THE SALT II TREATY

DOCUMENTS

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

EX. Y, 96-1

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18, 1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

PART 2

JULY 16, 17, 18 AND 19, 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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SALT II TREATY

MONDAY, JULY 16, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today marks the beginning of the second week of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the proposed SALT II Treaty. Last week we heard from various administration witnesses in support of the treaty, including Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from two prominent critics of the treaty as well.

This week we begin to take up some of the specific issues raised by these witnesses. Tomorrow and Wednesday we will be addressing U.S. monitoring capabilities and our ability to verify Soviet compliance with the treaty. Subsequently, we will examine the treaty from the perspective of our key allies and assess the impact of SALT II on our relations with Europe and Japan.

This morning we have with us three individuals who as a group have served in various capacities as either director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, or as chief SALT negotiator throughout the entire history of the SALT process. Their appearance here today will permit us to review the negotiating history of SALT: What were our original objectives, how have these objectives changed over time, what concessions have been made by each side, and how well does the proposed SALT II Treaty meet American security interests?

While we have received extended written remarks from each witness, we would like to ask this morning for a brief summary of these remarks.

We will first hear statements from all three witnesses, and then we shall proceed to questions.

Our first witness is Hon. Gerard C. Smith, a man who has held a variety of important governmental positions and is presently serving as the special representative for nonproliferation matters. From 1969 to 1972, Mr. Smith was the Director of the Arms Con-

trol and Disarmament Agency, and chief of the U.S. SALT delegation. In this dual capacity, he was instrumental in the negotiation of the SALT I agreements.

Our next witness is Hon. U. Alexis Johnson, a man who has had a long and distinguished diplomatic career as our Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Thailand, and Japan as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and from 1973 to 1977 as Chief of the U.S. SALT delegation.

Our third and final witness this morning is Hon. Paul C. Warnke. Mr. Warnke has had a highly successful career both as a lawyer and a public servant. From 1967 to 1969, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and from 1977 to 1978, he was Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Chief of the U.S. SALT delegation.

Gentlemen, I propose that each of you, beginning with Mr. Smith, give a brief statement summarizing the papers that you have prepared for the committee. The papers will be incorporated in full in the record of the proceedings.

Mr. Smith?

STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD C. SMITH, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR NONPROLIFERATION MATTERS AND FORMER DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ambassador SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I should say at the start that I have not been involved in SALT negotiations for almost 7 years, and make no claim to special expertise in the detailed provisions of the proposed treaty.

May I also express the hope that in deliberations on this treaty, some of the mood of earlier years of the nuclear era may be recaptured. What has happened to the awe we used to feel in watching nuclear explosions from an atoll in the Pacific? Where is the horror we felt in looking at photos of Nagasaki and Hiroshima?

All of us, I think, have become calloused to the threat of nuclear war and the effects of nuclear weapons. We seem to be adopting the numerical mental attitudes of systems analysts lacking an appreciation of what nuclear war would really be like. We turn to software and computer output, not recognizing the very limited utility of these tools.

Remember when youngsters engaged in civil defense drills at school, involving sheltering under their desks, and at a time when every time that siren rang, they used to ask themselves, is this it? Newspapers repeatedly showed what one megaton would do to Washington and other cities. Most of that is gone—sublimated—but if we are to get through this nuclear valley of death, I think it will take more than cold balancing of kilopounds of throw-weight or megatons of yield and the rest.

Ten years ago, we started an effort to limit offensive and defensive strategic systems. We made progress on defensive, but not offensive weapons, because the U.S.S.R. maintained that some American systems in Europe and the Far East had to be taken into account in setting limits.

In 1970, we turned down a Soviet offer to first reach an ABM Treaty and then continue to try to limit offensive systems. Both must go together, we said, and with this proposed treaty we finally will have limited both.

I would have felt great satisfaction if SALT I had produced the treaty now before you. It compares very favorably with what we proposed to the Soviets in 1970, which was an agreement with no constraints on MIRV's or force modernization. SALT I in 1972 turned out to be a compromise, a treaty limiting ABM's together with an interim freeze agreement on numbers of missile launchers while negotiations continued.

I like to recall that the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ABM Treaty with only two dissenting votes.

That treaty demonstrated that the SALT process could produce an agreement that significantly limited a major strategic arms system. In effect, it stopped cold any competition in one-half of the strategic missile realm, that involving defensive systems.

It has worked well. It has been lived up to by both parties and a costly, destabilizing, and perhaps absurd competition was avoided. I think America's security was significantly improved by that arms control agreement.

Admittedly, the 1972 freeze had deficiencies. In effect, it was a moratorium on new additions to the aggregate numbers of each side's missile launchers at a time when the U.S.S.R. had more deployed and under construction than we had.

It was United States as well as Soviet policy that left modernization and replacement during the freeze largely unconstrained. That policy and the fact that no MIRV ban was negotiated or even seriously tried for by either side contributed to present concerns about the prospect of a future imbalance.

The 1972 freeze was an exercise in damage limitation. Without it the Soviets could have rather quickly built up their then numerical advantage in missile launchers. It accomplished its limited purpose. Even now the U.S.S.R. is decommissioning missile submarines to keep under the freeze level, but the present treaty is clearly an improvement. It would eliminate the missile launcher numerical inequality of the 1972 freeze. It would also significantly limit modernization and replacement possibilities by qualitative controls on new types of missiles. It includes heavy bombers.

Critics of the 1972 freeze properly pointed out that it contained no data base to confirm our intelligence estimates of Soviet missile launcher forces at the start of the freeze, although we had tried to extract such information from the Soviet delegation.

SALT II corrects that deficiency and Soviet disclosures have already confirmed our intelligence estimates. The freeze was also criticized for lack of definition of what constituted heavy and light ICBM's. This treaty contains precise definitions.

Perhaps the sharpest criticism of the freeze was the claim that during its 5-year life, the Soviets would develop a capability to destroy almost all U.S. ICBM's in a surprise attack. Now, 7 years later, that, fortunately, is still not the case, but a real possibility for the future, a remedy for which I understand is being developed and can be designed within the constraints of the SALT II Treaty.

Hopefully, results of a SALT III negotiation may provide an even better remedy in the form of substantial reductions and further qualitative constraints.

In 1974, at Vladivostok, the sides reached a general agreement for limits on offensive systems. Subsequent negotiations resulted in the present treaty, which is more favorable to the United States than the arrangements foreshadowed by the Vladivostok agreement.

As with any bargain, we did not get everything we wanted, nor did the Soviets. Looking back to SALT I, I would say that this treaty looks much more like what we then wanted, equal ceilings on central strategic systems, with a precise set of limits and controls and specific provisions, than what the Soviets then wanted, a set of general principles involving unequal limits to compensate them for certain alleged U.S. advantages, in forward based systems, in the existence of the strategic forces of France and the United Kingdom, and our European submarine bases.

During the 1972 debates, one also heard claims that the SALT I provisions could not be verified. Subsequently, there were unsupported charges of evasion of specific provisions. Over time, these seem in large measure to have been replaced by claims that the spirit of those agreements was not being met. It looks to me as if SALT II is so precisely drafted as to need no help from any intangible spirit, and to my mind, spirit should have no place in Soviet-American arms control agreements.

You may recall earlier anxieties about possible Soviet failure to live up to arms control commitments. Some people sought to block the limited test ban treaty which has successfully met the danger of radiation pollution of the atmosphere by conjuring up possible violations, such as Soviet tests behind the moon. Later efforts to reach a Comprehensive Test Ban were met with the big hole theory for decoupling underground explosions to reduce seismic effects, and anxieties about the ABM Treaty centered on claims that the Soviets could evade it by upgrading their antiaircraft systems.

I have seen no convincing evidence of intentional Soviet violations of the numerous arms control arrangements we have. Two American Presidents have certified that there have been none under SALT I. I do not understand the thesis that the United States cannot rely on its intelligence systems for accurate information about what the other side is doing under agreed limitations which include restraints on counterintelligence measures, but could rely on the same intelligence systems to alert United States to new developments in an unlimited competition with no restraints on counterintelligence measures. Nor do I understand why those who are most concerned about possible Soviet evasions usually also hold that the proposed treaty strongly favors the U.S.S.R. Were that true, why would the U.S.S.R. violate it?

My responsibilities are now in the field of nonproliferation, to try to control the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. This is called horizontal proliferation, as opposed to vertical, which refers to the buildup by the two superpowers of their nuclear forces.

To my mind, the threat to American security from horizontal proliferation is substantially greater than that presented by the continuing improvement in Soviet forces. Limiting nuclear weap-

ons is not just a matter for the superpowers. Every nation in the world has a vital interest and responsibility in this respect.

More than 100 nations have done their part by foreswearing their right to possess nuclear weapons in the Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] of 1970. That treaty was the result of a bargain. In consideration for these commitments not to go for such weapons, the United States and the U.S.S.R. made commitments to get their weapons under control, and the other NPT parties are watching closely to see if we are going to carry out our part of the bargain.

If other countries decide to develop these weapons, and our failure to ratify SALT II can contribute to such decisions, American security will be seriously diminished, as all Presidents since Truman have recognized. I can assure you that this threat is real and not an empty anxiety. As the President's representative for nonproliferation matters, I am keenly conscious of the slim and slow progress that is being made to contain this threat. The outcome of SALT II will have a direct bearing on all of our efforts to keep down the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked me to state what I consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of the treaty. As a weakness I would cite its very short term, unlike the ABM Treaty, which is of indefinite duration. As I have said, it looks to be another interim arrangement calling for a duration not much longer than the original SALT I freeze, but I suppose that for those who worry about the treaty restraints on U.S. programs, it is a case of the shorter, the better.

It allows a substantial buildup in warheads, in part a result of failure to achieve a MIRV ban in the early seventies. The threat of ICBM vulnerability therefore is not eliminated and can only be deflected by a new U.S. missile basing system or by subsequent negotiations. Although a start is made on reductions, they are not as significant as those the United States proposed in March of 1977.

The treaty leaves both sides free to build bombers like the Backfire outside of the aggregate limits. After the 2-year protocol, both sides will be free to build mobile ICBM systems that could be difficult to verify. I am somewhat concerned that a competition in such systems may result in a more favorable situation for the Soviets than for us. Their geography and social system could more easily absorb such deployments.

On a more theoretical than real level it contains the unequal rights to fixed heavy ballistic missile launchers for which we have no requirement and which the U.S.S.R. at present wants to retain. With all fixed launchers becoming vulnerable, Soviet as well as American, I cannot conceive of our deploying such fixed launchers in the future. More likely to me is future Soviet phaseout of their fixed launchers. I have been told that this provision, which derived from the ban on new silo construction in the 1972 freeze, was accepted for the treaty at Vladivostok where the Soviets made concessions about equal launcher levels in spite of other American advantages such as leaving American forward based systems unlimited.

As for strengths, which I believe outweigh these weaknesses, I would say that we are now in sight of a treaty to match the ABM

Treaty and which calls for equal ceilings on missile launchers and intercontinental bombers, and a beginning of reductions of launchers.

It also puts limits on warhead numbers. It puts limits on MIRVs and moderates somewhat the potential of the Soviet threat. It contains significant qualitative limitations which would slow down the rate of change in force characteristics. It contains controls on counterintelligence against our national technical means of verification, and continues the Standing Consultative Commission, which has been a useful mechanism for resolving ambiguities in implementation of the treaty.

It would reduce our uncertainties about the nature and levels of future Soviet strategic forces. It does not call for any limits on our forward based systems or the nuclear forces of our NATO allies. It would end the imperfect freeze of 1972, with its unequal missile launcher levels, which has lasted for 7 years.

The treaty would give a new thrust to the superpowers' effort to control their nuclear arsenals, and would lay the groundwork for a future negotiation for substantial reductions and qualitative limitations.

It would register progress in the superpowers' fulfillment of their commitments under the NPT.

But, Mr. Chairman, in the final analysis, it seems to me that the case made against SALT II rests not so much on its specific terms, but on concerns that its becoming an international obligation and the law of the land will somehow prejudice our modernization programs and weaken our national will to undertake them.

That argument strikes me more as an argument against any arms control rather than against this specific treaty.

In conclusion, it appears that in spite of the current controversy, the SALT process itself meets with general approval. There is little dissent about the need for further negotiation to improve on the results of SALT II. Disagreement is about the context of further negotiations.

Would further negotiations be more likely to produce satisfactory results if the constraints provided for in the SALT II Treaty were already in existence, or if no limitations existed on Soviet and American programs during the continued negotiation.

A more radical position proposed by some is that abrogation of the ABM Treaty should also precede further negotiation. That strikes me as a very unwise course.

My experience in SALT negotiations suggests that a step-by-step procedure offers the best chance for progress, and that we would be well advised to register the not insignificant progress of SALT II before starting again on the long pull for more comprehensive arms control.

Thank you.

[Ambassador Smith's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, may I express the hope that in deliberations on this treaty some of the mood of earlier years of the nuclear era may be recaptured. What has happened to the awe and horror we felt in watching nuclear explosions from an atoll in the Pacific. Where is the horror we felt on looking at photos of Nagasaki and Hiroshima? All of us, I think, have become callous to the

threat of nuclear war and the effects of nuclear weapons—of which Three Mile Island has given us a tiny taste. More and more we seem to adopt the numerical mental attitudes of systems analysts. Software and computer output replace personal appreciations of what nuclear war would really be. Remember when our youngsters told of civil defense drills at school involving their sheltering under desks and newspapers often showed what 1 megaton would do to Washington and other cities. Most of that is gone—sublimated. If we are to get through this nuclear valley of death, I think it will take more than a cold balancing of kilopounds of throw-weight or megatons of yield and the rest.

I would stress that with or without SALT we are in for a continuation of a fateful competition with the Soviet Union in the field of strategic weapons. Since the time before SALT—almost a decade ago when the Soviets were catching up—they have been mounting large, broadly based missile programs. We have also been modernizing our forces but in the case of our land-based Intercontinental Missiles (ICBMs) with less dynamism. Despite this we are not in an inferior position. We have doubled the number of our strategic warheads since SALT I started. We have installed over 500 modern MIRV'd ICBMs, almost 500 modern MIRV'd SLBMs, and over 1,000 short range nuclear armed attack missiles on our heavy bombers. A new fleet of missile submarines, the Tridents, will soon be joining the strategic forces. Strategic cruise missiles will also soon be deployed. We lead the Soviets in a number of important areas. Our forces are more survivable and diverse. But even if the treaty is ratified, we will go in for extensive improvement measures to avoid in the future a perceived imbalance between the Soviet and American forces. The basic question is—can we improve our strategic position with less risk and cost with SALT II controls than in their absence.

Let us first look briefly at the experience under the SALT I agreements of 1972.

The main product there was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting ABM sites to two for each nation. Many of us think that that treaty avoided a risky, costly and perhaps absurd competition to try to build defensive ballistic missile systems. In the late 1960's there were outspoken proponents for deploying defensive missiles to reduce damage which attacking Soviet missiles could do to population centers and to our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. (Even in those days we worried about the ICBM vulnerability problem.) Then it was realized that any such defensive system could probably be neutralized by the other side's simply deploying more offensive missiles—and to the extent that an ABM system did promise to be effective, it could be destabilizing if it led a nation to believe it could attack while expecting the ABMs to deflect the brunt of the retaliation. The ABM Treaty enabled us to avoid a very expensive and futile arms race in defensive strategic systems.

I think it is generally recognized that this Treaty has worked. Secretary of Defense Brown recently said it had contributed greatly to stability. The ABM limit was later reduced from two to one site for each side and we later decommissioned the one site which we had built. The Soviets have not completed their one existing system around Moscow. The ABM Treaty was reviewed by the parties in 1977 and found to be effective. It is to be reviewed again in 1982.

The other SALT I agreement was called an "interim freeze". Its purpose, as we saw it, was to hold down the number of Soviet missile launchers while negotiations for treaty limitations continued. The aggregate number of land and sea based ballistic missile launchers was limited to approximately the number which were then deployed or under construction. Heavy bombers in which we had superiority were not affected. We also had significant leads in warheads and technology, but the Soviets had substantially more ICBM launchers and were permitted to keep most of them. In this respect the freeze had an *appearance* of inequality although such was not the case when our other strategic forces were taken into consideration. Psychologically, the freeze got off to a poor start. And for some reason there was an expectation in some quarters that the Soviets would not substantially modernize and improve their ICBMs as permitted under the freeze, an expectation which was disappointed. I think that is a major factor in the negative attitude which some people now have toward SALT II.

Also agreed upon during SALT I were two arrangements of special significance for the problems of accidents involving nuclear weapons—certain measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and for modernization of the Washington-Moscow Hot Line. They are largely forgotten, but the Hot Line has more than once proved its use in emergencies and the war risk reduction agreement could be of importance in the future.

As part of SALT I, it was agreed that fulfillment of the commitments could be verified by what were called "National Technical Means of Verification", a smooth term for some of the intelligence systems of the two sides, including satellite

photography. This proviso, in effect, legitimized the use of intelligence systems for arms control, a development which seemed to me an extraordinary thing for the Soviets to agree to.

The two sides also took commitments not to interfere with the operation of these intelligence systems and not to conceal from them the weapons systems limited by the agreements. These constraints on counter-intelligence measures have been an important plus for U.S. intelligence systems. With or without SALT we need to keep track of Soviet strategic force development and deployments. But without SALT, the Soviets could take any concealment measures available, thus making our monitoring task far harder.

There was also established by SALT I a Standing Consultative Commission whose function is to consider ambiguities which might arise and clarify doubts as to possible violations. This group has met frequently and has operated successfully. A number of ambiguities have been clarified. On some occasions practices by both sides which were considered inconsistent with the agreements have ceased. Presidents Ford and Carter have certified that there have been no violations of the SALT I agreements. Although by its terms the "freeze" expired in 1977, the Soviets even now are decommissioning some ballistic missile submarines in order to stay under a ceiling called for by this freeze. This, I think, is good evidence that the Soviets take SALT seriously.

I would say that (largely because no added ABM systems have been deployed by the USSR) American security is better now, after almost 7 years of operating under SALT I, than if the ABM Treaty and the missile freeze had not been approved by the Congress in 1972 and an unlimited competition had continued. We have gained confidence that certain commitments taken by the Soviet Union in strategic arms limitation can be verified. We are approaching SALT II, not as something new and untried, but as a continuation of a process that we have learned to live under and to count on.

The SALT II negotiation has been going on since November of 1972. It is some measure of the difficulty of this work that it has taken almost 7 years to reach an agreement which will expire in some 7 years.

What is the case against SALT II? It is said that SALT I didn't stop the Soviets' strategic programs which may become superior to our forces, so why agree to SALT II? And SALT I did not lead to the expected relaxation of Soviet-American tensions. During the past six years the Soviets have engaged in an adventurist foreign policy which has been destructive of a number of U.S. aims.

Here I would point out that useful arms control arrangements should not be limited to times of superpower good behavior. The treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere followed shortly after the Cuban missile crisis. SALT I was concluded only a few weeks after the U.S. started bombing Haiphong in Vietnam, a Communist ally of the USSR. In fact, if the USSR is to continue an adventurist foreign policy, it might be better if its strategic arms were under some agreed controls. Competition is inevitable between two societies having such fundamentally different goals and policies. But I would rather see that this competition take place, if it must take place, in an arena where the most dangerous aspect is subject to some regulation and control.

I think that underlying most of the opposition's arguments is a belief that in an open competition not limited by arms control, United States superior technology would give us some advantage. Claims are made that the existence of the arms control relationship tends to moderate our reaction to Soviet bad behavior abroad and that SALT II would be a psychological constraint on modernization of U.S. forces.

It is said that the SALT process has lulled us into inertia and has had no such effect on the Soviets and in the absence of agreed arms limitations we would be more keenly aware that we had to make a greater effort. To some critics rejection of the treaty by the Senate would mean reinvigoration of American programs. As for rejection's effect on Soviet programs, critics are either silent or apparently inclined to trust that the Soviets would not expand their strategic programs.

Critics of SALT are especially concerned about the predicted vulnerability of our land-based ballistic missiles, the ICBM vulnerability problem. It is now believed that the Soviets will have the capability to destroy almost all of our ICBMs using but a fraction of theirs, a threat which critics think will tend to make the United States reluctant to stand up to the Soviets in a crisis. I would inject here this thought—if ever the Soviets were tempted to such a desperate act as attacking our ICBMs, they would have to make the risky calculation that the Americans would never fire their missiles before Soviet missiles hit American targets. I wonder. I am not urging that the U.S. adopt a procedure of "launch on warning". But the possibility that we

would is a not unreasonable contribution to Soviet uncertainties. The Soviets would also know that if they struck our ICBMs, the U.S. would still have thousands of warheads in the alert bomber force and on its missile submarines at sea. Nevertheless, this ICBM vulnerability question needs more attention. SALT would impose no constraints on our efforts to solve or mitigate this problem.

Critics also emphasize that the Soviets could keep some 300 fixed launchers for very large ballistic missiles now in their force while the United States could not deploy any. U.S. force planners have consistently chosen not to match the Soviets in heavy missiles and to emphasize more important characteristics. The main consideration has been "What are our requirements?", not "Let's copy the Soviet forces."

Admittedly, it would look better if the United States had the right to build the same number of such fixed launchers as the Soviets now have whether or not we ever wanted to exercise it. But this would have no practical effect on U.S. forces during the life of SALT II. The U.S. has no use for and does not plan to deploy this kind of missile. Why would we want to deploy a fixed missile system of any kind when such systems are becoming vulnerable?

The situation will be exactly the same or worse if the treaty is not ratified. On the Soviet side there will be some 300 such launchers, (if not more), while we would not deploy any. Nothing in the treaty would prevent the testing or deployment of the new missile, the M/X. It is important to know that the heavy Soviet ICBMs are not the proximate cause of our prospective ICBM vulnerability. That situation would exist even if the Soviets had no heavy ICBMs. Accurate and MIRV'd light ICBMs would offer a similar threat. I understand that the U.S. traded its right to fixed heavy ICBMs and permitted the Soviets to keep their heavy ICBMs while the Soviets abandoned their long-held position that American nuclear systems based in Western Europe and the Far East and the fact that U.S. allies deploy substantial strategic missile forces must be taken into consideration in setting SALT ceilings. That seems to me like good use of a right we had no intention of exercising—it was an arrangement that fully commended itself to our allies.

Critics also don't like the fact that effective limitations would not be placed on the Soviet bomber "Backfire" which, though not truly intercontinental, does have some capability to strike targets in the United States. But here the U.S. does have the right to build unlimited numbers of aircraft of this type. More numerous than Backfires are the nuclear capable NATO fighter bombers which can strike targets in the USSR and which also would not be SALT limited. Neither would the strategic missile forces of our allies, the UK and France, be limited. (I understand that the Soviets have agreed not to increase the present production rate of Backfires—some 30 a year.)

Certainly there are weaknesses in our strategic forces that need correction and certainly SALT does not solve all of our strategic problems. But I believe the treaty would make these problems more manageable. Secretary of Defense Brown recently said that SALT II would make the strategic balance more predictable and would place important limits on the threat we will face. I have been advised that the SALT constraints would not prohibit any U.S. programs designed to reduce or eliminate present weaknesses. What modernization measures are necessary involves important issues needing enlightened debate. But a judgment about SALT should not depend on whether one favors these improvements or not. SALT does not require or prevent any of them.

Critics believe that the Soviets do not hold to our doctrine that the main function of strategic arms is to deter the other side from using or threatening to use its strategic forces. They say that the Soviets are planning not only to deter but, if necessary, to fight a nuclear war to a successful conclusion with damage limited by their weapons systems and by a large scale civil defense program to protect their people. These critics feel that strategic arms control will not work to our interest in the absence of acceptance by the USSR and the US of a common strategic doctrine. But it is not apparent that SALT will have any effect one way or the other on Soviet decisions about doctrine, nor will it prevent our adopting a doctrine more like that imputed to the Soviets and forces appropriate to it. We can make decisions about whether we want a greater "war fighting" capability, including a civil defense program of the kind and scale of that of the Soviet Union, independently of SALT.

Looming behind much of the criticism of the SALT package is doubt on the part of critics as to verifiability of commitments to be taken. They fear that the Soviets will violate the agreements and steal a march on the United States. By the same token, in SALT I an anxiety of some Americans was that the Soviets would violate the ABM limits by using anti-aircraft systems for anti-ballistic missile purposes—the so-called Sam upgrade problem. They didn't.

In addition to SALT I—our intelligence has confirmed that the Soviets are living up to other arms control agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty which curbed the pollution of the atmosphere, the Antarctica Treaty, the Seabeds Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. And now they know that their performance will be under closer scrutiny than ever.

In considering verification, keep in mind that is does not involve trusting the Soviets. It does involve confidence that our intelligence systems have already proved capable of monitoring performance of SALT I obligations and can check on Soviet performance under SALT II. In addition, in SALT II (by a provision which is unique in modern arms control arrangements) the sides have disclosed the exact composition of their present strategic forces and have agreed to update this "data base" to reflect future changes. Secretary of Defense Brown recently said, "We are confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the U.S. detecting it." We would be able to respond with appropriate actions before any seriously adverse impact on the strategic balance could take place. The relatively short life of the treaty, which would end in 1985 and in addition could be terminated on 6 months' notice, is good insurance that the Soviets cannot gain any advantage from not living up to its provisions. Even such a tough SALT scrutinizer as my friend, Paul Nitze, takes a somewhat relaxed view of the matter. In an article in Foreign Affairs in 1976 he wrote, "I personally take the verification issue less seriously than most because the limits are so high that what could be gained by cheating against them would not appear to be strategically significant."

Intelligence about Soviet strategic arms is a combination of knowledge about present capabilities and estimates about future developments. SALT helps in both respects. Present deployments can be more precisely determined since the Soviets are not permitted under the agreements to conceal weapons systems which are limited and they have agreed not to interfere with our National Technical Means of Verification (intelligence systems). As for estimating future deployments, the agreement spells out the maximum permitted levels of the limited systems, thus simplifying somewhat the problem or prediction of future force levels. The absence of this "predictability", which would result from a SALT rejection, would make the future strategic balance more uncertain and would thus be destabilizing.

In the Soviet Union are there also critics of SALT? While we don't hear their voices, I suspect that there are. Here are a few points they may be making:

1. The USSR would have to reduce its forces while the Americans could increase theirs.

2. The Americans will have many highly accurate air-launched cruise missiles during the life of the treaty and the Soviets will have few or none at all.

3. Soviets submarines are noisier and Soviet access to the high seas is much more contrained than America's. And the Americans have a forward base for their missile submarines in Europe and the Soviets have none in this hemisphere.

4. The Soviets have four nuclear adversaries with strategic forces—the U.S., the UK, France and China—and the Americans have but one.

5. The Soviets have an inferior heavy bomber force. The United States has over 300 truly intercontinental bombers.

6. The Soviets have nearly three-quarters of their warheads in vulnerable ICBMs while the United States has nearly three-quarters of its warheads in less vulnerable systems—bombers and submarines.

7. The United States can count on many hundreds of nuclear capable fighter bombers deployed close to the Soviet Union which could destroy hundreds of targets in Russia. These systems are not limited by the agreement.

There are several other important considerations—

My responsibilities are now in the field of nonproliferation—to try to control the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. This is called horizontal proliferation, as opposed to vertical, which refers to the build-up by the 2 superpowers of their nuclear forces.

To my mind the threat to American security from horizontal proliferation is substantially greater than that presented by the continuing improvement in Soviet forces. Imagine the instabilities that would be created if and when more nations have nuclear weapons or even a weapons potential. This is no empty anxiety. Pakistan is now headed in that direction. A key country for our non-proliferation efforts is India which exploded a nuclear device 5 years ago. One can hardly expect India formally to give up a weapons option until at least some further progress on SALT is registered and there is further prospect that the superpowers are putting their strategic weapons under constraints.

One of the main instruments to contain the spread of nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty which has been in force for almost ten years. Over 100 coun-

tries have taken commitments not to go for nuclear weapons. But there is a basic bargain embedded in this treaty. Those non-weapons countries' commitments are contingent on Soviet and American progress in controlling their nuclear arms. If efforts to this end of the last 7 years don't produce results, the integrity of this essential Non-Proliferation Treaty will be cast into doubt and our task of trying to control proliferation will be substantially increased. That, to my mind, is a very important reason for getting on with SALT II.

Without SALT II the continuance of the ABM Treaty could be in doubt and we could once again face a competition to deploy defensive missile systems. When, in 1972, the first SALT agreements were presented to the Congress, they included a statement which I had made to the Soviets at the direction of President Nixon that if a SALT II treaty limiting offensive forces to match the ABM Treaty was not reached, that could constitute a justifiable cause for abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Critics of SALT II already are calling for terminating the ABM Treaty. And the USSR could take the same position that we had reserved for ourselves in 1972. Then, whether the ABM Treaty survivied or not would be entirely up to the Soviets—who face nuclear threats from three smaller nuclear powers for which ABMs might be effective.

If the ABM Treaty is lost, we would again be in an unlimited strategic competition in which the Soviets would no longer be committed not to interfere with our technical means of verification and not to conceal their launchers. Gone also would be the S.C.C. consulting mechanism which has worked well to clear up ambiguities. I think these would be substantial losses for our intelligence capabilities.

The Soviets have a large advantage—in their superior command of information. They have the ability to predict the size and quality of American strategic forces of the future merely by studying our defense budgets and other documents in the open literature. Before SALT I we had to depend solely on hard won intelligence. In SALT I we obtained a degree of predictability about what Soviet force levels would be during the ABM Treaty and at the end of the 5-year freeze. We also gained an advantage from the Soviet commitment not to interfere with our means of verification or to conceal limited arms from them. Without SALT ceilings for the future, our uncertainties would increase. This would hardly make for stability.

It has been said that SALT will prejudice the interests of our allies, but the leaders of France, England and Germany have expressly, forcefully, and publicly endorsed the SALT package as has the Secretary General of NATO and the NATO defense ministers. Last month Chancellor Schmidt said that rejection of SALT would be a "catastrophe".

I couldn't put the case for SALT better than Schmidt did recently in the Bundestag. "SALT II can be concluded only in the form of a compromise . . . if everyone involved will accept something that is not fully in line with their own interests—it is necessary to differentiate between critical remarks involving individual aspects of this package . . . and the great world political significance of the whole treaty—otherwise the whole world will suffer a most serious confidence crisis." Later he said, "No people in Europe would be more seriously affected by the consequences of the failure of SALT II than the German people. For in our geopolitical situation we need to be able to trust in two things more than anybody else: Trust in the ability of the West to achieve and preserve a stable equilibrium, and trust in the continuation of the policy of detente on this sound foundation. The successful conclusion of SALT II will reinforce this trust. The success of SALT II will encourage the West and the East to find solutions—including arms control measures—for other potentials threatening the military balance of power."

At stake here is whether or not the U.S. Government is capable of conducting a coherent foreign policy.

In the current, uneasy state of relations with our allies, rejection would prejudice economic and political cooperation as well as defense policy coordination. U.S. prestige, influence and leadership around the world would suffer badly.

What about possible Senate approval but with proposed amendments or reservations? If they were substantive and required that the negotiation be reopened and the bargaining resumed, it seems likely to me that the renegotiation would not succeed. Agreed Soviet-American arms limitations are reached only as a result of concessions and counter-concessions which in turn are the result of internal bargaining in Washington and I believe also in Moscow. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. To start afresh would mean to reopen the whole bargain—not just to negotiate for one or more additional provisions. I would urge that close attention be given to whether one judges any proposed amendment to be negotiable or not. And before any renegotiation was launched we cannot avoid the question, "What further concessions are we prepared to make?"

Our choice, it seems to me, is to continue to modernize our forces for some 6 years under agreed SALT II ceilings with certain limitations on Soviet and American weapons systems *or* to go back to an unlimited contest. Is it in our interest to continue the deadly competition but with some ground rules to make it somewhat less costly, somewhat safer? On balance, I believe the United States will be in a relatively better position if we pursue force modernization programs under the SALT II package than if we go ahead in unlimited competition. But I think we should recognize that SALT II is no panacea, that it does not warrant the great expectations generated at the time of SALT I, and that it is a step, a necessary move toward more significant reductions and constraints which we should press for in the years ahead. The negotiations for major force reductions should start promptly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith, for an excellent statement.

We will turn next to Ambassador Johnson.

STATEMENT OF HON. U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, FORMER AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, CHIEF, U.S. DELEGATION, SALT TALKS, 1973–77, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before this committee to be of whatever assistance I can in your important deliberations on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty signed in Vienna, Austria, on June 18 by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev.

At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that I retired from the Foreign Service and resigned as Chief of the U.S. delegation to SALT on February 28, 1977. Thus I can in no way speak for or on behalf of the present administration.

However, I thought it might be helpful if I would summarize some of the highlights of the negotiations during the 4-year period I was chief of our delegation, that is, from February 1973, until February 1977.

During this period, I had literally hundreds of meetings, over thousands of hours with my Soviet counterpart, Vladimir Semenov, then Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. These negotiations were divided into two quite distinct periods. The first period was from March 1973, which followed closely upon the conclusion of SALT I, until November 1974. In November 1974, President Ford met with General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok and reached an understanding on SALT. The translation of that Vladivostok accord into detailed treaty form was the subject of the second period of our negotiations until my last meeting with the Soviet representative in November 1976.

Now, for the first phase, Mr. Chairman. In 1972 and early 1973, President Nixon had formulated some basic concepts which we were putting forward at that phase of our negotiations. These concepts were: Equal aggregates on the central systems of the two sides, that is, on the aggregate number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers; next, eventual reductions in the number of central systems; next, no provisions to be included or taking into account the so-called forward based systems of the United States or the nuclear systems of our allies as insisted on by the Soviets; and last, the inclusion of qualitative limitations, including limitations on ICBM's which were recognized as the most destabilizing of the strategic offensive arms.

My initial negotiations with the Soviets were based on these concepts, and I want to come back to remind you of these concepts when we come to the second phase of the negotiations.

In 1973, we made a formal proposal carrying out these concepts for an equal aggregate number of 2,350 on each side. An important aspect of the proposals that we made at that time was aimed at qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms. These included limitations on ICBM throw-weight, and MIRV's. As far as I know, this was the first time that the throw-weight had entered into the negotiations and was put forward as a concept.

For their part, the Soviet delegation pressed hard all through the period leading up to Vladivostok simply to extend in the new treaty the asymmetric limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers which had been agreed to in the interim agreement.

At the same time, the Soviets pressed hard for strict and detailed limitations on U.S. forward based systems. The Soviets proposed that strategic offensive arms be defined for the purposes of the treaty as any nuclear system whose characteristics including its geographic deployment, enabled it to strike the territory of the other side.

This proposed definition included attack aircraft carriers with nuclear delivery aircraft as well as U.S. nuclear delivery aircraft deployed on the territories of our allies. Although not U.S. forward based systems, they also included in their demand for asymmetric limits the nuclear systems of what they called third powers, that is, the British and the French, but they made it clear that they were talking not only about the British and the French, but they were also talking about the Chinese in that regard.

Now, the strategy of the U.S. SALT delegation in this 1973–74 period was to push hard for Soviet acceptance of these basic concepts, that is, equal aggregates, reductions, and qualitative limitations. At the same time, we continued vigorously to reject the Soviet proposals regarding forward based systems and nontransfer. Their proposals on nontransfer would have interferred with some of our ongoing and proposed programs for cooperation with our allies.

However, the two delegations were not able to come to agreement on these issues as of November of 1974. Now, in November 1974, we had the summit conference between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok at which they agreed on a set of principles for the new SALT II Treaty. Some of the important results of the Vladivostok accord were: One, a treaty to cover the period up to the end of 1985, an equal aggregate ceiling of 2,400 systems, an equal subceiling of 1,320 on the MIRVed systems permitted to each side, no limitations or account to be taken of U.S. forward-based systems or of allied nuclear forces, and to carry over to the new treaty the limitations in the interim agreement, freezing the maximum number of ICBM launchers and of modern, heavy ICBM launchers.

Given the very strong emphasis the Soviets had continued to place right up to the Vladivostok conference on the asymmetric central systems limitations to offset our forward based systems, I personally was very surprised, and I was very pleased at President

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Ford's success at Vladivostock in getting the Soviets to agree to equal aggregates with no limits on U.S. forward based systems.

When the two delegations returned to Geneva in January 1975, we had the task of translating these principles into precise treaty language. We had some specific aims in this drafting process. One was to draft precise and unambiguous definitions of the strategic defensive arms to be limited by the treaty. This turned out, Mr. Chairman, to be one of our biggest hurdles.

As Ambassador Smith has mentioned, the Soviets favor broad, general principles, but they resist very strongly putting these down in very precise language. The first reaction of the Soviets to my proposal on precise definitions was, we don't need them, everybody knows what an ICBM is, everybody knows what an SLBM is. Why do we need them at all? It took some years, I may say, of pushing and pulling and hauling and insisting to finally get them to agree to the principle that there should be an article in the treaty on definitions, and that is now what appears as article II in the treaty, and it was in the drafting of those definitions that many of the more important substantive issues, of course, naturally emerged. I do think that whatever else may have been accomplished in the treaty, we do now have a common, you might say, framework and a common base from which to operate on what we are talking about.

When it came to such things as, for example, throw-weight, we didn't even have a common concept of what we were talking about. We ourselves had to formulate a definition of what we thought throw-weight was, and then we had to sell it to the Soviets, and this was not an easy proposition.

Similarly, they opposed definitions of MIRV's and throw-weight in the specific limitations on ICBM's. We tried to make the definition of heavy ICBM's and of light ICBM's depend not on the launcher dimensions, as they did in the interim agreement, but rather, depend on throw-weight and on launch-weight as making a precise line between what was heavy and what was not heavy.

We also were able to persuade the Soviets, I am pleased to say, to agree upon what is now known as the data base. I said to them, you know, we cannot ask the Senate of the United States or ask the President of the United States to sign a treaty limiting these numbers and agreeing on numbers unless we know that we agree upon the numbers with which we are starting out.

There was great resistance from them on this, but I was pleased to see that while we were not successful in getting this accomplished during my period there, in the subsequent negotiations, Mr. Warnke in particular was able to get them to agree to the principle that even before we signed the treaty we agreed on the numbers, the base from which we are starting.

I think as the Soviets said to Mr. Warnke at the time they agreed to this, they said, you know, this violates 600 years of Soviet history in not talking about numbers of our weapons.

We also were successful in getting them to agree on MIRV verification rules. As you know, the new missiles that they were launching at the time and testing at the time, some of them had single warheads, some of them had multiple warheads, MIRVed warheads. We were successful in getting them to agree that if a

launcher had launched a missile of a type which had MIRV's, all launchers of that type, regardless of whether they in fact contained a MIRV missile or not, would count as being MIRVed launchers. This was a very important part of our verification limits and verification rules that we were able to establish.

In November of 1976, we had not been able to agree upon the definition of air-to-surface missiles, which appeared in the principles that the President and General Secretary Brezhnev had agreed upon at Vladivostok, and it was around that issue that the issue of cruise missiles arose, and there was still disagreement in November of 1976.

There was also disagreement, of course, on the whole question of whether the Backfire should be included within the definition of heavy bombers. However, in general, I think it fair to say, and I think that Mr. Earle has already said, that by November of 1976, about 80 percent of what is now the treaty had been agreed upon, obviously, ad referendum of the governments, but about 80 percent of the treaty had been agreed upon at Geneva.

Now, I want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, with just a brief personal word. Criticisms can readily be made of what has or has not been accomplished by three administrations in this very complicated field. The ideal would be an agreement so comprehensive, so perfectly balanced, so well anticipating the future that we would never again have to concern ourselves with the ominous shadows that these beasts of nuclear weapons cast over our lives.

However, we must deal with the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be. In my own view, SALT has nothing to do with what one's view may be with respect to détente, coexistence, or any other such terms. It has nothing to do with whether one likes the Soviets or does not like the Soviets, on whether one trusts the Soviets or does not trust them.

I personally, accept the statements of the Soviet leaders that they intend to remain our implacable foes, if not physically, then, as they say, ideologically. However, this should not prevent us from recognizing what is an obvious common interest in doing what we can by agreement to reduce the danger of mutual suicide by the limitation of the strategic forces of the two sides in a way that will contribute to stability rather than to instability in time of crisis.

I feel that the SALT dialog at all levels, chiefs of state, foreign ministers, the delegations, as well as congressional and private debate, has been useful, even though it has not by any means led to a full meeting of the minds even among ourselves.

This is understandable, as apart from differing ideologies between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and differing philosophies among ourselves, we are dealing with a fast moving and evolving technology which no agreement is going to freeze. However, as specific points of common interest emerge during this dialog, we should seek to negotiate agreements on those points without judging the outcome against the impossible standard of such a comprehensive and definitive agreement that all of the problems for all time to come would be resolved.

Rather, each agreement should be judged as to whether it is a constructive and a useful step forward. In my view, the SALT II agreement meets this test.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, I favor its ratification.
Thank you.
[Ambassador Johnson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before this Committee to be of whatever assistance I can in your important deliberations on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty signed at Vienna, Austria, on June 18, 1979, by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev. At the outset I want to make it clear that I retired from the Foreign Service and resigned as Chief of the United States SALT Delegation on February 28, 1977. Thus, I can in no way speak for or on behalf of the present Administration. However, I thought it might be helpful if I would summarize some of the highlights of the negotiations during the four-year period I was Chief of our Delegation, from February 1973 until February 1977.

During this period I had literally hundreds of meetings over thousands of hours with my Soviet Counterpart, Vladimir Semenov, then Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. Those negotiations were divided into two quite distinct periods. The first period was from March 1973, which followed closely upon the conclusion of SALT I, until November 1974. As you well know, in November 1974 President Ford met with General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok and reached an understanding on SALT. The translation of that Vladivostok Accord into detailed treaty form was the subject of the second period of our negotiations until my last meeting with the Soviet representative in November 1976.

The enormous complexities of the many proposals and counter-proposals that were made over those years can, I feel, best be dealt with in a generally chronological fashion. Therefore, I will first deal with the period prior to the November 1974 Vladivostok meeting.

In late 1972 and early 1973, the Administration of President Nixon had formulated some basic concepts to be proposed to the Soviets for the SALT II agreement. These concepts included:

—Equal aggregate ceilings on the central systems of the two sides, that is, on the aggregate number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

—Eventual reductions in the number of such central systems.

—No provisions to be included concerning or taking into account the so-called "forward-based systems" of the U.S. or the nuclear systems of our Allies, as insisted on by the Soviets.

—The inclusion of qualitative limitations, including limitations on ICBMs which were recognized as the most destabilizing of strategic offensive arms.

My initial negotiations with the Soviets were based on these concepts.

The Administration at that time was strongly committed to the policy that the strategic nuclear forces of the United States should be no less than equivalent in the overall sense to those of the Soviet Union. This was expressed by the concept which we called essential equivalence in central systems. In this the Administration was also taking account of the Jackson amendment associated with the ratification of the SALT I agreements in 1972, which called for the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.

It was on these bases that the U.S. SALT Delegation was instructed in the spring of 1973 to make a proposal for an equal aggregate ceiling of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers for the two sides. The number that we proposed at that time was 2350 for each side. We also pushed the concept of reductions from that number, without, however, making specific numerical proposals. Our proposals contained no explicit provision to cover U.S. forward-based systems (FBS), nor did our proposals take into account directly or indirectly U.S. FBS or the nuclear forces of our Allies.

An important aspect of the proposals made by the U.S. Delegation in 1973 and 1974 were those aimed at qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms. These included limitations on ICBM throw-weight and on MIRVs.

For their part, the Soviet Delegation pressed hard all through the period leading up to Vladivostok simply to extend to the new Treaty the asymmetric limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers which had been agreed in the Interim Agreement. They also made vague proposals to limit the number of heavy bombers, but we never could determine precisely what they had in mind. The Soviets tried to justify these asymmetric limitations on central systems as an offset for U.S. FBS and third country nuclear forces, namely, those of the United Kingdom, France, and even China!

At the same time the Soviets pressed for strict and detailed limitations on all U.S. FBS. The Soviets proposed that a strategic offensive arm be defined to be any nuclear system whose characteristics, including its geographic deployment, enabled it to strike the territory of the other side. This proposed definition included attack aircraft carriers with nuclear delivery aircraft, as well as U.S. nuclear delivery aircraft deployed on the territories of our Allies. Their detailed proposals concerning these systems included withdrawal of all ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers with nuclear delivery aircraft beyond same limits (which they did not specify), as well as a phased withdrawal of what in effect amounted to all U.S. FBS and U.S. bases for FBS from third countries. In addition, they proposed strict prohibitions on transfers to third states of strategic offensive arms and the technology related to such arms. The net effect of these one-sided proposals would have been essentially to ban all U.S. long-range theater nuclear forces and to disrupt military cooperation with our Allies.

The strategy of the U.S. SALT Delegation in this 1973–1974 period was to push hard for Soviet acceptance of the basic concepts we were proposing: equal aggregates, reductions, and qualitative limitations. At the same time, we vigorously rejected the Soviet proposals regarding FBS and non-transfer, as well as the concepts underlying them. However, the two Delegations were not able to come to agreement on these issues as of November 1974.

This is the background from the Delegation viewpoint of the period that led up to the summit conference between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974, at which they agreed upon on a set of principles for a SALT II Treaty. Some of the most important results of the Vladivostok Accord were:

—A Treaty to cover the period up to the end of 1985.

—An equal aggregate ceiling of 2400 systems.

—An equal subceiling of 1320 MIRVed systems.

—No limitations on, or account taken of, U.S. FBS or Allied nuclear forces.

—Carry over to the new Treaty the Interim Agreement limitations freezing the maximum numbers of ICBM launchers and of modern heavy ICBM launchers.

Given the very strong emphasis that the Soviets had continued to place on asymmetric central system limitations to offset U.S. FBS and third country nuclear forces, I was frankly surprised and pleased at President Ford's success at Vladivostok in getting the Soviets to agree to equal aggregates with no limits on U.S. FBS.

When the two Delegations resumed in Geneva in late January 1975, we had the task of drafting precise Treaty language based on the general principles which had been agreed at Vladivostok. Within about a month, each of the two Delegations had tabled a draft text for the Treaty, and we began work which soon led to a Joint Draft Text.

The U.S. had some specific aims in drafting the Treaty. One aim was to draft precise and unambiguous definitions of the strategic offensive arms to be limited in the Treaty. This was vitally important in order to make clear the obligations of the two sides and to ensure that the two sides would have the same understanding of the limitations in the Treaty. Such agreed definitions would thus help to avoid misunderstandings during the life of the Treaty. At first the Soviets rejected the concept of putting definitions in the Joint Draft Text. For example, they professed to believe that the language in the Interim Agreement concerning "light" and "heavy" ICBMs would suffice as a "definition" of the term "heavy" ICBM for the new agreement. Of course, one of the problems that had emerged in the Interim Agreement was the lack of an adequate definition of this term. Similarly, they opposed definitions of MIRVs and of throw-weight and a specific limitation on heavy ICBMs. In the next stage, they agreed to the concept of putting definitions in the Joint Draft Text, but opposed the detailed and precise definitions which we were proposing. Finally, and all of this took the better part of a year, the U.S. Delegation got the Soviets to agree to the approach to Treaty definitions that we had been proposing all along.

When the two Delegations got down to the business of working out these detailed definitions, it turned out, as we had expected, that significant substantive questions arose which required many months or even several years to resolve. One of our major achievements was to get the Soviets to agree to a detailed definition of "heavy" ICBMs and to agree to put on cap on the capabilities of "heavy" ICBMs. Specifically, by November 1976 we had obtained Soviet agreement on language which in effect defines a "heavy" ICBM as any ICBM with a launch-weight or throw-weight greater than that of the Soviet SS–19 ICBM. This means that no "light" ICBM can have a launch-weight or throw-weight greater than that of the SS–19. The Soviets also agreed on language which in effect bans any ICBM with a

launch-weight or throw-weight greater than that of the Soviet SS–18 ICBM. In connection with these provisions, we also had agreement on technical language defining the launch-weight and the throw-weight of an ICBM.

By November 1976 some of the definitions in the Joint Draft Text, such as the above definitions and also the definition of MIRVed missiles, were fully agreed. The remaining definitions were in an advanced stage of negotiation.

Another aim of the U.S. was to get Soviet agreement on type rules and counting rules which would make feasible verification of certain provisions which otherwise would be extremely difficult to verify. For example, the Soviet SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19 ICBM systems had all been flight-tested with both MIRVs and single RVs. It would be extremely difficult to tell whether a given missile contained MIRVs or a single RV. To solve this problem, the U.S. proposed early in 1975 a MIRVed missile type rule in which in effect any missile of a type which has been flight-tested with MIRVs would be considered to be a MIRVed missile. Thus, for example, all SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19 ICBMs would be considered to be MIRVed ICBMs, regardless of their actual payload. At first the Soviets rejected the concept of type rules and counting rules, saying that they would lead to overcounting, for example, by counting as MIRVed some systems which were in fact not MIRVed. However, the U.S. Delegation pressed the argument that the Treaty simply would not be verifiable without these rules, but would be verifiable with them. The Soviets eventually agreed to our approach. During the 1975–1976 period, the U.S. proposed type rules for ICBM launchers, heavy bombers, ASBMs, MIRVed ICBM and MIRVed SLBM missiles, and launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs. We made significant progress in this area during that period.

As you may know, the Soviets had not agreed at that time to the U.S. interpretation of the Vladivostok Accord with respect to the limitations on air-to-surface missiles. The U.S. held that these limitations would apply only to air-to-surface ballistic missiles, while the Soviets proposed that these limitations also apply to air-launched cruise missiles. This issue was at the time also under discussion at higher levels, but was not resolved by November 1976.

One of the important steps that the U.S. Delegation made in 1975 was to propose that the two sides establish a data base consisting of agreed numbers by category of the strategic offensive arms of each side limited by the Treaty. This was to be done at the beginning of the Treaty and twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission. The rationale for such a data base was to ensure that the sides had the same understanding of the limitations in the Treaty and to help manage the aggregate limitations during the life of the Treaty. You will recall that the Soviets had never before given out such information on their own military systems, so that the negotiability of this proposal was not assured. Indeed, we made only a little progress toward gaining their acceptance of the concept of data base by November 1976, although we had pressed them vigorously on all aspects of this issue. I was pleased to see that subsequently the U.S. Delegation was successful in obtaining Soviet agreement to the data base, and that it has become an important component of the SALT II agreement.

I now want to summarize where the Joint Draft Text stood when the two Delegations recessed in November 1976. The principles agreed at Vladivostok had been incorporated into the Joint Draft Text, including those basic concepts which the U.S. had been pushing since the beginning of SALT II. However, the air-to-surface missile issue discussed above had not been resolved at that time. The Backfire issue had also not been resolved. The Soviets had accepted the U.S. approach with regard to detailed definitions and type rules and counting rules, although differences remained. The sides had agreed to extend to the SALT II Treaty the mandate of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, which had been set up under the SALT I agreements to develop procedures to implement those agreements and also to consider possible compliance issues and ambiguous situations related to those agreements. In short I would estimate that at least eighty percent of the substance and language of the final text had been agreed by November 1976. The U.S. Delegation had conducted vigorous negotiations on the remaining issues which were still outstanding as of that date. Having been deeply involved in so much of the negotiation and drafting, I cannot refrain from noting how interrelated and intertwined each part of the text is with other parts, so that the whole is a single web.

Criticisms can readily be made of what has or has not been accomplished by three administrations in this very complicated field. The ideal would be an agreement so comprehensive, so perfectly balanced, and so well anticipating the future that we would never again have to concern ourselves with the ominous shadows that these

beasts of nuclear weapons cast over our lives. However, we must deal with the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be.

In my own view SALT has nothing to do with what one's view may be with respect to detente, co-existence, or any other such terms. It has nothing to do with whether one likes the Soviets or does not like the Soviets, or whether one trusts the Soviets or does not trust them. I accept the statements of the Soviet leaders that they intend to remain our implacable foes, if not physically, then, as they say, ideologically. However, this should not prevent us from recognizing what is an obvious common interest in doing what can be done by agreement to reduce the danger of mutual suicide by the limitation of the strategic forces of the two sides in a way that will contribute to stability rather than to instability in time of crisis.

I feel that the SALT dialogue at all levels, Chiefs of State, Foreign Ministers, and Delegations, as well as Congressional and private debate, has been useful, even though it has not by any means led to a full meeting of minds, even among ourselves. This is understandable, as apart from differing ideologies between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and differing philosophies among ourselves, we are dealing with a fast moving and evolving technology which no agreement is going to freeze. However, as specific points of common interest emerge during the dialogue, we should seek to negotiate agreements on those points without judging the outcome against the impossible standard of such a comprehensive and definitive agreement that all of the problems for all time to come would be resolved. Rather each agreement should be judged as to whether it is a constructive and useful step forward.

In my view the SALT II agreement meets that test. Thus, I favor its ratification.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Johnson. Your statement was a very insightful history of the SALT process and your connection with it through the years.

Now we turn to our third panelist who can bring us up to date, Ambassador Warnke.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, AND FORMER CHIEF, SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador WARNKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

It is a great pleasure for me to appear with my distinguished predecessors here this morning. I am not sure that I can add to what they have said. I will try and add something like the 20 percent that we added to the treaty.

I think that our appearance here today and the appearance last week of Ambassador Ralph Earle demonstrates the continuity of the SALT process, the fact that it is bipartisan, and the fact that it is a continuing process. I think the SALT II agreement has to be viewed in the context of the ongoing effort to bring about effective nuclear arms control. I think it is also significant that, out of this small club of negotiators, all four of us find the process to be a valuable one. I think the question that is before the Senate is whether this process should be continued, or whether it should come to a grinding halt because of the rejection of SALT II or amendments that would seek to get in through the ratification process that which was unachievable in 7 tough years of negotiation.

As for me, it is clear that the continuation of the process contributes to the security of the United States. It means the preservation of a stable strategic balance with less risk and less cost.

Now, some witnesses before this committee have suggested that there would be a therapeutic value in the rejection of SALT, that somehow it would shock Americans out of lethargy and make them

do more for their defense. I find this a curious indictment of American will. I think that we can live with arms control without being lulled into a sense of false euphoria. I think the size of the defense budget demonstrates the will of Americans to see to it that our defense remains strong.

Looking at the SALT process from my own personal standpoint I can attest to the Senate that it was a careful, thorough process in which the views of all of the interested agencies were consulted at every stage. Now, no one agency won all of the battles. That would not be expected. I think you have to recognize that any arms control agreement is a compromise not only with the other side but also a compromise of differing views within the U.S. Government itself, and that is the way it should be. It has to be a consensus, an amalgam of the varying views, and I think it has to be tested not in terms of whether it meets anybody's ideal of an arms control agreement, but whether instead it is a sound, effective step forward in a process that is gradually bringing nuclear arms under control for the better welfare of the United States and the surer survival of the world.

I believe that SALT II is that, and that equally important, it keeps open the opportunities for continuing progress in controlling nuclear arms. As I have said, it does represent inevitable compromises. Now, other witnesses before the committee last week have suggested that we should never compromise with the Soviet Union, but instead should force them to accept our maximum position. That, to me, is a formula for nonaction. We could anticipate that we could have another 7 years of negotiations, and at the end of that time we would find that we were 7 years further behind in trying to bring nuclear weapons under control. The Soviets would have more of everything and we would have to keep pace.

There would be no increase in security. There would be just the accumulation of ever more dangerous weapons that render the strategic balance more fragile.

The fact is that in any negotiation, what you can get from the other side depends in very large part on what you are willing to give up yourself. Now, as testified by General Jones last week on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, we have given up very little in SALT II. The statement of the Chiefs pointed out that there are important restrictions in SALT II which operate primarily to our advantage, and the statement continued that on the other hand, the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal.

Now, I think it is in that regard that you have to look at those things that we did not achieve. One of them, for example, is the question of reductions in the Soviet total of heavy ICBM launchers. It has been suggested that we should have continued to insist that the Soviets cut back on that total of approximately 308 launchers of heavy ICBM's.

Now, as has been pointed out, we do not have these heavy ICBM's because we have seen no military need for them. It was a decision that was made not because of arms control agreements but by our military planners. It would have been very easy for us to negotiate in SALT II a provision that would have enabled both sides to build heavy ICBM's for deployment on mobile launchers.

It was a military decision that led us to propose to the Soviets and achieve from the Soviets a ban on heavy missiles on mobile launchers. I can tell you personally that they resisted that ban, and for a very simple reason. They had a heavy missile program. We did not.

If both sides had been free to build these very large ICBM's, they would have built more; we still would have built none. So, accordingly, what we have in SALT II with regard to the heavy missiles is a limitation on a Soviet program with no limitation on an American program because no such American program exists.

I would submit that it is infeasible to get the Soviet Union to eliminate all or most of their heavy missiles, a system we do not want and would not build, while we go ahead with every system that we do want.

In terms of negotiations, whether it is commercial negotiations or international negotiations, you have to recognize you cannot make unilateral demands and expect to get capitulation on the other side unless they are in a position of such bargaining inferiority that an arms control agreement would prove to be unnecessary at all.

It is in that regard that I would like to address another criticism that has been presented. It has been suggested that we really do not need SALT because the Soviets are at the end of their tether, they couldn't do any more even if there were no SALT, and that therefore the SALT restrictions are unnecessary.

Frankly, I find that a very rosy view of the Soviets as an adversary. I myself cannot discount their capability of doing more in the absence of SALT. Our intelligence estimates indicate that without SALT, by the end of the SALT Treaty period the Soviets would have something like 3,000 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and with SALT they are cut back to 2,250. I find that a meaningful restriction.

I believe it was Secretary Brown who testified last week that in the absence of SALT, he estimates they would have 1,800 MIRVed ballistic missile launchers. With SALT, they are cut back to 1,200.

Again, I find that a very meaningful restriction, something that exponentially increases our ability to eliminate the theoretical vulnerability of our land based ICBM's. Without SALT, our intelligence indicates that they would have something like 900 to 1,000 MIRVed ICBM's. With SALT, they are cut back by at least 100, down to 820. Without SALT, they would have something like 100 more of the SS–18's, again meaningful restrictions.

I don't believe that it would be safe for the Senate of the United States or for the people of the United States blandly to assume that we do not need the SALT restrictions because the Soviets wouldn't do anything anyway. That has not been the experience of those of us who have watched the nuclear arms competition. That is not the prediction of any of us who has dealt with Soviet leadership.

Then, of course, we have the other criticism of SALT, that it does not go far enough to end the nuclear arms race. My opinion, for what it is worth, is that no one step in the SALT process is going to take us any further than this present step in SALT II. The cumula-

tive effect of a series of SALT agreements can in fact mean a much more meaningful restraint, but it has to be a step-by-step process.

We are dealing with a phenomenon that I believe is unique in history. We are dealing with two countries that have been bitter rivals for decades, two countries that compete for world leadership, two countries that have accumulated between them the most massive military arsenals in the history of mankind, two countries that have the ability to wipe out one another and take with them most of the world.

Despite this, despite our many differences, we find it possible to sit down and try to reach agreements that are of mutual benefit to the security of both countries. That mutual benefit is an absolutely essential agreement in any arms control agreement, because an arms control agreement that proved to be to the unilateral advantage of one side and detrimental to the security of the other would not be worth the paper it is written on.

The side that found itself disadvantaged would promptly take advantage of its opportunity to use the escape clause and to repudiate the treaty because of concerns about its own national security.

I think also we have to recognize that the entire question of arms control is one that requires the utmost prudence. We have to do it step by step. We have to test the way as we go along. Accordingly, I would ask that the committee and the Senate as a whole look at this treaty in terms of the question as to whether it is in fact a sound, effective step forward, an effective step in a continuing process.

Does it give us the kinds of controls that are meaningful? I submit that it does, both from the standpoint of putting an equal lid on the totals, introducing subceilings on the most dangerous and the most destabilizing of the nuclear weapons systems, having qualitative restraints that are very meaningful in terms of restricting the ability of the Soviet Union to build up thousands of additional warheads, setting the kinds of subceilings on MIRVed ICBM's that tend to protect the retaliatory deterrent capability of the other side, because after all, that is what we are dealing with.

What we are dealing with here is the question of life or death in the most literal sense. Are we able, with this agreement, to come close to a situation in which nuclear war is deterred? I submit that the terms of the agreement speak for themselves, and we should measure those terms not against some abstract, doubtfully attainable idea, but in terms of the realities of hard bargaining between two countries that are rivals, but find an opportunity here for the first time to increase the chances of national survival for both.

Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Warnke's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PAUL C. WARNKE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, during the past week, the Committee has received a full briefing on the details of the SALT II treaty and, in the testimony of Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Seignious and Ambassador Ralph Earle, a detailed analysis of the reasons why it contributes to the security of the United States. It is, therefore, difficult for me to see that I would add anything by a largely repetitive statement. I will, of course, be happy to reply to any questions that the members of the Committee might raise.

In the way of prefatory comments, however, I would like to comment briefly on the SALT process itself, as I saw it during my months as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Chief SALT Negotiator. I would like also to address myself to a few lines of argument that have questioned the value of this treaty. With regard to the process, the Committee, of course, is familiar with the way in which the American negotiating position has been developed and implemented. From my observation, the decision-making process in SALT has been a careful, thorough one that takes into account the views of all of the agencies of government primarily concerned in arms control and other national security matters. The SALT working group and the Special Coordinating Committee that have functioned under the National Security Council are multi-agency in composition. In the development of our proposals, every effort has been made to try and accommodate varying views and reconcile them when there have been differences.

Quite naturally, such differences have arisen. It cannot be expected that in every instance the starting points of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be identical. Inevitably, and I think helpfully, there is a bargaining process that goes on within the United States Government itself proceeding in parallel with the bargaining between the United States and the Soviet Union. No agency can or should expect that its initial decision will automatically prevail. No one of us who has been involved with the process has won every battle. Compromise is inevitable if consensus is to be reached.

In evaluating the product, therefore, the test must be whether the treaty does in fact serve the interests of the United States. It is not, as I see it, constructive or even feasible for anyone to pose as the test whether the treaty is in all respects what any individual or any agency of the United States Government would most like to have seen.

Speaking personally, I am frank to admit that there are provisions in the treaty that I would have preferred to see written differently and other provisions that I would have liked to have seen added. In several of these cases, I have some confidence that these changes and additions would have been negotiable with the Soviet Union. But these considerations are not, as I see it, relevant to the issue now before us. That issue is whether the entry into force of this treaty is in the national interest. If not, it should be rejected. If so, it should be approved promptly and any unsatisfied further aspirations be addressed in the continuing SALT negotiations.

Some critics of the SALT process have charged that those involved in developing our negotiating positions have become preoccupied with the need to secure an agreement rather than with the substance of that agreement. My experience shows that this charge and this apprehension are completely without foundation. There are, obviously, some ancillary advantages that can be anticipated from the successful completion of the treaty—making possible other useful arrangements with the Soviet Union, fostering allied confidence in American leadership and holding the way open for more substantial reductions in and controls over nuclear weapons. But, as I see it, these supplemental benefits can be anticipated if and only if this treaty itself is a sound and effective step forward in nuclear arms control. On that question, I am confident that an affirmative answer can be given.

With respect to some of the principal lines of argument presented in questioning the value of the treaty, I would like to address first the major criticisms that it does not do enough to restrict Soviet nuclear weapons systems. Principal among these is the argument that the SALT II treaty is unequal to the disadvantage of the United States, because it does not require the Soviets to get rid of their over 300 launchers of the so-called heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Some of the more vigorous opponents point out that, for the term of the treaty, only the Soviet Union will have this largest type of intercontinental ballistic missile. This is true. But the reason is that the United States, several years ago, elected for military reasons to stop building the large liquid fueled ICBMs and to build instead the smaller solid fueled, more readily maintained, more reliable Minuteman missiles. We today have none of these heaviest-type missiles because our military planners see no military need for them. During the SALT I negotiations, the United States proposed that there be a freeze on launchers of these heavy missiles. Although the freeze affected only the Soviet Union because the United States had no heavy missile program, the Soviets agreed to limit such launchers to the number then existing.

In SALT II negotiations, the question of heavy ICBM launchers was again addressed. As part of the agreement reached at Vladivostok when President Ford met with Mr. Brezhnev in late 1974, the Soviets accepted our insistence that the SALT II limits apply only to intercontinental range nuclear delivery vehicles, and not to our

forward based systems that could strike Soviet targets from European bases. The United States in turn accepted the fact that SALT II would not require reductions in Soviet heavy ICBM launchers.

Despite the Vladivostok understanding, the proposals we presented in Moscow in March of 1977 included a reduction of about one-half in the Soviet heavy missile launchers. This bargaining position was, not unexpectedly, unacceptable. The Soviets pointed out that this would require them to cut out about 150 of their newest missile launchers, while the United States would eliminate no launchers and was proposing to go ahead with its own new programs including new and larger submarine launched ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles on strategic bombers.

The Soviets did, however, agree to continue the SALT I ban on any increase in the number of heavy missile launchers. In addition, the Soviets accepted an amended American proposal putting a subceiling of 820 on all types of MIRVed ICBMs. From the standpoint of the strategic balance, this is a more effective limit than if the SALT II agreement required a cut just in the Soviet SS-18s, but permitted them a total of 900 or 1000 MIRVed ICBM launchers of all types.

In short, therefore, the SALT I freeze on heavy missile launchers—carried over into SALT II—represents a constraint on Soviet programs and none on our own. We have no heavy missiles because our military planners continue to see no U.S. military need for them. But the Soviets have to limit their program substantially below what it would be in the absence of SALT.

Those who argue that the SALT II treaty should be rejected because the Soviets wouldn't agree to give up all or most of their heavy missiles thus turn logic on its ear. Under the SALT limitations, the Soviets will have far fewer launchers of SS-18s and of all MIRVed ICBMs—18s, 19s and 17s—than if SALT were to be rejected. A vote against SALT therefore is a vote for more of these biggest Soviet nuclear weapons.

The fact that SALT limits Soviet heavy missiles and in no way interferes with planned American programs is dramatically shown by the SALT II negotiations about ICBMs on mobile launchers. The SALT I limits on size applied to the fixed launchers, not the missiles themselves. The Soviets were limited in SS-18 deployment because of the ban on building new ICBM silos or substantially enlarging existing silos. Accordingly, inasmuch as our MX would be deployed on mobile launchers, not in fixed silos, continuation of SALT I restraints would not limit its launch weight or throw-weight. The MX could have been designed to be as large as the heaviest Soviet missile.

Of course, the absence of size restrictions on ICBMs on mobile launchers would permit an increase in Soviet deployment of more SS-18 size ICBMs. After extensive study of the question, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs concluded that the optimum size for the MX would be no greater than the Soviet SS-19, the heaviest light missile as defined in the SALT II treaty. In accordance with the decision of our military planners, therefore, the negotiators in Geneva proposed Article IX, subparagraph 1(d), which bars "mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs." The Soviet negotiators stoutly resisted this limitation, recognizing it as in effect a restraint only on a Soviet program. Eventually, however, they agreed to accept it.

The importance of the SALT II restrictions on the Soviet land-based ICBM force can best be seen by considering what the Soviets could do if the SALT II restrictions did not go into effect. Without SALT the Soviets would be free to build as many new ICBM launchers as they saw fit. Their on-going programs include not just one, but a whole fifth generation of the new Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. There would be no limit on the size of such missiles and, most important, no limit on the number of MIRVs or separate nuclear bombs with which each missile could be equipped. The SS-18 in the absence of SALT could have as many as 30 or even 40 separate warheads.

The restrictions negotiated in SALT, therefore, improve the survivability of our own strategic force, and indeed the survivability of the United States, by preventing Soviet deployment of many thousand additional strategic nuclear warheads. We can, accordingly, have confidence that our retaliatory capability is not in jeopardy and that a nuclear attack is fully deterred.

Critics of the agreement, however, recently have argued that a collapse of SALT would not mean any appreciable increase in Soviet strategic nuclear forces. They maintain that the Soviet Union is already doing as much as it can afford to do. Their remarkable contention is that the Soviets have been pushed to the limits of their resources and, presumably, that without SALT they could do no more while we would have a free hand to increase our spending and actually could achieve some sort of strategic advantage.

This argument, in my opinion, sadly misconceives the real world. The facts are that the Soviets by merely continuing their existing programs unconstrained by SALT would have over 3000 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by the end of the SALT II period and could have as many as 18,000 strategic nuclear warheads in their inventory. This would require no big increase in annual spending, but merely a continutation of their production lines. Production of the SS-16, with its potential for deployment on existing Soviet mobile ballistic missile launchers, also could easily be resumed.

Moreover, there is no basis for the suggestion that the Soviets are at the end of their tether and that they could not make substantial increases in expenditures on strategic nuclear weapons. Were this to be the case, the much-vaunted Soviet threat would loom less large.

As for myself, I am unable thus to discount the Soviet military potential. Admittedly, they spend a very large proportion of their resources on defense. Without this heavy drain, the average Soviet citizen's standard of living unquestionably would be higher. But the hard-come-by gains in that standard of living could readily be diverted by a government that need not face an aggrieved electorate and further sacrifices could be demanded in the name of Soviet national security. Moreover, we could anticipate that a Soviet leadership would have considerable success in marshalling popular opinion to believe that American rejection of SALT portended a change away from any effort at détente, a decision for all-out confrontation and hence a grave risk to Soviet security.

For our own security, the risks of a substantial additional buildup in numbers of Soviet missiles and numbers of Soviet warheads, with a consequent decrease in the survivability of our own forces and the stability of the deterrent, cannot blithely be disregarded by predictions that economic constraints and domestic priorities can substitute for SALT limits on Soviet strategic forces.

Another major criticism, and indeed the focus of the most insistent complaints about SALT II, is the alleged impact on U.S. abililty to improve its strategic forces. The fact is that, as explained by the President after SALT was signed: "The agreement constrains none of the reasonable programs we have planned to improve our defenses." Throughout the negotiations, care was taken to preserve the options that those responsible for our military force planning have defined as necessary to our security.

I have referred to our deterrent triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. Each of these components can be modernized during the SALT II treaty period.

Our heavy bombers can be equipped with cruise missiles of unlimited range, assuring that this part of our nuclear deterrent could penetrate any conceivable Soviet air defense through 1985 and well into the future. Existing bombers can be equipped with as many as 20 such missiles, and when new bombers are produced, each one can carry an even greater number.

Our ballistic missile submarine force will remain invulnerable to any antisubmarine warfare developments because of new longer-range Trident missiles. As these come into the force, our submarines can operate in coastal waters of the United States for greater survivability and easier command and control.

The exception permitted each side for a new ICBM will permit us to develop the MX missile and deploy it after the period of the Protocol on whatever type of mobile launcher system is decided upon as best to improve the survivability of this part of our force.

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Committee last Wednesday, there are "a number of important restrictions in SALT II which operate primarily to our advantage." The Chiefs pointed out further: "On the other hand, the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal." In short, SALT measurably adds to the security of the United States by improving the survivability of the U.S. strategic deterrent. It does so by limiting Soviet developments that would add many thousands of additional warheads to the Soviet threat and by leaving us free to make those changes that protect our retaliatory forces.

Ironically, it is the fact that some new nuclear weapons programs can continue under SALT II that create another type of concern with regard to the effects of arms control efforts. Sincere supporters of arms control decry the fact that SALT does not go further and even impose a moratorium on any and all new nuclear weapons programs.

I can sympathize with their view. I personally would have preferred to see an agreement with more drastic cuts and more inhibitions on nuclear weapons. I also feel that the dissatisfaction expressed by supporters of arms control can be constructive to the extent that it leads to prompt efforts to achieve more drastic cuts in and

controls over nuclear arms. But I would ask them, as I would ask critics on the other end of the spectrum, to recognize that any negotiated agreement must be a compromise—both with the other side and within our own government.

We have had to recognize that the Soviets won't accept provisions that would trim the respective force structures to the taste and to the unilateral advantage of the United States. They won't scrap their big ICBMs while we insist on unlimited range cruise missiles on heavy bombers and on no controls on our nuclear forces in Europe that can destroy Soviet targets. Nor, given their heavy responsibility for our military strength, can the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs be expected to rely solely on arms control to preserve our deterrent forces.

In addition, the kinds of limits that can be written into a SALT agreement are only those that can be verified. As a matter of law, and as a matter of logic, controls can't be adopted, no matter how desirable they might be in theory, unless you can be sure you will know they are being met.

Any arms control treaty must recognize conflicting views and conflicting interests. The result cannot be expected to fit anyone's ideal. But I am convinced from hard experience that no more far-reaching treaty could, at this time, have been negotiated and that if this treaty is rejected or drastically altered, there is no realistic chance that a better treaty will be negotiated in the foreseeable future.

Through the Protocol and the Joint Statement of Principles, the road is cleared to greater progress in future SALT negotiations. The Protocol buys us time to decide whether our security would be increased or diminished by deployment of mobile launchers of ICBMs and long-range cruse missiles on ground or ship launchers. The Joint Statement sets the terms of reference for SALT III. SALT II is thus the indispensable foundation for further measures of strategic arms control.

As I mentioned earlier in my statement, the SALT II treaty must initially be examined in terms of the effect of its detailed provisions on our national security. Its foreign policy implications, however, are also relevant to this Committee's deliberations.

Previously, witnesses critical of the treaty have suggested that the uniform support for its approval strongly voiced by the heads of government of our Western European allies does not reflect support of the specific terms but rather stems from their concern about the political repercussions of the treaty's rejection. Because of the continuing consultations with the North Atlantic Council during the course of the SALT II negotiations, I know personally that our allies are fully aware of and in favor of the treaty's detailed provisions. There is no basis for the contrary assertion made in a paper presented a few months ago by the group known as the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. The prediction in that paper that, because of SALT II, the countries of Western Europe may choose the option of "an accommodation with the Communist bloc" is both absurd and irresponsible. Other suggestions that NATO governments support the SALT treaty publicly but oppose it privately demean, I believe, both the independence and the integrity of alliance leadership.

The other countries of the world also have a stake in the control of military competition between the two nuclear superpowers. The spectre of nuclear war threatens their own existence. And they recognize the grave risk that nuclear weapons will proliferate if the arms race rages unabated. The countries of Eastern Europe would see any intensification of the US/Soviet confrontation as a cause for despair because of the certainty tht the Soviet net would tighten.

The current Soviet leadership sees SALT and the SALT process as the cornerstone of the US/Soviet relationship. Success in SALT won't guarantee detente. Its collapse, however, would make detente impossible. If, after almost seven years of negotiations, the Soviet leadership should now see the U.S. turn away from an agreement that would limit nuclear weapons to the mutual security of both sides, they could be expected to see little chance for any improvement in relations or any future other than constant confrontation. Their stake in SALT, their interest in its continuation, today must be considered by them in decisions on Soviet international conduct.

The SALT II treaty won't solve all our foreign policy problems and meet all our security needs. It is, however, an indispensable component in a realistic foreign policy and a sound step toward greater national security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Warnke, for a very candid statement.

I think I will begin the proceedings this morning by making an observation before I go to questions. I was struck very forcibly, Ambassador Smith, with your statement that we seem to be adopt-

ing the numerical mental attitudes of systems analysts, lacking an appreciation of what nuclear war would really be like. Instead we focus on software and computer output, not recognizing the very limited utility of these tools. Do you remember when youngsters engaged in civil defense drills at school?

Well, I do. I remember when my young son came home and said: "They wanted me to get under a desk, but they said I had 10 minutes, and I would rather come home and die with you, Mommy." I remember that quite vividly.

And newspapers repeatedly showed what 1 megaton would do to Washington and other cities. Most of those images are gone, sublimated into technical discussions.

I think that is part of our problem today. We have lived so long with the nuclear weapons that we are no longer conscious of the shadow cast by the mushroom cloud. I can remember when the news of Hiroshima first reached me. I was a young lieutenant in China, in the military intelligence. When we heard that a bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima that had killed 120,000 people and had the force of 20,000 tons of TNT, it was understood then by the military, by my own colleagues, that we had entered a new era in which there were no limits on destructive power, and we had to begin to think in entirely different terms.

For a while, we did. I can remember Dwight Eisenhower, the soldier President, saying that nuclear war would be the ultimate insanity. I can remember Mr. Khrushchev saying that the survivors would envy the dead. They were talking about a time when our nuclear arsenals were just small corner grocery stores compared to the vast supermarkets of destruction that we have amassed today, and yet today we seem much less conscious of the peril with which we live—much less than we were then.

CRITICISM OF SALT PRIORITIES AND NEGOTIATORS

On Thursday we had two of the best known critics of this treaty before the committee, and I would like to put some questions to you as the principal negotiators of SALT for the United States that were raised by these critics.

One of them, General Rowny, was extremely critical of our negotiators and suggested to this committee that they had allowed the Soviet Union to get away with murder, so to speak, that our negotiators were somehow so anxious for an agreement that the concessions we made to the Soviet side were much too large.

We also heard from Mr. Nitze that perhaps we had started off on the wrong foot at the beginning, that the mistake we made then was to limit launchers rather than to limit missiles and throw-weight. I wonder how you, Ambassador Johnson, would answer that criticism since you were involved at the time of SALT I, when the original freeze related to launchers. Do you think we got off on the wrong foot?

Ambassador JOHNSON. First, Mr. Chairman, I was, of course, not a negotiator on SALT I. Approaching this from the standpoint of launchers, it seemed to me that we were sound in approaching it from the standpoint of those things that could be seen and could be verified. The test throughout SALT has always been, can the pro-

posal be verified? Launchers were something that could be seen. They were something that could be counted. It seemed to me entirely logical that it was approached from the standpoint of launchers rather than missiles. Launchers still remain, you might say, the basis of the limitations.

Now, we have written into the new treaty during the period of SALT II—we have tried to deal with this question of missiles by putting qualitative limitations on missiles and associating them with launchers. I mentioned, for example, a MIRVed missile. When we have seen a MIRVed missile tested from a certain kind of launcher, then we associate that launcher with MIRVed missiles, and the limitation is on the launcher that has been seen to launch MIRVed missiles. I believe you get the chain of the picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Any launcher that has ever launched a MIRV missile will be counted as a MIRVed launcher.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes. It is counted as a MIRVed launcher. This treaty also provides for provisions to consider rapid reload of launchers. That is, missiles cannot be stored in such proximity to launchers that it would be possible to reload them. This reload question arises primarily with the so-called cold launchers, that is, where you launch a missile out of the silo prior to firing it so that the mechanism of the launcher is not destroyed.

In the hot launch, the mechanism of the launcher is so far destroyed that it is a matter of weeks, if not more, to refit that for launching. But in a cold launch, in theory, a submarine is a cold launch, if you had a missile close by, you could stick it in and launch that, too, but we have anticipated that by provisions in the treaty which would limit the possibility of what you might call rapid reload.

In short, no, I think launchers were and remain the base of limitations, but you have to associate launchers with missiles in order to make the limitations meaningful.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

SOVIET RIGHT TO MAINTAIN HEAVY MISSILES

Ambassador Smith, I would like to ask you this question. Under SALT I, the Soviet Union was permitted to maintain larger numbers of launchers, both fixed land launchers and submarine launchers, than the United States. The number was 2,347 for the Soviet Union as against 1,710 for the United States. As we know, that disparity has been corrected in the SALT II Treaty, and an equal ceiling has been established for both sides.

The critics of the SALT process say that we made a serious mistake in permitting the Soviet Union to continue to maintain 308 heavy missiles, while the United States is not permitted to maintain such comparable missiles. Moreover the SALT II Treaty does not provide an opening for the United States to construct such missiles. What is your opinion of the original disparity in SALT I? Why did our negotiators agree to it? Second, why do you think that SALT II corrects that original disparity, inasmuch as it still continues to permit the Soviet Union to maintain the heavy missiles that we do not have and will not be allowed in our arsenal?

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Chairman, as we went into SALT, we had no heavy missiles unless you would call a Titan, which is really an obsolete system, a heavy missile. We had no interest in deploying heavy missiles. When we made a proposal in SALT I in August 1970, we proposed nevertheless that both sides have 250 of those so-called MLBM's, and the Soviets rejected that proposal, and they rejected all controls over offensive weapons because they said you have to first come to grips with the forward based system question.

So, in 1971, President Nixon made a decision that we would go ahead and try to negotiate an ABM Treaty together with certain measures to limit or control offensive weapons systems. That group of certain measures turned out to be the so-called freeze of 1972, which in effect tried to hold the numbers of launchers, the aggregate number of launchers, both land based and submarine based, in existence and under construction at that time to that level to permit SALT II to proceed without a background of an ever-increasing number of Soviet missiles at a time when we were not building any.

Now, at that time the Soviets had something over 280 MLBM's [modern large ballistic missiles]. They had not started any new construction for about a year, which we thought was a healthy development. Now, the question was, in that freeze, should we have a right to go ahead and build new ICBM's which I gather was considered inconsistent with the idea of a freeze, which was that no new launchers would be built.

As Ambassador Johnson has pointed out, this ban on new launchers was essential to verification. So the freeze came out with no right for the United States or for the Soviet Union to build new silos for ICBM's. They could keep what they had, which, by the time the freeze was signed, was about 300.

That ban on new launchers persists to this day. Now, there was a second part to your question, but I don't know what the yellow light means.

The CHAIRMAN. The yellow light means I am running out of time. I want to ask one final question.

DOES SALT II PROHIBIT UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING M-X?

Ambassador Warnke, Mr. Nitze said that one of the defects of the SALT II Treaty was that it might prohibit the United States from building and deploying an M-X missile. Do you agree?

Ambassador WARNKE. I do not agree, Senator Church. The protocol makes it very clear that we can deploy a mobile launcher of an ICBM after the protocol period, which is the end of 1981. Not only that, but the treaty itself makes it very clear that each side can have one new ICBM. That was one of the more difficult provisions to negotiate, because the Soviets wanted any new ICBM on either side to be restricted to a single warhead.

We insisted that that might fit their strategic forces, but it would not fit ours. We insisted on having the right to build a new ICBM with MIRV's and eventually the Soviets folded on that point. So, there is no basis for saying that we can't go ahead with the M-X. It is clearly foreshadowed in the treaty and in the protocol.

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The argument has also been made that maybe we couldn't do it because it would not be verifiable. Well, obviously, anything we do will be verifiable, because otherwise we would be in a position in which the Soviets could clearly do anything that we had done. The net result would be an unverifiable quantity on their side, and consequently the elimination of any greater survivability that we had achieved.

Unless we have some handle on the number of warheads that can be deployed against any sort of mobile ICBM system, we will have shot ourselves in the foot, and the mobile ICBM system will be frustrated.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Javits.

BETTER SALT TREATY COULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED UPON REJECTION

Senator JAVITS. Gentlemen, thank you for your appearance here today. I think it is critically important to the future of this treaty and Senate action.

I notice that Ambassador Smith and Ambassador Warnke agree upon one thing. They agree on others, but this is signal to me because I think one of the worst things that has happened respecting this treaty is the statements by Gromyko and Brezhnev that it is not subject to any change or amendment, and that it would go right out the window if it was.

For one thing, Americans do not like to be treated that way, and for another it is untrue. They know it and we know it. It depends on what the changes are, and whom they affect. If they affect our policy, I cannot see the remotest reason why it should change the circumstances between the parties. If they affect Soviet policy, then we would have to consider them very carefully and weigh them. If we think it is demanded by the situation, it is still our duty to propose them, and the Secretary of State has agreed that it is the duty of the President to put them forward and do the best he can with them.

Now, Ambassador Warnke says that there is no realistic chance that a better treaty would be negotiated if we reject this one. Ambassador Smith, you say substantially the same thing in your statement. Now, you are contradicted directly by General Rowny, one of the opponents, who says that he is "sure," and I quote his word, that a better treaty could be worked out. Would you each tell us further why you do not agree?

Ambassador SMITH. Senator Javits, my feeling is that if we go back at the Soviets with any substantial proposed change in the existing bargain, at best, they will ratify presumably after us and have a condition proposing a substantive change in our position, such as, the treaty is fine, but go and get the forward-based systems taken into consideration.

I think that would put us back to 1969, because that forward-based systems question was the stumbling block in the whole negotiation until Vladivostok. I think if you realize it took 2½ years to negotiate the first SALT, it has taken almost 7 years, to negotiate the second SALT, I think the third SALT, if you follow that progression, is liable to take a very long time.

During that time, I would have great difficulty seeing the Soviets, unless we had some more concessions to make, which I hope we don't, willing to change the treaty, so I would urge you gentlemen, before you put proposals to the Soviets for substantive amendments, to consider first the time that it is likely to take, and second, what concessions we are proposing to make in a renegotiation, because if we are not proposing to make any, that is a dictate that is not a negotiation.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Warnke?

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator Javits, I would say that a better treaty can be negotiated, but only after this treaty comes into effect. I think this is the necessary foundation for further efforts at nuclear arms control. It represents, as Ambassador Smith has pointed out, years and years of negotiations. Now, obviously, some amendments would be possible. We might be able to get them to give up certain other things. We would have to ask ourselves first what we are prepared to give up in return.

This represents, in my opinion, a very good balance. We have been able to get meaningful restrictions on Soviet programs as the Joint Chiefs, among others, have testified, and we have not ended up with anything other than nominal restraints on our programs, as the Chiefs have also testified.

Now, many people, and I would have to say myself included, would certainly be prepared to consider further restraints on the forces of both sides. Possibly that could have been done in SALT II. It seems to me the realistic thing, the useful thing to do now is to consider those as further moves in SALT III, moves which are made possible under the protocol and that are directed by the Joint Statement of Principles.

Senator JAVITS. As I understand both of you gentlemen, you would remind the critics that if they want to open the treaty, they have to be prepared to give as well as receive. Perhaps they have overlooked that point. Is that correct?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is correct, Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Warnke, in your statement, you say, the trade we made with the Soviets respecting heavy missiles was that our forward-based systems would not be challenged. Now, it is testified on the other side by General Rowny, and I believe it is Mr. Ikle's point of view, too, that we double traded on that, that is, that we gave up on the heavy missiles because we wanted to have our forward-based systems unchallenged, but we also gave up on Backfire for the same reason. So, the Russians got two to one on us on that one. What do you say about that?

Ambassador WARNKE. I would say, Senator Javits, that it is pretty clear that at Vladivostok both subjects were considered, the question of forward-based systems and the question of the Soviet heavy missiles. I do not know whether there was an actual trade, but the results were that the Soviets agreed to the principle of equal aggregates without any compensation to them for the forward-based systems in Europe, and we accepted the fact that for SALT II there would be a continuation of the freeze on the Soviet heavy missiles.

I regard that as being a very good trade. With respect to Backfire, that, of course, is a separate question. The separate question

there involves more than our forward-based systems. It involves whether or not we want the option to build a Backfire type bomber that would not be controlled. It involves the question of our FB–111's, which are located in the United States and assigned to the Strategic Air Command.

I thought at the time, as Ambassador Johnson has said today, that it was a remarkable accomplishment at Vladivostok. I think the United States was very well served by those negotiations.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Might I add just a word there, Senator?

Senator JAVITS. Please.

Ambassador JOHNSON. I believe General Rowny also bases that on what he says was a signal from the Soviets just before Vladivostok, a signal at Geneva that they were prepared to concede on the forward-based systems. All I can say is, I know of no basis whatsoever for that conclusion.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS IF SALT IS NOT RATIFIED

Now, each of you, Mr. Warnke and Mr. Smith, have added a new dimension to this debate. I do not know that we can assess its qualitative importance, but it is a new dimension. Mr. Smith, you have said that the failure to ratify SALT will have a highly adverse impact on the compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty by over 100 nations. Mr. Warnke, you have pointed out the effect upon the future Soviet leadership which I might say parenthetically has always been critical to me, what happens if we do not ratify SALT II?

Could we take you in turn? You say that failure to ratify will have a very adverse effect on the nations which have already signed the Nonproliferation Treaty on the grounds that we will demonstrate that we are not keeping our commitment to negotiate nuclear arms limitations. Would you expand on that?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, sir. To be specific, one of the key countries for our nonproliferation policy is India. The Indians have made it perfectly clear that they will not accept full scope safeguards on their peaceful plants while progress is not being made in the superpowers SALT negotiation, and if we can't get full scope safeguards on the Indian program, it follows that we are not going to be able to get them on the Pakistani program. This is a matter of some current interest. We are going to have a Nonproliferation Treaty review conference next year, and there are going to be searching questions, and hopefully not more than that, as to how the United States and the Soviet Union have carried out their commitments under article VI of that treaty.

If we reject this treaty, the Soviets will say, well, we did our best to carry out our commitments; the American partner just turned it down. In addition to the nonproliferation argument, I think we will hand the Soviets a tremendous psychological weapon, to say:

> We have been telling you all through the years since the war that it was the Soviet Union that was all for arms control, and the Americans were against it, and here is the hardest evidence you can have of that.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Warnke, do you have anything to add?

Ambassador WARNKE. Yes, Senator Javits. I think the two issues tie together in one respect. Well, at least one respect. In my negotiations with the Soviets, it became apparent to me that one strong motivating factor in their willingness to negotiate on arms control is their concern about proliferation. You can see that not only in the SALT talks but also in the talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban.

I would say that that was the No. 1 reason why they were interested in a Comprehensive Test Ban. I think when the Soviets look at the nuclear powers today, they see the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and China. Who do they think is target No. 1? I think they know who target No. 1 is. I think they have the same concern when it comes to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

I believe with respect to the possible effect on the Soviet leadership—obviously, this is speculation on anybody's part. Nobody can really be sure what is going to influence the succession in the Soviet Union. I was struck, however, by the fact that I was told repeatedly that we sometimes overlook the fact that Mr. Brezhnev had to spill a lot of political blood in Vladivostok, that in order to reach the Vladivostok understanding he had to overrule his military leadership, and he did so with the idea that this would be a step toward a continuing process toward trying to bring about nuclear arms control.

Now, we can't be sure, of course, what would occur. We can't be sure that the completion of SALT will mean more meaningful, more useful relations with the Soviet Union. I think we can be sure that the failure of SALT will virtually foreclose the chance of further progress.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. For a country that prides itself on being the leading technological power of the world, we seem to have an uncommon amount of difficulty making those three lights work this morning. The red light is not working. When the yellow light goes on, it means you have 1 more minute. When it goes off, it means the Senator's time has expired.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. AMENDMENT

Mr. Warnke, as the negotiator who has most recently worked on these problems, what would be your view as to what the Soviet response would be if there is an amendment and they want to reopen it? What would be their response to our amendment that would cause the treaty to be reopened?

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator Pell, I would say that that depends obviously on the nature of the amendment that is proposed. If it is an amendment that tries to make the treaty harder on them and softer on us, then I think their response would be very negative indeed. They aren't prepared to let the Senate of the United States make a unilateral adjustment to their disadvantage any more than we would respond favorably if the Politburo were to

make an amendment to the treaty, for example, to eliminate cruise missiles on strategic bombers.

Senator PELL. My question is: In your view as a negotiator, do you think they would then say nyet to the whole business and throw it out, or would they come back with an equally powerful amendment on their side, such as, let's count forward based missile systems, or something of that sort, and try to throw the ball back in our court that way? What would be your judgment?

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator Pell, based on my experience following the March 1977 proposals, I would say both, that the first response would be just to stonewall, and that then at some subsequent point they would come back with a counter proposal. As a consequence, I think it would take a very long time. You would have a new negotiation. I would prefer to have that be the negotiation of SALT III, and first of all, get SALT II in the bag.

Senator PELL. Ambassador Smith and Ambassador Johnson, would your judgments be about the same, or do you have any difference in viewpoint?

Ambassador SMITH. I agree with Paul.

Ambassador JOHNSON. I agree with him, too.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

SOVIET WILLINGNESS NOT TO COUNT FBS

Now, a question that has puzzled me is the way we have divided up the forward-based systems from the strategic systems. From the viewpoint of a victim, it does not make much difference if cities are wiped out by a forward-based weapon or a strategic weapon. How do you account for the Soviet willingness not to count the forward-based systems which can be destructive to their homeland when they do not have anywhere near the equivalent balance in non-counted strategic weapons that can affect us? Any one of you may answer that.

Ambassador JOHNSON. I would be prepared to address that.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Ambassador Johnson.

Ambassador JOHNSON. First, the forward-based systems, that is, our carriers and aircraft based in Europe, are there for defending our allies. It is the forward defense, you might say. On the Soviet side, they have similar systems. That is, they have their old SS–4's and 5's, which can attack Europe. They also have aircraft which can attack Western Europe. To say that only U.S. systems should be counted is so manifestly unequal that it would mean that our allies would be entirely without any nuclear defense against a very powerful Soviet nuclear capability to attack them.

So, I think they recognize that we cannot talk about one without talking about the other.

Senator PELL. Exactly, but wouldn't I be correct in saying that we have about 700 so-called American forward-based systems, and they have about 150, so the balance is in our favor?

Ambassador JOHNSON. What you count as a forward-based system is subject to a lot of change. I wouldn't want to get into the numbers. I don't think there is any inequality in our favor. In fact, I think the inequality is probably now in the Soviets' favor, but that is another subject which I think deserves a lot of study and a

lot of attention, but not as far as this particular treaty is concerned.

Senator PELL. From the viewpoint of the equation, the question that puzzles me is why all nuclear weapons are not thrown into the equation. Why do we have the threshold of strategic weapons? What would be the philosophical reason for that? Because from the viewpoint of being destroyed it is just as destructive to be destroyed by a nonstrategic weapon as it is by a strategic weapon.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Our interest obviously is in the Soviet ICBM's, the intercontinental ballistic missiles which can attack us. We have seen the difficulty that we have had in reaching agreement even on these three systems, that is, the ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. When you throw in the forward-based system, or the less than strategic weapons, then you enter into another dimension, you might say, of complication.

I am sure the Soviets are going to insist that that be discussed in the future, and I think one of the decisions that we have to make is whether or not we would consider it to our advantage to discuss it. I am not making any recommendations. One of the things that has changed a little bit, of course, is the fact that you do have the Soviet SS–20, which is a theater instrument. It is of less than intercontinental range, and is of concern to our allies. In some ways, the Backfire is also less than a strategic system, and that has been of concern to us and our allies.

On our side, there are the cruise missiles, which are of less than intercontinental range also. So there are elements there that might lend themselves to negotiation. I am not advocating it at this time at all. I think we should be very careful before we enter into a negotiation on this subject to make clear the direction in which we would like to see such a negotiation go, and whether or not we think it is feasible, but happily, at least from my standpoint, that is not a subject that we have to deal with in this treaty.

Senator PELL. But if there is a SALT III as we heard there will be, then it will be a subject that would have to be discussed?

Ambassador JOHNSON. Well, it could be raised, and we could agree or not agree to discuss it. I do not think we are committed to discussing it at all. Let me say that during my period there, and also, I am sure, during Paul's period there, the Soviets kept coming back, even after Vladivostok, back and back to the forward-based systems. One of the things they were insisting on during my period was that there be a commitment by us to discuss this in SALT III.

I am happy to see that there is not any such commitment in this agreement, because I feel that decision should be left open.

Senator PELL. I want to be sure we are talking about the same thing. I am talking about systems that can hit the homeland of the Soviet Union or the United States. I am not talking about systems pointed at our allies. This is where I think we have a substantial edge. I would imagine the Soviets are more nervous about their homeland and even the homeland of their allies.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes, but how do you define such systems? They define them as any nuclear capable aircraft on any aircraft carrier. You know, this is just one question. Do we want to accept such a definition of that or do we not? I think it is very questionable. I am not answering the question. All I am saying is, there is

not a clean line in the Soviet definition between the weapons of one side and the weapons of the other which can be drawn.

Senator PELL. Let me go to another subject.

RIGHT TO DEPLOY M-X MISSILES IN MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS

Is it correct, as I believe it was Paul Nitze who said, that the Soviets challenge our right to deploy the M-X missile in multiple protective shelters, the so-called shell game approach? I do not recall that the Soviets specifically challenged that. Did they?

Ambassador WARNKE. I believe, Senator Pell, that I am the one who has the firsthand information on that particular subject. The Soviets raised the question, having read some newspaper articles, as to whether some of these schemes proposed for M-X deployment would be consistent with the verification provisions. What we told them is that we would have to determine for ourselves what weapons systems we would build, what modes of deployment we would consider to be appropriate, and that that was a decision for us, but that obviously we would have to satisfy ourselves that any system we deployed would be adequately verifiable in accordance with the statutory standards because we would insist that any Soviet system similarly meet that test.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Percy is next.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT I

Senator PERCY. Gentlemen, we welcome your appearance here today. I think your presence can help us a great deal. I would like to go back to SALT I for a few minutes.

There have been many charges from responsible people including Mel Laird that the Soviets have violated SALT I, and implications that they will violate SALT II if they can.

I think your judgment on violations of SALT I would be very important. In your judgment, each of you, was the letter and spirit of SALT I violated by the Soviet Union? If so, in what regard?

Ambassador WARNKE. May I start, Senator Percy?

First, I would agree with my colleague, Ambassador Smith, that you really should not depend upon the spirit of arms control agreements. I do not think there is any place for necromancy in something that is that important to the security of the United States. That is why it took so long to negotiate SALT II. We had to have unambiguous definitions. We had to have joint statements and common understandings. We tried to eliminate any ambiguity so that there would not have to be this spongy reliance on something known as the spirit of the agreement.

As far as the letter of the agreement is concerned, there was an interagency study signed onto by each of the involved agencies and released, I believe, just about a year ago, which indicated our view that there had been compliance with SALT I by both sides. Questions have been raised in the Standing Consultative Commission by both sides. Satisfactory answers have been received. We think that the record shows that the letter of the agreement has in fact been complied with by both sides.

Senator PERCY. Ambassador Smith, would you concur with that?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, Senator Percy. Presidents Ford and Carter have certified that there have been no violations of the SALT I agreement. There have been ambiguities. There have been practices about which we wondered, and which we raised in the Standing Consultative Commission, and in one or two cases those practices stopped. In several other cases, it was adequately explained that they were not violations.

By the same token, the Soviets have raised questions about certain of our practices which they said looked as if they might violate the agreement, and those were satisfactorily resolved. I think the record is good on that.

Ambassador JOHNSON. I entirely concur, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

SOVIET STRENGTH INCREASED AFTER SALT I

Ambassador Smith, I recall with great pleasure the visit I made to you and Paul Nitze and others on the SALT I delegation in Helsinki. As a result of studying the deliberative process there and studying the treaty, I enthusiastically supported SALT I and will stand on that decision today. I think what was accomplished in ABM limitations alone was good for this country, good for our security, and certainly good for our budget.

There have been, however, several witnesses who have appeared before us who have assessed SALT I as not at all slowing the Soviet strategic buildup, and that relative to the United States, the Soviets have become even stronger since SALT I. As one of the major negotiators, would you care to reply to their charges that the Soviet Union stands stronger today after SALT I than it did before?

Ambassador SMITH. I think that is true. I think that the Soviet Union is substantially stronger than after SALT I.

Senator PERCY. Let's say in relationship to the United States, then.

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, I think the Soviets, building on the base of their having more launchers for ICBM's in 1972 than we had, have built up their ICBM capability. They have capitalized on the largeness of their missile volume, so there is no doubt about it. What there seems to be some confusion about is the feeling that the Soviets violated the understandings about converting light to heavy missiles. You will remember that we tried very hard to get a formal definition of a light and heavy ICBM, and the Soviets said, look, in this freeze we are not limiting missiles, we are limiting launchers, so why should we get into definitions of missiles?

We said, well, it is very important that we get into them, but we were not able to persuade them, so we had to rely, as you will recall, on a unilateral statement, but the Soviets advised us that during the life of the freeze, any missile that they would build would not have a volume going more than halfway between an SS-11 and an SS-9. It is my understanding that they have not, so anybody who read the record carefully cannot claim that we were misled.

SALT I LIMITATIONS ADVANTAGEOUS TO UNITED STATES

Senator PERCY. Outside of the limitations on ABM, were there other significant limitations in SALT I that have now proven to be advantageous for us as well as the Soviets in limiting arms?

Ambassador SMITH. I think to the extent that the freeze stopped the numerical upsurge in the Soviet force, yes, we can say that that freeze has worked out as expected in limiting launcher numbers. Otherwise, the intelligence projections were that they would go substantially higher than that. They were building eight submarines a year back in 1972 and 7 years later, since then, they could have produced 56. I don't think they have.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Smith.

NEGOTIATING PROCESS WITHIN SOVIET UNION

Ambassador Johnson, I think we would all be interested in the negotiating process and what happens inside the Soviet Union when negotiations are carried on. Everything that happens here is public and on the record. Is there as much internal negotiating within the Soviet Government as there is within our Government? What are the forces that pull on each other, that ultimately bring about a decision that this is an agreement they can sign?

Ambassador JOHNSON. I am sorry that I cannot answer that question as well as I would like, Senator. It is a subject upon which we endlessly speculated in the delegation. Of course, it is a subject upon which we were always seeking little shreds of evidence from our Soviet colleagues on what is there that in fact goes on.

Senator PERCY. That is why I thought within the confidence of our discussion here you could tell us your intimate thoughts on that. [General laughter.]

Ambassador JOHNSON. Well, I am not a Kremlinologist. As you know, I have never served in the Soviet Union itself. Talking to my Soviet colleagues, it was quite clear to me that there were differences, of course, within the Soviet system, and there were differences that had to be ironed out. The system, as I understood it, was that he reported to the Foreign Office and his military staff advisers reported to the Defense Department.

Then, these reports went on up to the party structure and it was actually the party structure that was making the decisions. In the end, most of them were made by Brezhnev himself. As I understood, on most of these issues, even some of our drafting issues, there in Geneva, their problem was getting the signoff, I would say, of Brezhnev himself to matters of detail that I don't think we would think normally in terms of going to the President on, but they were very, very tightly controlled, and there obviously were differences between them.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

PROTOCOL ISSUES BASIS FOR SALT III

Finally, Mr. Warnke, in your statement you indicate that the protocol buys us time to indicate whether our security would be increased or diminished by mobile launchers, ICBM's, and long-range cruise missiles on ground or ship launches. You seem to cast

doubt on the termination of protocol restrictions in December 1981. Do you believe protocol issues will be the basis for SALT III negotiations? Do the Soviets believe this because of the statement of principles paragraph in which the parties agree to resolve issues in the protocol in future negotiations? That really gets to the heart of what the Soviet intentions will be with respect to the protocol.

Many witnesses have said that it is the Soviets full intention to try to extend the protocol.

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator Percy, I would say that there is no doubt in the minds of the Soviets that the protocol expires at the end of 1981. It has no continuing effect. When I say it buys time, I mean just that. It buys us until the protocol expires to determine whether or not new controls will be negotiated.

The fact of the matter is that under section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the protocol could not be extended without ratification by the Senate of the United States or by joint action by a majority of the House and Senate, because it would be an additional arms control measure. As a matter of fact, this was one of the more controversial items, that is, our insistence that there be a fixed date for expiration of the protocol.

As I am sure you know, the Soviets wanted to have the protocol extended for 3 years from the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty. We said we could not accept that, because there was no way of telling when that date would come.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator McGovern is next.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This morning, I would like to use my first 10 minutes or perhaps most of it to make some observations. Then, if we do have a second round, perhaps at that time the witnesses would like to react to what I have to say. I just want to make that preface, to make clear that I am not maneuvering for more time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has sovereign rights over his 10 minutes.

SALT II MOVES RELENTLESSLY TOWARD ARMS BUILDUP

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, over the weekend, I reflected on the testimony presented to the committee this past week, and I am more inclined now than a week ago to the view that the SALT II Treaty combined with the ratification process may be a formula for escalating rather than reversing the arms race. Perhaps General Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a man whom I value as a personal friend, summarized most clearly where we are heading when he said that the SALT II Treaty is a modest but useful step provided we embark on substantial new nuclear spending to modernize our present strategic forces.

It is this proviso that worries me. I have heard the same statement frequently around this table. The message seems to be, we will take the treaty as long as we also get another costly round of nuclear weapons. I have noticed that even some Senators who originally appeared to oppose the treaty are now hinting that they

might support it if firm commitments to new weapons systems are attached.

Last week Senator Muskie spoke of his gut instinct. My gut instinct, for whatever it is worth, is that this treaty will be ratified when enough Senators are convinced that it does not impede any weapons systems that the best and the brightest at the Pentagon are planning for us in the 1980's.

SALT II will help us eliminate the second-rate killers so that we can concentrate on the high quality that comes from refined devices like the M–X. SALT II is so much finer than SALT I that one can scarcely wait for SALT III, although Ambassador Smith has reminded us that it may be a long wait beyond the 7 years it took to get SALT II.

The probability based on the record is that the weapons which the Kremlin and the Pentagon regard as the most destructive will be preserved, while lesser systems are weeded out in the name of arms limitation. Thus, one alternative that is emerging is treaty ratification conditioned on a new generation of nuclear weapons that are more deadly, more costly, and more destabilizing than the status quo.

Such a conclusion ironically undermines the very goals of the treaty, which include reducing the arms burden and the danger of nuclear conflagration. Perhaps the same process is going on in the Kremlin.

Paradoxically, a second alternative is emerging, embracing a broad spectrum of Americans, which holds that the treaty is seriously flawed because it fails to produce substantial arms reductions.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot recall a major witness, hawks and doves, including treaty proponents and opponents, military and civilian, who did not express regret that this treaty does not provide a deeper arms reduction. Some have argued that the treaty should be modified or rejected to require such arms reductions by both sides, but the paradox of these hearings so far is that everyone favors arms reductions, yet we move relentlessly toward more arms.

If this paradox is not overcome, we will be doomed to a new arms race whether SALT II is ratified or rejected. This means not only great physical danger to the world, but as Professor Melman has long warned us, it also means that we will continue to suffer from inflation and the loss of civilian industrial productivity while we pour our dollars, science, and technology, into surplus weapons.

It means also that we will postpone a major national energy policy while we plot new devices for human destruction.

With all due respect to the President's earnest speech last night, we are not rich enough to finance both a continuing arms race and the transition to renewable sources of energy without unacceptable inflation. Our challenge is to secure a treaty or a process that reduces nuclear armaments rather than increases them. Present approaches to arms control, in my judgment, cannot break free from the trap of negotiation followed by escalation. The fact is that the very modest steps which this treaty represents are no longer viable militarily, economically, or politically.

Arms controllers can no longer afford timid, incredibly long, drawn-out struggles while new weapons technology is boldly sprinting ahead.

To meet the need for a new approach, I am today announcing my intention to propose arms reduction legislation to the resolution of ratification which would mandate our negotiators to undertake immediately, upon the acceptance or rejection of SALT II, new negotiations to freeze and then reduce nuclear weapons arsenals on both sides. The legislation I will introduce will call for immediate negotiations for SALT III to, first, establish an immediate freeze or moratorium for 1 year on development or deployment of additional strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads; second, to mandate annual reductions of at least 10 percent in the arsenals of both sides for each of the following 3 years; third, to convene a summit meeting after 3 years to reconsider whether the percentage reduction should continue, and if so, at what level.

Such a resolution would permit our negotiators to devise a freeze and reduction proposal which is verifiable and equitable.

Mr. Chairman, I realize that many of the same problems of defining equitable reductions which have plagued the SALT talks may crop up again, but at least we would shift the terms of the debate from defining equitable increases in new missiles and warheads to defining equitable reductions. That is what the SALT process should be about, according to a wide range of Senators, from the most conservative to the most liberal.

Arms reduction legislation is necessary whether or not SALT II is approved. It is generally agreed that Soviet and United States nuclear arsenals are roughly equal now. If that is the case, let us freeze the present level and try to reduce rather than exercising our options under SALT II to achieve parity at ever higher levels of nuclear weapons. SALT II gives each nation the right to build up in certain categories. If instead we can freeze the arms race, then the arguments about which side gains the most from SALT II would largely disappear.

The danger, it seems to me, of moving to SALT III without a freeze is that the SALT II Treaty allows an expansion in launchers, warheads, and destructiveness. Therefore, even if SALT III reduced the level in SALT II, the end result would still be bigger arsenals than either side possesses today.

Mr. Chairman, during these hearings and in other fora, I have heard my name invoked by people who generally do not agree with me at all. Some of the most hard-line opponents of SALT II now say: "We agree with George McGovern that this treaty does not go far enough to reduce armaments". I have listened to these comments without challenging the sincerity of the speakers, and I do not do that today.

So, today, I call on those who agree with me in theory about reversing the arms race to join with me in practice to devise a new strategy of genuine arms reduction. Otherwise, I must at least object to my name being worn as sheep's clothing by cold war wolves whose real purpose is to invoke the dream of arms reduction to sustain the nightmare of nuclear overkill.

Mr. Chairman, President Carter, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, the Joint Chiefs, Senator Jackson, Senator Helms, and I

don't know how many other people, including Mr. Nitze, General Rowny, and the distinguished arms negotiators before us have said that they are disappointed that the SALT II Treaty has not provided for deeper nuclear reductions. I invite all of these spokesmen and all others who seek to reduce the arms race to join in supporting negotiations to first freeze and then systematically scale down the nuclear race that now threatens to destroy our civilization.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Senator McGovern's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN

Over the weekend, I've reflected on the testimony presented to the Committee last week. I am more inclined now than a week ago to the view that the SALT II Treaty combined with the ratification process may be a formula for escalating rather than reversing the arms race.

Perhaps General Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a man whom I value as a personal friend, summarized most clearly where we are heading when he said that the SALT II Treaty is "a modest but useful step" provided we embark on substantial new nuclear spending to modernize our present strategic force.

It's the proviso that worries me. I have heard the same statement around this table. The message seems to be: we'll take the Treaty as long as we also get another costly round of nuclear weapons. I notice that even some Senators who originally appeared to oppose the Treaty are now hinting that they might support it if firm commitments to new weapon systems are attached. Senator Muskie spoke last week of his "gut instinct." My gut instinct is that this Treaty will be ratified when enough Senators are convinced that it does not impede any weapons system that "the best and the brightest" at the Pentagon are planning for us in the 1980's. SALT II will help us eliminate the second-rate killers so that we can concentrate on the high quality that comes from refined devices like the MX. SALT II is so much finer than SALT I that one can scarcely wait for SALT III! And who can even imagine what lovely devices will emerge in SALT IV or V? The only certainty is that the weapons which the Kremlin and the Pentagon regard as the most destructive will be preserved while lesser systems are weeded out in the name of arms limitation.

Thus, one alternative that is emerging is treaty ratification conditioned on a new generation of nuclear weapons more deadly, costly and destabilizing than the status quo. Such a conclusion, ironically, undermines the very goals of the Treaty—to reduce the arms burden and the danger of nuclear conflagration. Perhaps the same process is going on in the Kremlin.

Paradoxically, a second alternative is emerging, embracing a broad spectrum of Americans, which holds that the treaty is seriously flawed because it fails to produce substantial arms reductions. I cannot recall a major witness, including Treaty proponents and opponents, military and civilian, hawk and dove, who did not express regret that this Treaty does not provide deeper arms reduction. Some have argued that the Treaty should be modified or rejected to require such arms reductions by both sides.

The paradox of these hearings so far is that everyone favors arms reductions; yet, we move relentlessly toward more arms.

If this paradox is not overcome, we will be doomed to a new arms race whether SALT II is ratified or rejected. This means not only great physical danger to the world, but as Professor Seymour Melman has long warned us, it also means that we will continue to suffer from inflation and the loss of civilian industrial productivity while we pour our dollars, science and technology into surplus weapons. It means also that we will postpone a major national energy policy while we plot new devices for human destruction. We are not rich enough to finance both a continuing arms race and the transition to renewable sources of energy without unacceptable inflation.

Our challenge is to secure a Treaty or a process that reduces nuclear armaments rather than increasing them. Present approaches to arms control cannot break free from the trap of negotiation followed by escalation.

Allowing upward expansion to ceilings above the arsenals of either side; allowing new types of weapons; development of "bargaining chips"; shifting the arms race from quantitative to qualitative competition—all of these will lead only to a deadlier rivalry at higher and more dangerous levels.

The fact is that very modest steps which this Treaty represents are no longer viable—militarily, economically or politically. Arms controllers can no longer afford timid, long drawn-out struggles while new weapons technology is boldly sprinting ahead.

Clearly, we need a new strategy. It is no longer enough to be for reductions in the abstract. The real issue is how are we going to achieve genuine reductions.

To meet the need for a new approach, I am today announcing my intention to propose "arms reduction" legislation to the Resolution of Ratification which would mandate our negotiators to undertake immediately upon the acceptance or rejections of SALT II to freeze and then reduce nuclear weapons arsenals on both sides.

The legislation I will introduce will call for immediate negotiations for SALT III to:

First, establish an immediate freeze or moratorium for one year on development or deployment of additional strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads;

Second, to mandate annual reductions of at least 10 percent in the arsenals of both sides for each of the following three years;

Third, a summit meeting after three years to reconsider whether the percentage reductions should continue and if so, at what level.

My instructions would permit our negotiators to devise a freeze and reduction proposal which is verifiable and equitable. In the Senate, we should focus on the major policy issues of national security and world peace. We need to send a message of common sense that will cut through the madness of the global arms rivalry.

I realize that many of the same problems of defining equitable reductions which have plagued the SALT talks may crop up again. But at least we would shift the terms of the debate from defining equitable increased in new missiles and warheads to defining equitable reductions. That's what the SALT process should be about according to a wide range of Senators from the most conservative to the most liberal.

Arms reversal legislation is necessary whether or not SALT II is approved. It is generally agreed that Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals are roughly equal now. If that's the case, let us freeze the present level and try to reduce rather than exercising our options under SALT II to achieve parity at ever higher levels of nuclear weapons. SALT II gives each nation the right to build up in certain categories. If instead we can freeze the arms race, then the arguments about which side gains the most from SALT II would largely disappear. A legislated freeze followed by mutual arms reduction would enable both sides to avoid the risks of amendment or rejection of SALT II while realizing the benefits of the genuine arms reductions which supporters and critics of the Treaty all seem to favor.

The danger of moving to SALT III without a freeze is that SALT II allows an expansion in launchers, warheads and destructiveness. Therefore, even if SALT III reduced the levels in SALT II, the end result could still be bigger arsenals of nuclear overkill than either side possesses today. These would be bogus reductions.

During these hearings and in other forums, I have heard my name invoked by people who generally do not agree with me at all. Some of the most security conscious opponents of SALT II now often say: "We agree with Senator McGovern that this Treaty does not go far enough to reduce armaments." I have listened to these comments without challenging the sincerity of the speakers.

So today I call on those who agree with me in theory about reversing the arms race to join in practice to devise a new strategy of genuine arms reduction. Otherwise, I must object to my name being worn as sheep's clothing by Cold War wolves whose real purpose is to invoke the dreams of arms reduction to sustain the nightmare of nuclear overkill.

President Carter, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senators Jackson, Garn and Helms, critics Paul Nitze and General Rowny, as well as arms negotiator Paul Warnke and General Seignious and many others have said they are disappointed that the SALT II Treaty has not provided for deeper nuclear reductions. I invite all of these spokesmen and all others who seek to reduce the arms race to join in supporting negotiations to first freeze and then systematically scale down the nuclear race that now threatens to destroy our civilization.

Let me conclude by summarizing the two alternatives I see emerging before this Committee. (1) We can create the illusion of arms control but the fact of arms escalation by ratifying this Treaty and then proceeding to build the MX and other nuclear monstrosities; or (2) We can accompany the Treaty with a resolution calling on the U.S. and the Soviet Union to freeze and then reduce the nuclear accumulation. I cannot support SALT II as presently constituted without some such accompanying resolution based on what I believe is the emerging consensus of both "hard-liners" and longtime advocates of arms limitation. I choose the alternative of arms

reduction and I shall urge the numerous advocates of this position to join with me. Let us have the courage and the will to force both ourselves and the Soviet Union to accept the realities of the nuclear age. We may or may not succeed in confronting that reality—either because of our own addiction to the arms race or because of Soviet addiction. But better the pursuit of reality than surrender to an illusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McGovern, for your statement.

I think, however, that the witnesses should be given an opportunity to respond to the McGovern statement. I would ask Mr. Warnke, if you would be first, and we will poll the other panelists.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will then yield my subsequent time.

Ambassador WARNKE. Might I say, Mr. Chairman, and Senator McGovern, that obviously any of us who have been negotiating in SALT II would have liked to see it go further, but we have to recognize, as I said in my opening comments, that you operate in the real world and there have to be compromises made. There have to be compromises internally as well as with your adversaries.

My feeling is that SALT II has to be viewed in terms of whether it is in fact the sound, effective step forward that I believe it to be. It is not insignificant. It does mean that it is far preferable to the alternative, which would be the defeat of SALT and consequently an increase in the development of weapons that are ever more deadly and more vulnerable and hence at a time of crisis present a greater chance of nuclear war because one side or the other might strike first for fear that it might not get a chance to strike second.

I agree also with what has been said about the difficulties of continuing arms control negotiations, but I think we have to recognize that with SALT II, for the first time we have a firm foundation on which further arms control efforts can proceed. It will not require reinventing the wheel in SALT III. We have the basic definitions that have been hammered out, primarily under the leadership of Ambassador Johnson. We have the basic verification provisions.

NEED TO FACE REALITY OF WORLD SITUATION

Senator MCGOVERN. Let me just interrupt you, Mr. Warnke. Several of you have made reference to the phrase that we have to operate in the real world. Do you feel when you are dealing with the kind of things you have been through in the last few years that you are in the real world or in a world of fantasy and paranoia that has gone mad?

All I want is for us to face reality, to face the reality that both sides are way beyond where they need to be to deter the other from attack. I think that is the real world.

Ambassador WARNKE. I think we all recognize that, Senator McGovern, but the fact is that you can't get from where we are today to something like substantial nuclear disarmament in a single step. It just is not feasible.

Granted, I do not like the nightmare logic of nuclear weapons any more than you do, the concept of mutual assured destruction. The fact that our security depends upon our ability to slaughter millions of Soviets is as distasteful to me as it is to you, but I think

we have to look at this in terms of what is the best way to get where we want to go.

I think the best way is to deal with this treaty, to consider whether this in fact does move in the right direction, whether it improves the security of the United States, and whether it leaves the way open to take the further steps.

There is always the risk that in an arms control agreement you may buy the treaty by doing those things which you would not otherwise do, but I think it is clear we are not doing that in this case.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith, do you have anything to add to what Mr. Warnke has said?

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Chairman and Senator McGovern, I would start by citing an Arab proverb that it takes two hands to clap. We have been proposing reductions to the Soviets right from the start of SALT. In 1970, we proposed an approach involving substantial reductions. The President proposed substantial reductions in March 1977. The Soviet attitude consistently has been, you have to curb—that is the verb they used—before you can consider any reductions.

Now, I am not saying they are right, but that is their position. That is why I think it is important for us to curb this competition so that we can lay the groundwork for subsequent reductions.

I wanted to clear up one point. You quoted me as talking about the long time it would take in SALT III. That was based on the assumption that somebody tries to leapfrog SALT II. Then I think you would be in for a long process. If we can get SALT II registering progress, then I don't see why the next negotiation couldn't be relatively shorter.

Senator MCGOVERN. Are you clear, Mr. Ambassador, that what I was talking about here today was not a rejection of SALT II but some formula under which, if we ratify it, we could accompany it with a resolution that might make SALT III more meaningful?

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Johnson, do you have anything to add?

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are two things. First, this treaty does provide for subsequent negotiations and further reductions, after entry into force of this treaty, the undertaking of immediate negotiations for subsequent reductions. Next, as far as the balance between us, I agree that the balance at the present time is substantially equal insofar as you can measure these things, but I also am very concerned that while we have been restraining our programs in this country, the Soviets have been embarking on a major program in spite of SALT I and I do not say it is contrary to the letter of SALT I, but they have been embarking on a major program in deploying a whole new family of land-based missiles.

I do feel that if we stand still and they continue their present programs, which they can continue under the treaty—the treaty is just a step in exercising restraint—if they continue those, I do feel that by 1985 we will be in a position of perceived inferiority to the Soviet Union in the strategic field.

Senator MCGOVERN. That is why I suggested a mutual freeze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your great indulgence.

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McGovern. Our next questioner is Senator Helms.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, before Senator Helms begins, let me say for the information of the Senators that Senator Baker will not he here today. I am very sad to announce that Mrs. Everett Dirksen has passed away.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very sorry to hear that.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I will say that Mrs. Dirksen was one of the truly great ladies of this country. I had a great affection for her, and for her principles.

ARE OPPONENTS OF SALT WARMONGERS?

Gentlemen, having heard Senator McGovern, would you agree with the pronouncement from on high that those who questioned or would defeat this treaty are warmongers.

Ambassador SMITH. I am sorry I didn't get the thrust of your question. We couldn't hear you, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Do you consider George McGovern a war monger since he opposes this treaty?

Ambassador SMITH. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand him to say that he opposed the treaty.

Senator MCGOVERN. If the Senator would yield just momentarily, I am an undecided.

Senator HELMS. I am just trying to lock you in to get one more vote. [General laughter.]

Seriously, this is an arms escalation treaty, isn't it?

Ambassador WARNKE. The answer, Senator, is clearly no.

Senator HELMS. My answer is that I clearly disagree, sir, in all friendliness. It is megatons that kill us. Isn't that correct?

Ambassador WARNKE. Megatonnage is one of the attributes. I would say numbers of warheads are much more significant. Megatonnage just determines how big a hole you want to make where the high school used to be.

INCREASE IN SOVIET MEGATONNAGE

Senator HELMS. Well, we can discuss that further, but as of June 18 of this year, the Soviets had 7,836 megatons. At the end of 1985, they will have 10,870 megatons, an increase of 3,034. Is that correct?

Ambassador WARNKE. I think that is approximately correct.

Senator HELMS. It is exactly correct. The United States today has 3,253, and at the end of 1985 it will have 3,537, an increase of 284, as compared to the increase of 3,034 on the part of the Soviet Union. 3,034 megatons, Mr. Warnke, are equivalent to about 242,720 bombs of the Hiroshima type. Is that correct?

Ambassador WARNKE. I haven't done the mathematics.

Senator HELMS. Well, I have, and I will so certify.

Ambassador WARNKE. May I ask, Senator, what elements of the strategic force are you hypothesizing in these figures?

Senator HELMS. What elements of the strategic force?

Ambassador WARNKE. Yes.

Senator HELMS. I am just using the figures that are available to me and to you, sir.

Ambassador WARNKE. Are these just ICBM's?

Senator HELMS. Excuse me, sir. I am trying to get at what this treaty is. We have had plenty of rhetoric here that if we do not sign this treaty, if we do not ratify this treaty, then the whole thing will go down the tube. I submit, sir, that this treaty is an invitation to the Soviet Union to intimidate and blackmail in terms of the oil-producing countries.

Now, I may be wrong, but I think history will prove me right, if we are not careful. I have raised this question with previous witnesses who have come here to sell SALT. I still wonder why we really did not go for an arms reduction treaty such as George McGovern is talking about. You say that we have to live in a world of reality. Well, the world of reality as I understand it is that most human beings on this earth are appalled at the prospect of dying in a nuclear holocaust.

Why didn't we take our story to the world and say, this Nation is in favor of arms reduction? The answer I get is that we live in the real world. Now, I say to you, sir, in all friendliness, that that is not a satisfactory answer to me.

Ambassador WARNKE. That is not the answer I gave, Senator. What I said is that this is part of a process that can in fact achieve very effective arms control. We are not going to be able to do it in a single treaty, and I think that is unrealistic to assume.

Senator HELMS. Well, the second verse of the song is pretty much the same as the first. I was not here when SALT I was ratified. I probably would have voted for it, but I think history since SALT I speaks for itself. I look at all sorts of figures. Again, I don't like being in an adversary relationship on this question, because none of us wants a nuclear holocaust, but it is just the simple arithmetic of the question that bothers me, and it is the matter of the administration having gone across this land and having convinced a great many people that this is in fact a limitation treaty.

Now, nuclear weapons of less than intercontinental range, according to the figures I have—I am talking about medium range ballistic missiles—the United States and NATO combined have just a little over 200 and the United States has none. The Soviets have 600 medium bombers—the United States has 66, our NATO allies have 80, the Soviets have 500. Aircraft, tactical, nuclear capable, the advantage is there. I just wonder, Mr. Warnke and Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnson, why we don't level with the American people and say, this is not a limitations treaty.

It is all right for you to say we are going to get reduction down the line, but it is not reduction in any sense. For us to sit here and talk about MIRVing, which the average American does not understand, the SS–18 or the SS–20 or silos or whatever, is obfuscating the issue.

If I am a warmonger for doubting this thing then so be it, but I am happy to be, at least for the time being, riding shotgun with my friend, Senator McGovern. As I said the other day, this may be the widest political wingspread in all of history. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you gentlemen care to respond to the Senator?

Ambassador SMITH. I would like to recall for Senator Helms that we did exactly what he prescribed 30 some years ago. We took it to the world and we said that it was intolerable to face this future, and in the Baruch plan we tried for complete nuclear disarmament. We kept it up for years, and we made no progress at all. Now the question is, should we continue that line and press for total nuclear disarmament or should we try to make more modest steps?

It seems to me the latter offers better promise than the former.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think in the atmosphere of the world today, if this Nation were to launch a genuine drive to persuade public opinion in all of the nations—admittedly they do not have the communications systems that we do, the people do not understand, but the word would get around, particularly among those nations which do not have the capability yet of producing nuclear weaponry. I think we could get somewhere. I think it is worth doing, worth trying, to say that this Nation thinks we all ought to reduce arms.

I would rather for my grandchildren to die with poison gas than in a nuclear holocaust and yet we have pretty much agreed around the world as to the use of poison gas, but we are talking about something that is unthinkable. I don't see why this nation doesn't go back to the drawing boards and put on an international public relations campaign on behalf of reduction of arms, and not merely say we live in the real world and the Soviets are not going to do it. I think that is strike one for them if they refuse.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms. The next Senator in line is Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I can see the headlines now: "Helms Rides Shotgun for McGovern," and the subheadline saying, "New Definition of Shotgun Marriage." If there ever was a shotgun marriage, that is it. [General laughter.]

I am going to try very much to overcome the instinct that I have, when there is strong disagreement with a preceding speaker, to take issue. It seems as though the lines of debate, gentlemen, are beginning to clarify. The witnesses we heard both in opposition and for the treaty are concentrating less and less on the specific terms of the treaty, on throw-weight, megatonnage, heavy missiles, et cetera, which they seem to feel do not really affect the actual security of the United States in a negative way. Rather, they talk about the perceptions that accompany heavy missiles, Backfire bombers, et cetera.

Ambassador Johnson, am I correct that you were a negotiator both in the Ford and Nixon administrations?

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes, that is correct.

SALT II IMPROVEMENTS ON VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT

Senator BIDEN. I would like to ask you this. Since you were there before Mr. Warnke, and after Mr. Smith, was the Vladivostok agreement improved upon by the ultimate SALT II agreement before us, or was it not improved upon?

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes, I think it was improved upon in significant respects. I think for those who are concerned about the Soviet modern large ballistic missile, the MLBM, in my own view, the limitation of 10 warheads upon that MLBM was a useful step forward both in practice and also, I think, in perceptions.

Senator BIDEN. Was there support in the Senate at the time Presidents Ford and Nixon were in office that is absent now, in spite of the fact that there appears to have been an improvement? In other words, were there people that you know in the Senate and other places who were supportive at the time of Vladivostok yet who seem to be wavering or not supportive of the present agreement?

Ambassador JOHNSON. Well, it is a little hard for me to answer that, because I have not thought about a head count. My general impression is, however, that Vladivostok at the time was looked upon as a substantial and useful accomplishment among most of the country, and I think in the Senate insofar as I had contact with Senators on it.

I think there has been some feeling since then that people think of new things to do and new things that should have been done, and they keep adding to that as time goes on. As far as the MLBM is concerned——

Senator BIDEN. I would rather not talk about that right now, if you will. I would like to ask any of you, if you disagree with this, to so state. It seems there was bipartisan support for the SALT process at Vladivostok which has since evaporated. It seems to have evaporated with the emergence of a new administration, in spite of the fact that all of those who negotiated Vladivostok now acknowledge that U.S. security, if it was improved by Vladivostok, was even more improved by the ultimate Vienna signing. I am just wondering whether or not we are seeing the disappearance of the bipartisan foreign policy that is called for on both sides of the aisle, particularly the other side of the aisle.

It seems to me that we are hearing people criticize the treaty who were silent when the treaty was being fleshed out. After all, 80 percent of it was arrived at during the past two administrations, and 20 percent during this administration. And almost everyone acknowledges that the last 20 percent was an enhancement of U.S. security. Would any of you like to comment on whether you disagree or agree with that? If you would rather not comment, that would be fine, too.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Personally, I just don't feel qualified to do so. I haven't been that close to the Senate in the last couple of years.

Ambassador SMITH. I was out of office at the time of Vladivostok.

Ambassador WARNKE. If I may comment very briefly, Senator Biden, I think what it shows is that the process has to be speeded up. I think there has been some sort of assumption that Vladivostok was already some kind of commitment, and that accordingly, now that the treaty is signed, the accomplishments of Vladivostok tend to be regarded as old hat. As you know, that is not the case. We now have no binding arms control limitations on offensive arms at all. The interim treaty expired 1½ years ago. More than that. So, accordingly, the only way we get the benefits of Vladivos-

tok and I agree with you that people at the time thought they were great benefits, and I still do, is by completing the SALT II Treaty.

Senator BIDEN. Do you gentlemen agree that, in order for us to avoid that pitfall, SALT III should be negotiated at a more rapid rate than SALT II, assuming we pass SALT II?

Ambassador JOHNSON. I certainly would do so. As Ambassador Warnke and Ambassador Smith have also said, I think we have a lot of the underbrush out of the way for a more rapid SALT III negotiation. All of the difficulty we had with definitions, new terms and so forth is now out of the way, so that it seems to me we could move more rapidly than we did in the past.

Senator BIDEN. To put it another way, can we afford to wait 7 years for a SALT III agreement?

Ambassador WARNKE. In my opinion, Senator Biden, we cannot, because I think that technology will continue to outpace us as it has in the past, and we will lose opportunities to bring nuclear arms under greater control. I think, however, that one thing we ought to take into consideration is that in SALT III we won't have the problem we had in SALT II of everything being dependent upon everything else.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes.

Ambassador WARNKE. We had no agreement until we had all provisions worked out. SALT III could be a series of amendments to SALT II.

Senator BIDEN. Does it make sense that in SALT III we should start to concentrate on consolidating the gains made in SALT II relating to noninterference and verification, data base, and prior notification, rather than seeking fundamental changes in central systems?

Ambassador WARNKE. I would favor doing both, Senator Biden, because as I said, progress in one direction does not necessarily have to be contingent upon progress in all other respects. I would hate to see an absence of an effort to make some more fundamental, more basic reductions.

Senator BIDEN. I hope as this debate and questioning goes on we will examine the broader, and I quite frankly think more important, foreign policy implications of this agreement, although I recognize we must at the outset spend time on the nuts and bolts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I add a point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador SMITH. I would not like it to be understood that I felt that if SALT III is not completed before the term of SALT II expires, that we will be in any trouble. I think the security of the country is going to be sound, even if by 1985 SALT III has not produced results. I hope it will produce results much sooner than that, but I do not think we should feel that we have a wasting asset here that may expire before its formal term expires.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this might be the appropriate time for me to make mention that there is a series of questions that we have prepared in written form for each of you on the panel. It is not always possible to cover every question in the time allotted to us, so I will ask the staff to submit to each of you these written

questions, I would hope, as quickly as you can address them, you would furnish the committee with written answers, please.

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador WARNKE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Mr. Warnke, you state on page 3 of your prepared statement that there are provisions in the Treaty that you would have preferred to see written differently and other provisions you would have added to the Treaty. What specifically did you have in mind?

Answer. As I said in my testimony, the U.S. positions put forward in arms control negotiations are developed by an exhaustive interagency process. That process requires the accommodation of conflicting views in order to obtain a consensus. It is apparent that every position preferred by each of the constituent agencies cannot be adopted. The product reflects a reasonable accommodation of the various views. I am sure the Committee would agree that no useful purpose would be served in rehearsing in the public record the instances in which the eventual American position differed from that advocated by any one agency.

Question 2. We have heard at least three theories as to why the Soviets fell off their insistence upon some limitation upon U.S. forward-based systems: that they dropped this demand in exchange for a continuation of their right to deploy 308 heavy ICBM launchers; that they dropped this demand in exchange for U.S. acceptance of the Soviet position on Backfire; and they dropped this demand out of fear that the U.S. would insist upon limits on the Soviet's own intermediate range systems such as the new SS–20. Which is it? You suggest on page 5 that it was in return for the heavy ICBM concession. Is that right? What, then, did the U.S. get in exchange for the other two concessions?

Answer. My understanding of the record, confirmed by the testimony of Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson before the Committee, is that the agreement that SALT II would not limit U.S. forward based systems and the agreement that the SALT I freeze on new launchers of heavy ICBMs would be continued both emerged from the Vladivostok meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev in November 1974. It is my further understanding that the Backfire bomber was not discussed at that meeting.

When the issue with respect to the capability of the Backfire bomber arose subsequently, the United States had to take into account the fact that insistence on counting as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle a bomber designed and deployed for theatre missions inevitably would reopen the issue of U.S. forward based systems. It would also raise the question of SAC-assigned FB–111s.

On the other hand, the United States refused to accept the Soviet position that the Backfire bomber could not be a part of the SALT negotiations and commitments were obtained from the Soviet Union to ensure the limitation of Backfire to the medium bomber role.

As for the theory that the U.S. conceded on an alleged position that SALT II should restrict Soviet intermediate range systems, this is without basis. The U.S. maintained consistently that neither its forward based systems in Europe nor Soviet intermediate range systems were appropriate items for inclusion in the SALT II Treaty.

Question 3. You state on page 10 of your testimony that SALT II does not constrain any of the programs necessary for our security. However, Paul Nitze testified last week that the "vertical shelter" basing mode for the MX missile was precluded by the definition of "launcher" contained in the Treaty. What is your view? What have the Soviets said on this issue?

Answer. As stated at length in my appearance before the Committee, the only restriction on a mobile ICBM system is the prohibition on deployment of mobile ICBM launchers before the end of the Protocol on December 31, 1981. Thereafter, any mobile ICBM launcher system may be deployed, including one in which a missile and its launcher move among a number of "vertical shelters."

The definition of "launcher" contained in the treaty does not preclude such a basing mode. Each side would, of course, insist that a particular "vertical shelter" basing mode permit the accurate determination of the number of launchers deployed, pursuant to the U.S. verification criteria accepted by the Soviet Union and embodied in the treaty. These criteria do not require that each side be able to

determine where the other side's launchers are at all times, whether these be ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers, or mobile launchers of ICBMs. Soviet comments about possible mobile basing have stressed the need for verifiability but recognized that such basing is not precluded by the treaty.

Question 4. Aren't you overstating the lack of SALT II limits on U.S. force programs? Doesn't SALT II limit us effectively to 120 bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles, and aren't such aircraft limited as to the number of cruise missiles they can carry by the requirement that the average for all such aircraft not exceed 28 per aircraft? How significant are these limits?

Answer. The SALT II treaty does, of course, set equal quantititive limits on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Under the sub-limit of 1320 applicable to launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kms, the MIRVed ballistic missile total cannot exceed 1200. To the extent that the U.S. deploys less than 1200 launchers of MIRVed missiles, the number of bombers equipped for long-range crusie missiles could exceed 120.

Neither the 1320 subceiling nor the limit on the average number of cruise missiles on heavy bombers is of significance in the light of U.S. planned military programs.

Question 5. What precedent does the inclusion in the Protocol of limits on land-based and sea-based cruise missiles set for SALT III? From the standpoint of negotiating tactics, how might any precedential effect be minimized or avoided? How might the Senate assist in minimizing this effect?

Answer. The inclusion in the Protocol of limits on deployment of long-range land-based and sea-based cruise missiles sets no precedent for SALT III. This is made clear by the negotiating history and by the U.S. insistence on a fixed term for the Protocol. As a matter of law, these Protocol limits can have no precedential effect because Article 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act requires that any further limitations on such systems beyond those in the SALT II Protocol be submitted to the Congress for ratification.

Question 6. You mention on page 11 the significance of limiting the number of warheads that can be deployed by the Soviets on their ICBMs. If warhead limits are so important, why did we accept a limit at 14 for SLBMs? Why didn't we seek something much lower, since improved accuracy on SLBMs would pose the same problem as it now does on ICBMs?

Answer. The limit of 14 reentry vehicles or warheads on SLBMs was proposed by the United States. This is the maximum number with which our Poseidon C-3 SLBMs had been flight tested as of May 1, 1979. Verification of numbers of reentry vehicles is largely dependent upon flight test data. Accordingly, it must be assumed that each missile type may carry the maximum number that has been tested.

Question 7. You state on page 13 that the Protocol buys us time to decide, among other things, whether our security would be increased or diminished by deployment of mobile launchers of ICBMs. How can you have any doubt about the need for a mobile ICBM, in light of the severe Minuteman vulnerability we face in the 1980s? What would be your answer to this problem?

Answer. The decision on whether our security would be increased or diminished by deployment of mobile launchers of ICBMs necessarily depends upon development of a mode of mobile basing that will in fact increase the survivability of the ICBM force. Some of the concepts thus far discussed seem to me of dubious value in this regard. The Protocol ban, which applies to the Soviet Union equally, lessens the chance of a precipitate and ill-considered decision. The decision on the particular mode of deployment of an MX missile is, of course, independent of the decision to proceed with the design and development of the missile itself. Because the potential vulnerability of ICBMs has been recognized for years, we have spread our strategic nuclear systems about evenly among land, sea and air launchers and are continuing to modernize each part of our deterrent triad.

Question 8. Why did the Carter Administration fall off its March 1977 proposal so quickly after its initial rejection by the Soviets?

Answer. In March of 1977, the Carter Administration made alternate proposals to the Soviet Union. In addition to the so-called "Comprehensive Proposal", the Soviets were offered the option of a simple treaty embodying the Vladivostok totals of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles of which no more than 1320 could be launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles, with other issues deferred for consideration in SALT III.

The completed SALT II treaty comes much closer in substance to the "Comprehensive Proposal" of March 1977 than the bare bones Vladivostok-type proposal. In some respects, moreover, it is more effective. For example, whereas the March 1977 proposal would have set MIRVed ICBM sub-limits only on SS-18 launchers, the

SALT II treaty limits the aggregate of Soviet launchers of MIRVed ICBMs to 820. On the other hand, the March 1977 "Comprehensive Proposal" would have constrained new U.S. strategic nuclear systems much more stringently than does the completed SALT II treaty. For example, mobile ICBM launchers would have been banned for the life of the treaty as would all new types of ICBMs, thus preventing testing and deployment of an MX missile on a mobile launcher. It should be noted that the March 1977 proposal would not have counted Backfire as a strategic bomber.

The differences between the March 1977 "Comprehensive Proposal" and the SALT II treaty thus represent an evolution in U.S. thinking as well as the result of negotiations with the Soviets.

Question 9. What did the U.S. obtain in return for its concession on the land-based and sea-based cruise missile issue? How do you respond to the argument that it was harmful to our position on verification to accept a 600 kilometer range limit on cruise missiles which we have little confidence in being able to verify?

Answer. I do not regard the Protocol range limits on land-based and sea-based cruise missiles as a U.S. concession. As indicated in my prepared statement, I consider this to be to our advantage because it buys us time to decide whether alliance security would be improved or lessened if both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were free to deploy unlimited and uncountable numbers of land and sea-based cruise missiles of unrestricted range. With respect to verification of cruise missile range, this too is a problem that will benefit from extensive consideration during the Protocol period. Negotiation of restrictions thereafter may depend upon agreement on new verification measures. In any event, because of our wide lead in modern cruise missile technology, the verification problem between now and the end of 1981 is largely a Soviet problem.

Question 10. Why didn't the U.S. insist on a total ban on encryption or any other form of denial of telemetric data? What would the Soviets resist in such a proposal, if they truly wanted a SALT II agreement with the United States? How could their security possibly be harmed by such a provision?

Answer. The treaty expressly prohibits any interference with national technical means of verification and any use of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by such means. Although these sweeping prohibitions would preclude any encryption or other forms of denial of telemetric data which might make verification more difficult, we considered it important to spell out in two "Common Understandings" that deliberate concealment measures associated with testing cannot be used and that neither party can engage in "deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty." Where the telemetric data relates to characteristics not subject to SALT limitations—for example, maneuvering capabilities of ballistic or cruise missiles— it would be inappropriate to ban its encryption.

Ambassador Warnke's Response to Additional Questions Submitted by Senator Church

Question 1. What is your response to charges that the Treaty as it now stands establishes the conditions which threaten our security for the years to come?

Answer. These broad unsubstantiated charges are without foundation and are shown to be false by the provisions of the treaty. These provisions impose significant restraints on Soviet nuclear weapons and leave the United States free to go ahead with the modernization of each part of its nuclear deterrent triad. Without the treaty, the nature and number of the Soviet strategic forces would constitute a much graver threat to our security for the years to come, regardless of what additions or improvements we might make in our own strategic nuclear forces.

Question 2. Can the Soviets indeed deploy several new types of ICBM's under the provisions of the treaty as some have charged, or must all new ICBM's (except one) be limited to modifications of existing types?

Answer. As set forth in the Treaty, each side may flight test and deploy only one new type of ICBM throughout the treaty period. The charge that the Soviets can deploy several new types of ICBM's is erroneous. It presumably is based on the fact that certain kinds of modifications of existing missiles, such as accuracy improvement, are not precluded. Here, as elsewhere in the Treaty, the scope and reach of the limitations cannot exceed verification capabilities. For the same reason, differences of less than 5 percent in the length, the diameter, the launch-weight or the throw-weight of the missile are not precluded because such minor differences cannot

be verified with a high degree of confidence. The relatively minor modifications permitted by the Treaty are, of course, permitted to both sides and would not provide room for the development of additional new missiles or those so improved as to affect the strategic balance.

Question 3. What was the negotiating history in Geneva—or to the extent you know, at other levels—with regard to forward based systems during the period immediately preceding Vladivostok? In particular, did the Soviets indicate they would drop their FBS position in response to U.S. arguments that more numerous Soviet systems would have to be counted? Did the Soviets ever threaten to revive the FBS issue?

Answer. As the Committee knows, I was not in charge of the SALT negotiations during the period preceding Vladivostok. I am, however, fully familiar with the record and know that it shows no Soviet indication that they would drop their FBS position. I have been told by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, who was the Chief SALT Negotiator at the time, that no such indication was ever given prior to the Vladivostok meeting. The Soviets repeatedly threatened to revive the FBS issue, particularly in connection with our insistence on some restraints on Backfire and our refusal to accept their position that rigid controls over cruise missiles were part of the Vladivostok agreement.

Question 4. Doesn't the fact that the treaty expressly permits encryption seriously inhibit our ability to verify the "new types" limits"?

Answer. The Treaty expressly prohibits telemetry encryption or other deliberate denial of telemetric information which impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. The permission of encryption of information which is not relevant to verification in no way inhibits our ability to verify the "new types" limits.

Question 5. Does the U.S.S.R. have the right to decide what telemetry to encrypt?

Answer. The U.S.S.R. does not have the right to decide what telemetry to encrypt. Only that telemetry which has no relationship to the limitations of the treaty may be encrypted. If encryption occurs, and we are denied any information which would in any way facilitate verification of compliance of the treaty, this would be raised in the Standing Consultative Committee as a violation of Article XV, para. 3.

Question 6. Some have charged that SALT legalizes the position the Soviets will soon achieve of strategic superiority. What is your response to that?

Answer. As is true of the charges referred to in question 1, this is a broad and baseless allegation. With or without SALT, the United States would not allow the Soviets to achieve strategic superiority. With SALT, the maintenance of a stable strategic balance will be less difficult, less costly and less risky.

Question 7. Is the United States contemplating building conventionally-armed cruise missiles which would have to be counted as nuclear weapons and, therefore, are effectively prohibited?

Answer. Cruise missiles with ranges up to 600 km are not subject to the provisions of the treaty. No decision has been made to build conventionally armed cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 km. After 1981, and in the absence of a new agreement restricting ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, there will be no limits on either conventionally-armed or nuclear-armed cruise missiles other than those on heavy bombers.

Bombers that are classified as heavy bombers because they are equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km are subject to the quantitative limits of SALT. It would obviously be contrary to the security interests of the United States to leave Soviet bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles uncontrolled by SALT limitations on the representation that such cruise missiles were conventionally armed. To insure verifiability, the SALT Treaty deals with the capabilities of launchers. Thus our B-52's and Soviet Bears and Bisons are included under the SALT ceilings whether or not they actually carry nuclear weapons. Similarly, launchers developed and tested for launching ballistic missiles with MIRVs are included under the MIRV launcher total whether or not they actually contain a MIRVed ballistic missile.

Question 8. Do you agree that a tougher U.S line would have produced a better result on Backfire or MCBMs? That reopening the talks now would do so?

Answer. I do not agree that a tougher U.S. line would have produced more Soviet concessions on Backfire or any other Soviet system. I am confident that reopening the talks now would not do so unless the United States is prepared to forego some of the options permitted to it under SALT, such as long-range cruise missiles on heavy bombers and the MX ICBM. In my opinion, the Soviets made significant moves to accommodate U.S. positions throughout the almost seven years of hard bargaining

and they would not now accept changes that would make the Treaty tougher on them or easier on us.

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Ambassador Johnson, you set out in your statement what you identify as the "basic concepts" of the Nixon Administration's approach to SALT II. It would appear that all of these concepts have been reflected fully in the proposed SALT II Treaty. Is there any way in which the proposed Treaty fails to meet the objectives set for SALT in 1972-73?

Answer. Although the details vary, the SALT II agreement signed at Vienna on June 18 contains provisions similar to and based upon the basic concepts proposed early in SALT II under President Nixon: equal aggregate ceilings, reductions, no FBS, and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Question 2. You state that the proposals of the U.S. Delegation in 1973 and 1974 included qualitative limitations on ICBM throw-weight and on MIRV's. What was the Soviet reaction to those two proposals? What became of them?

Answer. As I pointed out in my statement, after many months of intensive insistence on our part the Soviet Delegation eventually agreed to a detailed definition of "heavy" ICBM's and put a cap on both the launch weight and throw-weight of "heavy ICBM's. In doing this a similar cap was also put on "light" ICBM's. This is embodied in paragraph 7, Article II of the treaty with its related Agreed Statements and Common Understanding, as well as in paragraphs 3 and 7 of Article IV.

With respect to MIRV's the Vladivostok understanding of November 1974 provided a limit of 1320 in the number of ballistic missiles (the aggregate of ICBM's and SLBM's) that could be equipped with MIRV's. This was embodied in Article V paragraph 1 of the treaty. (The sublimits on MIRV's contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V were added during the Carter Administration.) Detailed definitions of launchers equipped with MIRV's are contained in paragraph 5 of Article II together with its related Common Understandings and Agreed Statements.

Question 3. What other efforts were made in SALT II to deal with the problem of the vulnerability of the U.S. land-based ICBM force? Since this is now viewed as the most critical problem we have with our strategic deterrent, why wasn't remedying this problem our number one objective in SALT II?

Answer. The effectiveness of a missile against a hardened target such as our ICBM launchers is much more a function of accuracy than of yield, and accuracy is, in turn, a function of the development and refinement of internal guidance mechanisms, as well as a function of experience, matters that do not lend themselves to verifiable treaty provisions, even if otherwise acceptable to us. Thus the approaches that commended themselves were limiting the number of Soviet ICMB's and the number of Soviet ballistic missiles that could be equipped with MIRV's. This was done in the Vladivostok understanding. (Subsequently the Carter administration obtained limits on the number of reentry vehicles that could be carried on a MIRVed missile.)

Question 4. What was the status of the Backfire and cruise missile issues at the end of the Ford Administration? Had any agreement been reached with the Soviets (even if only "in principle") on either of these two issues?

Answer. As I stated in my statement neither the air-to-surface cruise missile issue nor the Backfire issue had been resolved when the two Delegations recessed in November 1976. I do not know of any agreement "in principle" on the subject at that time.

Question 5. What changes were made in U.S. SALT objectives with the advent of the Ford Administration? In what ways did the Vladivostok Accord satisfy these objectives? In what ways did it fall short?

Answer. I cannot recall any substantial changes in the U.S. SALT objectives with the advent of the Ford Administration. The broad concepts set forth in my statement were also continued under the Ford Administration and the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 5 sets forth the degree to which they were achieved at Vladivostok.

Question 6. The Carter Administration has presented the SALT II Treaty generally as an improvement upon the Vladivostok Accord. Do you agree with this assessment? In what way does SALT II improve upon Vladivostok? In what way is it inferior to Vladivostok?

Answer. I agree that the SALT II Treaty as finally concluded was some improvement over the draft of the treaty as it stood in November 1976. I have mentioned that the sublimit on MIRVed ICBM's and the limitation on the numbers of warheads that can be carried on MIRVed missiles may somewhat reduce the hard

target destruction capability of the Soviet ICBM force by increasing the number of missiles that would be required to carry out such a mission. If one accepts the claims of benefits to the United States of both sides being permitted long range ALCM's, then removal of the range limit on ALCMs could be considered an improvement. I believe that obtaining Soviet agreement to and implementing the "data base" concept was a substantial accomplishment.

Question 7. What are the drafting problems with this treaty? What are the areas of ambiguity and uncertainty? How might the Senate remedy these?

Answer. I believe that insofar as language can accomplish the purpose, the text of the treaty together with its Agreed Statements and Common Understandings is clear and unambiguous with respect to those matters which it covers.

Question 8. In your view, does the proposed treaty comply with the requirements of the Jackson Amendment that SALT II not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union? How can this be so when the Soviets have a right to 308 heavy missiles while the United States can have none?

Answer. As noted in my statement the Administration did take account of the Jackson Amendment in formulating its position on essential equivalence. At the time of the Jackson Amendment the principal emphasis was on numbers of central systems. Eventually agreement was reached on equal aggregate levels, that is numbers, of central systems, at Vladivostok and is now contained in the treaty. As far as Modern Heavy Missiles are concerned—I was never aware of any desire on our part to build such missiles and therefore the question of our obtaining the right to do so never arose to my knowledge. Rather my instructions from both Presidents Nixon and Ford were to assure that the Soviets did not build any additional launchers for such missiles and to put a cap on the size of those under construction. This we did.

As far as "levels" other than numbers of launchers are concerned there are, of course, various other "levels" such as numbers of warheads, where we have and apparently will continue to have a large disparity in our favor, numbers of heavy bombers in which we greatly exceed the Soviet Union, and so on. There are, of course, other "levels" in which the Soviet Union exceeds us. If there were some way that all of these various measurements of capability could be translated into a single index number that could be considered as a single measurement of "level" between the two sides it would greatly simplify our own internal debate as well as negotiations with the Soviets. But I know of no way this can be accomplished.

AMBASSADOR SMITH'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Ambassador Smith, in your statement you say that "with or without SALT we are in for a continuation of a fateful competition with the Soviet Union in the field of strategic weapons." Yet you call for negotiations toward "major force reductions." What makes you think that the Soviets are interested in major reductions? Aren't you encouraging precisely the kind of "great expectations" that accompanied SALT I and which you say should be avoided this time?

Answer. No American can state definitively the extent to which the Soviet government is interested in major force reductions and under what conditions they would be prepared to negotiate them. However, this goal is so important and the payoff to the security of all from deep reductions is so obvious that this country should pursue it. That is the only way to get an answer to the question of Soviet interest. The Soviets have said that once SALT II is in effect they will be ready for negotiations looking to reductions.

As to creating "great" or exaggerated "expectations", the comments in my statement clearly run counter to such tendencies. More importantly, while no one can guarantee that the ratification of SALT II will lead to subsequent negotiations that will eventuate in major force reductions, one can say that this objective will be far more readily achieved if SALT II enters into force than if the agreemnent were to be rejected.

Question 2. You referred to the "great expectations" that accompanied SALT I. What went wrong? How did it happen that we so misread the Soviets? Why were these expectations unfulfilled?

Answer. It is important to point out that the unfulfilled "great expectations" that accompanied SALT I had to do primarily with the overall U.S.-Soviet political relationship rather than with the strategic relationship—the various agreements referred to as SALT I entered into force and have been observed by both sides.

While it is not clear to what extent top foreign policy officials truly believed that SALT I would fundamentally alter the U.S.-Soviet relationship, what is clear is that, to the extent that such perceptions were held, they were not justified by

subsequent events. It is also worth noting that the expected consequences of such expectations are difficult to specify. What is clear is that the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship has been characterized by continuing tensions and it is probable that this will continue—with or without SALT.

The case for SALT II does not rest on the supposed benefits that the Treaty will have for the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. It rests on the fact that the entry into force of this agreement will have a beneficial impact on U.S. national security.

Question 3. You seem to rely primarily on the ABM Treaty when you state in your statement that American security is better now than it would have been without SALT I. What contribution did the Interim Agreement make on enhancing U.S. security? Did it really constrain Soviet programs?

Answer. The Interim Agreement had a beneficial effect on U.S. national security. As a result of this agreement, the Soviets retired over 200 heavy SS–7 and SS–8 missiles. Moreover, they removed from their strategic forces—and they are continuing to do so—relatively modern Yankee-class submarines. It is doubtful that such actions would have occurred as rapidly as they did without the agreement. Thus, without the Interim Agreement, in all probability Soviet strategic forces would be significantly larger than they are today. The Interim Agreement did enhance U.S. security in that it did constrain Soviet programs.

Question 4. In your statement you state that precisely because of the competitive nature of the United States/Soviet relationship, it is important that in the area of strategic arms this competition be subject to some regulation and control. What evidence have you that the Soviets share this view and are willing to make meaningful concessions to achieve this "regulation and control"? What concessions did they make in SALT I, other than the ABM restrictions to which you have already referred?

Answer. The best evidence that the Soviets are prepared to make meaningful concessions in order to regulate and control the strategic arms competition is the existence of the SALT I and SALT II agreements. In both cases, the Soviets made significant concessions in order to achieve agreement. In the case of the SALT I Interim Agreement, (the "freeze") they negotiated a limit on the size of Soviet strategic forces which was substantially below the level they could have achieved in the absence of that agreement. Moreover, they did so without securing any satisfaction of their demands with regard to so-called FBS and also Allied nuclear systems. Also in SALT I the Soviets conceded on their long-held position that only an ABM Treaty should be negotiated at that time, that only minimal radar constraints be agreed upon, and that both sides be limited to one site in defense of capitals. The Soviets agreed to set up a Standing Committee to review ambiguities in the treaty's (and the freeze's) execution; they agreed to cover the freeze by a formal agreement after pressing for merely an exchange of letters and to our freeze duration which was much longer than they preferred. A comprehensive list of Soviet concessions would include a number of other matters.

Question 5. In your prepared statement you suggest that although the United States had no intention of deploying a heavy ICBM, we nonetheless were able to trade this empty right for Soviet abandonment of their effort to obtain some compensation for U.S. forward-based systems and the nuclear systems of our European allies. Yet on the same page you suggest that these systems were left unconstrained in return for the Soviet right not to count Backfire. Which is it? Did we trade these systems twice—the Soviets getting two concessions, and the United States only one?

Answer. As I understand it, the heavy missile, Backfire and FBS issues were resolved at Vladivostok. I don't know whether or not there were explicit concessions and counterconcessions.

Question 6. Did the Soviets press for limitations upon the nuclear systems of our allies? While we may have successfully avoided this pressure, are these systems really significant given the overall nuclear balance?

Answer. The Soviets actively sought to take the independent nuclear systems of the UK and France into account in the negotiations. The United States successfully resisted these pressures.

As is suggested by the question, the nuclear forces of these two nations are relatively small by the standards of United States and Soviet forces. However, the French are actively engaged in increasing and modernizing their nuclear forces while the British are studying the modernization of their capabilities. Despite their relatively small size, the Soviet defense planner obviously must take very seriously the unilateral ability of either the UK or France to deliver some dozens of enormously destructive thermonuclear weapons onto Soviet territory even after absorbing a Soviet first strike. We would certainly consider these forces as significant if

they were targeted on the United States. Thus, the exclusion of these forces from SALT II represents a major achievement of U.S. negotiators.

Question 7. You mention that SALT II does not constrain the United States forward-based systems, which are primarily aircraft deployed in Europe and capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union. But isn't it true that the Soviet "FBS" (systems located in the Soviet Union and capable of striking Europe) are much more significant militarily particularly with the new SS–20 medium range ballistic missile and modern Backfire bomber?

Answer. The point in the question is well taken. It represents the essential reason that the U.S. refused to accept limitations on so-called FBS in the SALT negotiations to date—U.S. theater nuclear capabilities are designed to offset Soviet theater capabilities which threaten our Allies, not Soviet central systems. Moreover, Soviet theater systems are more numerous and are undergoing extensive modernization.

The Administration is aware of the growing imbalance in theater nuclear forces and is actively exploring remedial steps in concert with the NATO alliance. The U.S. unilateral statement on theater nuclear forces is also of relevance in this context. Any future limitations on U.S. theater nuclear forces should be accompanied by limitations on analogous Soviet forces, especially the SS–20 and Backfire bomber.

Question 8. Why did the United States not seek in SALT I to reduce the number of Soviet land-based launchers of heavy ICBM's, in light of the fact that the United States had no such systems and that these systems, because of their great throw-weight, would once MIRVed pose such a formidable threat to the U.S. Minuteman force? Did the U.S. negotiators foresee the problem of the SS–18? Was it the expectation of the United States that this disparity was to be a permanent one?

Answer. In SALT I we did try to obtain reductions. On August 4, 1970 we tabled an approach that would have allowed 250 MLBM's for each side. The SALT I Interim Agreement finally negotiated was viewed as a first step in the process of limiting and reducing strategic arms. Thus, it was not judged feasible to seek reductions of any types of strategic armaments—instead the Interim Agreement sought to impose a freeze on various categories of such arms. Such a freeze on heavy ICBM launchers is in fact incorporated in the Interim Agreement. This clearly shows the importance we ascribed to this category of weapon in SALT I.

If, by the "SS–18 problem", one means Minuteman vulnerability, yes, this problem was foreseen at the time of SALT I and initial steps toward coping with it—within the bounds of the possible—were incorporated in the Interim Agreement.

As to the permanence of Soviet possession of modern heavy ICBM's while the United States has no such missiles, one should keep in mind the SALT II provisions which ban heavy ICBM's in other than fixed, land-based deployment mode. Given the growing vulnerability of such fixed ICBM's, it seems clear that the United States would not deploy such a vulnerable system. It seems more likely that the Soviets will start phasing out their vulnerable missiles. The question of heavy ICBM's is likely to be addressed in the SALT III negotiations.

Question 9. Paul Nitze has testified that the U.S. sought from the outset in SALT I to obtain limits on the wrong thing—seeking limits on launchers rather than on missiles, warheads, or throw-weight. Why was a launcher limit the focus of U.S. efforts? Were any efforts made to obtain warhead or MIRV limits in SALT I? Why did they fail? What is the significance of a launcher limit in SALT II when the Soviets will be able to increase the number of warheads deployed on their systems by about threefold without even violating the terms of SALT II?

Answer. The decision to limit essentially launchers as opposed to missiles or warheads in SALT was taken primarily on verification grounds—the number of missile launchers is relatively easy to verify while the number of missiles is far more difficult. Naturally, if one cannot readily verify missile numbers then verification of limits on warheads or throw-weight would be even more problematic. Thus, it was decided to take advantage of the fact that missiles are useless without launchers and that launchers are readily monitorable in framing the U.S. approach to SALT.

As to the last part of your question, it is true that the number of warheads deployed on Soviet systems can and probably will increase significantly under SALT II. However, in the absence of an agreement, such increases could be far greater. In fact, there would be no legal upper limit on the number of warheads without SALT II. As one example, the fractionation limit constrains the SS–18 missile to 10 warheads. As has frequently been pointed out, this missile has the innate capability of carrying perhaps as many as 30 warheads. Without the Treaty, the Soviets would be free to take advantage of this capability of the SS–18. Moreover, they would also be free to expand the overall number of SS–18's beyond the 308 limit imposed by the

Treaty. Thus, while SALT II can and probably will see an expansion in the number of Soviet warheads—and of U.S. warheads as well—the situation would be far worse without the Treaty.

Neither side in SALT I made a serious effort to ban or limit MIRV's and as early as 1970 gave up the pro forma effort that we did make.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just make a short comment. It seems to me there is an interesting transition that has taken place. Two or three weeks ago, possibly before Senators had an opportunity to read the treaty or to hear expert testimony, there was a great outcry against the treaty as being an act of appeasement, another Munich, and so on. Now, suddenly, having had the benefit of the testimony, the opposition seems to be shifting to a complaint that the treaty is really an arms enhancement rather than an arms reduction, and there have been more instant converts to nuclear disarmament than I would have thought possible.

Senator Hayakawa is next.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NATIONAL WILL TO FACE REJECTION OF TREATY

I would like to address my first question to Ambassador Smith. In your prepared statement, you quote Chancellor Schmidt as saying that the rejection of SALT would be a catastrophe. General Haig has stated, I guess it was just yesterday, on television, that our allies want us to sign the treaty because they are afraid we would not have the national will to face the problems such a rejection would create.

Do you think General Haig's remarks are correct? Would we not have the national will to face the consequence of a rejection of the treaty?

Ambassador SMITH. I think we would have the national will. I think rejection of the treaty would make us have to work very much harder and exercise an even firmer will. To the extent that it meant allocation of greater resources, to the extent that it made our nonproliferation problems much more difficult, to the extent that it made our intelligence operations much harder without the counterintelligence measures in force, yes, I think that we could survive it. There is no question about it.

Senator HAYAKAWA. You are more optimistic than our European Allies as regards the firmness of our national will?

Ambassador SMITH. I think the Allied position is much deeper than any thought that we could not have the guts or the will to pursue necessary modernization programs after rejection. I think that Schmidt's categorical statement of support is matched by the head of the French Government, the head of the Japanese Government, the head of the Canadian Government. I think there is a definite feeling that American leadership in some way here is at stake, and if we for 7 years pursue a line of foreign policy and then say, well, we have decided not to proceed with that, then the American leadership will suffer profoundly, I think, and the Allies depend very heavily for their security on American leadership.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Ambassador Smith.

SOVIET STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY BY 1985

Ambassador Johnson, I think you indicated that the Soviets would acquire by 1985 strategic superiority over the United States. Is that your understanding?

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes; if present trends continue. If we were to continue our very low level of expenditure and activity in this country and they continued their very high level, I think by most measures—and the question is how you measure—they would achieve what is generally considered to be a position of strategic superiority.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Dr. Kissinger once said that if we had strategic superiority, we wouldn't know what to do with it.

One wonders what the Soviets could do with strategic superiority.

Ambassador JOHNSON. They can continue to build more modern weapons. They can continue to develop new weapons. They are now, as I said, known to be deploying a whole new family of land-based weapons and a whole new family of sea-based missiles as well.

Senator HAYAKAWA. That is, they could increase their superiority?

Ambassador JOHNSON. I do not think they are now superior. That is not what I am saying. Now, these are subjective judgments. I think, in general, my own subjective feeling is that we probably have a degree of superiority at the present time, but if we do nothing—remember, we have not deployed, and I am not saying we should have, we have not deployed any new system in this country since 1967. Our last ICBM, our last SLBM, and our last heavy bomber were deployed 12 years ago. Now we have improved. We have done some qualitative improvements to them. We have MIRVed them and made them more accurate, but we have not been deploying any new systems, and I am not suggesting that we should, but I think we have to look to the balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Regarding the M-X program, I personally have some doubt whether it is the proper answer or not, or its means of deployment, but I think we should be doing something to reduce the perceived vulnerability of our fixed land-based ICBM's.

The fact that they were going to become vulnerable was inevitable in the situation. It is not whether the Soviets would actually attack or not. The question is, would people be concerned that we were vulnerable and what the perceptions would be. We are dealing not with mathematical military equations here so much as we are dealing with perceptions.

I think perceptions are very, very important.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Well, I cannot agree with you more that perceptions are the most important thing. Therefore, what arises out of perceptions are political consequences.

Ambassador JOHNSON. That is correct.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Senator HAYAKAWA. In the light of, say, marked Soviet strategic superiority, what would the political consequences be? What have we done with our superiority when we had it?

Ambassador JOHNSON. I think the consequences would be a greater willingness on the part of the Soviets to take risks in other areas, not nuclear risks, but a willingness to take risks in peripheral areas where we confront each other, and increasing concern on our part of being willing to stand up to those risks and those threats, if you will, and a concern on the part of our allies as to whether or not the United States has the wherewithal, if you will, to implement its commitments.

So, I think the perceptions that would lead to that situation would be very important and of very great concern to me.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Ambassador Johnson.

Senator Biden was pointing out that the Vladivostok agreements were supported on a bipartisan basis, whereas SALT II, which is a continuation of the same process, seems to be dividing us party against party, to some extent. He was wondering why this is so. I would say that much of Soviet adventurism in Africa has taken place since 1974, when the Vladivostok agreements were arrived at, so I think we have had reasons for increased concern.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Senator, I would not want to be misunderstood as saying that I in any way have reservations or am against this treaty. I think this treaty is a step forward in trying to deal with this problem and a constructive step forward.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I understand.

Ambassador JOHNSON. But it is not the complete answer.

Senator HAYAKAWA. At the moment, I was simply making a comment on Senator Biden's comment, and I thank you, Ambassador Johnson, for your reply.

At this point, I would like to join with Senator McGovern and Senator Helms, that unlikely team, by pointing out that it is somewhat disingenuous to call this treaty an arms control and limitation treaty when it actually seems to both Senator McGovern and to Senator Helms to be an arms acceleration treaty, which permits a considerable increase in striking force on both sides.

I keep wondering about this. If you are a citizen, say, of Italy, India, Argentina, or Japan, to say nothing of being a citizen of the United States or the U.S.S.R., would you feel more or less reassured, in the light of the escalation of nuclear weapons on the part of both the United States and U.S.S.R., about the possibility of human survival after a nuclear holocaust?

It seems to me that the signing of such a treaty could make the rest of the world more, rather than less, nervous about the possibilities of survival. You have a contrary opinion to this, I understand, Mr. Warnke, and Mr. Johnson.

Ambassador JOHNSON. I very much do. I have very much the contrary opinion. I think they would feel reassured that the two great powers in this area have been able to arrive even at this limited agreement, and that they are going to continue their dialog with each other and discuss these questions.

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Senator HAYAKAWA. Well, I must register my concern with Senator McGovern and Senator Helms that this is something of an arms race, albeit at a slightly slower pace, but still an arms race. I must say that it makes me nervous.

Ambassador WARNKE. The term, arms acceleration treaty, Senator Hayakawa, would suggest that somehow there would be fewer nuclear arms if the treaty were rejected. That is clearly not the case. It does not control all elements of the nuclear arms competition. It does have very significant restraints both of a qualitative and of a quantitative nature, so to call it an arms acceleration treaty, I submit, is a classical misnomer.

The only thing that you can criticize about the treaty is that it would be nice to have one which would go even further. You are not going to have that unless you accept this one as a necessary step, as a firm foundation for future efforts.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Warnke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NO REALISTIC CHANCE FOR A BETTER TREATY

Mr. Warnke, you stated in your prepared text,

> But I am convinced from hard experience that no more far-reaching treaty could, at this time, have been negotiated and that if this treaty is rejected or drastically altered, there is no realistic chance that a better treaty will be negotiated in the foreseeable future.

I felt that this was a rather strong statement of where we stand on this. Could you expand on this theme and explain to us on what basis you believe we would be that locked in right now if we made any changes?

Ambassador WARNKE. I didn't say any changes, Senator Glenn. What I said is if there were a drastic alteration or rejection.

I base that on my own personal experience, on my contacts with the Soviet negotiators, and on many quite spirited debates within the U.S. Government.

I think the fact that it has taken 7 years to get this far, the fact that 80 percent of it was completed when the Carter administration took office, the fact that it has taken us until now to complete that remaining 20 percent means that any drastic alteration—and that was the term I used—would, in fact, constitute the grinding to a halt of the SALT process, and I think it would be a period of many years before you could get the process back on track.

I may be wrong, but I don't believe I am.

Senator GLENN. Then you would not rule out some progress in SALT III on some of these same items that we did not get in SALT II?

Ambassador WARNKE. I think there is reason to believe that we would be able to make some progress on some items that we were unable to touch, or at least to touch effectively in SALT III. I think one of those reasons is the nature of the Soviet decisionmaking process. It was certainly my impression that one of the reasons we were not able virtually to bypass SALT II is that the Soviet deci-

sionmaking process is such that they had to get the Vladivostok-type treaty out of the way first, before they could consider something that went beyond that.

Senator GLENN. In light of what you have just said, I would come back to your statement, where you said, and I quote:

> Speaking personally, I am frank to admit that there are provisions in the treaty that I would have preferred to see written differently and other provisions that I would have liked to have seen added. In several of these cases, I have some confidence that these changes and additions would have been negotiable with the Soviet Union.

Could you list for us these changes and additions that you believe could have been negotiated? Why weren't they negotiated? Why are they not negotiable now?

Ambassador WARNKE. I would say that what I was referring to, Senator, is the fact that there were certain things we were not prepared to accept as restrictions on ourselves, and, as a consequence, we were not prepared to propose them to the Soviet Union. The compromise, as I mentioned, was not only with the Soviet Union, but among varying views within the U.S. Government. Those are the kinds of changes to which I was referring.

Senator GLENN. Can you give us a list of those things you would like to have seen in the treaty?

Ambassador WARNKE. I would prefer not to do that, at least not in a public session. I support this treaty and I am not prepared to reopen debates within the administration.

Senator GLENN. Could you give those to us on a classified basis for the use of the committee?

Ambassador WARNKE. I would be delighted to do so, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that those be given to the committee for its classified files.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Senator's request is translated into a committee request. The committee would be pleased to receive that information.

Ambassador WARNKE. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.]

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONSTRAINTS ON PROGRAMS NECESSARY FOR U.S. SECURITY

Ambassador Warnke, in your statement you state that SALT II does not constrain any of the programs necessary for our security.

However, Paul Nitze testified last week that the vertical shelter basing mode for the M-X missile was precluded due to the lack of an adequate definition of "launcher" contained in the treaty.

What is your view on this? Furthermore, what have the Soviets said on this?

Ambassador WARNKE. As I mentioned earlier, Senator Glenn, my view is that no verifiable mobile ICBM system is precluded by the treaty.

Obviously, if we were to conclude that a particular type of deployment did not provide for verifiability, then that would be precluded. Secretary Brown has testified repeatedly that anything we

do with respect to the basing of M–X would, in fact, meet the test of being verifiable.

I think the problem is a verification problem. It is not a problem of any lack of definition.

Senator GLENN. I believe he based his feeling that it was on a lack of definition of the term "launcher." I think his point was—and I think it is probably a valid point—that in the definition used in article II, it starts out saying "for purposes of this treaty, (1) intercontinental ballistic missile launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic missiles" and so on. It just defines it by using the term itself over again.

I think he questioned whether this was adequate for purposes of the treaty.

Ambassador WARNKE. I find no problem with it, semantically or otherwise, Senator Glenn.

I suggest that we could take a practical example. Suppose there is a field of 20 holes and you have one missile for those 20 holes. If all 20 of those holes are capable of launching that missile, then, obviously, you have 20 launchers. If you cannot tell by national technical means whether one of them or 20 of them are capable of launching that missile, then you have a verification problem.

Obviously what you need is a system whereby you can tell how many launchers there are and what type they are. If you have that kind of provision or that kind of system, then it meets the requirements of SALT. If you do not have that kind of system, obviously it is incompatible with SALT and incompatible with the survivability of your missiles.

Senator GLENN. It has always been very, very difficult for me to see how we could play that kind of shell game and not admit that it is a verification problem. We are designing it to be exactly that. I know they feel that we get around this by saying that it only be one per field of holes and that we have a choke point of some kind through which these things have to pass and where it would be verifiable. But it seemed to me that that was a very thin reed for us to lean on in the matter of verification.

I, personally, have favored a launcher that would be mobile. It would be out in the open and we could put big red "X's" on top of it to help identify it for them. They can identify it today, but it can be someplace else tomorrow in a crisis situation.

Ambassador WARNKE. I think that is the practical problem, Senator Glenn. As I said, under SALT, you do not have to know where a launcher is. That is not required for verification purposes. Obviously you can't tell where a ballistic missile submarine is at any given point. That is its virtue in terms of survivability.

I think we need the counterpart of that to improve the survivability of the ICBM force—something where we have a genuinely mobile launcher.

Senator GLENN. What we are doing now is taking our vulnerability, because we are tied to specific single spots of real estate for each launcher, and trading that for a few more spots of real estate for the same capability. It is still targetable, as opposed to a really mobile system that is, in essence, a two dimensional submarine system on land. In a crisis we could use our Interstate Highway

System, of which the Soviets have no counterpart. We could use it on the very large areas of Federal land that we have in the West.

In the meantime, it would be an infinite targeting problem for a Soviet targeter. That is what we are trying to do.

As far as letting them know how many we have, they can be out in the open, they can be on trucks or mobile launchers, they can be perfectly identified with whatever kind of identification we might wish to put on them. I think that is a far better way to go than tying ourselves to additional pieces of real estate, which I think would be of questionable verifiability and noninterference with NTM on our part.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would agree with that, Senator Glenn. I do not think you solve a fixed target problem by increasing the number of fixed targets.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt to say that there is a vote on at the Senate floor. Our witnesses have not driven the Senators from the table. Rather they are voting on the floor. We have now had the 5-minute bell.

Senator GLENN. I did not realize that the lights had gone on. I will forego my last question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

The committee will stand in recess for 5 minutes to permit Senators to vote.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator PELL [presiding]. Senator Lugar, would you take your turn now, please.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During the discussion this morning, certain viewpoints seemed to solidify, and it has been suggested that the opposition to the treaty centers upon the fact that it does not go far enough in terms of arms limitation. Senator Biden suggested that opponents of the treaty are not concerned any more with the nuts and bolts of the treaty, but are concerned with perceptions of strength.

I would not want to be associated with either of those points of view. It appears to me that the point of view that you gentlemen have portrayed this morning is a very important one, and that is that in the real world there has been a substantial buildup by the Soviet Union of arms during this period of time. You have made the point that those buildups were not precluded by SALT I. As a matter of fact, you have indicated that, as far as you can tell, they have not cheated on the SALT I agreement.

As I recall, Ambassador Smith especially pointed out that the Soviets have been building at such a rate that in his judgment by 1985, they might, in fact, have strategic superiority.

Ambassador SMITH. That was Ambassador Johnson.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you and I apologize. That was Ambassador Johnson.

He furthermore points out that we have not deployed new strategic systems since 1967, and, of course, that is our fault. That has characterized a part of our discussion, too, as to why we have reacted in this way.

Gentlemen, the thing about which I am concerned with regard to the treaty which you have negotiated collectively and individually over the course of time is that, in my judgment, it may not have

come out very well after it was all finished. That is not necessarily to the detriment of any of the three of you. But it just simply is a perception that at this point the Soviet Union does appear to be building very rapidly, and that is not precluded. That is not the fault necessarily of SALT I or SALT II, but that is the world in which we live.

It is not as clear to me as I think it is to maybe one or more of you that our basic strategic systems are that well protected.

Mr. Warnke, as I recall, in his statement, says that we can, accordingly, have confidence that our retaliatory capability is not in jeopardy and that a nuclear attack is fully deterred.

Well, perhaps. But this, I suppose, assumes the option of developing the M–X or some other such system to protect the ICBM's.

What I find disquieting in the testimony—and, once again, I cite Mr. Warnke as a case in point is that the protocol buys us time to decide whether our security would be increased or diminished by deployment of mobile launchers of ICBM's and long-range cruise missiles on ground or ship launchers.

Indeed, it does. But there is, I suppose, among some of us who are skeptical about this treaty, a disquieting feeling that we are not going to be able to couple together the things that we must do, in my judgment and likewise the Joint Chiefs who were very adamant about this the other day, to protect our ICBM's, to protect, for that matter, our aircraft that bring in the cruise missiles, and maybe other parts of our system.

One can say, as you have, even if you have my point of view, that you are better off with SALT because you have a procedure to keep talking about it. As Mr. Warnke says, you at least will limit the number of weapons that are being produced in a way, both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that you have a certain protection. But, even in that testimony, there is a disquieting thought that we really need SALT because the Soviet Union has such momentum that we have to slow them down by treaty and that failure to do this is likely to lead to a situation in which we are even in worse shape, granted, even as Ambassador Johnson pointed out, that with SALT there may be a strategic superiority by 1985.

We keep arguing around and around this sort of thing. For example, if one says that we ought to amend it to take care of Backfire, the SS–18, verification, and what have you, others can point out that this really will not quite cure the problem because there are other aspects of it that will bob out and hit you. It is hard to tell, really, how many things have to be cured in order for us to be secure. Even Senator McGovern's suggestion of a 10-percent reduction by both sides begs the question of what would be reduced. Clearly, our problem is if our ICBM's are unsafe and if we are entering a critical phase, merely reduction by the numbers does not cure that problem.

Let me ask this question of you, gentlemen, because you have all testified to the point that if we reject this treaty, we will not have another chance for a long while. We have no frame of reference, then, we have no way of verifying, aside from the unilateral attempt on our own. What can you do to help me in terms of my disquiet about the fact that with this treaty, I suspect the temptation will be very great for our country to do what we did after the

SALT I Treaty? The Joint Chiefs then testified that we ought to develop the B–1 bomber, for example and we ought to do a number of things. They pointed out last Wednesday that we really did not do these things at all. Now, 7 years later they have come back to suggest that their support is really based on our doing the right things for our country. What optimism do we have, given the umbrella of SALT II, the disquieting unhappiness about all of this, and, beyond that, the testimony of people like Senator McGovern that what we ought to be doing is not worrying about building these arms, but, as a matter of fact, reducing them, even in the face of what the Soviets are doing?

Can you help my disquiet in any of these respects?

Ambassador SMITH. Senator, I would like, first, to point out that we have not been standing still, as has sometimes been said, since 1972. We have been engaged in the largest shipbuilding program, I think, in the history of the world in Trident submarines. We have been engaged in developing cruise missiles which will be deployed on our airplanes, which will add thousands and thousands of highly accurate missiles.

We have brought in a whole new class of ICBM's, the Minuteman III, which substantially increased the size of our forces.

We have been spending billions of dollars and we have not stood still.

So, it seems to me that this is a pretty good sign that we are not going to stand still if SALT II is ratified. In fact, with all of the concerns that have been expressed during this debate, I would think that the prospects are that we would have little difficulty getting substantial new defense programs in the wake of SALT II.

SOVIET MOMENTUM HAS INCREASED

Senator LUGAR. But, Ambassador Smith, even while we have built whatever we have built at sea, the Soviets have obviously built a great deal more. They have developed new aircraft and clearly we have not. We may have felt, at some point, that we did not want heavy missiles, and feeling that they were unwieldy or not really our style, feeling that maybe the Soviets could not make them as accurate. Well, they have made them both big and accurate. Maybe we simply misfired in our own judgments.

Now I am not saying that we have not been doing anything. Clearly the point is that the Soviet momentum has increased, and, apparently the perception of the world is that they have been doing more. That is why we are in some difficulty diplomatically.

Ambassador SMITH. I think it is always important to distinguish between the vulnerability of one part of our force and all of our deterrent force. As far as I can see, the vulnerability of the bomber force and the vulnerability of the submarines has not been prejudiced at all since 1972.

If you are concerned about fixed launchers for ICBM's, the Soviets ought to be more concerned because they have so much greater a percentage of their force in that type of deployment.

AMBIVALENCE OF WILL ON U.S. PART

Senator LUGAR. Let me throw a further question at you and perhaps Ambassador Warnke would have a comment.

This morning we had a discussion in which we wondered aloud why the Soviets would give up the forward-based systems. This characterizes our negotiations, I am afraid, in which we ponder among each other. I think one of you pointed out that we really cannot decide what our point of view ought to be. No wonder we have difficulty as negotiators.

Did you find it true that there was ambivalence of will, not only among the negotiators, but among those giving you instructions as to what you should be doing?

Ambassador WARNKE. No, Senator Lugar, I found no such difficulty. As Ambassador Johnson says, we did, from time to time speculate as to why the Soviets were taking certain positions.

I never found that that was ever anything other than a kind of useful corridor talk, because what is more important is what they are prepared to do. They were prepared to make those moves that brought about, as far as I am concerned, an agreement which is very much in the interests of the United States.

I would like to second what Ambassador Smith has said. We certainly have not been standing still since 1972. We have been adding three strategic warheads per day under our MIRVing program. We still have in excess of 9,000 strategic warheads, as compared to their 5,000. We have gone ahead with improvements in the warheads with the deployment of the Mark XII-A. We can about double the yield of some of these strategic warheads. We have gone ahead with the Trident missile program. I believe that the first Trident missiles will be retrofitted on the Poseidons next year.

So, we have not been standing still.

I think, sometimes, people have tended to extrapolate from such things as the B-1 decision. Now that decision was made by the President and the Secretary of Defense on a cost-effectiveness basis, on the ground that the modernization of our strategic bomber force could be more effectively brought about by having long-range cruise missiles. We promptly took that decision to the bargaining table and ended up with no range restrictions on the cruise missile. I think it is a good example of the fact that we can pursue at one and the same time those steps that are necessary to improve our defense militarily and, also, arms control measures that can contribute to the security of the United States.

Now, I do not feel, for one, that anybody in the administration has ever felt that we needed a SALT agreement because otherwise the Soviets would gain strategic superiority. I don't think that is the risk.

The risk is that neither side would be able to gain strategic superiority but that the security of both sides would be diminished because technological developments and quantitative accumulations would continue unchecked. I think that is the risk. I think SALT II does much to beat that risk.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MAP/MPS PROHIBITION IN SALT II

Mr. Warnke, does the SALT II Treaty prohibit multiple aim points or multiple protective shelters for our current missiles, the Minuteman III?

Ambassador WARNKE. As I have said earlier, Senator Stone, any mobile system that we deploy that is verifiable is permitted by SALT. Under SALT we do not have to know where the launchers are on the other side and they don't have to know where ours are. We have to know how many there are and what types there are.

So, any system that would meet our security needs is permitted under SALT.

Senator STONE. Therefore your answer to my question is yes?

Ambassador WARNKE. My answer is yes—depending upon what particular details you have in a multiple aim point system or a multiple protective shelter system.

Senator STONE. There is, then, some ambiguity, and, as a matter of fact, the opponents of the treaty, or, at least, those who are opposed to the current form of the treaty, say it does not allow multiple aim points, and that that would be construed by the Soviets as deliberate concealment. Is that right or wrong?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is incorrect if you are talking about any sort of militarily viable multiple aim point system.

Senator STONE. Mr. Warnke, isn't it true that the key deterrence we have during the life of the treaty is the survivability of our current missiles?

Ambassador WARNKE. Obviously you need a survivable deterrent force. There is no question about it.

Senator STONE. Isn't that the key to protecting ourselves before 1985—that anything the Soviets might attempt in a first strike would not succeed because our current protective strategic systems would survive sufficiently to make a devastating counter strike?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is correct, Senator Stone. We are in that position and we will remain in that position.

Senator STONE. Did you hear my repetition of an article quoting Mr. Nitze as saying that his basic objection to this treaty would be largely dissipated if the treaty would permit a multiple aim point mode for the current Minuteman III missiles and if the administration would do that?

Did you hear that?

Ambassador WARNKE. I did not.

Senator STONE. He reluctantly conceded, again, that that still would be his position. The reason that he gave was the same reason advanced by the Interim Assessment of SALT II Report by the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. I will read that to you.

The panel is encouraged that the United States has taken the position that the U.S. deployment of a multiple aim point ICBM basing system is consistent with the provisions of a prospective SALT II agreement. The panel believes that the deployment of a MAP system would enhance the survivability of U.S. ICBMs and is essential to future strategic stability. The importance of a MAP system is illustrated

in the following testimony of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown before the Committee.

Then follows his testimony which also I read to Mr. Nitze.

Do you agree with that?

Ambassador WARNKE. I think it depends, Senator, on what you mean by a multiple aim point system. A multiple aim point system which, if the Soviets did it, would mean that we would not be able to tell how many launchers they had, would be inconsistent with the premise of the survivability of our forces.

Senator STONE. That is pretty twisted, Mr. Warnke.

Ambassador WARNKE. I do not think it is twisted at all, Senator.

Senator STONE. Are you saying that we could not deploy a MAP system for our current missiles which the Soviets could verify because they know how many missiles we have and we are not building any more on the theory that if they deployed a MAP system we could not tell how many they had? Is that it?

Ambassador WARNKE. I don't believe so.

Senator STONE. Well, then, what is your position?

Ambassador WARNKE. I was unable to follow that last statement, Senator.

DEPLOYING MAP SYSTEM FOR MINUTEMAN III

Senator STONE. Are you saying that we can or cannot deploy the MAP for our current Minuteman III missiles?

Ambassador WARNKE. I am saying that I have seen so many versions of the MAP that I do not believe you can just say "the MAP." Any system in which we would be able to tell how many launchers there were and what type of missile they could launch is a system that would be permitted by SALT. If it does not meet those criteria, it would be inconsistent with the security of the United States.

Senator STONE. Mr. Warnke, the only thing that was testified to here last week was that it is alleged this treaty prohibits in terms of our own strategic construction a multiple aim point system for the current missiles that we have. That was confused by some of my colleagues in that they thought that prohibition extended to the mobile missile we are going to build for deployment in the late stages and really after 1985. But actually, what Mr. Nitze was saying is that he wants it and he feels we have to have it for the survivability of our current system.

I am trying to obtain from you, if I can, a clear construction that if we do protect our current Minutemen III missiles with the so-called shell game, this would be permitted under the treaty. If it is, then there is not anything that the SALT II Treaty prohibits that we might want to do to protect ourselves. But, if it is not, then we either have to amend or change this treaty or clarify it so that it does, or abandon the idea of what the Armed Services Committee of the House, the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Nitze all say are the best ways of increasing the survivability of our current strategic systems.

What is your comment on that?

Ambassador WARNKE. First, may I say that I do not understand the Defense Department to say that the MAP system, or multiple protective shelter system, is the best way. I think, instead, what

they have concluded is that the most promising candidate at the present time is the covered trench, which does seem to me to have certain military advantages.

Senator STONE. I am trying to separate——

Ambassador WARNKE. I am trying to answer your question, Senator.

Senator STONE. I know that you are. But this gets us into the same confusion that my colleague——

Ambassador WARNKE. I am aware of——

Senator STONE. Just let me clarify one point. I will get back to your answer, I assure you.

My point is the difference between protecting the current Minuteman III missiles with a MAP system and the implantation of the new mobile missile with the trench system—the fact is that the current system of Minuteman III proposed for MAP is the shell game, not the trenches, and that Secretary of Defense Brown said:

> We believe that strategic forces should be highly survivable to insure stability and that ICBM's may need a multiple aim point deployment to achieve this. In this way, the resource exchange ratio may be made very disadvantageous for the attacker.

Now, please continue your answer.

Ambassador WARNKE. I say, Senator Stone, that with respect to the existing missiles, the only inhibition on any type—and I emphasize any type—of mobile ICBM system is in the protocol. So, it is the fact that putting Minuteman III on mobile ICBM launchers would be prohibited until the end of 1981. Thereafter, it would be permitted.

Senator STONE. That is what troubles me, because it is in this protocol period that, even according to the Defense Department charts, presented here by Secretary of Defense Brown, we are at our most vulnerable in our existing current systems.

What I am reaching for is a way of not allowing those lines to cross in the negative way during this first period in the 1980's.

Ambassador WARNKE. I don't believe that they do, Senator Stone. I don't think there is any challenge to our retaliatory capability through 1981 or thereafter.

I think we have an ample survivable force.

Senator STONE. How?

Ambassador WARNKE. Now, certainly, as far as the future is concerned, the time may come when it would be necessary to deploy some type of mobile launcher of ICBM. That period is not by the end of 1981. As a matter of fact, I doubt if we could do it even if we tried. I think the leadtime is longer than that.

Senator STONE. How long is the leadtime?

Ambassador WARNKE. I have not gotten an IOC [initial operational capability] from the Defense Department. I know of no plan——

Senator STONE. Mr Warnke, isn't it true that the most vulnerable period is in the early 1980's, starting in 1980 and running until 1983 and 1984, according to Defense Department forecasts that were presented here to the committee?

Ambassador WARNKE. I believe that what has been estimated is that there will be a theoretical vulnerability of the ICBM force beginning sometime in the early 1980's. I emphasize "theoretical vulnerability" because I think it is just that. I think the kind of

scenario in which that would be translated into actual vulnerability staggers the imagination.

However, we are free to do, under SALT, anything that makes sense with respect to improving the survivability of the ICBM force.

Senator STONE. Mr. Chairman, might I be permitted a 30-second comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. That is precisely what the House Armed Services Committee and reciting testimony of the Secretary of Defense wants to do, or at least wanted to do while this treaty was being negotiated—to protect our current missiles with a survivable mode. The problem that you have raised is that during the protocol, at least, that cannot be done. Query: whether it can be done during the balance of the early 1980's.

That is what I think I am going to have to address, because I do not like the lines crossing and us being vulnerable during the early 1980's. I do not think that is safe.

To you, it is theoretical. To me, it is very real.

Ambassador WARNKE. May I say two things?

First, there is no question of our ability to deploy an ICBM on a mobile launcher after the protocol period. There is no inhibition on testing that mobile launcher during the protocol period, and at no time when I was the negotiator was it ever proposed to me that we should try and eliminate that ban during the protocol period on the actual deployment of mobile ICBM launchers. At no point. No one within the Government ever proposed it.

As a matter of fact, in exchange for that very short-term ban, we have a ban during the entire treaty period on the one existing ICBM which we believe is capable of being launched on a mobile ICBM launcher, which is the Soviet SS–16. I think it is a very good trade. To the best of my knowledge, everyone within the Government felt the same way.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe Senator Sarbanes is next.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REASONS WHY SOVIETS AGREED TO SALT II

Mr. Warnke, you said in your testimony that the treaty places meaningful restrictions on the Soviets and nominal restrictions on us.

Ambassador WARNKE. That was a quote from the statement of the Joint Chiefs.

Senator SARBANES. With which you agree?

Ambassador WARNKE. With which I agree.

Senator SARBANES. I assume the others at the table agree?

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, if that is the case, why did the Soviets sign this agreement?

Ambassador SMITH. I would hazard the guess—well, nobody can tell why another sovereign power does something.

Senator SARBANES. It is a rather important point because I think a lot of people are asking this question. You negotiated with them. You faced them across the table. You obviously have to make a

calculation why the party with whom you are negotiating is willing to come to an agreement.

Everyone has said that this treaty greatly enhances our own security, that it places meaningful restrictions on the Soviets and only nominal restrictions on ourselves. Now, if that is so, why did the Soviets agree?

Ambassador SMITH. I think one of the answers is that they put a premium on the appearance of strategic equality with the United States. This has been a purpose of the Soviets, so far as I can tell, for the last 10 years.

I think, in addition to that, they realize that in their present rather strained circumstances, they are better off with a treaty that places these nominal restrictions on the United States than without one.

I think they are very concerned about their situation with the Chinese and I think they would like to have their relations with the United States in the strategic field tidied up to the extent that SALT II does.

Those are the three things that occur to me as possible motivations.

Ambassador JOHNSON. May I add to that my own view if we are speculating on this?

The Soviets well recognize that the American people are very unpredictable, from their standpoint, at least, that if the American people get the idea that we are in danger or that the Soviets are ahead of us in a significant way, however that may be determined, the American people are capable of exercising their technological and economic superiority in a way that could smother the Soviets—if you want to use that term—in a strategic arms race, even though it might not make any military sense.

The last demonstration they had of this was not in the arms field, but in the space field. Back in 1957, when the first Sputnik went up, it sent a real shock through all of the American people. We decided that we were not going to let the Soviets get to the Moon before we did. Whether it was a wise decision or not on our part to enter into that space program, when we made up our minds to get to the Moon before the Soviets got there, we did it. We had the organizational capability. We had the technological capability.

Now I think the Soviets feel, in part, and I do not think they should be disabused of this idea, that there is an advantage to them in having an agreement with us that will put some ceiling on both sides. It gives them some assurance of there being a ceiling on our effort of what we are going to be doing during this period even though we do not intend to do anything that is not permitted by the treaty. Correspondingly, it gives us an equal assurance. It puts some cap on what they are going to do as well.

So, this is one of the areas in which, as in any agreement, each side has to see some advantage for itself, and I think the Soviets see that as a part of the advantage, in addition to what Ambassador Smith mentioned. I think they see that as a part of the advantage to them in a SALT Treaty.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would say that there are basically three reasons. I am not sure that this adds anything to what Ambassador Smith and Ambassador Johnson have said, however. Certainly,

from the economic standpoint, they could use more money for nonmilitary purposes. From the political standpoint, I think it is clear that they would like to have at least tolerable relations with the United States, rather than having both China and the United States alined against them. I think also, from the political standpoint, as I mentioned earlier, that the current Soviet leadership has a political stake in the successful completion of SALT.

I think, from the military standpoint, they recognize that the alternative would be an uncontrolled nuclear competition with a more technologically advanced and richer country, and a competition that we would not let them win. As a consequence, they do not see any possibility of gaining strategic superiority. They do see a competition in which their security, just as ours, would be lessened.

Finally, as I mentioned earlier, I believe that they believe that if there is not a SALT agreement, there is very little chance that the nonproliferation regime can improve. Instead, it will worsen. When the NPT comes up for review in June 1980, I think there will be substantial defections unless we have been able to show that we have lived up to article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Ambassador JOHNSON. I agree with that.

EXPIRATION OF PROTOCOL IN 1981

Senator SARBANES. What will happen at the end of 1981, when the protocol period expires?

Ambassador WARNKE. I guess, since I was the negotiator at that point, I might try to answer first.

It depends entirely on whether we have decided that continuing restrictions on the protocol items are in our security interest. Unless we have so agreed, the protocol will expire, and the restrictions on those systems will end at that time.

Senator SARBANES. Under what circumstances would it be in our interest to maintain the restrictions in the protocol beyond 1981 since it has been very strongly asserted in the hearings that we need to end these restrictions on ourselves so that we can proceed expeditiously at the end of the protocol period.

Ambassador WARNKE. I think it would depend upon the particular items, Senator Sarbanes. Unless there were to be some development in SALT III that would virtually eliminate the risk of the survivability of the ICBM force, I am sure that that particular provision of the protocol would not be negotiated as an extension—in other words, that we would be free to go ahead with a mobile launcher of an ICBM.

As far as the long-range ground-launched cruise missiles are concerned, this will depend upon what happens during continuing consultations with our NATO Allies and whether or not there would be some possibility of trading off some continuing restrictions on the long-range ground-launched cruise missiles for restrictions on such things, for example, as the SS–20.

As far as mobile launchers are concerned, I see nothing on the horizon that would lead us to negotiate a further restriction on mobile launchers after 1981.

I am not that certain with respect to long-range, ground-launched cruise missiles.

But there is no precedential effect, and it is quite clear that those protocol items will be unconstrained unless we negotiate and agree to some continuing restrictions. In the case of the mobile launchers of ICBM's, I find it highly unlikely.

Senator SARBANES. If that is the case, then why is the provision here.

Ambassador WARNKE. I say that the provision is in there basically for two reasons.

First, we were not sure at the time that the protocol was first presented as to whether or not we might want to have continuing restrictions that would be negotiated as part of SALT III. It bought us time to make a reasoned decision.

The second reason is a historical one. The Soviets were proposing very tight restrictions on cruise missiles, and we resisted. We refused to accept any restriction in the range of the air-launched cruise missile, and we persuaded them to accept the short-term restrictions on long-range, ground-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles. It was a concession on their part. We got, in return, restrictions, as I mentioned earlier, on such things as the SS–16 for the entire duration of the treaty.

DO VERTICAL SHELTER SYSTEMS VIOLATE TREATY?

Senator SARBANES. Will the vertical shelter system violate the provisions of article IV, paragraph (l) of the treaty, which bars the construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers?

In other words, do the Soviets view each shelter as a fixed launcher prohibited by article IV?

Ambassador WARNKE. The answer is that if it is, in fact, a launcher, if, in fact, it is capable of launching an ICBM, then it would, in fact, violate the provisions of the treaty.

As I understand the proposals, there would not be 20 launchers for each missile, but, instead, 20 separate shelters, and the missile and its launcher would move among those 20 holes. Under those circumstances there would be no violation of that provision of the treaty.

Senator SARBANES. Is that the Soviet understanding or is that a unilateral assertion of our interpretation?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is what we have told the Soviets. It is a unilateral assertion in the sense that we retain the right to do it. I think there is a difference between unilateral assertions as to what the other side will do and unilateral assertions as to what we will do.

We retain the right to do anything that we believe is consistent with the treaty. We believe that that kind of system would be consistent with the treaty.

BACKFIRE ASSURANCES AS UNILATERAL ASSERTIONS

Senator SARBANES. Would you regard the Soviet Backfire assurances as unilateral assertions on their part to which they retain a comparable right?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is the opposite of what we have just been discussing, Senator Sarbanes, because the Soviets have made a statement as to restrictions they would accept on Backfire.

Senator SARBANES. Don't you think they should have signed it?

Ambassador WARNKE. They did sign the letter. The letter was submitted by President Brezhnev, as I understand it. I was not there, however. It was their letter.

The CHAIRMAN. It is unsigned.

Ambassador WARNKE. I do not really think it matters, Senator Sarbanes. It was given to the President of the United States by President Brezhnev. We made it very clear that we accept this as a binding obligation, just like any other international treaty obligation.

We have made no statement accepting restrictions on our ability to deploy any type of mobile launcher system. In fact, we have told them that we are planning to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Warnke, since you are so certain of the binding character of the Russian commitment, do you see anything wrong with the Senate ascertaining with the same degree of certainty that the commitment is binding?

Ambassador WARNKE. I see no objection, whatever, Senator Church.

It was very clear in my negotiations that the commitments with respect to Backfire would be legally binding.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMINISTRATION DECISION TO SHELVE B-1

Gentlemen, I would like to ask any or all of you how you first found out that the B-1 bomber was going to be set aside by the administration. Was it by direct communication from the administration? Did you read about it in the newspaper? Was there a liaison which informed you, or was it by some other means?

My ultimate question is to seek information on whether you were given the opportunity at all to have prior knowledge that you would not be able to use the B-1 as a discussion point in the negotiations themselves.

Ambassador SMITH. Perhaps I should lead off on that. I think I was practicing law at the time and I think I read about it in the newspapers.

Ambassador JOHNSON. I also read about it in the newspaper. This occurred after my resignation from the negotiating delegation.

Ambassador WARNKE. My recollection, Senator Zorinsky, is that I was informed about it by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator ZORINSKY. At what time was that, chronologically?

Ambassador WARNKE. I believe it was fairly shortly before the announcement, but I could not give you the exact time.

Senator ZORINSKY. Was it about 24 hours prior to the announcement?

Ambassador WARNKE. It would have been no more than that, Senator.

Senator ZORINSKY. So, then, what you are saying actually is that you did not have prior advance notice not to use this as a chip or in any way to utilize the B-1 as a tradeoff against any other item. Is that so?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is correct, Senator Zorinsky. But I would not have anticipated that I would be given it as a chip because it is not controlled by SALT. The B–1 bomber could be built under the SALT limitations—as a matter of fact, within the ceiling, since we now have something like 2,000-plus systems, and the reduced total, by the end of 1981, would be 2,250.

Senator ZORINSKY. Am I correct that if it is built as a replacement for a B–52, then, as a launcher system, it needs to be counted?

Ambassador WARNKE. It would be counted, yes.

Senator ZORINSKY. But at the inception, and until the SALT II agreement was finalized, this replacement obviously would have been an open-ended part of the treaty. I mean, at one time a B–1 in replacement of a B–52 was not a countable item.

Ambassador JOHNSON. May I interrupt to say at this point that during my period, there was never any argument or question that the B–1, if it were built, would be considered a heavy bomber and, thus, included in the aggregate. That was never a point of any contention.

Ambassador WARNKE. Might I say, also, Senator Zorinsky, that you would not have to eliminate a B–52 in order to introduce a new strategic bomber because the new ceiling would permit us to add something like 200 new strategic bombers—not as replacements, but as additions.

Senator ZORINSKY. I see.

Let me ask a followup question to that on one issue that Senator Muskie raised last week during the hearings.

Some testimony from various people indicated that there was possibly a less than equal ability on the American negotiating side compared with their counterparts in the Soviet Union concerning whether we got a fair shake under SALT II. I think General Rowny made the comment to Senator Muskie that he felt that our negotiating team had dropped the ball, so to speak, insofar as allowing the Soviet counterparts to gain an advantage under SALT II.

EQUITY OF TRADEOFFS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIETS

My question to you, Ambassador Warnke, or to any of the other gentlemen on the panel, would be this. But first, let me say that I realize that negotiating is a process of compromises and give and take. Could you list some of the main concessions made by the Soviet Union during your deliberations and some of those made by us, and give us your feelings concerning the equity of the tradeoffs?

Ambassador WARNKE. I do not like to talk about things as concessions because it sort of misconceives the nature of the SALT negotiations. What I would rather talk about instead is the respects in which the Soviet Union moved toward the American position and substantially adopted it.

The first of these, I think, was the one that was referred to by Ambassador Johnson in his opening remarks. They accepted what was the fundamental principle that we went into the SALT II negotiations with, which was that the agreement had to provide for equal aggregates of intercontinental range strategic nuclear sys-

tems, and to do so without taking into account the American forward-based systems that could strike the Soviet homeland.

Ambassador JOHNSON. That was fundamental.

Ambassador WARNKE. They accepted that at Vladivostok. I thought it was a fundamental move that indicated their desire to have a SALT agreement.

Second, with respect to the Vladivostok totals, they agreed to reductions from those initial totals. Again, I would say it was a movement toward the American position because of the fact that it meant the reductions would affect them, rather than us, because we were below the new total and they were some 250 to 300 systems ahead of it.

Another move on their part, to which Ambassador Johnson has referred, is that they finally dropped their insistence on a non-transfer clause—again, a very, very controversial item because we could not accept anything that would prevent our continuing cooperation with our allies.

Ambassador JOHNSON. Yes.

Ambassador WARNKE. They finally dropped that.

With regard to the question of definitions, they accepted a tight definition of heavy missiles, although they had resisted that during Ambassador Smith's SALT I negotiations and were still continuing to resist it, I think, until well along into 1975 and 1976.

Ambassador JOHNSON. That's right.

Ambassador WARNKE. With respect to cruise missiles, they initially insisted that the Vladivostok agreement meant that each individual cruise missile had to count against the total of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. They dropped that and moved, instead, to a reduction in the total of MIRVed ballistic missiles from 1,320 to 1,200, leaving us free to deploy as many as 120 strategic bombers with long-range cruise missiles, without any diminution of the 1,200 figure in MIRVed ballistic missiles.

With respect to the subceilings, in addition to accepting the lower subceiling on MIRVed ballistic missile launchers, generally, of 1,200, they agreed to a further subceiling of 820 on the combination of MIRVed ICBM's. We think this was a very effective limitation, more effective than just a cut in the SS–18 launchers because it means that the total of SS–18, SS–17, and SS–19 launchers is, in fact, controlled.

On the air-launched cruise missiles, as I pointed out, after, first of all, insisting on a limit on the range which would perhaps render the bombers vulnerable to Soviet air defense, they finally agreed, I think just late last summer, that there would be no limit on the range.

With respect to the question of limiting submarine-launched ballistic missiles, first of all they were insisting on having just one new SLBM on each side, which would have interfered with the development of our Trident missile. They finally accepted our position so that we could go ahead with both the Trident I and the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

I have mentioned the fact that, although the ban on mobile launchers of ICBM's generally is only in the protocol, they have accepted a ban for the full period of the treaty on the SS–16, which is the only existing mobile ICBM.

On the one new type exception, I think I mentioned earlier that, first, they insisted that that one exception could only be for a missile with a single warhead, which would have interfered with our ability to develop the M-X. I believe that finally Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed on the ability to have that M-X with multiple warheads sometime in the latter part of last year.

With respect to changes on existing missiles, they were first insisting on having a 20 percent change. We insisted that the limit had to be 5 percent. They eventually accepted that.

Then, with regard to verification, they finally accepted the counting rules that had been developed by Ambassador Johnson and his delegation, which means that they are now counting as MIRVed launchers a substantial number of launchers that we know contain a missile with a single warhead.

I think it is a pretty significant list.

With regard to our so-called concessions, they principally amounted to a lowering of expectations in terms of reductions. We would prefer to see more reductions, more drastic reductions. We had to accept the fact that those more drastic reductions would have to wait for SALT III. But we are getting some reductions in SALT II. We are getting some qualitative restraints in SALT II. And I think that, on balance, the movement by both sides has been much more substantial on the part of the Soviet Union than it has been by the United States.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Warnke. I am sure, after that explanation, that the Soviet Union will have a large outcry for the replacement of their negotiators. [General laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we proceed into a second round, I have several announcements to make.

This committee will reconvene in this Caucus Room this afternoon at 2:30 to hear two panelists, Richard Barnet, of the Institute of Policy Studies, and Jeremy Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists.

For the information of the press and the public, the committee will meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. to hear views of certain retired military officers. Testifying first, in general opposition to the treaty, will be Adm. Thomas Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adm. Elmo Zumwalt.

Following their testimony, the committee will hear from a second panel of retired officers favoring the treaty, and that second panel will consist of Gen. Russell Dougherty, Adm. Isaac Kidd, and Adm. Noel Gayler.

The committee will conclude tomorrow morning's session at approximately 1 p.m.—though we tend to run over—and the morning session will then be followed by an executive session of the committee at 2:30 tomorrow afternoon in which we will examine American intelligence monitoring capabilities.

Witnesses at the executive session will include the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner; the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, and the Director of our National Security Agency.

Moving to the second round of questions, I have just one question that I would like to ask. I understand that Senator Javits has a question. Then Senator Stone may have several.

Since I have to return by 2:30 to open up the afternoon session, as soon as I have asked my question, I will absent myself for lunch and turn the hearing over to Senator Stone to complete.

I will address my question to you, Mr. Warnke. It is a followup of the sequence of questions that was put to you by Senator Stone. He expressed his concern about a possible gap developing in connection with the vulnerability of our Minuteman force. He spoke of deploying the Minuteman III in a mobile mode, presumably to avoid that gap.

The protocol requires that there be no deployment of a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile for a 2-year period. But it does not proscribe against either the development of such a missile nor the testing of such a missile during that period.

Is that correct?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. If we were to choose the Minuteman III rather than the M-X missile, which the Chiefs of Staff prefer—it being larger and more advanced—would it be possible for us to simply extract a Minuteman III from its present silo and immediately convert it into a dependable mobile missile?

Ambassador WARNKE. My understanding, Senator Church, is that it would require considerable modification because it has not been designed as a mobile ICBM. That is what I meant in discussing with Senator Stone the question of leadtime.

I had always assumed that one of the reasons no one ever proposed having no ban, even for the protocol period, is that there was no plan and really no realistic likelihood of deploying a mobile ICBM, even a modified current ICBM, during the protocol period.

The CHAIRMAN. That had been my understanding, too, because the development of a mobile launcher and the testing of such a launcher, even for the Minuteman, would require a considerable period. That is why I am at a loss to see what advantage we would have in going to a Minuteman before turning the M-X itself.

Ambassador WARNKE. That is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just one question to clear up. This is asked of Mr. Warnke, although I would welcome the comments of others.

You did an interview on June 14 with the New York Review of Books. I assume that we may consider what you said there as having the same weight as what you said in your statement?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is correct, Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. That has raised one question in my mind.

You said, as I am sure you will remember, in relation to the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM's and to the alleged invulnerability of the Soviet ICBM's—I am using that word only in the sense that the critics have complained that we cannot knock them out, but they can knock ours out if they wanted to—you said: "And secondly, their own force, 70 percent of it is vulnerable because of the fact

that we can develop hard target killers that are just as good, or better, and so make their ICBM's vulnerable."

I assume that that reference is to the effectiveness of the M-X missile.

The reason I make this assumption is because, when asked about the M-X soon thereafter, the record goes like this:

> *Question:* But, we seem to be moving toward such a basing system for the M-X.
> Paul Warnke: I think that will never occur.
> *Question:* Why not?
> Answer: Conceptually, it is defective. It is defective because it decreases verifiability, and therefore you can't convince yourself that you have built more holes than they have warheads to strike against those holes.

Ambassador WARNKE. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. What is the substantive answer to the question?

Ambassador WARNKE. What I was saying in that interview is essentially what I was saying earlier in response, I believe, to a question by Senator Glenn, that I think we have to consider very, very carefully the actual mode of deployment of the M-X or any mobile deployment of any ICBM. I am not at all sure that the answer to the problem is to increase the number of fixed targets, which some of these proposals would do. It seems to me you might end up with a net decrease in survivability under those circumstances because, with the other side free to adopt the same sort of system, you would have a question as to whether or not they would have the ability either to deceive or to have a breakout capability that would give them more warheads than you were counting on. That is why I think it is very important to make sure that we make the right decision with regard to the method of deployment of the M-X.

Senator JAVITS. Here again, our colleagues may help us. That postulates an effectiveness of the other two legs of our Triad, which is challenged by the critics. I gather you differ and that you feel the other two legs of the Triad are adequate to walk on.

Ambassador WARNKE. First, I support the deterrent Triad. I think that it makes sense to have this redundancy, if that is what you want to call it, because it means that it would require a variety of methods of attack before your retaliatory force could be challenged. From that standpoint, I believe we ought to consider whether measures are available that would increase the survivability of the ICBM force.

I think we have made the right decisions with regard to the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. I think that the increase in range that is given by the Trident I, and, even more, by the Trident II, means that there is no foreseeable antisubmarine warfare development that would enable the Soviet Union to search all of that ocean to try to locate our ballistic missile submarines. I think, also, the fact that they would be able to operate in coastal waters of the United States simplifies the command and control problem.

I have also supported for many years the idea of the air-launched cruise missile because, again, that assures the penetrating capability of our strategic bomber force and means that no conceivable Soviet air defense would be able to blunt that part of the deterrent Triad.

I think we have made the right decisions. As a consequence, as I have indicated in my prepared statement, I am very comfortable with the survivability of our deterrent force.

Senator JAVITS. I gather that you are cool and cautious about the M-X.

Ambassador WARNKE. I think that we ought to make sure that the method of deployment will, in fact, do the job. If we can increase the survivability, clearly that is desirable.

Senator JAVITS. Are there any other comments on that?

Ambassador JOHNSON. No, Senator Javits.

Ambassador SMITH. No.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, all of you. You have been very important witnesses and we do thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STONE [presiding]. Senator Zorinsky has a followup question, and then I have a few to ask.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Warnke, I would like to ask you to give me some insight as to how you arrive at decisions and say yes or no, as you aptly described some of the tradeoffs. Who do you hear from or who do you check with to see if something is OK or not OK?

Ambassador WARNKE. I am not sure that I understand the question, Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. When a concensus has been arrived at by the negotiating team as to what to agree with or disagree with concerning Soviet proposals or our own proposals and you want to know how far you can go, generally, in business, you check with the boss or whomever you work for. With whom did you check?

Ambassador WARNKE. The positions put forward by the American delegation—and I am sure it was the same when Ambassador Smith was there and Ambassador Johnson—are developed by the National Security Council. Now, there is a subcommittee of the National Security Council known as the Special Coordinating Committee. That consists of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the President's National Security Adviser, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The SALT positions are developed within that group. If, of course, they cannot decide, then the issue has to go to the National Security Council.

Then the instructions come out in the form of a Presidential directive, and that constrains the SALT negotiating team. They are not free to make their own proposals.

Senator ZORINSKY. From your perception, did Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Vance have equal standing in that committee, or did you hear more from one than the other?

Ambassador WARNKE. I don't recall either one of them being bashful in putting forward his views. Of course, each was a fully participating member. I could not grade them.

Senator ZORINSKY. In other words, as you perceived it, they were equal partners?

Ambassador WARNKE. That was my view.

Senator ZORINSKY. The reason I ask is I have an amendment to the State Department authorization bill—and you have just con-

firmed my reasoning that we do not need two Secretaries of State—and only one is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator Zorinsky, I would say that it is a very different question with respect to your amendment than it is with regard to the meetings of the Special Coordinating Committee. The Special Coordinating Committee, as I have said, consists of those personnel. Their position, of course, dictates their presence on that committee. Obviously, being part of that committee, each one has no inhibitions on his ability to put forward his positions.

Eventually, of course, the President must make the decisions in case of disagreement.

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, one is billed as a personal adviser to the President and the other is more than that insofar as having an impact on foreign policy. And I think, to a great extent, this issue has an impact upon foreign policy.

Ambassador WARNKE. I never had any question of the fact that the Secretary of State was the principal foreign policy adviser to the President.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

Mr. Warnke, let's get clear what the treaty allows and what it prohibits with regard to multiple aim points as to the existing missile systems that we have—Minuteman III systems.

Does the protocol prohibit a shell game deployment?

Ambassador WARNKE. Does it prohibit every shell game deployment? The answer is no.

Senator STONE. Which does it permit and which does it prohibit?

Ambassador WARNKE. It would permit any kind of multiple shelter deployment in which the missile and its launcher move from hole to hole so that the other side could not tell where it was at any given time.

Senator STONE. What does it permit?

Ambassador WARNKE. That is what it would permit. It would permit any system, whereby the missile and its launcher went from hole to hole and hid so that the other side could not tell where the missile and its launcher were. That would be permitted.

If each of those 20 holes could launch the missile, then, obviously, that would be prohibited.

Senator STONE. How would the Soviets verify that each could not launch the missile?

Ambassador WARNKE. By having an identifiable launcher that would travel with the missile. It would be the same concept as the ballistic missile submarine. They would not know where it was, but they would know how many there were and they would know what type they were.

Senator STONE. How would the Soviets be able to verify the number of the launchers, as compared to the number of the Minutemen missiles? We know they know how many Minutemen missiles we have because we have stopped building them. How would they know how many launchers we have?

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator Stone, I would assume that the launcher would be an identifiable piece of equipment. It would

require construction. It would require being present, obviously, at the missile field, and there should be some way of telling how many of them there are. Without knowing the exact details, of course, I could not say how big the verification problem would be. The verification problem, of course, would be as much of a problem for us as it would be for the Soviet Union. That is the fundamental constraint.

Senator STONE. Now this is during the protocol. What about after the protocol?

Ambassador WARNKE. During the protocol you could not, in fact, deploy the mobile ICBM launchers. After the protocol, you would be free to do what I have just said.

Senator STONE. The greatest survivability risk, according to the administration witnesses, is from 1982 to 1986. Those were on the charts and that was their testimony.

Would we be able to develop a mobile launcher to go with the Minuteman missile by 1982?

Ambassador WARNKE. I really could not give you an informed answer on that. It does seem to me that if it were necessary to do it, it could be done.

Senator STONE. If we had a Minuteman that could be moved among all of these different shell game holes, would that enhance the survivability of the Minuteman system from 1982 to 1986?

Ambassador WARNKE. Again, I would have to know what the particular system was. I think, in the abstract, I would not be able to answer that question.

Senator STONE. But you think that the treaty itself does not prohibit that taking place from 1982 to 1986—excuse me, from 1981 to 1986.

Ambassador WARNKE. From the beginning of 1982, yes.

Senator STONE. From the beginning of 1982, but it would prohibit that from happening between now and 1982?

Ambassador WARNKE. There is no question about that, Senator Stone. The protocol bans the deployment of a mobile ICBM launcher until the end of the protocol period, which is December 31, 1981.

Senator STONE. And if we saw fit to do that for our Minuteman missile, starting in 1982, then could we not substitute the new M-X mobile missile for the mobilized version of Minuteman by taking away those mobile launchers and leaving the Minutemen in fixed silos?

Ambassador WARNKE. Again, I do not believe I could answer that question without knowing the exact system that you would have in mind.

Senator STONE. Thank you very much.

Ambassador WARNKE. Might I make one further point on this, Senator Stone?

The reason why I feel that we cannot answer that question in the abstract is that I would have to know what the relative hardness would be, for example, of these multiple shelters. That would distinctly affect the question as to whether or not it was more or less survivable than our present very highly hardened shelters.

Senator STONE. Did you ever negotiate for that system with the Soviets?

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator Stone, I never felt that it was the Soviets' business as to what particular type of systems we would deploy. I was told to make sure that we preserved the option to go ahead with a mobile ICBM system following the protocol period, and we did so.

Senator STONE. And you feel that the Soviets could not legitimately raise an objection under the treaty if we wanted to make our Minutemen III systems mobile in the sense of being able to move them among and within these multiple shelters?

Ambassador WARNKE. A system whereby the missile and its launcher moved among these multiple shelters would be perfectly valid after 1981.

Senator STONE. Thank you very much.

This hearing is adjourned until 2:30 p.m. I thank all three of our panelists.

[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:45 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Stone, Sarbanes, Javits, Percy, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. First of all, I apologize for the fact that the committee is a little late this afternoon, but votes in the Senate have occasioned that delay. As the Senators vote they will, I am sure, join us here at the table. A vote is now underway.

WITNESSES

As I announced this morning, our two panelists this afternoon are Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., and Jeremy Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D.C.

I might say that in the effort to secure a balanced testimony and in the hope that we might accommodate all points of view, our witnesses this afternoon have been called because of the positions that they hold that the SALT II Treaty falls much too short of the objective of nuclear arms control and indeed nuclear arms reduction to warrant ratification.

For the purpose of presenting that view, the panelists will present 10-minute statements, after which the committee will question them.

First we will hear from Richard Barnet, please.

[Mr. Barnet's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF RICHARD J. BARNET

Richard J. Barnet is a Senior Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, an independent center in Washington, D.C. devoted to research on public policy questions which he helped to found in 1963. He served as co-director of the Institute until 1978. During the Kennedy Administration, he was an official of the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament agency and a consultant to the Department of Defense. Since the late 1950's he has been a student of U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations and wrote a study of the early postwar negotiations entitled, Who Wants Disarmament? (Beacon Press, 1960).

Mr. Barnet is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School. He served in the Army as a specialist in international law and has been a Fellow of the Harvard Russian Research Center and the Princeton Center for International Studies, and a visiting professor at Yale and the University of Mexico.

Mr. Barnet's articles have appeared in Harper's, the New York Times magazine, the New Yorker, Science, Foreign Policy, the New Republic, and the New York Review of Books, and in numerous scholarly publications. He is the author of several books, including "Intervention and Revolution" (New American Library, 1968), "The Economy of Death" (Atheneum, 1969), "Roots of War" (Atheneum, 1972), and co-author (with Ronald Müller) of "Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation" (Simon & Schuster, 1974); and "The Giants: Russia and America" (Simon & Schuster, 1977).

STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. BARNET, SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. BARNET. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be asked to present my views to the committee at this critical point in your deliberations. The SALT II Treaty is before you at a historic moment. The

Soviet Union and the United States are about to take some major forward steps in the arms race—with or without SALT.

STRATEGIC WEAPONS THAT CAN BE BUILT LAWFULLY UNDER SALT II

The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress recently compiled an imposing list of strategic weapons that can be built lawfully under the SALT II agreement and which, in the present climate, no doubt will be built. The Trident, the M–X and other so-called technological "improvements" are creating a very much more dangerous military environment.

PRECONDITIONS FOR NUCLEAR WAR

The real issue facing the Senate and the American people about this treaty is whether it increases or decreases the risk of war. The war no one wants will come, in my view, only if two preconditions are met. One is the development of a hair trigger counterforce technology that puts pressure on military planners on both sides to insure that their weapons are not caught on the ground. That means a world of more weapons rather than less, and one in which weapons are fired sooner rather than later. It is a world in which the time for decisions about war and peace become dangerously compressed, and the chances of fatal human error multiply. That world is now being created, with or without SALT II.

The other precondition for nuclear war is a political confrontation in which nuclear weapons might credibly be involved. Such life and death struggles over which the shadow of nuclear weapons hangs face us across the world—the Middle East, despite the great efforts to bring peace to that area; Southern Africa, Iran, the great danger of a Sino-Soviet confrontation. The risk that the United States and the Soviet Union will be sucked into a fateful confrontation around one of these struggles is in my view increasing. If neither the arms race nor the United States-Soviet competitive interventions can be controlled, then I fear that the outbreak of a nuclear war sooner or later is inevitable.

SALT II INADEQUATE FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Judged by the magnitude of the crisis of national security we face, the SALT II agreement is totally inadequate. It will not stop the arms race. It does not stop the dangerous development of "first-strike" counterforce technology; indeed, the most destabilizing developments occurred during the long years in which the SALT process was unfolding. The SALT agreement does not call for the destruction of missile stockpiles, except for 250 obsolete Soviet missiles. There is evidence that the "SALT process" actually accelerates weapons stockpiling on both sides in anticipation of an agreement because to secure the acquiescence of the military in both countries, and to secure ratification in the United States, weapons developments have been approved which increase the danger of the arms race more than the minimal agreements reduce it. I am talking particularly of the M–X. It is extraordinary that almost 10 years of negotiation have produced so little.

In my view the provisions of the SALT treaties themselves, because they permit so much of the arms race to continue, would not substantially reduce the risk of war. The managed arms race under SALT is a more dangerous race than the unmanaged arms race of the last 10 years, although the chances are that without SALT the new arms race would proceed even faster.

Claims for what is called the "SALT process" have been very much exaggerated.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, since no other member has yet arrived I am not trespassing on their time by interrupting with questions. I do not think I quite followed your last sentence. Would you repeat it?

Mr. BARNET. About the SALT process?

I am saying, Senator, that the SALT agreement is not disarmament; is not arms control, it is joint management of the arms race. It is a joint effort to bring about one form of weapons development rather than another. What I am suggesting is that if one compares what is in prospect over the next 10 years under SALT II with the arms race that was unmanaged in the previous period, I do not think there is much ground for optimism. I think we are entering a much more dangerous world than the world which we have left.

The CHAIRMAN. But you went on to say that without SALT the arms race would probably be larger.

Mr. BARNET. That is probably true.

The CHAIRMAN. So, then, if you want to compare the next few years with SALT, dismal as you believe them to be—and I am not arguing that point now—or the next few years without SALT, which would you prefer?

Mr. BARNET. As I will indicate, Senator, I believe that the treaty ought to be ratified not because I think that the restrictions included in the SALT agreement would mean much to the forward motion of the arms race, but because I think that the overall political climate, in which the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union will evolve, would be more encouraging with SALT than without.

SALT GOALS NOT CLEAR

I think the reason why opposition to SALT is so much more enthusiastic than the support is that the goals of SALT are not clear. The opponents can rightly note that any agreement, however minimal, raises the emotion-laden issue: Can you trust the Russians? But the supporters—I think many of us at the table would like to be more enthusiastic supporters than we are—we cannot really convince ourselves or convince others that the arms race will be stopped, or that it will be capped, as it is said because the technological competition is in fact intensifying.

The most important function of any arms agreement in my view is to reduce the element of ambiguity and uncertainty in United States-Soviet relations and to clarify intentions in such a way as to build confidence and political support in both societies. That, it seems to me, SALT does not do.

There is nothing to suggest from the history of the arms race so far that either a weapons buildup by the United States, or the

achievement of marginal arms control arrangements will cause the Soviet Union to downgrade the importance of military power in its foreign policy. Indeed, the contrary is true. Since it is vital to the United States security, in my view, and to our economic health to induce the Soviet Union to accept a significant demilitarization of our relationships because such a step is crucial for reducing the growing risks of nuclear war, I think we have got to go far beyond the SALT II agreement. Something that goes much farther in the direction of demilitarization is also absolutely a precondition for limiting the worldwide arms traffic and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Limiting these dangerous developments is essential to the security of the American people.

SALT RATIFICATION RECOMMENDED

I believe that rejection of SALT II, for the reasons that I suggested in response to your question, Mr. Chairman, will increase the risk of war for reasons having nothing to do with the text of the treaty. For that reason I recommend ratification.

In the present state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union there is no way to arrive at a meaningful measure of arms control, let alone substantial arms reduction, without ratifying SALT.

If it were politically possible now to draft a new and better treaty in the Senate which the Soviets would sign, I would favor that; but it is not possible. I am not reassured by the sudden conversion of long-time advocates of ever greater military spending into apostles of disarmament. Many of these national leaders who now oppose SALT because it does not go far enough, had the opportunity for a generation to press for disarmament and genuine arms control, and instead they pressed the futile policy of seeking security through terror and opposed constructive steps toward reversing the arms race.

TACTIC TO DEFEAT INADEQUATE TREATY

The tactic of defeating an inadequate treaty by writing a better one at this late date, knowing that the Russians will not sign it under these conditions, should not be permitted. The result would be a negotiating atmosphere in which the Soviet Union, for reasons of pride and reasons of suspicion, will hesitate about all negotiation. When we meet again at the negotiating table—if we ever do—the problems will be far worse because of the new weapons and the political environment in which to negotiate will be worse.

Those of us who believe that the treaty does not go far enough have to judge what will take its place if it is rejected. The answer, over the next 2 years at least, is not a better agreement but no agreement. Major weapons programs will go forward in both countries. The Soviet Union will proceed to MIRV its remaining un-MIRVed missiles; the United States will develop dangerously destabilizing technologies including the M-X missile which greatly complicates the problem of verification. Most important, I fear, leaders in both countries will lose hope in the possibility of controlling the arms race through agreements.

ECONOMIC DANGERS

We cannot continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on the military without risking mortal danger to our economy, which is the foundation of our national security. In a time of austerity, increasing the military budget while domestic programs are being slashed, raises the issue not of guns versus butter, but of missiles versus the local police and firefighters. This distortion has become so acute that as we are talking about a 3 percent "real" increase in military spending, essential services in every American city are being cut.

To suggest that the threat of bluff and so-called "Finlandization" in Europe is a greater threat to national security of the people of Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Detroit than the loss of social services, the breakdown of the education system, the rise in crime, the increasing increase in infant mortality, the impending municipal bankruptcies, and our failure above all to invest adequately in an alternative energy system, is to distort national security strategy and to misconstrue the meaning of strength. The same, I think, is also true for the Soviet Union.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON GOALS FOR SUBSTANTIAL DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION

It is not hard to imagine a better agreement than SALT II. A simple agreement that would force the two sides to choose between continuing the arms race and stopping it would be far preferable. Both the United States and the Soviet Union can and should establish a realistic set of common goals for substantial disarmament and demilitarization. This could significantly improve the security of both the American and Soviet peoples. Such an agreement could demonstrably increase feelings and perceptions of security on both sides. A new more stable arms relationship ought to have clear economic payoffs so that there is a strong incentive in moving in this direction. A primary purpose of the agreement ought to be to remove ambiguities about intentions because the greatest threats that are perceived are not the weapons already built, although they are more than adequate to destroy us, but the weapons about to be built.

A more comprehensive agreement that would have fewer exceptions and fewer technicalities, that would be simpler and more comprehensive, would be both fair to all sides; it would be much easier to negotiate, and much easier to enforce.

For those that believe that SALT II is inadequate because it does not go far enough the proper strategy seems clear. The goal should be to supersede that treaty as quickly as possible with one that moves the world to real arms reduction. But the treaty for all its inadequacies and all the exaggerated claims that have been made for it, cannot be avoided. We are limited by the history we have made. The road to arms reduction and increased security cannot bypass SALT II.

Thank you.

[Mr. Barnet's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. BARNET

I am honored to be asked to present my views to the committee at this critical point in your deliberations. The SALT II treaty is before you at an historic moment. The United States and the Soviet Union are about to take some major forward steps in the arms race—with or without SALT. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress recently compiled an imposing list of strategic weapons that can be built lawfully under the SALT II agreement and which, in the present climate, no doubt will be built. The Trident, the M-X, and the other technological "improvements," as they are mistakenly called, are creating a much more dangerous military environment.

Not only is the military environment becoming much less stable but the political environment as well. The world is no longer held in check by the projection of American power in the way it was during the first postwar generation. American power has declined from that extraordinary moment when we were the only undamaged economy emerging from the Second World War, the only possessor of atomic weapons, and our dollars were better than gold. That decline was inevitable. No other power can now play that role, and there is no evidence that any other power believes that it can play that role or seeks it. But the consequence of the enormous shift of power in the world is instability and violence and increased dangers of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The war no one wants will come, in my view, only if two pre-conditions are met. One is the development of hair-trigger counterforce technology that puts pressure on military planners on both sides to insure that their weapons are not caught on the ground. That means a world of more weapons rather than less and one in which weapons are fired sooner rather than later. It is a world in which the time for decisions about war and peace becomes dangerously compressed and the changes of fatal human error multiply. That world is now being created—with or without SALT II.

The other pre-condition for a nuclear war is a political confrontation in which nuclear weapons might credibly be involved. Such life and death struggles over which the shadow of nuclear weapons hangs face us across the world—the Middle East, despite great efforts still a danger point; southern Africa, Iran, and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The risk that the United States and the Soviet Union will be sucked into a fateful confrontation around one of these struggles is increasing. If neither the arms race nor United States-Soviet competitive interventions can be controlled, the outbreak of a nuclear war involving both is inevitable.

Judged by the magnitude of the crisis of national security we face the SALT II agreement is totally inadequate. It will not stop the arms race. It does not stop the dangerous development of "first-strike" counterforce technology; indeed the most destabilizing developments occurred during the long years in which the "SALT process" was unfolding. The SALT agreement does not call for the destruction of missile stockpiles, except for 250 obsolete Soviet missiles. There is evidence that the "SALT process" accelerates weapons stockpiling on both sides in anticipating of an agreement. To secure the acquiescence of the military in both countries and to secure ratification in the United States, weapons developments have been approved which increase the dangers of the arms race more than the minimal agreements reduce it. It is extraordinary that almost 10 years of negotiation have produced so little.

The SALT agreement, in my view, raises two overriding questions. But the one that is now most often asked, "Will the treaty leave the United States No. 1?" is meaningless. Stockpiles are so high, destructive power so enormous, that the notion of "superiority" which had a real meaning in the days of U.S. nuclear monopoly and near-monopoly is an empty word today. There is no way a Soviet leader could confidently calculate victory in today's world with or without SALT II.

We need first to understand what the agreement is and what it isn't. It is not disarmament, certainly. It is not even arms control for it does not touch the most dangerous aspects of the arms race. It is an effort at joint arms planning by the United States and the Soviet Union. A highly complex document has been painstakingly negotiated over a very long time which represents a consensus on the new direction the arms race should take. It is, arguably, a better direction than that which would result from market forces and domestic politics.

The second question is the crucial question of conscience which on the day of the ratification vote every senator must answer for himself—and for his constituents and his children. Will the coming into effect of SALT II make war more likely or less likely? That is the fundamental issue. In my view the provisions of the SALT treaty themselves because they permit so much of the arms race to continue, would not substantially reduce the dangers of war. The managed arms race under SALT is a more dangerous race than the unmanaged arms race of the last ten years,

although the chances are that without SALT the new arms race would proceed even faster.

Claims for what is called the "SALT process" have been much exaggerated. Indeed, a strong case can be made that in the last few years the SALT negotiations have exacerbated tensions between the two superpowers. The unfavorable political climate for the development of better United States-Soviet relations that has developed in the United States is a predictable, perhaps inevitable, consequence of the process of negotiation. One reason why the opposition to SALT is more enthusiastic than the support is that the goals of SALT are not clear. The opponents can rightly note that any agreement, however minimal, raises the emotion-laden issue of whether we can trust the Russians. But the supporters cannot maintain that the arms race will be stopped or "capped," since the technological competition is intensifying. The military buildup of each adversary can be interpreted by the other in different ways—either as an effort to amass "bargaining chips" for future negotiations, or as an indication of lack of faith in the possibilities of negotiation, or as a strategy of increased reliance on military power to achieve political goals. The most important function of arms agreements is to reduce the element of ambiguity in United States-Soviet relations and to clarify intentions in such a way as to build confidence and political support in both societies. This the "SALT process" does not do.

Whether any agreement on arms is feasible depends upon the intentions of the two powers. Most Americans assume that U.S. intentions are clear, and they focus on Soviet intentions. Indeed, the debate over SALT really comes down to a disagreement about Soviet goals, a fact that tends to be masked by discussions of numbers, throw-weights, and other technical details. American opponents of an agreement believe that this country should not accept limitations on the right to acquire, test, deploy, and use weapons (unless the agreements are clearly one-sided) because Soviet leaders are bent on expanding their military power one way or another. Creating uncertainty, to their mind, is the best guarantee of security. They would argue that stabilization of the nuclear arms race decreases uncertainty, creates illusions for Soviet leaders that they might bring off a successful surprise attack and thus increases the risk that they may resort to war or the threat of war.

The other view, which I share, is that Soviet leaders have no such fixed intentions. There are already enough nuclear weapons in the world to make any rational leader sufficiently uncertain about the consequences to his own society of starting a nuclear war that he would never launch one as an instrument of national policy. But increasing the level of uncertainty increases the risk of preemptive war, because it creates a tense military environment in which Russian fears about what the United States is about to do may cause them to strike first. In the nuclear age no one chooses war over peace, but there are circumstances in which one might well choose war now over war later if those were believed to be the only choices.

The opponents of arms reduction believe that military power is assuming an ever greater importance in Soviet policy because the Soviet system has lost some of its attraction for other countries and military power is the best, perhaps the only, vehicle available for them for projecting their influence. This leads to a belief that the Soviets are uninterested in any significant arms reduction except under clearly one-sided agreements and that, accordingly, it would be unsafe for us to commit ourselves to that effort. But a surer guide for a rational U.S. policy than such speculation are these considerations: the historic concern of the Russians with territorial security, their growing apprehension about the de facto NATO-Chinese alliance, and the fact that their weapons programs, military doctrines, and political uses of military power have been imitative of and responsive to U.S. programs, doctrines and operations. The role of military power in Soviet foreign policy will be determined, to a very great extent, by what other powers, prinicipally the United States and China, do.

There is a third view of Soviet intentions, which says that since those intentions are unknowable they should be ignored. The classic military approach is to prepare against capabilities and assume the worst intentions. But that is a prescription for an unending arms race, and almost certainly for a war, since in that situation each side will consider itself secure only if it makes pessimistic assumptions and ensures that its capabilities exceed those of its adversary. What one side regards as a responsible "defensive" response to a threatening military posture looks to the other side like a preparation for aggressive war or political blackmail.

There is no way, then, of avoiding a serious assessment of Soviet intentions in developing a sensible arms policy. Such assessments are in fact always made, either explicitly or implicitly. To adopt either the view of the pessimists—that the U.S.S.R. will relentlessly project its power by military means until opposed by equal or greater power—or the view of the optimists—that it is a status quo power beset

with internal problems—is unwise and unnecessary. A serious view of Soviet intentions must be dynamic, that is, it must try to understand the relationship between Soviet decisions and external pressures, particularly the impact of U.S. policies. Arms reduction agreements should be designed to create controlled situations for testing intentions. In order to do so, they must be sufficiently broad and unambiguous to provide a framework for a significant demilitarization of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that is quite different from the regulated arms race provided by SALT II.

To create situations for testing intentions requires a hypothesis about Soviet behavior from which to start. What do the Soviets want? Their 62-year history suggests that, like the leaders of most nations, the managers of the Soviet state have a hierarchy of foreign policy objectives. The most basic is to safeguard the physical security of the czarist empire they inherited. The next is to maintain control over the ancient kingdoms of Eastern Europe and the half of Germany they occupied during the Second World War. The third is to project their political influence in the world on a scale equal to the United States, and some day to become the number one power. There is no clash between the first objective and American security. It is a long time since this country defined its security as requiring the return of capitalism to Russia. As for the second objective, the situation in Eastern Europe is not ideal from a human rights standpoint, to say the least, but it does not threaten the United States, nor is there any way that the intrusion of U.S. military power could change the status quo. That was shown long ago in the streets of Budapest, when it proved impossible to turn Captive Nations Day rhetoric into an effective American foreign policy. The real clash between Soviet and American objectives concerns the role the Soviet Union aspires to play on the world stage.

Ever since the end of World War II the Soviet Union has tried to establish its legitimacy as a world power. In the beginning the strategy was merely to assert the claim. "The Soviet Union should take the place that is due it and therefore should have bases in the Mediterranean for its merchant fleet," said Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov at the London Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1945. In the same period they also asked for a share in the occupation of Japan. When the claims were summarily rejected by the West, nothing more was said about them. The early crises of the cold war—the Czechoslovak coup, the tightening of control over Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade—were attempts to consolidate power over the World War II conquests.

As the Soviet Union recovered from the war it became more active abroad. In the Khrushchev years (1957-63), a time Zbigniew Brzezinski has called the era of "premature Soviet globalism," the Soviet Union gave aid to such far-flung regimes as Sukarno's in Indonesia and Castro's in Cuba. At the same time, a general support for "wars of national liberation" was proclaimed, although actual support was selective and, except for Vietnam and Cuba, largely ineffective. The culmination of the era of "premature globalism" was the Cuban missile crisis, which had two objectives: first, to defend the communist regime 90 miles from Florida with the same sort of bold stroke the United States had used many times to protect Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon, its clients close to the Soviet Union; second, to proclaim that the era of U.S. nuclear superiority had come to an end. The Soviets could now directly threaten U.S. territory and bring their missiles to bear on political crises as the United States had done so many times. The move succeeded in its first purpose and failed in its second. Indeed, the confrontation dramatized the reality that the United States had a huge military superiority which, American officials immediately made clear, they intended to keep. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told a Senate Committee in 1964 that "any disarmament treaty or agreement . . . that we participate in must be one in which we maintain what I call our favorable differential balance of power." The theory remained that U.S. strategic power to threaten the Soviet homeland and the capacity to project conventional forces to every corner of the globe were necessary to contain Soviet expansion.

The Soviets immediately launched a military buildup that was designed to erase the American political advantage, and to make sure, as their diplomats kept saying, that future confrontations would never be resolved in the same humiliating way. In the intervening years the military buildup has continued at a steady pace; Soviet rhetoric is much more moderate than in Khrushchev's time, with the former chairman openly condemned as an adventurer; and as the Soviets have built up their missiles they have stopped rattling them. But they are exhibiting a greater willingness to project power at a distance where the opportunity presents itself, notably in Africa.

Just as in military hardware, the Soviet Union has been three to five years behind the United States in developing major new weapons systems, so in acquiring

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the political accoutrements of superpower status—"show the flag" naval power, proxy armies, military aid—the Soviets have been imitators. Compared with the far-flung network of bases, alliances, aid programs and covert operations maintained over the years by the United States, the Soviet effort is modest; but we should assume that in the present environment it will increase. Like their now impressive military forces, the increased propensity to take political risks in, say, Africa, are designed to make a statement: anything the United States can do, we can do—perhaps not on the same scale, but for the first time we are now in the same league.

As Soviet military power has increased, their political problems have multiplied. The Chinese enmity is an obsession and the U.S.-China rapprochement poses the nightmare of a two-front war. The splintering of the international communist movement has made it clear, if illusions ever existed, that the triumph of political movements in other countries calling themselves Marxist does not necessarily add to the power of the Soviet state. The record of Soviet expulsions from the Middle East and Africa—Egypt, Sudan, Somalia—suggest that even in areas of great political vulnerability for the United States, the Soviet Union finds it hard to triumph.

There is nothing to suggest from the history of the arms race so far that either a weapons buildup by the United States or the achievement of marginal arms control arrangements will cause the Soviet Union to downgrade the importance of military power in its foreign policy. Indeed, the contrary is true. It is vital to U.S. security and to its economic health to induce the Soviet Union to accept a significant demilitarization of superpower relationships, because such a step is crucial for reducing the growing risks of nuclear war. It is also a precondition for limiting the worldwide arms traffic and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A negotiating framework for demilitarizing the U.S.-Soviet relationship and for reversing the arms race would need to have clear goals and make explicit recognition of the interrelatedness of such crucial matters as strategic weapons, conventional forces in Europe and overseas bases. Such a framework would really represent a return to the approach embodied in the McCloy-Zorin Agreement of Principles of 1961 for staged comprehensive disarmament agreements leading to "general and complete disarmament." That approach was abandoned in the mid-1960s in favor of piecemeal negotiations on strategic weapons systems and later on conventional force reductions in Europe, because broad agreements were considered visionary or worse—cynical propaganda. Step-by-step negotiations were considered the "serious" way to confront the arms race. When the Soviets stopped talking about "general and complete disarmament" and entered negotiations for the control of ICBMs, they demonstrated, as Henry Kissinger and others used to say, that they were "serious." But for many reasons—the relentless pace of technological development, the volatility of political moods in the United States, the cumbersome Soviet bureaucracy—small agreements may turn out to be more visionary than substantial agreements, that is, agreements with benefits for both sides that clearly outweigh the risks, and with the ability to communicate unambiguous intentions.

Nevertheless, for all its inadequacies, I believe that rejection of SALT II by the Senate will increase the risk of war for reasons having nothing to do with the text of the treaty, and for that reason I recommend ratification. My reason is a simple one. In the present state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union there is no way to arrive at a meaningful measure of arms control, let alone substantial arms reduction, which is now our only road to national security, without ratifying SALT. If it were politically possible to draft a new and better treaty in the Senate which the Soviets would sign, I would favor it. But it is not possible.

I am not reassured by the sudden conversion of long-time advocates of ever greater military spending into apostles of disarmament. Many of these national leaders who now oppose SALT because it does not go far enough had the opportunity for a generation to press for disarmament and genuine arms control and instead they pressed the futile policy of seeking security through terror and opposed every constructive step towards reversing the arms race. The sense of the Senate could be expressed in the strongest terms that the SALT II treaty should not be allowed to stand for more than a few months, that it should be immediately superceded by a negotiated moratorium on new weapons and a program of substantial reductions. But the tactic of defeating an inadequate treaty by writing a better one at this late date, knowing that the Russians will not sign it under these conditions, should not be permitted. The result will be a negotiating atmosphere in which the Soviet Union for reasons of pride and reasons of suspicion, will hesitate about all negotiation. When we meet again at the negotiating table, if we ever do, the problems will be far worse because of thew new weapons and the political environment in which to negotiate will be worse.

Those of us who believe that the treaty does not go far enough have to judge what will take its place if it is rejected. The answer over the next two years at least is not a better agreement but no agreement. Major weapons programs will go forward in both countries. The Soviet Union will proceed to MIRV its remaining un-MIRVed missiles. The U.S. will develop the dangerously destabilizing technologies, including the M-X missile which greatly complicates the problem of verification. Most important, leaders in both countries will lose hope in the possibility of controlling the arms race through agreements.

The only road to national security is to stop and to reverse the arms race. We have the technological capability to match any conceivable Soviet buildup. But we cannot continue to spend hundreds of billions on the military without risking mortal danger to our economy which is the foundation of our national strength. In a time of austerity, increasing the military budget while the domestic programs are being slashed raises the issue, not of guns versus butter, but of missiles versus the local police and firefighters. The distortion of priorities has become so acute that as the Administration counsels a three percent "real" increase in military spending each year, essential services in every major American city are being cut. To suggest that the threat of "Finlandization" in Europe is a greater threat to the people of Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles or Detroit than the loss of social services, the breakdown of the education system, the rise in crime, the alarming increase in infant mortality, the impending municipal bankruptcies, or the failure to invest in an alternative energy system is to distort national security strategy, and to misconstrue the meaning of "strength."

The same is also true of the Soviet Union. For both of us the return on investment in the military is declining. The heavy burden of the military preempts not just scarce capital, but political energy and managerial skill needed to address the real threats facing Soviet society. Because of the military burden, the Soviet Union is unable to develop its productive capacity. Instead of developing a domestic capacity to satisfy the sharply increased expectations of Soviet citizens for a better diet and a better standard of living, Soviet leaders find themselves importing grain to support the new meat-eating habits of the population and deferring critical investments in the engines of the economy.

We can spend almost two trillion dollars in the next ten years in pursuit of a "defense" that no longer exists and they can spend an equivalent sum, and in the end both will be poorer and more vulnerable because the level of destructive power in the world will have gone up. Neither will have a secure defense because there is no defense in the nuclear age.

The Soviet leaders, I believe, understand this fact of life. For the Soviet Union SALT is a political symbol. If this treaty cannot be ratified, as minimal and as hedged as it is, then no agreement with the U.S. on arms is possible. The whole history of U.S.-Soviet negotiations since 1974 has given the Soviets little reason for confidence. On crucial issues the Administration has changed positions, as in the March 1977 proposals, and the Senate has refused to approve credits and most-favored-nation status which the Soviets had been led to expect. These developments, it will be said, are inherent in our system of separation of powers and quadrennial elections. They were risks the Soviets took in negotiating with us. That is true, but whatever the merits of the new negotiating positions and Senate reservations, they make up a picture from the Soviet perspective of an unreliable negotiating partner. It is not in the American interest to have the Soviet leadership conclude that negotiations with the U.S. are hopeless. Were that to happen, we would face, in my opinion, an accelerated military buildup and the possibility of a more activist foreign policy designed to break out of the increasingly isolated position in which the Soviet Union finds itself. In a world without arms control the U.S.-West German-Japanese-Chinese relationship becomes more threatening in Soviet eyes. Every missile not in the Soviet Union is now assumed to be aimed at the Soviet Union. It is not in the interests of the U.S. that Soviet leaders feel isolated or cornered.

It is not hard to imagine a better agreement than SALT II. A simple agreement that would force the two sides to choose between continuing the arms race or stopping it would be far preferable. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union can and should establsh a realistic set of common goals for substantial disarmament and demilitarization that could significantly improve the political climate, reduce the risks of confrontation, and improve the security of both the American and Soviet peoples. To create a positive political climate in which it becomes possible to reverse the arms race, arms agreements should meet three criteria. First, the agreements should demonstrably increase perceptions of security on both sides. Second, a stable new arms relationship should have clear economic payoffs for both sides. Third, the

primary purpose of the agreement should be to remove ambiguities about intentions. The greatest perceived threats are not the weapons already built, although they are more than adequate to destroy both societies, but the weapons about to be built. New weapons systems convey threatening intenions and raise unanswerable questions: Are the Soviets seeking "superiority"? If so, is it to neutralize the effects of 30 years of U.S. "superiority," or do they really expect to play a similar role themselves in the next 30 years? No one can provide definitive answers about these matters. To have the questions occupy center stage is already disturbing the political atmosphere, and introducing a note of hysteria into a set of issues on which the soberest judgments must be made.

The question of ultimate intentions cannot be answered, but it can be rendered irrelevant by an agreement which is sufficiently clear and comprehensive. Within a controlled but continuing nuclear arms race there is always room for arguing that the agreement favors one side or the other. However, a freeze on all new nuclear weapons systems would make it clear that both sides indeed intend to stop the arms race.

It is in the interest of the United States to press for a halt of nuclear weapons and missile production this year. A rough balance of nuclear forces now exists—a balance which, in the view of the Administration, still favors the United States. The next round of the arms race can only work to the economic and strategic disadvantage of this country and create new perils for the entire world.

A more comprehensive agreement would have fewer exceptions and fewer technicalities. The simpler and more comprehensive, the fairer it is likely to appear to both sides. It would be simpler to understand and verify. It would fulfill the primary purpose of arms agreements by removing ambiguities about intentions. I believe that a mutually agreed upon moratorium on the procurement, testing, and deployment of all bombers, missiles, and warheads for three years is in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. During such a period the two sides could, I would hope, negotiate deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Such agreements would require significant internal changes in the national security establishments of both societies, including a serious program for conversion of military industy. Such changes represent the most reliable form of verification for they require leaders in both countries to reverse major policies and to confront powerful domestic interests in order to commit the society to arms reduction. Real internal changes in the direction of peace are far more reassuring than professions of peace or agreements like SALT II that are compatible with either an intention to move to arms limitation or to a new stage in the arms race.

For those who believe that SALT II is inadequate because it does not go far enough the proper strategy seems clear. The goal should be to supercede SALT II as quickly as possible with a treaty that moves the world to real arms reduction. But the treaty for all its inadequacies and all the exaggerated claims that have been made for it, cannot be avoided. We are limited by the history we have made. The road to arms reduction and increased security cannot bypass SALT II.

Senator McGOVERN [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Barnet. We will proceed now to Dr. Stone.

Senator Church went to vote, and when he returns I will take his place on the voting line; but I hope I will be back in time for the questions.

STATEMENT OF JEREMY J. STONE, DIRECTOR, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dr. STONE. Thank you, Senator McGovern. Let me first say that I would like to have this testimony put in the record in full, along with two pages of supplemental testimony, Mr. Chairman, after which I would, rather than read the testimony, speak it to you.

Senator McGOVERN. Fine. Without objection, that material will be included in the record.

Dr. STONE. Let me say first, it is a great privilege to appear before this most distinguished committee on this important occasion. I propose to treat this invitation to testify as an invitation for my personal views, but in fact much of the thrust of the policy

conclusions to be presented here have been approved by the elected council of our organization, as is indicated in my testimony.

I am not, as the chairman suggested earlier, actually an opponent of the treaty, but rather a critic of the treaty. Much as General Rowny, earlier in these hearings, suggested leaving it to the Senate to decide what is to be done about the treaty, I would simply propose to give my criticisms of the treaty; but I would go a little bit further than General Rowny did, and propose my approach as to how the Senate might best deal with this problem of a treaty which is basically a fait accompli—one that has been worked on for a very long time, and one which a very large number of people have a great stake in having ratified on both sides of the world.

TREATY RATIFICATION SUPPORTED

Let me summarize the conclusion I am reaching right at the beginning. I think that the treaty should be ratified, but only with the kind of understanding that you, Senator McGovern, were suggesting this morning, that something better would come next time.

I think there have to be very specific assurances demanded by the Senate if one can expect Moscow and Washington to reach more substantive treaties than they have so far in this lengthy arms control process which has produced, I think, so little in the way of offensive weapons arms control.

CONSENSUS FOR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES

I suggest that there are two methods by which one could get a consensus for arms control treaties. The method that has been used so far by Moscow and Washington is to hollow out the substance of the treaties and thus to get agreement on treaties which are by and large basically cosmetic. In other words, agreement is reached by agreeing that if one side wants to buy this weapons system, then the other can do it too. If both can do it, then there will not be major complaints from the defense ministries of either side. So, a consensus is worked out on a basically superficial treaty.

It is not necessary, it seems to me, to pursue consensus through this unfortunate method.

Senator BIDEN. I will stay, do not worry.

Senator MCGOVERN. We have a series of rollcalls going, so people will get up and down all afternoon. I hope, you understand what is going on.

Dr. STONE. I understand quite well.

It is not necessary, in my view, to achieve consensus on arms control treaties by hollowing out their substance. It seems to me there is another route, and this route has been revealed in the hearings during the last week. There is now a broad national consensus, at least on paper, that substantial reduction should follow this agreement. I propose that the Senate work out resolutions of instruction to the negotiators as to what substantial reductions would be acceptable to the Senate, and then urge the negotiators not to come back without these agreements.

I believe this course would strengthen the hand of our negotiators. It is not easy to get reductions. But if the Senate—as a sort of

third force in the Moscow, Washington, and Senate triangle—said: "No treaty will be considered satisfactory unless it has major reductions and reductions which also resolve strategic instabilities," then I think our negotiators would be in a better position to get just that.

SOMETHING FOR NOTHING

I think the present treaty is basically something for nothing. I think a vote against this treaty would be, from a strategic point of view, a vote against a treaty that does something for us at no cost to us. I think that has come out rather clearly in the hearings so far. The Joint Chiefs called the restrictions on us "quite negligible." The President told Congress no reasonable planned program of the United States would be precluded in this agreement, and I believe that is true.

On the other hand, the Soviets have given up certain improvements which, in the absence of the treaty, they could make, mainly in numbers of missiles and in numbers of warheads. Whether or not they were actually planning to make those improvements is not clear. But I think the chances are, looking at the treaty as a whole, that we got a little something for nothing. We got this, basically, for political reasons—the Soviets wanting a treaty for a number of political reasons on which the Senators are more expert than I.

So I think the doves are the people that have a right to complain about this treaty, not the hawks. I think that SALT I, and the Vladivostok Agreement, limited numbers of strategic vehicles only when warheads had become the important element in the arms race. Now this agreement has fractionation limits controlling the numbers of warheads, but only when both sides are fairly well saturated with numbers of warheads.

CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

In the meantime we have included in the treaty, at our insistence, permission to go forward with the cruise missile. The cruise missile will cause us as many difficulties in SALT III, IV, V, and VI as MIRV is already causing difficulties in SALT II and III.

So, I do not think there is any doubt that both sides will be farther from disarmament in 1985 when the treaty ends than they are today, just as we are worse off today than we were when the negotiations began.

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me, when you say we are worse off, you mean we are worse off on the road to arms control, or worse off in terms of our security?

Dr. STONE. Worse off on the road to arms control. I am giving now what I would say are the rights of the doves to complain. I would like to show one chart here, if I may, to bear this out.

This chart is a chart that the Defense Department showed to you earlier in the hearings, which I have simply copied. The only reason I show it to you again is that the Defense Department said that the numbers on the chart were classified, and of course it is a trivial matter in this particular case to put the numbers on it. So, I have summarily declassified this chart.

Senator BIDEN. Congratulations.

Dr. STONE. Thank you. It was quite simple, actually.

The Defense Department showed this chart in order to show that its plans would maintain more warheads on our online forces than the Soviet Union would have, over the given time period. But I propose to draw your attention to the numbers that would be on the chart if the Defense Department had shown them. This lower number is 3,000 warheads; this is 6,000; this is 9,000; this is 12,000; this is 15,000. Each major power here has about 100 cities of significant size. If one warhead were detonated on each of those cities, the heart of the city, if not the total city, would be eliminated.

If I tried to point out to you 100 warheads on this chart you would not be able to see it, even if you were standing as close to this chart as I am standing now. One hundred warheads would be one-eighth of an inch high on the graph. What I am pointing out is that, with the 10,000 warheads we are now approaching, we will have approximately 100 warheads for each major Soviet city. The Soviet Union is reaching this level, also.

So, with this Defense Department chart, Mr. Chairman, on which I have just put on the numbers, I am providing a visual impression of the fact that a factor of a hundred in the number of warheads that one might need for deterrence is a very large factor indeed. A hundred warheads would hardly show on the bottom of this chart.

Now, as you know, members of the committee, the treaty permits each side to build an entirely new missile with up to 10 warheads, and that is just on land; we are not limited in any way on the number of new missiles that we can put on submarines. Because both sides could not agree on missile flight test bans, the right to modernize existing missiles permits improvements in accuracy. And accuracy is the key strategic element of this time period. So, just as SALT I missed the boat by limiting vehicles when warheads were the problem, so this treaty limits warheads, when accuracy is the problem. These SALT treaties are coming too late to stop the serious problems that are arising. The cruise missile, as I said before, will bedevil the next treaty.

So, someone has to do something. I think we cannot continue on this road of hollowed out cosmetic treaties—treaties that are justified by administration officials because of the predictability they give. Another official recently said: "Anyway, arms control is just an exercise in confidence building."

We need treaties that do what arms control is supposed to do, save money and improve our security, and do something about the risks of war.

Basically, the treaties so far have sat around the arms race like scaffolding on a building. They are similar to the kind of treaty that would be worked out by two alcoholics who sat down to persuade onlookers that they were really going on the wagon. The alcoholics would draft an agreement that would preclude the kinds of binges that they were not intending to go on, and they would then define alcoholic content in such a way as to permit each to continue on the kinds of drinking plans that each had in fact planned.

PROBLEMS OF M–X MISSILE

Of course, the particular problem here, as Mr. Barnet has mentioned, the M–X missile, is going to be a very serious problem for the United States. One thing I want to emphasize to Senators for or against the treaty is something that has not come out in the hearings so far. In my supplemental testimony I mention five points that I want to draw your attention to—but this is the most important point.

I do not think the committee has yet a full understanding of the extent to which the M–X will bedevil American policy and strategy, no matter how narrowly you look upon it. You can forget all arms control considerations and you will find, I think, that the M–X missile is going to turn out to be a very serious boondoggle, one which will give us very serious problems—not just in arms control. It is no accident that 30 different methods of basing this system have already been tried. It is no accident that Secretary Brown told you earlier in the hearing—though you may not have noticed it—that it was the President who said he thought they would come up with a satisfactory basing system in time and therefore he could go ahead and announce that we were going to go ahead with the M–X.

We are proceeding down a path of buying before we fly it; buying before basing. The impulse to go forward with the M–X in order to satisfy treaty opponents is so strong that we are going down the road of basing a system which I believe will be as vulnerable a few years hence, as in fact the Minuteman Missiles are looking vulnerable now. It is not going to fix it, just to buy the M–X. I want to return to that in a minute.

HAWK-DOVE ALLIANCE TO IMPROVE TREATY

What I want to emphasize now is what is at the bottom of the prospects for this hawk-dove alliance that might exist, not in rejecting this treaty but in improving it subsequently.

For the last generation there has been a schism in American policy between hawks and doves. By and large the hawks have been assuming and asserting that the danger to American security arose from the Russians. The Russians had to be deterred. Nuclear surprise attack and nuclear blackmail was the problem.

The doves have long believed the Russians were well deterred on the nuclear level. Their complaint has been that a war would arise nevertheless—a war associated with escalation and miscalculation. In their view, we could have the highest possible quality deterrence and still get a nuclear war.

Now, this schism still exists in American strategic thinking. But I think what we have seen in the last week is that the hawks are prepared, for strategic reasons, to support disarmament—and the doves are not against disarmament just because it is going to fulfill strategic goals and balance asymmetries and resolve instabilities.

So, there is room now for a consensus, as Senator McGovern was suggesting earlier this morning, between doves and hawks for a meaningful disarmament, disarmament that provides reductions, and at the same time achieves them in ways that maintain a consensus in the United States about instabilities and asymmetries. There is no reason why we cannot even things up by chopping legs

off the tables. We do not have to build up the table legs in order to get consensus. We do not have to look toward cosmetic treaties.

In fact, if we continue down the road of cosmetic treaties, I think what you have seen in the last week is that these treaties will no longer maintain a consensus in American strategic thinking and in the public at large.

SENATE OPTIONS

So, I think the Senate has before it three options. One is to make basically cosmetic adjustments to this treaty—which will have basically cosmetic significance. Second, it can adopt amendments to the treaty, which guarantees a Soviet outcry, and a long delay before the negotiations get back to stage one.

But the third and most constructive thing it can do, which has only surfaced so far in your hearings, I think, with Senator McGovern's statement this morning, is that it can, in a resolution of ratification, demand that no more cosmetic treaties need apply, that the Senate is not prepared to accept treaties unless they are meaningful.

This was the kind of effort that Senator Jackson tried with SALT I. I know that the hawks feel that the Jackson resolution did not go far enough in performing their goal. I think the administration is right, that it has fulfilled the meaning of that resolution in that the treaty does not provide unequal forces. But of course Senator Jackson and others may feel that the forces though equal in numbers and equal in other ways—and while I would say we are superior—others may say they are not as equal as they would like.

My answer to complaints about the success of that resolution is that we should design a more specific resolution this time. In any case the Senate has made it quite clear that another treaty of this cosmetic kind will not be approved, and therefore any resolution that you do pass will have very real meaning to the negotiators both in Moscow and in Washington. They will be forced, I think, to try to bring home the bacon.

MIRV MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

Now, as far as the substance of the resolution, I think it is clear that the complaints of hawks and of doves center on MIRV—on the MIRV missiles that we now regret having deployed in 1970 because those MIRV missiles have, as predicted, made Minuteman vulnerable.

Of course, they are making the Soviet land-based missile force vulnerable, too. Even in the early 1980's, about which Senators have complained, a larger proportion of the Soviet force will be vulnerable to our attack than we will be vulnerable to Soviet attack of our force. This is for the simple reason that while we will only be able to destroy perhaps half of their land-based missile force, that land-based missile force is 70 or 80 percent of their entire force. So, applying 50 percent to 70 or 80 percent, we will be able to destroy 35 or 40 percent of their force right there alone. We have the better antisubmarine warfare system as well.

So, I do not think there will be a vulnerability gap in the early 1980's, notwithstanding the problem of whether the M-X is deployed.

ADMINISTRATION ARGUMENT FOR M–X MISSILE AND SALT TREATY

As far as the M–X is concerned, turning to that, Mr. Chairman, I want to draw your attention to a statement that the President of the United States made to the Congress which, I believe, is the worst strategic argument made by an administration in the 17 years I have been working in arms control. He told the Congress, "Without the SALT II limits the Soviet Union could build so many warheads that any land-based system, fixed or mobile, could be jeopardized." This was, in part, his argument for the M–X system whereby he was saying in effect: "You had better approve SALT because, without SALT, any M–X system will be jeopardized."

Now, I submit to you this that is a fundamental, decisive argument against any M–X system. Because this M–X is not even going to be deployed until after this treaty runs out. If in the absence of the SALT limits the Soviet Union could destroy the M–X system, then what we are asking our negotiators to do is to return in 1986 and tell the Russians:

> I hope you fellows are going to maintain these limits and go along with another round of SALT because if you are not, according to our President, any M–X system that we might deploy—and we have not even deployed it yet—could be beat by your going above the SALT limits and building more warheads.

The President has conceded to you, as I read it, that you are going to have to make M–X depend on a piece of paper—a multibillion dollar system dependent on a piece of paper which can be abrogated by the Russians at any time, and which expires before the system is even going to be deployed; and which is going to have to last for 20 or 30 years while the M–X system lasts.

Secretary Brown told you to build the M–X because our subs might be vulnerable in the 1990's. I submit to you that a land-based missile system that we cannot even make invulnerable on paper today, is not going to be much good in backing up our submarine force in the 1990's if the submarine should become vulnerable.

So, one thing I would like to emphasize to the members of the committee is that the M–X is not a solution to the dilemma in which we find ourselves, and in which the Russians find themselves because, as Secretary Brown pointed out, whether we build the M–X or not, their entire land-based missile force is going to be vulnerable even to our submarines by the 1990's, and is already getting vulnerable to our Minuteman force in the 1980's.

SOLUTION TO STRATEGIC INSTABILITY

There is only one solution to this kind of strategic instability, and that is disarmament, in particular, getting rid of land-based missiles and lowering reliance upon them. You do not have to give up the Triad, but you do have to lower reliance on the land-based missile and especially, get rid of as many MIRVed land-based missiles as you can.

On this principle, I believe, you will find the kind of unanimity of hawks and doves that you need in order to go forward with reduction.

If I may, I will show one other chart at this point. [See p. 111.] Senator McGovern mentioned this morning the notion of percentage reductions and it is a very good idea. I think once you have the SALT Treaty, you have a structure which you can then reduce by a certain percentage each year. You could reduce the 2,250 upper limit; you could reduce the MIRV total of 820 land-based MIRV's; you could reduce the 1,200 limit and the 1,300 limit just by agreeing on a single number with the Russians. You could agree with the Russians on one number, and that number would be a percentage.

What you would agree to do is knock down the strategic forces on both sides by that agreed percentage each year for as long as the two sides are willing to continue. As Senator McGovern proposed this morning, it would be 3 years and then a summit conference; but there could be variance on that.

What this chart shows is how long it is going to take, and how important it is to start at once. This chart shows strategic delivery vehicles building up from 1955 to 1970–75; it shows the U.S. force buildup in strategic vehicles going up very rapidly. The Soviet force buildup following it and, actually, their strategic delivery vehicle total going above ours.

Now, as one of the benefits of this treaty, their force will go down 250 strategic delivery vehicles to our level a few years after the treaty is signed. But then we are both going to be stuck up here with 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles.

If you knock down the strategic force by 5 percent a year for the indefinite future, you would go down this path of 5 percent, percentage annual reduction, which I call PAR. Even at 5 percent—I am delighted that Senator McGovern proposed 10 percent this morning—at 5 percent, you see, you are already in the next century, to get down to 400 strategic delivery vehicles, you are at the year 2010. We have a long way to go.

But I want to emphasize the importance of starting nevertheless because the risk of war that we are facing is a very small risk. The risk, as I told the committee in earlier hearings is one which mathematicians can estimate in various ways, and suggests perhaps a half percent to 1 percent a year.

This is not the risk of a breakdown in deterrent where the Soviets see a green light and attack. Even Paul Nitze and General Rowny both said in their testimony, they did not think the problem was one of Soviet surprise attack. The problem is really one of a war that nobody wants. That probability, if it can be based on previous wars, is probably a function of the size of the war and is somewhere around a half percent to 1 percent a year. That means we have about 50, 100, or 200 years to get rid of this stuff to the point where if, in fact, the war nobody wants comes, it does not destroy our Republic in 30 minutes.

So, my suggestion is that it is not too late to begin simply because we have so many strategic delivery vehicles. We have time

because the probability of war is low. But the probability is, unfortunately, not zero. One can buy as many weapons as one wants and there will still be a residual probability of a war that arises through escalation or miscalculation. The great danger to our Republic is not that the Russians are going to attack. As I say, General Rowny and Mr. Nitze have not used that as their argument. The danger to our Republic is that this stuff will go off. The only way to resolve the problem is to begin with reductions.

INCREASED U.S. POLARIZATION PREDICTED

Since for a variety of reasons the hawkish side of our debate is worried about Soviet imbalance and is also calling for reductions, the moment has come for the Senate to issue instructions for a new consensus. In the absence of that consensus I predict the United States will not build more weapons to catch up with the Russians: I predict there will be increasing polarization in the United States. The doves will give up on arms control if it does not do better next time.

What they will retreat to is a policy of, "Buy only what you need." By that measure none of the weapons that are being proposed now-a-days are really needed because we have such adequate deterrent forces. You will find, if you do not get a consensus together for the next round of SALT, you will not have a consensus either for new strategic weapons systems. There will just be polarization and debate both on weapons systems and on SALT, and the country will look very bad indeed. Worst of all, this overhang of weapons which threatens to obliterate our society will go on for decades and decades. I would have to predict if it did, that we would not reach our 300th or 400th birthday.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Dr. Stone's prepared and supplementary statements follow:]

Prepared statement of Jeremy J. Stone

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great privilege, indeed, to appear before this most distinguished Committee of Congress, on this historic occasion, to discuss this important matter. I propose to treat the Committee invitation to appear, as I believe it was meant, as a request for my personal views.[1]

In my opinion, the American people are tired of hearing that disarmament is either at hand or around the corner but that, just now, ceilings are being put on the arms race, after which the real progress will follow. Americans are becoming cynical about the failure of the superpowers to reverse the arms race. And they understand quite well that this treaty is not really providing disarmament.

In these circumstances, the Congress's job, in dealing with this treaty—and the treaty-making process—is to shape the future rather than to massage a fait accom-

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[1] This course is also indicated by time constraints precluding the circulation of the written document inside our group, but even more so by the fact that our Federation of American Scientists members—while largely agreed on the underlying strategic facts—are understandably divided on some tactical issues in the shifting political context in which the ratification debate is taking place. However, the major policy conclusion of what follows was, in fact, approved without dissent by our policy-formulating body, the elected National Council, in an editorial of our Public Interest Report of March, 1979, which I have appended to these remarks.

For the record also, these personal views are based on observing and studying the arms race since 1962, for one or two year stints at such institutions as the Hudson Institute, the Harvard Center for International Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations, and, subsequently, for the last nine years, as Director of the Federation of American Scientists, a public interest civic organization of 5,000 scientists, founded in 1946 by atomic scientists in their effort to control the bomb they had created. During this period, I have authored two books, various articles, and have functioned as the editorial writer of the FAS Public Interest Report in drafting and catalyzing what consensus exists among us on science and society issues such as this one. My Ph. D. is in mathematics.

pli. And, in this testimony, I suggest one man's analysis of how a Senate (and wider) consensus might be achieved to prevent future treaties from suffering the weaknesses of this one.

The thesis of this testimony is that there are two roads which our Government might pursue to secure, and maintain, a national consensus for arms control treaties on offensive strategic weapons. One road leads to largely cosmetic treaties which, like this one, as President Carter told Congress, "constrains none of the reasonable programs we have planned." Here pro-ratification doves support the treaty because it is a treaty, and pro-ratification hawks do so because it constrains nothing we were planning.

This is the easy path politically and bureaucratically. But it treats disarmament as a means mainly to detente, and secures few, if any, of the real potential security and economic advantages to disarmament. As progress in disarmament falls behind expectations and desires, public cynicism sets in, and the SALT process itself loses support.

There is another road upon which the Carter Administration sought to embark in March, 1977, and upon which it could, with Senate support, make a new effort with renewed determination and stiffened backbone. This is the road of major reductions in strategic weapons—reductions that would, as a by-product of lowering weapons levels, redress the asymmetries and imbalances seen by the hawks even as it made unnecessary new weapons systems opposed by the doves.

It is the thesis of this testimony that the Seante should make its mark upon this treaty, not by amending its substantive proposals, or by adopting declarations of minor significance, but by attempting to forge a new consensus about what should be done in SALT III—and then instructing the Administration and the Soviet Union, by Senate resolution, of the terms without which a subsequent treaty would not be acceptable.

TREATY IS SOMETHING FOR NOTHING

Let me say at the outset that this treaty is far, far more vulnerable to criticism from doves than from hawks. The strong Soviet interest in securing an agreement with the United States, for various political reasons, has led that country to agree to:

(a) greater U.S. ability to inspect and verify than would be the case in the absence of the treaty;

(b) limits on numbers of Soviet warheads per missile lower than might otherwise be maintained;

(c) lower limits on numbers of missiles than might otherwise be maintained and, indeed, reduction of 250 Soviet strategic delivery vehicles.

And this agreement has been reached without the U.S. giving up, to my knowledge, any programs which we might otherwise have desired. Thus the treaty is, from the U.S. point of view, something for nothing. The Russians have agreed to such a treaty, in my opinion, because they consider SALT to be the "spearpoint" of a detente policy. Further, they see detente as an imperative created by fear of China, and their desire to trade with the West. Moreover, the Soviets recognize that the basic momentum of their strategic program can be continued and maintained under the strictures of SALT II, notwithstanding the above limits, so their concessions are marginal in strategic terms.

I do not believe the treaty has any significant military flaw, as witness the support of the agreement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Committee earlier this week.

True, the Soviet Union has permission to have 308 heavy missiles and we none—but we did not, and do not, want any;

True, the Backfire bomber is only included by letter rather than treaty, but this is a reasonable solution to a grey area of negotiation.

In these and other ways, the hawk dissenters have very little to complain about in the treaty; in my opinion, they are really concerned about the Soviet buildup of strategic weapons—not the treaty itself—and this is quite a different matter.

DOVES ARE THE ONES WITH THE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN

By contrast, the doves—though gagged by their fear of treaty rejection[2]—have a great deal to complain about, in reflecting how the SALT process on offensive weapons is working out.

[2] An example of this fear was a letter to the New York Times of April 3, 1979, in which eleven arms control specialists condemned "poormouthing" the SALT II Agreement and listed its advantages without significant qualification. (The signers were members of FAS, including seven Sponsors; ten other FAS officials, including eight elected Council Members, responded in a letter printed in the New York Times on April 29, 1979.)

The SALT I (1972) and Vladivostok Agreement (1974) focused on numbers of bombers and missiles when, it was already clear, these numbers had saturated in favor of exploitation of the newest breakthrough: multiple warheads on each missile (MIRV). Now the SALT II Agreement puts an upper limit on numbers of warheads but, too late again, at a level that is basically one of saturation of the interests of either side.[3]

Meanwhile, the new breakthrough of cruise missiles has, at U.S. insistence, been embedded in the treaty rather than precluded. Just as failing to stop MIRV in earlier agreements represented a time bomb for SALT II and III, so also will the modern cruise missiles, with their verification problems, afflict future negotiations for decades hence.

There can be no doubt that both sides will be further from disarmament in 1985 when the treaty expires than they are today, just as we are worse off today than we were when negotiations for SALT II began in 1972.

The treaty permits each side to build an entirely new type of missile with up to ten warheads; this will take the United States more time than the six-year term of the treaty. Because the two sides could not agree on missile flight test bans, the treaty right to modernize existing missiles permits improvements in accuracy, and confidence in that accuracy, which are the critical strategic element of this time period. The Treaty Protocol limiting certain U.S. programs for a few years was negotiable because none of the programs in question were ready to be deployed during the period. And the Treaty Statement of Principles shows only too clearly, as does talk around Washington, that no concrete plans exist for what to do next in SALT III.

Arms control and disarmament is supposed to do something! It should help provide a solution to such problems as land-based missile vulnerability. It should make weapons systems unnecessary and save money. Above all, it should reduce the risks of war and reduce the destruction if war occurs. This treaty is doing these things, at best, by saying that matters would otherwise be worse.

Arms control is not, as one Administration official suggested in a recent article, at bottom "an exercise in confidence building." High Administration officials are reduced to talking of the treaty providing "predictability"—which simply means that we have some idea of what, for the next six years, at least, the other side might do—as if this were an important arms control goal. And to saying, again, that things would otherwise be still worse. Meanwhile, other such officials talk of the permitted MX missile as providing stability—when by every ordinary meaning of the term in arms control, it provides just the opposite; what they have in mind is that it will, they think, "match the Russians." Thus even arms control language is being destroyed in the effort to paint this treaty as doing things which it patently does not.

Thus far, the SALT Agreements on offensive weapons have had little more provable effect on the course of the strategic arms race than scaffolding has on the shape of a building.[4]

In effect, thus far, the treaties on offensive weapons suggest a negotiation between two alcoholics. The addicts readily agree that they will not engage in binges which neither really had in mind—the better to persuade onlookers that they are indeed going on the wagon. But when the issue arises of putting significant restaints on their real drinking plans, they find it easy to define alcoholic content in such ways as to permit each to continue.

Thus the treaty permits the entire eight-point program of the Committee on the Present Danger, as witness Jan Lodal's article in the Winter, 1978–79 Foreign Affairs.

Still worse, as will be documented below, the effort to secure a two-thirds vote in the Senate in favor of the treaties has had, and is having, a tangible escalatory

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[3] Against a Soviet Union with only about 100 significant cities, we have 10,000 warheads at the ready—or one hundred to one—and this number will rise to more than 12,000 during the period of the treaty. This simple "overkill" calculation may seem oversimplified, but a factor of one hundred provides a lot of room for error! Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has 5,000 warheads which could rise, under the treaty, to 10,000.

Under these circumstances, a kind of "saturation parity" exists in which warheads are ample for city attack and deterrence. (As soon as their accuracies improve, which is simply a question of time, the numbers of warheads already existing on each side will be ample also for attacks on the fixed land-based missile forces as they presently exist.)

[4] This situation is in marked contrast to the success of the Atmospheric Test Ban in preventing radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, and the success in the ABM treaty in cutting off a new (defensive) dimension in the arms race. But it resembles the Nixon Administration Threshold Test Ban Treaty which set the level of underground tests at 150 kilotons—a level high enouth to prevent any significant complaints from either side's defense ministry—simply and solely to get agreement, and without any justification from verification considerations.

effect on our arms program. As Admiral Thomas Moorer has written about the period he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs agreed to support SALT I ony if: "Such things were undertaken as: 'vigorous research and development programs designed to maintain technological superiority of our weapons systems; . . . [and] aggressive improvement and modernization of strategic forces . . . These improvement and modernization programs were to include acceleration of Trident construction; maintenance of the B-1 bomber program on schedule so as to provide an option to deploy the first aircraft in the late 1970's; a national command authority defense as permitted by the ABM treaty; a satellite basing program for strategic bombers; deployment of the submarine-launched cruise missile; and, finally, an improved re-entry vehicle for ballistic missiles,'" (National Review, June 22, 1979, p. 787)

And recently, with regard to SALT II, the Administration has been forced to commit itself to development of the MX missile without even knowing how it planned to base the missile—so strong are the pressures to reassure reluctant treaty supporters. Also, a new U.S. bomber is being encouraged by the flap over Backfire as a price for overlooking the way it enters into the agreement.

THE HAWK-DOVE CONTROVERSY

Now in order to avoid duplicating recent history, we must learn from it. What exactly do the contending "hawks" and "doves" want? Ironically, today, they are, at least on paper, in surprising agreement: Both want "real" arms control.

In fact, the SALT II debate is not so much about the SALT II Agreement itself as it is, instead, a now pointless echo of a generation-old struggle between two schools of American strategic thought. Following the invention of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, one school of thought, often characterized as "hawkish," took the traditional military view that the danger, as before, lay primarily in the adversary which, if he could not be defeated, would, at least, have to be deterred. Adversary attack was the dominant problem in surprise nuclear attacks, nuclear first strikes, nuclear shows of force, and/or nuclear aggression against allies.

A second school of thought, often characterized as "dovish," saw the major source of nuclear danger in the arms race itself. Considering that any sane person, or plausible Government, would be well deterred by the fear of nuclear response, it saw residual dangers of "wars nobody wanted" arising from uncontrolled escalation.

Thus, while the first school was predisposed just to buy more weapons so as to stay ahead of the Russians, the second school was disposed to "stop the arms race" itself. Naturally, the two schools apply quite different yardsticks to proposed treaties, and their dialogues are therefore often dialogues of the deaf—the hawks focusing first on the relative military balance implied by the treaty, while the doves focus on its effect in restraining the competition.

In past years, U.S. superiority in the arms competition led hawks to reject treaties as unnecessary mechanisms that might just constrain us in some kind of "unilateral disarmament," without constraining the Russians. Doves, for their part, saw treaties as useful vehicles for securing at least a modicum of détente, and were prepared to take pretty much any treaty that both sides could negotiate.

POTENTIAL NEW CONSENSUS EMERGING

In recent years, Soviet progress in matching U.S. weapons levels has provided hawks with a potential regard for treaties. Treaties could in principle at least, redress the very imbalances of concern to the hawks. It was with this in mind that Senator Jackson made a number of disarmament proposals.[5] Ironically, much recent complaint from Senate hawks about this treaty, such as that of Senator Jake Garn, is based upon the view that arms control has not done enough, and should do more.

At the same time, traditionally pro-arms control Senators, such as Senators McGovern, Hatfield, and Proxmire, have recognized that—especially in an age in which detente has gone about as far as it is going—treaties must be held to a higher standard than that of basically cosmetic agreement only. And they feel that this is especially so if hawkish support for treaties is purchased with commitments to weapons systems they consider wasteful. So they are also complaining that arms control is not doing enough to carry its freight.[6]

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[5] For example, March 29, 1971 (S4035), a proposal that would have stopped MIRV deployments; April 23, 1974, a proposal that would have limited ICBMs to 800, submarine-launched missiles to 560, bombers to 400 and provided for equalization of throw-weight.

[6] Hawks who, heretofore, often assumed that defeat of the treaty would rouse the Nation to procure felt-to-be necessary weapons systems may be having second thoughts as to whether such a defeat would lead Americans to get mad at the Russians and buy more weapons, or just to get

Footnotes continued on next page

For all these reasons, our Nation ought to be ready, in logic and in politics, for an aggressive policy of hard-nosed bargaining for real disarmament subsequent to the ratification of the treaty. And this is what I propose.

In 1977, to its credit, and to the credit of the United States, the Carter Administration proposed sharp cuts. It sought to forge precisely the kind of coalition here advocated—disarmament for the doves but disarmament of specific kinds desired by the hawks. The Russians objected violently, but there was one reason at least that does not now apply. The Russians rightly considered themselves near the end of negotiations on SALT II and were unwilling to start on new proposals in the midst of that negotiation.[7]

The Administration should try again with new far-reaching proposals and the Senate should pass resolutions of instruction that will give these proposals momentum and bargaining leverage.

Would it work, and could the Senate really help? Nothing is certain. But considering the current alternative before the Senate reinforces the idea that this is the best course.

SENATE OPTIONS FAVOR A RESOLUTION OF INSTRUCTION

The Senate has before it three approaches. It can:

(a) Adopt amendments, reservations, interpretations, and resolutions concerning the treaty itself but which are of such a nature that they do not require Soviet concurrence or do so on noncontroversial issues;

(b) Adopt amendments to the treaty that would require renegotiations;

(c) Pass resolutions, in conjunction with ratification of the SALT II Agreement, that will attempt to shape the future course of negotiations in SALT III.

Option (a), restricting the Senate's action to noncontroversial issues, simply guarantees that nothing substantial will be secured.

Option (b), amending the treaty in such a way as to require renegotiation, is more likely to undermine our bargaining position than to enhance it, since it virtually requires the Soviet Union to complain bitterly for months before reentering negotiations. And there is no reason to believe that there is bargaining leverage left in this treaty yet to be exploited.

But, option (c), a resolution of instruction for the future, that captured the support a majority of the Senate, including both hawks and doves, would provide a vehicle upon which the Administration might rely in hanging tough on far-reaching reductions that would, at the same time, redress instabilities.

A similar resolution of instruction was passed by the Senate on September 13, 1972 in conjunction with SALT I. The Jackson resolution (S.J. RES. 241, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess.) passed by 56–35. The resolution requested the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to "levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."

What effect this resolution had on the subsequent negotiations is a subject of debate. Perhaps it only led the superpowers to seize upon the cosmetic fact that if numbers of bombers were added to the earlier limits on missiles in the 1972 Interim Agreement, the two sides would be close enough in overall numbers of missiles and bombers to reach agreement on a common bound of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles.

But even if that resolution had, in retrospect, only limited significance, it does not mean that the Senate could not now have still more influence with some other, perhaps more precisely formulated, resolution. And it is obvious, anyway, to the Executive Branches of both superpowers that the U.S. Senate is becoming impatient with the present course of things. They know that something new must be added to get subsequent approval of a future treaty. Should not the Senate announce what this new element might be?

THE COMMON GROUND: SUSTAINED AND SHARP REDUCTIONS, IN PARTICULAR, OF MIRVED LAND-BASED MISSILES

But is there scope for agreement between hawks and doves upon what they would like next to do? I think there is.

Footnotes continued from last page

mad at each other. Meanwhile, those doves who assumed that MX would be easier to defeat in the context of the treaty, rather than in its absence, may also be uneasy following the President's speech tying MX to SALT. Thus a shared perception that ratification could lead to more weapons than defeat is providing a slight backlash in position for both hawks and doves.

[7] One example of this was Brezhnev's responding speech in Tula when he said the USSR "is prepared to go further in limiting strategic armaments, but first one should consolidate the gains already made, all the more so since the Interim Agreement expires in October this year. Then one could go directly into negotiations on more far-reaching measures."

MIRV (Multiple Independently Retargetable Reentry Vehicles) is a root cause of the concern of both hawks and doves. Introduced by the United States in 1970, and by the Soviet Union in 1975, MIRV makes it possible for a single missile to destroy several missiles on the other side. Soviet exploitation of this new technology puts it within reach, on paper at least, of the ability to destroy U.S. land-based missiles with only a fraction of its land-based force. That such an attack might be threatened, implicitly or explicitly, or even occur as a show of force, is a major current preoccupation of the hawks.

While denying the reality and political relevance of these attack scenarios, doves have their own reasons for concern about the same development. The current Administration planning is to replace the fixed Minuteman missiles with the MX missile in one deployment or another, probably a shellgame or trench deployment. Doves believe:

(a) That the missile will be too expensive, as well as unnecessary—a $35 billion downpayment on a new round of land-based missile arms race;

(b) That with increasing numbers of Soviet warheads MX will be, conceptually, no less vulnerable to Soviet attack than the existing land-based missile force, and will, therefore, tranquilize none of the fears thus far raised;

(c) That MX will be an offensive, as well as defensive missile, thereby encouraging the Soviet Union to set its missiles on a lighter, rather than a heavier, "trigger," and/or to redeploy its land-based missile force, precluding for many future years, some agreed halt in the constant redeployment of land-based missiles;

(d) That, overall, two opposing missile forces, each capable of destroying the other's entire land-based force with a fraction of its own, will increase the chances of a war nobody wants.

In short, both hawks and doves would, today, prefer a return to the pre-MIRV period, at least insofar as land-based missiles are concerned. In such a pre-MIRV period, no one missile could destroy several and, hence, there would be no particular advantage in missiles firing first because, for each missile wasted in firing, at most one opposing missile would be destroyed.

Now a complete return to the pre-MIRV era is obviously going to be difficult. But sharp reductions in MIRVed land-based missiles are by no means impossible. The SALT II Agreement provides for each side to have 820 fixed land-based missiles with MIRV, and, in so doing, it confirms that we have the means by which we can verify which Soviet missiles are counted against that 820 total, and which need not. Thus SALT II thereby provides, in particular, a method for verifying reductions of that number.

SALT III would go a long way toward satisfying the interests of hawks and doves if it would provide for sharp reductions in that 820 limit, with a view to the ultimate elimination of MIRVed land-based missiles. Such a program would not give up the triad concept—since several hundred unMIRVed land-based missiles would remain on both sides. But it would moot the issue of having an entire land-based missile force vulnerable to a fraction of the other's land-based force. And it would thus make any concerns about reciprocal fear of attacks by land-based missiles upon each other transitional.

The reduction in land-based missiles, coming over about a decade, would be in the narrow military interests of both sides, as well since land-based missile forces are becoming increasingly unreliable as second-strike (survivable) weapons in any case. Each side should want to diminish its present degree of emphasis on such land-based weapons, while decreasing the other's ability to attack them.

Unfortunately, the Administration position, at present, is to try to use SALT to move in the opposite direction. In what is surely one of the poorest arguments ever made in the strategic arena by an Administration, the President told Congress: "Without the SALT II limits, the Soviet Union could build so many warheads that any land-based system, fixed or mobile, could be jeopardized."

But, obviously, no multi-billion dollar strategic weapon system should be based on a piece of paper, certainly not a piece of paper that could be abrogated by the Russians. Most bizarre of all, this particular piece of paper expires in 1986, before the MX will be even initially deployed. No good can come of purchasing systems that will require our negotiators to seek unilateral Soviet concessions in subsequent negotiations, so as to keep our weapons system viable.

Thus, instead of rushing to deploy the MX missile, and then begging the Russians to keep it viable, we should make a major effort in SALT III to make MX deployment unnecessary. We would do this by negotiating a sustained and continuous process of reductions, in particular of land-based MIRVed missiles.

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Whatever the concerns of hawks and doves, they can, in principle at least, be resolved by suitable disarmament agreements. Every wobbly table can be made stable by a round of cutting off of legs; we need not always buildup to seek stability.

If the SALT II Agreement has any advantage, it is precisely to provide a context of agreed definitions and background in which such subsequent negotiations take place. But unless a consensus of hawks and doves in the Senate pushes a major effort to secure such reductions, history suggests they will not take place.

Let me emphasize that, while we need a consensus of hawks and doves to get the SALT process moving, the road of progress in SALT reductions is not that difficult. We ought not despair at the present inability to make progress.

For example, using the SALT II treaty to provide agreed definitions and qualitative limitations, one could embark on SALT III by negotiating a single number. Each side would agree to reduce its agreed number of strategic delivery vehicles (2,250), and its MIRV limits also, by an agreed percentage each year, e.g., 10 percent, for a number of years until, for whatever reason, the agreement had to be modified. This method, called Percentage Annual Reduction (PAR) would, I believe, have various specific advantages besides simplicity commending it to: hawks, doves, strategists, Presidents, the Defense Department, the Senate, the Armed Services Committee, the Russians, and others. I attach a relevant article from the Washington Post Outlook section for those who want to pursue it. But perhaps Senators might want to look at the attached PAR chart for a second to see also why doves have a right to complain about the SALT II Agreement.

The post-World War II buildup in strategic delivery vehicles is compared with what would happen if a 5 percent reduction each year went on for a generation or more. What has happened in the last thirty years may take many more decades to reverse, even if we start now.

AND IF WE FAIL?

It is only too clear that reductions in strategic weapons cannot be secured by doves alone. Therefore, if it is impossible for hawks and doves to agree on a program of subsequent real reductions—as here proposed—these reductions, patently, will simply not occur.

In the wake of such a failure, I predict that SALT on offensive weapons will self-destruct by 1985. Doves would return to urging a unilateral policy of "buy only what you need." And since the U.S. already has so much nuclear fire power, squirreled away in so many ways, public support for constant additions to our stockpiles would wane. In this case, the hawkish concern for keeping up with those nuclear Joneses on the other side of the world would not be assuaged. Instead, the domestic debate would be increasingly polarized. A consensus would disappear, not only for SALT negotiations, but also for major additions to our strategic posture.

Worst of all, our Nation would then face the prospect of continued reliance on deterrence for its safety for generations hence. Hanging over us, for decades and decades, would be the possibility that—notwithstanding the highest quality deterrence achievable—a nuclear war that nobody wanted would nevertheless occur, through miscalculation and escalation. Our entire Republic could then disappear in 30 minutes. As I advised the Committee in hearings on March 16, 1977, this probability may be on the order of 0.5 percent to 1 percent a year.

We—and the Russians—are uniquely vulnerable to destruction. Unlike the Latin Americans, the Africans, and many Asians, we and the Russians (and the Europeans) are living dangerously on the edge of a nuclear abyss. While strategists argue the finer points of "who is ahead," the truth is that both sides are falling behind.

The Founding Fathers must be rotating in their graves at the diminution in our security that has occurred in the last thirty years. To maximize the likelihood that our Nation will reach its 300th and 400th birthdays, the disarmament process has got to be started. I would therefore hope that the Senate could rise to the occasion and formally announce in a suitable resolution the already existing latent consensus on pointing the negotiations in the direction of a disarmament that is both real and strategically meaningful.



[From the Washington Post, Dec. 31, 1978]

An Arms Race in Reverse

(By Jeremy J. Stone)

The United States and the Soviet Union are now in the final throes of negotiating a second strategic arms limitation (SALT II) agreement. Soon the Senate will debate its ratification.

But SALT will not end with SALT II. And if it did, SALT II would not, by itself, be worth very much. Senators will be forced to ask—and all observers will want to know—to what kind of far-reaching agreement might SALT II lead.

As the SALT negotiations have amply proven thus far, it is no easy task to satisfy all the participants and institutions here and abroad. Ironically, the simplest conceivable treaty may satisfy all the actors best. Still more ironically, the approach underlying this simplest treaty might be described as running the arms race in reverse.

SALT is already structured around the fortuitous fact that—measured in a certain easily verifiable way—both sides have about the same number of weapons. Thus, if one adds the number of long-range bombers, the number of land-based intercontinental missiles and the number of submarine-based strategic missiles, one gets a roughly similar number of so-called "strategic delivery vehicles" on each side. (Indeed, SALT II will bring the two sides into approximate equality by this measure with an overall limit of 2,250.)

Under these circumstances, one could set in motion a far-reaching disarmament program simply by bringing these overall limits steadily down. One would negotiate with the Russians nothing more than a single number reflecting the rate of reduction. The proposal, in short, is this:

The superpowers would agree to dismantle a small percentage (somewhere between 5 and 15 percent) of their strategic delivery vehicles each year, with each side retaining the "freedom to choose" those weapons that it would dismantle in any given year. Retained weapons could be modernized or replaced (within the agreed restraints, perhaps, of SALT II). The duration of the agreement would be indefinite, with conferences each five years to review its progress and the possibility of its prolongation.

Let us call this simple, underlying proposal PAR for "Percentage Annual Reduction." How would it suit the different participants?

The Senate would be faced with a simple understandable, easily verifiable concept rather than a complicated agreement, and Senate ratification would be once and for all.

The Defense Department would confront something akin to a simple budget cut which it gets to implement. It would get a maximum of freedom, and a year-by-year opportunity to decide what to dismantle after it has seen the whites of the eyes of the then current technology and the exact form of the previous year's Soviet cutback.

For President Carter, PAR would provide the possibility of an announcement of eventual major disarmament without the otherwise insurmountable necessity for any major action in the short run. Even U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle to PAR, without agreement to a specific percentage, would be electrifying. In particular, PAR would fulfill Carter's desire to set in motion a sustainable trend toward zero nuclear weapons without requiring him to gain an administration consensus on precisely which weapons would be dismantled in any given year. Considering the uncertainties that perpetually cloud the future of weapons technology, there may well be no other responsible way to undertake to reduce weapons levels beyond the next several years.

For the hawks, who have lost confidence in the U.S. negotiating machinery, PAR would replace an untrustworthy network of doves and bureaucrats with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of defense.

For the doves, PAR would give hope that SALT II will really lead to something by building, as a starting point, on the one equality thus far in sight—numbers of delivery vehicles.

For the strategists, PAR would offer strategic advantages because the U.S. force is, at its core, considerably more invulnerable, and less exposed, than that of the Soviet Union and can thus make more effective use of the freedom to choose what will be dismantled.

For the Russians, PAR would provide a continuing disarmament process assuring a modicum of detente—their major goal.

For Sen. Henry Jackson and his supporters, PAR would leave the supervision of U.S. SALT reductions primarily in the hands of the two congressional Armed Services committees, one of which he will soon chair. Furthermore, Sen. Jackson in 1975 proposed something quite similar to PAR: the dismantlement by each side of 700 of the most obsolescent nuclear delivery vehicles (the quota of a 5 percent PAR agreement for almost 10 years).

One important advantage of PAR's simplicity is that Carter and Secretary General Brezhnev could discuss it together and agree on it in principle. Both leaders are undoubtedly searching for some such announcement of future progress so as to enhance the attractiveness of SALT II. And both may be looking for a simple way of inducing their bureaucracies to take the possibility of true disarmament seriously.

What problems might this agreement have? In the first place, what about the fact that it does not control the number of bombs and of missile warheads—which are, after all, the implements that actually kill people? Indeed, if the PAR percentage negotiated were low—say, 2 percent—and if both sides were permitted to do so, each could, for a time at least, actually increase its total number of bombs and warheads by loading up each retained plane and missile with still more weapons, or by buying new and bigger planes and missiles.

But if the percentage reduction negotiated were significant—say, 10 percent—both powers would have to increase the size or loadings of these planes and missiles dramatically every several years just to keep up. And this they would find difficult to do because of payload limitations, the cost of new systems, and the military ineffectiveness of overloading any one missile or bomber with extra warheads.

SALT II already has restraints on just such subdivision of missile payloads and on the numbers of cruise missiles permitted per bomber; these restraints would, if carried over to SALT III, go far to limit such offsetting increases, and to induce an eventual decline.

Precisely because PAR is so simple, it could be built upon with such side conditions. For example, those who are concerned with throw-weight imbalances, or gross missile size, of the two sides, could ask that larger missiles be eliminated as quickly as smaller ones. Similarly, it would be natural to require that multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles be dismantled at least as rapidly as non-MIRVed missiles. Such conditions can, like the basic PAR percentage, be negotiated clearly once and for all.

Would PAR take one to zero nuclear weapons in an unrealistically short span of years? Not at all. Because the percentage applied is applied always to a smaller total, one does not ever reach nuclear abolition—for instance, at a 5 percent PAR one does not get to zero in 20 years. Instead, it would take 30 years to get even to

one-quarter of the number of strategic delivery vehicles which we have today, i.e., to about 400

Obviously, at some point, a superpower PAR agreement would require the inclusion and cooperation of such evolving strategic forces as those of China. But one might be able to secure very large reductions before that time. And one might be able to get Chinese cooperation at, or before, that time to reduce its forces as well. The goal, of course, would be to move toward a world in which, if nuclear war somehow occurred, we would not lose our entire nation and most of our population. Meanwhile, these cooperative efforts would reduce the chance of the war itself.

What of the much-discussed problem of land-based missile vulnerability? There seems little, if anything, that the United States would want to do about this problem that we could not do under PAR. After all PAR would permit each side to replace and modernize the missiles retained. And by setting in motion a process of reductions; the United States would gain the option of paring down the number of exposed land-based missiles, thereby reducing the percentage of the overall force that is vulnerable.

There are, of course, undiscussed complexities: for example, "gray area" systems based in Europe that are partly strategic weapons and partly tactical. These will surely be problems in SALT III. But there is nothing about PAR that would make these problems—which we already have—more difficult.

In his farewell press conference as U.S. SALT negotiator, Paul C. Warnke said one of his main problems was that arms control was, for humanity, "an unnatural act." No doubt it is. But PAR seems to come as close as one can to turning arms control into the more familiar and little feared "budget reduction." Melvin Laird and Charles E. Wilson may have shared nothing else, but each knew the wisdom of letting the Defense Department implement the financial cuts each was obliged to impose. Might we not have to do the same with weapons cuts?

In effect, PAR would be a way of running the arms race in reverse. In an arms race, each side builds weapons as it prefers. But the two sides are linked implicitly by a rate of growth of weaponry, because neither wants the other to get too far ahead. Under PAR, the rate would, of course, be negotiated and it would be a rate of reducing armament. But, as in the arms race, each side would maintain stability independently, as each did before. If the two sides are not willing to accept PAR as their underlying approach, one wonders if anything will ever work to achieve the disarmament that all participants declare is their goal.

[From the F.A.S. Public Interest Report, March 1979]

Both Hawks and Doves Should Insist on Reductions of MIRVed ICBM's

The burning strategic issue of the day is the issue of land-based (Minuteman) missile vulnerability. Will the Soviet Union have—in fact or appearance—the ability to destroy the land-based ICBM component of the U.S. triad by the mid-1980s? If so, should America buy a new land-based missile with new basing? And should it equip its MX land-based missiles with the accuracy necessary to do the same to the Soviet force?

The first alternative is expensive (tens of billions of dollars). Nevertheless, last month, the Administration decided to move into full scale development of the MX missile without even knowing how it would be based. Why is it violating, at such potential expense, the most element "fly before you buy" rule—and doing so despite the discouraging recent experience of finding that 30 different basing methods have already been found wanting? The answer, of course, is the pressure to placate the hawkish-leaning undecided Senate votes on SALT.

PRECIPITOUS MX DECISIONS: A PRICE OF SALT

Individuals will have to decide for themselves how far this major price of SALT goes to negate its overall advantages. But the technological future impending is absolutely clear. Unless something intervenes, the period of the SALT II agreement, running to 1985, will see the vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles to Soviet land-based missiles. And with the 1985 deployment of MX, undoubtedly armed with the requisite warheads and accuracy to do the same to the Soviets, the Soviet land-based force will be forced to redeployment. Thus the period of SALT III, as well as of SALT II, will be bedeviled by events set in motion right now.

Still worse, the alternative of counterforce is likely, should nuclear escalation begin, to encourage each side to fire first—in a reciprocating cycle of fear of otherwise firing last.

The one obvious solution to this new round of arms race that has, predictably, not reached public consciousness is: disarmament. The two sides could agree to phase out the MIRVed component of their land-based missile force. With only single-headed missiles left, the party firing first would succeed in destroying, at most, only one missile with each single-warheaded attacking missile. He would therefore lack positive incentive to strike first. And he would have no negative incentive to do so (no fear of waiting) because there would be no danger that the other side might have incentive to strike him first. The agreement would be verified by prohibiting all flight tests of MIRVed land-based missiles.

It is true that such disarmament would not return the superpowers to the pre-MIRV era because submarines would still have MIRVed missiles. But the size, accuracy and numbers of the sub-launched missiles are not such, in this era, as would threaten the land-based missile forces.

WHY NOT PHASE OUT THE MIRVED ICBM'S

The two sides have agreed in SALT II to have at most 820 land-based MIRVed missiles. In fact, the United States now has 550 and the USSR about 570, but theirs are growing. If each side were to dismantle a sizable fraction each year, the mid-1980s would see the absence of land-based MIRVed missiles, rather than a dramatic threat to Minuteman.

But would the Russians agree? These MIRVed missiles are their newest ones and expensive. Nor are our own Minuteman III missiles obsolete. Would the two sides agree to dismantle usable equipment? This is, of course, like asking: Could disarmament be "for real"?

There is a live opportunity to make it so during the ratification of the SALT II treaty. Doves who want disarmament could, if they had the wit to do so, join with hawks concerned over the vulnerability of Minuteman, to instruct negotiators to resolve promptly the forthcoming concerns of Minuteman vulnerability through reductions of strategic weapons, in the subsequent negotiations.

This would be in analogy to the resolution passed after SALT I in which negotiators in SALT II were instructed to assure "equal aggregates" in any subsequent agreement. It would not amend the SALT II agreement, but simply give the sense of the Senate as to its desires for the future—a sense strengthened by being attached to the treaty document and subsequently signed by the President.

The Administration would, at the moment, surely oppose such an effort because it would fear an inability to strike the requisite bargain with the Russians. It really wants disarmament agreements to maintain detente even as do the Russians. Neither superpower administration now expects disarmament to matter except in a largely cosmetic fashion, if ever they did.

Thus, while agreements once touted as "better than nothing" are sold now as "maintaining the process," few believe the process is going anywhere on comprehensive offensive weapon agreements. Those who will still urge that it be taken seriously are normally called by the press "ardent" disarmers. On the contrary, smart money in the Administration, shaken by the prospect of a close SALT II vote, is already scaling down its ambitions for SALT III to a series of bite-size agreements or, alternatively, a grand (show up the Russians) proposal. The latter is unlikely to be agreed if only because it will be proposed in 1980 after the SALT II agreement has set back any Soviet incentive to agree to 1985 (when the SALT II agreement runs out and it needs a new SALT agreement to achieve its motivating political goals of maintaining a modicum of detente).

DÉTENTE OR DISARMAMENT

The unity of the disarmament community is itself hampered by a feeling that detente rather than disarmament is the only achievable goal. But recognition is growing that the institutionalized misuse of disarmament to achieve only political goals will eventually wear thin and backfire.

There is, thus far, little second-guessing of the ABM treaty on defensive weapons. But the results of the effort, in SALT I, and SALT II, to limit offensive weapons have persuaded a segment of the defense community that the Russians have exploited the previous treaties to improve their defense situation vis a vis our own. Obviously a certain amount of jockeying is inevitable under treaties. If the treaties themselves give a good downward impulse to the arms situation, each side will still be advantaged, notwithstanding minor shifts in relative position. Unfortunately, if the treaties in question are not sufficiently substantive, the jockeying, or even the appearance of it, can dominate the terms of the agreements.

In any case, in this instance, the costs of not agreeing to rid oneself of the MIRVed missiles is going to be: tens of billions of dollars on our side in MX missile and new basing; tens of billions on the Soviet side in new basing—since our MX will threaten their existing land-based force; and a conceptually dangerous situation in which each side can, if it strikes first, rid the other of its land-based force with only a fraction of its own. All this plus a prolongation of arms race redeployment over a decade or two.

Here surely is a situation in which disarmament can represent a clear and immediate solution to a pressing strategic problem; can save tens of billions of dollars; and can avoid the arms control problem of temptations to fire first.

If such an effort is not made, the problem will not be traceable to the flaws in the plan but to flaws in the thinking of the superpower administrations. As Secretary of Defense Brown said in his recent posture statement, SALT agreements "can make the achievement of destabilizing future advantage even more difficult than is already the case, while allowing current vulnerabilities to be removed." This is such a case. This is a job for negotiated reductions. Can't one side or the other rise to the occasion and make a suitable proposal?

Supplemental Testimony of Jeremy J. Stone

On listening to the first week of testimony, these five observations came to mind that might usefully supplement my earlier prepared remarks:

1. In assessing General Edward Rowny's relative enthusiasm for the March, 1977 proposal over the existing treaty, the Committee should ask the Defense Department to confirm that DOD studies show that even the entire March, 1977, proposal would not have changed the prospect of impending Minuteman vulnerability. In short, even the better proposal which General Rowny thinks we might have reached would not have been that different in its strategic implications.

2. In assessing Paul Nitz's concern to protect the possibility of a multiple Protective Shelter System (MPS) in which the MX missile would be moved between vertical shelters, the Committee should investigate these allegations, which I would make:

(a). The U.S. would not find it desirable to run a race in which it built holes to match the Soviet capability to destroy holes (with additional warheads) unless it abrogated the ABM treaty and used ABM systems to selectively defend the holes in which the MX missiles would be hidden; the risks here of losing the best arms control treaty the United States has would be prohibitive.

(b). Were the Soviet Union to construct the same kind of MPS shelter system, the risks of rapid Soviet expansion of its missile force into those empty shelters (the problem of "break-out") would become a dominant concern of American strategists, as would be related problems of verification as to whether the holes had or had not already been filled with real missiles.

3. In assessing Secretary of Defense Brown's support for the MX missile, the Committee should note that he defended it on the basis of the possible future need for a survivable land-based system in the light of the possibility that, in the nineties, our submarine based force might become vulnerable. The Committee should ask itself whether it seem plausible that a land-based MX system whose invulnerability, on paper, is already a subject of massive controversy (after 30 possible basing schemes have been examined) is likely to be a useful backup to the submarine-based force should the submarine ever appear to have become vulnerable. Further, the Committee should note Secretary Brown's remark that it was the President who assumed that some suitable basing scheme would be found and, therefore, announced the decision for MX in June. There is a real likelihood of enormous error in strategic planning in the rush to deploy MX. What will the U.S. do for an encore if this multibillion dollar scheme fails?

4. In assessing the judgment of both General Rowny and Mr. Nitze that the strategic situation is becoming unbalanced against us, the Committee should observe that both witnesses denied the likelihood of Soviet attack based upon this imbalance because of the strength of our retaliatory forces; instead, both analyzed the problem as one of perceptions of superpower leaders or third parties. Thus the Committee is being provided with a political, not a military judgment; the Committee should therefore ask itself, as a body wholly qualified to make such political judgments, whether it believes, in this case, that military imbalances that are devoid of military significance would, or would not, have political significance.

5. In determining whether the treaty is "equitable", the Committee should recognize that, by the nature of the U.S. political process, there is no advocate here for

the Soviet view of what is equitable. These points might be made, however, were such advocate here.

(a) *The U.S. Got Belated Permission For the Air-Launched Cruise Missile Which the Soviets Do Not Have And Got It At Unlimited Range:* The U.S. succeeded in winning post-Vladivostok permission to deploy the cruise missile on bombers, a weapon which the Soviet Union does not have and which adds thousands of warheads to our arsenal, a number comparable to those associated with the SS–18 heavy missile—which we do not have but did not and do not want.

Morever, although the U.S. gets to trade bombers with cruise missiles off against missiles with MIRV under a 1320 total, the Soviet Union must stay below 1200 in MIRVed missiles and cannot fill the 120 additional slots with MIRV or cruise missiles on bombers (since it does not have them). In effect, we are permitted 10% higher MIRV limits!

(b) *The U.S. Got Belated Limits on Backfire for Questionable Reasons:* The Soviets have every reason to believe that the Backfire concern was a "make-weight" argument to give the U.S. the bargaining leverage to get the cruise missile permitted (since by oversight, neither of these weapons systems were raised at Vladivostok) and to limit a Soviet weapon that is effective against our naval forces.

(c) *The Soviet Force Continues to Be More Vulnerable than the U.S. Force:* Because a larger percentage of Soviet retaliatory power is in its land-based force (perhaps 70–80%) the U.S. ability to destroy 50% of that force, which we shall have in the 80's, is more significant than the Soviet ability to destroy our entire land-based missile force representing, after all, only about 25% of our entire force. In short, the Soviet Union must have concern, even in the 80's, about its land-based force as we do, and it has our greater anti-submarine warfare capability to be concerned about as well.

(d) *Above All, For the U.S., the Treaty Is Something for Nothing:* As the Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted, the Treaty has a "quite nominal" effect on our program, but it does restrain the Soviet program, as Secretary Brown testifies, in numbers of missiles and warheads per missiles in ways which the Soviets might otherwise have pursued.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Stone.

Of course, the buildup on both sides has become so great that if these weapons were ever ignited and fired in anger, they would surely constitute the funeral pyre not only of this Republic and the Soviet Union, but for much of the world.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET SECURITY IN WORLD

Dr. STONE. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that the United States and the Soviet Union have themselves in a unique fix. While we will be obliterated, the Latin Americans, the Africans, Australians, and many Asians would not, although they would suffer terribly from the aftereffects, genetic effects, and also from the fact of not having so much of the industrial world to trade with.

We are like champions with glass jaws. These two great powers are paradoxically falling farther and farther behind in their security, and are farther behind than most Third World countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be correct to say that each has spent a trillion dollars to develop a weapons system that have made both the most insecure nations in the world today?

Dr. STONE. I would agree completely.

Mr. BARNET. I would agree with that completely. Also, I think it is important to keep in mind that the risks of war are growing. I think it is very difficult to put any kind of specific mathematical measure on the risks of war, but I do think it is worth noting, that the period we are now in is very different from the period from which we come. One of the reasons that we tend to be very complacent about the danger of nuclear war is that after all, despite a lot

of people warning about it and worrying about it, we have not had one, not since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

But the world which we are entering is a very different world from the postwar generation that is just ending. That was a period in which the United States had an overwhelming power to project onto the world to maintain the kind of stability that we do not now have.

It was also a world that had not yet emerged from colonialism to the extent that we now have, and where we have so many disputes, literally of a life-and-death character over which nuclear weapons are hanging. The very great increase in the danger is also a result of the increasing complexity of technology.

So, I do believe that in making judgments about our security we ought not to lull ourselves into the belief that the next years are going to be just like the years which we have just been through.

TREATY RATIFICATION WITH ACCOMPANYING SENATE RESOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Stone, if I understand your position correctly, you favor the ratification of SALT II if it is accompanied by a resolution that calls for the progressive reduction in the size of the nuclear forces on both sides.

Dr. STONE. Yes, sir, I do. I would not oppose the treaty even if it did not have that resolution, myself, because, as I say, it is something for nothing. But I think without that resolution the SALT process would self-destruct by 1985.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish that I had the same confidence in the consensus that you see for me. [Laughter.]

I think the sudden confessions in favor of the reduction of nuclear arms are rather startling, and I would wonder if they would withstand the test of a resolution that actually called for a reduction.

Mr. BARNET. As I indicated in my testimony, I share your skepticism, Senator. I do think it is well worth making the effort. The arguments are so overwhelming now from the point of view of our overall security, not just our military security, but our overall national security and the very great need to conserve capital to invest in other ways than in new and redundant weapons systems, that perhaps it is possible to get support for what I think is a very good proposal put forward by Senator McGovern on a freeze and moratorium on new weapons systems.

I put at least as much emphasis on freezing the forward development of new weapons systems as I do on reductions, although of course I favor reductions. But the great political momentum behind the new arms race, and the great danger is caused by the fact that each new weapons system creates concern and anxiety on the other side. Each asks: "Why are they doing it?"

Since in fact we the Soviet leaders are aware of the charts, we have seen today each asks why are they building more? So, it is the very process of building up which creates a political climate in both countries which makes it impossible to move to a more stable and more secure relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask one or the other of you, or both, if you so choose, why do you think the adoption of a resolution, calling for a certain rate of reduction which would accompany the Senate ratification of the treaty would serve us well when you, yourselves, have said the resolution that was adopted at the time that the Senate ratified SALT I, the so-called Jackson resolution, apparently did not help us achieve the kind of subsequent treaty that you would have desired?

In other words, in the joint statement of principles to which both governments have agreed four objectives are stated to govern SALT III. One of these objectives, indeed the first, is agreement that the two sides will work toward further numerical reductions and qualitative limitations in their nuclear weapons systems.

Now, my question is, why would a resolution of the kind that you have advocated be so much more desirable than the general statement already agreed to—which has declared that the objective of the talks leading to SALT III would be to achieve further numerical reductions and qualitative limitations in the weapons systems?

Mr. BARNET. Senator, the reason why a clear and specific resolution calling for a moratorium, why I favor the moratorium rather than general language about reductions is, that it is by its nature enforceable. That is, it is something which is clear, and it is something which the Senate, if it is resolute in monitoring the progress of the treaty can enforce.

To say that we are not going to build any more nuclear weapons systems from this time forward is something which is clear, unambiguous, and can be enforced.

The CHAIRMAN. The moratorium, to be acceptable, would have to be a moratorium to which both sides agreed.

Mr. BARNET. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that not have to be negotiated?

Mr. BARNET. It would have to be negotiated, Senator, but I am optimistic about that because of the statement of the Soviet Union of April 11, 1977. At that time—if I could just read it—this was the Soviet response to the March proposals of the present administration. At that time the Soviet official response was as follows:

> The American side proposes a ban only on the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and not on new weapons systems in general. It still would not hear the Soviet proposal on banning such new weapons systems as the Trident, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the B-1 strategic bomber in the United States, and analogous weapons systems in the U.S.S.R. although, as was repeatedly stated, these proposals remain standing.

My understanding is that these proposals from the Soviet standpoint still remain standing. So that it would seem not impossible for the Senate to obtain a Soviet reaction and agreement to a reservation to the treaty.

REDUCTION EFFECT ON NUCLEAR BALANCE

The CHAIRMAN. One last question, since my time is about up. We have heard the argument again and again that we can maintain the nuclear balance, so to speak, only by building the very weapons that you have referred to; that is to say, proceeding with the Trident submarine; the cruise missile, and the M-X.

If we were not to build those systems and were simply to take the present systems and begin to reduce them, would not the Russians secure an advantage by virtue of the composition of their large missile forces? In other words, would not the balance tip further in their direction if the only thing we did was to reduce the total number of missiles on both sides?

Dr. STONE. May I answer that, since this is the scheme I put forward?

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to prejudge what form the resolution takes that the Senate might reach. I am just saying that the Senate, having shown its unease about this treaty, has an obligation to tell the negotiators what it would find acceptable in the future, and that the resolution should take that character.

But I think proportionate reductions of the structure that has been created by SALT II would probably go down rather well with the negotiators on both sides. It would not mean entire freedom to choose what weapons one throws away. One would have to cut down proportionately the 820 land-based MIRV missiles and the heavy missile limit presumably would also be proportionately reduced, too and so on.

SALT II has been justified to you as providing a structure for future disarmament, but no one has told you how that structure might be used, or how it might be applied. What I am saying is, that whole structure could be used in ways the administration has not yet fathomed by just negotiating a single number with the Russians and saying: "Let us just take this whole thing if it is equitable"—and I think it is equitable—"and just shrink the whole thing."

The CHAIRMAN. I take it what you are saying is, the aggregate number could be reduced, and in that aggregate we could make such changes as seemed necessary to maintain essential equivalence.

Dr. STONE. No; I am saying something more precise than that. If you agreed on 10 percent, as Senator McGovern proposed, I propose you do it in the following way: The next year the 2,250 limit would go down by 10 percent; and so would the 1,320 limit go down by 10 percent; and the 1,200 limit, and the 820 limit, and the 308 heavy missile limit; so that the whole structure that has been created which, if you approved it, you would have deemed equitable, would then be just shrunk.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Gentlemen, I thank you very much for appearing. You have two very fine minds and on the whole I am in agreement with you as to the situation.

Mr. BARNET. Thank you, sir.

Dr. STONE. Thank you.

Senator JAVITS. I do not think that I construe Senator McGovern's ideas quite as he does; the idea of declaring our intentions to be the total reduction of armament is a very sound one and we ought to have some backbone and fortitude about it and be willing to run some risks for it. That goes for not only nuclear arms. We are much more likely to face the prospect of a conventional war which could lead to a nuclear war, then of a nuclear strike on either side. No Soviet leader, I do not care how bad in other

respects, wants to eliminate much of the world, including the Soviet Union. But, it could escalate to that level of risk.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET POLITICAL STALEMATE

I would like to take your two first-rate minds and lead you in a somewhat different direction. I think, with all due respect, the time has come for your organization in particular, Dr. Stone, and for Mr. Barnet's influence to be directed to yet another area. I take my point of departure from Professor Barnet's statement—I often do this in questioning, refer to the statement, and go from there. You know what you said, you know why you said it, so the question becomes more intelligible.

You say the following: "The Soviets immediately launched a military buildup that was designed to erase the American political advantage, and to make sure, as their diplomats kept saying, that future confrontations would never be resolved in the same humiliating way." That was post-1962, the Cuban missile crisis.

That implies that the fundamental difference between us and the Soviet Union is political, not military. Military power is only a way of impressing their political will, and it has been a way of impressing our political will. We will not move very far from that premise, as you yourself testify in SALT II, until we can rationalize and make less dangerous the competition between the two systems which are prevalent in the world today. Our military forces, armed with atomic weapons, are only meant to add an element to negotiation, to persuasion, to demagoguery, to propaganda, or to the force which is actually employed to bend populations to a given will.

So, my question to you really is this, should we not try to get all of the minds which think in decent humanistic terms, like yours, turned toward some effort—and might that not even be a concommitant resolution, some such resolution as Senator McGovern speaks about—to try to rationalize the international political process?

Why should we be at such loggerheads with the Soviets in the Horn of Africa; in southern Africa; in the Middle East, the area of Iran; in Southeast Asia respecting Vietnam, as to perhaps make the only way of resolving that difference war? Can we not just treat our military situation as a stalemate—get it to the stalemate stage every time?

Now, my impression of SALT II is that it is a 5-year stalemate and that we are not going to be very adversely affected, and that they are not going to be able in that period of time to gain a great deal. So, it is another 5 years in which to try to get our wits together, to try to do something about the political side, bearing in mind that the military issue is simply evidence of the deep, dangerous division which we face politically.

That is the way it strikes me. It is clearly implied in your message and the near-hopelessness of your position. You do not really give us any light at the end of the tunnel, even with your suggestion on Senator McGovern's resolution; it still takes two to tango. If the Russians are as obdurate as they have been and we are as obdurate as we have been, nothing is going to happen except a SALT III, maybe.

I ask you that question because I want to think with you, not because I am a smart-Alec, believe me.

Mr. BARNET. Well, Senator, I appreciate very much the question. I think to answer it we need to go back a little bit into history and to look at the relationship between this arms race and the political competition and the periodic confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The fact is that up until the Cuban missile crisis the arms race was substantially a one-man race. We had some periodic scares in this country. We had a bomber gap in the late 1950's. Some of the same people who are now talking about the clear and present danger today were talking about a bomber gap which turned out to be fictitious. Then, 10 years later, or 5 years later, they talked about a missile gap, which turned out to be equally fictitious.

My own view—and I think there is a good deal of historical evidence now to support it—is that the Soviet Union used the Cuban missile crisis, a very daring, and dangerous, and ill-fated maneuver, to try to produce some kind of a balance in the world power situation on the cheap, and they failed. It was at that time—I was in the Government at that time—it seemed to me that we missed a unique opportunity. With the enormous superiority that we had, which is admitted now on all sides, we had a real chance to come to an agreement that would have enhanced our security. But somehow we seem to have two rules about negotiating. That is, you do not negotiate when you are ahead because why should you? And you do not negotiate when you are behind because you are at a disadvantage and the pressure is to build up the "bargaining chips" for some future negotiation. As a result, the time always eludes us.

There is a relationship between the overall political relationships of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the arms race. I happen to agree with the former Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, when he advanced the idea that it was in the interest of the United States to build relationships across a broad spectrum of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—military, economic, scientific, in which the Soviet Union would have a greater incentive to build some kind of world structure, than to move unilaterally, and to try to destroy it.

Now, that is sometimes presented as appeasement, and I think that is a most shortsighted view. It is simply a reflection of the basis of all politics that no agreement is ever possible unless it somehow meets the mutual interests of the parties. I believe that the Soviet Union has strong, mutual interests with the United States in demilitarizing the competition with the United States—not ending it. I do not think they are interested in changing their ideology. I think that we have profoundly different views about how the world ought to be organized. But I think they have very strong economic and domestic political incentives to try to reduce the staggering cost which is going to escalate like gasoline prices and everything else, in the next few years.

The Soviet Union has deep domestic problems. I agree with Paul Nitze and General Rowny that there is nothing to suggest that they have an interest in a surprise attack. We never really ask the basic question, why would they want to do that? Why would they

want to take the risk of being destroyed probably by the radioactivity floating back from the United States, even if we never dropped a bomb on them?

Somehow, it is important to try to build a relationship with the Soviet Union. We have to end the clinically crazy aspects of this relationship in which we keep piling missiles on top of missiles on top of missiles, when both sides know that they are not going to do us any good, and that the process itself is going to do us a lot of harm.

So, I feel that we have to work toward improving political relationships and building international institutions. But I do not think we can do that in an atmosphere where the arms race continues.

Senator JAVITS. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. I think perhaps I neglected to point out the signal system here. You are on the red light, which means that you should complete your answer to the question at the end of the next sentence.

Mr. BARNET. Very good.

Mr. BIDEN. Whether or not it makes any sense. [Laughter.]

Mr. BARNET. A very good rule.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we can make sure that everybody has his chance to ask questions.

Our next Senator up is Senator McGovern.

SENATE APPROVAL OF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE GOVERNING SALT III

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, this is a question that perhaps should be directed at you or the members of the staff for clarification. You made the point to Dr. Barnet that there is a statement of principle governing SALT II that does call for some reduction in the next round, in SALT III.

Is it not a fact that the Senate does not really act on that statement of principles, that it is a purely executive branch arrangement with the Soviet negotiators on which we do not need to register approval or disapproval?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think that is true, unless the Senate were to somehow incorporate by reference that statement of principle and express its own approval.

FAILURE OF PROPOSED ARMS REDUCTIONS IN 1977

Senator MCGOVERN. This morning, Dr. Barnet and Dr. Stone, I announced, as you have already recognized several times, my intention to propose that the Senate go on record, following the same technique Senator Jackson used in SALT I, with a statement, to accompany the SALT II Treaty, if we decide to ratify it, that would very clearly put the Senate on record favoring, first of all, a moratorium for a period of at least a year, and then followed by the annual reductions. Both of you tended to support the same idea.

Now, I realize that you have alluded to this previously and again replied to a question by Senator Javits, but the argument is probably going to be raised against that by other Senators and some critics outside the Senate, that it is a good idea but that, again, it is not part of the real world. So, they are just not going to buy it, as witness the experience in the spring of 1977.

I wondered if one or both of you could address yourself to that concern on any basis you see as to why these proposed reductions in 1977 broke down. Why were they so quickly rejected by the Soviet Union? Was it purely because they favored a buildup and feared reductions?

Dr. STONE. I addressed that in my written testimony, though I did not have a chance to mention it. I would say one thing that has been overlooked by Senators thinking about this was the fact that the Russians believed they were near the end of the line of the negotiations. When the Carter administration came out with the March 1977 proposals it did so publicly. It had among other disadvantages from the Russian point of view the look of a "grandstanding" approach, and one that would disrupt what they had hoped, and many had expected, to be the imminent end of negotiations.

Now, they said at that time, Brezhnev said at Tula—I quoted it at a footnote—here that:

> The Soviet Union is prepared to go further in limiting strategic armaments, but first one should consolidate the gains already made, all the more so since the interim agreement expires in October this year. Then one could go directly into negotiations on more far-reaching measures.

I think that is the first thing to say. You do not have to take a malevolent view of Soviet intentions to explain why they were angry about the sudden intervention of new deep cuts proposals when the Carter administration came in. But second, the Russians want disarmament for many reasons, and this is why they have agreed to a treaty which is from our point of view "something for nothing." They have agreed to it because they have problems with China, they want détente, they want to trade with us, and disarmament has always been a staple in Soviet thinking.

Now, in this context, the notion of proportional reductions is not an outlandish out-of-this-world thing. It is simpler to negotiate by a factor of 10 than this treaty. It is a single number, really, that you proposed negotiating, Senator McGovern. It gives each side the freedom to choose what weapons it wants within the limits of this scaffolding that has been negotiated in the SALT Treaty.

I do not think it is unreal. I just add one brief point to that. I attached to my testimony an article in the Washington Post which tried to list the advantages of this kind of scheme for the Senate, the Joint Chiefs, the Russians, the President, Senator Jackson and the Armed Services Committee. I believe that this scheme of proportional reduction has advantages for everyone. But for the Russians the main advantage—to answer your question—is that from their point of view it provides a kind of disarmament "bear hug." Disarmament goes forward every year, a few percent at a time. This puts a bound, from their point of view, on how much détente might break down because we would have to face the fact that, if détente did break down, that disarmament would stop.

So, a continuous method of reduction is favorable from their point of view.

STALEMATE DEVELOPMENT IF TREATY IS REJECTED

Senator MCGOVERN. To use your phrase of the importance of forming a coalition of the "hawks" and "doves," you have said that

in the absence of that you foresee kind of a stalemate developing if this treaty were rejected. A disillusionment of the whole arms control process, but also a blocking of strategic weapons systems.

Dr. STONE. Yes.

Senator MCGOVERN. I think I understood you correctly. It is interesting, at the end of last week I attended a little function that Secretary Brown had where a brilliant young Defense Department employee—who shall remain nameless—said to me: "I hope that treaty is not defeated because if it is, let us say it goes down by a vote of 60 to 40, 60 in favor and 40 against, those 60 Senators who vote for that treaty are going to be so resentful, so frustrated about the whole militaristic force in this country, we are not going to get anything through up there."

Is that part of what you were talking about in terms of the kind of stalemate you see developing?

Dr. STONE. Absolutely. I think that the M-X in particular is going to be the ABM of the 1980's, and that it will be opposed as a taxpayer waste, as an environmental hazard, as an arms race accelerator, as a vulnerable strategic weapons system and, at the end, after a tremendous struggle, defeated.

I have a footnote in my testimony, saying that both the hawks and the doves are beginning to realize, in the last few weeks, that M-X may be more likely to pass in the presence of the treaty than in its absence. This is why there is some uncertainty among the leading hawkish opponents of the treaty about actually defeating the treaty with a minority because they fear, as Senator McGovern pointed out, that the weapons systems that they want, might be less likely to be purchased. For the doves the same thing happened when the President nailed the M-X to the SALT Treaty—but they became nervous about treaty passage.

RATIFICATION WITH ASSURANCES OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Senator MCGOVERN. The reverse of that is if you ratify the treaty by purchasing all kinds of assurances through the promises of new weapons systems, then you set just the opposite scenario.

Dr. STONE. Yes.

Senator MCGOVERN. You get the treaty ratified, but you have the political stage set for the construction of the M-X, with the President leading the way. It is on that basis, is it not, that there needs to be a clear statement on the part of the of the Senate of where we stand. Are we for a larger strategic nuclear force with new spending following the ratification of this treaty, or are we not?

That is the issue that I am trying to force and to sharpen in these hearings because it does seem to me that is the kind of policy judgment the Senate has to make. It is not just a matter of whether we ratify this treaty or whether we do not, but how we do it; what kind of a stage we set for that process.

Mr. BARNET. I think to your question about whether the moratorium proposal is at all conceivable in the real world, the rejection of the March 1977 proposals is not much evidence. Those proposals for various reasons, not only the procedural points that Dr. Stone mentioned, but I think the content itself, the emphasis on the land based missiles and so forth, were not calculated to produce Soviet

enthusiasm. We do have the repeated statements from the Soviet Union—vague and in general though they are—about the interest in negotiating a ban on all new weapons systems.

POSSIBILITY OF WAGING LIMITED NUCLEAR WARFARE

Senator McGovern. Does either one of you see any logic in some of the discussion we have heard, I think including Mr. Nitze and others, that it may be possible to wage limited nuclear warfare, and that it is on that basis that you need these highly sophisticated systems like the M-X to take potshots between the two nuclear weapons systems that only kill a few million people, incidentally, but do not really escalate into major wars. Is that a realistic scenario?

Dr. Stone. I think the committee is wholly qualified to judge the relevance of what General Rowny and Mr. Nitze have proposed because what they proposed was that military weapons, even though they had no capacity to do something of military significance, might nevertheless have political significance. This is a judgment which Senators, as politicians, are both empowered and assigned to make.

If you think that if the Russians have 1 billion warheads, and we only have 1 million warheads, that we are in some jeopardy, then you would agree with Mr. Nitze and General Rowny. But, if you think, as I do that the arms race will probably end with the Soviets having 1 billion warheads, and we having only 1 million warheads, and that it does not matter, then I think you would reject their argument about the shadow of power from these wholly saturated imbalances.

Mr. Barnet. I think it is important to point out that both the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Soviet Union are on record as saying that a limited war of that sort cannot happen, that it is most unlikely in the view of domestic politics and human psychology.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator McGovern. It might be well to note that this committee did commission a highly competent study of the likely consequences of a nuclear war. Part of that study took into account the so-called surgical strike of one attack on our missiles, followed by a similar counterattack against Russian missiles. If I remember correctly, the estimates were that the human cost of such a surgical attack would vary from 10 to 20 million people in the United States, which hardly makes it surgical—that sounds like a rather big hemorrhage. It makes me very doubtful about the scenario that we are so often told.

Senator Percy?

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our distinguished guests and thank them for the careful thought they have put into their testimony.

This is the first chance I have had to answer Senator McGovern and his statement this morning, which I felt was very thought provoking and extraordinarily helpful.

SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS

It is apparent that Senators on both sides of the table now have criticized the present treaty for not limiting enough, and I share the disappointment that it does not go far enough. I wish it would go a great deal farther.

But I do think we have to be careful not to overlook the fact that it is a very significant thing that the two superpowers—adversaries in the world today—have sat down and have agreed to any limits at all.

I can recall early in my Senate career, President Johnson would have done anything to get the Soviets to sit down with the United States. Early in President Nixon's term, he was deeply disappointed, because there seemed to be a total reluctance on the part of the Soviets to sit down and even talk about the subject that President Nixon thought they should talk about.

It is almost as though you have two ancient warriors who have represented hostile tribes through the centuries. They have finally come together and faced each other. They look each other right in the eyeball, they each pull one arrow from their quivers and they break the arrow. Now, they each still have a full quiver of arrows, minus one. They continue to be suspicious of each other's intentions. And they both would still take advantage of any weakness they perceive in the other. But the fact that they are standing there, facing each other, and have done something symbolic is really very important. It is not that they have lessened the danger overall, but it could be a step toward easing of tensions.

I look at the United Nations meeting last year, a whole U.N. session devoted to just one subject, disarmament. Of course, it did not make great progress. It was too vast a subject and the disparity of views was tremendous; but the very fact that we held it, and the very fact that every nation focused its attention for several weeks on that one subject is important. The whole world is really watching to see what we do because our actions in relation to the Soviet Union could affect the whole world.

It is, I think, very encouraging to them and probably would be very disillusioning to the world if suddenly the two warriors moved aside and decided not to take any further steps whatsoever.

I think we should, therefore, not overlook the significance of the fact that the arms control process is really continuing, and that it is terribly important that it does continue, even if we do not make the kind of progress any of us would like to see or get the significant results we really want. The results that we do have are certainly important but very modest indeed.

It does make sense to me that we have to limit the arms race buildup before we can reduce arms. We have to reduce arms before we can hope to eliminate them, that is just the nature of the process. We need a step-by-step approach, and we found in the Mideast it has to work that way, and it has to work that way in this process. We can build the confidence necessary to go the ultimate step, hopefully, by the process we are now going through.

Whether I will support this treaty or not really depends upon my ultimate judgment as to whether it is in the national interest that we do so. I am not in a position now to endorse this treaty. I have

notified the administration that if they stand firm that no understandings or reservations, even, could be accepted, I would not vote to ratify this treaty. But, if there is a little flexibility and resilience I would hope we could adopt enough measures on the floor of the Senate to strengthen this treaty and remove the ambiguity that some of us find in it.

I hope we will not demean the significance, however, of the fact that the two most powerful nations in the history of the earth, both capable of changing the face of the globe within a matter of a few hours, and making large sections of it totally uninhabitable, have agreed to sit down and talk, and have negotiated for these 7 long years now on means of limiting their arsenals. As has been aptly stated, "The Journey of 10,000 miles begins with but a single step". We are spending a lot of time talking about not the journey of 10,000 miles, but only the second step and whether it is desirable to take it. That is the purpose of your testimony here and why we are very grateful, indeed, for it.

Yes, Mr. Barnet?

Mr. BARNET. If I could just respond. I very much agree with the tenor of your remarks. I think it is certainly better that the two sides are talking than not talking.

The thing I fear is that the pace of events, particularly the technology, and particularly the changing political situation of the world is racing ahead so fast that disillusionment with the process, not only by the participants themselves, but by the public also will increase. The Senate has a unique opportunity now to take this situation and to try to push it as far as we can towards an agreement that would be somewhat more commensurate with the danger that we all face.

ASSESSMENT OF BLAME FOR RAPID ARMS ESCALATION

Senator PERCY. Mr. Barnet, in your own statement, in your testimony, you indicate the SALT II Treaty is an effort at joint arms planning between the United States and the Soviet Union.

You do not seem to assess blame for the arms race on either country. Do you think that either country is more to blame than the other for the rapid arms escalation?

Mr. BARNET. Well, I think you have to look at the arms race historically. The energy and the original impetus in the arms race came from the United States. The United States was the inventor of the atomic bomb; the first developer of the hydrogen bomb; the first developer of ICBM's, cruise missiles, MIRV, and so on. For a long time we had a clear superiority.

The Soviet Union, after what I think was the great divide in the early 1960's, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, began to build up at a rapid, steady rate. Those who point to the fact that the Soviet Union in recent years has been engaging in a much more active a buildup than the United States are, of course, correct. But I think they ignore the historical context which is that the United States had done most of its building up before that.

So, I think there is blame to go on both sides. What is happening now is that more and more the military posture of two sides and the military doctrines are converging. This is the kind of conver-

gence that offers very little comfort because when both sides have forces for projecting naval power—the Soviets are way behind us in this, but they are developing and I think one has to assume that as the arms race continues, if it does, they will match us in this—the possibilities of confrontation and enormous escalation of expense increase.

So, there is blame on all sides and there is opportunity on all sides to stop the arms race now.

CLARIFICATION OF TESTIMONY

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Dr. Stone, could you briefly describe what appears to be a change of opinion on your part? In your testimony you would recommend passing a resolution in conjunction with SALT II ratification that would instruct our negotiators of SALT III. At one point during your own consideration of SALT II, as I understand it, you were leaning in favor of returning the treaty to the President with instructions for renegotiation, were you not?

Dr. STONE. I do not think I was. I published an article in the New York Times which said if something were not done about MIRV land-based missiles by 1985, that the SALT process might self-destruct. I said also that there was a big difference between the SALT process and this particular SALT agreement; and that everyone who said, "Are you for or against SALT" was making a semantic error which Senator Hayakawa, who is a great general semanticist would understand quite well. There was a great difference between SALT itself and the SALT II Treaty. People were confusing these two concepts in their minds.

The article ended by raising the possibility that we reject the treaty and work on taking care of the MIRV land-based missile problem. But it warned this would probably not work while saying that, if we do not do something about these MIRV land-based missiles, the whole SALT process would self-destruct.

This gave people, I think, an exaggerated view of my hostility towards the treaty.

MARCH 1977 PROPOSAL OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Senator PERCY. Do you think the administration should have continued on the track that they were on in March 1977? Should they have stayed with it a little longer? Do you think that if they had, the Russians might have continued negotiations along those lines?

Dr. STONE. The basic trouble with this treaty is that it was not concluded early enough. Unfortunately, that March 1977 proposal which was trying to create the same consensus I am calling for here, and is the kind of thing I think should be done again, came at an inappropriate time and delayed the treaty, therefore leading to the turmoil the committee is now facing.

So, it was perhaps a mistake in retrospect, but an understandable one.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy. Senator Biden is next.

Senator BIDEN. Dr. Stone, I think it is very helpful that you and Dr. Barnet have made the statements that you have made here this afternoon. Although, as you know from our discussions and my voting record and what has occurred as it relates to arms control, I am sympathetic to the point of view you suggest, and that was justified by Senator McGovern, I have concerns about its being able to work.

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION APPROVAL

Let me comment on your proposal concerning annual percentage reductions from SALT II ceilings and subceilings. The simple percentage cut approach doesn't, I think, take us very far down the road that you and I, and Senator McGovern, and, hopefully, Senator Helms and others want to go.

We don't get very far down that road before we get into trouble and have to take into consideration new methods and approaches.

Let me give you an example. If we reduce by 20 percent the 820 limit of MIRVed ICBM's, we begin to cut much more significantly into Soviet overall arsenal than we cut into the U.S. arsenal, and we begin to move the U.S. arsenal into a superior position to the Soviets because of the configuration of the force.

Conversely, if we just go the simple percentage cut route, there are certain ways that U.S. interests would be adversely affected. For example, overall percentage reductions would accentuate the already existing imbalance in the Euro-strategic area, which is not even encompassed by SALT.

The point I am trying to make is that your proposal starts us down the road in the right direction. I know in fact that the administration is already thinking about SALT III in terms of percentage cuts. But once you get to about that 20 percent point, asymmetries in force structure start to impede your progress.

Dr. STONE. There is so much fat in the strategic forces of the two sides that you could have very substantial reductions for quite a long time before you really had to solve, for strategic reasons, these questions of theater nuclear forces and others in which you are so expert, Senator.

Of course, I am not trying to solve the whole arms race with one number.

Senator BIDEN. I am not trying to discount all you said. I just don't want the impression left here by either a man of Senator McGovern's stature and standing in the arms control community, and in the political community, or a man of your stature in the scientific community who have advised so many of us over the years, that we really could make a major breakthrough by percentage reduction.

Dr. STONE. I do believe you could make a major breakthrough by negotiating one number with the Russians, and keeping the quality of constraints of SALT II, and reducing for a number of years by that percentage, thereby shrinking the whole strategic force confrontation.

When I say major breakthrough, I don't mean that we would suddenly cease to be able to be blown to bits in 30 minutes, as we can be now—that would be the same. But compared to this treaty,

which permits both sides to go up in warheads, it would be a major breaththrough, like turning night into day.

Senator BIDEN. I guess the other way of saying it is this. Unfortunately not everything in the strategic arsenals is included in SALT II. And I think our Allies would have apoplexy if that were the case.

Dr. STONE. We have to do something about these theater nuclear forces you are talking about. I did not propose that they be frozen. They should be negotiated along with the SS-20 question.

Senator BIDEN. When we talk about cruise, we are really talking as much in theater as in central terms, in a sense maybe even more. That is really why we are all talking about protecting the cruise option. The reason for the overwhelming concern about the Protocol is that it relates to theater more than it does central.

Mr. BARNET. That is why, Senator, I think that the proposal Dr. Stone has made for expanding negotiations to include theater weapons is very important. Here, again, my understanding, in talking to some members of the German Parliament, is that the Soviet Union has expressed an interest in talking about this.

SOVIET PERCEPTION OF IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY POWER IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY

Senator BIDEN. You said in your statement, Dr. Barnet:

> There is nothing to suggest from the history of the arms race so far that either a weapons buildup by the United States or the achievement of marginal arms control arrangements will cause the Soviet Union to downgrade the importance of military power in its foreign policy.

With that, I fully agree.

Then you said, in response to another question:

> We must look at the history, and the history shows that in the Cuban missile crisis the Soviets attempted, in a sense, to leapfrog, to get a freeze, but they found out that they ran up against our arsenal, and therefore they decided that they needed to build their strategic arsenal because they could not get a freeze.

I would suggest that the post-Cuban buildup is not so much a consequence of U.S. nuclear power having been so superior at the time, but a change in the concept of what constitutes security for the Soviets. We have moved from the revolutionary days, when the Soviets viewed their security in terms of a spreading Communist revolution and a class alliance that would transcend borders.

When that did not come to pass, Stalin begin to see the security of the Soviet Union in terms of regional control, and he built the entire effort during and post-World War II in terms of the immediate surrounding area, behind the so-called Iron Curtain.

Then Krushchev came along, and the Soviets began to view their security in a still different way. They viewed their security in broader geographic and functional terms, the Third World. They sort of leap-frogged over that belt around them. They made that conceptual change in what they viewed as constituting their security, and I don't see how, no matter what we did, we could have avoided their moving along the path they have moved.

Mr. BARNET. Because, I think, Senator, there is a relationship for the Soviet Union and also for us between the strategic doctrine and definitions of national security that a country has and the kind of

weapons system that it has. When they build certain kinds of weapons and develop capabilities, people are always looking for some justification to use it when a capability exists; military people tend to view it as absolutely necessary to the national security, like our bases.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up. I hope that we can get to the conventional side of that question in the second round.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SALT II STEP TOWARD SALT III

I am going to address my question to both of you, but first of all I want to quote from both of you what I feel to be the crucial statements you have made in your testimony.

Dr. Stone, I am very impressed with your statement that—

> It is the thesis of this testimony that the Senate should make its mark upon this treaty, not by amending its substantive proposal, or by adopting declarations of minor significance, but by attempting to forge a new consensus about what should be done in SALT III.

You see SALT II as a step toward SALT III, and a whole change of climate is what you hope for in SALT III.

"Then instructing the administration and the Soviet Union by Senate resolution of the terms without which a subsequent treaty would not be acceptable."

Dr. Barnet, what you say about "the only road to national security is to stop and to reverse the arms race." This impressed me very much.

> In a time of austerity, increasing the military budget while domestic programs are being slashed the issue is not of guns versus butter, but of missiles versus the local police and fire fighters. To suggest that the threat of "Finlandization" in Europe is a greater threat to the people of Chicago, Cleveland, and Los Angeles, or Detroit, than the loss of social services, the breakdown of the education system, the rise in crime, the alarming increase in infant mortality, et cetera, is to misconstrue the meaning of "strength." The same is also true of the Soviet Union. We can spend almost $2 trillion in the next 10 years in pursuit of a "defense" that no longer exists and they can spend an equivalent sum, and in the end both will be poorer and more vulnerable because the level of destructive power in the world will have gone up.

Dr. Barnet, if I may quote one more sentence from you, "It is not hard to imagine a better agreement than SALT II. A simple agreement that would force the two sides to choose between continuing the arms race or stopping it would be far preferable."

I would like for both of you, in turn, whatever turn you want to take, to elaborate on these ideas. I do believe with all of you that we are engaged in a totally futile race, totally wasted expenditure on both sides, even more wasteful on the part of the Soviet Union than on our part because they have sacrificed so much of their standard of living for the maintenance of this arms race. But we are sacrificing much of ours. We are sacrificing much that we can do, not only for ourselves but the rest of the world by the amount of resources we commit to armament, missiles, and so on.

So I would implore both of you to elaborate a little bit on what you were saying here. What are you looking for? Do you really see SALT II as a step toward a SALT III, if a sufficient understanding

is arrived at in connection with SALT II, so that there can be such a step toward a further agreement in the future?

Dr. STONE. That is exactly what I would like to expand on. It is often considered naive, and some Senators on the committee may also feel that it is a bit naive, to take at face value the statements of Senators who have previously been very hawkish in their attitudes toward the arms race about their new interest in reductions, and their antagonism toward a treaty that permits more and more warheads.

However, it would also be naive to think that there can be reductions without a consensus of hawks and doves. Doves cannot, by themselves, turn the arms race around. So while it may not be a big chance that we can work out a consensus in the United States on reductions, it is the only chance for reductions and the only chance, I think, to maintain the SALT process.

The thing that makes some of the statements in favor of reductions seem hypocritical to Senators hearing them, is that they are phrased in arms control rhetoric, when they come from persons who have traditionally been concerned with strategic imbalance. But that is just a rhetorical difference.

When Mr. Helms, this morning, talked about wanting this treaty to be otherwise, and said that he wants reductions, he may not want them for the same reasons the doves want them, but he does want reductions, and he wants reductions for a very good reason.

He and the school of thought that he represents are afraid that the Russians are getting ahead in the arms race, and they see the reductions as a way to resolve those imbalances, and those instabilities. So there is a legitimate underlying urge, which we have seen in the arms control proposals of Senator Jackson now for 5 or 6 years.

I think, in fact, the only way to solve the instabilities that the United States is facing is going to be through reductions. I don't think the United States or the Soviet Union can solve the land-based vulnerability problem without reductions. I don't think that it can be done with new missile systems, and certainly don't think that it can be done with new missiles dependent on a continuing SALT process.

I think if the Senate is not prepared to give instructions as to what it would accept for SALT III, then it is not fulfilling its duty. The Senate has already thrown such a scare into both sides about any future SALT Treaty, that it has to explain what it is it wants. And if it does say what it wants, our negotiators will be invaluably strengthened in their negotiating hand.

Up until now, the Russians have the right to assume that Presidents always want SALT Treaties and will eventually give in on minor things in order to get a treaty. But if the Senate says, "No treaty should come back without X," the President has to take that into account.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

Senator HAYAKAWA. Dr. Stone, let me say that I am delighted that you are associated with the Federation of American Scientists. I want to say that in 1945 and 1946, when the federation first started, I was a member.

Dr. STONE. Thank you.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I was associated, at that time, with Illinois Eastern Technology, and many of my friends had worked in Oak Ridge, and they came back from Oak Ridge sort of starry-eyed with the possibilities of what was then known as atomic energy, as a contribution to world peace, and the necessity of some kind of rational control of that atomic energy. That was the time that I associated myself with that organization.

Dr. STONE. I want to say, Senator, that at about that time, sir, I was an avid student of your general semantics writings, and should like to say that semanticly this cannot be called an "arms race acceleration treaty," as you did this morning, because it is not accelerating the arms race.

NATIONAL SECURITY DEFINITION

Mr. BARNET. I also believe that the only hope for the arms race is a new consensus. I see that new consensus possible only if we broaden our traditional definition of national security, which is extremely narrow. We tend, in this country, and we have tended for a generation now, to equate national security and military hardware.

I think, as the President pointed out last night, this country is facing a series of crises and threats which have really nothing to do with the Russians, and really from which the Russians would have a hard time even profiting, if they should want to.

I believe that we have a chance to reverse the arms race, if we get back to rather traditional notions of national security, which go back right to the founding of this Republic, that it is based on a strong economy. It is based on a society in which people feel they have a part, and can make a contribution. That cannot be done if we are shoveling trillions of dollars into the arms race.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much.

I can promise you that I shall read both of your papers thoughtfully again tonight because there is so much in there that corresponds with my own thinking on the subject, because I have had to think about atomic energy since 1945, when my colleagues at Illinois Tech came back from Oak Ridge, and joined us. Then we started the heated argument about what we were going to do about all this. I really have not stopped thinking about it.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Sarbanes, please?

RESOLUTION OUTLINING SALT III PARAMETERS, SALT II APPROVAL LINKAGE

Senator SARBANES. Dr. Stone, is it your view, on supporting SALT II, to tie it to a resolution of the sort that you have been outlining that would at least set the parameters of SALT III?

Dr. STONE. Let me say, Senator Sarbanes, since I don't have a vote on the Senate floor, I am spared some of the ultimate questions which Senators are forced to make at the end.

As I said at the beginning, these are my personal views, and although the general thrust of them has been supported by our council, the fact is that we have a wide range of views as to exactly how much maneuvering should be done before, or when the treaty would be signed.

Our group as a whole is in favor of signing the treaty, but by and large view with dismay its weaknesses, and would like some promise of doing better for the future.

I think that if I were in the Senate, I would be doing what Senator McGovern is doing, endeavoring to insure with my vote that there would be greater progress later. Because all agree if this treaty leads to something, it will be very desirable, but if it does not lead to anything, all agree that it will not be meaningful at all.

Senator SARBANES. Is the resolution you propose one in which the agreement of the Soviets would be obtained as representing a shared goal on their part?

Dr. STONE. No, sir. My idea is that the Senate would say that they wanted certain things in the treaty, and that the negotiators are instructed to try to achieve those things, and to report back quickly how they are doing on it, and to keep the Senate informed.

In other ways, the Senate would, with this resolution, instruct our negotiators.

Senator SARBANES. What would happen if the Soviets rejected those goals?

Dr. STONE. If the negotiators felt that it was quite impossible to make any headway, it would end this whole process because the Senate would have said: "We will not accept treaties without such and such," and if, in fact, no progress at all was going to be made along those lines, it would be clear that no treaty was subsequently going to be approved. But I envisage that this would not happen.

Senator SARBANES. If this were to happen, would you, then, have felt that the approval of SALT II was the right step, or would it then appear to be a mistake?

Dr. STONE. It would still be a right step because the SALT II agreement is, as I testified, something for nothing. What little it does, it does to restrain the Russians. As the Joint Chiefs testified, it has quite nominal effects on our program.

To complain about SALT II is to look a small gift horse in the mouth.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Barnet, what is your view on this resolution?

Mr. BARNET. I favor the resolution for the reasons that have been mentioned. This is a unique opportunity, perhaps the last opportunity, of the Senate to express a view which could have a profound influence on the future direction of the SALT process.

I think the SALT process is very much of a black box at this point. If the process is simply a continuation of cosmetic agreements, I don't think that anything is gained, and maybe in the end a good deal is lost. But if, in fact, the Senate can express a view and exert an influence on the administration that could push it in a good direction, and end what I think is the most dangerous aspect of the arms race, the forward momentum, the new weapon systems, then, I think a great deal will have been accomplished.

SOVIET ACQUIESCENCE IN STATEMENT OF GOALS FOR SALT III

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that the Soviet acquiescence in that statement of goals for SALT III could be obtained?

Mr. BARNET. I would hope that it could be. I am not sufficiently familiar with the mechanics of the ratification process to know how this could be done, or how this was done in the past.

I make a big distinction between reservations and amendments which I think clearly run at variance with stated Soviet positions. Something like the moratorium would seem to me not inconsistent with statements which the Soviet Union has made, such as the April 11, 1977, statement which I read earlier.

Senator SARBANES. Suppose you put it out there, and they refuse to accede to it?

Mr. BARNET. That would be a very serious development, and one that I think would end the SALT process, as far as I could see. It would, I think, still probably justify ratifying this agreement for the reasons that Dr. Stone has mentioned.

Senator SARBANES. I thought your position was that unless we know that SALT II is going to lead to a SALT III of the sort you and Dr. Stone are sketching out, SALT II may be a bad idea.

Mr. BARNET. No; my position, Senator, is that in order to get to a SALT III which would really be meaningful, I think we have to go through this square. As I said in the statement, I think we are prisoners of the history that we have made.

I just don't see, given the larger history of negotiations with the Soviet Union where, from their perspective, there have been a number of treaties that have been made, agreements, and understandings that seem to be frustrated by later administrations, or by the Congress, that we could simply reject it altogether. The climate for doing anything would then be a lot worse.

RESOLUTION ENCOMPASSING DOD/JCS ARMS PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator SARBANES. Instead of your resolution, suppose a resolution passed with the recommended arms program of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. Would you still favor SALT II with that kind of resolution?

Mr. BARNET. SALT II with the M–X.

Senator SARBANES. That is right. You are projecting one kind of resolution. The Joint Chiefs want all these other things done.

Mr. BARNET. And that was made a resolution?

Senator SARBANES. Suppose that that was made a Senate resolution, would you favor SALT II in that context?

Mr. BARNET. Probably not.

Dr. STONE. May I answer that question?

Senator SARBANES. I want Mr. Barnet to elaborate on his answer.

Mr. BARNET. Let me tell you why I am uncertain, Senator, about that. I think the answer to that would really depend entirely on a contemporary judgment about all the political circumstances of the moment.

The issues are these: What would be the effect on this country, on the political climate, the public opinion, and the possibilities of

going to a meaningful SALT III—and what would be the effect on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as far as obtaining a decent SALT III?

My inclination, I think, would be to fear that the inclusion of that resolution would create such an unfavorable political environment in both situations that it would vitiate the possibilities of a real SALT III. So I probably would be against it.

Dr. STONE. Senator Sarbanes, 12 percent of our organization, when voting in a recent poll said that if M-X were nailed to the treaty, they would oppose the treaty.

If the resolution to which you refer were passed, that percentage would grow. But it would be limited by a feeling among many of our members that no matter what resolution you passed, the M-X will not be built.

A lot of people are not as upset as they might be about M-X being nailed to the treaty because of their deep-seated conviction that the M-X will eventually be defeated for systems analysis reasons.

At the moment, of course, it is unknown what exactly the missile is supposed to be. M-X is, itself, a shell game because we don't know what basing method is involved. But my guess would be, independent of any resolution, M-X will stand or fall depending on whether a suitable basing can be found, and I doubt that it can.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

M-X DEPLOYMENT LINKAGE TO SALT TREATY

Dr. Stone, picking up on your last comment, you have made the point as I recall in your testimony, that President Carter and his administration became very excited about M-X and, other defense measures recently as there was a general perception that the treaty might be in trouble. Without assurances to the Joint Chiefs and to Senators interested in defense that all of these items might be included, the administration would have faced a much more difficult task.

You have made, I think, a very valid point that the interest has been so sudden that the M-X amounts to a couple of letters presently, without any precise idea as to its deployment, and all the rest of it.

In other words, as I listen to testimony day in and day out about people advocating M-X to reassure people like myself that we will somehow be able to defend our ICBM's, I really am not satisfied that they know precisely what they are advocating, and I certainly have no idea.

Your point is well taken that there is a shell game going on. It is conceivable that we could pass the treaty, and the M-X might be forgotten, and maybe for good reason, because it was not well thought out to begin with. I think that that point is important.

VULNERABILITY OF LAND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEM WITHOUT SALT

What I would like to explore with you this afternoon, however, is this problem. That is, one reason why people such as myself are interested in the M-X is that we have a genuine belief that the land-based missile system we now have will become vulnerable and in a fairly short time.

Your answer to that is an intriguing one; namely, that this vulnerability conceivably could increase without SALT because more MIRVed land-based weapons might be allowable, and indeed might be developed and produced. As a result, even as the M-X, in one of its forms, spreads out into more and more pods, so would the number of MIRVed missile launchers and the missiles themselves, so that it is hard to know, really, how long and tortuous you follow this route. It may be that the M-X does not bring security under those conditions, and that is an important point.

What you are suggesting, as I gather, is that in the event an agreement could be arrived at to reduce by percentages the MIRVed weapon systems and launchers each time around, somehow or other we begin to reduce the problem of defending one line of our strategic deterrence.

Specifically, could you review again the system that you presented on the one occasion, which it seems to me I recall, both sides could choose the types of weapons within the percentage that they wanted to destroy in the particular year. Is that essentially where you are presently in your thinking on this system?

Dr. STONE. I think that my thinking has been constant since the publication of this article in the Post, which is attached to the testimony. Namely, the reductions would permit freedom to choose within the limitations of the SALT II agreement. So you would be able to modernize the 820 MIRVed missiles, while reducing the total within the limits of the SALT II agreement, and so on.

Senator LUGAR. Presently, both sides have something in the upper 500's. You are still working from the SALT limit of 820 as opposed to the actual counts?

Dr. STONE. By the time you get around to applying this percentage, the Russians will have 820. We may still only have 550.

You might therefore want to apply the percentages to the numbers that exist rather than pretending that we already had 820 and taking 10 percent of that.

Senator LUGAR. Even if the system is a good one, and it is conceivable. I think that each one of us would like to massage these figures around, and see whether we get more security from them, but the question of the timing and the strategy of how all this is to occur in ratification clearly requires a lot of thought, too.

IMPORTANCE OF SALT II RATIFICATION TO SALT III NEGOTIATIONS

You have suggested, and Dr. Barnet has suggested that all things being equal, SALT II ratification is important. I think that Dr. Barnet has said that it is a product of our history, and this is something that we have to pass through in order to touch base, to settle down to do SALT III.

I am not certain that I agree with that, although I appreciate the logic of what you are saying. It seems to me that we will not be

going through this debate every year. I would hope not. While we are in the process of discussing all this, maybe we had better touch down and decide really what we are about, in other words, as opposed to taking on faith that we take off SALT II, and then get right on to SALT III with instructions to our negotiators, I have almost as little faith in that process as I have that the M-X might be produced even if we had some pledges of an administration to do that.

I think that at this stage, if we are going to spend this much time at it, we really had better get things down on paper.

Why would the Soviets not be pleased at this turn of events? It suggests, Dr. Barnet, that they were displeased with the original suggestions in March 1977 because this is not quite in the sequence that they hoped for. In other words, to sign SALT II first, and then get on with the reductions.

Clearly, the negotiators this morning, Mr. Warnke and others, said that if we make a proposal for cuts in their armament, we have got to be prepared to do something quid pro quo. But as I recall your suggestion, it is precisely that. We take a 10 percent reduction in MIRV's, and maybe for that matter, if we really want to go at this with a vengeance, we might do more than that.

Why would the Soviets not agree to that procedure before we get to the signing of SALT II?

Dr. STONE. I think that they might agree to it eventually but the Russians take a long time thinking about things. Even under the pressure of your resolution, and our negotiators explaining it to them, it would take them some time to adjust gears

Senator LUGAR. Why couldn't we wait for them to think about it?

Dr. STONE. You see, we need the SALT II agreement to make these reduction processes make sense. If the SALT agreement is anything, it is a structure of constraints under which you could later do reductions.

For example, it says that 820 missiles can be MIRVed. It, therefore, implies that we can tell the difference between a missile that is MIRVed and a missile that is not MIRVed. It is, therefore, a presupposition of these reductions.

Without this structure, this par scheme would make a lot less sense.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that, but the Soviets are not going to forget the definitions that we have been tediously going at day in and day out to negotiations. We have a pretty good idea of what is involved.

In other words, what I am suggesting is, why would we go through the procedures of ratifying this treaty when, in fact—you have listed the options. You could have the so-called killer amendment, to include the Backfire within the treaty and see if they take it or don't. You are predicting they will not, and therefore we are not far down the trail.

It is a more intriguing situation if you say, let's take our 25 percent of all MIRVed weapons. Let's both agree mutually to that. Let's see how that one sells. Otherwise, we have no assurance, in having signed SALT II, that we will get on to SALT III. You, gentleman, in a way, suggest that it does not make a whole lot of

difference, and the doves and hawks have not lost a whole lot anyway in the process. But I am not so confident of that.

Mr. BARNET. It does make a difference, I think, if you are thinking about the continuation of the process.

What worries me—I would very much favor your view of stopping and negotiating a better agreement, and going to the Soviets with it, if history would stop still for us. But we have a tremendous momentum going here, with weapons systems, with people in this country talking about the military, just spewing metaphysical and mystical notions of the military balance, which is something that nobody can conceive, and which people have very strong feelings about, and very different feelings about. It is something that alarms a lot of people.

Also we have a situation in this country where we have an election coming up, the possibility of a new administration. We have, I think, the probability of a new administration in the Soviet Union within the very short period of time, and a world which is increasingly unstable for all kinds of reasons.

It is in this situation that even the minimal degree of stability and confidence increasing effort of SALT II would be an improvement.

Senator LUGAR. You may be right, but on the other hand, it could be rather electrifying in terms of our foreign policy if we took a position that rather than subject the world to all the tortuous process that might go on post-SALT II, when no one wanted to negotiate, we then proceeded on to the higher levels.

Our ICBM's were vulnerable throughout the 1980's, and maybe our aircraft size and maybe a lot of other things. Maybe a different tack is useful at this point.

Mr. BARNET. I think a different tack is absolutely necessary. What I strongly proposed in my testimony is that the next stage has got to be something very much simpler. That is why I favor so much the idea of the cut-off from the moratorium because it is simpler, it seems to me, than getting into the question of, what weapon do you choose, what weapon do you leave out, what exceptions do you make?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Pell has not yet had a chance to question, and I am going to call on him in just a moment.

Senator Javits and I have to leave for another meeting, and I would ask Senator Pell if he would conclude the meeting this afternoon.

TREATY IMPACT UPON OTHER IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS

I just want to make this one observation. There has been a good deal of talk about the weaknesses, and the deficiencies in the SALT agreement, and nearly everybody, I think, whether Hawk or Dove—and the birds in the air are no longer distinguishable—would all like to see greater reductions. Indeed, we would.

However, SALT II is the only game in town. Each Senator in his own imagining can conjure up a better treaty, and it is obvious from even the most casual reference to your chart that we and the

Soviet Union have built up these strategic weapons to such an astonishing level, given their destructive power, that we are not only going to live precarious lives, but so are our children and our grandchildren after them, before we finally get those levels down to the point where an exchange of the remaining arsenals in some kind of war, through act of miscalculation or madness, whatever, will not utterly incinerate both countries.

I think that it is apparent, whether you get reductions of 5 percent a year, or even 10 percent, that we are going to live through a long period of extreme danger which threatens national extinction on both sides.

So, I would suggest that we not only think about greater reductions in SALT III, and how we get there from here, but that we also think about this treaty in terms of its impact upon other negotiations that are also important to our security.

For example, we are making substantial progress in the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Indeed, a great breakthrough has been achieved: For the first time the Soviet Union has apparently agreed to the installation of a monitoring system within the Soviet Union, which is unprecedented for them.

The impact of mutual reduction is important in the European theater.

Finally, the ratification of SALT II as it might affect the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the willingness of countries that are now not weapon states to continue to abide by its terms.

In other words, I think that we, too, can get tunnel vision as we consider this treaty. It does not simply have to do with the balance of missiles, and the relative strategic positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. It has a lot to do with other negotiations which, in turn, can affect the security of this country and the likelihood of war in the future.

So I would hope that the committee would not take too narrow a view of the treaty and its impact.

Now, Senator Pell, I am sorry to have made that speech, after you have waited all afternoon. I now turn the hearing over to you, and ask if you will conclude it. There may be a second series of questions. Senator Sarbanes is still here, and Senator Lugar, and they may wish to ask some further questions.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I had the opportunity to go over your papers, even though I was called away while you were delivering them. I found them very interesting and very stimulating.

SOVIET SCIENTISTS' VIEWS ON SALT PROCESS, ROLE IN SOVIET ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS

Dr. Stone, you have had personal contact with Soviet scientists, some of the dissenting ones as well as the official ones. What is their view of the SALT process as far as you could ascertain, and the SALT II. In that regard, what is the role of official scientists in the Soviet decisions on arms control?

Dr. STONE. I think that the leading, one of the few, anyway, Soviet scientific dissidents who addresses himself to arms controls

questions is Andrei Sakharov, and I believe he has supported the treaty.

The Soviet scientists who go to official meetings to talk about arms control would, of course, be supporting the Soviet position. In fact, Soviet citizens in general would find it difficult to understand a rejection of a SALT Treaty, much as they would find it difficult to understand the rejection of a friendship treaty, or any of these other symbols of peaceful foreign policy.

So, by and large, those who have addressed themselves to it publicly, I think, would support the Treaty. I know that Scientists for Orlov and Shcharansky, which is a group of scientists in America supporting Orlov and Shcharansky, have carefully explained in recent letters that they are not opposing the SALT Treaty as leverage on human rights.

So, by and large, these things have been kept separate.

Senator PELL. In other words, the Soviet side is, both the official one and the dissenting one, that they are supporting the treaty.

Dr. STONE. The official one, certainly. The only dissenting one that I have seen, Andrei Sakharov, is also, I believe.

IMPACT OF SOVIET SCIENTISTS' VIEWS ON SOVIET POLICY

Senator PELL. What do the dissenters see for their cause in SALT II, or in the SALT process? I understand that some of them are against negotiating anything with Moscow until Professor Orlov is released from prison. I wondered what your reaction was to this, and also what your assessment as to the impact of their views on Soviet policy.

Dr. STONE. I should explain. I cannot speak for Scientists for Orlov and Shcharansky, which is a genuine grassroots movement of scientists, and it has a wide spectrum in it of scientists. There may be some in it that say that they would not like to trade or do anything with the Soviet Union until Orlov and Shcharansky are released.

However, I think that the official policy in recent letters that I have seen from Scientists for Orlov and Shcharansky, have not opposed the SALT II Treaty, and in fact specifically said that.

IMPACT OF TREATY REJECTION ON RUSSIAN POPULACE

Senator PELL. What do you think would be the impact of a Senate rejection of this treaty upon the general community in Russia?

Dr. STONE. Russia is, as has been said so often, a real enigma, and almost anything could happen. The defeat of the treaty would certainly add to what you might call the "standard deviation" of things that might happen there. It would certainly expand the range of unpleasant happenings that could occur. So I think it adds a certain risk.

Senator PELL. I think that I would like to ask Mr. Barnet that question.

Mr. BARNET. If I could respond to that question. I think it is difficult to know, obviously, exactly what the consequences would be, but I think the conflict within the Soviet Union is not so much between hawks and doves, as between those who see the security of

the Soviet Union requiring increasing connections and relationships with the United States, evolving a more interdependent relationship with the United States, and those who don't, those who see this as a hopeless course, and propose much more unilateral policies.

Brezhnev clearly represents the first category in many, many ways. Were he to fail down the line, fail, really, in his trade policy because of action that the Senate has taken—I am now talking from the Soviet perpsective—fail in the trade policy, and fail in other aspects of détente, and now finally fail in this major symbol of the evolving relationship with the United States, the so-called détente, I think one could confidently expect a successor group in the Soviet Union to take a different position.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES AND BEHAVIOR LINKAGE

What worries me is this: I think that there is a linkage between Soviet foreign policy initiatives and behavior, and its arms relationship with the United States. I think to the extent that the Soviet Union has strong incentives to save money, to try to get some recognition of a rough balance, a rough equality with the United States, they have much less incentive to go it alone in places like Africa.

U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION

Senator PELL. From your own experience as a Russian expert, Dr. Barnet, what more do you think we might have gotten out of the negotiations, if we had been either more skilled or more tough?

Mr. BARNET. I think that the Soviets have put forward, from time to time, rather enticing proposals of a more general character, which from everything I can gather have not been picked up on. I quoted earlier a statement that they made on April 11, 1977, about a ban on the development of all new weapon systems, ones that would both include intercontinental missiles and qualitative improvements. A much more general and comprehensive proposal. As far as I know, we have not picked up on that. I think we should have. I think that it is not too late, and I think that we still should, certainly in SALT III.

I believe that we could have pressed for deeper cuts and more comprehensive agreements earlier, and met with some success. The whole history of these negotiations, really, shows a conversion of the Soviets from rather radical proposals, which they made in the 1950's and 1960's. Through the SALT process they have been educated into the much more minimal, the much more marginal arms control arrangements which we have been putting forward. I think that turns out, probably, to have been a mistake from the point of view of both.

Senator PELL. Thank you both very much indeed.

Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. I have no further questions.

Senator PELL. This concludes the hearing.

Tomorrow at 10 o'clock in this room, the Foreign Relations Committee will resume its hearings. We will hear from Admiral

Moorer, Admiral Zumwalt, General Dougherty, Admiral Kidd, and Admiral Gayler.

The hearing is recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, July 17, 1979.]

SALT II TREATY

TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Stone, Sarbanes, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This morning, the Committee on Foreign Relations will hear from five retired military officers who have recently held key positions in the Armed Forces. This will provide the committee with the opportunity to follow up on a number of military issues raised during our sessions with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee will be particularly interested to get the views of the witnesses on the current and projected strategic military balance with and without SALT. The committee will also want to receive your views on specific military issues relating to the SALT II Treaty, such as the Soviet heavy missiles, the survivability of our Minuteman force, and the Backfire bomber.

Today's witnesses will appear in two panels. The first panel will consist of the treaty opponents, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, retired, and Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, retired. We will hear from these two distinguished officers until 11:30 this morning, when we will turn to a second panel consisting of Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, retired, Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, retired, and Adm. Noel Gayler, retired.

In order to accommodate both panels in this morning's session, we will follow the 5-minute rule. Gentlemen, having been witnesses before, I believe you are acquainted with our light system. The yellow light will indicate 4 minutes have passed, and the red light indicates when 5 minutes have passed.

Both of our witnesses in the opening panel, Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zumwalt, have attempted to accommodate the committee by abbreviating their statements, and I would call first on Admiral Moorer to present his testimony. Then Admiral Zumwalt will present his testimony, after which we will ask our questions.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER (USN, RET.), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. CHAIRMAN.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored and grateful for this opportunity to appear before your committee to give my views on the vital subject now under consideration by you; namely, SALT II. My great interest in this matter is heavily influenced by my experience in the SALT I process. In my capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 to 1974, I participated in practically all of the National Security Council [NSC] meetings and attended other meetings held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Secretary of Defense as well as Dr. Kissinger, in his role as Advisor to the President on National Security Affairs.

SALT II OPPOSITION

Subsequently, I have followed the SALT II negotiations as closely as possible without ready access to all details. I unequivocally oppose SALT II as now presented to this committee on two counts; first, in substance, on which I will briefly comment; and second, on the impact it is bound to have on the world political and military environment.

With respect to substance, let me say at the outset that since we have never had a nuclear exchange between two powerful nations, all conclusions as to the outcome can be nothing more than speculative estimate. I doubt that there are as many as 100 people in the United States who understand the interplay of warning time, decisionmaking, command and control, response, yield, accuracy, damage effects, fallout, and so forth, which are so closely associated with the use of nuclear weapons. Consequently, I do not propose to deal in detail as to the specific numbers of characteristics and effects of various weapons systems which must be considered unless queried by this committee. No matter what one may say on any subject, there will always be someone else who holds a different opinion, whether based on fact or not.

BACKFIRE BOMBER

I would like, however, to highlight several concerns I have in regard to the proposed treaty. First, the Backfire bomber. I fail to see why the United States can afford to exclude this weapons system from the SALT Treaty while at the same time count all of the strategic bombers of the United States, including those in storage. The Backfire bomber has a full capability of reaching the United States without refueling. It is inconceivable to me that in any major nuclear exchange with the United States, the Soviets would be overly concerned with the capability of these aircraft to return to Russia after an attack on the United States.

The facts are that they can reach the United States, deliver their weapons, and then recover as best they can by landing in Cuba, Mexico, or perhaps even at sea. Furthermore, the effectiveness of this aircraft is already in the process of being enhanced by tests with the cruise missile.

I consider it most ill-advised for the administration and other supporters of the treaty to simply pass over the Backfire bomber issue by informing us that they are in possession of a statement by Mr. Brezhnev which has assured the United States that the Soviet Union will not use the Backfire bomber as a strategic bomber and that it intends to limit the production of this aircraft.

Clearly, Mr. Brezhnev will not be in power forever, and the question then arises as to what action his successors might take on this matter. In fact, I think no chief of state would pay any serious attention to such assurances and anyone who really believes to the contrary, particularly in regard to the Soviet Union, is naive indeed.

U.S. AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

To add to this problem, I think that the American people should be aware that the United States has no air defense worthy of the name. While the Soviet Union has thousands of surface-to-air missiles and interceptors designed to defend against bomber attack, the United States in recent years has all but eliminated such capabilities.

At best, our air defense can be described as a peripheral warning system. For all practical purposes, once an enemy penetrates this system, he can cruise over the interior of the United States essentially unopposed. Hence, why ignore the threat of the Backfire bomber and thus give the Soviets a free ride in this area of strategic offensive capabilities?

SS–18 LIMITATIONS

Second, I have always been concerned about the large missile, the SS–18, which the Soviets are allowed to have while the United States is denied such a weapons system. The argument that we have no program to build such a missile is to me a specious one. What possible basis can there be for permitting the Soviets to demand that the United States be denied the capability which they possess?

SS–20 MISSILE QUESTION

Third, I would refer to the SS–20 missile, which, as you know, can be modified by the addition of a third stage, and thus be converted to an SS–16 missile, a missile easily capable of reaching the United States. For that matter, by removing two of the three warheads, the SS–20 can reach the United States in its present configuration.

Why should this missile not be counted in the aggregate inventory of weapons?

U.S. VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES

Finally, we come to verification. There is no question about the fact that the loss of Iran has very significantly degraded our verification capabilities. There is also little doubt that our political difficulties with our old ally, Turkey, due largely to what I would term ethnic politics, has made it doubly difficult to compensate for the loss of the facilities in Iran through operation from the bases in Turkey.

In addition, one must never lose sight of the asymmetry existing between the closed society of the Communist world and the open society we enjoy here in the United States. I hope it is clear to the American people that when the Soviets are assessing U.S. defense policy, they can obtain through purchase of the Congressional Record and publications such as Aviation Week all the information they need for less than $5. The United States on the other hand, must invest hundreds of millions of dollars to acquire the same kind of information insofar as Soviet weapons procurement is concerned.

Also, the Soviets have never been willing to discuss onsite inspections, and I for one am not willing in any sense to base the security of the United States on a matter of simple trust.

U.S. IMAGE IN THE WORLD

I now come to my second concern, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, which has to do with the worldwide perception of the United States and its will, determination, and capability to protect its own interests and those of our allies. We already have portrayed an image which suggests full retrenchment functionally as well as strategically.

One only has to talk to many of our allies to understand this point. The Vietnam war, the suggested withdrawal of troops from Korea, the failure to take action in Angola or Ethiopia, the loss of Iran, the proposal to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, all of these things have made the nations of the world ponder where we are headed.

The timing of this treaty, when considered against the nonmilitary commitment and perceived retrenchment policies of the United States, in my view is very bad indeed. I fear that the SALT II Treaty as now proposed will freeze the United States in a position of inferiority and simply serve to augment and reinforce this growing perception which other countries, friend and foe alike, have of the United States.

Once this happens, Mr. Chairman, one can be confident that we will feel far-reaching impacts, not just in the military arena, but in the international, political, and economic arenas as well. Most of the countries of the world do not enjoy the geographical and economic security with which the United States is blessed. Many of them are in a permanent state of insecurity, always looking for what appears to be the wave of the future and making their accommodation with it.

It is for this reason more than any other that I am concerned about the substance of SALT II.

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR SALT

I also have another concern I would like to mention. There are, of course, those who say that all of the European leaders fully support SALT II and hence conclude that, this being the case, SALT II must be very good. The facts are, Mr. Chairman, that the European nations are frightened. They are no longer certain that they can count on the United States to play the role it has played in the past, and as a consequence, they do not want to see any

action taken which would encourage the Soviets to be even more aggressive in the pursuit of world paramouncy, the goal they have sought since World War II.

BASIS FOR U.S. NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR

Also, I would like to comment in passing that it has been my observation that here in the United States we produce what I consider to be the world's worst negotiators. After giving much thought to this matter, I believe I can understand the basis for U.S. negotiatory behavior. The reason, I believe, is that Americans are goal-oriented, and if given a job to do, such as negotiate a treaty, they will do just that, and often are prone to reveal their fallback position almost before they have heard the full opening position of the other side.

In any event, I think history supports the point that generally speaking, our negotiators feel that a bad treaty is always better than no treaty. To me, our negotiators often seem to be approaching the problem as if they are building the bridge over the River Kwai, without stopping to consider the terrible traffic destined to pass over the bridge.

SALT III

I would also like to mention at this time SALT III. There are those who justify SALT II on the grounds that "we must keep the process alive." If SALT II is an example of our negotiating effectiveness, I predict that SALT III will result in the dismemberment of NATO for all practical purposes.

In the first place, we have already run out of concessions in the field of weaponry. The first action of the Soviets in SALT III will be to complain bitterly about our forward-based systems in Western Europe, as well as the location of the 6th Fleet. We will hear proposals that the 6th Fleet withdraw from the Mediterranean, that any nuclear delivery capability aircraft be withdrawn from Europe, that submarines remain behind certain lines, ignoring, of course, the fact that Soviet submarine missiles can reach the United States from areas off of our mass. If the United States, in the interests of continuing the process, ever accedes to all the parts of the Soviet proposals, that will be the end of NATO and the isolationists in this country will have achieved their objective; that is, all U.S. forces and influence overseas, to withdraw behind a fortressed America.

U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR SALT III

In sum, in the SALT II process, we will have seriously bargained away our negotiating position for SALT III in 1985. Thus, it is the future negotiating position itself which will have been seriously compromised if SALT II is approved in its present form.

For those who would ridicule this idea and suggest we would never let it happen, I can only say we should look at the record so far.

CORRECTING SALT II DEFICIENCIES

Finally, Mr. Chairman, you had inquired as to what action I would recommend to correct any deficiencies in SALT II I have cited. As to tactics and procedures, I would certainly leave that up to the judgment of this prestigious committee. However, I strongly recommend that we correct the deficiencies I have outlined with respect to the Backfire bomber, the SS–20 missile, the verification capabilities, encoding and telemetering, and so forth, but more importantly, I recommend that the United States conduct its foreign affairs in such a way that we convince the world that henceforth we intend to protect our interests worldwide, and no longer intend through action or inaction to convey the message that we are engaged in an exorable program of largescale entrenchment.

After all, the name of the game is security of our country and our allies, in which SALT agreements play an important but not a total part. That being the case, I strongly recommend, Mr. Chairman, that this ongoing Senate debate be expanded to encompass such things as the relation of our nuclear umbrella to the effectiveness of our conventional theater forces in Western Europe, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the Western Pacific. In addition to the conventional balance, let us also take a look at the vulnerability and morale of our allies together with their true perception of the United States as they view us today. Only then can we evaluate the real impact of SALT II provisions on world stability.

Last Sunday night, President Carter stated, we have a crisis of confidence within our own country. I submit that we also have a crisis of confidence in the international arena. Certainly, this crisis will not be solved by approval of SALT II, thereby freezing this country into a permanent position of strategic inferiority.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral, for your statement.

Now we will hear from Admiral Zumwalt.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR. (USN, RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, MILWAUKEE, WIS.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Mr. Chairman, today I want to try to remind you and the committee where we have come from in arms control, and measure promise against performance.

As Director of Arms Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1962 and 1963, I participated in the formulation of strategic policy and programs. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara made the bold and idealistic decision to begin a dialog with the Soviet Union designed to achieve a fair and balanced strategic nuclear relationship.

U.S. POLICY

Their speeches, their policy statements to Congress, and their discussions with Soviet officials sought to put across a new theory. The essence of the message was as follows: The United States recognizes that its strategic nuclear superiority is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. We understand that your attempt to install the missiles in Cuba was an effort to redress that imbalance. We pro-

pose now to let you catch up to us. We shall then have a situation of mutual assured destruction or mutual deterrence. We propose to stop at the 1,054 ICBM's and 656 submarine ballistic missiles we are now building. You should do the same.

We propose to keep our missiles with a combination of size and accuracy such that you will know from your own calculations that we cannot destroy yours in a first strike, so that you could always retaliate if we struck first. You should do the same with regard to size and accuracy. Both sides should reduce the continuing radiation produced by their warheads to minimize the kill of innocents if military targets should be struck. Each side should forgo civil defense, so that cities of each would be hostage against their own government's first strike.

To show good faith, the United States gradually reduced its expenditures for strategic nuclear arms to one-third of the constant dollar budgets of the period 1956 to 1962, over a decade and a half.

U.S. AND SOVIET POLICY REACTIONS TO CUBAN MISSILE CRISES

In retrospect, it is clear that the Soviet Union and the United States reacted exactly oppositely in their policies and programs after the Cuban missile crisis. In essence, our proposed dialog remained a monolog. The Soviets accelerated their strategic nuclear weapons expenditures, outspending us for many years, today by threefold. They proceeded to build asymmetrical advantages in each of the areas of suggested constraint.

In order to get them to sign the SALT I interim offensive agreement a decade later, we had to grant them nearly a 55-percent advantage in ICBM's, 1,618, to our still earlier proposed 1,054. They had the option to reduce to a 35-percent advantage in ICBM's in order to exercise their option to build up to a 35-percent advantage in submarine ballistic missiles, which they have been doing. At the signing of SALT I, because they had disregarded the suggested constraint on size, they had about a 300-percent advantage in megatonnage and throw-weight. While we have greatly reduced the fallout produced by our warheads, they have maintained full fallout lethality, so that their weapons will kill innocents for hundreds of square miles around the targets they hit, and while we have truly foregone civil defense, the Soviets have made major expenditures to develop underground shelter, population evacuation, and industrial survival procedures.

It was with this background of knowledge that I had to make my decision as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to whether or not to support SALT I. It was clear at that time that the United States would retain significant advantages during the 5-year period of the SALT I offensive agreement. Our advantages in MIRV's and in strategic bombers would offset during most of the 5-year period the huge Soviet advantages in numbers, megatonnage, throw-weight, radioactivity, civil defense, and terminal bomber defense.

The thrust of my testimony in SALT I was to make it clear that the Soviets would have all the advantages in the post-SALT I era unless SALT II were to provide balance, and that such balance could only be negotiated if the United States maintained the rec-

ommended strategic programs, the necessary intelligence programs, and rigorous research and development programs.

In other words, I considered SALT I to be the last best hope for achieving the mutual assured destruction or mutual deterrence that President Kennedy had sought, and that during the period of SALT I, as the Soviets began to overtake our qualitative advantages, they would have to be required in negotiating SALT II to surrender their quantitative advantages.

None of the assurances required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in supporting SALT I were adequately carried out. Further, the present administration, instead of maintaining strategic forces for negotiation leverage, unilaterally gave the leverage away.

I have heard much talk about SALT II being the result of negotiating efforts of three Presidents. I consider that to be a misleading claim. The cancellations and delays of strategic forces and the concessions of this administration go far beyond what those previous Presidents were prepared to agree to.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSSHIP

With SALT II, the whole theory of the strategic relationship which Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford visualized between the United States and U.S.S.R. has been revised. The Soviets have achieved a treaty structure which conforms to their strategic concept of attaining a war-winning capability, and denying equality to us. We have deluded ourselves that we have achieved a useful arms control outcome.

Our Secretary of Defense and our Joint Chiefs of Staff——

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Zumwalt, I apologize for interrupting. There is a vote on the Senate floor which accounts for the absence of Senators. The time is about to run out, so I think I will just call a brief recess for purposes of voting. If you would just withhold reading the balance of your statement until Senators return, it would be appreciated.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator PELL [presiding]. The committee will come to order.

At the request of Senator Church, I ask Admiral Zumwalt to resume his testimony at this point.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, Senator Pell.

SALT II FORMALIZES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORTY

We have deluded ourselves that we have achieved a useful arms control outcome. Our Secretary of Defense and our Joint Chiefs of Staff have confirmed recently that during SALT II the United States will fall into strategic nuclear inferiority.

My own work as a member of the Committee on the Present Danger confirms this grim forecast. SALT II, rather than being a part of the continuum that would have led to mutual assured destruction or deterrence, has instead served as a device for juridical formalization of Soviet strategic nuclear superiority.

The result is a SALT II which: One, on the legal side, grants juridical strategic nuclear superiority to the Soviet Union. It permits the Soviets 308 modern heavy ballistic missile launchers, while we are denied any.

The missiles in those silos have greater destructiveness than the entire strategic ICBM and SLBM force of the United States. The Soviets are granted 10 reentry vehicles on their largest missiles, 4 or 6 on their other MIRVed ICBM's, and we are permitted no more than 3.

Two, in practical terms, SALT II permits continuing large increases in Soviet capability during the period of the treaty. By the time SALT II expires, the Soviet Union will have about the same number of launchers and warheads as we will, but the greater size of their missiles and warheads and their rapidly improved accuracy will give them superiority in every other strategic nuclear measure.

They will have five times our ICBM and SLBM hard-target kill capability, two times our area destructive capabitity, three times our megatonnage, and two times our throw-weight. If our aging B-52's and their cruise missiles can get airborne, and if they can survive massive Soviet air defenses, we will have a growing superiority in delayed countermilitary potential.

However, if one credits, as one should, the contribution of Soviet strategic Backfire bombers, this will not be an advantage. In any case, the delayed countermilitary potential does not offset the other factors.

Three, SALT II has designed limits so high that they put no effective limit on Soviet offensive strategic nuclear capability.

Four, SALT II does not permit adequate verification.

Five, nevertheless, SALT II so favors the Soviet Union that the Soviets ought not to cheat.

Six, it so improves the Soviet leverage and so reduces U.S. leverage that SALT III will be more favorable to the U.S.S.R. than SALT II, just as for the same reason SALT II is much more favorable to the Soviet Union than was SALT I.

Seven, SALT II encourages the Soviet Union to accelerate its foreign policy adventurism around the globe, in the face of our strategic inferiority and of the weakness of an administration which has permitted itself to be driven to such terms.

SENATE EXAMINATION OF ENTIRE UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP RECOMMENDED

In my judgment, this dangerous treaty and this inadequate leadership have made it essential for the Senate to broaden its examination to include the entire strategic relationship with the U.S.S.R. Such a review would, I believe, lead to the conclusion that it is essential for the Senate:

One, to fulfill its constitutional advisory role by amending or rejecting SALT II in its present form; two, to take action now to adjust the strategic context within which SALT II will be operative.

Rather than ratifying a strategic arms limitation treaty which permits the Soviet Union to achieve strategic nuclear superiority, the Senate ought to require from the President:

First that he renegotiate the terms, providing the right to equality on both sides and at reduced levels, so that the strategic nuclear parity becomes feasible during the tenure of the treaty; and

Second, that at the same time that he submits the revised treaty, he send forward to the Congress a program to acquire and maintain the specific strategic forces that would restore the balance under the renegotiated terms.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, indeed, Admiral Zumwalt, and thank you, Admiral Moorer.

PREDICTION THAT UNITED STATES WILL FALL INTO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR INFERIORITY DURING SALT II

I have a couple of questions. Admiral Zumwalt, in your testimony you said that the Secretary of Defense and our Joint Chiefs of Staff have confirmed recently that during SALT II the United States will fall into strategic nuclear inferiority. Where did they make that prediction?

Admiral ZUMWALT. They said it to this committee within the last week, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I was here, and I am trying to get the citation.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Let me just read you some of the words: "We are concerned because their momentum will allow them to gain an advantage over us in most of the static indicators of strategic forces by the early 1980's."

Just last night, I examined the 12 curves prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the static measures of strategic power. I wish that this committee could get a hold of them in a classified session. I think you will be shocked to see the extent of our inferiority. In 10 of the 12 we drop well below the Soviets from 1980 on, and in 2 of the 12 we are almost exactly equal. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff made an overwhelming case that we will have strategic nuclear inferiority during SALT II, whether or not there is a treaty, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I was here for their testimony, and I did not get the same impression.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I wrote those words from the transcript of the hearing, Senator Pell, last night.

Senator PELL. Secretary Brown, on July 9, referring to whether the Soviet Union will attain strategic nuclear superiority over the United States, testified that SALT II, "Makes such an outcome less likely." So it depends, I guess, on which phrase you alight on.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think it is quite clear from Secretary Brown's testimony both on that occasion and in his posture statement, Senator Pell, that he also concedes that we are becoming strategically inferior to the Soviet Union. Even so, the calculations that he uses to establish the relationship are flawed. He plays the Soviet target system on both sides, instead of playing our target system on our side and the Soviet target system on their side. He admits that he does this in his statement.

If he had played the actual target systems, you would find that the inferiority is even worse than that to which he testified.

Senator BIDEN. SALT does not preclude us from rectifying that in any way, does it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think that the SALT II process does, Senator Biden. I believe that the SALT II ratification process ought to

I keep thinking there's someone who's following my use of these docs & who's actually reading all my comments - maybe...

be viewed by the Senate as a process of examination both of the strategic relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union and the impact of this particular treaty on formalization of that strategic relationship.

Senator BIDEN. The four corners of the document do not.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, in my judgment, they do.

Senator BIDEN. Tell me specifically how, Admiral.

Admiral ZUMWALT. In my judgment, the legal superiority of the Soviet Union granted in SALT II can be described as follows: We pretend that there are equal ceilings on launchers; namely, holes, whereas in fact we permit the Soviet Union not to have to count what will be 375 Backfire bombers, and whereas we permit them to have 308 of the huge SS–18 missiles, and we are permitted zero.

Senator PELL. We are on a 5-minute rule, so I will let Senator Biden come back to that in his time, if I may.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I thought the Admiral was still presenting his statement.

Senator PELL. No, this is my time now.

NUCLEAR BALANCE, VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS WITHOUT SALT II

I have one further question along the same line. How would the nuclear balance or the verifiability of Soviet nuclear programs be improved if SALT is rejected? Your advice, I understand, is to reject SALT II.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, as you see in my statement I have suggested that the situation is so serious because the Senate has been so unfocused on the shift in balance by virtue of having to deal just with the treaty in the case of SALT I and then quite separately on the strategic relationship. The time has come when the Senate must focus on both the strategic relationship and the subset issue that you are being asked specifically by the administration to look at, the SALT II Treaty, which juridically formalizes Soviet strategic nuclear superiority.

I do not think one can be detached from the other. I think it is mandatory that the Senate both correct the treaty flaws and correct the flaws in the strategic relationship.

U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator PELL. In other words, your view, as you say in your testimony, is that we should reject the treaty and then we would be free to move ahead and vastly increase our nuclear arsenal?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I believe that the treaty ought to be sent back with suggested amendments, and that those amendments should include a requirement that we greatly reduce the arms on both sides, but in doing so, that we achieve equality rather than Soviet superiority, and that at the same time the President be required to submit what he does not now intend in my judgment to submit; namely, the programs to restore parity under that renegotiated treaty.

Senator PELL. But as you know, the first proposal that this administration made was along those lines of deep cuts in both sides, which the Soviets rejected.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think, Senator Pell, that was a classic demonstration of what Admiral Moorer was talking about, the poor quality of our negotiators. You will recall that Presidents Nixon and Ford had refused to knuckle under on those very same items. Mr. Carter, to his credit, in March of 1977 tried to carry out that philosophy, and he went back to the Soviet Union and said, you have got to come from 326 SS-18's, counting their 18 on test ranges, down to 150.

You will recall that the Soviet Union utterly rejected that. We went back and tried 190. Then we tried 220. Then we tried 250. Finally, we went back and said, look, if we let you keep all 308 of them, will you then sign the treaty? That is what I call a classic example of moving all the way to the other fellow's side in the negotiation.

U.S. VIEWS CONCERNING PRODUCTION OF MISSILES EQUIVALENT TO SS-18

Senator PELL. But didn't we always have the philosophy that we did not care to have big missiles equivalent to the SS-18's, that we are not concerned how wide the hole is, when a missile or target is destroyed? Weren't we more interested in accuracy, than in size?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, I think that is a deceptive argument that the administration is making. This is why it is so important and why I tried to demonstrate that the theory Mr. Kennedy set out to achieve was one of fair and balanced arms limitations. In our decision to keep our missiles small and sufficiently inaccurate so that we could not destroy the Soviet missiles in a first strike, we were saying to the Soviets, let's each forgo a first strike.

Now, because the Soviets violated that over the years, and because they have achieved an impressive first strike capability, the most important part of which is those 308 huge SS-18's, there is absolutely no reason why we should continue to say we didn't want to build them in the first place. We didn't want to build them because we were working toward a theory which the Soviet Union has violated and which the Soviet Union has made fraudulent. We should not have conceded them a legal unilateral right to them.

U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION

Senator PELL. Incidentally, going back to your point that the 150 heavy missile position was dropped, that is correct, but, in lieu of that, didn't we get a provision we wanted even more, which was an 820 limit on all of the MIRVed ICBM's which to the United States was more meaningful?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, the administration pretends that we achieved equal limits of 820 on intercontinental MIRVed missiles. That also is a deceptive claim. President Carter has stopped the Minuteman III production line. We cannot have more than 550 of those most important missiles in the whole strategic equation.

The Soviet Union will have all 820. Further, the administration is misleading because it does not point out that 512 of those missiles, nearly as many as our total, will be 3 or 4 times the explosive

force and another 308 of them will be 7 times the explosive force of our missiles.

So, there is a gross inadequacy in that subceiling.

Senator PELL. I guess the point of difference here, as I understand it, is, as long as the objective is achieved, we do not care what the explosive force is.

SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think, Senator, that the objective ought to be to avoid giving the Soviet Union a first-strike capability. I think it is quite clear from the calculations of the Joint Chiefs that they now have that first-strike capability. I would urge this committee in classified session to require the Joint Chiefs to come over and brief the committee on the RISOP-SIOP exchange results, which show that the country is in deep and desperate trouble in the strategic relationship.

Recently, a war game was completed over in the Pentagon. I would urge that the committee be briefed on that. The results have always turned out beginning—in about 1979 onward—to be negative to the United States and getting progressively worse by a very serious degree.

Senator PELL. Thank you. My time is up.

U.S. WEAPONS PRODUCTION PROHIBITED BY SALT II

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Admiral Zumwalt, if you were in charge, having expressed your concern about the present nuclear balance, are there any weapons you would build that are prohibited to us by SALT II?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. First, if I were in charge, Mr. Chairman, I would keep insisting to the President that it is just simply wrong to agree to let the Soviet Union keep its huge missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you build a missile of comparable size if you thought the M-X would be adequate for our needs?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would build missiles larger than the size of the M-X as I have been told the Chief's staff was considering recommending initially and did not in order to conform to the commitments of this treaty.

ADEQUACY OF M-X TO DESTROY HARDENED SOVIET TARGETS

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't the M-X missile adequate to the task of destroying hardened Soviet targets?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The M-X missile, if it is built, would give the United States some first-strike capability. It would be far better if both sides agreed to forego that capability by the Soviets giving up their huge missile, but the SS-18 will retain a great advantage over the M-X missile in its ability to destroy much larger areas.

SOVIET LARGE MISSILE ADVANTAGE

The CHAIRMAN. You start by saying that the large missile is a danger to us because of its capacity to destroy our Minutemen. Then it seems to me that you shift by saying that the size of the

missile will destroy a larger area. Now, if its chief utility to the Soviet Union is to destroy our hardened bases, then it is hard for me to see how the size of the missile matters.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Perhaps I was not clear enough, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you get my point? If it is big enough to kill a hardened target, then what added advantage does the overkill have?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The advantage is that the Soviets can destroy all of our missiles by firing less than half of their SS-18's, then with the other half they have the capability of destroying much larger city areas than we would be able to destroy with the M-X or any other kind of missile. It is a huge weapon, only half of the arsenal of which would be expended in their first strike.

Mr. Chairman, the figures show that the Soviet Union would destroy almost all of our ICBM's, almost all of our bombers, and all of the submarines in port with the expenditure of less than half of their SS-18's, and would then be in a position to retaliate against our cities in a far greater way if the President retaliated for that first strike.

The CHAIRMAN. Would they dare to do that without first evacuating their own cities?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, I think they would undoubtedly evacuate their cities and we would undoubtedly see it and would have a minimum of 3 days' warning.

The CHAIRMAN. With 3 days' warning, does it then follow that they will reach and destroy with a first strike our bombers on the ground and most of our submarines at port?

Admiral ZUMWALT. With 3 days of warning, the Soviet Union would be able still to get a very large fraction of our bombers because the bombers cannot stay airborne for an indefinite period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. But the submarines could go to sea.

Admiral ZUMWALT. The Soviet Union should, to carry out a classic attack, go to the city evacuation and then wait longer than 3 days, when the bombers have to begin to stand down. They cannot maintain a surge capability for a long period of time.

The real issue here is the issue that Paul Nitze pointed out to the committee. It is the prospect of this kind of advantage for the Soviet Union that will force the United States to give in, in confrontation after confrontation.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this advantage? It is often referred to, but it has never been really made clear to me.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the advantage is, if you play all the war games, you see that the Soviet Union has such huge advantages that the military people responsible for making recommendations to their Commander in Chief in the 1980's would have to say to him, "bluff as long as you can, but back down before you risk war, because you are in trouble."

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we have had testimony showing that with the warning we are likely to receive if the Soviet Union ever contemplated a first strike, with our surviving force of submarines and aircraft we could retaliate in a way that would obliterate the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the assumption that large missiles

would take out our Minutemen rests upon a conclusion that I find difficult to accept; namely, that in the face of an all-out assault, we would leave our missiles in their silos. I just do not know how, since deterrence is based upon the concept of governments being rational—otherwise there is no use building all of these weapons—any rational leader would assume the risk of a first strike without confidence that the Soviet Union would not be obliterated in retaliation, and surely our surviving forces have that capability.

So, I do not follow your conclusion that the large missile gives the Soviet Union this kind of advantage in the real world.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Mr. Chairman, if you examine what the Soviet leaders say in their discussions with their own Apparat, if you examine what their military writers are saying, they say that they intend to have a strategic nuclear war-winning capability. They make it clear that they intend to be able to destroy so many of our missiles and other systems in a first strike that the United States will have only the choice of retaliating against their empty cities or of surrender. They make it clear that they believe that what that gives them is the ability not to have to go to war, but rather, to force a President of the United States to knuckle under in crisis after crisis.

I would like to ask Admiral Moorer to speak to the launch-on-warning concept. My own view of it is that it is absolutely unbelievable that any intelligent, operational person could recommend that we could count on a launch-on-warning capability.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think it is believable that the Soviet Union might strike the United States knowing that our retaliation would obliterate Soviet society?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I believe that the Soviet Union would believe that it can force us to back down. The Soviets will believe that their immense preponderance of advantage nailed down under SALT II would give both us and our allies the perception that we must back down. They may not be able totally to count on it, just as we could not count on it totally when we delivered an ultimatum in the Cuban missile crisis, but we counted on it enough to deliver the ultimatum.

The Soviet Union therefore intends to be prepared to survive if they miscalculate; but they believe they will not have to fight that war.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. However, I would say that I think the Cuban missile crisis example has to be treated with caution because at that time we had an enormous superiority, and since that time, as you point out, an equivalency has developed. I think that that has to be taken into account with reference to the Cuban missile crisis.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. I am looking forward to the 1980's, when the reverse situation will be in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we cannot permit the reverse situation to come about.

Admiral ZUMWALT. The testimony that this committee has received is that it will happen whether or not SALT II is ratified, sir, in my judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Javits is next.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I welcome you to the committee.

Admiral, I note with great interest that you were Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974, and that contemporaneously Admiral Moorer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral MOORER. It was the identical period of time, sir.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT I INTENT

Senator JAVITS. Now I note also, Admiral Zumwalt, that in your testimony you say that the Soviets accelerated their strategic nuclear weapons expenditures, outspending us for many years, today by threefold. You state that they proceeded to build asymmetrical advantages in each of the areas of suggested constraint, that is, in the nuclear weapons field. Then you detail what they did. They disregarded the constraint on size. They did not forgo, as we did, civil defense, but on the contrary emphasized civil defense.

Now, during those years when you served as Chief of Naval Operations, were you aware of these facts: that the Soviet Union was at least violating the spirit which animated SALT I?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, I was, Senator. Both Admiral Moorer and I testified on many occasions that this turnover was occurring. We made it quite clear in our support of SALT I that we had the deepest reservations about it unless a whole series of assurances were carried out.

In addition, Senator, I tried every year to visit every Member of the Congress to make the case personally. I believe I talked to you at least three or four times during that period.

U.S. INCREASE IN NUCLEAR ARMAMENT

Senator JAVITS. Now, in that period of time you were seeking to materially increase the nuclear armament of the United States. Is that correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Now, how consistent is that with your present position—and which seems to me to be a new line with respect to opponents of the treaty—that you want the treaty rejected so that we may bring about a reduction of nuclear weaponry. So, I ask both of you, do you ask us to believe that if we reject SALT II and send our negotiators back, we can get a better treaty? In view of the premise that great nations can't bluff, we are to at the very same moment that we send them back, be prepared to materially increase our nuclear weaponry if they cannot achieve a negotiation for reduction?

Don't we have to be ready to materially increase rather than to reduce in view of your claim that already the Russians have the momentum to be far superior to us, even if we did have SALT II?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, Senator. Throughout my entire 4-year term I was advocating both that we increase our strategic expenditures and renegotiate treaties to achieve lower numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. These are not inconsistent. Indeed, my statement today points out that I recommend that the Senate both send the treaty back for renegotiation at lower levels and at parity levels, but that at the same time the President be required to come forward with a program to build up to that, because we are in

possession of an obsolescent strategic nuclear force that must be updated, and even under a reduced level, unless it is very low, we will have to have some increases at expenditures.

Right now, we are counting the bombers in the graveyard while the Soviets are not required to count even Backfire.

Senator JAVITS. Isn't it a fact, Admiral, however, that such a program of increase would exceed the levels set by SALT II?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. In my judgment, the levels set by SALT II will, as both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Harold Brown pointed out, require increases above our present expenditure levels.

Senator JAVITS. Right, but nonetheless, not as great increases as we would have in the absence of a treaty. Isn't that true?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think the Joint Chiefs made it clear that they disagreed with Secretary Brown's recommendations and that more would have to be spent under the treaty than he has recommended. I think they are right.

Senator JAVITS. But your recommendation has no limit whatever. In other words, if what we had to do was to build up to whatever the Soviets do absent the treaty, there are no limits of any kind, not even those in SALT II.

RENEGOTIATION ARGUMENT

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is not what I am suggesting. I am suggesting that the Soviet Union respects only power and will. I am suggesting that if we make it clear to the Soviet Union that we are going to match them and that we would prefer to match them at lower levels, we will be able to achieve a revised SALT II at lower levels that is fair and balanced rather than this inequitable treaty.

Senator JAVITS. So in the final analysis, it is your guess—against the record—that we will be able to do better by a renegotiation. Isn't that what you are arguing for?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It is my conviction that part of the negotiation process is the advice of an informed Senate. I believe that SALT II in its present form is a halfway through, imperfect document, flawed by virtue of weak negotiating decisions. I believe that the Senate changes can provide the muscle to make it a useful treaty.

Senator JAVITS. So you are really second guessing the negotiators.

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. I am urging that the full constitutional process of the country be brought into play on such a major issue.

CONFIRMATION THAT UNITED STATES WILL FALL INTO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR INFERIORITY DURING SALT II

Senator JAVITS. You also say, I notice, that our Secretary of Defense and our Joint Chiefs of Staff have confirmed recently that during SALT II the United States will fall into strategic nuclear inferiority. Now, I heard them both. I get no such impression,

Admiral. Precisely what did they say that makes you draw that conclusion?

Admiral ZUMWALT. There are at least 8 or 10 references that one might make. The ones I jotted down last night are these. "We are concerned because their momentum will allow them to gain an advantage over us in most of the static indicators of strategic force by the early 1980's."

I went on to point out that I examined last night the curves that the Joint Chiefs have put together of 12 static indicators of strategic nuclear plants and find that by 1980 we will be well behind the Soviets in 10 of the 12, and only about equal in the other 2.

JCS SUPPORT FOR TREATY

Senator JAVITS. If I may have one other question, Admiral, they came out for the treaty. Are they insincere? That is what I ask you, are they insincere? If you are right as to their conclusion, then they testified before us insincerely.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not agree. I think they were asked the wrong question, Senator. I think what they were told by the President is, "I will make the political judgment, you just make the military judgment. I am telling you as President that the American people will not support more. I am telling you that the Senate will not support more. This is the best treaty we can get. Now, on balance, will you support it?"

Incidentally, Mr. Carter came directly back from Moscow and made his speech to the Congress without checking with the Chiefs to see whether they did support the final full draft, so he put a real test of loyalty on them. I believe if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked the following question: "Let's assume that the U.S. Senate is so concerned about the strategic balance that we want to do two things, we want to send the treaty back for modification at lower levels and at fair levels, and we want to get from the President a revised strategic program that will produce equality with the Soviet Union at whatever level; do you support that," I believe the Chiefs would give you an overwhelming yes.

Senator JAVITS. It seems to me, Admiral, that it is you against the Chiefs, as far as we are concerned. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Are we on a 5-minute rule or a 10-minute rule?

The CHAIRMAN. We are on a 5-minute rule today because we have two panels to accommodate.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

JCS LOYALTY, SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE QUESTIONS

First of all, Admiral, with regard to the President putting the Joint Chiefs under a test of loyalty, we asked them about that. They said they were conferred with, and that they indicated they would support the treaty under certain conditions. Those conditions were met. That is why the President was able to say what he said.

Second, with regard to civil defense, since we are under the 5-minute rule, I will not ask a question, but I ask permission to put

into the record a CIA study, which makes three important findings. First, Soviet civil defense is not a crash program, but rather has been going on for 10 years. Second, despite its building of shelters, its population is outstripping its construction programs.

Third, although the Soviets have sought to disperse their industry, the policy has been strongly undercut by a tendency to put new investments into existing facilities. The study concludes by saying that the Soviets cannot have confidence in the degree of protection civil defenses would afford them, and that the program by itself would not be likely to embolden them deliberately to expose the U.S.S.R. to a higher risk of nuclear attack.

I would like that in the record, if I may.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the Department of State, Special Report No. 47, September 1978; Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication]

Soviet Civil Defense [1]

KEY FINDINGS

Civil defense in the Soviet Union is an ongoing nationwide program under military control. The Soviets' strategic writings integrate civil defense into their military strategy. It is part of a general scheme of the likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. The Soviets' experience in World War II and their traditional emphasis on homeland defense reinforce their interest in civil defense. By developing an active and extensive civil defense, in conjunction with their other defensive and offensive strategic programs, they hope to convince potential enemies that they cannot win a war with the U.S.S.R. If war should occur, the Soviets seek through civil defense along with other means to assure survival of the homeland and to leave the U.S.S.R. in a stronger postwar position than its adversaries. Civil defense is meant to contribute to the maintenance of a functioning logistic base for continuing military operations, to help limit human and material losses, and to help enable the Soviets to speed recovery from the effects of nuclear war.

The Soviet civil defense program is not a crash effort, but its pace increased beginning in the late 1960s. Civil defense activities are directed by a nationwide civil defense organization consisting of over 100,000 full-time personnel located at all levels of the Soviet government and economic structure. While improvements have been made in virtually all facets of the program, it has been marked by wide variations in implementation from area to area and year to year. Bureaucratic difficulties and apathy on the part of a large segment of the population have retarded implementation in the past, though in wartime such problems would probably diminish. A sustained effort has been made to provide blast shelters for the leadership and essential personnel. Programs to protect industry by geographical dispersal have not been implemented to a significant extent, however, and there is little evidence of hardening of economic installations.

The Soviets regard the specific objectives of their civil defense program to be:

An ability to protect people—the leadership first, the essential work force second, and the remainder of the population third.

An ability to protect the sources of economic productivity, to assure the continuity of economic activity in wartime, and to permit the restoration of production following a nuclear attack.

An ability to sustain the surviving population in the period immediately following a nuclear attack, and to prepare for longer term postattack recovery.

We have assessed the state of Soviet civil defense preparations with respect to these objectives.

Protection of people

Leadership.—The Soviets probably have sufficient blast-shelter space in hardened command posts for virtually all the leadership elements at all levels (about 110,000 people). Some of these shelters are harder than those available to the general population. All fixed leadership shelters which have been identified are vulnerable to direct attack, but we assume that alternative arrangements are available to protect at least the top leadership.

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[1] This report was released by the Director of Central Intelligence, July 1978.

Essential work force.—Shelters at key economic installations could accommodate about 12 to 24 percent of the total work force. However, Soviet plans do not call for sheltering the entire work force. In a crisis, nonessential and off-duty workers would be evacuated. Only those required to maintain essential production would remain behind to be sheltered. If one-half the total work force is dispersed, from 24 to 48 percent of the remainder could be sheltered.

Population.—A minimum of 10 to 20 percent of the total population in urban areas (including essential workers) could be accommodated at present in blast-resistant shelters. By 1985, the percentage of the urban population that could be sheltered would rise to 15 to 30 percent, assuming no change in the present rate of shelter construction. Despite the scope and pace of shelter construction, the absolute number of city dwellers not afforded such protection by 1985 will increase because of the expected population growth in urban areas.

The critical decision to be made by the Soviet leaders in terms of sparing the population would be whether or not to evacuate cities. Only by evacuating the bulk of the urban population could they hope to achieve a marked reduction in the number of urban casualties. An evacuation of urban areas could probably be accomplished in two or three days, with as much as a week required for full evacuation of the largest cities. These times could be extended by shortages in transportation, other bottlenecks, or adverse weather conditions.

Protection of the economy.—Soviet measures to protect the economy could not prevent massive industrial damage. The Soviet program for dispersal of industry appears to be offset by a contrary tendency for investments in new facilities to be inside or near previously existing installations. The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting damage from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring production after an attack. We expect some improvements in the level of protection for the economy, but any radical change in its vulnerability to nuclear attack is unlikely.

Postattack recovery.—The operating elements of the civil defense program as well as a substantial number of the civilian population (a number we cannot estimate with confidence) have received training in rescue and recovery operations such as administering first aid, clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair and restoration of power. With at least several weeks to build up reserves and distribute supplies of food and fuel, the Soviets could probably provide adequate supplies to sustain the relocated and surviving urban population in the period immediately following a nuclear attack. Nevertheless, the coordination of requirements with available supplies and transportation is a complex problem for Soviet planners even in peacetime, let alone following a large-scale nuclear attack. We have not evaluated the potential for continuity of the Soviet government or the USSR's long-term ability to recover from the effects of a nuclear attack.

Costs.—While total civil defense costs are unknown, cost estimates have been made of three major elements of the Soviet program: pay for full-time civil defense personnel, operation of specialized civil defense military units, and shelter construction. The cost of these elements in 1976 amounted to about 400 million rubles, less than 1 percent of the estimated Soviet defense budget. If these three elements of the Soviet program were to be duplicated in the United States, they would have cost about $2 billion in 1976, with about three-fourths of this representing manpower costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations. They are affected by uncertainties both in the quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)

Effects of civil defense—In analyzing the effects of civil defense on levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustain, we simulated a hypothetical attack against high-volume military and economic targets. The Soviet population as such was not deliberately targeted. For the purposes of this simulation we assumed a single retaliatory attack immediately following a Soviet first strike. Our analysis in effect tends to present a "worst case" for retaliation. For example, various times were assumed to be available to the Soviets to make civil defense preparations, ranging from a few hours to a week or more, while in each case opposing forces were assumed not to have progressed beyond day-to-day alert. In reality, Soviet efforts to maximize civil defense preparations could lead a potential opponent to place its forces at increased levels of readiness.

The effectiveness of civil defense in reducing casualties in the USSR and in coping with the postattack period would depend primarily on the time available to make final preparations before an attack. (The analysis considered only those casualties that occurred during the first month following an attack and resulted from prompt nuclear effects and early fallout.) Using the results of the hypothetical attack under the assumptions referred to above, we estimate that:

Under worst conditions for the U.S.S.R. with only a few hours or less to make final preparations, Soviet casualtites would be well over 100 million but a large percentage of the leadership elements would probably survive.

The critical time for preparation appears to be about two or three days, because only by evacuating could the Soviets hope to avert massive losses. With a few days for final preparations, casualties could be reduced by more than 50 percent; most of this reduction would be due to evacuation, the remainder to shelters.

Under the most favorable conditions for the U.S.S.R., including a week or more to complete urban evacuation and then to protect the evacuated population, Soviet civil defenses could reduce casualties to the low tens of millions.

While many of the essential personnel sheltered at economic facilities would probably survive an attack, the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to their economy and the destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments.

The casualty levels noted above could be increased if, for example, the attack came while an evacuation was in progress, if the size of the attack were larger, if the attack were stretched out over a longer period, if it were directed against the population as such, or if the evacuation were less expeditious than planned or impeded by adverse weather or transportation deficiencies. In assessing the protection afforded by their civil defenses the Soviets would take account of these uncertainties.

The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses would improve their ability to conduct military operations and would enhance the U.S.S.R. chances for survival following a nuclear exchange. They cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection their civil defenses would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendant to a nuclear exchange. We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the U.S.S.R. to a higher risk of nuclear attack.

Present evidence does not suggest that in the foreseeable future there will be any significant change in the Soviet leaders' judgment that civil defense contributes to war-fighting and war-survival capabilities, nor that their uncertainties about its actual effectiveness would be lessened. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders' perception of the contribution of civil defense to their capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.

DISCUSSION

1. Civil defense in the Soviet Union is an ongoing nationwide program under military control. The Soviets' strategic writings integrate civil defense into their military strategy. It is part of a general scheme of the likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. The Soviets' experiences in World War II and their traditional emphasis on homeland defense reinforce their interest in civil defense. By developing an active and extensive civil defense program, in conjunction with their other defensive and offensive strategic programs, they hope to convince any potential enemy that it cannot win a war with the USSR. The Soviets seek, through civil defense along with other means, to assure the survival of the USSR if a war does occur and to come out of it in a stronger postwar position than their adversaries. Civil defense is meant to contribute to the maintenance of a functioning logistic base of operations by regular armed forces to win the war, to help limit human and material losses, and to help enable the USSR to speed recovery from the consequences of war.

2. This study focuses on the USSR's civil defense objectives and the progress the Soviets are making toward achieving them. It assesses some of the effects of Soviet civil defense preparations in reducing casualties and damage from a large-scale nuclear attack. Because we do not know much about the consequences of a large-scale attack on the functioning of a modern, industrialized society, the study deals with that relatively brief period following a strike during which the most obvious effects of a nuclear exchange would be apparent. It does not assess the Soviets' post-nuclear-attack capabilities to conduct military operations or their longer term prospects for political cohesion and reconstitution of the economy.

3. We have attempted to describe the Soviet program in a way that would allow for an assessment of the confidence that the Soviet leaders place in the program—the degree to which their civil defense makes them feel more able to withstand the consequences of a strategic nuclear exchange. A principal effort has been to analyze what the effect of an attack on the Soviet Union would be—to assess the degree of protection provided for the leadership, for the economy, and for the population.

Objectives, priorities, and pace

4. The Soviets regard the specific objectives of their civil defense program to be:

An ability to protect people—the leadership first, the essential work force second, and the remainder of the population third.

An ability to protect the sources of economic productivity, to assure the continuity of economic activity in wartime, and to permit the restoration of production following a nuclear attack.

An ability to sustain the surviving population in the period immediately following a nuclear attack and to prepare for longer term postattack recovery.

OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Program objectives and priority tasks

Protection of human resources.—Sheltering and relocation of the leadership; sheltering and dispersal of essential workers; sheltering and evacuation of the urban population; stockpiling food and medical supplies.

Continuity of economic activity in wartime.—Integration of civil defense and economic mobilization plans; rapid shutdown of industrial facilities; permanent and hasty hardening of installations and equipment; crisis relocation of economic enterprises; stockpiling reserves of materials; geographic dispersal of industry.

"Liquidation of consequences of enemy attack".—Preparation of military and civil defense formations; training in rescue and recovery; preparations for distribution of food and essential supplies.

5. In terms of actual priorities, the Soviet program appears to hew closely to what its organizers have declared their intentions to be. The first priority is to protect people. In support of this part of the program, the Soviets have built blast shelters, established relocation sites, and developed evacuation plans. The second priority is to maintain the continuity of economic activity in wartime. Much of the action on this part of the program appears to have been directed toward providing protection for the work force. The third priority, "liquidation of the consequences of an enemy attack," involves the training of a substantial number of the civilian population in postattack operations such as administering first aid, clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair and restoration of power.

6. The pace of the Soviet civil defense program is affected on the one hand by commitments of the leadership to realize progress in peacetime preparations, and on the other by the reluctance of some ministries, industrial managers, and local officials to dedicate scarce resources to what they regard as a secondary requirement and by apathy toward civil defense among a large segment of the public. While it is not a crash effort, the pace of the program increased in the late 1960s. Civil defense preparations are continuing, but the extent of implementation of civil defense measures varies from area to area.

Organization

7. A publicly recognized, highly structured, military-controlled civil defense organization exists at all levels of the Soviet government and economy, with the head of every organization designated "chief of civil defense." The national organization is led by General of the Army A. T. Altunin, a Deputy Minister of Defense. Full-time civil defense staffs exist at each echelon of the Soviet administrative structure: national, republic, oblast, city, and rayon, as well as at all significant economic institutions and enterprises.

8. The operating elements of the Soviet civil defense program—those that would carry out postattack recovery—consist of a large number of military civil defense units, communications elements, and civilian civil defense formations. We estimate the number of full-time civil defense personnel to be more than 100,000. Counting all civilian units and formations according to guidelines issued by General Altunin in 1975, the total number of people in the program would be upwards of 16 million—a number that includes many perfunctory participants.

9. The peacetime effectiveness of the civil defense organization suffers at times from the reluctance of industrial officials to spare labor and other resources for civil defense and from misunderstandings between civil defense officers and Soviet civilians. In wartime, increased centralization of authority would probably reduce many of the bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in this large organization. But the fact that the organization exists, despite its problems, and the fact that progress is being made toward fulfillment of the objectives of the civil defense program give Soviet civil defense leaders some confidence in their ability to function as required. On the whole, the Soviets' view of their civil defense organizational structure probably is a favorable one—overall, better than it was before the military assumed control of it in the early 1970s.

10. The Soviet leaders' emphasis on civil defense also offers the potential to foster favorable popular attitudes toward the Soviet system, to demonstrate leadership concern for the people, and to lend credibility to calls for vigilance against potential enemies. Nearly every Soviet citizen receives civil defense instruction either in school or through training courses, lectures, and exercises at places of work. Public attitudes about surviving a nuclear war remain skeptical, however, and there is evidence that many people do not take the program seriously. Nevertheless, the Soviet people would respond to directions from civil defense authorities.

Protection of people

11. *Leadership.*—When we speak of measures for the protection of the leadership, we refer not only to the top national leadership but also to some 5,000 party and government officials at the national and republic level; 63,000 party and government leaders at kray, oblast, city, and urban rayon level; 2,000 managers of key installations; and about 40,000 members of civil defense staffs—about 110,000 people in all.

12. Throughout the Soviet Union there is a pattern of shelter construction for this leadership. It consists of hardened underground shelters near places of work and relocation sites outside the cities. Hardened command posts have been constructed near Moscow and at other sites. Some of these shelters are harder than those available to the general population. The pattern of local shelter and relocation sites extends from government ministries to party headquarters and oblast and city governments and includes sites for major industrial enterprises as well. While we do not know much about exact amounts, it is probable that these shelters generally have some stockpiles of food, medicine, protective equipment, communications, and other supplies for their prospective occupants.

13. The Soviets probably have sufficient command post shelter space for virtually all the leadership elements as defined in this paper (that is, about 110,000 people). This estimate takes into account space required for supplies, communications, and work area. All fixed leadership shelters which have been identified would be vulnerable to direct attack, but we assume that alternative arrangements are available to protect at least the top leadership.

14. *Essential personnel.*—Soviet plans for protection of essential personnel includes sheltering at their places of work and rotation of off-shift personnel outside of likely target areas. The Soviets could probably shelter about 12 to 24 percent of the total work force at key industrial installations. This assumes shelter occupancy factors of 1 square meter or 0.5 square meter per person—factors that are mentioned in Soviet civil defense manuals. The actual percentage of on-duty workers that could be sheltered during a crisis would be considerably higher. Only those required to maintain essential production would remain behind to be sheltered. If one-half the total work force is dispersed, from 24 to 48 percent of the remainder could be sheltered.

15. *Population.*—Soviet plans call for moving people to in-place blast shelters as well as for the evacuation of population from urban target areas. Assessments of the effectiveness of this part of the Soviet program are highly dependent on the scenario chosen, but tentative evaluations are possible. Nationwide the Soviets have probably constructed more than 15,000 blast-resistant shelters (including those at economic facilities) that can protect 10 million to 20 million people, depending on whether the shelter occupancy factor is 1 or 0.5 square meter per person. This is roughly 10 to 20 percent of the total population in cities of more than 100,000 people. We are confident that more extensive analysis would result in an upward, not downward, adjustment of this figure, but we are unable to say by how much.

16. Some additional protection would be available to the Soviet population in the form of subway tunnels and stations. The Moscow subway, for example, has 92 underground stations and more than 150 kilometers of tunnels. We estimate that between 240,000 and 480,000 persons could be sheltered in the station areas and four times that number in the track tunnels, for a total of 17 to 34 percent of the population of the city. This total is in addition to the number that could be sheltered in the previously discussed shelters. The five other operating subway systems in the U.S.S.R. could provide an additional increase in the total sheltered population. However, we have not included subways in our estimate of total shelter capacity because the subways could be intended for evacuation and because of our uncertainty about the existence of life-support systems in the subways.

17. We estimate that 75 to 90 percent of the people in urban shelters would be adequately protected from the blast and other prompt effects of a nuclear attack that was intended to maximize damage to industrial and military targets. On the other hand, evacuation of the bulk of the urban population would be necessary in order to achieve a marked reduction in the total number of urban casualties.

18. Soviet writings state that the order to evacuate cities would be given during the "special period"—a period of high tension and increased risk of war. This order would be disseminated to the public via the mass media. Individual installations would use available means to notify personnel of the time and place for staging their evacuation. Factories, offices, schools, or bus and train stations would serve as embarkation points. According to Soviet planners, the population would have only a few hours to prepare for an evacuation following the order to do so. On their arrival at assembly points, people would board buses or trains, or would begin walking toward their previously assigned relocation areas. Those persons destined for remote areas would be evacuated first to intermediate points, where they would rest and be fed by local authorities. There is no evidence that evacuation exercises in large cities involving the actual movement of people have been practiced. There is evidence of small-scale evacuations and numerous exercises primarily involving civil defense staffs.

19. Theoretical studies indicate a range of times necessary to accomplish evacuation, depending primarily on the availability of transportation. For evacuation employing motorized transport—buses, trucks, trains, and cars—one to four days would be required for the last group of evacuees to reach their relocation area. If the evacuation were carried out on foot, a week or more would be required to evacuate the larger cities. Using some combination of motorized and foot transport would reduce the required time to less than a week. Unusually severe weather could slow the pace of evacuation and affect a local decision to evacuate. On an average, two or three days would probably be required to evacuate the major portion of the Soviet urban population.

20. Soviet planning recognizes that the evacuated portion of the population must be provided fallout protection. Plans and some materials exist for upgrading existing structures and constructing hasty shelters in rural and exurban areas. However, as a practical matter, the bulk of the evacuated population would initially have about the level of protection afforded by upgraded basements and interior rooms of standard Soviet rural structures. Under ideal circumstances, with a week or so to evacuate urban areas and to modify existing structures and construct hasty shelters, the evacuated population could be afforded high levels of protection.

Protection of the economy

21. Plans for protecting the Soviet economy include a number of complementary measures, not all of which are to be taken at any individual site but which could apply selectively depending on a site's importance to a wartime economy. These measures include:

Sheltering personnel at installations in the event of attack.

Dispersal of a portion of the work force during a period of crisis.

Emergency relocation of certain installations.

Geographic dispersal of new installations.

Hardening of physical structures.

Hasty hardening measures when an attack is imminent, such as sandbagging of equipment and mounding of earth around structures.

Rapid shutdown of equipment.

22. In their programs to protect the economy, the Soviets have given first priority to protection of personnel at economic facilities. Their plans for protecting the work force are related directly to the importance of the place of work both in terms of its output and its contribution to postattack recovery. Some industries and other enterprises will continue to function on a two-shift basis, with one shift dispersed outside of urban areas and the other protected in blast shelters at or near its installation. Some enterprises are considered nonessential and will stop operations, and others will be relocated in time of crisis.

23. The Soviet program for geographic dispersal of industry is, as far as we can tell, not being implemented to a signficant extent:

New plants have often been built adjacent to major existing plants.

Existing plants and complexes have been expanded in place.

No effort has been made to expand the distance between buildings or to locate additions in such a way as to minimize fire and other hazards in the event of a nuclear attack.

Previously open spaces at fuel storage sites have been filled in with new storage tanks and processing units.

The value of overall productive capacity has been increased proportionately more in previously located sites than in new areas, raising even more the vulnerability of industry to attack.

24. Little evidence exists that would suggest a comprehensive program for hardening economic installations. Published Soviet civil defense guidelines acknowledge

the high cost of such measures and explicitly state that they are to be carried out only when economically feasible. The Soviets appear to have given greater emphasis to rapid shutdown of equipment. The emphasis in this scheme seems to be on protecting vital equipment and installations from secondary damage triggered by prompt effects of a nuclear attack, such as ignition of combustibles, and on facilitating longer term recovery of installations after an attack.

25. Overall, the measures the Soviets have taken to protect their economy would not prevent massive damage from an attack designed to destroy Soviet economic facilities. At best, Soviet leaders and civil defense planners are probably confident that, through rapid shutdown and emergency repairs by the surviving work force, limited production at slightly or moderately damaged sites could be restored soon after an attack. We have not assessed the Soviets' long-term ability to reconstruct their economy.

Postattack recovery

26. The Soviets characterize recovery activities in the postattack period as measures for the "liquidation of the consequences of an enemy attack." We are uncertain how effective Soviet civil defense would be in such postattack operations as rescue and recovery, sustaining the surviving population, and maintaining government control. There is evidence, however, of Soviet preparations for the postattack period.

27. Soviet plans require that rural civil defense staffs and formations prepare for protection of livestock and growing areas from fallout, with emphasis on safeguarding the current harvest. In the U.S.S.R., food storage and food processing are activities performed outside urban areas of greater than 50,000 population. In addition to the normal peacetime levels of food supplies stored above ground, there are buried or semiburied food storage facilities outside urban areas. Also, food storage in the U.S.S.R. varies seasonally. We are uncertain how long the surviving population could be sustained on the undamaged food stores after an attack.

28. Supplies of petroleum products and coal in the U.S.S.R. would last for perhaps a month at prestrike consumption levels. Reduction of these supplies by nuclear attack and the disruption of local distribution could be offset by energy conservation measures, alternate fuel sources, and a decrease in industrial demand. Sufficient stocks of fuel would therefore probably be available in the near-term postattack period to sustain the needs of the surviving population.

29. In the immediate postattack period, treatment of trauma (wounds and broken bones) and burns would create the greatest burden on those who possess specialized medical skills. Treatment for radiation sickness and relatively minor injuries could be provided by those who have received civil defense first-aid training. Nevertheless, Soviet civil defense medical preparations would be unable to cope with the levels of casualties which large-scale nuclear attack would inflict on the civilian population.

30. The Soviets' capacity to continue production in the postattack period depends not only on how much of the critical production equipment and essential work force survive, but also on the on-hand inventories of raw and processed materials. Attacks against industry in general would reduce the overall level of supplies on hand, but it is likely that supplies would be available at undamaged industrial facilities to allow production to continue for several weeks following an attack. The adequacy of strategic reserves for continuing production over a longer period. however, would depend on the survivability and restoration of transportation and electric power systems.

31. The distribution of essential supplies in a postattack period would be a difficult problem for the Soviets. They have made some effort to ensure survival of the transportation system through such measures as preparations to disperse equipment and to establish stockpiles of rolling stock. They have also organized civil defense services and formations in transportation enterprises and have constructed blast shelters at critical points in the road and rail transportation systems. Nevertheless, the coordination of requirements with available supplies and transportation is a complex problem for Soviet planners even in peacetime, let alone following a large-scale nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R.

32. The operating elements of the civil defense program as well as a substantial number of the civilian population (a number we cannot estimate with confidence) have received training in rescue and recovery operations such as administering first aid, clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair and restoration of power. With at least several weeks to build up reserves and distribute food and fuel, the Soviets could probably provide adequate supplies to sustain the relocated and surviving urban population in the period immediately following a nuclear attack. We have not evaluated the potential for continuity of the Soviet government or the Soviets' long-term ability to recover from the effects of a nuclear attack.

Costs

33. We are unable to estimate the total annual costs of Soviet civil defense, but we have made a tentative estimate of the costs of three elements of the program: full-time civil defense personnel, operation of military civil defense units, and blast shelter construction. These three elements cost 400 million rubles in 1976. This ruble figure, which indicates the burden of these three elements on the Soviet economy, represents less than 1 percent of our estimate of Soviet defense spending. If incurred in the United States, the costs of these three elements would have been about $2 billion in 1976. While this dollar figure conveys the magnitude of the program in familiar terms, it does not reflect the economic burden to the Soviets. The higher dollar estimate results primarily from the greater costs of manpower in the United States than in the U.S.S.R. Manpower represents about 70 percent of the total dollar costs—that is, about $1.4 billion of the $2 billion—but only about 40 percent of the ruble costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations. They are affected by uncertainties both in the quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)

Overall effectiveness

34. We have analyzed the effects of civil defense on the levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustain from a nuclear exchange. We have deliberately chosen to analyze important and sensitive variables—economic damage and casualties—that can be evaluated quantitatively, and have made arbitrary assumptions to deal with the inevitable uncertainties regarding preparations for and conduct of an actual nuclear exchange. This type of analysis involved trading on the realism of the war scenario adopted to gain detail in calculating the consequences—the more detailed our analysis for purposes of calculations, the less likely the calculations would apply to another scenario.

35. For purpose of these calculations we have assumed, for example, that various times ranging from a few hours to a week or more would be available to the Soviets to make civil defense preparations, while in each case opposition forces were assumed to be on no more than day-to-day alert. In reality, Soviet efforts to maximize civil defense preparations could lead a potential opponent to place its forces at increased levels of readiness. We have also assumed that a retaliatory strike would not deliberately target the Soviet population but would attack high-value military and economic targets. This approach tends to establish a lower limit for the level of casualties such an attack would inflict on the Soviet Union. In effect, it tends to present a "worst case" for retaliation, especially if Soviet population casualties are a major criterion.

36. *Protection of people.*—The extent of losses to the leadership would be less sensitive to final preparation time than would be the level of casualties among essential personnel and the remaining population. Casualties among the latter would depend primarily on the time the Soviets had to prepare for an attack and whether or not they chose to evacuate their urban population. The findings of our analysis, based on the results of the hypothetical retaliatory attack under the assumptions given above, were as follows:

With several hours to make final preparations, a large percentage of leaders and communications facilities would probably survive.

A large percentage of the essential work force in shelters would survive an attack designed to maximize damage to economic facilities.

With a minimal period to make final preparations (a few hours or less), Soviet casualties from prompt nuclear effects and fallout would be well over 100 million. More than half the casualties would be fatalities.

With a moderate period of preparation (two to three days) during which the Soviet civil defense authorities implemented plans for evacuation of urban areas, the level of casualties and fatalities could be reduced by more than 50 percent. Most of this reduction would be due to evacuation, the remainder to shelters.

Extended preparation (a week or more) could further reduce the level of Soviet casualties and fatalities. With time to complete urban evacuation and to protect the evacuated population, casualties from prompt nuclear effects and fallout could be reduced to the low tens of millions, about half of which would be fatalities.

37. The findings of our analysis serve to point out the important fact that, in the preparations for an attack, the critical decision to be made by the Soviet leaders in terms of sparing the population would be whether or not to evacuate the cities. The cost of not evacuating could be in the neighborhood of 100 million casualties. There are, of cource, many combinations of preparation times and assumptions about hypothetical retaliatory attacks which would increase the calculated levels of casualties over those shown above—for example, a larger attack directed at more targets

(perhaps as a consequence of the opposing forces' having been placed on increased levels of readiness), and attack directed against the population, one which was carried out over an extended period, or an attack which came while the Soviets were in the process of evacuating their cities.

38. *Protection of the economy.*—Those measures we have described for protection of the economy could not prevent massive damage. Even with a week or so of preparations, there would be little reduction in the amount of prompt damage to facilities inflicted by blast. The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting damage from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring production after an attack. As noted above, however, we have not analyzed the Soviets' long-term potential for economic recovery.

39. *Postattack recovery.*—We are unable to make a confident assessment of how effective Soviet civil defense would be in rescue and recovery operations following an attack. Our tentative estimate is that, given a week or more to make preparations, the Soviets could accumulate stocks of essential supplies adequate to sustain the surviving population in the period immediately following a nuclear attack, but the distribution of these supplies would be a critical problem. Under worst conditions with only a few hours to prepare, the chances would be poor that the Soviets could effectively support the surviving population with supplies and services.

40. The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defense will improve their ability to conduct military operations and will enhance the U.S.S.R.'s chances for survival following a nuclear exchange. They cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection their civil defense would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendant to a nuclear exchange. We do not believe that the Soviet's present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the U.S.S.R. to a higher risk of nuclear attack.

Future trends

41. Programs for protection of the leadership are solidly established and well advanced. We are confident that this aspect of the program will continue to receive attention, with better protection for leaders at all levels. The continued growth in the numbers of leadership facilities will increase the prospects of survival for a large number of Soviet leaders.

42. The Soviets will probably continue their emphasis on construction of blast shelters in urban areas. If this results in a pace of construction matching that since 1968, they would, by 1985, increase the minimum percentage of population sheltered in urban areas to an estimated 15 to 30 percent. This increase takes into account the projected growth in urban population.

43. Over the next 10 years, the percentage of population which can be sheltered will increase, but the absolute number of people that would have to be evacuated will also increase because of growth in the urban population. To avoid an increase in the number of people to be evacuated, the rate of shelter construction would have to be higher than the rate currently indicated. Thus, the Soviet leaders' critical problem of deciding whether to evacuate, and when to do so, will not change substantially over this period. They may, however, be able to achieve some reduction in the time required to evacuate by increasing the available transportation.

44. Prospects for improvement in measures to protect the economy against attack are mixed. The increase in the number of blast shelters at economic facilities will probably enable the Soviets to shelter a larger porportion of the work force. But the continuing concentration of economic investment in previously existing plant sites, together with an absence of construction-hardening techniques, suggests that a future retaliatory attack would be about as destructive as at present. The protective measures the Soviets are likely to undertake during the next 10 years would probably not significantly reduce damage from a large-scale attack designed to maximize destruction of economic targets.

45. Present evidence does not suggest that in the foreseeable future there will be any significant change in the Soviet leaders' judgment that civil defense contributes to war fighting and war-survival capabilities, nor that their uncertainties above its actual effectiveness would be lessened. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders' perception of the contribution of civil defense to their capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.

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SALT II AND U.S. SECURITY

Senator BIDEN. Let me get into a specific question. Once again, what does SALT II as a matter of international law, if agreed to, preclude the United States from being able to do that you believe needs to be done in order to enhance U.S. security?

Admiral MOORER. Sir, as I understand the treaty, we can build a new bomber and a new missile, but we cannot build a missile equivalent to the SS-18, for instance.

Senator BIDEN. And you think we should?

Admiral MOORER. I think that the American people do not like a situation wherein one side, in this case the opponent, is allowed to take certain action and it is forbidden to us, even though we may not intend to move forward right away. Senator Biden, I think that what we are really talking about——

Senator BIDEN. Admiral, excuse me, you will have time on other people's time to finish your answer. The answer then is, you would want to build a missile the size of the SS-18. Is there anything else that we are precluded from doing that you think we should do specifically? I only have 5 minutes.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think it is clear if you read the treaty literally we cannot do the M-X system in the basing——

Senator BIDEN. I think it is clear that we can.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think it is clear that the Soviet Union has reported to the State Department that they take exception to that interpretation.

Senator BIDEN. I have no indication of that, and I have spoken with the people. By the way, the Defense Department told me that the Chiefs never recommended an M-X larger than the 190,000 pound missile weight that has been approved.

Admiral ZUMWALT. My information is that they did make such a recommendation, but I will have to check my sources to see that I can verify it.

Senator BIDEN. I would appreciate that very much.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

Later information is that it was considered at the staff level.

Admiral ZUMWALT. The State Department does have the Soviet demarche with regard to the illegality of the deployment of the M-X. I would suggest that you get that, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. I find this 5-minute rule very troublesome.

[General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. No. 1, with the possible exception of M-X interpretation, you are not saying there is anything that SALT II precludes us from doing that we may want to do during the terms of that treaty.

SS-18, U.S. LAND-BASED SYSTEM VULNERABILITY QUESTION

No. 2, let's go back to the argument of the SS-18, which I thought we had pretty well obliterated. I am glad you did not bring your little plastic missiles. I was going to bring out my map and point to forward-base systems and play that game.

With regard to the SS-18, if we eliminated the 308 and knocked it down to 150, or eliminate them altogether, the SS-19 still has the capability of taking on our land-based system.

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is because we permitted the Soviet Union to violate the firm commitments that were made to the U.S. Congress with regard to the SS-19 size.

Senator BIDEN. Let's talk about, as the tough military folks like to call it, the real world. The real world is done with. It is past. Whether it should have been or should not have been, it is past.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I could not disagree with you more, Senator Biden. I think we have to look at Soviet performance in SALT I to see whether or not there is any validity in trusting them for anything in SALT II.

Senator BIDEN. That is a separate question. How does eliminating the SS-18 and/or reducing it to 150 make our land-based system less vulnerable than it is now?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, I just cannot believe that the average American cannot understand that 3 million megatons is better than 10 million megatons.

Senator BIDEN. I just cannot believe that you make that argument. I just cannot believe that the average American is not smart enough to know that once you get beyond a certain megatonnage, it does not matter where you are. We are talking about the land-based systems, Admiral. You are saying to me that it is critical to be able to protect them.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, I urge that you get the presentation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the official exchange outcomes. You will see how far wrong you are.

Senator BIDEN. That is absolutely dead wrong. I have gone through those scenarios with the intelligence community. I sit on the Intelligence Committee and have heard all these Dr. Strangelove exchanges, and they are, for the most part preposterous. But even the most preposterous one does not show how eliminating the SS-18 from the Soviet arsenal does anything to improve the survivability, within the next 4 years, of our land-based system.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Because unfortunately, both the Soviet Union and the United States have military leaders who do not understand that kind of illogic, and who do understand the vast difference in the power of the Soviet Union compared to the United States.

Senator BIDEN. You acknowledge that logically it doesn't do anything, does it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not think it is logical to say what you just said, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I do not understand what you are saying, Admiral. How does it logically improve the survivability of our land-based system to reduce the SS-18 to 150?

Senator HELMS. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral ZUMWALT. You have put words in my mouth, Senator Biden. I have not suggested 150. That is just the number that President Carter started with.

Senator BIDEN. OK, to zero.

Admiral ZUMWALT. We ought to insist that the SS-19 come down to zero. We ought to insist that the SS-19 be restored to the size that was specified by us under SALT I.

Senator BIDEN. OK. Now we are to it. So, doing the SS-18 alone does not do the job, does it? You have to do something with the SS-19, don't you?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Only because you eliminated any right to consider SALT I, do I not have a right to discuss that, Senator. I have not accepted your right.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My 5 minutes time is up.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden's 7 minutes are up.

Senator BIDEN. Now, Jesse, don't be petty.

Senator HELMS. I would say to the two gentlemen that we are playing a game here this morning of trying to be two places at once, on the Senate floor and here at this committee. I was not able to hear the testimony of either of our witnesses, but I have read their statements.

Gentlemen, contrary to some other statements, I would think if the American people could have access to copies of your statements, they would understand precisely what you have and I for one commend you.

AMBIVALENT POSITION OF JCS

I would like to go back, if I may, Admiral Zumwalt, to the discussion about the testimony of the Joint Chiefs. Insincerity or sincerity aside, I do not think that it is entirely appropriate to say that it is your view versus that of the Joint Chiefs. I think it might be more appropriately said that it is your view against half of the statement by the Joint Chiefs, because they were on both sides. They were ambivalent. They came here, it seems to me, intending to show a support for SALT II that really was not there when you read what they said. All of the disclaimers and all of the ifs, ands, and buts.

Now, let me ask you again, Admiral, why do you think that the Joint Chiefs came here with such an ambivalent position?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator Helms, I believe it is almost impossible for anyone who has not been there to understand the immense pressures that are put on the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to that kind of issue. If one reads carefully the testimony that General Rowny gave, General Rowny was the representative of the Joint Chiefs going all the way back to when Tom Moorer and I were members, and his testimony represents what in the privacy of their boudoir I believe the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff think when they are permitted to think about the thing in the proper context.

I think it is almost impossible to understand the tremendous feeling of loyalty that a military man has for his superior, in this case the Joint Chiefs for their Commander in Chief. I think it is difficult to understand the impact of the loss of two members of the Joint Chiefs who had been there throughout most of the negotiating period, replaced by people newer to the negotiating process and how therefore changed was the general consensus.

I think it is almost impossible to state the impact on the Chiefs when the President tells them to stay absolutely out of political considerations and accept his judgment that the public will not support more unless we have a SALT II, accept his judgment that the Senate will not support correcting the strategic imbalance unless we have a SALT II. I think it is almost impossible to understand the feelings that go through members of the Joint Chiefs when, after they testify in front of Congress and report our declining military inferiority, the President stands up time after time to say publicly, we are the most powerful now and will remain so when they know in their heart of hearts that they have told him in chapter and verse of the extent of our inevitable inferiority, with or without SALT II.

I think it is almost impossible to understand the impact of their knowledge of the way in which the whole future budget process will be looked at depending on whether or not you are considered a member of the team. This issue is looked at by the Chiefs in a loyal sense, a sense of loyalty to the country's needs, as defined politically by their President, overall in making their final decision.

What I am saying, then, is that in that context you are able to get honorable and patriotic military people as members of the Joint Chiefs to come in and give a highly qualified, highly caveated

point of view which, if one reads the caveats and the qualifications, ought to give a different message to the Senate and the public.

I believe that a much fairer question to put to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be to say to them: Gentlemen, the picture is very grim. We, the Senate, believe that the time has come to act on this whole strategic relationship. We propose to use SALT II as a vehicle to get at the facts. We propose to work with the Senate Armed Services Committee on understanding the military aspects and to help them understand the foreign policy aspects.

We propose to send the treaty back for renegotiation to achieve lower levels and fair and balanced agreements, and we are going to insist that the President return it with a strategic program which will make it possible to achieve equal numbers. Now, do you support that action?

I believe then you would get a 100-percent yes vote.

Senator HELMS. I thank you, Admiral.

ARMS LIMITATION OR ARMS ESCALATION TREATY

Admiral Moorer, I have asked this question several times this week, and I ask it to you now, Is this an arms limitation treaty, or is it an arms escalation treaty?

Admiral MOORER. Well, in my opinion, Senator Helms, it is nothing more than a set of rules for building weapons. It is not in any sense an arms limitation treaty, because both sides have agreed to build up and the Soviets, having a significant momentum, will obviously add more during the time of this treaty to their inventory than we will find it possible in any sense to add to ours.

The difficulty is that we are going to see the same thing that happened in SALT I; namely, the fact that you have the words, "arms limitation" in the SALT creates a euphoria in the country. I am not certain, for instance, that the M–X missile is in fact going to be financed, because at the hearings on SALT I the previous Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright, attacked the Secretary of Defense in a most acid tongue, saying, what do you mean coming up here with an arms limitation treaty and then coming forward with these requests that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed for you.

This went all the way through the House as well as the Senate. So, I am not saying that in any sense the Senate will in fact support additions to our forces, because there is going to be a big pressure that this is an arms limitation treaty, so let's limit the arms unilaterally.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. You kept within your time, Jesse. Congratulations.

Senator HELMS. I hope you will take lessons from me. [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. I will try, Jesse. It just depends on whether you have anything to say. [General laughter.]

Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AGREEMENT

Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zumwalt, you were both on active duty during the Cuban missile crisis, were you not?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Senator STONE. The SALT process began, did it not, as a result of the confrontation that took place during the Cuban missile crisis and the agreement that ended it, did it not?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator STONE. Isn't that why many of my colleagues have repeatedly referred to the Cuban missile crisis and the agreement which ended it then and the current situation now?

I would like to ask both of you this question. Is it your understanding of the agreement which ended that blockade conducted by the U.S. Navy that the Soviet Union is not permitted to introduce major offensive weapons into Cuba, and as a result of that commitment we agreed not to invade Cuba to remove these missiles?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Admiral MOORER. That is my understanding. They did in fact remove the missiles, but in my view, and I said so at the time, it would have been far better for the United States if we had let them leave the missiles in and take the Russians out.

SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILE CARRYING SUBMARINES IN CUBA

Senator STONE. Now, the further agreements that were entered into were to the effect that servicing a Soviet submarine in Cuba, if it were equipped with nuclear missiles, would be a violation of the agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis. Is that not correct?

Admiral MOORER. That was my understanding. As a matter of fact, ships and submarines that were equipped with a nuclear capability were not allowed to enter Cuban ports.

Senator STONE. Is the Gulf II Soviet submarine capable of bearing nuclear ballistic missiles?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

CLOSED CUBAN MISSILE PORTS

Senator STONE. Can we be sure if the missile ports are closed that underneath those closed missile ports are no nuclear ballistic missiles?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, I don't think we can always be sure. It is clear that the Soviet Union has over the years been in the process of eroding the understanding, the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding in order, just as they did in SALT I, to get the United States to accept conduct that we have in the past made clear was unacceptable.

SOVIET EFFORT TO ESTABLISH MILITARY BASES IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Senator STONE. At the time of the Panama Canal Treaty, the President wrote me a letter which was made public, and I quote:

> In particular, it has and will continue to be the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere.

I would like to ask either or both of you whether you think a direct or indirect effort to establish a military base would be established by the introduction of a large number of combat troops of the Soviet Union into Cuba.

Admiral ZUMWALT. There is no question in my mind.

Admiral MOORER. Absolutely. Yes, sir.

Senator STONE. Would you say that if other than advisers, the Soviet Union attempted to introduce as much as a brigade of combat troops into Cuba, that that would constitute a direct or indirect effort to establish a military base?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, in my opinion. As a matter of fact, during the Panama Canal debate last year, I called attention to the fact that there was a Torrijos-Castro-Moscow axis, in my opinion, and that before very long you would see this in operation along Central America, and I think that is exactly what is happening in Nicaragua today.

Senator STONE. Would you think that the Soviet Union would be willing in the middle of this SALT debate to take the chance of introducing large numbers of Soviet combat troops into Cuba, and if you do, would you think that it is part of that process that one of you just described of eroding away that agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis?

Admiral ZUMWALT. My own view, there, Senator, is that their judgment would be made as to whether or not they thought they could get away with it during the ratification process. I believe that it is quite clear that the Soviet Union desperately wants the SALT II deal, because it nails down for them juridical superiority. They have, however, become increasingly contemptuous of our lack of will and power.

For example, normally they wait a decent interval after they have achieved an important objective before they rile up the American people again, but after the loss of Iran, they did not even wait a matter of days before they initiated the South Yemeni invasion of North Yemen to see if they could get away with something else while they saw an appreciable weakness over here.

U.S. REACTION TO SOVIET VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT

Senator STONE. Admirals, what good would verification be if we learned of a violation and did not do anything about it? Wouldn't that provoke a crisis of confidence not in the SALT process but in our own administration's willpower?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. I asked that question the other day to the members of the administration. In other words, they were using the words "significant violation." When I asked, what is a significant violation, the answer was that it is a violation which

brings about a shift in the strategic balance. My position is that once that has happened, in view of the long leadtime associated with developing new systems, it is almost too late to react.

Senator STONE. I have already inquired about the Soviet submarine visits. I have already inquired about the Mig-23 and Mig-25 presence in Cuba. If, in addition to that, there were a major introduction of Soviet combat troops into Cuba, could there be any further doubt that we just do not care about protecting our hemisphere against Soviet military bases in this hemisphere?

Admiral MOORER. None whatever, and I think it would be the height of folly for the United States to permit that to happen, sir.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ALTERNATIVES TO RATIFICATION

Gentlemen, I would like for you to weave your way through three potential actions which this committee could take. You have already testified with regard to some of these alternatives, but I want you to weigh the three.

It appears to me that the committee could follow the military advice which you have offered, and construct amendments that dealt with the MIRV launchers, that dealt with the verification problems, that went item by item through the deficiencies of the negotiation. Conceivably, those amendments would be adopted by the Senate, and renegotiation of the treaty would commence.

A second alernative is, I suppose, to say that that process of amendment and renegotiation is tedious, maybe impossible, maybe difficult to try to pick and choose among items in an already negotiated treaty, that the Senate should simply do the obvious, and that is, reject the treaty, and suggest that we try again, while moving on to do the things militarily that you and others have suggested.

A third option would appear to be one in which an amendment calling for very substantial reductions in the MIRV area, for example, or in those threats to our strategic defenses are involved, reductions on both sides, in which literally this becomes a substantial disarmament treaty, and that would require further negotiation. It is a very different path than the first one in which we simply move to both renegotiate and maybe we could couple that with defense things we should be doing.

Which of these three courses do you advise? I am not clear from your testimony, although I am clear as to the course of what we ought to be doing in America in your advice. But in terms of the technical aspects of our parliamentary situation, could either of you offer advice to this committee?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would advise as follows. I would say that the best would be the amendment with substantial reductions. The second best would be to construct the amendments in a series of ways along the lines that you have outlined. The third best would be to reject the treaty, and worst of all would be to approve the treaty in its present form.

In my judgment, it is important for us to continue to show that percentage of the American public who believes that arms control negotiations are good, that we are continuing to negotiate. I advocate fair and balanced arms control reductions. I think it is important for us, in restoring our national safety, to maintain every effort to keep in touch with the Soviets, because as we begin to show the will to restore our national safety, they are going to be more reasonable about accepting fair and balanced results.

REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AMENDMENT

Senator LUGAR. Admiral Zumwalt, in terms of this reduction of armaments amendment, how deep a reduction should we aim for at this particular point, as a stipulation of ratifying this treaty?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think that 1,800 strategic nuclear launch vehicles on each side would be a number to shoot for that would make it possible for the United States then to begin to catch up.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Lugar, if I might add to that, I agree with what Admiral Zumwalt has said. We, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, looked at that very carefully. We concluded that 1,800 equal aggregate delivery vehicles was a goal to work for. You must bear in mind, however, that always the Soviets must keep in their inventory what they consider to be sufficient to handle Red China, so consequently you would have to go down by stages, but I think a mutual reduction has always been supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We are very much opposed to unilateral reduction. We have always maintained that we cannot negotiate from weakness, and I think as the gap widens the capabilities, our negotiating capabilities are likewise being reduced at a rather rapid rate.

Senator LUGAR. If we went to 1,800 as an equal aggregate at the top figure, would you make as a proviso that the 820 on the MIRV be reduced, and, if so, to what level?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe that it should come down to, at most the 550 which is all that the United States can have. We simply cannot get above the 550, so the 820 is meaningless for us. I believe also that the amendment process should require that the 550 or whatever lesser number are agreed to will include no SS–18's and will include the right for both sides to have equal megatonnage, equal throw-weight, equal accuracy, equal warheads.

All I think the United States wants is equality, not inferiority.

Senator LUGAR. Would you be able to support a SALT II Treaty with those limitations, of 1,800, 550, no SS–18's, and equal megatonnage and equal throw-weight?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would.

AdmiraI MOORER. Yes, sir, I think so.

I do think, though, that you are never going to reach a situation where one side is a mirror image of the other, and consequently, that was why the Joint Chiefs of Staff went in for a freedom to mix within the ceilings.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Thank you, Senator,

Senator Hayakawa?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CRITICAL PERIOD IN STRATEGIC BALANCE

It seems to me that all of our witnesses have agreed that the critical period lying ahead would be from 1983 to 1985. Is that correct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. In my judgment, it begins earlier than that. The 12 curves of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on static indicators shows that it begins in 1980.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So it begins in 1980, and the critical period would go on quite a few years beyond that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What can be done to give the United States during that period an effective and plausible second strike counterforce capacity?

Admiral MOORER. In light of the long leadtime associated with modern weaponry, I do not think hardwarewise that we are in a position to counter this problem. I think, however, that what we must do is to have a national commitment to a program which will truly indicate that the United States no longer will permit this gap to widen, and under those circumstances it is my opinion that the Soviets will take a different approach to the negotiation.

Admiral ZUMWALT. There are some things that I think one could do to improve greatly over this administration's performance. You will recall that this administration canceled the B–1, slowed down the M–X, slowed down the cruise missile, failed to build the neutron bomb, so this administration has done exactly all the wrong things to make it possible to achieve a fair and balanced arms control agreement.

We could go back to a much faster production of those programs. There was no need to slow down the cruise missile enough to make the protocol date effective. We should have made the protocol bend around the cruise missile program instead of vice versa. We can improve the accuracy of our ballistic missiles and submarines, something that the Congress has never been willing in the past to permit.

CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES

Senator HAYAKAWA. Admiral Zumwalt, you mentioned the necessity of civil defense measures. What do you have in mind? Is it likely that the public will rally to support such measures?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, I would not presume to advise you on public reactions. However, I will say that it is absolutley basic under our system that we must report the facts to the people. I believe this administration has not reported the facts with regard to Soviet civil defense. I believe it is quite clear that they have invested many, many times the funds that we have invested. I believe it is quite clear that they have deep underground shelters. In one particular city, when we studied it, 27 percent of their population could go underground, if you believe in a square meter per individual, or 54 percent if you believe in half a meter.

It is quite clear that they have prepared to evacuate. However imperfect their procedures, it is quite clear that they will reduce their casualties, our Joint Chiefs of Staff calculations show it, they will reduce their casualties to a major degree by virtue of civil defense, and we are doing nothing.

I think at the very least we have to make sure that the public understands that, and then, my own view is that the public will want to match it.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I agree that the public does not know this, does not understand it, and it is a terribly alarming fact to which the public will react if properly informed. There is one last question I would like to ask.

As I understand it, both of you would like to see the level of armaments, missiles, et cetera, reduced on both sides. I have been given to understand by previous witnesses that successful ratification of SALT II could be a step in SALT III of reductions on both sides, but I get the impression from you that if we ever were to achieve any kind of reduction on both sides, it would have to be through the rejection of SALT II.

Admiral MOORER. That is my firm conviction, Senator Hayakawa. In my opinion, SALT III is going to bring about the destruction of NATO. As I said in my statement, we have already made just about every concession in our bank account, and consequently in my opinion we have to reverse the trend in the approach to this problem.

So, I cannot buy the thought that after all we must support the Senate if it advises and consents in the ratification of SALT II so as not to jeopardize SALT III. I think SALT III could well bring about even more dangerous situations than we have here with SALT II. I say that because I think what is taking place in the world is that the nations of the Third World are watching very closely what we are doing, and the minute they perceive that the Soviets are stronger than the United States, then, to use Dr. Kissinger's term, they are going to tilt in the other direction and you will see a major impact on the political and economic equilibrium worldwide.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would like to add that I agree totally with that comment on "tilt". I think it would be important for the Foreign Relations Committee to ask the State Department to provide them with the working documents that State used to stroke, massage, and demand from our European allies that they support SALT II.

For example, specifically, I would like to recommend that the Comittee on Foreign Relations ask the State Department for a copy of the working document that was handed to Joseph Luns, the Secretary General of NATO, which he was asked to use. Several of my European friends have reported to me with resentment the extent to which we really leaned on those fellows, to say, look, if you really want our support on other things you had better come out and support our President on this.

Senator PELL. We would be glad to inquire into that.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Mr. CHAIRMAN.

Senator PELL. Senator Muskie?

UNITED STATES-SOVIET EXCHANGE OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Senator MUSKIE. Admiral Zumwalt, in your statement, you say that the treaty permits the Soviet 308 modern heavy ballistic missile launchers, while we are denied any missiles of destructiveness

greater than the entire strategic ICBM and SLBM force of the United States. Would you exchange our entire strategic ICBM and SLBM force for 308 modern heavy ballistic missiles of the kind which the Soviets have?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, of course not, Senator Muskie, because I would not ever strike first, but the Soviets would.

Senator MUSKIE. Then I would like to ask why you would not make that exchange.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Because those weapons are of primary value for the first-strike destruction of all of our significant land-based systems, and would be very effective. Just less than half of them would destroy almost all of our ICBM's, almost all of our bombers, and all of our submarines in port. For a first strike, they are extremely effective.

Senator MUSKIE. On the other hand, you have said in response to some of my colleagues' questions, unless I have misunderstood you, that you think we should build heavy ballistic missile launchers comparable to those 308. I do not know that you mentioned the number, but that we should build them.

DEVELOPMENT OF LARGER M-X MISSILE

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir. My suggestion was that we should build an M-X somewhat larger than the M-X that we have. I admitted candidly that that would give us a first-strike capability. I went on to say that that would be a far worse world than the world in which we got the Soviets to carry out my preference, namely, to join us in reduced ceilings, without those huge first-strike weapons.

Senator MUSKIE. I understand that, and thoroughly agree with that objective. I would like to see their ceiling reduced. I would like to see our own reduced, provided we maintain, of course, the necessary deterrent capability, but I wanted to be clear as to your position on the 308 heavy missiles as a U.S. weapons system. Why would you suggest building an M-X larger than the one that was approved?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think that the value of the M-X is to give us the opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviets a first-strike capability so that some day we can persuade them to join us—I hope when the Senate gets through with the proper action on SALT II—in eliminating a first-strike capability.

If they do not join us, then the virtue of having a larger M-X is that in 1985 after the expiration of SALT II the Soviets would not then have the unilateral advantage of going on to put a larger number of MIRV's on their SS-18's than the 10 that they are now authorized. We could match them in MIRV numbers with a larger M-X.

I think until 1985 the intelligent number for them is 10. That gives them all they need, but we should have the capability to match them if we cannot get them to join us in intelligent arms control.

TREATY REJECTION AND ITS RISKS

Senator MUSKIE. Is it your position that no treaty is better than this treaty?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, it is, but I also gave the preferred alternative as being renegotiation.

Senator MUSKIE. But that nevertheless we reject this treaty. Do I gather you accept the risk that the result may be no treaty?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not believe that there is very much risk of that. I believe that the Soviet Union wants arms control. I believe the Soviets prefer to get the very advantageous deal that SALT offers. I believe that if we show will and initiative, we can get them to accept a less advantageous treaty, which will still be better for them than no treaty.

Senator MUSKIE. The less advantageous treaty to which you refer is a treaty that reduces their SS–18's to zero. Is it your view that it is not a high risk that the Soviets would refuse to eliminate their SS–18's.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think, Senator Muskie, that both the Russians and all Americans can understand that it is fair to insist on equal numbers, equal megatonnage, equal throw-weight, equal warheads, equal accuracy, equal civil defense, equal terminal bomber defense.

Senator MUSKIE. I don't think you have answered my question. You do not think it is a high risk——

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not.

Senator MUSKIE [continuing]. That the Soviets would refuse to eliminate their SS–18 force? In other words, their 308 heavy missiles?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe, Senator Muskie, if the Senate does nothing but reject SALT II, there is high risk. I believe if the Senate does the intelligent thing and amends SALT II, insisting that the President come forward with a good strategic program to match the Soviets hopefully at lower levels but at whatever level it takes, that the Soviets will then negotiate in good faith. They have not had to negotiate in good faith in SALT II.

Senator MUSKIE. But as I understand it the position the Senate ought to take from your point of view is to make it clear that we will not approve a SALT Treaty that does not reduce the 308 heavy missiles to zero.

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. And you do not think that that would create any substantial risk of no treaty?

Admiral ZUMWALT. In my judgment it would create 6 or 7 months of Soviet bellicosity and continuing talk about grave consequences, just as they have threatened the Senate, and then they would come back and begin to negotiate in good faith if we have shown that we intend to do the necessary things here.

Senator MUSKIE. Do you have any basis except your own gut instinct on that point?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir, I have what I consider to be a scholarly understanding of the Soviet Union, having devoted a year of study to the phenomenon of their political dynamics.

Senator MUSKIE. But you have had no specific signals on that point from the Soviet side to communicate to us?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, but I have a lifetime of study and observation of the Soviet phenomenon that convinces me that I am right.

Senator MUSKIE. So that is a gut instinct?

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, I would say that it is an informed judgment.

Senator MUSKIE. There are two different ways of describing an informed judgment based wholly on one's own personal judgment. While judgement can be based upon extensive reading, you could still make a decision based upon your own internal response to the situation. So I will drop the word "gut." Is your judgement based upon your own internal response to the situation? Is that it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It is very similar to the dynamics that one goes through intellectually in making a business decision or a military command decision. You look at all the factors. You give it the benefit of experience, and you make a judgment. I think it is an intelligent judgment.

Senator MUSKIE. I would assume that everybody involved in this SALT process from the U.S. side has gone through a similar dedicated, committed, and thoughtful analysis to make his judgment, so I am not prepared to conclude that you are the only person of all of those who are involved in this process who have been similarly concerned, many of them as informed on a scholarly basis as yourself.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator Muskie, I think it is difficult to overstate the awesome raw, naked power of the Presidency to bring people into line, whether you are talking about leaning hard on your allies or leaning hard on your Joint Chiefs of Staff, or making it clear to Cabinet members that they had better get aboard or get off.

Senator MUSKIE. He did not succeed in leaning on you.

Admiral ZUMWALT. No, sir, but they tried.

Senator MUSKIE. We all try in this business to persuade others to our point of view. I am sure as Chief of Naval Operations you must have leaned on somebody occasionally at some point to get your point of view across. I can't believe that you didn't.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I like to think that I was always a very gentle and persuasive type, Senator Muskie. [General laughter.]

Senator MUSKIE. We all like to think that.

Senator PELL. Gentlemen, we are trying to limit the questioning period to 5 minutes per Senator because we have another panel coming up after this. Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly welcome both of you as friends of this committee and as personal friends. We value your testimony.

SALT PROCESS EFFECT ON NATO ALLIANCE

Admiral Moorer, in your statement you indicated that the European nations are frightened. You might know that I have questioned a number of witnesses from the administration about NATO attitudes. We were told originally that Pacific powers supported the President's unilateral decision to withdraw ground forces from South Korea. Checking with many of our friends and allies out there, I found that they were reluctant not to verbally support a new American President, but that underneath it all they were deeply concerned about that decision.

Many of us have worked mightily to convince the President to change his policy there in light of the existing circumstances. We have the appearance, at least, of unity in NATO in support of this treaty. I believe the coalition states that one of the most serious flaws of the SALT process has been its effect on our NATO Alliance. How would you describe this effect? Is it consistent with a formal endorsement of SALT II that European leaders have given? Why are they frightened?

Admiral MOORER. Well, sir, I think that the chiefs of their various governments have given public approval, but if one were to talk to the military people, for instance, and talk to others, I am sure that he would conclude that the NATO nations are losing confidence in the United States, and consequently they are not quite sure just where we are headed.

That being the case, they have taken a position which they hope will not generate difficulties for them with the Soviet Union. I think it is quite clear that they are simply afraid of where we are headed. They do not want to rock the boat, but I do not feel down underneath from those to whom I have talked that they feel this is a good approach for them, because they now know full well that when SALT III comes up the next proposal that the Soviets are going to make is to take the 6th Fleet out of the Mediterranean, to withdraw our submarines to the Western Atlantic, and to take the nuclear capability forces out of Europe.

They do not have any confidence that we necessarily will stand firm in light of the actions or I should say inactions that we have been responsible for in recent years.

Admiral ZUMWALT. What the Europeans tell me is quite similar to that, Senator Percy. They point out specifically that they believe there is quite a linkage between the tactical nuclear weapons that would have to be used at the forward edge of the battle area because of Soviet conventional superiority, and the theater nuclear weapons, and the U.S. strategic deterrent.

They say that the situation is so bad with regard to the immense advantage that the Soviets have accumulated both in the forward edge of the battle tactical area and in theater nuclear weapons that it is just grossly misleading for the administration to pretend that the elimination of forward-base systems is a victory for us.

The Soviet Union has an immense advantage over there in their European forward-based systems. The Europeans are saying they just have to assume that SALT II is going to take care of the central strategic relationships itself. They say they need every bit of help that they can get in getting theater nuclear weapons. They say "If the President insists on our support of SALT II in order for us to get his help on theater nuclear weapons, OK, we will give it to him. SALT II is your American problem."

TRANSFER OF CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO NATO

Senator PERCY. I have one other point on the NATO allies. The coalition of which you are cochairman, Admiral Moorer, states that SALT II would deny NATO the right to benefit from U.S. cruise missile technology. This is a reference, I believe, to the noncircumvention clause in article XII of the treaty.

When questioned on that particular point, Secretary Brown testified on July 9 that this provision would not limit the transfer of cruise missile technology to NATO. How can you explain this difference of opinion between the Coalition and Secretary Brown? Does his statement alleviate somewhat your concerns about the impact of SALT II on NATO?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think if you get down into detail, there is a difference between transferring technology to the Europeans on the one hand and the Europeans in fact being able to develop an in-place capability on the other hand.

I believe this is covered in the protocol. At the moment, the sea-based and land-based cruise missiles are very limited as to range. Only in the case of the air-based cruise missiles do you have the full capability of the missile.

Senator PERCY. Would you feel it desirable, and I would appreciate a response from both admirals on this, for us to have an understanding to the treaty on this? I have introduced on the Senate floor and had printed two understandings that I think we are beginning to reach a consensus on here. They may be adopted as committee understandings. One would indicate that the protocol cannot be extended beyond its termination date without the advice and consent of the Senate by two-thirds vote. It cannot be unilaterally extended by the President. The other would say that nothing in the treaty prohibits the transfer of technology for cruise missiles to our allies.

Do you think that would help in this particular area and alleviate some of your concerns?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. I do.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think it is clear, and the committee should ask the State Department to give it this information that the Soviets have made a demarche that it is not permitted. I think it is clear we can interpret the language in a way to permit it. I think it is mandatory for the Senate to write that understanding as you suggested, Senator Percy, and it is one of the few things in the treaty that in my judgment can be fixed without an amendment.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, that is right.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator PELL. Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PUBLIC SUPPORT BEHIND UNITED STATES

Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zumwalt, I am sorry I was not here to hear your statements. There were two amendments on the Senate floor in which I was directly involved, and I had to be there for that debate.

In World War II, we did not have such a thing as hawks and doves in this country. Virtually the entire country was united behind that war effort. I was one of those who participated. To this day, I have never had any regrets about it. I thought it was a war that we had to fight to save western civilization. We more or less maintained that broad bipartisan support both for our defense policies and also our foreign policies for a number of years after World War II.

It seems to me looking back on it that where we fractured that unity was on the Vietnam venture. That is where it began to come apart. That is when we heard the phrases "hawks" and "doves" emerging for the first time. The same phrases are now used with reference to our military posture. Those who think we need more for our security are branded as hawks. Those who think we need less are branded as doves.

One of the things that seems to have emerged in these hearings is the possibility that maybe we could rebuild that coalition that used to exist with regard to America's posture in the world and that it would come in the form of an agreed upon negotiating position on the part of the United States, and hopefully the Soviet Union when we go into SALT III, under which both sides would attempt to work out an agreement to put a freeze on any further buildup of nuclear weapons.

Obviously, this would not work unless both sides would agree to it. Then perhaps we could follow that up with systematic reductions in nuclear arsenals. Would you gentlemen think that that would be a wise objective for us to attempt here in this country as an instruction to our negotiators in the future of this SALT process, operating, of course, on the assumption that obviously we would call off the game if the Russians did not agree to it?

Admiral MOORER. Senator McGovern, I think that you will find that all of the senior military people support reductions in nuclear arms so long as they are mutual reductions. I think also you have to remember that the American people are very apt to shift quickly from one side to the other. I was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck. Shortly before that we had only passed the draft law by one vote. The U.S. Army was in Louisiana training with wooden guns, and we had an announcement that we were not going to fortify Wake and Guam Islands.

Then, promptly after Pearl Harbor, we declared war with, I believe, one dissenting vote. Then we turned around and because a submarine fired two or three shells into Santa Barbara, Calif., we promptly locked up every Japanese from San Diego to Sacramento and kept them locked up for several years.

What I am saying is that the people of this country are very, very much in favor of any peaceful measure, but when they feel they are absolutely threatened themselves, they can turn around and take very significant actions as they did in World War II.

My problem is that I do not feel in light of the technological advances and the fact that a missile can fly from Russia to the United States, that we can necessarily expect to have the same time to reorient ourselves in the future as we did during Pearl Harbor, but I would certainly be in favor of mutual reductions of nuclear weapons. I have always supported that.

Senator MCGOVERN. Admiral Zumwalt?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator McGovern, I myself am excited at the prospect of being on the same side with you. I would strongly support reductions to equality, but I think it is very important for us to be aware that just simple reductions in numbers of strategic launch vehicles will leave the Soviets very superior.

Indeed, I predict that, if SALT II is ratified, in SALT III Moscow will go exactly that route. That is, they will urge us to make

reductions while letting them keep their huge preponderance of megatonnage and throw-weight.

WEAPONS MORATORIUM FOLLOWED BY SYSTEMATIC REDUCTIONS

Senator McGovern. Do you think, Admiral, that if we could get general agreement on the principle of a temporary freeze on weapons, followed up by systematic reductions, that this could be a fruitful field for negotiation to work out the formula? I frankly don't know exactly what that formula ought to be in terms of reductions in launchers or warheads or various systems, but that could become then the subject for negotiation, all the time protecting our own security and making sure that reductions were equitable and verifiable.

Admiral Zumwalt. Senator McGovern, I have difficulty with seeing how a freeze could be made to work. Both sides if they agreed to lesser numbers would still have some things that they ought and need to do that are probably beneficial to both sides in terms of creating a more stable force. I believe that the thing to do is to turn it right around and say to the President's negotiators, you really flubbed this one. You left us in a heck of a hole. Now go back and agree to equal numbers, equal megatonnage, equal throw-weight, equal accuracy, and give us a fair treaty and a balanced treaty with phased reductions to equality.

Senator McGovern. Admiral, do you believe our negotiators flubbed basically because we did not get substantial reductions on both sides in SALT II?

U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION

Admiral Zumwalt. As I talked to our negotiators over the years of the SALT II negotiations, Senator, it is clear to me that what happened is, the Soviets would take a position here [indicating], we would take a position here [indicating], the negotiation process would work like this [indicating total U.S. movement to the fixed Soviet position]. The negotiators found themselves overruled time after time. The President was saying to the public, we are going to have SALT II, it is just around the corner, and the Russians were hanging tough. The President having predicted it so many times now had a domestic political need to have SALT II. We just made all the compromises and they made none, or at least very few.

Senator McGovern. Thank you very much. My time is up.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Senator McGovern.

Senator Sarbanes?

REASONS FOR CONCERNS

Senator Sarbanes. Admiral Zumwalt, to what extent does your concern flow from the specific terms of the treaty and to what extent from your view that there is a need to take certain actions with respect to our strategic forces?

Admiral Zumwalt. I would say that they are about equal, Senator Sarbanes. I am deeply concerned about a treaty which has been negotiated in a way to help the Russians get everything that they need to get in order to achieve their objectives; namely, a strategic nuclear war-winning capability, and which has so compromised our

objectives; namely, to achieve something which was good for our national security, at lower levels of force.

MEETING U.S. STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCY OBJECTIVE

Senator SARBANES. Suppose the treaty were approved and a major program was embarked upon. Would that in your view enable us to meet this strategic equivalency objective?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would be concerned——

Senator SARBANES. Is that your objective, first of all, strategic equivalency?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; it is my objective to achieve strategic equivalency. I would be concerned about a SALT II ratified in its present form even with modifications that permitted us to do the M-X, because that is moving toward a still less stable world in which not only the Russians have a first-strike capability but now we have a first-strike capability.

I believe the SALT II Treaty is bad on its merits for that reason, and it should be sent back with instructions that both sides should do without a first-strike capability, and that we should achieve equal numbers at lower levels.

STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY GOAL

Senator SARBANES. Do you think the goal of strategic superiority is not achievable or is a destabilizing objective?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I was one of those who believed that President Kennedy's initiative should be supported at the time. As a director of arms control, I believed that it was a distinct possibility that the fright the Russians had been given in the Cuban missile crisis would make them want to work with us toward those constraints that I listed in my statement.

I believe the Soviet Union has demonstrated in spades that they have totally disregarded that appeal, totally disregarded our practice of those constraints and are building huge asymmetrical advantages. I believe that SALT II formalizes those and is therefore not a step forward but a step backward in the continuum.

Senator SARBANES. Should the goal of strategic superiority be pursued? If so, would that not lead the other side to do the same, and would we not then both be involved in an ever-escalating arms race?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I do not believe that under our American system it is possible for us to have strategic nuclear superiority. I believe there are enough Americans who take the fair and balanced view that it is unachievable. I do not think that is the case in the Soviet Union, where they do not have to worry about public opinion. I think they do intend to have a strategic nuclear superiority. I think SALT II gives it to them both legally and practically, and I think it is therefore a very bad development.

Senator SARBANES. Is it SALT II that gives such superiority to them, or is it our failure not to undertake certain defense programs? I notice that you constantly couple those two points in your presentation here today.

Admiral ZUMWALT. Senator, I do not believe it is possible to separate them. I believe that the reason we are in the trouble we

are in is that the Senate did not insist in coupling a study of the strategic relationship and SALT I together at the time of their hearings. I believe it is essential that the Senate do so on this occasion.

SALT PROCESS

Senator SARBANES. Is it your view that SALT II would lay the basis for or put us on a path to an even worse SALT III?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think that is absolutely unquestionable. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Did SALT I lead us to the SALT II we have before us?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think as it worked out that that is correct.

Senator SARBANES. You supported SALT I. What was it that worked out that did this?

Admiral ZUMWALT. My support for SALT I and that of all the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time was—it was a very tortured support, along the lines that the Joint Chiefs have just done on SALT II, and for many of the same reasons, but the point we made is that there were three significant assurances that must be met in order for SALT I to be supportable. One was to maintain adequate strategic forces and to fund the necessary forces. Another was to do the necessary intelligence work, and the third was to do the necessary research and development.

In my judgment, none of them has come to pass at a level that would have been necessary in order to make SALT I be convertible to a fair and balanced SALT II.

Senator SARBANES. But were not all of those things permitted under SALT I?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, they were, and further, Senator, we also made it clear that it had to be recognized that we were trading off for a 5-year period of time some quality advantages for some numerical advantages, and that by the end of that 5-year period the Soviets must have given up their numerical advantages, because they would have overtaken our quality advantages. Now we are in the seventh year of that 5-year period, and the Soviets are overtaking the quality advantages and are being granted even larger numerical advantages.

Senator SARBANES. But now, as then, we maintain options to do a whole series of programs. Mr. Nitze was here, and he listed eight things we ought to do. All of them could be done under SALT II with the possible need to clarify this option on the multiple protective systems. Do you agree with that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I agree that all of the things which have been asked for, with the exception of M-X, could be done under SALT II. I do not agree that that then leads to a fair and balanced strategic relationship under SALT II, nor do I believe that those things will be done unless the Senate as part of its process of dealing with SALT II at the same time insists that the President give them a program upon which they can act.

Now, I realize that cuts across all kinds of committee responsibilities and so forth. To produce strategic balance, I think it takes both a modification of a bad treaty—a treaty which gives legal superiority to the Soviet Union—and it takes modification of stra-

tegic programs which are contributing to practical Soviet strategic nuclear advantage.

Senator SARBANES. So even if you got those programs, you would still want to reject the treaty and go back to square 1.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I would urge that there be amendments to the treaty to move it dramatically in the direction of equality and a clear guidance—more clear than the resolution passed last time, about which the administration has deluded us on its fulfillment—to achieve equal numbers of everything in SALT III.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Zorinsky? I would add that after Senator Zorinsky we will be moving on to the next panel, who have been waiting for some time.

U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET FIRST STRIKE

Senator ZORINSKY. Admiral Zumwalt, I understand that you support a thesis put forward by Paul Nitze which concludes that a U.S. President might not respond to a Soviet first strike if his only option was destruction of population centers or capitulation. Since any such Soviet first strike could take 10 million or more U.S. lives and for other reasons, Secretary Brown has called this thesis unrealistic.

Can you explain why you think it is realistic as an option?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, Senator. I believe what Paul Nitze is saying is that the Soviet Union is so superior to us or will be during the course of SALT II that if there were a confrontation and the Soviet Union could not achieve its objective and he makes it clear that he believes their objective would be to force us to capitulate in a given confrontation if they could not achieve it, and if there were a miscalculation, the Soviets might then decide to preempt in a first strike.

His calculations, which are quite similar to those done by some of us in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and still operative, which I have validated—I think his work is the best work in or out of Government that I have seen—his calculations are that the Soviet dead would be about one-tenth of the American dead. If the President then went to a city-busting retaliation and it is unthinkable that a President faced with that kind of situation in which he can kill if he fires at empty Russian cities something on the order of 10, 20, or 30 million Russians, but would lose in excess of 100 million Americans—it is unthinkable that he would do so.

Further, he goes on to point out that you do not get to that point. What really happens is, the President is urged to back down before the Soviet strategic strike takes place.

SALT I ASSURANCES

Senator ZORINSKY. In your observation of SALT I, you indicated that none of the assurances required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in supporting SALT I were adequately carried out. Have you enumerated any of those assurances?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir; I have not enumerated them, but I have given the three generic categories, and would be glad to provide them for the record. All it really takes is to look at the submissions made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff each year and to

compare them with the major cuts made in those recommendations by the Secretary of Defense and then the additional cuts made by the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] and the additional cuts made by the Congress.

Senator ZORINSKY. Do any strategic weapons stand out in your mind as not having been followed up on?

Admiral ZUMWALT. Yes, sir. The cancellation of the B–1 was an unbelievably bad decision. The decision to slow down the M–X missile and the cruise missile and the failure to build the neutron bomb—although it deals with the linkage between strategic and conventional—have all contributed to our dramatic descent into inferiority.

NEUTRON BOMB DEPLOYMENT

Senator ZORINSKY. What would you do with the neutron bomb? Where would you deploy it?

Admiral ZUMWALT. The neutron bomb should be deployed, as the Europeans wanted it to be deployed, as a weapon which is less lethal than existing tactical nuclear weapons but has the virtue that it can be used against invading Soviet troops over German territory without massive destruction of German territory. It is a defensive weapon in a very classic sense.

Senator ZORINSKY. I agree with you, but I understand that this Nation cannot get permission from the NATO nations to currently deploy the neutron bomb on their soil.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think the NATO nations have a very great distrust of us because they did agree to it. President Carter did have their support to go forward with it, knowing that they would accept it, and then decided not to. It is one of a series of reasons for which I support Tom Moorer's judgment that NATO is losing confidence in us.

Senator ZORINSKY. I would suggest that the truth of the matter is, the President did not go forward with it because he did not want to store them in somebody's basement here when they were needed to be deployed for NATO and could not get permission from the NATO members. As a matter of fact, one of them said, yes, we will let you deploy them in our nation, provided another NATO nation will accept their deployment, knowing full well, and precluding England at the time, that we could not get the permission of another NATO nation.

This is the hangup; to manufacture neutron bombs with no place to deploy them. And that indicates to me that possibly the choice was a correct one on behalf of the administration.

Admiral ZUMWALT. My information is that the Germans agreed to it prior to President Carter's decision not to build it. It is Germany where the neutron bombs should be stored. The President had the authority of the Germans to go forward with it, and then chose, for his own political reasons, not to go forward with it.

Senator ZORINSKY. Very recently I met with high officials in the German Government, and they said, when I asked that question: We are going to have a meeting about that, and hopefully, maybe some day, we can get permission, but today it is a very sensitive subject with the citizens of our country, just as burying nuclear waste is in this country.

Admiral ZUMWALT. I think that is accurate today because of their disaffection in the President's willingness to back them up on the last occasion.

Senator BIDEN. A point of clarification. Hasn't nonsingularity been a tenet of the German position not just recently but for the past several years?

Admiral ZUMWALT. It is my understanding that the Germans had the necessary nonsingularity at the time Mr. Carter made the decision.

Senator BIDEN. Really?

U.S. WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEPLOYMENT

Senator ZORINSKY. I would like to ask another question. Do you feel that the United States plans to develop and deploy the M-X missile, the Trident submarine, and air-launched and possibly ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles under the SALT II Treaty? Do you think SALT II will impede the development of any of these strategic systems? In your estimation are they the correct system?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe that the M-X deployment still has to be clarified with regard to the treaty. I believe the State Department has not made you aware of the Soviet position on it. I believe it is quite clear that an accurate reading of the treaty would support the Soviet position that we cannot base the M-X in a mode I would consider nonvulnerable. I believe it is quite unlikely that the cruise missiles will be deployed if this administration is reelected. I believe they are quite likely to knuckle under to Soviet demand in negotiating SALT III that we extend the protocol.

I would hope that the Congress would make that very difficult. I believe even if all of those weapons systems are done, that we will remain strategically inferior to the Soviet Union, and that that is why SALT II ought to be renegotiated by direction of the President to achieve lower levels, reasonable, fair, and balanced levels, that we can meet during the period of SALT II.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed, gentlemen. The record will be kept open for Senators who, because of the brevity of time, wish to ask further questions, so that they may do so in writing. Also, if you would care to insert any material into the record, gentlemen, it will be so inserted. I will do so in connection with Admiral Zumwalt's statement that the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have confirmed recently that during SALT II the United States will fall into strategic nuclear inferiority. I will be inserting in the record at this point with unanimous consent the paragraphs from their testimony that I think take a different view, and please submit your citations as well.

[The information referred to follows:]

CITATIONS OF TESTIMONY FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCERNING U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR INFERIORITY DURING SALT II

[Supplied by: Senator Claiborne Pell]

(Excerpt taken from July 11, 1979, testimony of Hon. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate Concerning the Salt II Treaty)

"I do not believe the U.S. will face strategic inferiority in 1985—or at any other time before or later—IF we have SALT and IF we do the things we need and plan to do to modernize our own forces. In particular:

"In 1985, our bomber and submarine force will be far more capable then today, and far more capable than the corresponding Soviet force.

"In 1985 the U.S. would have a range of devastating responses open to it were the Soviets to run the enormous risks of an attack on our ICBM's. It bears emphasizing, because it is so often ignored, that even after a total loss of Minuteman missiles, we would not face the dilemma of surrender by inaction or mutual suicide by an all-out attack on Soviet cities and industry, provoking an equivalent attack on ours. We would instead have surviving bomber and submarine forces still fully capable of selectively attacking military, economic, and control targets, thus negating any gain the Soviets might imagine they could attain by an attack on our ICBM force.

"In the aftermath of an attack on U.S. ICBM's, the remaining Soviet ICBM's would not be in sanctuary. Our ALCM's in surviving bombers would have the accuracy, numbers, and ability to penetrate defenses sufficient to allow us significantly to reduce the residual Soviet ICBM force. The time for cruise missiles to arrive on target would be longer than the time for ICBM's to arrive, but that element of difference is only one among many factors in determining the balance."

(Excerpts taken from the July 11, 1979, testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the SALT II Treaty)

The danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitations in the Agreement, but from potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past and, if we are not careful—in the future.

In the context of the strategic balance and the concerns I expressed at the outset of this statement, our ability to take the necessary programmatic actions to ensure essential equivalence is the ultimate test for SALT II. The foregoing discussion should leave no doubt that our options and flexibility are adequate, so long as we choose to exercise them.

COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER,
Washington, D.C., July 20, 1979.

Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Russell Senate Office Building,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PELL: At the end of the hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Tuesday, 17 July, you asked me to provide inserts to back up my statements that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have confirmed recently that during SALT II the U.S. will fall into strategic nuclear inferiority, with or without a treaty.

In accordance with that tasking, I attach excerpts of pages from the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those that I have marked with number one (1), either directly or indirectly, confirm the statement that I made.

In addition, I urge again that your Committee have a classified session in which it receives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff their top secret twelve indicators of strategic nuclear power, showing that in ten of the twelve the United States is distinctly inferior after 1980 and that in the other two we are about equal.

In addition to the static measures of strategic nuclear inferiority, I urge that that same classified session obtain testimony on the outcomes of the various SIOP-RISOP and other war games, including the one recently completed.

I reiterate that these twelve static and war game dynamic comparisons will leave you deeply concerned about forthcoming U.S. strategic nuclear inferiority.

Sincerely,

ELMO R. ZUMWALT, Jr.

Attachment.

(Excerpts from the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 11, 1979, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)

"We are unanimous in our view that, although each side retains military advantages, Soviet momentum has brought them from a position of clear inferiority to their present status of at least military equality with the United States. In some areas, they have already surpassed us and we are concerned over the United States in most of the static indicators of strategic force by the early 1980's. There is room for reasoned debate about the practical implications of this prospect, but it is important that we face up to its reality as we consider our own strategic responses."

"It is, after all, the Soviet military might which affords them 'superpower' influence. Thus, there is little inherent to restrain the dominant component of their national power—especially when our own restraint appears to offer at least the prospect of an exploitable military advantage.

"The path of unilateral restraint has failed to serve either our security interests or our arms control objectives satisfactorily. Regardless of the outcome of the SALT II ratification process, there is an urgent need to proceed resolutely and deliberately with all well thought out program of force modernization, both to avoid the undersirable international consequences of strategic inferiority and to create the necessary incentives for Soviet agreement to significant reductions as the arms control process continues."

"In 1972, our predecessors on the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed SALT I with the assurance that certain follow-on actions would be implemented to safeguard our strategic interests. Regrettably, their advice was not heeded. Had it been followed, we would face less perilous strategic prospects in the 1980's and we are convinced we could have achieved deeper mutual reductions in SALT II."

Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed, gentlemen, for your kindness in being with us. We hope we did not keep you too long. Thank you.

WITNESSES

I now call to the witness table General Dougherty, Admiral Kidd, and Admiral Gayler. I would add by way of background that General Dougherty has had remarkable experience in the Strategic Air Command, having spent most of his service in that line of activity and having wound up as Commander in Chief of SAC.

Admiral Kidd has spent his career in the Navy. He was educated in Georgia schools and the Naval Academy, and has been mainly in service vessels, and was Supreme Allied Commander in Chief.

Admiral Gayler has spent a lifetime in the Navy, winding up his career as Commander in Chief of our Pacific Forces.

Gentlemen, I do not know how you would like to start. Seniority? How does it work? Who graduated from your respective academy first? [General laughter.]

Admiral Gayler?

STATEMENT OF ADM. NOEL GAYLER, (USN, RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. FORCES PACIFIC, AND FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, STEAMBOAT, COLO.

Admiral GAYLER. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here, to be able to testify, because I believe that the nuclear arms limitation process and this SALT Treaty itself is vital to the security of the United States.

You are totally familiar with the provisions of the treaty. You have heard extensive testimony of a technical kind, and some sophisticated, not to say convoluted arguments. I am going to attempt, if I may, to separate the woods from the trees in this area, and to talk about first principles, although I would be perfectly

happy to entertain as sophisticated questions as any Senator may wish to ask me.

SITUATION WITHOUT SALT II

The first thing that I think is clear is that the process and this treaty itself, it is easy to wish for more, it is easy to wish for better progress, it is easy to wish for a lower limit on nuclear weapons, and I do, but I think we must ask what the situation would be without this treaty, realistically, in the process toward reduction of nuclear armaments.

It does in fact put a modest cap on what would otherwise be the nuclear posture both of the United States and of Russia, and in that modest way it is a good thing. It does in fact decrease the danger of nuclear war, because these limitations, although they are small, are finite, because the fact of the understanding with the Soviet Union, the communications established and the communications reestablished, will be important, and because of the improved atmosphere that will result if it is ratified.

I think it is very important to focus on our power position in the world, as many witnesses have. I share their view about the importance of our being strong and our being seen to be strong. I do not share this almost exclusive focus on nuclear weapons. They are the least useful, the least useful of all military weapons when you actually come to establishing the power position in the world. I will return to that subject.

It is my view, in spite of the complaints that have been made about our negotiators, that it was in fact a pretty good bargaining process from the standpoint of the United States. In fact, the Soviets made four major concessions and some seven more or less to our advantage, to a total of two or three that we gave to the Soviets.

I think we have to consider the fact that this is not a treaty based on trust, but a treaty which we can verify within the limits that we need to, with our own intelligence. I suggest that the proper reaction of people who are concerned about verification should be to make sure that our intelligence community charged with this task is supported in future years so that we can in fact keep track of what is going on in the Soviet Union.

CONSEQUENCES OF TREATY REJECTION

We should look at the consequences, totally predictable, of a rejection of the treaty. The first consequence will be more weapons in the hands of the Russians. The second consequence would be to alarm our allies, including Japan and many others who look toward us for security, because we give the impression of being unable to form and complete policy. That is an impression far more important to them than sophistical arguments about who has the most megatonnage.

In my personal experience, I have never had a head of state, a foreign minister or a defense minister or a military officer of a foreign power in official conversations I have had with them, never on any single instance, inquire about the strategic nuclear position of the United States as being a matter of concern to them. Their inquiries are always, what is our power position in the area that

they are interested in, what is our capability to carry things across the seas and through the air to assist them if need be?

I think another consequence will be to spread weapons throughout the world, in the hands of other powers. It is inconceivable that we can carry much weight in dissuading others and asking others to hold back if we demonstrate that we ourselves will not do so.

A further consequence, I think, contrary to what you heard a few minutes ago, would be to ruin the arms control process. It would be a step not just to square 1 but to square minus 1. We are dealing with a fragile situation with our principal adversary. We have a leadership now that is apparently committed to arms control. We have no guarantee that a successor leadership or even this one under the impact of a rejection would be so committed.

It is entirely possible that it would rupture United States-Soviet relationships and return us to the cold war. I am afraid that in the eyes of the world, the fault would be ours. I think one must ask oneself, will the Russians behave better without a SALT Treaty than they will with one? I think the answer clearly is that they will not.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Now, let me attempt to tick off what I think are some basic truths about strategic nuclear weapons. First, nuclear weapons are not the only part, not even the major part of the security position of the United States. That resides in our political strength, in our economic strength, and in our military strength, which is useful, which is appropriate, which is at the right place at the right time and of the right kind.

Having said that, let me recite a first nuclear truth. The United States and Russia can each destroy the other. That situation will not change. Of all of the countries in the world, America is most at risk because we have the most highly developed society and therefore the most vulnerable target system.

A third truth is this. There is no defense and there is no prospect of defense against a major nuclear attack, whether by intercontinental ballistic missiles or some other delivery means, not antiballistic missiles, not particle beam technology, not space weapons, not civil defense. None of them will make us safe against nuclear attack. The only thing that will make us safe is to make sure that it does not happen.

Another truth is that the capabilities of the opposing forces are not very much affected by numbers after a certain threshold is reached. That is because the first few arriving weapons do all the conceivable damage. The one exception is in this thing that we thought up about attacks against a very large number of discrete hard targets.

We have heard the SS–18 cited as a major threat, as indeed it is against that kind of target. Both the Russians and ourselves have open to us, and both the Russians and ourselves are moving toward a solution to that problem. The solution is simply to deprive the opponent of any point to shoot at. When you have done that, the accuracy of his missile and the size of his missile becomes irrelevant if he doesn't know where to shoot it.

We are both moving in that direction, and for that reason, the presumed importance of the very large missiles with the very large number of warheads is a great deal less.

I think it is very important that we maintain the fire break in our thinking and in our attention between nuclear weapons and all other kinds of weapons. They are not the same kind of weapon. They are very different. To me, the bottom line is the common sense observation: The fewer nuclear weapons, the better.

I have seen nuclear weapons go off. I do not think many people have seen these tests. I have reread the story of Hiroshima, and the destruction that was accomplished by one bomb of 14 kilotons, something that we would now call a small tactical weapon. I must confess that as a military person, I am astonished that we can even contemplate the exchange of these very large weapons in their thousands with this kind of experience behind us.

U.S. POWER POSITION IN WORLD

Now, a lot has been said about the power position of the United States. I support a strong United States, I think, as strongly as anybody can possibly do it. I support a real military strength, and that is usable military power in the air, on the sea to keep our sealanes and airlanes open, on the ground to be able to hold ground without resort to nuclear weapons, and not least in the evolving arena of space where American technology can really keep an edge and should.

I think that the principal difference militarily between the Soviets and ourselves is that the Soviets are self-sufficient in all of the sinews of war and we are not. We are an oceanic alliance. We depend on our allies as they depend on us. It is keeping those alliances together, NATO, Japan, the bases, all of those things, which really makes the difference in the American power position and in the perception of that position in the world.

For these reasons I think, as other witnesses have said, that a reduction in nuclear weapons is a good thing. The fact that it is a good thing for America and for Russia and for the rest of the world does not bother me at all. I think that is a very good result. We seem to be preoccupied with the question of whether we or they got the better bargain. That is not the point. The point is that we both got a good bargain and we have a lot of experience in all of our lives with bargains that are to the advantage of both sides, and this is one of them.

U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES

The policy objectives, to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, are increased by SALT to insure the survival of the United States and its allies, is certainly not diminished. To deny advantage to the adversary is not diminished by SALT. To deter aggression at all levels, we are now, if we can get understanding with the Soviets on this, free to improve our capabilities which will in fact deter aggression at all levels, and facilitiate arms control.

It is my belief that all Americans or very nearly all Americans share two basic goals. One is that they want a strong America. The second is that they want to get a handle on nuclear weapons. I think these goals are consistent and that we can go for them. That

means the political way to go is to strengthen our Government. The military way to go is to strengthen our usable military power, and to strengthen the unity with which this Government—the American Government—addresses problems abroad.

When we have cut a bargain which is admittedly to the advantage of both adversaries as well as to the world, we should stay with it and support it. Thank you.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Admiral Gayler.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I state that I have to leave to attend a meeting, but I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I have one question which I will leave with Senator Pell. Thank you all very much, gentlemen. I appreciate it.

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, may I also say that I have to preside over a 2:30 luncheon, and I can't get out of it. I apologize to these distinguished witnesses, but I do look forward to reading the testimony.

Senator PELL. Senators, the record will stay open in case you care to submit any further questions.

Next we will hear from Admiral Kidd.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ISAAC C. KIDD, JR., (USN, RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, FALLS CHURCH, VA.

Admiral KIDD. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am both flattered and humbled to have been invited before your committee today on the subject of our strategic arms limitation treaty now under consideration. I am an authority on neither strategic arms limitations nor on treaties. For the last 8 years, however, I was responsible to our Commander in Chief and to you gentlemen for the development, design and production of Navy strategic weapons, the last 4 years being in command of three-quarters of our Navy's strategic forces, the submarines and the weapons in them.

REASONS FOR TREATY SUPPORT

With this modest background, I support this treaty for the following reasons:

One, we are a strong Nation which has allowed itself to get behind, behind in both strategic and conventional forces. The treaty offers a time out, as it were, for us to catch up. I trust we will not blow this opportunity to catch up as it could well be our last chance.

Two, it is so unusual for such times out to occur in the conduct of international affairs that this is an opportunity I am almost ashamed to say we cannot afford to lose.

Three, we as Americans have done this deed to ourselves. We have no one but ourselves to thank for it, the deed being the frittering away of our bargaining edge of military strength. I have confidence we have the wisdom in our Government and in our people, the strength to acknowledge our mistakes, and determination to get on with correcting the deficiency.

Four, the treaty is a compromise. It is far from ideal. We would have preferred it different in many ways. We were not able to bring it off. The compromise being the least unattractive of two

poor alternatives, of course, many are unenthused with the results, I among them. The alternative of having no ceiling at all considering our position at this point in the so-called race, I find totally unacceptable, because I know how difficult it is to design and build such systems, and how very long it takes to bring them into service.

From a technical point of view, I find the details on verification acceptable. Granted, marginally acceptable, but considering the state of the art, acceptable under the circumstances.

The potential for cheating is present everywhere. It is certainly not unique to this treaty. If one is determined to cheat, it must be expected. We, too, must be prepared for it to happen. Considering Ambassador Luce's assertion that the Soviet record is virtually unblemished when it comes to abrogations at times convenient to them, our preparations and sensors in my view will provide such evidence in time.

The better question seems to me to be, are we quite ready to blow the whistle on them when the evidence comes to hand? To make this action effective, we must be strong enough to oblige compliance.

Five, the treaty was under negotiation for so long and under so many negotiators of varying persuasion, party, background, and like differences, I find it quite remarkable we did as well as we did, recognizing that each one in the turbulence of personnel turnover felt undoubtedly compelled to leave his or her bit of body English in the language of some particular part.

Six, considering the allegation, and I quote—it has been so often said—"we were not tough enough and could have gotten more had we been," I regrettably find it necessary to reject this argument as an absolute truth because I fear the real reason was that we were not strong enough. There is indeed a vast difference.

It is pointless to sit down at a high stakes poker table when everybody at the table knows you don't have any money. The Soviets have been busy building rapidly for many years. We have not. They had more that they could negotiate with than we did. Over the many years of negotiation, I have watched negotiators take pride in winning a point, but it costs something every time. We seemed simply to run out of things to give up to get what we wanted, so we ended up being dictated to in a way rather than being strong enough to dictate the terms as we would have preferred. A new and somewhat mortifying position for us. We must therefore get down to business and reverse this unsatisfactory trend.

Seven, considering the option of rejecting the treaty, it has been asserted that this would confound the Soviets and draw greater respect, followed by their asking to reopen negotiations because they have more need for the treaty than we. Now, this may be so, but this entire philosophy is based upon the evaluation of Soviet intentions that, and I quote from one of the opposers to the treaty, "I think the probability is that the Soviet defense program, and particularly that portion of it dealing with strategic nuclear weapons, will be about the same whether SALT II is ratified or not." This from one of the principal objectors to the treaty in its present form.

Now, gentlemen, I have been educated and trained for over 40 years to deal with capabilities and limitations vice intentions, because intentions could change minute by minute, and probably will. For myself, I do not find the Soviet track record of consistency in following stated intentions, implied intentions, or assumed intentions as in this case, to be reassuring to the degree needed on which to base a national decision of this magnitude.

We must keep reminding ourselves that they are ahead. We allowed them to get there, as we blissfully slid down the bannister of strength from superiority to equivalence to rough equivalence. We have a treaty offering a ceiling at the so-called equivalence level. If we reject it, so be it, but heaven forbid we be so naive as to assume when we start building up to redress the imbalance that they will be accommodating good chaps and allow this to occur with, and I quote from the objectors, about the same building rate as today.

No way, gentlemen, to borrow from the vernacular of the young.

Eight, the cost of the treaty is viewed by some as staggering. The term "arms race" is often heard referring, for example, to the numbers of new warheads needed to reach our limit. A race to me carries the traditional connotation of somewhere near an even start. This then is a new use of the term "race" when we use it to describe the effort needed to catch up. We seem to lose sight of the fact that with the treaty there is an end in sight; without it, there is none clearly evident.

Gentlemen, the costs to reacquire this so-called level of rough equivalence will be the bargain of the history of the world if that is what is needed to deter nuclear war, nay, any war, for that matter. There was a time when it took roughly two generations to pay for a war. Now, with our more sophisticated methods for destruction, historians of economic matters report that we have yet to pay one thin dime on the principal of the costs of World War II and onward, a tidy bill of some $1,076.6 billion owed by you and me as taxpayers. The bill for the next one if nuclear fought promises to be quite a number indeed. It is thus rather clear those responsible for paying the premiums of prevention on our national insurance policies of the day in years gone by did not do so well. I have hopes our record will be more realistic, persuasive, and underwritten by unmistakable tangible evidence of national resolve.

Finally, gentlemen, a plea to you to better help the American people understand what this subject of SALT is all about. My six children, their husbands and wives, living from one end of the country to the other, have called and told me they are quite confused. To listen to learned men of substance pillory each other, call each other liars, in a nice way, off course, has created an atmosphere of wonderment as to whom to believe.

This is not good. Public confidence must be restored in those of us who are and have been public servants. The Nation needs and has every right to expect this confidence. Your efforts here are therefore terribly important and appreciated.

As a retired public servant with no party, with three sons who served in uniform and a father killed in World War II who never voted—it was considered improper in those days—I am uneasy over the undercurrents of partisanship surging and rolling on the

beaches. From my vantage point over the last many years, there is an abundance of blame to spread about on just how we managed to slide this far. No one man, no one party, no one administration could possibly have done it alone. In retrospect, it was indeed an all hands effort. It is too late for acrimony. It is too late for recriminations. I must respectfully urge that we take Chairman Vinson's advice in years gone by and acknowledge the ox is in the ditch, and muster all hands to get it out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much.

General Dougherty?

STATEMENT OF GEN. RUSSELL DOUGHERTY (USAF, RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, ARLINGTON, VA.

General DOUGHERTY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am honored to be in this company and honored to be invited to participate with you in your deliberations.

You asked me to comment on the military significance of SALT II. I, of course, underline the word "military," because that is my perspective.

Military significance, to me, is very great, not only in SALT II, but in the overall SALT process. There is moral and practical significance because in this process is the only reasonable way I see that we can reduce the burden of maintaining a very consequential strategic nuclear force, or other kinds of force; to maintain, as a minimum, some sort of aggregate balance with the Soviet Union.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE TRANSCENDED BY MORAL SIGNIFICANCE TO HUMANITY

You did not ask me this question, but I find in the process that military significance is transcended by the moral significance to humanity because it is the only reasonable way in which the horrors of full-scale nuclear war can be ameliorated.

It also has great significance to me from a military and political sense, if I can go into that area, in that it is taken by so many to be the end. The Chiefs use the word "tranquilizer." I remember use of the word "euphoria." They both apply.

Notwithstanding what you have heard and the debate into which people are placed because of the nature of a debate—and I wish we could get away with that word—I know of no senior military colleague, active duty or retired, who does not support our Nation's objective to achieve mutual and balanced reductions and limitations in both strategic and general purpose weapons if it can be done without increasing the risk to the security of the United States.

WITHOUT INCREASING THE RISK TO THE UNITED STATES

I would like to underline the term "without increasing the risk to the United States" because I think it is in this single phrase that the debate occurs, because that is a subjective thing.

It dawned on me in my mature period of military service of 39 years that it was not my job to determine the risk that the United States was willing to accept. It was the job of the administration and the job of the Congress. I don't think that has dawned on many people.

So, the solemnity of what you are doing and the consequence of what the President has done in signing the agreements represents, in my judgment, the voice of the people in assuming the risk, whatever that risk may be.

So, in an attempt to try to judge the risk and to advise you in this respectful and weighty job that you are doing today, I have tried, without any influences, without any pressure, and without any constituency; and without any responsibility, except to myself, to weigh these things. I recognize that, in doing that, I will create the animosity of some who have tried to typeset me, because, as the Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command, as the Director of Strategic Nuclear Target Planning, I recognize that there are many who do typeset me and my successors and my predecessors.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we in politics have that same problem.

General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir. I know you do.

My constituency, however, does not have to be recounted from time to time to restore my faith. [General laughter.]

In making this judgment, I have come to the conclusion that this agreement is far better for the United States than no agreement. Hopefully, in the deliberations that you will come to, the Senate will agree.

We do not have any requirement at all to have any military forces other than those for internal security or to prevent the interference with our legitimate national objectives throughout the world. Our requirement for maintaining peacetime military forces came about in my lifetime, in post World War II, when we recognized the emergence of an overly large standing military force on the part of the Soviet Union that had no legitimate defensive reason for its size or being in the areas of what had been non-Soviet Europe.

That has continued. It has grown. It has gone from its consequential, conventional character into an equally consequential and more modern conventional and nuclear character. That is the requirement for our forces. If we can reduce that requirement through negotiation, we can easily reduce our requirement to maintain this continuous burden of armament that history and circumstance has placed on us; and that Churchill telegraphed was upon us in his speech at Fulton, Mo., in 1947.

So, I cheer this whole process of arms control and I commend the step that has been made in SALT II toward that end. It is not satisfactory. It is not based on trust. It is not based on any sort of hope that we can totally and absolutely verify. I think the word "absolute" has crept into adequate verification, which I think we can do.

I think the term "arms race," Senator Church, very, very inaptly describes this serious dilemma that we have in trying to provide that protection and to counter that threat.

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UNITED STATES SECOND TO NONE

Three presidents, to my knowledge, have used the phrase "Second to none" in describing what they were going to do; they were going to maintain a force that was second to none. This pricked up my ears because, at the time it was first used by a President, I was the Commander of the Second Air Force and the motto of that Air Force was "second to none."

In fact, President Ford even called once and asked General Jones if I minded if he used that motto in a speech that evening, and I cheered him on. The reason I did is because I think it satisfies all of the legitimate security concerns of this virile country. But it does not require any specific-size force. It only requires that it not be second; and, if we can scale down through peaceful processes of negotiation the consequences of any inimical force against which we must maintain standing peacetime forces, and progressively scale it down, we can always satisfy that legitimate requirement of being second to none.

President Nixon said it, President Ford said it, and President Carter said it in the courtyard of the Pentagon. I cheer it.

In my opinion, the SALT II agreements, on balance, are more in the security interests of us and our allies than would our security be without those agreements. I fully respect the judgments of my colleagues who have testified here that we should have gotten a better deal and that we could have gotten a better deal. I don't know whether they are right or wrong, but I know that this is the deal that we've got and I think it is better than no deal.

Of course, this does not achieve the overall objective of the SALT process. That objective, as we have interpreted it, is first, to establish an equality, and from that equality we can begin balanced, phased reductions. That was the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff years ago, when I worked those matters as the Air Force Operations Deputy. We wanted equal aggregates with the freedom to mix.

This establishes, as a principle, an equal aggregate. That is good. The aggregate is too high, some would say, but this is the way the negotiation has gone.

Now, having established an equal aggregate, we can begin to go about the long-term process of reducing weapons, if the other side agrees. We should—we must—do this in a way that does not increase our risk.

I have also attached great significance to the press reports that the Commander in Chief, the President, has said that, with or without ratification of these treaties, he will comply with the basic agreements that he has signed. I find that very important.

I cannot imagine any meaningful military program proceeding to development, procurement, and deployment in today's environment without the support of the Commander in Chief.

Thus, the treaty status withheld or accorded is not so much a point for me as to what we can do under the terms of the agreement and what determination we can muster to do it; to achieve that equality which will then give us an opportunity safely to go about reductions.

As I look at the agreement, I think the options are there, if we elect to use them, to have a series of modernization programs that will reverse the downward trend of our relative force balance with the Soviets, and not just in strategic nuclear forces and theater nuclear forces, but in what Admiral Gayler properly called that great array of general purpose forces that, as he says, are far more likely to be used or engaged. They are the most likely to be used—not the strategic forces. The strategic forces are the least likely to be used, but only if we do our job properly. Strategic forces are, however, the focus of this discussion, and I do not find that there is anything that we are precluded from doing if we will just do it.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE

To me, the discussion of intelligence has been overdrawn in the public eye. I am very sensitive to the critical use, the difficulty, and the demanding task on our technology, and I am very sensitive to the fragility of our intelligence. I think we have already had too much public discussion on this.

My bottom line on that would be that I think we can adequately verify major deviations in the terms of this accord on the part of the Soviets.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF SALT II

I find considerable military significance in these agreements in that they will permit us better to size the threat. I think that is very important. The numbers that have been agreed—and, for the first time, the use of their numbers and not just numbers that we assess as their numbers—will permit us to size the threat. As Admiral Kidd says, they will give us time to build and get into a better negotiating position in subsequent negotiations. It will give us the time to understand the consequence of the threat. The visibility of this hearing will give the U.S. populace a much better and deeper appreciation of what it is that we are about, what we must do, and why we are doing it. It will give us the time to build an essential consensus for action to develop, produce, deploy to operational units and train—something that is almost forgotten in the halls of Washington. These are all the things that are important to operational commanders, and three of the four U.S. nuclear force commanders during my time are sitting here at this table.

Arthur Hadley wrote in the Washington Star just the other day the following. He said, "I am in this car heading for a 4:30 in the morning station time for a B–52 flight because I am always suspicious of Washington debates." He said, "They are so often about things that do not exist out there."

Well, those of us who follow these hearings and these matters listen to discussions of things such as 3,000 air-launched cruise missiles, ALCM carriers, M–X missiles, C–4 missiles, none of which exist today and most of which will not exist at the time this treaty expires. We have to remind ourselves of the years and years it takes for these developments to become actual operational weapons. Unfortunately, the Soviets have expended many of those years; and, in some important respects, we are at the threshold of needed expenditures of effort, time, and training, to get into a balanced position.

We talk about our more advanced economy, more advanced technology, more wholesome democratic political system. We have all of the trappings of an advanced society, and I appreciate that as much as any person on either side of this table. But timely use of all of those advantages is very essential if we expect them to protect us under an immediate military threat which may not become active—but which may.

I know the arguments of those who would have us go to a single mode of deterrence. I know the arguments of those who find that our nuclear weapons are excessive not usable; that only other weapons are usable, and that we can get by on the cheap. They may be right. But, if they are wrong, are left in an absolutely intolerable position to protect our Nation, control escalation, to defend ourselves, to maintain the confidence and commitment of our allies, and this I find is the thing least understood as I have traveled around the United States and talked with our people.

PROTOCOL TO TREATY

I have a specific concern which I would like to voice, and that centers around the protocol. I have listened to the discussions and heard some of the testimony. I think the agreed termination date of the protocol is critical. I think we need and must have the uninhibited freedom to test and deploy the M-X. Then we can offset some of the Soviet's megatonnage advantage, and begin to take advantage of the fractionation that our negotiators were able to achieve. Then we will be able seriously to address whatever perceived or real impact those large missiles, which I decry, will have on future force balance.

I do not like to see the Backfire not included, but I think we can handle that; if we just will.

The potential precedent from this protocol could result in an extension, or drift, into a positive opposition to the things that, in my judgment, I think we must have in order to get to the equality point from which we can start to balance reductions.

I think it is a danger point and I flag it.

SUPPORT FOR JCS TESTIMONY

I would urge the committee again to read the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they appeared before you. I think the statement is brave, accurate, and forthright and I associate myself with it, in toto.

I agree with their summary evaluation. SALT II agreements are a modest, but useful, step. Independently I arrived at the same bottom line that they did when they said that the danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitation in the agreement, but from the potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past and, if we are not careful, in the future, and our ability to take the necessary programmatic action to insure essential equivalence. That is the ultimate test.

I have heard most of my military associates in Europe say that the concern they have in looking at us is the lack of programmatic actions; and they question how can we think about going into the

very complex and difficult SALT III negotiations with such a dearth of meaningful programmatic action.

The SALT II agreements that we made with the Soviets are the focal point for this discussion, but I think the agreements we make with each other are the test of whether our security is going to be endangered or whether the risks that we take are acceptable. I would urge the Senate, the Congress, the administration, and all of us who deal with these things—not out there, but here in Washington—not to attempt to be too precise in our weapons calculations, not to be too clever in our proceedings, not too dependent on critical assumptions, because things may not happen that way. As a military commander, planner, or crew member, the thing that I have found most useful in all the circumstances that we have had to face over my 39 years is to have military flexibility—flexibility to be able to handle the things that do not occur in the way in which we predicted they would. This is because, there is one sure thing in all of this: Things will not happen exactly like we think they will happen, and we'll need all the margin we can get.

Thank you.

[General Dougherty's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY (USAF, RET.)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: By your letter of 5 July 1979, you have invited me to testify before your committee on 17 July 1979, and have solicited my views on (a) "the military significance of the SALT II agreements" and (b) my "assessment of whether the SALT II agreements enhance or diminish our national security." Additionally, you have indicated that you would welcome my thoughts on (c) "specific strengths and deficiencies of the SALT II agreements" and (d) "what actions I would recommend to address any of the deficiencies" that I identify in the agreements. I, of course, am honored by your invitation and pleased to respond to your questions. My comments will be in the limited context of a retired officer and from the perspective of a former strategic force commander, military planner and international staff officer in Allied Command Europe.

There is *great military significance*—for us and our Allies—in the overall strategic arms limitation process and in our hopes and expectations for the results of that process. For, in the final analysis, the success that can be achieved in mutual, balanced reductions and limitations in strategic weaponry (or, for that matter, any other type of military strength) offers the only reasonable way in which we can *reduce the burden* of maintaining: (a) as a *minimum*, an *aggregate* relative balance with the conventional and strategic military strengths of the Soviet Union (and, with three tours in Europe, I find both strengths absolutely related), or (b) as an *optimum* U.S. and Allied posture, an *actual* balance in every aspect of Soviet military strength. And, of even more significance, success in this process offers humanity the only reasonable way in which the horrors of full scale nuclear conflict can be ameliorated.

I know of no senior military colleague—active or retired—who does not support our nation's efforts to achieve mutual, balanced reductions and limitations in both strategic and general purpose forces and weaponry, if such can be achieved *without increasing the risk to our security* and that of our Allies.

As I understand the basic objectives of our nation, they are not premised on any requirement to maintain military forces for conquest or agggression.

The required peacetime forces and posture flowing from our own national objectives is minimal—only that required to maintain internal order and to preclude any external interference with our nation's peaceful pursuit of its legitimate national objectives thus, our nation has no inherent national requirement for standing military forces to deter or counter consequential external military threats to our security and our national objectives in the absence of such threats.

The post-world War II emergence of a requirement for consequential US standing forces, nuclear and conventional, did not result from any aggressive intent of our nation, but from a recognition that such a threat existed.

The inimical political creed of the Soviet Union and its aggressive spread, coupled with the maintenance of a gross excess of Soviet military strengths—initially con-

ventional, but now both conventional and nuclear—well in excess of any reasonable requirement for their own defense, and fully integrated into their overall objectives.

Given this basic rationale for the increasingly serious situation in which we and our Allies find ourselves, I am unable to accept or understand the use of misleading phrases, such as "arms race" to describe the dilemma we face in maintaining relevant strengths to deter or counter these Soviet forces. In the face of our inability to achieve a more equitable agreement that will suit everyone and make our job less complex and demanding, I think we should set aside if the SALT II agreements enhance our security and make our job a bit easier—or diminishes our security and increases the burden on our nation. I have tried my best to do just this—without the pressures of any external influences other than those inherent in my military experiences over the past forty years.

In my opinion the SALT II agreements, as they have been negotiated and signed by the President are, on balance, more in our security interests and those of our Allies than no agreements. They establish the principle of equal limits--this is basic to me, and I well remember the years of earlier work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in the 1960's and early 1970's) when all were agreed that "equal aggregates of strategic forces with freedom to mix" was fundamental to an equal starting point in the arms limitation process. From such a starting point, it would be possible to proceed to "balanced" reductions; assuming, of course, that we maintained such strength that we had a meaningful negotiating stance.

Obivously, the SALT II agreements have not really achieved the general objective we all have for the overall process; these agreements are not (in the short term, at least) going to reduce the requirement for the essential modernization of our strategic forces, nor for building in diversity and flexibility (a tired, overused, but very important word to describe what is so very important to a military planner) in the capability of our strategic forces and in our theater nuclear forces. I do not like the exclusion of the Soviet's Backfire bombers; I do not like to see them permitted to continue the deployment of modern, large ballistic missiles; I cannot even disagree with my respected colleagues who are confident that we could (or might) have negotiated a better agreement—they may be right, but we didn't negotiate a better one, we negoitated this one. I hope it is not the last one we negotiate, and I hope and urge the Senate to help us be in a better, stronger position for the next negotiating round—certainly in our strategic nuclear forces; but, importantly, also stronger, more modern and relevant in our theater nuclear forces and our interrelated general purpose forces.

It has been of great significance in my review of this SALT II agreement to learn through two press reports that the Commander-in-Chief, The President, has said that he would do all he could to comply with the basic agreements he has signed, even if the Senate fails to ratify these agreements as a treaty. If these reports are accurate, this is an important point, for those of us in the military planning and programming process know that the actions of the Commander-in-Cheif are critical to the military development and deployment process. I cannot imagine a meaningful military program proceeding through development, procurement and deployment in today's environment without the support and approval of the Commander-in-Chief. This was brought home to me very forcefully by the Senate's amendment and the President's action on the B-1 procurement legislation while I was serving at CINCSAC. Thus, the treaty status accorded or withheld on these SALT II agreements may be less of a consideration than an assessment of what we can do under the terms of the agreements, as signed. I have made such a personal assessment of the SALT II agreements and conclude that we have the options, if we elect to use them, to have a series of modernization programs that will reverse the downward trends of our relative force balance with the Soviets—and greatly improve the position of the United States in subsequent negotiations.

I am well aware of the problems of verification of the provisions of the SALT II agreements; these problems for our intelligence community and our sensor systems are certainly made no more difficult by the agreements. Fortunately, I do not think anyone approaches this as a matter of "trusting the Russians"—I find that irrelevant. Insofar as the issue of "cheating" is concerned, I suppose they could if they chose to do so. But, if we adhere to a continuing, aggressive modernization program for our intelligence community and take all reasonably available opportunities inherent in our various intelligence capabilities, we should be able to detect meaningful "cheating" by the Soviets. The test will come in deciding what to do about it once it is discovered. In my view we must not let any variation in practice go unchallenged. At best, adequate intelligence on Soviet activities is a very difficult, demanding and *fragile* thing. I think we will do ourselves a great disservice if we

discuss the issue of verification too much, too publicly. In my judgment, we have already done too much of this.

In my analysis of the Agreements I find considerable military significance in the utility they will have in helping us "size the threat" posed by the Soviet's intercontinental nuclear forces in some important measures—agreed warhead limits is an illustration; numbers, of course, is another. Also, it could operate to buy us some critically needed time to get our own programs up on schedule. In the mid-1960's it was difficult (or impossible) for many of our key decision makers to accept the early indications of a major Soviet thrust to equal or surpass us in many measures of strategic weapons capability. It is still difficult for some to accept and assimilate the significance of the momentum and consequence of the Soviet military programs and deployments. Accurate, unobscured highlighting of the facts of this buildup throughout the Senate's hearings will be belated but useful revelation for our nation; and, at last, we are dealing with their numbers now—not just our assigned numbers. It should be easier for all of us to understand and size the task that is before us.

I mentioned the element of time—time to understand to decide, to build a consensus for action, to develop, to produce, to deploy, to train . . . all the things that are so important to the operational commanders. On 1 July, writing in the Washington Star, Arthur T. Hadley explained why he was visiting one of our operational commands and, as he wrote, "I am in this car, heading for this (4:30 a.m.) B-52 flight because I am always suspicious of Washington debates. They are so often about things that do not exist 'out there'." How true. We who have followed this hearing have been exposed to figures such as 3,000 Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), ALCM carriers, M-X missiles, etc . . . none of which exist today—some of which will not exist in operational units when the SALT II agreements are scheduled to expire. It is useful to remind ourselves that it takes years and years for these developments to become actual operational weapons in the hands of trained operational units "out there". It is only then that they figure realistically in the deterrent equation; and, unfortunately, most of the weapons figures we are discussing for the Soviets are years ahead of ours in becoming operational weapons systems.

I appreciate fully the national pride, the accuracy, the optimism of the repeated references I hear to the effect that military strength is the only area in which the Soviet Union seriously challenges us—that we have a far stronger economy, a more advanced technology, a more wholesome and democratic political system; that we far excell them in all the other trappings of an advanced society. All of this misses a very fundamental point: we must make *timely* use of these strengths if we expect them to protect us under immediate military threat, coercion or attack. We have these societal advantages, true; but if we fail to use them wisely and in good time, the potential advantages could be made meaningless by a very real, very operational, and very massive arsenal in being and in the hands of the Soviets.

One specific concern should be highlighted—and that refers to the Protocol to the SALT II Agreements and its present termination date of 31 December 1981. I think that termination date is critical for I am of the opinion that we must have uninhibited freedom to test and deploy the M-X—it is vital to our deterrent strength and to the future of the SALT progress. Also, we need to have the flexibility in deployment of sea and land-based cruise misssles, with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers, as soon as they are ready to deploy. We have some very important but antiquated theater nuclear forces that must be modernized; we have a capability in cruise missiles that, while still potential, is so important that we should not inhibit and hazard our flexibility in deployment and range beyond the date we expect to be ready to deploy it in multiple modes. In any event, the potential precedent that could result from any extension or drift in the positive termination of this Protocol would be seriously damaging. It's a danger point.

I would urge this Committee to again read the statement of the JCS on 11 July when they appeared before you; observing their careful analysis and rereading the reservations and concerns they expressed. This so-called SALT II "debate" (and I wish we could rid this town and this nation of that designation!) is having a divisive, corrosive effect on many of us in the senior officer ranks, active and retired. The JCS are not above this vicious schism among us with military backgrounds; nor, I suppose are Senators of the United States. If I am correct, this schism is the result of varied degrees of frustrating experiences in attempting to reconcile prudent military concerns for the security needs of our nation with the understandable yearning of our people and our political leaders to be free of the fear of nuclear war and of the consequential burdens of armament and readiness.

I think the statement of the JCS, through General Jones, the Chairman, is a brave statement, an accurate statement, a forthright statement and I associate

myself with it, without reservation. I agree with their summary evaluation of the SALT II agreements as a "modest but useful step . . ." I would hope that more and more of my military colleagues who have now had time to reflect on the SALT II issues, options and alternatives—and who will and can break out of the "type boxes" into which they are placed by circumstance, association, or pressures will be persuaded of the correctness of the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Independently, I have arrived at a "bottom line" not unlike that taken by the JCS when they advised you that: ". . . the danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitations to the Agreement, but from potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past—and, if we are not careful—in the future . . . *our ability to take the necessary programmatic actions* to ensure essentail equivalence is the ultimate test for SALT II . . . our options and flexibility are adequate, so long as we choose to *exercise them.*" (Italics mine.)

From my analysis, the SALT II agreements we have made with the Soviets are the focal point for the discussion, but *the agreements we make with each other* to rebuild our sagging strategic and theater nuclear forces are the real test for our future. These internal agreements are at the core of the controversy and will determine the danger and increased risk we will face throughout the life of SALT II. Our deterrence must not fail—the uncertainties of failure are too great to chance it. I would urge the Senate—the Congress, and the Administration—not to attempt to be too precise in their calculations, too clever in their proceedings, too dependent on critical assumptions. We must rapidly reverse the downward trend of our force capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviet Union—in our Strategic intercontinental forces. Things may not happen in the way we assume they will and our military must have more flexibility than that precisely calculated in some sterile, remote analysis. If we err, it must be on the high side—on the side of strength, not imbalance and weakness; the stages are too great, the possibility of error too high.

Some say we need only a single mode strategic deterrent force, and that this force and our related theater nuclear forces do not require a war-fighting capability; they assert that a war-fighting capability is passe, irrelevant, outdated. They may be right—*but they may be wrong!* If they *are*, we will be left in an inflexible, inadequate, intolerable position from which we cannot hope to assure our allies, control escalation, defend our nation, or deny an enemy the fruits of his agression.

Respectfully, I urge you and the Administration to take advantage of the time we have—while we have it.

Thank you—and I will do my best to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Dougherty, for an excellent statement.

CONGRESSIONAL/EXECUTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS

I would like to commence my questioning by picking up on a theme that you developed at the very conclusion of your statement in which you said that it may be more important what understandings we have with each other looking to the future.

One formalized way for achieving an understanding between the legislative branch and the executive branch is by attaching that understanding to the instrument by which the Senate consents to the treaty. I have sensed from the questions at this table during the past week and a half that there is a kind of emerging consensus about some understandings that could be formally reached between Congress and the executive branch. One of those would be an understanding that the SALT II Treaty, which expires by its terms on December 31, 1985, and the protocol to the treaty, which expires by its terms on December 31, 1981, may not be extended, formally or informally, with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. In other words, we would have an understanding between us that the expiration dates will, in fact, take effect, unless the Senate were to consent otherwise.

I take it that you gentlemen would approve of such an understanding between the two branches of the Government?

Admiral KIDD. Yes.

General DOUGHERTY. May I respond?

The CHAIRMAN. Please do, General.

General DOUGHERTY. I would approve of the thrust of what you are saying. But if asked—and now, for the first time, you have asked me—I would not approve of extending the protocol in its present terminology one day beyond 1981, period.

I think it needs to be renegotiated. I think some of the things in the protocol were transient in nature. They were a compromise and a recognized compromise to try to accommodate some very difficult issues that could not be worked into the treaty. So, I think the protocol itself should die and then it should be thrown into the renegotiating process. I certainly would agree with what you said about not extending it.

I feel the treaty is the same way. It is a transient thing. If we find great economical, reasonable, and very advantageous ways to protect the security of the United States without vast expenditures, I do not think we need fall into the trap of things that have been created by SALT I and SALT II as we go into SALT III.

With that reservation, I agree with the thrust of what you say.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kidd, your argument, it seems to me, concerning the SALT Treaty is that if the United States is to establish its strategic parity or equivalence with the Soviet Union looking to the future, it will be easier for us to undertake the necessary actions if there is some kind of lid on the Soviet Union, the lid which this treaty establishes. And, if there is no such lid, then the amount of effort and money that we might have to spend could be much greater and the challenge to our political will to spend that much would be greater as well.

Isn't that the essential argument that you make?

Admiral KIDD. Exactly, Mr. Chairman.

I used to be a professional prizefighter before I came into the Navy, Mr. Chairman. I always liked to know beforehand how many rounds there were going to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, how many rounds. I think that is a very good question to ask before you get into the ring. You should size up your opponent and ask how many rounds there will be.

When you consider the other impositions, the energy crisis and the amount of money we are going to have to spend to eliminate our present vulnerability on that front and the other spending requirements that we face in the next few years, it seems to me that these limits take on added significance.

Admiral Gayler, before my time is up, I would like to ask you a question on which you touched upon in your statement.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET SALT II CONCESSIONS

You stated that the Soviet Union made four major and seven more or less important concessions in the SALT II Treaty which worked to the American advantage, while the United States made

two or three concessions that may have worked to the Soviet advantage. Can you list those for us?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes.

The concession by the Soviets that they would not count the U.S. forward-based systems was balanced by the omission of Backfire. That is one major one on each side.

The no limitations on air-launched missile range was a considerable concession. The nontransfer clause, which the Soviets wanted very badly, was another. They acceded to our position. Also, the fact that there is no limitation on ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missile testing is another. All of those I believe are major concessions favoring the United States; to the 308 SS-18, about which we have heard, the Backfire, which I have already mentioned, and the protocol limits on the sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles which, of course, expire in 1981, and therefore have no practical effect. Those are the things to which I was referring.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I think it is valuable to have those listed for the record.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Kidd, I notice that your last command was the NATO command in Europe. In fact, you are wearing the NATO necktie now.

NATO REACTION TO SALT TREATY

I had some opportunity to talk with various NATO officials in my role as chairman of the Senate Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, both last November and in the spring meeting in May. My reaction was that the NATO countries, in broad measure, almost without exception, though with some exceptions, really wanted us to move ahead on SALT II. We have been exposed to a series of witnesses who have said that they were not genuine in this regard, that they were pushed into it by this administration and that privately they did not want us to go ahead with SALT II.

The people whom I saw, whether it be noon or midnight always seemed to have the same view—that we should go ahead with SALT II.

Admiral Kidd, what was your reaction from amongst your fellow NATO commanders when you were over there?

Admiral KIDD. It was the same as yours, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

I think that this myth is being spread, particularly with the television medium, that the NATO countries do not really want SALT II. It is really a complete canard and should be dispelled.

I would like to ask Admiral Gayler a question in connection with verification.

VERIFICATION

I understand that you handled yourself very well in a debate a few days ago and touched on verification there. I missed that debate. But I was wondering whether you would explain whether you consider this treaty adequate from the viewpoint of verification. Would you comment on that, please?

Admiral GAYLER. I think that the prospect of absolute verification—that is, where every single missile is, where every aircraft is, the movement of every commander and so forth—is, of course, an impossible goal. But the verification necessary to make sure that we are not surprised to our detriment by any significant change in the strategic balance I think we can do with our own means, even now, and will be able to do in increasing measure as the various programs to fill up our temporary gaps mature.

But I think there is an even more important point to be made about verification and that is this. Clearly, verification is going to be better with SALT than without SALT—not only verification of things which are covered by the SALT Treaty, but that whole variety of things having to do with Soviet military developments which are not covered in the SALT Treaty but which we still need to follow. In fact, we may need to follow them more than things which are covered. The verification of these, too, will be facilitated by the treaty.

Senator PELL. Would it not be a correct statement that without SALT II there would be no such thing as verification because there would be no norms to which they would have to adhere?

Admiral GAYLER. There would be no verification of the treaty and we would be more handicapped in our normal intelligence.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

WAR GAME SCENARIO

General Dougherty, we often hear the scenario that the Soviets might knock out our ICBM's with a first strike and then inform our President that their big SS–18's are targeted on our cities, and that they will fire unless the SLBM's and bombers are withheld.

With your detailed knowledge of the single integrated operating plan [SIOP] and the way a retaliatory strike would be ordered, does this appear feasible? What do you see as the problems with such a scenario?

General DOUGHERTY. I see problems with any scenario, Senator Pell, because it may not happen that way.

Certainly they may have the capability of doing that, or will have.

I don't know how they might choose to use it.

As to what our force could do, I think I can speak with some dated authority, We have always tried to maintain the capability to detect such an attack. We maintain the capability to launch from under such an attack, if that is the decision. Whether that would be the decision or not I cannot even offer conjecture.

What the President would want to be the target of our response attack, I don't know. But, as you know, we have to do some extensive preplanning in order to have a meaningful deterrent posture. We have some flexibility in that posture. We maintain that flexibility to respond to the President's decisions. Whether or not the Soviets would do this, I don't know; but that Soviet planner would have a real job of convincing the Presidium that they could pull this off and get away scott free with that sort of attack.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

DESTRUCTION OF SOVIET URBAN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

With your knowledge of the single integrated operating plan—and I realize that these are "Dr. Strangelove" questions and maybe too extreme—what percentage of the Soviet urban industrial complex could be destroyed by the remaining two legs of the Triad if our ICBM's were destroyed?

General DOUGHERTY. I would have to submit the details of my answer for the record. I do not know about that with precision. My knowledge is dated. A consequential portion for sure—whether it would be unacceptable to the Soviets is conjecture. Whether it would be something that the Soviets would have calculated, and made unusual attempts to increase defenses, or to evacuate and reduce urban population, or to take unusual measures to harden and protect their critical industries—they could do all of these things to a degree. I think you would have to have a more precise scenario before one could give you a precise answer. But I will try to provide for the record a better answer. If it need be classified, I will provide it in that way.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET URBAN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX THAT COULD BE DESTROYED BY REMAINING TWO LEGS OF TRIAD IF ICBM'S WERE DESTROYED

(Supplied by: General Russell Dougherty)

" * * * even with the loss of our ICBMs we would have high confidence that we could attain the required damage on our highest priority objectives—those commonly referred to as the assured destruction category. The same principle would apply not only to the loss of our ICBMs but to the loss of any single leg of the Triad. However, it is important to realize that this could diminish our capability to attack other elements of a vast and diversified target system especially from a day-to-day posture. The total loss of any Triad leg would severely reduce the level of confidence in our attack on other objectives and restrict our ability to support the broad national objectives of escalation control and flexible response. Given the extreme scenario you have described, where the Soviets attacked and destroyed our ICBMs, the National Command Authorities' flexibility of choice for the targets of our retaliatory response is critical. Knowing that our only viable recourse remaining was that of assured destruction—inviting response in kind—if our force posture were so inadequate that the President were left in the position where our only feasible recourse was one of urban-industrial destruction—inviting a potentially devastating response by the Soviets—we could be self-deterred from any retaliatory action. I would hope and pray that we never get ourselves so force limited. We must not allow ourselves to be boxed into that unpalatable choice."

INDICATIONS OF PLANNED SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK

Senator PELL. As Commander in Chief of SAC, did you feel confident that you would have some strategic indication if the Soviets planned to launch a nuclear attack?

General DOUGHERTY. If I may qualify, the word confidence—I had a reasonable confidence that we would have some strategic indication. But I could not be absolutely confident.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator McGovern is next.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

Admiral Gayler, I was delighted to hear your statement before I had to leave for a few moments. I have read what Admiral Kidd and General Dougherty have said. I am impressed with the wisdom and the high intelligence and commonsense in all of these statements. I may not agree at every point, but I am very much impressed with the manner in which you have approached these military and security issues.

U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM

Admiral Gayler, if I understood you correctly, you said that the strategic part of our defense system with which this treaty is concerned in your judgment is the least important part of our national defense. Did I understand you correctly?

Admiral GAYLER. Senator McGovern, the problem starts because we have murdered the language. "Strategic" does not mean "strategic nuclear weapons." "Strategic" is an adjective when talking about a particular kind of nuclear weapons. My concern is with the total strategic position of the United States.

I feel very strongly that, since we are the only country in the world that combines great power and freedom—there are free countries and there are powerful countries, and we are the only one that is both—we have a very special responsibility I think that others—and they volunteer this to us—are concerned that we exercise that responsibility.

The forces that I think of the military component that are really important are the ability to hold ground, the ability to keep open the sealanes and airlanes, the heavy transport and the sea transport, and the ability to make sure that we do not get behind in surveillance from space and in intelligence. Those sorts of things are important.

Senator MCGOVERN. So, you are really talking about the nonnuclear parts of our system.

Admiral GAYLER. I am talking entirely about the nonnuclear parts.

Senator MCGOVERN. So, when you say "strategic," you are saying that the nuclear weapons are the least important part of this total.

Admiral GAYLER. Yes—of the total strategic picture.

WORLD PERCEPTION OF U.S. WEAKNESS

Senator MCGOVERN. The reason I asked you that is this.

This morning, the witnesses, as I understood them, were arguing that the perception of the United States is that it is weak because of what happened in Vietnam, Iran, and various other trouble spots around the world.

In your judgment, to whatever extent those incidents or those events were setbacks for the United States, do you think they were caused basically by a nuclear imbalance or any perceived nuclear imbalance? Did that have anything to do with the collapse of the Shah or our difficulties in Vietnam?

Admiral GAYLER. No, sir. The thrust of my testimony is entirely the reverse. It is my belief—actually, my world belief, if you will—

that under this rough strategic balance which dissuades either side from moving toward nuclear weapons, thank goodness, is where all the action takes place.

I do not agree with the view that Cuba came our way because we had a preponderance of strategic nuclear weapons. In point of fact, it came our way because it is 90 miles off our coast, it was in our sea and air backyard, and we had our way because under the strategic nuclear balance we had the horses.

If you contrast that with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, there we had a considerable nuclear predominance and it did not do us any good. The military action was in the Soviet backyard and all we could do, essentially, was to wring our hands about it.

That is my perception of the situation in the world. The power that counts is the visible, usable, appropriate power down to, maybe, very low levels of violence.

Senator McGOVERN. I would like to ask General Dougherty and also Admiral Kidd if they wish to comment on this.

U.S. INFERIORITY

Assuming that Admiral Gayler is right, that our nonnuclear forces are, if not the most important, at least very important in determining our overall strength in the world, just looking at the total American military posture, is there any basic area where you see us inferior to the Soviet Union? Take, for example, naval power or air power. Would you trade either the American Navy or the American Air Force for the Soviet forces in those two categories?

General DOUGHERTY. Noel Gayler said that the language lets us down sometimes, and I think it does.

I think that our strategic nuclear forces are our most important forces. They are not the most costly; they are not the most likely to be used; they are not the most visible; they are not the ones with which we are most concerned. But they are the controlling rod to violence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

I remember one of our Secretaries of Defense once saying that we are really not concerned with the nuclear posture of Chad. Well, we are not. But, where the Soviet Union is concerned I think it is the capstone. I think that certainly the other forces contribute to the strategic environment about which Admiral Gayler spoke. But I think that, given what the Soviet Union has, if we did not balance in some essential aggregated way their capability, all of the other forces, to an extent, could be useless.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE

Senator McGOVERN. General, do you think we are at rough parity now with the Soviet Union in terms of strategic systems? Are we roughly equal as far as the two superpowers are concerned?

General DOUGHERTY. The Secretary of Defense says that we are, and I have no reason to doubt that rough equality at the moment. But I think that this is a very transient thing. It goes up and down and is very susceptible to being changed.

There is great difficulty in trying to translate rough parity or essential equivalence into an objective for force posturing and force building, It is very difficult as a military objective.

Senator McGOVERN. Admiral Gayler.

Admiral GAYLER. Very quickly, Senator McGovern, let me say that I agree with General Dougherty. The strategic balance is necessary. Underneath that, in my view, is where the action takes place.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to undertake a line of questioning on the Backfire bomber, but I do not know how to do it in less than 5 minutes. So I would like to yield my time now and wait until everyone has had his chance and then take the 8 or 10 minutes it will take to ask my questions about the Backfire bomber.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Before we pass on to Senator Sarbanes, I would like to make an announcement.

The committee will meet this afternoon in executive session at 2:30 for the purpose of inquiring into the question of verification.

Tomorrow the committee will meet here in this room, the Caucus Room, at 10 o'clock in the morning for an open session at which we will take public testimony on the verification issue.

This afternoon we will meet in the Capitol for an executive session.

Senator Sarbanes.

SALT II GIVES UNITED STATES A TIME OUT

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, you have given us some very interesting perspectives.

Admiral Kidd, you said that we have allowed ourselves to get behind and that this treaty is a time out. It gives us a chance to recover to do the things that ought to be done.

Why would the Soviets want to give us that time out? If you had been battered around a bit, as I guess you would contend here, why would the other fellow want to give you a longer time to recover?

Admiral KIDD. I don't know, Senator Sarbanes. It would have to be a highly speculative thing.

We have heard from the gentlemen this morning and from a wide range of experienced people that the Soviets are not to be trusted. Perhaps they have something up their sleeves of which we are not aware.

This morning we heard many words on momentum, such as "if that momentum continues." The question is a most difficult one, sir. I don't know the answer: At what point in time would they perceive us weak enough to tempt them to pull our chain, as it were, and test our resolve? They like big numbers. They have always liked big numbers as a people. They have always waited until the preponderance of advantage to them, going back through the centuries, has been very, very heavily weighted in their favor, something akin to 3 to 1, going back to the battle of Poltava, the Cossack charges, the infantry charges in World War I, and so on.

They seem wedded to the principle of wanting massive advantage before they undertake to commit.

Why they would choose to accord and afford us a time out, as it were, I don't know.

Senator SARBANES. Do any of the other witnesses have a view on that?

Admiral GAYLER. I can only repeat my view that I think the treaty is clearly in the Soviet interest as well as it is in the U.S. interest. This is not unusual when you strike a bargain.

Senator SARBANES. Why is it in the Soviet interest to agree to the treaty if that treaty provides a time out during which the United States can remedy this imbalance?

Admiral GAYLER. It would be speculative. I think the Soviets have their own problems, however, and they, too, might welcome a time out.

General DOUGHERTY. I don't think it is time out—I think it is time. The Soviets could well be betting that we won't take advantage of what the treaty offers us by way of options and by way of actions.

Admiral KIDD. If we just stick to historical facts, Senator Sarbanes, if they have taken a look at our track record over the last 10 years—and let me just take the Navy so as to speak on something that I know a bit about—10 years ago, we decided we would retire old ships. We came to Congress and got an agreement, to borrow from Chairman Church's observations, among ourselves that we would retire the older ships, take the money saved, build new ones, and, in about 10 to 12 years' time have the Navy back up to where we were.

So, we came from 1,000 ships to 500.

Now, here we are, 10 years later. In our judgment, there have been other, more needful, things for that money to be applied to, and we still have a Navy of about 500 ships.

If they are gambling that our resolve to catch up, as it were, is going to be a transitional thing and the resolve subsides, and the treaty is signed and approved and they bet that we are going to boat our oars and do nothing, this could be in their minds.

Senator SARBANES. In that instance, then, what would be more important to them would not be any limitations in the treaty, but rather that the treaty would lull us into not taking the actions which you gentlemen think are necessary to take.

Admiral KIDD. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that happened with SALT I?

Admiral KIDD. I am not competent to speak on SALT I, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. What about you, Admiral Gayler or General Dougherty?

Admiral GAYLER. No. I do not think it happened as a consequence of SALT I. We did not have some of the programs of the kind I have talked about that I would like to have seen and that I would still like to see. But I do not think it was associated with SALT I. It was associated with our economic position and the relative values that people placed on the ways in which we could spend our money.

General DOUGHERTY. My answer would be that we had opportunities after SALT I to get ourselves into a better posture but we did not take advantage of them. One that I have been singularly unsuccessful in convincing people about was the flexibility that would be offered by producing the B-1. To offset Soviet throw-weight advantages I recommended an earlier start on the development of a large missile roughly the size of the M-X, for early deployment in Minuteman silos and subsequent deployment, as need be, in multiple-protective shelters, either vertically or horizontally. I recommended we keep the Minuteman lineup.

I recommended some improvements with regard to the SRAM. I think people have failed fully to appreciate what SRAM can do. They have failed fully to appreciate the flexibility that we have to exploit our technology in a cheaper and easier way by using a very competent, modern, and well designed delivery vehicle, such as the B-1 would have been.

But I do not want to reopen that argument unless some of you do.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see that my time is up.

Senator MCGOVERN [presiding]. Senator Muskie.

PERCEPTION THAT U.S. DEFENSE IS BEHIND

Senator MUSKIE. Gentlemen, in what areas of our defense posture are we behind, in the sense that you have been discussing and when did we fall behind?

Admiral KIDD. I think we started falling behind in the broad sense of our military strength in its total frame of reference, probably beginning about 15 years ago, when the Navy dropped 50 percent, as it was testified to earlier today. We secured the line on Minuteman. I can remember when I was working for you up here, we were discussing Trident and the building program. The announced intention at the time was much more ambitious than we are seeing now. That has been allowed to slip from several a year down to a fraction of one a year.

It has been sort of like being nibbled to death by a flock of ducks, Senator Muskie. No one bite has been excruciating, but taken in the aggregate, our total stockpile of national military competence has shrunk. The B-1 was set aside and the M-X was postponed. It has just been one little thing right after another,

Senator MUSKIE. Now you have discussed the process by which we began to fall behind. At what point did that process result in the widespread perception, at least in the Defense Establishment, that we were behind?

I would like an answer from all of you.

Admiral KIDD. That would be a range in time, Senator Muskie. I guess if you ask 10 people you will get 10 different answers.

If you ask me, I would say probably in the early 1970's. I first became aware of it from a point of view of research, contracting with contractors, and rates of productions of the hardware.

Maybe it started earlier than that and I just was not smart enough or in a job where I saw it. But that would have been the point where I first recognized it for what it was, sir.

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Senator MUSKIE. General Dougherty.

General DOUGHERTY. Senator Muskie, my judgment on that is 1967, to be precise. In 1967, I was privileged to be in a position where we had some insight into where Soviet money was going. We had a thing we called the knee of the curve. We knew they were investing but we didn't know where it was going. We began to find out in late 1967.

That was the sort of warning, to me, that indicated in the strategic area they were going all out to put us in a position to be well behind in throw-weight.

We had an opportunity to take advantage of that warning if we had started earlier.

Command control and communications is an area where I think serious attention needed to be given—not so much because we were behind, but because we could not get ahead or even get even in this area. We depend so much more on our command control and communications; it needs to be very robust. It is the nature of the way we operate. We were falling behind in modern theater weapons and we began to see major modernizations of Soviet weapons for theater use, or at least so-called theater use.

We saw this beginning in 1967.

Another area that concerned us was our Army modernization. I am not speaking for the Army now, of course, but I am very interested in our Army capabilities and I have done a lot of planning for them in my joint and international duties as Chief of Staff, SHAPE, and as the planner in European Command with three tours over there.

Our Army has not anything like what I call the integral electronic environment of the Soviets, and this is very meaningful. Some people use this as a way to create imbalances in weapons by having a great preponderance of electronic capability on a battlefield or in a battle area. Another is modern tanks, also antitank weapons. We began to see Soviet tanks in Europe that never seemed to be retired. They just kept building new tanks on top of the older ones. We saw new tanks coming in; but they did not pull the old ones out of the forward area. On antitank weapons, we had the signal right then that our need was urgent.

Of course I cannot pick a date, but another example is all-weather weaponry. This is something we are still seriously behind—well, not behind the Soviets, but behind an ability to balance the Soviets. Also, there is a weapon system that I know you gentlemen have labored over, and that is AWACS. To me this was one element of U.S. technology that provided so many different capabilities to help redress some of our weaknesses and make us less vulnerable. We argued endlessly.

One of my friends, a Turk, fully recognizing what the AWACS offered said, "I just don't understand you Americans. You have paralysis by analysis."

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you.

Admiral Gayler.

U.S. HEAVY AIRLIFT DEFICIENCIES

Admiral GAYLER. I agree with what General Dougherty has just said. I would also just point to our deficiencies in heavy air lift, to our need to maintain qualitative air superiority or a usable substitute, to the difficult problem of antisubmarine warfare, on which we are totally dependent to link us together, and I would call attention to the growing importance and potential of space, which may be dominant. I do not think it would be a bad thing if it were, because then we might end up with our contraptions fighting their contraptions instead of people getting shot. I think there is real prospect there for us to take advantage of our superior American technology in a way which is not provocative and not threatening, and yet is militarily very effective.

I recognize that this is a very long list of things. What it says to me is that things of this kind, which to me are genuine military power, need the command attention that we have been giving to the intercontinental rockets for so long.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, gentlemen. I see that my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dougherty, it is good to see you once again. Having been mayor of Omaha at the time you were SAC Commander, I got to know you personally. I would like to say hello to you from your many dear friends back in Nebraska. I might add, that your friends, knowing I was coming back after the 4th of July recess to participate in these hearings and knowing of your attendance as a participant in the hearings, wanted me to tell you that, as much respect as they had for you when you were Commander of SAC, they give more respect and credibility to your statements about SALT II now that you are retired.

Possibly that is brought about by the chain of events following some statements by General Singlaub.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that the American people seem to put more credibility in a military commander's veracity and honesty of speech once he or she is retired because the commanders would then have no one over them, no Commander in Chief, so to speak. This is not in any way to question the honesty or integrity of those who are still in commanding positions.

At any rate, you and I had several conversations in the past during your tenure as SAC Commander. I remember one evening, seeing a film on encouraging the production of the B-1 bomber prior to my becoming a U.S. Senator, and I know how devoted and dedicated you were to that project.

U.S. DECISION TO ABANDON B-1 BOMBER

For the record, I would like to ask you something which possibly you may directly or indirectly have previously answered.

Do you feel that this administration made an incorrect decision in its abandonment of the B-1 bomber?

General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir. In my judgment they did it incorrectly because they failed to take advantage of a major opportunity that we had to provide flexibility through the full range of war-

fare. They mistakenly made assessments of a manned weapon system that we were offering only at the extreme spectrum of warfare, and they did it by using tools, measurements, and analyses that are really best reserved for more static systems.

They forgot the ways, the different ways, in which it can be used.

Also, they forgot that we could have greatly increased stability with this weapon system—and I use that word as it is used in the arms control process. We could greatly have increased our stability and our ability to deter a wider range of challenges without increasing the volatility of modern armament.

THE B-52

Senator ZORINSKY. General, how old is the B-52? For how many years has it been in existence?

General DOUGHERTY. The newest B-52, if recollection serves me correctly, was delivered in 1964. The weapon system started coming into the inventory in 1956.

Senator ZORINSKY. How many more years do you feel we can depend upon this important leg of the Triad without a replacement for delivering cruise missiles or for conventional usage in its broad spectrum?

General DOUGHERTY. Those of us who have flown and operated B-52's love it and we would like to say forever, so long as you care to feed it and take good care of it. But it really is behind the modern technology curve to a very serious degree, and the care and feeding to keep it modern and viable become far too great for the long term.

I think before we will get through—and I make a mark on the wall here, Senator Zorinsky—that we will see preparing the B-52 to stay modern as a carrier for air-launched cruise missiles will become so expensive that we will have wished we had produced the B-1 ab initio for that purpose, as well as others.

Also, there are little things that do not come to the mind of a lot of people and which never properly get explained.

About 35 percent is one estimate of the cost of the B-1 that went into shielding it, masking it, and making it nuclear hard to protecting it against EMP. Those things are very, very difficult to see, but very, very important in a modern strategic weapon system. To take an old airplane and to make it nuclear hard and to protect all of its connections and all of its electronic equipment and everything vulnerable against EMP becomes very expensive. I think the airplane is capable for many missions, but certainly not as capable as our Nation needs for its future, and it is certainly not as capable an aircraft as our technology can provide; and, hopefully, at reasonable cost.

SOVIET URBAN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX DESTRUCTION

Senator ZORINSKY. General, with your knowledge of the single integrated operational plan, what percentage of the Soviet urban industrial complex could be destroyed by the remaining two legs of the Triad if ICBM's were destroyed?

General DOUGHERTY. I do not mean to avoid your question, Senator Zorinsky, and I would like to answer it for the record, if I could,

after determining the degree to which that may have to be provided to you in classified form.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you very much.

[The information referred to appears on p. 216.]

Admiral GAYLER. Senator Zorinsky, might I comment on something which you said earlier?

Senator ZORINSKY. Certainly.

Admiral GAYLER. What you said bothers me. It is the notion that when we are retired we speak up and when we are on active duty we are muzzled.

That has not been my observation. I know of a lot of officers on active duty, including the present Joint Chiefs who, I think, call it precisely as they see it.

As for me, I have never suffered any of the sorts of pressures that were described earlier on today, and I have never said anything consequential on these subjects after I retired that I did not say when I was on active duty and sign my name to. So, I think one should recognize that the people who have the present responsibility are the people to whom we should listen in the last resort.

Senator ZORINSKY. I appreciate that clarification.

General DOUGHERTY. I share that view, Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. I do not intend to imply, by any means, with a broad brush that that is the case. Unfortunately, many of the American people look at the statement of present officials as lacking credibility, though.

General DOUGHERTY. If I could answer this for this wonderful, salty, respected friend of mine on my extreme right over here, [referring to Admiral Kidd] who has not yet answered this question, I will guarantee you that he was never inhibited. [General laughter.]

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you. I might say that some of us at this table suffer from the same malady also.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator.

Gentlemen, I knew that if I had waited long enough, I would be chairing this hearing and then could have as much time as I wanted.

Senator MUSKIE. Do you mean that we are not going to have a second round? [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. I would like to point out that, although I was out of the room during the delivery of Admiral Kidd's and General Dougherty's statements, I did hear them and did listen to the questions put to them. Where I was, I had access to the radio.

I would like to discuss with you gentlemen one specific item.

BACKFIRE BOMBER USE AGAINST UNITED STATES

General Dougherty, I believe you would be the one with the greatest expertise in this because I want to talk about the Backfire bomber. But I would not suggest to any of you gentlemen that if you wish to respond you not do so.

Two so-called killer amendments are widely discussed by opponents of the SALT Treaty. One relates to the heavy missile, the SS–18. The second relates to the Backfire bomber, which the Sovi-

ets claim is a theater nuclear weapon and which the critics claim has intercontinental range and, therefore, should be counted within the limits of this SALT agreement.

First, I would like to question the plausibility of the Backfire being used against the United States, which is the basis for arguing that it should be included in the SALT ceilings.

Is it not true, General, that, faced by NATO on one side and China on the other, the Soviet Union has a substantial military requirement for an aircraft capable of regional or theater mission?

General DOUGHERTY. They perceive that requirement. I do not know the extent to which NATO poses a threat to the Soviet Union, but I think they perceive it. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Next, am I correct that the basic design characteristics of the Backfire are appropriate for theater strike missions?

General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Am I correct that, with regard to the Backfires now in service, their deployment clearly evidences the Soviet desire to satisfy regional requirements, that they have been deployed to airfields previously occupied by medium-range aircraft, and that their training missions are oriented to peripheral attacks on NATO and China?

General DOUGHERTY. As to the Backfires now in service, their deployment is as you have characterized, on bases indicating that they are for theater use or for naval use in the peripheral areas around the theater.

Insofar as the training; yes, I think, to the extent that we know—and we only know what we know; we don't know what we don't know—most of their training that has been observed has been of a character indicating a theater orientation.

Senator BIDEN. Isn't it true that the Backfire is rapidly becoming a major threat to our sea lanes of communication with Europe, which is a theater mission rather than an intercontinental one?

Admiral Kidd. I can take that one.

Yes, Senator, you are correct, quite correct. I faced in my last position most of their Backfires. They had moved them up into position to go after the sea lanes, to go after any operations in the Norwegian sea. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Finally, is it not fair to say that an intercontinental use of the Backfire would be an extremely inefficient use of this highly capable aircraft in that in any reasonable scenario of East-West confrontation or NATO-Warsaw Pact hostilities the Soviet Union would almost certainly reserve the Backfire for use where it is most capable, that is, in theater operations?

General DOUGHERTY. I think I would have to have a scenario on that, Senator. The thrust of your question is, however, as it is now deployed and as it is now seen and viewed, it would have great efficiency in the theater.

But you would have to have some more givens. What is the situation in the theater? How desperate are they? What do they choose to accomplish in the United States?

They have the capability. Yes, I see the thrust of your question, and I think that they have gone to great ends to make us convinced that this is a theater weapon.

Senator BIDEN. To put it another way, if there were a confrontation involving NATO and Warsaw Pact or a reasonable expectation that as a consequence of any other confrontation such a confrontation would develop, isn't it true that a military, a reasonable military leadership on the other side would not throw away the use of the Backfire in that theater by using it another way?

General DOUGHERTY. Certainly if you needed it it would be there. It has optimum utilization there.

Senator BIDEN. I acknowledge that they might use it elsewhere if they were absolutely certain that there would be no theater need. But I cannot envision that occurring.

Admiral KIDD. Well, if they were cornered—in fact, if you corner any wild animal, he is apt to do anything or be unreasonable. The Soviets use Cuba now. They run bears down there from time to time. So, Cuba, in your line of thinking, might be the end of a trip, conceivably.

In my humble judgment, the answer to the Backfire, if we are worried about it as an intercontinental threat, is in beefing up NORAD. In this case, as to Senator Muskie's earlier question of when did we perceive that we started down this toboggan, NORAD's track record would be a very revealing one, sir, as to when we began to cut down.

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen it seems to me that the idea of the Backfire actually being used against the United States is not a very plausible one at the outset. But, for purposes of this discussion, let's accept the highly implausible idea that, despite the fact that neither the airplanes themselves nor the pilots are apparently being prepared for a strategic mission, the Soviets might use them against the United States in a strategic role.

SALT II EXCLUSIONS OF BACKFIRE, F-111'S AND FB-111'S

COMPARABILITY

Then, let us ask how we fared in SALT II, which excludes from the strategic totals not only the Backfire, but also our F-111's and our FB-111's.

General Dougherty, am I correct that the United States has approximately 65 FB-111's stationed in New England, each of which could reach the Soviet Union on a strategic nuclear mission?

General DOUGHERTY. With refueling, you are correct. Without refueling, I think you could say that you could reach the Soviet Union, but you may not be able to get to the target structure in the Soviet Union. But you could reach it.

Senator BIDEN. Am I correct that the United States has 175 F-111's stationed in the United Kingdom, each of which could hit the Soviet Union on a strategic nuclear mission?

General DOUGHERTY. In the sense that we use it—they are not in the strategic nuclear mission area. But they can carry nuclear weapons. They can reach the Soviet Union.

Again, they may not be able to reach a significant portion of valuable target array, but they could do that.

Senator BIDEN. Am I correct that the United States has an additional 190 F-111's stationed in the United States, each of which could be rapidly repositioned so as to be able to make

strategic nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union from other soil, if you take as a given what we are told by Admiral Zumwalt and others who acknowledge there would be, in all probability, at least a 3-day warning?

General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir. They could reach the Soviet Union by staging as you have described.

Whether their purpose would be a strategic nuclear mission or not, we must remember they really have been held as the all-weather capability for conventional delivery much as you say the Soviet Union is using the Backfire for theater missions. The crying need is to have an all-weather capability for conventional weapons. That is about the only major weapon system that we have for that purpose.

Senator BIDEN. I am aware of the great difficulty in comparing aircraft as to performance and payload because, as you pointed out here, General, so much depends upon the particular mission or how it would be flown. But isn't it fair to say that the FB-111 carries a payload that is roughly comparable to the Backfire, while that of the F-111 is somewhat less?

General DOUGHERTY. Well, Senator Biden, you did say that you appreciated the variables in this.

I really do not think so.

The Backfire is almost a 300,000-pound delivery system. It ranges from 270,000 to 290,000. External stores figure very prominently in what we can carry on the FB-111.

I would think it would be wrong to compare the payload of the two. It is more than twice as big an airplane.

Senator BIDEN. What is the payload that the FB-111 could carry compared to the payload of the Backfire, if you know?

General DOUGHERTY. I don't know, I will supply that for the record.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

The Air Forces's standard aircraft characteristics manual lists an optimum payload for the FB-111 as 8,988 pounds. The unclassified estimate of the Backfire's payload is 20,800 pounds.

Senator BIDEN. Isn't it also fair to say that in terms of range, all of these aircraft are roughly comparable?

General DOUGHERTY. In an unrefueled sense, I would say that the Backfire has a considerable edge in range. But we do not plan to use ours that way. We use them with refueling.

Senator BIDEN. Do we acknowledge that the Backfire, to have that intercontinental use that the critics argue, requires a refueling capability?

General DOUGHERTY. Well, you have given it a 5,000-mile range. It depends on the launch point and it depends on the profile, high or low. They really do not have to go in low today. We do not have that kind of defenses.

There is no question in my mind that the Backfire has the unrefueled range to be used intercontinentally, if the Soviets so choose to use it.

In exploiting its full range, it would have a limited payload—something at or below 20,000 pounds. If you could carry a 20,000-pound payload, you would not get very far with an F-111 or FB-111. But I think the Backfire is opted for use in the theater, as you

have surmised; but I do not think that you can use that as the bottom line by saying that it has no intercontinental capability nor would it be used intercontinentally.

I think it could range over a significant portion of the United States on a one-way mission and with a considerable load.

I find nothing unusual about that. When I was a SAC bomb commander, I had a one-way mission.

Senator BIDEN. Currently, the Soviet Union has some 100 to 150 Backfires in its inventory, and, at current production rates, could have up to 330 by 1985. Yet, by my calculations, according to the deployments we have discussed, the United States has already deployed some 430 F-111's and FB-111's, each capable with the constraints you have suggested of strategic missions against the Soviet Union.

Even accepting that the Backfire might be, or is, more capable in terms of payload and performance, wouldn't you say that these two bomber forces, each excluded by treaty ceilings, are roughly comparable in strategic value, and that, if anything, the balance between now and 1985 weighs in favor of the United States?

General DOUGHERTY. I could not agree with that, Senator, though I see the comparability in numbers. We have not postured our F-111's for use in strategic nuclear attacks.

Senator BIDEN. But we could, couldn't we?

General DOUGHERTY. We have that capability. With refueling we can give them that kind of range.

Senator BIDEN. Why is it that, sitting here as reasonable men and planners that simply because the Backfire has the capability we all acknowledge, it will be used that way. If we are going to sit here and postulate that, why is it not equally as reasonable for the Soviets to assume, with regard to 430 FB-111's and F-111's, each of which, if the mission were changed, would have a strategic capability against the Soviets, that the United States would use those in such a role? I mean, if it is reasonable for us to make the assumption with regard to the Backfire, why is it unreasonable for the Soviets to make a similar assumption about the FB-111's and the F-111's?

In turn, is it not a reasonable thing to suggest that neither be included in the treaty and neither be at a disadvantage as a consequence of that?

General DOUGHERTY. If that is addressed to me, I would say that my judgment and my evaluation of the SALT II Treaty is we just could not get the Backfire included, so we left it out. I cannot weigh these two things and come up with a reasonable explanation for it. I would just accept the fact that it is left out and go from there.

Senator BIDEN. The point I am trying to make is that I believe we have already gotten a better deal. I certainly would not have wanted it the other way. I certainly would not have wanted it if the Soviets had said all right, we will include the Backfire in the ceilings, but you will have to include your FB-111's and your F-111's. I would not want to strike that deal, especially since we have a commitment from the Soviets that they will not increase the Backfire production rate.

I do not want to belabor the point. I acknowledge that the Backfire can have a strategic capability, and could be so used in the scenarios with which we are all familiar.

But, in light of what their other requirements and needs are, in light of the theater requirements, including blocking our naval communication lines to Western Europe, it does not seem reasonable to postulate that the Soviets would use it in an intercontinental capacity.

Admiral GAYLER. Senator, I think you have to add to that whole question of the Backfire the observation that it really does not make much difference whether or not they use them in an all-out attack. We would not be able to find the differences in calculating the consequences.

A bottom line thing to recognize about these nuclear forces is all that stuff up on top really has no significance, particularly if it arrives late.

Senator BIDEN. I would concur with that assessment, and I would underscore the point that if we were to kill this treaty because of the Backfire issue, we would be doing it for a not very worthy reason.

Admiral KIDD. I agree.

However, I would insert a respectful word of caution in your addition and subtraction process as we look to the future. I would respectfully urge that we not in our thinking count, for instance, our F-111's totally in the strategic role for future discussions because of the increasing extent to which things naval are having to depend upon them—the FB-111's and the B-52D's, for instance—to redress naval disparities that we are seeing occur as they build up.

We are having to depend more and more on SAC.

Senator BIDEN. I would argue that it not be part of the strategic force. I am just trying to make the point that all the talk about the Backfire bomber is not very perceptive in terms of its impact on this agreement, or on the strategic force structure.

I do not have any further questions. I have already gone triple my time.

Senator Zorinsky, do you have any questions?

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I am impressed, and many people who have listened to the witnesses comments hopefully will be impressed by their honesty and sincerity.

Admiral, if I am wrong, please correct me, in summation, your feeling on this is that SALT II should be ratified as a treaty, but aside from that there are many things that need to be done in order to maintain the continued parity of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Admiral KIDD. I certainly agree with that, Senator Zorinsky.

General DOUGHERTY. That is exactly my bottom line. Many of my associates don't share that view, and many of our friends in Omaha don't share that view Senator Zorinsky; but it is my honest opinion.

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, I would concur. I think that your statements have been most helpful, most balanced.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The hearing is recessed until 2:30, at which time the hearing will take place in the Intelligence Committee room.

[Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day in executive session.]

SALT II TREATY

WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Helms, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. This morning we commence the second half of the second week of public hearings on the SALT Treaty by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

We take up in public session this morning one of the most complex issues concerning the treaty, the American capability to assure, or in the exotic language of the treaty, to verify Soviet compliance with the provisions of the treaty. The committee and the Senate must thoroughly investigate this issue and come to a judgment as to whether or not this treaty as presented is verifiable.

There is no question for all concerned that verification is a necessary condition for SALT II. It is also agreed that the United States cannot rely or trust the Russians to comply with its terms. This, I think, is not because of our inclination to treat Russians differently than other foreign governments. It is, rather, a simple recognition that this treaty cuts very close to the bone, the bone of our survival as a society. Should nuclear war ever occur, the United States as well as the Soviet Union would be totally incinerated.

That is why the Senate could not consider a treaty of this kind without being assured that we have in our own national possession the means to verify compliance by the other side. What we must be able to detect is any cheating that would represent a threat to the compliance with the treaty, that would affect the strategic balance or in any way jeopardize our own national security.

Yesterday in executive session, this committee heard testimony from the Secretary of Defense about the more sensitive aspects of the issue of verification. I think everyone will understand that when it comes to the details concerning the sources and the means by which we seek to verify provisions of this treaty, those are

matters of great sensitivity which must be dealt with in executive session.

On the other hand, it is equally important that the American people should know in public session what the conclusions are, those reached by our Secretary of Defense, by General Seignious, the Director of ACDA, and by Stanfield Turner, the Director of the CIA.

Yesterday we did not have time to question Admiral Turner in executive session. For that purpose I have set aside next Tuesday, and I want to announce this morning that the public hearings previously scheduled for next Tuesday are canceled. We will spend the entire day in executive session questioning Admiral Turner, the Director of the CIA, in matters relating to verification. This will give each member of the committee adequate opportunity to pursue the matter without limitations on time.

This morning, Secretary of Defense Brown and the Director of ACDA, General Seignious, and Ambassador Earle will testify on the question of verifiability of SALT II. As I have previously indicated, the committee appreciates the difficulty of taking testimony on such a sensitive subject in open session. I am sure that Senators will be guarded in the questions they ask in open session, and the witnesses will, of course, refrain from answering any question which they feel might jeopardize national security. Those questions can be and will be answered in executive session.

I apologize, Mr. Secretary, for the delay in your testimony, but the committee is now prepared to proceed with the hearings scheduled for this morning. We invite your testimony at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY DR. WILLIAM PERRY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was a welcome respite.

I would like to submit for the record my full statement of this morning, Mr. Chairman, and then to speak from it, abbreviating it heavily. After that, I would ask the committee to allow Dr. Perry, who accompanies me, to give some examples of how we monitor Soviet missile tests, for example, as much as could be said in an open hearing.

But before I go to my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to try to place the whole issue of verification in perspective. I am afraid that there has been a good deal of confusion which has crept into the issue of verification, both in the minds of the public and perhaps, even, among those of us who are participants in the presentations for and against the SALT II Treaty.

We need, I think, to distinguish between two related but distinct concepts: First, the intelligence capabilities of the United States, including our ability to inform ourselves about what the Soviets have done, are doing, or are likely to do, specifically in terms of their strategic forces, a matter of great concern with or without SALT; and a second distinct concept, our ability to assure ourselves that the Soviet Union is living up to the terms of limitations imposed upon it by the SALT II agreement—to monitor, if you will,

Soviet compliance. This, and only this, is an issue unique to SALT and is what is usually referred to in discussions of verification.

The first of these concepts, our intelligence collecting capability, includes all systems, clandestine and overt, human or technical, that comprise our extensive intelligence network. The information that our intelligence collects, on strategic and on other forces, is essential to our national security. We collect that intelligence in a number of ways, spend large amounts of money annually to obtain it, and must have it with or without SALT II.

The SALT II agreement enhances our ability to obtain this information. Put simply, our ability to collect needed intelligence about Soviet strategic activities and intentions is very much greater with the SALT II agreement than without it. This is because of the provisions of the SALT II agreement that protect and enhance the usefulness of our so-called national technical means, by forbidding concealment that impedes those means of collection.

For example, under SALT II, the Soviets could not hide submarine launchers through their period of construction and launch to prevent us from knowing what kinds of launchers were aboard a particular submarine. That would be forbidden, but without SALT, the Soviets would have no obligation to avoid such deliberate concealment, and we would have no basis on which to complain.

They would also be free to deny all telemetry if they chose to. The so-called counting rules of SALT II also aid our intelligence efforts. The rules, for example, provide that launchers that look alike are counted alike. Thus, a launcher of the type from which a MIRVed missile has been launched counts as a MIRVed missile launcher even though non-MIRVed missiles may also have been launched from that same kind of launcher.

Moreover, the Soviets are barred from concealing the association of launchers and their missiles. This virtually forces them to make all the launchers in which they have MIRVed missiles look different from those in which they do not have MIRVed missiles, and considerably reduces our uncertainties.

From these examples, and many others could be given, it is clear that the terms of the SALT II agreement greatly improve our ability to know what the Soviet strategic force includes, now and to some degree, in the future, compared to what that ability would be without a SALT II agreement. That is distinct from the advantage that we gain under SALT II by the Soviets having committed themselves to specific limits on what they deploy in the future. This has to do with how well we know what they are deploying, whatever they may have committed themselves to deploy.

Verification is something quite different from this. It is the second concept to which I referred and it means monitoring Soviet compliance with the limitations of the treaty. It is related to the commitments that the Soviets have made with respect to limiting their own forces, because verification is meaningful only in the context of specific agreements. If there is no limitation, then there is nothing to verify, although there is something to get intelligence about.

To monitor the treaty, we use some of our various kinds of collection capability to measure whether the Soviets are living up to their part of the SALT II bargain. Not all of our intelligence-

collecting capability is required to provide us with this assurance. Conversely, no single element of that capability can alone provide us that assurance. As a result, the reduction of the effectiveness of one of the elements of that capability does not necessarily imperil our overall ability to verify.

This monitoring capability is, in effect, one determinant of the value to us of the limitations on Soviet strategic forces contained in the SALT II agreement. Those limitations, such as the limitation of the potentially 30-warhead SS–18 missile to only 10 warheads, are considerable. The effective value of such limitations to the United States depends in part, though, on two factors. The first is whether the Soviets would, even without SALT, want to exceed those limitations.

It is clear that in some places, notably the reentry vehicle limit and the various numerical levels, for example, the Soviets would have considerable reason to exceed those limits. In other cases, perhaps they would not. But the element of predictability is itself valuable.

The second factor is how well we can be sure that the Soviets are living up to the limits, that is, how well we can monitor and how well we would be able to tell that they were violating them in time to respond with actions of our own, a criterion that I call adequate verification. And this is where verification comes in.

On that score, I think the conclusion is clear. To have a good chance of remaining undetected, any Soviet cheating would have to be on so small a scale that it would not be militarily significant. Cheating on such a level would not be worth the political risks involved. I firmly believe we could detect cheating potentially dangerous to our security in sufficient time to take whatever action the situation required.

Moreover, the United States will maintain forces and programs capable of being accelerated so as to offset any potential Soviet violation. We have made it clear to the Soviets that any violation of SALT II would entail the most serious consequences militarily and politically for the relationship between our two nations. Even in those areas where there are uncertainties, we will be better off with the treaty.

A simple example will illustrate my point. The Soviets have agreed to deploy no more than one new ICBM during the period of the treaty, through December 31, 1985. Modifications of other ICBM's are allowed only up to 5 percent in certain vital characteristics, for example, throw-weight.

Suppose that we are not able to monitor their compliance within that 5 percent. Suppose that we can do so only to 10 percent. In the first place, the Soviets would have no way of being sure that our monitoring capabilities, now or in the future, did not extend to 5 percent. But suppose they did know, and suppose they thereupon increased their throw weight in existing missiles through modifications by 10 percent. This would be a deficiency in verification, but it would not make verification inadequate if the difference between 5 percent and 10 percent is not militarily significant, and it is not.

In fact, what really counts is the number of warheads, the weight of each warhead, and their accuracy. The last is not con-

strained by SALT. We are not constrained and they are not constrained.

If other factors in the missile change, if it has, for example, different bolts in it, that does not change the military threat. So I would say this uncertainty, this possible deficiency in verification, is not militarily significant.

But compare the sort of uncertainty under SALT II with the situation without SALT II. Would the Soviets then be limited to 5 percent changes in throw weight? No. How about 10 percent? No, they would not be limited to that. How about 50 percent? No, they would not be limited to 50 percent changes in their existing missiles. Or 100 percent? No, they would not even be limited to that. There would be no limitations.

They could modify their existing missiles by changing their type of propellant, which under SALT II they cannot do, the dimensions and everything else. So the throw weight and warhead numbers could be anything they please, and they could then deploy as many of those missiles as they wished.

The crucial fact is that even if one assumes that uncertainties in monitoring some of the limitations will exist, the provisions establishing those limitations are of very great utility to the United States. What this adds up to in military terms is that SALT II provides the United States two very substantial benefits. The first is the greater accuracy of our intelligence estimates because of the protections embodied in SALT II. This is an enormous advantage. One need only think of the difficulties we would have if all Soviet telemetry were encrypted, and it could be if the SALT II Treaty were rejected, to realize how much more difficult a time we would have in telling the nature and number of Soviet forces.

It is here that the issue of how well we can monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty comes into play. Uncertainties in monitoring can reduce our assurance about how well those limitations are being adhered to, but I believe that they can reduce our assurance only marginally, as my prepared statement details.

More importantly, we have to make a comparison, with and without SALT II, of how sure we will be that the Soviet levels of strategic force will be no greater than those the SALT II Treaty prescribes. With SALT II we will have some uncertainty. Without it, we will have no assurance whatever that those levels will not be exceeded. Indeed, we can be virtually sure that they will be, and considerably. Thus, by this criterion as well, the disadvantages and risks of rejection are incomparably greater.

What do we trade for these two major military advantages? We do give up something in return. SALT II puts limitations on our strategic forces. But as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I both indicated in previous testimony, those restrictions are minor indeed in terms of anything that we had planned to do or foresee doing in our strategic forces, providing that the terms of the protocol are not extended past the end of 1981.

By that I mean, of course, there are no signficant restrictions on what we would want to do to match Soviet forces of the level and character mandated by SALT II. If Soviet programs in the absence of SALT II were larger, as I am convinced they would be, we would

respond and would very probably be forced to do more than we are allowed to do under the agreement.

To summarize, the minor limitations on our own forces in the SALT II context are, in my judgment far more than balanced by, first, major gains in the certainty of our ability to obtain vital information about Soviet strategic nuclear forces; and second, substantial limits on Soviet force levels and characteristics. Our intelligence capability gains from the first of these. The value of the second is determined in part by our monitoring capability. I am convinced that that capability is quite good indeed, and that in those areas where there are monitoring uncertainties, the Soviets could not gain a strategic advantage by cheating.

Let me turn now to the specific question of monitoring. To monitor Soviet compliance, we employ a set of intelligence capabilities which I have called national technical means. That includes a variety of methods, including photographic satellites and other technical means. Many of them are very sensitive, and public acknowledgement of their capabilities would make it easier, far easier, for the Soviets to negate.

For that reason, public information about the details of our intelligence facilities and capabilities is, or we try to keep it, quite limited.

There have been a number of discussions in the media about our intelligence sources. It would not be in the Nation's best interest, however, to comment publicly on the accuracy of reported capabilities. In closed testimony, details will be covered and have been covered in considerable detail, and all Senators will have access to the information before voting on the treaty through procedures worked out with the Senate leadership, so that each will be able to make his or her own judgment about the adequacy of our capability.

Our national technical means allow us to monitor various key aspects of Soviet strategic programs, including development, testing, production, deployment, training and operation of Soviet strategic capabilities. We can perform these tasks despite the closed nature of Soviet society, and Dr. Perry will be giving some examples of how we do this in a few minutes.

The Soviets know that we have a large and sophisticated intelligence operation and know a certain amount about it. But, as I said, there are things they do not know, and that is one reason to keep quiet about what those capabilities are.

From time to time, our intelligence system can suffer some gaps in its coverage. This occurred most recently with the loss of our collection sites in Iran, but those gaps can be filled and the systems capability restored sufficiently to insure that its job is done adequately.

In recent months a great deal of attention has been given to the impact on verification from the loss of the Iranian sites, and I would like to place that in perspective. Those sites provided important information on some Soviet ICBM tests. Their loss reduced but did not eliminate our ability to make certain judgments about the tests.

Reestablishing all of that capability, which we would want to do with or without a SALT II agreement, may take until 1983 or even

1984. Regaining a substantial portion of that capability, the part most needed for SALT verification, is likely to be feasible within a year. And during that time, we have a large number of other technical and intelligence collection sources which would continue to collect intelligence on Soviet strategic systems and will prevent them from being able to make any significant violation without our knowing about it.

The process of determining the adequacy of verification must also weigh the benefits of a particular provision against the monitoring problem involved. The gains to the United States in some cases, either in permitting flexibility to pursue certain programs of our own or in imposing limitations on Soviet actions, are worth accepting some additional uncertainty in verification.

In several instances, we have had to consider a tradeoff between verification considerations and the impact of the provision on U.S. program flexibility. In some cases we negotiated a provision which allowed us to pursue strategic force options, even though doing so may have marginally increased our monitoring uncertainties.

The provisions affecting cruise missiles and mobile ICBM's are the two most important examples of such a tradeoff.

Let me touch briefly on verifying compliance with some specific major provisions of the agreement. The first is our ability to verify compliance with the aggregate limit of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Here we have high confidence in our ability to monitor the number of fixed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

I would like to stress that that simple sentence covers many of the most significant provisions of the treaty. On mobile ICBM's, we would face somewhat greater uncertainty. That is one of the cases I mentioned earlier where there was a tradeoff during the negotiations between ability to monitor and retaining force flexibility.

We decided it was very much in our interest to permit the deployment of a mobile ICBM as a way of dealing with the increased vulnerability of fixed silo forces. We have decided, as you know, to proceed with the M-X missile and to deploy it in a basing mode which will insure that the number, although not the location at any one time, of deployed missile launchers can be monitored.

Taking into account the advantage of the United States of retaining that option and the details of the monitoring problem, the verification of mobile ICBM's, I am convinced, will be fully adequate. I would note that if the Soviets made special efforts to conceal mobile ICBM launchers or if they deployed a system without central support facilities, there could be uncertainties in the number. But covert deployment of a force on a scale large enough to be militarily significant would be a formidable task requiring successful concealment of a large number of deployed launchers and of their production, support and training exercises as well.

Deployment without central support facilities would entail significant operational disadvantages. Also, concealment measures would themselves be violations if they impeded our ability to count launchers deployed. And we would detect the fact of such attempts at concealment even more easily than we could count the precise number of launchers.

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On MIRV limitations, another important limitation in the treaty, we have confidence we can monitor the number of launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's equipped with MIRV's. Again, I stress that this simple judgment covers several of the most significant provisions of the treaty.

On launch weight, throw weight, and the number of reentry vehicles we can now continue to monitor, launch and throw weight of ICBM's tested in the Soviet Union, while the uncertainties are somewhat larger than they were when the Iranian sites were functioning, we are still able to detect significant changes in launch weight and throw weight over the course of a flight test program.

The uncertainties would be smaller for monitoring changes to existing ICBM's, on which we have built up a considerable base of information, than they would be for the one new type ICBM permitted by the agreement. But again, I want to emphasize that the launch weight is less important than the throw weight. The throw weight is less important militarily than the payload weight. The payload weight is the number of warheads and the weight of each warhead, and those have been and continue to be well monitored by a variety of methods.

Our knowledge of payload weight, the number of warheads, the weights of the warheads did not depend upon a ground station in one country.

In fact, we can determine the number of reentry vehicles accurately during flight testing. The Soviets might try to deploy ICBM's with a greater number of reentry vehicles than had ever been actually flight tested on that missile. SALT II deals with this problem by limiting some test practices which could be used to test procedures to release more reentry vehicles than were actually tested.

Cruise missiles are another area where there is some monitoring uncertainty. It is also very definitely an area where the U.S. negotiating position generally emphasized preserving future force options. We well understand. We know the numbers, the characteristics, and capabilities of current Soviet cruise missiles, even though cruise missile range is difficult to define and estimate precisely.

Soviet continuation of present practices will allow us to maintain our present level of understanding. If Soviets altered their current practice, those estimates of range capability could increase in uncertainty. We believe that is acceptable, because we believe the Soviets have little incentive for cheating on cruise missile range limits.

The agreement in effect provides both sides with enough flexibility to pursue long-range cruise missile programs without cheating.

On the Backfire, we can estimate the number produced with confidence as we do for heavy bombers. We could detect a significant upgrade in its capability either by a physical modification of the aircraft or reorientation of the force toward intercontinental missions. Careful observation of Backfire testing, deployment patterns, and training and exercise with this aircraft indicate it is assigned a theater, that is intermediate range and antiship roles, but it does have an inherent capability to perform some intercontinental missions. Improving its capability for such missions would

probably require changes in its deployment pattern or training activity which could be monitored.

Moreover, the additional strategic capability that it could provide would be at the expense of a substantial loss of theater and anti-ship capability resulting from such a change in role.

Let me turn now to compliance and reactions to violations. In considering Soviet compliance, it is important to keep in mind that there is a difference between detecting a violation and enforcing it, that is, bringing it to an end. It is not done in the courts, and it does not happen automatically. On the other hand, we do not have to prove the case to a jury. We do need evidence to challenge Soviet actions.

First, if we were concerned about possible violations, we would take any ambiguous situation to a Standing Consultative Commission, and in appropriate cases we could raise it again at higher diplomatic levels. We expect satisfactory resolution. If we encounter problems, they may be able to explain them, or they may stop the activity, but in international agreements the only ultimate enforcement mechanism is our own actions either to produce agreement, to cease and correct the problem, or to offset the consequences by our own unilateral steps. We have a number of courses of action open to us.

We could take actions permitted if the problem is not resolved to our satisfaction—permitted under SALT—which would offset the Soviet action. We could insist on taking certain actions ourselves outside the treaty to compensate militarily and politically for the violation. Our ultimate remedy would be termination of the SALT II agreement. We would not think such a step at all likely, but if a problem were not resolved or if we detected a violation which threatened our security, I would not hesitate to recommend to the President, and I have no doubt but that he would be prepared to take whatever steps would be necessary to meet that threat, including, if necessary, the ultimate step, treaty abrogation.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that cheating on a scale large enough to affect the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. For that reason and others noted in the testimony, I am confident that the SALT II agreement taken as a whole is adequately verifiable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[Secretary Brown's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,

I am here today to discuss one of the most important issues concerning the new SALT II agreement, the question of verification. I believe that verifiability is a necessary condition of any good arms control agreement. Without it, even the most attractive and advantageous agreement should be rejected. We are dealing in SALT with our principal military competitor, our chief political—and potential military—adversary. We expect compliance with the accord, but we cannot rely on trust or optimistic assumptions about Soviet behavior. The treaty must be adequately verifiable from the day it enters into force.

Let me begin my presentation by stating my conclusion: we can adequately verify Soviet compliance with the provisions of SALT II. We will be able, by our own intelligence efforts, to detect a Soviet violation in time to react so as to block or offset any substantive military advantage that could result from the violation. Put another way, any Soviet cheating which would pose a significant military risk or

affect the strategic balance would be detected by our intelligence in time for the United States to respond effectively.

MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

To monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of SALT II, we employ a set of intelligence capabilities known as "national technical means." This general term covers a variety of methods for monitoring Soviet military activities, including photographic satellites and other technical collection means. These systems enable us to monitor, for example, Soviet telemetry—technical data transmitted by radio signals from the Soviet missiles during tests—from outside Soviet territory. Other examples of national technical means include the ships, aircraft, and land-based radars used to monitor Soviet missile testing.

This is not a complete list of the technical devices that constitute our national technical means. Still less is it a complete list of all U.S. intelligence resources. Many of our intelligence resources are very sensitive, and public acknowledgement of their capabilities would make it far easier for the Soviets to negate them. For that reason, public information about the details of our intelligence facilities and capabilities is quite limited. Although there have been a number of discussions in the media about our intelligence sources, it would not be in the nation's best interest to comment publicly on the accuracy of reported capabilities. The details of our intelligence collection capabilities will be covered in considerable detail during closed testimony. All Senators will have access to this information before voting on the Treaty through procedures worked out with the leadership, and will be able to make their own judgments about the adequacy of our capability.

It is important to distinguish the nature of monitoring from the process of verification. Monitoring, in the SALT context, is the task of collecting and analyzing information about Soviet systems subject to SALT limits. Verification refers to the continuing process of assessing compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements. It is the process of judging whether a state is living up to its international obligations. It uses the results of monitoring as one key input, but relies on other assessments and judgments as well.

It is also important to remember that monitoring is simply a name for one type of strategic intelligence. Our need for such information did not begin with SALT. The United States spends billions of dollars every year to maintain the most sophisticated and capable intelligence-gathering system the world has ever seen. With or without SALT we have a vital interest in keeping track of Soviet strategic forces. Doing so is our highest intelligence priority.

The attached chart reflects the range of our monitoring and detection confidence. "High confidence" in detecting a prohibited activity means that we have a probability of detection greater than 90%. With respect to counting and measuring requirements, high confidence means that we have an uncertainty of less than 10%. "High moderate" confidence is a probability of detecting a prohibited activity of between 75 and 90%, or an uncertainty in counting and measurement of between 10 and 25%. Ranges for moderate, low, and very low confidence are shown on the chart.

The United States by necessity takes a conservative approach to monitoring an arms agreement. We cannot afford to do otherwise in a matter so fundamental to our national security. Anything less than a 50 percent chance of detection, for example, we consider as providing "low confidence" in our monitoring capability. At the same time, however, what we take to be "low confidence" may appear to the Soviets as a high risk. A somewhat less than even chance of U.S. detection would probably appear as a prohibitively high risk to a Soviet planner contemplating cheating, particularly when he considered the likely U.S. reaction to such a discovery.

RANGES OF MONITORING AND DETECTION CONFIDENCE



THE ADEQUACY OF VERIFICATION

Our impressive monitoring capability does not mean that we can be certain of detecting every conceivable treaty violation—or every conceivable change in Soviet strategic forces—as soon as it occurs. That is an impossible and unnecessary standard to meet, either for verification or for intelligence generally. No arms limitation agreement can ever be absolutely verifiable. The relevant test is not an abstract ideal, but the practical standard of whether we can determine compliance adequately to safeguard our security—that is, whether we can identify attempted evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so in time to mount a sufficient response. Meeting this test is what I mean by the term "adequate verification."

I should note that "adequate verification" has been our objective throughout the entire ten years of SALT negotiations. As a member of the U.S. delegation to SALT I, I recall President Nixon's instruction in 1969 that "any agreed measures must be subject to adequate verification." That has been the consistent policy of our government ever since. It is also the standard embodied in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Adequate verification depends on a number of factors. Among the most important are our capability to monitor Soviet activities related to compliance; our assessment of the risks to the United States (and benefits to the Soviet Union) of potential violations in light of the probability of detection; and our ability to carry out appropriate and timely responses if violations are discovered.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES

Any judgment about the adequacy of verification must begin with an examination of our own intelligence collection systems and techniques for analysis. Our national technical means enable us to monitor various key aspects of Soviet strategic programs, including the development, testing, production, deployment, training, and operation of Soviet strategic capabilities. We can perform these tasks despite the closed nature of Soviet society.

Our national technical means enable us to assemble a detailed picture of Soviet forces, including the characteristics of individual systems, by using information from a variety of sources. For example, our intelligence system has enabled us to build a comprehensive understanding of the Soviet ICBM system from design through deployment. We know that the Soviets have four design bureaus for the development of their ICBMs. We monitor the nature of the projects and the technologies pursued at these bureaus. We know which bureau is working on each of the

new or significantly modified ICBMs known to be under development. We have a reasonably good idea of when they will begin flight-testing of these missiles.

Missile production takes place at several main assembly plants and at hundreds of subassembly plants, employing hundreds of thousands of workers. We monitor the Soviet ICBM deployment areas on a regular basis, observing construction activity, movement of people and materials, and training exercises. We have a good understanding of the organizational and support structure for deployed ICBM units.

We regularly monitor key areas at the Soviet ICBM test ranges. We monitor missile test firings with a wide variety of sensors: cameras taking pictures of launch and impact areas; infrared detectors measuring heat from the engine; radars tracking ICBMs in flight; and radios recieving Soviet telemetry signals (the Soviets use telemetry signals to measure the performance of their test missiles in flight, and we use them to deduce technical characteristics of their missiles). The use of multiple sources complicates any effort to disguise or conceal a violation. In the course of 20 to 30 tests of a new ICBM, we collect thousands of reels of magnetic tape and spend tens of thousands of hours processing, analyzing and correlating this vast array of data to determine the characteristics of the new missile.

It is inconceivable to me that the Soviets could develop, produce, test, and deploy a new ICBM in a way that would evade this monitoring network. We have missed some data on some firings—and will in the future. But we have not erred significantly in our assessment of any Soviet ICBM.

The Soviets know that we have a large and sophisticated intelligence operation, and they know a certain amount about how it works. However, they do not know the full capabilities of our collection systems and analytical techniques, and this uncertainty would greatly complicate any Soviet attempt to conceal evasion of the SALT II limits. (It is also a reason for strictly limiting what we say in public about our systems.)

No one can pretend that our intelligence collection capability is perfect, or that there is no room for improvement. No sensor can be expected to catch every Soviet event of interest—but it is just as unlikly that a Soviet cheating program on a significant scale will evade every sensor. I expect the Soviets have a healthy respect for our intelligence capabilities, and that respect will influence their calculations about the costs and possible benefits of cheating.

It is possible for our intelligence system to suffer some gaps in its coverage from time to time. This occurred most recently with the loss of our collection sites in Iran. But these gaps can be filled, and the system's capability restored sufficiently to ensure that its job is done adequately. In recent months a great deal of attention has been given to the impact on verification of the loss of the Iranian sites, and it is useful to place that loss in perspective before turning to the details of specific provisions.

THE IRANIAN SITES AND THEIR REPLACEMENT

It has been suggested that our intelligence system has been fatally crippled by the loss of our stations in Iran. That view represents a misunderstanding of the full extent and capability of our system for assessing the Soviet missile program. In the past two decades, the United States has spent billions of dollars for sophisticated monitoring systems specifically targeted against the Soviet missile program. As a consequence, we have developed an extensive and effective collection network. In fact, all of the data used in the SALT debate—by supporters and opponents—are a product of this capable network.

The Iranian sites provided important information on some Soviet ICBM tests. Their loss reduced, but did not eliminate, our ability to make certain judgments about the tests. Reestablishing all of that capability, which we would want to do with or without a SALT II agreement, may take until 1983 or 1984. Regaining a substantial portion of the capability—the part most needed for SALT verification—is likely to be feasible within a year. During that time, we have a large number of other technical intelligence collection sources which will collect intelligence on Soviet strategic systems.

One interim measure we are considering is the use of U-2 reconaissance aircraft to monitor Soviet missile tests. However, it is important to keep in mind that U-2 overflights are by no means the only way to replace the Iranian sites' contribution to SALT monitoring.

It is also important to keep in mind that a new strategic weapon takes several years to develop. A new missile, bomber, or submarine represents a major investment in time and money. It is not a simple process. We know from our own experience, and from observing the development of Soviet forces, that building a new strategic weapon system is an expensive and time-consuming enterprise. The weapon system first must be designed, developed, and tested; this phase alone

generally takes several years. Eventually the system enters the operational force, and full operational capability may not occur until 10 or more years after development was begun. Throughout the system's operational life it is periodically tested and evaluated.

Each of these stages in the life cycle of a strategic weapon system is susceptible to a different mix of monitoring methods, and each presents a different opportunity for monitoring. Each stage poses a new problem for the side attempting to conceal such a program. A Soviet program to develop a new ICBM would require between 20 and 30 flight tests over a period of years. With existing (let alone with planned) additional collection systems, we would be able to monitor testing and detect violations well before the testing program could be completed.

In sum, I believe the SALT II agreement would be adequately verifiable if it came into effect today, even taking into account the loss of the Iran sites.

INCENTIVES FOR AND AGAINST CHEATING

As I mentioned earlier, in assessing the adequacy of verification we must also consider the likelihood that the Soviets would be tempted to run the gauntlet and cheat on the limits of SALT II. Theoretically, the incentive to cheat is a function of the value of the strategic gains which a side would expect to achieve from such a program, and the risks and consequences of being caught cheating.

In most areas, the chances of detection are so high that the issue of the utility of cheating would never arise. My own view is that the Soviets would find little advantage in exploiting those areas where our verification uncertainty is greater. This judgment is based on three factors: First, that the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance will remain reasonably stable and durable, so that the Soviet Union will be unable to derive a significant strategic advantage by quantitative or qualitative improvements that might conceivably go undetected. Nothing which the Soviets are capable of doing secretly with their strategic forces would deny us the capability of responding with a retaliatory attack of devastating proportions. The United States has a credible nuclear deterrent today and we will have one in the future, even under the most pessimistic scenarios of Soviet cheating.

Second, SALT II does not halt Soviet strategic force modernization dead in its tracks. There will exist under the terms of the agreement a number of permitted opportunities for the Soviets to improve their strategic forces.

Third, the Soviets have their own—rather than our—uncertainties about our collection capabilities. They cannot be sure of our overall intelligence capability to monitor a SALT II agreement. For that reason, Soviet planners would be likely to make careful and conservative assumptions regarding U.S. verification capabilities.

The Soviets would also have to face the possibility that a clandestine effort could be compromised by a defector, an intelligence source, or an accident which revealed the nature of the activity. The larger the scale of the effort and the longer it went on, the more people would be involved and the greater the possibility of compromise would become. This serves as a further disincentive to cheat.

U.S. "HEDGES"

We have a number of "hedges" available as responses to possible Soviet violation of the agreement. These are actions which we could take to increase the deterrent capability of our strategic forces and to offset any gain the Soviets might seek to achieve. Some would be permitted under SALT II. Others would require a U.S. decision that the Soviets had violated and thereby voided the treaty.

But hedges, when they are real and credible options, not only give us the capability to react to Soviet cheating; they also serve to deter such activity by negating the benefit of any contemplated non-compliance. One quick reaction response would be to raise the alert level of our B-52s and ballistic-missile-carrying submarines. This, though expensive, would provide an immediate and significant increase in the number of weapons which would survive an attack.

There are a number of longer term responses available to us. The development and deployment of strategic offensive systems like the ALCM or the MX could be accelerated to provide their contributions to our force posture at an earlier date than is now programmed. We could adjust our planned MX deployment and basing (particularly by adding hard shelters) to offset increases in the RV force available to attack it. We could also expand the deployment of the MK-12A warhead on the Minuteman III force, or replace some of our Minuteman II missiles with Minuteman III's. Other actions could include steps which would extend the lifetime of the Polaris submarine, and an acceleration of the development of a cruise missile carrier aircraft.

These actions are illustrative examples of U.S. strategic hedges. Some of them we may want to pursue in any event, even in the absence of Soviet violations. Our actual response to a Soviet violation would take into account the nature of the violation, the time available to respond, and the status of our various force improvement programs at the time.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The process of determining the adequacy of verification must also weigh the benefits of a particular provision against the monitoring problem involved. The gains to the United States in some cases—either in permitting flexibility to pursue certain programs of our own or in imposing limitations on Soviet actions—are worth accepting some additional uncertainty in verification.

In several instances we had to consider a trade-off between verification considerations and the impact of the provision on U.S. program flexibility. In some cases we negotiated a provision which allowed us to pursue strategic force options, even though doing so may have marginally increased our monitoring uncertainties. The provisions affecting cruise missiles and mobile ICBMs are the two most important examples of such a trade-off, and I will discuss them in detail later.

In determining how much monitoring uncertainty was acceptable, we also had to consider the importance—to the United States—of securing certain restrictions on Soviet forces. We felt it was desirable, for example, to restrict modifications to existing Soviet ICBMs as much as possible so that the limitation on "new types" of ICBMs would have maximum effect. Without a precise and narrow limitation on permitted modifications, the Soviets could claim that any new ICBM was simply a modification of an existing one. We determined that it was clearly in the U.S. interest to accept some greater uncertainty in monitoring in order to secure a far more meaningful limitation on "new" Soviet ICBMs.

TREATY PROVISIONS WHICH FACILITATE VERIFICATION

The SALT II agreement is designated to be adequately verifiable by national technical means. It is considerably more complex than the Interim Agreement it replaces. In addition to counting the number of launchers deployed, we must monitor the deployment of launchers for MIRVed systems. We must also monitor such characteristics as the launch-weight, throw-weight, and number of warheads for ballistic missiles, and the range and launch platforms for cruise missiles.

These are not new intelligence responsibilities; they are new only to arms control. We have monitored Soviet missile characteristics since the early days of missile flight history. What is new is the increased importance of such monitoring in light of the provisions of the SALT II agreement. For this reason, the United States successfully pressed for a number of provisions in the SALT II agreement designed to assist verification.

One provision, carried over from SALT I, bans interference with the national technical means used to verify compliance with the agreement. Another prohibits deliberate concealment measures which impede verification. Because many of the provisions of the agreement are verified by monitoring Soviet testing, the ban on deliberate concealment applies explicitly to testing practices as well as to construction and deployment activities. In particular, deliberate denial of telemetric information during testing is prohibited whenever such denial impedes verification. Neither party can unilaterally determine whether denial impedes verification. If questions arise on this issue they will be resolved in the Standing Consultative Commission.

A number of counting rules are included in the agreement to facilitate verification. For example, one rule resolves the difficulty of trying to distinguish launchers containing MIRVed missiles from launchers carrying non-MIRVed versions of the same missile. Another rule counts as a MIRVed launcher any launcher of a type which has ever contained or launched a MIRVed missile. Other counting rules have been worked out for bombers. These rules simplify verification tasks that would otherwise have been much more difficult.

Finally, the two sides have developed a common data base in which each party states the numbers of systems deployed in each of the principal categories limited by the agreement. While the U.S. does not depend upon these numbers for verification, the data will provide an agreed baseline from which to measure compliance with the aggregate limits. The data base will be updated at each semiannual meeting of the Standing Consultative Commission.

AGGREGATE LIMIT

Let me now address our ability to verify complance with the major provisions of the SALT II agreement. The first issue is our ability to verify compliance with the aggregate limit of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Here we have high confidence in our ability to monitor the numbers of fixed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. I want to stress that this simple sentence covers many of the most significant provisions of the treaty.

ICBM silos are readily identifiable during construction, and take a year or more to build. The missiles themselves require extensive support facilities, including missile handling equipment, checkout and maintenance facilities, survivable communications, and nuclear warhead handling, storage, and security facilities. Our intelligence collectors regularly examine the existing ICBM fields, but in addition they also conduct extensive surveys of the Soviet Union at periodic intervals for evidence of additional ICBM activity. The intelligence community judgment is that we would detect a Soviet effort to deploy a significant number of excess fixed ICBM launchers even if they departed substantially from their current deployment practices.

Facilities for the rapid reload of ICBM launchers are prohibited by the treaty, as are excess missiles at the launch site. A realistic capability to reload a silo launcher rapidly during nuclear conflict would require hardened facilities for missile storage, handling equipment, and crews. Construction of such facilities would be observable.

Turning to SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines are large and complex systems. They are currently constructed in only one shipyard in the Soviet Union. After launch they are fitted out in the open for a period of months before they begin sea trials. We monitor the launch, fitting out, and sea trials of each submarine. We also monitor Soviet ballistic missile submarines at operational bases, at sea, and at overhaul facilities. In addition, we search for evidence of SSBN-related activity at other facilities, and we monitor naval activities generally with a wide range of intelligence collection systems. We are confident we can monitor closely the number of Soviet SLBM launchers.

Heavy bombers are large in size, built at a small number of plants, and deployed at a limited number of operational bases which are closely monitored. The total inventory of heavy bomber type aircraft can be monitored with confidence.

A potential problem that is dealt with in the agreement concerns variants of heavy bomber type aircraft that are used for other purposes. Any future variants are required to have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they are not capable of performing a heavy bomber mission. Existing bomber variants are handled on a case-by-case basis—some will be modified within six months of entry into force; some which we have no problem distinguishing from bombers are exempted from this requirement.

MOBILE ICBM'S

We would face somewhat greater uncertainty in our count of mobile ICBMs. The amount of uncertainty depends on the deployment pattern of the system.

The limitation on mobile ICBMs is one of the cases I mentioned earlier in which we faced a trade-off during the negotiations between monitorability and retaining force flexibility. We decided that it was very much in our interest to permit the deployment of a mobile ICBM as a way of dealing with the increasing vulnerability of the fixed-silo Minuteman force. As you know, we have decided to proceed with the MX missile, and to deploy it in a basing mode which will ensure that the number of deployed missile launchers can be monitored.

Taking into account the advantage to the United States of retaining a mobile ICBM option and the details of the monitoring problem, I believe that the verification of mobile ICBMs will be fully adequate. Determining the number of mobile ICBM launchers is more difficult than counting silos, but it is a manageable task. The uncertainty in monitoring the number of deployed mobile ICBMs depends on the deployment mode chosen. For example, the Soviets are now deploying the mobile SS–20 IRBM, and we can estimate the number of launchers deployed with reasonable confidence. If the Soviets made special efforts to conceal mobile ICBM launchers, or if they deployed a system without central support facilities, the uncertainties could be larger. But covert deployment of a force on a scale large enough to be militarily significant would be a formidable task, requiring successful concealment of a large number of deployed launchers, and of their production, support, and training exercises as well, and deployment without central support facilities would entail significant operational disadvantages. Also, concealment measures would themselves be violations if they impeded our ability to count

launchers deployed. And we would detect the fact of such attempts at concealment even more easily than we could count the precise number of launchers.

The degree of uncertainty in verifying the number of mobile ICBMs deployed can be sharply reduced if a system is designed with verification in mind. In planning our own land-mobile ICBM, we have devoted considerable effort to devising deployment schemes which permit the other side to monitor the number of launchers deployed, even though not knowing exactly where they are at any one time. This same situation already exists for SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. We would insist that any Soviet mobile ICBM system permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed.

One specific concern about the clandestine deployment of mobile ICBMs is the possibility that the Soviet SS–16 ICBM could be deployed on SS–20 mobile IRBM launchers. To resolve this problem, the Soviets have agreed not to test, produce, or deploy the SS–16. We believe that we could detect over time any significant violation. Given their relatively small size and poor accuracy, deployment of SS–16s would not add significantly to the Soviet strategic forces in any case. Moreover, the diversion of SS–20 launchers to SS–16s would substantially reduce the capabilities of the Soviet theater nuclear forces.

In light of all these considerations, we believe that the advantages of keeping the mobile ICBM option open far outweigh the increased complexity of monitoring. The potential monitoring uncertainty is a small percentage of the total force capability on either side, and is acceptable.

MIRV LIMITATIONS

We have confidence that we can monitor the number of launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs. Again I stress that this judgment covers several of the most significant provisions of the treaty.

The Soviets have always tested their missiles (both in R&D and training phases) from launchers that are identical to the operational launchers for that type. Any change from this practice would reduce both missile reliability and raise questions about concealing the association of missile and launcher a practice prohibited by the Treaty.

I have already mentioned the MIRV counting rules which substantially ease the task of monitoring such systems. One such rule requires counting as MIRVed missiles all those missiles of a type which has been tested with MIRVs. This is required even if that missile type has also been tested with a non-MIRV payload.

These rules also count as MIRV launchers all launchers of a given type once any one has contained or launched a MIRVed missile. The launchers associated with each of the Soviet MIRVed missiles are distinctive, and the MIRV launcher types can be readily distinguished from non-MIRV types. The agreement stipulates that future launchers not equipped for MIRVed missiles must be distinguishable from MIRVed missile launchers, and vice versa. If they are not, such launchers would count as MIRV launchers.

LAUNCH-WEIGHT, THROW-WEIGHT, AND NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES

At the present time, we can continue to monitor the launch-weight and throw-weight of ICBMs tested in the Soviet Union. While the uncertainties are somewhat larger than they were when the Iranian sites were functioning, we are still able to detect significant changes in launch-weight and throw-weight over the course of a flight-test program. The uncertainties would be smaller for monitoring changes to existing ICBMs on which we have built up a considerable base of information than for the one new type ICBM permitted by the agreement.

The deployment of additional collection systems in the near term could enhance our ability to monitor launch-weight and throw-weight. A new or significantly modified missile requires a number of flight tests over a period of years before it is deployed. Significant evasion of the launch-weight and throw-weight limits would likely be detected during this test program. The Soviets would gain little militarily by exceeding the launch-weight and throw-weight limits by amounts that we may not be able to detect, and would risk challenge in the Standing Consultative Commission.

As for the number of reentry vehicles, we can determine accurately the number of RVs released from a missile during flight-testing. However, the Soviets might deploy ICBMs with a greater number of RVs than had ever been actually flight-tested on that missile. The SALT II agreement deals with this problem by limiting certain test practices which could be used to demonstrate procedures to release more RVs than were actually tested. We currently can monitor the maximum

number of RVs tested on existing missiles, and planned future collection systems will allow us to continue to monitor the maximum number of RVs on future Soviet missiles. Furthermore, potential increases in the number of RVs on existing types of ICBMs are also restricted by a provision banning the flight-testing or deployment of an ICBM with an RV lighter than the lightest RV which has been flight-tested on an ICBM of that type.

NEW TYPES OF ICBM'S

The agreement limits each side to one new type of ICBM. New types of ICBMs are distinguished from existing types on the basis of launch-weight, throw-weight, number of stages, propellant type (liquid or solid), length, and maximum diameter. Launch-weight and throw-weight are characteristics which I have already discussed. We have good monitoring capability for the remaining features: number of stages, propellant type, and dimensions.

In order to distinguish between new types and modifications to existing types, a line must be drawn between the two. The agreement does this by specifying the amount by which certain features of an existing missile may be changed before it becomes a new type. Any change in the number of stages or propellant type, or any difference of more than 5 percent in launch-weight, throw-weight, overall length or largest diameter qualifies an ICBM as a new type. Over the period of a test program for a new or modified ICBM we could detect significant deviations from these limits. Here again some small transgressions of the limits on missile modification fall within the area of our monitoring uncertainty. Such violations would not, however, affect missile capability in any significantly threatening way, particularly since increasing the maximum number of RVs is subject to a separate limitation, and is verifiable. In the absence of a SALT II agreement, the Soviets could modify existing missiles, develop new ones, and deploy both, all without limits.

The "new types" provision allows the U.S. to test and deploy the MX, and, if we desired to do so, to make some modifications to the Minuteman III. This provision will, however, probably have a more significant impact on the Soviets. The rule will force them to choose between replacing the SS–11 with a new, larger (possibly solid-fueled) non-MIRVed missile, or replacing the SS–17 and SS–19 with a 10–RV MIRVed missile. They cannot do both. We will be able to determine with confidence that the Soviets are complying with this limitation.

CRUISE MISSILES

This is another area in which there are some monitoring uncertainties. It is also very definitely an area in which the U.S. negotiating position emphasized preserving future force options.

We have a good understanding of the numbers, characteristics, and capabilities of current Soviet cruise missiles, even though cruise missile range is difficult to define and estimate precisely. If the Soviets continue their present practices for the development and deployment of cruise missiles, we expect to maintain our present level of understanding. If the Soviets altered this current practice, our estimates of cruise missile range capability could be subject to considerable uncertainty.

This uncertainty is acceptable because we believe the Soviets have little incentive for cheating on cruise missile range limits. The agreement provides both sides with enough flexibility to pursue long-range cruise missile programs without cheating.

Since all limits on SLCMs and GLCMs expire with the Protocol, and the range of cruise missiles deployed on heavy bombers is unconstrained for the entire treaty period, the most important monitoring task for cruise missile ranges after the Protocol is to determine that ranges of cruise missiles deployed on aircraft not counted in the 1,320 limit have a range capability of less than 600 km.

Our confidence in verifying the limits on ALCM numbers is considerably higher than for cruise missile range limits. Bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles are counted in the 1,320 limit. As with MIRVs, there are counting rules to distinguish aircraft equipped for ALCMs from those which are not. The association of an ALCM with its carrier aircraft is made as early as the flight-test phase.

BACKFIRE

We can estimate the number of Backfire aircraft produced with confidence in the same way we estimate the number of heavy bombers.

We could detect a significant upgrade in Backfire's capability either by a physical modification of the aircraft, or a reorientation of the Backfire force toward intercontinental missions. Careful observation of the testing of Backfire, its deployment patterns, and training and exercises with this aircraft indicate that Backfire is assigned a theater and anti-ship role. However, the aircraft does have an inherent

capability to perform some intercontinental missions. Improving its capability for such a mission would probably require changes in the aircraft's deployment pattern or training activity which could be monitored. Moreover, the additional strategic capability which the Backfire could provide would be at the expense of a substantial loss of theater and anti-ship capability resulting from such a change in the role of this aircraft.

I would also note that we were able to extract some important limitations on the Backfire from the Soviets. They have agreed to freeze its production rate at 30 per year; they have agreed not to improve its intercontinental capability. Any more direct and restrictive limitation on Backfire would inevitably have brought into the negotiations on SALT II our forward-based systems which are marginally capable of reaching the Soviet Union. We have insisted throughout SALT that these systems are not for negotiation between the United States and Soviet Union alone. The acceptability of the verification uncertainties have to be considered in the light of these factors.

Given this negotiating history, and the factors that reduce the incentives tempting the Soviets to cheat on the Backfire assurances, I find our uncertainties in this area acceptable.

COVERT DEPLOYMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

Some observers have disputed the judgment that the provisions of SALT II can generally be monitored with high confidence. They suggest that it would be a fairly simple exercise for the Soviets clandestinely to deploy significant numbers of strategic forces. They imply that the U.S. intelligence community has developed a false confidence in its monitoring capabilities because "we have never found anything that the Soviets have successfully hidden."

This tautology, like all such statements is true on its face. But it is gravely undermined as a practical argument by our experience in the real world. The fact is that we have never found a strategic weapon system that the Soviets had successfully hidden for a period of time. If the Soviets had embarked on a significant clandestine deployment of strategic forces, we would expect to have discovered—at some point since the beginning of the missile age—a strategic weapon program which had been operational for some time, or an occasional example of attempted concealment which was not entirely successful. That has not been the case, and that fact does give us confidence in our collection capabilities and analytical techniques. We have had—and will continue to have—disputes over the meaning of the data we collect, but we have had remarkable success in monitoring Soviet strategic forces over the last 25 years. We have detected every ballistic missile and heavy bomber as soon as it entered the flight-test phase. Most of these systems were detected even earlier.

In short, throughout our years of monitoring Soviet forces we have observed no grain elevators being loaded with ICBMs, no SLBM launchers being installed on fishing trawlers. One theoretical explanation is that the Soviets are doing an extraordinary job of concealment—with absolutely no breaches of security or inadvertent disclosure of what would be a substantial effort. The other far more plausible interpretation is that Soviet clandestine deployment of strategic forces, if it exists at all, is at such a low level as to be strategically insignificant.

COMPLIANCE AND REACTION TO VIOLATION

In considering Soviet compliance with the provisions of SALT II, it is important to keep in mind that there is a difference between detection of a violation and enforcement, bringing a detected violation to an end. The SALT II Treaty will not be enforced in the courts; the mere existence of a provable violation does not bring it to an end. Conversely, the issue is not whether we could prove a case to a jury. We do not need proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even evidence we can discuss in detail, to challenge Soviet action.

Our initial course, if we were concerned about a possible violation, would be to discuss any ambiguous situation with the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). In appropriate cases we could also raise the issue in higher level diplomatic channels. We come to SALT II with more than six years of experience with the SCC. Over the years both sides have raised questions concerning activities of the other side. On several occasions we observed activity which raised questions with respect to Soviet compliance with the agreements. We raised these issues promptly with the Soviets, and in every case the activity ceased, or subsequent information clarified the situation and allayed our concern. As a result of our record of raising questions in the SCC, the Soviets are well aware that we will call

them to account in SALT II for any questionable activities related to their strategic programs.

My own belief is that the Soviets are more likely to attempt to exploit the ambiguity of various provisions and understandings (and there has been a very considerable effort to make these substantially less in SALT II than in SALT I) than they are to try to find ways to test our verification capabilities by cheating. This was certainly our experience in SALT I. The ambiguities were greater in SALT I, and the limitations less detailed—but our monitoring capabilities are even better now than they were at the time.

We will expect satisfactory resolution of any problems encountered under SALT II. If we do encounter problems and present them to the Soviets, they may be able to explain satisfactorily the ambiguous activity. Or they may stop the activity in question.

It must be acknowledged, however, that in international agreements the only ultimate enforcement mechanism is our own actions, either to produce agreement by the other side to cease and correct the problem, or to offset the consequences by our own unilateral steps. If a problem is not resolved to our satisfaction, a number of courses are open to us. We could take actions permitted under SALT which would have the effect of offsetting the Soviet action. We could insist on taking certain actions ourselves outside the Treaty to compensate militarily and politically for the violation.

Our ultimate remedy would be termination of SALT II agreement. That is a step we would not take lightly. However, if a problem were not resolved or if we detected a violation which threatened our security, I would not hesitate to recommend to the President that we take whatever steps necessary to meet the threat—including, if need be, the ultimate step of Treaty abrogation.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

In assessing the significance of our monitoring uncertainties, I have assumed (and believe) that we will recover from Soviet missile testing the telemetry that is relevant to SALT limitations. Given this assumption, I believe that all of the uncertainties we face are acceptable risks. The United States will maintain forces and programs capable of being accelerated so as to offset any potential Soviet violation. These U.S. hedges mean that the Soviets must count on a low payoff—very likely a negative payoff—for any contemplated cheating. Finally, all of the uncertainties we face in SALT II would be far worse without an agreement because Soviet concealment practices would then be unconstrained. SALT actually serves to reduce our uncertainties about Soviet strategic forces.

In my judgment, we can adequately verify compliance with every provision of SALT II. In assessing the adequacy of verification, it is important to consider the total agreement rather than its particular provisions taken separately. To determine whether the agreement as a whole is adequately verifiable, we should also ask ourselves whether the Soviets could exploit the monitoring uncertainties of several individual provisions, even if each is judged as adequately verifiable, in a way that would affect our national security interests. This perspective asks, in effect, what would the Soviets have to do not just to cheat and (perhaps) to get away with it, but what they would have to do in order to gain an advantage in the strategic balance by cheating. In such a context, the probability of detecting the fact of cheating increases markedly as the number of provisions being violated increases. The high likelihood of detecting significant cheating on individual limitations and our ability to detect the fact of even small cheating if it is attempted over a period of time on a number of provisions enhances our monitoring confidence.

The Soviets would also have to take into account the possibility that any clandestine effort to violate the terms of SALT II could be compromised by a defector, an intelligence source, or accidents which reveal the nature of the activity. The larger the scale of the effort and the longer it went on, the more activity would be involved and the greater the possibility of compromise would become.

In short, there is a double bind which serves to deter Soviet cheating. To go undetected, any Soviet cheating would have to be on so small a scale that it would not be militarily significant. Cheating on such a level would hardly be worth the political risks involved. On the other hand, any cheating serious enough to affect the military balance would be detectable in sufficient time to take whatever action the situation required.

This testimony lays emphasis on the issue of verification; correspondingly I have emphasized my conviction that the Treaty now before the Senate meets the tests of adequate verifiability. But SALT II does more than this. It actually enhances our ability to gather intelligence on Soviet strategic forces. The treaty forbids interfer-

ence with our SALT-related intelligence systems and prohibits deliberate concealment which would impede verification. Without SALT II, we could be faced with concealment, countermeasures, plus all the actions that would be considered "cheating" under the agreement. Without SALT all of these actions would be permitted; with SALT they are all prohibited. The SALT II agreement does not present a verification problem. On the contrary, it improves our ability to gather strategic intelligence and enhances our national security.

I believe that cheating on a scale large enough to affect the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. For these reasons, and others noted in this testimony, I am confident that the SALT II agreement, taken as a whole, is adequately verifiable.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Perry, we will have to ask you to be as brief as possible in order that Senators may have sufficient time to question.

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From the point of view of a strategic planner, Mr. Chairman, the issue of verification of the treaty has to do with how it might change our planning for our strategic forces and the issue of adequate verification means we want to determine those changes which would be of strategic significance, that is, those changes which, if the Soviet Union made them, would lead us to want to make a change in our own force deployment. That is, after all the acid test.

If we look, for example, at the Soviet ABM program, we estimate that they have no capable ABM deployed today, even though they have a vigorous R. & D. program. Therefore, we have not deployed penetration aids, although we are capable of deploying them. It would be a very significant change if the Soviets were to deploy an ABM system because it would require an immediate and significant response on our part.

The CHAIRMAN. They could not deploy an ABM system without violating the treaty.

Dr. PERRY. That is right. It would be a significant change, and one most important for us to detect, because we have a response which we can make to it, which we are not making to it based upon our estimates.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think that if they were to—they have thus far complied with the ABM treaty presumably because both sides finally recognize that the system would not work, and so agreed not to waste hundreds of billions of dollars in constructing it, but if the Soviet Union were to abrogate that treaty and suddenly start to deploy an ABM system, I would say all bets would be off. The time would have arrived to set aside all treaties.

Secretary BROWN. Indeed, there would be very severe diplomatic conseqences. Dr. Perry is pointing out we could react militarily.

Dr. PERRY. We estimate they will not do it. The question is, what if the estimate is wrong, and the answer is, we have a response and we would want to be able to detect that change soon enough. We could make the response in a timely fashion, and we believe we can.

In the case of the ICBM's we estimate there that they will have in the early eighties approximately 5,000 warheads deployed, and that these will have accuracy comparable to our Minuteman. That has led us to estimate that they would have the capability of attacking silos.

Our strategic response to that was to determine to deploy a mobile ICBM which has 5,000 shelters protecting the missiles in it. That has a factor of two safety in it. So, if we err somewhat in our estimate, we are covered somewhat by the safety factor in the design.

Now, if our estimate were grossly in error, that is, if notwithstanding our estimate the Soviets were to deploy 1,200 MIRV launchers or they would have 20 reentry vehicles per ICBM, then we would need to make some appropriate change. The most obvious change we would make militarily would be to deploy 10,000 shelters instead of 5,000. It is a change we could make. We know how to make it. We are not planning to make it. Our safety factor does not accommodate that large a change. We are basing our estimate on what capabilities we see in the Soviet Union and the belief that they will comply with the SALT provision.

Those, then, are the kinds of changes we would look for, and that is why our verification system is going to be important, to catch changes of that order of magnitude, changes that will be larger than the safety factor we have already built into our system. We do that by a broad range of monitoring activities.

The question could they deploy many hundreds of more missiles, could they have 20 reentry vehicles instead of 10, that is the sort of question we are looking for. My answer to that is, no, they could not. We monitor the activity at the design bureau's and production plants well enough that we have been able to predict every ICBM before it ever began its tests. That is an important point.

We have been talking about monitoring the test program, but it is important to note that we have always in the past been able to detect an ICBM's existence before it ever went into test.

In the deployment area, we monitor the missiles that are going into and out of that area and the construction activity with a very high degree of confidence, and can determine the number of missiles deployed to a high level of confidence and to a high level of precision.

In terms of measuring the number of reentry vehicles per missile, which is a key to this verification, we do that by a vast panoply of collection systems, and we do it with photography, which takes photographs in both the launch and impact area. We do it with infrared systems which measure the heat of the engines in flight. We do it with radars which track the missiles and the reentry vehicles as they come into the impact areas. They not only count the reentry vehicles, but they give us the first approximation of the size and shape of the reentry vehicles.

Finally, we do it with radio receivers that listen to telemetry signals. There is one important but not unique aspect of that—to measure the number of vehicles.

A factor of secondary importance is to measure the size of the reentry vehicle, the so-called throw-weight. The number of reentry vehicles we can measure with very high confidence, the throw weight we can measure with a lesser percentage of tolerance.

In summary, I would say that our present intelligence systems are more than adequate to measure the nature of the changes I have described to you. We will continue to improve the systems and we have testified to you about some of the changes that are

underway now. These changes will allow us to have several independent ways of measuring the same event and therefore increase our confidence. They will give us a refinement of measurements so that we can improve our tolerance from, say, a 20 percent to a 10 percent tolerance in some cases.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, they will allow us to make measurements of other factors, such as guidance systems, which, while not covered by SALT, are of great importance to us in our strategic planning.

Mr. Chairman, that summarizes the comments I would make.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Perry.

LOOPHOLE IN TREATY CONCERNING NEW TYPES OF ICBM'S

Mr. Secretary, the New York Times reports today that there is a loophole in this treaty concerning new types of ICBM's. The article refers to a fifth generation of ICBM's that are being developed, and I quote from the article as follows:

> Intelligence officials say that the Soviet Union's new generation of missiles under development consists of one heavy liquid fueled missile, two medium-sized liquid fueled systems, and two smaller, solid fueled systems.

The charge is that a whole new generation of missiles—rather than one new type of ICBM—can in fact be developed by the Soviet Union under the terms of the treaty between now and 1985.

What is your reaction to that charge?

Secretary BROWN. Well, my reaction is that it has been known that the Soviets have been developing new and modified missiles as a new generation. The limitation to 5-percent changes on payload, to no change on propellant, to 5 percent on throw-weight, 5 percent on the critical dimensions, which they are allowed to make, assures that if they go ahead and deploy all but one—that one conception is a new and very different missile, changing payload, changing propellant, and so on—if they go ahead and deploy other than one they will be deploying systems which are not militarily significantly different.

What counts, as I said in my introductory remarks, is the number of warheads, the yield of warheads with this accuracy. The last two are not constrained in SALT, and can be improved in an existing missile or a modified missile or a new missile. They can also change some of the material, but that has no significant military effect.

I can imagine the response of the Senate Armed Services Committee if I were to come up with a proposal for a several billion dollar development of something that I described using the words which have occasionally been used, "an entirely new missile," whose payload, number of warheads, size of warheads, dimensions, propellants were essentially the same as before. I would be accused, and quite rightly, of wasting the taxpayers' money. Since that mechanism does not exist in the Soviet Union, the same accusation may not be leveled, but it is not something for us to be militarily concerned about, even if they were to change all of the bolts, change the thickness of the casing and a number of other things. It really does not matter if they have a new shape of tailfin on the missile. It does not matter militarily.

We have always made a distinction between new missiles and modified missiles, and the negotiations went into where you would draw the line on that distinction. I believe we drew it quite narrowly, and I believe that it will keep the Soviets from being able to deploy more than one new missile. They will have to make some difficult choices.

NEW SOVIET SYSTEMS TO REPLACE SS-17'S, SS-18'S, AND SS-19'S

The CHAIRMAN. Well, critics say that the treaty would enable Moscow to use new systems to replace the existing heavy SS-18's as well as the SS-17 and the SS-19.

Secretary BROWN. They could replace them, but they could only replace them with missiles whose characteristics were not significantly different.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, allowing for the fact that changes within this 5 percent limitation might not make much difference militarily, what do you think the political perceptions would be during the life of the treaty were we to learn that the Soviets were replacing the SS-17, the SS-19, and the SS-18 with a new missile.

Secretary BROWN. I think, again, the issue is how new and how different. My perception would be that they are wasting money.

ADEQUACY OF U.S. DETECTION TECHNIQUES

The CHAIRMAN. Are you satisfied that our detection techniques are adequate to the task of assuring ourselves that any changed system or any replacement of the SS-17 or the SS-19 or the SS-18 would come within the prescribed limits. Five percent is a very narrow limit to impose and it assumes a capacity to detect changes. That is a very accurate one.

Secretary BROWN. Indeed, 5 percent is a very narrow limit. As I said in my introductory remarks, even if we cannot monitor to better than 10 percent, that does not make verification inadequate because it still does not give them a significantly different military capability.

Remember, they will not be able to increase their numbers of reentry vehicles at all. We, for example, have made changes in Minuteman III, very significant ones, both on guidance accuracy and putting in a new warhead, a MARK 12A warhead. We think those are significant changes, but changing the payload by 5 percent, the throw-weight by 5 or 10 percent, is not a significant change militarily.

The CHAIRMAN. How big a change would have to be made before you would regard it as significant?

Secretary BROWN. Let me answer the question this way. If there were no SALT II agreement, changes would take place that I would regard as very significant. They certainly could and I think they would make changes on the order of 50 or 100 percent, and that, I believe, is the comparison that has to be made.

From the point of view of attacking soft targets, they already can destroy soft targets, as can we, with any of our missiles. With respect to hard targets, our projections are that they already have sufficient accuracy and sufficient yield on their missile warheads so that they will in the early eighties be able to threaten our Minute-

man silos. Therefore, increasing the accuracy or increasing the yield slightly by having a 5-percent or a 10-percent or a 15-percent bigger warhead weight in each of the defined number of warheads that they can have will not improve their capability to attack hard targets. So there is no military gain to be made from either improving accuracy or improving yield. I think that the political perceptions ought to follow and in the end will follow the military evaluation.

You see, we could by these same provisions replace Minuteman with a missile, a solid propellant missile with the same number of stages, the same dimensions to within 5 percent, the same throw-weight and launch-weight to within 5 percent. We could do that. We will not, and we will not because to do so would not have a significant military effect.

CAPABILITY TO MONITOR IF FOREIGN POSTS ARE DENIED

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, our ability to monitor Soviet activity, as you have pointed out, will be enhanced by the treaty, but with or without the treaty, we will have to continue to do our best to monitor the Soviet Union, particularly in connection with these strategic weapons that could destroy this country. Part of our monitoring capacity rests abroad, and as we learned in Iran, political changes, changes in government can have a drastic effect upon continued use of American monitoring stations on foreign soil.

Suppose that those stations that presently exist on foreign soil were to be denied to us. Would we still have a capability to adequately monitor this treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Our capability for monitoring is spread among ground stations, some of them in foreign countries, satellite systems, and other detection techniques, some of them deployed aboard ships and aboard aircraft that stay in international air space. If we lost all of our overseas, our non-U.S. sites, our ability to monitor SALT would be degraded somewhat. But our ability to monitor Soviet strategic and other military programs in general and our indications and warning capability for potential Soviet actions would be degraded very much more than that.

My concern would be for those other uses of ground stations, even more than their uses for monitoring SALT. So not having SALT, not approving the SALT Treaty not only does not solve that problem, it would fail to solve the much worse problems that would be created by our loss of such facilities.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you answered my question.

Secretary BROWN. Adequately over—yes, I would say still adequately but not as well. I mean, I cannot draw a line——

The CHAIRMAN. Even in the unlikely event that all foreign governments were to deny us the sites we now use and we were forced to rely upon our own monitoring system without foreign bases, do you still think this treaty could be adequately verified?

Secretary BROWN. I think it could be adequately verified, but I would be very much less comfortable. I think those sites are quite valuable. Others might have a different judgment of adequacy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate again your willingness to come to grips with the details of the treaty. I will leave to my colleagues the details of what you may and may not verify. I would rather take my time to go to the sanctions, because I think that is what we are ultimately going to be reduced to. To me the most important article of the treaty respecting sanctions is article XV, which reads as follows (article XV-2):

> Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this article "which provides for the use of national technical means."

And especially paragraph 3 of article XV:

> Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means, of compliance with the provisions of this treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Now, we are well acquainted with these practices, are we not?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, indeed.

ABILITY TO DETECT CONCEALMENT BY NTM

Senator JAVITS. Do you believe that we will be able to note when there is concealment or impeding of verification by our national technical means?

Secretary BROWN. We will be able to see when that happens. We will not always be sure, but we will always know enough to be able to raise it as an issue.

Senator JAVITS. That is one thing we are sure about, is it not? Whatever uncertainties there may be, we will be able to detect that we are being impeded in the use of our national technical means, or that there is deliberate concealment?

Secretary BROWN. Well, we will be able to tell that such things are happening. There may then be an argument about whether there is concealment, but we will be able to tell whether it is happening; yes.

Senator JAVITS. Wouldn't you rate that above our ability to actually monitor and photograph and everything else?

Secretary BROWN. Indeed, I think that is an extra safeguard above our own capabilities of monitoring what they are doing with their strategic weapons. It is easier to tell that they are trying to hide something than it is to tell what they are trying to hide.

Senator JAVITS. And, we will be sure of our result in that case, will we not?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, we will, and that is true of these provisions [indicating], even if there were no limitations in the SALT agreement.

Senator JAVITS. That is an overall protection against other deficiencies.

Secretary BROWN. Yes; it is.

VIOLATIONS CAUSE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO TERMINATE TREATY

Senator JAVITS. All right. Now, under those circumstances, I refer to your prepared statement, in which you say: "If a problem is not resolved to our satisfaction, a number of courses are open to

us." One—you don't number them, but I number them: "We could take actions permitted under SALT which would have the effect of offsetting the Soviet actions." Two: "We could insist upon taking certain actions ourselves outside the treaty to compensate militarily and politically for the violation."

Three: "Our ultimate remedy would be termination of the SALT II agreement."

So, I ask you, Mr. Secretary, if such a problem arises under article XV, where we are satisfied that they are impeding the use of our national technical means, or concealing, and if that problem "is not resolved to our satisfaction," will the administration consider that serious enough to terminate the SALT II Treaty?

Secretary BROWN. It depends upon how serious the violation was and how clear a violation it was, but we would certainly include termination of the SALT Treaty as a remedy if we did not get satisfaction by other means.

Senator JAVITS. I need more than that, and so does the Senate. In short, is this particular violation of article XV so high on our list that we would consider it a sufficient basis for terminating the whole treaty? That is how seriously we regard it.

Secretary BROWN. A clear violation, you see, depends upon how sure we are that they have violated it, and how serious we consider what they may be covering up to be. You know, it does make a difference whether we are talking about environmental shelters, environmental protection shelters, over silos, or if we talk about test practices or something else. I do not think that the Administration should commit itself to abrogate the treaty in a situation where what has happened may be ambiguous.

Senator JAVITS. I am not asking you to do that.

Secretary BROWN. If it is unambiguous, I think we would be moved to very strong measures.

Senator JAVITS. I am not asking you to do it. I am asking you to tell me that the United States considers the violation of article XV to be serious enough to warrant terminating the treaty, not that we will do it or that we won't——

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. In our list of priorities, article XV is so critical that we would feel justified, if there was a violation, in even terminating the treaty.

Secretary BROWN. A violation of article XV is grounds, and we would consider it grounds for terminating the treaty.

Senator JAVITS. It is that high on our list of priorities.

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. The reason I press you on that, Mr. Secretary, and I do wish you would think this over, and I do wish you would talk to the President about this, because all of the arguments about the Soviets not being trusted are answered here. If we have grounds for not trusting them, I could not care less about the rest of the provisions you have in the treaty. We ought to be ready to terminate, if we say we can't trust you, we don't know what you are doing. Once you impede our national means, or you conceal, that is serious enough. They ought to know in advance that once they are nailed on article XV, they are really in trouble, if they want this treaty. So, I hope very much, Mr. Secretary, that you will

discuss that with the President. I think it deserves attention on the highest level, because I think that is one thing we can nail down in advance: We would say to the Soviets, this is to us the most serious point, because despite all of this nonsense that you go through about the fact that you do or do not want to tell what you are hiding, if you want SALT II, we have to be able to use our national means to monitor and verify what you are doing. There is no use in fudging on that.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Would you agree with me generally on that?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you. The only other question I would like to ask, if I still have the time, is the following: It is said that the Soviets have gone through four generations of missiles. They now have a fifth on the drawing board. We accept one more missile just like they have to accept the M-X. Now given the questions you have been asked about the M-X—whether I would favor it when it comes up for vote is another matter—we have to nail down that there is no question about the M-X.

That does not mean that the Russians are not going to jump up and down as they did in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They may, but we are nonetheless going to persist. We have to be convinced that we have the right to persist. Now they have a fifth generation of missiles coming down the pike, and the question that I would like to ask is: Suppose that we find that they have not only one new missile to wit, the one they are permitted, but that the conversion of existing missiles which they are making under the treaty—and you say we can judge whether it is 5 percent or 10 percent or 15 percent—goes over that line and is so great as to represent new missiles, would you place that on a high enough priority to say to the Soviet Union, that that is the kind of violation which can invalidate this whole treaty?

Secretary BROWN. If we conclude that the changes are significant enough to constitute a new type of ICBM as defined in the treaty and they then test or deploy more than the one such new type of ICBM that they are allowed, we will consider that a violation, and it would be grounds for termination of the treaty.

Senator JAVITS. The question I am putting to you now, Mr. Secretary, is, does the administration consider that as the kind of violation which would justify cancellation of the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. When I used the words "fifth generation," of course, I was referring to the one new ICBM the Soviets can deploy under the treaty.

Secretary BROWN. That is right. Yes, they can test missiles that are sufficiently like the existing ones, so that they do not constitute a new missile.

Senator JAVITS. All right, sir. So your answer to that is——

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. CHAIRMAN.

PORTION OF IRANIAN MONITORING CAPABILITY RECOVERED

In connection with the loss of the Iranian sites, I think we would be interested in knowing as of today what portion of the Iran capability has been recovered?

Secretary BROWN. I cannot give you numbers in open session.

Senator PELL. No.

Secretary BROWN. I would say that most of the items we are monitoring we never got from the Iranian sites. We got them from elsewhere. There are a couple of quantities, launch-weight is one that I think I mentioned in my testimony, for which the precision of our knowledge is reduced in the absence of the Iranian stations, but we still will have enough knowledge to know whether or not they test a new missile, for example.

FOCUS OF DIRECTION ON VIOLATIONS

Senator PELL. If they are testing a new weapon, and you catch a violation of that, that would alert you to focus your efforts in that direction afterwards.

Secretary BROWN. I think that is a very important point, Senator Pell. We do not rely simply on one technique to make measurements. We check radio signals against photographs, against radar, and we monitor different aspects of the missile capability. If we get suspicious on the basis of one, then we can check with others, and it is very, very difficult for the Soviets to try to avoid this collection of different means of detection.

Senator PELL. About how many tests does it take to develop a new weapons system, in your view?

Secretary BROWN. It is 20, perhaps 30. It is in that range.

DIFFICULT FOR SOVIETS TO DEVELOP NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM

Senator PELL. Well, I don't ask you to comment on this, but would it be out of line to suggest that if you take 20 tests and your chances are even of catching one of them, that that probably means that multiplying 2 to the 20th power, it is better than 1 out of 1 million, and it would be difficult for the Soviets to develop a new weapons system without our being alerted to that fact?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; I think the chances that they can go through 20 tests and we would not be able to tell that they were testing and roughly what they were testing is not as high as 1 in 1 million.

Senator PELL. Not as high as 1 out of 1 million?

Secretary BROWN. Although 2 to the 20th power is 1 million, we have various ways of detecting things, so that the chances would be more than 50 percent on each test.

Senator PELL. In other words, it is to our advantage. From the viewpoint of the assurance of the American people, the chance of a new weapons system being developed and our being unaware of that fact is substantially less than 1 out of 1 million?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, I think so, but it is not an easy mathematical calculation.

Senator PELL. I realize that. It is hard to reduce all of these things to simple terms that people can understand and that is why

I was pursuing this line of questioning, leading to the thought that it is less than 1 out of 1 million.

ADEQUACY OF VERIFICATION RELATED PRIMARILY TO TOUGH AREAS

Now, along another line of questioning, in your statement, you seem to relate a judgment on the adequacy of verification primarily to the tough areas of verification. Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. I dismissed the easy ones, which was perhaps a mistake, because we are looking at the hole instead of the donut in this case, and saying, let's dismiss the easy ones and let's just concentrate on the hard ones. That may overestimate the difficulties of verification.

Senator PELL. And that is erring on the side of safety.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, it is.

Senator PELL. Would you agree that the only conceivable advantage for the Soviets in cheating in the difficult to monitor areas and by difficult to monitor areas, I am thinking of the range of cruise missiles or the exact throw-weight of a new missile, that is uniquely related to SALT, would be in areas where in the absence of SALT we would either have exceeded the limits themselves contained in SALT or would have been further along in weapons programs than would be the case under SALT?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, I agree with that, and we picked those areas deliberately to assure that our own capabilities would move ahead.

COMBINATION OF U.S. COMPLIANCE AND SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Senator PELL. Are there any such actions on our part where the combination of our compliance and Soviet cheating in areas beyond our ability to detect would give the Soviets some advantage?

Secretary BROWN. I can think of none, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Well, then, it would seem to me that if that is our position in the difficult to discover areas, the areas difficult to verify, and if in the easy areas we are already in good shape, it would seem to me that you had built a strong case about not insisting on an excessively high standard of verifiability particularly in light of my esoteric thought that the Soviet chances of getting away with cheating in their testing program is less than one out of a million.

I gather you feel completely comfortable with our position in this regard.

Secretary BROWN. As I define "adequate verifiability," and I think you have gone through the same reasoning process, I agree that to reject the treaty because of some arbitrarily high standard of verification really makes our ability to monitor worse.

DIFFICULT TO MONITOR PROVISIONS PROPOSED BY UNITED STATES

Senator PELL. Also, you mention in your statement that in determining the adequacy of verification, one must weigh the benefits of a particular provision against the monitoring problem involved, and you mentioned in this connection that the new types of Provi-

sion causes us perhaps the most difficult monitoring problems, and it has more than offsetting advantages.

In this regard, would it be true to say that most of the difficult to monitor provisions were proposed by the United States for good reasons and not by the Soviets?

Secretary BROWN. It is certainly true for the mobile multiple ICBM and the cruise missile, both of which are more difficult to monitor than some of the other provisions. Now, the Soviets would have been quite willing to ban cruise missiles, which would make them easier to monitor. I do not know about mobile ICBM's, but they would have been willing to ban cruise missiles that would have made it easier to monitor.

We wanted to keep the option open for a very good reason, and the same thing is true of mobile ICBM's.

Senator PELL. I think this is a very important point you make. The public is not sufficiently aware of that, that we could have increased the verifiability of the treaty by eliminating certain provisions, but then we would have had a treaty that was a lot less meaningful.

Secretary BROWN. Well, verifiability is not the primary criterion. Our national security is. Those provisions which we proposed increase our national security even though they may make certain components more difficult to verify.

MONITORING SOVIET CAPABILITIES WITH OR WITHOUT SALT

Senator PELL. Finally, could you tell me how much of our ability to monitor Soviet forces, and this, as you pointed out in your opening statement, is the most important point, would be degraded if the Senate rejects this treaty and thereby causes us to lose the monitoring aids contained in the treaty.

In other words, would we be better off from the viewpoint of monitoring Soviet strategic capabilities with or without the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Oh, we are very much better off in monitoring Soviet strategic ability with than without the treaty. I would like—for the reasons I gave at the beginning—not to use the same word "monitoring" for the situation without a treaty because that confuses it with monitoring provisions of the treaty. We are much better off in getting intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities with the treaty than without the treaty, no matter what the provisions are.

Senator PELL. So in other words, if the treaty is rejected and one of the excuses is the verifiability of the treaty, that pales in comparison to the diminution in our ability to follow the Soviet strategic weapons systems?

Secretary BROWN. Precisely.

Senator PELL. So it is really weighing an apple against a great big huge watermelon?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

We have Senator Helms next.

Senator HELMS. Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BROWN. Good morning, sir.

Senator HELMS. It is a pleasure to see you here. With all the letters of resignation running around town, you never know. [General laughter.]

I know you will understand that I have some problem with the repeated use of the word "adequately" in terms of verification. Now, I don't want to be picky, Mr. Secretary, and I certainly don't want to appear suspicious, but the repeated use of the qualification "adequately" bothers me. And I guess Mrs. Brown would be a little suspicious of you if you were to come home tonight and tell her that you were adequately faithful to her, wouldn't she? [General laughter.]

Secretary BROWN. In that case as in this, I suppose it would depend upon the alternative offered. [General laughter.]

Senator HELMS. I am not going to ask you how your wife feels. I am not going to fall into that. [General laughter.]

Secretary BROWN. We did not invent the word "adequately." The statute establishing the ACDA uses the word "adequately." President Nixon used the words "adequately verifiable" in his charge to the SALT delegation.

SOVIET UNION'S FIFTH GENERATION ICBM'S

Senator HELMS. I understand. Let me go back to the question that I believe Senator Javits raised about the Soviet Union's fifth generation ICBM's. Do you suppose that the Soviets are delaying the testing of this fifth generation ICBM to avoid sort of a fireworks display during the ratification period?

Secretary BROWN. I don't see any evidence of that. As Dr. Perry said, we usually know about new missiles or modified missiles well before they are tested. And I don't know what their motives are. In any event, if they were to test them and they did not conform to the structure that only one new missile, as defined by the definition of a new missile, is allowed, that would indeed be very serious.

If they went ahead and tested them and they were not new missiles, I think that would have a lesser effect. Maybe Dr. Perry would like to comment on the schedule for those missiles.

Mr. PERRY. Our best estimate is they could not begin tests of them this year.

Senator HELMS. When? Why?

Mr. PERRY. Middle of 1980, or later perhaps.

Secretary BROWN. Simply because they are not far enough along, by our judgment.

Mr. PERRY. Yes.

DOES TREATY PERMIT USE OF DUMMIES ON ICBM'S

Senator HELMS. Let me move along. Mr. Secretary, the second agreed statement to Article XV states—and let me read the description of it given by the State Department:

> The prohibition on deliberate concealment measures does not preclude the testing of anti-missile defense penetration aids even though penetration aids may have as their purpose the concealment or imitation of reentry vehicles.

Now, am I correct in surmising that this statement might be suggesting that the treaty permits the use of dummies on ICBM's to make it more difficult to single out the reentry vehicle?

Secretary BROWN. If it is a dummy with the same weight as the reentry vehicle, we would conclude it is not a penetration aid, that there is another reentry vehicle. It certainly allows simulation of reentry vehicles by penetration aids with similar radar cross-sections, for example. We, in fact, I think as much as the Soviets, wanted to make sure we could test penetration aids if we had to without violating the treaty.

It is one thing to be able to tell a penetration aid from a reentry vehicle in the time allowed during a nuclear war. It is another thing to be able to tell a penetration aid from a reentry vehicle over a long series of tests where you have lots of time for analysis.

Senator HELMS. Are you saying you can tell the difference?

Secretary BROWN. I am saying over a long test sequence, you can tell whether they have more than the allowed number of actual reentry vehicles.

Senator HELMS. Why would the Soviets want an exception for penetration aids if the United States can tell the difference?

Secretary BROWN. Because, as I suggested, Senator Helms, telling the difference during a 3-year period, a 3- or 5-year period of a test program, and telling penetration aids from reentry vehicles during the 2 minutes that is allowed when they are used during a nuclear war are two very different things. I think the first is feasible. The second is not. Perhaps Dr. Perry would differ with that judgment.

Mr. PERRY. No, I agree.

WHAT ANY SPECIFIC SS–20 IS TARGETED AGAINST

Senator HELMS. There we get into the business of adequate verification.

Mr. Secretary, do we have the expertise to tell from photography what a specific SS–20 is targeted against?

Secretary BROWN. No. That inference might be drawn from its location and its range, but not from taking a picture of it.

Senator HELMS. How can you know that the SS–20's that are supposed to be targeted against Western Europe are not really targeted against the United States?

Secretary BROWN. Because in that case they would fall into the ocean. [General laughter.]

No, I think there is a point.

Senator HELMS. I am talking about warheads now. It is not a laughing matter.

Secretary BROWN. The real question is what is the range? And the range does depend upon some things that I don't want to go into in open session.

Senator HELMS. All right.

Secretary BROWN. But I do want to make it very clear that we would know if it had been tested to have a capability at an intercontinental range. None of us believe—I will express my opinion and I think the intelligence community would agree with me—that the Soviets would deploy something like that against the United States without having tested it at intercontinental range.

Senator HELMS. Perhaps this is a subject we should pursue in an executive session. Any question that I ask, Mr. Secretary, don't hesitate to say, "forget it." I learned more yesterday in that session than I have learned in twice the time in these public sessions. I know of the inhibition both the questioners and the respondents have.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

LENGTH OF TIME NEEDED TO RETARGET SS–20

Senator HELMS. How long does it take to retarget an SS–20?

Secretary BROWN. Again, I don't think I ought to say in open session.

Senator HELMS. All right.

Secretary BROWN. But I do want to draw a distinction between the time that it takes to retarget something which is within its capability merely by changing the coordinates of the target in a tape, for example, which might take hours, and giving it a capability to reach the United States when it has never been tested that way, which I would say is a matter of 1 year or 2 years or 3 years of a testing program.

Senator HELMS. I want to ask you about converting an SS–20 into an SS–16 and doing it at night. Would you rather not discuss that in public session?

Secretary BROWN. I would rather not. The way we tell whether that is being done or not really does depend upon the details of our monitoring capabilities.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think I have just about hemmed myself out with all of the questions I have. I certainly don't want to contribute to any disclosure of information which ought not be disclosed at this time.

Secretary BROWN. I am not concerned about disclosing, Senator Helms, what our conclusions are, which is that the Soviets cannot expect to get away with it if they try to cheat by deploying SS–16's where SS–20's are, or to cheat by giving the SS–20 an intercontinental range. What I do not want to do, and I know you do not want it done either, is to explain the intelligence basis upon which we arrive at that conclusion. The more of that which is known, the more we invite the Soviets to take actions which, while legal, would make it more difficult for us to tell.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENCRYPTION AND CONCEALMENT

Senator HELMS. One final question. This was raised to me in a letter from a gentleman in North Carolina. He said: "I hear about concealment." What is the difference between encryption and concealment? Obviously, he has watched these hearings on television pretty closely. Do you want to answer my friend from North Carolina?

Secretary BROWN. Encryption is one way of keeping some information from unauthorized persons, which in this case would include the United States. The question is whether that encryption impeded—that is, made more difficult—our monitoring of Soviet compliance with the limits of the treaty. And if it did not—let me give you an example.

Supposing the encryption had only to do with the accuracy of the missile. That is not limited by SALT, for reasons that you have already gone into in detail earlier. So it is not concealment of anything limited by the treaty, and it would not be a violation. But if that encryption did impede our ability to monitor the throw weight or the launch weight, that would be a very different matter.

Senator HELMS. I see my time is up, Mr. Secretary. Thank you. I appreciate your letting me joke with you a little bit.

Secretary BROWN. That is fine. Let me restate what I said. Concealment is a word that applies only to matters limited by the agreement, and that is a distinction that has to be drawn. It is not always easy to draw.

Senator HELMS. I was going to say we need to talk about that in executive session, too.

Mr. Chairman, I have overshot my time. I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, Senator.

Senator McGovern.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

VERIFICATION DOES NOT DEPEND ON SOVIET COOPERATION/IRANIAN POSTS

Mr. Secretary, Dr. Perry. Gentlemen, as you know, the public opionion polls have showed that between 70 and 80 percent of the American public favors the concept of arms limitations between the Soviet Union and the United States, but the same poll shows that about 70 percent of the American people don't trust the Russians; hence, the importance of this verification issue.

Aside from the technical and military aspects of it, you need to reassure the American public that we do have a dependable way of verifying this treaty. As for myself, after listening to the briefings from you gentlemen and having talked with the Director of the CIA and listening to the testimony and the statements, I have no doubt about our capacity to verify the terms of this treaty with the technical means that we now have.

I read a very compelling article by the former Deputy Director of the CIA, Dr. Herbert Scoville, that appeared about a month ago, in which he was attempting to answer the concern about the loss of Iran. He said that while that was something of a loss to us, that nevertheless, it does not fundamentally affect our capacity to verify the terms of this treaty.

I do not want to go into all aspects of this article other than to read one paragraph. He said:

> Satellites can now locate, count and measure modern weapons from 100 miles away, while radar-sensitive radio receivers and infrared sensors on ships, on planes and on land can determine their characteristics and the number of warheads they carry. Limits on armaments can be verified so that pacts such as SALT II do not depend upon Russian cooperation.

He had earlier stated they do not depend upon the bases in Iran either. Do you agree, essentially, with that conclusion?

Secretary BROWN. I agree with those last few sentences you quoted. I might place a greater value than Dr. Scoville does on our various ground stations, even on their value for SALT. But essentially, the fundamental base on which our verification capability

rests is satellites, aircraft, ships. And although the ground stations are very helpful, we can, if we have to, do without them.

Senator McGovern. Then he makes this interesting observation, Mr. Secretary: "However, possible U.S. proposals to conceal American M–X missile locations from the Soviets would negate America's ability to count ICBM launchers if the Russians followed suit." He goes on to point out that while he thinks that we now have a capacity to verify the treaty and the Russians have a similar capacity, that once you go to these concealment operations represented by the M–X, then all bets are off on verification.

I am opposed to the M–X, as you know, on many grounds. I think it is a preposterous waste of the taxpayer's dollars. But aside from that, don't you think it does complicate, as Dr. Scoville has said, the whole process of verification?

Secretary Brown. Well, complicate is one word, and negate is another word. I think mobiles are more difficult to count, but they can be counted. We do it right now with submarines. We do it right now with bombers. And the Soviets will be able to verify our M–X deployment. And if they follow suit, we will be able to verify their numbers.

Senator McGovern. You disagree with Dr. Scoville?

Secretary Brown. I disagree with him sharply on that.

Senator McGovern. He says flat out: "If adopted, this American scheme could lead to a complete breakdown in our ability to verify numerical ceilings on ICBM's."

Secretary Brown. We were the first to deploy submarine launched ballistic missiles. The Soviets followed suit. They don't know where our submarines are, we don't know where their submarines are. But we know how many missiles they have and they know how many missiles we have. And the same thing is what we intend to follow with mobile land-based missiles.

Senator McGovern. Mr. Secretary, last March Senator Hatfield and Senator Proxmire and I wrote the President about the M–X and urged him not to make that decision in the context of the SALT considerations. He wrote back that "We may find it desirable in the future to deploy ICBM's such as the M–X in a new basing mode, but this critically important and difficult decision to the United States must be made outside the context of SALT." He said: "I will not be influenced by factors relating to SALT ratification in making my decisions on this or any other defense issue."

Do you think the President has complied with that written commitment that he made to Senator Proxmire, Senator Hatfield and to me?

Secretary Brown. Yes; I believe he has. I believe the M–X decision was made on the basis of our security needs, the needs of deterrence and essential equivalence. Its interaction with SALT had to do with his need to satisfy himself and our need to satisfy ourselves in the Defense Department that it could be done in a verifiable way. And we are satisifed that that is the case.

RACETRACK CONCEPT FOR M–X LAUNCHERS

Senator McGovern. You know, this morning's Washington Post carries a story that the basing system to the M–X, which was

believed originally to have included some 200 trenches in the Southwest, has now been replaced with a racetrack concept. The article describes racetracks, probably in groups of four, that would be located in valleys, primarily on Government-owned land. Then it describes the pattern in which the missile could be dashed around from one part of the racetrack to another, with a Defense Department official assuring the public that they could continue to use most of the racetrack area for campers and recreational purposes.

Are you really thinking about that kind of a system, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary BROWN. That is not significantly different from the system that has been talked about all along, Senator McGovern, although it may be new to the individual who wrote the article. The difference between a trench and a racetrack is elevation. There is no hole in the case of a racetrack. Environmentally, that is much more like the present deployment of Minutemen, near which people do indeed engage in various occupations, including farming.

Senator MCGOVERN. But if this article is right, how can the missile and its transporter dash around from one of these holes to another if the place is littered with campers and motor bikes and family picnics and things of this kind? [General laughter.]

To me, Mr. Secretary, frankly, the whole concept of this M-X seems so preposterous that I have great difficulty grasping it.

Secretary BROWN. I understand, Senator McGovern. I am aware of that. If a nuclear war takes place, the big problem for the people in the region will not be the M-X launcher moving around. It will be the effects of the attack on the United States.

Senator MCGOVERN. I just wonder why we are going through all of these various schemes. It seems clear to me that you and your associates have not yet arrived at any settled agreement as to how we are going to base this thing. If we are really worried about this land-based system becoming vulnerable, why don't we just beef up the submarine force? We know that that can be invulnerable, and rely on that. Why all of these schemes? First the railroad trenches and now the racetracks.

You may get objections from the Western Governors to this, too.

Secretary BROWN. This one they have approved, actually.

Senator MCGOVERN. The Governors have approved it?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; because it is very much like the concept that they are aware of and that already exists with Minuteman. You will recall in my very earliest testimony before this committee on SALT, Senator McGovern, what my reasons were and are for believing that we need to have a land-based component. Those reasons have not changed. Indeed, the submarines are invulnerable; 1990 is not that far away, and for the security of the United States, I would not want to depend on their never becoming vulnerable.

Senator MCGOVERN. My time is up, Mr. Secretary, but I raise this because I do think this new system, if the Soviets follow suit, makes verification infinitely more difficult.

Secretary BROWN. I think that is a matter of detail. A transporter weighing 600,000 or 700,000 pounds is not going to be difficult to

know the number of. It is not as big as a submarine but it is almost as distinctive.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I want to acknowledge the presence of Alan Cranston, the Senator from California, our majority whip. He has been monitoring these hearings, and other Senators from time to time have come in to do so. I just want Senator Cranston to know, and other Senators as well, that they are always welcome.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, Secretary Brown, a basic problem, it seems to me, in discussing the verification issue this morning, is that our society is an open society and Soviet society is not. That is fundamental with regard to verification. It has often been pointed out that it is very hard to keep any secret in this country, however vital it might be. We wish we had comparability with the Soviet Union. Obviously, we do not.

The problem I am concerned about as I listened to your testimony in both closed and open session, and I presume you would not have a disagreement with this thought, is that we have gone through a very difficult period in this country with regard to our intelligence program. It has been under attack and still is in some quarters. I suspect that our major problem, as I listen to you, quite apart from verification of the treaty, is simply a first-class intelligence program that tells us a great deal more about what is going on in the Soviet Union.

I am hopeful that as a part of your program, as a part of the selling of SALT, some attention may be brought to the intelligence program generally.

Leaving that aside for a moment, it seems to me that the second thing which needs to be said, and you have said it, I think, in your first testimony, is that we are going to proceed—you quoted the President this morning, or perhaps Senator McGovern did—with some things we are going to have to do defensewise. The M–X missile is an example. There has been a thought that something will occur in the aircraft area, but you have not pledged to do that although some are hoping that will occur, and some things in submarines. In essence we need an independent program, in which we beef up our intelligence and beef up our entire defense capability.

And I may say, apropos of that, that since your last testimony, the President of the United States has talked about the freedom in this country, about our independence. He has discussed this vividly with regard to energy, and he has talked in terms of as much as $148 billion being spent, as I recall.

Now, that makes rather minuscule whatever we were talking about the other day in terms of an additional $3 billion if SALT is not ratified, $2.5 billion if it is. In short, it seems to me in terms of security, independence and freedom, that in perspective, a first-class program for defense of this country is of the essence. I don't think we have a disagreement on this.

The problem—at least for some of us—is how do you couple the things that we need to do, regardless of SALT, just simply to catch up? As Admiral Kidd said yesterday, our case for SALT is that we have stumbled from superiority to parity to a rough parity. In

essence, we need SALT for a time-out period to pick ourselves up off the floor.

Now, that would not be your characterization of the situation, but it is his, and a rationalization for backing this treaty.

What I want to know from you today is, as a third point, if somehow or another we could couple together a first-class intelligence thrust, a first-class strategic defense thrust independent of SALT, what are the things that we can do to amend SALT that help us securitywise in the realm of the practical? It has been suggested that amendments to simply delete SS–18 or delete the Backfire portion, or in bits and pieces pick up these deficiencies, are not negotiable and ultimately the Soviets will not negotiate that kind of a situation.

But what if we move in the direction that Admiral Zumwalt suggested yesterday in response to a specific question I asked? I asked him, for instance, in article III, if we were to take a look at the aggregate number, and that comes to 2,250, what number should we really aim for? He suggested an off-the-top-of-the-head suggestion, although I think a studied answer from the past, of 1,800. I asked him how about the MIRV launchers? What number should we head at there? He suggested the figure of 550.

He also suggested, as I recall, and I hope I do him justice, that we have to have the equal aggregate in numbers, equal aggregate also in throw weight.

Now, what I want to ask of you is, if we were to make mutual reductions that went to 1,800 and 550, it still could be said that there are too many warheads around, that you still have double or triple coverage.

In a technical sense, if we were to go the route of amending articles III and V on the aggregate number and the sublimit to a reasonable number with regard to progress toward our own security, is 550 helpful? What comment do you have on any of this?

Secretary BROWN. My comment is the treaty was very carefully negotiated to get where it is; that each side gave in on certain points and that a revision of the kind you suggest may be something we can get at in SALT III. My own judgment—but I would leave it to the negotiators, who have spent much more time on it—is that although that is something that you and Admiral Zumwalt could negotiate, or even you, I and Admiral Zumwalt, that is not the same thing as a successful negotiation with the Soviet Union.

That is behind my position, which I share with my colleagues, that we cannot alter parts of this agreement without reopening the entire treaty to renegotiation.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that, but at the same time, there is something to negotiate here. If we are going to limit both sides, are we going to offer a greater degree of security? I am not certain there is any magic in 1,800 or 550. Maybe 1,500 and 400.

Secretary BROWN. The 1,800 and 550 happen to be the numbers we proposed in March 1977, and as has been recounted, the Soviets then said that the treaty had to be based on the Vladivostok figures and would take up lower figures in SALT III.

Now, actually we have done better than that. We have gotten them to agree to go from 2,400, a Vladivostok figure, to 2,250 by the end of 1981. And we did get them to agree to a MIRVed ICBM

plus SLBM number and a separate MIRVed ICBM number. So that we actually started where you now say, and we negotiated with them and we finally got them to agree to something between our position and their position.

You are now saying what we might consider doing is amending the treaty to be our original position on these matters. I think the outcome of that is obvious.

Senator LUGAR. Perhaps so, but it seems to me that the outcome is also obvious to us if we were to adopt this treaty unamended. That is a perception by the world that we are on the run. Now, I think the dilemma we face at this stage is a pretty serious one with regard to the treaty. There are advantages to the treaty, and I would admit those and have. But it seems to me very clearly in terms of the strategic sense, that the perception is that we are on the run. So, as we turn to the verification item, mentioned by Senator Javits' earlier today, I cannot imagine that if the Soviets finally decided they wanted to scrap the whole thing, why they would not do so.

Quite apart from the minute points of verification, why would they not simply cheat and say we have you and it is all over as far as we are concerned, or we do want to renegotiate but on our terms? Clearly, the perception on my part and, I think, on the part of many is that we are not in good shape and we have got to get well.

So while we are renegotiating 1,800, 500 or something else, we have to do some things intelligencewise and in terms of strategic defense. We have to, in essence, enhance our position so someone will pay some attention to us. If we blew the whistle, would they really care? I think that becomes a basic point on verification.

The CHAIRMAN. May I just say that 10 minutes have expired? The committee is under a time constraint this morning. We have a conference with the House on the economic assistance bill this afternoon beginning at 2:30, and the committee is hosting the British Defense Minister, Mr. Pym, at a luncheon. We have another panel still to hear from, so I wonder if we can move on.

Senator LUGAR. I will cease fire.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to cease fire? Well, that is fair enough. I was going to engage in one brief volley of return fire.

I don't agree with Senator Lugar when he says that ratification of this treaty would be perceived anywhere as the United States being on the run. I cannot conceive of how a treaty which establishes equal aggregate ceilings for all weapons for both sides suggests that either side is on the run. It may suggest that both sides have finally woke up to the need to bring some measure of constraint upon a nuclear arms race that makes both sides increasingly insecure. That is how I would perceive it.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin my 10 minutes by pointing out that I think the 10-minute rule is not a very useful one, although I understand the rationale for it, and I would hope the chairman would do more of what he just did—violate the rule. [General laughter.]

I sincerely mean it. I think it is a shame the way these hearings are conducted under the time constraints that are being made. We

don't get a chance to interchange with our colleagues and take on in a vociferous way, if need be, witnesses with whom we disagree, and I happen to have in front of me two with whom I disagree in part on some aspects of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think, Senator, you have ever been handicapped by this constraint. [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have tried not to be, but nonetheless, I have by the witnesses. All a witness need do to testify before this committee—and I am not suggesting that these two witnesses who have appeared time and again before this committee are guilty of this, because they are not, but we have had other witnesses where you just ask one question and they filibuster for 10 minutes and give you a nonanswer.

I think Admiral Zumwalt was a case in point yesterday. I don't think he was responsive. I don't think we had a chance to continue to pin him. I don't think we had a chance to do that with Mr. Stone, who was a protreaty witness. I think that is a shame. I think it is a flaw. I think it may be a product of both the television setup and the time constraints and the other issues that face us.

But nonetheless, I want to acknowledge that I think we should do it as we do it in the Budget Committee, open it up, anyone intervenes. And if you as the chairman think we are trespassing and making no sense in our interventions, then gavel us down.

The CHAIRMAN. Woe to the chairman who followed that injunction. [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. With all due respect, I realize I am using up my time, but most of what I want to ask I can't ask in open session anyway, so this is an appropriate place to do it.

In the Budget Committee, I would suggest that the macroeconomic effects on the economy are equally as complicated, more complicated than the SS–18, for example, and we have the highest level witnesses, of the level of the Secretary of Defense, who testify in that committee. There are very deep splits in philosophy on that committee, yet it works very well and I think it can work here.

REJECTION WOULD BE WORSE THAN ACCEPTANCE BASED ON VERIFICATION

At any rate, now to my questions. Having said that, with the little time I have left I want to start off by pointing out that I think you gentlemen are making a fallacious argument which I find somewhat insulting. You argue that rejection of this agreement would be worse than accepting the agreement because with this agreement we can verify better than we can without the agreement.

Secretary BROWN. That is not what I argued. I argued that our ability to check Soviet forces is better with the agreement. The word "verification" has meaning only within the context of limitation, so there is no such thing as verification without the agreement. There is, however, the ability to tell what Soviet forces are, and that will be better with the agreement than without.

Senator BIDEN. But implicit in that and the way it is being used by others is that if we come down and say we cannot adequately verify, then we are somehow putting ourselves in more jeopardy as

it relates to the force structure of the Soviet forces relative to our force structure.

Secretary BROWN. Senator Biden, I worked on this statement that I delivered at the beginning for several hours over this week to try to make that distinction. I think it does, but I would be glad to hear your formulation of it. I suspect that we may not differ.

Senator BIDEN. My formulation of that is that it is irrelevant and we shouldn't talk about it because that would assume that we would stand still in the meantime because we could not verify, because we could not count as well, because we could not measure the force structure of the Soviet Union as well without the treaty; that somehow we would not act in the way in which I think we would act, which would be we would assume the worst case and move forward with whatever we thought we needed to do to counter the worst case possibility, thereby insuring at a minimum that we would not be in a position of inferiority relative to the Soviets.

TOTAL BAN ON ENCRYPTION

But let me move on, if I may, with the few moments I have left. Why is there not a total ban on telemetry?

Secretary BROWN. You must mean encryption.

Senator BIDEN. Encryption of telemetry.

Secretary BROWN. Let me make several points on this. First, we don't have a basis for requiring unencrypted telemetry on matters that are not limited by the treaty, such as the accuracy of missiles, for example. Second, if you banned encryption of telemetry, that would not be the same thing as assuring our ability to monitor. There are other ways to deny telemetry besides encryption. There are various ways to do that and I do not want to go into them.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that.

Secretary BROWN. Therefore, a ban on telemetry encryption would by implication—whether it did or not, allow other ways of denying telemetry.

Senator BIDEN. I understand it would.

Secretary BROWN. But what we have agreed with with the Soviets does not do that. It prevents concealment of telemetry by encryption or other means if that concealment impedes verification.

Senator BIDEN. But the fact of the matter is, is it not, that they can under the provisions of this treaty play games with their encryption so that they could do the double-think with us in terms of how they encrypt?

Secretary BROWN. I would prefer not to get into that in open session. But I believe that we have a basis for challenge of any such practice.

Senator BIDEN. I think the point raised by Senator Javits is the critical one of the day. I won't go back over that, but I want to go on the record as sharing the concern and point of view Senator Javits expressed on article XV.

One more question, and then I am sure my time will have expired. Will you explain to the committee, if you can in open session, how we will be able to determine whether or not the Soviets are replacing their SS–11's with SS–19's, the SS–11 not

being MIRVed, the SS-19 being MIRVed, and them having essentially the same configuration. Is that able to be done in open session?

Secretary BROWN. I think not in open session except to say the problem is probably not the SS-19 but another missile, the SS-17.

Senator BIDEN. The SS-17. But nonetheless, the problem is replacing a MIRV.

Secretary BROWN. I believe that is, in fact, rather thoroughly discussed in my classified testimony of yesterday, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I apologize, after having shot off a volley also, as was said here earlier——

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has more time.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. For having to get up and leave. I realize we cannot discuss most of the things about which I think most people have questions in open session. The Intelligence Committee has Ray McCrory, who at 12:15 will be testifying on the verification of a new type of ICBM, which is a question you have raised. I am, with the permission of the chairman, going to leave and go listen to what he has to say in closed session.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am under my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. That is the hearing on some of the classified material I also was at for about an hour this morning when I ducked out.

Mr. Chairman, I should submit that we should not even be having a verification hearing today because verification is based upon monitoring. It has to be based upon that, each provision of monitoring, and that is of primary importance before we can apply the other things that apply in verifiability—the political considerations.

I have objected to some of our scheduling on this committee in the past. I do it so publicly today for the first time. Yesterday we were supposed to have our background briefings on monitoring, appropriate defense and intelligence officials coming before the committee. As a result of it being an afternoon session, which I have objected to repeatedly on this committee, we wound up having 5 minutes, 5 minutes for each Senator, 5 minutes to question on items of monitoring, a thing we have spent 2 years digging into. And that was supposed to be our background for this committee meeting today.

The CHAIRMAN. I would hope the Senator would be fair.

Senator GLENN. I will be fair, Mr. Chairman, because we are going to schedule that with Admiral Turner next week.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Senator GLENN. But today is the day the cameras are grinding. Today is the day we are going to the American public to tell them whether verification is for real or not. This committee is not prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator wishes a second public session following additional executive sessions on this issue, I would be very glad to entertain that request.

Senator GLENN. We may well have that request. But I think it is too bad on this first time, when all the attention is focused. I see

reporters and I see cameras here, which I have not seen before, and today is the big verification day as it is built up to be. This committee has not yet done its background work on this item to enable us to even get into anything in open session that even approximates what I think needs to be done on verification.

This committee has not adequately gone into, for instance, our ability to monitor launch weights, throw weights, number of reentry vehicles, weight of reentry vehicles, about which there is considerable disagreement, reentry vehicle simulations, ban on the SS–16, production of SS–16 third stage, mobile missiles generally. How do we verify between new ICBM's and modifications of old, existing ICBM's?

DESCRIPTION OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION

These are all very, very important items, and I would say I know it is difficult to describe, but Mr. Secretary, can you describe what "adequate" means to you in terms of "adequate verification"? Can you give us an example of what would be a violation you would consider would fall outside "adequate verification"?

Secretary BROWN. I cannot give you any examples of something the Soviets could conceal and we could not monitor adequately to provide adequate verification, but I can tell you something that I would consider inadequate verification. If the Soviets could cheat and get away with it, if they could deploy 30 reentry vehicles on the SS–18 without our knowing it, I would say that our verification would be inadequate.

Senator GLENN. Would we take that to the Standing Consultative Commission in that case?

Secretary BROWN. I don't think we would bother in that case. I think that that would be the end of the treaty.

Senator GLENN. I don't think we are liable to be faced with that type of extreme consideration. I think that is unlikely.

Secretary BROWN. No, I don't think we will either.

Senator GLENN. How did we arrive at the percentage changes allowed, that is, 5 percent plus or minus?

Secretary BROWN. It was a compromise between getting as low a figure as we possibly could and what our monitoring capabilities are. And I don't want to say what our monitoring capabilities are. It depends upon the confidence level that you set. However, it had to be set low enough so that we considered it insignificant militarily if the Soviets lived within that limitation on what constitutes——

Senator GLENN. Do you think it is important that the Soviets comply with these percentages we have set in the provisions?

Secretary BROWN. I believe that it is important that they not be able to exceed them by an amount that would be militarily significant.

Senator GLENN. That is a weasel-worded answer, Mr. Secretary. You gave your example a little bit earlier this morning while I was here that it would not be significant, perhaps, if we went from 5 to 10 percent. But would you think it significant if we went from 5 to 35 or 50 percent?

Secretary BROWN. Let me give you a direct answer, though perhaps too heated an answer. If we went to 50 percent, we could surely tell that and we would be worse off.

Senator GLENN. No. I would submit that by the intelligence estimates there are some—in some of these areas this morning, that the best intelligence estimates are that it would be between 50 and 75 percent.

Secretary BROWN. What I said, Senator Glenn——

Senator GLENN. Would that be adequate?

Secretary BROWN. What I said, Senator Glenn, was that if the limitation were 50 percent instead of 5 percent, we could monitor it better but we would be worse off.

Senator GLENN. No, I am talking about some of the areas where we have talked about the requirement for plus or minus 5 percent, and with the existing facilities now as opposed to the future facilities that you keep testifying to, that we will have—right now our capability, if there is a launch this morning, we will not even come close to 5 percent. We would be far, far, many times over 5 percent.

Secretary BROWN. Senator Glenn, maybe I misunderstood you. I thought you were dealing with whether the deviation from past Soviet throw-weights, launch-weights and so on were 5 percent or 50 percent.

Senator GLENN. I am talking about what we have required in the treaty and what we will be able to monitor in some of these areas in the future.

Secretary BROWN. Then we are talking about the same thing, and I will repeat what I have said. If that treaty read 50 percent instead of 5 percent, we would have more assurance of being able to monitor it; 50 percent is easier to monitor than 5 percent. I maintain that we would be worse off under those circumstances than we are with the treaty as it stands.

Senator GLENN. I just don't see that we spend 7 years dealing with these percentages, and we have fussed like crazy for several months over one, whether they would be permitted to reduce weight by 10 percent as opposed to 5 percent. And that was a very sticky item for a number of months, as I understand it, in negotiations.

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator GLENN. That 5 percent was extremely important. And now we are saying if we exceed that by a number of times or if it is 50 percent, it really is not that significant. It just doesn't fit.

Secretary BROWN. Now we come to the question of confidence level. What confidence do we need to that that their missiles have not increased by more than 5 percent? Do we have to have 100 percent confidence? Do we have to have 70, 50, 30? The real question to them is how confident are they that we will not be able to detect that they have exceeded that number?

I would submit to you that their confidence, if you will look at that chart, which is merely a graphical depiction of this, would have to be very high that they would not be detected.

Senator GLENN. You are trying to read into this whole thing, then, Soviet intentions as to whether they think they could exceed this by a certain percentage or not, and that is a very sketchy way,

that is a very thin reed for us to lean on insofar as American security goes.

Secretary BROWN. What I am trying to say is what counts is its effect on U.S. security, and of that I am confident. It is others who have raised the issue of whether we need 90 percent confidence of being able to tell that their change is 5 percent instead of 10 percent. I don't think it matters whether it is 5 or 10. It doesn't affect our security.

Senator GLENN. Were you more confident a year ago than you are today that we could detect cheating?

Secretary BROWN. No, I don't think my confidence has changed. Some things have gotten more difficult. Other things I have gotten more confidence in.

IRANIAN POSTS NEEDED TO MONITOR TREATY

Senator GLENN. You have stated previously in public that we needed the recoupment of the information we were getting from Iran. The President has said the treaty will be verifiable from the day it is signed. You have said it will be verifiable from the day it takes effect. You previously have said we needed that information from Iran to monitor certain functions of SALT II and we wouldn't have it for a year.

Now, that is very difficult to bring all of those statements together and still have much credibility, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BROWN. I have not changed my view. The treaty will be adequately verifiable from the beginning. We do want to replace the Iranian stations. We do not rely primarily upon our ground stations.

Senator GLENN. Obviously, we are into areas here where I cannot proceed further in open session, and I would request once again, Mr. Chairman, that we have these background monitoring briefings, the classified ones, at the very earliest. I have spent I don't know how many hundreds of hours on this thing. I think I am pretty well informed on what has gone on in the background. I spent 6 full days last week and on two weekends over in the Intelligence Committee reading everything in sight on this. I think I am pretty well up to speed on it, and I still have very serious reservations.

The Secretary and most of the administration witnesses keep saying that we will have these capabilities. I think that is the crux of our difference on this. We will have those capabilities. And yet that means the development of systems, and I want to see our ability to verify adequately—I will use the term myself. I want to see our capability of doing that the day this thing goes into effect. I think whether it will pass in the U.S. Senate will depend upon that.

And whether we can develop those systems and make sure they are reasonably reliable, I think, will determine whether this treaty passes or not. And my vote, and I still hope to be for SALT, will probably hinge exactly on that. I hope we can find out that we are going to have reliable means, and I think that is only going to come as we have testimony from the appropriate intelligence agencies that can be brought before the committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I just might say that that is the plan of the committee, to hold however many executive sessions are necessary to thoroughly explore the verification question. In fact, the committee has held a number of such briefings even prior to the time that the treaty was submitted to the Senate. Throughout the course of the past 4 months, we have held extensive briefings. We will hold more executive sessions.

The committee will not mark up this treaty until September, and I will endeavor, as other members, I am sure, would desire, to hold however many executive sessions are required to ferret out every aspect of this verification.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, as we go along on these hearings, if I might just have 30 seconds, by not having ourselves adequately briefed on this, we accept and we hear over and over it is adequately verifiable, adequately verifiable, and gradually it comes to be believed enough that I think people will hesitate to question whether it is adequately verifiable, if we hear that enough times without it being known that there may be some other answers that some of the rest of us have and have questions on.

If we wait until the last week of hearings before we all are adequately briefed on monitoring, then we all will have been committed beforehand as to whether we accept it or not and it will be after the fact.

The CHAIRMAN. As the Senator knows, we have a full day on Tuesday with the CIA Director. We are not going to wait until the last week. We are going to proceed as best we can to fully examine the verification issue.

Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, verification and monitoring are the first half of the process. Timely protest is the second half, and standing up for our rights under this treaty is clearly as important as learning about a violation. Is that not true?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, it is an important part of assuring adequate verification.

SA–5 RADAR TESTED IN ABM MODE

Senator STONE. Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you about an incident which occurred during the previous administration. Therefore, it has nothing to do with this administration's stewardship of possible violations, but it relates to the situation we are in now.

On April 7, 1972, according to selected unclassified documents of the Department of State, the United States interpreted our position on testing radar, specifically the SA–5 radar in an ABM mode, to be that we would consider that radar to be so tested if it took measurements on a cooperative target. In other words, the Soviet's own missile during the reentry portion of its trajectory.

Now, according to this same document, this same report, during 1973 and 1974, observation of Soviet tests of ballistic missiles led us to believe that a radar associated with the SA–5 surface-to-air missile system had been used to track strategic ballistic missiles

during flight. Thereafter, we protested it to the standing committee.

Why did it take several years for us to protest it? And I may say that following the protests, the Soviets stopped doing it. Why did it take 2 years?

Secretary BROWN. The issue here, Senator Stone, was whether the radar had been tested in an ABM mode. It had been indicated during the negotiation for SALT I that radar used for such purposes as range safety or instrumentation would be exempted from these criteria, and it required us to follow the pattern for a period before we had enough confidence to know that that surface-to-air system's radar had been used at the same time that strategic ballistic missiles were in flight and to get to the point where we felt that we had an issue.

Senator STONE. Was that a fault in the monitoring process? Mr. Nitze testified here that that testing took place on at least 40 occasions before we made our protest, 40.

Secretary BROWN. Judgments are not easy to make in every case on these issues, and we needed a complete pattern before we felt confident enough to raise the issue.

Senator STONE. Doesn't that create a difficulty here if it takes more than 2 years for us to be sufficiently assured before we make a protest?

Secretary BROWN. The degree of difficulty depends upon the importance of the issue to our strategic balance. If we, to follow an example raised earlier, were to see something that we thought indicated 30 reentry vehicles on an SS–18, in the first place it would not take us 2 years to determine; and in the second place, it would not take us 2 years or even 1 year to decide to raise the issue. In fact it took us considerably less than a year to raise the SALT radar issue, including a period of intensive further collection and analysis and some discussion of the sources and methods involved.

Senator STONE. We raised another issue before the standing committee, according to the same selected documents, and that was that we took the position before the standing committee that the ABM Treaty required only Sary Shagan—is that the proper pronunciation?

Secretary BROWN. Sary Shagan.

Senator STONE. Sary Shagan as the only Soviet range. The Soviets insisted that they also be allowed to do that at the Kamchatka Peninsula, and we backed off, did we not?

Secretary BROWN. That is not my recollection. My recollection is at the time SALT I was signed, we said what we considered to be the Soviet and United States ranges. The Soviets later said no, Sary Shagan was not the only one, Kamchatka was always such a range. And after looking at it, we concluded that they had a perfectly good argument there. They had had ABM radars there from the beginning.

PROTEST DEVELOPMENT OF SS–19 AS HEAVY MISSILE

Senator STONE. Did we not also protest before the standing committee that the SS–19 they were deploying was a heavy missile, not

a light missile, as the SS–11? And did we not then yield and conclude in this treaty that the SS–19 is indeed not to be considered a heavy missile?

Secretary BROWN. That is not my recollection. My recollection, Senator Stone, is that what you have here is not a possible violation but an ambiguity. The Soviets never had been willing to define light and heavy missiles. We made a unilateral statement in that case as to what we would regard as a heavy and a light missile. The Soviets did not agree with that statement, and in fact we knew when SALT I was signed that they were developing a missile of SS–19 size and throw-weight. We had every reason to believe at the time we signed SALT I that that was going to be deployed because their negotiators told us so informally.

We did bring the issue to them later when they actually deployed the SS–19 but I think, given that ambiguity, I am not surprised it came out the way it did.

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, that is what disturbs and distresses me.

Secretary BROWN. Well, that is not a verification issue. That is an ambiguity of an agreement issue.

Senator STONE. My problem with this is not verification as it is to Senator Glenn. My problem with this is the U.S. willpower in standing up when we feel we have a case. Let me just review for you this SS–19 situation. According to your unclassified briefing book, the United States judged that the SS–19 was significantly greater in volume than the SS–11 and it had a throw weight some three times that of the SS–11.

Now, is that correct or not correct?

Secretary BROWN. As a statement of fact, that is correct.

Senator STONE. Then why did we not hold to our position that this is a heavy missile rather than defined as a light missile?

Secretary BROWN. Because what we agreed on in SALT I was not our position but the treaty, Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. And let me return briefly, just as time permits, to my first line of questioning on the radars. Is it the administration's position that accomplishing SA–5 in an ABM mode is not as important to our security as is the number of extra warheads on top of a heavy missile?

Secretary BROWN. No.

Senator STONE. If they can accomplish that.

Secretary BROWN. No. If they deploy SA–5's with an ABM capability, that would be as clear a violation of the ABM Treaty as the deployment of 30 RV's on an SS–18 would be.

Senator STONE. Well, since that was the previous administration, I think it is fair, then, to ask this administration, if you discovered that they were bouncing their SA–5 radar signals off their own reentry trajectories of their missiles, would it take you 2 years to make that protest?

Secretary BROWN. I don't want to make invidious comparisons. Given our experience, I would be inclined to press things early and strongly.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Stone.

Senator Sarbanes.

AGREEMENT AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, following up on Senator Javits' very effective line of questioning, is there agreement between the two parties as to what constitutes national technical means?

Secretary BROWN. That is not explicitly defined.

Senator SARBANES. Is there, a common view between us and the Soviets as to what that means? Do they see it as having the same scope as we do?

Secretary BROWN. In my view there is an understanding between the sides that national technical means can be described broadly as technical information collection systems used for verifying compliance with agreements and which operate from outside the national territory of the other state. In SALT I the United States described NTM in these terms and the Soviet side stated there was no substantive difference between us on this point.

The agreement does not specifically define or list the NTM used to verify the agreement, and for good reasons. First, while some NTM are well known, such as photographic satellites, others are quite sensitive and we don't want to discuss them with the Soviets. An incomplete list would call into question those systems not on the list.

A second reason is that the Soviets oppose any language whose use would involve their explicitly sanctioning and endorsing United States intelligence activities in third countries. The Soviets are well aware that the United States collects intelligence from sensors located on the territories of third countries. The Soviets do not consider such activity illegal, and have not interfered with such system. On at least one occasion, a Soviet official has publicly referred to U.S. stations in third countries as national means.

In the course of the discussion of the verification provisions of the agreement, the Soviets have referred to photographic satellites, satellites using other sensors, and ground- and sea-based sensors. The NTM used to verify the agreement encompass all of these systems.

Senator SARBANES. Well, how could we assert that they have violated article XV by interfering with a national technical means if they counter assert that the subject matter does not constitute a national technical means?

Secretary BROWN. We have agreed with some. We have agreed on satellites. At times they have suggested that radars in other countries may be national technical means. I would not care to list for them all of our stations and describe what they do.

Senator SARBANES. I don't expect you to do that.

Secretary BROWN. Well, that makes it a bit difficult to get an unambiguous decision.

Senator SARBANES. If they deny that something is a national technical means at the outset, then interference by them does not constitute, in their view a violation of article XV.

Secretary BROWN. They have not denied that satellites are national technical means. In fact, they have mentioned them as such. They have also mentioned ships, aircraft and ground radars as national technical means. The issue with them is where they are

based. The Soviets do not, however, consider such systems illegal. The Soviets are well aware that we gather intelligence from sensors located on the territories of third parties, and have not objected to them or interfered with them.

DEFINITION OF NTM NOT INCLUDED IN ARTICLE II

Senator SARBANES. Why was a definition of national technical means not included in article II of the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. I have already given you one answer to that. We did not care to list for them just what each of our monitoring systems is, and a nonexclusive list could well have placed outside the protection of the agreement those things which were not on the list.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING AND VERIFICATION JUDGMENTS

Senator SARBANES. Within the executive branch, how are monitoring and verification judgments made? Who is responsible for reaching the conclusion that a provision of the treaty is not being complied with?

Secretary BROWN. That, I am quite sure, would go through the national security apparatus in the usual way. There would be a meeting of the special coordinating committee at the request of any of the agencies involved. It could be the Defense Department, it could be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency could conclude that the Soviets were not complying with the treaty and bring it before the SCC—this is a different SCC—for consideration and recommendation to the President.

Senator SARBANES. Would that question always reach the President?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. If one of the member agencies of the committee thought that there was a violation and all the others thought not, would it still reach the President?

Secretary BROWN. It would still reach the President. It would reach him as a disagreed conclusion but it would still reach him.

Senator SARBANES. Is that issue brought to the attention of any of the component parts of the Congress under present procedures?

Secretary BROWN. I will let the Director of ACDA talk about the legislation that governs him and which requires him to do so. The Intelligence Committees of the Congress would also get reports on this.

Senator SARBANES. Who knows when such an issue is being raised in the Standing Consultative Committee?

Secretary BROWN. It is known through the executive branch.

Senator SARBANES. Is it known by any of the component parts of the Congress?

Secretary BROWN. The practice would be, Senator Sarbanes, that if we were raising an inquiry at the standing consultative commission, that does not require notification of congressional components, if we concluded it was a violation, then such notification would be required.

DESCRIPTION OF VARIOUS BREAKOUT SCENARIOS

Senator SARBANES. Finally, I would like you to address the various breakout scenarios. How well we can determine that the Soviets might be preparing for that in one way or another? The argument runs that they act in secret, and then, all of a sudden, they move in a very fast and aggressive way to implement those things. At that point we realize they have now broken out of the constraints. But they are moving at such a fast pace that we are at a significant disadvantage.

How well can we detect that such a breakout preparation is under way?

Secretary BROWN. Well, you know, it takes some years to build a missile silo. It will take similar time to prepare and deploy substantial numbers of mobile missiles, no matter how ready you are. Submarines are not built overnight either. So I do not greatly worry about numbers of launchers as a breakout scenario.

I suppose of more concern would be a situation in which they prepared to deploy large numbers of reentry vehicles on existing missiles. There, testing is what would inhibit them. They would require considerable tests, tests lasting over a year or more, and further time for deployment. That would give us enough time to react to that particular one by building more shelters for M-X missiles, for example.

Now, I cannot give you a general statement. I can only give you examples. That is one example. My own conclusion is we can handle all of those breakout scenarios, each one differently.

Senator SARBANES. Dr. Perry, would you want to comment on that?

Dr. PERRY. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. You touched upon it earlier, I think, in talking about the ABM.

Dr. PERRY. In the case of the ABM, for example, the fact that they have an R. & D. program under way and a system under development means to us that they could carry that system into deployment in about 5 years. We estimate that is the time that would be required to break out with that system. We don't think that system is worth breaking out with. But were they to elect to do that, it would take about 5 years for a deployment significant enough to make us concerned.

In the case of the ICBM, going from 10 to 20 reentry vehicles on the SS-18, from the time they started testing that, which would be when it might be most visible, to the time they had a significant deployment of that unit would be a minimum of 5 years. The test program itself to verify the accuracy would take several years. The retrofitting of the new front end into the deployed SS-18's would take another several years. I would think that 5 years would be the minimum amount of time. If we could catch evidence of that before they started testing, it would be greater than 5 years. It would be more like 7 or 8 years.

Secretary BROWN. But in this case the first test would be a violation of the treaty.

Dr. PERRY. From that time, the first test, which would be the violation, to when they could have a significant deployment is on

the order of 5 years. I might say, Senator Sarbanes, we don't have to guess too much in that. We have many examples not affected by the treaty at all where they have made modifications to existing ICBMs or where they have introduced new systems, and we have the time lines on that and we can make precise estimates of how long it takes from the first test to when they have full deployment.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Senator Muskie, I have two short announcements to make. General Seignious has been advised that owing to the fact that we have run out of time this morning, that he will be called back at a later time to testify before the committee.

The second announcement is that we will meet with the Defense Minister of Great Britain following this meeting.

Third, for keeping the record straight, I would like to mention that this committee has held 15 hours of executive sessions on the question of verification. At none of those meetings has any Senator been restrained in any way with respect to questioning. The meetings were held on March 1, March 21, March 22, March 29, and April 5, at which time we were briefed by the most expert witnesses of the CIA and the Defense Department.

We will have other executive sessions on this question of verification as the committee decides, and for that purpose we hold meetings each Friday where matters of committee procedure may be discussed and where the committee may reach the decisions.

I just think it is necessary that we keep the record straight as we go along.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie.

SUFFICIENCY OF FIRST TEST TO GIVE EVIDENCE OF VIOLATION

Senator MUSKIE. Mr. Secretary, you just made the statement that the first test would be a violation. Is the first test sufficient to give us evidence of a violation?

Secretary BROWN. It depends upon the nature of the tests, Senator Muskie. If they deployed 30 reentry vehicles, I have no doubt that we would find that out in the first test.

Senator MUSKIE. But it could take several tests?

Secretary BROWN. It could, depending on how they went at it. If they got ready to do that, we would be suspicious. If they carried out earlier tests that did not actually deploy them, we would be suspicious, but we might not see it on the first.

Senator MUSKIE. Earlier, I think you testified that a minimum of 20 tests is necessary for any significant——

Secretary BROWN. For any modification of that sort.

Senator MUSKIE. Is it conceivable that 20 tests could be conducted without our detecting a violation?

Secretary BROWN. I think the chances of that are really very small. As I said to Senator Pell, less than 1 in 1 million, not very good odds for someone to try to cheat.

ABILITY TO ASSURE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON ISSUE OF VERIFICATION

Senator MUSKIE. It is true, as Senator Biden has pointed out, that one of the purposes of these public meetings is to enlighten the American people on the significant issues, and one of them is

verification, but is it possible for anyone, including Senators, especially citizens, to be personally assured about the adequacy of our means for verification simply from what you are able to tell us publicly?

Secretary BROWN. It is true, Senator Muskie, that a good many of the details can only be heard in closed session, and therefore the citizens will not only depend on my judgment or the executive branch witnesses judgments, but also upon the judgments of those of Senators, all of whom will have access to all of this information. But I think the issue is simpler than that. I think that not on the basis of our assurances, but on the basis of our examples, which are not contradicted by those who are opposed to SALT, that enough is laid out on the public record to give the citizens of the United States confidence in the adequacy of verification.

The fact that there are a good many people of substance who are, I think, trustworthy as to their integrity, if not always as to their judgment, are of the view that although they are against SALT, verification is not the problem. It seems to me that that kind of view plus the very considerable detail and example that is laid out in the public record, those plus the assurances of administration witnesses and the judgments of the Senators who have been exposed to all of this information will and should provide the basis for confidence on the part of the American public that the treaty is adequately verifiable.

Senator MUSKIE. If a Senator could give that kind of assurance to his constituents, to what degree should he immerse himself in the details of precisely what our national technical means are, and the application of those means to particular vulnerabilities from the point of view of the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Well, the figure——

Senator MUSKIE. In other words, how much do we have to know about the national technical means? And that is highly classified information. How much should we know about national technical means in order to reach a judgment comparable in quality, given our incomparability with respect to the intellectual capacity?

Secretary BROWN. I do not think that is the problem, Senator Muskie. [General laughter.]

Senator MUSKIE. Well, it is pretty formidable. In any case, to what extent should we understand the nature of the technical means and the range of monitoring that each of them makes possible?

Secretary BROWN. I think the figure that the chairman gave—was it 48 hours?

The CHAIRMAN. It was 15 hours of briefing on this question.

Secretary BROWN. Fifteen, but I think you have to add to that all the testimony you are going to hear.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Secretary BROWN. And that is going to amount to dozens of hours. I have full confidence in the ability of Senators on the basis of that amount of information to reach independent judgments on this issue.

Senator MUSKIE. To what extent are technical means, and by that I take it as meant, and if I am in error, I wish you would tell me, are technical means sufficient——

Secretary BROWN. As opposed to human intelligence.

Senator MUSKIE. Yes, independent of counting rules, cooperative measures, collateral restraints, and so on. To what extent are the technical means sufficient unto themselves?

Secretary BROWN. Without these additional constraints? Is that what you are asking?

Senator MUSKIE. Yes.

Secretary BROWN. In other words, supposing that we did not have a constraint with respect to counting rules or a constraint with respect to concealment or a constraint with respect to interference. I think that would make it much more difficult. That would make a great difference. I would then begin to have doubts about the adequacy of verification if it were not for those.

Senator MUSKIE. Those constraints involve Soviet cooperation.

Secretary BROWN. No, they involve Soviet observance of the treaty in ways that if they did not observe them, we would be able to tell. In other words, it is easier—well, it is easier for us to tell that they are concealing or that they are interfering than it is for us to tell what it is they are concealing or what it is they are interfering with our knowledge of.

QUESTION OF WHETHER ENCRYPTION IS RELATED TO TREATY

Senator MUSKIE. Now, with respect to encryption, I listened with interest to the discussions we had this morning. The argument has been made, but I have not heard rebuttal, although there may have been rebuttal in my absence, that whether or not encryption is related to the treaty is a subjective judgment for the Soviets to make, and that we have no check on it. I think that is an accurate description.

Secretary BROWN. That is an accurate description of the argument. I do not think it is an accurate description of the situation. I think we will make the judgment on the basis of which we will determine our own actions with respect to the treaty. I do not want to imply that this is a matter we would not discuss with them and ask for an explanation of, allow them to persuade us if they can, but by no means would we be willing to leave the judgment on whether encryption is relevant to the limitations of the treaty to the Soviet Union.

Senator MUSKIE. Well, let me ask this question?

Encryption is a way of concealing information from us.

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator MUSKIE. If they have concealed information from us, on what basis do we reach a judgment that what they have concealed is relevant to the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, it is a complicated issue. I am not sure it can be answered fully in open session, but Dr. Perry, who has spent half his professional life on this kind of issue, will do his best to answer.

Dr. PERRY. If we were trying to make this judgment the first time we ever saw the Soviets fire an ICBM it would be extremely difficult. We have a reference, a data base of more than 20 years of firings, and we know what parameters they telemeter. We know which ones we need to make various determinations. We do not

have to know what is being encrypted. All we must do is observe what is missing from the data base we are accustomed to working with, and on that basis alone we can judge that the data we need is missing, and we can presume that it is encrypted.

Senator MUSKIE. Is that kind of analysis, and I see my time is up, is that kind of an analysis accepted by the Soviets as a sufficient challenge so that they feel forced to defend themselves?

Secretary BROWN. We are not going to leave that judgment to them. They do not have the right to deny telemetry of relevant information, if that denial impedes our verification of items limited by the agreement. Our experience in dealing with them on this kind of thing is that we are successful. If we are not, then we would have to make a judgment to take action with respect to the treaty, and we would do that.

Senator MUSKIE. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Muskie. Are there further questions? Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. No; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

VERIFIABILITY OF RACETRACK CONCEPT FOR MOBILE MISSILE

Mr. Secretary and Dr. Perry, from the point of view of the Soviets, is what you are now considering in this racetrack concept verifiable for the mobile missile?

Secretary BROWN. We intend to design it and I think we have designed it so that their national technical means will surely be able to count how many we have. I just have no doubts about that, and it will be patently so that even though they will maybe be tempted to claim that it is not, I do not think that it can become a major issue.

Senator STONE. Do you intend to disclose to them directly the nature of the system and get their opinion upon whether they do consider or do not consider it a violation?

Secretary BROWN. We do not intend to ask their permission. They will see as we build it just as we see as they build their submarines and as they build their missiles that it is not being concealed.

Senator STONE. How soon do you plan to make a determination on that system?

Secretary BROWN. We will do that this summer. What we are dealing with, really, is design details. I know that Senator McGovern expressed a different view, but it is not a completely different system if it is 10 feet below ground and on a track or if it is on the ground and on a roadbed. That is a design detail.

GREATEST VULNERABILITY OF ICBM FORCE 1982–85

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, you testified originally that the period of our greatest vulnerability of the existing missiles we have, the Minuteman missiles, will be approximately from 1982 through 1984 or 1985. Is that not right?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; that is right.

Senator STONE. Is it possible that this system you were designing for the mobile missile might be useful to us to protect our Minuteman missiles from that period of vulnerability?

Secretary BROWN. We could save a year or two with that, as I have indicated at previous hearings on this subject, Senator Stone. It would leave no legacy. Minuteman has vulnerabilities other than its basing vulnerability that are greater than those of the M-X missile, and so far, at least, I have concluded that it is not a cost effective thing to do, particularly because what we are talking about here is not an overall danger to the U.S. deterrent which has two other legs in the triad but to one component of it. We do not want that component to continue vulnerable through the late eighties and into the nineties, because then the Soviets would be tempted to attack or learn to attack or develop systems to attack the other components, but for a period of a few years, I think it is not a matter of endangering our deterrent, if we decide not to go ahead, as we have so far, and try to base Minutemen another way.

Senator STONE. Finally, Mr. Secretary, and Dr. Perry, I will have some additional examples of violations or alleged violations to discuss on your next visit here, and I will do my best to inform you of those before you come so that we can compress the questions and answers into a 10-minute round. I thank you very much for being very responsive. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. I just have one quick question, Secretary Brown, and perhaps others might help you in the answer.

It would appear to me that in all of the long negotiations on SALT, it would have appeared evident to Soviet negotiators as it does to us that verification is extremely important to the ongoing process of SALT. Granted, there is this competition between the nations that you described in your earlier testimony which is all too obvious, but at the same time, if there is validity in the SALT process, if there is a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to limit the dangers to that country in addition to ours, there surely must be some comparable interest in making certain this verification process works. Now, I agree historically, I think, as you and others have pointed out, that the Soviets have not been very forthcoming. The data base situation was given as an illustration of a breakthrough. The fact is, maybe they are doing some other things to help us out a little bit, but isn't it possible even at this late date to begin to think constructively with the Soviet Union about problems of having adequate verification on things that are absolutely vital to this process as opposed to a situation in which literally we play cosmetic games with each other and still are not certain whether we have a high confidence level on certain basic aspects of verifying this treaty?

Secretary BROWN. I believe, Senator Lugar, that if we had been asked in 1969 when SALT I negotiations began or even in 1973, when the SALT II negotiations began, whether it would be possible in the foreseeable future to get the Soviets to agree to the verification provisions that they have now agreed to, very few of us would have thought it possible in light of the history that you describe.

So I think there has been a very significant forward movement there. I think we do need to go further, and I think that in SALT

III it is important that we do so. We have to remember that if we spend billions in our monitoring capabilities every year and our intelligence capabilities every year, the Soviets spend one way or another probably the equivalent of tens of billions in maintaining a closed society. That gives them some advantages of secrecy and they are not easily willing to give those up, especially because they go far beyond SALT. They go to economic aspects of their society, military aspects that are not strategic or even military aspects that have to do with strategic weapons that are not covered by SALT, and our intelligence methods are so applicable to all kinds of things that there is a penetration to some degree of Soviet secrecy in all things by virtue of their willingness to be forthcoming at all for the purposes of SALT verification. I do not think they have gone nearly far enough for our good or their good, and I think we should pursue that in SALT III, but we should not underestimate the distance that has already been traveled.

Senator LUGAR. Is it possible that we should be devoting more of our intelligence capability, and I ask this as a serious verification question with regard to SALT, simply to the political intelligence of the Soviet Union? So much of what we have talked about in these hearings comes down to a question of will and political strategy. We can monitor as you have pointed out a number of things by technical means, but of course the basic questions we are interested in are interpretations on the part of the Soviets of their position and what they plan to do, which gets to the heart of the whole intelligence problem.

Would you support the earlier contention I made this morning that right along with this SALT process, and I am not certain how we couple this together, that we really have to make some statements about our intelligence capability, especially in the context of what you have just described as a closed society in which tens of billions of dollars may be spent on keeping it closed? For our own safety with regard to this treaty or any other process, we simply, I think, need to do better. This has to be affirmed and supported by the American public. I think that ought to be a part of our debate now.

Secretary BROWN. Political intelligence on the Soviet Union should and does have the highest priority, but it is not the kind of thing that is easily monitored by taking pictures of missiles. Beyond that intelligence, of course, is the analytical capability to tell what the political intelligence means, and the political judgments that then have to be made on the basis of that analysis.

That is both very important and very difficult, and it is really not a matter of large amounts of money. It is a matter of skills which are not in large supply.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Senator Sarbanes, have you a question?

Senator SARBANES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I close the hearing, I am going to ask for unanimous consent to insert in the record at this point a statement by Hon. George M. Seignious and Ambassador Ralph Earle.

[The prepared statements of Hon. George Seignious and Ambassador Ralph Earle follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS II, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to testify today before this Committee regarding the verifiability of the SALT II agreement. I fully recognize the gravity and seriousness of this subject.

I want to begin today by making five key points.

Point one: After careful study, I have concluded that SALT II as a whole, and in its parts, is adequately verifiable. As required by Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, I now formally certify this conclusion, and I have provided for you today a classified report that discusses the verifiability of SALT II. Furthermore, I believe that SALT II will be adequately verifiable from the day the agreement enters into force.

Point two: SALT II does not depend on trust. No nation bases its national survival on trust, and I would not be here today before you if I thought that trust was an element of SALT II.

Point three: Our national verification capabilities are impressive and mutually supportive today. We must have, and we do have, specific programs to enhance them even further.

Point four: SALT II, and indeed the entire process of strategic arms negotiations, actually enhances the knowledge we have about Soviet strategic nuclear forces and other forces not constrained by SALT. It makes our intelligence task easier than would be the case without SALT.

Point five: The record of SALT I shows that we have been vigilant in pursuing questions of Soviet compliance. This will continue to be the case under SALT II. Abrogation of the Treaty is, of course, the ultimate recourse, and we must have the national will to follow that path if we believe that Soviet actions grieviously threaten our security.

Verification is the process by which we determine whether the Soviet Union is living up to its obligations under SALT. SALT limitations, however, are not absolutely "verifiable" or "unverifiable." The relevant question is whether the SALT II Treaty is adequately verifiable: that is, are we confident that our verification capability is sufficient to ensure that any Soviet non-compliance will be detected before it can pose a significant military risk or adversely affect the strategic balance.

The criterion of "adequate verification" has been national policy since SALT I began:

In 1969, President Nixon approved instructions that said: "Any agreed measure must be subject to adequate verification;"

In 1973, in Washington, President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev signed a document called "Basic Principles of Negotiations" for SALT that again required "adequate verification;"

In 1974, "adequate verification" remained the standard under President Ford when our SALT delegation received its instructions;

And in 1977, Congress established the standard "adequate verification" in Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. This section states: "It is the sense of the Congress that adequate verification of compliance should be an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement."

SALT II has been designed and negotiated to be adequately verifiable. We never put a SALT proposal on the negotiating table without first considering our ability to verify that proposal. And we never accepted a Soviet proposal without giving it the same consideration. One of my strongest impessions as Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a member-at-large of the SALT Delegation, and in my present position has been the unanimity of the U.S. Government in eschewing any reliance on trust or faith in the Soviet Union as a substitute for verification.

No matter how excellent our intelligence capabilities, there will always be some uncertainties. In judging verification risks, we have taken many factors into account: (1) the capabilities of our existing and projected intelligence-collection systems and analytical techniques; (2) the measures the Soviets could take to evade detection; (3) the costs and risks to the Soviets of any attempt to evade the limits; (4) the military significance of potential violations; and (5) the capability of the United States to take appropriate and timely counter-measures to offset the effects of potential Soviet non-compliance.

With these factors in mind, I have reached the conclusion that SALT II is adequately verifiable. This is based on the judgment that we have high confidence in our ability to detect significant Soviet violations. In my opinion, any cheating which could affect the strategic balance would be discovered in time for the United States to make an appropriate response. In view of U.S. programs and our resolve to

challenge any questionable Soviet activities, the areas of uncertainty are not such as to permit the Soviets to produce a threat to United States national security.

I said at the beginning that in SALT we do not rely on trust. The myth that SALT and trust go together is a myth and only a myth. We do not rely on faith, or hope, or the Soviet's signature. To put it bluntly, we are dealing with our principal adversary.

We rely on our own independent, national intelligence capabilities. We survey the Soviet Union regularly, thoroughly and accurately with a vast array of sophisticated and powerful intelligence-gathering systems, such as photo-reconnaissance satellites, radars, and other monitoring devices in space, on land, on sea, and in the air. The result is a network of collection systems, which provide us with redundancy and which complement each other in their coverage of the Soviet Union.

We have spent billions of dollars on these systems, and it has been money well spent. I find our intelligence capabilities truly astonishing in their technological capacity—especially to a soldier who began his career in World War II, when we seldom knew what was happening six hundred yards behind enemy lines, let alone six thousand miles away.

Although the exact nature and capabilities of these intelligence systems are highly classified, I can illustrate their effectiveness by outlining the kinds of information we receive from them.

For example, we know where the Soviets build their submarines. It takes several years to construct a ballistic missile submarine. We carefully observe it during this period. We count its missile tubes as they are being built, and we determine which types of missiles will be installed in those launchers. When the Soviets launched their latest Delta class strategic missile submarine, it was no surprise. We had been aware of its construction for years.

Similarly, we know where Soviet ICBM launchers are deployed and what types they are. We observe new missiles as they are flight-tested, and they are tested extensively. We know whether a missile is tested with one warhead or more than one. We can count the number of Soviet reentry vehicles as they reenter the atmosphere.

We monitor the conversion of older Soviet ICBM launchers so they can handle their new MIRVed missiles. Well before the conversion is finished and the launcher is again operational, we know not only whether it is a launcher for a MIRVed missile—but also the type of MIRVed missile it is designed to contain.

In the case of Soviet heavy bombers, we have an adequate count of how many bombers there are, where they are produced, and where they are based. We can observe important modifications that are made to these bombers.

A good measure of the overall capabilities of our intelligence collection system is the detailed information published each year in the Secretary of Defense's report to the Congress. Indeed, the numbers used by opponents and proponents of SALT alike are based on information acquired by our national intelligence collection systems. Not one bit of this information has been volunteered by the Soviet Union. It has been gathered entirely by ourselves.

Several factors help us in verifying the provisions of SALT II:

One factor is time. Many of the systems limited in SALT are very large and complex and cannot quickly be constructed. For example, it takes many months to construct an ICBM silo launcher and years to develop and deploy a new missile. This gives us time to monitor activities.

Another is reliability. New strategic systems have to be tested to have operational reliability. We can observe these Soviet tests.

And a third factor is support requirements. Strategic systems need personnel to run them and extensive logistic and security support. These requirements compound the task of keeping deployments hidden, and they increase the chance that we will detect them, especially if such activities were to take place in significant numbers. Some charge that the Soviets could stockpile extra missiles and then one night change the strategic balance. Let me say that it is one thing to produce a missile in a factory; it is quite another to have the trained personnel, the logistics, the large amounts of heavy equipment to handle the missiles and the launchers themselves—without our being able to spot them.

I might add that the Soviets, if they wanted to violate the provisions of SALT II, would face another difficulty—uncertainty. Our use of multiple intelligence sources complicates any Soviet effort to disguise or conceal important activities. The Soviets know that we have a large, sophisticated intelligence operation, and they know a certain amount about how it works. They do not, however, know the full capabilities of our collection systems and analysis techniques. This uncertainty will further complicate any Soviet attempt to conceal an evasion of the SALT II limits.

In assessing the capabilities of our network of collection systems, it is important to recognize that intelligence is a dynamic process in which our effort will need continual improvement. We must be prepared to take the necessary actions to exploit the new opportunities that advancing technology offers us, and to offset the loss of sources, as happens from time to time. The recent loss of important intelligence stations in Iran is a clear example. Because of our extensive capabilities, we continue to be able to monitor adequately the testing of Soviet ICBMs, although some uncertainties are temporarily larger than we would like.

As you know, we are aggressively pursuing a number of alternatives and specific programs to collect the information formerly gathered in Iran in order to reduce these uncertainties to their former level. We expect to do this before a test program for any new or modified Soviet strategic missile could be completed.

As intelligence is a dynamic process, so must be verification. As weapons systems become more and more sophisticated, we must negotiate verification provisions to keep pace with them. Good examples of how this has taken place in SALT II are the various counting rules, such as those for MIRVs, bombers, and cruise missiles.

Verification is, and must be, an evolving process. As we pursue arms control measures more difficult to verify by national technical means, our ability to reach agreement may well depend upon our ability to negotiate procedures which allow access to information unobtainable unilaterally, but which is essential to verification. I signal this today not as a requirement for the present but as a possible harbinger for the future.

The limits of SALT II, however, are adequately verifiable with our own national technical means. By restricting launchers and not missiles, by ingenious counting rules, we have no imperative need for more intrusive measures in SALT II. On-site inspection is not required for adequate verification of SALT II. The proponents of on-site inspection oversell the alleged advantages of such inspection. For example, the SALT II MIRV counting rules, which I will discuss in detail later, are a better device than on-site inspection for counting MIRVs. We are able to use these rules to count Soviet MIRVs on a total, national basis. We will not have to rely on inspectors who can be deceived and who cannot watch all of the launchers all of the time.

We would monitor the Soviets even if there were no SALT agreement. It is essential for us to have good, solid intelligence on Soviet strategic forces, totally apart from any arms control agreement. In fact, only a portion of the total intelligence we collect on Soviet strategic forces is related to SALT limits.

There are specific provisions in SALT II, proposed by us and accepted by the Soviets, that make the job of monitoring the Soviets easier than it would be without SALT.

Under SALT II, the Soviets will not be allowed to interfere with the intelligence systems we use to verify SALT.

Under SALT II, deliberate concealment, including encryption of telemetry, which impedes verification of compliance is banned. This ban applies not only to concealment of construction and deployment of systems limited by SALT but also to concealment of testing of those systems, because some provisions are verified by observing testing. Without this ban, the Soviets could use any and all means of concealment.

Under SALT II, the production, testing, and deployment of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM, and its unique components, are banned for the Treaty period. This ban precludes difficulties that would have arisen in distinguishing it from a Soviet shorter-range missile that is not limited by the Treaty. The SS-16, I want to stress, is the only ICBM that has been assessed to have been tested from a mobile launcher.

Under SALT II, neither side is allowed to conceal the association of a missile with its launcher. Without this provision, it would be much more difficult for us to assess which missile goes with each type of launcher.

These are just some of the SALT II verification provisions. Without them, it could be much more difficult to collect needed intelligence on Soviet strategic programs. Without the bans on concealment and interference, we could find it much harder to determine how many strategic missiles and bombers they are deploying, and what their military capabilities and characteristics are. The Soviets would be free to take steps to complicate our ability to predict accurately the size and capability of Soviet strategic forces.

No leader, military or civilian, wants to plan with less rather than more information about an adversary. I believe that in SALT we have used verification to good advantage—for our own security, for strategic stability, and to help turn uncertainty into confidence.

That is a clear, specific example of the contribution arms control can make to our national security.

We have over six years experience verifying Soviet compliance with SALT. The Soviet record during SALT I has been carefully reviewed and analyzed. In every case of questionable activity that we raised with the Soviets, the activity ceased or additional information has allayed our concern.

As an example of the seriousness with which the Soviets have taken their responsibilities under SALT, they have dismantled ballistic missile submarines in order to place newer class submarines at sea and still stay within the limits set by SALT I in 1972. Perfectly good submarines, newer than some of our own ballistic missile submarines now in service, have been withdrawn from the Soviet strategic inventory to comply with SALT.

The question has been asked: "What do we do if we discover a Soviet violation or if we even suspect one?" As a result of the SALT I agreements in 1972, we established at Geneva a U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) where any compliance questions, any suspected activities, can be challenged at once. We thus have an established forum where even the slightest suspicion of a violation can be raised with the Soviets. This forum has worked well under SALT I.

Some also question whether we actually would challenge the Soviets if they appeared to be in violation of SALT II. I believe our record under SALT I is solid proof that we would. We have not been hesitant to challenge the Soviets about questions of concern to us—eight times. The fact is, however, that there is not one outstanding challenge that we have made against the Soviet Union that has not been resolved to our satisfaction. If a violation persisted without correction or if a violation threatened our security, then we could abrogate the agreement and build the forces necessary to meet the threat. This would be a very serious development, and the Soviets know it.

Within the U.S. Government, procedures have been established for monitoring Soviet performance and for dealing with matters related to compliance. All intelligence information is carefully analyzed in the context of the provisions of SALT, and recommendations on questions which arise are developed by interagency intelligence and advisory groups within the National Security Council system. Currently, these are an intelligence community steering group on monitoring strategic arms limitations and the Standing Consultative Commission working group of the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council.

Should analysis of intelligence information indicate that there could be a question concerning compliance, this latter group reviews and analyzes the available information and provides recommendations. The President decides whether a particular question or issue is to be raised with the U.S.S.R. based on the sudy and recommendations of the department and agency principals who comprise the Special Coordination Committee or the National Security Council itself.

In the event that ambiguity over Soviet compliance should arise, each agency has the right to raise the issue before the National Security Council. Each of the principals from those agencies represented on the National Security Council also has direct access to the President. I cannot imagine an attempt to avoid or cover up possible Soviet violations. For my part, if I had evidence of deliberate Soviet cheating of such a nature that it indicated their disregard for SALT and their desire to take advantage of our compliance, I would not hesitate to advise the President to take the strongest measures necessary, even abrogation of the Treaty.

SALT II was constructed with verification in mind. Indeed, during more than six years of negotiations, verifications issues have probably received more attention and more effort than any other single aspect of SALT policy. Every new idea was scrutinized in terms of our present and projected monitoring capabilities.

The SALT II agreement is adequately verifiable because we insisted that it be so. In several instances, provisions enhancing verification took months or years of hard bargaining before the Soviets agreed to them. I would like now to give several examples.

In SALT II, there will be rigorous counting rules to solve such problems as determining which missle launchers have missiles that carry multiple independently targetable warheads—or MIRVs—and which do not. While it is difficult to determine whether a particular Soviet missile is MIRVed, we can monitor the unique types of Soviet missile lanuchers with high confidence. In essence, the MIRV launcher counting rule states that if a launcher has ever contained or launched a MIRVed missile, all launchers of that type must be counted as MIRVed. This is coupled with a rule that any missile of a type that has ever been tested with MIRVs counts as a MIRVed missile. The practical result of these rules is that all potentially MIRVed Soviet missile launchers must be considered as MIRVed under SALT,

even though these launchers may actually contain only missiles with one warhead. These counting rules exemplify how this Treaty has been constructed to allow us to utilize our monitoring capabilities most effectively.

We arrived at this solution to MIRV verification only after many years effort. When the United States entered into negotiations with the Soviets on this issue, we proposed limits on MIRV launchers as well as verification rules to enable an accurate and unambiguous count of these launchers. We insisted that such rules for MIRVed missiles and their launchers were essential. Although the Soviets resisted for several years, they eventually agreed to these rules. And they also agreed that the rules would cover missiles and launchers at two missile bases called Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, where some unMIRVed missiles were deployed in launchers which we could not distinguish from MIRV-type launchers. This was a significant Soviet concession which assured our ability to verify adequately the MIRV launcher limits. It meant for the Soviets that about 100 Soviet launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk with unMIRVed missiles had to be counted as launchers of MIRVed missiles.

Another example of the important role played by verification considerations in the SALT II negotiations is the limitation on telemetry encryption. We sought Soviet agreement that encryption of telemetry which impedes verification would not be permitted under the prohibition on deliberate concealment measures. For a long time, the Soviets resisted. However, the United States insisted that the Treaty contain specific language making clear that deliberate telemetry denial, such as by encryption, would be prohibited whenever it impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

At the Geneva meeting between Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in December 1978, the Soviets finally agreed to a provision that deliberate denial of telemetric information is prohibited whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance. At the Summit in Vienna, we again received explicit confirmation, this time from President Brezhnev, who agreed that there must be no encryption of information involving parameters covered by the Treaty.

This most certainly does not mean that the Soviets are free to decide whether or not telemetry encryption impedes verification. We have established a clear basis for raising with the Soviets any instance of encryption which impedes our verification, while protecting sensitive U.S. intelligence sources and methods.

The agreement on this issue does not ban all telemetary encryption. We have monitored telemetry from Soviet missile tests for many years, and we have developed complex analytical tools for evaluating that telemetry. Accordingly, we know what types of data are important for verification, and if those data are denied, we can make that determination. We had a sound basis to demand that the Soviets agree not to conceal data related to the provisions of the agreement. We were successful.

The main reason why we did not propose a total ban on encryption of telemetry from strategic systems is that we have no basis in the Treaty for demanding data not related to the provisions of the agreement. Not all telemetry is relevant to the verification of the SALT Treaty. If all were relevant, we would have proposed such a ban. We do not need all telemetric information to verify compliance; we only need those channels of information used to assess certain characteristics limited in the agreement, such as missile throw-weight, launch-weight, and fractionation. We do not need other telemetric information which would be related to features unlimited by SALT, such as measures taken to harden reentry vehicles for return into the atomosphere.

A third example concerns the limits on what we call missile "fractionation," or the number of warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles. Fractionation limits promote a major U.S. SALT objective, which is to keep the Soviets from fully exploiting the potential of thier land-based ICBMs. The Soviets could realize substantial benefits from their recent improvements in accuracy if they could add more warheads to their current and projected ICBMs.

The Treaty, however, will:

Freeze the number of warheads on existing types of ICBMs;

Establish limits on the number of warheads on the one permitted new type of ICBM and on SLBMs and air-to-surface ballistic missiles;

Ban testing and deployment of lighter warheads, which could be used to circumvent the fractionation limit;

Require that future warhead release simulations must count toward the permitted number of warheads for each type.

The United States can adequately verify these provisions. The Soviets long resisted them and agreed only in the final period of negotiations. On some of the key

verification provisions, we negotiated right down to the final days of the talks and got the Soviets to agree to our position. We didn't blink.

During the SALT II negotiations, we have also had to consider the tradeoff between verification considerations and the need to ensure that we would be able to take the necessary steps under SALT II to maintain strategic equality. For example, as Secretary Brown noted in his testimony, it would have been easier to verify a total ban on all cruise missiles than it would be to verify some of the cruise missile limitations in the agreement. We decided that, on balance, it was in our national security interest to be allowed the flexibility to pursue these development programs, even though allowing the Soviets the same options may complicate verification. An important element in our decision was our lead in cruise missile technology.

Another area where we made a similar choice is mobile ICBM launchers. Despite their potential for improved survivability, mobile ICBMs could, in principle, introduce difficult verification problems in SALT. The task of counting mobile ICBM launchers after deployment is inherently difficult, since such systems derive their survivability primarily through uncertainty as to their specific location—usually through concealment measures of some kind (shelters, trenches, camouflage). In practice, whether or not deployment of a particular mobile ICBM system would be adequately verifiable would depend on a number of factors, particularly the specific characteristics of the launcher itself and the configuration of its basing mode (including support facilities).

Any U.S. mobile basing ICBM system, such as the multiple protective shelter system, will be designed so as to permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed, and we will be prepared to address any Soviet concerns regarding the system's verifiability. Similarly, if the Soviets choose to deploy any mobile ICBM system which employs deliberate concealment measures, they too would have to meet the same verification standards.

In my testimony today, I have touched on only a few examples of our ability to verify Soviet compliance with SALT II.

In the course of these hearings, additional information is being made available to the Committee in testimony by Secretary of Defense Brown and Director of Central Intelligence Turner and in other testimony and written reports. In making my certification of adequate verifiability, I have leaned heavily on the assessments of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Additionally, and importantly, I have taken into account the conclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that SALT II is adequately verifiable.

As I look back over the course of SALT I and SALT II, I am impressed by how far we've come, as well as how far we still must go.

I am impressed by the degree to which the Soviet Union has conceptually and practically moved in our direction on verification.

I am impressed that, for the first time in the history of strategic arms negotiations, the Soviets will provide figures on their own offensive forces as part of an agreed data base, figures which we will be able to verify independently and figures which the Soviets must update on a regular basis. Acceptance of this data base overturns a tradition of centuries of Russian secrecy. It provides a clear, agreed baseline on which to judge treaty compliance and from which future negotiated reductions can be made. It will serve to assure that both Parties interpret the provisions of SALT II in the same way.

I am impressed that under SALT II the Soviet's SS-16 ICBM will be banned.

I am impressed that under SALT II the Soviets will not be able to intefere with our monitoring of their strategic forces.

I am impressed that under SALT II the Soviets will not be able to conceal their strategic forces—an action that, without SALT, would be in their favor considering their closed society and enormous land mass.

I am impressed that without SALT II, every one of these and many other advantages would be lost.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RALPH EARLE II, CHAIRMAN, U.S. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS DELEGATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is a pleasure to meet with you again today, to duscuss verification and the SALT II agreement.

Secretary Brown and General Seignious have expressed their judgment that the SALT II agreement is adequately verifiable. I strongly endorse that conclusion.

This state of affairs did not come about by chance. A principal United States objective throughout the SALT II negotiations has been adequate verifiability. The United States Government formulated its proposals for the new agreement in terms of verifiable parameters. Let me mention just a few examples.

It is launchers of ICBMs and launchers of SLBMs which will be counted in the aggregates, not the missiles themselves, which are more difficult to count.

In provisions concerning qualitative constraints on missiles, we again used verifiable parameters.

The limitations on light ICBMs and heavy ICBMs are formulated in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight, which are verifiable parameters.

Of course, it is not enough to formulate and press for verifiable Treaty provisions. It is the negotiating outcome that matters. The United States has successfully negotiated a large number of provisions that will aid significantly in verifying the provisions of the SALT II agreement.

I would now like to discuss briefly some of the provisions of the new agreement which facilitate and aid verification. I shall divide these provisions into three categories: (1) Provisions applying explicitly to verification itself; (2) provisions concerning type rules and counting rules; and (3) provisions which provide specific mechanisms which facilitate and aid verification.

First, as to provisions applying explicitly to verification itself, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to carry over to the new agreement the provisions of the Interim Agreement that were designed to assist verification by national technical means:

A ban on interference with national technical means used to verify compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

A ban on deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

In addition, because many of the provisions of the new agreement, such as those dealing with launch-weight, throw-weight, and the number of warheads, are verified during the testing phase of missile development, the U.S. pressed for, and the Soviets have agreed to, several additional provisions designed explicitly to assist verification of the SALT II agreement:

The ban on deliberate concealment measures will apply explicity to testing practices. This ban would include measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

Deliberate denial of telemetric information during testing, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, will be prohibited whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

Second, the U.S. has pushed hard to get a number of type rules and counting rules which will facilitate and simplify the accomplishment of otherwise difficult verification tasks:

ICBM launchers

One verification question in connection with the definition of ICBM launchers is how to distinguish ICBM launchers from land-based launchers of ballistic missiles of lesser range, e.g., IRBMs and MRBMs. It would be extremely difficult to make its determination for each individual launcher. However, this problem is manageable with a type rule.

This ICBM launcher type rule under paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty provides that if a launcher is a launcher of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), all launchers of that type will be considered to be ICBM launchers.

As an aid to verification, it has also been agreed that if a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher and therefore all launchers of that type will be considered to be ICBM launchers.

A specific question arose in this connection concerning the apparent ability of the SS–20 IRBM launcher to launch SS–16 ICBMs. The U.S. pressed for, and obtained, explicit Soviet agreement that during the term of the Treaty the U.S.S.R. will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS–16 type, and will not produce the unique components of the SS–16.

MIRVed ICBMs and SLMBs

Another specific question that arose was how to count MIRVed launchers for Soviet missiles that have been flight-tested with both MIRVs and single RVs, such as the SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19. The answer is the set of type rules for MIRVed missiles, and launchers of MIRVed missiles, under paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty. These have the effect, for example, that all SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19 launchers will count as launchers of MIRVed ICBMs, regardless of the missiles that these launchers actually contain.

The MIRVed ICBM and SLBM type rules provide that if an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), all missiles of that type will be considered to be MIRVed ICBMs or MIRVed SLBMs, respectively, regardless of whether the missile has also been tested without MIRVs. These are missile type rules.

The MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launcher type rules provide that if a launcher is a launcher of MIRVed ICBMs or MIRVed SLBMs, then all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of MIRVed ICBMs or MIRVed SLBMs. Thus, MIRVed launchers will be considered by types. It will not be necessary to determine the status of each launcher on an individual basis.

The "contains or launches" criterion mentioned above will apply to these MIRVed launcher type rules, too.

A question arose as to the application of these provisions to the nearly 200 Soviet ICBM launchers at the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas. Many of these launchers are judged by the United States to contain the non-MIRVed SS-11 ICBM. The remaining launchers contain SS-19s, which are all considered to be MIRVed ICBMs under the MIRVed missile type rule. However, the launchers which contain MIRVed ICBMs are not distinguishable from those which contain non-MIRVed missiles, and the United States cannot be sure that all of these launchers are not capable of launching MIRVed missiles. Therefore, the U.S. pressed for, and obtained, explicit Soviet agreement that all the launchers in those two areas will be included in the MIRVed launcher limits.

Heavy bombers

Similar counting questions arose with regard to heavy bombers.

Existing and future heavy bombers will be counted under the various SALT II aggregates by heavy bomber types, as provided under paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty.

Another problem concerns how to distinguish between heavy bombers of a given type and airplanes with the same basic airframe that do not have heavy bomber capabilities. One example would be how to distinguish between B-52s equipped for long-range cruise missiles and B-52s not so equipped. A second example would be how to distinguish between a possible, future, long-range cruise missile carrier which uses a wide-bodied transport airframe and non-military, commercial airplanes with the same basic airframe. The answer is the so-called FRODs rule, which is a type rule that makes it unnecessary to consider each airplane on an individual basis.

The FRODs rule provides that functionally related observable differences (FRODs) will be used:

To distinguish between heavy bombers of a given type and airplanes which otherwise would be of the same types but have FRODs which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber;

To distinguish between heavy bombers of a given type equipped for long-range cruise missiles or ASBMs and airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but have FRODs which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range cruise missiles or ASBMs. However, for existing types of heavy bombers, only externally observable differences, which do not have to be functionally related, would be required. This will permit flexibility in U.S. deployment of cruise missiles on B-52s. Such externally observable differences must be design features which are verifiable by NTM.

Cruise missiles

Unmanned aerodynamic vehicles, including those with the same or similar airframes, can be either armed or unarmed, and can have range capabilities either above or below 600 kilometers. As in the other cases I've discussed, the sides have agreed to cruise missile type rules, thus alleviating a potential verification problem.

You can see that the rather large number of agreed type rules and counting rules covers the entire spectrum of systems to be limited by the SALT II agreement, and thus will aid significantly in the verification of the new agreement.

Third, the U.S. and the Soviets have agreed to provisions which provide specific mechanisms for facilitating and aiding verification.

SCC

The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) set up under the SALT I agreements will be continued under the SALT II agreement with expanded responsibilities, particularly the maintenance of the data base.

One of the functions of the SCC is to consider and resolve questions which may arise concerning compliance issues and ambiguous situations. The SCC has estab-

lished a solid record in this regard under the SALT I agreements and should continue to be a principal forum under SALT II for discussing verification considerations between the sides.

Agreed data base

The sides have reached agreement on establishing and maintaining twice annually in the SCC during the term of the Treaty an agreed data base consisting of the numbers of strategic offensive arms of both sides in the ten categories of arms limited by the Treaty.

We don't rely on the data base for verification, but it will give an agreed baseline from which to measure compliance with the various Treaty limitations.

I would like to emphasize that the two sides have obligated themselves to reach agreement on the data base numbers in each category for each side. This is a major breakthrough of Soviet secrecy and an important confidence-building measure.

The data base process will aid the two sides in interpreting the relevant provisions of the agreement in the same way. The data base process provides a specific mechanism for resolving differences that may arise in this regard.

Notification provisions

The sides have agreed on a number of notification provisions that will aid verification:

Notification in the SCC of future types of heavy bombers, of additional types of MIRVed ballistic missiles, of the dates of the first launch, and of the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment, whichever occurs earlier, of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to a Party, and notification of the number of airplanes, according to type, to be included in the sixteen permitted exemptions for airplanes used solely for testing of long-range ALCMs or ASBMs.

These provisions provide specific notification mechanisms for changes in strategic systems under the Treaty, which would help to avoid possible ambiguities and misunderstandings in the future. They serve as important confidence building measures.

In conclusion, this overview demonstrates in a concrete and detailed way that verification has been a key concern of the United States in SALT II. The United States has been successful in including a large number of agreed provisions in the new agreement which will facilitate and aid in the verification of its provisions. This is one of the key factors that lead to the conclusion that the new SALT agreement is adequately verifiable.

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room, the committee will hear several witnesses discuss allied attitudes toward SALT. The first witness will be the former Governor of New York and a man who has given much of his life to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, Governor Averill Harriman. He will be followed by administration witnesses and in the afternoon two outside witnesses, George Ball and Eugene Rostow. The afternoon session will begin at 2 p.m. It will be conducted by the chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs, since the subject matter in the afternoon will deal with European attitudes and our relations with our NATO allies in the context of the SALT II Treaty.

Senator Biden will chair the meeting tomorrow afternoon and it will be held in room 4221 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., July 19, 1979.]

THE SALT II TREATY

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Helms, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Averell Harriman's appearance before this committee is an extraordinary opportunity for us. We have heard many witnesses already, many experts, many authoritative opinions. We have many more to hear, but Governor Harriman's testimony on the SALT Treaty and its place in the context of United States-Soviet relations carries special weight. It reminds me of President Kennedy's remark at a White House dinner for American recipients of the Nobel Prize. He said that the group represented the most extraordinary collection of talent and knowledge that had ever gathered together at the White House with the possible exception of the time when Thomas Jefferson dined there alone.

If the occasion were a gathering of Soviet experts, of American statesmen showered with honors and esteem, the same comparison could be made without exaggeration between them and Governor Harriman.

It was in the Kennedy years that one of Washington's perpetual wiseacres tried to joke about Averell Harriman that he was the only ambitious 70-year-old in the administration. The wisecrack was accurate, but only up to a point. Averell Harriman has been and still is ambitious, but his ambition is for his country, for peace in our world, for a future of decency and democracy.

To the service of that ambition he has has brought unusual energy and great wisdom. At home, he was administrator of the National Reconstruction Administration for President Roosevelt. Abroad he directed the Marshall plan for President Truman. At home, he negotiated with businessmen as Secretary of Commerce. Abroad, he negotiated with Churchill, Stalin, and Khrushchev on conducting World War II and on averting World War III.

For Presidents Ford and Carter, he has been an emissary to Moscow, a rare and valued statesman whose word carries weight in

the Soviet capital as in our own. No other American in our time has acquired such experience in dealing with and trying to understand the Soviet leadership. Few other Americans of any time have served their country with greater distinction in so many different posts.

The committee is privileged to have his counsel.

Governor, I would invite you at this time to make your statement to the committee and to present your testimony. Then we will proceed to questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, at your suggestion, I am summarizing the statement which I have given the committee. I stand by that statement, and thus let it be put in the record.

I will make a somewhat briefer summary of what that statement covers, with your permission.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The entire statement will appear in the record at the appropriate place.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate greatly this opportunity to testify before this committee on a subject in which I have been deeply involved for many years, the control of nuclear weapons. In fact, I accompanied Prime Minister Churchill on his visit to Washington to see President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor. Among the members of his staff, he brought with him his scientific adviser. Churchill proposed to Roosevelt the urgent need to develop an atomic bomb before Hitler. Churchill offered to pool the British scientific knowledge with ours.

Following these discussions, the Manhattan Project was launched. Fortunately, Germany was overrun before Hitler's scientists achieved a breakthrough. I was with President Truman at Potsdam when he heard of the success of the Los Alamos test in 1945. May I add that there were those present, including Mr. Stimson, who were already concerned about how we were going to control this awesome power. I was involved in Truman's efforts to control the atom bomb in the United Nations through the Baruch plan. He felt deeply his obligation.

President Eisenhower also was gravely concerned. Under President Kennedy in 1963 I headed the American team that negotiated the limited test ban in Moscow with Khrushchev. I visited Moscow again in 1965 for President Johnson, and Premier Kosygin raised with me the need for an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the control of nuclear weapons. I recall Kosygin saying that we both had the capacity to kill each other many times over, and he remarked, what difference does it make if one can do it 21 times and the other only 19 times?

President Johnson later discussed the need for such an agreement with Premier Kosygin when the latter visited him at Glassboro in 1967.

I was in Paris in August 1968. President Johnson had agreed to meet Kosygin at Leningrad to start these nuclear negotiations. Our Ambassadors to the NATO countries had received instructions to inform their host governments of the planned meeting. These

instructions had to be canceled that very morning, because of the Soviet entry into Czechoslovakia.

It is a tragedy that these talks did not begin in 1968, as it was before we had developed the MIRV's and our mutual capabilities were very much less than they later became.

You are, of course, fully familiar with the successful meetings which President Nixon had with General Secretary Brezhnev in 1972 leading to the important agreements on ABM's and on SALT I. I think it is significant to point out that Khrushchev was prepared in 1963 to agree to a complete comprehensive test ban. Verification was the principal obstacle from our standpoint. With the state of our technology at that time, we could not detect for sure the difference between an underground nuclear explosion and an earthquake.

We therefore asked for onsite inspections. We demanded seven onsite inspections, and Khrushchev offered only three. Jerome Wiesner, now president of MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] was President Kennedy's scientific adviser. Wiesner urged our taking the risk of not being sure of verification as he thought any cheating might be of relatively little value and that our technology could be developed rapidly in order to distinguish between these two types of explosions.

Other scientists held the same view, but verification won the day. We had to be satisfied then with a limited test ban. If only we had followed the wisdom of Dr. Wiesner, think how greatly the whole development of nuclear weapons would have been restrained by a prohibition of testing.

Our own lead in weapons technology would in all probability have held.

I have reviewed the testimony of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense given last week. They have told this committee the complete details of the restraints in quantity and quality of permitted Soviet buildup. They have also explained our modernization program fully permitted under the treaty, which is required to maintain our position of equivalence and the protection against the threat to our ICBM's.

There is no need for me to repeat these points. I wish, however, to strongly endorse their statements. I would like to comment that the Soviet Government has undertaken a massive program during the last 15 years to catch up with the United States in nuclear capability, and because of our limited activity, it is succeeding. We can no longer expect to stay way ahead of them as in the past. There is, however, a stability that comes from neither side feeling inferior. There is in the Soviet Union a spectrum of opinion in the ruling group, from hardliners who are pressing for military strength to support their ideological objectives to those who have a more reasonable attitude and who are concerned with the development of the Soviet Union for the benefit of the Soviet people.

Our acceptance of equivalence as conceived by the SALT II Treaty will, I believe, tend to strengthen the more reasonable group, and it may well affect the succession to Brezhnev when he steps down. Rejection of the treaty, however, I fear, might lead to a hard-line succession. This could have a far-reaching effect on our relations for many years. It could mean the difference between

greater progress both in the control of nuclear and conventional arms as well as in political affairs as against a return to more of the cold war attitudes.

I was in Moscow in May 1975, heading an American delegation appointed by President Ford to participate in the Soviet celebration of the 30th anniversary of VE Day. The emphasis of this celebration was not, as one would expect, on the victory in war, but on the maintenance of 30 years of peace. President Brezhnev emphasized this in his hour-long speech. He called for the same cooperation for peace as we had during the war, yet when he came to the role of the Communist Party, he made the following statement:

"Our high-principled support of liberation movements throughout the world adds to our influence and prestige."

He has been quite open in statements of this kind, and we should recognize that the Soviet Government will help Communist subversion—they call them liberation movements—wherever the opportunity arises. Our nuclear weapons will not stop communism. The strength of our ideals and the way we adhere to them, as well as our assistance to others who are trying to protect their freedoms will, I believe, in the long run prevail over communism.

In addition, we should also give more attention to strengthening our conventional forces where needed. The decision on SALT II can have such a far-reaching effect on our security that I earnestly hope it can have bipartisan cooperation such as existed in the immediate postwar period, when Republican Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, worked so closely with President Truman in the historic achievements of that time.

I would like to recall Senator Vandenberg saying that it was not bipartisanship but nonpartisanship.

I should say that Senator Vandenberg's nonpartisan leadership made possible an agreement for the founding of NATO. He deserves as much credit as any other individual for that achievement.

Today, the governments of our European allies are strongly supporting this SALT II Treaty because they know it will add to their security. Also, they hope it will lead to a reduction of forces under MBFR in which we have a vital interest. There are also many fields in which we have a vital interest that would be favorably affected by the ratification of SALT II. In the Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union are committed to reduce nuclear weapons.

SALT II would contribute to our working together to reduce and prevent nuclear proliferation. Without the treaty, it would be far more difficult to prevent an increasing number of countries attaining nuclear capability with all its attendant dangers.

Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would give promise to the success in other important areas with the Soviet Union such as the antisatellite negotiations, chemical weapons, the law of the sea, and a most important beginning in the development of fusion power. The attainment of our objectives in controlling nuclear weapons is a long process, starting with President Truman.

Real progress is now being made, but it can only be achieved on a step-by-step basis—some modest and some more extensive. I am sure the committee is aware of the extent to which the views of the

Senators have been sought and the attempt of the negotiators to attain as many of their suggestions as possible.

I believe a balance has finally been agreed to with the Soviet Union which represents as close to a consensus as is achievable now.

Based on my years of negotiations with the Soviets and my long talks with President Brezhnev, I am convinced that it would be unproductive to seek to reopen the treaty as only disastrous results would come from it, or at least unfavorable ones.

In closing, I would like to state to those who feel that SALT II does not go far enough that I believe the way to make progress is to approve SALT II and move to achieve their objectives in SALT III to which both governments are committed. On the other hand, there are some who have been persuaded to oppose the treaty because they believe the Soviet Union gains superiority under this treaty. Nothing could be further from the truth. As has been testified, the treaty places important restrictions and restraints on Soviet developments. There is no doubt that without the treaty, the Soviets would have a substantially greater nuclear capability in the coming years. It would be far more costly, as Secretary Brown has testified, to keep up with the Soviets.

He has also explained how our modernization program maintains essential equivalence in addition to countering the growing vulnerability of our ICBM's. All in all, Mr. Chairman, I see much to be gained and nothing to be lost in ratifying this treaty in the interest of our national security and in our awesome objectives of controlling nuclear weapons.

I have closely watched developments since the Truman days. We have always lost in failure to take advantage of offered opportunities and found a more difficult situation later. Therefore, I unhesitatingly strongly recommend approval of this treaty to this committee. Thank you.

[Ambassador Harriman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate greatly the opportunity to testify before this Committee on a subject in which I have been involved for many years—the control of nuclear weapons.

In fact, I accompanied Prime Minister Churchill on his visit to Washington to see President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Among the members of his staff, he brought with him his scientific advisor, Frederick Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell). Churchill proposed to Roosevelt the urgent need to develop an atomic bomb before Hitler. Churchill offered to pool the British scientific knowledge with ours. Following these discussions, the Manhattan Project was launched. Fortunately, Germany was overrun before Hitler's scientists achieved a breakthrough on an atomic bomb.

I was with President Truman at Potsdam when he first learned of the success of the Los Alamos test in July 1945. Later I was involved in his efforts to control the atomic bomb in the United Nations through the Baruch Plan.

In July 1963 under President Kennedy, I headed the American team that negotiated the Limited Test Ban in Moscow with Premier Khrushchev.

I visited Moscow in 1965 for President Johnson, and Premier Kosygin raised the subject with me of the need for an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the control of nuclear weapons. I recall Kosygin stating that we both had the capacity to kill each other many times over, and he remarked, "What difference does it make if one can do it 21 times and the other 19 times?" President Johnson later discussed the need for an agreement with Premier Kosygin when the latter visited him at Glassboro in 1967.

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I was in Paris in August 1968 when President Johnson had agreed to meet Kosygin at Leningrad to start nuclear negotiations. Our ambassadors to the NATO countries had received instructions to notify their host governments of the planned meeting. These instructions had to be canceled that very morning because of the Soviet entry into Czechoslovakia. It is a tragedy that these talks did not begin in 1968, as it was before we had developed the MIRVs and our mutual capabilities were very much less than they later become.

Your are, of course, fully familiar with the successful meetings which President Nixon had with General Secretary Brezhnev in 1972, leading to the important agreements on ABMs and on SALT I.

I want to emphasize that the delays in discussions have led to greater difficulties in subsequent talks because of the rapidity with which scientific development produced more deadly weapons.

I think it is significant to point out that Khrushchev was prepared in 1963 to agree to a complete Comprehensive Test Ban. Verification was the principal obstacle from our standpoint. With the state of our technology at that time, we could not determine for sure the difference between an underground nuclear explosion and an earthquake. We therefore asked for on-site inspection and the establishment of the so-called "black boxes" which would be strategically placed and available to us. We demanded seven on-site inspections and Khrushchev offered three. Jerome Wiesner, now President of M.I.T., was at that time President Kennedy's scientific advisor. Wiesner urged taking the risk of not being sure of verification, as he thought any cheating would be of relatively little value and that our technology could be developed rapidly in order to distinguish between the two types of explosions. Other scientists held the same view, but verification won the day; we had to be satisfied with a Limited Test Ban. If only we had followed the wisdom of Dr. Wiesner and the other scientists, think how greatly the whole development of nuclear weapons would have been restrained by the prohibition of testing. Our own lead in weapons technology would in all probability have held.

I have been convinced by the judgment of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, as well as from information I have received from scientists at Harvard and M.I.T., that SALT II is adequately verifiable and there is no strategic danger from possible violations.

I have studied the testimony of Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown. They have given this Committee complete details of the restraints in quantity and quality of permitted Soviet buildup. They have also explained our modernization program, fully permitted under the Treaty, which is required to maintain our position of equivalence and the protection against the threat to our ICBMs. There is no need for me to repeat these points. I wish, however, to strongly endorse their statements and judgments.

I would like to comment that the Soviet government has undertaken during the last fifteen years to catch up with the United States in nuclear capability and is succeeding. We can no longer expect to stay way ahead of them. There is, however, a stability that comes from neither side feeling inferior. It gives greater opportunity for reaching agreements in other fields. There is in the Soviet Union a spectrum of opinion in the ruling group, from hardliners who are pressing for military strength to support their ideological objectives, to those who have a more reasonable attitude and who are concerned with the development of the Soviet Union for the benefit of the Soviet people. Our acceptance of equivalence as conceived by the SALT II Treaty will, I believe, tend to strengthen the more reasonable group, and it may well affect the succession to Brezhnev when he steps down. A rejection of the Treaty, I fear, might lead to a hardline succession. This could have a far-reaching effect on our relations for many years. It could mean a difference between greater progress both in the control of nuclear and conventional arms, as well as political matters, as against a return to more of the cold war attitudes. It could affect the balance in the areas in which we find it possible to cooperate, or where we are faced with competition, if not confrontation.

I was in Moscow in May 1975, heading an American delegation appointed by President Ford, to participate in the Soviet celebration of the 30th Anniversary of VE Day. The emphasis of the celebration was not on the victory in war but on the maintenance of thirty years of peace. President Brezhnev emphasized this in his hour-long speech. He called for the same cooperation for peace as we had during the war. Yet when he came to the role of the Communist Party, he made the following statement: "* * * our high-principled support * * * of liberation movements throughout the world * * * adds to our influence and prestige." He has been quite open in statements of this kind, and we should recognize that the Soviet government will help communist subversion—called "liberation movements"—wherever

the opportunity arises. Our nuclear weapons will not stop communism. The strength of our ideals and the way we adhere to them, as well as our assistance to others who are trying to protect their freedom, will, I believe, prevail over communism. We should also strengthen our conventional forces where needed.

The decision on SALT II can have such far-reaching effects on our security that I earnestly hope it can have bipartisan cooperation such as existed in the immediate post-WWII period, when Republican Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, worked so closely with President Truman in the historic achievements of that time. I like to recall Senator Vandenberg saying that it was not "bipartisanship" but he called it "nonpartisanship." The avoidance of nuclear holocaust is so serious that it requires acceptance of Senator Vandenberg's wise precepts. After all, this Treaty has been negotiated under both Republican and Democratic administrations.

In 1948 there was a strong difference of opinion, both from the left and the right in this country, about whether we should join in a military alliance with Western Europe. Such a prominent Republican leader as Robert Taft opposed this alliance. Senator Vandenberg's nonpartisan leadership made possible agreement on the founding of NATO.

Today the governments of our European allies are strongly supporting this SALT II Treaty because they know it will add to their security. They also hope it will lead to agreement on European nuclear balance and the reduction of conventional forces under MBFR (Mutual & Balanced Force Reductions). There are many other fields in which we have a vital interest that would be favorably affected by the ratification of SALT II. In the non-proliferation treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union are committed to reduce nuclear weapons. SALT II would contribute to our working together to reduce and prevent nuclear proliferation. Without the Treaty, it will be far more difficult to prevent an increasing number of countries attaining nuclear capability, with all its attendant dangers.

Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would give promise to the success in other important areas, such as the anti-satellite negotiations, chemical weapons, the Law of the Sea, and the development of fusion power.

The attainment of our objectives of controlling nuclear weapons is a long process, as I pointed out, beginning under President Truman in 1945. Real progress is now being made, but it can only be achieved on a step-by-step basis—some modest and some more extensive.

I am sure this Committee is aware of the extent to which the views of the Senate have been sought and the attempt of the negotiators to attain as many of their suggestions as possible. Recent negotiations have, however, had to consider commitments taken in compromises which, though favorable to us, are not now renegotiable. I believe a balance has been finally agreed to that represents as close to a consensus as is achievable today.

Based on my years of negotiations with the Soviets, and my long talks with President Brezhnev, I am convinced that it would be unproductive to seek to reopen this Treaty following these lengthy negotiations by three Presidents.

In closing, I would like to state to those who feel that SALT II does not go far enough, that the way to make progress is to approve SALT II and move to achieve their objectives in SALT III. The Treaty, under Section XIV, commits us to prompt negotiations for further limitations and reductions in strategic arms. On the other hand, there are some who have been persuaded to oppose the Treaty because they believe the Soviet Union gains superiority under this Treaty. Nothing could be farther from the truth. As has been testified, the Treaty places important restrictions on Soviet developments in the numbers of warheads and in the numbers of MIRVs to be allowed, not to mention the ten-percent reduction in total permitted launchers. There is no doubt that without the Treaty the Soviets would have a substantially greater nuclear capability in the coming years. It would be far more costly, as Secretary Brown has testified, to keep up with the Soviets. He has also explained how our modernization program maintains essential equivalence in addition to countering the growing vulnerability of our ICBMs.

I have explained that over the years we have always lost by delays. Agreements have become more difficult as both sides have attained a higher level of technological development.

All in all, I see much to gain and nothing to lose in ratifying this Treaty in the interest of our national security and in our awesome objectives of controlling nuclear weapons. I have closely watched developments since Truman's days. We have always lost in failure to take advantage of offered opportunities and found a more difficult situation later. Therefore I unhesitatingly strongly recommend approval by this Committee of the SALT II Treaty.

SOVIET UNION WILL NOT CHANGE ITS IDEOLOGY

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Governor, for your statement. I was struck by one passage from that statement that I would like to reread. It is where you say:

> We should recognize that the Soviet Government will help communist subversion—called "liberation movements"—wherever the opportunity arises. Our nuclear weapons will not stop communism. The strength of our ideals and the way we adhere to them as well as our assistance to others who are trying to protect their freedom will, I believe, prevail over communism.

I think that is a chord that needs to be struck in the consideration we give to this SALT II Treaty. The Soviet Government is not going to change its stripes. It isn't going to begin to behave any differently, quite apart from the question of control over the nuclear arms race. Our tremendous arsenal of nuclear weapons had little effect upon the Marxist elements of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Our enormous nuclear power has not prevented the Soviet Union from intervening in the Horn of Africa, Angola, and in other places where it seeks advantage and supports Marxist type governments.

LINKAGE OF SALT TO OTHER ASPECTS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR

The question that I would put to you is this. Do you believe that there is anything to be gained by the effort that some would make to link Senate ratification of the SALT II Treaty with some effort on our part to restrain Soviet activities worldwide—in other words, to try to link SALT II with other aspects of Soviet behavior?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Absolutely none. I think we must keep it entirely apart. Now I have heen told in no uncertain terms, that they have been greatly concerned by the disaster that would come to the Soviet Union if nuclear war occurred. Both sides would be destroyed. They are interested in this for one reason and one reason alone, and so are we. To try to think that we are doing them a favor is really beyond the realm of conception, and their reaction to it would be just the same as our reaction would be if they had tried to put conditions on our acceptance.

Now, I have said this since 1945. Our objectives and the Kremlin's objectives of an ideological nature are irreconcilable. They want governments that are dominated by dictatorships of the proletariat, and we want to see governments that are responsive to the will of the people, but we have to find a way to compose our differences in other directions to prevent war on this small planet.

That hasn't changed, but the situation has changed, and we really now have an opportunity to come to agreements. It is utterly impossible to mix considerations of the nuclear treaty or any arms limitation treaty with any other political subject. They stand on their own. It would look as if we are gaining something or they are gaining something. It is impractical.

SOVIETS INTERPRET NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT AS SIGN OF OUR WEAKNESS

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, there is a theory that I hear more and more often these days that the American debate over SALT II is

not really an argument over the terms of the treaty or really even over Soviet intentions in accepting this particular bargain, but a disagreement among Americans over what kind of role we can and should play in the world. As that theory applies to dealing with the Soviet Union, it is argued that theirs is a purposeful, self-confident society on a well reasoned and calculated march toward a clear goal—world domination, while America, the theory goes, cannot match that sense of resolve and purpose without confronting the Soviets more forcefully than we have in recent years.

The theory is that the Soviets will always interpret a negotiated agreement between the superpowers as a sign of our weakness, as a sign of our acquiescence in the face of their insistence, applied not just to SALT, but to the range of United States-Soviet dealings. Do you consider that theory to be a valid one?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I am not quite sure which side is yes and which side is no. With the noise here, I cannot fully understand your question. I can only say that the signing of this agreement is in no sense a sign of weakness. If we want to show our firmness, the thing to do is to be firm in places like Angola. I am afraid that may offend some people, which I do not mean to do, but I have to be frank about it.

I think where they are taking advantage of situations and trying to impose their Communist will on other people, we should try to take an interest if it is possible for us to prevent it. I am for strong action in that respect, but I am also for protecting our interests and trying to avoid the possibility of nuclear war, which is the most essential of all. It is not a sign of weakness. It is a sign of strength. It is a sign of determination. I think, frankly, that nothing would be worse—I have to say this. I hope it does not affect any of you. The Senate's failure to ratify the treaty would have an appalling effect all over the world. People would wonder how our Government operates, whom they could trust, with whom they could negotiate, and it would affect our relations for some years to come.

So, I cannot help but believe that this committee will recommend it and that the Senate will act on it, because it is so clear to me that we have so much to gain and nothing to lose. Is that an answer to your question?

The CHAIRMAN. That is, sir. Thank you very much.

Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield 1 minute of my time to Senator Helms, who has to go elsewhere and wishes to ask one question.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I am sorry? I am quite deaf, sir. Would you repeat that, please?

Senator JAVITS. Certainly. I said I would yield to Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Senator Javits, I thank you so very much. I will not be long.

Governor, the first week of July, I was in London, and I met with a distinguished group of members of the House of Commons, one of whom was a young man named Winston Churchill III. Do you know this young man?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. He is my stepson.

Senator HELMS. He is a very fine young man.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I agree.

QUESTION OF STRONG SUPPORT FOR SALT IN BRITAIN

Senator HELMS. We discussed SALT II, Winston and I, and about 75 other members of Parliament, and they are greatly alarmed about SALT II, and I was very much interested in your statement relating to the strong support of our European allies. I do not think that strong support exists in Britain.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. He is very much interested in seeing Britain have more of a nuclear capability, and he is afraid there would be something in the treaty which would make it impossible for him to do so and for Britain to attain it. Now, I am not fully familiar with the details, but I am familiar with the fact that he is very strongly opposed to the Soviet Union in his individual judgment. I do not agree with him on many of his ideas, but I have great respect for him. He is a fine individual, and has nothing but good motivations, but his concern is whether Britain is going to be able to get everything it wants from us in the way of help to increase its nuclear capability.

Now, I understand from Mr. Vance that he has told the Government that the ideas they have in mind are permitted under the treaty, but I cannot discuss that any further. However, he does not speak for the Government, he speaks for himself, just as I do not speak for the U.S. Government, I speak for myself. There is no question about the British Government approving the SALT agreement. I checked that again with Mr. Vance to be sure that I could make that statement. It is unqualified.

Of course, there is a difference of opinion in Britain, just as there is a difference of opinion in this country, including, I notice, occasionally a difference of opinion among Senators. This statement in no sense affects the judgment of the British Government.

Senator HELMS. I would say that he is one of many with whom I met.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Senator from New York for his courtesy. I have to go to the Ethics Committee. Please let me ask unanimous consent that he be given his full 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from New York will be given his full time.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

JUSTIFICATION FOR VOTING AGAINST TREATY ON SECURITY GROUNDS

Governor, I know your views, and it is very encouraging to me that since the debate before the North Atlantic Assembly last December in Lisbon both of us have taken the view that the succession to Brezhnev will be determined in large part by what happens to this treaty in the Senate of the United States. What I would like to ask you in order to give the matter balance is this.

I want to be for this treaty. I am not saying this as an enemy of the treaty. Would you not agree that if a Senator has real doubt about the fact that U.S. security will be adversely affected at the end of the treaty period, to wit, 1985, that notwithstanding all of the positive considerations, he would still have to say he cannot vote for the treaty as it now stands. That is if he had really

sincere, justifiable doubts that it would adversely affect the security posture of the United States in 1985?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, I just do not agree that there is such a possibility, and therefore I simply cannot answer your question. It is hypothetical. We are able to do everything that we are planning to do. The M–X program the President has approved and if the Congress approves the action, will come into being in 1986.

There has been too much talk, I think, among the opposition about the ICBM's. They have 70 percent of their capacity in ICBM's where we have somewhere between 25 and 30. The strength of our Tridents, the strength of our Trident weapons, the strength of our other submarines, the strength of our Air Force, the extraordinary strength of cruise missiles by that time will be completely released. These are all assets which we are going to have. I could mention many others which will strengthen our position, so I cannot answer your question because I just don't believe there is this basis for doubt, and if anyone has that feeling, I believe he is misinformed. Therefore, I would not make a justification for voting against the treaty on security grounds.

Senator JAVITS. That is the Harriman that I remember very well, with that answer.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. If that is a compliment, thank you. [General laughter.]

Senator JAVITS. It is. I was your lawyer many years ago, when I was Attorney General and you were Governor.

LINKAGE BETWEEN TREATY REJECTION AND BREZHNEV'S SUCCESSION

Governor, you have vast experience with the Soviet Union, and I deeply believe that your testimony respecting Brezhnev's succession, which I consider to be a critical argument, is one of the most important that we have had yet. I would like to ask you one other question on that score, and that is, what other evidence do you have, aside from simply your judgment based upon your vast experience with the Soviet Union, that, as you say in your statement, "a rejection of the treaty, I fear, might lead to a hardline succession." What is the basis for that judgment?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. There is this spectrum of opinion similar to the spectrum in this country. It is not the same, of course, but I knew that existed even under Stalin. The Politburo was divided at that time between those who wanted to cooperate with us in the postwar period and those who saw the opportunities for expanding communism as being so great that they ought to go their own way and press communism. I have known that existed, and therefore I had every reason to believe that it existed here. I learned this not from any specific information that was given to me but by the many contacts I have had with the leaders of the Communist Party.

I have had many, many talks with Mr. Kosygin. I have known him since 1942. I have had a number of personal talks with Mr. Brezhnev, not representing the Government. I see their attitudes. Also, one reads what other people say and one forms a judgment on the basis of that.

I am glad you say that I say this might, because I cannot say positively that it will, but I am virtually convinced that it will have a very serious effect on the succession. It seems natural that it would because with the difference of opinion between the hard-liners who want to press for communist expansion and those who do not think they have done a good enough job in showing how well communism works in helping people, and I think Mr. Kosygin is one of them, I see there is the conflict.

I do know that when we take a hard line, it pulls the rug out from under the more reasonable people, and strengthens the hard-liners who believe they have to maintain a larger military establishment to stop us in ways that they think are against their interests.

That is about all that I can say, sir. It is a judgment based on some 50-odd years, experience with their leaders. I knew Trotsky. I did not know Lenin, but I worked intimately with Stalin during the war, perhaps more so than any westerner. I knew Khrushchev. In fact, I knew him well. I am not a Kremlinologist, and do not pretend to be, but I do know what the attitude of the senior leaders of those countries has been over the years.

My judgment is based on experience, and that is about all I can say, sir, and I am satisfied that I am right.

Senator JAVITS. Governor, I respect that judgment enormously, and I believe the country should as well. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET ADHERENCE TO STRATEGIC TREATIES

Governor Harriman, I was just thinking listening to your testimony here today that the committee could not have found anyone with a longer and more distinguished record of dealing with the Soviet Union than you. It also occurred to me that the men in power in the Soviet Union now right from the top on down are men of your age, of your generation. So I think that gives you a special insight into what they are thinking.

As you pointed out in your statement, you have been involved in a lot of these strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union. I am wondering what the record shows about the Soviet side adhering to the strategic treaties. They signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in which you were involved. They signed the SALT I Treaty. They signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. What has been their performance in adhering to those treaties to which they have affixed their signatures?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. As far as I know, they have adhered to those agreements. People say you cannot trust the Russians. You can trust the Russians to do the things which they consider in their interest, and in my judgment they consider it in their interest to control nuclear weapons.

I believe that there is no country where the leadership is more anxious to keep war off the soil of its territory than the Soviet Union. I have had this judgment confirmed by Tito, whom I have known intimately ever since the wartime days. I have seen him

frequently over the years. This generation of Russian leaders does not want to see war. Brezhnev is quite emotional about it. He has children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren. He does not want to see them go through what they did during the last war. They are building up their conventional forces for that purpose. They have gone too far with their conventional forces in the view of our military, and I have every reason to believe they are right. Just why the Soviets are doing that, I do not know, but it concerns me greatly.

They have motivation to catch up with us in nuclear weapons and in the expansion of their conventional forces. For the first time, they can stop invasion. They want to be able to stop it both from the east and from the west. Therefore, they want to see control of nuclear weapons, because they do not want to see their nation destroyed. They know the danger. They are not wild people in this respect.

I have fundamentally disagreed with their ideology since I first went there over 50 years ago. They believe it is the wave of the future. I think they are wrong. I do not like anything about their system, but they are concerned about their survival just as we are. I see no reason why we should not recognize that they want to see these agreements in the nuclear field just as we do. They are not sitting there planning a first strike, as some people seem to think. They are sitting there trying to build up a defense of their country and also build up a military establishment which will help expand their influence and the spread of communism in other parts of the world.

I want to say that although they have had some success, they have had enormous failures in the spread of communism. In Africa, we see their success today, but recently they were thrown out of Ghana and the Sudan, and of all places, they were thrown out of Cairo. They have been very heavy-handed. They have also been less influential in India.

Stalin thought he was going to control the world by the development of communism with Moscow as the oracle. That no longer exists, as you fully know. They do not even control their satellites as they did years ago, or the communist parties in Europe. They are looking after their security first, and also the use of their military to spread communism, but in my opinion they are not ready to take the risks that Mr. Khrushchev took. I think that is one reason why he was fired, because he took the risk of sending his missiles to Cuba, but they will use their conventional forces.

I don't know if that answers your question.

Senator McGovern. Yes, Governor, it does. Thank you.

PRESENTING U.S. VERIFICATION ABILITY TO AMERICAN PUBLIC

Yesterday, we looked at the verification issue as it relates to this treaty. I may have some questions about certain aspects of the treaty and more particularly about the ratification process and what it does to the arms race, but there is no point where I agree with you more fully than that the administration has demonstrated beyond a shadow of any doubt in my mind that we can adequately verify this treaty. Whether we trust the Russians is irrele-

vant, because we have the technical means by satellite, by photographic reconnaissance, by radio receivers, by listening posts, to detect any violation of this treaty. It would be impossible for the Soviets to launch any significant missile that we wouldn't immediately detect.

I have been especially struck by the uncanny accuracy of these photos that we can take even from very high altitudes. We can identify an object the size of a bicycle. Certainly we could pick up any changes in their strategic structure, but unfortunately, much of that information and technology is not made available to the American public.

I have always thought, Governor, that one of the reasons you are as effective as you are in foreign policy is that you have always understood the close relationship between strong foreign policy and effective domestic politics.

Now, recognizing that relationship and the importance of bringing the American public along in its understanding of just how reliable American verification technology is, do you see any reason why the American public should not be shown on television and through other ways, through the press and elsewhere, samples of the kind of photographs we could take?

Maybe we wouldn't want to show the ones that have been taken in the last 2 or 3 years, but even if you went back 4 or 5 years, those photographs are impressive enough to show that we know what we are doing when we say we can verify this treaty.

Do you think that might be a useful thing to do?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, I think you are absolutely right. Of course, we must protect against these sensitive methods that we have which they are not fully aware of. The fact that they don't know exactly what we know and what we do not know is a great protection to us. I am sure by your question that you agree that we must keep a sensitive area from getting to them, but I do think that we can show the American people some of the old photographs which would be very startling, I think, to everyone, but I do think and I am sure you agree that we have to protect our recent information.

Senator MCGOVERN. Yes, we have to protect those things that would compromise our security.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. By the way, may I say that I have come to the same conclusion that you have on verification, not only because of my respect for the judgment of Defense Secretary Harold Brown, but also I have discussed it with other scientists whose judgment I believe in. I have kept in touch with them and have come to the conclusion that you have, Senator, on verification.

There is always a slight risk, whether it is one in a million, as was said yesterday. Nothing is perfect. The risk of using verification to block this treaty, I think, would be a tragedy today.

Senator MCGOVERN. Governor, in your statement at one point you refer to the tragedy that the SALT I process did not move fast enough to bar the MIRV system. I agree with that. One of the problems I have had with this whole SALT procedure is that both the negotiations and the ratification take so long, and so many concessions have to be made to satisfy security and political consid-

erations, that it always seems like the arms race is one step ahead of the negotiators.

Can you see any formula under which, if we assume we are going to ratify SALT II, we can get a handle on the SALT III process by devising some instructions that could come out of the Senate to shape that SALT III process, so that the negotiating process and the arms control process can not only catch up with the technology of the arms race, but bring it under control?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Sir, I would think that the sense of the Senate would be very important. I would be a little careful about specific limitations because it is very hard to foresee what the situation is.

As a matter of fact, the Senate's insistence on quantity of launchers helped these negotiations. I understand that at Vladivostok we obtained that objective, but by and large I think it is dangerous to hold negotiators to specific matters, but I think the sense of the Senate in the fields that concern the Senate would be very useful to stimulate and give some support to the negotiators.

Senator MCGOVERN. I have a formula that I would like to take the liberty of discussing with you at some point, Governor, which I think might be useful in terms of instructions to our SALT III negotiators.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I would appreciate that.

Senator MCGOVERN [presiding]. We have a rollcall on now, Governor. That is why people are leaving, but I will be back, as will the chairman and others.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I hope you vote right, Senator.

Senator MCGOVERN. Senator Javits?

U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF EQUIVALENCE WILL STRENGTHEN SOVIET MODERATES

Senator JAVITS. Governor, I will ask questions for a few minutes, but I, too, will have to go and vote. There was one thing about your statement that interested me, and that is your view that our acceptance of equivalence will strengthen the more reasonable group in the Kremlin. You count equivalence in nuclear armament as an affirmative achievement in terms of trying to ease the tensions which are bound to exist between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. If I understand your question correctly, my answer is yes, I think it does strengthen us. I think it strengthens what I call the more sensible people who are more interested in the development of Russia than in international adventure.

Senator JAVITS. I may have to run in a minute, because I hear the bells, on the vote, but I would like you to answer this question for the record.

There is some concern among the doubters that the Soviet Union may not accept the doctrine which we have laid out, respecting traditional cooperation with the allies in Europe on nuclear arms, which we have done for years; whether this will or will not be claimed by the Russians to be a violation of the non-circumvention provisions of the treaty, and similarly with the M-X missile, whether our development of it will also not be claimed by the Russians to be a violation of the treaty. Ambassador Earle and

others assert that it would be very unwise to ask the Soviets whether they do or do not agree. If we believe so, and we so state before the treaty has actually been signed, that is much better for the U.S. position, that we may insist and proceed on those programs.

Now, I happen to feel strongly. I do not mind telling you my view that they are right about not asking. I think given your tremendous experience in negotiating with the Soviet Union your answer would be a very important bit of evidence in this connection.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. If I understand which is yes and which is no, my answer is yes, sir, I would agree with you. It is very important to take a position on these matters, which are our affairs. As long as we have told them exactly what we are going to do and what our position was and they have gone ahead and signed the agreement without objection to it, I see no reason why we should go to them and expect to get them to agree.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Governor.

Our next questioner is Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think, Governor, there would be total agreement on both sides of the aisle that no one could walk in that door as a witness before this committee for whom all of the members of the committee would have greater affection and greater admiration than you. You are a toughminded railroader, a toughminded investment banker and businessman, a toughminded Governor, and a toughminded diplomat, and we have great respect for you.

I think you and I would agree on two things. First, business is a good background for politics, and, second, there is nothing wrong with our hearing. It is just that everyone we talk to seems to mumble. [General laughter.]

NOMINATION OF TOM WATSON AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW

Senator PERCY. I would like to ask you my first question because of the comment you make, you state, "In closing, I would like to state to those who feel that SALT II does not go far enough that the way to make progress is to approve SALT II and move to achieve their objectives in SALT III." That has really been a common theme. People looked on as both doves or hawks, have been critical of this treaty because it has not gone far enough.

Assuming now that this is a continuous process of arms limitation negotiation could you comment first on the nominee to be the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Tom Watson, former head of IBM Corp., who will appear before this committee on July 27?

You have been an ambassador to the Soviet Union. You serve on the President's Advisory Committee for Ambassadors. Could you comment on his nomination and confirmation as it relates to the continuing process of dealing with the Soviets in a fair and just but toughminded frame of mind to bring about continued steady arms reduction but in a way that will preserve our national security and keep us second to none?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, it has been said in the press that I proposed Mr. Watson. That is not true. The Secretary of State and the President decided upon him, and I strongly support

his appointment. I have known him well. I have known his father well. He has done an amazing job with that company, and in international affairs. He has been to the Soviet Union and spent 6 months there during the war, by the way. He knows it well. He knows what he is up against. I have found Mr. Brezhnev and some of the other leaders to be very anxious to talk with businessmen. Businessmen have been able to get engagements to see them which others have not.

When Mr. Brezhnev heard of the suggested appointment, he was pleased by it.

I was not surprised. I was satisfied with it. I think he will bring not only good morale, but he will start again what ought to be started, and that is a two-way channel. The Soviet Ambassador here, Mr. Dobrynin, is extraordinarily able. It has been very convenient to do business back and forth with him, but our embassy has been cut out, and I think the establishment of Ambassador Watson in that status will enable us to go back to the two-way channel. I think we will get along better with the Soviet Union. I think he will be excellent in every way. His experience qualifies him well for it, and his background will be well received.

The Soviets are very anxious to do business with the American people. Of course, the business in which he practices is the one in which we are most careful in giving them technology, namely, computers. So, his company is one in which they are particularly interested.

Now, I am not suggesting that that is a reason to appoint him, but it is an indication of the interest which I have found on the part of the Soviet leaders. His character, of course, is unquestionable. I cannot say that he is doing this as a sacrifice, because he is very glad to do it. I do not like the idea that people work for the Government as a sacrifice. They get a lot of satisfaction out of it. He will get satisfaction out of it. I think his wife is making a real sacrifice, however, but I believe she is glad to do it.

DISPARITY BETWEEN EUROPEAN POLITICAL/MILITARY LEADERS OVER SALT

Senator PERCY. Governor Harriman, you have appeared before this committee over a period of many, many years. I would like to say something publicly that I said in executive session the other day. This is the most complex problem I have ever tried to deal with, and I think almost every one of us feels that way. It has been broken down into its various component parts. The jigsaw is being put together. Today we are devoting a great deal of time to one major concern of mine, the attitude of our NATO allies, but I would like to say again that this is the finest and best prepared work that has ever been done for the Foreign Relations Committee in my experience in the Senate.

I want to commend the chairman for what he has accomplished, and I want to commend the staff for their efforts.

Governor, we have had some skepticism evidenced to us despite the fact that political leaders in Europe have been very strong on the record for this treaty. There has been a recognition that there is some skepticism by the NATO allied military personnel, the top

military personnel. We will probe deeply into that with General Haig and others.

Could you tell us from your judgment and from your experience why there is this disparity of view—enthusiasm for the treaty on the part of political leaders in Europe but skepticism on the part of military leaders?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I cannot answer that because I have not been involved in talking to the military men. Of course, I know that in England the military leaders are highly respected, but they are respected as advisors to the cabinet. They never go to the Parliament. They never testify to the Parliament, as they do here. They are advisers to the Government. There isn't any doubt that the Government has received their advice. If it is opposed to this, it has not acted on that.

Of course, you cannot tell what their motives are. I have told you their motive in connection with another question of one individual, but I am afraid I cannot answer your question because I have not talked with them, but it does not upset me because in Europe the governments are the supreme force and the military will do exactly what the governments instruct them to do.

UNDERSTANDINGS ON EXTENSION OF PROTOCOL AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

Senator PERCY. Thank you. We have looked for the underlying reasons for skepticism and find that there is a concern that the protocol may be unilaterally extended by the President or some future President rather than ending on December 31, 1981, and secondly, that article XII might possibly inhibit the transfer of technology to our European allies, for instance, on cruise missiles.

We are working on understandings that will make it clear that the protocol will not be extended without the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and clarifying that we intend to continue transferring to our NATO allies all technical information needed for our mutual defense in Europe. Do you think that those understandings would go a long way toward relieving some of the skepticism that might exist about the treaty as it now stands?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Yes; I would think so. I think it is a logical concern of the European military. But you know the position. It has been testified to by Secretary Vance at the Senate hearings confirming the position that the administration has taken. It would be a strengthening of the position. To have to go back and renegotiate, I think, would be counterproductive, and such efforts would collapse, but confirming the interpretations of the administration would be a strengthening of the hand of the Government.

EUROPEAN CONCERN ABOUT AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Governor. I have one last quick question. The European political powers do support this treaty right on the record, and they would say so categorically. There seems to be, however, a concern among them about the will of the United States, about our tenacity, about our toughness. Why can't we solve

the energy problem? Why can't we curb imports and cut consumption? Are we adrift? Is there some underlying concern in your judgment, that the allies now have about American leadership and could that affect their enthusiasm for this treaty as a part of the total picture?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I am not familiar with a connection between the two, but there has been concern in Europe on the matters that you have discussed. There is always a concern. They depend so much on the United States. There is always the concern that we may not live up fully to what they expect of us.

Senator PERCY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Percy. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I think I should begin by making an admission. I have tried, Governor, to be objective in my questioning of witnesses and to be equally skeptical of what any of them has to say, but I must acknowledge at the outset that my regard for you transcends my ability to be skeptical to the degree that I should, and I will acknowledge that publicly.

EVIDENCE OF EUROPEAN SKEPTICISM OVER SALT

Having made my admission, I would like to pursue two questions. I will preface my first question with this comment. In my travels to Germany and in my meeting with the Chancellor, the Defense Minister, and other high ranking civilian and military officials, I have not seen any evidence of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] military leadership expressing anything beyond a healthy skepticism about the noncircumvention clause and the protocol. The degree of skepticism that I have encountered from the military persons in Europe is not significantly different from that of the political leadership. And the political leadership to which I spoke, and to which the committee staff spoke throughout Europe, shows an overwhelming support for SALT. The attitudes of our allies have been overwhelmingly supportive, both in opposition parties and the party of the government in each of the countries.

As recently as yesterday, we met with the Defense Minister of Great Britain, of the Tory government. He was the first Tory official to spend any time in Washington since coming to the government. He acknowledged unequivocally the Tory government's support and the Labor government's support. He acknowledged that this reference being made to an undercurrent of opposition in Great Britain to the treaty may reflect as many as 30 parliamentarians, but he reminded us that there are over 600 parliamentarians in Great Britain.

In short I have not seen anything that would substantiate in the slightest the assertion made here on the committee by Senator Helms about the skepticism of European military personnel. So, I want to know whether you, Governor, can disabuse me of the impression I have acquired, which is that there is no skepticism among our allies that would even approach the level of suggesting we should not move forward with this treaty. My impression is that the allies are concerned about theater nuclear force modern-

ization, and SALT III, but not about SALT II. To the best of your knowledge, is my impression correct or incorrect?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I believe you to be correct, although I have not as recently visited Europe as you have, but I have no reason to doubt your statement.

SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCE BUILDUP

Senator BIDEN. One thing you mentioned in response to a question from one of my colleagues, Governor, related to Soviet competition, Soviet attitudes, and overall United States-Soviet relations. You said that there is not an attempt on the part of the Soviets to seek a first strike nuclear capability. But you acknowledge the Soviet conventional force buildup, and if there is a conflict, it would be in the conventional force area. Is that a correct understanding of what you said?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I did not say that they were seeking a first strike capability. I said that I did not think they were planning a first strike capability. I do not know what they are seeking, but I think it is very dangerous and very unstabilizing for either side to have a first strike capability. We are much safer with both sides feeling secure. I think you understand what I mean.

I find nothing in the Soviet Union among the contacts that I have had but a recognition that if a nuclear war comes, it would be a disaster, a destruction of both nations and most of the adjoining territory.

Senator BIDEN. What I would like to get to, Governor, is the conventional forces question, if I may.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Yes. I think the buildup of conventional forces is first from a defensive view. They want to be able to be secure for the first time against invasion which they have never been before from the west or from the east, but I think now it has gone beyond that. Just why they are doing that, I don't know. I doubt if they have any plans to invade Europe because of the danger that would follow that, but at the same time they could use a known capability superior to NATO defense as a bullying process politically, and it would be very dangerous to the security of Europe.

I am very strong for making sure that the increase of NATO's capabilities be able to withstand whatever the Soviet buildup is. I also think we ought to spend more energy on our technology and be ahead of them, as we are in nuclear affairs, in our conventional weapons. We can make the tank obsolete, but the best thing to do is to go ahead with MBFR and try to get a reduction. I understand from my talks with Mr. Brezhnev that he is ready to do that, and I think that ought to be pressed.

SALT WILL FREE FUNDS FOR CONTINUED SOVIET CONVENTIONAL BUILDUP

Senator BIDEN. Governor, an academician whose views I respect and has put forward the following thesis as it relates to conventional weaponry and the SALT agreement. He has suggested a theory which goes like this. If we have a SALT pact which allows the

Soviets to slow down their strategic buildup, that will free up rubles that heretofore have been going into strategic arms and that now will flow into conventional arms. The already unprecedented conventional buildup then will be further increased, thereby further destabilizing what is already an unbalanced situation in Europe and on the border with China. Thus, the end result of the SALT process will be to further destabilize United States-Soviet relations, and put our allies in greater jeopardy than they are now, and in the end bring us closer to conflict than we would be if we did not have SALT. I wonder if you would comment on that.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I completely disagree with that theory. I think it is more apt to apply to the United States if we have to pour more and more endless sums into the nuclear field in an attempt to reduce the available funds for conventional weapons, which I think are more important. The Soviet Union already is very high in the percentage of its gross national product. I know there are people—Kosygin told me so as early as 1965—who felt that they were spending too much on the military. I think the competition will be for other things in the way of improving the economic situation of the Soviet Union. They think they ought to do a better job for the Russian people, and there are other investments they want to make, but I think your argument would apply equally to the United States.

If we have to spend vast sums of money to try blindly to keep up, we will not know what they are doing, as you well know. Therefore, we have to take the worst case and go on pouring money into this useless field, which does not do anybody any good except it extraordinarily increases the danger of nuclear war.

I think that man is absolutely wrong. The danger of nuclear war comes from the piling up of weapons and the uncertainties that exist. The fewer nuclear weapons that there are, the less the danger there is. Nonproliferation would go out the window, as you know, and other disadvantages of it, and so I could not disagree with the theory more than I have said.

I could amplify what I say, but I feel very positively on this subject.

Senator BIDEN. Governor, if our new Ambassador is half the Ambassador that you were to the Soviet Union, he will be the best Ambassador that we have throughout the world.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. It is very kind of you to say that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell is next.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for not being here earlier. I am chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing, and I will have to leave again to resume a meeting there shortly. I want particularly to apologize to Governor Harriman, whose friendship I value very much. I guess he is one of the reasons I am in politics. I remember resigning from the Foreign Service in 1952 to be deputy director of the Harriman for President campaign, in which we won 3 to 1 in the District of Columbia. Perhaps if we had won not only the primary but the general election, we would be in a different situation today.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Mr. Senator, may I interrupt to say that I thought you were very foolish at the time to resign to support me.

Senator PELL. I remember you told me that.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. But I am very proud of what has happened since.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I am your Frankenstein. [General laughter.]

I would like to say that there is no one's testimony that I want to hear more than yours. I have had a chance to read it. I was struck by one statement that you made to the effect that the governments of our European allies are strongly supporting the SALT II Treaty because they know it will add to their security.

I completely agree with you. I have been chairman of the Senate delegation to the North Atlantic Alliance and all of the people from NATO countries to whom I have talked are uniformly urging us to ratify SALT.

Yesterday at lunch the Minister of Defense of Great Britain, of the new government, Mr. Pym, recognized the same point. I cannot find these people who are opposing it, who are supposedly in responsible positions abroad. In your view, what is the source of the canard that the allies do not support SALT II? Is there any truth in it whatsoever?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, you have as much information as I have. I assume that some Senators are going abroad and sitting down to a meal with somebody who may happen not to agree with it, and who has ideas of his own. The countries of Europe are democracies, and everybody has the right to free speech. They may not understand, just as there are people in this country who do not understand and are against SALT. Many fine Americans are against SALT. I think they are utterly benighted in their arguments, however, but that does not mean that they are unpatriotic.

The same is true abroad. People abroad like to talk to Americans to press their views. I think there is a little gossip going around which has no basis in substance. Governments are strongly for the support of SALT.

Senator PELL. I completely agree with you. I do not think there is a single NATO allied government that does not strongly support SALT II. I thank you for your testimony in that regard.

My second question is this. You mention in your statement that there are hardliners in the Soviet Union, which is absolutely correct. Now, if the Soviet Union were a democracy and you were a Soviet senator, how would you react to a treaty that, one, does not maintain the unequal overall limits contained in SALT I; two, forces the Soviet Union to decrease its nuclear forces by 10 percent, while permitting the United States to increase them by about 7 percent; three, does not count 700 American systems based in Europe that could hit the Soviet Union's homeland; four, puts unilateral constraints on the Soviet medium bomber called the Backfire, but imposes absolutely zero restraint on U.S. medium bombers?

Do you think a treaty of that sort would have any chance of ratification in a hypothetical Soviet Senate?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I do not know about eventual ratification, but all those points would be brought up, and I think there would be a very strong group that would be opposed to the number of concessions that the Soviets have made to us and the relatively

few that we have made to them. There was somebody who told me that if he were advising the Soviet Government, he would have to advise not to sign the agreement. I do not know if the gentleman has testified or not, but he has taken the same position that you are taking. I think it is important, Senator. I am glad that you are bringing it up, because there has been so much talk about the relative positions of ICBM's and not a balanced discussion.

There has been criticism of SALT before there was an agreement. Those who were in favor of SALT could not talk until there was an agreement. It is very healthy, Senator, for you to bring out these facts.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed, and thank you so much for being with us. I apologize, as I said earlier, for not being able to be here for your entire testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Governor, for your testimony. It has been most helpful to the committee. We appreciate your coming and giving us the benefit of your long experience in Soviet-American relations.

I beg your pardon. Senators Lugar and Zorinsky are here. I did not see them enter.

Senator LUGAR. I would defer to Senator Zorinsky.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Zorinsky, do you have questions you would like to put to the Governor?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the Governor a question or two. I apologize for my tardiness. I was over in a meeting on gasohol.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you advanced the cause of gasohol.

NATO RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR ATTACK ON UNITED STATES

Senator ZORINSKY. Governor Harriman, considering your experience as an ambassador, I would like to ask you about your feelings concerning our NATO alliance and the dependability of that group in the event that this Nation were attacked by the Soviet Union in a first strike scenario. By that I mean there are currently four major countries with nuclear armament capability. I have heard it often expressed that three of those countries have their missiles and armaments pointed at the Soviet Union. With your previous connections and experience as an Ambassador, what type of response do you feel we could count on that is not included as part of the numbers in SALT II, but is available as part of the NATO Alliance in the event of an attack on this Nation?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Well, Senator, I am very glad to meet you. I have spent much of my life in Omaha, and I am glad to know that you are representing that constituency.

It is very hard to answer any specific question of that kind. I think we have had good allies. We have always thought of the danger coming to the Europeans by a conventional force invasion of Western Europe, and the Europeans have been concerned whether we would really stand up with them on a first strike basis against the United States.

I do not think that the number of nuclear weapons that the Europeans have would count very much in the balance, because of our fantastic number of nuclear warheads. We have about 9,500

against a relatively small number in Europe, so I have never thought of it in those terms, but they are good allies and they are ready to work with us. It is a startling difference to the Soviet Union, who has no allies whom they can trust. Their allies have begun to show their independence, and I think they are utterly undependable.

I have to answer your question in a general way only. The NATO allies, our allies, I think, are good allies, and will work together with us for our mutual security, but it would never occur to me that their relatively small nuclear capability would add so much that we would ask them to use it. It is really very small.

On the other hand, our forward-based nuclear capability in the European field is very real, and it was a major concession which President Ford got from the Soviets in the Vladivostok agreement over the insistence of the Soviets on counting them. Use of those weapons would be something that we in this country would have to consider. I feel certain that the allies would not interpose any objection to that, Senator. All I can say is, I have found them to be good allies, and the Soviet Warsaw Pact is a very doubtful alliance.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Governor.

SOVIET ADHERENCE UNDER LOOSE VERIFICATION FACTORS

There is one other brief question that I would like to ask. From your observations and experiences, in your personal view, do you feel that the Soviets can be trusted to live up to the conditions of a SALT II Treaty with a loose verification factor on our side, at least for the first two years of the SALT II Treaty ?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, I think we have to be satisfied not by trust in the Russians, but that this treaty is verifiable. In answer to your question, I do believe they will keep this treaty, because they are interested in seeing progress made, and if they are caught violating the treaty, it will have a serious influence and be adverse to their interest.

Now, I think on the whole, the record of the last 6 years and our method of dealing with them has been good. I have noticed some delay on our part in bringing violations to the attention of the Soviet Union, but that is our fault and not theirs. We may find them violating some provision, but basically I think they will want to keep this agreement, because they believe it is in their interest to keep it, but we cannot count on that. We have to be reasonably sure. You cannot be positive about anything in life. We have to be reasonably sure, as Secretary Brown has testified, that they cannot gain any advantage of strategic importance by any violations which we would not catch.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Governor. I would like to say that I think your past experience evidenced through your answers has contributed to an insight of immeasurable importance for this committee to use in its deliberations during SALT II. I also would like to thank you for helping with a certain railroad that is based in Omaha, Nebr., at a time when your services were very much needed. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

Senator Lugar, I will call on you next.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. NEGOTIATING STRENGTH IN COMPARISON TO SOVIET UNION

Governor Harriman, I apologize for my inability to hear you deliver your testimony but I did read your statement with great interest. Governor Harriman, given the long experience that you have had in dealing with the Soviet Union for well over 30 years, what are your impressions about our relative bargaining strength now as we deal with the Soviet Union, as compared to other times, starting all the way back with Potsdam and moving forward?

You mentioned that we often delayed and may have lost by failing to do so, but presently you have characterized the Soviet situation as one in which we are dealing with the current Brezhnev regime, and we might be dealing with others if we do not take advantage of that situation, I think, as you characterized it. Some of us believe that our position has deteriorated in relationship to the Soviet Union during a period of time in which we did not advance our strategic weaponry in ways that we might have. In fact the President may be trying to recoup a part of that with the proposal for the M–X now and for other initiatives.

Are we in the proper posture presently to be negotiating this kind of treaty with the Soviet Union? Can you characterize anything about our relative advantage or disadvantage?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I think it is very much to our advantage, Senator, if I understand your question correctly. I think the more agreements we make with the Soviet Union, the easier it becomes to make another one. They are increasing their trade with Europe and with Japan. They are becoming more interdependent with the world. There is enormous change in the situation since Stalin's death. They are gradually becoming more involved in international and world affairs in a way in which they are dependent upon peace.

I am satisfied they do not want to get involved in a war. They have been rather cautious in the use of their troops except in the defense of their territory, and to be sure their satellites do not get away from them. At the same time, to varying degrees, there still is a desire to extend their ideology. They have faith in their ideology. Like any ideological drive, it slowly becomes less and less vigorous. I think we see quite a change from Stalin's day to the present day.

As I said, Stalin thought there would be a Communist revolution throughout the world, and that Moscow would be the center, the oracle, but that dream was shattered first by Yugoslavia and then by China. Now, you see Communist parties all over the world that are independent of Moscow. Even those in the so-called satellite states have shown a real desire for independence. The visit of the Pope to Poland showed how strong the Catholic Church was there as compared to the Communist Party.

These are all vast changes from what has happened, so I have seen a gradual reduction in the strength of the Communist drive, the Communist movement. They have been successful recently in

several areas, but prior to that, as I pointed out, the situation was quite disadvantageous to them.

If this answers your question, sir, I think the more agreements we make with them that are beneficial to us and our judgments, the better it is, the more they will become interdependent, the easier it will be to deal with them in future agreements, and the more they will become part of the world system rather than an independent force attempting to impose their ideological conceptions on world affairs.

U.S. BARGAINING FROM POSITION OF RELATIVE WEAKNESS

Senator LUGAR. Would you not feel that at the present time the SALT II Agreement is one in which the Soviet Union would move toward a strategic superiority under the terms of the treaty? Our problem stems from the fact that we may not in the past have done all the things we should have been doing in strengthening our own ICBM situation or doing the things we might have done with aircraft, doing things, in other words, that would have made a difference as we approach SALT II.

The question some of us have is whether or not we are bargaining from a position of relative weakness in this situation, and may in fact, given the Soviet designs, be relatively weaker still by 1985.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, I do not think we have given them anything. I think as Senator Pell brought out we have an enormous number of advantages to us from this. I think if you go over the negotiations of the last 2 years, the concessions on the Russians' part have been greater than ours. We are not dealing from a position of weakness. The United States never deals from a position of weakness.

Certainly in the nuclear field it is highly questionable whether they have yet caught up with us. It is stated as rough equivalence. If we did nothing, they might get ahead of us by the early 1980's. Therefore, I strongly support the recommendations of the administration for modernization in the various fields which have been suggested, but I do not think we have been negotiating from weakness, nor do I think we have given anything up from weakness. I do not think our weakness has had anything to do with the fact that the Russians have gotten things from us. They have given in because they want to have an agreement.

They recognize that there has to be equivalence, and they have given in in areas where if they had not given in, it would have been impossible for us to accept a treaty.

Senator LUGAR. You would not agree with Admiral Kidd, who testified before us 2 days ago, who said that we had moved from superiority to equivalence to rough equivalence, and that we were sliding down the bannister and needed a time out, and that the SALT Treaty mercifully gave us historically a period of time out to regroup our forces.

Your characterization is that we have been negotiating from strength with the Soviet Union?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Senator, I do not want to comment on other people's testimony. I think that they are in the process of catching us. That is my judgment. Taking the balance of all of the

capabilities that we have—I mentioned a few of them—I think if we just sat by and did nothing, they would be ahead of us in the early 1980's, but I am satisfied that Secretary of Defense Brown is right when he says, if we undertake a program which has been approved, a program of modernization, in the different ways it has been described, we will keep pace, and we will maintain equivalence as well as take steps to protect the vulnerability of the ICBM's.

I have always thought the ICBM's were vulnerable. I thought so for 5 years. So it is not surprising that it becomes a subject today.

In any event, my answer to you today is, I do not agree that we are on the downhill slide. I think we would be if we did not take the steps that have been recommended, but we have not yet reached that point.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS IF TREATY IS NOT RATIFIED

Governor, we are very pleased to have you with us this morning. You have always been a very tough-minded analyst of the Soviets.

If the treaty were not ratified, what direction would you expect United States-Soviet relations to take?

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I used to say when I was working for the Government that I was never hired to be a prophet. I cannot tell you. I fear it greatly. As I say, I think it will strengthen the hardliners. It will make them much tougher to deal with. On the other hand, I never give up on anything.

As I said before, if you confirm him, I am glad that we will have such a broad and wise man as Tom Watson to be our Ambassador to Moscow. We would certainly try to do everything we could to hold the line, but it would be extremely difficult. I could paint a picture of gloom and doom, but that is not in me to do. It would be desperately difficult, but I know I would be willing to go and talk to Brezhnev and see whether we could work out something from the pieces which were left by such an unfortunate act as the failure to ratify. But it would be difficult. It would not be in the national interest. It would not be in our security interest and it would put aside many of the very important things that I mentioned, such as nonproliferation. Nonproliferation would go out the window. I am sure of that.

You see, we are pledged to reduce our nuclear capability, and now we have that chance. If we fail to take the chance, there will be many countries, in my opinion, that will gain nuclear capability, with all of the dangers that this has. The spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world can lead to so many countries acquiring them.

The whole world would be a far more dangerous place. Of that I can be sure.

Just what our relations with the Soviet Union would be I cannot tell you. But I hate to think of the difficulty there would be in

dealing with people who are anxious for improved relations with us. We would be much weaker.

Those who ardently want to force a Communist revolution throughout the world would get the upper hand.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think no further member has appeared. If the Senators have no further questions, we will thank our witness.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I am sorry that Senator Biden is not back as I understand that he made some comment that those sitting to the right of the chairman have implied there is not support for the treaty in Europe. That certainly does not apply to this Senator, and I do not think it applies to many others on this side of the table. I made a speech on the floor of the Senate stating categorically how strong the support is among the political leadership in Europe. I merely said that there is some skepticism among some of the military, and I have also said that I feel that skepticism can be relieved by the understandings that I believe we intend to adopt.

I did want to clarify the comment that I believe Senator Biden may have made.

I am sorry that he is not here to expand on what he did say and I hope I did not misquote him.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I thank you for your courtesy and may I have the temerity to say this.

I have listened to the debates and I want to express my admiration for the thoroughness with which the Senators are analyzing the situation. Therefore, it gives me great hope that favorable action will be taken.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Governor Harriman.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I join you in thanking the Governor on his almost limitless experience in this matter and for giving us the benefit of his thinking, and especially the impact of his character in this particular field.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits.

Ambassador HARRIMAN. I am grateful for your statement, Senator Javits.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Governor.

ALLIED THINKING ON SALT II

Last week the administration presented its general views of allied thinking on the SALT II Treaty. We have heard and read the allies themselves on the subject, speaking through the heads of government, and there is no question of their official and strong support for the treaty.

It has been suggested that members of NATO are anxious that the protocol constraints on deployment of long-range ground- and sea-launched missiles might remain to bind the United States after the protocol expires by its terms in December of 1981.

It has also been suggested that they are worried that the prohibition on circumventing the treaty's provisions will impede long-

established allied cooperative arrangements on sharing technology and weapon systems. It has been suggested further that our allies are concerned over the joint pledge which would try to resolve the unreconciled questions referred to in the protocol. Finally, our European allies fear that in the next round of strategic arms control talks the United States will bargain away their options and ignore their interests.

These are all legitimate concerns to the committee inasmuch as our own security has been closely linked to that of Western Europe, and the principal alliance the United States has maintained since the end of the Second World War has been the NATO Alliance.

To discuss these questions and others we have with us today the Honorable Ralph Earle II, who was chairman of the U.S. Delegation at Geneva in conducting the talks that led to the signing of the SALT II Treaty. He is accompanied by the Honorable David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense; the Honorable William J. Perry, Under Secretary for Research and Engineering of the Department of Defense, from whom we have heard before; the Honorable George Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State; and by Mr. Walter Slocombe, Director of the SALT Task Force of the Department of Defense.

This panel is sizable, so we have asked one member, Ambassador Earle, to make a brief statement. Then we will question the panel as a whole.

Ambassador Earle.

STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH EARLE II, CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DAVID McGIFFERT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; HON. GEORGE VEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND WALTER SLOCOMBE, DIRECTOR, SALT TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ambassador EARLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I trust that together the five of us will represent some fraction of Governor Harriman's expertise.

It is an honor to appear before you again today, this time to address allied attitudes toward SALT.

Throughout the SALT II negotiations, which have spanned three administrations and almost 7 years, we have consulted closely, fully, and directly with our allies on the entire spectrum of SALT issues. In addressing the realities of Soviet military capabilities, the United States and its allies share vital security interests. We understand this, our allies understand this, and as we continue to pursue our common security interests, we make this clear to the Soviets. Thus, it was only to be expected that our mutual allied

interests would be reflected in close consultations throughout the SALT negotiations.

I have been privileged to have been intimately involved in this process. In December 1972, I attended the first SALT II consultations with our NATO Allies at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. I was then serving as the Defense Department's Representative at NATO.

Last month, in July 1979, as chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation, I participated in the last consultation on SALT II within NATO when, among other things, our NATO Allies formally endorsed the SALT Treaty.

Our discussions on SALT II have included some 40 meetings in the North Atlantic Council, of which half occurred within the past 2½ years. We have made the North Atlantic Council the focal point for these consultations because it provides a cohesive, high-level forum in which all of our NATO Allies participate.

For most of our consultations, the chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation, accompanied by some delegation members and staff, visited the Council once every several weeks—or more frequently if circumstances warranted—in order to discuss SALT developments and issues.

Following the opening statement by the chairman, Council members discussed current SALT questions in detail, including particularly their relation to overall alliance interests and objectives. Often these sessions were followed by "experts" meetings at which specialists from NATO capitals participated in even more detailed discussions of intricate SALT issues with representatives of the United States.

These meetings with the North Atlantic Council were only part of our extensive consultations with NATO. There were also meetings with the alliance at higher levels throughout the SALT II process. For example, our Secretaries of State and Defense discussed SALT with their counterparts at regularly scheduled ministerial meetings.

There were specially scheduled sessions of the North Atlantic Council to discuss, for example, SALT meetings held with the Soviet Foreign Minister or at the summit level.

There were interim reports to the Council, between formal consultations, by our Ambassador to NATO.

There were visits by experts from Washington to the Council to discuss SALT-related matters of particular allied interest.

There were supplementary contacts through normal diplomatic channels, both with NATO countries and other allies.

Throughout SALT II we have taken allied interests fully into account. Let me cite a few examples.

At the beginning of SALT II, the Soviets sought extreme limitations on U.S. systems forward deployed in support of alliance commitments, including, at one point, their complete withdrawal. The Soviets did not propose corresponding limits on Soviet systems which could strike Western Europe. We rejected these demands, obviously with the strong support of our allies. There are no limitations on U.S. systems which are forward deployed in the SALT II documents.

Similarly, the Soviets sought limitations on the nuclear systems of our allies. We rejected these demands as well, again, with strong allied support. There are no constraints on allied systems in SALT II.

In addition, the Soviets proposed a strict nontransfer provision to be incorporated in the treaty early in SALT II. The United States rejected this and subsequent Soviet proposals, again, with strong allied support. There is no nontransfer provision in SALT II.

From the beginning of SALT II, the United States sought Soviet agreement to equal aggregate limits on central systems—ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers—without limits on U.S. theater forces or allied nuclear systems. Our allies strongly supported this objective and welcomed the agreement at Vladivostok to equal aggregate limits.

More recently, Mr. Chairman, we have consulted closely on certain aspects of SALT of particular interest to our European partners. Prior to negotiating the final formulation on the SALT noncircumvention provision, we discussed possible implications fully and at length with the allies. We also consulted closely with them prior to making to the Council the formal statement Secretary Vance submitted to this committee on July 10 which makes clear our interpretation of the provision.

Following allied consultations, we proposed and secured Soviet agreement to a protocol expiration date of December 31, 1981 which is well before the anticipated date when deployment of ground-and sea-launched cruise missiles would begin. We also made clear to the Soviets that the protocol limits do not establish a precedent for future negotiation.

The SALT II Treaty addresses intercontinental strategic systems. However, we and our allies are also consulting closely about the expansion and modernization of Soviet theater nuclear forces facing Western Europe. Alliance consultations on this issue have addressed the impact of this trend upon NATO's deterrence strategy. In particular, the high level group, which is chaired by Mr. McGiffert, of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, has been created in order to develop recommendations as the basis of future alliance decisions. The High Level Group will prepare recommendations on NATO theater nuclear force modernization for consideration by the alliance defense and foreign ministers.

In addition, we are consulting within NATO on the positive role which arms control efforts might play in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West. Alliance efforts in the field of arms control complement our collective endeavors on defense policy. In recent months the Alliance has carefully considered the implications of seeking constraints on theater nuclear systems through arms control negotiations. In April 1979, a special group was formed under the aegis of the North Atlantic Council to develop an arms control approach to theater nuclear forces in parallel with the work being done by the high level group.

In order to maintain all United States and allied options with respect to possible future limits on theater nuclear forces, the United States consulted closely with its allies on a formal statement which we made to the North Atlantic Council on June 29. As Secretary Vance indicated last week, we stated, and I quote, that

"any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limits on Soviet theater systems."

This statement preserves flexibility to pursue future limitations on theater systems or not, depending on what we and our allies determine to be in NATO's best security interests. This approach will give the Alliance time to consider in depth its theater nuclear force requirements and to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of involving theater systems in arms control before any discussion takes place with the Soviets.

Mr. Chairman, throughout SALT II, our interests have been served through consultations—not just briefings, but thorough discussions on all sides—with our allies. I have been struck by the depth of detail with which our allies have pursued these issues with us and with the expertise which has so clearly emerged from our consultations. Our discussions have ranged from the broadest issues of defense policy to the most detailed consideration of such issues as MIRV launcher type rules. Our discussions have been thorough, candid, and mutually beneficial.

All of our NATO allies, without exception, support SALT II. The same is true of the NATO Defense Ministers, the Secretary General of NATO, and the North Atlantic Council. All have publicly endorsed SALT II.

I believe, however, that no one can speak to the views of our allies better than they, themselves. For this reason, I have submitted with my statement a representative sample of allied statements in support of SALT II, and I ask that they be included in the record. I would like to read one of them for you now. It is by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and I quote:

> SALT II is, of course, not only a domestic matter for the Americans. For that reason the United States Government informed its allies on the progress of the talks and also consulted with them. This treaty is a piece of world history. It is also a piece of world security and a piece of my own country's security. For the present it is a climax of cooperative arms limitation. The Federal Republic of Germany supports the SALT II Treaty and hopes that it will soon be ratified by Washington and Moscow.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that this allied support reflects, to some degree, the continuing and close consultation that the United States has had with its allies throughout the period of the SALT II negotiations. More importantly, however, I believe it reflects their own assessment of the contribution the treaty makes to their individual and collective defense, and their judgment that it safeguards United States and allied strategic and security interests.

Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Earle's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RALPH EARLE II

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you again today—this time to address Allied attitudes toward SALT.

With me are Mr. George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Mr. David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

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understand this, our Allies understand this, and as we continue to pursue our common security interests, we make this clear to the Soviets. Thus, it was only to be expected that our mutual Allied interests would be reflected in close consultations throughout the SALT negotiations.

I have been privileged to have been intimately involved in this process. In December 1972 I attended the first SALT II consultations with our NATO Allies at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. I was then serving as the Representative of the Secretary of Defense at NATO. Last month—in July 1979—as Chairman of the United States SALT Delegation, I participated in the last consultation on SALT II within NATO, when our NATO Allies formally endorsed the SALT Treaty.

Our discussions on SALT II have included some forty meetings in the North Atlantic Council, of which half occurred within the past two and one-half years. We have made the North Atlantic Council the focal point for these consultations because it provides a cohesive, high-level forum in which all of our NATO Allies participate.

For most of our consultations, the Chairman of the U.S. SALT Delegation, accompanied by some Delegation members and staff, visited the Council once every several weeks—or more frequently, if circumstances warranted—in order to discuss SALT developments and issues. Following the opening statement by the Chairman, Council members discussed current SALT questions in detail, including their relation to overall Alliance interests and objectives. Often these sessions were followed by "experts" meetings at which specialists from NATO Capitals participated in even more detailed discussions of intricate SALT issues with United States representatives.

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Interim reports to the Council, between formal consultations, by our Ambassador to NATO;

Visits by experts from Washington to the Council to discuss SALT-related matters of particular Allied interest; and

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Similarly, the Soviets sought limitations on the nuclear systems of our Allies. We rejected these demands as well, again with strong Allied support. There are no constraints on Allied systems in SALT II.

In addition, the Soviets proposed a strict non-transfer provision early in SALT II. The United States rejected this and subsequent Soviet proposals, with strong Allied support. There is no non-transfer provision in SALT II.

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STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL LUNS ON BEHALF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, JUNE 29, 1979

After detailed review, against the background of regular exchanges of views which had taken place within the Alliance throughout the negotiations, the Allies have concluded that the new agreement is in harmony with the determination of the Alliance to pursue meaningful arms control measures in the search for a more

stable relationship between the East and West. The Allies therefore hope that the agreement will soon enter into force.

This treaty responds to the hope of the Allies for a reduction in nuclear arsenals and thus offers a broader prospect for detente. The Allies note that the Treaty fully maintains the U.S. strategic deterrent, an essential element for the security of Europe and of North America. They have been given explicit assurances by the United States, which they welcome, that nuclear and conventional cooperation among the Allies can and will continue.

United Kingdom Statement on SALT II Issued by the Foreign Office on June 27, 1979

"The British Government welcomes the strategic arms limitation agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which was signed in Vienna on 18 June. Successive British Governments have strongly supported the efforts of the U.S. Administration to negotiate balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic arms. Throughout the negotiations leading to the new agreement the U.S. has kept its allies informed of progress and has consulted them, particularly on aspects of special concern to them. The Government are satisfied that the agreement will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional cooperation between the U.S. and its allies and that the essential security interests of the alliance are safeguarded. They hope that the treaty will be ratified."

The Foreign Office spokesman also said that day:

"SALT II must be seen as a carefully balanced compromise between the different interests and attitudes of the two sides. It breaks new ground in placing equal ceilings on the strategic arms of both sides which will involve the dismantling of some Soviet delivery systems and in applying qualitative limits. It is thus an important step in the continuing process of arms control which the Government sees as complementary to the alliance's defence capability."

Commencement Address by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Harvard University, June 7, 1979

SALT II is, of course, not only a domestic matter for the Americans. For that reason the United States Government informed its allies on the progress of the talks and also consulted with them. This treaty is a piece of world history. It is also a piece of world security and a piece of my own country's security. For the present it is a climax of co-operative arms limitation. The Federal Republic of Germany supports the SALT II Treaty and hopes that it will soon be ratified by Washington and Moscow.

NATO Defense Planning Committee Communique, May 16

Following the conclusion of the DPC meeting with Defense Secretary Harold Brown, May 16, the committee issued a communique which contained the following section devoted to the SALT II agreement:

"Ministers welcomed the Agreement in Principle reached between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. They agreed that equitable limitation of the nuclear weapons capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States will improve the security of NATO. Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the past record of close and full consultations within the Alliance on issues arising from these talks, confirmed the importance of continuing close consultation, and looked forward to the opportunity to study in depth the official SALT II text once the Treaty is signed."

Thatcher-Schmidt Press Conference, London, May 11

Schmidt (FRG). "We are in favor of a quick, swift ratification process, both in Moscow and in Washington, DC. We imagine that the world might change, might undergo a change not for the better, if new difficulties for the coming into force of SALT II would arise. The process has already lasted long—a little bit too long to my feeling—and so it is about time that this agreement should have been concluded and it is about time that it is getting into force. Otherwise, I would feel that there are many great disadvantages for the West and the East that would arise. . . . We would try to be helpful as regards President Carter's efforts to get ratification in the

American Senate for SALT II. If we felt to have been hurt in our defense posture by that agreement, we would certainly not do so. As regards SALT III, it is a little bit premature to speculate about it, but certainly, the United States Administration will consult her Allies, whether it is United Kingdom, or Germany, or France or others, so we will have to wait for that consultation first before we speculate about it."

THATCHER (UK). "I thought Chancellor Schmidt's view was very much the view that we have taken, that the Treaty has taken a long time to come to a conclusion and we trust it will be ratified. . . . I think SALT III will be one which concerns Europe even more and perhaps we can concentrate rather more on that."

OFFICIAL FRENCH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON SALT II ISSUED JUNE 26 BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AFTER A MEETING CHAIRED BY PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING

Based on a presentation given by the Defense Minister (in the absence of the Foreign Minister), the government proceeded with a thorough examination of the text of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT II).

The government concluded after that examination that the agreement signed in Vienna constitutes, in its principal aspects, an event to be saluted for its range and positive character.

From the political point of view, the agreement represents the conclusion of several years of difficult negotiations and marks an important step on the road to international détente.

From the point of view of disarmament, the agreement signals only relative progress in that it barely provides for significant reductions in the size of the Soviet and American arsenals. On the other hand, the genuine limitations that the agreement imposes on quantitative and qualitative growth act to brake the accumulation of nuclear arms by the world's two principal military powers.

From the point of view of security, the agreement can be considered balanced overall, taking into account the different structure of the military apparatus to which it applies.

The government notes in conclusion that the Soviet-American agreement does not jeopardize the vital security interests of third party states. In particular, the independence of the French nuclear deterrent force is not affected in any way.

Consequently, the government considers that the Vienna agreement meets conditions which permit the government to express its approval.

The government hopes that the agreement will come into effect soon, and thus open the way to a new series of negotiations which will not only prevent increases in the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals, but also reduce their size and power in a balanced and duly verifiable fashion.

NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT OF JUNE 18, 1979

The government wishes to express its great satisfaction with the signing of SALT II by the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty is a milestone in the complicated efforts toward achieving control of the strategic arms race through limitations on long range means of delivery of nucear weapons. The SALT negotiations are a basic element in the process of detente between the super powers and between East and West in general. It is our hope that the SALT treaty is ratified and that it will have positive effects on the efforts to promote Arms Control also in other forums, and that the Salt process can be continued with a view toward achieving, in the next round, real reductions in the strategic armaments.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON SALT II, MAY 10

The Government is glad that progress on SALT II has gone far enough to permit the long-awaited summit meeting to take place and we welcome the settlement of major outstanding issues. The Government will study the final text of the Agreement when it is available and its implications. There will of course be an opportunity to discuss all aspects of the new Agreement with the Americans especially during the forthcoming visit of Secretary Vance to London.

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD CARRINGTON'S PRESS CONFERENCE MAY 14

We are glad that the negotiations have progressed this far, and I think that has undoubtedly been the message which the U.S. Government has got from Britain, and we welcome the settlement of outstanding issues. We very much hope that this Treaty will be ratified before long. We have all supported efforts to limit strategic arms . . . Of course I shall have an opportunity to speak to Mr. Vance about SALT and there are I think specific British interests in SALT, which I will seek to ask him about and be satisfied that they are, in our judgment, fully safeguarded. Of course, SALT III is of even more importance to Europe and it's early days about SALT III (sic) but we shall have to look very carefully at the terms of reference, which we don't know at the moment, and we shall have to consider very carefully the way in which we can and should participate.

FOREIGN MINISTER CHRISTOPHERSEN'S MAY 9 PRESS STATEMENT (DENMARK)

It must be greeted with the greatest satisfaction that the Foreign Ministers of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. after so many years of negotiations have succeeded in reaching agreement on the so-called SALT II Agreement on a limitation of the strategic arms race. The Agreement not only opens up new perspectives for the disarmament talks in general, but is also an expression that the two superpowers recognize their common interests in vital areas and their responsibility for world peace. The Agreement is thus also an important contribution to further general relaxation between the East and the West. The Government hopes, therefore, that the Agreement will soon be followed up by the necessary approval by the two countries, and that it will be followed by new talks—the so-called SALT III—the aim of which is additional and considerable reductions of the nuclear arms.

SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEPH LUNS' MAY 11 STATEMENT (NATO)

I welcome the announcement recently made by the government of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that they have reached agreement in principle on the terms of a second treaty to limit strategic armaments. This Agreement is obviously an important development in the process of achieving such a treaty and, as such, may constitute a significant milestone in the evolution of the East-West relations since World War II.

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S MAY 10 STATEMENT (FRG)

The Federal Government welcomes the fact that it was possible to bring the SALT II negotiations to an essentially positive conclusion. The Federal Government is of the opinion that SALT II constitutes a very important contribution toward the stabilization of world peace.

During the negotiations, the Government of the United States of America regularly informed the Federal Government and the governments of the other Allies about the status of the talks and gave regard in the negotiations to the proposals and ideas that were voiced in the course of these consultations by the Allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Federal Government has always considered the American-Soviet negotiations on a limitations of strategic armaments to be a central factor of stabilization in the field of security policy. The Federal Government has repeatedly expressed the hope that these negotiations be concluded at an early date.

The Federal Government welcomes the fact that the successful conclusion of the negotiations will make possible a signing of the Agreement in the forseeable future.

FOREIGN MINISTER FORLANI'S MAY 10 STATEMENT (ITALY)

The new pact . . . presents a unique occasion for the international community to bring about a decisive turning point that will break the spiral of rearmament and establish peace and security in the world for everyone on the basis of balanced military force and armaments at gradually decreasing levels.

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STATEMENT OF CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT AT THE DINNER FOR THE DELEGATES OF THE 10TH GERMAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, HAMBURG, GERMANY, MARCH 17, 1979

SALT II, as a whole, to my view, to the view of my government, or any other Western European government, is of enormous importance for the continuity of West-East relations and for peace . . . just think of a situation where this agreement collapses. Think of the consequences not only in Europe but also in other theaters in order to understand the global importance of that undertaking, whatever you may think about this or that or the third detail of it.

STATEMENT OF KLAAS DE VRIES, MEMBER OF NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENT, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY PLENARY DEBATE ON SALT AND ARMS CONTROL, NOVEMBER 30, 1978

Rejection of such a treaty would entail the consequences of a most serious nature and would raise the spectre of a totally unrestrained and destabilizing arms race.

STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN AFTER GUADELOUPE SUMMIT, JANUARY 6, 1979

I would like to urge—speaking as someone who is on the other side of the Atlantic—I would like to urge the speedy ratification, the conclusion of the agreement and speedy ratification on both sides, that is, on the United States side and on the Soviet Union.

I think it would be a very sad day if this agreement were not ratified, and the administration will have our support in their efforts when they place it before the American people. And we look forward to the development of a SALT III negotiation, which we believe will be of benefit to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador for your statement. I also want to commend you for the tenacity that you showed for a long period of time in conducting American negotiations with the Soviet Union. I know how exasperating that can be. I have witnessed just enough of it to know.

I must say that on those occasions when we have met in Geneva, your briefings have been very thorough.

Ambassador EARLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to turn to the protocol, to article IV, which reads: "This protocol shall be considered an integral part of the treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the treaty and shall remain in force through December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms."

Keep that in mind, together with the fact that the protocol concerns a mutual undertaking not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers before the termination of the protocol—that is, before December 31, 1981—and neither to deploy nor test cruise missiles on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers. It also, of course, contains a commitment on each party's part not to flight test or deploy ASBM's.

Ambassador EARLE. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt, the prohibition on sea-based and ground-launched cruise missiles is only with respect to deployment. We are permitted to test throughout the protocol period.

The CHAIRMAN. I read from article II, paragraph 2, "Each party undertakes not to flight test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers."

Ambassador EARLE. That is correct with respect to those with multiple independently targetable warheads, but not with respect to basic cruise missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. But the weapons we are discussing—cruise missiles, mobile ICBM's—are weapons that the United States intends to add to its strategic deterrent in order to preserve equivalence with the Soviet Union in the future.

Now, looking to the future, it seems likely that the United States would want to preserve the limits we have now established on warheads or to reduce them. It would seem that the United States would want to preserve the freeze on heavy Russian missiles that we have in the SALT II Treaty in addition to reducing numbers of these strategic weapons on both sides.

Now, what will the Russians be looking for in exchange? I should think that they would be looking for a limitation of the kind the protocol presents, a limitation on mobile ICBM's, on land-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, on that kind of thing, the very weapons that we propose to develop in the future.

Would you not agree?

Ambassador EARLE. I would agree. That is what they will seek to limit.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

PROSPECT OF PRESERVING ADVANTAGES ACHIEVED IN SALT II

Well, then, what are the prospects that we can succeed in preserving the advantages that we have obtained in the SALT II Treaty without making concessions to the Soviet Union in the area of new weapons that we believe to be necessary in order to preserve our equivalence?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator, one of the items you mentioned was the freeze on the launchers of heavy ICBM's. This appears in the treaty. The limitations on the weapons that we would plan or are planning to deploy appear in the protocol.

It seems to me that the leverage is all on our side. It is unquestionable that the Soviets will attempt to continue at least some of the limitations in the protocol beyond December 31, 1981. But article IV, which you read at the outset of your questions, by itself determines that the protocol expires on that date.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. But I am concerned about our running out of bargaining chips. If we are forced to accept cruise missile limits in SALT III, just to maintain the limits already contained in SALT II, what negotiating capital, or bargaining chips will we have to obtain new limits in SALT III on Soviet theater systems, such as the SS–20 or the Backfire?

Ambassador EARLE. It seems to me, Senator Church, that if we do deploy mobile ICBM launchers and sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles after the expiration of the protocol, which we are entitled to do, we then come toward the end of 1985 in a very strong bargaining position. At least we are even. I think we will probably be a little ahead. As far as the issues in the protocol are concerned, the leverage is on our side.

The CHAIRMAN. That works only if the protocol expires, and is not extended informally the way the SALT I treaty was extended,

and if we are in a position, as we approach 1985, to bargain with these weapons well advanced, with some deployed and some being tested. Isn't that true?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. McGiffert may have indicated that he would like to respond to this question.

Mr. MCGIFFERT. No, Mr. Chairman, I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other response?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Does that not then underscore the responsibility of the Senate making certain, in a formalized way, as an understanding between the executive branch and the legislative branch that this protocol will expire and will not be extended by unilateral declaration or by any other means. Because our bargaining position, as we approach SALT III, really depends on the development of some of these weapon systems which we have been discussing, that are limited under the protocol.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Church, I would again simply point to the words of the protocol themselves, to the statements to this committee by representatives of the administration, and to statements made to us by representatives of the Soviet Union, that there is absolutely no question that the protocol expires on December 31, 1981. No one doubts it.

The Soviets realize that the protocol is not a precedent. In fact, they have so articulated that to us. Therefore, I think that the agreement and the understanding of the parties is sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that here in the Senate we may take a different view.

Ambassador EARLE. I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIETS RUNNING TO CATCH UP

Ambassador Earle, first of all, as one who has expressed some concern about the pace of both the negotiating process and the ratification process, I want to express some concern about the fact that the arms race always seems to move faster than the effort to catch up and control it.

In no way would I want anyone to think that reflected on the work by you and your colleagues because I think you have done a splendid job for the country, given the constraints under which these negotiations have to take place and the demands that the Senate ratification process places on you.

Before I get into the question of the SALT implications for European theater security and so on, there is one question on which I wanted to pick up from Governor Harriman's statement. He said:

> I would like to comment that the Soviet Government has undertaken during the last 15 years to catch up with the United States in nuclear capability and is succeeding. We can no longer expect to stay way ahead of them. There is, however, a stability that comes from neither side feeling inferior.

Obviously, if somebody is catching up, if somebody is ahead, they, at least temporarily, have to do more than the person who is ahead

to close that gap. Do you think that this effort to catch up explains why some of the people who have testified before the committee have pointed with great alarm to the fact that the Soviets are expending a greater percentage of their GNP on strategic weapons and other military systems than we are? In other words, my point is if you are ahead in a race, it is obviously the guy who is behind who has to run a little faster, at least until he catches you. It does not necessarily mean that he is going to achieve superiority.

I wonder if you would just comment on that point which I thought Governor Harriman made very well, on which we did not have a chance to question him.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator McGovern, I am personally inclined to agree with you. I think this, in fact, has been the case.

I hesitate to put before this committee too many statements from my Soviet colleagues or too many impressions that I have derived from them during the negotiations. But, in a general sense, my impression, having dealt with them on an almost daily basis for 6 years, is that they feel they are still catching up. My impression is that they do not believe they have caught up yet, in spite of the size and number of their missiles.

I think that they have serious concerns about the technological lead of the United States, and I think they see little hope of catching up in that area. Therefore, their efforts have been directed down avenues which they can pursue more effectively than perhaps some other avenues.

Perhaps Dr. Perry would care to comment on that.

Dr. PERRY. I would concur with your statement, Mr. Ambassador.

SENATE COULD EXTEND PROTOCOL

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Ambassador, it is my conviction—and I think you share this—that SALT II should strengthen the search for arms control solutions to European security problems. But I have some concern that the opposite could very well happen.

My concern is that the SALT ratification process, not the treaty which you have negotiated, if we are not careful, could foreclose the arms control path to European security. Let me give you some examples of what I am talking about.

First, regarding the protocol to the treaty, to which the chairman just referred, I think it is one thing to require Senate consent before the protocol is extended. It is a very different thing for the Senate to say that under no conditions do we want the protocol extended formally or informally. That action would foreclose future negotiating options, it seems to me. It might reduce the incentive of the Soviet Union to negotiate theater arrangements. And yet, I think the committee appears to be moving in that second direction of, in effect, just foreclosing the possibility of any extension of the protocol.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I say that I am not moving in that direction.

Senator MCGOVERN. Senator Church, I did not mean to draw you individually into this, but it seems to me that this has been the drift of what I have heard around the table.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are quite right that the important point is to make sure that the protocol is not extended without the consent of the Senate, because we cannot foresee changes in circumstances that might make that in our national interest.

Ambassador EARLE. I could not agree with that more.

Senator MCGOVERN. I would just underscore that that is quite different from a flat prohibition by the Senate against any extension. I hope that difference is understood.

Second, on the Backfire bomber, Ambassador Earle, it is one thing to state that the United States reserves the right to deploy a Backfire equivalent. But I think this statement is being interpreted by some as a license to go ahead and build the Backfire equivalent, even though we already have hundreds of nuclear capable aircraft which can function with nuclear weapons in the European theater and thus probably have no real military need for a Backfire type bomber.

PROTECTING ARMS CONTROL OPTION FOR EUROPEAN ALLIES

A third point of concern is allied military cooperation.

I agree that our traditional patterns of cooperation in NATO need to be protected. But, again, that does not mean that we should sign licenses tomorrow for exporting cruise missiles to Germany or Trident submarines to Great Britain.

Finally, regrettably, I expect American-Soviet relations to take something of a beating during this ratification process because a good many of our colleagues believe that it is possible to have SALT without détente. But in Europe détente is a much more immediate and pressing issue. I think Europeans want to preserve détente. To them, it means the reunion of families, it means more trade, it means fewer tensions that can explode into violence which would be right on their doorstep.

In discussing SALT and Europe, we cannot confine ourselves just to our view of SALT. We have to take care not to harm the prospects for strengthening détente in Europe as well.

So, on all of these levels—military, political, and diplomatic—I think we have to be careful that ratification of strategic arms limitation does not make it more difficult for our friends and allies in Europe to exercise the arms control options that are open to them.

I am wondering if you would agree and would care to comment on the importance of us protecting and preserving that arms control option for our European allies.

Ambassador EARLE. Absolutely, Senator McGovern.

As I indicated in my statement, we have kept our allies fully apprised of what we were doing in this arms control negotiation. As I also mentioned in my statement, just a few months ago there was formed in NATO the so-called special group, which is chaired by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from our State Department; it is pursuing the track of arms control, if you will. At the same time, the high level group is pursuing the study of options for modernization and improvement of the NATO forces in Europe. So, we have the two-track approach.

I am no expert in either of these discussions, having been occupied in Geneva. My colleagues would be prepared and willing to explore them with you further. The fact is that we are pursuing the arms control approach for the future with our allies in Europe.

POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE

Senator McGovern. There has been some implication from time to time, Ambassador Earle, that there might be such a thing as a limited nuclear war conducted in Europe with European-based nuclear and tactical weapons being used against the Soviet Union. Can you conceive of any scenario in which that can happen, in which it would not escalate into a major strategic exchange?

Ambassador Earle. It is difficult to conceive of such a scenario, Senator McGovern. I realize, with respect to contingency planning and the use of nuclear weapons, that one must plan. As I think Secretary Brown said yesterday, nothing ever turns out the way you expect it to. But at least we can cover the various options. On a personal basis, I find it difficult to conceive of a scenario which would limit a nuclear war to the theater.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Ambassador Earle, and I thank your distinguished associates.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator McGovern.

Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TRANSFER OF CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO NATO ALLIES

Ambassador Earle, you are familiar with the understandings which we are trying to develop to remove the ambiguity about transfer of technology, to our NATO allies.

In addition to some of the language used in the United States statement to the NATO Council, which I have felt would be desirable to be a part of this whole package, I have added specifically the cruise missile, simply because that is the heart of much of the concern that we have heard expressed.

Both Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown have testified that nothing in the treaty will prevent the United States from transferring cruise missile technology to our allies.

Do you agree with their statement?

Ambassador Earle. Yes; essentially I do. The Soviets originally proposed, as you know, a so-called nontransfer provision based on the nontransfer provision in the ABM Treaty, which referred to blueprints and so forth. This was specifically rejected by us and they accepted that rejection. Therefore, I believe that your interpretation and the Secretary's interpretation is correct, and that this interpretation is also understood by the Soviets and is supported by the negotiating record.

Senator Percy. As I understand it, the administration originally opposed all understandings. I suppose you did not want to open up a floodgate. But now I think there is some resilience, some recognition that there are going to have to be some understandings to remove the ambiguity.

Because the cruise missile is the essence and the heart of the concerns of some of the military in NATO, can you tell me why the administration is opposing the mention of cruise missile technology specifically in my own proposed understanding?

Ambassador EARLE. I confess, Senator Percy, and I regret that I have not seen the proposal that you have put on the table. Therefore I am really not in a position to address it or its substance. I do not know whether or not any of my colleagues are in a position to do that today.

[Pause.]

Ambassador EARLE. I see that they are not. I am sorry.

Senator PERCY. We will furnish to you a copy of both of the understandings that I put in.

Do you know of any reason why we could not simply take the language that was used by the administration in addressing NATO and then simply add in the specific inclusion of cruise missile technology? Is there any reason why you could not add that specific, which is the particular thing about which they are concerned?

Ambassador EARLE. Is this with respect to an understanding or a reservation incorporating the entire interpretive statement?

Senator PERCY. No, just part of it.

Ambassador EARLE. First of all, with respect to the basic principle, Senator Percy, it seems to me that this is a statement between us and our allies. It is not a statement that we made to the Soviet Union, as was discussed earlier today by Governor Harriman and previous witnesses. I do not think we ought to ask permission of the Soviet Union to do what we believe we can do under the treaty. I think it would be a mistake to do that. Therefore, I am opposed, in principle, to the incorporation of the interpretive statement into any resolution.

Senator PERCY. But this is not asking for permission at all. That is not our intention. We are simply categorically stating, on the record, in an understanding attached to the treaty, that the treaty does not prohibit this. That is not asking for permission at all.

You said the same thing in the statement to the NATO allies to give them assurance. All we are saying is let's take it a step further now and put right on the record the fact that this treaty does not prohibit us from transferring technology on cruise missiles to the NATO Allies.

Ambassador EARLE. Obviously you are an infinitely superior parliamentarian than I am. But it seems to me that a reservation or an understanding placed on a resolution of ratification which is transmitted to the Soviet Union would appear to be a transmission of a position with which, perhaps, we hope they would agree.

With respect to the inclusion of reference to cruise missile technology, it seems to me that specificity of any sort tends to weaken a resolution, understanding, or whatever it may be. What about other technology? Does the fact that the U.S. Senate in this understanding has singled out this technology imply that it is not enthusiastic about the transfer of other technology? I just think that a broader statement, as we made it to the allies, is preferable. But that is my own opinion.

Senator PERCY. Inasmuch as you have been having talks since last September with our allies about cruise missiles, yet there is

still some feeling of ambiguity—and that certainly has been brought out by many witnesses before this committee—we think it is important to clear up that ambiguity and to simply state categorically to the Soviets, as we have to our allies, that article XII does not apply to the transfer of cruise missile technology. We think that would help to relieve some of the concerns that have been evidenced by our NATO Allies.

Ambassador EARLE. Obviously, Senator Percy, I am just giving you reactions off the top of my head. I would like very much to see a copy of this. We would, of course, give it careful consideration.

Senator PERCY. Fine, thank you. I would appreciate that very much indeed.

DISPARITY OF SUPPORT BETWEEN MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS

On the question that we raised this morning about skepticism among some military personnel, could you amplify at all why there might be some disparity of viewpoint between the very strong statements that you put on the record this morning from the political leadership and from Luns and from many others and the skepticism that you do get from some of the military personnel in NATO?

Is it a malaise going beyond the treaty? Is it a skepticism about our will in this country to support what is needed for our defense now, as I asked Governor Harriman earlier this morning? Is it a concern about our unwillingness to face up to an energy crisis? Is it a concern about the political happenings in the United States today? Does it go beyond treaty concerns?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Percy, let me try to answer you in this way.

First of all, I think that one expects, and it is quite understandable, that the military is going to be somewhat more skeptical about an arms control agreement than others, given the fact that they are responsible for the physical security of their individual countries.

I think, though, that in this case, with respect to the NATO military skepticism, I would describe it as residual more than current.

I think that part of the problem is that so many things have been written about the SALT II Treaty for the past few years and, indeed, many of them have been inaccurate. As recently as a month ago, someone made a speech, in Germany, I believe, though I cannot remember who it was, which asserted that all cruise missiles were limited to 600 kilometer ranges for the life of the treaty. There are simply many, many inaccuracies that have crept into the debate in Europe as well as in the United States. I think these have troubled the military.

Residual skepticism, doubt, or suspicion had grown up over a period of years that there would be limitations, particularly on cruise missiles and cruise missile technology that would be unsatisfactory to the NATO military. I think they were unaware or unclear as to our position with respect to transfers of technology. These issues, were resolved somewhat later in the process; particu-

larly when we made the statement to the North Atlantic Council on June 29.

The chairman of the Military Committee has attended all of the briefings in Brussels, which I described, and there have been informal briefings of the Military Committee in Brussels. But I think their awareness of precisely how we were going to come out on this issue was not complete, really, until quite recently. I think part of their difficulties stemmed from the past.

Mr. Vest, did you wish to elaborate?

Mr. VEST. Not really, except that I know from my own experience, talking to a considerable number of NATO military figures or national military figures, that they were concerned about the noncircumvention impact. Now that we have made the statements that we have, I think, if you went to a majority of military figures in Britain, Germany, and other countries, you would find that they have a much clearer picture and are much more at ease about the consequences.

Dr. PERRY. Let me add to that statement and amplify what the Ambassador has said.

I have talked with a good many of my counterparts, both in the civilian and military end of the ministries of defense in Europe. Those who had apprehensions and expressed them to me had, in nearly every case, apprehensions as a result of misconceptions of what the treaty was or, really, estimates of what the treaty would be. In particular, the major concern they had was because they thought the cruise missiles were going to be limited in range to 600 kilometers.

In almost every instance, when I was able to clarify that that was not going to be a limitation, their apprehensions dissolved.

The second point that I would make is somewhat related to that.

Given that they had some assurance that we would be able to transfer the cruise missile technology, then they reverted to a very positive position because they perceived that failure to proceed with this treaty would lead the United States into a strategic arms race. They saw that as siphoning resources away from the conventional arms in the United States, siphoning it away from our potential for building up theater nuclear forces and for building up conventional arms.

As I see it from my discussions with people in the defense ministries in Europe, that is their strong reason for supporting SALT. They see it as an opportunity for us to build conventional forces and theater nuclear forces.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Earle, you have been associated with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since 1972. You have been a deputy to Mr. Nitze, a deputy to Mr. Warnke since 1977, and Chief Negotiator since November 1978.

Is that right?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes, except that in 1972, I was associated with the Department of Defense, and in 1973 with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Senator STONE. I see. Thank you, Ambassador Earle.

SOVIET CONCEALMENT PRACTICES

Mr. Ambassador, has the Soviet Union engaged in concealment practices associated with their strategic weapons programs?

Ambassador EARLE. I think not, but I would prefer that Dr. Perry address himself to that because I am only current with respect to the things that we were negotiating in Geneva. With respect to those, I know of no concealment measures other than the encryption, which has been discussed at length.

Senator STONE. I am talking about a pattern of concealment practices.

Ambassador EARLE. No.

Senator STONE. Dr. Perry, would you differ with that?

Dr. PERRY. No, I would not.

Senator STONE. Mr. Ambassador, has the Soviet Union engaged in an expanding pattern of concealment activities associated with its strategic weapons programs?

Ambassador EARLE. I deny that they have been participating in a pattern. Therefore, I would have to be consistent and say that it has not been expanding either.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator Stone, may I respond?

Senator STONE. Yes, Mr. Slocombe.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I believe in 1975, although I do not have the documentation before me—it was well before I was in the Government, but Ralph was there at that time in another capacity—there was a concern which was raised in the SCC and which has been described in the phrases that you have been using. I assume that this is what you referred to. It had to do with the encryption to which Ambassador Earle has referred.

For various reasons, which have now passed, we did not choose to use that word in that context at that time. It also had to do with some activities in connection with submarines, if I remember correctly.

Senator STONE. Mr. Slocombe, then do you differ with Ambassador Earle and Dr. Perry and do you assert that the Soviet Union has engaged in concealment practices and has engaged in an expanding pattern of concealment activities?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is a matter of public record that we raised an issue—I believe it was in 1975—which has been described in those terms and that we have been monitoring Soviet practices relating to their strategic programs very carefully since. We have not found anything which could be described as an expanding pattern of concealment practices.

Senator STONE. So, then, you agree that they were engaged and that we asserted they were engaged in concealment practices, but deny that they have been engaged in an expanding pattern of concealment practices, is that right?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

I agree that we used those terms in the question which we raised in the SCC, and I certainly agree that we have not concluded that there has been an expanding pattern of concealment practices

since that time—certainly not since the time of my involvement in these matters.

Senator STONE. Mr. Ambassador and Dr. Perry, do you agree with that last statement?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes.

Dr. PERRY. Yes.

Senator STONE. Let me read to you from the February 21, 1978, unclassified release of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, entitled, "Compliance with SALT I Agreements."

On page 3 I read the following:

> The United States has closely monitored Soviet concealment practices, both before and after conclusion of the 1972 SALT Agreements. During 1974, the extent of those concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs increased substantially.

Then there is some other language which I would be glad to read to you to the effect that that concealment did not prevent our verification.

Then it states this—that is, your agency stated this:

> The United States stated this concern and discussed it with the Soviet side. In early 1975, careful analysis of intelligence information on activities in the U.S.S.R. led the United States to conclude that there no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern of concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs.

Now that indicates that there had been both concealment practices and an expanding pattern and that they tailed off in early 1975.

Finally, that paragraph reads: "We continue to monitor Soviet activity in this area closely."

Would you like to change your statements now to the effect that they did engage in an active pattern of concealment as to their strategic weapons, that there was a period of active expansion, and that it then tailed off, according to our intelligence conclusions?

Is that a more accurate portrayal of what they did?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, that is a more accurate rendition of what is written on the paper that you hold; but it is approximately what I tried to say a few minutes ago.

Senator STONE. The paper that I hold is your paper.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, I understand. But I do not have it before me.

Senator STONE. I would be glad to hand it over.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you.

What I said was that there had been a question raised with the Soviets—I said in 1975, though now I gather it was in 1974—under the previous administration in which those terms were used. I did say that in the time I have been involved with these issues, there has not been a conclusion that there has been an expanding pattern of concealment activities.

Senator STONE. Mr. Slocombe, you now have the date before you.

What is the date on that report? Please look at the front page.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is 1978. I am familiar with the report. But the conclusion which I stated is, I know, the current conclusion of the Government—that while there was a period around 1974 when we were concerned about Soviet concealment activities and raised them, even though there was no conclusion at that time that they impeded our ability to verify SALT I, that this pattern has been kept under very close observation, and that there has been no

conclusion that there has been an expanding pattern of Soviet concealment practices.

Senator STONE. Mr. Slocombe, if we continue to monitor and the only conclusion we can draw from your report of February 1978, is that the pattern of concealment is not expanding and all we are doing is monitoring, do you think that is a sufficient protest of a pattern of concealment, even when it does not impede our verification?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator Stone, as Secretary Brown indicated yesterday, we do not have a ground under the SALT Agreement to protest Soviet concealment, except insofar as it impedes our ability to verify. What was done in 1974 or 1975, whatever the year was, was to call attention to a pattern which had not yet reached the point of impeding our ability to verify. We continue to watch activity, to raise the question when we see something happening, and whether or not it does impede our ability to verify, we will certainly raise such an issue. In the same report to which you refer and during this administration there was an incident with a net over a test launcher. We did raise that because it was potentially a concealment practice about which we were concerned.

Senator STONE. What happened?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The net was taken down.

We will continue to monitor those activities and we will continue to raise questions, I would think, as we did in the case of the net, even before it reaches the point of impeding our ability to verify.

Senator STONE. Do they continue to engage in concealment practices, though, as to their strategic weapons?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Soviets have continued to do certain things which do constitute a form of concealment. For example, there has been, as is well known, a limited amount of encryption on existing systems. There has also been some practice, for example, with respect to the net, and this we protested and they took it down.

I would make the point that under SALT II, because the range of things to be verified is more extensive, the possibility of impeding is greater. The range of concealment activities which would impede under SALT II I think is clearly far broader than it would be under SALT I.

Senator STONE. I see that my time is almost up.

After looking at that release of ACDA, if there are further comments you might want to make, I would be glad to receive them during my second round.

I would like, as time permits, to ask Secretary Vest about the Soviet compliance with their agreement for prisoner exchange. But I see I will have to wait until my next turn to do that because the red light has just come on.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Stone.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentlemen.

EXPIRATION OF PROTOCOL IN DECEMBER 1981

During Senator McGovern's questioning of you, Mr. Ambassador, he harked back to Governor Harriman's testimony. You may recall

that Governor Harriman characterized the Soviet position as one of catching up. Senator McGovern said that he concurred with that and, in fact, has reiterated that point many times during these hearings.

It seems to me that also in these hearings, prior to this catching up theory, an idea has been cast around that we had earlier tried a posture of good will. In essence, one of the foreign policy establishment dicta of the time was essentially that if we moved in good faith, the Soviets might follow. Of course, they did not.

As a matter of fact, now testimony is abundant that for various reasons the Soviets have been building arms at a pretty steady rate, in fact, so fast that there is testimony now that the momentum is with them and if we do not do some things on our own, we could be in a strategically inferior position by 1985 and may have some jeopardy with one leg, if not two, of our strategic defense Triad before that point.

So, it seems to me that at this point the theory of catching up takes hold, since good will did not work and whatever we may have done in a relatively relaxed position, the Soviets went right on ahead with their massive buildup.

Now we explain why they did this on the theory that they were catching up.

You have just responded to Senator McGovern that from your own observations of the Soviets, leaving aside your position as negotiator, they feel that they are still catching up. As a matter of fact, they feel they still have some further catching up to do in the process. It is ominous, to say the least, if that is their feeling, whether or not it is valid.

What troubles me is that throughout these negotiations, in fact, throughout these hearings we almost are applying for the good sportsmanship award. We are so eager to find some scintilla of good will in this posture that we characterize it always as catching up and that we are hopeful the American public will understand what the Soviets are up to. This in a way excuses what would otherwise seem to be rather ambitious, if not potentially belligerent, activity.

Now the dilemma this poses, it seems to me, for our European allies, is that we are reading into the record statements by our European allies and by political leaders. To the man and woman, they are testifying that they are for this treaty, that they think it is an important process and that it needs to proceed and so on.

I cannot imagine why a leader of a European country, taking a cold blooded look at the future of his or her country, would say anything else. The facts of life for those under the gun are that they could have a lot of trouble from the Soviet Union. They are not certain what we are up to, although they are very hopeful and optimistic as to what we are doing. But they are now under the gun, as a matter of fact, and they really do not have a lot of options to be picking and choosing among. They are hopeful that a war will not come of this, but if it does, that they will not be in trouble with the Soviet Union beyond where they are now.

I cannot imagine why anybody really is concerned seriously about whether we should read into their statements the truth,

veracity, confidence, or what have you. I think they simply have to go through the motions of doing this.

What I think is pertinent is Senator Church's question, which is most probing. If, in fact, we do not end the protocol, as Senator McGovern asked quite properly in conjunction with his line of thinking, why should we be so worried about this protocol ending? Well, I would state the other side. We ought to be mighty worried if it does not end because we do not have a whole lot with which to bargain.

The point is if we do not deploy the weapons that we are prohibited from deploying by the protocol, if we do not get on with cruise missiles in the European sector, the suggestion might well be, as Admiral Moorer presented it, that we will begin bargaining away and using our allies as the bargaining chips, in fact using NATO itself as a bargaining chip.

This is a serious proposition.

I would like to know why we should not stipulate now and not leave it to conjecture that we do not intend to go beyond December 31, 1981, with the protocol, and that we intend to deploy these missiles on European soil. In addition to that question, which is an important one by itself, I would ask you how they are going to react to it. My guess is the real danger we fall into with the whole SALT process is, even if the protocol expires at the end of 1981 and we do then have the right to deploy these missiles, given the tenuous quality of confidence of some of our allies with our strength, they may say nothing doing. They may say, "You think you have the right to do this, but we don't want any of these missiles on our territory. We don't want any part of it."

As is the case with the neutron bomb, we are told by the President that they do not want to have neutron bombs deployed, that they are scared to death of that proposition, as a matter of fact, for fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union and because of local political problems.

I think we are working ourselves into a real bind and I hope we can concentrate a part of this hearing on what are going to be the facts of life after what I hope will be the end of this protocol in 1981.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator, let me make a few comments, and I think Dr. Perry would also like to address your question.

With respect to the discussion of catching up, I think it is not inconsistent with anything else that has been said here today or in the previous testimony. What I was saying is that my perception of the Soviets is that their perception is that they have been catching up. I think they are correct, if I put it in the past tense. My own personal view is that they essentially have caught up.

Senator LUGAR. I hope you can get that point across to them and maybe convince them that that is the case.

Ambassador EARLE. There is no question that this is why we finally obtained equal aggregates and got the other limitations in the agreement. But I want to make it clear that it is not my view that they still have a way to go to catch up. In my view it is their view that they still have a way to go to catch up.

With respect to the protocol, I do not know that I can add much more to what I said to Senator Church. I think it speaks for itself.

In my view, it is a clearly drafted document which provides that the protocol expires on a date certain, and both parties have also agreed to that outside the document itself.

With respect to the Soviet reaction, I am not entirely sure what their reaction would be. I think they would see it as redundant, given the fact that they have acknowledged repeatedly at every level that the protocol expires on December 31, 1981. They look at it and say, "That is what the paper says." So, beyond that, I really cannot speculate.

I think Dr. Perry would like to address this.

Senator LUGAR. First, let me follow that up because your position may be a little more difficult around this table. For instance, Senator McGovern has stated that he sees a little bit of a drift, that the committee appears to be for terminating the protocol, and he is simply hopeful this is not so. He turns to the chairman and the chairman says that it is not necessarily so and that he is reserving judgment on this.

Now, if you were a Soviet negotiator and you were watching this televised hearing and you heard some of us saying that we don't want that thing to end at all, I wonder what their reaction might be. I am wondering why we should want to be in favor of the protocol at this point, except that I think you would respond that failure to ratify the protocol means failure to ratify SALT and the whole thing would fall apart. But we have locked ourselves in and now even are in a debate as to whether we would advance our interests beyond 1981.

I think that is a serious predicament.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Lugar, perhaps I have not been listening, but I do not remember anybody in this debate on either side of the table saying that the protocol should be extended.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I have a very strong feeling that my colleague, Senator McGovern, would argue that, and argue it very strongly. As I listen to him, he does not want the M–X missile. I think, as a matter of fact, that he is arguing really that we ought to be moving away from this posture of so-called modernization with the picking up of our options as we see them. I do not know whether that is the majority feeling. We shall see in due course. But clearly it is an opinion that I think is being expressed around this table.

Ambassador EARLE. Well, I do not have Senator McGovern's proxy to state his case.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on Senator Lugar's question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. I do not want to pass up the opportunity to categorically reject the statement that we are in the position of having to catch up with the Soviets in strategic systems. That is not correct in my view. We are substantially ahead of the Soviet Union in our submarine forces, both in technology and in number of warheads deployed. There is a 4 to 1 differential in warheads. We are ahead of them in the technology of our bombers, and, again, it is about 4 to 1 in the number of warheads deployed.

It is only in the ICBM field where they still have a technological lead and we have about a 2 to 1 disadvantage in numbers.

If you look at this in aggregate, I think it is clear that we are at least equal to the Soviet Union today. In my judgment, I would not trade our position for their position today.

The issue is what the trends are and where we are going in the future.

I would offer a concluding statement that, if we maintain the programs now projected, the programs on which we are now working—the Trident missile, the Trident submarine, the cruise missiles, and the M-X—there is no question in my mind that we will maintain a strong position and an equivalent position through the period of the treaty.

Senator LUGAR. I would just respond that these equivalence theories always rest on the fact that we do not intend to strike first. I am worried that they do not have that feeling. Our position is a little more vulnerable.

Dr. PERRY. Senator, my statement assumes that in any attack the Soviet Union would strike first and our forces would have to be sufficiently survivable to withstand that force. All of the emphasis on building up their strategic forces is on adding survivability to those forces so that they could withstand such a strike.

So, my statement did not make that assumption.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I overlook doing so, I would like to submit for the record a series of questions that I had intended to propose dealing with cruise missiles. They are followup questions to those that were actually asked. I would appreciate it very much if written answers would be supplied to these questions for the record.

Ambassador EARLE. We would be happy to do that, Senator.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

AMBASSADOR EARLE'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHURCH

Question a. What are current U.S. plans for developing and deploying a nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missile? When would the system be ready for deployment? How many launchers would we deploy?

Answer. The nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) is currently in full-scale engineering development, with initial operational capability scheduled for [deleted]. The number of launchers to be deployed is subject to discussion between us and our NATO Allies.

Question b. What are the answers to these questions with respect to nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles?

Answer. The nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile is in full-scale engineering development. Procurement is not presently being planned, but the option is being maintained for a [deleted] initial operational capability.

EFFECT OF SALT II ON U.S. PLANS FOR AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

Question a. What are U.S. plans for equipping U.S. aircraft for cruise missiles? How many B-52's will be equipped for such missiles? When will that number exceed 120?

Answer. The U.S. Plans to equip all B-52G aircraft (171 total) with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's). The IOC of the first ALCM-equipped B-52 squadron (16 UE aircraft) is planned for December 1982. Initially each B-52G will be loaded externally with 12 ALCM's. After the program for the external loading of B-52G's has been completed, internal loading of eight ALCM's each will be started. Each B-52G will have a total of 20 ALCM's, with a program completion date of [deleted].

Question b. How many other aircraft carrying long range cruise missiles do we plan? When would they begin to be deployed? How many cruise missiles would each carry? What would be the aircraft that would be used?

Answer. At this time there are no specific plans for equipping other aircraft with ALCM's. A new cruise missile carrier aircraft concept is being studied by the Air Force, and a feasibility flight demonstration for two aircraft types is planned for 1981. The initial deployment date and the number of cruise missiles such aircraft would carry depend on the outcome of studies and the flight demonstration. We are protecting the option for a mid-1980's IOC. [Deleted.]

Question c. What impact will the SALT II limits on air-launched cruise missiles have on these programs prior to 1985?

Answer. Prior to 1985 the SALT II limits would have no effect on these programs. [Deleted] however, the number of B-52G's equipped for ALCM's is planned to exceed the level of 120, necessitating the retirement of a sufficient number of Minuteman III and/or Poseidon C-3 launchers so as not to exceed the 1,320 aggregate limit.

Question d. What would be the impact upon these U.S. programs if the SALT II limits were extended past 1985?

Answer. If the SALT II limits were extended past 1985, the continuing retirement of MIRVed ICBM and/or SLBM launchers would be required as more Trident SSBN's and ALCM-carrying B-52's enter the inventory and are counted against the 1,320 ceiling. If the limits were extended well beyond 1985, the 28-ALCM average limit would affect the number of cruise missile carrier aircraft that could be deployed with more than 28 ALCM's each, and the number of ALCM's that these aircraft could be equipped to carry.

CONSTRAINTS ON CONVENTIONAL CRUISE MISSILES

The definitions of "cruise missile" contained in the SALT II Treaty and Protocol cover all "weapon delivery" cruise missiles whether the weapon delivered is a nuclear or conventional warhead.

Question a. Why did the United States accept such a definition which effectively imposes limitations in a strategic nuclear arms treaty on non-nuclear systems?

Answer. The definition of a cruise missile raises a difficult question: a definition which does not distinguish between conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles imposes limits on systems which are not necessarily strategic weapons (although, actually, SALT II limits strategic delivery systems, not weapons per se—for instance, B-52's and Bear heavy bombers count against the aggregates whether they are carrying conventional or nuclear weapons, or, indeed, whether they are armed at all), but distinguishing between conventional and nuclear cruise missiles would involve extremely difficult verification issues. The original U.S. proposal for the definition of cruise missiles made no distinction for the period of the Protocol, but reserved the option to exclude long-range conventionally armed cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers in the post-Protocol period. During the negotiations, the Soviets maintained that a definition of cruise missiles in SALT II which would distinguish between nuclear and conventionally armed systems would be unverifiable. Since we have no plans or programs for such long-range conventionally armed cruise missiles, we indicated to the Soviets that, in the context of satisfactory resolution of other issues, we would be prepared to agree to a definition of ALCM in the Treaty covering all weapon-delivery vehicles, and a definition of GLCM and SLCM in the Protocol covering all weapon delivery vehicles.

Question b. What programs does the United States have underway for a conventionally-armed cruise missile?

Are they for air, land, or sea-launched systems?

What would be the mission of each system?

Under current plans, when would each system be ready for deployment?

Which of these systems have the NATO Allies expressed interest in?

Answer. There are currently no programs for long-range conventionally-armed versions of the nuclear ALCM and GLCM systems. A Tomahawk land attack conventionally-armed variant (TLAM/C) of the nuclear-armed SLCM with a potential for surface-ship and submarine launch is under development by the Navy. It would have a range of approximately [deleted]. Specific missions for this missile have not been firmly established and there are no current plans for its deployment.

The Tomahawk conventionally-armed anti-ship missile, which has a range of [deleted] km, is scheduled for a [deleted] IOC. It can be launched by SSNs and surface ships.

A conventionally-armed mini-RPV, the Harassment Vehicle, is under joint development by the United States and the FRG for the mission of [deleted].

The range of the vehicle would be at least [deleted] km. It would be launched from the ground. The system is in joint engineering development, with IOC during [deleted]. The system has gained widespread endorsement within NATO.

Finally, together with the armament directors of the FRG, UK, and France, we are examining concepts for a family of air-launched precision-guided munitions for missions against fixed land targets. Because the systems under consideration sustain flight through the use of arodynamic lift over most of their flight path, they would be considered cruise missiles under the SALT II definition of air-launched cruise missiles.

Question c. Does acceptance of this cruise missile definition in SALT II mean that in SALT III any cruise missile limitation will also apply to conventionally-armed cruise missiles? How can we avoid this outcome?

Answer. The United States insisted upon separate definitions for air-launched cruise missiles in the Treaty, and sea-based and land-based cruise missiles in the Protocol. We have made explicit our view that the provisions of the Protocol, which expires on December 31, 1981, do not set a precedent for future limits, if any, on cruise missiles on sea-based and land-based launchers.

Question d. Do the Soviets currently deploy any air-launched cruise missiles capable of a range greater than 600 kilometers? Which ones?

Answer. The United States has intelligence information indicating that on a small number of occasions prior to 1965 the Soviets tested an air-launched cruise missile to ranges in excess of 600 kilometers. The missile observed during flight tests at that time was believed to be the AS–3, currently deployed on TU–95 heavy bombers. In response to repeated questioning, the Soviets told us that at present they have no cruise missiles in their operational inventory which have been tested to ranges in excess of 600 kilometers. They indicated that a few launches to ranges in excess of 600 kilometers took place on the occasions noted in the early 1960's, but that those launches were of an experimental missile which was never put in the active inventory—i.e., those missiles observed by the United States were not the AS–3 missile currently deployed. In addition, with regard to the AS–3, the Soviets told us that production of these missiles stopped as early as 1965 and the remaining small quantity would be deactivated "in nearest years" since their service life is running out. The Soviet statements do not contradict U.S. intelligence information.

The claim that the deployed AS–3s are different from the missiles tested in the early 1960's is consistent with the lack of tests to ranges greater than 600 kilometers since those early days. It would also be unlikely and inconsistent with usual practice to deploy a missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and never test it to its full range for 15 years. On the basis of all the information available to us, we accepted a data base entry of zero in the data base category of Soviet airplanes equipped for cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers. We indicated, however, to the Soviets that any ambiguous situation concerning the AS–3 or any other cruise missile would be an appropriate topic for discussion in the SCC.

Question e. Are these cruise missiles or their carriers subject to the limitations of the SALT II Treaty or the Protocol? If not, why not?

Answer. On the basis of all the information available to us, we have agreed to a data base entry of zero for the Soviet Union in the category of heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers (it is cruise missile carriers, rather than the missiles themselves which are SALT-accountable). Any Soviet bombers equipped for such long-range cruise missiles would, of course, be subject to the appropriate aggregate limitations.

The Protocol does not address air-launched cruise missile systems.

Question f. Where do the Soviets stand on nuclear land-launched or sea-launched long-range cruise missiles? Are they developing such systems? For what mission? When would each be ready for deployment?

Question g. What would be their range? How about conventionally-armed land-launched or sea-launched long-range cruise missiles? Any in development? For what mission? When would each be ready for deployment? What would be the range of the system?

The responses to these questions are classified. I have asked the intelligence community to provide answers separately for the Committee's classified files.

Question h. It is generally agreed that the range, payload, and launcher compatibility for cruise missiles would be difficult to verify. While it is true that the United States would have preferred no cruise missile limitations at all, in which case we would still face this uncertainty, nonetheless isn't it a harmful precedent to accept a range threshold of 600 kilometers, for example, when we cannot adequately verify compliance with this threshold?

Answer. We have a good understanding of the characteristics and capabilities of current Soviet cruise missiles. If the Soviets continue their present practices for the development and deployment of cruise missiles, we expect to maintain our current level of understanding of their cruise missiles, including our present level of understanding of their range capabilities. If the Soviets altered their testing practices or took various concealment measures, however, our estimates of cruise missile range capability could be subject to considerable uncertainty. Deliberate concealment measures which impede verification would themselves be violations of the agreement, and would be subject to challenge in the SCC.

The United States was prepared to conclude an agreement without any limits on cruise missiles, in which case the Soviets would have been entirely free to develop and deploy cruise missiles and conceal their range capabilities. This illustrates that the strategic balance is not sensitive to Soviet acquisition of long-range cruise missiles, nor is our security affected by uncertainties in our knowledge of their range.

In this context, we believe the cruise missile limitations agreed to in SALT II are adequately verifiable.

Question a. Won't this permit the Soviets to deploy aircraft equipped for cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers but avoid counting such aircraft under the SALT II Treaty because we would be unable to detect (much less establish) that the range of the missile does exceed 600 kilometers?

Answer. As previously stated, if the Soviets continue their present practices for the development and deployment of cruise missiles, we expect to maintain our present level of understanding of Soviet cruise missiles. This is true with respect to the range of cruise missiles and their deployment on aircraft. Soviet deliberate concealment measures which would impede our ability to verify compliance with the provisions of the agreement limiting cruise missiles would be a violation of the Treaty, and any ambiguous situation would, of course, be an appropriate topic for discussion at the SCC.

Question b. Doesn't this uncertainty as to range invite the Soviets to enhance the Backfire for a possible intercontinental role by equipping it for long-range cruise missiles, knowing that we will be unable to establish that the missile has a range in excess of 600 kilometers?

Answer. No. We believe that the Soviets would perceive significant risks in attempting to test and deploy a cruise missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers on the Backfire. The Treaty provides that aircraft equipped for cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers must be distinguishable from other aircraft not so equipped. Backfire aircraft equipped for cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers would be included in the SALT II aggregate limits and, thus, require the dismantling and destruction of other Soviet systems limited by the SALT II aggregate limitations on a one for one basis. The number of Backfires that would be included under SALT could equal the total number of Backfires if those not equipped for long range cruise missiles did not have FROD's.

Question c. Haven't we weakened our general position that we will not accept arms control limitations that are not verifiable, both as a general matter and in relation to any future cruise missile constraints?

Answer. We can adequately verify Soviet compliance with the cruise missile constraints in SALT II. We do not, therefore, accept the premise that SALT II cruise missile constraints are unverifiable. We believe that verification uncertainties associated with the cruise missile limits are acceptable, and are preferable to more verifiable but more stringent limits which would affect U.S. programs. Any future constraints will be negotiated on the basis of the strategic situation existing at the time, and will, of course, give proper weight to the need for adequate verification.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next questioner is Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TIMING OF AGREEMENT ON JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

Mr. Earle, when in the negotiating process was the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations arrived at?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Sarbanes, the decision to have such a joint statement was made in May 1977. Thereafter, each side tabled its proposals for it, which, in both cases, were considerably

more specific than the document ended up being. It was apparent that we would be unable to reach agreement and that it would end up as sort of a Shanghai communique.

The decision was made in Moscow in late 1977 or early 1978, at a meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Vance, that the joint statement of principles should be made more general. Both sides pursued that goal, and the final language was agreed upon only about 2 or 3 weeks before the signature in Vienna.

Senator SARBANES. That sets out the parameters that govern SALT III, is that correct?

Ambassador EARLE. That is what it is designed to do, yes.

Senator SARBANES. We are constantly being told that SALT II is going to lead to SALT III. What is SALT III going to look like?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Sarbanes, I do not mean to be facetious, but I wish I could tell you. I really do not know. We are giving it very careful consideration as to what our specific goals should be. I assume that the Soviets are doing the same. But I really do not have an official, or even unofficial, position to give you today.

Certainly we seek general things as set forth in the joint statement. It would be purposeless for me to read it back to you. It has reductions, further qualitative limitations, and so on. But as to the precision with which those will be implemented, I simply cannot answer today.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN PROTOCOL

Senator SARBANES. Paragraph 3 of the joint statement gives as an objective the "resolution of the issues included in the protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." What are the issues included in the protocol that are to be resolved, pursuant to the joint statement of principles?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Sarbanes, the issues in the protocol to be resolved essentially are reflected in the first three articles of the protocol: In other words, what will be done about mobile ICBM launchers in the postprotocol period, what will be done about cruise missiles in the postprotocol period, and what will be done about air-to-surface ballistic missiles in the postprotocol period—if anything.

Senator SARBANES. I thought we were asserting our freedom to do what we wanted with protocol matters in the postprotocol period.

Ambassador EARLE. We have that freedom.

Senator SARBANES. Then how do they become issues to be resolved?

Ambassador EARLE. Because the initiation of the protocol, Senator Sarbanes, which was agreed on in May 1977, was to put into it certain contentious issues which the sides understood could not be agreed upon one way or the other for the life of the treaty. For instance, with respect to cruise missiles, the Soviets wanted very severe limitations for the life of the treaty and we wanted no restrictive limitations. So, in effect, they were just put aside for the moment.

Now I agree with the suggestions that were made earlier that our position should be that we have flexibility with respect to these issues. I do not think we ought to prejudge them. A colleague of mine said that obviously, under any circumstances, we would want to be able to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles. I said that if the Soviets were prepared to give up all of their ICBM's, might you not consider giving up ground-launched cruise missiles?

So, I think we have to leave these issues open because we do not know what the resolution will be. It is not that these issues necessarily are going to be negotiated in a vacuum or in a segregated fashion. The extreme example, which I just cited to you, is an example of a way in which the protocol issues might be negotiated, impacting on amendments in the treaty itself.

Senator SARBANES. Assuming that you were to stay on as a negotiator, is it your view that you could go to the table to discuss SALT III and take the position that we will not discuss any of the items contained in the protocol because the protocol will expire and we intend instead to proceed to consider other items for SALT III? Would that be consistent with the joint statement?

Ambassador EARLE. I think that this position on the protocol issues would indeed be a discussion of the protocol issues. I believe I could take that position, but I am not sure that it would be a very wise one.

ASSUMPTIONS GUIDING DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

Senator SARBANES. What assumptions, if any, did you proceed from concerning development of our own strategic nuclear forces when you negotiated SALT II?

Ambassador EARLE. Of course, Senator Sarbanes, the assumptions, such as they were, changed with respect to the programs of the United States as I sat at the table for the years that I did.

For instance, I had initially assumed that we were going to have a new heavy bomber. When the decision was made to change the emphasis of the air-breathing leg of the Triad from a new penetrating bomber to the air-launched cruise missiles, then I made different assumptions about strategic procurements on the part of the United States.

I assumed from the outset that there would be a new Trident submarine. I did not have to change that assumption. And so it goes.

Senator SARBANES. So you did have a set of assumptions about our strategic nuclear force now and in the future; is that right?

Ambassador EARLE. Well, I am not sure that "assumption" is really the right word as we have been using it. I would say "information with respect to U.S. programs."

Senator SARBANES. Is the context from which you proceeded identical with that from which the Joint Chiefs proceed when they talk about how the treaty is to be considered?

Ambassador EARLE. Well, Senator Sarbanes, I really cannot speak for the Chiefs. I can only say that the instructions which the Delegation and I received in Geneva were, as I testified last week, based on interagency study, analysis, and conclusion. But I have

not had the opportunity to sit with the Chiefs in the tank, so I really cannot describe the method in which they reach their own decisions.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think you could have negotiated this treaty, or any treaty, without considering what we would do with our own strategic nuclear forces?

Ambassador EARLE. I think I could have, but I think it would have been an unwise way to do it.

Senator SARBANES. Is this treaty, then, premised on doing certain things?

Ambassador EARLE. This treaty was designed from our point of view to achieve, and I think it essentially does achieve, protection of programs necessary to the security of the United States.

Senator SARBANES. And those are programs permitted under the terms of the treaty?

Ambassador EARLE. They are.

Senator SARBANES. Did you make a further assumption whether we would, in fact, accomplish those programs, or was your role as negotiator simply to preserve our option to do them?

Ambassador EARLE. As chairman of the SALT Delegation, I do not play a role in procurement decisions. In answer to your question, I think the latter alternative is correct. My job was to protect the options, as I understood them and as the instructions implied them, for the United States.

Senator SARBANES. Whether or not defense programs are undertaken is a decision made by somebody else. Is that correct?

Ambassador EARLE. That is essentially correct, Senator. I think Dr. Perry may have something to add.

Dr. PERRY. Concurrently with the negotiations, we were making specific plans for our strategic force modernization, and as these plans evolved, we maintained communications with the negotiating team. So the options which they were maintaining were not theoretic or academic options. In fact, the strategic programs that are necessary for the United States and that we intend to pursue are all specifically permitted.

At times, when the negotiating was veering in directions which seemed to inhibit them in a serious way, I had every opportunity to communicate with the team and did, explaining the problem. One very specific example of that was in the possible restraint of range of the air-launched cruise missile, where our program indicated the need for having a range in excess of 2,500 kilometers and where the Soviets wanted to limit that range to 2,500. So, we represented very strongly to the negotiating team to maintain that option for us to have ranges in excess of 2,500 kilometers, which they did.

PROTOCOL COVERS ALL CRUISE MISSILES

Senator SARBANES. Do the limitations on the cruise missile contained in the protocol apply whether the cruise missile has a nuclear or conventional warhead?

Ambassador EARLE. In the protocol, which limits the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, they apply regardless of the nature of the warhead; it is a weapon delivery vehicle.

Senator SARBANES. Why is that? Why did you allow the treaty and the protocol to cover all cruise missiles?

Ambassador EARLE. It was a difficult issue, both with the Soviets and within the U.S. Government. I was not here in Washington when the final decision was made to go to "weapon-delivery" as opposed to "nuclear-armed." I believe some of the principal considerations were the verification problem, the possibility of the Soviets deploying thousands upon thousands of long-range cruise missiles, and simply saying, "There is nobody here but us conventional warheads."

Dr. PERRY. May I add one other point to that, Senator?

Senator SARBANES. Please.

Dr. PERRY. With the design of the cruise missile which we have, if we make it a conventional warhead, in order to put in enough explosives to make it an effective system we must necessarily limit the range of the missile. We have to exchange high explosives for fuel. So, while it is a theoretical limitation, it is not one to have practical impact on our programs.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

I want to announce at this time that, although the morning hearing and the afternoon hearing may overlap, I should mention that at 2 o'clock, 50 minutes from now, we will continue to pursue the subject of SALT II as it relates to our European allies. The afternoon hearing will be conducted by Senator Biden, the chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs.

Our witnesses will be George W. Ball and Professor Eugene Rostow, two former Under Secretaries of State. The hearing will take place in the public hearing room of the committee, room 4221 in the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

I will recognize Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, is it a fact that the central question respecting relations with our European allies is the question of what we can do with them by way of transferring information and even weaponry, rather than whether or not they support the treaty?

Mr. Ambassador, would you respond to that, please?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Javits, I think that is not correct. I think that SALT, for the European allies, with or without the problems or the doubts that they have had in the past—but which I think they no longer have—regarding cooperation or transfer, has a far more important role in their attitude, both toward us and toward the Soviet Union.

Given the premise, I would ask Mr. Vest to expand upon it, because he is far more expert in that area than I.

Senator JAVITS. First, do you all share the premise? Do you dissent from the premise?

Mr. VEST. May I express how I see the premise, sir?

Senator JAVITS. Yes, please.

Mr. VEST. I think you have three major factors which influence allied thinking. First, they did want to reassure themselves about the security consequences of this treaty, and they did. At the same time they view it for two other reasons, I think, as very important. The first one is that we and our allies, ever since the early 1970's,

have shared a common point of view on what is the best way to have a policy in Europe, that is, between East and West Europe, which, for lack of a better term, has been called by our shorthand "détente." It is very serious to them and it is very serious to us.

They do see the possibility of this treaty, if it is not carried through, as having the potential impact, as Governor Harriman made very clear, of destroying the basis for the support of that policy.

Senator JAVITS. If not carried through?

Mr. VEST. Yes, if not carried through.

Now I think there is a second point of view which is equally important, and that is this. Throughout the history of the alliance, there have been ups and downs in the relationship between the United States and its allies on the other side of the Atlantic. As I know from personal experience, having worked in NATO affairs since 1958, there have been other times when our allies have been discontented with our leadership and uneasy about one thing or another in the way of our conduct in world affairs. We are the leader of the alliance. Their security is inextricably bound to ours, and they will find it very difficult indeed, and they have said so, if they feel we cannot provide that kind of leadership. They consider this so serious in relation to how we deal with the Soviets and how we maintain the larger elements of foreign policy that there will be questioning about our capacity for leadership if the treaty is not ratified.

I think this is a simple fact.

Senator JAVITS. Therefore, you accept as a fact that they are confident—to paraphrase the words of the U.S. statement to the North Atlantic Council of June 29, 1979—that everything that they want in cruise missile technology or weaponry, in theater nuclear weaponry or technology, they can get, because the noncircumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with the allies?

You say that they are satisfied?

Mr. VEST. Yes, sir. I do think they are satisfied. I would emphasize something in answer to a question that has not been asked, but something that is often said—that the allies simply are going to do what we want because they would not be ready to put themselves out or extend their necks in this area. I would simply say that that does not characterize the relationship between the democratic countries of Europe and the United States. If they were not happy with what they have or what we have and with what we have told them, they would have told us so in most unmistakable terms.

Senator JAVITS. That is the past experience, then?

Mr. VEST. That is the past experience and the recent experience.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Javits, may I add to that?

Senator JAVITS. Yes, Ambassador.

Ambassador EARLE. On June 29, when I appeared before the Council for the final time, prior to the issuance or even the discussion of the issuance of Secretary General Luns' statement, each of the allies—14 of them—volunteered in that closed session their views of the SALT II Treaty. It was a closed session and they had ample opportunity to say what they thought. Because it was a closed session, I cannot tell you about it here. But, if you like, I

would be happy to submit to you a summary of the 14 statements that were made on that day.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you. Would you please do that for the record?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Without objection, I hope it will be included.

[The information referred to is classified and is in committee files.]

IMPORTANCE OF U.S. MAINTAINING EQUIVALENCE RATHER THAN SUPERIORITY

Senator JAVITS. Now, Dr. Perry, let me turn to you because I think you said something terribly significant. It bears out something that Governor Harriman said, which I think is very important.

He said that the acceptance of equivalence is just as important to us as it is to the Russians, and that is essentially what you said when you recounted what we had in the Trident, in the M-X, in the cruise missile, and so on.

Now, we are ready to agree that they have attained it. The maintenance of equivalence now requires, considering their momentum, some catching up by us. Dr. Perry says that we are very well underway in this effort and have no worry about ending up in 1985 any worse than we are now. It may be the same relationship, but no worse, and you say that right now there is equivalence. Why is that as important to us as it is to them?

Dr. PERRY. If I understand your question, Senator Javits, you ask why is it as important for the United States to maintain equivalence as it is for the Soviet Union.

Senator JAVITS. Right. In other words, there are those who would argue that we have to be superior all the time, otherwise we would not have enough of an edge. God knows what we should do with it if we had it. But that is their argument, that we are not safe unless we are superior.

Governor Harriman says that we are safer if we are equivalent. Why?

Mr. PERRY. I believe we are safer if we are equivalent because the entire nuclear posture then simply is more stable. As I see it, the great danger is not in the United States or the Soviet Union deliberately starting a nuclear war, but in a nuclear war accidently starting, starting through miscalculation. The environment in which that is most likely to happen is in an imbalanced relationship, I believe. Therefore, I think equivalence, mutual equivalence, is a desire.

The second point I would make is: Even if we wanted to achieve superiority, it is not at all clear that the Soviet Union has to let us achieve it. They seem quite willing to spend very large percentages in their gross national product in building arms in the area of strategic arms and strategic weapons. While they are not equal to us technically, they are close.

Therefore, I believe it would precipitate, if we tried to achieve a permanent position of superiority, a race which neither side could win or from which it could benefit.

Senator JAVITS. Are there any other judgments on that from the panel?

Ambassador Earle.

Ambassador EARLE. I concur in that. We have talked for years about crisis stability; equivalence is a major step toward crisis stability.

Mr. VEST. I agree.

Mr. MCGIFFERT. I strongly agree.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Absolutely.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STONE [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.

UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. SPY-DISSIDENT EXCHANGE

Secretary Vest, there is another agreement in addition to the strategic agreements in which we entered with the Soviet Union this spring in which we agreed to exchange two of their convicted spies for five prisoners of conscience and their families. Am I correct that as to Georgi Vins, Valentin Moroz, and Edward Kuznetzov, the agreement has been kept.

Mr. VEST. That is my understanding, sir.

Senator STONE. Am I correct that the family of Alexander Ginsburg, his mother, his wife, his two small sons and his ward, a 19-year-old boy who has been a member of his family since 1974, is still in the Soviet Union?

Mr. VEST. I do not know the exact details on that, sir. I would have to get that and report it to you.

Senator STONE. Is it correct that the Soviet authorities have refused to let the boy leave, that they have inducted him into the army despite one medical commission's finding that he is too ill to serve, that they have assigned him to a construction battalion in northern Russia, that they interfere with his correspondence with Mrs. Ginsburg, and that they assert that the Ginsburgs have no legal claim to consider him their ward, despite the fact that Russian law—both marriage and family code—specifically recognizes such relationships as de facto guardianships?

Mr. VEST. This is an area which we have been discussing with the Soviets and pressing them on. They claim that he is not a member of the family; we claim that he is. We continue to press them on this matter.

Senator STONE. Finally, am I not correct in saying that in the matter of Sergei Shibayev, the Soviet authorities are, in effect, circumventing their agreement with us by invoking a technicality, which goes clearly against the spirit and intent of the understanding that we have reached?

Mr. VEST. Regarding that case, sir, I would have to look into the matter and report back to you. I just do not have the information automatically on hand. I am not trying to evade the answer.

Senator STONE. These are important issues. The Helsinki Commission, which the Congress has set up to monitor the Final Act, today is hearing Mr. Moroz and Mr. Ginsburg as witnesses. It is very important because Americans want to be assured that if we negotiate a bargain with the Soviets, a specific bargain as this one

was, they will keep to it and we will see to it that they keep it. If they do not keep it and we do not see to it that they keep it, what good would an agreement be? If they do not keep a small, clearly monitored agreement, like the prisoner exchange, then how can we really rely on a large, difficult-to-monitor issue such as SALT?

So, I wish, when you press these points with the Soviets, you would understand that many of us on the Hill and elsewhere do relate their compliance with their specific agreements with the ability to gain compliance with these large, world-shattering agreements as well.

Mr. VEST. Senator, I appreciate your point very much. I was a negotiator of the origins of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. I have the highest regard for what we are trying to do under it. We are pressing where there is a difference between us and them on the interpretations of what we have agreed to. We will be sure to do exactly what you are asking.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Secretary Vest.

Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNDERSTANDING ON TRANSFER OF CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

Ambassador Earle, I could not expect you to respond fully to an understanding, the wording of which you had not seen. You now have been supplied a copy of that. I will read the pertinent section: "Nothing in the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms prohibits the United States from continuing traditional patterns of collaboration and cooperation with its allies; this would include the transfer of technology relating to cruise missiles."

Nothing in there says that we intend to transfer. It simply gives us maximum leeway to do so if we so desire, and we can do it on a case-by-case basis.

Would you comment on whether or not you would see any objection to that understanding, please.

Ambassador EARLE. Thank you, Senator Percy, and thank you for supplying me with the document.

I have read it here at the table. I also note that in the preceding paragraph in your statement on the floor you mentioned the arguments which administration officials have made against it. I must confess that I think they are well stated and I continue to agree with them.

I am really bothered by the concept of sending something to the Soviets about the way we interpret this treaty. I think we ought to interpret this treaty the way we choose to interpret it, the way we think it is properly interpreted. In no way do I think we should suggest to the Soviets, implicitly or explicitly, that somehow we are seeking their concurrence in our interpretation.

I think if we do something or if they do something which is contrary to the other's interpretation, we can discuss that with them in the SCC. Frankly, I think it is not profitable, and indeed it may be dangerous, to implicitly or explicitly seek their concurrence in our interpretation.

Senator PERCY. Thank you. I think we will just agree to disagree, then.

You are a skilled negotiator and I have great admiration for you. I have done my share of negotiating through some 30 years in business and government. I have always found that it pays to remove ambiguity so that you will not have a misunderstanding on it later. The problems which I have had with misunderstandings have been very great, indeed, and they should have been clarified at the outset.

I think it is the intention of the Senate to add understandings to the treaty where necessary so that the Senate of the United States is on record as to what it understands the intent and purpose and meaning of the treaty language to be.

Now, we are only a part of this. The President has to concur. But we worked together on the Panama Canal Treaty. We started out miles apart and ended up very close together, and that brought about ratification. Unless there had been resilience on the part of President Carter, there would have been no ratification of that treaty.

We will have to work together and we do want to work together. I will continue to try to convince you of my arguments. If we don't, I think we are just going to go ahead anyway. Then you can react as you will.

But we will always try to listen to your arguments. As you know, I stated the administration arguments and found them not compelling at all. I was not really influenced by them.

Ambassador EARLE. In this negotiation, Senator Percy, it seems to me that you have a slight advantage over me.

[General laughter.]

WHAT CONSTITUTES VIOLATION OF ARTICLE XII?

Senator PERCY. I would like to go through article XII because of its great importance and ask you to respond.

Would you explain what would constitute a violation of article XII in the view of the United States? What principles would be applied in determining whether a particular action was a circumvention of the treaty? We are talking, of course, about transfer of technology to a third party.

Ambassador EARLE. Let me, if I may, try to answer you now.

Article XII, as we have told you on a number of occasions, and as I know you are aware, simply states what is, in fact, international practice and international law—that sides do not enter into international agreements with the intention of circumventing them.

I think the general principle which I would apply to noncircumvention is if either side undertook an action which, in effect, upset the basic goal of the treaty—and in this case I think the basic goal of the treaty is to establish a strategic balance or a strategic equivalence of the sides—if outside the treaty a side took steps in terms of deployments or arrangements with allies that terminated or threatened that strategic balance or strategic equivalence, that would constitute circumvention.

In our discussions with the Soviets and in our discussions with the allies we consciously stayed away from specific examples. I do

not think specific examples are helpful. I think in this case, with all due respect for your desire for specificity, it is better to leave the principle broad and wait for the application, if necessary, in the future.

Senator PERCY. Let's try to be as specific as we can today.

Would the United States consider the transfer of air-launched cruise missiles to our NATO allies during the term of the treaty to be a violation of article XII?

Ambassador EARLE. I think not.

Senator PERCY. Are you pretty certain of that?

I am saying this just as much to put the Soviets on notice as to what we intend and want to have the right to do without any misunderstanding that it is a breach of article XII.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator Percy, if I may, the interpretive statement deals with systems which are limited numerically but not prohibited. That includes air-launched cruise missiles, which are such a case. The interpretive statement states explicitly that the transfer of such systems is not necessarily precluded.

So the answer which I believe was also given, I think both by Secretary Brown and Secretary Vance, is that we could make such transfers.

Senator PERCY. What I would like to do specifically is get the words "I think" out of there. Because of the very fact that you say "I think" or "I think not" it is left ambiguous and subject to interpretation.

Ambassador EARLE. I'm sorry, then. I withdraw the word "think." It was my word.

Senator PERCY. I appreciate that.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. May I call your attention to an exchange between Secretary Brown and Senator Helms earlier in these hearings in which Senator Helms said that that includes the cruise missile, Trident submarine, and so forth.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, we are allowed under that statement to provide them with modernized forces along those lines.

There is a separate policy issue as to what we would do in each case, and we would handle it on a case by case basis.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me make one point clear. I am not an employee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but of the Department of Defense. I certainly am not going to contradict Secretary Brown on that position, not only for that reason, but because he clearly is stating the position of the administration of the United States on this matter when he says that.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

The second question I would like to ask is: Would the United States consider the transfer of air-launched cruise missile technology to our NATO Allies during the term of the treaty to be a violation of article XII?

Ambassador EARLE. No.

Senator PERCY. Would the United States consider the transfer of sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missile technology to our NATO Allies during the term of the protocol to be a violation of article XII?

Ambassador EARLE. No.

Senator PERCY. Would the United States consider a transfer of the Trident I missile to Great Britain during the term of the treaty to be a violation of article XII?

Ambassador EARLE. No.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

SUPERPOWER EQUIVALENCE EXACERBATES EUROPEAN IMBALANCE

My final question relates to comments made by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. He has stated in the press that a SALT agreement, creating a balance of forces between the super powers, exacerbates the imbalance of forces in Europe. He has endorsed SALT II, and all indications are that his official endorsement reflects a personal endorsement.

Do you agree with his general analysis that equivalence in strategic arms between the United States and U.S.S.R. makes the imbalance in East and West Europe even more significant, both politically and militarily?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes, I think I generally do agree with that.

NATO SURVIVAL PROSPECTS IF SALT II IS REJECTED

Senator PERCY. Earlier in the hearings, Senator Zorinsky asked Secretary Vance whether NATO would survive if the Senate rejected SALT II. Secretary Vance replied that he did not know.

Do you share this uncertainty about NATO's future without a SALT II Agreement?

Ambassador EARLE. I do.

Senator PERCY. Would you expand a little on that, please? You have worked intimately and closely with our allies. This very real possibility exists.

I would be dismayed if we could not find a way to satisfy the opponents of the treaty from one standpoint or another with understandings, reservations, or clarifications that will not wreck the treaty and will not take us back to the drawing board to begin all over again. I think that would be a momentous backward step.

I am hopeful that we can find ways to improve the treaty without wrecking it. But the possibility exists that it will be defeated. Skepticism is so great, as evidenced by this committee, which may be a more friendly and understanding committee than the Armed Services Committee and others in the Senate. So, it will be tough going.

That is evident as every day goes by. The possibility exists that it will not be ratified. What would be the consequences of its defeat for our allies? NATO is an integral part of our own defense establishment. It is our first line of defense, and the Soviets should never misunderstand, because of our reluctance to go all-out in Vietnam, our willingness to go all-out in Europe, no matter what, if they breach security lines there.

Ambassador EARLE. That is precisely the misunderstanding that would be created in NATO if this treaty were to be defeated.

I would like to speak for a moment and then perhaps Mr. Vest may wish to add something.

Based on my personal exposure, I have spent 3 years at NATO as the representative of the Secretary of Defense and 6 years consult-

ing with the allies. I think they see SALT as having a number of benefits, especially the broad political ones, which have been discussed at some length here. SALT is the epitome of alliance consultation between the senior partner, if you will, and the other members. I think its defeat would raise such serious questions about the reliability of the senior partner, it would raise such serious questions about the seriousness of the senior partner in dealing with the Soviets directly and with the indirect impact on NATO, that I can see a turning away from the United States and a turning in to Europe. I think they would find this course not particularly desirable, but they could well view it as necessary in view of the unreliability of the United States in a matter as important as this.

Mr. VEST. I would only say that I could not agree with that more thoroughly. I think you have to remember one thing, also. In one sense the NATO leaders have been the conegotiators of this agreement. They have been kept in touch. They have contributed to decisions. They have been party to it all the way.

I think, having shared in a negotiation all the way through which has such enormous security and political implications for them, there would be a crisis of leadership and it would be very difficult to know what the consequences would be. I think in the words of Governor Harriman, it would be a "desperately difficult" situation.

Mr. MCGIFFERT. May I add a comment, Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Please, Mr. McGiffert.

Mr. MCGIFFERT. From a security point of view, I think what Chancellor Schmidt was saying was that as the balance of nuclear forces between the two super powers has moved from one in which the United States had substantial superiority to one of parity, it has become increasingly important that something be done about the imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union in long range theater nuclear force, an imbalance which has been exacerbated by their deployment of the SS-20. It is, indeed, that question which we are looking at in the high level group in NATO.

It seems to me that failure of ratification for SALT II would be likely to have quite a disastrous effect on that effort, because I think it would raise fears in Europe that the United States was turning from a concern for arms control as one means of achieving and managing a stable relationship to a policy of confrontation, and that that would produce a disinclination among some rather important political constituencies in Europe to support modernization of theater nuclear forces for fear it would be seen as part of a confrontation policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Senator PERCY. I wonder if one of you could transmit to Gen. Bernie Rogers my concern in this area.

I talked with him before he left to become Supreme Commander in Europe about some of my concerns. As soon as he has formed a judgment on this particular issue, how important it is and whether defeat of the treaty would harm NATO, I would appreciate having a statement from him sent to the committee, directed to my attention. He could make it on a classified basis if necessary. If it is unclassified, we could insert it in the record when it arrives.

I realize that he has just taken command and may not have formulated a judgment on it yet.

We will also put the same question to General Haig when he appears. I will try to get word to him or will arrange to meet with him prior to his appearance for discussions.

It is a matter of grave concern.

There is no question that there would also be consequences in the rest of the world if we fail to ratify this treaty.

The United Nations had a Special Session on Disarmament. Emotionally there is no question many nations would feel it would destroy everything they have tried to work toward, every effort of every country to limit armaments, especially in the developing countries, where so much is being poured into military hardware instead of the kinds of things they ought to be spending money on.

So, it would dismay them.

But I still come back to the fact that if the Senate decides this is a bad treaty, it is our job to convince the rest of the world that though we want a treaty, we cannot ratify a bad treaty.

I have yet to come to that conclusion, however.

Our NATO Allies are the closest of all of the people in the world to us. Our defense is intertwined. The ultimate consequences of failure to ratify this treaty should be known to the world and certainly should be known to us.

I very much appreciate the length of time you have spent with us today, gentlemen. For a morning session to go on until almost 2 o'clock is putting a strain on our distinguished witnesses. But we are very grateful for your appearances here and for the help that each of you has provided to us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STONE. Mr. Slocombe, did you want to supplement the first round of questions with regard to the compliance issue?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. At least, in light of the hour, I would only want to say that your original question had to do with the current status. My remarks were directed largely to the events in 1974 and 1975. I certainly agree that watching Soviet concealment activities is a very important matter. My understanding is that there is going to be a hearing devoted entirely to compliance in about a week's time—or at least I believe one is now scheduled.

Senator STONE. That is correct.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would be happy to stay as long as you want to pursue the issue, but there will be that opportunity later on.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe.

Gentlemen of the panel, thank you all for your cooperation.

At 2 p.m. the committee hearing will continue in room 4221 of the Dirksen Building.

I may say that the reason we have yielded this room this afternoon to the Science and Technology Committee is they will have a seminar in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the Moon walk. They know that they have made one small step for mankind.

We are still debating that issue.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day, in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building.]

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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations met, pursuant to recess, at 2:05 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Javits, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

Senator BIDEN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This afternoon, as part of the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of the SALT II Agreement, the Subcommittee on European Affairs will hear from two experienced American statesmen, each of whom has had a distinguished record in previous administrations, where they both served as Under Secretary of State. While sharing this common experience, the two are now associated with very different views on SALT II, as I am sure will emerge clearly during our discussion.

Our subject this afternoon is allied attitudes toward SALT. This is an extremely important aspect of the treaty context. As I previously announced, my own decision on SALT will be based upon three considerations. The first is whether the treaty terms represent essential superpower equivalence in the strategic balance. The second is whether Soviet compliance with those terms is verifiable, a question I have been pursuing in the Intelligence Committee. The third is the subject we are gathered here to discuss this afternoon, which is whether our allies truly support SALT and whether ratification would serve to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and overall Western security.

Now, from the outset, the one thing that needs to be said, even though it should be obvious, is that there is no single European opinion on SALT. There is a spectrum of opinion in Europe, just as there is in the United States. But what we must attempt to discern is the essence of opinion among informed Europeans and how our allies' attitudes and interests would be affected by Senate action in either approving or rejecting the treaty.

Our first witness this afternoon is Secretary Ball. Mr. Secretary, I would like to suggest that you proceed in whatever manner is most comfortable for you. Then we will turn to Mr. Rostow.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which I would like to read, if I may.

Senator BIDEN. Please do.

Mr. BALL. During the course of these hearings, the committee has heard extensive testimony on the technical aspects of the SALT II agreement, and on its probable effect on the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I do not envy this committee or the Senate the responsibility for making a judgment on these matters. The determination of equiva-

lences between delivery vehicles as different in characteristics and qualities as cruise missiles and Backfire bombers or land-based and submarine-based missiles requires a substantial exercise of individual judgment.

Predicting the danger to our country by scenarios that depend on the survival or destruction of second-strike capabilities, assessing the relative value of qualitative as against quantitative advantages, and deciding what constitutes adequate verification, given the fact that no verification can be totally comprehensive—these tasks demand thoughtful judgment. They are not amenable to precise scientific or mathematical proof.

In spite of the black and white positions taken both by some opponents and proponents of the SALT II Treaty, there is in this debate a large element of speculation, indeed, even of scholasticism. We are dealing with postulated events which none of us in our hearts believe will ever happen but which we can ignore only at our peril. We are faced with questions that are so highly abstruse and technically complex as to render categorical judgments reckless. There are too many variables, too many imponderables.

No matter how rigorously one may insist that a decision must rest strictly on a comparison of capabilities, it would be unrealistic to ignore completely the probability of use implicit in the issue of Soviet intention—or, to put it more clearly, the possibility of an irresponsible Soviet government. I use "irresponsible" to mean a Government capable of an action that might risk the almost complete destruction of the Soviet nation or Soviet people.

Stalin, for all his callousness, still acted with a certain caution. Hitler is the only modern example of such irresponsibility, but even he drew back at the thought of initiating gas warfare.

With nuclear arsenals capable of overkill, such considerations cannot be ignored. To assess the SALT II Treaty solely on a theoretical comparison of capabilities would be to become the slave of the computer. All one can be certain of in contingency planning is that events will never happen as predicted, though differences—even slight—in the way they might happen could significantly alter the results.

I have been exposed to the controversy over nuclear arms control ever since it began. I know the general vocabulary and the prevailing lines of argument, but there is little I can offer on the technical aspects which this committee has not already heard from others better qualified.

So today, I shall direct my remarks at some nontechnical problems which relate primarily to the political context in which the issue of ratification must be decided.

TREATY RATIFICATION SUPPORTED

Though I do not find the decision an easy one, on balance, I would urge that the Senate give its consent to ratification. I do not believe that the opponents of the treaty have proved their case that its provisions would prevent the United States from maintaining and improving an arsenal of strategic weapons sufficient to assure our security and sustain our position of world responsibility. Whether our country does remain secure will depend to a critical

extent on the defense policies the Congress is prepared to pursue within and apart from treaty limitations.

At the same time, I believe that a refusal of the Senate to consent to ratification would risk the exacerbation of East-West conflict, while at the same time weakening the cohesion and thus the strength of the non-Communist nations. The issue of ratification must be decided in that context.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RATIFY ON UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

What would be the effect of a failure to ratify on Soviet-American relations—that state of affairs we imprecisely but rather wistfully refer to as "détente"? The Brezhnev regime is clearly approaching its final days and there seems little doubt that a succession struggle is already in progress. We know little about it. We can speculate only feebly as to its probable outcome, or even as to the principal considerations that will go into determining that outcome. During the years when I was Under Secretary of State and privy to the full flow of our official intelligence, I was constantly impressed with how little we knew about the no-doubt brutal politicking inside the Kremlin.

SALT has been a major undertaking for President Brezhnev. He has looked to the conclusion of SALT II as the culminating act of his long tenure of leadership and the rejection of SALT II would almost certainly be regarded as a repudiation of Brezhnev's policies. Though we can only speculate as to the effect this might have in determining the identity or the policies of his successor, I think it is likely that it would tend to favor the more hardline elements against those wishing to continue and expand "détente."

Thus, for the Senate to reject the crowning achievement of a regime during which there has been some improvement of Soviet-American relations would risk strengthening those power elements most unsympathetic to us and presumably most adventurous and aggressive.

In spite of the pretensions of those students of photographs and sheep's entrails we call Sovietologists, the Soviet Union still remains as Winston Churchill described it "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Thus, speculation as to how a rejection of the SALT Treaty might affect Soviet policies or the Soviet succession is largely guesswork. We can be far more sure of ourselves when we consider how that rejection might affect relations with our Western Allies.

UNITED STATES IS SURROGATE FOR ALLIES, WHOLE NONCOMMUNIST WORLD

In undertaking to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the limitations of nuclear weapons, the United States is not acting for itself. It is a surrogate for its allies and, indeed, for the whole non-Communist world. Our Western Allies are in a specially sensitive position. They are the ones who could feel the weight of Soviet power most acutely since they share the continent of Europe with this power giant.

They witnessed at firsthand their neighbors being gobbled up in the immediate postwar years. The most powerful of our allies, West Germany, a truncated nation, is made every day aware of what Soviet power can mean. The United States, on the other hand, being far from the European land mass, has never felt the thrust of Russian armies or Soviet tanks or planes. Fortunately, there have been almost no shots fired in anger on our territory in this century. Thus our appreciation of the Soviet menace differs from Europe's.

Because we are the only major power that could possibly match Soviet might, we have developed a more comprehensive understanding of the nuclear issue, but we differ in the nature and quality of our anxieties.

I mention these obvious facts because they necessarily affect the way in which the Soviet nuclear power is viewed on the two sides of the Atlantic. Though the Europeans, and particularly the Germans, fear the Soviet Union, they are eager to support any policies that will ease the problems of living next door to a huge and ferocious neighbor.

It is inevitable that the difference in the respective situations of Europe and America, the lack of symmetry in the dangers we face and the disparity of the means at our command to counter those dangers should result in some differences of view as to how to deal with Moscow on this point.

The Europeans show a degree of ambivalence that can, from time to time, be extremely annoying. They equivocated as to whether they really wished the United States to go forward with the development of neutron bombs, and Germany has even more recently rejected the implantation of intermediate-range weapons on its territory capable of reaching Soviet territory unless other European states agreed to accept them also.

Europeans have, on the whole, been glad to let the United States carry the laboring oar of negotiating a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Since the treaty was solely concerned with strategic weapons, they did not feel they could play a useful role at the bargaining tables, since they had few chips with which to play the game. Their principal concern has been that the United States keep them reasonably informed and that has certainly been done.

How will the Allies react if, after 7 years of negotiations, the United States rejects the SALT Treaty, or so burdens it with amendments as to make further negotiations unfeasible?

MAINTAINING CONFIDENCE WITH ALLIES

That relates to the whole question of maintaining confidence between our allies and ourselves—a confidence that is essential if we are to maintain anything resembling Western unity and an effective collective security system. At the moment, the level of that confidence is at a low ebb.

It began to deteriorate with Vietnam, where, in the view of most Europeans, America seemed bogged down in a prolonged agony in an area that only marginally touched its own interests. That raised doubts as to our judgment. Could we be trusted as the leader of the

non-Communist world if we engaged in conflicts we could not win and should never have entered?

Confidence was further eroded by Watergate. Europeans are remarkably sensitive to American public moods. We ourselves have contributed to European doubts as to our steadiness of purpose by our own loud lamentations and self-criticism. Europeans have tended to take at face value the assertions of some Americans that, because we did not intervene in two areas of Africa which, in my judgment, were only peripheral to our interests—though we did interfere in North Yemen—we have somehow lost the will to defend freedom.

They also take at face value unfounded assertions by some of our countrymen who should know better that, if we had only been more resolute, the United States could have kept the Shah of Iran on his throne.

Europeans have also interpreted the decline in the parity of the dollar as symbolizing the loss of American strength, overlooking the fact that a major contributing reason for the dollar's decline was a lack of phasing in the growth rates between Europe and the United States. The essential contradiction in the European attitude is shown by the fact that, though Europeans speak gloomily of the American economy, they still regard America as the safest and most profitable place to invest their capital.

CAUSE OF DECLINE IN AMERICAN PRESTIGE

A central cause of the decline in American prestige has been our appearance of impotence when faced with the energy issues. They see a great nation flailing around more or less aimlessly through three presidencies and five sessions of Congress and bringing forth little more than a large sized mouse, while 60 percent of the American people—if the polls can be trusted—continue to believe that there is no energy crisis, only a ripoff by the oil companies—a conclusion which to the European mind seems incredibly naive. Meanwhile, they see the United States continuing to waste the world's supply of oil.

In the face of all this they feel relatively powerless. Is the United States effectively looking out after their interests? The suspicion is gaining ground that the U.S. constitutional system no longer works. With the administration and Capitol Hill at cross-purposes on major issues, can the United States be trusted anymore as the leader of the democracies.

SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEM

The American system of separation of powers has always been a mystery to Europeans. One of the features widely discussed—particularly since the Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty in 1920—is that our Allies cannot be sure of the binding effect of a commitment by the Executive since it is subject to repudiation by the Congress.

Under the parliamentary systems that prevail in Europe, a government is composed of leaders of the party that controls the Parliament so that, barring an intervening change in government,

a Parliament rarely rejects a treaty made by a chief of government or a head of state.

I am not criticizing our own constitutional arrangements. Given the American temperament, a Presidential government is better for us than a parliamentary system. But Europeans view us from a different background and, under current circumstances, the rejection of a treaty negotiated over 7 years would deeply upset our Atlantic relations.

The reaction would, of course, not be simple or uniform. If the Senate should deny its consent to ratification—or attach far-reaching amendments which would have the same effect—while at the same time making clear its intention to improve America's strategic capability, that would encourage some Europeans while discouraging others.

But, on the whole, I think a rejection would certainly increase European doubts as to our competence and reliability as a leader and could, in the longer term, weaken our whole system of cooperation and common effort. Here again we must pay particular attention to the repercussions in Germany, which is by far the most powerful of our allies, and the nation most directly exposed to Soviet action.

Germany's position has always been peculiar since it has had to live with a kind of suppressed irredentism, holding always the vague hope of reunification while recognizing that it was not within the realm of the feasible.

At the same time, the division of Germany has created agonizing hardships and many Germans find it difficult to contemplate a divided people as a permanent state of affairs. Ten years ago, we saw the emergence in Germany of Ostpolitik, which resulted in West Germany signing treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union. Many of us, at the time, regarded that development with some apprehension, since it seemed dangerous for Germany to be engaging in its own bilateral dealings with the East. Subsequently, however, Ostpolitik was subsumed under the more spacious rubric of "détente" arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus it lost much of its significance as a German initiative.

Lately, there have again been stirrings, perhaps more nostalgic than real, particularly among leftist elements of the Social Democratic Party, which is the party that—in coalition with the smaller LPD—now controls the government.

A small group of the SPD—consisting principally of Mr. Herbert Wehner, the leader of the party in parliament, Egon Bahr, the party's general secretary and a few others—has long maintained—against formidable evidence—that the Soviet Union has purely defensive intentions and that by loosening its ties with America, the Federal Republic might, in time, be able to work out some form of confederation or economic community with East Germany at the cost of what, in realistic terms, would amount to neutralization. Recently, as doubts have grown that the United States was any longer totally dependable as the main instrument of the Federal Republic's defense, the Wehner group has again become voluble.

Though it would be easy to overstate the implications of this—since the bulk of the Germans are far too realistic to think that they could trust the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union too inse-

cure in Eastern Europe to give the East Germans room to maneuver—still the sentiment has found some resonance, particularly among German youth in the universities.

I do not believe for a moment that the rejection of the SALT II Treaty would mean the destruction of NATO or the end of the Western Alliance, but it would certainly reinforce European doubts as to our steadiness on course and thus our reliability as Europe's main defense.

It would give renewed vitality to the movement of the Federal Republic to undertake independent negotiations with the Soviet Union, in spite of the disparity in the power positions of the two parties. Such a bifurcation of Western diplomacy with the Soviet Union could seriously endanger the cohesion and effectiveness of the Western democracies. To Germans, and to the Europeans generally, it would be seen as a further demonstration that the American system does not work. That would not be good for our country or for world peace.

I am not suggesting, of course, that for this reason alone the Senate should ratify the treaty. If the Senate decides—as I hope it does not—that the treaty seriously jeopardizes our security—which I do not personally believe—then you, of course, cannot consent to ratification. But that conclusion must depend on the individual judgment of each Member of the Senate, since no scientific or mathematical proof is possible.

In the absence of such definite proof, the decision as to whether or not to recommend ratification must be considered in the context of our larger relations, including the effect of rejection on the vitality of our Western collective security system. It is essential to maintain the integrity of that system if the Western democracies are to hang together and not be gradually absorbed, one by one, into the Communist orbit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Rostow?

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE V. ROSTOW, CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

Mr. ROSTOW. I appreciate your invitation to testify today, Mr. Chairman, and it gives me special pleasure to be teamed up with my good friend, George Ball. We won the war together from adjoining desks in Washington, and we have been friends ever since.

I shall speak today as chairman of the Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger, and in its behalf.

Since my experience, like Mr. Ball's, has been in the State Department and not on the other side of the Potomac, I shall discuss primarily the effect of the nuclear equation and of SALT on world politics.

I welcome the fact that our agenda today concerns the relationship of SALT to the problems of NATO, and our other Alliances. That emphasis, I believe, goes to the heart of the matter. The administration's spokesmen usually speak and write as if the only function our nuclear arms have is to prevent a nuclear attack on the United States itself. This is not the case.

GOAL OF U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL

The United States cannot be defended as an island fortress, and the risks we face go far beyond Dr. Strangelove's war. The goal of our nuclear arsenal is nuclear deterrence and nuclear stalemate: That is, to prevent the Soviet Union from using or brandishing nuclear weapons in world politics at the expense of our alliances, our commitments and our other interests.

EFFECT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY

To my mind the chief question before you is whether Soviet nuclear superiority, which will surely be achieved in the early 1980's unless we act decisively now, will keep us from using our political influence backed by conventional arms to protect our interests in Europe, in Japan, and in many other parts of the world.

It is our contention that the political consequences of an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance would be catastrophic, and unlike George Ball, I do believe that SALT II would keep us from preventing that adverse shift.

Until very recently, because we had a clear second-strike strategic capability, it was possible for us to protect our interests effectively by political means and by the use of limited conventional force where necessary. Even during the years of our nuclear monopoly, and then of our great nuclear superiority, we could not prevent Soviet proxy wars and other attempts at expansion by conventional means in areas which they thought we regarded as secondary or peripheral—in Iran, Turkey, and Greece; for example, and then in Yugoslavia, Berlin, Korea, and Cuba. In those cases, the shadow of our nuclear power helped to persuade the Soviet Union to back down, when we demonstrated our determination to insist on our interests, and to use conventional forces in their defense.

During the last decade, the pattern has been changing, as the Soviet nuclear program, like the Soviet buildup in conventional arms, has moved forward with astonishing momentum. What it would mean for the United States to be hopelessly behind in its effective armed forces is the question which haunts every statesman in the world. They ask themselves what the United States would do in the event of a Soviet proxy attack, or attempt to take over in any one of a dozen neuralgic spots around the world. Could we, in fact, use our conventional forces if there were a Macedonian liberation movement, say, in Greece, which is aided from Bulgaria, an attack on Malta or Iceland, or South Korea, a lunge in Germany? Could we use conventional force if we had to assure our oil supplies from Libya or the Persian Gulf?

Former President Ford and Secretary of Defense Brown have indicated that we might well use force to assure our oil supplies if we were sufficiently provoked. But, according to the press, a recent study by Colonel Collins of the Library of Congress Research Service is dubious about the possibilities of military action in the Persian Gulf, given the present state of the Soviet-American military balance, because of uncertainty about what the U.S.S.R. might do.

Just a few months ago, President Carter bowed before a public Soviet warning not to help Iran, or seem to help Iran in its agony.

We turned our ships back. During the tragic recent breakdown in Lebanon, our behavior makes a startling contrast with what we did so effectively in that tortured country in 1958.

These trends are symptoms of a serious disease. As our nuclear position fades, as our Navy and other conventional forces decline in absolute and relative strength, we can see all too clearly the specter of political impotence not very far down the road. Because of the radical recent shift in the intercontinental nuclear balance, we find it increasingly difficult to contemplate using either conventional or nuclear weapons in defense of our interests, and we discover, as so many other nations have discovered before us, that diplomacy without power behind it is a weak reed.

INTERESTS REQUIRING U.S. POLITICAL, MILITARY INTERVENTION

How can we define the interests which may require our intervention, both political and military? Every responsible American understands that preventing Soviet control of Europe, and a few other critical areas of the world, is a vital security interest to the United States. Soviet control of those areas would alter the balance of world power and expose us to intolerable pressures backed by overwhelming military force.

But no definition of our vital interests can stop with the major centers of power. Other places may become important in the context of Soviet programs for expansion. For example, as Mr. Ball noted, the United States moved recently to prevent a Soviet takeover of North Yemen as a step toward conquering Saudi Arabia. It is hard to imagine a place more peripheral than North Yemen in a static catalog of our interests. Yet, North Yemen has become important, and for the time being it is important.

We can examine this relationship between the nuclear balance and the process of Soviet expansion in many contexts. Surely Europe is one of the most important, and that is our special concern today.

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR TREATY

In making his case for SALT II, President Carter has put great emphasis on the public support of the treaty announced during recent months by some of our European Allies at the President's urgent request. What I get from my European friends and colleagues is that we should take those statements with more than a grain of salt. I fully agree with that judgment.

My European interlocutors are not suggesting that those responsible for governmental policy in Europe are hypocrites or cynics, nor do I. I know many of these men and women to be honorable, high-minded, and responsible people. But they are realists.

The first reality with which they must live, 24 hours of every day, is that they are totally dependent upon the United States, and especially on the nearly instinctive reactions of the President of the United States, for their security against the Soviet forces arrayed around Europe in growing strength from the East, the North, and the South, and in the oceans. Because of the Soviet lead in nuclear weapons, that dependence is far greater today than it was 30 years ago, despite the prosperity of Europe, the formation of

the European Community, and the success of Europe's political and social institutions.

The second reality with which these men and women must live is that they face complex political situations in their own countries and must move cautiously in relation to their public opinion. There are strong Communist parties in France and Italy. The Socialist parties of Germany and Great Britain have strong left wings. Mr. Ball just spoke about the left-wing groups in the German Social Democratic Party.

In all the Allied countries, including our own, there are pacifists, defeatists, neutralists, illusionists and people who invariably find excuses for anything the Soviet Union does, or wants.

For years now, European leaders have had to hold to a steady course, despite the fluctuations and occasional explosions of American politics, and to avoid the development in their own countries of a state of opinion which would conclude that it is hopeless to oppose the pressures of Soviet policy, and that it would be better to accept the status of Finland, or even of Poland, than the chance of war on unequal terms.

These two themes, Europe's dependence on the United States and the risks of despair and defeatism in European opinion, are interrelated. They both derive from the development of the Soviet Union's nuclear forces following the Soviet rejection of the Marshall plan and the Baruch plan in President Truman's time.

SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST EUROPE

Soviet conventional forces facing Europe have always been stronger than those of the Allies. Until now they have been balanced by our nuclear forces. Today that balance is challenged, not only by the rising strength of Soviet conventional forces, but by formidable Soviet nuclear forces in the European theater, which constitute a first-strike capability against Europe.

The mobile and MIRVed SS–20 missiles, other sophisticated Soviet intermediate-range missiles, and the Backfire bomber have touched the European mind, and generated a wave of fear which is causing great concern in Europe. That concern has been intensified by the actions and the inactions of our own Government, by our passivity in the face of Soviet threats to our supplies of vital raw materials, by the neutron bomb episode, the cancellation of B–1, the slowing down of our strategic effort, and the steady erosion, in consequence, of the credibility of our nuclear guarantee on which the NATO Alliance and all our alliances and commitments are ultimately based.

If we should allow the Soviets to achieve a first-strike strategic capability, which would paralyze our entire intercontinental arsenal, European and other allied concern would become panic, and our alliances would be lost.

GREY AREA ISSUES

The special nuclear problems in the defense of Europe symbolized by the SS–20 and the Backfire, are generally called problems of the "grey area" in the jargon of the subject, the "grey area" that is between theater and strategic forces.

In 1972, when the SALT I agreement came up for ratification, the "grey area" issues were not of acute concern. It was said then that our superiority in MIRVing and in accuracy compensated for the numerical imbalance of the terms of the agreement. But the military circumstances of 1972 have gone glimmering along with the high political hopes and expectations we had at that time.

So far as Europe is concerned, the rapid development of intermediate range Soviet nuclear weapons and SALT II itself—particularly the handling of the cruise missile problem in SALT II—have opened a gap between us and Europe, a gap we must not allow to become an abyss.

EURO-STRATEGIC ISSUES

The Soviets never stop trying to separate us from Europe. That is one of their major strategic aims. For them SALT II is a major weapon in that effort. This is the subject the Allies, led in this regard by the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, have been pressing on President Carter in the context of their discussions about SALT II. Beefing up our defenses against Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe is for the Europeans the quid pro quo, the necessary condition implied in European public support for SALT II.

We can all understand the response of the European leaders to the President's request for their support of SALT II. We sympathize with their efforts to press the Euro-strategic issues to the forefront at this time, and to take advantage of our SALT II ratification controversy as a lever in that effort.

NATIONAL SAFETY IN A TURBULENT, CHANGING WORLD

Our reaction to this phenomenon is simple and clear cut. We do not believe that democracy can survive unless its leaders trust the people, and are willing in public to discuss the real problems they deal with in the exercise of their offices. That is the purpose of the entire effort we have undertaken through the Committee on the Present Danger, to encourage courteous, disciplined, factual discussion among us about the basic issues of national safety in a turbulent and changing world.

The rule we propose applies first and primarily to the political leadership of the United States. Compared to our allies, we are strong, and we have the inescapable responsibilities of leadership. Obviously, it is attractive for a politician to soothe his public with bland words about improving our relations with the Soviet Union. Every politician likes to portray himself as a peacemaker. This posture, however attractive politically, is wrong.

The President has suggested that a failure to ratify SALT II would have a bad effect on the solidarity of NATO, and our other alliances, and Mr. Ball has done so, although in more muted terms. We disagree. It is our belief that if the Senate follows the course we have recommended in our statement, the effect on our alliances would be electric and most constructive.

Let me recall the content of that recommendation, which appears in our prepared statement. "In view of the gravity of the issues raised by SALT, and all that has happened since the SALT I package was approved in 1972," we suggested two things:

One, that the Senate advise the President and the Nation of the need to seek a more positive, forward-looking, and effective foreign and defense policy, and state the goals and principles on which that policy should be based; and

Two, that the Senate withhold its consent to the ratification of the treaty the President has submitted unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficiencies, and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that will achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.

Such an approach, we believe, would rescue the SALT debate from becoming bogged down in technical details, and bring it into focus on the main political issues affected by the nuclear balance, so that it could become the occasion for creating a new and a realistic consensus in our public opinion.

Such action on your part would answer the question which has been put to me with increasing insistence and anxiety by friends all around the world since 1973, the key question on which the answer to every other question depends: "Where does the United States stand?"

Raymond Aron states it very well in the preface to his new book, "In Defense of Decadent Europe":

"Time and time again," Professor Aron writes:

> European journalists, politicians, and intellectuals have asked themselves and their colleagues these questions: "Is the United States also plagued by the British disease? Have the causes that have brought about the decline of the United Kingdom not become visible in America as well? Faced with an increasingly powerful and militant Soviet Union, do the Americans still have the same resolution they did 30 years ago?"

If the Senate pursues the course that we recommend here, and the United States turns a sharp corner in its defense and foreign policy, NATO and our other alliances will be strengthened, not weakened, and many forms of allied cooperation which are now nearly impossible, should become possible again—monetary cooperation, for example; the implementation of the Harmel resolution recommending concerted action by interested NATO Allies outside the treaty area; and many other useful procedures.

Our European, American, Middle-Eastern, and Asian allies would conclude that the United States—their difficult, unpredictable, but indispensable partner since 1917—had entered into another of its periods of creative energy, and they would rejoice.

For our allies, nothing has been better than the good periods of American foreign policy—that of the Marshall plan, the Baruch plan, the point IV program and NATO, for example, the Cuban missile crisis and some others; and nothing worse than the disastrous periods—Versailles and the isolation of the 1920's and 1930's; the Suez affair of 1956; and others too sad, too recent, and too numerous to mention.

In view of the position taken on these matters by President Carter, a special responsibility falls upon the Senate of the United States as it considers SALT II. In the aftermath of Vietnam, we have been sleepwalking now for several years, unable to believe the facts about Soviet policy, and the Soviet military buildup, although we know them to be true.

We must wake up and act while there is still time to act in peace through diplomacy and deterrence, and not through war. We have faith that the Senate will act wisely, prudently, and firmly, in the best interest of the Nation. And we are sure that the Nation will respond greatly to leadership in the grand manner.

[Mr. Rostow's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUGENE V. ROSTOW

I appreciate your invitation to appear here today. I am testifying as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger. The Committee began to function on November 11, 1976, on the basis of two statements which I have submitted for the record, "Common Sense and the Common Danger" and "How the Committee on the Present Danger Will Operate—What It Will Do and What It Will Not Do." Since then, the Excutive Committee has issued nine statements, including a position paper, "Where We Stand on SALT II," published on July 6, 1977, and approved by the Board of Directors at its 1977 Annual Meeting. The analysis of that paper was brought up to date in a series of nine follow-up statements prepared by Paul H. Nitze, our Chairman of Policy Studies, and released by the Executive Committee. The last of the series, Mr. Nitze's examination of the Treaty itself, is before you, along with our 1977 Statement, the Executive Committee's monograph, "Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the Military Balance," issued in 1978, and later approved by the Board of Directors, and a number of speeches, articles, and statements on the subject by the Executive Committee and some of its members.

The Committee on the Present Danger has been most reluctant to differ with the President on his SALT II Treaty. We strongly favor equitable and verifiable arms limitation agreements, and true arms reductions on both sides to the lowest possible level. And many of our members have had governmental experience. We have been in that famous kitchen, and our natural sympathies are with the cook. We much prefer to support than to oppose the foreign policy of the government of the United States. Since early in 1977 and, after August 1977, at the President's request, we have canvassed a wide range of foreign policy and defense questions with responsible officials of the Administration. While we failed to persuade them, and they have not persuaded us, the climate of opinion in the country on foreign policy problems has changed since 1976, and is changing rapidly. Many of the trends to which we called attention during this period are now accepted as facts, and the need for us to rebuild our defenses and our alliances is now generally conceded, in principle at least.

In view of the gravity of the issues raised by the Treaty now before you, and all that has happened since the SALT I package was approved in 1972, we recommend (1) that the Senate advise the President and the nation of the need to seek a more positive, forward looking, and effective foreign and defense policy, and state the goals and principles on which that policy should be based; and (2) that the Senate withhold its consent to the ratification of the Treaty the President has submitted unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficiencies, and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that will achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.

The Committee on the Present Danger is the first to recognize that withholding the Senate's consent for the SALT II Treaty now before you is not in itself a foreign and defense policy. We have concluded, however, that the action I have just outlined is a necessary condition for developing a sound and prudent policy. And it is the only available way to convince the President that the SALT II Treaty he signed in Vienna fails both as a means for protecting our national security, and as an arms limitation measure.

It is our conviction that what the country needs above all else is to turn a sharp corner in our foreign and defense policy. To recall the language of President Carter's speech of July 15th, we believe the nation should start on a new course, based on a clear recognition of the truth. Such a course, in our view, should include these elements: (1) to shake off our post-Vietnam depression about foreign affairs and the yearning for isolation which is implicit in it; (2) to reach a bipartisan consensus on what our national interests in this turbulent world really are; (3) to rebuild conventional and nuclear force deterrence so that we can protect those interests by political means or by the use of conventional forces if we have to; (4) to cooperate closely and continuously with our allies and other nations whose interests in a peaceful and stable world political order and economic system are parallel to

our own; and (5) on that basis to continue negotiating with the Soviet Union about the limitation of nuclear arms, including both intercontinental and intermediate range nuclear weapons like those threatening Europe and other areas of great importance to us.

There is still time for that great task to be accomplished in peace. As a group, the NATO allies, Japan, China and other like-minded nations have more than enough power and potential power to contain the Soviet drive for domination. But that power is dispersed and inchoate. It is not being mobilized into forms which can become political power—naval squadrons and armored divisions; planes, reserves and research formations. The potential power of the nations which favor a peaceful world order cannot be brought to bear on world politics unless the energy, optimism and intelligence of the American people are liberated and harnessed once again in considered programs designed to restore the peace and prosperity of the nation. In the bipolar world of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail, no coalition to guard the peace can act without the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and confidence that our nation is willing and able to meet its commitments.

In the early thirties, as Germany and Japan built up their armed forces, the British government clung to its faith in arms limitation agreements and disarmament conferences as an alternative to the politics of power. Our own government was even more foolish; we passed a Neutrality Act, and adopted the posture of the ostrich. At that time, prompt British and French rearmament, Anglo-French political unity and Anglo-French action if necessary to stop the German occupation of the Rhineland and of Czechoslovakia could have prevented World War II. But it did not happen that way.

The American people have learned a great deal from that terrible experience. We have learned that nineteenth century policies of isolation and neutrality can no longer protect our security. But some of us are hypnotized by SALT II and the SALT negotiating process as MacDonald, Baldwin, and Chamberlain were hypnotized by the myth of disarmament forty-five years ago. They view SALT II and what they call the SALT process as a kind of magic, a substitute for having a foreign policy, and a justification for not decisively restoring our deterrent military strength and the solidarity of our alliances. Only such action on our part, coordinated with like action by our allies and other nations whose interests parallel our own could reverse what could well become a slide toward war. We are not now following that clear and simple course. Instead, we debate the intricacies of the nuclear weapons problem, and wonder.

The Russians believe that what they call the "correlation of forces" determines world politics. SALT II is case in point. It would reflect and ratify the changing balance of world power and the trends which lie behind it. That is exactly what one would expect. The Soviets bargain hard. They give nothing for nothing. If America wants to accept a permanent position of military and political inferiority to the Soviet Union, we should ratify SALT II. This is not, of course, what our people want. But we have allowed ourselves to fall behind, and we are becoming Number Two. We have been marking time—to put it politely—for seven years now, while the Soviet Union has been forging methodically ahead. Unless we move quickly and decisively, we should be even worse off in 1985 than we are today.

I

President Kennedy once perfectly defined the problem we face in deciding whether to ratify SALT II. "If you are cheated once," President Kennedy said, "it is their fault. But if you are cheated a second time, it is your own." President Carter urges us to approve SALT II on the same grounds that were advanced in defense of the SALT I package in 1972: the Treaty will limit the Soviet arms buildup and even reduce the Soviet arsenal or at least keep it smaller than it would have been without the agreement; establish a stable military parity between the Soviet Union and the United States; preserve "detente" and prevent a return to "the cold war"; save us money; and, above all, further the process of negotiation with the Soviet Union, which, we are told, is the only alternative to open hostility, and perhaps war.

It was not unreasonable to accept these arguments in 1972, at least if one kept his fingers crossed. But it is unreasonable to accept them now. They have become the litany of an empty ritual. Both the political and the military expectations which determined our decision in 1972 have turned out to be false. And there is every reason to suppose that those expectations would be even more completely at variance with experience if we believed them now.

We should examine the arguments for SALT II with the skepticism of the small boy in the fairy story—the boy who noticed that the Emperor was naked, and then

said so. There has been no "detente," save as an exercise in deception and in self-deception. The "cold war" has not been ended, or even suspended. Indeed, it has been more acute, and on a large and more menacing scale since 1972 than ever before.

No American has to be reminded that the Soviet Union betrayed the agreements of January and March 1973, which promised peace for South Vietnam and all of Indo-China. At the time SALT I was ratified, it was legitimate to hope that those agreements would be made and carried out.

Equally, it was legitimate then to hope that we and the Soviet Union would agree on a reasonable peace for the Middle East. In May 1972, the Soviet Union had assured President Nixon that it would cooperate in bringing peace to the Middle East. That promise was betrayed in the War of October 1973, and many less dramatic episodes before that war, and since.

Far from cooperating with us in reducing the tensions of world politics, in accordance with their 1972 commitments to President Nixon, the Soviet leaders have been generating tensions throughout the world and exploiting them to expand their empire in a drive for power which, despite occasional setbacks, has been steadily gaining momentum.

The Soviet rush for hegemony is fueled by an extraordinary arms buildup in both conventional and nuclear forces. That buildup was not slowed or stabilized by the 1972 agreements. On the contrary, it has accelerated since 1972, especially in the sphere of nuclear arms. The greatest Soviet military gains in relation to the United States and the greatest increase in the Soviet threat to American security have occurred since we have been engaged in the SALT negotiations. The Soviet nuclear weapons program includes at least thirteen new major strategic weapons systems introduced since 1972, a period in which we have deployed none. While the generally accepted figure for the Soviet arms buildup as a whole is 4 percent to 5 percent a year in real terms, our official national estimate is that Soviet nuclear arms have been increasing at a rate of 8 percent a year in real terms. In view of the fact that our intelligence estimates have for many years consistently underestimated Soviet military activities and capabilities, we can take these figures as conservative. For years now, the Soviet military budget has been far greater than ours. The Soviet Union is now ahead of us by almost every index of military power and is manufacturing and modernizing arms at a pace far greater than that of the United States and its allies. I have brought along for you copies of our 1978 study of the Soviet-American Military Balance, call, "Is America Becoming Number 2?" to which I referred earlier. While it is now being updated in a 1979 version which should be available this fall, the basic picture it presents is sound and would, I believe, be generally accepted. Every other serious analysis of the subject reaches approximately the same conclusion—that we were ahead but have been resting on our oars and now face the necessity of moving quickly to restore our deterrent strength before we fall dangerously behind. The agreed response of the NATO allies to the Soviet threat—an increase of at least 3 percent a year in real terms—would be totally inadequate to redress the balance, even if it were being met. The 3 percent target is not now being met by the United States. And we are continuing to fall behind.

We are often told that SALT II would save us money, although even Paul Warnke has said that the savings could not be quantified. We shall have to spend more money in order to make up for the neglect of the recent past. General Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that the amount we have to spend to safeguard our security would be the same, whether SALT II is ratified or not. Actually, General Jones' conclusion is inadequate. Some of the military programs being considered are more expensive than they would otherwise have been because of the provisions of SALT II. For example, the basing model for MX which seems to be favored by the Administration at the moment would cost half again as much as its most practicable alternative, the so-called "shell-game," and be only half as good a system.

The fact is that we are not taking the Soviet Union and its military buildup seriously. This is a fundamental mistake. The Soviet Union is governed by serious people who believe in what they are doing and pursue their goals with determination and conviction. We know the facts by now at the intellectual level. But we do not believe them. Emotionally, therefore, we are paralyzed—unable to act. We read the statistics about Soviet and American stocks and production of tanks, planes and missiles, and then hear President Carter claim proudly that we are superior to the Soviet Union in overall military strength. In effect, we procrastinate and hope that something will turn up, just as we have procrastinated for more than six years in facing up to the energy crisis. If we insist on deceiving ourselves about our own

strength and that of the Soviet Union, we could easily stumble into a war we could not win.

I cannot explain or understand our prolonged resistance to reality, which parallels the Western failure to react to the rise of Hitler some forty years ago. I leave the explanation of the phenomenon to the psychologists. All I can say here is that we must somehow bring ourselves to act on the basis of what we know while there is still time to protect our national interests in peace.

George Kennan once said that it is an insult to the dedicated men who direct the Communist movements of the world to suppose that they can be diverted from their course by cajolery, flattery and the other devices through which our government is trying to propitiate the Soviet Union, above all through SALT II. For the ultimate argument of the Administration for ratifying the SALT Treaty is unworthy of our people and their history: It is an argument of fear. If we don't ratify the Treaty, we are told, the Soviet Union will be very angry. It will make even more military hardware than it is manufacturing now and behave even worse on every continent and on the seven seas. Secretary of State Vance told this Committee on July 9 that if SALT is not ratified "the entire fabric of East-West relations would be strained, and . . . the world could easily become a more hazardous place for us all."

What could the Secretary have meant by this Delphic sentence? The world is already as hazardous to our interests as the Soviet Union dares to make it. As the Secretary knows from his daily confrontations with trouble, the Soviet Union is proceeding on its imperial course as rapidly and as vigorously as it thinks it can without stirring us to react. Does our Secretary of State believe that Soviet behavior since 1972 toward American interests in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Southern Europe and the Caribbean have not been "hazardous to us all?"

Soviet spokesmen have openly threatened us with regard to the ratification of SALT II. The Soviet Union will go on "a war footing" if the Treaty is not ratified, they have said. It will never negotiate on nuclear arms again if the Senate changes a comma of the Treaty signed in Vienna. And President Brezhnev himself has commented that a failure to ratify the Treaty would have "grave consequences." In the language of diplomacy, that phrase used to be considered an ultimatum.

There is no objective reason for us to be afraid. In the future as in the past, the Soviet Union will negotiate with us when it is in its interest to do so. Displays of public anger by Soviet leaders are calculated episodes of political theater, and should always be understood as such. And it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union can significantly increase its defense effort above its extraordinarily high present level short of a general mobilization. Soviet programs of military procurement are laid down in their Five-Year Plans, and under their system are extremely difficult to change.

But even if the Soviet Union could increase its military procurement programs, the NATO allies, Japan, China and like-minded countries around the world have the economic capability, as I remarked earlier, to contain the Soviet drive for dominance. The Soviet imperial drive was not limited by the SALT I agreements, and would not be limited by the proposed SALT II Treaty if we did ratify it. Since World War II, the Soviet Union has been held back not by arms limitation agreements or by the Charter of the United Nations, but only by the confrontation of unacceptable risks. There will be no stability in the Soviet-American relation, no diminution of stress, and no restraint in the Soviet push for power, unless the United States and its allies and their associates, backed by adequate deterrent forces, insist on respect for their rights and interests.

II

The focus of the Hearings planned for today is most important, Mr. Chairman. Administration spokesmen speak and write of SALT as if the only function of our nuclear arms were to deter a nuclear attack on the United States itself. This is most emphatically not the case. The United States cannot be defended as an island fortress. The risks we face go far beyond the possibility of a nuclear attack against the United States itself. The heart of the matter before you in SALT II is not Dr. Strangelove's war, important as it is, but whether Soviet nuclear superiority, which will surely be achieved in the early 1980s unless we act decisively now, will prevent us from using conventional and theater nuclear forces to protect our interests in Europe, Japan and many other parts of the world. The state of the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is the center of a network of relations between the military and the political components of influence. Without a clear and credible second strike nuclear capability, we should be unable to use political influence or conventional force to defend our stake in world politics.

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The question haunting every statesman in the world is what the United States will do in the event of a Soviet or a Soviet proxy attack or attempt at takeover in Libya or the Persian Gulf, in Greece or Norway, in Germany, or Malta, or a dozen other neuralgic places. Could we in fact use conventional forces if we had to assure our oil supplies from Libya or the Persian Gulf? President Ford and Secretary of Defense Brown indicated that we might well do so if sufficiently provoked. But a recent study by Colonel Collins of the Library of Congress Research Service is dubious about the possibilities of military action in the Persian Gulf under present ciircumstances, because of uncertainty about what the Soviet Union might do.

How can we define our vital national interests in the turbulent realms of world politics? The starting point for such a definition, the Committee on the Present Danger has said, is the concept of the balance of power.

The balance of power is the oldest and most durable idea in political theory. It was as familiar to Thucydides as it was to Montesquieu and James Madison. The American Constitution, with its equipoise among the three branches of the government, and between the nation and the states, is a classic example of the balance of power at work. So was the European diplomatic system, the Concert of Europe, which kept the peace pretty well between 1815 and 1914. The hopes men invested in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Charter of the United Nations rest in the end on the same idea—that the peaceloving states would defend the general peace by maintaining a balance of power and insisting on the enforcement of agreed rules of public order. That is what the principle of collective security is all about.

Every responsible American understands that preventing Soviet control of the people, area, resources and skills of Western Europe, Japan and a few other critical areas of the world is a vital security interest of the United States. Soviet control of those areas would fatally alter the balance of power and expose us to intolerable pressures backed by overwhelming military force. In such an event, as the Committee on the Present Danger said in 1976, "we could find ourselves isolated in a hostile world. * * * Our national survival would be in peril, and we should face, one after another, bitter choices between war and acquiescence under pressure."

But our interests cannot be confined to the major centers of power. South Korea is vital to the defense of Japan, as the Middle East is to Europe. Other places may become important in the context of Soviet programs for expansion. For example, the United States moved recently to prevent the Soviet takeover of North Yemen as a step toward conquering Saudi Arabia. It is hard to imagine a more peripheral place in a static catalogue of our interests. Yet it has become important, and it is important. And our signal of intention seems to have been effective, for the moment at least. The moral of the episode is that no area of the world can be excluded a priori from the zone of our concern, if we view the world dynamically and as it is.

As the Committee on the Present Danger said in its basic declaration of principles on 11 November 1976:

"Soviet expansionism threatens to destroy the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends. * * * Without a stable balance of forces in the world and policies of collective defense upon it, no other objective of our foreign policy is attainable. For the United States to be free, secure and influential, higher levels of spending are now required for our ready land, sea and air forces, our strategic deterrent and, above all, the continuing modernization of those forces through research and development. * * * From a strong foundation, we can pursue a positive and confident diplomacy, addressed to the full array of our economic, political and social interests in world politics. It is only on this basis that we can expect successfully to negotiate hardheaded and verifiable agreements to control and reduce armaments."

The relationship between the strategic nuclear balance and the capacity of the United States to protect its interests throughout the world by political means or by the use of conventional forces if necessary is the essential problem before you, we believe. This is the inescapable "linkage" between the nuclear weapons question and the rest of foreign policy. An editorial in The Economist of London for June 9, 1979 comments on linkage in these terms:

"It is the old puzzle of linkage, or how to discourage Russia from doing A or B by threatening to do Y or Z yourself. The lesson of experience seems to be that linkage works only when some specific thing you want the Russians to do, or not to do, is made dependent on some specific, usable, western carrot or stick. The Jackson-Vanik carrot is at least getting more Jews out of Russia. The fear of a Senate rejection of Salt-2 may have deterred Soviet foreign policy from doing some things hurtful to western interests this year (in Iran? among Arabs angry about Camp David?). It is being suggested in Washington that the prophylactic value (Rhodesia?)

of Salt-2 could be prolonged if the senate's ratification of it (assuming it does get ratified) had to be reconfirmed by an annual vote. It is an ingenious idea, perhaps over-ingenious: it would probably not have much real deterrent effect after the first couple of years of Salt-2's likely six-year span.

"But linkage in general—meaning the hope of discouraging some general Soviet course of action in the political or military field by some general threat of western displeasure in other matters—does not seem to work. The oblique approach to great-power politics rarely does. The problem is the will to power of a Soviet Union in the first youth of its imperial enthusiasm, and now equipped with an armoury of global weapons. In the end, that has to be contained, so that matters do not slide to major crisis and war, by an equal and matching western will to resist and an equal and matching western armoury. Accommodation, compromise and a shrewd avoidance of hopeless causes are an essential part of the process; but they must start from the premise of equal strength.

"Since 1961, the year of Vienna-1, the west has lost its old lead in intercontinental nuclear weapons; the Russians have taken the lead in the shorter-range Europe-based nuclear weapons; and they have increased their lead in non-nuclear forces in Europe, and come up fast from behind outside Europe. The west has slowly begun to react. The NATO countries' attempt to increase their defence budgets by 3 percent a year starts this year. The SALT ratification debate in the American Senate is almost certain to lead to more American spending on nuclear weapons. As Mr. Carter takes Mr. Brezhnev's measure in Vienna-2, he is unlikely to conclude that the need for counter-armament will diminish in the 1980s."

The record of our experience since 1945 demonstrates that we must have an unambiguously effective second-strike nuclear capability as well as adequate theater forces in order to be able to back up our diplomacy with the possibility of using conventional force. During the years of our nuclear monopoly, and then of our great nuclear superiority, we could not prevent Soviet attempts at expansion in areas they thought we regarded as secondary or peripheral: In Iran, Turkey and Greece, for example, and in Yugoslavia, Berlin, Korea and Cuba. But in the end, the shadow of our nuclear power helped to persuade the Soviet Union to back away from efforts of that kind when we had convincingly demonstrated that we were determined to insist on our interests and to use conventional force in their defense if necessary.

During the last decade, this pattern has changed as the Soviet nuclear programs, like the Soviet buildup in conventional arms, have moved forward with astonishing momentum while our own forces have been sharply reduced. The effect of the shift has been dramatic, both for conflicts in peripheral areas and for the security of Europe, Japan, China, South Korea, Israel, Egypt and other places in which we have important interests. We have hesitated to intervene in the long cycle of Soviet adventures in the Middle East, the Far East and Africa. Just a few months ago the Soviet Union publicly warned us not to help Iran in its agony; President Carter ordered our naval forces, which were then headed for Iran, to turn back. It was an ominous episode. The affair in Lebanon has been, and is, no less tragic. In 1958 the United States and Great Britain put forces into Lebanon and Jordan. Their presence ended a powerful threat to both nations. During the recent appalling struggle in Lebanon, we did not seriously consider following the same course. Obviously, if we had, the risks would have been much greater than they were in 1958.

These sad and disturbing trends are symptoms of a much deeper disease. As our nuclear position fades, and our Navy and other conventional forces decline in absolute and relative strength, we can see all too clearly the specter of political impotence not very far down the road. Because of the radical recent shift in the intercontinental strategic balance, we find it increasingly difficult to contemplate using either conventional or nuclear weapons in defense of our interests. And we discover, as so many nations have discovered before us, that diplomacy without power behind it is a weak reed.

III

There can be no question about the fact that unless we act very promptly indeed, the strategic nuclear balance will tip heavily against us. The experts identify the early eighties as the years of greatest danger—the danger, that is, that we shall be exposed to Soviet political demands backed by superior nuclear forces we dare not challenge. Under such circumstances, we shall be forced to back down, as the Soviet Union did in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and for the same reasons. If that should ever be allowed to happen, the Soviets would exact a heavy, bitter price.

As Paul H. Nitze has written in one of our Committee's Occasional Papers:

"It is a copybook principle in strategy that, in actual war, advantage tends to go to the side in a better position to raise the stakes by expanding the scope, duration

or destructive intensity of the conflict. By the same token, at junctures of high contention short of war, the side better able to cope with the potential consequences of raising the stakes has the advantage. The other side is the one under greater pressure to scramble for a peaceful way out. To have the advantage at the utmost level of violence helps at every lesser level. In the Korean war, the Berlin blockades and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States had the ultimate edge because of our superiority at the strategic nuclear level. That edge has slipped away.

"These circumstances form a background for understanding the stakes in SALT II. In broad terms the U.S. aim has been to arrange a standoff so as to neutralize the strategic nuclear threat overhanging superpower rivalry. The Soviet Union's contrasting aim has been and is to take over and nail down the advantage which the U.S. has appeared willing to relinquish."

The SALT II Treaty signed at Vienna does not provide for either equality or stability in the strategic nuclear balance. It cannot be verified by national means. It would prevent us from promptly undertaking programs to restore our second-strike capability in time to prevent the looming dangers of the early 1980s. And it would lock us into a position of strategic inferiority which would be fatal in all aspects of our foreign policy, and particularly in future arms negotiations.

The Treaty provides of course for cosmetic equality in the number of certain strategic launchers on both sides and of MIRVed vehicles. It says nothing about the number of missiles or the number of warheads that can be produced and stored. But people are killed by warheads, not by launchers. Under the Treaty, and during the period before 1985 covered by the Treaty, the Soviet Union will improve its present striking advantage in intercontinental ballistic missiles, which in itself will go far towards neutralizing our submarine force whose weapons are notably less accurate than Soviet and American ICBMs. The Soviet ICBMs carry 4, 6 and 10 warheads on the SS–17, SS–19 and SS–18 missiles. Our Minuteman IIIs carry three much smaller warheads each. And MX, if it is actually built, would not be available in significant numbers until 1989 on the present schedule. It is often said that the SALT II Treaty leaves both sides "free" to improve their strategic forces. The Soviet Union is surely pursuing such a course; but the corresponding American programs remain delayed, insufficiently funded or shrouded in uncertainty.

Both in numbers and in destructive power, the Soviet ICBM arsenal and current ICBM development program constitute a threat which will soon be formidable: a threat of destroying our ICBM's, and much of the rest of our strategic force, with only one-third or one-fifth of the Soviet force, leaving a superior Soviet force to inhibit any American reprisal. Under such circumstances the threat of retaliatory attack on Soviet cities from our submarines, on which we have relied in the past, would lose its credibility and deterrent effect. We could hardly expect the Soviets to believe that we would destroy their cities if the Soviet Union had enough strategic forces in reserve to destroy our cities in turn. That is, the Soviet Union is within striking distance of achieving a credible first-strike capability. The third leg of our strategic force triad, bombers—and sometime during the 1980's, cruise missiles—also faces a doubtful future, both because of the cancellation of the B–1 program and because of the scale and scope of Soviet programs of active and passive defenses. The Defense Department has recently conceded the vulnerability of cruise missiles to defensive weapons. Moreover, there are limitations on cruise missiles in SALT II.

It cannot be said too often that both SALT I and SALT II are based on a false premise which permeates the entire subject—the premise that both the United States and the Soviet Union have accepted the McNamara Doctrine. The McNamara Doctrine contends that nuclear war can be prevented if each side leaves its homeland exposed and unprotected, hostage to the nuclear forces of the other, and if neither side threatens the nuclear forces of the other. However plausible that view of the matter was in 1972, it cannot be advanced today. We still live by the McNamara Doctrine. But the Soviet Union does not. We have no air defenses; the Soviet Union bristles with fighter squadrons and antiaircraft batteries. It is generally believed that within a few years the Soviet Union will be able to "break out" of the ABM Treaty quickly and effectively. And the Soviet Union has invested heavily in civil defense, which would in turn further reduce the deterrent effect of our entire strategic force. As the Secretary of Defense has noted in the current Department of Defense Report (p. 80), the Soviet Union has put a massive effort into developing its capacity to destroy our retaliatory forces before they could be launched. Even more troublesome, the Secretary comments, "is the degree of emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on a war-winning nuclear capability, and the extent to which current Soviet programs are related to the doctrine."

These are some of the fundamental flaws of SALT II—that it does not provide for equality and stability in the nuclear balance, and it would allow the continued development of a Soviet first-strike capability, while it would prevent us from restoring our second-strike capability by the only practicable means available between now and 1985—the deployment of Minuteman III missiles in multiple vertical protected shelters: the so-called "shell game." Such shelters would be considered additional "fixed launchers" under Article IV of the Treaty and are prohibited.

As for stability, how can a situation be described as stable if it can be altered in minutes or hours by the movement of missiles from warehouses to launchers; by the firing of missiles from warehouses or factories; or by the transformation of a mobile intermediate range missile into an intercontinental missile by adding another stage, by reducing its payload, or by moving it to the north?

SALT II is quite as unsatisfactory from the point of view of verification.

Verification is a most peculiar subject. Outside the circle of experts, few people realize the extraordinary fact that both the SALT I and the SALT II negotiations have been conducted until now on the basis of figures supplied by ourselves. The Soviet Union has not in the past put its own production figures on the table. We have provided our intelligence estimates for Soviet activities and our production figures for our own. That is, we have been negotiating with ourselves—a process which informs the Soviet Union fully about the accuracy of our intelligence. Since we have ourselves concluded, as I remarked earlier, that our intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities have been consistently in error, this bizarre feature of the SALT negotiating process makes the stability of the nuclear relationship the Treaty is supposed to regulate altogether dubious.

But even if our national means of verification were fully reliable, they could not accurately monitor the most important indices of nuclear power—the number of warheads on a missile; the number of missiles and warheads in storage; the throw weight of missiles. The controversy over Soviet encoding of telemetry deals with a highly important aspect of modernization—the testing of new missiles. But even without taking advantage of the modernization provisions of the Treaty, the Soviet Union could transform the balance of power for years to come simply by making more and more old models.

IV

In making the case for SALT II, President Carter has put great emphasis on the public support of the Treaty announced during recent months by some of our European allies at the President's urgent request. What I get from European writings on the subject, and from conversations and correspondence with European friends and colleagues, is that we should take these statements with more than a grain of salt. I fully agree with that judgment. My European interlocutors are not suggesting that those responsible for governmental policy in Europe are hypocrites or cynics; nor do I. I know many of these men and women to be honorable, high-minded and responsible people. But they are realists.

The first reality with which they must live, twenty-four hours a day, is that they are totally dependent upon the United States, and especially on the nearly instinctive reactions of the President of the United States, for their security against the Soviet forces arrayed around Europe in growing strength from the East, the North, and the South, and in the oceans. Because of the Soviet lead in nuclear weapons, that dependence, is far greater today than it was thirty years ago, despite the prosperity of Europe, the formation of the European Community, and the success of Europe's political and social institutions.

The second reality with which these men and women must live is that they face complex political situations in their own countries and must move cautiously in relation to their public opinion. There are strong Communist parties in France and Italy. In all the Allied countries, including our own, there are pacifists, defeatists, neutralists, illusionists and people who invariably find excuses for anything the Soviet Union does or wants. For years now European leaders have had to hold a steady course despite the fluctuations and occasional explosions of American politics and avoid the development in their own countries of a state of opinion which would conclude that it was hopeless to oppose the pressures of Soviet policy, and that it would be better to accept the status of Finland—or even of Poland—than the chance of war on unequal terms.

These two themes—Europe's dependence on the United States and the risks of despair and defeatism in European opinion—are interrelated. They both derive from the development of the Soviet Union's nuclear forces following the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan and the Baruch Plan in President Truman's time.

When President Truman made his proposals for Soviet-American postwar cooperation, and helped to found NATO when the Soviet Union turned him down, it was generally believed both in the United States and in Europe that we should stand guard for a few years while Europe recovered and became a United or federated political entity. Then, we thought, Europe—stronger, richer and more numerous than the Soviet Union—would be able to protect itself against any possible Soviet threat. And we could bring our troops home and return to normalcy. It would have seemed lunatic in 1949 to suggest that we should have garrisons of 300,000 troops in Europe in 1979. But we do and we should. On this point all non-Communist Europeans are unanimous. They know that our military presence in Europe, backed by our nuclear second-strike capability, is the only counterweight that could contain the growing Soviet superiority in conventional forces and the extraordinary buildup of Soviet nuclear forces aimed at Europe and the United States.

Exactly the same constellation of events lies behind the risk of defeatism and neutralism in Europe. Soviet conventional forces facing Europe have always been stronger than those of the Allies. Until now they have been clearly balanced by our nuclear forces. Now that balance is challenged not only by strong modern Soviet conventional forces, but by formidable Soviet theater and intercontinental nuclear forces. The mobile MIRVed SS–20 missiles, various intermediate range Soviet nuclear weapons and the Backfire bomber have touched the European mind and generated a wave of fear which is causing great concern in Europe. This fear could easily become hopelessness and passivity, especially if we should allow the Soviets to develop a first-strike nuclear capability which could neutralize our intercontintental nuclear arsenal and create doubt about our capacity and willingness to provide conventional force support and a nuclear umbrella for Europe and our other allies.

The SS–20 is deployed in a mobile mode. One way it can be converted into an intercontinental missile is by adding a booster, which concerns us in the SALT context. What concerns Europe in the first instance is the threat these weapons imply for Europe itself, without the third stage booster. Similarly, the Backfire bomber can reach targets throughout the United States as well as in Europe, China, the Middle East and Japan. You will hear a good deal about Backfire in relation to SALT II during the next few months. But the Europeans are concerned first with the fact that Backfire could destroy European targets with nuclear weapons.

Many call these problems the "grey area"—the grey area between theater forces and strategic forces. This development brings out one of the the most fundamental weaknesses of the SALT II Treaty, the fact that it purports to deal only with international weapons. Dean Rusk once commented that the SALT approach was like building a dam across half a river. It serves no purpose to regulate the intercontinental nuclear balance if Europe, Japan and our other allies and interests are exposed to more and more ominous threats, both conventional and nuclear. The danger to our vital national security interests is the same. In fact, of course, the Treaty is not confined to intercontinental weapons in any meaningful sense. For example, United States ground and sea-launched cruise missiles having ranges beyond 600 km. are counted as "strategic" weapons and limited in SALT, while Soviet SS–20s and Backfires having ranges in the thousands of kilometers are not considered "strategic" and are not covered by SALT. This feature of the agreement has grave implications. Our acceptance of the cruise missile limitations was a retreat from a position of principle on which we had held firm for a long time, namely, that limitations affecting systems for allied and theater use are inappropriate in a bilateral agreement, and particularly that asymmetrical limitations concerning Western Alliance defenses are unacceptable.

In 1972, when the SALT I Interim Agreement came up for ratification, the grey area issue didn't make much difference. It was said then that our superiority in MIRVing and in accuracy compensated for the numerical imbalance in its terms.

But the military circumstances of 1972 have gone glimmering, as I remarked before. So far as Europe is concerned, Soviet nuclear development, and SALT II itself, have driven a gap between us and our allies, a gap we must not allow to become an abyss. That gap concerns Alliance defenses against the SS–20 and the Backfire and the across-the-board modernization of Soviet nuclear and conventional weapons. The adequacy of our defenses in these two areas, coupled with the maintenance of our second-strike strategic capability, determine the credibility of our commitment to the defense of Europe and therefore its deterrent influence. Anxiety in this area has, of course, had been heightened by our decision of the neutron warhead which could significantly improve our capacity to defend Europe against a Soviet invasion. This is the subject the Allies, led in this regard by the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, have been pressing on President Carter in the context of their discussion about SALT II. It is the necessary condition implied in European

public support for SALT II. The urgency of this problem is one of the important factors which led our Committee to recommend that the present text of the SALT II Treaty should not be ratified, and that we should proceed forthwith to rebuild our alliances and our defenses and resume arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on the basis of an agenda which includes "the grey area".

The European leaders still tend to speak in terms of a vocabulary which was more popular here seven years ago than it is today. The rejection of SALT II by the Senate, many of them have said, would "end détente, and revive the Cold War." President Carter sometimes uses the same phrases.

The European leaders know as well as we do that this way of talking about our relations with the Soviet Union is meretricious. But what it means to European mass opinion is brutally simple—that Soviet wars of expansion are going on somewhere else. Responsible Europeans know that the control of Western Europe is the first and primary objective of Soviet strategic thought and of Soviet expansionist policy. And they know too that Soviet programs of expansion in Africa and the Middle East, and Soviet force deployments both in Europe and on the seas, are undertaken in order to outflank Europe and to reduce it without war. Such a step, the Soviet strategic planners believe, would have a profound impact in Japan and China and lead inevitably to the complete isolation of the United States.

We can all understand the response of the European leaders to the President's request for their support of SALT II; we can sympathize with their efforts to press the "Eurostrategic" issues to the forefront at this time and to take advantage of our SALT II ratification controversy as a lever in that effort; and we know that there are lots of people in our country who still talk about "the end of détente" and "reviving the Cold War."

Our reaction to his phenomenon is simple and clear-cut. We do not believe that democracy can survive unless its leaders trust the people and are willing, in public, to discuss the real problems they deal with in the exercise of their offices. That is the purpose of the entire effort we have undertaken through the Committee on the Present Danger—to encourage courteous, disciplined, factual discussion among us about the basic issues of national safety in a turbulent and changing world. The rule we propose applies first and primarily to the political leadership of the United States. Compared to our Allies, we are strong, and we have the inescapable responsibilities of leadership. Obviously, it is attractive for a politician to soothe his public with bland words about improving our relations with the Soviet Union. Every politician likes to portray himself as a peacemaker. Few indeed would choose to offer their constituents nothing but "blood, sweat and tears."

This posture, as I remarked, is politically attractive. But, especially for American politicians, it is wrong.

Our thesis applies with particular force, I submit, to the issues raised by SALT II, which touch the raw nerves of our primitive safety. There is simply no place in our consideration of these problems for non-issues like "ending détente" and "reviving the Cold War." There has been no relaxation or improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union save in the travels of ballet companies and the sale of Pepsi-Cola.

The President has suggested that a failure to ratify SALT II would have a bad effect on the solidarity of NATO and our other alliances. I disagree. It is my belief that if the Senate follows the course we have recommended in this statement—that is, if it advises a positive, active foreign policy, and withholds its consent to the ratification of the Treaty until its text is modified, and we are committed to a new course in our foreign and defense policy, the effect on our Alliances would be electric and most constructive.

Such action on our part would answer the question which has been put to me with increasing insistence and anxiety by friends all around the world since 1973, the key question on which the answer to every other question depends—where does the United States stand? Raymond Aron states it very well in the Preface to his new book, In Defense of Decadent Europe:

"Time and time again, European journalists, politicians, and intellectuals have asked themselves and their colleagues the question 'Is the United States also plagued with the 'British disease'? Have the causes that have brought about the decline of the United Kingdom not become visible in America, as well? Faced with an increasingly powerful and militant Soviet Union, do the Americans still have the same resolution they did thirty years ago?'"

If the Senate pursues the course we recommend here, NATO and our other alliances will be strengthened, not weakened, and many forms of allied cooperation which are now nearly impossible should become possible again—monetary cooperation, for example; the implementation of the Harmel Resolution recommending concerted action by interested NATO allies outside the Treaty area; and many other

forms of useful cooperation. Our European, American, Middle Eastern and Asian allies would conclude that the United States—their difficult, unpredictable, but indispensable partner since 1917—had entered into another of its periods of creative energy, and they would rejoice. For our allies, nothing has been better than the good periods of American foreign policy—that of the Marshall Plan, the Baruch Plan, the Point IV Program and NATO, for example; and nothing worse than the disastrous periods—Versailles and the isolation of the '20s and '30s; the Suez Affair of 1956; and others too sad, too recent and too numerous to mention.

V

In view of the position taken by President Carter, a special responsibility falls upon the Senate of the United States as it considers SALT II. In the aftermath of Vietnam, we have been sleepwalking now for several years, unable to believe the facts about Soviet policy and the Soviet military buildup although we know them to be true. We must wake up and act while there is still time to act in peace through diplomacy and deterrence, and not through war. We have faith that the Senate will act wisely, prudently and firmly, in the best interests of the nation. And we are sure that the nation will respond greatly to leadership in the grand manner.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Gentlemen, in light of the fact that I have been somewhat critical of the way in which questions have been allowed to be asked in this committee, I would like to suggest to my colleagues that we attempt to have this a more free-flowing exchange, that we not be held to any particular time, and that our colleagues intervene at any point, assuming that they are continuing to pursue the subject in question. I will attempt to exercise judgment and bring to a halt a line of questioning if, it becomes too protracted, or someone is not having an opportunity to ask questions. Would you all agree?

Senator PELL. I would just like to comment here that that is absolutely your prerogative, and will work very well today because you have three of the more quiet members of the committee here. But when you have 14 or 16 members, and even a larger number of television cameras than there are here, and even more conspicuous witnesses, I question that.

Senator BIDEN. Touché.

I will begin by yielding to Senator Pell. [General laughter.]

Senator PELL. I pass.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Glenn.

U.S. MILITARY, POLITICAL INFERIORITY

Senator GLENN. Mr. Rostow, you state that if America wants to accept a permanent position of military and political inferiority to the Soviet Union, we should ratify SALT II. Do you think that it goes that far, that if we ratified SALT II, we would accept a military and political inferiority to the Soviet Union in the minds of most of the nations of Europe, and the rest of the world?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; I do. All the experts in the higher metaphysics of SALT tell us that the period of maximum danger is the early 1980's. There is no way, under SALT II, that we could move to restore the balance in that period. The administration having prolonged the M–X program for years by its delays, now tells us that M–X in whatever basing mode is agreed upon would not be available until 1989. Under the ABM Treaty, we cannot use ABM's to defend our intercontinental fixed missiles. We are precluded by the SALT II Treaty from adopting the most practical and quickest alternative method for preserving the third leg of the Triad, our

ICBM's—that is, the so-called shell game, or multiple vertical shelters. Therefore, we should face a period, and we do face a period in the early 1980's in which our ICBM's would be vulnerable to attack from the Soviet Union. I am not saying that they would be attacked, but they would be vulnerable to attack by a force that would include about one-third or one-fifth of the Soviet force.

In other words, the threat of such an attack would paralyze us. This is the fallacy of the argument of overkill that you find very often, the argument that under such circumstances we could retaliate against Soviet cities and industries from our submarines. Under such circumstances, if the Soviets could take out our ICBM's with a fifth or a third of their force, leaving a huge reserve behind, then no President in his right mind, I think, would seriously consider using the submarines to attack Soviet area targets, knowing that our cities would be devastated in return. That is what I have in mind.

MILITARY, POLITICAL POWER LINKAGE

Senator GLENN. Prospectively down the road, I can see, of course, the linkage between the military and the political power, if we were to become definitely a secondary power.

I think your statement, if I accept that as you state it here, "The Soviet Union is now ahead of us by almost every index of military power," and then the rest of that sentence there. That is a very big statement. I do not feel that the Soviet Union is as of this instant ahead of us in every index of military power.

Mr. ROSTOW. I did not say every. I said almost every.

Senator GLENN. If you accept that, then you can say, they can use their superiority in flexing their muscles around the world and maintain the political advantage which goes along with it. I don't think most people here would feel that they are now ahead of us in most of the indices of military power, to the extent that that statement would indicate.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, Senator Glenn, we tried to document that in this monograph "Is America Becoming Number Two?" which we prepared as carefully as we could, and issued last year. It is being updated now. The only mistake that has been called to my attention in this monograph was a mistake in the other direction. We said that we were ahead in antitank missiles. It appears from later information that that statement is not correct. The Soviets are making them just as fast as we are, if not faster.

SOVIET ICBM STRIKING ADVANTAGE

Senator GLENN. Do you feel that they have, as you state, a present striking advantage in intercontinental ballistic missiles now?

Mr. ROSTOW. Do I say that?

Senator GLENN [reading]:

> Under the Treaty, and during the period before 1985 covered by the Treaty, the Soviet Union will improve its present striking advantage in intercontinental ballistic missiles, which in itself will go far towards neutralizing our submarine force whose weapons are notably less accurate than Soviet and American ICBM's.

I don't see that they are that superior now.

We have roughly double the number of deliverable nuclear warheads that they have right now, and I think definitely superior forces. I agree that in this treaty we have agreed for the first time since the Washington Naval Conference, post-World War I, to agree to just a parity and evenness of arms with our principal adversary, or potential opponent. So we have raised them to our equity, or an equal status with us as to what is permitted under SALT II, and we don't want to see them break out of that parity, and I have been very concerned about that.

I find it difficult to believe that they really have a striking advantage in ICBM's right now.

Mr. ROSTOW. It is the ICBM hard-target warheads which I had in mind in that sentence, which we all had in mind because this document was approved by our committee. I think that that is documented here.

Senator GLENN. They have a hard-target kill capacity with their ICBM's which exceeds our hard-target kill capacity with ICBM's?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right because they are much heavier. They are heavier warheads. They have more throw-weight on the launchers, and they have much heavier warheads.

Senator GLENN. Let me take that on for just a minute, because we deliberately, some years ago, went to smaller warheads because we are more accurate. It is like saying that if I want to shoot a target over here in the park in front of the Capitol, and I have a high-powered rifle, I can target that, and it is a very small pellet, and I can hit it in there and it does the damage. If I am not that accurate, and do not have that accurate a rifle, and I have to shoot at that thing with a mortar, I am going to have to put a great big explosive on it to make sure that I get that same target. That is sort of the position that we find ourselves in now.

I will grant that the Soviets are improving their accuracy by our best estimates, and on down the road, 5, 8, 10 years, whatever it is, they will undoubtedly have the same kind of accuracy we have. But I never have bought the megatonnage argument that they are superior to us in megatonnage because we target more specifically than they do with lesser megatonnage, and do equal or even greater damage than they would be able to do.

Mr. ROSTOW. But, Senator Glenn, I am not, as I said at the outset, a weapons expert, and I don't purport to be. I come from Foggy Bottom and not from the other side of the river. But these charts of ours, and the tables on which they are based, do indicate a very striking superiority in certain indices—the number of warheads on ICBM's, throw-weight, and megatonnage.

In accuracy, which is very important, I fully agree, they seem to have made great strides. And our intelligence is so vulnerable, and has been so chancy that we cannot assume they are behind us in accuracy anymore.

I think we face a situation today, and certainly in the near future, when their capacity to deal with hard targets is now favorable. Of course, we have many fewer hard targets than they do, but it is a very ominous state of affairs.

Senator GLENN. I have always questioned that, too, as to whether in a real nuclear exchange, we would just be shooting for hard targets. I think that if we really start a nuclear exchange with the

Soviet Union they can expect us to probably be starting with Red Square, and working out from there, and we would expect the same thing.

Now, the first few that come over might well be targeted to hard targets as a demonstration of what they are capable of doing, but I cannot imagine a U.S. President sitting down the street, just a mile or so from here, and saying: "We now have 20 incoming, Mr. President. They just went off in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Kansas." And he will sit there and debate as to whether we are going to shoot back or not, or whether we are going to respond and be held hostage.

Senator BIDEN. If the Senator would yield on that.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. That scenario does not even call for 10 or 20, according to the "Present Danger" scenario. It is 1,000. We are talking about a massive launching of their missiles in our direction.

Mr. ROSTOW. Senator Glenn and Senator Biden, that is exactly the point that I wanted to raise, and that is exactly the question that concerns me so much, and concerns all of us.

My experience with it is that it is extremely hard for anyone to imagine that the President of the United States would stand idly by if, we will say, the missile sites in South Dakota were blown up. He would be furious. American people would have been killed, and he would immediately respond. But would he respond if he knew that whatever he did to the Soviet Union would be more than matched by the Soviets' third strike?

That, I think is the reason why someone said very well that facing such a scenario, even Gen. Curt LeMay would advise accommodation.

Senator GLENN. I doubt that.

Mr. ROSTOW. Most people would under those circumstances. I think the chances are that there would be accommodation. You would have the Cuban missile crisis in reverse. The Soviets would give us a chance, let us say, to pull our fleet out of the Mediterranean, or whatever it was that they wanted. We would not have the blowup in South Dakota, but we would have the political exploitation of the state of the equation.

Senator BIDEN. Assuming this is all true, which I don't believe, how does SALT II affect that in any way?

Mr. ROSTOW. SALT II affects it in several ways. In the first place, SALT II prevents us, as I said before, from falling back on any method for making our ICBM's invulnerable during the period of the treaty. The M–X does not come on line until 1989.

Senator BIDEN. That is not precluded by SALT.

Mr. ROSTOW. As a practical matter it is precluded by SALT. We cannot do it.

Senator BIDEN. But SALT has nothing to do with that.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; it does. I will tell you why SALT has something to do with it. The other alternative methods are precluded because if you put the Minutemen III into shelters, shell-game shelters, the multiple-vertical shelters that have been much discussed, you would have more than the number permitted by the treaty because you would have to count each shelter as a launcher.

To make more Minutemen III's, to revive the production line of Minutemen III's would be a strenuous and hasty operation, and it would be prevented by SALT II. You would be violating the number fixed in the treaty.

Senator GLENN. What if we went to a real mobile, which is the only M-X that makes any sense to me?

Our problem now with our hard sites is that they are specific spots of real estate that can be targeted. Now, we are talking about taking each one of those and making multiple holes that can be put in. I grant you that these can still be targeted with the 15,000 warheads that would be legal under SALT II.

The only M-X that really makes sense to me is the true mobile, and one that can go on our 70,000 square miles of Federal land, or that can use our Federal highway systems in times of crisis, or whatever, and it truly is mobile and gives Soviet targeters an infinite targeting problem, one that they cannot possibly cope with.

There are millions of potential spots that can be identified with red X's on top of them, as far as I am concerned, to help the Soviets, but they could be in a different spot tomorrow from where they are today. How do you target that? That is the only M-X that really makes sense to me.

Mr. ROSTOW. But the mobile is precluded during the protocol period.

Senator GLENN. That is all right because we can't develop it in 3 years anyway.

Mr. ROSTOW. We have to do something within 3 years. Three years is what we are talking about.

Senator GLENN. We cannot test and deploy during that period. So it has nothing to do with whether we could develop an M-X of that type or not.

Mr. ROSTOW. An M-X, perhaps, but we cannot even put Minutemen III on tractors.

Senator SARBANES. Could we separate those two things? Is there something that we could do without the treaty with respect to M-X that we cannot do with the treaty?

Mr. ROSTOW. Under the treaty, M-X would be our one new system. We are each allowed one new system. Then you get into metaphysical arguments as to whether you are dealing with an improvement in the range of 5 percent, 10 percent, or whether you are dealing with a new system. But from our point of view, there is no question about it, you fit M-X into the treaty as a new system.

Senator SARBANES. You cannot move any faster on M-X without the treaty than you can with the treaty. Is that right?

Mr. ROSTOW. As far as M-X is concerned, my objection is that our M-X program does not deal with the period of maximum danger in the early 1980's.

Senator GLENN. We cannot develop it that fast, though. It is going to be beyond the protocol to even get it developed.

Mr. ROSTOW. I understand that. All I am talking about is trying to do something quickly. The quick-fix approach for dealing with the vulnerability of our ICBM's goes back to all the decisions that were made earlier, which turned out to raise difficult problems.

Senator BIDEN. It is argued by those who share your point of view, including Mr. Nitze, that the vulnerability of the land-based system does not come about until the early 1980's.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. If our land-based system is not vulnerable now to a first strike, and if in fact the M-X can come after the protocol expires and is not precluded by the remainder of the treaty, what are you worried about?

Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Nitze has said that he is sure that the ICBM's are vulnerable in the early 1980's. The question of their vulnerability today remains to be seen, and the question of testing depends upon the kind of crises we have.

My belief is that it is better to be safe than sorry on these things, and it is better to have too many than too few. Mr. Ball said that he thought there had been improvements in American-Soviet relations during the Brezhnev regime. This is one of the few occasions where I flatly disagree with him.

I think that the Brezhnev regime has been the worst period of the cold war. We may get a test of the political effect of these threats very soon.

Senator BIDEN. But back to the treaty, you are contending that this treaty would preclude us from being able to take the steps you believe are immediately necessary to correct what you believe is an existing problem——

Mr. ROSTOW. Or a very imminent problem.

Senator BIDEN. What is very imminent?

Mr. ROSTOW. The early 1980's.

Senator BIDEN. That is the point that I am trying to make.

Mr. ROSTOW. But it takes several years to get these things going. You have got to make the decisions now.

Senator BIDEN. Precisely, and we have made the decision now on the M-X, although the basing mode remains to be decided.

What I want to get straight is this: I have read your document, and I have looked at the list of eight things you believe are necessary to be done, and I have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former members of the Joint Chiefs, and they all acknowledge that every one of the things that you recommend need to be done, can be done under the treaty, and are not precluded. You are the first person from the "clear and present danger" school who has suggested that the eight things you recommend in your paper are not able to be done, with the single exception of M-X.

Mr. ROSTOW. With the M-X, it was the vertical shelter game that I had in mind.

Senator BIDEN. The vertical shelter game can be done, assuming we pass a reservation interpreting the verification provision so as to allow the vertical shelter game——

Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Chairman, a reservation has the same legal effect as a letter from my mother.

Senator BIDEN. It is much different in the international community and in international law. If the reservation is adopted by the U.S. Senate, and the Soviets go forward with the treaty accepting our stated interpretation——

Mr. ROSTOW. That is the same drama we had in 1972. That is exactly the problem of the unilateral interpretations in 1972, which

were sold to you and the Senate as grounds for abrogating the treaty. The Soviets paid no attention to our unilateral interpretations, and we did nothing about it when they were violated.

Senator BIDEN. I am told by counsel that a reservation becomes a full part of the treaty. Assume that counsel is right that it does, would you then have a problem?

If we solved the vertical shell game problem, is there anything that the Present Danger Committee recommends need be done that would be precluded by the passage of SALT II?

Mr. ROSTOW. I made a list of other problems on which we think amendments or reservations are necessary and I certainly should prefer amendments. I am happy to know that your counsel thinks that a reservation becomes part of the treaty, and I will be glad to talk with him about it afterward.

It seems to me that the discussions we have had have identified a number of other problems, which also require action by the Senate either through reservation or amendment.

Senator BIDEN. With all due respect, would you please answer the question I asked?

Mr. ROSTOW. I beg your pardon. No.

Senator BIDEN. I like that answer.

Mr. ROSTOW. I assumed that.

Senator BIDEN. Now we are going on to other problems you have defined.

By the way, gentlemen, would you like to change the subject?

Senator HAYAKAWA. I would love to. [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. Why don't we change the subject, and then Senator Glenn and I, and others, will go back to that after we raise a new subject.

Senator HAYAKAWA. First of all, Mr. Ball, if I could change the subject for a moment. May I thank you and congratulate you for your editorial on the "boat people" in the Washington Post last Monday. We have introduced it in the Congressional Record.

Not only that, but Mr. McCloskey and I have written to the President asking him to send the 7th Fleet out to Asian waters to pick up whatever refugees we can, and take humanitarian action because their plight is really as desperate as you say.

I am very, very grateful to you for strengthening our convictions in this matter. You have a lot of support in the Senate on this.

EFFECT OF SALT REJECTION ON COHESION OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY

I would like to ask you, Mr. Ball, if the rejection of the treaty would seriously endanger the cohesion and the effectiveness of Western democracies, as you say; and why is the Soviet Union so eager for us to ratify SALT II?

When we were in the Soviet Union last January, we were surrounded by Soviet officials of one kind or another telling us that we simply had to ratify SALT II.

Mr. BALL. I think that the Soviets conceive it to be very much in their interest not to get into an unrestricted strategic arms race with the United States. A great many of the Soviet leadership, according to the impression I have, are eager to get on with very formidable tasks.

The Soviet Union today is faced with terrible problems that make even the problems that preoccupy us look rather simple. They have an economy which simply is not working, and in the nature of things I do not think can be made to work. They face the danger of China. They have the problem of an ethnic balance in the country which is very rapidly changing.

This year for the first time in history, the population of the Soviet Union will be more than 51 percent non-Slavic, non-Great Russian. This means that their problems of ethnic separation movements throughout the Union of the Soviet Republics is a very, very serious one, which preoccupies them a great deal, and which has caused them a great deal more trouble, I think, than has actually appeared in the American press.

They have problems of how they are going to try to do more for their consumers who are becoming acutely unhappy and who are reaching the conclusion that 60 years after the Great Revolution a one-room apartment in Moscow may not be a satisfactory answer.

Senator SARBANES. Isn't it perhaps more likely that the Soviets calculate that the approval of SALT II will lull us into a sense of improved relations, and therefore, lead the United States not to undertake programs which some people have advocated, much as perhaps happened after SALT I?

Why would the Soviets enter an agreement, which allows our people to say: "Place these substantive restrictions on them, and only nominal restrictions on us?"

The answer may be that their calculation is not on what the agreement would do, but the climate it will produce. Of course, they may be wrong. If the treaty does not produce that climate, but does impose these restrictions, then you couple the treaty, not with doing nothing, as they expect, but with doing a number of things.

You may very significantly enhance the American position because we may both do a number of substantive programs the Soviets really did not expect to happen, and also have the restrictions upon them that are contained in the treaty.

Mr. BALL. The point that you make is a central point, that the condition of our defense establishment is going to depend on what we do from now on. If we have the treaty, then within the framework of the treaty we must do what we have to do, and it seems to me that we can still maintain the integrity of our defense. But at the same time, we don't lose the benefit of some sense of constraint.

I am very much afraid, quite frankly, that if we signal to the world that as far as the United States is concerned, we are rejecting the work of 7 years, we are saying that there is no real possibility of an agreement with the Soviet Union. That would, I think, become clear if there were major amendments that went to the heart of the treaty, or a rejection.

With a new regime coming into the Soviet Union, not only would the new regime feel committed to go forward with much greater speed on the development of stronger strategic weapon systems on their side, but they would be totally unrestrained. The world would reel back in great shock, and say, "Are we going to see these two giants enter into a competition which has no limits? One or the other is going to spend itself to death."

Senator BIDEN. Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Ball, if the Soviets really want the treaty, as you suggest, why did they not go for lower levels, such as we suggested in 1977—if, as you say, there are at least some among them who would like to wind down the arms race?

Mr. BALL. Again, it is a question of the pressure they are getting from their own military. They do not make a decision in a vacuum. The significant thing that one must undertstand about the Soviet Union is that even a man like President Brezhnev has far less authority than President Carter. At that time that Mr. Nixon was in Moscow in 1972 he was making judgment decisions off the top of his head. Every time he made one, the Politburo went into a 7-hour session so that they could provide him with an answer because Brezhnev could not give him any answers.

Their decisions represent a compromise of forces that are at work within the Soviet system. There are the military and there are the people who are interested in getting on with the improvement of the economy. There are people who are worried about the ethnic problems, and so on.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Rostow, if I may just ask one more question. I have been delighted with your statement that "There has been no détente, save an exercise in self-deception. The cold war has not ended, or even suspended."

I wish I could have had that statement in front of me in 1976 when so many people were asking me, during my campaign, "What does détente mean?" I could have said to them, "There is no such thing."

I would like you, Mr. Rostow, to elaborate on your views about the Allies. That is, how would West Germany, for example, react to the rejection on our part of SALT II.

Mr. ROSTOW. I think that there is no question about the fact that there is, as Mr. Ball said, a very strong left-wing group within the Social Democratic Party. My answer to the question, in general, would be the one I put, that is, we are not in favor of a simple rejection of the treaty by the Senate. We are in favor, as I tried to make clear, of the Senate advising the Nation that we need a sharp turn in our defense policy, and our foreign policy, a much more active policy based on Alliance solidarity and backed by adequate deterrents at the conventional as well as the nuclear level, and backed, indeed, by appropriations that would commit us to that sort of a posture.

On that basis, we propose to continue the negotiations with the Soviet Union for arms control, and for arms limitations, but on a much more equal footing. It is our belief that the Soviet Union, despite all the things it says, would continue those negotiations if it found them in its interest.

Among the things that would have to be taken into account, as I tried to bring out in the paper and in my summary today, would be not only the question of a "quick fix" to assure the protection of our fixed ICBM's in the near future, but the Backfire question, the heavy missile system, and above all provisions that would assure the allies, with respect to cruise missiles and intermediate range missiles, that we are not going to allow the protection of Europe

and of Japan, and other allies, to be decoupled from the strategic posture of the United States.

We are not going to be forced back into fortress America, where we will simply protect ourselves. That is not the real danger at all. The real danger is of having our allies nipped off one by one.

Those people, I think, would react positively. Mass opinion throughout Europe would welcome such a posture from the Senate. It would be positive not negative. It would not be mere rejection. It would be pointing the way to the future. That is what we tried to do in this statement.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. On the decoupling question, to follow up on that, that is sort of a two-edged sword, isn't it?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Assume your point, for a moment, that we have a central system strategically inferior to that of the Soviet Union——

Mr. ROSTOW. Or soon will be.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Or soon will be. If we rectify that inferiority and have strategic parity, then the issues become theater nuclear force modernization, Euro-strategic forces, where the Soviets are dominant now.

The German leadership, and the British leadership that I have spoken to worry about this. Too few nuclear forces in Western Europe could be decoupling, it is feared, by making Europe too dependent on massive retaliation by U.S. control systems, which is not a highly credible option. On the other hand, if we build up nuclear weapons in Western Europe to a point where we have Euro-strategic parity, that could also be decoupling because the United States would be seeming to say:

> Now the Europeans can take care of themselves. They can fight out a nuclear war in Europe. There is equality; therefore the central systems need not be brought into play.

I know personally that Chancellor Schmidt is worried about that. He specifically told me that. How do you respond to that?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is the anxiety in Europe and in Japan, and in other places about the American yearning for isolationism, and our tendency to try to dive back into the 19th century. It is universal, and it is going to continue.

The yearning is there on our part. It is part of our history, and the Europeans know it, and they will always worry about it. All our allies will. We simply have to make it clear that we are not yielding to that temptation.

Now I think the best analysis of the subject that I have seen, and the best treatment of it is in the article by Francois DeRose, who is a very able and courageous French Ambassador, in the summer of 1979 issue of Foreign Affairs. He is talking about these problems, the "grey area" and decoupling problems. His answer is a simple one, and I think a wise one.

It is not that there should be only European weapons and European formations to cope with the Soviet nuclear threat in Europe. What we are talking about, he says, is the safety of the whole alliance, including the United States and Canada, in Europe. Therefore, he argues we should have American as well as European weapons in Europe.

He is not saying, "Just give us the cruise missiles and we will take care of it ourselves." He is saying: "Bring over the Pershing-2's, and bring over the others, and we will set up a combined system." In other words, he is using the present crisis, which is simply a symptom of what the Soviets have been trying to achieve, as a way of integrating the alliance.

Senator BIDEN. Chancellor Schmidt and others understand that full well. They did not think of us handing over the strategic weapons. But that still does not speak to the decoupling question. The Europeans with whom I have spoken fear that we could fight, if you will, our war on European soil.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. That is decoupling.

Mr. ROSTOW. No, that is not decoupling. The decoupling is when we don't react. The decoupling is when we leave them alone.

Senator BIDEN. I will not pursue the point at this time, other than to say as a high German official told me, "We would not consider the destruction of Bonn a 'tactical' event."

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. That makes a bit of a difference.

EFFECT OF ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON SOVIET UNION

Senator GLENN. I want to get back just a moment to Mr. Ball's statement on the buildup, and the economic pressures in the Soviet Union as a reason for the treaty, because I have not quite bought that, I don't believe, in this regard.

Under the treaty, they can triple their nuclear strength within 5 years. I cannot imagine that they are going to want to, or could afford to build more than that in that period of time with or without the treaty. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. BALL. It depends on what their interpretation would be as to what we would do if we rejected the treaty. In other words, if we rejected the treaty, this could well be seen as a signal to them that we were embarked on an unrestricted arms race. Therefore, the pressures from the military to go forward would be very much stronger.

Senator GLENN. They have already been outspending us by tremendous amounts in the conventional arms area, anyway.

Mr. BALL. I appreciate that.

Senator GLENN. Do you think that they would go up in conventional expenditure as well as nuclear?

Mr. BALL. I think that if they felt they were now in a new situation, in which the United States, by failing to ratify SALT, was seen as determined to go forward full-speed, they would have to do the same thing.

On the other hand, if they feel that there are some constraints, there would be very much less pressure on them.

Senator GLENN. I don't really see that they would be capable of pursuing an arms race like that, and nor would we. Under the treaty as it is, they can triple their nuclear delivery strength. The deliverable nuclear warheads can be tripled under the treaty, and that lets them establish a parity with us, which is the basic purpose of the treaty.

I have been concerned that they then not have the capability, through whatever other means they might build up, to break out, or whatever, later on, so that we would be kept in the dark enough that we would not know that there was something ominous here looming in the background beyond that. That has been a principal concern of mine throughout the whole SALT consideration.

I think that just for us to assume that we are going to trigger off some monstrous arms race, when they already have the capability of tripling it, is not really realistic.

Mr. BALL. Again, this would be a question of their interpretation of what this meant as far as the United States was concerned. I think that there would be a general assumption that the United States was going to go forward at a much faster pace than, indeed, it would with the treaty. Therefore, they would be under pressure to do the same thing.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I chaired the Senate delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly last November, and then I was at the spring meeting in May. During those meetings I was struck by the fact that many fellow parliamentarians from both sides of the spectrum came up to me spontaneously, saying: "What the devil is going wrong? I hope you are going to push ahead with SALT. What is the reason for the delay?

Some of my colleagues, and there has been at least one, have raised the question that, in fact, the European allies are doing this because they are under pressure from the United States and they have no alternative, a theme which is reiterated by you, Mr. Rostow, in your statement here. I cannot equate the two.

What is the reason for our differing conclusions?

Mr. ROSTOW. I would say that the reason is a very simple one. The European heads of government, concerned about the "grey area" issues, and concerned about many other aspects of American policy and of world politics, were caught in a dilemma by the President's request for support on SALT, and they had very little choice but to go along, although they had grave doubts, I believe, almost all of them. Giscard, of course, expressed those doubts in public.

But they went along with the President's request, and publicly support him, although they are trying to use the occasion as a way of obtaining satisfaction on these "grey area" problems with which they were deeply dissatisfied by SALT.

Now it is said that the effect of the rejection of SALT in Europe, and especially in Germany would be a loss of confidence in the coherence and steadiness on course of American policy. They already have very strong opinions about the coherence and steadiness on course of American policy, and they think that we have been steady on course downhill and over the abyss.

Senator PELL. I think that you are raising a strawman and then very skillfully and ably knocking it down. They want it for their own security, or that is what they tell me, and said nothing about wanting to be reassured about American security policy. The people that I have talked with were not chiefs of government, in general. They were just parliamentarians, the rank and file.

Mr. ROSTOW. It may be that we talk to different people, but the people that I talked to are like our military here. They say: "What we really want from America is a restoration of the strategic deterrence, the second-strike capability, and American conventional forces, and American political activism backed by them." SALT does not make much difference one way or the other, and they have not gone into it. Those that have gone into it have come out pretty much as we have.

Mr. BALL. If I may just say a word. I have been in Europe almost once a month for quite a long time, and I have been at a number of quite large international conferences which are private, but where the attendance consists of journalists, members of the opposition, members of governments, in some cases, even chiefs of governments and heads of state. I found no one, in my experience in talking to these people, and they run into 50 or 100, who was not concerned that we go forward with the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

I cannot imagine that they were all trying to make brownie points with the United States. I think that this represented a legitimate concern on their part. They were very earnest, and they prophesized very serious repercussions if, indeed, there should be a failure to ratify.

Senator PELL. I had the same experience. They would come up to me, I did not ask them, from many different countries. Just yesterday, speaking from the Government's viewpoint, the Minister of Defense of Great Britain very emphatically stated his Government's strong position in support of it.

I think that this canard that is circulating that they really don't want it is a hard one to nail down, because then you try to ask, who.

I would ask Mr. Rostow who really does not want it amongst your acquaintances, or do you have to protect your sources?

Mr. ROSTOW. I would say that the analysis of Francois DeRose here is a clear case for the European viewpoint as I have presented it. It says that the important thing is not so much SALT. He assumes that SALT will be ratified. He does not express himself on SALT as a foreigner, but he points out all the real problems, and he calls for an active American response to the slide that has taken place during the last few years. He makes it clear that a Soviet first-strike capacity to attack our ICBM's would indeed neutralize our submarines, and make the McNamara doctrine obsolete. I find his analysis a most realistic one.

I have had the same experience at conferences, and other meetings. I suppose that they are different conferences, with different people. But the real anxiety in Europe, I think, is about the general course of American policy and the real answer to that anxiety, and the real answer to our own dangers, is for us to change our course quickly, and clearly.

Secretary Brown uses the metaphor of the hare and tortoise. We have been the hare. We were ahead, and we have gone to sleep under the tree for a while, and the tortoise has caught up. I think what is needed is for the hare to rouse himself and get going again.

Senator PELL. I don't know, and perhaps I should know Mr. DeRose, and I apologize for not knowing who he is. But does he come out against SALT, and is he a European politician?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, he is a European ambassador.

Senator PELL. To where?

Mr. ROSTOW. He has been an ambassador to Moscow, and an ambassador to NATO.

Senator PELL. I should know him, but I don't.

Mr. ROSTOW. He has been a high official in the Quai. He does not come out against SALT. He does not express himself on that at all. It would be quite improper for him to do so.

Senator PELL. But he is retired?

Mr. ROSTOW. He thinks so, anyway. He is a well-trained French civil servant, so he would not do it. We could not expect him to express himself on a political question in the United States. But his analysis is exactly like the analysis I have been presenting here.

Senator BIDEN. Point of information, Senator. Two staff persons, both of whom are here, specifically spoke to that gentleman, and specifically asked that gentleman about SALT. He did not say that he opposed SALT. He did say what he says in the article, but did not take a position in opposition to SALT. As a matter of fact, he assumes that it will go forward, and in a private discussion with two staff members, he did not even imply that he did not want SALT to go forward.

I am not saying that you have said anything different, but I just wanted this to be clear.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is exactly how I read his article, and what I would expect him to say. I always sit next to him at various meetings because of the alphabet, and we know each other quite well.

Senator PELL. Would it be possible to ask you for some typical European political leaders who oppose SALT—their names?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I am sorry, Senator Pell, I don't think that it really would be appropriate for me to tell names of private correspondents here in a public meeting.

Senator PELL. In other words, none of them have taken a public position?

Mr. ROSTOW. No. I would not take any public position on any internal affair in any country abroad. I don't know why they should take a public position on matters in the United States.

Senator PELL. I think we take positions on internal affairs abroad all the time.

Mr. ROSTOW. I don't.

Senator PELL. It is one of our bad habits.

Mr. ROSTOW. That may be.

RESURGENCE OF OSTPOLITIK SHOULD SALT BE DEFEATED

Senator PELL. Mr. Ball, in arguing for Senate ratification, you raise the spectre of how West Germans might respond to the treaty's defeat. You spoke about a new and dangerous resurgence of Ostpolitik. Would you enlarge on that thought a little bit?

Mr. BALL. Yes, within the last few months, I think that this was about 3 months ago, Mr. Wehner made his statement. In general

terms he talked about the fact that the Germans could not forget the need for a reunified Germany at some time, and in effect indicated that if they conducted themselves properly, they might be able to work out something which would result in some kind of community or federation with East Germany.

This has been echoed in the universities. I don't want to overestimate it, because it is not the majority view in Germany, but it is a view of a group which is politically significant within the governing party, the SPD [Social Democratic Party]. It is a group which has a certain appeal, particularly to the German youth. The German youth have not had the background and the experience of their elders, and they do not necessarily share the same view of the Soviet Union. They applauded the efforts of Willy Brandt and his colleagues when the Ostpolitik process was underway.

What I am disturbed about is a feeling on the part of Germany that the United States is no longer competent to be its surrogate in dealing with the Soviet Union and, therefore, it must begin to undertake its own negotiations. Because of their great relative weakness, but at the same time the latent desire for a reunification of the country, the Germans might be led into actions which would not necessarily be disastrous, but would certainly be divisive as far as the Western alliance is concerned.

That is simply one of the tendencies that I wanted to point out, which could be certainly encouraged by a nonratification of SALT.

The point that I want to make, and which I think is very important, is that, in the current view of Western Europe there is deep concern about whether the U.S. constitutional system works any longer. This is a matter which one hears discussed constantly. Part of this is because Europeans feel that the President has not been able to solve the energy problem, and there has not been the collaboration between the Executive and Congress which existed in the past.

Therefore, they raise the question, and I have been confronted by it on a half-dozen or a dozen occasions, "What are you going to do to your system to make it work?" The possible rejection of the treaty is something that has deep echoes for the Europeans because it recalls the rejection of the Versailles Treaty, and the agonizing consequences of all of that. "Are you Americans going to repeat that experience? Are you back in the early 1920s, again?" This is the problem that really disturbs me.

Senator PELL. Mr. Rostow?

Mr. ROSTOW. Could I add briefly to that comment, if you will allow me to protect the anonymity of my interlocutors.

Senator PELL. Please.

Mr. ROSTOW. They say very much the same sort of thing, but with a different emphasis, I think, in this sense—their concern is not with our constitutional system, but with our presidential leadership, and with the decisions which have been made, and they say that under those circumstances it is better not to run the risk of stirring up the Soviet Union too much. Therefore, perhaps it would be better, if you can possibly do so, to get by with this treaty, and to improve your defense posture, so that you will be in a better position to negotiate a better treaty next time.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

In conclusion, I would just revert for a second to Mr. Ball's point about the Treaty of Versailles. I think that that treaty came up in the early 1920's, and the 1920's are still very much in people's mind in Europe. By the same token, while this is in the mind of our Western Allies, we should not forget that in the mind of the Soviets they can recall that in the 1920's, in three separate parts of Mother Russia, American troops landed and invaded, and those memories remain in people's minds, I think.

Mr. ROSTOW. In the Far East, we landed to protect the Soviets.

Senator PELL. We have always landed to protect, but we did have American troops supporting the White Army. It was perfectly proper at the time, and I think that I would have been a supporter of the White Army. But we did have American troops invading in three different places.

I think that we would feel even more nervous about the Russians if 60 years ago we had had the Russians landing in Florida, the State of Washington and Rhode Island. I know that I would be even more nervous than I am now.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you for appearing, Mr. Rostow and Mr. Ball. You both have very fine minds. Those are very provocative statements that you have made.

I would like to see if we could derive some crystalization of differences in your thinking, so that we are fixed on a given point, where we can try to decide. So I would like to refer to your statement, Mr. Rostow, and your statement, Mr. Ball, to what I consider to be the two key points.

Mr. Rostow, you say:

> The President has suggested that a failure to ratify SALT II would have a bad effect on the solidarity of NATO and our other alliances. I disagree. It is my belief that if the Senate follows the course we have recommended that is, if it advises a positive, active foreign policy, and withholds its consent to the ratification of the treaty until its text is modified, and we are committed to a new course in our foreign and defense policy, the effect on our alliances would be electric and most constructive.

Then you go on:

> If the Senate pursues the course we recommend here, NATO and our other alliances will be strengthened and not weakened, and many forms of allied cooperation which are now nearly impossible should become possible again.

I will ask the question. Am I correct in assuming that that contemplates a totally new direction of the foreign policy of the United States, which is even different from the policy you supported when you were in the White House, to wit, that we would at one and the same time have immediately to rearm in a major way, M-X, cruise missiles, neutron bombs, the works, because you allege that we are behind now. If you are going to mean what you say, and lay it on the line, and make the world feel that we are now going to proceed from "strength," you have to prove it, because you say that we have disproved it time and again.

So, doesn't that postulate an immediate massive rearmament program?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes. It is not a totally new policy. It is catching up with the neglect. You used the phrase the other day, or were

quoted in the papers, at any rate, as having said: "We have been goofing off for some years." That is correct in my opinon.

What I am saying is that we should decide to wake up and stop goofing off, and get back into a position of strength, redefine our interests in the aftermath of Vietnam, and proceed through the solidarity of our alliances to protect them. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. Is it not a fundamental postulate, then, Mr. Rostow, that the idea that we are going to withhold our consent until the text of the treaty is modified, is a lovely bird flown out the window. I cannot conceive, and I doubt that you can conceive, from your experience, the Russians coming to the negotiating table at that time, and saying "We would rather negotiate than fight," to wit, "in an arms race."

In other words, if you are going to launch, as you must to make this strategy good, a major buildup, don't you, at the same time, have to forget about this negotiation for maybe a year, 2 years, or 3 years?

It is inconceivable to me that the Soviets are going to come to the negotiating table with you in view of that change in policy, which is drastic and very sensational to the world, and start to renegotiate the terms of SALT II.

Mr. ROSTOW. I quite agree that it would take time. I think that the negotiations would take time. I think that if they are in the mutual interest of both parties, and perhaps they can be made so, then they would continue. The agenda for the negotiations would have to be changed. But I think that what is important now is for us to put ourselves in a position to protect our interests and those of our allies, and to move forward; to stop retreating, and to take a positive posture.

It is precisely the linkage of the SALT problem to our foreign policy and defense policy as a whole which led us very carefully to negotiate the statement that we made in our prepared statement, which we discussed at great length. You correctly interpret the thrust of it.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Mr. BALL. May I just add a footnote to that, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. I will have a question for you, too.

Mr. BALL. I think one should not overlook the fact that an action taken now by the Senate in proposing a number of amendments, or far reaching reservations to SALT II, would come at a time when the Soviets could not resume negotiations for the simple reason that they are at the end of a regime.

Brezhnev has made this SALT Treaty a symbol of the success of his policy. He could not resume negotiations, and it would then depend on what the attitude of his successor was. What I have suggested in my statement was that, I think the character of that successor, given the probability that there is a power fight going on now, could very well be influenced by the action of the Senate.

In other words, I think that the hard-nosed, the hard-liner position would be greatly strengthened in the succession fight.

Senator JAVITS. You agree with me, and I agree with you, and you agree with Averell Harriman. That was the first time that I heard a witness, and you are the second, say what I have felt very

deeply and have been saying for many months. I think that we had better take Brezhnev's succession into account.

Also, if I may say so, I don't always agree with you, as you know, but I do in this, I am glad that you said what I could not get Averell Harriman to say this morning.

Nonetheless, if the Senate decides, as I hope it does not, that the treaty seriously jeopardizes our security, which I do not personally believe, then you, of course, cannot consent to ratification.

That is the necessary caveat.

It does not mean that I am vacillating or weak. It simply means that we must recognize the oath that all Senators take.

Mr. ROSTOW. I would like to add, Senator Javits, two things to what I said, and to this colloquy with George Ball.

First, when we talk about a massive buildup, we are not talking about a colossal war mobilization, or anything of the sort. We are talking about a restoration of conventional deterrence, and of nuclear deterrence.

Various estimates have been made, some of them larger than others, and we are in no position to make a budgetary estimate ourselves, but generally speaking our group has thought that the proposals of the Joint Chiefs sounded as if they were within the ballpark. So, it is not a sensational change that we are talking about, but simply a catchup position.

Now, as far as our action influencing one way or the other the succession to Brezhnev and the political posture of the Politburo, of course there are differences within the Politburo, and opposition, too, but not on these issues. Nobody in the Soviet hierarchy favors our brand of détente. I had the experience once in the 1968 Czech invasion of going very carefully and very fully into the analyses of postures within the Russian system. We pooled all the intelligence there was at that time, after the event, and the conclusion of our best people, and the British and the French, and some others, was that there were no hawks and no doves. They were all united in the policy of invading Czechoslovakia.

It is my conviction, having talked to some of the Sovietologists whom I know at Yale and elsewhere, that that remains true. The notion that Brezhnev is a moderate is an illusion. The period of his leadership has been the gravest, the riskiest period that we have known in Soviet policy. They betrayed us in Vietnam and in the Middle East. They moved with great boldness in Africa. The restraints on their policy are not in treaties but in the fear of unacceptable risks. It is up to us.

Senator JAVITS. Now, Mr. Rostow, I hope that you will forgive me if I don't agree with you; I will tell you why.

If the Soviet political system, and it is a political system, is one in which there are no hawks and no doves, then, truly it is the most unique political system since the beginning of politics.

Where there is a political system, there is opposition. The opposition in the Soviet Union must be in existence because, relatively speaking, the mere fact that these fellows want to make a deal at all, of any kind, makes them another party from the people who do not want to make a deal. We certainly know that there are people in the Kremlin who do not want to make a deal.

Mr. ROSTOW. But the deal is made for two purposes. One to lull us into doing exactly what we did after 1972, namely, nothing, and to separate us from Europe and our other allies. It is very well conceived for those two purposes. So it is very much in their interest.

If you will look at what happened in Vienna the other day, Senator Javits, I think that you would see the symbolism of it. They refused to talk about any subject other than SALT. The purpose of the meeting was to sign on. There was not even the usual cynical symbolism of releasing some dissidents that normally accompanies such summit meetings.

Senator JAVITS. We have to go and vote, so I would like now to turn to Mr. Ball, and ask him this question.

You say in your statement:

> In the absence of such definite proof, to wit, scientific or mathematic proof as to whether they are ahead or whether we are in trouble, the decision of whether or not to recommend ratification must be considered in the context of our larger relations, including the effect of rejection on the vitality of our Western collective security system. It is essential to maintain the integrity of that system if the Western democracies are to hang together and not be gradually absorbed, one by one, into the Communist camp.

Let me ask you this question. Mr. Rostow has just said that if we don't go through with this treaty, we will link the Western democracies to us even more closely. He has admitted that it will take an arms race. He has tried to lessen it by saying that this is what the Joint Chiefs said, but let's remember the Joint Chiefs said that they were for the treaty, and not against it. However they might have qualifications, they were for it. He is against it.

What I would like to ask you is, is there any reason why we should not believe all the European leaders in what they say publicly through their parliaments to us and to their publics, but that we should believe those who say, "Well, they really don't mean it"?

Mr. BALL. No; I don't understand that myself. If I heard only what is said by chiefs of government or heads of state, or read in the newspapers only what is said by them, I might have a somewhat cynical view. But my own judgment is based on conversations with dozens of Europeans, with various kinds of backgrounds, and I have not heard, as I said, any dissent from the proposition that it is very urgent that we go ahead with the ratification of SALT.

Senator JAVITS. Please forgive us; we have to go and vote.

Senator BIDEN. We will recess for a few moments, and be back.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, if I could stay 10 seconds longer here because I will not be able to come back.

I have talked to probably half a dozen European leaders in the last 6 months or so, and I think that maybe there are other fish to fry in their support of SALT, also. They are for SALT, but they see it as a means of getting back the MBFR, which is really their concern.

Mr. BALL. I agree.

Senator GLENN. They repeatedly say that they don't think that either side is going to be stupid enough to start a nuclear war, but they are much, much more concerned about the huge preponderance of conventional arms that has been building up on that east-

ern front, and they see SALT as a means of getting back, once we get through SALT, to MBFR.

Mr. BALL. That is quite right.

[Recess.]

Senator BIDEN. The subcommittee will be in order.

RESURGENCE OF OSTPOLITIK

Mr. Ball, in arguing for Senate ratification, you have raised the spectre of how West Germans might respond to the treaty's defeat. Specifically, you have spoken of a new and dangerous resurgence of Ostpolitik. I would like you to amplify that a little bit more for us, if you would.

Let me explain my question by noting that in your statement you refer to the left wing of the SPD: Mr. Wehner and those associated with him. One whom you did not mention, but who is closely associated, is Mr. Emke, with whom I had an opportunity to speak at some length on SALT and on TNF. That SPD left wing is moving forward strongly in calling for TNF modernization. Is that inconsistent with what you are saying?

Mr. BALL. I don't think so. I think that you will see that the left wing is almost entirely in support of the treaty.

Senator BIDEN. The only thing that seems different is that they are also stepping out front saying, we also have to modernize the strategic weaponry in Europe.

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. I think that it is relatively new, isn't it?

Mr. BALL. It is rather new. As a matter of fact, for some time they were one of the deterrents to the idea of the implantation of intermediate range missiles on German soil.

There is a mixed view within the SPD on this whole issue. This is really what has led Chancellor Schmidt to the position where he says: "I am prepared to have intermediate nuclear weapons, and indeed I would like to have them, but we don't want to be the only country that has them," because from the point of view of the German people it means that Germany would become the target in Europe for a Soviet offensive.

To understand the German problem, as you very well know, you have to factor in the whole brooding preoccupation with the truncation of the country, with the fact that there is a divided Germany, which means divided families, divided friends. It means that there always is a kind of dream that somehow, some way, they might be able to get back together again.

The Germans are realistic, or have been in the last 30 years. They recognize the fact that any move toward neutralization would mean a move toward captivity, and this they are not prepared to do. At the same time, there has been a rather romantic aspect of German policy among certain elements in the SPD—I think to some extent Willy Brandt himself was illustrative of this—a feeling that somehow they could greatly improve the relationships between East and West Germany, and in the process, alleviate the tensions as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.

So they went forward, and there was a treaty, as you recall, with Poland, and a treaty with the Soviet Union. What I foresee now is

that in the disillusion with regard to the U.S. policy in the past few years, which has been affected by a lot of things from Vietnam to Watergate, and more recently by what they see as a kind of flightiness on the part of the U.S. Government in the failure to pursue a very clear and logical course, a feeling has developed that "perhaps the United States may not be an effective surrogate for us in its conversations with the Soviet Union, and perhaps we had better begin ourselves to undertake some bilateral discussions." This, I think, is a very dangerous trend. Not only would it mean that they might undertake negotiations from a position of very great inferiority, but it would cause great difficulties with the other Western Allies, a feeling that they were being left out, and that, if the Germans were talking, shouldn't they be talking. This could set in motion very divisive influences within the whole structure of the Alliance. This was what I meant.

Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Chairman, could I add a word?

Senator BIDEN. Yes; you may. I just want to add one point.

I really appreciate your answering my question. In your statement, you said "a small group of the SPD has long maintained that the Soviet Union has purely defensive intentions and that by loosening its ties with America—" The only point I was trying to make is that my reading was that they have now abandoned the position that it is purely defensive. After the deployment of the SS–20, and the buildup, I get the impression from even that wing of the party that they doubt the pure defensive nature.

Mr. BALL. I think that if you talk with Mr. Wehner, for example, and Egon Bahr, you would still get the argument that it is purely defensive.

I agree that it is not a sentiment that is widely held within the party, but it is an element that could become amplified if they were faced with what I think would be the severe shock of a rejection of the treaty.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Rostow, you want to comment?

Mr. ROSTOW. I agree with George on that.

I would like to add one thing, Mr. Chairman, to this discussion about the reaction of the European leaders in their public statements, and whether they really mean it, and so on.

The Senate has its own responsibility. We have our own responsibility as members of the public. We all have the same concern about the coherence and good sense and prudence of American foreign and defense policies as a whole.

We recognize, and all I meant to say about European attitudes, and this is not a canard, or a myth, is that the European governmental leaders have a very special set of responsibilities in relation to the American Government, and if they are put under pressure to support the President publicly on this, it raises a lot of complicated questions for them. What they say should not be taken as binding or decisive for us.

Of course, we should think about it, and, of course, we are concerned about the impact of a given line of action on the political orientation of Europe. We know very well that the adverse recent changes in the strategic balance and other changes in the conventional force balance and in the general tenor of our foreign policy,

have had a very adverse reaction on the political unity of our alliances.

We have only to imagine the Turks asking Russian permission before allowing an American plane to fly over the Turkish airspace, or the Norwegians doing very much the same thing, or the Germans taking the position that Mr. Ball has just discussed. What does that mean?

That means a total lack of confidence and a desire for reassurance, and if these trends continue then I think we will find things getting worse and worse. That is to say, if the allies begin to lose confidence in our ability to provide a nuclear umbrella for them, then we will find detachment developing in very acute forms, indeed, ranging from Gaullist independence, then to neutrality, and then to accommodation.

Senator BIDEN. The allies have forcefully spoken out in support of the SALT agreement. Doesn't this undercurrent to which you refer go to the question of perceptions of U.S. strength, and wouldn't defeat of SALT intensify the perception of weakness?

Mr. ROSTOW. It all depends how. If the Senate pursues the scenarios that were outlined by one of the columnists a couple of months ago, and just allows SALT to die somewhere in the corridor, then I think that it would be a very disastrous way to handle the problem.

But, if you answer the question for the Nation along the lines that I have suggested, which was a considered proposal on our part, linking the fate of the SALT Treaty to a real assertion or a declaration on American foreign and defense policy, then I think that the effect will be quite different.

Senator BIDEN. You acknowledge in response to Senator Javits' question that if we went forward as you suggested, we would at a minimum delay the matter for a number of years.

Mr. ROSTOW. So far as SALT is concerned, absolutely. But our security is not protected by SALT. It is protected by our weapons.

Senator BIDEN. I agree, but you have just said what appears to be two different things.

You told Senator Javits that if we move forward as you suggest it would rupture the SALT process for at least a couple of years. Then you went on to say that you agreed with the columnist who said that if the Senate just let the SALT process die, it could have disastrous effects. Aren't they inconsistent positions?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, I don't think so, Senator Biden. Let us see if I can do better the second time around.

What we are proposing is some amendments to cure what seem to us to be real deficiencies, and I have a list of them here if you are interested.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, I am.

Mr. ROSTOW. But the real thrust of our testimony is to link the changes and development and maintenance of the SALT process to a fresh and strong assertion of the principles and sinews of American foreign policy. That means naval appropriations. That means protecting our ICBM's. It means lots of things, research and development. It means doing it, and not just talking about it because the time is now getting very late.

I think that if we do that, then I am very confident that the effect in Europe will be, as I said, electric, and not negative. I think if we just allow everything to ooze away without taking a clear-cut position, it could be very dangerous, indeed.

Mr. BALL. Could I point out that Mr. Rostow and I are not as far apart as we might appear. We differ, really, on one fundamental point.

I think that the failure to ratify SALT would have a very serious effect on our alliance, and I think that it would have a deleterious effect on the conduct of future relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, I am wholly in accord with him that we ought to expend a great deal more effort on the strengthening of our military capability than we have.

I am almost more concerned, actually, with the strengthening of our conventional capability, and particularly our ability for quick response. I have developed serious reservations as to whether the Volunteer Army is an effective instrument.

I think that we are going to have to face up to the fact that we are going to have to be a lot stronger than we are, and we are going to have to be able to respond to situations as they develop. I would go along with the idea of the M–X.

It is simply that I think that the question of the failure to ratify the treaty would have very serious political consequences.

Senator BIDEN. To get back to the original point, it is the vulnerability of the ICBM's, Mr. Rostow, that you believe cannot be cured if we ratify SALT II in its present form.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Rostow, you stated in your prepared statement that "The posture of peacemaker is politically attractive. But especially for American politicians, it is wrong."

I am not an expert, and I do not have the experience that both of you gentlemen have in the area of foreign policy, but I would very humbly submit that I am as good a politician as either or both of you gentlemen. I would just like to say for the record that I have no doubt in my mind that politically the most treacherous position for an elected official to take today, and survive politically, is the one that you suggest is easy. Quite frankly, the easiest and best position today is to demagogue the life out of our being No. 2, suggest that we are in serious trouble, and call for an all-out arms race. You are simply incorrect, I would suggest, as to what is politically the easiest to do. It is much easier today to be the "monger" rather than the "maker," much, much easier today.

Basically, Mr. Rostow, it seems that your position is this. You don't want to deal with the Russians because you think that to deal with the Russians will lull the American people to sleep, and what you want is a shock, which energizes the situation, that shock being the rejection of SALT.

Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Chairman, what I was saying here really goes to a subject which I did not bring up in my oral summary today, because I did not have time. It is the talk about the end of "détente," and the return to the cold war.

As I indicated in response to one of George Ball's points, I don't think that it is true at all that there has been any improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union since 1972. The Soviet Union

always pursues the same policies. George Kennan once said: "It is an insult to the serious people who run the Communist parties of the world to suggest that they change." They are serious and determined, and believe in what they are doing and doing it very well. There is no use getting very excited about it.

I do believe in negotiating with the Russians. I spent a considerable part of my life doing so in an enthusiastic way. But I believe in negotiating with them from strength, as Dean Acheson used to say. They don't give anything for nothing. They are hard bargainers. We are now in a position—I think everyone has accepted, in the way that these trends are moving, and we are in a tough position for negotiations.

You spoke of areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union. There aren't any. There is no cooperation in the Middle East. They double-crossed us in the Far East. There is just not an area in the world in which there is cooperation.

The African policy of the Soviet Union is as hostile as it can get.

Senator BIDEN. In your statement, you talk about "The Europeans love nothing better than going back to the good times," and then you cited the times that were good. But in between those intervening times, I remember the Berlin blockade, and the exacerbation of the cold war.

I don't think the Europeans I speak to really consider the 1950's and the early 1960's as the good times. I have not heard any European leader in any political party suggest those are the good old days.

Mr. ROSTOW. Of course, the situation is different. Of course, the situation, and the relation between East and West Europe is now different, and probably the Iron Curtain cannot clang down again very completely for a lot of reasons.

I am saying that the Europeans were very enthusiastic about the kind of policy we had in the early postwar period, and that remains a classical dream in their memories. There are plenty of actions of the U.S. Government in the intervening years that they do approve of.

They approved, I am sure, of the Berlin blockade behavior, the United States, Britain, and France sticking very firmly to the Berlin position, and not being pushed out of it, and many other things since. But they do grumble and they do worry, and they will grumble and they will worry. But we have to make up our own minds.

Senator BIDEN. If you are correct, and I believe you are, that they cannot fully comprehend our system as compared to their parliamentary system, then they will not understand that the Chief of State who has staked his political marbles on this agreement could not deliver. It would overwhelmingly reinforce, wouldn't it, the impression in Europe that the Americans cannot follow through. Doesn't it reinforce the very thing you are concerned about?

Mr. ROSTOW. I don't believe that at all. I think that people who live in a parliamentary system know very well what a vote of no confidence means. If the Senate rejects the SALT Treaty on which the President has worked very hard, and has staked his political future, as you say, everybody will understand that the Senate is

making a judgment that the course of our foreign policy in the last few years has been unsatisfactory.

Mr. BALL. But there is not the same immediate consequence as in a vote of no confidence.

Mr. ROSTOW. But the Congress can vote on appropriations.

Senator BIDEN. I know that you and the committee you represent pride yourselves in talking about the real world. In the real world of the American political system there is no vehicle, including the U.S. Senate, that could, as a consequence of a vote of no confidence—as you suggest the rejection of SALT would be—arrive at a consistent policy that encompasses what you suggest as being a necessary concomitant to rejection of the SALT Treaty. I am talking about the real world.

Mr. ROSTOW. You don't expect, Mr. Chairman, that a professor of constitutional law is going to say that he regards the constitutional system established by the sainted James Madison and others a long time ago as being inadequate to deal with the real world.

Senator BIDEN. Only if you talk in terms of votes of no confidence. We don't have that system of no-confidence voting.

Mr. ROSTOW. But what are the alternatives? The alternative is this: We say, we have to go along with a course that we regard as dangerous, if you come to the conclusion that it is dangerous, in order to demonstrate that we have a stable and continuing constitutional system, even though you think the United States is on a slippery slope headed for perdition.

No, obviously not. If the Senate decides that it is time for a sharp turn in our foreign and defense policies, then it ought to call for that sharp turn no matter what the consequences. I am telling you about European opinion.

Senator BIDEN. We agree on a number of things. No. 1, the time is late, and I have kept you very long. I would like to come back again, but I would be trespassing on your goodwill. There is another vote, and I will have to make the vote.

We agree on another thing: if, in fact, we do perceive the SALT Treaty to put the U.S. security in jeopardy, it should be voted down, regardless of what our European Allies think of it.

We begin to disagree from there on a number of very vital points. I find particular difficulty in accepting your idea that we should reject SALT as a way of reasserting our leadership in the Atlantic Alliance. All that you suggest need be done can be done under SALT with the possible exception of the shell-game basing system for the MX. And that, as I have indicated, can be handled by the reservation I have introduced to the resolution of ratification.

When I, as one Senator, balance it all off—and if I were satisfied on verification, which I am not at this point—I would have a great deal of difficulty rejecting SALT because of the consequences involved.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Before I close the hearing, I am going to ask unanimous consent to put in the record a statement by John Armitage, retired Foreign Service officer, on the matter we have discussed today.

When the Subcommittee on European Affairs initially scheduled hearings on allied attitudes to SALT, John Armitage, a career

Foreign Service officer with 30 years of experience in Soviet and East European affairs, kindly agreed to testify on SALT as it related to the U.S. policy in both East and West Europe. Now retired after serving from 1973 to 1977 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Mr. Armitage is a seasoned diplomat who has served twice in Moscow and once in Prague, and also headed the East European service of the Voice of America. Although we cannot have him here to testify today, we are fortunate to have the testimony he prepared earlier, and will order it inserted in the record at the close of this hearing.

Mr. Armitage's reasoning is not easy to summarize fairly, but it is worth noting as an introduction to his full text that he views SALT as in the interests of the United States because of its positive impact on both our allies and on the Warsaw Pact countries. Looking at NATO, Mr. Armitage sees Western countries anxious to be reassured of American resoluteness, but nearing the edge of independent action toward their own accommodation with the U.S.S.R. if that reassurance is too long delayed. Looking at East Europe, he sees countries anxious to expand their ties to the West—as a way of further loosening those with their Eastern neighbor—and fearful that an abrupt break in the SALT process will foreclose options they want to expand. His perspective is that of a political observer of great experience, and his views are a welcome addition to the SALT hearing record.

[Mr. John Armitage's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN A. ARMITAGE

Mr. Chairman, we can probably find general agreement that the aim of Soviet European Policy is to make the Soviet Union the dominant—and dominating—power in Europe. That aim applies to Western as well as to Eastern Europe. It is inhibited in both areas but in quite different ways. And Soviet pursuit of dominance in Europe is significantly—sometimes decisively—affected by the inter-action of its policy conduct in the respective areas. It is also importantly affected by the still higher priority aims of maintaining the rule of the Soviet regime in the Soviet Union itself and of maintaining the security of the Soviet state. We may sometimes take the security of a powerful, nuclear-armed Soviet Union for granted; its own leaders most assuredly do not.

The Soviet Union sees Eastern Europe as an area which it must control: as a buffer zone enhancing its own security by pushing threatening European powers away from its own borders, as a secure staging area from which to project Soviet power into the rest of Europe, and, perhaps equally importantly, as perceptible evidence that Communist rule has expanded and can continue to thrive beyond the Soviet Union, thereby validating its claim to power at home.

In Western Europe the Soviet Union seeks to extend and expand its influence by reducing and ultimately eliminating the American presence in Europe and by avoiding the emergence of a united European political entity led by a militarily powerful Germany. One dilemma lies in the problem of getting the Americans out without provoking the European unity it fears and in the questionable adequacy of the gradualist approach which it feels compelled to follow.

Mr. Chairman, I cite these not very original propositions as background for brief comment on European-Soviet relations in the late 1960's and early 1970's. I think a brief review of those relations may have some relevance to our assessment of the effect of passage or rejection of SALT II on U.S. interests in Europe.

In the late 1960's this country was overwhelmingly preoccupied with its involvement in Viet Nam. The drain on our miltary resources seemed to deflect our attention both from strategic weapons systems and from the problems of European security at a time when Soviet nuclear strategic capacities began to approach numerical parity with our own. Our European diplomacy and the more mundane but no less important problems of economic and political coordination appeared

relatively unattended. Our concerns seemed to focus largely on our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union. Our European allies apparently came to feel that their problems did not merit our priority attention.

Having for so long accepted U.S. leadership and capabilities in the strategic field, the Federal Republic of Germany did not openly challenge our position in this area. But it did on its own decide to alter its basic policy positions toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and initiated the process of working out a new relationship with its eastern neighbors. The Soviet Union has never ceased consistently to regard Germany as the central element and the key country in its European policy. This thawing of fixed Bonn positions when Washington was elsewhere preoccupied must have seemed a heaven-sent opportunity to bring into play an active Soviet diplomacy aimed at easing the U.S. out of Europe.

One should recall that the idea of withdrawal of U.S. troops was not without its public American supporters at this juncture. The Bonn overtures were greeted with hardly restrained enthusiasm by Romania and Czechoslovakia and somewhat more reservedly by Poland and Hungary. However, Moscow was fearful that the process would get out of hand and was coping with the Czechoslovak problems that later led to the invasion of that country, so the Kremlin sharply rebuffed the Bonn initiatives. When the negotiating process was later resumed, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the terms of the game had changed—Western Europe had been sharply reminded of the military threat posed by the Soviet theatre build-up and the Soviet propensity to utilize force—and the American presence in Europe was no longer, even prospectively, at stake.

This experience should serve to remind us—the United States—of three points: (1) If U.S. leadership is not responsive to West Europe's interests and concerns, we would be most unwise to take for granted that West Europe will not develop her own policies for coping with the Soviet Union's immense continental power and presence.

(2) When the Soviet leadership perceives that there is a conflict between its pursuit of its objectives in Western Europe and those in Eastern Europe, the latter are considered more closely related to Soviet security interests and must be given priority. It is, therefore, important to this country that we not assume an undiluted Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe but keep in mind that we have an important stake in our Eastern European policy.

(3) The Soviet Union has the unique power to influence the future relation between the two Germanies and this power gives her a very strong card to play—or to play on—in her relations with Bonn. We would do well to remain alert to this fact and not to act in the comforting assumption that under no circumstances could Moscow decide to make more active use of it.

To provide a framework for asking what all this has to do with SALT II, it is useful to look at what the detente period has come to mean to the two Europes.

For Western Europe it has meant a highly prized adjustment—and a thorny security problem. Tensions, crises and pressures from the Soviet Union have substantially diminished and political, economic and cultural ties have expanded greatly—a situation which Western Europe values greatly and considers a more normal and promising line of development for Europe as a whole. But the great expansion of Soviet strategic power has raised questions about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent—and the Soviet theatre build-up has markedly increased Soviet capabilities to implement a surprise attack and to bring Europe under attack by intermediate range missiles. Western Europe will want to preserve the improved political relationship with Moscow but will also need to make hard decisions in order to develop with us theatre capabilities which will provide a theatre deterrent credible to the Soviets and to the Europeans themselves. Those decisions will focus on the excruciatingly difficult political problem of positioning intermediate range missiles and improved tactical nuclear weapons in allied countries.

Western Europeans, particularly West Germans, will be reassured if this country takes what steps it deems necessary to overcome the problem of vulnerability of our land-based nuclear missiles. That will add to the credibility of our deterrent power and will, but ratification of SALT II will, in my judgment, be equally important to a courageous European decision on theatre defense. For we should be under no illusions; a rejection of SALT II will be regarded by Europeans as a basic change in U.S.-Soviet policy—away from an attempt to contain Soviet expansionism while offering the prospect of improved relations under appropriate conditions—and toward a policy of unrestrained confrontation with primary emphasis on the military rivalry. Europeans will not wish to join us on that path.

More importantly, without SALT II the prospect for negotiations on control and reduction of theatre weapons, including theatre nuclear delivery systems, will be

bleak. Western Europeans will, I believe, be highly reluctant to make the tough decisions on theatre nuclear forces and doctrine, unless there is some prospect of bringing that part of the arms race under control. And in the divisive debate that could eventuate, this country would be in for a large share of the blame and European acceptance of American leadership—even now in shaky condition—could become doubtful indeed. In addition, we could reasonably expect Soviet leadership—current or successor—to adopt a differentiated policy toward us and our Western allies which would exploit to our disadvantage the widening divergence in our respective Soviet policies, U.S. security interests would be likely to suffer markedly in precisely the area of the world where we can most indisputably call them "vital".

In Eastern Europe the Soviet regime under all its leaders has shown that it is prepared to employ armed intervention to prevent those countries from slipping out of its control. But both Khrushchev and Brezhnev have been aware that such intervention bears high political costs to Soviet influence elsewhere—and that it is inadequate to provide the stability and security which would make Eastern Europe a solid and reliable addition to Soviet power. It was, therefore, one of the important aims of Soviet "peaceful coexistence" to obtain Western recognition of East European borders and some implicit acceptance of the status quo in that area. This aim was partly achieved by Bonn's agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland and the German Democratic Republic and by the Helsinki Act. I say "partly achieved" because the affirmation of the Western position in Berlin continued to qualify the future status of the German Democratic Republic and the reaction in Eastern Europe to the Helsinki Act seemed to keep open the prospect of internal political changes if they did not directly challenge the Soviet position. It was probably close to the mark when the French Eastern European expert, Pierre Hassner, said that both East and West had realized they had to recognize the status quo in order to change it.

Certainly, one of the Kremlin's fears is that the considerable expansion of Western ties and presence in the Eastern European countries over the last decade will affect adversely their political orientation. The Kremlin has worked assiduously to counter any such tendency. Ideological strictures have been prescribed and tightened, political consultation has been markedly intensified and considerable attention has been paid to strengthening and regularizing coordination within the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The energy crisis and oil price rises have dramatized the economic dependence of Eastern European countries on Moscow and that dependence has numerous other dimensions.

But, by and large, it would seem difficult for Brezhnev to regard Eastern Europe as any more reliable than it has been. He has felt constrained to permit almost every East European Communist leadership to stake its position on a commitment to improving living standards. To deliver on this commitment Hungarian, Polish, and even East German leaderships have introduced economic policy modifications not yet tolerated in the ideology or in the USSR. And, all Eastern European leaders have stressed the need for continued development and expansion of their economic connections with Western Europe and the United States if they are to move in the desired direction. On the political level, Romania has continued to chart a carefully considered independent course whose recent expression included welcoming a Chinese presence in Eastern Europe and an apparently successful questioning of the Soviet demand for greater East European defense spending. And, in Poland, where we have all witnessed the remarkable visit of Pope John Paul, the regime has become considerably dependent for its survival on the acquiescence of the workers and the toleration of the Church; it now seems that the range of permissiveness has extended to organized groups critical of government policies. The economic difficulties of Eastern Europe bid fair to get worse. One could surmise that from the Kremlin's point of view those difficulties are more likely to compound its Eastern European problems than to bring added leverage for bringing them under firmer control.

For those in Eastern Europe—both officials and dissenters—working in the relatively relaxed atmosphere to expand the range of Soviet tolerance and to push steadily for greater autonomy without directly challenging Soviet hegemony—rejection of SALT II will signal at a minimum a likely curtailment of their own relations with the United States—a reduction of their ties and options abroad and, quite possibly, considerably tightening strictures on their activities within their own countries. In a country like Poland—where the pressures are intense, the problems are staggering, the expectations are high and the population traditionally volatile—the difference could conceivably lead to a cycle of explosion and external repression

that would be no less tragic for U.S. interests in Eastern Europe than it would be for the brave people directly involved.

Senator BIDEN. The subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

[The following information was requested by Senator Church at the July 11, 1979, hearing on the SALT Treaty. It was received too late for inclusion in Part 1.]

ADDITIONAL CHARTS REQUESTED BY SENATOR CHURCH SHOWING OTHER METHODS OF MEASUREMENT

[Supplied by DOD]

The charts that follow depict trends in total warheads, throw-weight, EMT, soft target kill capability, and hard target kill capability. Charts are shown for on-line forces before any attack, after a Soviet first strike, and after U.S. retaliation. These charts are unclassified upon removal of the scales.

On-Line Forces: These charts reflect planned U.S. forces and moderate estimate Soviet forces assuming SALT II limits are in effect through 1985 and beyond. Planning factors assumed for current U.S. forces are consistent with actual planning factors; for future systems, planning factors are consistent with development objectives and moderate estimate threat estimates under SALT II.

Soviet First Strike: The Soviet counter-silo attack maximizes U.S. ICBM warheads destroyed [deleted]. The Soviet attack assumes knowledge of silo hardness (that is, Air Force severe damage VN's are used), assumes that single point estimates of system characteristics (yield, reliability and CEP) are correct, and that there is no fratricide. [Deleted.]

The resulting damage on U.S. nuclear forces assumes that the United States does not launch the ICBM force out from under the attack, and that all not on alert and all SLBM's not at sea are destroyed.

U.S. Retaliation: [Deleted].

These static measures should not be considered in isolation because although they do indicate general force trends, they do not clearly portray force capabilities for sufficiency. In addition, it is generally unclear which static measures have greater importance although numbers of warheads usually are considered the more significant indicator. In order to illustrate these points, a brief analysis was performed to assess the remaining capability available in U.S. forces after a counterforce retaliation. U.S. forces in 1982 are used in this example because, as shown in the accompanying charts, U.S. static measures for this case are generally near or at their lowest point relative to Soviet measures, although better than they are today.

It is assumed that the Soviets successfully perform a surprise counterforce strike and that the U.S. responds against Soviet silos, bomber airfields, and submarine bases as described above. It is further assumed that destruction of [deleted] of the economic value of the Soviet Union [deleted].

[Deleted] constitutes a reasonable high assured destruction objective. This objective could be achieved by U.S. residual forces in a variety of ways, depending on which forces we desired to hold back for reserve.

The results of the analysis show that this assured destruction task could be accomplished by using [deleted] warheads, [deleted] of throw-weight, or [deleted]. This would still leave a substantial reserve force to attack other targets or prevent coercion of ourselves or our allies. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that the United States would retain a secure deterrent even in 1982 when the static measures are least favorable to the United States.

[The charts follow:]


WARHEADS
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE
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75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
FISCAL YEAR


WARHEADS
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE AND US RETALIATION
WARHEADS
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US
USSR
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FISCAL YEAR


TOTAL THROW WEIGHT
ON-LINE FORCES
USSR
US
THROW WEIGHT
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FISCAL YEAR


THROW WEIGHT
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE
THROW WEIGHT (KILOPOUNDS)
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USSR
US
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FISCAL YEAR


TOTAL EMT
ON-LINE FORCES
EMT
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USSR
US
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FISCAL YEAR


EMT
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE
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USSR
US
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FISCAL YEAR


EMT
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE AND US RETALIATION
EMT
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US
USSR
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FISCAL YEAR


TOTAL SOFT TARGET KILL
ON-LINE FORCES
NUMBER OF TARGETS DESTROYED
[DELETED]
US
USSR
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
FISCAL YEAR


SOFT TARGET KILL
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE
NUMBER OF TARGETS DESTROYED
DELETED
US
USSR
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
FISCAL YEAR


SOFT TARGET KILL
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE AND U.S. RETALIATION
NUMBER OF TARGETS DESTROYED
[DELETED]
US
USSR
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
FISCAL YEAR


TOTAL HARD TARGET KILL
ON-LINE FORCES
NUMBER OF TARGETS DESTROYED
DELETED
USSR
US
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
FISCAL YEAR


HARD TARGET KILL
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE
NUMBER OF TARGETS DESTROYED
DELETED
USSR
US
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
FISCAL YEAR


HARD TARGET KILL
AFTER SOVIET 1ST STRIKE AND U.S. RETALIATION
NUMBER OF TARGETS DESTROYED
[DELETED]
USSR
US
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
FISCAL YEAR