THE SALT II TREATY

DOCUMENTS

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

EX. Y, 96–1

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18, 1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

JULY 9, 10, 11, 12, 1979

PART 1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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SALT II TREATY

MONDAY, JULY 9, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Jake Garn.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

Of the many and varied tasks that comprise the work of the U.S. Senate, and in particular of the Committee on Foreign Relations, none is more important than the obligation we take up today. The Constitution and tradition charge us with the specific responsibility to receive treaties that have been negotiated by the executive branch, to examine them carefully and diligently, to reflect upon them, to make such modifications as we deem necessary, and then to report our recommendations to the entire Senate for ratification or rejection.

That is the task we undertake today for the treaty known as SALT II—the second agreement to limit strategic arms between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Text of SALT II Treaty follows:]

96TH CONGRESS
1st Session

SENATE

EXECUTIVE
Y

TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND PROTOCOL THERETO (SALT II TREATY)

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18, 1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

JUNE 25, 1979.—Treaty was read the first time and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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WASHINGTON : 1979

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 22, 1979.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as SALT II, including the Protocol thereto, both signed in Vienna, Austria, on June 18, 1979.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the Report of the Secretary of State with respect to the Treaty, together with the following related documents:

1. a series of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings concerning the obligations of the Parties under particular articles of the Treaty;

2. a Memorandum of Understanding that will establish an agreed data base by categories of strategic offensive arms along with associated statements of current data;

3. a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines on the Limitation of Strategic Arms concerning the next phase of negotiation on this subject; and

4. a Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber, together with a U.S. response.

For thirty years the United States has pursued a fundamentally bipartisan foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, with the objectives of deterring aggression by maintaining strategic forces second to none, creating a pattern and tradition of negotiation to settle differences, building a strong framework of allies, and stabilizing the globe by halting the uncontrolled growth and spread of nuclear weapons.

SALT II strengthens each of these objectives. The seven years of negotiations, under three administrations representing both political parties, were carried out in closer consultation with Congress and under greater public scrutiny than any other arms limitation treaty. SALT II is truly a national accomplishment.

It is my best judgment and firm belief that these patiently negotiated agreements further the long-standing goals for our nation's security. They improve our strategic situation and allow for further improvements in the future. They reaffirm our leadership of the world in the cause of nuclear arms control. They allow us to negotiate for peace from strength in SALT III.

Like SALT I, the Test Ban Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT II is another important step forward toward our basic goal of a secure America at peace in a stable world.

I pledge the full cooperation of my Administration in helping to explain the principles and details of the agreements.

Therefore, I request with a sense of special urgency the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

JIMMY CARTER.

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the Protocol thereto, together referred to as the SALT II Treaty.

I am enclosing with the Treaty: a series of Agreed Statements and Common Understanding, reflecting understandings and supplementary provisions associated with various articles of the Treaty; a Memorandum of Understanding and Statements of Data, which record the numbers, by category, of the strategic offensive arms of each Party that are limited by the Treaty; a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for the conduct of the next phase of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms; and a Soviet statement on the Tu-22M (Backfire) bomber, along with subsequent exchanges between the two Presidents on this issue.

The SALT II Treaty and the enclosed related documents were meticulously negotiated over more than six years. In my judgment, they strengthen our national security and that of our Allies.

—For the first time, the two sides will be limited to an equal number of strategic weapon systems.

—For the first time, reductions in the number of operational Soviet weapon systems will be required.

—And for the first time, we will be slowing the race to build new and more destructive weapons.

The Treaty limits can be adequately verified by our own national technical means. These highly sophisticated systems, such as photo-reconnaissance satellites, enable us to determine for ourselves what strategic systems the Soviets have, what new systems they test and deploy, and what existing systems they dismantle or destroy in order to bring and maintain their forces within Treaty ceilings. The Treaty establishes rules for counting strategic systems and other provisions which will simplify the task of verifying Soviet compliance.

Finally, the Treaty allows us to develop and deploy the systems we need to modernize our strategic triad—such as the Trident submarine and ballistic missiles, the cruise missile for our bombers, and a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the MX.

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During these negotiations, we have consulted extensively with our Allies. Allied leaders have expressed their strong support for the SALT II Treaty as a contribution to NATO security and to stability in East-West relations.

We have also consulted closely with the Congress. Numerous Congressional hearings and briefings were held during the negotiations, and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives participated as advisers to the United States Delegation in Geneva. As you know, the Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council Staff were involved in the formulation of recommendations concerning positions and policy throughout the negotiations.

A detailed analysis of the provisions of the Treaty and related documents is annexed to this report. The basic features of the Treaty, which lasts until the end of 1985, are as follows:

NUMERICAL LIMITS ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

The Treaty imposes equal overall ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear delivery systems for both Parties. The systems limited by the ceilings consist of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers (ASBMs).

Article III places an initial ceiling of 2,400 on these armaments; this was the level agreed at the Vladivostok summit in 1974. In addition, Article III goes beyond that level by lowering the ceiling to 2,250 beginning on January 1, 1981. At that time a Party must begin to dismantle or destroy systems which exceed that number. This process must be completed by December 31, 1981.

The Soviet Union will have to dismantle or destroy more than 250 strategic offensive systems in order to comply with the 2,250 aggregate limitation. The United States will not have to dismantle or destroy any of its operational systems.

Article V of the Treaty imposes upon each Party an equal sublimit of 1,320 for the combined number of launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and airplanes equipped for long-range cruise missiles (i.e., cruise missiles capable of a range of over 600 kilometers).

Article V imposes further sublimits on particular subcategories of weapons equipped with MIRVs. Each Party is limited to a total of 1,200 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, and MIRVed ASBMs. Of this number, no more than 820 may be launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

ADDITIONAL LIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES

In addition to these overall numercial limits, the Treaty places important restrictions on fixed launchers of ICBMs, which are potentially the most destabilizing of strategic offensive arms. Under Article IV, the Parties are prohibited from contructing any additional fixed

ICBM launchers, relocating existing ones, or converting launchers of light ICBMs or older heavy ICBMs into launchers of modern heavy ICBMs. Taken together, these limitations will prevent the Soviets from increasing the number of their heavy ICBM launchers.

The Treaty restricts heavy missiles in other ways. Article II of the Treaty places an upper limit on the launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs by defining those missiles which exceed certain limits as heavy ICBMs. Article IX prohibits mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs, heavy SLBMs and their launchers, and heavy ASBMs. In addition, Article IV also limits the launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs.

The Treaty also limits qualitative improvements in ICBMs. Article IV permits each Party to flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM, which must be "light", as defined by the Treaty. Certain key parameters of each existing ICBM type may not be varied by more than 5 percent, plus or minus, from previously tested missiles of that type. Under this limitation, the United States will be able to proceed with the development and deployment of its only planned new ICBM, the MX.

LIMITS ON NUMBERS OF REENTRY VEHICLES

Article IV limits the numbers of reentry vehicles on ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs. The Article establishes a freeze on the maximum number of reentry vehicles permitted on existing types of ICBMs, e.g., four for the Soviet SS–17, ten for the SS–18 and six for the SS–19. The one new type of ICBM permitted to each Party may not have more than ten warheads (which is the number planned for the MX). These "fractionation" limits on ICBMs will prevent the Soviet Union from fully exploiting the larger throw-weight of its ICBMs by increasing the number of reentry vehicles. Moreover, under Article IV, SLBMs may not be flight-tested or deployed with more than fourteen reentry vehicles, nor ASBMs with more than ten.

LIMITS ON AIRPLANES

For purposes of the aggregate limits, the Treaty includes as "heavy bombers" the following: (a) certain designated types of current bombers (the US B–52 and B–1, and the Soviet Bear and Bison); (b) any future types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of the listed current heavy bombers; (c) airplanes equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and (d) airplanes equipped for ASBMs.

Furthermore, the Parties can deploy up to, but not in excess of, an average of twenty-eight long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber so equipped. The Parties may not deploy more than twenty such cruise missiles on any current type of heavy bomber.

OTHER LIMITS ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Article IX prohibits certain other types of weapons systems. These include surface-ship ballistic missile launchers, systems to launch missiles from the seabed or the beds of internal waters, and systems for

VIII

delivery of nuclear weapons from earth orbit (including fractional orbital missiles).

VERIFICATION

Article XV sets forth important rules which facilitate verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. To verify compliance, each Party will use intelligence-gathering capabilities known as national technical means. These include highly sophisticated technical equipment such as photo-reconnaissance satellites, land-based radars, and radar and other intelligence systems based on ships and aircraft, which we use to monitor Soviet missile tests. Any interference with national technical means of verification or any deliberate concealment measures which impede verification are prohibited.

The ban on such deliberate concealment encompasses, among other things, measures to deliberately conceal verification-related information during missile testing. Certain characteristics of some systems limited by the Treaty become apparent during the testing phase. This ban specifically includes any deliberate denial of telemetry information, including any telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification, as well as any concealment of association of an ICBM with its launcher during testing.

Various other provisions also contribute to the verification structure set up by the Treaty. The Treaty establishes "type rules" to simplify the counting of various systems and therefore facilitate verification of compliance with the Treaty's numerical aggregate limitations. For example, if a particular type of launcher contains or launches an ICBM, then all launchers of that type are considered to be ICBM launchers and will be included in the Article III aggregate limitation.

The definition of a MIRV launcher also includes "type rules" to assist in determining what systems are to be counted within the MIRV limits.

The first of these, the "missile type" rule, provides that if a missile is a MIRVed missile, all missiles of that type are thereafter considered to be MIRVed missiles regardless of the actual number of reentry vehicles with which they are deployed. This rule is important because the Soviet SS–17, SS–18 and SS–19 ICBMs have been flight-tested with both a single reentry vehicle and with MIRVs. A second rule, the "MIRV launcher type" rule, provides that if a launcher of a given type is a MIRV launcher, all launchers of that type will be counted as MIRV launchers and will be included under the appropriate Article V sublimits. Thus, it will not be necessary to determine whether each launcher of a given type actually contains a MIRVed missile.

A further constraint related to verification included at United States insistence, is a ban on production, testing, or deployment of the Soviet SS–16 ICBM. This missile appeared to be compatible with the launcher for the Soviet SS–20, a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile. (Intermediate-range ballistic misslies are not covered by the Treaty.) Without the ban on the SS–16, it would have been very difficult to verify whether SS–20 launchers were equipped for ICBMs.

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OTHER PROVISIONS

Article XII states that neither Party will circumvent the provisions of the Treaty. This will not affect existing patterns of defense collaboration or cooperation with our Allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization. Article XIII provides that neither Party in the future will undertake obligations which conflict with the obligations of this Treaty.

Article XVI provides for advance notification of any multiple ICBM launches, and of any single ICBM launch which is planned to extend beyond the national territory of the launching Party.

Article XVII sets forth the charter of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission for this Treaty. The Commission is empowered to address questions relating to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and to develop measures to implement these provisions.

Under Article XVII, the Parties will also maintain in the Standing Consultative Commission the agreed data base established by the Memorandum of Understanding. They have exchanged data on weapons in categories limited by the Treaty, and will update this data base at each semi-annual session of the Standing Consultative Commission. Although the United States does not require that data for verification purposes, the data base will assist us in confirming that the Parties are interpreting their obligations under the Treaty in a like manner.

Finally, the Parties preserve the right to modernize and replace their strategic offensive arms in a manner not inconsistent with other provisions of the Treaty (Article X); undertake to begin further negotiations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty (Article XIV); and agree to procedures for amendment, entry into force, and withdrawal (Articles XVIII and XIX).

THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol, which is an intergral part of the Treaty, sets forth certain limitations through December 31, 1981. These limitations deal with several issues about which the Parties were unable to agree for the entire term of the Treaty. Deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and flight-testing of ICBMs from such launchers are prohibited during the period of the Protocol. Under the Treaty, mobile ICBM launchers will be permitted after the Protocol expires. (The Protocol will not affect the MX program; the MX missile will not be ready for flight-testing before expiration of the Protocol.)

In addition, during the period of the Protocol the deployment of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers is prohibited. However, there is no range restriction on the flight-testing of such cruise missiles. (As a result, the Protocol will not affect the U.S. cruise missiles program since such systems will not be ready for deployment in any event prior to expiration of the Protocol.) Finally, the Protocol prohibits both the flight-testing and the deployment of ASBMs.

The shorter-term limits will remain in force only unitl December 31, 1981. The limitations in the Protocol will not serve as a precedent for any limitations which may be negotiated in the next stage of SALT negotiations.

THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

The Joint Statement of Principles states the intentions of the Parties concerning future negotiations on strategic arms limitations. The Joint Statement sets forth general goals to be achieved in the next round of talks: to work for significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms; to seek further qualitative limits on strategic offensive arms; and to attempt to resolve the issues addressed in the Protocol in the context of implementing the other agreed joint principles. The sides will also consider other steps to enhance strategic stability, and either side may bring up any other topic relevant to the further limitation of strategic arms.

The Joint Statement of Principles also sets forth the principle that further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using, additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures to strengthen such verification.

BACKFIRE

During the SALT discussion at the Vienna Summit President Brezhnev provided to the United States a written statement by the Soviet Union dealing with the Backfire's capabilities and rate of production. He also confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed thirty per year. In response, President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty. President Carter also affirmed that the United States has the right to an aircraft comparable to Backfire.

CONCLUSION

I firmly believe that the SALT II Treaty will measurably strengthen strategic stability and help reduce the risk of nuclear war. It is a major contribution to the national security of the United States. I recommend that it be transmitted to the Senate with a view to entry into force at the earliest possible date.

Respectfully submitted.

CYRUS VANCE.

ANNEX

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SALT II PROVISIONS

On June 18, 1979, President Carter and Brezhnev signed at Vienna the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Protocol thereto, which is an integral part of the Treaty, along with the document containing the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings associated with various provisions of the Treaty and Protocol, and the Joint Statement of Principles. The Treaty establishes certain limitations on strategic offensive arms through December 31, 1985, while the Protocol provides for additional limitations through December 31, 1981.

This Annex analyzes in detail the various provisions of the Treaty and its Protocol, together with those Agreed Statements and Common Understandings which relate to each provision. The Annex also discusses the Joint Statement of Principles concerning the next phase of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, the exchanges between the Parties concerning the Soviet Backfire bomber, and the Memorandum of Understanding and Statements of Data regarding an agreed data base on the strategic offensive arms of the two Parties.

THE TREATY

The Treaty consists of nine preambular clauses and nineteen operative Articles.

The Preamble

The preamble identifies the Parties and contains nine paragraphs that set forth common general views and objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the limitation of strategic arms.

The first paragraph recognizes that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second paragraph refers to the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union of May 29, 1972.

The third paragraph records the significance the Parties attach to limiting strategic arms and states their determination to continue these efforts.

The fourth paragraph states the Parties' conviction that the additional measures provided for in this treaty to limit strategic offensive arms will contribute to the improvement of relations between them, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, and strengthen international peace and security.

The fifth paragraph acknowledges the obligations of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [1] (under which they un-

[1] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at London, Moscow and Washington, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, TIAS 6839. The United States and the Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty.

dertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament).

The sixth paragraph states that the Parties have been guided by the principle of equality and equal security.

The seventh paragraph expresses the recognition by the Parties that the strengthening of strategic stability serves both the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security.

The eighth paragraph reaffirms the desire of the Parties to take measures for the further limitation and reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of general and complete disarmament.

The ninth paragraph declares the intention of the Parties to undertake negotiations in the near future further to limit and reduce strategic offensive arms.

Article I—Basic Obligations

Article I sets forth the basic undertaking of each Party, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in the Treaty.

Article II—Definitions and Associated Verification Rules

Article II sets forth the definitions of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty. The article defines (1) ICBM launchers, (2) SLBM launchers, (3) heavy bombers, (4) ASBMs, (5) launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs, (6) MIRVed ASBMs, (7) heavy ICBMs, and (8) cruise missiles. It also includes certain provisions facilitating verification.

ICBM launchers.—Paragraph 1 of Article II defines ICBM launchers as land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers. This definition is patterned on the definition of such launchers in the 1972 Interim Agreement,[2] but is more explicit. The term "ICBM launchers" is used in the Treaty to refer only to fixed or mobile land-based launchers of ICBMs. The provision defines an ICBM launcher in terms of the range and basing of the missile it launches. Air-launched ballistic missiles are covered by paragraph 4 of Article II which defines ASBMs.

An Agreed Statement and two Common Understandings associated with paragraph 1 contain rules for counting launchers, by types, in the aggregate limitations set forth in Article III of the Treaty as follows:

—All launchers of a particular type shall be considered ICBM launchers if any launcher of that type has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM (First Agreed Statement). This provision establishes the launcher type rule for ICBM launchers. The word "tested" is a broad term which refers to any kind of test of a launcher for use with ICBMs, not only a flight test of an ICBM from the launcher.

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[2] Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3462, TIAS 7504.

—Any launcher that contains or launches an ICBM shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs and, therefore, shall be considered an ICBM launcher (First Common Understanding). This is a rule to facilitate application of the First Agreed Statement. However, as the language indicates, the "contains or launches" criterion is not exclusive. Other evidence, for example, the presence of certain ground support equipment, could be used to establish that a launcher has been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

—If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except ICBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the aggregate Treaty limitations (Second Common Understanding). ICBM test and training launchers are dealt with in Article VII.

Under the Third Common Understanding, the United States' 177 former Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers, which are no longer operational and are partially dismantled, will not be subject to the Treaty limitations. A total of more than 220 older Soviet ICBM launchers, i.e., all the SS–6, SS–7 and SS–8 launchers, have been dismantled under the Interim Agreement or otherwise removed from the Soviet operational force, and therefore are not among the Soviet systems which are subject to the Treaty limitations.

To emphasize that launchers of mobile ICBMs are permitted after the expiration of the Protocol,[3] the Second Agreed Statement states that mobile ICBM launchers, which are included in the definition of ICBM launchers in paragraph I of Article II, are subject to the limitations of the Treaty applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties subsequently agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after the Protocol expires on December 31, 1981. The term "mobile ICBM launcher" includes the various basing concepts the United States has been considering, including those, such as the "multiple protective structure" (MPS) system, in which missiles with their launchers are moved among shelters which might themselves be hardened. The basis for classifying the MPS system as mobile is that essentially all the equipment required to launch the missile, as well as the missile itself, are moved together periodically from one shelter to another—with the shelter providing a protected launch location. Of course, any mobile ICBM basing system would have to permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed, in order to be fully consistent with the verification provisions of SALT II.

The following existing operational launcher types would be treated as ICBM launchers under this Article: for the United States, Titan II and Minuteman II and III; for the Soviet Union, SS–9, SS–11, SS–13, SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19. (As indicated below, the production, testing, and deployment of the Soviet SS–16 missile will be prohibited.)

SLBM launchers.—Paragraph 2 of Article II defines SLBM launchers as launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, nuclear-powered or non-nuclear-powered.

The Agreed Statement associated with this paragraph defines modern SLBMs for the United States as ballistic missiles installed in all

[3] While the Protocol is in force, the Parties are prohibited from deploying mobile ICBM launchers or flight-testing ICBMs from such launchers.

nuclear-powered submarines; for the Soviet Union, as ballistic missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines which have been made operational since 1965, (This currently includes the SS–N–6, SS–N–8, SS–NX–17, and SS–N–18, which have all been installed in such submarines); and for both Parties, as all SLBMs first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine regardless of its type (this is intended to include any future SLBM whether installed on a nuclear or a non-nuclear powered submarine).

The effect of this paragraph and its Agreed Statement, as under the Interim Agreement, is to include all present and future United States SLBMs, and all present and future Soviet SLBMs except for a small number of launchers of older missiles on existing Soviet diesel-powered submarines.

EXISTING SLBM LAUNCHERS TO BE COUNTED UNDER SALT II

Party	Launcher (by missile deployed)	Submarine(s) on which deployed (by class)
United States	Polaris A–3	Polaris.
	Poseidon C–3	Poseidon.
	Trident C–4	Poseidon.
U.S.S.R.	SS–N–5	H–II.
	SS–N–6	Y–I, G–IV.
	SS–NX–17	Y–II.
	SS–N–8	D–I, D–II, G–III.
	SS–N–18	D–III.

All Soviet launchers of the SS–N–4 SLBM, and most launchers of the SS–N–5, both of which missiles were flight-tested prior to 1965, are deployed on diesel type submarines (G–I and G–II class), and hence are not counted under SALT II.

Heavy bombers.—Paragraph 3 of Article II establishes which airplanes are counted as heavy bombers. It lists current types of heavy bombers to be counted, provides that the mission capabilities of these current airplanes will be used as the basis for identifying future types of heavy bombers, and sets certain other conditions which cause airplanes to be considered as heavy bombers.

Subparagraph (a) lists the current types of heavy bombers for each Party. For the United States, these are bombers of the B–52 and B–1 types. (Four B–1 test airplanes have been produced and will be included in the aggregate.) For the Soviet Union, current types of heavy bombers are the Tupolev–95 (or "Bear") bomber and the Myasishchev (or "Bison") bomber. Pursuant to subparagraph (b), heavy bombers in the future will include all types of bombers that can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to those current heavy bombers listed in subparagraph (a). The Third Agreed Statement associated with this paragraph provides that the criteria to be utilized in making determinations as to which future types of bombers are similar or superior to current heavy bombers will be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 3 provides that all types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers are considered to be heavy bombers.[4] The term "bomber" as used

[4] Elsewhere in this document the term "long-range", as applied to cruise missiles, will be used to refer to such missiles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

in the Treaty is defined in the First Agreed Statement associated with this paragraph (discussed below). Subparagraph (d) provides that all types of bombers equipped for ASBMs are considered to be heavy bombers. However, under paragraph 5 of Article III, heavy bombers equipped *only* for ASBMs are not counted toward the Treaty's aggregate limits, because the ASBMs themselves are counted. (Also, airplanes do not become subject to Treaty limitations pursuant to this provision merely because they are used to transport ballistic missiles.)

The First Agreed Statement associated with paragraph 3 of Article II defines "bombers" as those types of airplanes initially constructed to be equipped for bombs or missiles. Pursuant to this definition, any type of airplane, including one based on an airframe originally designed for other purposes (e.g., one of wide-bodies design), that is initially constructed for cruise missiles will be considered to be a cruise missile carrier and, therefore, considered to be a heavy bomber. The same would be true for an airplane constructed to carry ASBMs. (Article VIII deals with the conversion of aircraft other than bombers to heavy bombers—including cruise missile or ASBM carriers—and with aircraft for flight-testing cruise missiles or ASBMs.)

The Second Agreed Statement to this paragraph provides that the Parties will notify each other in the Standing Consultative Commission of types of bombers to be included as heavy bombers pursuant to paragraph 3. They will also hold consultations on these matters, as appropriate, in the Standing Consultative Commission. However, neither side will be able to veto the construction and use by the other side of particular kinds of airplanes as cruise missile or ASBM carriers.

The Third Agreed Statement sets forth, as an aid to verification, the basic rule for determining which airplanes among those having the same basic airframe will not be considered subject to various Treaty limitations—the rule regarding functionally related observable differences (FRODs). Functionally related observable differences are defined in the First Common Understanding to paragraph 3, which states that FRODs are differences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not they can perform the relevant mission. The Common Understanding also provides that the existence of FRODs must be verifiable by national technical means and, as appropriate, the Parties may take cooperative measures which contribute to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means.

The Fourth Agreed Statement provides in subparagraph (a) that airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type (i.e., airplanes with the same basic airframe as a heavy bomber) will not be considered to be heavy bombers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber. For example, in the case of bombers, the presence or absence of bomb-bay doors could be a FROD, and it is on this basis that the Bear reconnaissance variant (which has no bomb-bay doors) is excluded from the aggregate. In the case of cruise missile carriers, the presence or absence of a specialized door through which ALCMs are released could be an example of a FROD.

Subparagraph (b) of the Fourth Agreed Statement establishes a FROD rule for cruise missile carriers. If a cruise missile carrier should be developed on the basis of a wide-bodied transport airframe, for example, there would need to be FRODs to distinguish other aircraft with that airframe from cruise missile carriers. Likewise, if any Backfire or FB–111 bombers were to be equipped for long-range cruise missiles, all airplanes with the same basic airframe would be included under the 2400/2250 aggregate limitation and the 1,320 sublimit, unless there were FRODs indicating that some of these aircraft should not be counted because they could not function as cruise missile carriers. Subparagraph (c) sets forth the same FROD rule for ASBM carriers.

The Fourth Agreed Statement also provides, however, that airplanes of current heavy bomber types (i.e., B–52, B–1, Tu–95, Myasishchev) which are not equipped for long-range cruise missiles may be distinguished from those that are so equipped on the basis of externally observable differences; FRODs, i.e., a functional relationship between the observable differences and the ability or inability to carry ALCMs, would not be necessary. (The same rule is set forth for airplanes of current heavy bomber types used as ASBM carriers.) Thus, B–52s which are not converted to cruise missile carriers will not be subject to the Article V limitations if they are observably different from the B–52s that are equipped for long-range cruise missiles. These observable differences must be externally observable design features. In this connection, it is the United States' intention that the operational B–52Gs to be equipped with long-range ALCMs will also be fitted with "strakelets" (aerodynamic fairings located where the front of the wing meets the fuselage) which will distinguish them from other B–52Gs. FRODs are required only for future types of heavy bombers, because the Parties did not judge it practical to apply this concept to existing heavy bombers.

The Fifth Agreed Statement deals with the Tupolev-142 airplane. This airplane is configured for anti-submarine warfare, but has the same basic airframe (Bear) as the Tu–95 heavy bomber. The Tu–142s have bomb bay doors and bomb bays, and therefore cannot be excluded from being considered bombers on the basis of FRODs. However, the U.S. has long regarded these airplanes as dedicated to anti-submarine, not heavy bomber missions, and there are observable features of these aircraft which distinguish them from Tupolev–95 heavy bombers: the dimensions of their fuselage, their chassis gondolas (landing gear housings), and their radome are all observably different. In exchange for a corresponding exemption from the FROD rule for B–52s equipped for long-range ALCMs (which exemption was subsequently broadened to include all current heavy bombers), the United States agreed that Tu–142s in their current anti-submarine warfare configuration may be excluded from the aggregate on the basis of observable differences. The reference in this provision to "current configuration" is not intended to preclude improvement of these airplanes as an anti-submarine system, but would prohibit their being modified to carry out a heavy bomber mission if they are to remain excluded from the aggregate. Also, this exemption from the FROD rule for TU–142s does not prejudice or set a precedent for the application of the FROD rule to future types of airplanes.

The Second Common Understanding requires, within six months after entry into force of the Treaty, that FRODs be given to all thirty-one Myasishchev (Bison) tanker airplanes which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber. The United States insisted on this requirement because the Myasishchev heavy bombers and Myasishchev tankers are indistinguishable by national technical means. The United States was concerned that Myasishchev tankers could be rapidly converted for use as heavy bombers.

Finally, the Third Common Understanding associated with this paragraph correlates United States and Soviet terminology for heavy bombers. It states that the Soviet Tupolev-95 and the Myasishchev heavy bombers are known, respectively, as Bears and Bisons to the United States and that B-52 and B-1 bombers are known by the same designators to both Parties.

ASBMs.—Paragraph 4 of Article II defines ASBMs as air-to-surface ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings. ASBMs (not ASBM launchers) are included in the overall aggregate limitations of the Treaty. The actual counting of these missiles is done on an airplane-by-airplane basis, as explained in the discussion of Article III. Neither Party has any ASBMs at the present time.

Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs.—Paragraph 5 of Article II defines launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) as launchers of the types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs. As a result, all such launchers are included in the appropriate aggregate sublimits regardless of the missiles they actually contain.

This paragraph, along with the First Agreed Statement and First Common Understanding, establishes the MIRV launcher type rule, which is of great significance for MIRV verification. These provisions set forth a type rule for MIRV launchers similar to that in paragraph 1 of Article II for ICBM launchers.

—If any launcher of a given type has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of MIRVed missiles (First Agreed Statement). This is the MIRV launcher type rule.

—If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs (First Common Understanding). However, as the language indicates, the "contains or launches" criterion is not exclusive and other evidence, such as the presence of certain kinds of ground support equipment, could be used to establish that the launcher has been developed and tested for launching MIRVed ICBMs.

—As in the case of paragraph 1 of Article II, if a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type, except for test and training launchers (see the discussion of Article VII), shall be included in the appropriate sublimits specified in Article V (Second Common Understanding).

All ICBM launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Soviet Union will count in the Article V sublimits, i.e., as MIRVed ICBM launchers, pursuant to the Fourth Common Understanding. Thus, all 180 launchers at the Soviet ICBM complexes at those two areas will be regarded as launchers of MIRVed ICBMs, even though at this time most of the 180 launchers are judged by the United States to contain the non-MIRVed SS–11 ICBM. (We expect that all these 180 launchers will eventually contain MIRVed ICBMs.) This understanding is an illustration of the launcher type rule: the launchers which contain MIRVed ICBMs are not externally distinguishable from those which contain missiles with single reentry vehicles, and the United States cannot be sure that all 180 are not capable of launching MIRVed missiles. Therefore, all of them must be counted as MIRV launchers.

The Fifth Common Understanding associated with paragraph 5 of Article II addresses the question of ICBM and SLBM launcher distinguishability in the future. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of MIRVed missiles must be distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs. Likewise, any such launchers which are converted or constructed, or undergo such changes, which are launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of MIRVed missiles. Additionally, submarines with launchers of MIRVed SLBMs must themselves be distinguishable from submarines with launchers of non-MIRVed SLBMs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the submarines. Programs underway as of the date of signature of the Treaty (such as the Minuteman silo hardness upgrade program) are expressly exempted from this requirement. There are no such Soviet programs which would be so exempted. The purpose of this provision is to ensure there will be no problems of launcher distinguishability, such as at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, in the future.

The Soviets raised a question with regard to distinguishing between non-MIRVed Minuteman II and MIRVed Minuteman III ICBM launchers. This question was resolved on the basis of the following statement, which was made by the United States at the Vienna Summit:

> "The United States has 450 Minuteman II launchers and 550 Minuteman III launchers operationally deployed; there are no Minuteman III missiles in Minuteman II launchers; Minuteman II launchers are not capable of launching Minuteman III missiles, and if we convert Minuteman II launchers to give them a capability for launching Minuteman III missiles, they would have to have externally observable design features which would distinguish them from Minuteman II launchers.

The Second Agreed Statement associated with this paragraph sets forth the equally important missile type rule. The Parties agree that ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independent targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles

which are not independently targetable (so-called MRVs). As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMs are: for the United States, Minuteman III ICBMs, and Poseidon C–3 and Trident C–4 SLBMs; and for the Soviet Union, RS–16 (SS–17), RS–18 (SS–19) and RS–20 (SS–18) ICBMs and RSM–50 (SS–N–18) SLBMs. The "RS" and "RSM" designators are the Soviet designators corresponding to the United States designators shown in parentheses.

The Third Common Understanding associated with the paragraph correlates the designations used by the United States and the Soviet Union for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs as indicated above. This Common Understanding also contains descriptive material for each missile and identifies the Soviet SS–19 as the heaviest of the light ICBMs in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight and the Soviet SS–18 as the heaviest of the heavy ICBMs in terms of launch-weight and threw-weight. Also, the Parties agree to update the list of deployed MIRVed ballistic missiles in the Standing Consultative Commission.

The Third Agreed Statement associated with paragraph 5 (which is repeated as the Second Agreed Statement associated with paragraph 6) defines independently targetable reentry vehicles, setting forth the distinction between missiles equipped with MIRVs and missiles equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable (MRVs). It provides that reentry vehicles are independently targetable if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of: (1) devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism (post-boost vehicle or "bus") or on the reentry vehicles (e.g., maneuvering reentry vehicles, or MaRVs) and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers, in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems; or (2) other devices which may be developed in the future. The key feature of this definition is the reference to "unrelated trajectories." In the case of MRVs, the trajectories are in a constrained pattern, thereby precluding the flexibility in targeting which gives MIRVs their effectiveness against multiple targets.

MIRVed ASBMs.—Paragraph 6 of Article II defines ASBMs equipped with MIRVs as ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs. The missile type rule for such air-to-surface ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVs is set forth in the First Agreed Statement to this paragraph. This Statement provides that ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles regardless of whether they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. This provision is the counterpart for ASBMs of the MIRVed missile type rule for ICBMs and SLBMs contained in the Second Agreed Statement to Paragraph 5.

Heavy ICBMs.—Paragraph 7 of Article II contains the definition of heavy ICBMs. This definition in effect sets the upper limit on the launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, because it defines heavy ICBMs as those ICBMs having a launch-weight or throw-

weight greater than that of the heaviest of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of the Treaty. By establishing a clear demarcation between light and heavy missiles, this definition is central to the effectiveness of the following provisions of the Treaty: (a) the freeze on the numbers of fixed launchers of modern heavy ICBMs (paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article IV); (b) the obligation that the one permitted new type of ICBM be a light ICBM (paragraph 9 of Article IV); and (c) the ban on mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs, on heavy SLBMs and their launchers, and on heavy ASBMs (Article IX).

As indicated in the Third Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of Article II, the Soviet SS–19 is the heaviest of the deployed light ICBMs in terms of both launch-weight and throw-weight. Therefore, the upper limits on launch-weight and throw-weight for all light ICBMs are those of the Soviet SS–19 ICBM.

On August 16, 1977, in a plenary statement, the United States informed the Soviet Union that "* * * for planning purposes, with respect to ICBMs it might develop, test or deploy in the future, the United States considers the launch-weight limit on light ICBMs to be 90,000 kilograms and the throw-weight limit to be 3,600 kilograms." These figures are based on our estimates for the SS–19. The Soviet Union did not respond to this statement. The United States will regard these figures as the limits for the one new type of light ICBM permitted to the United States under Paragraph 9 of Article IV.

The Agreed Statements associated with paragraph 7 define launch-weight and throw-weight.

—The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch (First Agreed Statement). It does not include the weight of any supporting equipment, such as a separate launch-assist device which might be used to eject the missile from the launcher.

—The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: (a) its reentry vehicle or vehicles; (b) any post-boost vehicles or any other devices for targeting, releasing, or dispensing reentry vehicles; and (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release (Second Agreed Statement).

As associated Common Understanding provides that the term "other appropriate devices", which is used in the definition of throw-weight of an ICBM, means: (1) any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and (2) any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle that cannot provide their reentry vehicle(s) with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second. The purpose of this understanding is twofold. The first part ensures that *any* devices for *dispensing and targeting* (a MIRV function; see below) two or more reentry vehicles are included in throw-weight. Thus, for example, if a final boost stage itself carried out that function, it would be included in throw-weight. The second part deals with the case of a device which may release two or more *MRVs* or target a *single reentry vehicle*. It serves to distinguish between a post-boost vehicle and the final boost stage of a missile, since the latter device might provide some guidance to reentry vehicles on a non-MIRVed missile. If the device cannot provide additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second to a reentry ve-

hicle, it is considered comparable to a post-boost vehicle and included in throw-weight. If it can so provide, it is considered to be a final boost stage and is not included in throw-weight.

These Agreed Statements and Common Understanding are repeated in association with paragraph 7 of Article IV, which imposes the upper limit on heavy ICBM launch-weight and throw-weight.

The terms "targeting", "releasing", and "dispensing and targeting have particular meanings in the context of the definition of throw-weight. These are made clear in the negotiating record associated with the definition of throw-weight, which contains additional explanations for the purpose of ensuring that the technical terms used are mutually understood. On October 29, 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union Delegations made identical statements in a plenary session as follows:

> "The [United States] [Soviet] Delegation understands that, with respect to the Agreed Statement defining the throw-weight of an ICBM and to the associated Common Understanding, the term 'targeting' applies to one reentry vehicle: the term 'releasing' applies to multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable; and the term 'dispensing and targeting' applies to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. 'Other appropriate devices * * * for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles' perform the same function as 'self-contained dispensing mechanisms' and are included in the throw-weight of an ICBM irrespective of the additional velocity which they can provide the reentry vehicles."

The relationship between the terminology used in defining throw-weight and terminology used in the United States is as follows:

—"Other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle" include what are called "post-boost vehicles" in the United States. The velocity criterion in the Common Understanding serves to separate such devices from final boost stages.

—"Other appropriate devices . . . for releasing two or more reentry vehicles" can be devices of various complexity, including what are called "post-boost vehicles" in the United States. The velocity criterion in the Common Understanding serves to separate such devices from final boost stages.

—"Other appropriate devices for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles" perform the same function as self-contained dispensing mechanisms, which are also called "buses" or "post-boost vehicles" in the United States.

Cruise missiles.—Paragraph 8 of Article II defines cruise missiles for purposes of the Treaty. Cruise missiles are defined as unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles (for nuclear or non-nuclear weapons) which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path, and which are either (1) flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft (air-launched cruise missiles), or (2) for use in underwater launchers of certain types referred to in Article IX. The definition of cruise missiles in the Treaty does not apply to ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles. Limitations on these latter systems are contained only in the Protocol, and ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles are defined separately therein.

There are a number of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings associated with the Treaty paragraph defining cruise missiles.

There is a type rule for distinguishing between cruise missiles and unarmed pilotless guided vehicles which also sustain flight through aerodynamic lift. If an unmanned aerodynamic vehicle has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type will be considered weapon-delivery vehicles, i.e., cruise missiles (Third Agreed Statement). Cruise missiles must be distinguished from unarmed pilotless guided vehicles on the basis of differences in externally observable design features. (Third Common Understanding). These differences could be in the basic engineering design of the vehicle or they could be observable differences in certain dimensions. The differences need not be functionally related.

In addition, neither Party will convert unarmed pilotless guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor will either Party make the reverse conversion (Fourth Common Understanding).

The Parties have also stated that they have no plans during the period of the Treaty to flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. However, such flight-testing and deployment is not prohibited. In the event such plans change in the future, the Parties will notify each other prior to flight-testing or deploying such vehicles. This statement of current planning and the obligation to provide such notification does not apply to target drones (Fifth Common Understanding).

There is a definition of cruise missile range capability. The range capability of a cruise missile is defined as the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact (Second Agreed Statement). The key features of this definition are as follows:

—Standard design mode. This missile is assumed to fly its design operational profile (speed and altitude).

—Fuel exhaustion. The total store of fuel is assumed to be burned. No fuel reserve is held back.

—Projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere. The distance measured would be that measured by the odometer of an automobile driven beneath the missile on a smooth model of the earth.

During the negotiations, the United States advised the Soviet Union that an appropriate approach for calculating the maximum range which a cruise missile can cover in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, in those cases where the cruise missile flying a standard profile has not exhausted its fuel, is to assume that the remaining fuel will be used by continuing to fly at the same altitude and speed at which the cruise missile was flying in the last segment of its flight. The Soviets responded that the definition of cruise missile range had already been agreed, that no additional clarifications were needed, and that any specific questions arising in the future could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

A second cruise missile type rule distinguishes between cruise missiles that are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and those that are not; if any cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600

kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers (First Agreed Statement). Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers must be distinquishable on the basis of externally observable design features from those of greater range capability (Second Common Understanding).

If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a distance in excess of 600 kilometers, regardless of the flight profile, it will be considered to be capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers (First Common Understanding).

Article III—Overall Aggregate Limitations

Article III sets forth the initial overall aggregate limitation established by the Treaty (which will require initial Soviet reductions), as well as the aggregate limitation to become effective subsequently (which will require additional Soviet reductions). Current operational deployments by the United States are below the specified levels, and we will only be required to dismantle or destroy approximately thirty strategic systems (probably to be chosen from among mothballed B–52 heavy bombers which have already been heavily cannibalized for parts).

Paragraph 1 of Article III requires each Party, upon entry into force of the Treaty, to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400.

Paragraph 2 provides that from January 1, 1981, the aggregate limit on strategic offensive arms will be reduced to 2,250 and that reductions will be initiated for arms which, as of that date, would be in excess of this aggregate number. Article XI requires that these additional reductions be completed by December 31, 1981.

Paragraph 3 of Article III establishes the principle of freedom to mix types of strategic systems within the overall aggregate limitations. This paragraph provides that, within the aggregate limits set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 and subject to any other applicable Treaty provisions, each Party has the right to determine the composition of its strategic forces, that is, the number of its ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers and ASBMs.

Paragraph 4 of Article III sets forth the method for counting ASBMs on a bomber. It provides that the aggregate numbers set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall include for each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs the maximum number of ASBMs for which any bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

Paragraph 5 of Article III provides that if a heavy bomber is equipped *only* for ASBMs, that bomber shall not itself be included in the aggregate limitations. In that case only the ASBMs for which it is equipped will count in the aggregate. Should a heavy bomber equipped for ASBMs also be equipped for bombs, for example, then both the bomber and the ASBMs would be included in the aggregate.

Paragraph 6 of Article III provides that reductions necessary to reach the limitations set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III shall be carried out as provided in Article XI of the Treaty.

Article IV—Special ICBM and Related Limitations

This Article establishes several restrictions on ICBM launcher construction and modification as well as other qualitative limitations on

ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs, ASBMs, and ALCMs. Several of its ICBM provisions re-establish obligations contained in the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement, some refine obligations in that Agreement, and others create new restrictions.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV obligates the Parties not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. Thus, the freeze on new construction of fixed ICBM launchers, establishd in the Interim Agreement, is continued in the Treaty, as agreed at Vladivostok.

Paragraph 2 of this Article obligates the Parties not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers. This obligation makes it clear that the freeze on fixed ICBM launcher construction applies to all such construction, not only to construction which would add to the deployed totals.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV restates the obligation, also contained in the Interim Agreement, not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of modern heavy ICBMs (e.g., Soviet SS–9 and SS–18).[5] (The older types of ICBMs referred to in this paragraph are Titan II for the United States and SS–7 and SS–8 for the Soviet Union. All of the launchers for the SS–7 and SS–8 have now been dismantled, for the most part to be replaced by new Soviet SLBM launchers, under the Interim Agreement.)

Paragraph 4 of Article IV is based on the limitation on increases in silo dimensions contained in the Interim Agreement. This paragraph provides that in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher shall not be increased by more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit, each Party has the right to determine whether to make such an increase through an increase in the original internal diameter or in the original internal depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.

The Agreed Statement associated with this paragraph explains that the word "original" refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher became operational, whichever was later.

An associated Common Understanding provides that the diameter or depth of a launcher may not be increased by an amount greater than that which would result in a thirty-two percent internal volume increase if the other dimension were not changed. The effect of this understanding is to place an upper limit on permitted increases in diameter (fifteen percent) or depth (thirty-two percent) in cases where the other dimension is reduced in the course of modernization and replacement. (A fifteen percent increase in diameter alone would result in a thirty-two percent increase in volume.)

Paragraph 5(c) of this Article prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of systems for rapid reload of ICMB launchers. As reinforcing commitments, the Parties undertake in subparagraphs 5(a) and (b), respectively, not to supply ICBM deployment areas with ICBMs in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements, and not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of "normal de-

[5] The definition of heavy ICBMs is contained in paragraph 7 of Article II, discussed above.

ployment requirements" at launch sites. The associated Agreed Statement defines "normal deployment requirements" as the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher.

Paragraph 6 of Article IV requires the Parties not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms (ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers and ASBMs) in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule. The associated Common Understanding declares that a normal construction schedule is one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

The purpose of this provision is to prohibit a Party from constructing large numbers of strategic offensive arms (e.g., SLBM launchers) to a stage short of the final stage of construction, as defined in Article VI, thereby avoiding having them counted in the aggregate limitations. Such a practice could afford that Party a "breakout" potential.

Paragraph 7 sets the upper limits for launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs. The Parties undertake not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of the Treaty. The Third Common Understanding associated with paragraph 5 of Article II states that the Soviet SS–18 is the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs. Thus, paragraph 7 of Article IV prevents the Soviet Union during the period of the Treaty from developing, testing or deploying an ICBM with a launch-weight or throw-weight greater than that of the SS–18. The First and Second Agreed Statements associated with Paragraph 7 of Article II, which define launch-weight and throw-weight, apply also to this provision, as does the Common Understanding to paragraph 7 of Article II.

The eighth paragraph of Article IV prohibits conversion of land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers of ICBMs, and testing them for this purpose. Thus, the conversion of an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) launcher into an ICBM launcher would violate the Treaty. (Note that a "dual-capable" launcher, e.g., a launcher which could, without conversion, launch either an IRBM or an ICBM, would be handled differently. Such a launcher would in fact *be* an ICBM launcher; therefore, it and all launchers of its type would be counted as ICBM launchers, pursuant to the launcher definition and type rule in paragraph 1 of Article II.)

In the associated Common Understanding the Soviet Union undertakes, for the period of the Treaty, not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS–16 type, and not to produce the unique components of the missile, that is, its third stage, its reentry vehicle, or its appropriate device (post-boost vehicle) for targeting the missile's single reentry vehicle. This obligation is important because of the apparent commonality of the first two stages of that missile and the booster of the SS–20 missile, which is a two-stage IRBM deployed on a land-mobile launcher. This apparent commonality was a cause for U.S. concern that the SS–20 launcher could launch SS–16 ICBMs with little or no change, and thus not only raise verification questions but also give the Sovet Union a mobile ICBM "break-out" potential.

In paragraph 9, each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy "new types" of ICBMs with the exception of one new type of ICBM

for each Party, which must be a "light" ICBM. ICBMs of a type which have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, are not considered to be of a new type. The one exception to the prohibition on new types of ICBMs may be either MIRVed or non-MIRVed.

This provision will permit the United States to flight-test and deploy the one new type of ICBM that we currently have under development, the MX. The Soviet Union will also be limited to only one new type of light ICBM. They must choose, for example, between: (1) replacing the multiple reentry vehicle (RV) SS–17 (4–RVs) and SS–19 (6–RVs) with a 10–RV light ICBM; and (2) replacing their SS–11 with a single-warhead light ICBM that differs substantially from the SS–11. They cannot do both.

The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings to paragraph 9 define a new type and at the same time limit the degree of permitted changes to existing types of ICBMs. An ICBM of a new type is defined to be an ICBM which is different from all ICBMs flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 with respect to: the number of stages of the missile; *or* the type of propellant (liquid or solid) of any of its stages; *or* differences of more than 5 percent (plus or minus) in the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, *or* the throw-weight of the missile (First Agreed Statement and First Common Understanding).

The five percent limit on reductions in launch-weight and throw-weight may be exceeded if the additional reduction in excess of five percent is due solely to reducing the number of reentry vehicles or penetration aids or both. (This allows a Party, for example, to extend the range of an ICBM by decreasing the number of its reentry vehicles.) In cases where the quantity of propellant carried by the missile is reduced, these five percent reduction limits may also be exceeded, provided that the number of reentry vehicles or penetration aids or both is also reduced and that the entire reduction in throw-weight and launch-weight is due solely to reducing the quantity of propellant and the number of reentry vehicles or penetration aids or both (Third Common Understanding). (For example, in this latter case the weight of the missile structure could *not* be reduced.)

With respect to the one new type of light ICBM permitted to a Party, each ICBM of that type must have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (liquid or solid) of each stage as the first ICBM of that type launched by that Party. The baseline values of the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight are established as of the twenty-fifth launch or final launch before deployment, whichever occurs earlier. The values of these parameters may not differ in subsequent tests by more than five percent from the baseline values (Second Agreed Statement and Second Common Understanding). Here, too, the five percent limit on reductions in launch-weight and throw-weight may be exceeded for the purpose of reducing the number of reentry vehicles or penetration aids, and, additionally, propellant (Fourth Common Understanding).

As a further constraint on the flight-testing of the one permitted new type of ICBM, the values of the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight of the missile may not differ by more than ten percent during the last twelve launches before the twenty-fifth launch or the final launch before deployment, whichever occurs earlier (Second Common Understanding). This inhibits a Party from

actually testing more than one new type of ICBM under the guise of a test program for a single new type. Significant inconsistencies between the values demonstrated in these last twelve launches and the previous launches of the missile could be a subject for discussion in the Standing Consultative Commission.

The Second Agreed Statement further provides that a Party which launches an ICBM of the one permitted new type shall promptly notify the other Party: (1) of the date of the first launch; and (2) of the date of either the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment, whichever occurs earlier. This requirement will increase confidence in verification of compliance with the new-type limitations.

In paragraph 10 of Article IV, the Parties agree not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM of an existing type with more reentry vehicles than the maximum number that had been flight-tested on that type of ICBM (MIRVed or non-MIRVed) as of May 1, 1979.

The First Agreed Statement associated with this paragraph (and with paragraph 12, which deals with SLBM fractionation) records the agreement on the maximum number of reentry vehicles that have been flight-tested on existing types of MIRVed ICBMs: seven for the Minuteman–III, four for the SS–17, six for the SS–19, and ten for the SS–18—and MIRVed SLBMs: fourteen for the Poseidon C–3, seven for the Trident C–4,[6] and seven for the SS–N–18.

Although Minuteman III has previously been flight-tested with up to seven reentry vehicles, it has never been deployed with more than three. The United States has agreed that, consistent with its plans during the term of the Treaty, it will not flight-test or deploy Minuteman III with more than three reentry vehicles (Common Understanding).

The Second Agreed Statement makes clear what is considered and counted as a flight-test of a reentry vehicle, whether from ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs. After May 1, 1979, a flight-test of a reentry vehicle includes procedures for the actual or the simulated releasing or dispensing of reentry vehicles. Such procedures mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing reentry vehicles whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed.

The United States stated its understanding that such missile maneuvers include changes in orientation as well as changes in position and velocity and that in the event a question arises concerning procedures for targeting and releasing reentry vehicles which do not involve such changes, this could be a subject for discussion in the Standing Consultative Commission. The Soviet Union did not respond.

The purpose of the Second Agreed Statement is to prevent a Party from evading the fractionation restrictions through simulations. However, the Parties may test procedures for releasing antimissile defense penetration aids during the flight-test of a missile without such a test being considered as a flight-test of a reentry vehicle, provided that the procedures for releasing them are different from the procedures for releasing or dispensing reentry vehicles.

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[6] The figure of seven reentry vehicles for the Trident C–4 is based on the maximum number of reentry vehicles actually released during flight-tests of the missile as of May 1, 1979. If simulated releases of reentry vehicles had been counted as flight-tests of reentry vehicles, as is the case for simulations occurring after May 1, 1979, the figure for the C–4 would have been eight, which is the largest number of reentry vehicles for which the missile is designed and with which will be deployed.

In addition, each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy: (a) a multiple-reentry vehicle ICBM (MIRVed or non-MIRVed) of an existing type, with a reentry vehicle that is lighter than the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on that type of ICBM as of May 1, 1979; (b) a single-reentry vehicle ICBM of an existing type that does not have an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle (e.g., a post-boost vehicle), with a reentry vehicle that is lighter than the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an existing type of MIRVed ICBM by that Party as of May 1, 1979; and (c) a single-reentry vehicle ICBM of an existing type that has such an appropriate device, with a reentry vehicle that weighs than fifty percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM (Third Agreed Statement). These provisions are intended to inhibit a Party from quickly deploying, at a later date, more reentry vehicles than the number to which existing types of ICBMs are limited by paragraph 10 of Article IV.

In paragraph 11, the Parties undertake not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one permitted new type with more than ten reentry vehicles, which is the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979. Further, a Party may not flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type with more reentry vehicles than the maximum number flight-tested on this type as of the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier (First Agreed Statement). The provision related to paragraph 10 for simulated release of reentry vehicles on flight-tests after May 1, 1979, is carried over and repeated (Second Agreed Statement).

There is no lower limit on the weight of individual reentry vehicles on the permitted new type of ICBM. (As noted above, there are such limits for existing types of ICBMs.). However, a concern could arise were a side to flight-test a reentry vehicle on the permitted new type of ICBM for which the total weight of ten such reentry vehicles was a relatively small fraction, e.g., forty percent, of the missile's throw-weight. Such a practice would raise serious questions as to whether the missile were really designed to be one for which the payload would not exceed 10 reentry vehicles. In light of such a possibility we stated to the Soviets that, if such a problem arose in the future, it would be an issue for discussion and resolution in the Standing Consultative Commission. The Soviets made no response.

In paragraph 12, the Parties undertake not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with more than fourteen reentry vehicles, which is the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979. This limit applies to all SLBMs, both existing and future. As noted earlier, the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 10 of Article IV specifies the number of reentry vehicles with which MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types have been flight-tested, and that Statement is repeated for paragraph 12 (First Agreed Statement). The provision for simulated release of reentry vehicles on flight-tests after May 1, 1979, is again repeated (Second Agreed Statement).

In paragraph 13, the Parties undertake not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with more than ten reentry vehicles, which is the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979. The simulation provision for re-

entry vehicle tests after May 1, 1979, again applies (Agreed Statement).

Paragraph 14 of Article IV establishes an undertaking by the Parties not to deploy on heavy bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles at any one time a number of such cruise missiles in excess of an average of twenty-eight per bomber so equipped. This sets no limit on the number of ALCMs that can be placed on a given bomber, so long as the average over the whole force of bombers equipped for ALCMs does not exceed twenty-eight. The First Agreed Statement provides that for the purposes of this limitation there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy bomber of a given type, the maximum number of long-range cruise missiles for which any bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. This Agreed Statement is similar to the language of paragraph 4 of Article III, which establishes an ASBM carrier counting rule.

In the Second Agreed Statement, the Parties state that they will not equip any heavy bomber of existing types (B–52 and B–1 bombers for the United States and Tupolev–95 and Myasishchev bombers for the Soviet Union) for more than 20 long-range cruise missiles. This would not affect current U.S. plans for deployment of long-range cruise missiles on B–52s. During the Vienna summit, the two Parties made parallel statements to the effect that neither has plans to deploy during the period of the Treaty new types of aircraft equipped with more than twenty long-range cruise missiles. However, such deployment is not prohibited under the provisions of the Treaty.

Article V—MIRV Limitations

This Article sets a sublimit on MIRVed systems and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles under the overall aggregate limitations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III.

Paragraph 1 of Article V provides that within the overall aggregate numbers, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320.

Paragraph 2 provides that within the aggregate number set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article (1320), each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200. Thus, of the 1320 aggregate, only 1200 can be used for MIRVed systems. The remaining 120 can be used only for heavy bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles. A Party may, however, have more than 120 such bombers, if it has correspondingly fewer MIRVed systems, thereby complying with the 1320 aggregate.

Paragraph 3 provides that, within the aggregate number set forth in paragraph 2 of this Article (1200), each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 820. As noted in the discussion of paragraph 5 of Article II, all of the Soviet ICBM launchers at the deployment areas near Derazhnya and Pervomaysk are included in the 820 limit.

Paragraph 4 establishes the method for counting MIRVed ASBMs under the 1320 and 1200 aggregates. It provides that the aggregate numbers set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall include for each bomber

of a type equipped for MIRVed ASBMs the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. The method is analogous to that established in Article III for counting ASBMs under the overall aggregate limitation. An associated type rule provides that if a bomber is equipped for MIRVed ASBMs, all bombers of that type will be considered to be bombers equipped for MIRVed ASBMs (Agreed Statement).

Finally, paragraph 5 provides that within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Article and subject to the other provisions of the Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates, thereby adopting the same principle of freedom to mix for MIRVed systems as for strategic offensive arms generally.

Article VI—Rules for Inclusion of Arms in the Aggregates

Paragraph 1 of this Article is patterned on paragraph 2 of Article II of the ABM Treaty.[7] It provides that the Treaty limitations apply to all strategic offensive arms which are: (a) operational; (b) in the final stage of construction; (c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed; and (d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion. Its purpose is to ensure that strategic offensive arms begin to count in the aggregate limitations when they enter the final state of construction, and that they continue to be included regardless of changes in status until removed under agreed procedures. For example, under subparagraph (d), an ICBM launcher remains subject to the aggregate limitations even while undergoing modernization or conversion, and a heavy bomber remains subject to such limitations, even if placed in storage or mothballed (such as certain United States B–52s).

Paragraph 2 defines the term "final stage of construction". For SLBM launchers, this stage begins when the submarine on which such launchers are deployed begins sea trials (the same criterion as used under the Interim Agreement). ASBMs enter the final stage of construction after a bomber equipped for such missiles has been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where its final assembly or conversion for the purpose of equipping it for such missiles has been performed. Other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembed in a shop, plant, or other facility, are likewise in the final stage of construction after they come out of the shop, plant, or other facility where their final assembly has been performed. This provision will apply to heavy bombers and to mobile ICBM launchers.

Paragraph 3 provides rules as to when existing ICBM and SLBM non-MIRV launchers which are converted to MIRV launchers become subject to the limits of Article V. ICBM launchers undergoing conversion for MIRVs become subject to Article V when work on their conversion reaches the stage which first definitely indicates that they are being so converted, *i.e.*, when work has advanced to a stage that permits verification by national technical means that conversion, as opposed to other work such as silo hardening, is taking place. SLBM launchers which are being converted to accept MIRVed SLBMs become subject to Article V when the submarine on which such launchers are deployed first goes to sea after conversion has been performed.

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[7] Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow, May 26, 1972. 23 UST 3435, TIAS 7503.

An associated Agreed Statement states that procedures for determining when mobile launchers of non-MIRVed ICBMs being converted to launchers of MIRVed ICBMs become subject to Article V will be developed in the Standing Consultative Commission (pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article), unless the Parties agree that such launchers shall not be deployed after expiration of the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 provides that ASBMs on a bomber which is being converted from one equipped for non-MIRVed ASBMs to one equipped for MIRVed ASBMs become subject to the MIRV limitation of Article V when such a bomber is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where the conversion of the bomber has been performed.

Paragraph 5 provides for the inclusion under the 1,320 limitation contained in paragraph 1 of Article V of types of bombers being converted to a bomber of a type equipped for long-range cruise missiles. A heavy bomber so converted becomes subject to such limitation when it is first brought out of the conversion facility. Likewise, airplanes other than heavy bombers become subject to both the Article III and Article V aggregate limitations when they are first brought out of the facility where they have been equipped for long-range cruise missiles.

Paragraph 6 contains the rule as to when strategic offensive arms will cease to count under the Treaty limitations. It provides that the arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty shall remain subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. The last phrase covers cases in which a strategic delivery vehicle is lost by an accident such as a submarine sinking or a bomber crash. In addition, the association Agreed Statement makes clear that procedures for arms ceasing to be subject to the Treaty limitations shall incude procedures for removal from the limits of Article V if such launchers should be converted from launchers of MIRVed missiles to launchers of non-MIRVed missiles. Also to be included are procedures for converting bombers to remove them from the overall aggregate limitation of Article III as well as the Article V limitation as appropriate. The Common Understanding to paragraph 6 provides that procedures to be developed for removal of converted bombers from the aggregate limitations must be based on the existence of functionally related observable differences.

Paragraph 7 states that, in accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of Article VI.

Article VII—Test and Training Launchers

Paragraph 1 of Article VII provides that the aggregate numerical limitations of Article III of the Treaty (as well as the sublimits set forth in Article V) do not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are defined as ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing and training. Thus, operational launchers cannot be removed from the aggregate limitations by virtue of their being used also as test and training launchers. No exemption exists for heavy bombers used for purposes of

testing or training except for the special provision for cruise missile and ASBM test aircraft associated with Article VIII. The Common Understanding associated with this paragraph states that the term "testing" as used in Article VII includes research and development activities.

In paragraph 2 of Article VII the Parties agree on certain specific limitations on ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers which are not otherwise limited by the Treaty. These limitations resemble limitations in the SALT I Interim Agreement, although they are made more precise in this Treaty. Paragraph 2 prohibits any significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs.

The First Agreed Statement defines "significant increase" as an increase of 15 percent or more. In a meeting between the Chiefs of Delegations on May 5, 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the number of test and training launchers in existence on the date of entry into force of the Treaty would be the base for counting increases in the numbers of test and training launchers. The First Agreed Statement also provides that any new ICBM test and training launchers which replace launchers at test ranges must be located at test ranges. As a result, except for the permitted increase (up to 15 percent), a Party could not locate new test and training launchers at an operational complex.

Paragraph 2 further provides, as did the Interim Agreement, that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training. The Second Agreed Statement specifies the locations of current ICBM test ranges: for the United States, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida; and for the Soviet Union, in the areas of Tyura-Tam and Plesetskaya. The Statement also obligates the Parties to give notification in the Standing Consultative Commission of the location of any additional test range used to flight-test ICBMs.

The First Common Understanding states that other arms may also be tested at ICBM test ranges.

The Second Common Understanding deals with the disposition of eighteen Soviet launchers located at the Tyura-Tam test range, which the Soviet Union stated were test and training launchers associated with fractional orbital missiles, but which the United States assessed to be part of the operational SS–9 missile force. Twelve of these launchers will be dismantled or destroyed within eight months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Dismantling or destruction must begin upon entry into force of the Treaty and follow procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. These twelve launchers, unlike test and training launchers which are dealt with elsewhere in Article VII, may not be replaced. The remaining six launchers may be converted to launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization and will be included in the base from which the permitted increase will be measured. After entry into force of the Treaty, the missiles they now contain will be removed and destroyed pursuant to Articles IX and XI, and may not be replaced by other missiles unless the launchers are converted. Prior to such conversion, any activities associated with the launchers must be limited to normal maintenance requirements for launchers in which missiles are not

deployed. The six launchers will be subject to the provisions of Article VII and, if converted, must be distinguishable as launchers of MIRVed missiles or launchers of non-MIRVed missiles on the basis of externally observable design features, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty.

Finally, paragraph 2 includes a prohibition on conversion of test and training launchers or of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations in Article III (and Article V).

Article VIII—Limitations on Aircraft Other than Heavy Bombers [8]

Under paragraph 1 of this article, the Parties undertake not to flight-test long-range cruise missiles or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers, or convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

The associated Agreed Statement excepts up to sixteen test airplanes from the Article III aggregate limitation (and the 1,320 sublimit), so long as these airplanes are used only for test purposes. These test airplanes must be distinguishable by functionally related observable differences (FRODs) from airplanes otherwise of the same type that are not equipped for long-range ALCMs or ASBMs (with the exception noted below). These airplanes may either be initially constructed or converted for this purpose, notwithstanding the conversion ban of paragraph 1 of Article VIII. Airplanes which would be considered to be heavy bombers even if not equipped for long-range ALCMs or for ASBMs may not be included among those sixteen test airplanes.

The exception to the FROD requirement noted above is limited to airplanes other than heavy bombers which were used for testing long-range cruise missiles prior to March 7, 1979. These airplanes will not be used for such testing after six months after entry into force of the Treaty unless they are made distinguishable from other airplanes with the same basic airframe on the basis of FRODs. The United States proposed this exception to cover two existing U.S. A–6 bombers which were in use as cruise missile test airplanes and which are not distinguishable from other A–6s.

The First Common Understanding makes clear that the term "testing" includes research and development. The Second Common Understanding provides for notification in the Standing Consultative Commission of exempted test airplanes. The Third Common Understanding provides that none of the sixteen test airplanes may be replaced except in the case of its dismantling or destruction. The Standing Consultative Commission will develop procedures to cover this situation as well as to provide for conversion of such airplanes from the ALCM or ASBM test function.

A principle effect of paragraph 1 of this Article is to prohibit the conversion of previously constructed airplanes, other than bombers, e.g., existing transport airplanes, for use as operational cruise missile carriers or ASBM carriers, with the exceptions mentioned above. Existing bombers which are not heavy bombers, such as the Backfire or the FB–111, may be converted to cruise missile or ASBM carriers. However, if they are so converted, they will be included as heavy

[8] Note that the Treaty makes a distinction between the term "airplane" (a vehicle which sustains flight by use of fixed or variable-geometry wings) and the term "aircraft" (which also includes vehicles such as helicopters and dirigibles).

bombers in the Article III aggregate limitations and in the 1320 Article V limitation. Furthermore, all other bombers with the same basic airframe would also be included, unless than have FRODs indicating they could not be used as long-range cruise missiles or ASBM carriers.

Paragraph 2 of the Article prohibits the conversion of aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar to or superior to that of current types of heavy bombers, i.e., the B–52, B–1, Tupolev–95, and Myasishchev types.

Article IX—Special Prohibitions on Weapon Systems

This Article prohibits or restricts certain types of weapon systems.

Subparagraph 1(a) prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, and of launchers of such missiles. This provision prohibits the development of a long-range ballistic missile system for surface ships. The United States has no plans for such a system. An associated Common Understanding declares that this prohibition does not affect current practices for transporting ballistic missiles, such as would be used in supplying missiles to operating bases.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article IX prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the seabed or on the beds of internal waters, or mobile launchers of such missiles which move only in contact with the beds of such waters, as well as missiles for such launchers. The effect of this provision is: (a) to extend the prohibitions of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty [9] to the entire territorial waters and internal waters of the Parties; and (b) to extend its obligations to include development and testing in addition to deployment. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty essentially prohibits Parties from emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons, on the seabed and the ocean floor (or its subsoil) beyond a 12-mile coastal "seabed zone" measured from the baseline of the territorial sea. An associated Agreed Statement makes clear that the obligation contained in this subparagraph applies, *inter alia*, to all areas covered by the Seabed Arms Control Treaty.

The prohibition on mobile launchers which can move only in contact with the seabed does not include launchers on submarines, as submarines need not be in contact with the seabed in order to move.

Subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX prohibits the development, testing and deployment of systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. This subparagraph expands the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty,[10] in that the Outer Space Treaty prohibits

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[9] The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, signed at Washington, London and Moscow February 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS 7337. The United States and Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty.

[10] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London and Moscow January 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347. The United States and Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty.

only the actual placement in space of weapons of mass destruction, and does not cover fractional orbital missiles.

An associated Common Understanding states that the prohibition on fractional orbital missiles does not require dismantling or destruction of existing launchers of either Party. However, under the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 2 of Article VII the Soviets have agreed to dismantle or destroy twelve SS–9 launchers at the Tyura-Tam test range which have been used to test a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) several times in the past. Moreover, any fractional orbital missiles in existence must be dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the obligation of paragraph 4 of Article XI, and such missiles cannot be developed in the future.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs. This obligation complements what is in effect a ban on additional fixed launchers of modern heavy ICBMs contained in Article IV. Heavy ICBMs are defined in paragraph 7 of Article II.

Subparagraphs (e) and (f) prohibit heavy SLBMs and their launchers and heavy ASBMs. These subparagraphs in effect define heavy SLBMs and heavy ASBMs in language parallel to that for the definition of heavy ICBMs in paragraph 7 of Article II. A heavy SLBM or ASBM is one with a launch-weight or throw-weight heavier than that of the Soviet SS–19 ICBM. The First and Second Agreed Statements defining launch-weight and throw-weight and the Common Understanding concerning "other appropriate devices" for SLBMs and ASBMs also parallel those under paragraph 7 of Article II. The mutual understanding of the Parties on the terminology related to the definition of throw-weight set forth in the plenary statements by both Parties on October 29, 1976 (stated above), applies here as well.

The second paragraph of this Article prohibits the flight-testing and deployment on heavy bombers of long-range cruise missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads. An Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 defines "independently targetable" warheads of cruise missiles. This definition is similar to that of MIRVs, which are defined under paragraph 5 of Article II. This definition does not include cruise missiles equipped with "cluster warheads"; nor does it include a recoverable, single-warhead cruise missile which can attack independent targets on separate flights.

Article X—Modernization and Replacement

This Article, like Article IV of the Interim Agreement, provides explicitly that the Parties may modernize and replace strategic offensive arms, subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Examples of Treaty provisions that restrict this right include: the prohibition on the conversion of launchers of light and older heavy ICBMs to launchers of modern heavy ICBMs; the establishment of an upper limit on the launch-weight and throw-weight of light and heavy ICBMs: the prohibitions on mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs, heavy SLBMs and their launchers, and heavy ASBMs; the ban on ICBM rapid-reload systems; the limitations on the flight-testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs; the fractionation limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs; and the various aggregate limits and sublimits.

Article XI—Dismantling and Destruction of Excess and Prohibited Arms

Paragraph 1 of this Article provides that strategic offensive arms in excess of the numbers specified in the Treaty, as well as those which are prohibited by the Treaty, shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. This paragraph is similar to Article VIII of the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph 2 provides that the dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the 2,400 ceiling specified in paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall be completed within four months for ICBM launchers, six months for SLBM launchers, and three months for heavy bombers. The time periods specified for ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are derived from procedures agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission pursuant to the Interim Agreement. The concept of dismantling or destroying excess systems includes the possibility of converting excess systems to a non-limited status. For example, the Soviets have stated their intention of converting their Myasishchev (Bison) heavy bombers into tankers or for other purposes. In so doing, they would be given features indicating that they cannot be used as heavy bombers.

Paragraph 3 provides that dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the 2,250 ceiling provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III shall be initiated by January 1, 1981 and completed no later than December 31, 1981. Reductions pursuant to this paragraph shall be carried out throughout the prescribed period.

Paragraph 4 of this Article provides that dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms of types which are prohibited by the Treaty must be completed no later than six months after entry into force. As of the date of signature, the only strategic offensive arms of these types are the fractional orbital missiles of the Soviet Union, as noted above.

Article XII—Non-Circumvention

Article XII contains an undertaking by the Parties that they will not circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through a third state or states, or in any other manner. This provision simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. The provision does not impose any additional obligation, nor does it broaden the interpretation of the other obligations in the Treaty. It will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our Allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization.

Article XIII—Prohibition of Conflicting Obligations

Article XIII provides that, during the term of the Treaty, neither Party will assume any international obligations which would be in conflict with this Treaty. The Article refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future, and existing agreements are therefore not affected. The article is identical to Article X of the ABM Treaty.

Article XIV—Future Negotiations

In this Article the Parties undertake to begin the next phase of the SALT negotiations promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Such negotiations are described in this Article as negotiations on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. These negotiations are also the subject of the Joint Statement of Principles.

The Parties also state in this Article their intention to conclude a successor agreement to this Treaty well in advance of its expiration in 1985.

Article XV—Verification

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article are adopted verbatim from the first two paragraphs of Article XII of the ABM Treaty and Article V of the Interim Agreement. In the first paragraph, the Parties agree that, for providing assurance of compliance with the Treaty, they will utilize the national technical means of verification at their disposal in a manner consistent with accepted principles of international law.

National technical means include a broad range of systems for collecting intelligence. Such systems include, *inter alia*, photo-reconnaissance satellites, the ships and aircraft which are used to monitor Soviet missile tests, and ground stations, such as the large U.S. radar on Shemya Island in Alaska.

In the second paragraph, the Parties state their commitment not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. For example, this provision prohibits use of anti-satellite systems against satellites of the other Party that are used for Treaty verification.

The third paragraph of this Article prohibits deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the Treaty. This obligation does not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, and overhaul practices. This provision repeats paragraph 3 of Article XII of the ABM Treaty and Article V of the Interim Agreement. However, two Agreed Statements and two Common Understandings further elaborate its meaning and a third Common Understanding broadens its scope in one area.

Deliberate concealment measures are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification by national technical means (First Agreed Statement). The purpose of this understanding is to indicate that the concept of deliberate concealment measures includes means of impeding verification other than physical concealment—for example, measures such as camouflage, decoys, or encryption of telemetry (discussed below).

The prohibition on deliberate concealment measures does not preclude the testing of anti-missile defense penetration aids, even though penetration aids may have as their purpose the concealment or imitation of reentry vehicles (Second Agreed Statement).

The ban on deliberate concealment in paragraph 3 and the definition of deliberate concealment in the First Agreed Statement apply to all provisions of the Treaty, including provisions associated with testing (First Common Understanding). This Common Understanding further notes that the prohibition on deliberate concealment measures includes measures associated with testing. Thus testing practices, such as the encryption of telemetry, are covered. Also, the Common Understanding notes that the prohibition includes measures intended to conceal the association between ICBMs and their launchers during

testing. For example, this would prohibit the kinds of covered facilities employed at a Soviet test range several years ago which impeded our ability to associate the SS–16 ICBM with its launcher.

The question of deliberate denial of telemetric information is explicitly addressed. Although each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information, including its encryption, the deliberate denial of telemetric information by any means, such as by encryption, is prohibited whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty (Second Common Understanding). Because the *only* purpose of encryption is to conceal information from other than the intended recipient, any encryption of telemetry is a deliberate denial of telemetric information; therefore, any encryption of telemetry that impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty is prohibited.

In further discussions of the telemetry encryption issue at the Vienna summit the Soviets stated that there must be no encryption of information involving parameters covered by the Treaty, that there was an understanding between the Parties on this issue and that if any misunderstandings arose, they could be considered in the Standing Consultative Commission.

The use over ICBM silo launchers of shelters, such as environmental shelters, which impede verification by national technical means is prohibited (Third Common Understanding). This prohibition applies whether or not the use of such shelters is deliberately designed to impede verification. The language of this Common Understanding refers only to ICBM *silo* launchers, which are fixed launchers of ICBMs; thus it does not apply to mobile ICBM launchers.

Article XVI—Advance Notification of ICBM Launches

The first paragraph of Article XVI provides that before conducting each planned ICBM launch, each Party will notify the other well in advance that such a launch will occur. An exception is provided for single ICBM launches, whether from test ranges or launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond the launching Party's national territory. Thus, the Treaty requires advance notification of all planned multiple ICBM launches, and of all single ICBM launches that are planned to extend beyond the launching side's national territory.

This provision will require notification of all Soviet multiple ICBM launches (more than one missile in flight at once), from both test ranges and ICBM launcher deployment areas, as well as all Soviet ICBM launches which are planned to extend beyond Soviet national territory.

All United States ICBM launches are planned to extend beyond its national territory, so advance notice will be required of all United States ICBM launches. Since all U.S. ICBM launches extend over the high seas, the United States already gives notice of all its ICBM launches under the Incidents at Sea Agreement,[11] by means of a general notice to mariners.

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[11] Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed at Moscow, May 25, 1972, 23 UST 1168, TIAS 7379.

The Soviets also already give such a general notice of their extra-territorial ICBM launches under the Incidents at Sea Agreement. However, under paragraph 1 of Article XVI of the Treaty they will now be required to give notice to the United States of each such planned launch (as opposed to a general notice of possible launches during some period of time), and also of each intra-territorial launch for which two or more ICBMs are planned to be in flight at one time (for which no notice is now required).

The word "launch" as used in Article XVI does not cover so-called pop-up tests. (In a pop-up test, a missile is ejected from a silo by compressed air or some other device, but its fuel is either not ignited or only burns for a very short time.)

The First Common Understanding associated with this Article declares that the obligations of Article XVI include those ICBM launches for which advance notification is already required pursuant to the Accidents Measures Agreement [12] and the Incidents at Sea Agreement. In addition, the Parties also agree in this Understanding that nothing in Article XVI is intended to inhibit advance notification on a voluntary basis of ICBM launches not covered by the obligations of the Article in cases when, in the judgment of the conducting Party, notification would enhance confidence between the Parties. The Second Common Understanding defines a multiple launch as one which would result in two or more ICBMs of a Party being in flight at the same time. The Third Common Understanding provides that the ICBM test ranges referred to in this Article are those designated pursuant to the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of Article VII.

Paragraph 2 indicates that procedures will be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article XVII—Standing Consultative Commission

Article XVII is based in part on Article XIII of the ABM Treaty [13] and includes a number of provisions contained in that Article. This Article also includes significant new provisions, such as the provision for the maintenance of an agreed data base.

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII states that the Parties, in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty, shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established, pursuant to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, by a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding.[14]

Paragraph 2 sets forth the functions of the Standing Consultative Commission with respect to this Treaty, which are based in large part on Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. Subparagraph (a) authorizes the Commission to consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty and related situations which may

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[12] Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed at Washington September 30, 1971, 11 UST 1590, TIAS 7186.

[13] The Interim Agreement also stated that the Parties would use the Standing Consultative Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of that agreement.

[14] Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, signed at Geneva December 21, 1972, 24 Stat. 238, TIAS 7545.

be considered ambiguous. This provision establishes a broad authority for the Commission.

Subparagraph (b) states that each Party will provide on a voluntary basis such information as it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed.

Subparagraph (c) states the Commission's authority, as under the ABM Treaty, to consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and adds to this the authority to consider questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. The latter authority was added as a result of the Parties' discussions associated with the negotiation of paragraph 3 of Article XV and the meaning of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification. This additional provision specifically authorizes the Parties to consider questions such as unintentional concealment which results in the impeding of verification by national technical means.

Subparagraph (d) states the Commission's authority to consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty.

Subparagraph (e) provides that the Parties will agree on procedures for replacement, conversion and dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms as provided by the provisions of the Treaty (most notably Articles VI and XI), and also upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty (as specified in Article VI).

This subparagraph also requires notification at regular sessions of the Commission, in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, of actions completed and those in process. Such notifications shall occur at least two times a year. This carries over into the Treaty the concept of procedures and notification developed in the course of implement ing the Interim Agreement. It should be noted that under the Interim Agreement the Parties successfully negotiated in the Commission detailed procedures for dismantling, destruction, replacement, and notification for ICBM and SLBM launchers.

Subparagraph (f) states the Commission's authority to consider proposals to increase the viability of the Treaty, including proposals for amendment, as well as proposals for additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

In paragraph 3, the Parties agree that in the Commission they will maintain, by category, the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding of June 18, 1979 (discussed below). The Agreed Statement to this paragraph provides that, in order to maintain the agreed data base, the Parties agree to notify each other of and consider at each regular session of the Commission (at least twice yearly) any changes in the agreed numbers for each of the categories listed.

Article XVIII—Amendments

Article XVIII states that each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and that any amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the same procedures as those governing the entry into force of the Treaty.

Article XIX—Entry Into Force and Duration

Paragraph 1 of Article XIX provides that the Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. This Treaty is of limited duration and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 2 of this Article states that the Treaty shall be registered with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.[15]

Paragraph 3 of this Article contains the "supreme national interests" withdrawal clause which has been a standard provision in most modern arms control agreements. It provides for the right of a Party to withdraw from the Treaty if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Withdrawal under this provision requires a six-month advance notification.

THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It sets forth limitations of shorter duration on certain systems, which limitations will remain in force until December 31, 1981. The Protocol consists of a preamble and four Articles. The limitations in the Protocal will not serve as a precedent for any limitations which may be addressed in future negotiations.

Preamble

In the preamble, the Parties state that, having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty, they have agreed on additional limitations for the period of the Protocol.

Article I—Mobile ICBM Launchers

In this Article, the Parties undertake, for the period of the Protocol, not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs from such launchers. This Article will permit the development, construction and testing of mobile ICBM launchers, provided that the testing does not involve ICBM flight-testing from such launchers during the period of the Protocol. The MX missile will not be ready for flight-testing prior to the expiration of the Protocol, and this Article will therefore not affect the development of a mobile-based MX missile.

Article II—Sea-Launched and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles

In paragraph 1 of this Article the Parties, for the period of the Protocol, undertake not to deploy lang-range cruise missiles on sea-based launchers or land-based launchers. This Article does not limit the range capability of cruise missiles flight-tested from sea-based or land-based launchers or the range of such tests. (It should also be noted that there is no upper range limit, either in the Treaty or in the Protocol, on cruise missiles flight-tested from or deployed on heavy bombers).

After the expiration of the Protocol, no limits are provided for either flight-testing or deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles

[15] Article 102 of the U.N. Charter provides that every treaty and international agreement entered into by any U.N. Member shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

(SLCMs) or ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), since no such limits are contained in the Treaty.

This Article will not affect United States plans for testing or deploying ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, which will not be ready for deployment prior to expiration of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Article II of the Protocol prohibits the flight-testing of long-range cruise missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based or land-based launchers. An Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 defines "independently targetable" warheads. The definition is the same as that used in Article IX of the Treaty for independently targetable warheads of long-range cruise missiles on aircraft.

Paragraph 3 of Article II provides a definition of sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. For the purposes of the Protocol, cruise missiles are defined as unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), respectively. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings associated with this paragraph for SLCMs and GLCMs parallel those for ALCMs under paragraph 8 of Article II of the Treaty.

The purpose of carefully limiting the cruise missile definition and its associated provisions in the Treaty to those cruise missiles covered by the Treaty, and likewise limiting the definition in the Protocol, is to reinforce the concept that the definition of cruise missiles in the Protocol applicable to sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles expires with the Protocol. As the United States has made clear in the negotiating record, this definition sets no precedent for future limits, if any, on weapon systems covered by Article II of the Protocol.

Article III—ASBMs

Article III prohibits for the period of the Protocol the flight-testing and deployment of ASBMs.

Article IV—Entry Into Force and Duration

Article IV of the Protocol states that the Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty, and remain in force until December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS

The Joint Statement of Principles, also signed on June 18, 1979, sets forth the intent of the Parties concerning subsequent negotiations on strategic arms limitations. In Article XIV of the Treaty the Parties have agreed to begin these negotiations promptly after the entry into force of the Treaty. The Joint Statement consists of three preambular paragraphs and four sections.

Preamble

In the first paragraph, the Parties state that they have concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

In the second paragraph, the Parties reaffirm that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security.

In the third paragraph, the Parties state their belief that early agreement on the further limitation and reduction of strategic arms will serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

First Section

In the first section, the Parties state that they will continue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, and for further qualitative limitation of such arms. The Parties, in furtherance of existing agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, and in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war, will continue to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, negotiating limitations on those strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack.

Second Section

The second section addresses the question of verification of compliance with limitations to be agreed upon. It states that further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The United States stated to the Soviets that this section recognizes that future negotiations may involve more complicated qualitative limitations with a resultant need for additional cooperative measures which go beyond national technical means alone as a method of verification. The Soviets did not disagree. The section also states that the Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with Treaty obligations.

Third Section

The third section sets forth shared objectives of the Parties in these negotiations. The Parties state that they will pursue significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms, *e.g.*, reduction in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles significantly below the overall aggregate limitation provided for in Article III of the SALT II Treaty. They also state that they will negotiate on further qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing arms. In addition, the Parties state that they will seek resolution of the issues addressed in the Protocol in the context of implementing the other agreed joint principles.

Fourth Section

In the fourth section, the Parties declare that they will consider other steps to enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the aforementioned principles and objectives. They also state that they will consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. It is

stated that either Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms during the next phase of the SALT negotiations. This could include the limitation of strategic defenses, as well as the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

On June 18, 1979, Ambassadors Earle and Karpov (Chiefs of the United States and Soviet SALT Delegations) signed a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. On the same date they signed and exchanged Statements of Data updating the agreed numbers for each side as of the date of signature of the Treaty. These steps were taken in connection with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, under which the Parties are required to maintain an agreed data base consisting of the numbers of strategic offensive arms of each Party by specific categories.

The Memorandum of Understanding establishes such an agreed data base and states that the Parties have, for the purposes of the Treaty, agreed on the numbers of arms in each category for each Party as of November 1, 1978. The numbers are stated for each Party in the following categories:

Launchers of ICBMs
Fixed launchers of ICBMs
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs
Launcers of SLBMs
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs
Heavy bombers
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs
ASBMs
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs

The Memorandum further states that the Parties will update the agreed data, in the categories listed, at the time of entry into force of the Treaty.

In each of the two Statements of Data the Party in question declares that it possesses the stated numbers of strategic offensive arms in the categories listed above as of the date of signature of the Treaty.

The exchange of data accomplished by these documents (and the semi-annual update of data which will take place within the Standing Consultative Commission pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty) is an important step in ensuring that the Parties have the same interpretation of Treaty obligations, and in providing a base against which to assist verification.

BACKFIRE

At the Vienna Summit, President Brezhnev handed President Carter a written statement in which the Soviet Union informed the United States that it did not intend to give the Backfire bomber the capability of operating at intercontinental distances, and would not increase the production rate of this airplane over the current rate nor

increase the radius of action of the Backfire in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States.

President Brezhnev confirmed that the Backfire production rate would not exceed thirty per year.

President Carter affirmed that the United States has the right to an aircraft comparable to Backfire.

President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations under the Treaty.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties.

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,

Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security.

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Guided by the principle of equality and equal security,

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security.

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament,

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty.

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

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2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type.

3. Heavy bombers are considered to be:

(a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B–52 and B–1 types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev types;

(b) In the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above;

(c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and

(d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.

4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings.

5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

6. ASBMs equipped with MIRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs.

7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX.

Article III

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400.

2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250 and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number.

3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI.

Article IV

1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers.

3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.

5. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements;

(b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers;

(c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.

6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.

7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose.

9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.

10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date.

11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number

of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 28 and the number of such heavy bombers.

Article V

1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320.

2. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200.

3. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 820.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

Article VI

1. The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:

(a) operational;

(b) in the final stage of construction;

(c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.

2. Those arms in the final stage of construction are:

(a) SLBM launchers on submarines which have begun sea trials;

(b) ASBMs after a bomber of a type equipped for such missiles has been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where its final assembly or conversion for the purpose of equipping it for such missiles has been performed;

(c) other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembled in a shop, plant, or other facility after they have been brought out

of the shop, plant, or other facility where their final assembly has been performed.

3. ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation as follows:

(a) fixed ICBM launchers when work on their conversion reaches the stage which first definitely indicates that they are being so converted;

(b) SLBM launchers on a submarine when that submarine first goes to sea after their conversion has been performed.

4. ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are subject to that limitation shall become subject to that limitation when the bomber is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where such conversion has been performed.

5. A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V shall become subject to that limitation when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. A bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article III shall become subject to that limitation and to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon.

7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article VII

1. The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training.

2. The Parties agree that:

(a) there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(b) construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training;

(c) there shall be no conversion of ICBM test and training launchers or of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations provided for in Article III.

Article VIII

1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II.

Article IX

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;

(d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or launchers of such SLBMs; or

(f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft.

Article X

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

Article XI

1. Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

2. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph

1 of Article III shall begin on the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and shall be completed within the following periods from that date: four months for ICBM launchers; six months for SLBM launchers; and three months for heavy bombers.

3. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III shall be initiated no later than January 1, 1981, shall be carried out throughout the ensuing twelve-month period, and shall be completed no later than December 31, 1981.

4. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time, but not later than six months after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XII

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner.

Article XIII

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is also the objective of the Parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this Treaty upon its expiration.

Article XV

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion or overhaul practices.

Article XVI

1. Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other Party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory.

2. The Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article XVII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.

2. Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, the Parties will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling or destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this Treaty and upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of actions completed and those in process;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 1979.

Article XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XIX

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Jimmy Carter

PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Л. Брежнев

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty,

Having agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol remains in force, as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs for such launchers.

Article II

1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers.

3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, respectively.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

Done at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS



GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers," as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms provided for in Article III of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. The one hundred and seventy-seven former Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers of the United States of America, which are no longer operational and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date.

TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type.

TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers," as used in paragraph 3 of Article II and other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be equipped for bombs or missiles.

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty; in this connection the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty.

Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case determinations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties further agree that:

(a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber;

(b) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and

(c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs.

First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differences in the observable features of airplanes which

indicate whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable by national technical means. To this end, the Parties may take, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means.

Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev–142 airplanes in their current configuration, that is, in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of Tupolev–142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes.

Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry into force of the Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its thirty-one Myasishchev airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner:

Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B–52 and the B–1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations;

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Tupolev–95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bear type; and

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bison type.

TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been delivered and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the corresponding aggre-

gate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs and SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMs are: for the United States of America, Minuteman III ICBMs, Poseidon C–3 SLBMs, and Trident C–4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, RS–16, RS–18, RS–20 ICBMs and RSM–50 SLBMs.

Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped with MIRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs when first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped with MIRVs when first flight-tested.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs correspond in the following manner:

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman III and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Poseidon C–3 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C–4 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS–16 and known to the United States of America as the SS–17, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS–18 and known to the United States of America as the SS–19, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS–20 and known to the United States of America as the SS–18, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with

a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSM–50 and known to the United States of America as the SS–N–18, an SLBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

Third Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:

(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems;

(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty.

Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MIRVs on the basic of externally observable design features of the submarines.

This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or construction programs, or to programs including significant changes to the principal observable structural design features of launchers, underway as of the date of signature of the Treaty.

TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable.

Second Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable:

(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems;

(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

TO PARAGRAPH 8 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile

in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes operational, whichever is later.

Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the ICBM silo launcher by thirty-two percent solely through an increase in one of these dimensions.

TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements," as used in paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher.

TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

TO PARAGRAPH 8 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS–14 and known to the United States of America as the SS–16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the reentry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate device for targeting the reentry vehicle of that missile.

TO PARAGRAPH 9 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs," as used in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 in any one or more of the following respects:

(a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile;

(b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages.

First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of 5 percent.

Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type,

whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile.

A Party which launches ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall promptly notify the other Party of the date of the first launch and of the date of either the twenty-fifth of the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Common Understanding. As used in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of 5 percent from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier. The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last twelve of the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve launches before deployment begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than 10 percent from any other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those twelve launches.

Third Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the First Agreed Statement and the First Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant.

Fourth Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the Second Agreed Statement and the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than

the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of that type with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant.

TO PARAGRAPH 10 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

First Agreement Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type---------- Seven reentry vehicles
SLBMs of the Poseidon C–3 type---------- Fourteen reentry vehicles
SLBMS of the Trident C–4 type---------- Seven reentry vehicles

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ICBMs of the RS–16 type---------- Four reentry vehicles
ICBMs of the RS–18 type---------- Six reentry vehicles
ICBMs of the RS–20 type---------- Ten reentry vehicles
SLBMs of the RSM–50 type---------- Seven reentry vehicles

Common Understanding. Minuteman III ICBMs of the United States of America have been deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles. During the term of the Treaty, the United States of America has no plans to and will not flight-test or deploy missiles of this type with more than three reentry vehicles.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Pro-

cedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

Third Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with multiple reentry vehicles, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with reentry vehicles the weight of any of which is less than the weight of the lightest of those reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date;

(b) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and without an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle on an ICBM of a type equipped with MIRVs and flight-tested by that Party as of May 1, 1979; and

(c) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and with an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than fifty percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM.

TO PARAGRAPH 11 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraph 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

TO PARAGRAPH 12 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type.....Seven reentry vehicles
SLBMs of the Poseidon C–3 type.....Fourteen reentry vehicles
SLBMs of the Trident C–4 type.....Seven reentry vehicles

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ICBMs of the RS–16 type.....Four reentry vehicles
ICBMs of the RS–18 type.....Six reentry vehicles
ICBMs of the RS–20 type.....Ten reentry vehicles
SLBMs of the RSM–50 type.....Seven reentry vehicles

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

TO PARAGRAPH 13 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles.

TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. For the purposes of the limitation provided for in paragraph 14 of Article IV of the Treaty, there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers the maximum number of such missiles for which any bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

Second Agreed Statement. During the term of the Treaty no bomber of the B–52 or B–1 types of the United States of America and no bomber of the Tupolev-95 or Myasishchev types of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be equipped for more than twenty cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. If a bomber is equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, all bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. The procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of Article VI of the Treaty shall include procedures determining the manner in which mobile ICBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force.

TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. The procedures for removal of strategic offensive arms from the aggregate numbers provided for in the Treaty, which are referred to in paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty, and which are to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission, shall include:

(a) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Article V of the Treaty, of ICBM and SLBM launchers which are being converted from launchers of a type subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, into launchers of a type not subject to that limitation;

(b) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty, of bombers which are being converted from bombers of a type subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty or in Articles III and V of the Treaty into airplanes or bombers of a type not so subject.

Common Understanding. The procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) of the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty for removal of bombers from the aggregate numbers provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty shall be based upon the existence of functionally related observable differences which indicate whether or not they can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE VII OF THE TREATY

Common Understanding. The term "testing," as used in Article VII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE VII OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement. The term "significant increase," as used in subparagraph 2(a) of Article VII of the Treaty, means an increase of fifteen percent or more. Any new ICBM test and training launchers which replace ICBM test and training launchers at test ranges will be located only at test ranges.

Second Agreed Statement. Current test ranges where ICBMs are tested are located: for the United States of America, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the areas of Tyura-Tam and Plesetskaya. In the future, each Party shall provide notification in the Standing Consultative Commission of the location of any other test range used by that Party to test ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. At test ranges where ICBMs are tested, other arms, including those not limited by the Treaty, may also be tested.

Second Common Understanding. Of the eighteen launchers of fractional orbital missiles at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, twelve launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization.

Dismantling or destruction of the twelve launchers shall begin upon entry into force of the Treaty and shall be completed within eight months, under procedures for dismantling or destruction of these launchers to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. These twelve launchers shall not be replaced.

Conversion of the six launchers may be carried out after entry into force of the Treaty. After entry into force of the Treaty, fractional orbital missiles shall be removed and shall be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX and of Article XI of the Treaty and shall not be replaced by other missiles, except in the case of conversion of these six launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization. After removal of the fractional orbital missiles, and prior to such conversion, any activities associated with these launchers shall be limited to normal maintenance requirements for launchers in which missiles are not deployed. These six launchers shall be subject to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty and, if converted, to the provisions of the Fifth Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty.

TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. For purposes of testing only, each Party has the right, through initial construction or, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, by conversion, to equip for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs no more than sixteen airplanes, including airplanes which are prototypes of bombers equipped for such missiles. Each Party also has the right, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, to flight-test from such airplanes cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to flight-test ASBMs

from such airplanes as well, unless the Parties agree that they will not flight-test ASBMs after that date. The limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty shall not apply to such airplanes.

The aforementioned airplanes may include only:

(a) airplanes other than bombers which, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, have been converted into airplane equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs;

(b) airplanes considered to be heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(c) or 3(d) of Article II of the Treaty; and

(c) airplanes other than heavy bombers which, prior to March 7, 1979, were used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

The airplanes referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Agreed Statement shall be distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs.

The airplanes referred to in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement shall not be used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers after the expiration of a six-month period from the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless by the expiration of that period they are distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

First Common Understanding. The term "testing," as used in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

Second Common Understanding. The Parties shall notify each other in the Standing Consultative Commission of the number of airplanes, according to type, used for testing pursuant to the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. Such notification shall be provided at the first regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission held after an airplane has been used for such testing.

Third Common Understanding. None of the sixteen airplanes referred to in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty may be replaced, except in the event of the involuntary destruction of any such airplane or in the case of the dismantling or destruction of any such airplane. The procedures for such replacement and for removal of any such airplane from that number, in case of its conversion, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE IX OF THE TREATY

Common Understanding to subparagraph (a). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IX of the Treaty do not affect current practices for transporting ballistic missiles.

Agreed Statement to subparagraph (b).—The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX of the Treaty shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone

referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

Common Understanding to subparagraph (c).—The provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX of the Treaty do not require the dismantling or destruction of any existing launchers of either Party.

First Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f).—The launch-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f).—The throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the sum of the weight of:

(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles;

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding to subparagraphs (e) and (f).—The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM in the Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs 1(e) and 1(f) of Article IX of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE IX OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement.—Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XV OF THE TREATY

First Agreed Statement.—Deliberate concealment measures, as referred to in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement.—The obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures, provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, does not preclude the testing of anti-missile defense penetration aids.

First Common Understanding. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement thereto apply to all provisions of the Treaty, including provisions associated with testing. In this connection, the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

Second Common Understanding. Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. In addition to the obligations provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, no shelters which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be used over ICBM silo launchers.

TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE XVI OF THE TREATY

First Common Understanding. ICBM launches to which the obligations provided for in Article XVI of the Treaty apply, include, among others, those ICBM launches for which advance notification is required pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971, and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed May 25, 1972. Nothing in Article XVI of the Treaty is intended to inhibit advance notification, on a voluntary basis, of any ICBM launches not subject to its provisions, the advance notification of which would enhance confidence between the Parties.

Second Common Understanding. A multiple ICBM launch conducted by a Party, as distinct from single ICBM launches referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty, is a launch which would result in two or more of its ICBMs being in flight at the same time.

Third Common Understanding. The test ranges referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty are those covered by the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty.

TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE TREATY

Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and consider changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs; fixed launchers of ICBMs; launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs; launchers of SLBMs; launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs; heavy bombers; heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs; ASBMs; and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL

Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL

First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

Done at Vienna, on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Jimmy Carter

PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Л. Брежнев

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have considered data on numbers of strategic offensive arms and agree that as of November 1, 1978 there existed the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today.

	United States	U.S.S.R.
Launchers of ICBM's	1,054	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBM's	1,054	1,398
Launchers of ICBM's equipped with MIRV's	550	576
Launchers of SLBM's	656	950
Launchers of SLBM's equipped with MIRV's	496	128
Heavy bombers	574	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kms	0	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBM's	0	0
ASEM's	0	0
ASBM's equipped with MIRV's	0	0

At the time of entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will update the above agreed data in the categories listed in this Memorandum.

Done at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For The United States of America

CHIEF OF THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS

For The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHIEF OF THE
U.S.S.R. DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS

З А Я В Л Е Н И Е

о данных о количествах стратегических наступательных вооружений на день подписания Договора

Союз Советских Социалистических Республик заявляет, что на I8 июня I979 года у СССР имеются следующие количества стратегических наступательных вооружений, подпадающих под ограничения, предусмотренные Договором, который сегодня подписывается:

Пусковые установки МБР	I398
Стационарные пусковые установки МБР	I398
Пусковые установки МБР, оснащенных РГЧ индивидуального наведения	608
Пусковые установки БРПЛ	950
Пусковые установки БРПЛ, оснащенных РГЧ индивидуального наведения	I44
Тяжелые бомбардировщики	I56
Тяжелые бомбардировщики, оснащенные для крылатых ракет с дальностью свыше 600 километров	0
Тяжелые бомбардировщики, оснащенные только для БРВЗ	0
БРВЗ	0
БРВЗ, оснащенные РГЧ индивидуального наведения	0

I8 июня I979 года

Руководитель делегации СССР
на переговорах об ограничении
стратегических вооружений

[Translation from the Russian]

STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	608
Launchers of SLBMs	950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	144
Heavy bombers	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0
ASBMs	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0

JUNE 18, 1979.

/s/ V. KARPOV,
Chief of the U.S.S.R. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Translation certified by:
W. D. KRIMER,
Senior Language Officer, Division of Language Services,
U.S. Department of State.

William D. Krimer

(69)

[COPY]

STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The United States of America declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs	1,054
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,054
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	550
Launchers of SLBMs	656
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	496
Heavy bombers	573
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers	3
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0
ASBMs	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0

JUNE 18, 1979.

/s/ RALPH EARLE II,
Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

I certify that this is a true copy of the document signed by Ambassador Ralph Earle II entitled "Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty" and given to Ambassador V. Karpov on June 18, 1979 in Vienna, Austria.

Thomas Graham Jr.

General Counsel
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Have agreed as follows:

First. The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation.

In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack.

Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties.

Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives:

(1) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms;

(2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;

(3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein.

Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

VIENNA, *June 18, 1979.*

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Jimmy Carter

PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Л. Брежнев

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Soviet Backfire Statement

On June 16, 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written statement (original Russian text attached):

"The Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet 'Tu-22M' airplane, called 'Backfire' in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate."

President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year.

President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.



Советская сторона сообщает американской стороне, что советский самолет Ту-22М, именуемый в США "Бэкфайер", является средним бомбардировщиком и что она не намерена придавать ему возможности для действия на межконтинентальной дальности. В этой связи советская сторона заявляет, что она не будет увеличивать радиус действия этого самолета так, чтобы он был способен поражать объекты на территории США. Она не намерена придавать ему этой способности и каким-либо иным образом, в том числе с помощью дозаправки в воздухе. Одновременно советская сторона сообщает, что она не будет наращивать темпы производства этого самолета по сравнению с нынешними.

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The CHAIRMAN. History waits upon our considered judgment. SALT puts us face to face with our future. This treaty compels us to confront the fundamental issue of ultimate survival in the nuclear age. The answer we give will shape the lives we lead and the kind of world we pass on.

These hearings are meant to enable the committee to explore that issue as it is raised by this treaty, and we shall do so article by article, line by line. Moreover, these hearings are intended to inform and educate not only those of us in the U.S. Senate, but also the American people we represent.

The last several months have been an aggravating time for the American people. Inflation grinds ever more harshly on people's daily lives. The problem of energy is no longer abstract, not when you sit for hours in a gas line. Indeed, I suspect quite a number of Americans will be listening to these hearings as they inch forward in those interminable lines.

Some might ask, "What does SALT have to do with my life?" While SALT may seem distant from the immediate world of gas lines and high prices—and the treaty text itself extraordinarily complex—what the SALT process represents is no far off land ruled by nuclear theologians. The stakes in SALT are very real. The decisions of this committee may affect the way many billions of U.S. tax dollars will be spent. Even more important, what we decide about this treaty can have an overriding impact on the success or failure of the larger effort to stabilize Soviet-American relations, particularly in moments of crisis and confrontation. SALT II is not remote from our everyday lives, not when it would take a Russian missile only 11 minutes of flight time to reach Boston, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, or Seattle.

For the last 34 years, the United States and the Soviet Union, two entirely different societies—one an open nation of free people and the other a secretive, highly authoritarian country—have been engaged in a deadly competition leading to a huge accumulation of nuclear weapons on both sides.

What makes this competition so different is the awesome destructive power of these nuclear warheads. The United States alone produces three such weapons every 24 hours, each many times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The nuclear arsenals amassed by the two superpowers have the explosive power of over 600,000 Hiroshima bombs. Nuclear war would be an apocalypse, and it is this ever-present danger of incineration by accident or by madness that makes the work we do so vital.

We recognize the insanity of nuclear war, but that recognition delivers no easy answer to the question of how best to manage the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in order to minimize the danger. All of us would agree that American military strength must be maintained, but for more than two decades there has also been a recognition that we should match our military power with the resolve to reduce the risk and uncertainty concerning nuclear weapons through the process of negotiation and agreement.

The treaty before us today is one outcome of that resolve. It has been in negotiation for some 7 years, but that vintage alone is no recommendation. It is a testament not to the value of the treaty,

but only to the difficulties encountered in negotiating issues so elemental to the United States and the Soviet Union.

No one expects that this treaty by itself could resolve the many intractable problems between the United States and the Soviet Union, even in the one area of strategic arms. It is part of a process meant to regulate the competition, to put some limits on the development and buildup of nuclear arms, and to put some ceilings on their accumulation. But the treaty, if judged valuable by the Senate, can be a major step within that process, a key to further progress in the future.

In the course of these hearings many complex, technical matters will be investigated. We will delve deeply into them. We cannot afford to shrink from the abstruse points of advanced technology, but I suspect that in the end, our assessment of this treaty will not turn on technicalities. Rather, it will turn on a handful of overarching issues of security and survival that we can and must clarify for ourselves, for the Members of the Senate, and for the American people.

The Constitution has clearly mandated the Senate's role in this matter. We must review the treaty very carefully. We must listen attentively to the advocates and opponents, and we must question them with precision. We must search out each article in the treaty for ambiguity or inconsistency, and we must do this like judges, in a spirit of objectivity, guided by our basic concern to promote and protect American interests.

We may report this treaty to the Senate much as we received it, or we may add such understandings, clarifications, interpretations, or reservations as we believe necessary, or we may recommend rejection. Our responsibility is clear, and we will not be swayed from honest judgment by cajolery or attempted intimidation from either our own executive spokesmen or those of the Soviet Union who say that the treaty as delivered is sacrosanct.

Let us also keep in mind that the issue at hand is the SALT Treaty, not a referendum on general Soviet behavior. None of us in this room, I am sure, have any illusions about the Soviet Union. Its leaders will remain aggressive in the pursuit of Russian interests everywhere in the world. Still, the basic question is whether the treaty serves American interests. If we find that it does, we would spite ourselves to reject it.

While we seek to determine whether this treaty serves American interests, there are certain central questions that must be answered. First, is this treaty evenly balanced? We will be forced to make judgments about the comparability of very different weapons systems, from the alleged Soviet advantage in heavy missiles, to the wisdom of not counting certain Soviet bombers in the strategic totals.

Second, is the treaty verifiable? We must be able to detect any pattern of Soviet activities that would violate the treaty and do so with our own national means.

Third, does the treaty address the concerns of our allies, and promote continued cooperation with them?

Fourth, does the treaty safeguard the defense options and weapons programs that are essential to our future security? We will need to ask our military leaders if this treaty, with its limits and

constraints, improves their ability to safeguard our country or complicates it.

Fifth, is this treaty a step in the direction of more meaningful arms control in the years to come? If it falls short of solving all our problems, does it solve some, and point us toward the solution of others?

Sixth, what are the Soviet interests in this process, for their interests as much as our ability to verify will determine their compliance.

Seventh, what would be the consequences not only of approval, but also of rejection, whether outright or in the form of "killer" amendments? What would rejection do to the position of the United States in the world, to the renewal of an accelerated nuclear arms race, to international stability and to relations with our own allies? We cannot afford to have a debate that considers only half the balance sheet, the consequences of ratification without considering the other half, the cost of rejection.

In planning these hearings, I have been reminded again that there is no real rivalry between arms control and adequate defense. Arms control is an integral part of our security policy. It is a way to control threats to our well-being. We can build weapons systems to counter Soviet weapons systems, or we can work out agreements with the Russians so that they do not deploy those weapons in the first place.

The problem is to find the right balance between arms control and armaments. I trust that these hearings will help bring that balance into clearer focus. I also hope that these hearings will do one other thing. There are great divisions and uncertainties in our country about America's role in the world today. In a free society such as ours, debate and open discussion are essential, yet without some consensus debate and discussion can give way to paralysis. We are seeing that happening on energy policy. It can also afflict our foreign policy.

Perhaps through these hearings on the most critical of all considerations, survival, we can help ourselves to better understand America's place in an age in which the unfettered accumulation and proliferation of nuclear weapons can lead only to oblivion.

Senator Javits, the ranking minority leader, will make an opening statement, after which we will proceed to our witnesses.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, all of us,—Senators, witnesses, staff, press, and public—are highly conscious of the historic significance of this occasion. It is my judgment that the committee and each of its members will do his part, and the committee will do its part to assure that the hearings serve the Senate and our Nation well, and that they stand up favorably under the scrutiny that they are certain to receive from our colleagues in the Senate and, I might add, in the House—although they are not directly involved, they certainly are charged with a heavy responsibility—by the people, by the press, and by history.

I say at the outset that we may not be deterred in our judgment by the fear of failure or by the threats of the Soviet leaders about the consequences of amendment or reservation or even rejection, or even our own administration's injunctions to the same effect, but

in all of these matters we must have a decent regard for these eventualities and take them into our consideration.

For my own part, I wish to state that I have an open mind on this treaty, but I hope that I can be for it, that I can be pursuaded that this is the way to go. I am open to such persuasion because the control and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons is an objective I have long and actively supported. I do not know of a Senator who opposes nuclear arms control, and as a veteran of World War II myself, and a public official deeply involved in foreign policy for over 32 years, I am acutely conscious of the vital role in keeping the peace of the world that has been and must continue to be played by the military strength of the United States as the leader of a coalition of free nations in the dangerous world we share with aggressive totalitarian regimes. In the final analysis, the hopes for peace are the most sensitive to the balance of military strength between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The questions at stake in this treaty reach to the very core of our national existence and our role in the world. I have a deep sympathy for our negotiators, led by Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown, with Mr. Earle there on the ground in Geneva who are here to testify today. I am sure they have sought to acquit their heavy responsibilities with the same high sense of purpose, dedication and talent that we have learned to expect of them throughout their many years of distinguished public service.

I do not accept the suggestion implicit in some of the criticisms that I have heard of this treat, that it is the product of fools or knaves. I am anxious to hear the explanations of the negotiators concerning the treaty and their exposition of its merits, and I believe they will be equally fair, or will try to be, as to its shortcomings.

Personally, I will accord their views the highest degree of respect, for they have much to teach us all.

The fact remains, however, that serious men have raised serious questions about the treaty. While this is not a law case with its doctrine of the burden of proof, the President is the man who finalized the negotiations and signed the treaty. Therefore, it is for the spokesmen of the President in support of his request for the Senate's advice and consent to tell us why the treaty is in the best interests of the United States and of peace.

I might add, too, that I hope it is in the interests of the Soviet Union.

One of the geniuses of the American business community we have learned, is that for A to profit, B does not have to lose, and that there are many things in which both can profit, and I hope that is the case here. I hope very much that we can divert their energies from knocking down strawmen which they have themselves invented.

The crucial test for me will be the ability of the administration to answer the questions about the treaty which are raised by serious critics and which appear to me to be serious. Senator Church has admirably set forth seven of those key questions.

This treaty, like SALT I, is premised upon theories of strategy, deterrence, and balance, which go far beyond the treaty's terms, and which may have one meaning to the future of the security

status of the United States and quite a different meaning to that of the Soviet Union. This is not just a philosophical inquiry, for the actions to be taken by each side pursuant to and following this treaty will be governed by the conceptions which underly it.

The Soviet Union, we must realize, is in full career on a course of military preparation which is likely to make it too powerful for comfort relative to the United States, both in strategic and conventional capabilities, unless regulated by mutual agreement or by competition. The hopes for what SALT I could mean to the arms race have not been realized, so we must meet the challenge of this treaty in full recognition of what the Soviet Union has in mind, and we must do so in a manner which is true to ourselves and true to our allies.

Nor can we allow ourselves, through the process of military competition to be transformed into a mirror image of the totalitarian challenge that confronts us.

One last word, so critical to the American people. The implications of these issues may involve risks and force painful budgetary choices affecting many areas of our national life. They may also require new standards of national resolution and national discipline, but the failure to face up to the realities now could place in jeopardy the survival of freedom and of the democratic system that we enjoy and hold in sacred trust for our posterity.

So we sit not only as judges, I would say to our chairman, but also as trustees of the future of our own Nation and perhaps for the future of all mankind. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Javits.

Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I have an opening statement that I would like to submit for the record, so we will have more time for questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Percy.

[Senator Percy's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY

UNDERSTANDINGS TO SALT II TREATY

At the appropriate time during Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the SALT II Treaty, I am considering introducing two understandings to the treaty. They are designed to reassure our NATO allies that the Treaty will not work against their interests and to demonstrate to the Soviet Union the strength and vitality of our bonds to our European allies. I will not make a final decision on these two understandings until I have heard the administration's full testimony. Hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began this morning at 10 a.m. and will continue except during the August recess into September.

The first understanding would state that the Treaty Protocol which, among other things, limits the deployment of ground and sea launched cruise missiles above a 600 kilometer range cannot be extended without the advice and consent of the Senate. The second understanding would state that nothing in the Treaty prohibits the United States from continuing traditional patterns of allied defense cooperation, including the transfer of cruise missile technology if it deems such a transfer necessary.

On May 16, the defense ministers of NATO officially announced their support for SALT II. Concluding their semi-annual meeting, the NATO ministers stated in a communique that "equitable limitation of nuclear weapons capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States will improve the security of NATO."

European support for SALT makes sense. Limits on strategic competition can reduce tensions between the two superpowers and European security is greater in an atmosphere in which U.S./Soviet rivalry is constrained. Moreover, essential

equivalence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in strategic capability could lead to a greater awareness and political will to do something about the conventional imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. Money that does not have to be spent in an unlimited strategic arms race with the Soviet Union could be available for improving NATO's posture.

In consultation with the United States during the SALT talks, our allies consistently urged that the so-called forward based systems that the U.S. maintains in Europe—the FB-111's, the F-4's, F-16's, and various carrier-based aircraft—be exempt from SALT, and they are. Neither are the nuclear forces of our European allies constrained by SALT. On the other hand, two major Soviet weapons systems presenting a direct threat to Europe—the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber—remain outside SALT limits. These systems and the threat they pose cannot be ignored.

Our NATO allies support SALT II but we know that Protocol restraints on cruise missiles, the possible counter to the aggressive Soviet posture in Europe, did cause them concern. I have been concerned about range restrictions on cruise missiles since the cruise missile issue was brought up in negotiations several years ago. It occurred to me then and it still seems odd that we should be limiting a system that may prove to be very useful in allied defense. I believe that the option of the cruise missile should be open and real. It should not be foreclosed by SALT II.

My two understandings make it clear that the cruise missile option will remain open.

Senator Hart is also concerned about extension of the protocol. I am sure that he and I can work together on this issue and present the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with some mutually agreeable language. The principle should not be controversial. In April hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Taiwan treaty termination issue, I asked witnesses whether the President could act alone to extend the duration of a treaty. There was a consensus that the President did not have this power. In answer to a written question, the Department of Justice responded, "If the term expires, the treaty no longer remains in force and the President cannot extend the treaty as a treaty."

The second understanding clarifies the U.S. position on the transfer of cruise missile technology to our NATO allies. This language should allay our allies' concern that in SALT II we are restricting our traditional pattern of defense cooperation.

If these two understandings are accepted by the Senate, they will go a long way toward countering the precedential aspect of the range limits on cruise missiles agreed to in the Protocol and will clarify the U.S. position that these weapons are still a viable option for both U.S. and NATO defense.

HEARING PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say a word about the procedures the committee will follow in this hearing and in the subsequent hearings on the SALT II Treaty throughout the balance of the month. First of all, we will observe the 10-minute rule, and we have a signal system of which the Senators are fully aware, but I call it to the attention of the witnesses. The red light indicates that 10 minutes have passed. The amber light is a warning signal that the 10 minutes are about to pass. The green light shows that additional time is still available.

In order to expedite proceedings, members of the committee have generously agreed to refrain from opening statements in order that we can get on with the testimony and questions. In that connection, the committee has allotted 20 minutes to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense for their initial presentation. Subsequent witnesses will be asked to confine their presentations to 10 minutes in order that the committee may have adequate time for questions.

With that in mind Secretary Vance, let me welcome you to the committee. I am very pleased to have you as the leadoff witness on this momentous matter. We invite your testimony at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we proceed today with the second step in a fateful joint responsibility.

The President has completed a negotiation in the process launched by President Nixon with the first strategic arms limitation treaty—SALT I—and continued by President Ford at Vladivostok. The Senate is now called to perform its equally important function of advice and consent on the second strategic arms limitation treaty—SALT II.

President Carter has taken a further step along the path marked out by his predecessors. I am sure that the Senate will perform its high duties in a totally nonpartisan manner, for the course our country takes, through this ratification process, will have a profound effect on our Nation's security, now and for years to come.

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

I know we all understand what is at stake. And thus we share a common purpose in this undertaking, to do what we believe is best for the security of our country. As it has been throughout the negotiations, this remains a cooperative undertaking of the executive branch and the Senate. In the weeks ahead, we will do all we can to assist the Senate in addressing the treaty's relationship to the central issues of security and peace.

When the United States and the Soviet Union each have the capacity to destroy the other, regardless of who strikes first, national security takes on new dimensions. First and foremost, we must preserve a stable military balance with the Soviet Union. That is the surest guarantee of peace. Second, we must have the best possible knowledge of the military capabilities and programs of the Soviet Union. We must know the potential threats we face, so that we can deal with them effectively, and we cannot rely upon trust to verify the strategic arms control obligations are being fulfilled. We must be able to determine that for ourselves, through our own monitoring capabilities.

Third, we must sustain the process of placing increasingly more effective restraints on the growth of nuclear arsenals. Fourth and finally, we must take those actions that will strengthen our alliances and enhance our leadership in the world.

As I will describe today, the treaty that is before you serves each of these imperatives of our national security. Tomorrow I will focus more particularly on the treaty bearing on our broader international interests.

Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss in greater detail the strategic balance and the treaty's relationship to it. Secretary Brown and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Director Turner will focus on the relationship among SALT verification, monitoring, and our intelligence on Soviet strategic forces.

Arms Control Director Seignious and Ambassador Earle will concentrate on the impact of the treaty in the restraining of the nuclear arms competition.

Let me now turn to the treaty and how it serves the four national security imperatives that must guide us in a nuclear armed world.

MAINTAINING STABLE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES

First, the SALT II Treaty will greatly assist us in maintaining a stable balance of nuclear forces. It fully protects a strong American defense. Our national defense requires nuclear arms that are sufficiently numerous, powerful, and flexible to deter the full range of potential threats. As an essential part of this, our strategic forces must be—and must be seen as—equivalent to those of the Soviet Union.

The SALT II Treaty helps us maintain this balance in two fundamental ways. It will permit and in fact aid the necessary modernization of our strategic forces, and it will slow the momentum of strategic Soviet programs, thus reducing the threats we would otherwise face.

U.S. TRIAD MODERNIZATION

As members of the committee know, our strategic nuclear forces are securely diversified among three separate delivery systems—land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and long-range bombers. Each of the three serves a unique and vital role in our defense. This diversity is in contrast to the Soviets heavy reliance on increasingly vulnerable land-based missiles.

SALT II will permit the necessary modernization of each of these three forces.

This fall we will begin fitting our Poseidon submarines with the longer range Trident I missile. By the middle of 1981, the first of our new Trident submarines, the USS *Ohio*, will be deployed. Together, these new systems will assure that our submarine-based missiles will continue to be invulnerable. We are enhancing the effectiveness of our B–52 bombers with air-launched cruise missiles. This will enable our B–52's to overcome Soviet air defenses for the foreseeable future. We expect the first squadron of B–52's equipped with air-launched cruise missiles to be in operation by the end of 1982.

M–X MISSILE—PLANNING FUTURE FORCES

Because of our technological lead, this is an area which only the United States will be able to exploit fully during the term of the treaty. The President has decided to proceed with a new land-based missile, the so-called M–X, which will deliver more warheads with greater accuracy than our existing Minuteman missiles. The M–X will be mobile, so that it can survie a surprise attack. Each of the mobile systems that the President is considering would be verifiable by the Soviet Union's own monitoring capabilities.

With that standard met, the M–X is clearly permitted under SALT II as our one new land-based intercontinental missile. Indeed, SALT II allows us to move ahead with each of these necessary modernization programs.

The treaty will also assist us in planning our future forces. The M–X missile is a case in point. It is designed to deal with the growing vulnerability to a surprise attack on land-based missiles in fixed silos. Without some limit on the number of warheads that could be sent to attack it, an effective mobile system would be more difficult to deploy, for it would require many more launch sites and much greater cost.

SALT II makes the mobile M–X more survivable by limiting the number of warheads on Soviet land-based strategic missiles through 1985, and by providing the basis for negotiating such limits beyond that period under SALT III.

In this and other ways, the treaty contributes to more certain defense planning and thus provides a major benefit to us.

As Secretary Brown will develop in more detail, the treaty will permit the modernization of our strategic forces and aid our defense planning, and will also assist in maintaining a strategic balance through the mid-1980's by restraining Soviet growth.

TREND IN NUCLEAR STRENGTH ON BOTH SIDES

For more than 15 years, Soviet investments in nuclear arms have risen steadily. Today, the overall strength of the two sides is roughly equal. What concerns us is not the present balance, but the trend. SALT II limits the number of missile launchers and long-range bombers, and therefore constrains the future threats we will face.

LIMIT ON STRATEGIC LAUNCHERS, BOMBERS PERMITTED UNDER TREATY

Since the Soviets are well above the 2,250 limit on strategic missiles and bombers permitted each side under the treaty, they will have to destroy or dismantle over 250 of these systems, about 10 percent of their total. Undoubtedly, some of the older systems will be discarded, but with nuclear weapons, old should never be mistaken for frail. Most of these systems that would be given up have been built since 1965. Many have the same destructive power as our existing Minuteman II and Polaris missiles. Each could destroy an American city.

Beyond these reductions, the fact is that in the absence of a SALT II Treaty, the Soviets would not only keep these weapons, they could add far more new and modern systems. Based on their past practices, they could be expected to acquire several entirely new types of strategic land-based missiles by 1985. The treaty holds them to only one.

Our best estimates are that without the treaty they could have 3,000 launchers by 1985, 750 more than they would be permitted with the treaty. And they could have several thousand more individual weapons than they would have as a practical matter under the treaty.

We, of course, would do whatever is necessary to counter an increased threat, but it would be at far greater risk and far greater cost than by limiting that threat under the treaty.

LIMIT ON SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT ADVANTAGE

The treaty limits Soviet potential in another important way, by denying them the ability to exploit fully the greater lifting power of their bigger missiles, their throw-weight advantage.

The main practical value of this greater throw-weight is that it allows each missile to carry more warheads which can be independently directed at separate targets. In the absence of restraints, the Soviets could load up their bigger missiles to gain a lead in the number of nuclear warheads. However, under the provisions of the treaty which limit missile improvement, no land-based strategic missile can be fitted with more warheads than have already been tested on that type of missile.

Both the Soviet SS–17 land-based missile and the larger SS–19 are big enough to carry a considerably greater number of warheads than they now have. Under the treaty, they will be limited to their present number, four for the SS–17 and six for the SS–19. The biggest Soviet missile, the SS–18, has the potential to carry at least 20 to 30 warheads. The treaty holds it to 10. Ten warheads is the same number that will be permitted on our new ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile], the M–X.

The net effect is that SALT II goes a long way to blunt the Soviet throw-weight advantage. Both Soviet and United States warheads will be accurate enough and powerful enough to destroy the most hardened military targets. Beyond that, neither great size nor greater accuracy is of much additional value.

SALT II thus helps us retain a balance not only in the bombers and missiles that carry nuclear warheads or weapons, but also in the weapons themselves.

SALT II CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This, then, is the first contribution of the SALT II Treaty to the security requirements of the United States. It will serve as a brake on Soviet military expansion and on the Soviet improvement we could otherwise expect, and it will permit us to move ahead with the improvement of our own strategic forces.

On this basis, it is clear that the ratification of SALT II will materially enhance our ability to maintain the strategic balance through the 1980's and beyond.

VERIFICATION TERMS OF SALT II

A second way that SALT II serves our national security is by improving our ability to monitor and evaluate Soviet strategic forces and programs. Verification has been a central concern in every aspect of these negotiations. At every stage we put the treaty to this test; can we have confidence in its verification—that is, can we determine for ourselves that the Soviets are complying?

The verification terms of SALT II build upon the proven principles of earlier agreements, prohibitions on concealing strategic forces and prohibitions on interfering with the monitoring systems of the other side. And the treaty continues the joint commission, or Standing Consultative Commission, for resolving doubts or dis-

putes. As with SALT I, verification will be based upon our own observation and our own technical systems, not on faith.

But SALT II goes much further in facilitating our ability to watch Soviet strategic forces and our ability to determine for ourselves whether they are complying with their treaty obligations. Let me cite some of these significant new steps.

For the first time, there is explicit agreement not to encrypt telemetric information—that is, to disguise the electronic signals which are sent for missile tests—when doing so would impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. We would quickly know if the Soviets were encrypting relevant information. This would be a violation of the treaty.

We have agreed that we will regularly exchange information on the size and composition of our strategic forces. This is by no means a substitute for our ability to count for ourselves, but the exchanged data will help us confirm that both parties are interpreting their obligations in a like manner.

We have agreed to rules which simplify the job of counting weapon systems limited under the treaty. For example, every missile or missile launcher of a type that has ever been tested with more than one independently aimed warhead will automatically count against the multiple warhead ceiling, even though some may in fact have only a single warhead.

The Soviet SS–16 long-range mobile missile would have presented us with particular verification problems, because its first two stages cannot be distinguished from the intermediate range missile, the SS–20. To avoid that potential difficulty, the SS–16 has been banned entirely.

In the days ahead, Secretary Brown and others will provide in closed session detailed classified information that is required for Senators to make an informed judgment on verification. I know this issue will be central to your consideration. It has been central to ours.

Let me state very clearly that I am convinced we will be able to adequately verify this treaty—that we will be able to detect any Soviet violations before they could affect the strategic balance.

Let me emphasize that with or without SALT, we must have the best possible information about Soviet strategic programs. Our security depends upon it. Without SALT there would be nothing to prevent the Soviets from concealing their strategic program.

Thus, the treaty's verification provisions have an independent value for our national security, quite apart from their role in enforcement of the treaty. Thus far, I have discussed the impact of the treaty on the strategic balance and the treaty's contribution to our intelligence capabilities. Both elements illustrate a critical point. Arms control is not an alternative to defense; it is complementary to sound defense planning.

TREATY OPENS WAY TO SALT III NEGOTIATION

Let me now turn to the third reason for supporting this treaty. It not only imposes effective limits on important categories of strategic arms, it also opens the way to negotiating further limits in SALT III.

Arms control must be seen as a continuing process, as the Chairman has pointed out. Each agreement builds on the last, and paves the way for the next. There have been significant achievements over the 10-year period in which we have been engaged in this evolving process. The Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty of 1972 closed off an entire area of potential competition, one which could have damaged the very foundations of deterrence. It increased stability, and it enabled us to proceed with limits on offensive weapons.

The first agreement on offensive arms, the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972, froze the race to build more missile launchers on each side at a time when the Soviets were building up in this area and we were not.

The SALT II negotiations began immediately thereafter. In 1974 in Vladivostok, President Ford and President Brezhnev moved to another vital stage in the process. They agreed that restraints should cover all strategic delivery systems, and they agreed to the central principle of equal limits.

SALT II now secures that Vladivostok formula. The treaty had to be carefully structured to balance the differences between our forces and theirs, but for both sides, the numerical ceilings and subceilings are the same.

Beyond this achievement, the SALT II Treaty begins to tighten the limits. There will be actual reductions in nuclear forces. There will be significant limits on qualitative improvements—on the race to build new weapons and make existing weapons more deadly.

The promotion of an essential balance may prove to be this treaty's single greatest contribution to long-term arms stability and to further arms control progress. With the principle of equivalence established in SALT II, we have laid a solid foundation and set a clear direction for further reductions and tighter restraints in SALT III.

We would, of course, have preferred deeper cuts in SALT II, but it is nevertheless clear that this treaty takes us further down the road toward greater restraint. Surely the way to achieve more is to secure the gains we have made and move on, for this treaty represents a step on the road of arms control, not the end of the journey.

ARE WE BETTER SERVED WITH OR WITHOUT SALT II

The issue we face is not whether this treaty does everything we would like it to do, either from an arms control or security perspective. The issue is whether we are better served with this treaty or without it. I think the answer to that is clear. We should build on the progress we have made. The alternative is to return to an unrestrained arms competition, with the suspicions and fears of an earlier time, but with the ever more devastating arms of today and of tomorrow.

TREATY IMPORTANCE TO ALLIES, EFFECT ON U.S. POSITION OF LEADERSHIP

The fourth broad reason for supporting the SALT II Treaty is its importance to our allies and its effect on our position of leadership

in the world. I will discuss these issues in greater detail tomorrow. Let me simply stress one major point this morning. Our allies and friends have made it clear to us, publicly as well as privately, that they have a vital interest in the ratification of this treaty.

Our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies want to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving superiority; they would be the first to feel the pressure. They know this treaty helps preserve a stable and equal strategic balance.

Our allies want to maintain a stable strategic situation so that together we can continue our cooperative effort to improve the conventional balance in Europe. They know this treaty makes a major contribution in this respect.

And they want to avoid the political tensions and pressures that would accompany rejection of the treaty.

We have consulted with our NATO partners continuously during the negotiations of SALT II. We have made it clear to them and to the Soviets, that the treaty will not interfere with existing patterns of defense cooperation with NATO. SALT II leaves us free to take needed measures to modernize and strengthen European-based nuclear forces.

At the same time, we are consulting now with our allies on the possibilities for future negotiations which could include limits on Soviet as well as U.S. intermediate-range systems in Europe.

These are among the reasons why our allies have welcomed SALT and urged ratification. Defeat of the treaty would be a profound blow to our closest friends. Its approval will benefit our most valued alliances. It will signal continued American leadership for peace.

In Europe and beyond, all of our friends and allies have a stake in international stability. They expect us to manage our relationship with the Soviet Union in ways that would reduce its risk while protecting our interests. They look to the United States for both decisive leadership and sound judgment. They understand that if SALT were rejected, the entire fabric of East-West relations would be strained, and that the world could easily become a more hazardous place for us all.

LEGISLATIVE—EXECUTIVE CONSULTATIONS

In the days ahead, we will work closely and cooperatively with you in your consideration of this treaty. The Senate has had and will continue to have a major role in shaping our policy on strategic arms. Indeed, SALT II as presented significantly reflects the influence of the Senate.

Throughout these negotiations, we have consulted closely with this committee and with individual Members of the Senate at every stage. Twenty-seven Senators traveled to Geneva to observe the negotiations firsthand. We have strongly encouraged that process. Secretary Brown, General Seignious, his predecessor, Ambassador Warnke, and I have discussed SALT issues in nearly 50 separate congressional hearings since January 1977. Most of those have been in the Senate.

In the same period, there have been over 140 individual SALT briefings of Senators by responsible officials of the administration,

and another 100 briefings of members of Senators' staffs. The consultation and cooperation between the Executive and the Congress on this treaty have been extensive.

Those sessions have been held to receive your advice as well as to report on our progress. Time and again, issues raised by Members of the Senate have been taken up directly in the negotiations. Our negotiators were conscious of the need to meet a number of specific objectives of the Senate.

The principal of equality was initiated in the Senate and mandated by the Congress in 1972, when the SALT I agreement was approved. The basic elements of equality were agreed to by President Ford and President Brezhnev at Vladivostok. Those elements are embodied in this treaty.

The Senate was clearly intent on closing loopholes and ambiguities. The definitions and understandings contained in this treaty are exhaustive and precise.

Many specific provisions on verification, including those on the data base and telemetry encryption, were shaped by concerns and views expressed to us by Members of the Senate.

We now seek your consent to ratification of a treaty we negotiated with these concerns in mind. We have worked together throughout the negotiations. I believe that we must continue to do so through the ratification process.

NEGOTIATING PROCESS

The SALT II Treaty is the product of almost 7 years of hard bargaining, on both sides. As members of the committee know, they have been extraordinarily complex negotiations—discussions to limit arms, not by imposition of a victor over the vanquished but by voluntary agreement between two powerful nations. To achieve such an agreement compromise is required by both sides.

In far-reaching negotiations such as these, agreement on one provision inevitably becomes intertwined with agreement on others. Terms that seem entirely unrelated often depend on each other. Thus, to be evaluated fairly, the treaty is best judged as a whole.

Taken as a whole, it is a balanced agreement. Taken as a whole, it clearly serves, in my judgment, our national interests. That is the basis for my belief that we cannot realistically expect to shift the bargain more in our favor now through a process of amendment and reservation. Even if it were possible to reopen the negotiations, certainly they would be reopened for both sides.

This could lead to the reopening of points that are now resolved in a manner favorable to our interests.

PREMATURE JUDGMENTS

As we move ahead, I urge you not to make premature judgments. Let us first carefully consider the treaty as it now stands. Let us see if your questions do not in fact have satisfactory answers. Let us all avoid emotional rhetoric which can only obscure the real issues.

This treaty is complex. It bears on a difficult and complex relationship. Before reaching a final decision, we, the Senate and the

administration together, have an opportunity for discussion and debate that will illuminate our common national goals as well as clarify the terms of the treaty itself.

Finally, as we proceed with the debate, which will often be technical, let me express the hope that the nature of our subject will be kept clearly in sight—the terrible power of nuclear weapons. Together, the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union already hold more than 14,000 strategic nuclear warheads and bombs. The smallest of these are several times as powerful as the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. If a fraction of those weapons were ever fired, tens of millions of our people, tens of millions of the Soviet people would perish. Nuclear war would be a catastrophe beyond our imagination, for the aggressor as much as the victim.

This, in the end, is what the debate is all about. Not pieces on a chessboard, or chips on a table, but instruments of mass destruction, even as they are instruments of deterrence.

This will be an historic debate. It can be a healthy one for our country, a unique opportunity to focus our collective attention on the requirements for peace in today's world and to reassert a broad consensus on these obligations. I believe that most Americans and most Members of the Senate agree. The security of the United States requires us to maintain an effective deterrent and forces that are equivalent to those of the Soviet Union, to prevent them from gaining a military or political advantage.

And I believe that most Americans and most Members of the Senate also agree that the safety of our people requires the major nuclear powers continue the process of step-by-step agreement to limit and to reduce the size and destructiveness of each side's strategic forces.

Undoubtedly, some believe more strongly in one of these propositions than in the other. It would be very difficult to forge a national consensus around either by itself, but a strong national consensus can be built for both of these propositions together.

ASSURING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Chairman, I have spent most of the past 20 years of my professional career dealing with the requirements of our national security. I have faced these issues from a military perspective during 6 years in the Department of Defense, and from the perspective of the Secretary of State. I know from this experience that neither arms control nor military preparedness alone can assure our security. We must pursue both simultaneously, for that is the only rational path to secure our Nation's safety in a nuclear world.

In seeking your approval of the SALT II Treaty, we are recommending that we strengthen America's security, and build a broad national consensus through a sensible combination of a strengthened defense and arms limitation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for an excellent opening statement. I think we will move next to Secretary Brown before we start with questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. RALPH EARLE II, CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Secretary BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, today you prepare to exercise one of your most weighty responsibilities as Members of the U.S. Senate, the decision whether to approve the treaty on control of strategic armaments which we call SALT II, recently signed by the President in Vienna.

In appearing before you this morning, I am acutely conscious of my own, as well as of your, responsibility. As Secretary of Defense, I am the senior appointed official charged by law and by the President with full-time responsibility for the military capability of the United States. Within that charge, my preeminent concern must be to assure the physical safety of our Nation from military attack. I speak also from the context of my own experience in strategic military matters. Most of my life has been devoted to the security of the United States in an era of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. It is in the light of those responsibilities and that experience that I offer to you this morning my evaluation of this treaty.

UNILATERAL RESTRAINT IN WEAPONS PROGRAMS

Let me say at the beginning that I reject the notion that unilateral restraint in weapons programs is the way to enhance our security. I would not recommend this treaty to you today if it did not impose on the Soviet Union significant restraints that balance those it imposes on us, or if it did not in my judgment favorably affect our national security.

I would not recommend this treaty if it required us to trust the Soviets. Too much is at stake for us to have to rely on their good will or scruples. The SALT II Treaty is designed to assure that we do not need to rely on trust. It is verifiable. I will in later testimony before this and the Senate Select Intelligence Committee discuss this in detail. At this point, let me convey my conclusion on the subject. The Soviets cannot gain a military advantage by concealed actions that violate the agreement. U.S. intelligence capabilities to detect violations and U.S. capacity to respond to detection of violations by adjusting and increasing our own program are such that before any Soviet secret buildup or other violation could approach a scale that would affect the strategic balance, we would detect the effort and be able to respond appropriately to prevent any advantage from accruing to them from the violation.

I also state to you my strongly held view that the United States must not permit the Soviet Union to attain nuclear superiority. Were that to happen, I am convinced they would very probably exploit that advantage through political intimidation or military action or both. No agreement should be approved that would make more likely such an outcome. This agreement makes such an outcome less likely. It limits the size of Soviet forces and thereby limits what we must do to maintain the balance.

Finally, I take the treaty as it is, not as it might have been. The issue in national security terms is the effect of this treaty, not some ideal or hypothetical one. There are broader issues of international relations, the effects of the SALT II Treaty on Soviet-American relations, on our alliances and our allies, Third World diplomacy, nuclear nonproliferation, and so forth. These matters also affect our national security, and I have views on them. But the principal responsibility for those matters lies with Secretary Vance, who has touched on them already this morning and will expand on them tomorrow. I have concentrated as I reviewed this treaty and participated in its negotiations on the national defense considerations I have mentioned. In those terms, I ask you now to look at this treaty from one specific point of view, and to ask yourselves a single question: Does this treaty serve the security interests of the United States?

I have examined the treaty with care, and in the light of what I know about the nuclear armaments that exist in the world today and are likely to exist in the future, my judgment is that this treaty will make the people of the United States more secure militarily than they would be without it. For that reason, I recommend that the Senate give its approval.

In the balance of this statement I will summarize for you the reasons that have led me to that conclusion.

ARMS CONTROL

Let me turn first to arms control itself. I start with the proposition that we cannot be militarily secure unless our strategic military forces are at least in approximate balance with those of the Soviet Union. The forces of the two countries are in a position of essential equivalence today. I invite your attention to the chart that has just been put up on that side of the committee room. It is a busy chart, and I will not go through it in detail now. I believe that we will probably have quite a lot of time to do so later.

[The chart referred to follows:]

CHART 3



Secretary BROWN. I would draw your attention only to one thing, that we have less total throw-weight than the Soviets, but more total weapons. The total number of missile launchers and heavy bombers is about the same. The distribution on the two sides is very different, and by concentrating on one or another item, one can allege a disparity in capability; but, overall, we are in a position of essential equivalence.

MAINTAINING EQUIVALENCE

There are two ways to maintain that equivalence. One is for both sides to add to their nuclear arsenal without limit, but in equivalent or offsetting ways. The other is for both sides to limit their arsenal or to reduce them on a comparable basis. We have the option to follow either course. Either can maintain our security, but the course of limiting arms is preferable for a number of reasons.

First, it tends to make the future balance more predictable and stable, and less likely to become one sided. Second, it provides more certainty to each side about the current program for the other. Third, it is obviously less costly for both sides, and overall, it is less risky for both sides.

Let me now describe our strategic forces as they have been planned and as they exist today and the threat that they face.

UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE PLANNING

Two objectives underly our strategic force planning: deterrence and essential equivalence. I have expanded on this matter in my written statement which is before you, and I will say more about it on Wednesday, but rather than take your time with it now, let me again pass to a brief summary.

By any reasonable standard, the United States has a credible deterrent today and will have one for the foreseeable future. We have and we will continue to have survivable forces capable of massive destruction of Soviet cities and industrial potential, even after an all-out surprise attack on the United States.

We also have and will have increasingly in the coming years both the forces and the targeting and employment policies that permit us selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited action. In particular, we will have forces whose capabilities will make it clear that the Soviets could not improve their relative military position by a first strike attack.

In addition to their purely military capabilities, however, strategic nuclear forces like other military forces have a broader role in the world. Countries—we ourselves, the Soviet Union, and others—make judgments about our strength and that of the Soviets. The behavior of all those nations will be influenced by their judgments. It is in that respect that our second objective, essential equivalence, particularly applies. It requires that our forces overall be, and be recognized as, at least on a par with those of the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the Soviets would gain in the world—and in my judgment we would lose—without war, from changes in perception about the balance of nuclear power.

For those reasons, while we have essential equivalence today, it is very important that we keep it. Our most important objective is to insure by our own programs, and by arms control, that the Soviets remain in no doubt that they would not gain from such a conflict now or at any time in the future either.

TRIAD CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENT CAPABILITY

For many years, our nuclear deterrent capability has rested on the Triad concept, that is, maintaining three separate and independent sets of nuclear delivery systems to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. Our Triad of defense consists, as you have heard before and will hear again in these hearings, first, of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles; second, of ballistic missiles launched from our submarines; and third, of manned bombers armed with bombs, short-range attack missiles, and soon with air-launched cruise missiles.

We have continued to increase the capabilities of each of the three legs of the Triad, both in quantity and in quality, and again you will notice that the chart is divided into those three separate legs of the Triad. With that Triad of capabilities is our strategic nuclear deterrent. The present balance is adequate in terms of our objectives of deterrence and equivalence, but we face challenges for the future that we can ignore only at great peril.

SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN STRATEGIC BALANCE

Some trends are of real concern. The Soviets are rapdily eroding important advantages we once held in a number of key areas. This is especially so with respect to accuracy and warhead numbers. The improvement in Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces; that is, intermediate range forces of the SS-20 or Backfire type that they deploy against European or other peripheral targets, that improvement increases in significance as the central balance becomes less favorable to us. By central balance, I mean balance in areas of ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers and their weapons.

Moreover, the growing vulnerability of our land-based missile force in the early 1980's could if not corrected eventually produce a significant element of U.S. disadvantage and contribute to a perception of U.S. strategic inferiority.

The consequences would be severely adverse politically and could be potentially destabilizing militarily.

The Triad approach improves the assurance of deterrence by forcing a prospective attacker to deal with three different components, each of which would have to be attacked in a different way, and against which active defenses would also have to vary. Because we have a Triad, a temporary diminution of survivability of one component can be restored over time without our overall deterrence going through a period of extreme danger. If the temporarily diminished component were not eventually restored, however, the Soviets would be enabled to concentrate their resources on the remaining legs of the Triad—working, for example, on antisubmarine warfare, and their defense, neither limited by SALT II, and working also on barrage attacks—thus perhaps putting our overall deterrent in doubt in the 1990's.

Although the Soviets are posing increasing challenges in the strategic area, the United States has not been idle itself. During the past 10 years, we have deployed more than 1,000 missiles with multiple warheads, thereby increasing our missile warhead total nearly fourfold. We have, with short-range attack missiles increased the capability of the B-52 force. Moreover, we have under way programs to improve each of the three legs of the U.S. Triad of strategic forces. Again, I will cover these programs in more detail on Wednesday, and so we will skip over the detailed statement of it that is contained in my written testimony with which you have been supplied.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET MILITARY COMPETITION

SALT II can and does limit to a degree the scale of our military competition with the Soviet Union, and the extent of the necessary response. Even with SALT II, however, in order to maintain essential equivalence, we will need to continue to maintain and to modernize our strategic nuclear and other military forces at an annual cost in constant dollars; that is, dollars corrected for inflation, which will be higher than in recent years. That is true quite irrespective of SALT II, though needs and costs would both rise further without SALT II.

The nuclear balance does not take care of itself. Unless restrained by arms limitation treaties or matched by us, the Soviets present momentum could tip the balance in their favor. Neither equivalence nor even deterrence will be maintained automatically. To do that requires will and resolve and action on strategic programs from the people of this country. This situation is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. We face a continued military challenge for the future that we can ignore only at our peril, but we have an opportunity to limit the scale of that challenge, an opportunity that it would be most unwise for us to let pass.

SOVIET STRATEGIC MILITARY CHALLENGE

That, in brief, is how I see the strategic military challenge we face from the Soviet Union, and how I think we must respond to it. With that as a background, let me now discuss the SALT II Treaty itself, and why I support it.

REASON FOR DOD SUPPORT FOR SALT II

I support SALT II, quite simply, because I believe it enhances our military security and is in the defense interests of the United States. The basic elements of the SALT II agreement are familiar to you. They include treaty, protocol, and a statement of principles. Perhaps I could have chart No. 1, that shows this in some more detail.

[The chart referred to follows:]

CHART 1



SOVIET REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES

Secretary BROWN. The treaty is to last through 1985. It does these things: It limits each side by the end of 1981 to a total of 2,250 intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, and heavy bombers. That number, 2,250, will be reduced over a period by the Soviets, because it will require them to reduce by about 250 these strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, called SNDV's for short. Without SALT II, if the present trend continued, as I believe it would, the Soviet Union would instead have about 3,000 such weapons by 1985 instead of 2,250. In contrast, no operational U.S. system will have to be reduced.

Within the 2,250 overall limit, the treaty sets a lower limit of 1,200 lower than the 2,250, for launchers of ballastic missiles that carry multiple warheads aimed at more than one target. Those systems are called MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] systems for short. Also, the number of such launchers plus the number of heavy bombers that carry air-launched cruise missiles, so-called ALCM's, cannot exceed 1,320.

Again, these limits hold the Soviets down to a level well below what I believe they otherwise could be expected to reach. For example, without SALT II, I would expect them by 1985 to have in the vicinity of 1,800 multiple-warhead missiles instead of 1,200. The limits placed on heavy bombers with cruise missiles will permit us to build the heavy bomber forces we have planned by 1985. To the extent that we may be required to reduce multiple-warhead systems, they would be older ones, chiefly Minuteman III missiles of increasing vulnerability, whose place will be taken by heavy bombers with cruise missiles, or by Trident submarines, and the overall effect of that change would be to leave us stronger than if we had not made it.

The treaty also sets a sub-limit of 820 on launchers for land-based missiles that have multiple warheads that can be aimed at more than one target. Those are the most threatening part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, as far as we are concerned. The 820 figure is at least 100 fewer than we expected a few years ago that the Soviets would reach even under the SALT II limits then contemplated, and is much lower than the number they could reach by 1985 without SALT, given their current trend. The 820 figure, however, is well above the number of MIRVed ICBM's we plan to deploy.

QUALITATIVE LIMITS UNDER TREATY

The treaty also contains qualitative limits. It limits each side to only one new type of land-based ICBM, and it requires that any such new missile not carry more than 10 MIRV's. This limit permits us to build the only new land-based missile we have planned to develop through 1985, the M-X. It permits us to place on it the maximum number of warheads we intended, 10.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have been developing several new land-based missiles, their fifth generation of them. The treaty limit means that now all but one of those new missiles would have to be restricted to quite limited modifications of their predecessors.

It will also mean that instead of developing a separate specialized new missile for each of several missions, the Soviets will have to make some tough choices. For example, they will have to choose either a replacement for their existing single warhead land-based missile, the SS–11, or another new missile with up to 10 warheads to replace their SS–17's, which have 4, and their SS–19's, which have 6 warheads. They cannot, under SALT II, develop both of these alternatives, nor can they develop a new type of missile to replace the SS–18.

TREATY LIMITS ON FRACTIONATION

The treaty also places a limit on what we call fractionation. This means that the number of reentry vehicles on existing or modified ICBM's cannot be increased from what it is now, and that the permitted new ICBM could not, if provided with multiple warheads, have more than 10 of them on each missile.

We have no plans to increase the number of warheads on our principal ICBM, the Minuteman III. Doing so would not increase its military effectiveness. The Soviets, however, have much larger missiles that could be adapted to carry many more warheads. The treaty takes away the ability of the Soviets to exploit this. For example, except for this limit, the Soviet SS–18 missile could be equipped to carry 20 or even 30 independently targeted warheads in the 1980's—actually theoretically more than that, but above 30 I think you run into limits of practicality—but with SALT II, that won't happen. They will be limited to deployment of no more than 10.

UNIMPEDED VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

The treaty also provides measures to permit unimpeded verification by national technical means. As I said, I will come back to this in more detail when I return to testify on verification. For the present, I will note only the simple but very important point—that all the uncertainties we face about Soviet forces with SALT II would be greater without a SALT II agreement, because any deception, concealment, and countermeasures which the treaty bans would without a SALT II Treaty, be permitted. So much for the treaty itself.

PROTOCOL TO TREATY

The protocol covers a shorter period. It expires on December 31, 1981. It bars operational deployment of ground- and ship-launched cruise missiles, so called GLCM's and SLCM's, with ranges greater than at 600 kilometers through 1981, but it permits unimpeded testing and development of such vehicles of any range.

This limit will have no impact whatsoever on our present cruise missile testing and development schedule.

I might add that the protocol provision was adjusted to our schedules, and not vice versa. The protocol also bars deployment of mobile land-based or air-to-surface ballistic missiles through 1981. Again, this will not affect our M–X development, which will not enter its flight test phase until 1983, and I remind you that the

treaty allows the deployment of mobile land-based or air-to-surface ballistic missiles after 1981.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE SALT III

Finally, there is a statement of principles to guide SALT III and a Soviet commitment not to produce more than 30 Backfire bombers a year, and to limit increases in its capability. The Backfire production restriction means that the Soviets now will not be able to divert Backfires to a strategic role where they would add marginally, anyway, without greatly reducing Soviet capability for the naval and regional missions to which Backfires are normally assigned.

AGREED STRATEGIC FORCE LIMITS

I consider SALT II a significant and most useful step, though not so far reaching an agreement as we would have liked or as we hope for in the future. The chart that is now available for you to look at shows the agreed strategic force limits, first under the Interim Agreement of SALT I, then under the Vladivostok Agreement of November 1974, and now as negotiated in the SALT II Treaty. Again, we will be coming back to this in later testimony to discuss in more detail, but this chart shows that, although our predecessors, like we ourselves, sought more far-reaching agreements at earlier stages of the talks, we finally accepted the more modest limits of the Vladivostok Agreement, which is that second pair of bars.

We took the dual track of trying to negotiate the largest possible reductions of the Vladivostok overall ceilings and the lowest possible sublimits while limiting qualitative improvement in new systems. We have achieved real success in both of those areas, reductions to the Vladivostok ceilings and sublimits, and also qualitative limitations.

We have been able to negotiate the reductions in the Vladivostok limits from 2,400 to 2,250 for the overall total. We have also introduced new sublimits. Instead of 1,320 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, there can now be only 1,200, while the 1,320 limit applies to the sum of those and of heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

[The chart referred to follows:]

CHART 2



Secretary BROWN. There is also a new sublimit of 820 on land-based ICBM's with multiple warheads, the most destabilizing strategic force element. In addition, we have broken significant new ground in a qualitative area by limits on numbers of reentry vehicles on each type of ICBM and also maximum limits for submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead numbers, and by allowing each side only one new type of ICBM.

Taken together, these two tracks have resulted in a significant step forward in the arms control process, and it is, moreover, a step that supports our strategic objectives.

MEASURING UTILITY OF SALT II TO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

A simple way to measure the utility of SALT II to our strategic objectives of deterrence and essential equivalence is to return to a fact I mentioned before in passing: Without the SALT II agreement, the Soviet Union could have nearly one-third more strategic systems than with the agreement. Instead of the 2,250 delivery vehicles with the treaty, they could have 3,000, and there would be corresponding effects on other measures, including overall throw-weight, megatonnage, weapons numbers, and the like. Naturally, we do not know what the Soviets would do in the absence of a treaty, but these higher strategic system levels are well within their capability, and they are our reasonable intelligence projections of what they could be expected to do.

1985 PROJECTIONS FOR UNITED STATES-SOVIET FORCES

The chart that you are looking at now is another busy one. [The chart referred to follows:]

CHART 4



Secretary BROWN. It shows 1985 projections for United States and Soviet forces by various measures with and without SALT. The left-hand side of each pair shows what we expect with SALT, and we look at missile launchers and heavy bombers, we look at total numbers of warheads and bombs at the lower left, we looked at MIRVed missile launchers and ALCM equipped; that is, cruise missile equipped heavy bombers on the upper right, we look at throw-weight on the lower right.

You will see that in each case the numbers, particularly the Soviet numbers, are significantly lower with the SALT agreement than without them. Both with SALT and without SALT, there would be some uncertainty as to what the situation would be in 1985, but you will notice that the uncertainties which are indicated by those dotted white-colored triangles at the top of each bar, are always substantially larger without a SALT II agreement than with it, and that, I think, is a very signficant point to keep in mind about the SALT II agreement. It reduces uncertainties. It doesn't eliminate them, but it reduces them.

SOVIET BUILDUP WITHOUT SALT II

A Soviet buildup, as allowed without SALT II—and it would be a larger one without SALT II—would pose greater challenges and make protecting our security more difficult in quite specific ways.

First, the simple addition of numbers would force us to increase our own program still further to preserve esential equivalence, to maintain areas of U.S. advantage, and to offset Soviet leads in other areas. Without SALT, we would lose the greater predictability that I have just talked about. In my view, it is probable that without SALT II we would enter into an era of greater uncertainty in both military and political terms. That would result in increased strategic forces on both sides as hedges against that uncertainty. This would mean less rather than more security for the United States, and for the Soviet Union, too.

For, faced with such a Soviet buildup, the United States could, and I am confident would, respond. Given our determination to maintain essential equivalence, and the demonstrated Soviet willingness, in fact, determination, to avoid strategic inferiority even at great cost, the net result of such a numbers race would be greater strategic force levels at greater expense and at substantial risk to stability.

MINUTEMAN VULNERABILITY PROBLEM WITH SALT II

Second, while SALT II won't solve the Minuteman vulnerability problem, it will make the solution of the problem easier than without an agreement. SALT II will limit to well below previously projected levels the number of Soviet MIRVed ICBM's. It will freeze the number of warheads on existing ballistic missile launchers, and will limit the number of reentry vehicles allowed for new ICBM's.

These restrictions sharply reduce the significance of the Soviet throw-weight advantage which, without limitation would, for example, enable them, as I have said, to deploy many more warheads on their largest ICBM.

The combination of limitations on missile launchers and numbers of warheads per missile limits the total number of ICBM warheads well below what it could otherwise be. This will ease somewhat the task of maintaining the survivability of our land-based ICBM's. The deployment of a new mobile ICBM system, regardless of basing mode, will be more feasible because an upper bound will be placed on the number of warheads that can be aimed at the targets represented by that deployment. Even if the fractionation and MIRVed ICBM limits were not continued after 1985, which is 1 year before the M-X missile will come into the force, the inability to test much larger numbers of warheads or to add more new ICBM's with multiple warheads before the treaty expires would substantially delay the Soviet capability to increase the threat to our mobile systems. Thus the SALT II agreement improves what I judge to be already a favorable cost exchange ratio for the M-X versus the Soviet systems that threaten it. That is, it will be easier and cheaper for us to add hard aim points to the M-X system to preserve its survivability, than for the Soviets to add

missiles or reentry vehicles to attack it. SALT II becomes, then, an important element in insuring ICBM survivability.

GREATER SOVIET PROGRAMS, LARGER U.S. RESPONSES WITHOUT TREATY

Third, to the extent that, as seems to me extremely likely, the lack of SALT limits would result in greater Soviet programs and larger U.S. responses, we would in the absence of SALT II be diverting scarce resources from other defense priorities, such as improvements in conventional forces, or risking negative effects on our domestic situation, in terms, for example, of social needs and inflationary pressures.

SALT II will not by itself be the solution to our strategic nuclear force problems. Even with SALT, we will need to and we will be permitted to expand our strategic military force program efforts above their present levels. Those levels significantly are about half of what they were during the mid-1960's, when measured in constant dollars, but SALT will mean greater stability and predictability in the strategic challenges we face, and so the balance will be maintainable at a substantially lower level of destructive power than would otherwise be the case. Correspondingly, with SALT, it would be significantly less expensive, perhaps as much as $30 billion less expensive over the next decade, in 1980 dollars, for the United States to maintain that balance than it would be without a SALT II agreement.

SALT II, while forestalling this unproductive numbers race, will leave us the flexibility to carry out the important qualitative programs to deal with the challenges the treaty will not eliminate. We can develop, test, and deploy each of our planned programs, cruise missiles, the Trident submarine, and Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile [SLBM] and, the M-X, in the fashion and on the schedule that we have planned.

SALT II will also leave us free to pursue with our allies the important issues of modernization of NATO's intermediate range or theater nuclear forces and to consider arms control initiatives in that area.

SALT II AGREEMENT, SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN OTHER AREAS LINKAGE

Some have argued that we should link the SALT II agreement to Soviet behavior in other areas. For example, the Soviets and we certainly are completely at odds about Soviet and Soviet sponsored destabilizing actions in developing areas of the world, and about U.S. concerns for protection of fundamental human rights. These are expressions of fundamental differences in world view that make us adversaries. That adversarial relationship in turn motivates the strategic arms competition, and carried to its extreme, could produce a nuclear conflict, but the SALT II Treaty is in the interest of both nations. For the United States to frustrate its own interest by insisting on such linkage makes no more sense than for the Soviets to use the threat of SALT II rejection to try to inhibit the development of close and friendly relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

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CONCERN THAT RATIFICATION WILL ENCOURAGE COMPLACENCY

Concern has also been expressed that SALT II ratification will encourage complacency and cause the United States to fail to do what is necessary to retain adequate deterrence and essential equivalence in strategic forces. In fact, the SALT II debate is likely, I trust, to have the opposite effect. An understanding of the strategic situation will promote awareness of what we need to assure our security in strategic nuclear terms, insofar as security is feasible in the era of thermonuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, and strategic bombers.

STRATEGIC FORCE BALANCE WITHOUT TREATY

If SALT II is rejected or otherwise fails to come into effect, it is not certain that U.S. actions on strategic forces as compared to Soviet actions would produce a more favorable balance than will result under SALT II. The United States could and, I think, would respond to a heightened competition in strategic arms if we had to. The result, however, would be more weapons, higher costs, and probably less security for both sides.

In any event, to quote a recent editorial from the Chicago Tribune, "We have no need to terrify ourselves into doing what is necessary for our security."

We intend to do what is necessary. Less will be necessary under SALT II than without it, and we will be at least as likely to do what is necessary. From this, as from other points of view, SALT II is a contribution to our national security.

U.S. DEFENSE INTERESTS SERVED

It is my considered judgment, in conclusion, that the SALT II Treaty will serve the defense interests of the United States. It enhances stability, it allows us the flexibility to modernize our strategic forces, to maintain deterrence and equivalence without unnecessarily expensive and potentially destabilizing strategic nuclear arms competition.

I do not doubt our economic or technical ability to compete successfully with the Soviets in strategic weapons. I do question whether such an effort is desirable to the extent that we can avoid a part of it through strategic arms limitation, and I do not believe that we would find our security increased after such a further increased round of competition. We can maintain flexibility and credible deterrence under the treaty and assure essential equivalence. Without the treaty, we could also do these things, but it would be more costly and less certain.

MEETING U.S. STRATEGIC GOALS

I see the treaty as a valuable method of meeting our strategic goals as a major component in our efforts to do so, along with our weapons programs. In my judgment, it is a very important component, although I emphasize once again that it will have to be accompanied by substantial U.S. defense programs and specifically by expanded ones in the strategic field.

This is my analysis of the SALT II Treaty. It clearly limits the Soviet threat with which we will have to contend, while not substantially constraining what we would otherwise plan to develop and deploy.

My professional career of more than 30 years has been devoted principally to maintaining the security of the United States in a period during which international developments and technological advances have made that goal attainable only to a rather limited degree. I have personally seen tens of nuclear explosions, some of them of many megatons, but I do not pretend to know what a full-scale nuclear war would be like. I am utterly convinced that it would be dreadful beyond imagination.

To make it less likely, we have to do two things. We have to remain strong militarily—second to none. SALT II allows us to do that, but we must retain the will and make the sacrifices to do it, and we must limit and then reduce nuclear arsenals and prevent their further proliferation to nonnuclear nations.

SALT II, which protects and enhances the military security of the United States, is a modest but vital step along that road. We must not fail to take that step. Thank you.

[Secretary Brown's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, today you prepare to exercise one of your most weighty responsibilities as members of the United States Senate: the decision whether to approve the treaty on control of strategic armaments which we call SALT II, recently signed by the President in Vienna.

In appearing before you this morning I feel acutely my own responsibilities. As Secretary of Defense I am the senior appointed official charged by law, and by the President, with full time responsibility for the military capability of the United States. Within that charge my preeminent concern must be to assure the physical safety of our nation from military attack. I speak also from the context of my own experience in strategic military matters. Most of my life has been devoted to the security of the United States in an era of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. It is in light of those responsibilities, and that experience, that I offer to you this morning my evaluation of this treaty.

Let me say at the beginning that I reject the notion that unilateral restraint in weapons programs is the way to enhance our security. My experience with the Soviets has shown that this is not so. We have found that when we build weapons, they build; when we stop, they nevertheless continue to build—unless they have agreed otherwise with respect to the particular weapons system concerned. I would not recommend this treaty to you today if it did not impose on the Soviet Union significant restraints that balance those it imposes on us—or if it did not favorably affect our national security.

I would not recommend this treaty if it required us to trust the Soviets. Too much is at stake for us to have to rely on their good will or scruples. The SALT II treaty is designed to assure that we do not need to rely on trust. It is verifiable. While I will not be addressing the issue of verification in detail today, verification will be the subject of separate hearings later before this Committee and before the Select Committee on Intelligence where I will speak in detail. For the present, I will limit myself to stating my conclusion on the subject: The Soviets cannot gain a military advantage by concealed actions that violate the agreement. U.S. intelligence capabilities to detect violations—and U.S. capacity to respond to detection of violations by increasing and adjusting our own programs—are such that before any Soviet secret buildup or other violation could approach a scale that would affect the strategic balance, we would detect the effort and be able to respond appropriately to prevent any advantage from accruing from the violation.

I also state to you my strongly held view that the United States must not permit the Soviet Union to attain nuclear superiority. Were that to happen, I am convinced they would very probably exploit that advantage through political intimidation or military actions, or both. No agreement should be approved that would make more likely such an outcome. This agreement makes such an outcome less likely; it limits

the size of Soviet forces and thereby limits what we must do to maintain the balance.

Finally, I take the treaty as it is, not as it might have been. The issue in national security terms is the effect of this treaty, not some ideal or hypothetical one.

There are broader issues of international relations: the effects of the SALT II Treaty on Soviet-American relations, on our alliances and our allies, third-world diplomacy, nuclear non-proliferation, and so forth. These matters also affect our national security, and I have views on them. But the principal responsibility for those matters lies with Secretary Vance, who has touched on them already this morning and will expand on them tomorrow. I have concentrated, as I reviewed this treaty and participated in its negotiations, on the national defense considerations I have mentioned. In those terms, I ask you now to look at this treaty from one specific point of view and to ask yourselves a single question: does this treaty serve the security interests of the United States?

I have examined this treaty with care and in the light of what I know about the nuclear armaments that exist in the world today and are likely to exist in the future. My judgment is that this treaty will make the people of the United States more secure militarily than we would be without it. For that reason I recommend that the Senate give its approval.

In the balance of this statement I will summarize for you the reasons that lead me to that conclusion. I have arranged the analysis in four parts:

First, and briefly, my view of the role of arms control in defense.

Second, an outline of our strategic defense today, and how that defense relates to the threat from the Soviet Union.

Third, the main provisions of the treaty as they relate to our defense program and that of the Soviets.

Finally, I will say what I think will happen to our defense posture if the Senate approves the treaty; and also what the consequences would be if the treaty were not approved.

Turning first to arms control itself, I start with the proposition that we cannot be militarily secure unless our strategic military forces are at least in approximate balance with those of the Soviet Union. The forces of the two countries are in a position of essential equivalence today.

There are two ways to maintain that equivalence. One is for both sides to add to their nuclear arsenals in equivalent or offsetting ways. The other is for both sides to limit their arsenals or to reduce them on a comparable basis. We have the option to follow either course. Either can maintain our security.

The course of limiting arms is preferable, however, for a number of reasons. First, it tends to make the future balance more predictable and stable, and less likely to become one-sided. Second, it provides more certainty to each side about the current program of the other. Third, it is obviously less costly for both sides. Overall, it is less risky for both sides.

Neither the present balance, nor ongoing Soviet programs, nor the state of arms control agreements, are such that we can avoid substantial defense programs needed for our military security. In fact, we need to increase our present level of such programs overall, regardless of this Treaty. But SALT II is a clear and valuable, though limited, step toward curtailing the numbers and types of weapons that can be added by either side, and even towards reducing—by some measures—the number of weapons systems that one side (the Soviet Union) already has on hand.

In short, our military security can be enhanced either by increasing our own defense programs, or by limiting the forces of the Soviet Union. Arms control, carried out with balance and care, can add to our military security just as can added defense programs. SALT II takes that approach toward making this country safer.

Let me now describe our strategic forces as they have been planned and as they exist today, and the threat they face.

Two objectives underlie our strategic force planning: deterrence and essential equivalence.

Deterrence of nuclear war is our most fundamental defense objective. For us to achieve this, our potential adversaries must be convinced we possess sufficient military force that, whatever the circumstances, if they were to start a course of action that could lead to war, they would either: (1) Suffer unacceptable damage; or (2) be frustrated in their effort to achieve their objective.

Our strategy requires us to be able to inflict such damage on a potential adversary—and for him to be convinced in advance of our ability—that, regardless of the circumstances, the prospect of that damage will preclude his attack on the United

States or our vital interests. To achieve this we need, first of all, a survivable capability to devastate the industry and cities of the Soviet Union, even if the Soviets were to attack first, without warning. That capacity, called assured destruction capability, is the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. It is not, in my judgment, sufficient in itself as a strategic doctrine. Massive retaliation may not be appropriate—nor will its prospect always be sufficiently credible—to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent.

For fully effective deterrence, we need to be able to respond at the level appropriate to the type and scale of a Soviet attack. This requires forces of sufficient size and flexibility to attack selectively a range of military and other targets and to enable us to hold back a significant reserve. We must be able to deter Soviet attacks of lesser scale by making it clear to them that, after such an attack, we would not have only the choice of either making no effective military response, or totally destroying the Soviet Union.

This kind of counter-military capability, which we consider necessary in addition to a survivable capability to penetrate and attack urban-industrial complexes, is not a first-strike force. Just as we have programed—no matter what the Soviets can do through the 1980s—survivable SLBM and air-breathing forces, so the Soviets will retain a survivable deterrent. But the ability to attack a variety of military targets has always been a central feature of our strategic force.

This ability to provide measured retaliation in response to less-than-total attacks is a part of credible deterrence. It prevents the Soviets from imagining that they can gain meaningful advantage at any level of nuclear conflict. Moreover, whatever doubts one may have about whether a nuclear war could be kept limited—and I have serious ones—it would be the height of folly to put the United States in a position in which uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow.

By any reasonable standard, the United States has a credible deterrent today and will have one for the foreseeable future. We have—and will continue to have—survivable forces capable of massive destruction of Soviet cities and industrial potential, even after an all-out surprise attack on the U.S. We also have—and will have increasingly in the coming years—both the forces and the targeting and employment policies that permit us selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited actions. In particular, we will have forces whose capabilities will make clear that the Soviets could not improve their relative military position by attack.

That, in barest outline, is our plan of deterrence. In addition to their purely military capabilities, however, strategic nuclear forces—like other military forces—have a broader role in the world. Countries—we ourselves, the Soviet Union, and others—make judgments about our strength and that of the Soviets. The behavior of all those countries will be influenced by their judgments. It is in that respect that our second objective—essential equivalence—particularly applies. It requires that our forces overall be, and be recognized as, at least on a par with those of the Soviet Union. Otherwise the Soviets could gain in the world (and we lose), without war, from changes in perceptions about the balance of nuclear power.

We have essential equivalence today, and we must keep it. While no one can predict with confidence the outcome of a nuclear exchange, the Soviets would not gain, in any rational sense, from such a conflict—nor would we. Our most important objective is to insure—by our own programs and by arms control—that the Soviets remain in no doubt they would not gain from such a conflict at any time in the future, either.

For many years our nuclear deterrent capability has rested on the Triad concept—that is, maintaining three separate and independent sets of nuclear delivery systems to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. This triple approach reflects our unwillingness to take chances where the survival of this country is concerned. We would never want to be in a position where the unexpected failure of one kind of system, or the Soviets suddenly developing an effective defense against another, could leave us defenseless, or appearing in danger of being unable to retaliate. If one leg of the Triad develops a problem, the other two can amply defend us while it is being fixed. I would have it no other way, and the President recently has reaffirmed that commitment to the Triad.

Our Triad of defense consists, first, of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles; second, of ballistic missiles launched from our submarines; and, third, of bombers armed with bombs, short-range attack missiles, and soon with air-launched cruise missiles. We have continued to increase the capabilities of each of the three legs of the Triad, both in quantity and in quality.

With the Triad as our strategic nuclear deterrent, the present balance is adequate in terms of our objectives of deterrence and equivalence, but we face challenges for the future that we can ignore only at great peril.

Some trends are of real concern: the Soviets are rapidly eroding important advantages we once held in a number of key areas. This is especially so with respect to accuracy and warhead numbers. The improvement in Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces increases in significance as the central balance becomes less favorable to us. And, the growing vulnerability of our land-based missile force in the early 1980s could, if not corrected, produce a possible U.S. disadvantage, and contribute to a perception of U.S. strategic inferiority. The consequences would be severly adverse politically, and could be potentially destabilizing military.

The Triad approach improves the assurance of deterrence, by forcing a prospective attacker to deal with three different components, each of which would have to be attacked in a different way, and against which active defenses would also have to vary. Because we have a Triad, a temporary dimunition of survivability of one component can be restored without our overall deterrent going through a period of extreme danger. If the temporarily diminished component were not eventually restored, however, the Soviets would be enabled to concentrate their resources on the remaining legs of the Triad (working on anti-submarine warfare and air defense, neither limited by SALT II, and barrage attacks) thus perhaps putting our overall deterrent in doubt in the 1990s.

Although the Soviets are posing increasing challenges in the strategic area, the United States has not been idle. In the past 10 years, we have deployed more than a thousand MIRVed missiles, thereby increasing our missile warhead total nearly fourfold; we have, with short-range attack missiles (SRAM), increased the capability of the B-52 force. Moreover, we have underway programs to improve each of the three legs of the U.S. Triad of strategic forces.

This year we will begin to put the new Trident C4 missile in our submarine fleet. In addition, the first new Trident submarine will be on patrol in late 1981, will be quieter—and thus less detectable acoustically—and will be capable of longer on-station times. We are also considering still more advanced submarine-launched missiles.

Our cruise missile programs will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the bomber leg of the Triad. B-52 aircraft capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses will continue to contribute to the viability of the manned bomber leg of the Triad into the late 1980s. We are working on bomber and cruise missile technology for the longer term.

The most difficult issue to resolve has been the survivability of the land-based leg of the Triad. We have been seeking a solution that will satisfy our military needs, have a cost not out of line with past investments in strategic systems, and be consistent with—in fact enhance—our efforts in the principle of verifiability of strategic arms limitations.

To restore the survivability of our land-based force we will deploy a new ICBM in a mobile basing mode that is both survivable and verifiable. As you know, to do this, the President has chosen to authorize the full-scale development of the largest new missile permitted under SALT II—the MX. This missile will be as capable as any the Soviets can deploy under SALT II. It will have the same number of reentry vehicles as allowed on the Soviet SS-18—ten; it will have roughly equivalent military capability against both hard and soft targets to that of the SS-18—and better capability than the SS-19. It is as large as any missile we would want to build, even if SALT II imposed no limit on size. Thus it deprives the Soviets of any significant advantage from their right to 308 "modern large ballistic missiles"—SS-18's.

The President's decision on MX is consistent with both SALT II and our broader arms control policies. It will be verifiable; that is, an observer, using national technical means, would know the number of launchers deployed, though without knowing their exact location. The MX program thus will enable us to: improve the stability of the strategic balance, a stability without which serious negotiations in SALT III are not possible; deny the Soviets any advantage should they pursue an arms race, and thus increase their motivation to negotiate for reductions; and more safely pursue significant bilateral force reductions, because we would be able to reduce the size of our force size without jeopardizing its survivability. The basing system, whose detailed design features are under consideration, allows reduction in the number of launchers and missiles because, independent of the number of launchers in the system, the Soviets would have to hit the same number of targets in order to attack the system. That allows us to adjust the scale of MX deployment according to the progress made in SALT III.

The MX program began its development in 1976; full-scale development will begin within one month or so. We plan the first flight in 1983, the initial deployment in 1986, and full deployment in 1989. There will, therefore, be a period—including most of that for which SALT II will be in effect—during which our ICBMs will be

more vulnerable. We can afford such a degradation for a temporary period because our overall capability will remain very good.

Today our strategic nuclear forces are sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from all-out or lesser nuclear attacks. They are also clearly perceived in the world as essentially equivalent to Soviet forces, so that the Soviets cannot use any apparent nuclear superiority to their advantage in the world. The Soviets do have more ballistic missiles, with larger payloads, and more megatonnage. But to offset this, we have a larger number of warheads, greater accuracy, and advantages in our submarines and bomber forces.

SALT II can and does limit, to a degree, the scale of the military competition with the Soviet Union, and the extent of the necessary response. Even with SALT II, however, in order to maintain essential equivalence we will need to continue to maintain and modernize—at an annual cost higher than in recent years—our strategic nuclear and other military forces. That is true quite irrespective of SALT II, though needs and costs would both rise without SALT II. The nuclear balance does not take care of itself. Unless restrained by arms limitation treaties or matched by us, the Soviets' present momentum could tip it in their favor. Neither eqivalence nor even deterrence will be maintained automatically. To do so requires will and resolve—and action on strategic programs—from the people of this country. This situation is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. We face a continued military challenge for the future that we can ignore only at great peril. But we have an opportunity to limit the scale of that challenge, an opportunity that it would be unwise for us to let pass.

That, in brief, is how I see the strategic military challenge we face from the Soviet Union, and how I think we must respond to it. With that as background, let me now discuss the SALT II treaty itself, and why I support it.

I support SALT II, quite simply, because I believe it enhances our military security and is in the defense interests of the United States.

The basic elements of the SALT II agreement are familiar to you. They include three documents: a treaty, a protocol, and a statement of principles.

The treaty is to last through 1985. It does these things:

It limits each side by the end of 1981 to a total of 2,250 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers.

This will require the Soviets to reduce by approximately 250 these strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (called SNDVs). Without SALT II, if the present trend continued, as I believe it would, the Soviet Union would instead have about 3,000 such weapons by 1985, instead of 2,250. No operational U.S. system will have to be reduced.

Within the 2,250 overall limit, the treaty sets a lower limit of 1,200 for launchers of ballistic missiles that carry multiple warheads aimed at more than one target (these systems are called MIRVed). Also, the number of such launchers plus the number of heavy bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) cannot exceed 1,320.

Again, these limits hold the Soviets down to a level well below what I believe they otherwise could be expected to reach. For example, without SALT II I would expect them by 1985 to have 1,800 multiple-warhead missiles instead of 1,200.

The limits placed on heavy bombers with cruise missiles will permit us to build the heavy bomber forces we have planned by 1985. To the extent that we may be required to reduce multiple-warhead systems, they will be older ones (chiefly Minuteman III missiles of increasing vulnerability) whose place will be taken by heavy bombers with cruise missiles or Trident submarines, leaving us stronger.

The treaty also sets a sublimit of 820 on launchers for land-based missiles which have multiple warheads that can be aimed at more than one target (MIRVed ICBMs). Those are the most threatening part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal as far as we are concerned.

The 820 figure is at least 100 fewer than we expected a few years ago that the Soviets would reach even under the SALT II limits, and much lower than the number they could reach by 1985 without SALT given their current trend. The 820 figure, however, is well above the number we plan to deploy.

The treaty also contains qualitative limits. It limits each side to only one new type of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile, and it requires that any such new missile not carry more than ten independently targeted warheads or reentry vehicles (RVs).

This limit permits us to build the only new land-based missile we have planned to develop through 1985, the MX. It permits us to place on it the maximum number of warheads we intended, ten.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have been developing several new land-based missiles, their fifth generation of them. The treaty limit means that now all but one of those new missiles will have to be restricted to quite limited modifications of their predecessors. It will also mean that instead of developing a separate specialized new missile for each of several missions, the Soviets will have to make some tough choices. For example, they will have to choose either a replacement for their existing single-warhead land-based missile (the SS–11), or another new missile with up to 10 warheads to replace their SS–17's (4 warheads) and SS–19s (6 warheads). They cannot, under SALT II, develop both of these, nor can they develop a new type missile to replace the SS–18.

The treaty also places a limit on what we call "fractionation." This means that the number of reentry vehicles on existing or modified ICBMs cannot be increased from what it is now, and that the permitted new ICBM could not, if MIRVed, have more than 10 reentry vehicles.

We have no plans to increase the number of warheads on our principal land-based missile, the Minuteman III; doing so would not increase its military effectiveness. The Soviets, however, have much larger missiles that could be adapted to carry many more warheads. The treaty takes away the ability of the Soviets to exploit this. For example, except for this limit, the Soviet SS–18 missile could be equipped to carry 20 or even 30 independently targeted warheads in the 1980's. With SALT II, that will not happen.

The treaty also provides measures to permit unimpeded verification by national technical means.

This is a matter I shall cover in more detail when I return to testify on verification. For the present, I will note only the simple point that all the uncertainties we face about Soviet forces with SALT II would be greater without a SALT II agreement, because any deception, concealment and countermeasures which the treaty bans would be permitted.

So much for the treaty itself. The protocol covers a shorter period; it expires on December 31, 1981. It bars operational deployment of ground-launched and ship-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) with ranges greater than 600 kilometers through 1981, but it permits unimpeded testing and development of such vehicles of any range. This limit will have no impact whatsoever on our present cruise missile testing and development schedule. I might add that the protocol provision was adjusted to our schedules and not vice versa. The protocol also bars deployment of mobile land-based or air-to-surface ballistic missiles through 1981; again, this will not affect our MX development, which will not enter its flight-test phase until 1983.

Finally, the agreement includes a statement of principles to guide SALT III, plus Soviet commitments not to produce more than thirty Backfire bombers per year and to limit increases in its capability. The Backfire production restriction means that the Soviets now will not be able to divert Backfires to a strategic role (where they would add only marginally anyway) without greatly reducing Soviet capability for the naval and regional missions to which Backfires are normally assigned.

I consider SALT II a significant and most useful step, though not so far-reaching an agreement as we would have liked—or as we hope for in the future.

Our predecessors sought more far-reaching agreements at earlier stages of the talks, but finally accepted the more modest limits of the Vladivostok agreement. In 1977, at the beginning of this Administration, we attempted to achieve a comprehensive arms control agreement that would have been substantially more restrictive than the Vladivostok agreement—or the SALT II Treaty itself. But a number of technological and political factors prevented success. Not least was the Soviet insistence that the Vladivostok agreement had set the major parameters for SALT II, and that deeper cuts had to await the negotiation of SALT III.

We therefore took the dual track of trying to negotiate the largest possible reductions to the Vladivostok overall ceilings, and the lowest possible sublimits, while limiting qualitative improvements in new systems. We have achieved real successes in both areas.

We have been able to negotiate the reductions in the Vladivostok limits from 2,400 to 2,250 for the overall total. We have introduced new sublimits. Instead of 1,320 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, there can be only 1,200, while the 1,320 limit applies to the sum of those and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. There is also a new sublimit of 820 on land-based MIRVed ICBMs, the most destabilizing strategic force element.

In addition, we have broken significant new ground in the qualitative area by limits on numbers of reentry vehicles on each type of ICBM (and maximum limits for SLBMs) and by allowing each side only one new type of ICBM.

Taken together, these two tracks have resulted in a significant step forward in the arms control process, and it is a step that supports our strategic objectives.

A simple way to measure the utility of SALT II to our strategic objectives of deterrence and essential equivalence is to return to a fact I mentioned before in passing: Without the SALT II agreement, the Soviet Union could have nearly one-third more strategic systems than with the agreement—instead of the 2,250 delivery vehicles of the treaty, they could have 3,000. And there would be corresponding effects on other measures—including overall throw-weight, megatonnage, weapons numbers and the like. Naturally, we do not know what the soviets would do in the absence of a treaty, but these higher strategic system levels are well within their capability.

A Soviet buildup of this kind would pose greater challenge and make protecting our security more difficult in quite specific ways:

First, the simple addition of numbers would force us to increase our own programs still further to preserve essential equivalence, to maintain areas of U.S. advantage to offset Soviet leads in other areas.

Without SALT we would lose the greater predictability that is one of the agreement's most important contributions to stability. In my view, it is probable that without SALT II we would enter into an era of greater uncertainty—in both military and political terms—that would result in increased strategic forces on both sides, as hedges against that uncertainty. This would mean less rather than more security for the United States—and for the Soviet Union, too.

For, faced with such a Soviet buildup, the United States could—and I am confident would—respond. Given our determination to maintain essential equivalence, and the demonstrated Soviet willingness to avoid strategic inferiority even at great cost, the net result of such a numbers race would be greater strategic force levels at greater expense and at substantial risk to stability.

Second, while SALT II won't solve the Minuteman vulnerability problem it will make the solution of the problem easier than without an agreement. SALT II will limit, to well below previously projected levels, the number of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs. It will freeze the number of warheads on existing ballistic missile launchers, and will limit the number of reentry vehicles allowed for new ICBMs. These restrictions sharply reduce the significance of the Soviet throw-weight advantage, which, without limitation, would, for example, enable them to deploy many more than the 10 warhead limit on their largest ICBMs.

The combination of limitations on missile launchers and numbers of warheads per missile limits the total number of ICBM warheads well below what it could otherwise be. This will ease somewhat the task of maintaining the survivability of our land-based ICBMs. The deployment of a new mobile ICBM system, regardless of basing mode, will be more feasible because an upper bound will be placed on the number of warheads that can be aimed at the targets represented by that deployment. Even if the fractionation and MIRVed ICBM limits were not continued after 1985, the inability to test much larger numbers of warheads (or add more MIRVed ICBMs) before the Treaty expires would delay the Soviet capability to increase the threat to our mobile systems. It will thus improve what I judge to be already a favorable cost-exchange ratio for the MX versus the soviet systems that threaten it. (That is, it will be easier and cheaper for us to add hard aim points to the MX system to preserve its survivability than for the Soviets to add missiles or reentry vehicles to attack it.) SALT II becomes, then, an important element in ensuring ICBM survivability.

Third, to the extent that, as seems to me extremely likely, the lack of SALT limits would result in greater Soviet programs, and larger U.S. responses, we would be diverting scarce defense resources. In the final analysis, the United States does not have unlimited resources to spend on strategic weapons programs without significantly affecting other defense priorities—such as improvements in conventional forces—or risking negative effects on our domestic situation, in terms, for example, of social needs and inflationary pressures.

SALT will not by itself be the solution to our strategic nuclear force problems. Even with SALT we will need to, and we will be permitted to, expand our strategic military force program efforts above their present levels. Those levels, significantly, are about half, in constant dollar terms, of what they were during the mid-1960's. But SALT will mean greater stability and predictability in the strategic challenges we face, and so the balance will be maintainable at a substantially lower level of destructive power than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, with SALT, it would be significantly less expensive (perhaps as much as $30 billion less expensive over the next decade) for the United States to maintain that balance than without a SALT II agreement. Those additional costs represent a rough estimate of the kinds

of additional increases we would need to expand our present programs further (or add new ones) to meet increased Soviet efforts. The $30 billion is by no means a maximum possible additional cost; it does not, for example, take into account the effects on U.S. programs if Soviet buildups were to continue beyond 1985—or if the collapse of the effort to limit offensive arms also meant an end to the ABM Treaty.

SALT II, while forestalling this unproductive numbers race, will leave us the flexibility to carry out the important qualitative programs to deal with the challenges the treaty will not eliminate. We can develop, test, and deploy each of our planned programs—cruise missiles, Trident, MX—in the fashion, and on schedule, that we have planned. Apart from putting some distinguishing features on our ALCMs and cruise missile carriers (to aid counting under SALT), we will not be forced by SALT II to alter our strategic programs; which we need to balance Soviet programs that are allowed in SALT II and that are, in large measure, already in place. SALT II will also leave us free to pursue with our allies the important issues of modernization of NATO's intermediate-range or theater nuclear forces (TNF), and to consider arms control initiatives in this area.

Some have argued that we should link the SALT II agreement to Soviet behavior in other areas. For example, the Soviets and we are certainly completely at odds about Soviet and Soviet-sponsored destabilizing actions in developing areas of the world—and about U.S. concerns for protection of fundamental human rights. These are expressions of the fundamental differences in world view that makes us adversaries. That adversarial relationship in turn motivates the strategic arms competition and—carried to its extreme—could produce a nuclear conflict. But the SALT II Treaty is in the interest of both nations. For the U.S to frustrate its own interests by insisting on such linkage makes no more sense than for the Soviets to use the threat of SALT II rejection to try to inhibit the development of close and friendly relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Concern has also been expressed that SALT II ratification will encourage complacency and cause the U.S. to fail to do what is necessary to retain adequate deterrence and essential equivalence in strategic forces. In fact the SALT II debate is likely to have the opposite effect. An understanding of the strategic situation will promote awareness of what we need to assure our security in strategic nuclear terms—insofar as security is feasible in the era of thermonuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles and strategic bombers.

If SALT is rejected or otherwise fails to come into effect, it is not certain that U.S. actions on strategic forces (as compared to Soviet actions) would produce a more favorable balance than will result under SALT II. The United States could—and I think would—respond to a heightened competition in strategic arms if we had to. The result, however, would be more weapons, higher costs, and probably less security—for both sides. In any event, to quote a recent Chicago Tribune editorial, "We have no need to terrify ourselves into doing what is necessary for our security." We intend to do what is necessary. Less will be necessary under SALT II than without it, and we will be at least as likely to do what is necessary. From this as from other points of view, SALT II is a contribution to our national security.

In conclusion, it is my considered judgment that the SALT II treaty will serve the defense interests of the United States. It enhances stability. It allows us the flexibility to modernize our strategic forces to maintain deterrence and equivalence without unnecessarily expensive and potentially destabilizing strategic nuclear arms competition. I do not doubt our economic or technical ability to compete successfully with the Soviets in strategic weapons. I do question whether such an effort is desirable if we can avoid a part of it through strategic arms limitation. And I do not believe that we would find our security increased after such a further round of competition.

Under the treaty, we can maintain flexibility and credible deterrence, and assure essential equivalence. Without the treaty, we could also do these things, but it would be more costly and less certain. I see the treaty as a valuable method of meeting our strategic goals—as a major component in our efforts to do so, along with our weapons programs. In my judgment, it is a very important component, although I emphasize that it will have to be accompained by substantial U.S. defense programs, and particularly by expanded ones in the strategic field.

That is my analysis of this treaty. I believe that though the limitations it imposes are modest ones, they are important, and the treaty an important step toward increasing our military security. It clearly limits the Soviet threat with which we will have to contend, while not substantially constraining what we would otherwise plan to develop and deploy.

My professional career of more than thirty years has been devoted principally to maintaining the security of the United States, in a period during which internation-

al developments and technological advances have made that goal attainable only to a rather limited degree. I have personally seen tens of nuclear explosions, some of them of many megatons, but I do not pretend to know what a full-scale nuclear war would be like. I am utterly convinced that it would be dreadful beyond imagination.

To make it less likely, we have to do two things. We have to remain strong militarily—second to none. SALT II allows us to do that—but we must retain the will and make the sacrifices to do it. And we must limit, and then reduce, nuclear arsenals, and prevent their further proliferation to non-nuclear nations. SALT II, which protects and enhances the military security of the United States, is a modest but vital step along that road. We must not fail to take that step.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for a very comprehensive statement.

May I suggest in the first place that you make these charts available, in smaller form, to the members of the committee and also to the members of the press.

Secretary BROWN. We will distribute them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I want to acknowledge at the witness table the presence of Ambassador Earle, who was our negotiator during the last stages of the negotiations for SALT II, a negotiation that lasted nearly 7 years.

Mr. Ambassador, we appreciate your presence.

Ambassador EARLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Vance, I commence the questioning this morning with a reference to past history.

TRANSMISSION OF ALL FORMAL SALT II DOCUMENTS TO SENATE COMMITTEE

When this committee held hearings on SALT I, the Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, declared on June 19, 1972, categorically, "There are no secret agreements."

Within 6 weeks after the Secretary made that statement we were later to discover that Mr. Kissinger, acting in his capacity as National Security Adviser to the President, had entered into a secret clarification with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, which involved the treatment of G-class Russian submarines under the Protocol to the Interim Agreement. Then, later, it was discovered, according to Secretary Kissinger, that President Nixon informed Chairman Brezhnev that the United States would not deploy the maximum number of submarine missiles permissible under the ceiling of the agreement reached at Vladivostok.

I don't want any surprises of that kind in the course of our consideration of the SALT II agreement. So, at the outset, let me ask you this question.

Do the SALT II documents that have been formally transmitted to the Senate and the committee contain all of the obligations to be assumed by the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to strategic offensive arms? In particular, are there any agreements, understandings, undertakings, or clarifications, either written or oral, relevant to SALT II that are not contained in these documents?

Secretary VANCE. Mr. Chairman, the documents which the President has transmitted to the Senate contain all of the obligations to which the parties have agreed.

In order to be absolutely clear on this, however, I would note that statements were made by each side over the course of the negotiating period concerning various provisions of the treaty. The important statements of this character which were made by the United States are set out in the annex to my report to the President, which is contained in the documents which are before your committee.

These statements do not alter the treaty, but they will be relevant to interpretations of the treaty.

I am sure that in the course of these hearings the meaning of the provisions will be fully examined by the members of this committee. In that examination, we stand ready to provide additional summaries from the negotiating history in answering particular questions that may arise.

LEGAL STATUS OF DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED BY PRESIDENT FOR SENATE'S INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, two documents have been formally transmitted by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent: The treaty and the protocol. The other documents, transmitted on June 22, 1979, have been transmitted by the President for the Senate's information, not for its advice and consent.

What is the legal status of these other documents?

Secretary VANCE. Here, again, Mr. Chairman, the agreed statements and common understandings and the other documents which have been transmitted to the Congress are not formally a part of the treaty. The treaty itself sets forth the basic rights and the basic obligations of the parties and the agreed statements and common understandings record the understandings as to details or interpretations and applications of the treaty.

It has been traditional U.S. practice in regard to such related documents, but not part of a treaty, for them to be transmitted to the Congress for its information, but not to be ratified as is the treaty.

I would point out that this practice was followed in connection with the agreed interpretations which were submitted at the time of the SALT I agreement. The same practice was followed recently in connection with the Panama Canal treaties.

DIFFERENCE IN LEGAL STATUS BETWEEN AGREED STATEMENT, COMMON UNDERSTANDING

The CHAIRMAN. A careful reading of this treaty, however, Mr. Secretary, serves to underscore the importance of the so-called agreed statements and common understanding. It is a highly complex treaty. The interpretations of the meaning of each sentence are, in my judgment, as important as the actual text of the treaty itself.

The first thing one observes in the reading of the treaty is that there are two categories: agreed statements and common under-

standings. Is there any difference in legal status between an agreed statement and a common understanding?

Secretary VANCE. None.

AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS REPRESENT BINDING OBLIGATIONS OF TWO PARTIES

The CHAIRMAN. Then do the agreed statements and/or the common understandings represent binding obligations of the two parties?

Secretary VANCE. The answer clearly is yes. They were signed by the heads of the two governments involved and there is no question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. So, they will not be regarded simply as negotiating history from which to interpret the obligations contained in the treaty, but will have equal, binding force with the treaty itself?

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

RESERVATION IN CORPORATING AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDING AS PART OF TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Then why should not the Senate consider them as part of the treaty itself? Why should the Senate not, by means of reservation, incorporate these agreed statements and common understandings so that there can be no question in the future as to their binding effect?

Secretary VANCE. The Senate has the power to express its views with respect to these. But, as I said, as a matter of practice, they have not normally been submitted for ratification. This is because when there is ratification of a treaty, that ratification encompasses the agreed statements and common understandings.

The CHAIRMAN. Then nothing would be lost if the Senate were to make that explicit, either by way of an understanding or by way of a reservation. Is that not so?

Secretary VANCE. I think nothing would be lost in that case.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing would be lost.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, because that is the clear understanding of what the law and practice is.

The CHAIRMAN. But such an explicit statement of understanding or such an explicit reservation would eliminate any doubt in the future, would it not?

Secretary VANCE. The Soviets understand it in that way. There is no question of that.

The CHAIRMAN. The next question I would like to address to Secretary Brown.

TRENDS IN STRATEGIC BALANCE

In 1972, when the SALT I agreement was concluded, both we and the Soviets had about 2,400 strategic missile launchers and bombers. At that time, the United States had more bombers and submarines and about 2½ times as many nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union. Since then, the Soviets have nearly doubled the size of their submarine force and deployed three new types of ICBM's. They have narrowed the qualitative gap between their forces and ours,

while improving 350 launchers. By the early 1980's, the administration projects that the Soviet Union will have deployed almost as many nuclear warheads as the United States, while retaining the larger yield advantage of their heavier missiles, and that they will have further improved the quality of their strategic forces.

On the basis of these figures and trends, do you believe that we have maintained equality? Certainly we have lost the advantage that we once possessed at the time of the SALT I agreement. Or, is this trend one of slipping into a position of strategic inferiority with respect to the Soviets?

Secretary BROWN. The trends in the strategic balance have been adverse to the United States, Mr. Chairman, and that is a matter of concern. In fact, it is this trend which causes some people to assert—incorrectly, in my view—that the United States is now strategically inferior. It is not. But people tend to project trends, and with some reason.

During the period between the signing of SALT I and now, a period of just about 7 years, the Soviets have been devoting about two and a half to three times as much in the way of resources to strategic forces as has the United States. The effect is what you would expect.

This has not been enough to give them strategic superiority to this point. I believe that by pursuing the strategic programs that this administration has decided upon, and by pursuing them vigorously, we will be able to prevent the Soviets from gaining strategic superiority through the period of the treaty, that is, through 1985.

They will have the edge in 1985 by some measures. We will still have the edge in other measures. In some of those—as in total number of weapons, which you indicated—that advantage will not be as great as it is now. But it will continue to exist.

On Wednesday, when I will be testifying before this committee at greater length on the military balance, I will give some example of ways to measure the strategic balance that will indicate that in 1985, we will still have strategic equivalence. We will have lost some more of the advantage that we had, but we will stilI have strategic equivalence.

Without SALT—and this is the important point to make—the greater momentum that the Soviets had in 1972, which enabled them to improve the balance from their point of view between then and now, and which they have kept up, will give them an even greater improvement in the balance from their point of view. SALT II constrains them more than it constrains us. It thereby gives us the possibility and improves our opportunity to assure that the strategic balance does not tilt against us. But by itself, it does not assure that the strategic balance will not tilt against us. We have to go ahead with programs to balance the momentum of programs that the Soviets already have going.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. This is a subject which we will pursue in greater detail.

Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INJUNCTION THAT RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS WOULD "KILL" TREATY

Mr. Secretary, you have already stated that you see no reason why the Senate should not include an understanding or a reservation regarding these agreements to which we referred and which do not require our advice and consent.

Under those circumstances, why did the President consider it desirable or necessary to, in effect, join with Brezhnev or Gromyko, warning that if there were any reservations or amendments, this would mark the end of the treaty and that we therefore should not do it? Why did he have to join with them in this? Why could he not just say that the Senate is an independent body and it will judge whether or not it is desirable to jeopardize the mutual agreement on this treaty by a reservation or agreement, but I am not going to tell it what it should and should not do. What dictated that he should join the other side in this injunction?

Secretary VANCE. Senator Javits, the President made his statement before any statements were made by the Soviets.

We recognize the Senate's power to advise and consent and that it includes the power to advise that particular amendments or reservations be adopted. However, we believe that the treaty and the protocol are fair and balanced as they stand, and that ratification of the treaty and the protocol in the form in which they stand are in the national interest.

Any proposed amendment or reservation has to be analyzed on the basis of whether or not it is in our overall interests, whether or not it is negotiable, and whether or not the inclusion of such an amendment or such a reservation would lead to reopening points that would possibly lead to resolutions contrary to our national interest. It could also lead to the question of whether or not the consequence would be no SALT II Treaty at all.

The simple point is that the President believes, as I do, that the treaty and the protocol, as presently drafted and presently laid before you, are clear, are sound, are in the national interest, do enhance our national security, and that amendments and/or reservations and understandings are not necessary.

RETURNING TREATY TO SOVIETS WITH RESERVATIONS, AMENDMENTS

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, does that mean that the President will or will not take to the Soviets any reservation or amendment that the Senate concludes is necessary and ask them to agree?

Secretary VANCE. Senator, I would hope that before we get down to the question of possible amendments, understandings, reservations, and so forth, the Congress would listen to all of the testimony and at that time make its decision as to whether or not it, in its wisdom, believes it is necessary to take such action.

Obviously, if such action is taken, then that is the will of the Congress. The Congress has the power to do this. But I would hope that it would do this with great care and great caution.

Senator JAVITS. I think the Congress would exercise even greater care if we understood it also to be the duty of the President, as he

sees it, to take what the Congress does and try to get it done that way.

Secretary VANCE. What the Congress does the President will have to accept. There is no question about that.

The point which I want to make—and which I will emphasize again—as you all have said and all of you I know feel very deeply it is a very solemn responsibility. Therefore, any suggestions with respect to amendments, reservations, and understandings is one that should be exercised only in the case of clear and urgent need.

Senator JAVITS. Do I understand that the President will do his duty in that event?

Secretary VANCE. Obviously the President will do his duty.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

I find an inconsistency between your statement and that of the Secretary of Defense in one area. I think it is very important to rationalize it for the country.

TWIN OBJECTIVES OF EQUIVALENCE, DETERRENCE

You speak of the "twin objectives" of equivalence and deterrence. The Secretary of State, in his statement, says, "It will permit and, in fact, aid the necessary modernization of our strategic forces. SALT II will permit the necessary modernization of each of these three forces." The Secretary of Defense says the same thing. In his statement he says, "In fact, we need to increase our present levels of such programs overall, regardless of this treaty." Then he adds the following, which I find very illuminating. "In short, our military security can be enhanced either by increasing our own defense programs or by limiting the forces of the Soviet Union." Then he goes on to say, "Arms control, carried out with balance and care, can add to our military security, just as can added defense programs. SALT II takes that approach toward making this country safer."

I ask you this, gentlemen. Must we understand when we adopt SALT II that we are also adopting a major program of modernization and catchup for our forces because, while we may be equivalent now, you really do not expect us to be equivalent in 1985 unless we engage this massive program. My question is this: What does this program amount to? We need to know that, too.

Secretary BROWN. Senator Javits, I think you have stated not the inconsistency, but the paradox, and I believe you have resolved it in what you have said.

The security of the United States depends on what the United States has in the way of strategic weapons and what the Soviets have in the way of strategic weapons, plus a great many other factors, too. Essential equivalence depends upon a comparison of those two forces, which is a difficult and complex matter simply because strategic forces have many different components and it is possible to imagine their use in many different scenarios.

The United States now has strategic equivalence. The Soviets have a substantial program that will increase their capability between now and 1985. Without SALT, they could increase it very much more than that. We have to respond to that. This means that we are going to have to go forward with a strategic program of our

own which will increase our capability above what it is now in effectiveness, and it will require us to put more effort into strategic programs than we have during the past 7 or 8 years—although not as much as we would have to if there were no SALT II agreement.

COST TO UNITED STATES OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

You ask how much will this cost. I can give you a rough estimate. This all depends upon how you calculate and what you count in the way of infrastructure and how you allocate other costs. We are now spending about $10 billion a year directly on strategic forces in 1980 dollars. The program that we project through 1985 will probably require us to increase that number, in 1980 dollars, by about 25 percent. That will still be only about half—again, in constant dollars—of the rate at which we spent during the late 1950's and early to mid-1960's. But, it will be about $2 or $3 billion—again, in 1980 dollars—less than we would have to spend if there were no SALT II agreement and if the Soviets went ahead at their current momentum, which they could do very easily, and we had to respond to assure essential equivalence at that higher level.

To summarize, as you have said, these are two parallel tracks, and we must take both of them. To agree to SALT II and then, for example, to dismantle all of our strategic nuclear forces—which it is allowed for us to do under SALT—would certainly not produce essential equivalence. The question will continue to be, as it has been, how much is enough and what produces essential equivalence.

We have a program that will assure essential equivalence. That program will cost us less—substantially less—than the program we would have to follow if there were no SALT II and the Soviets expanded their forces.

Senator JAVITS. To sum up the figures, it is $10 billion now and it has to be $12.5 billion in order to modernize and catch up. We admit that we have slipped seriously behind.

Secretary BROWN. In rate.

Senator JAVITS. It is $15 to $16 billion if there is no SALT agreement. Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; that is correct. Now, there are always many uncertainties, and my estimates are all in fiscal year 1980 dollars. They do not include all of the indirect costs, either. But that is roughly the situation.

Incidentally, I should say that not only is it uncertain to project these now, but without SALT, it becomes much more uncertain.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NATO ALLY VIEWS ON SALT II RATIFICATION

Secretary Vance, I would like to support your statement about the views of our NATO allies.

I was the chairman of the Senate Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly in November, and I went to the spring meeting in

Norway. There is no question but that every single one of those governments would like to see us ratify SALT II.

PROBLEM OF TREATY COMPLEXITY

There is a problem for the American people and for some of us too in the Senate, and that is the complexity of the treaty. It is like comparing apples, oranges, bananas, and pears and trying to achieve an even balance. For example, how do you weigh accuracy against throw-weight? Once upon a time, David may have had great accuracy against Goliath, but in the long haul, Goliath would win. We have to weigh the different factors, such as the Backfire versus the U.S. systems.

PROJECTED COST INCREASES TO SOVIETS IF TREATY REJECTED

Touching for a moment on the cost factor, what would be the increased cost to the Soviet Union if we rejected the treaty, in your view? Or, have there been such estimates made?

Secretary BROWN. We have made rough estimates. Again, I think we are talking about several billions of dollars a year. It is harder for us to project those, but they would be substantial. Indeed, those additional costs would, in some ways, hurt the Soviets more than additional costs would hurt us because their economy already devotes 12 to 15 percent of its gross national product to military expenditures, as compared to under 5 percent for us. On the other hand, they have, in the past, shown an ability to take that increased pain rather more than we have.

Senator PELL. Because we are not in the same economic imperative as they are, that is perhaps one more banana or apple to add into the equation.

My next question is directed at Secretary Vance.

INCLUSION OF FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, SOVIET POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Mr. Secretary, as we know, the forward-based systems, the theater systems, have not been included. If a city is destroyed or a person killed, it is the same whether it is done by a forward-based or a strategic system. It is my understanding that we have more than 900 forward-based systems, versus 175 for the Soviet Union. This would seem to give us a tremendous advantage in that area.

I wonder, with your experience in politics through various administrations, what is your view of the following. If the Soviet Union had a Senate and a democratic form of government, do you think that Senate would ratify this treaty—if it were like our Senate?

Secretary VANCE. The issue of forward-based systems has been one of the key issues that has threaded its way through all of the SALT negotiations. The Soviets have tried to include forward-based systems of the United States in the negotiations. We have resisted this. We have successfully resisted it and it is not included in this treaty.

I would think that this is something that a Senate in another country would look at very hard, because I think it is a major

factor in the overall balance of the treaty. They are not included and they are a very strong and powerful force.

Senator PELL. Yes; it is a 6 to 1 advantage which we have and I would think they would want it included.

My next question is directed to Secretary Brown.

Mr. Secretary, why is it that we violated the provisions of SALT I by covering our ICBM sites with canvas or material which prevented the Soviets from checking those sites for a period of 4 years? I understand that the President relayed instructions that this practice was to cease a long time ago, but that his orders were not carried out until May 22 of this year. Why was there the delay?

Secretary BROWN. Senator Pell, before I respond to that charge—to which we have already responded to the Soviet Union—let me comment also on your previous point, if I may.

I do not wish to face the prospect of a Soviet Senate, so let me just talk about the Soviet negotiators.

The Soviet position has not been that the intermediate-range forces on both sides should be counted. It has been that the U.S. forces, our forward-based systems, carrier-based aircraft and so on, should be counted and the Soviet systems should not. They do not view the Soviet intermediate-range systems as strategic. They claim that they cannot attack the United States, whereas some of the U.S. forward-based systems, they claim, can attack the Soviet Union.

Indeed, these are very different kinds of systems. The ones about which we are talking for the Soviet Union are, principally, the SS-20 and earlier versions, the SS-4 and SS-5, of their intermediate-range missiles, and their Backfires. Those are both very formidable systems. They are not really to be compared with an F-4, for example. The numbers, therefore, do not describe the situation at all precisely.

The main point that I would want to convey here is that we have succeeded in excluding from the totals the forward-based systems. The Soviets have succeeded in excluding from the aggregate the SS-20 and the Backfire. But they have made very significant concessions in limiting the Backfire in terms of its numbers and in terms of its future upgrading.

Let me turn now to the Minuteman covers.

ENVIRONMENTAL SHELTERS USED TO FACILITATE WORK AT MINUTEMAN III SILOS

The United States and the Soviet Union have each used environmental shelters to carry out work underneath those shelters on missile silos. We have been able to determine adequately what has been going on in the way of silo change, despite that. We do that, as will become clear in some of the classified testimony on verification, at an early stage of construction.

While I do not want to characterize the motives of the Soviets, they have complained for a number of years that they cannot tell what is going on under our environmental shelters that have been used to facilitate work at increasing the hardness of Minuteman III silos. We have responded to that, first by reducing their size and, subsequently, by removing them. The Soviet claim is, apparently,

that they cannot tell enough about our programs, despite all of the hearings that exist on them, and that national technical means [NTM] are the sole legitimate means. We have not violated the agreement. We have made it possible for the Soviets to verify what is going on regarding construction at our sites, and we will continue to do so.

DELAY IN CARRYING OUT ORDER TO REMOVE ENVIRONMENTAL COVERS

Senator PELL. Is it a correct statement to say that instructions were issued from our high command to get rid of those environmental covers several years ago and that there was a delay in carrying out those orders?

Secretary BROWN. No, that is not correct.

We first agreed to reduce them in size to be comparable in size to what the Soviets had. Subsequently, during the negotiations, the Soviets pressed for complete removal. Because we believe rather strongly that compliance with verification and no impeding of national technical means is important, we agreed to do that, and then we did it.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

My next question is directed to Secretary Vance.

Mr. Secretary, I have heard that you requested the Air Force to remove those covers. Is that correct?

Secretary VANCE. We discussed the question of removing shelters, and we agreed that when certain actions were taken on their part that we would remove the shelters.

When we finally negotiated that provision out, we did immediately execute the order for the pulling down of the shelters.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The only reason I wanted to ventilate this point is that it takes two to tango. Also, we must view this from the viewpoint of the adversary, as well as our own. This is why to my mind when we look at it from our viewpoint, we emphasize our disadvantages and when we neglect to look at it from their viewpoint, we emphasize only our thought of violation and fail to see the other side.

Secretary BROWN. I agree, Senator Pell. I think we have to remember that each side is barred from silo shelters that impede, even if it is not deliberate.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next questioner is Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING TREATY, PROTOCOL

Gentlemen, let me first indicate that several months ago I announced in my own State of Illinois, after several months of study of this issue, that there were four criteria that I would use to evaluate the treaty and the protocol to form a judgment as to whether they are in our national interest. I would like to express my appreciation to the State Department, the Department of Defense, General Seignious, and Ambassador Earle as well as the CIA

for the invaluable help that all of us have had in trying to determine what is in our national interest. They have provided indepth information that must be weighed in making our judgment.

The four criteria that I have established are these.

First, it is essential that this treaty and the protocol not in any way undermine the security of our NATO allies, our own first line of defense.

Second, it is essential that the treaties be fully balanced. They must really be the result of hard bargaining on our part.

Third, it is important that they not indefinitely limit U.S. flexibility to build weapons systems deemed necessary for our own national security. There are limitations in the protocol right now in that area.

Fourth, it is essential that we be able to detect any cheating in which the Soviets might engage that would in any way undermine our own national security. In other words, the treaties must be verifiable.

CONCERNS OF NATO ALLIES

Today, in the limited time we have, we can only deal with the first point, that of our NATO allies.

I think it is essential that we look at some of the concerns that I understand some of our NATO allies have had. As I understood it, their first concern was the range limit placed on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles deployed during the protocol period. The second is a desire not to limit in any way our traditional pattern of defense cooperation—in other words, sharing technology with them that would help them secure their own defense.

I am now considering introducing two understandings to the treaty that are designed to reassure our NATO allies and ourselves that the treaty will not work against their and our interest, and to demonstrate to the Soviet Union the strength, vitality, and permanence of our bonds with our European allies.

I would like to ask you about these two understandings. The first would state that the treaty protocol, which includes limits on the deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles with more than a 600 kilometer range, cannot be extended without the advice and consent of the Senate.

This matter has concerned other colleagues of mine, such as Senator Gary Hart.

The second understanding would state that nothing in the treaty prohibits the United States from continuing traditional patterns of allied defense cooperation, including the transfer of cruise missile technology to our allies, if it is deemed that this transfer of technology is necessary.

Secretary VANCE. Would you repeat the second one, please.

Senator PERCY. The second was that there would be nothing in the treaty that would prohibit the United States from continuing its traditional pattern of allied defense cooperation, including the transfer of technology and knowhow to our allies, deemed necessary for their own security.

I would like to go back to General deGaulle's original skepticism about U.S. commitments to use and maintain a so-called nuclear umbrella over Europe. His view was epitomized in his question. I

will quote what he asked, "Would the United States sacrifice New York to try to save Paris?"

STRENGTH OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE

Would each of you comment on how strong our commitment to Europe's defense is. You have been in consultation steadily with our NATO allies. Please include our willingness to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, and the will to do it, to defend Europe in the case of an attack.

Secretary VANCE. Let me start off.

First, insofar as our commitment to our allies, there can be no question about that. We have made it clear to them, time and again, that our commitment to them is unshakeable.

Senator Percy, I believe that they believe that. I really don't know that there is much more to say about that than what I have already said.

Second, with respect to your second suggestion, there is nothing in the treaty which precludes us from continuing our traditional exchanges with them with respect to the cooperation and collaboration which we have had in the past, nor which precludes cooperation in modernization of their forces.

I do not think that it is necessary for there to be any reservation or understanding with respect to that. This is very clear. As you know, we have given an interpretive statement of the noncircumvention clause to our allies. They are satisfied with that. I will talk more about that in detail tomorrow. I think that fully meets the objective which you are seeking, and I think it is unnecessary to have any reservation or understanding.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Secretary Brown.

CRUISE MISSILE RANGE LIMITATION

Secretary BROWN. Let me speak briefly to the cruise missile range issue and then perhaps comment on the other points as well.

The cruise missile range limitation applies to ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles deployed before the end of 1981. It does not apply to development and testing of such cruise missiles to any range whatever, nor does it apply to deployment after that date. Therefore, our programs for ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles are not, in practice, limited in any way by the protocol, because we will not be in a position to deploy them, which deployments we are discussing with our NATO allies, until well after the expiration of the protocol at the end of 1981.

This fact is what reassures our allies.

Both we and the Soviets, in our negotiations, have made clear that the protocol limits expire with the protocol. So, I do not think there is any need to incorporate that into a reservation. It is clear in the negotiating record.

On the issue of cooperation with the allies, the Soviets attempted to get a nontransfer provision into this agreement, into this treaty. You will recall that there is a nontransfer provision in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They attempted to do that in this one, and we rejected it. So, the record is clear that our patterns of coopera-

tion, either past or future, for the purpose of modernization, are not limited by the treaty. It contains a noncircumvention clause, which does not impose any restriction on us that we would not feel bound by, even in its absence. The noncircumvention clause really says that neither country shall do anything to undermine the purpose of the agreement.

I have some concern that if a reservation is incorporated in, specifically referring to nontransfer or to cruise missile, this would somehow imply that we would have to get Soviet permission otherwise, in order to continue those patterns of cooperation, and they could come back to us later and say on anything that was not covered specifically in such a reservation that this is not exempted because it was not in the reservation.

This is another indication of why we should be very careful about how we approach these matters.

ARTICLE XII EFFECT ON U.S. PLEDGE TO NATO ALLIES

Senator PERCY. The reason for my concern and the reason for the concern expressed by some of our allies, Mr. Secretary, is in article XII, where we pledge in this treaty not to circumvent the treaty through any other state or states.

Would this pledge in any way discourage us from transferring technology to our NATO allies? What is the actual effect of that pledge?

Secretary BROWN. It would prevent us from transferring only technology unique to systems that are prohibited to us by the agreement.

For example, we are not allowed to emplace weapons on the seabed, and if we were to transfer to them technology that were uniquely for that purpose, this would be a circumvention of the treaty.

But this does not at all apply to the kinds of things on which we have cooperated with our allies or intend to cooperate with them in, specifically including ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.

PROTOCOL EXTENSION

Senator PERCY. The protocol ends in 1981 and the treaty in 1985. The protocol prohibits our deployment of a new missile system, and places a prohibition on the new ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile deployment. We saw in the Taiwan treaty termination case that the President thought he could, as he did, annul a treaty. Now could he extend the time of the SALT protocol unilaterally? Would there be any objection to our having an understanding that makes explicitly clear that the President could not extend the time of that protocol without the advice and consent of the Senate?

Secretary VANCE. The protocol expires by its terms. It is very clear that it expires by its terms. It expires at the end of 1981. It could not be extended without coming back again to the Congress.

Secretary BROWN. That is my view also, Senator.

Senator PERCY. That is your view, too, Secretary Brown.

I thank you both very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator McGovern.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, and Ambassador Earle.

CONCERNS ABOUT SALT PROCESS

I think my concern over this treaty may be somewhat different than that of some of my colleagues on the committee in that I am not so concerned over the exact phrasing contained in the treaty as I am over the SALT process itself, which includes the negotiations during the treatymaking phase of it, and also the ratification process and what is going to be involved in getting 67 Senators to agree to vote for this treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to use a few minutes of my allotted time to clarify some of my concerns. Then, whatever time I have left I would use for questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You may use your time, Senator, in any way that you wish.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you.

The question is whether SALT II is really a formula for arms limitation or arms escalation.

I think if the SALT II Treaty were the end of the line, it wouldn't really make very much difference whether we ratify it or whether we do not. But, if it sets the stage for genuine future arms reductions, then that is a matter worth considering.

The facts are these. Since the SALT talks began in 1969, we have doubled our warheads. We have improved the accuracy of our missiles. We have increased the destructiveness of that strategic system. We have spent $125 billion on strategic programs during the SALT process to date.

And yet, the irony of all of this is we find ourselves feeling more threatened, more insecure, and more vulnerable than when we began the SALT process a decade ago. Presumably, the Soviets are in the same predicament.

The main issue in these hearings to me is whether the SALT process in general, and the SALT II Treaty in particular, offer the American people a realistic hope that the arms race can be reversed.

I am not insisting on an ideal treaty. But I am not willing to endorse an arms control hoax which turns what is called a weapons limitation treaty into a nuclear expansion that is militarily unwarranted, that is fiscally wasteful and diplomatically destabilizing.

I know it is generally taken for granted that Senators with a philosophy and a viewpoint like mine can be counted on automatically to vote for an arms control treaty. But I do want to make it clear—and I think there are four or five other Members of the Senate who feel as I do—that we will not vote for the illusion of arms control.

I have not arrived at this position easily. I am deeply distressed that more business-as-usual in arms control and military policy will perpetuate the military vulnerability and the political paranoia which are the defining characteristics of this nuclear era.

We need new security policies to protect the United States and the entire world from nuclear destruction. We must face the unhappy fact of life that no nation can any longer unilaterally guarantee its own survival. We can build weapons to deter nuclear war. We can build weapons to assure destruction. But we cannot really protect ourselves if nuclear war comes.

The search for ways out of this dilemma is important. These hearings must be more than a confrontation between those who favor, let us say, the M–X, as the price for this treaty, and those who want even more. It must be more than a debate between those who see the Russians as 10 feet tall and those who view them as 13 feet tall.

In short, it must be more than a duel between the administration and its more severe cold war critics.

ALTERNATIVE THIRD POSITION SUPPORTED

There is an alternative third position which I will try to represent, along with several other Senators. While supporting a strong military deterrence for the United States, we believe that true security is attainable only by mutual and substantial arms reductions, not by the kind of expansions that apparently are forecast by this SALT II Treaty. Piling on more nuclear overkill does not enhance our diplomatic prestige or our military defense.

If the Soviets wish to bankrupt themselves on weapons programs, let them do it. Why should we follow them in the production of surplus weapons that go beyond any reasonable deterrence?

Instead, we believe in getting the United States off the treadmill of nuclear insecurity. During these hearings, I am going to make sure that this third position is examined and explained. This may be a three-sided debate. All three legs may not be equal in terms of votes, but this is one of the Triads that we are going to talk about—those who are for the treaty, those who are against it, and those who are still undecided, such as me.

In addition to scrutinizing the treaty for its military equity and its verifiability, I will be concentrating on other issues. First, does SALT III, as framed by the statement of principles, hold out a real promise for genuine reductions? Second, will the ratification price for SALT II cancel the promise of SALT III? Third, what are the real measures of national security?

Our total security posture should be examined in these hearings, not just in terms of sterile numbers, but in a much broader international and domestic context.

For example, the fate of the Shah of Iran should serve as a reminder that arsenals of sophisticated weapons alone are no guarantee of national security.

We cannot meet the challenges to our military security from abroad if we continue to flounder without a strong energy policy here at home. This is related directly to the issues that are before us in these hearings.

We have a responsibility to make these hearings relevant to the Americans waiting in gas lines or in checkout lines at the supermarket. Otherwise, we run the risk of formulating security policies

which lack broad popular understanding and support, thus handicapping our ability to move on to new arms control initiatives.

We cannot afford to let our strategic nuclear posture become a Maginot Line which diverts attention from the critical problems of inflation, fuel, and economic productivity. We have to ask whether the $100 billion or more—no one knows how much—in nuclear overkill which we will deploy during the life of this treaty is tolerable in an era of tight budgets and unmet economic and social needs.

Mr. Chairman, I will be making my own assessment of the treaty before deciding how to vote, keeping in mind the words of the late President Kennedy, that we need to pursue a "strategy of peace."

REDUCTIONS, RESTRAINTS FORESEEN UNDER SALT III

Secretary Vance, your statement, you mention that further reductions and tighter restraint are feasible in SALT III. I have heard this argument made frequently, even by some of the most ardent advocates of the treaty. They say it does not really accomplish much in terms of arms reductions. Secretary Brown has pointed out the expansions in our military posture that will take place even if SALT II is ratified. But there is the hope of SALT III.

What types of reductions and restraints do you foresee if we ratify SALT II and set the stage for a continuing SALT process?

Secretary VANCE. I would like very much to answer the last question, but I would like, if I might, to say something about your broader statement.

Senator MCGOVERN. Fine.

Secretary VANCE. First let me say that I share your deep concern that we should couple with the necessary defense measures to maintain strategic equivalence a real search for arms control. I do not think that they are inconsistent. I think that they are complementary, as I said in my statement.

SALT PROCESS ACCOMPLISHMENTS

I would take issue with you that nothing has been accomplished in the SALT process, which I think you were saying.

Senator MCGOVERN. I said not much.

Secretary VANCE. Just let me review some of the things that I think have been accomplished.

First, let me say that I think we all have to recognize that SALT is a process. It is a continuing process. It cannot be brought to a conclusion overnight. We have to move step by step along the way. We have done that in a series of steps, starting with SALT I, where we did freeze, for the first time, the numbers where they were. They were unequal numbers at that time, but that was a start and there was a freeze. We did have the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty enacted. In my judgment, that was a major step in true arms control.

Then we moved on to Vladivostok. There was an agreement with respect to equal numbers. Again, maybe it was not a tremendous step, but it was an important step.

Now we come to SALT II, and here I think we do have some important steps which are true arms control steps. Among these

are enshrining the principle of equal aggregates in the treaty, providing for the first time for actual reduction in the number of strategic weapons. On the qualitative side, we put limits on the qualitative improvements for the first time by limiting, for example, each side to one new land-based missile. We limited the number of warheads that can be carried on each land-based missile. This is the so-called fractionation limit, which puts a ceiling on how many warheads can be carried in each land-based missile. I think that is a very important step forward and it is one that should not be valued lightly, because I think it is important.

Coming on to the question of SALT III, I think SALT II does lay a basis for moving to SALT III. In SALT III, I think our hopes lie in several areas.

First, there is a clear commitment in the joint statement of principles to further reductions. The question of how great those reductions can be is obviously something that will have to be negotiated. I would hope that they could be deep reductions.

I cannot promise that they will, however, because, as all of us have tried in the past, when we went to get deep reductions, we found that you had to have two to tango, as we used to say when I was growing up, and if you could not get your partner on the other side of the negotiating table to agree to that, you could only go so far as was possible in the practical world in which you were living.

Obviously we will be pressing for deep cuts in terms of numbers of reductions.

Further, the principle is stated that there should be further qualitative constraints. I think here there is a real opportunity to move forward again.

There are a number of kinds of things which we suggested when we put our proposal on the table, when we first went to Moscow in March, where we did ask for deep cuts and real constraints on qualitative improvements, far beyond what we were able to get, which I think could be raised in SALT III. There is nothing to inhibit us from raising that.

Now, we can start on SALT III once this treaty goes into force. I think the most important thing right now is to ratify this treaty so that we can then move forward into SALT III and get going on those negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. I see that Secretary Brown is straining to respond. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired, but we will permit the Secretary to respond.

Secretary Brown. I will answer briefly and you can take the time from my time allotment. [General laughter.]

I would like to comment just very briefly on the assumptions in your statement, Senator McGovern, because I think those are important in a dialog that is going to continue during the hearings. I agree that there is a valid point of view that has not gotten sufficient attention.

Nevertheless, I would like to challenge a couple of your assumptions.

First of all, I don't believe the Soviets consider themselves less secure than they were in 1969 or in 1972. Their demeanor, their behavior, their statements, all tell me that they believe they are

now at least equivalent or approaching equivalence with the United States and that they were not so then.

Second, the administration does not intend to build, in order to get a SALT ratification or with a SALT ratification, what we do not think makes sense. We are not going to go ahead with any strategic system unless we believe that it is important and its costs justified by the national security.

Third, there has been continuity in progress. We are, in fact, spending, as I indicated earlier, less than half the money in constant dollars on strategic offensive forces that we were 15 or 18 years ago. This is at a time when our gross national product has risen. So, the percentage of gross national product going to strategic forces is probably like a third of what it then was. I personally think it has fallen too far.

With respect to SALT II, the chart that is before you makes it clear that, although it does not produce the reductions we would like to see and it does not mark an end to the strategic arms competition, there is no question but that without SALT II all those numbers will be bigger. Therefore, I agree with what Secretary Vance has said. What I would urge is ratification, approval of SALT II, and proceeding with SALT III in the direction, not necessarily in detail, but along the lines that you suggest.

HEARING PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. Before turning to Senator Baker, there is a brief announcement I would like to make concerning the plans of the committee for the balance of the day.

At 1:50 p.m., Senator Javits and I will have to go to the floor to present six different tax treaties—two with France, two with the United Kingdom, one with Hungary and one with South Korea. The Senate is scheduled to vote, en bloc, on those treaties at 2:20 this afternoon, following which the Senate will take up the reorganization plan for IDCA [International Development Cooperation Agency]. There will be a vote on that plan this afternoon.

With this in mind, and with the concurrence of other members of the committee, I propose that the committee complete the first round of questioning so that every Senator has his opportunity this morning. Then, since both our witnesses will be back—Secretary Vance tomorrow and Secretary Brown the following day—we will have, of course, plenty of opportunity to pursue our individual points.

This would mean that we should try to complete the hearing this morning by 1:50 or by 2 p.m. Then we will resume tomorrow morning.

If there is no objection to that plan, our next questioner is Senator Baker.

Senator BAKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,

Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, and Ambassador Earle, I thank all three of you for having the patience to be here and testify together. I think that will be very helpful to the committee.

I would like to thank each of you publicly for your hospitality and cooperation in previous meetings and encounters. I remember when I traveled to Geneva to witness firsthand the negotiating

process, Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown helped arrange that trip, and Ambassador Earle and his wife were very cordial and gracious while we were there. That was also the first encounter I ever had in Geneva with a $10 cheeseburger. [General laughter.]

If we think prices are high here, you ought to see what Ambassador Earle puts up with over there. But then, that is not why we are here.

Gentlemen, I would like to begin my time in this first round of questioning by agreeing with you. The question really is whether we are better off with or without this treaty. I accept that formulation.

I even accept the idea that the future of this treaty will have an effect on our progress in the next stages of the strategic arms limitation continuum—our continuing effort to reach a more agreeable, hospitable, sane and sensible time, when we won't be talking about 2,250 missiles, but will talk of 100 missiles or 10 missiles; when we can alleviate the great chaos of the human apprehension of nuclear holocaust.

QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR TREATY

In my mind, it is not a question of whether I support or whether this committee supports a treaty. It is a question of whether we support this treaty.

I think all of us would even agree that the test here is whether this treaty is the best treaty for the United States under these circumstances at this time. I supported SALT I. At the time I came to the Senate in 1967, however, the United States was in a vastly different situation than it is today. It was the undisputed, unchallenged military leader of the world. Our decisions were clearly capable of implementation.

How very different our situation is today. Now, some 12 years later, it is not so clear that the United States has the undoubted military authority to make a decision and make it stick; that is, the combination of enlightened diplomacy and authoritative military power. As in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, it was clear that when President John F. Kennedy stood his ground, the Russians blinked.

I want to make sure that in negotiating this treaty the Russians did not stand their ground and we blinked. This is the test: Whether or not we have done as well as we can under these circumstances; whether this treaty is the best opportunity for the United States or whether in these negotiations for this treaty we gave away the store. This really is the question.

I want to see a SALT II Treaty. I want to see SALT III, a SALT IV, a SALT V, and a SALT VI, and so on, until we have rid the world of the threat of nuclear holocaust. But I don't want to use the threat of nuclear holocaust to make me ratify a bad treaty.

There is a young man who flies for me in Tennessee. He lets me sit in the right seat of that small plane from time to time. The other day we were flying through a thunderstorm, and I was watching the radar screen intently for weather and severe turbulence. I had my head in the radar-scope. He touched me on the

shoulder and said, "Senator, why don't we turn that thing off before we scare ourselves."

You know, I sort of get the feeling that every time we conjure up the idea and the image of nuclear holocaust, if we are not careful, we are going to scare ourselves. We are not here to decide whether the world is going to be faced with nuclear holocaust. We are here to determine whether this treaty better serves the purpose of diminishing that prospect.

If we were still as strong as we were in 1967, I would not be quite as concerned about the equity, the fairness, and the lack of ambiguity in this contract document. But we are not. We are not the undisputed leader now of the entire world, and certainly the Free World.

I believe we are still stronger than the Soviet Union, but I am not sure that we are going to be stronger much longer, unless we change some of the decisions that have been made recently. But we are not the power that we were in 1967, when I came to the Senate. So, the inequities, the unevenness, the ambiguities, the uncertainty, the challenge to verification, and our ability to determine whether or not the Soviet Union lives up to this treaty become vitally important in view of this diminished role and power of the United States.

In the few minutes that I have remaining, let me put these questions to our witnesses.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ICBM AND MEGATONNAGE

In terms of the most awesome of all weapon systems, that terrible invention of this last third of the 20th century, the intercontinental ballistic missile, the real threat to the American homeland and to the Russian population, the device by which we each hold hostage maybe 100 million Americans to the threat of nuclear annihilation and by which maybe 100 million Russians are hostage to our retaliatory capability—in terms of these missiles, what is the ratio today between missiles and megatonnage? What is the explosive power of those weapons and what will it be in 1985, when this treaty expires?

Secretary BROWN. Let's look first at chart 3, which answers your question with respect to the present situation, Senator Baker. [See p. 99.]

As is implied, in a way, by your question, the Soviets do have substantially more throw-weight and, indeed, perhaps somewhat more re-entry vehicles on their ICBM's than we do. But one could put the same issue another way, in terms of the most survivable system, the one which the other side can be sure will be used against it and which cannot be wiped out by an initial attack. Take the submarine launched ballistic missile. How do the numbers look there? They look very, very different. They look overwhelmingly in favor of the United States.

This is why I think you cannot pick out one component and judge the treaty by it. The United States and the Soviet Union have followed different courses. I think you have to look at the entire force and compare the entire force.

Senator BAKER. Let me interrupt for just a moment, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BROWN. Surely.

Senator BAKER. Since I asked about ICBM's first, I did not mean to imply that that was the last question I had for you. I do have others.

If you don't mind, would you read into the record what the present numbers are for our ICBM force and theirs and what they will be in 1985, and the relative throw-weight at both times.

Secretary BROWN. Let me put it into the record. We happen to have fewer MIRVed ICBM launchers than the Soviets do now. We have 550 ICBM launchers that are MIRVed, and they have 608. Their ICBM throw-weight is, I would judge, about three times ours.

In 1985, it is difficult to say, but I can say this. The ratio will not be better for the United States on ICBM's without SALT II than it will be with SALT II.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry to interrupt you again, but there is enough lawyer left in me so that I keep trying to get an answer to that question.

Is it not true that in 1985, the Soviet Union, in terms of megatonnage—that is, deliverable, explosive power of their ICBM's—will outnumber the United States by between three and four to one?

Secretary BROWN. I think that is probably true for total ICBM megatonnage, with or without SALT II. Without SALT II, the ratio probably would be considerably higher.

Senator BAKER. It might—depending on decisions that both sides make and depending on what we do with respect to the next SALT treaty. Is that not so?

Secretary BROWN. Well, we are talking about the end of SALT II in both cases.

Senator BAKER. But we are also talking about SALT II as you have negotiated it. Under the terms of that treaty, is it not true that the Soviet Union will have between three and four times an advantage over the United States in the amount of nuclear explosive that it can plant on the United States?

Secretary BROWN. In terms of megatons delivered by ICBM's, yes; in terms of most other quantities, no, that is not so.

Senator BAKER. What is the ratio today?

Secretary BROWN. The ICBM megatonnage ratio today is probably 3 to 1 or thereabouts.

Senator BAKER. And it will be about 3 to 1 at the end of the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. This is my judgment on a military matter, and I think you have picked probably the least important criterion in your first question.

Senator BAKER. I understand.

TREATY IMPACT ON STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.

The yellow light has come on to signify that I do not have much more time, but let me simply say this. This question was chosen not to be a definitive statement of the relative strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, but rather to point out that

there are a series of balancing judgments that we must make and that you have already made.

Is it better to increase the advantage of the Soviet Union in terms of its explosive potential against the United States, or is it better to go to some other weapon system, such as a B–52, a cruise missile, or submarine systems? These are balancing judgments that we must make, too, the tradeoffs between one and the other.

I will have other questions as time permits on other systems. But there are a number of these tradeoffs. The cold, hard fact remains, however, that in the case of ICBM's, the most destructive of all systems in my judgment, this treaty does not improve, but in fact worsens, the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Secretary BROWN. I disagree completely for reasons that are contained in my statement.

Senator BAKER. And I will disagree with that, and thus the issue is joined, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BROWN. I believe we are both striving to make a balanced judgment on what that balance is. Again, I call your attention to the chart, [see p. 99] which shows, for example, that the United States has almost double the number of total weapons of the Soviet Union, and that the SALT II agreement will allow us to make our ICBM's more survivable, but in so doing, it calls attention to the fact that, although, indeed, ICBM's are by some measures the most terrifying, they are not the most assured method. Therefore, again, as a matter of judgment, the Soviets are not, on balance, advantaged by the SALT II agreement. Their ICBM's, although very powerful, are not survivable, and that will influence things.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, the time status I assume does not afford me a chance to respond to that comment.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure you will have plenty of opportunity, Senator Baker, in the future.

Senator BAKER. I trust that the enthusiasm of this debate will not be lost in the interim.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure it will not. The debate has just been joined.

Senator Biden is next.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by asking unanimous consent that my opening statement that I did not deliver be allowed to be printed in the record as though I had read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[Senator Biden's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

ONE SENATOR'S APPROACH TO SALT II

Faced with the diversity and complexity of issues surrounding SALT II, a Senator must—to evaluate the Treaty fairly—adopt a clear, systematic approach. In my own study thus far, I have found that SALT-related issues divide generally into three categories: basic terms, verifiability, and allied attitudes. It is therefore my

intention, as the Foreign Relations Committee now commences its consideration of the Treaty, to study all three categories methodically to determine whether SALT II meets a reasonable standard of acceptability in each.

1. Basic terms

The first category concerns the Treaty's basic terms. SALT II's essential purpose is to set limits and sublimits on strategic missile launchers. Ostensibly, since the specified limits are the same for both sides, the Treaty establishes superpower equivalence. But what we must examine is whether this apparent balance disguises an actual imbalance—an imbalance which could destabilize the current condition of mutual deterrence.

In answering this question, we must avoid a mindless machismo which demands that we exceed the Soviets in all statistical measures related to nuclear weaponry. Any such requirement would be a formula for futility, for successful arms negotiation, by its very nature, involves compromise and mutual concession. For example, in photographs or scale models, the Soviets' so-called heavy missile, the SS–18, appears frightenly large as compared to our own ICBM, the Minuteman III; and indeed the SS–18 does have a greater throw-weight and yield. But what we must ask is whether this difference translates into real Soviet advantage—and, if so, whether the treaty, as its proponents claim, allows a compensatory advantage to the United States.

As we so proceed—and as we deal with dozens of comparative figures describing weapons capabilities and deployments—we cannot afford to lose sight of the enormity of the potential cataclysm about which we speak. We need remember that even our so-called small Minuteman—which is lighter and more accurate than the SS–18 primarily because we chose to make it so—represents a force of more than 2,000 independently-targeted warheads, each able to hit a Soviet city and each more than 10 times more powerful than the bombs which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And this, of course, is only a part of our diversely-deployed strategic arsenal. The purpose of that arsenal, it bears emphasis, is not to destroy the Soviet Union but to insure that Soviet leaders are never tempted to destroy us. Therefore, machismo aside, what we must ultimately determine, as we assess this treaty's terms, is whether our entire arsenal, when posed against the Soviet weaponry allowed under SALT II, provides for the continuing condition of stable nuclear deterrence upon which our own Nation's security—and indeed the survival of mankind—depends.

2. Verifiability

Our second area of examination must concern whether Soviet compliance with the treaty's terms can be verified. Here we must be clear as to meaning. Not even the treaty's most single-minded supporters would attempt to sustain an argument that the American intelligence community is equipped to detect any conceivable Soviet violation of the treaty's terms. Indeed, it seems safe to say that the Soviets might well be able to commit certain minor violations of this treaty with a high degree of confidence in escaping detection. But our concern is not with minor violations, which

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would offer the Soviets little other than a risk of serious embarrassment if caught. Our concern is with the possibility of significant violations—violations which, if not detected in time, would provide the Soviets with an exploitable nuclear advantage over the United States and its allies. Because such violations would necessarily be extensive and systematic, the verification task we face is less demanding than is sometimes suggested. Nonetheless, the verification problem is formidable, requiring the most advanced technological capabilities; and meticulous inquiry by the Senate is warranted to determine whether U.S. technology can accomplish the job.

On the Senate Intelligence Committee, as one of two Senators who sit also on the Foreign Relations Committee, I began 2 months ago—principally by way of comprehensive briefings—an extensive study of the U.S. capability to detect Soviet testing, production and deployment of strategic weapons. This study will not continue as the Intelligence Committee commences an exhaustive series of secret hearings on SALT verifiability. Although it will not be possible to disclose, outside the Intelligence Committee, certain highly classified information concerning the U.S. intelligence capability—lest that capability be compromised—it will be possible to convey to my Foreign Relations Committee colleagues useful insights, and eventually general conclusions, concerning verifiability. These considerations will, I hope, have direct bearing on the committee's evaluation of the treaty.

3. Allied attitudes

Of extreme importance, and too often discounted, are the views of the West European democracies. Because their security hangs in the balance of U.S.-Soviet relations, our NATO Allies have vital interests at stake in the SALT process in general, and particular interests in those aspects of SALT II which are most directly pertinent to West European defense. Among these are the protocol governing cruise missile deployments, the noncircumvention provisions relating to the sharing of technology with allies, and the joint statement of principles concerning the goals of future arms control negotiations. We need therefore to explore thoroughly, and attach considerable weight to, the way in which a ratified SALT Treaty—or a defeated SALT agreement—would affect our allies and the Atlantic Alliance which binds us in a common defense.

Toward this end, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs, I have undertaken to learn as much as possible about the true views of our NATO Allies—beyond the official public statements of support and also beyond the vague rumors that our NATO Allies are secretly dubious about the SALT II provisions. Last month I traveled to Bonn to meet in private sessions with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Defense Minister Hans Apel and other FRG officials of both government and opposition parties. I met also with French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet, and I intend, over the coming weeks, to solicit the views of other key allied leaders. Simultaneously, to secure a more broad-based sampling of opinion at the subcabinet level and also of informed public opinion, I commissioned two senior staff members of the Foreign Relations

Committee to visit the capitals of each of our key NATO Allies, to meet with dozens of knowledgeable governmental and nongovernmental figures, and to submit to the committee a formal report, which is now being prepared. In addition, to bring the issue of Allied attitudes formally into the committee's examination of SALT, I have scheduled three sessions of hearings: One with U.S. officials who, during the SALT process, have been most directly involved in liaison with our allies; another with nongovernmental experts on European affairs; and a third with representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly, the interparliamentary body of NATO, who can render firsthand the view of our legislative counterparts in the NATO countries.

My initial findings concerning Allied attitudes lead me to the tentative conclusion that Allied support for SALT is more than superficial. Indeed, there appears to be a deep-seated desire among Allied governments that SALT II be ratified and that the SALT process continue without interruption. This is not to say, however, that the Allies are without concern about certain portions of SALT II which could affect the process of theater nuclear forces modernization in Europe and the negotiations during SALT III. The West European security dimension of SALT II therefore warrants our most intense study.

The coming debate on SALT II will test the wisdom and the integrity of the U.S. Senate as have few issues in recent years. On an informal level, the debate began months ago. Critics of this treaty have called it an act of appeasement. As the Senate now begins its formal consideration of SALT II, it is my intention as one Senator to determine whether they can make that charge stick.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, it seems as though we are all wanting the same things that the American people want, judging from the statements I have heard my colleagues make over the last several months. We all want a SALT agreement. We all want a strong defense, and none of us trusts the Russians. The question is how to resolve all three of those things.

MEASURING RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET UNION

I would like to begin my time by taking some issue with the minority leader, Senator Baker. The premise from which he operates seems to be that the relative strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union are measured in terms of nuclear capability as the principal determinant of our ability to work our will.

Although in 1967, I was in my second year of law school and was not in the Senate, I do not recall in that year our being able to work our will in any way we wanted. As a matter of fact, I recall us being mired down in something to which I had a great aversion, a war that some say we lost in Southeast Asia. Earlier in that same decade, when by any measure we had overwhelming nuclear superiority, we had the Bay of Pigs fiasco. I remember in 1968 the tanks rolling into Wenceslaus Square in Czechoslovakia. I do not remember our overwhelming nuclear superiority enabling us to deter any of those events.

It seems to me if we measure the relative strength of the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear capability, the fact that the imbalance is now a balance does not seem to be a prime determinant in our ability to work our will. It seems to me that our ability to work our will in foreign policy is based as much, if not more, on the morality of our cause, the strength of our economy, and the strength of our conventional forces, rather than on the strength of our nuclear forces.

So, the basis upon which I join in this debate is not the same as that of the Senator from Tennessee.

When Senator Baker suggested that he was flying through a thunderstorm and looking at a radar screen, my copilot, John Glenn, said what he should have done is fire the pilot. [General laughter.]

Howard, if you keep talking like that, I would imagine that Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown would be able to arrange another trip for you if you would like. [General laughter.]

DOUBTS ABOUT SALT TREATY

As the minority leader is, so am I very doubtful about this treaty. I have a number of questions, and I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I will support the treaty. But I would like to point out, without having delivered my whole statement, that the basis upon which my doubt rests is not that somehow if we had great increases in nuclear capability relative to the Soviets, we would be able to work our will around the world. I have not seen how that happens. But I know this is a very, very popular, very, very potent, and very, very politically energized position that is being suggested, not just by the Senator from Tennessee, but by a number of Senators on both sides of the aisle. I want to disassociate myself at the outset from that position.

GRAVE DOUBTS HELD BY NATO ALLIES

As many here have had, I have had the opportunity in the recent past of going to Western Europe specifically to meet with Western European leaders. The purpose was to determine whether or not the grave doubts I had been hearing that our NATO allies had about SALT, an idea that was gaining a lot of currency in the beginning of the year, was, in fact, true. I had a private meeting, for over 2 hours, with the Chancellor and Secretary of Defense of West Germany and the Foreign Ministers of both Germany and France. These were private meetings that lasted a minimum of 2 hours each.

Not only did I fail to detect any concern about the SALT Treaty but my overwhelming impression was rather the opposite. The subcommittee which I chair, Mr. Chairman, at your direction, is about to file a fairly extensive report regarding this. Two staff members, with your permission, also visited every other capital in Western Europe and will provide an extensive report on that very subject.

OVERWHELMING CONCERN FOR SALT III

I found that there was overwhelming support for SALT, as Senator Pell indicated, but there was also an overwhelming concern for SALT III. No one wanted to talk to me about SALT II. They would start off by saying something to the effect that we need it, and, as Chancellor Schmidt said, absent SALT II, the entire map of Europe and the world would have to be rewritten.

Now this may sound a little grave, but that was how he phrased it. Then, right after this opening statement to me he talked about SALT III.

I do not think this is something that can be brushed aside, Secretary Vance. That is, the issues raised by Senator Percy on the protocol, noncircumvention, and cruise missile deployment are substantive and serious. All of the leaders wanted to talk about that with me. Because some did not understand the process as well as others, they suggested that the protocol be the starting point of SALT III. They are afraid that it implicitly will mean that the Soviets will go to the bargaining table in SALT III with the protocol in hand.

I think, even though I think it legally is the case now that the President could not extend the protocol without Senate ratification, I do not see any harm in us reassuring our allies and our colleagues in the Senate that we would require that. It might be redundant, but I see no problem with that and also with the noncircumvention question that was raised.

DEPLOYMENT IN NATO OF ANY SYSTEM UNITED STATES IS ABLE TO DEPLOY

I would like to ask you this, specifically. If ratified, would SALT II prevent us from deploying in NATO the Pershing missile, or the upgraded version of the Pershing, or the cruise missile at the expiration of the protocol, or any other system that we, the United States, would be able to deploy ourselves?

Secretary VANCE. I understand your question, and the answer is no, it would not.

Senator BIDEN. Let me be sure that you do understand it because I may not have said it correctly, and it is very important, at least to me.

If, in fact, the SALT II Treaty is signed, will the portion of the treaty that relates to noncircumvention preclude the United States from deploying in the NATO arsenal any system which the United States itself would be able to deploy?

Secretary VANCE. The answer is no, it does not.

Secretary BROWN. Not after 1981.

Senator BIDEN. Not after 1981?

Secretary BROWN. No.

Senator BIDEN. With regard to theater nuclear force modernization, everyone is aware that the high level group of NATO is in the process of discussing not if, but in what form, this modernization will take place.

Secretary VANCE. Right.

Senator BIDEN. Again, would the SALT II or the protocol in no way inhibit that discussion or determination?

Secretary VANCE. In no way.

CONTINUED NATO SUPPORT FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATING FORUM

Senator BIDEN. With regard to the joint statement relating to future negotiation, one of the questions that was raised with me and which I in turn raised with others, including Defense Secretary Apel, Foreign Minister Genscher, and Chancellor Schmidt, was the question of the form of SALT III.

SALT III obviously, in a large if not major part, will be taken up with theater nuclear force [TNF] capabilities and forward-based systems—the grey area question.

In your opinion, will our NATO allies continue to be satisfied with a bilateral forum—the United States negotiating with the Soviets for grey area, TNF questions?

Secretary VANCE. Let me respond. Then perhaps Harold would like to add something to my answer.

We have told our allies that, with respect to SALT III and what will be involved in SALT III, this is a subject which we are going to discuss with them in great detail before we decide where we are going to go in our bilateral negotiations.

Senator BIDEN. We, along with NATO, will come to a conclusion before we will go to the table with the Soviets. Is that what you are saying?

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

These discussions have already started, as you know. There is no consensus at this point in NATO as to whether the forum for the discussion of the kinds of weapon systems about which you are talking, namely the theater nuclear weapon systems, should be in SALT or should be in a parallel forum going along side by side. That is one of the things we have to hammer out with our allies.

We are in the process of doing that. It is a matter of importance and urgency that we do this. We discussed this both at Harold's meeting and my meeting at the NATO ministers conference just a few weeks ago. So this is a subject which is not yet answered, but which is very much on the front burner.

Secretary BROWN. I would like to add only this to what Cy has said. We will continue to consult with our NATO allies, as we have, on the SALT III application of the so-called central systems, which, of course, are our own—the ICBM's, the SLBM's and the heavy bombers. On theater nuclear forces, to the extent that those are involved in SALT III—and they may very well be, if the Soviets are going to try again to do what they tried last time, to have them count as part of the overall aggregates—we will have even a closer and more detailed discussion with our allies, along the lines you indicated, Senator Biden. We have told them and we have told the Soviets that United States theater nuclear forces will be taken into account in SALT III only to the extent that the Soviets are willing also to have discussed and included their medium range systems.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden, let me comment in passing that I do not think the question of the possible extension of the protocol

without the concurrence of the Senate is a redundancy. I think we can develop that in the course of these hearings, based upon some past experience.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.

Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, and Ambassador Earle, you will be delighted to know that I am not going to make a speech. I want to commend you on your capacities. You have been sitting here for 3 hours and 20 minutes and you have not left the room once. [General laughter.]

U.S. ASSURANCES TO ALLIES CONCERNING NONCIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE

Senator HELMS. Let me go back just briefly—and Mr. Chairman, I do not expect to use all of my time—to the noncircumvention clause in article XII.

I was in London last week and met for an hour or more with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Defense Committee of the House of Commons. I can tell you that they have some concern about the interpretation of article XII.

Now one, perhaps both, of you said that they were satisfied. Well, that was not the story that I heard.

Prime Minister Thatcher stated in the House of Commons that certain assurances had been provided to the Europeans concerning the article, article XII, and you have pretty well identified those assurances in a general sort of way. I wonder if they were written commitments, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary VANCE. I'm sorry, but to what specifically are you referring?

Senator HELMS. I refer to the assurances you have given to our allies. How were these assurances given—orally or in writing?

Secretary VANCE. We gave an interpretive statement on June 29 to the NATO Council. I will have a copy of that next to my testimony tomorrow and will put it in the record at that time. [See p. 181.]

Senator HELMS. Very well.

Secretary VANCE. So the answer is yes, they have it in writing.

Senator HELMS. In other words, you will give us precisely the assurances that you gave to Prime Minister Thatcher?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Fine.

NATO ALLY FORCE MODERNIZATION UNDER ARTICLE XII

Let me pin down something a little more closely. Can the United States provide the British and other NATO allies with the weaponry they need to modernize their forces under this article?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator HELMS. The answer to that is yes.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, indeed.

Senator HELMS. That includes the cruise missile, Trident submarine, and so forth?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; we are allowed under that statement to provide them with modernized forces along those lines.

There is a separate policy issue as to what we would do in each case, and we would handle it on a case-by-case basis. But that is a matter for us and the United Kingdom. It is not constrained by the treaty.

Senator HELMS. So, our NATO allies can be supplied with advanced technology as well, is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF NONCIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE

Senator HELMS. Do the Soviets agree with this interpretation?

Secretary VANCE. We have never put specific cases to the Soviets and we do not intend to. As Secretary Brown indicated earlier, we refused to go along with their nontransfer clause, which was very specific in that it would have prohibited us from transferring things like technology and so on. We said we will not accept that and we insisted on the noncircumvention clause.

Senator HELMS. If I understand what you are saying, it is that you have had no agreement whatsoever with the Soviet Union with respect to interpretation of article XII. Is that right?

Secretary VANCE. No. They will obviously read our interpretive statement which we have issued to the NATO people.

Secretary BROWN. They are aware of that, and they have signed the agreement in knowledge of that interpretive statement. They will ratify it in knowledge of that interpretive statement.

I must say, Senator Helms, that I think it a mistake to negotiate with the Soviets our cooperation with our allies. I think for us to ask their permission or get their agreement would be a very dangerous precedent.

Senator HELMS. Well, I did not suggest that.

Secretary BROWN. I know you did not.

Senator HELMS. I agree with you. I would resent it if you had done it. I just wanted to know if there had been any discussion of the interpretation.

Secretary BROWN. Not on a case-by-case basis.

Senator HELMS. Thank you.

U.S. REJECTION OF ANY INTERPRETATION RESTRICTING U.S. ABILITY TO TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY TO NATO ALLIES

Under this treaty, will the United States clearly reject any interpretation of SALT II which would restrict the right of our NATO Allies to obtain strategic nuclear arms systems, such as the Trident and the cruise missile from the United States?

Secretary BROWN. We would reject any interpretation that would restrict our ability to transfer Trident missile technology and cruise missiles to our allies.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. UNILATERAL STATEMENTS

Regarding the understandings about which the chairman asked earlier, that is, whether there were any written or verbal issues of which we had not yet been advised, I have been concerned with what happened concerning the Backfire.

In a number of briefings, we had been told, several times, that in fact we did have an agreement limiting the Soviets to 30 per year on Backfire.

Now it turns out that when the President went to Vienna, this was still a major issue and that our previous unilateral statements concerning the 30 per year limit obviously had not been accepted. Now it has come around to where we actually need a letter to confirm this, and I would ask, first, whether we have this letter. Second, are there other unilateral statements to which they have not responded that will be in a similar vein as what happened with the Backfire?

Secretary VANCE. We had an understanding before we went that the number would not exceed 30 per year. When there was not a clear answer to our statement that that was the premise on which we were signing, we said, "This is what you committed to ahead of time, this is what it must be," and Brezhnev did then say, "Yes, it will be no more than 30 per year."

Senator GLENN. Was this acquiescence by silence, or did they affirmatively agree?

Secretary VANCE. Oh, no. I put the question to him, so I know what the answer was. His answer was, "Yes, it will be no more than 30 per year."

Senator GLENN. If the news reports here in the paper were correct, there was a considerable amount of pushing that had to be done to get that agreement.

Is that correct?

Secretary VANCE. There was a statement by one of the others in his party which was challenged. After that challenge, Brezhnev made the decision.

Senator GLENN. Are there other unilateral statements we have made of our understanding of things that they have not yet responded to?

Secretary BROWN. The answer, Senator Glenn, that I would give is, we have made some unilateral statements in the negotiation and they have made some unilateral statements in the negotiation. Neither side is bound by the other side's unilateral statements as to what it itself will do. But in every case where we have made a statement with respect to their future actions, that has been resolved satisfactorily.

U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS AS BEING BINDING

Senator GLENN. But we are not accepting, then, our unilateral statements as being binding in the absence of any statement by them, are we?

Secretary BROWN. Not binding on what they do. Our unilateral statements about what we are going to do or how we are going to interpret something are binding on us.

PRESIDENTIAL UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF PRESENT TREATY

Senator GLENN. There have been some comments here this morning about extension of the protocol. Perhaps with some of the Presidential statements, it might be somewhat academic, Mr. Chairman, whether or not we have extension of the protocol, especially since the President has indicated that he might unilaterally extend the whole treaty if the Senate refuses to approve it.

Did he seek your advice before he made such an indication?

Secretary VANCE. If I may respectfully disagree, Senator Glenn, I do not believe he said that. I think what he said was he would not want to see us enter into an arms race.

Obviously the President could not enter into an agreement without consulting with the Congress and the Congress taking action on it. However, I think it is perfectly right and proper to say, as he did, that he would not unilaterally want to launch an arms race. Therefore, I think there is quite a difference between what you said and what he said.

Senator GLENN. Perhaps some of the reporting of this has been in error, especially regarding his intent.

U.S. ABILITY TO VERIFY TREATY COMPLIANCE

No treaty, including this one, is an instrument of trust. If anything, it shows the absence of trust. If we trusted the Soviet Union to act in our best interests, we would not need the treaty to begin with.

I think our ability to monitor what they are doing is therefore a key and will be a major factor in whether or not this gets through the Senate.

We made some advances in this area and I am aware of some of those things. I am sure we will have a great deal of testimony subsequently in this area. I look forward to receiving it.

We do have some variation in statements, though. The President has said repeatedly that the treaty was verifiable from the day it was signed—adequately verifiable, that is. That extra word crept in along the process somewhere. The Secretary of Defense has said that post-Iran we need to recoup some of this information and it would be possible a year or more before we would have that capability, even if things worked out right.

Mr. Secretary, how do these statements square with each other?

Secretary BROWN. As the President has indicated to you, Senator Glenn, his statement was made after he had seen mine and is completely consistent with it. In fact, it was carefully worked out to be consistent with it.

The situation is that the loss of the Iranian monitoring stations impairs some of our capabilities. But our capabilities do not depend on any one form of verification, that is, one kind of sensor or one geographical location.

Moreover, the Soviets take some years to develop new systems. In fact, between the time a system is thought of and the time design begins, and the time deployment is completed, it is usually about 10 years. During that period, we monitor the design, development, testing, production, deployment, training, and operations of the system. We put all of these things together to determine

whether the Soviets are living up to their agreements. We did that in SALT I and will do it in SALT II.

As a consequence of all of those capabilities, my judgment is that indeed SALT II will be verifiable from the moment that the treaty takes effect.

DEFINITION OF VERIFIABLE

Of course, one has to define what one means by verifiable, because it is not so that we will be able to measure every quantity on every test or every deployment, missile, bomber, cruise missile, or submarine. But the Soviets will not be able to tilt the balance strategically by violating the treaty without our knowing it early enough to respond and prevent them from doing so.

INTERFERENCE WITH NTM OR DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT TO PREVENT VERIFICATION

Senator GLENN. A key part of this is whether they continue past practices that we can monitor. I am very concerned about this part of the treaty.

I had thought from previous testimony that if they changed practices in their testing—and this would include telemetry, power on telemetry, and so forth—this would be a violation of the treaty. Now I find nowhere in the treaty nor in the memoranda accompanying it anything that indicates this. On what do we base this?

Secretary BROWN. We are basing our estimates on the provisions of the treaty, Senator Glenn, that forbid interference with national technical means or concealment that deliberately impedes verification.

CHANGE IN SOVIET PRACTICES THAT WOULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION

Senator GLENN. But you are talking about specific interference, and that is not covered in the treaty. What if they change their practices? What if they do not send telemetry and drop a data capsule?

Secretary BROWN. That impedes verification and we would regard that as a matter on which they would be challenged.

Senator GLENN. Have we made unilateral statements to them or do we have their agreement on that? I cannot imagine that they would agree to something like that. If so, why was this not included in the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. There is no way that they would agree never to change their practices at all. This is why we have to rely on these general provisions, which, nevertheless, really are quite specific.

Our agreement, for example, speaks of denial, including by encryption. So, if they changed their practices in another way so as to deny us access that would allow us to carry out verification, that also would be inconsistent with the treaty.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF DATA PACKAGE DROP SYSTEM

Senator GLENN. News reports have carried the development by the Soviets of a data package drop system on which they apparent-

ly have been working for some time. If they used that, would that violate the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. I do not feel I wish to go more into this kind of detail in open session, Senator Glenn. I will only repeat what I said—that denial of data, relevant telemetry data, relevant to verification of the limits imposed by the treaty including by encryption, would be a violation. But it is not limited to denial by encryption.

Senator GLENN. My time is almost up and I know we will have time to address this in other sessions.

CALL FOR REDUCTION OF RHETORIC

Secretary Vance, I was glad to see in your statement a call for a reduction of rhetoric. I hope that you carry that message back down the Hill with you. It was not the Hill that started comments concerning labeling those of us who are raising questions as being warmongers. It was not here that terms such as dark nightmare into which we are about to be plunged originated. It was also not this committee that sent out some 2,000 emissaries to attend 2,000 meetings across the country where some of the rhetoric has been getting pretty high. At least it has been in my State. I have chosen not to respond to it. So I hope your message is heeded by those at the other end of the Avenue, as well as on Capitol Hill.

I agree with you completely. I think yours was a good statement. I welcome it and hope it is heeded both here and down the street.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you. I hope it is heeded in both places, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, Ambassador Earle, I, too, am not going to give a speech. I will just ask a few technical questions.

SOVIET DEPENDENCE ON NTM FOR VERIFICATION

First, I would like to know if the Soviet Union depends as much as the United States does on national technical means for verification, means such as telemetry, satellite photography, and so forth? Is espionage included, too?

Secretary BROWN. They depend less on national technical means because, quite aside from espionage or human intelligence, if you want to call it that, there is so much available to them from the media and from the openness of our society, that includes a very thorough examination by the Congress of all the programs we have, that they, if anything, probably have too much data and may have to rely on their national technical means to tell them which of the things about which they read are correct. So they do depend on it less than we do. Nevertheless, they have an equal right to it and the treaty provides that right.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERING THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM LAUNCHERS

What are the consequences of the right of the Soviets to have 308 heavy throw-weight ICBM launchers while the United States has no such right?

Secretary BROWN. Senator Hayakawa, in practical terms I would say the consequences of that difference are negligible. This is one reason why we and our predecessors were prepared to concede that right to the Soviet Union, even in SALT I, in return for concessions on things that we wanted more.

The United States, during the SALT I period, never built as large an ICBM as it was allowed under SALT I. That is one evidence that large missiles were of less interest to us.

This does not mean that they are not of interest, because essential equivalence does require us to have a survivable ICBM capability with substantial numbers of reentry vehicles.

The treaty, by limiting the number of reentry vehicles on any ICBM to a maximum of 10, and in some cases less, makes the value of the extra payload capability on an SS–18, as compared, say, to an SS–19, or an M–X, very much less. In fact, the M–X with 10 reentry vehicles on it will have a military capability against soft targets or hard targets that is almost identical, that is, within the range of uncertainty, equivalent to that of an SS–18. Under SALT II's limits, if they were extended beyond 1985, we would be able to deploy as many as 820 of those. We do not have any intention of doing that, but the legal right is there.

Senator Hayakawa, as an example of the lack of interest on the part of the United States in so-called modern, large ballistic missiles for ourselves, during the last months of the negotiation, there was a question of whether we should ban or allow mobile heavy missiles. If they had been allowed, we could have had them.

On the unanimous advice of our senior advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the decision was made to ban heavy mobile missiles. Again, this is an indication that the United States, if it had it, would not be likely to take advantage of such an opportunity.

SIGNIFICANCE OF EXTRA PAYLOAD OF HEAVY MOBILE MISSILES

Senator HAYAKAWA. You are saying that the extra payload of these heavy missiles is not that significant?

Secretary BROWN. It particularly is not that significant when the number of reentry vehicles is limited to 10. We never considered it significant enough, even in the days of SALT I, to try to increase the size of our then-deployed ICBM's. This may or may not have been a mistake. But certainly in a situation where 10 is the maximum number of reentry vehicles, that extra 40 percent or so of payload does not translate into useful military capability.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I think you have already answered my next question about larger and smaller ICBM's. So let me go on to another question.

SALT TREATY EFFECT ON MINUTEMAN SURVIVABILITY PROBLEM

Does the SALT Treaty make solving of the Minuteman survivability problem easier or more difficult?

Secretary BROWN. It makes it easier for the reasons that I have indicated in my statement, Senator Hayakawa. I do not want to claim too much of it. I do not want to say that with SALT II that problem is easy to solve and without SALT II it becomes impossible. But it definitely makes it easier by limiting the size of the number of ICBM reentry vehicles that the Soviets can have, therefore limiting the size of the attack on a mobile ICBM of the United States.

It has been suggested that since the treaty runs only until 1985 and M-X cannot be put into place until the beginning of 1986 that this is irrelevant. But it is not irrelevant, because without the SALT II Treaty the Soviets, before 1985, could test and begin to deploy larger numbers of reentry vehicles on their heavy missiles, and they could deploy many more heavy missiles, thus bringing the M-X system under the potential of a much larger attack.

I think we could probably make it survive even then, but it would be much more difficult and much more expensive to do so.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

I have one last question which I suggest is the most serious of the lot. It is really a political question.

"FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY" DANGER

I wonder if there is not a danger that the ratification of SALT II will lull the United States into a false sense of security which will cause the United States not to take the required actions to maintain its relative defense position.

Secretary VANCE. Although it is a political question, I think this is one Harold should respond to because he spoke to it in his opening statement.

Secretary BROWN. Senator Hayakawa, I think that the United States will do what it has to do with or without a SALT II agreement.

I don't believe that it was SALT I that lulled the United States into not doing more for defense. I believe that the United States can and will respond to a heightened competition in strategic arms if it has to. But I think it would be a bad mistake to reject SALT II in order to frighten the American people into doing more.

The American people do not and should not have to be frightened into doing what is necessary for their defense.

This administration will propose, and I am convinced that the Congress will approve, strategic forces necessary for our defense. Those will be much more and not make us more secure if SALT II is not approved.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stone is next.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET REJECTION OF U.S. DEEP CUTS PROPOSAL

Secretary Vance, in SALT I the world was promised deep cuts in SALT II. I repeat, in SALT I, the world was promised deep cuts in SALT II. In your first round of negotiating in Moscow, before leaving you told us on this committee of your proposed offers of deep cuts. Then, during your Moscow visit, and even before your Moscow visit, you made a pretty substantially full disclosure of the deep cut proposals for both sides that our administration was presenting to the Russians.

Mr. Secretary, what reasons did the Soviets give for rejecting the deep cuts in the administration's first major proposal?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before you answer that question Senator Javits and I have to leave now to go to the floor of the Senate. Senator Pell will continue to conduct the hearings. They will continue until each Senator has had an opportunity to question the witnesses for a first round of questions.

We will take up the hearings tomorrow morning in this same room at 10 o'clock, when Secretary Vance will be our witness.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, please carry on.

Secretary VANCE. The answer is that they told me that they had reached basic agreement in the Vladivostok negotiations as to what the general numbers were going to be and they would not and were not prepared to negotiate deep cuts in light of what they thought was the negotiating agreement that they had reached at that time.

Senator STONE. There were no substantive reasons given?

Secretary VANCE. No, no substantive reasons were given.

U.S. PRESSURE FOR DEEP CUTS DURING NEGOTIATIONS

Senator STONE. We have continued to press during these negotiations?

Secretary VANCE. We have continued to press. As you know, we were able, by continuing to press, to get down to an aggregate of 2,250. In addition to that, we were able to get subceilings of 1,320, 1,200 and 820. I think that is one of the achievements of SALT II, that we were able to get not only reductions in the overall numbers, but subceilings, because I think they are of really great importance.

I think in each one of these negotiations you find that you just have to do what you can under the circumstances.

It is still our objective that there be deep cuts. As we go into SALT III, as I indicated to Senator McGovern, we will be pressing for deep cuts, and we have made clear that we would like deep cuts.

How far one will be able to go depends upon the negotiations.

I believe Harold would like to add to my response.

Senator STONE. Secretary Brown.

Secretary BROWN. I think it is perhaps not adequately understood how well we actually have done in achieving at least many of the proposals made as part of the comprehensive March 1977 reductions proposal.

We had been at 2,400, you will recall, for total aggregates. We got down to 2,250, which was not quite half way to where we had hoped to get in our March 1977 proposal. We did not succeed in reducing the number of heavy missiles since that was something that dated all the way back to SALT I and had been reiterated at Vladivostok. It was one of the reasons the Soviets gave for rejecting that proposal.

We did get to 1,200 MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's, which is within the range that we proposed in March 1977. Although we did not get to 550 MIRVed ICBM's, we did get to 820, whereas before there had been no separate limit on MIRVed ICBM's.

Then there is a long list of ICBM restrictions that we had sought in March, of which we got a good many. We got a ban on all but one new missile and we defined terms for limits on modifications of other missiles. We arranged for no production of the SS–16 and so on.

I will go no further except to say that we did get quite a lot of what we had proposed in the spring of 1977.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

VULNERABILITY OF MINUTEMAN SYSTEM

Secretary Brown, you mentioned in your opening remarks that the Minuteman system is vulnerable.

Secretary BROWN. It will be during the early 1980's.

Senator STONE. Could you tell us the years that they will be vulnerable?

Secretary BROWN. Well, it doesn't happen all at once. It grows in the early 1980's and will continue until 1986, when we introduce the M–X. I should reiterate what I said publicly before, that that is a matter of concern, and one that we need to redress, but the vulnerability of Minuteman is not the same as the vulnerability of our overall deterrent, nor is it the same as the loss of a strategic capability of the United States.

We need to assure a survivable ICBM so that in years beyond for example, in the late 1980's or the early 1990's, when the Soviets might otherwise be able to concentrate on attacking our submarine launched ballistic missile capability, and our bomber and cruise missile capability, that they will realize that even then they can't attack our deterrent because we will have restored our ICBM capability.

Secretary VANCE. Senator Stone, let me just add this. I don't wish to leave a misinterpretation on the record. In my answer I was not being critical of what was done at Vladivostok. They tried there also to get deeper cuts. They simply were unable to get deeper cuts there, so this is a perennial problem that one has to face.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Secretary Vance.

SS–18 THREAT

Secretary Brown, is it correct to say that in the early 1980's, the Soviets can threaten our Minuteman forces plus our submarines in port and our nonalert bombers with their SS–18 and that that could

leave us with as little as one-third of our forces to one-half of their nuclear forces and in no position to use them?

Secretary BROWN. Well, it would reduce the number of our nuclear forces and would reduce the number of theirs. What would be left in our case is thousands of warheads which would be able to completely pulverize the Soviet Union, so the last statement, "and in no position to use them," is the one which I think reflects a misapprehension of reality. We would not only be in the position to use them, but the Soviet Union, having attacked the United States, and in the process of having destroyed Minuteman and submarines at port, very likely having killed some tens of millions of Americans, would almost certainly have to expect and rightly, in my view, that it would be visited with massive retaliation.

CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES TO DESTROY OTHER SIDE

Senator STONE. In regard to this retaliation, are our missiles capable, either in accuracy, power, or the combination of both, capable of destroying their missiles and correspondingly, are their missiles, as to their power and their accuracy, which is now improving—at least the accuracy is—capable of destroying our missiles, cities?

Secretary BROWN. Well, there are other targets besides cities and ICBM's. There are other military targets, but let me respond simply to the question of vulnerability of ICBM's.

Senator Stone, the situation is that with the increasing numbers of warheads and their increasing accuracy, both our fixed ICBM's and silos and the Soviet fixed ICBM's and silos are going to become vulnerable and rather soon, in the early 1980's, in fact.

VULNERABILITY OF SILOS ON BOTH SIDES

Senator STONE. Their silos will be vulnerable at the same time ours will be vulnerable?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, but not in exactly the same degree or in exactly the same forces. It is not just intercontinental ballistic missile warheads that are getting more accurate. Cruise missile warheads will also be more accurate. In fact, they will be more accurate than ICBM warheads, and although this will come later, submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads will also be more accurate.

So, although our ICBM's will be vulnerable to Soviet ICBM warheads in the early 1980's, theirs will be vulnerable to our cruise missiles a little later in the early 1980's, say, around 1983 and 1984.

We also have accurate ICBM warheads, but we don't have as many of them. Therefore, it does not look to us as if our Minuteman III can knock out their fixed ICBM's. From their point of view, they may be more apprehensive than that, since people always tend to take an exaggerated view of the capabilities of the other side. I would expect that in the early 1980's, they would also begin to be worried about the survivability of their fixed ICBM's from our ICBM's. I would say they really shouldn't be quite that worried, but a little later in the 1980's, when our cruise missiles come into the force, they clearly will be vulnerable. In the 1990's,

even if we didn't have either of those things, they would be vulnerable to our submarine launched ballistic missiles.

Let me add one more sentence. That is why I think not only do we have to move away from fixed ICBM's to mobiles, but I think in the long run there will be very substantial pressure on the Soviets, quite aside from the existence of the M-X, to do the same thing.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator PELL. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY SCENARIO DURING PERIOD OF GREATEST U.S. VULNERABILITY

Secretary Brown, may I carry further your answers to the last question of Senator Stone, to try to pin down the periods of time of vulnerability? As I understand it, part of the predicament that has led the President and led you to favor the M-X is a perception of vulnerability of our ICBM's in the near-term period of 1981 to 1982, and you have mentioned that this is a problem the Soviets may share, but at some time down the trail. I think you simply mentioned 1984 in your last answer.

In the symmetry of this treaty, in trying to determine advantage and disadvantage, one of the points made by critics of the treaty throughout has been that our disadvantage, that is, the vulnerability of our ICBM's, would be coming at an earlier date, and the remedy; namely, the M-X missile, despite the timetables that you and Secretary Vance pointed out in your testimony, will be coming along really too late to meet that particular dilemma; namely, the timetables of 1983, 1986, 1989, as I remember the dates in your testimony.

What is likely to be the scenario diplomatically or militarily in 1981, when it would appear that we may have our greatest vulnerability?

Secretary BROWN. Let me again say, Senator Lugar, that the vulnerability of Minuteman is not the same as the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. What we have here is more a question of essential equivalence and perceptions of the military balance, at least during that period, and not a matter of U.S. loss of its deterrent capability.

To go back to a scenario that Senator Stone raised, if the Soviets should attack our Minutemen and destroy them, even if those missiles had been destroyed before they were launched, which is another thing the Soviets would have to worry about, although it is not a doctrine of ours, we would still have enormous cruise missile and bomber capability. We would have an enormous SLBM capability, with which we could respond against their cities to the extent that that sort of response was appropriate in view of the damage done to the U.S. urban-industrial complex, or we could selectively attack Soviet military forces, conventional forces or nuclear forces, bombers, or missiles. Now, it would take somewhat longer for our cruise missiles to get there, but nevertheless, they could destroy the Soviet ICBM's.

Senator LUGAR. Will they be developed to the point where they really would be an effective force?

Secretary BROWN. Not by 1981, but yes, by 1983 and 1984.

Senator LUGAR. Then once again we have the problem of a 2- or 3-year gap.

Secretary BROWN. Except that the U.S. bombers also have the same capability without cruise missiles. The cruise missile is being put in partly because it has greater accuracy, but even more because it has greater ability to penetrate defenses, defenses which by 1981 or 1982 or even 1983 or 1984 will not be such as to be able to intercept our bombers.

B–52 PENETRATION CAPABILITY AGAINST SOVIET UNION IN 1981

Senator LUGAR. The B–52 could still penetrate the Soviet Union in 1981? Is that what you are contending?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; I have no doubts about that. I have no doubts about B–52 penetrability in the early 1980's. The M–X system is not designed to take care of the vulnerability of the Minuteman in the early eighties. It is designed to assure that we have a survivable ICBM capability in the late eighties and the early nineties, when some of the other components of the force might otherwise come under threat.

STRIKE, COUNTERSTRIKE CAPABILITY SCENARIO

Senator LUGAR. To trace the scenario, you have indicated that of course we could retaliate with great destructive power on Soviet cities and some military installations, but as that sort of scenario is often played out, the ICBM's of the Soviets remain. That is, the vital military power to retaliate with devastating force against us on the second try remains.

Isn't this a problem of the sort of response about which you are now talking? If they hit our ICBM's, we fire back, and hit innocent people, essentially, but they then have the military power with which to come back and annihilate not only our cities but whatever else we have left at that point?

Secretary BROWN. That scenario has never seemed realistic to me since I first heard it propounded in the 1969 and 1970 period. This first attack that the Soviets would have launched on our ICBM's and submarines in harbor and so on would have killed tens of millions of Americans. One cannot say that our ability to retaliate against urban industrial targets would not be of relevance. I know you are not saying that.

This is, I think, a very important point. There would very likely be such retaliation. There would also be retaliation against Soviet military targets of all kinds, including their ICBM's, but a scenario in which strike and counterstrike goes on until all of the people in both countries are dead and almost all of the military forces are gone, but one side has some missiles left and says, "we win," does not really strike me as realistic.

Senator LUGAR. No, they would not strike me that way either.

Secretary BROWN. The important point is that SALT II did not create the problem. Neither did SALT I. They did not create the problem of Minuteman survivability and cannot be expected to cure it any more than it can be expected to cure all of our strategic force problems.

We have to proceed with programs in parallel with limitations in order to assure deterrence and essential equivalence. SALT II does help us to cure the problem, but we have to go ahead with new programs to do it.

DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF SOVIET SS-18

Senator LUGAR. Wouldn't SALT II help us more if we were able to work with the Soviets, to get them to take their SS-18's out of the picture? Isn't this really the destabilizing aspect?

Secretary BROWN. No, not very much, because although the SS-18's will have 3,000 warheads, the SS-19's all together will have about 2,500. Either would pose a very substantial threat to Minuteman. The SS-19 goes under the category of nonheavy missiles, and even if the 308 SS-18's were somehow eliminated, the threat to Minuteman would still be quite severe in the early 1980's.

NEED FOR M-X MISSILE

Senator LUGAR. If in fact a part of our need for the M-X missile is the fact that the Soviets have, however, the SS-18, and we counter that with the M-X, thus using up our one option, don't the Soviets have a leg up in this process? They still have one option open, too. There was discussion this morning which said they would have to make some tough choices among programs that are moving along and are not certain which one they might choose, but isn't there a possibility for them to perhaps make a significant advance well beyond the situation in which they have the SS-18 and we counter with the M-X and they come back now with something else?

Secretary BROWN. It is not clear to me what that significant advance will be, except we do know some things about it. We know it cannot be as big as the SS-18. It cannot be any bigger in payload than the SS-19. That is one of the provisions of SALT II.

This limit would not exist absent SALT II. We also know that it cannot have more than 10 warheads, because that is a provision of SALT II, but that limitation would not exist without SALT II.

The point that you raise, I think, makes it clear that SALT II does prevent them from going far beyond the SS-18. It is also true that absent the SS-18, we would have a comparable, not equal, threat from the SS-19, which already exists.

ASSURANCES OF ADMINISTRATION WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE M-X, CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM

Senator LUGAR. Moving into your testimony this morning, and the estimates you have given of the amounts we might spend for strategic systems, are you able to give during the course of your testimony on Wednesday or some other time some assurances of how much we actually are willing to do with regard to the M-X or the development of cruise missiles in that these are extremely important items?

For instance, cynics have said from time to time that in this SALT debate assurances might be given by the President that he had a good feeling about the M-X and the movement toward cruise

missiles, but then, after the SALT treaty was ratified, that might disappear from view.

What sort of assurances can be given of the constancy of the administration's program and these developments that are critical in the balances we are talking about?

Secretary BROWN. I will be prepared to talk further about these programs on Wednesday, Senator Lugar, and to discuss to some degree what our plans are, and what we hope the Senate and the House will approve, because that also, of course, is an element in our military capability. The President proposes such programs, and the Congress disposes.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFY TREATY, PROTOCOL

We have a vote on, and I will try to go very quickly. The first questions I have are in the nature of procedures.

What is it we are being asked to advise and consent to? I take it it is the treaty and the protocol.

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

ARE AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS PART OF TREATY

Senator SARBANES. Both of these have been signed by the President, and by Brezhnev. Are the agreed statements and common understandings part of the treaty and the protocol?

Secretary VANCE. They are not part of the treaty and the protocol, but they are interpretive of it and they are binding agreements between the two countries.

Let me say one other thing. When you ratify the treaty and the protocol, there is no need to do anything further with respect to the common understandings and agreements.

VIOLATION OF AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS IN VIOLATION OF TREATY

Senator SARBANES. Would a violation of one of the agreed statements or common understandings be a violation of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

SIGNATURES ON DATA BASE, AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS

Senator SARBANES. The data base and the agreed statements and common understandings were also signed by the President, were they not, and by Chairman Brezhnev?

Secretary VANCE. There is an error in that they were actually signed by Ambassador Earle and by Ambassador Karpov.

Senator SARBANES. The common understandings and the agreed statements?

Secretary VANCE. No, just one of them.

Ambassador EARLE. No, the memorandum of understanding on data base.

Senator SARBANES. I haven't gotten to the data yet.

Secretary VANCE. I thought you were talking about the data base.

Senator SARBANES. No, the data, I understand, was signed by the chief negotiators on the side.

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Ambassador EARLE. Yes.

VIOLATION OF DATA MEMORANDUM

Senator SARBANES. Is a violation of the data memorandum a violation of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. No.

SIGNATURE ON SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT

Senator SARBANES. Who signed the Soviet Backfire statement?

Secretary VANCE. The Soviet Backfire statement was not signed. It was given by President Brezhnev to President Carter, and it is part of the record.

VIOLATION OF BACKFIRE STATEMENT

Senator SARBANES. Would a violation of the Backfire statement be a violation of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. The President made a statement with respect to that, and said that he in accepting that, and I will get his exact words, he stated, "The United States enters into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement, and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the treaty."

Senator SARBANES. Then what is the answer to the question? Is a violation of the Backfire statement a violation of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. It is tantamount to it.

Senator SARBANES. Is that the view of the Soviet Union?

Secretary VANCE. That is our view, and we would act on the basis of our view.

BACKFIRE STATEMENT ONLY STATEMENT WITHOUT SIGNATURE

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I am struck by the fact that of all of the documents contained in this submission, the only one that does not have signatures of a chief United States party and a chief Soviet party is the one pertaining to the Soviet Backfire statement.

Secretary VANCE. It was never agreed that we would. The understanding was that there would be an exchange of statements, and that is what took place.

EFFECTIVE TERMINATION DATES OF SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT

Senator SARBANES. What is the effective date of the Soviet Backfire statement?

Secretary VANCE. The date on which the treaty takes effect.

Senator SARBANES. Does it have a termination date?
Secretary VANCE. No, it does not.
Senator SARBANES. So it extends without limit?
Secretary VANCE. That is the way I would read it.
Secretary BROWN. At least as long as the treaty.
Senator SARBANES. What was that?
Secretary BROWN. At least as long as the treaty.
Senator SARBANES. To December 31, 1985?
Secretary VANCE. Yes, at least that long.
Secretary BROWN. At least that long.

SOVIET VIEW REGARDING FORCE, EFFECT OF BACKFIRE STATEMENT

Senator SARBANES. What is your view on whether the Soviets regard it as having the same force and effect as the treaty itself?
Secretary VANCE. My view is that they see it as a binding commitment given by their highest authority, and that therefore it is a binding obligation on the part of the Soviet Union.

U.S. PLANNING FOR 1980'S UNDER PROTOCOL RESTRICTIONS

Senator SARBANES. Secretary Brown, in the protocol, is the planning for the 1980's period based on the eventual deployment of the cruise missile?
Secretary BROWN. You are talking now about sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles.
Senator SARBANES. Those that are restricted by the protocol?
Secretary BROWN. Yes, our planning and our programing and our discussions with our allies were proceeding on the basis that the protocol terminates and those restrictions terminate with it at the end of 1981.

PROTOCOL AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING SALT III

Senator SARBANES. This is somewhat the line of questioning that I think Senator Biden was pursuing. You do not see the protocol as constituting the base from which SALT III will be negotiated? In fact, just to the contrary. Is that what you are testifying to?
Secretary BROWN. Both sides have said that the obligations of the protocol expire with the protocol. Now, that is not to say that the Soviets will not try to get us to extend them or make them more restrictive or do a lot of other things, but both sides understand that the protocol's obligations expire with the protocol.

PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS, RESTRICTIONS AT PROTOCOL EXPIRATION

Senator SARBANES. Isn't there the danger that we projected a course that while it does not in theory limit or restrict us, it may, in practice, limit or restrict us at the end of the protocol period because that deployment would be seen as a resumption of the arms race?
Secretary BROWN. I am sure that that argument will be made by the Soviets and not only by the Soviets, but we have made it clear what our intentions are. They extend not only to the cruise missiles, the ground- and sea-launched cruise missile, but also mobile

ICBM's, which are not allowed to be tested and deployed during the period of the protocol, but which can be tested and deployed under the treaty thereafter, and that is exactly what we intend to do.

Secretary VANCE. May I add to that, please, I made it very clear on several occasions to the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union that the protocol expired by its terms on December 31, 1981. That was the end of it. All of the obligations disappeared at that time. He said he understood and agreed with that interpretation.

So, there is no obligation at the end of that period.

DEPLOYMENT OF LIMITED MISSILES PRIOR TO PROTOCOL EXPIRATION

Senator SARBANES. Could we have deployed the missiles that are limited under the protocol as a practical matter prior to the time of the expiration of the protocol?

Secretary BROWN. No.

PURPOSE OF PROTOCOL FROM SOVIET UNION

Senator SARBANES. What is the purpose of the protocol from the Soviet view if it is not to try to establish a projected path which they would hope to exploit at the end of 1981, dealing with the limitation of the missile deployment?

Secretary BROWN. The restrictions that they had proposed and which were discussed at earlier stages of the negotiations were more restrictive and ran for longer periods of time. We insisted in the course of the negotiations that the protocol be limited to the time that we said, and that its obligations then expire in order to assure that we go ahead with our programs.

They acceded to that, and in so doing, they accepted the consequences. What their intentions or motivations may be as to what they are going to try to get in future negotiations I cannot say, but I believe that as the protocol now exists, it is a vestige and, I think, a vestige that has no effect on our programs of earlier Soviet attempts at broader and stronger restrictions.

REASON FOR PROTOCOL CREATION

Secretary VANCE. I agree with what Harold has said. I would just say in answer to your very specific question that the protocol was created in order to take care of problems that were just too difficult to resolve in the treaty, and the idea was to have a temporary resolution, realizing that these would have to be dealt with some time in the distant future.

Secretary BROWN. The so-called SALT precedents are not automatic. An example is that in the SALT II negotiations they tried to carry over the disparity in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and we rejected that.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, gentlemen. I have to excuse myself. There is a vote on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Senator PELL [presiding]. At this point, I would like to pass on to you a question which should be answered for the record. If you would submit for the record, Secretary Brown, a statement of the details of the U.S. negotiating proposal of March 1977, would you indicate specifically, as you indicated earlier, what portions of the proposed details would achieve SALT II? We would appreciate it. Thank you.

[See appendix, p. 599.]

Senator PELL. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PUBLIC DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT

Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown, as you are well aware, the SALT II Treaty does impose limits on both nations in order to hopefully lead to arms reduction and a future SALT agreement. I would like to briefly tell you of a concern which I certainly think the American people want projected into this equation concerning SALT II. Having just returned from the Fourth of July recess—and many of us, I am sure, went back to our States—I found that there is a general thread of concern among American people.

No. 1, they don't trust you, and No. 2, they don't trust the Congress. Government has a high lack of credibility out there. Nobody believes Government any more. Initially, I felt that I would approach SALT II based on the alternatives to no SALT II agreement, but I found back home that a lot of people who have objections to SALT II would like to favor SALT II if they could be reassured that this Government would make the necessary commitment to keep parity with the Soviet Union under the SALT II agreement.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOUND U.S. DEFENSE

In Secretary Brown's statement, the phrase, "While not substantially constraining what we otherwise would plan to develop and deploy," concerns me. I fear that the general public would feel that once we have made our commitment to the deescalation of arms with the passage of SALT II, this Nation again might be lulled to sleep.

I cannot remember which of the gentlemen testified that the Soviet Union has outspent us 2½ to 1. I believe Secretary Brown made that statement.

Secretary BROWN. On strategic weapons.

Senator ZORINSKY. The fact remains they can continue to outspend us in SALT II, if that is allowed to happen, so I guess what I am saying is this. What type of commitment can we unilaterally make to the American public? It is something which I think is aside from the SALT II Treaty itself. I find that in addition to a high mistrust of Communist countries and specifically in this instance based on the past history of the Soviet Union—a high mistrust also of our own Government by its own people.

Secretary Brown, my question to you would be this: would it be necessary for the United States to develop and deploy up to the maximum allowed by the limits which are contained in SALT II?

Secretary BROWN. I would not want to say that we would have to, in order to maintain essential equivalence, do everything that SALT II allows us to do. In particular, there is more than one way to reach the SALT limits, so that even if you were committed to building up to the SALT limits, you would still have a choice of which way you do it, and there will be differences. Do you want to put it into, as I said, 820 MIRVed ICBM's? Do you want to put it into submarines? Do you want to put it into cruise missiles?

An answer to your concern, which I recognize, Senator Zorinsky, reflects the concern of many Americans, not only in Nebraska, that we need to assure the strategic equivalence and deterrent capability of the United States with more strategic programs. I would say this. The administration is moving ahead vigorously on air-launched, sea-launched, and ground-launched cruise missiles. It is moving ahead vigorously with the M-X missile system, and with a mobile and survivable basing system. We are moving ahead with Trident I missiles and with Trident submarines. We are prepared to do whatever we have to do to maintain our deterrent capability and essential equivalence during our term of office. We are going to do that with or without SALT II. We think it is more to our advantage to have SALT II and to do it under SALT II, but we are prepared to join the Congress in a declaration of intention to maintain essential equivalence during our respective terms of office.

CREATING PARITY UNDER SALT II

Senator ZORINSKY. Has or can the administration outline the specifics concerning what it feels needs to be done under SALT II to create parity with the experts being the ones that pick out where you do it and where you don't, as you pointed out?

I heard previous administrations say that under SALT I, certain actions would be taken, but evidently commitments are a thing of the moment. Certainly there is no way you can be held accountable for future administrations any more than we can be held accountable for future Congresses.

Secretary BROWN. That is correct, Senator Zorinsky. On Wednesday, the Joint Chiefs and I will be testifying, and I will be prepared to say what I think is necessary, and they will be prepared to say what they think is necessary and what our program is. We also will be testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee and will be making known our strategic programs there. So, there will be considerably more detail than I have been able to give today.

COST PROJECTIONS

Senator ZORINSKY. Earlier, I think in answer to Senator Javits' questions, you testified that the cost would escalate from a current $10 billion per annum of spending in this area to $12.5 billion per annum. With just one item such as the M-X system, we hear numbers of anywhere from $20 billion to $70 billion. How can you ascribe a $2.5 billion increase? Is that a hypothetical figure, or is it a rhetorical figure?

Secretary BROWN. Let me make two points, Senator Zorinsky. I am talking about fiscal year 1980 dollars. I cannot project inflation with any accuracy, and so that is what I am talking about. Also, I

am talking about per year. The figures that are quoted for M-X were figures that extend over 10 years or sometimes 15 years. It is because we plan ahead in Defense that people always quote the whole program cost, whereas in other parts of the Government an annual cost is sometimes quoted.

What I am talking about is an average fiscal year 1980 dollar cost over the early 1980's. That adds up, as Senator McGovern pointed out, to lots of money over a much longer time. If you project it over 20 years, $12.5 billion a year is $250 billion. That is a great deal of money, but even the $12.5 billion a year that I am talking about is about half again in constant dollars what we were spending on strategic forces in the late 1950's and early 1960's. There is no question that we can afford it. We can afford it.

RESOLUTION CONTAINING U.S. COMMITMENT TO ATTAIN PARITY

Senator ZORINSKY. Are you telling me that you would be happy if I would propose a resolution that would contain the essentials that you indicate you will present to us? That will necessitate this Congress and administration, as a joint commitment, to do as you said what needs to be done, that this country will do whatever has to be done to obtain parity under SALT II, that the administration would agree to that type of resolution?

Secretary BROWN. Well, we certainly would be prepared to consider it, Senator Zorinsky. I would have to look at the wording. I think this, of course, is a very major matter, which the President would have to consider. Nevertheless, I will say that this administration for its term is prepared to do what is necessary, and if the Congress is also prepared to do what is necessary, it may be possible to indicate that in some way.

Senator ZORINSKY. I have my doubts about some of my colleagues being prepared to commit themselves to that. Also, I think the American public is entitled to know whether this administration and Congress is committed to do those things that need to be done because, as you indicated, it is very simple to say we will do whatever needs to be done, but in effect, in reality, will we? That is where we have lost credibility with the American people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky.

This brings the hearing to a close for today. We will meet again tomorrow morning in this room at 10 o'clock. Secretary Vance will again be with us at that time.

[Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., July 10, 1979.]

[Additional questions submitted to the State Department and their answers thereto appear in the appendix.]

SALT II TREATY

TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m. in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

Today the committee's inquiry into the SALT II Treaty is broadened to include not only the terms of the treaty itself but also its context, the areas of agreement and disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union over policy and politics. We are here to consider where SALT II figures in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and how it relates to other Soviet interests and objectives. In other words, today we consider not only the what of SALT II, but the why.

CLARIFY ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SOVIETS

Yesterday, I observed that we are not here to conduct a referendum on the character of the Soviet Union, yet in defining the contribution of SALT II to our national security, it is important that we clarify assumptions about Soviet policy, behavior, and doctrine, and about our ability with or without this treaty to deal effectively with the Soviets in the many areas of the world where our interests and theirs meet. They meet often in rivalry and occasionally in potential accord.

We have been down a rocky road since the SALT I agreement was signed in 1972. The euphoria of the first flush of détente has long since disappeared. Instead of being restrained by political ingenuity, the arms race has been fed by technological developments. The Soviet weapons program and our own have both maintained a momentum that has outpaced diplomacy. Contrary to expectations, trade relations between our two countries have not flourished, and we have seen the Soviets aggressively pursuing their own interests in different parts of the world in ways that have deeply disturbed us.

We have also seen fresh proof of Soviet repressiveness and intolerance at home. In addition, there is a widespread fear in the West and in the U.S.S.R. of a possible period of Soviet instability accompanying that country's inevitable leadership transition.

RELATE SALT TO OVERALL CONTEXT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

The Soviets, for their part, will tell us that they have found it confusing and puzzling to deal with U.S. foreign policy in the seventies. They will say that they find us inconsistent and uncertain. They will ask how a superpower can speak with so many different voices. All of these concerns make it mandatory that we seek to relate these SALT agreements to the overall context of Soviet-American relations.

The American people want to understand. They want to know what is in SALT for the Soviets, why the Soviets have entered into the treaty, what is their stake, and why they would honor it. What relationship do the Russian leaders see between SALT and their other concerns? What effect will a change of leadership have on the Soviets' stance on arms control, and the overall course of relations? What differences of view exist within the Soviet leadership on SALT II and other aspects of foreign and internal policy?

I know that members of this committee will want to ask how SALT relates to other areas about which we are concerned, human rights, Soviet adventurism in the Third World, the Soviet military presence in Europe. We have come some distance in Soviet-American relations these past 10 years, despite the problems and disappointments. We must not shy away any longer from the question no one wants to face. What are the costs of rejection? Where do we go if the Senate rejects the treaty? What effect would Senate rejection have on the leadership struggles in the Soviet Union?

COMMON INTEREST TO STABILIZE ARMS RACE

These are questions I think the committee is obligated to face as it considers both sides of the issue before us. It does seem to me that despite all the differences between the two nations, there persists an abiding common interest in finding ways to stabilize the nuclear arms race. There is no absolute guarantee that we can succeed, yet the knowledge of the stakes involved in a nuclear arms race is the most sobering thought of all.

This morning, we again welcome Secretary Vance, who will address the question of SALT and U.S. policy. Secretary Vance is accompanied by Dr. Marshall Shulman, the Special Adviser to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, and other associates, including Ambassador Earle and Mr. McGiffert.

Senator Javits, do you wish to make any statement before we turn to the witnesses?

EXTENSION OF 3-YEAR PROTOCOL CONDITIONAL ON SENATORIAL CONCURRENCE

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to ask the Secretary of State one question on which he may wish to consult with the President.

Mr. Secretary, what is your position respecting the points raised by Senator Percy relating to the 3-year protocol? If you don't want a reservation, and I am for a reservation—I will tell you that now—you have to make a commitment by the President that this 3 years will not be extended without the consent of the Senate. So I leave that to you to tell us authoritatively what the story is on the 3-year protocol on cruise missiles.

Senator PERCY. If Senator Javits will yield on that point.

Senator JAVITS. Of course.

Senator PERCY. I would like to make a point as to why I felt it essential. We can't always just accept the assurance of the Secretary of State. We have such deep, abiding faith in you, Secretary Vance, but we don't know who the Secretary of State might be who succeeds you, nor who will be the President of the United States. He may or may not change. We have had the personal assurance from the President that he will not unilaterally extend it. But we think the issue should really be bound into the whole Senate process. We have to work regardless of personalities. That is why I was pressing the point yesterday and will pursue it again today. Thank you.

Secretary VANCE. Let me just respond very briefly by saying that Senator Percy has just made clear a point which I was going to make, namely, that the President already has stated that the protocol will not be extended without coming back to the Senate for consultation with the Senate.

I will, of course, discuss this matter with the President, as Senator Javits has requested.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, let me underscore the point, too, because it was the first question that I had intended to raise with you. We all remember what happened in the case of SALT I. At that time it met with the general approval of the Senate, so that the point was not raised, but when SALT I expired under its own terms, both the Soviet Union and the United States made unilateral declarations. I have the text of the unilateral statements before me this morning. It was your statement made on September 23, 1977, and it reads as follows:

> In order to maintain the status quo while SALT II negotiations are being completed, the United States declares its intention not to take any action inconsistent with the provisions of the interim agreement.

The Russians made a similar statement. The matter was never submitted to the Senate for senatorial approval. It was not felt necessary at the time. The Senate generally concurred with the action that was taken, but that does not necessarily mean that the same situation would exist 2 years hence. This protocol imposes certain restrictions on cruise missiles and on mobile ICBM's which are or could be of very special importance to the United States, and yet some future President might decide that in order to expedite

SALT III, we should preserve the status quo and do so by a unilateral declaration of the kind that we use in extending the status quo following the termination of SALT I.

This is why this issue has to be cleared up, and I think quite possibly by way of reservation, it will be clear in the document itself that the Senate's consent is made conditional upon senatorial concurrence in any effort to extend the protocol.

Secretary VANCE. I understand exactly what you have said, Senator Church. I can speak for this President. I know what this President's view is. He has stated it before, and I reaffirm it today. Obviously, I cannot speak for a future President.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker has asked me to yield to him for a moment.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will not take but just a moment.

I will make a statement I hope in aid of this question.

In January 1979, I traveled to the Soviet Union, and was privileged to meet with President Brezhnev and with Foreign Minister Gromyko, among others at the Kremlin. In the course of that conversation, this subject came up. Mr. Gromyko made the clear and, I think, unequivocal statement that the protocol would not extend beyond the time specified, and would not be precedential.

The question was put directly, and I thought the answer was unambiguous, and categorical. I thought I would add that for purposes of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary VANCE. I appreciate your adding that, Senator, because that confirms what Foreign Minister Gromyko said to me on several different occasions when we discussed the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you have a statement that you would like to make at this time?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; I do. I have a full statement which I would like to submit for the record. I would like to give excerpts in order to expedite the delivery of the statement and get us more promptly to the question and answer period.

STATEMENT OF HON. CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY MARSHALL SHULMAN, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; HON. DAVID McGIFFERT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND HON. RALPH EARLE II, CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

EFFECT OF SENATE DECISION ON BROADER U.S. INTEREST

Secretary VANCE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, today I want to discuss how the decisions of the Senate will affect our broader international interests. Let me begin by repeating one thought from yesterday's testimony. First and foremost, SALT II must be judged by its impact upon our national security. That is its transcendent purpose.

In this context, approval of the treaty will help us meet several essential objectives of our foreign policy. It will help us to defend our interests and promote our values in the world from a position

of strength for a strategic balance could lead some of our friends and allies to question our ability to protect our interests and theirs.

It will help us to fashion a balanced relationship with the Soviet Union in which we build in areas of mutual interest but do not let the benefits of cooperative measures blind us to the reality of our continuing competition.

It will reinforce the confidence of our allies and help strengthen the alliance through which our own security is enhanced, and it will enable us to broaden the work of arms control so we can encourage the further transfer of attention and resources to steps which will lift the human condition.

SALT WILL MEET EXPECTATIONS OF AMERICAN PEOPLE

SALT will also meet the expectations of the American people. Our people look to both the administration and the Congress to shape a sound and sensible national security policy. They know that America's leadership in the world depends on wisdom as well as strength. They want us to search for peace and cooperation, even as we maintain a strong defense. They wisely reject a euphoric view of détente but they do not want a return to the undiluted hostility of the cold war.

We do not suggest that SALT II will by itself carry us to a new world of prosperity and peace. Even with this treaty, there will be continued tests of our political will. Substantial new investments will be required to keep our defenses strong and ready. Nor do we suggest that if SALT is not approved, we could not survive. We could. The issue is whether we are in a better or worse position, whether our national security and foreign policy would be enhanced and strengthened or hurt and weakened, as some suggest, by the approval of this treaty.

SALT DECISION IMPACT ON UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

The decision on SALT II will have a direct and important impact on our relationship with the Soviet Union. The growth of nuclear arms has altered that relationship in fundamental ways. We continue to have sharply different values and different views on many issues, yet in a nuclear age each nation understands the importance of seeking agreement where our interests coincide. For the foreseeable future, our relationship with the Soviet Union will continue to have two strands. One is the steady pursuit of measures of cooperation and restraint. There is no reason why we cannot benefit from carefully negotiated arms control, economic or cultural agreements, just because the Soviet Union also benefits. At the same time, the process of seeking restraint and broadening areas of cooperation cannot be allowed for a moment to divert our attention and determination from the fact of continuing competition with the Soviets in many areas.

It is imperative in an era of continuing competition that we not allow a military imbalance which would offer the Soviets either political or military advantages. The challenge of the eighties and nineties is to maintain both deterrence and equivalence, for both military and political reasons. The Soviet Union must never be

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able to use any edge in military weapons to shape the course of world events.

PRESERVE EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES

Perceptions of our strength and resolve are crucial. If there were doubts about the credibility of our deterrent, third countries could feel more vulnerable to Soviet pressure. The result would be a lessening of American influence and a more dangerous world. The surest way to prevent political harm is to preserve an essential equivalence between our forces and those of the Soviet Union.

As Secretary Brown and I discussed in detail yesterday, that is precisely what SALT II will help us to do.

What would happen to the United States-Soviet relationship if SALT II were rejected? We cannot know entirely, but it is clear that we would be entering a period of greater uncertainty. I see no reasonable basis for believing that if SALT II is not ratified, the Soviet Union will be induced to moderate its defense spending or to become more cooperative in the Third World. In the absence of SALT, however, we face unlimited nuclear competition and a serious increase in United States-Soviet tensions. In such an atmosphere, each crisis and each confrontation would become far more dangerous.

We do not negotiate arms control on the basis of friendship. We do not see it as a reward for Soviet behavior. As President Carter has stated, it is precisely because of our fundamental differences that we must bring the most dangerous dimension of our military competition under control.

We must be clear about the message we want to convey, both to the current Soviet leaders and to the next generation, that we are committed to the building of a stable and peaceful world in which fundamental human rights are universally accepted, that we will firmly oppose any effort that threatens the peace and security of this Nation and its friends, but that we are also prepared to move ahead in those areas where cooperation can bring gains for both sides, particularly in lightening the burdens and lessening the dangers of nuclear arms. Both the competitive and the cooperative strands of our policy must be pursued.

SALT II contributes to both. Its rejection, by diminishing the possibilities for future cooperation, would make the competition more dangerous and difficult.

RELATIONSHIP OF SALT TO NATO AND OTHER ALLIANCES

Let me turn to the relationship of this treaty to NATO and our other alliances. America's allies fully support the SALT II Treaty. Just as our partners look to us for leadership in strengthening the military position of our alliances, which we are doing, they also expect and want us to lead in the quest for greater security and stability through arms control.

In particular, our NATO allies see their security enhanced by the agreement in three ways. A destabilizing and unregulated competition in strategic forces between the United States and the

Soviet Union could create new tensions and thus military dangers in Europe. Increasing the U.S. resources devoted to such a strategic competition would divert from our efforts together with our NATO partners to strengthen NATO's conventional and theater nuclear forces, and the possibility of improving western security through other arms control efforts, especially MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] and possible future negotiations involving theater nuclear forces, depends heavily on securing the SALT II Treaty.

Our allies also see their political well-being served by the agreement. To them, improved relations with the Soviet Union means families reunited, contacts with their fellow Europeans in the East expanded, and hopes for a more tranquil continent advanced. They know that failure to agree on SALT II could cast a chilling shadow over the whole range of East-West relations.

SPECIFIC INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF ALLIES

Our allies had specific interests and concerns in connection with SALT II. The questions they raised were related to specific points, not to the enterprise as a whole, and in each case we have developed mutually acceptable solutions. Because we have no more important national priority than political and military solidarity with our allies, I want to describe these solutions in some detail.

FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON U.S. SYSTEMS FOR THEATER MISSIONS

In the North Atlantic Council on June 29 we addressed two issues of central importance to our allies, on which we consulted closely. First, to make clear that SALT II does not foreclose future options with regard to either arms control or modernization of theater nuclear weapons, we stated that any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

EFFECT OF TREATY ON ALLIANCE COOPERATION AND MODERNIZATION

Second, to make clear that nothing in the treaty would prevent continued cooperation in weapons technology and systems, we stated in detail our views on the effect of the treaty on alliance cooperation and modernization. We stressed that in the treaty we have undertaken no obligation on noncircumvention beyond the basic tenets of international law and that the treaty will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our allies. Nor will it preclude cooperation on modernization.

We also recall that in SALT II negotiations we rejected a provision on nontransfer of weapons and technology, and we defined in detail our policy on such transfers. The text of our statement is a part of my prepared testimony, so that it can be examined in full by this committee.

NATO ALLIES ENDORSED SALT II ON TWO LEVELS

At this same meeting on the 29th of June, our NATO allies issued a formal statement which is contained in my prepared testimony for your perusal.

The NATO allies have endorsed the SALT II Treaty on two levels. They are convinced that it preserves all essential defense options to sustain deterrence in Europe and they believe the treaty serves a necessary role in the overall East-West political and strategic relationship.

Beyond Europe, this treaty is supported by our other friends and allies around the world. I have just returned from a 2-week trip throughout the Pacific region. In Tokyo and Korea, at the meeting of the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] foreign ministers, and at the ANZUS [Security Pact Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States] meeting in Australia, our friends and allies emphasized to me they view this treaty as contributing to stability and peace in the world, and to the ability of the United States to continue to meet its regional commitments.

SALT II IMPORTANT TO ALL EFFORTS TOWARD ARMS RESTRAINT

Beyond its effects on East-West relations, and the interests of our allies, SALT II is important to all of our other efforts toward arms restraint. The accumulation and spread of modern arms, including conventional arms, is a burden on the world and a central challenge to our leadership. A global arms buildup conflicts with every one of our international aims, peace, human development, greater attention to such issues as energy, the environment, population, and other common needs of the human family.

This challenge calls for an unrelenting commitment to restrain the growth of arms so that scarce resources in all nations can be used in better ways, yet our prospects for success in other key arms control efforts could turn on the fate of SALT II.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH SOVIET UNION

We have other serious arms control talks under way with the Soviet Union. We are negotiating, for example, to limit antisatellite weapons, in order to protect the observation and communications vehicles which are vital in times of calm and indispensable in time of crisis.

We are negotiating with the Soviet Union and Britain toward a potential ban on nuclear testing which could be a significant restraint on the arms race. Failure of the SALT Treaty could jeopardize these endeavors.

The outlook for arms control elsewhere would also be dim, for our arguments in favor of restraint by others will be judged in large part by our commitment to SALT. More than a dozen nations have the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon within 2 years of making such a decision. In a world of intense regional disputes, the risk this poses to peace and to our own safety is evident. These nations will be less likely to exercise restraint if they see the two nuclear superpowers unable to agree upon nuclear restraint.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty itself specifically provides that the nuclear weapons states will pursue effective arms control measures.

Our progress in fulfilling that obligation will undoubtedly be a major focus of the next year's review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Without the SALT II Treaty, the authority of

our efforts to halt the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons would be undermined. Failure of SALT II could also damage our efforts to limit transfers of conventional weapons, both with major suppliers like the Soviet Union, and with Third World arms consumers.

Even under the best of circumstances, this is a difficult task, yet we must be committed to this effort, for the flow of arms depletes precious resources and heightens the potential danger and destructiveness of volatile regional tensions. Let us therefore demonstrate that our commitment to the control of arms is genuine. By acting in our own self-interest we can also help create a world environment which promotes the interests of peoples elsewhere.

SALT SHOULD REFLECT VALUES OF AMERICAN PEOPLE

Finally, beyond using SALT to advance our foreign policy goals, we should assure that our actions on this issue fairly reflect the values and the hopes of the American people. I believe the American people have a sound understanding of our security needs. They have supported the increased defense effort that this administration has proposed. Certainly this country possesses the technology and the funds to achieve effective deterrence and essential equivalence at any level that unlimited competition brings about.

If we engage in a needless arms race, I believe we would part company with the American people. They support a strong defense, but they have other priorities as well, including urgent needs in the areas of energy and inflation, and they understand that such an arms race would not enhance our security.

In sum, the SALT II Treaty and the commitments we have made to strengthen the strategic forces will have a profound influence on the character of American leadership in the world. Obviously, with or without this treaty, we will face an imposing array of challenges and problems, but if we are to meet them, SALT II is an important and a necessary first step.

SALT WILL PROMOTE U.S. SECURITY

The treaty will promote our security by helping us maintain a strong position of strategic equivalence and manage our most dangerous relationship. It will help keep our alliances secure and united. It will serve our interests throughout the world. In all of these ways, approval of SALT II will reflect what I believe to be the basic posture of the American people, not a pointless belligerence, but a sensible determination to defend our Nation and our interests, to advance our ideals, and to preserve the peace and the safety of the entire human race.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Secretary Vance's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance

Today I want to discuss how the decision of the Senate will affect our broader international interests.

Let me begin by repeating one thought from yesterday's testimony: first and foremost, SALT II must be judged by its impact upon our national security. That is its transcedent purpose.

We believe the treaty meets that test. It makes an important contribution to maintaining a stable strategic balance, now and in the future.

SALT II is not a substitute for a strong defense. It complements and reinforces our defense efforts. Together, SALT II and our defense modernization programs will give us the security we need as we meet other critical challenges to America's future.

Beyond its direct contribution to our security, the SALT II treaty must also be seen in the context of the larger fabric of international relations.

Approval of the treaty will help us meet several essential objectives of our foreign policy.

It will help us to defend our interests and promote our values in the world from a position of strength. For a strategic imbalance could lead some of our friends and allies to question our ability to protect our interests and theirs.

It will help us to fashion a balanced relationship with the Soviet Union in which we build on areas of mutual interest, but do not let the benefits of cooperative measures blind us to the reality of our continuing competition.

It will reinforce the confidence of our allies and help strengthen the alliances through which our own security is enhanced.

And it will enable us to broaden the work of arms control, so we can encourage the further transfer of attention and resources to steps which will lift the human condition.

SALT will also meet the expectations of the American people. Our people look to both the Administration and the Congress to shape a sound and sensible national security policy. They know that America's leadership in the world depends upon wisdom as well as strength. They want us to search for peace and cooperation even as we maintain a strong defense. They wisely reject a euphoric view of detente, but they do not want a return to the undiluted hostility of the Cold War.

We do not suggest that SALT II will by itself carry us to a new world of prosperity and peace. Even with this treaty there will be continued tests of our political will. Substantial new investments will be required to keep our defenses strong and ready.

Nor do we suggest that if SALT is not approved, we could not survive. We could.

The issue is whether we would be in a better or worse position, whether our national security and foreign policy would be enhanced and strengthened or hurt and weakened, as some suggest, by the approval of this treaty.

SALT AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

The decision on SALT II will have a direct and important impact on our relationship with the Soviet Union.

The growth of nuclear arms has altered that relationship in fundamental ways. We continue to have sharply different values and different views on many issues. Yet, in a nuclear age, each nation understands the importance of seeking agreement where our interests coincide.

For the foreseeable future, our relationship with the Soviet Union will continue to have two strands. One is the steady pursuit of measures of cooperation and restraint. There is no reason why we cannot benefit from carefully negotiated arms control, economic or cultural agreements just because the Soviet Union also benefits.

At the same time, the process of seeking restraint and broadening areas of cooperation cannot be allowed for a moment to divert our attention and determination from the fact of continuing competition with the Soviets in many areas.

It is imperative, in an era of continuing competition, that we not allow a military imbalance which could offer the Soviets either political or military advantages.

During the 1940's and 50's and into the 60's, the United States enjoyed an extraordinary advantage in nuclear weapons. Given the Soviets' industrial power and the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, our monopoly could not last. It was inevitable that the Soviets would develop a nuclear arsenal of their own. Since then we have come to a condition of strategic parity which must be preserved. So long as it is preserved, neither side can expect to use its weapons for unilateral advantage.

We cannot hope to turn back the clock and recapture our earlier wide advantage. All we could expect from the attempt would be a spiraling arms race that would be costly, dangerous, and futile. Secretary Brown summed up the situation last April in Chicago when he said ". . . equivalence and deterrence are at one and the same time our maximum feasible—and our minimum tolerable—objectives."

The challenge of the 80's and 90's is to maintain both deterrence and equivalence, for both military and political reasons. The Soviet Union must never be able to use any edge in military weapons to shape the course of world events.

Perceptions of our strength and resolve are crucial. If there were doubts about the credibility of our deterrent, third countries could feel more vulnerable to Soviet

pressure. The result could be a lessening of American influence and a more dangerous world.

We have no way to measure precisely how large a military discrepancy would have to be to cause political harm. We also have no interest in experimentation. The surest way to prevent political harm is to preserve an essential equivalence between our forces and those of the Soviet Union. As Secretary Brown and I discussed in detail yesterday, that is precisely what SALT II will help us to do. Indeed, equivalence is the premise of this treaty. With the future strategic balance more secure, we can most effectively compete wherever necessary.

What would happen to the U.S.-Soviet relationship if SALT II were rejected? We cannot know entirely. But it is clear that we would be entering a period of greater uncertainty.

I see no reasonable basis for believing that if SALT II is not ratified, the Soviet Union will be induced to moderate its defense spending or become more cooperative in the Third World. In the absence of SALT, however, we face unlimited nuclear competition and a serious increase in U.S.-Soviet tensions. In such an atmosphere, each crisis and each confrontation could become far more dangerous.

We do not negotiate arms control on the basis of friendship. We do not see it as a reward for Soviet behavior. As President Carter has stated, it is precisely *because* of our fundamental differences that we must bring the most dangerous dimension of our military competition under control.

We must be clear about the message we want to convey, both to current Soviet leaders and to the next generation:

That we are committed to the building of a stable and peaceful world in which fundamental human rights are universally respected;

That we will firmly oppose any effort that threatens the peace and security of this nation and its friends;

But that we are also prepared to move ahead in those areas where cooperation can bring gains for both sides, particularly in lightening the burdens and lessening the dangers of nuclear arms.

Both the competitive and the cooperative strands of our policy must be pursued. SALT II contributes to both. Its rejection, by diminishing the possibilities for future cooperation, could make the competition more dangerous and difficult.

U.S. ALLIANCES AND SALT

Let me turn to the relationship of this treaty to NATO and our other alliances.

America's allies fully support the SALT II treaty. Just as our partners look to us for leadership in strengthening the military position of our alliances—which we are doing—they also expect and want us to lead in the quest for greater security and stability through arms control.

In particular, our NATO allies see their security enhanced by the agreement in three ways:

A destabilizing and unregulated competition in strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union could create new tensions, and thus military dangers, in Europe.

Increasing the U.S. resources devoted to such a strategic competition could divert from our efforts, together with our NATO partners, to strengthen NATO's conventional and theater nuclear forces.

And the possibility of improving western security through other arms control efforts—especially MBFR and possible future negotiations involving theater nuclear forces—depends heavily on securing a SALT II treaty.

Our allies also see their political well-being served by the agreement. To them, improved relations with the U.S.S.R. means families re-united, contacts with their fellow Europeans in the East expanded, and hopes for a more tranquil continent advanced. They know that failure to agree on SALT II could cast a chilling shadow over the whole range of East-West relations.

Our allies had specific interests and concerns in connection with SALT II. The questions they raised were related to specific points, not to the enterprise as a whole. And in each case we have developed mutually acceptable solutions. Because we have no more important international priority than political and military solidarity with our allies, I want to describe these solutions in some detail.

In the North Atlantic Council on June 29th, we addressed two issues of central importance to our allies' concerns, on which we consulted closely.

First, to make clear that SALT II does not foreclose future options with regard to either arms control or modernization of theater nuclear weapons, we stated that any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

Second, to make clear that nothing in the treaty would prevent continued cooperation in weapons technology and systems, we stated in detail our views on the effect of the treaty on alliance cooperation and modernization. We stressed that in the treaty we have undertaken no obligation on noncircumvention beyond the basic tenets of international law, and that the treaty will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our allies. Nor will it preclude cooperation on modernization. We also recalled that in the SALT II negotiations, we rejected a provision on non-transfer of weapons and technology. And we defined in detail our policy on such transfers. The text of our statement is a part of my prepared testimony so that it can be examined in full.

At this same meeting on June 29th, our NATO Allies issued a formal joint statement which read in part:

"The Allies have concluded that the new agreement is in harmony with the determination of the Alliance to pursue meaningful arms control measures in the search for a more stable relationship between the East and West. The Allies therefore hope that the agreement will soon enter into force. This treaty responds to the hope of the Allies for a reduction in nuclear arsenals and thus offers a broader prospect for detente. The Allies note that the treaty fully maintains the U.S. strategic deterrent, an essential element for the security of Europe and of North America."

Thus, the NATO Allies have endorsed the SALT II treaty on two levels: they are convinced that it preserves all essential defense options, to sustain deterrence in Europe; and they believe the treaty serves a necessary role in the overall East-West political and strategic relationship.

Beyond Europe, this treaty is supported by our other friends and allies around the world.

I have just returned from a two-week trip throughout the Pacific region. In Tokyo, in Korea, at the meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and at the ANZUS meeting in Australia, our friends and allies emphasized to me that they view this treaty as contributing to stability and peace in the world and to the ability of the United States to continue to meet its regional commitments.

SALT AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL

Beyond its effects on East-West relations and the interests of our Allies, SALT II is important to all of our other efforts toward arms restraint.

The accumulation and spread of modern arms—including conventional arms—is a burden on the world and a central challenge to our leadership. The global arms build-up conflicts with every one of our international aims—peace; human development; and greater attention to such issues as energy, the environment, population, and all other common needs of the human family.

This challenge calls for an unrelenting commitment to restrain the growth of arms, so that scarce resources in all nations can be used in better ways. Yet our prospects for success in other key arms control efforts could turn on the fate of SALT II.

We have other serious arms control talks underway with the Soviet Union. We are negotiating, for example, to limit anti-satellite weapons, in order to protect the observation and communications vehicles which are vital in times of calm and indispensable in times of crisis. We are negotiating with the Soviet Union and Britain toward a potential ban on nuclear testing, which could be a significant restraint on the arms race. Failure of the SALT treaty could jeopardize these endeavors.

The outlook for arms control elsewhere would also be dimmed. For our arguments in favor of restraint by others will be judged in large part by our commitment to SALT.

More than a dozen nations have the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon within two years of making such a decision. In a world of intense regional disputes, the risk this poses to peace—and to our own safety—is evident. These nations will be less likely to exercise restraint if they see the two nuclear superpowers unable to agree about nuclear restraint.

The non-proliferation treaty itself specifically provides that the nuclear weapons states will pursue effective arms control measures. Our progress in fulfilling that obligation will undoubtedly be a major focus of next year's review conference on the non-proliferation treaty. Without the SALT II treaty, the authority of our efforts to halt the world-wide spread of nuclear weapons would be undermined.

Failure of SALT II could also damage our efforts to limit transfers of conventional weapons—both with major suppliers like the Soviet Union and the Third World arms consumers. Even under the best of circumstances this is a difficult task. Yet

we must be committed to the effort, for the flow of arms depletes precious resources and heightens the potential danger and destructiveness of volatile regional tensions.

Let us therefore demonstrate that our commitment to the control of arms is genuine. By acting in our own self-interest, we can also help create a world environment which promotes the interests of people elsewhere.

Finally, beyond using SALT to advance our foreign policy goals, we should assure that our actions on this issue fairly reflect the values and the hopes of the American people.

I believe the American people have a sound understanding of our security needs. They have supported the increased defense effort this Administration has proposed.

Certainly this country possesses the technology and the funds to achieve effective deterrence and essential equivalence at any level that unlimited competition brings about. But the higher the level, the greater the sacrifice from our own citizens—and with less assurance of achieving these objectives.

If we engage in a needless arms race, I believe we would part company with the American people. They support a strong defense. But they have other priorities as well, including urgent needs in the areas of energy and inflation. And they understand that such an arms race would not enhance our security.

In sum, the SALT II treaty and the commitments we have made to strengthen our strategic forces will have a profound influence on the character of American leadership in the world. Obviously, with or without this treaty, we will face an imposing array of challenges and problems. But if we are to meet them, SALT II is an important and necessary first step.

The treaty will promote our security by helping us maintain a strong position of strategic equivalence and manage our most dangerous relationship.

It will help keep our alliances secure and united.

It will serve our interests throughout the world.

In all of these ways, approval of SALT II will reflect what I believe to be the basic posture of the American people—not a pointless belligerence, but a sensible determination to defend our nation and our interests, to advance our ideals, and to preserve the peace and safety of the entire human race.

TEXT OF JUNE 29, 1979, STATEMENT TO NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

In the view of the United States, the non-circumvention provision in the SALT agreement simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. It is a basic tenet of international law that agreements once entered into are to be carried out and not circumvented, and the United States would be so obligated with or without a non-circumvention provision. It is the position of the United States that the non-circumvention provision does not impose any additional obligations whatever on it beyond the specific obligations of the provisions of the Treaty and, for the period of its effectiveness, the Protocol, nor does it broaden the interpretation of those obligations.

The United States has consulted intensively with the Alliance throughout the SALT TWO negotiations, recognizing the important Alliance interest in the SALT TWO agreement which deals with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of the possible implications of the non-circumvention clause for Alliance cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with its Allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization. The United States believes that, in practice, the non-circumvention provision, which it will apply as stated below, will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional cooperation with its Allies.

As to the issue of transfers, the United States has consistently rejected the inclusion of a provision on non-transfer in the SALT agreement. We have made clear in the negotiating record that transfers of weapons or technology to our Allies will continue and cannot, ipso facto, constitute circumvention. The United States will deal with future requests for transfers of weapons systems and technology on a case-by-case basis under the SALT TWO agreement, as it has done in the past. The transfer of weapons systems or technology for systems which were not numerically limited or prohibited by the agreement would be unaffected by the agreement. With respect to systems numerically limited in the agreement, as under the Interim Agreement, transfers would not be necessarily precluded by the agreement. Of course, requests for such transfers would, in many cases, involve policy issues, and would have to be dealt with in light of the circumstances of the situation and the particular request. This would also be the case if there were no agreement.

The United States will not be able to transfer to its Allies or other states those weapons systems or technology uniquely related to such systems, which are prohibited to the United States itself by the agreement. The United States fully accepts its responsibility not to circumvent the agreement. For the United States to supply to other states systems of a type that is prohibited to the United States itself by a provision of the agreement would be a circumvention of the agreement, even if there were no non-circumvention provision.

In accordance with recognized international practice, no third party can be bound or legally affected by the obligations the United States assumes under the SALT Agreement. The United States would reject and would view as inconsistent with the political and strategic purposes of the agreement any attempt by the Soviet Union to raise, on the basis of the non-circumvention provision, questions concerning the activities of states not party to the agreement. In both a legal and practical sense, only the United States is subject to challenge in connection with questions raised by the Soviet Union with respect to the SALT agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

AMENDMENT—RESERVATION—UNDERSTANDINGS

First of all, I would like to pursue a rather technical matter for purposes of the record. So far in our discussion we have used three terms rather loosely. We have spoken of amendment, we have spoken of reservation and we have spoken of understandings. I think it would be well to clarify the difference between these three.

During the Senate's consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties last year, an amendment to the text of the treaty was approved. Prior to the Senate's approval of that amendment, however, both the Government of the United States and the Government of Panama had agreed to the revision in the text.

Now, an amendment of the treaty itself is like amending a contract that has already been entered into force. The amendment changes the text and therefore requires the consent of both contracting parties. In other words, if the Senate were to actually amend the text of the treaty, it would necessitate going back to the negotiating table, would it not?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; it would.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other hand, if the Senate seeks to modify the substance of the treaty, it could do so by adopting a reservation to the articles of ratification. That would not change the text of the treaty, but since it would affect the substance of the treaty, that, too, would have to be agreed to by the other contracting party before the instruments of ratification could be exchanged and the treaty could take effect. Is that not true?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, there is an understanding, which also does not alter the text of the treaty, but relates to the articles of ratification. An understanding usually deals with a clarification or an interpretation of the meaning of the text of the treaty.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

REASON RUSSIANS WANT SALT TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to keep those distinctions in mind as we proceed.

Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the Russians have been narrowing the gap since 1967—which was the last time we had a confrontation with the Russians that brought us close to the edge

of a nuclear war—they have been closing the gap in terms of their strategic forces. They have spent a great deal of money building their missiles, their submarines, their bomber force, and it was acknowledged yesterday that they have been overtaking the United States, though we may still hold some strategic edge.

That being the case, why do the Russians want the SALT Treaty?

Secretary VANCE. I believe that the Soviets want the SALT Treaty for several reasons.

First: I believe that the Soviets have a genuine fear of war, and the consequences of a nuclear war, as do we and all other countries in the world. They still have fresh in their memory the result of World War II, in which over 20 million people were killed. There was hardly a family that doesn't still have the scars of what happened during that time. So, I think this plays a major role in their thinking.

Second: I believe that they would for their own national self-interest like to see a more stable relationship with the United States, the other so-called superpower in the world. This would mean a more balanced relationship with less likelihood that the ups and downs could lead to actions detrimental to them which could potentially get out of control and lead to conflict.

Third: I believe that the entry into this treaty is of symbolic importance to them because of the equality with the United States which it provides in their view and in the view of their people. The principle of equality as well as equal security is a principle to which they refer many, many times, and it is stated as one of the basic principles for the treaty. I think this is important to them.

Fourth: And of great importance, I think, are the domestic implications of the signing of a SALT agreement. The economic conditions in the Soviet Union at this time are not good. The question of allocation of resources within that nation is important. Not only financial resources, but resources in terms of time and attention that can be devoted to the problems that they are facing within the domestic economy. I think they believe that the signing of the SALT agreement, will make it easier for them to allocate their resources and direct their attention to the domestic problems than would be the case if there were no SALT agreement.

There are other reasons, but those are the four principal ones.

SALT II ACHIEVED AFTER EQUIVALENCE WAS ACHIEVED

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you think it would be accurate to say that until the Russians reached a state of rough equivalence with the United States in nuclear power, this SALT II Treaty would not have been achievable?

Secretary VANCE. I believe the answer to that is yes. I think that in the period following World War II, there was a concern on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to the need as they saw it to move toward a state of equality. I think this also was the case at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and a determination was made by them that this was going to be one of their fundamental goals. They were going to build until they reached essential equivalence or rough parity with the United States.

OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE CEILINGS AND LEVEL OF DANGER

The CHAIRMAN. Now that that rough parity does exist, this treaty establishes equal ceilings and thus affords us an opportunity in the future to reduce those ceilings and thus the level of danger to both sides. Would you not agree?

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir.

U.S. RESPONSE TO ANOTHER CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The CHAIRMAN. Often in this argument opponents of the treaty have said that it was the tremendous nuclear superiority enjoyed by the United States in 1962 that enabled us to force the Russians to back down at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

My question is as follows: Could we respond to a Cuban missile crisis similarly today as we did in 1962?

Secretary VANCE. My answer is unequivocally yes. First, let me say that I do not share the view that it was our nuclear superiority alone that created that situation. I think the very great naval power that we had at that time also played an important part in what took place during the Cuban missile crisis. But I have no doubt that at this time we could act in a fashion which would protect our national interests.

OBSOLESCENCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CONCEPTS

The CHAIRMAN. What this seems to add up to, then, is that neither side is advantaged once the nuclear weapons on both sides have grown to the point where if a nuclear exchange ever occurs both sides would be incinerated. In other words, it is not that we lack muscle, but that we are musclebound, that neither side dares use these nuclear weapons except in the act of commiting suicide. And, if there is to be future war, and both sides are to avoid suicide, then it will have to be a war conducted by conventional weapons.

In other words, national defense is rather an obsolete concept when there is no way to defend against missiles. We have even dropped that word from our military lexicon. We talk instead of deterrence, not of defense. Correct?

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

GREATER ATTENTION TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. If we were able to establish these ceilings through the ratification of this treaty and thus avoid even larger expenditures for nuclear weapons, does it follow that we could then give greater attention to the kinds of conventional weapons that we might have to use in the event of war?

Secretary VANCE. I feel that we are going to have to continue to modernize our conventional forces. This has been one of the beliefs of this administration since it came into office. Steps are being taken to do just that. I think this must be done with or without a treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. But with the treaty we would need to spend less on further buildup of nuclear weapons that we dare not use, and

thus could devote greater attention to the conventional weapons in our arsenal.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TEST DESIRABILITY OF THE SALT TREATY

Mr. Secretary, may I welcome you here this morning with respect now to your political hat, together with Marshall Shulman, your expert, Ambassador Earle, and Mr. McGiffert. I welcome one statement which you make which I think is the most important thing you have said yet in this matter. It appears in your written statement. You say, "Nor do we suggest that if SALT is not approved we could not survive. We could." I think that was essential, Mr. Secretary, to put you on the same side with us in the Senate.

If we are going to consider this on the theory that we have no alternative and we have to approve it, what are we here for? The fact is we are here to test the desirability of this treaty in the interests of the United States. To me, you have sounded the note which makes it possible to be bipartisan or unpartisan with that recognition. I am sure it was very conscious on your part, but I just wanted to call it to your attention and to the attention of my colleagues.

Would you agree that my interpretation is not far fetched?

Secretary VANCE. I thought it very important to state that.

Senator JAVITS. I thank you.

ICBM DETERRENT WILL BE IMPERILED BY 1980's

Also, I am impressed with your statement which leads to my questions this morning. You say: "The Soviet Union must never be able to use any edge in military weapons to shape the course of world events." Now, Mr. Secretary, it is admitted that the most important deterrent force of the United States is the ICBM. It is admitted that the ICBM, the validity of the ICBM as a deterrent, will be imperiled in the early 1980's, before this treaty expires.

Therefore, I ask you, what is your judgment as to whether we should or should not decide that by reason of that fact, the Soviet Union will be emboldened to destabilize areas in the world which are critical to our national interest, to wit, South Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean?

By way of a demonstration as to what that means, Mr. Secretary, and because we all know—we are not children—that this treaty is not all pro the United States, we all know there are some things we are going to give up, and going to risk, and we are better off laying them on the table. The Soviet Union in 1972 made an agreement with the United States of the most solemn kind. It was between Brezhnev and Nixon and was entitled "Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 29, 1972."

I have carefully examined that agreement, Mr. Secretary. I believe that practically every section of it has been violated by the Soviet Union, which has pushed its advantage in a manifold series

of actions beginning with the introduction of the Cubans into Angola as a result of our decision in the Senate—in which I participated—to stay out; in its activities in Afghanistan; in the present activities of Vietnam respecting Cambodia; in its activities in the Middle East; all by virtue of Soviet arms supplies, in direct violation of the statements in the agreement to which I have referred.

For example, in article 2, "Efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other directly or indirectly are inconsistent with these objectives which are described in the agreement."

Mr. Secretary, under those circumstances, what do you say to us about putting the Russians in an even better position to impose their will on us in these critical areas of the world because we accept the freezing of the weakness which has now been demonstrated on the part of the United States in respect to deterrence, bearing in mind that you did not negotiate this agreement? It may have been a great mistake that the country did not negotiate with the Russians as we did in the ABM treaty to reduce our ICBM's during this 5-year period.

I think it is a very real question to ask you. Why didn't we? Why didn't we, in view of the fact that we are richer, bigger, more industrially powerful, and if made to do it, they know that we can compete successfully with them with respect to nuclear arms? That is the basic question I would like to ask you. What is your answer, please?

Secretary VANCE. Let me give several answers, because you really asked several different questions. First, I want to comment on your statement that because there will be a vulnerability of our land-based missiles during the early 1980's through the mid-1980's, this will make us weak and we will be perceived to be weak. I do not agree with that.

As Harold Brown pointed out yesterday, our ICBM's form one and only one leg of the so-called Triad, the three-legged stool on which our defense is built. The Triad includes not only land-based missiles, but sea-based missiles and our bombers which soon will be able to carry air-launched cruise missiles which have great accuracy.

Even assuming that one were to launch a first strike against our land-based systems, we would have left devastating power which could retaliate and destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society. So, I think that the premise is one which I cannot accept, but I would like to move on and answer the other questions which you have asked.

QUESTION OF LINKAGE

Second, it is my strong view that competition will continue to exist in fields other than the strategic field. That leads us into the question of linkage or no linkage. The treaty deals with the cardinal question of national security for both of our countries. I think it is unrealistic to expect that either country will make concessions on matters of supreme national interest which would be affected by the treaty in order to achieve political aims of a lesser priority.

In short it is my judgment that neither side is going to do anything in the other side's favor by concluding a SALT agree-

ment. It is not a reward for good behavior. What it is is an action taken in order to regularize the nuclear competition and to thus protect and enhance the security of the two nations.

Next, if we were to link SALT with other issues, the Soviets could insist on making comparable linkages in foreign policies as a price for SALT. As Harold Brown pointed out yesterday, for example, the Soviets might try to affect our relationship with the People's Republic of China. That is our business and should not be affected. Therefore, I continue to believe what I have believed from the outset: the SALT agreement should be evaluated on its own terms. We should judge whether or not it is sound and enhances our national security. If it does, then it should be approved. If it doesn't, then it shouldn't.

Finally, with respect to the question of competition in these other areas, such as Africa, I believe that we should strive for restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. We have raised these questions directly with them, and they were discussed at the Vienna meeting.

I think it is important that we do indicate very clearly our concerns where we think that the competition is endangering the peace of the area and affecting adversely the lives of people in that area. We should strive to reduce that kind of competition and to see restraint exercised. But I do not think that you can depend upon that happening, nor that it should be linked to the approval or disapproval of the SALT agreement.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time is up. I will be back.

Secretary VANCE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIETS MODERATE BEHAVIOR BASED ON SALT APPROVAL

Is there any evidence, Mr. Secretary, to suggest that the Soviets are likely to moderate their behavior in other areas, in human rights, for instance, or in Africa, if the SALT II Treaty is approved? This gets back to your linkage point. Conversely, do you think there is any likelihood that they would behave worse without SALT?

Secretary VANCE. Let me answer your second question first. I believe that in the absence of a SALT Treaty, local confrontations could take on a more hazardous dimension than in an atmosphere where a treaty existed. I am not saying that competition is going to be eliminated. As I indicated to Senator Javits, I do not believe that that is the case, although I do not rule out some movement toward greater restraint. But I do believe very strongly that in a situation where the treaty failed and where I think you would clearly have a severe worsening of the relationships between the two countries, differences would become more difficult and more dangerous.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

FUTURE SALT PROGRESS AFTER BREZHNEV

In going into the SALT agreement, as we did with SALT I, we see a strong identity with Brezhnev, he being the motivating force, or at least the force of power in this period of time. With his eventual departure from the international scene, do you see a slowing down of the desire to move ahead with SALT, provided SALT II gets through.

Secretary VANCE. I would point out that this agreement has been negotiated over a period of 6½ years. The decisions that have been taken during the process of that negotiation have almost always gone to the Politburo and were approved by the Politburo, if they were major items within the negotiation. The decision to enter into a SALT agreement and the approval of a SALT agreement on the Soviets' part is not the work of one man, President Brezhnev, but it is the decision of the ruling authorities within the Soviet Union.

No one can predict with certainty what the future will bring, but I think it is reasonable to assume that the decisions taken by the government at the highest corporate political level over a period of time will not be changed if the current leadership should pass from the scene.

SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ADHERE TO THE TREATY

Senator PELL. To follow up that thought a little bit, I think public perception in America is very skeptical of the Soviet willingness to adhere to the treaty. There is no question that we all agree it is an abominable system. It is an abuse of human rights and an interference around the world.

From your experience as Secretary of State, have you found them to be punctilious in adhering to the written word?

Secretary VANCE. I have found from my examination of arms control agreements that in the field of arms control agreements they have adhered to the terms of the agreement. This is not to say that where there have been loopholes, they have not pressed to the margin, but where it is clear as to what the agreement specifies, they have abided by their agreement. This is what has been the conclusion of past administrations, as well as our own review of what took place under the SALT agreement and under the ABM agreement.

I would point out that where questions arose as to whether or not there were violations, and on both sides there have been challenges in the past, we have taken these to what is called the Standing Commission. The Standing Consultative Commission has looked into each of the complaints that either side has raised. In every case the matters brought before the Commission have been satisfactorily resolved, as not a violation either by them or by us, and has been dropped.

So, I would say in the arms control field, they have followed what they have promised. Now, I cannot say that the same thing is true in all other types of agreements.

AIR FORCE ORDERS TO CEASE COVERING SILOS

Senator PELL. Let me follow up this point for a moment, and also the point I raised with you yesterday. I wonder if you would provide for the record, classified, if you would like, the various requests that emanated from you or Presidential orders to the Air Force to cease covering their silos. I would like to be provided on a classified basis, if you would like, with the Air Force's responses to those requests. Would that be agreeable to you?

Secretary VANCE. I would be glad to take a look at it.

Senator PELL. If necessary, on a classified basis, we would like that information.

[The information referred to is classified and in the Committee files.]

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

QUESTION OF STRATEGIC CEILINGS

Senator PELL. Finally, on the question of strategic ceilings, does this perhaps not mean that the Soviets will then take their resources and start spending them on even greater conventional forces, and that while we avoid nuclear disaster, as Senator Church said, we find ourselves musclebound, and they will start using new sets of muscles to achieve their objectives across the earth?

Secretary VANCE. The savings that would come from a SALT agreement as opposed to no SALT agreement obviously have to be distributed according to what the priorities are of the Soviets. I cannot put myself in their shoes and determine where their highest priorities lie. Certainly. I think even those of us who do not profess to be Soviet experts believe that there are many things on the economic side which are of paramount priority insofar as they are concerned.

Insofar as conventional weapons are concerned, we know what they have spent. We know that they have spent extraordinarily large sums on their conventional forces, particularly those in the European theater. That is one of the reasons that we have been pursuing the question of a possible attempt to reduce the forces in the European theater by the mutual balanced force reduction talks which have been going on for several years at this point.

In answer to your question. I would sum up by saying that they might put additional funds into that area, but it would be my belief that they would be more likely to go into other domestic needs which are more pressing.

SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES TWICE THAT OF UNITED STATES

Senator PELL. The rough rule of thumb, as I understand it, is that the Soviet Union is spending now about twice what we do on so-called defensive or offensive weapons systems in general. Would that be a correct statement?

Secretary VANCE. I am sorry, I didn't hear you.

Senator PELL. Is it correct that the Soviet Union spends about twice the percentage of its gross national product as we do on its defense and since their GNP is about half of what we do, it means about an equal expenditure?

Secretary VANCE. I believe it is slightly more than that, but I would prefer to ask you to put that question to Secretary Brown when he is here tomorrow.

Senator PELL. Very well. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MOTIVATIONS BEHIND SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP

Mr. Secretary, I have a question either for you or for Marshall Shulman. I wish you to expand on your answer to Senator Javits' previous question. George Eliot admonishes us, "Leave us not inquire into the motivations of man," but I think the motivations of the Soviet Union are essential for us to analyze.

What is it that has caused them to engage in such a huge military buildup, way beyond what would be considered to be their self defense needs? You have attributed a part of it possibly to the nuclear crisis that they faced in Cuba. I happen to think that the humiliation they experienced motivated them a great deal. It was almost a test of their nationhood and manhood. Is it really their purpose to simply catch up with us? They have certainly done that. Is it to neutralize U.S. military power and influence around the world, or is it, as some would say, to actually equip them to be in a position where they can wage a successful nuclear war against us?

Would you as an expert in Sovietology, give us your judgment on that? You have spent most of your life studying their motivations.

Secretary VANCE. Marshall, would you answer that, please?

Dr. SHULMAN. Senator, as you say, it is very hard to penetrate their motivations, but the record is fairly clear. It goes back to the immediate period right after World War II in the first series of defense budgets in 1946. They began a very large allocation of resources in the military sector. Stalin was very clear that the purpose was to overcome their sense of strategic inferiority under which they labored. That has continued more or less steadily since that time.

It is clear that there has been a particular upward slope in the proportion of their resources coming into the defense field since the early sixties. Whether that was because of the Cuban missile crisis or because they were responding to our military budget in fiscal 1961, we don't know. At any rate, there has been a slope of somewhere between 3 and 4 percent a year increase in their defense allocations.

Now, whether the purpose of it is to catch up or to go beyond catching up, we cannot say. We simply don't know. It is very difficult to say, and very difficult for them to know when they have caught up, because it is clear that in some categories of weapons they have surpassed us and in others they still feel an inferiority.

My impression is, the area in which they still feel a great deal of uncertainty is the advantage that we have as a result of our superior technological base, which still continues to concern them, but they have been as explicit as we have been about the dangers of war and the fact that superiority is very difficult to use from a

military point of view. It is very difficult for either side to compel the other one militarily to do its will with strategic weapons.

NATO AND THE EUROPEAN THEATER

Senator PERCY. Thank you. I would like to pursue this at a later date also with other witnesses. I appreciate your answer very much. The remainder of my questions this morning I would devote again to the subject of NATO and the European theater. I do so because it has been the scene of two world wars in which we have been a decisive factor. The Warsaw Pact powers have amassed forces there far beyond what we would consider their need. We have in a conventional sense inferiority to that position and therefore have to match the Soviets with a nuclear effort.

Mr. Secretary, yesterday and today Senator Javits and several others of us expressed an interest in the impact of the SALT II agreement on our NATO allies. I suggested that two understandings may be necessary, and I introduced general language on the floor of the Senate yesterday afternoon for consideration by my colleagues.

Mr. Secretary, yesterday, you argued that neither of these proposed understandings, one requiring Senate advice and consent to extend the protocol, and one regarding the U.S. intent to continue to transfer technology to our NATO allies, is necessary. Yet on behalf of the administration Ambassador Tap Bennett just a few days ago, the 29th of June, found it necessary to make a formal statement to our NATO allies.

I will read the entire text of article XII. It is very short:

> In order to insure the viability and effectiveness of this treaty, each party undertakes not to circumvent the provision of the treaty through any other State or States or in any other manner.

Now, on behalf of the administration, Ambassador Bennett said to the NATO allies, "In view of the possible implications of the noncircumvention clause for Alliance cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the noncircumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with its allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization." Now he is saying the United States, but once again the United States in this case is both the administration and a coequal partner on treaty ratification, the Senate of the United States.

The Senate is even more a continuing body than our administrations through the years. I think Senator Javits, others, and I feel that it is essential that the Soviets understand crystal clear our intentions in the future so that there is no ambiguity on the part of the administration or the Senate of the United States.

TRANSFERRING CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO NATO ALLIES

My first question in this regard is this. I understood you to say yesterday that there is no prohibition against transferring cruise missile technology to our NATO allies in the SALT Treaty or protocol. Do you reaffirm that that is correct, that there is no prohibition?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; that is correct, there is no prohibition.

Senator PERCY. Have our NATO allies asked for technology related to cruise missile development or deployment?

Secretary VANCE. They have inquired in two cases and I am referring to one country whether or not, should they ask for it, if particular technology would be available. We responded affirmatively in both of those cases.

This is something that has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Let me put into context the statement of Ambassador Bennett to which you referred. We indicated to our NATO allies that upon the completion, namely, the signing of the treaty, we would issue a statement to them with respect to the so-called noncircumvention clause and our interpretation of exactly what that meant.

The allies wanted confirmation that the noncircumvention clause was not a nontransfer rule in disguise, and that the long-existing pattern of U.S. cooperation on nuclear and conventional weapons could continue, and that modernization would not be affected.

Those are perfectly reasonable requests for them to make. We wanted to give them an answer which would be clear and responsive to their request. We did so. That was the reason Tap Bennett gave to the NATO Council the statement of June 29, a copy of which is attached to my testimony of this morning which you all have before you.

I would repeat what I said yesterday. I think it is very clear what this says. I do not think it is necessary in light of that to have any reservation.

Senator PERCY. In this case, I was raising it as an understanding. Senator Helms just made an observation to me now, and I would ask Senator Helms if he would care to comment on that.

Senator HELMS. Well, the Secretary has gone a little bit further since I made that statement. I said, simply, since you were stronger on this point yesterday than you appeared to be at the time I mentioned it to Senator Percy, but I want to raise the question on my own time when that comes, Mr. Secretary, because this is a very vital point. It is very vital.

Senator PERCY. Could you then tell us to what extent you intend to transfer cruise missile technology to our NATO allies?

Secretary VANCE. It depends. It would be on a case-by-case basis when they make requests. As I said, there have been two requests and we have responded affirmatively, and if asked on the particular questions which this particular country raised, the answer would be yes.

Senator PERCY. Have we so far limited our discussion with our allies on cruise missile deployment options or other cruise missile-related issues?

Secretary VANCE. No.

CONVENTIONALLY EQUIPPED CRUISE MISSILES INCLUDED IN PROTOCOL

Senator PERCY. Are conventionally equipped land- and sea-launched cruise missiles also included in the protocol's range limitations? These are certainly not strategic weapons.

Secretary VANCE. Would you repeat your question?

Senator PERCY. Are conventionally equipped land- and sea-launched cruise missiles also included in the Protocol's range limitations?

Secretary VANCE. The answer is yes.

Senator PERCY. And what is the rationale for their inclusion then, Mr. Secretary? That would be my final question, since my time is up.

Secretary VANCE. The rationale for their inclusion was that we were trying to resolve the question of cruise missiles, which was a fundamental issue between the parties, namely, ourselves and the Soviet Union. We reached agreement on this issue by putting it in the protocol which lasted only until 1981, at the end of which it would expire, and none of the limitations would extend past the period of the end of the protocol.

The limitation there with respect to the range of the cruise missile is a limitation which presents no problems for us, quite frankly, because we do not have any intention or plans, any of us, to deploy anything beyond that range during the period of the protocol.

So, it just doesn't raise the problem.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESOLUTION COMMITTING SENATE TO SERIES OF WEAPONS PROCUREMENTS

Mr. Secretary, first I would like to clear up a question from yesterday in response to a question from Senator Zorinsky to Secretary Brown. Secretary Brown said he would welcome an accompanying resolution to the treaty which committed the Senate to a series of weapons procurements during the life of the treaty. Is that in fact the administration position? Are you seeking an assured weapons list to go along with ratification?

Secretary VANCE. As I recall, what Harold said at that time was, he would be glad to examine a resolution of that type. That is where it was left.

Senator MCGOVERN. The reason I ask that, Mr. Secretary, is, that has been one of my fears all along, that in the desire to get this treaty ratified, to get the 67 votes you have to have in the Senate, good men like you will be tempted to go along with weapons systems that otherwise you might be opposing.

Let me say, Mr. Secretary, that I think we are very fortunate to have you and to have Secretary Brown in the positions where you are today. The Carter administration is perceived to be in trouble, but the fact is that no American boy has died anywhere in the world under this administration. No other administration in the last 40 years can make that claim.

I give you and Secretary Brown considerable credit for that, but I find it very hard, frankly, to understand how prudent men, which I believe you are, can endorse something like the M-X missile unless you see it as a way of getting support for the SALT II Treaty from people here in the Senate who otherwise would not support it, or maybe getting the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It seems to

me such an obvious boondoggle, and so unnecessary that I am searching for some explanation as to how you could support it.

Secretary VANCE. I would be glad to give you an explanation. I believe that one of the most important aspects of strategic stability is to insure adequate survivability of our various systems. Otherwise, it would undermine the concept of deterrence. I think that the M–X missile deployed in a mobile mode that is verifiable will increase survivability. I think that it will provide the best method of resolving the tension that automatically exists between survivability on the one hand and verifiability on the other.

I think it does this extremely well. By having a more survivable land-based leg of the Triad, I think it will increase stability rather than work against it. Therefore, I think this is important, not only from the standpoint of having an adequate defense, but also from the standpoint of arms control in that it gives you a more stable situation.

So, I see it from both sides as being an important and proper step.

VULNERABILITY OF LAND-BASED SYSTEM

Senator MCGOVERN. Secretary Vance, I thought you made a very compelling statement here a while ago when you addressed the fear of those who see our land-based system as becoming vulnerable. Perhaps it is. If it is, that should be a much greater concern to the Soviet Union, that is, if land-based systems are becoming more vulnerable, because most of their system is in land-based missiles, whereas most of ours are in other types of things such as submarines, bombers, cruise missiles, and so on.

I thought you made a case that at least to me makes the M–X unnecessary. Let us suppose that our land-based system is somewhat more vulnerable today than it was 5 years ago. Maybe it would be a little more vulnerable 5 years from now, too. What real difference does that make? Who is going to attack a country that is perceived to have a somewhat vulnerable land based missile system that also has 41 submarines, any one of which is capable of knocking out the major cities of the Soviet Union?

Why would they attack under those circumstances, even if the land-based system is vulnerable? Let's suppose we don't even have a land-based system.

Secretary VANCE. I would be delighted to answer that. I think you have to take a look at the long range and what we are talking about is the system, the land-based system that we will be having from the period starting in 1986 until the end of the century. That is the system about which you are talking when you talk about the M–X.

Now, what may or may not be the vulnerability of the sea-based systems at that time should there be a breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare, we don't know. Therefore, I think it is important to try to keep a survivable set of systems in all three legs of the Triad. I think it is important, even though, as I said earlier, I don't think that at this time nor through the mid-1985 period it should cause us to fear that we are going to be attacked and not able to respond, and thus lose our deterrence.

I think it only prudent and wise to go ahead and correct that vulnerability and put in a system that is more survivable.

EQUIVALENCE AND QUESTION OF SUPERIORITY

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Secretary, you have talked several times about equivalence and about the danger of permitting the other side to become superior. When I hear arguments like that, I always wonder what it really means to be superior, after each side has the capability, as you pointed out, of absorbing a first strike and still destroying the other.

In other words, what difference does it make to say one side has 12,000 warheads and the other has 10,000? In terms of our security or the doctrine of deterrence, since if those weapons are ever used we are all going to be dead anyway, what consolation is there in knowing that one side began this catastrophe with a few more warheads than the other?

Secretary VANCE. Let me say that it is not merely a question of military use. You also have to deal with the question of perceptions, and perceptions not only in our own country but in other countries as well. I made reference to this in my prepared statement. I think that is a factor that is important to take into account. That is how I would answer your question.

PERCEPTIONS INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Secretary, can you really cite any case where those perceptions made all that much difference? You yourself have said in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, which is the one frequently cited, that it was doubtless the naval power and other factors that were more decisive. It seems to me even if you go back to the period. as Senator Biden said yesterday, when we had clear nuclear superiority, that that did not stop the Soviets from blockading Berlin, or from moving into Hungary, or from doing what they did in Czechoslovakia. We ended up with a stalemate in Korea, and I don't know what you would call what happened in Vietnam. During all of those periods, we had clear nuclear superiority. What good did that perception do us? How much are the Soviets getting out of the perception that they are stronger today than they were 10 years ago?

The Chinese do not seem to be accommodating to them any more readily. They have been invited out of countries like Egypt and other Arab and African countries. What evidence is there that the perceptions of who has the most weapons in the stockpile, the most nuclear weapons, really changes how countries really behave?

Secretary VANCE. It is not a question of who has the most. It is a question of whether you have an adequate number in order to have deterrence and a strategic balance. I think there is a great deal to the point that was made by Senator Biden yesterday that this is not the sole determinant. On the other hand, I have to be very frank in saying that the question of perceptions is a question which is of concern to some of our NATO allies.

What we do and do not do in this area, I think, will be important to them. In fact, I know it will.

SOVIET CONCERN OVER U.S. DOMESTIC SITUATION

Senator McGOVERN. Do you think they worry more about our energy and dollar situation than they do about SALT II?

Secretary VANCE. This comes back to a point that has been made before, either in these hearings or in other hearings, which I think is a fundamental point. Our strength is not solely military strength. Our strength is great because it is based upon our economic power. It is based upon the political values which we have. It is based upon the strength of our people and what they stand for.

All of these kinds of issues have to be taken into account when you are talking about the perception of the United States throughout the world, but you cannot ignore the fact that the military aspect of it is one factor that is taken into account.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I see that my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McGovern. Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think it is going to be absolutely essential that we have an executive session somewhere along the line, because there are so many sensitive things into which I want to inquire that I am even hesitant to bring them up peripherally at these hearings.

Secretary VANCE. Certainly.

NONCIRCUMVENTION ARTICLE

Senator HELMS. As to the noncircumvention article, article XII, I met last week in London with about 75 Members of Parliament. I can tell you, sir, that they are not at all satisfied with any interpretation of that, but we can discuss that later. Mr. Shulman, with all due respect, sir, you did not answer Senator Percy's question, and I am relatively certain you do not have a crystal ball or mind-reading capability, but it is an interesting thing to speculate about what really is the intent of the Soviet Union.

All sorts of questions come to mind, such as preemption, which is an awesome thing to contemplate, but I am certain that the administration has given consideration to that dreadful possibility.

REASON FOR NOT OBTAINING ARMS REDUCTION TREATY

What I would like to ask, Secretary Vance, if I may, is this. Why didn't you go for an arms reduction treaty? That is the question that the average person across America is asking, and I am sure the average person over in the Soviet Union, if he had any access to public information, would ask that question. The average American, at least those with whom I am in contact, does not understand a treaty that really does not stop anything, and if anything it escalates things.

Why did you not go for an arms reduction treaty?

Secretary VANCE. Senator, as you know, when I made my first trip to Moscow in connection with the SALT negotiations, in March, I believe it was, of 1977, I took with me two proposals. One proposal was a proposal which we said clearly was our preferred

proposal. It was clearly an arms reduction treaty proposal which provided for deep cuts. We urged the Soviet Union to accept that as the preferred alternative.

They were unwilling to accept that on the basis of the negotiations which had been held up to that period of time.

Senator HELMS. That, then, was the answer to Senator Percy's question to Mr. Shulman. That indicates some degree of the motivations and the intent of the Soviet Union. Is that not correct? Anybody who is in good faith wanting to avoid a nuclear holocaust is bound to be in favor of weapons reduction.

Secretary VANCE. They said to us at that time that we are this far down the road as a result of the negotiations we have had, and we want to stick to what was agreed to at the Vladivostok meeting. They said we can talk about deeper cuts when we get into SALT III. We eventually concluded, and bear with me, please, Senator, that we could not go to as deep cuts as we had hoped we could, but we did get cuts. We went down from the 2,400 which was agreed to at Vladivostok to 2,250. That is about a 10-percent cut. We would like to have gone down, as we suggested, to somewhere between 1,800 and 2,000. That was our original proposal in March, but in the practical world in which we live it simply was not possible to do that.

As Harold Brown pointed out yesterday, we did go further and we did get subceilings. Those subceilings are extremely important. The subceiling on MIRVed missiles, that is, missiles that have multiple independently targetable warheads, was moved down from the 1,320 which had been talked about at the time of Vladivostok to 1,200. That was progress. We would like to have seen it go further, but that was a step.

We also set a sublimit, which I think was a very important limit, as Harold Brown said yesterday, of 820 on the ICBM's. Because ICBM's are the most volatile of the systems, this was an important reduction, in terms of what they could have done without it.

So, what we did was go as far as we could, living in a practical world, and we have laid the base now for moving into discussions on SALT III.

SALT TREATY IS ARMS ESCALATION TREATY

Senator HELMS. Now, Mr. Secretary, you are my friend, and I said before on countless occasions that I do not like being in an adversary relationship with you, and I respect you, sir, but I am going to have to make the suggestion to you that you made to us yesterday, not to pick pieces or components or figures out of this treaty, but that we should look at this treaty as a whole. It is an arms escalation treaty, is it not?

Secretary VANCE. No; it is not.

Senator HELMS. Well, as Senator Baker said, I have to disagree with you on that. Mr. Chairman, I hope and I formally ask that we have an executive session, because there are many things of a sensitive nature which I would like to discuss with the Secretary and others.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say, Senator Helms, that it had been contemplated that we would have such a session.

Senator HELMS. Fine. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We will make arrangements for one.

Senator HELMS. Thank you. In that case, Mr. Chairman, I think I will save the committee's time and yield back the balance of my time. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

I will turn next to Senator Biden, but first I would like to make a comment. I am puzzled. Certainly as far as the Soviet Union is concerned there was another arms reduction involving about 250 intercontinental ballistic missiles which they would have to dismantle and destroy.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Those missiles would have the capability of obliterating all of the major cities in the United States.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct. That is why I cannot agree with the statement of Senator Helms.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to get something out of the way at the outset today. It has seemed obvious for some time that the Senate at a minimum will attach understandings as part of the conditions of ratification of this treaty. I think that is a political fact of life. I understand your reluctance to acquiesce to any of them, but I think it is incomprehensible to think that there would be a ratification by the U.S. Senate without at least some understandings.

Yesterday several were put forward right at the outset. Some of our colleagues even went to the floor. I think we waste a lot of time at the expense of other more central issues. The most central issues in my opinion being the basic terms of the treaty, the relative equivalence, the adequacy of verification, and the attitudes of our NATO allies. So that we don't devote an inordinate amount of time and discussion to these so-called understandings, and so that we can focus as much as possible on the basic issues of the treaty, I spent yesterday evening working out eight points of understandings. These eight points that I have raised, and I will not ask you to comment on them now, but I will submit them for the record, relate to the maintenance of essential equivalency, the noncircumvention, the protocol, all the issues that have been raised. I don't ask the administration to formally comment on them now, but to work with us and with the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee to give us your views and judgment.

[The information referred to follows:]

BIDEN OFFERS EIGHT-POINT UNDERSTANDING

For some time it has been clear that the Senate would, at a minimum, desire to attach to its resolution consenting to ratification certain statements or understandings having the effect of clarifying both Treaty content and the significance of ratification. In part, this is an exercise in clarifying the meaning of the Treaty package itself. In perhaps larger part, it is an exercise in demonstrating to ourselves—and, more specifically, to our constituents—that we take the Treaty seriously and are not, as one Senator put it, "buying a pig in a poke."

As recent news releases have indicated, and as yesterday's opening hearing demonstrated, a number of such so-called understandings will be put forward. This is fine. But I think we can waste a lot of time on that, at the expense of other, more central matters. The real questions, it seems to me, are:

First, whether the basic terms of the Treaty are such as to insure superpower strategic equivalence and the maintenance of a stable condition of mutual nuclear deterrence;

Second, whether Soviet compliance with those terms can be adequately verified; and

Third, whether the Treaty is acceptable to our NATO allies and serves the interests of a strong Atlantic Alliance.

So that we don't devote an inordinate amount of time to discussion of so-called understandings, and so that we can focus as much as possible on the real issue—which is whether or not the Senate is going to approve this Treaty or else try to amend it substantially and perhaps fatally—I worked last night to devise a comprehensive understanding, a draft of which I am conveying to the Secretary of State this morning. It has eight points and contains the kind of language which I think the Senate might wish to use if it were not going to amend the treaty but did want, in the course of consenting to ratification, to make certain clarifications—to the Soviets, to our own citizenry, and to our allies—concerning both treaty content and American purpose. I will ask the Secretary to work with me on this and also have his staff work with the committee staff concerning any comments on the draft language which the Department might have. Getting this out of the way will leave us free to focus on the fundamental issue of whether we are going to try to amend the treaty substantially or not.

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as SALT II, including the Protocol thereto, both signed at Vienna on June 10, 1979, subject to the understanding, which shall be included in the instruments of ratification:

(1) With regard to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, that ratification of this Treaty shall not be construed as acceptance by the United States of Soviet aims or conduct, but is instead based upon the imperative that United States-Soviet competition be regulated to reduce the danger of nuclear holocaust;

(2) With regard to future strategic policy and nuclear weapons deployments, the United States shall continue to take all steps necessary to maintain essential equivalence with the Soviet Union and a stable condition of mutual nuclear deterrence;

(3) With regard to future arms negotiations, that the arms limitations required by this Treaty shall be considered only an interim measure, leading to future intensive efforts to achieve significant reductions in established levels of strategic nuclear weaponry;

(4) With regard to the non-circumvention provisions of Article XII, that such provisions shall not impede traditional patterns of military and technological cooperation between the United States and its allies, and that such cooperation shall continue in all ways necessary to ensure the common defense of member-states of the North Atlantic Alliance;

(5) With regard to the provisions of the Protocol, that such provisions shall not without Senate concurrence be legally extended beyond December 1981 and shall not be construed as having precedential significance for subsequent arms limitations;

(6) With regard to production and deployment of the Soviet Backfire bomber, that the written and verbal assurances set forth by President Brezhnev shall be considered integral to the Treaty;

(7) With regard to agreed statements and common understandings, the memorandum of understanding regarding data, and the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations, that such associated documents shall also be considered integral to the Treaty;

(8) With regard to future United States deployment of mobile land-based missiles, that such deployment, regardless of mode, shall, if accompanied by procedures conducive to appropriate Soviet verification efforts, be acceptable under the Treaty.

ATTITUDES OF ALLIES TOWARD SALT

Senator BIDEN. With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to proceed to what I said earlier was one of the three most critical issues relating to this treaty, and that is allied attitudes, NATO attitudes in particular, toward the SALT Treaty. You have heard used a number of times by our allies in Western Europe the phrase,

"decoupling," and whether or not the United States is already decoupled, is in the process of decoupling, or will in the future decouple. Our allies have raised some questions about the resolve of the United States to continue to couple firmly its strategic interests with the strategic interests of our Western European allies.

Chancellor Schmidt said to me on my recent trip to Europe that he did not view an all-out attack by the Soviets on Bonn as a theater attack. He viewed that as an all-out attack. For those who have not dealt in this as long as the committee has, the decoupling argument is essentially whether or not the United States would use its own strategic systems to retaliate if an attack on Bonn, or a similar attack, occurred. I found little evidence in Europe that the European leaders thought we would decouple. Nor did I find evidence in Europe that passage of SALT II would be taken as an intent of the United States to decouple its interests from European interests. I found European leaders suggesting to me in fact that they thought just the opposite—that non-ratification of SALT might signal an attempt to decouple. Our European allies would view this as a sign of weakness.

EFFECT OF STRATEGIC PARITY ON U.S. CREDIBILITY

With regard to the whole issue of decoupling and its impact on SALT II, I would like to ask several very specific questions in the several minutes that I have left. Is it your experience that our European allies believe that strategic parity or essential equivalence, whichever term you prefer, as institutionalized by the SALT II agreement undermines the credibility of the U.S. deterrence?

In other words, do U.S. central systems retain the capability to deter the Soviet theater threat to Europe, or has SALT in some way diminished the credibility of our willingness to act on behalf of our NATO allies?

Secretary VANCE. SALT in no way diminishes our ability or will to use those systems in response to an attack upon our allies in Europe.

SS–20 REPRESENTS NEW THREAT TO NATO ALLIES

Senator BIDEN. Given the fact that Western Europe has been targeted for the past 25 years by Soviet ICBM's, why is it, sir, that the SS–20 represents such a quantum change in the threat to our NATO allies? The Soviets were able to hit all those cities already with nuclear weapons before SS–20. Why has the SS–20 so dramatically changed the theater composition?

Secretary VANCE. It is probably for a couple of reasons. One is because it is a mobile system. Another is, it is being produced in large numbers. A third is because it is a MIRVed missile as opposed to a single reentry vehicle. I think these are probably the main factors that have drawn such great attention to it.

ARMS CONTOLLERS AGAINST SALT II

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I have several other questions that I would like to submit for the record relating to theater capability and this issue of decoupling. In the little time that I have left, I would like to raise an argument that goes something like this: that SALT II really will be destabilizing because it will allow the Soviet Union to take that portion of their military budget which they are now addressing to strategic weaponry and would put that money and resources into increased conventional weapons capability.

This buildup will find its outlet on the European front. Warsaw Pact nations, in turn, will put more divisions in Eastern Europe facing and threatening Western Europe. More importantly, the Soviet Union will put additional divisions and more pressure on the Chinese border, thereby increasing the prospects of global war. In sum, passage of SALT—which might result in a greater buildup of conventional Soviet forces threatening West Europe and China—will be fundamentally destabilizing.

Or put another way, there will not be war with strategic weapons, no matter how far we build them up, because the genie is already out of the bottle. It doesn't make any difference from here on how much more you build. The real danger is a conventional war. Therefore, why increase the possibility of war by allowing resources to be diverted into conventional weapons?

End of scenario. I wonder if you might respond to this line of argument, please.

Secretary VANCE. I would respond first by pointing out that there is no need or requirement on their part to put additional forces into the European theater. They have large numbers of forces, indeed, forces substantially in excess of those particularly on the ground.

Senator BIDEN. But in fairness to your argument, they have had those for a long time and have kept building anyway.

Secretary VANCE. On the other hand, there is a certain momentum in those programs that carries them on. I do not see any basis for increasing further. They have not been limited in funds up to now with respect to the putting of conventional forces into the area.

In similar fashion, we will be saving money which we could use for conventional forces, if you want to take a look at it in the same way. Indeed, as you know, the expenditures for NATO have been increased over the last 2 years or 1½ years, as a result of certain decisions which have been taken. I see no real basis to draw the conclusion that among their various priorities, as I indicated earlier, that this would be the place where they would put their funding. They have needs which are much greater than that on the domestic side.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time is up, but I would like to pursue this matter further at another time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[See appendix, page 611, for additional questions submitted to State Department by Senator Biden.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

I believe the next Senator to ask questions is Senator Hayakawa of California.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET EXPENDITURES ON IMPERIALISTIC ADVENTURES

My first question really is not so much a question as it is a speculation. The Soviets are spending a lot of money in imperialistic adventures in Ethiopia, Zambia, Latin America, et cetera, as Senator Javits has detailed very clearly, so it is not necessary for me to repeat that. Is it not likely that if the SALT Treaty is not ratified, and the arms race accelerates, the Soviets would be compelled for financial reasons to withdraw their military support from the many areas of the world in which they are now stirring up trouble? They just will not be able to afford all that at once, perhaps.

This really requires no answer, unless you wish to comment on it. It is kind of a speculation.

Secretary VANCE. Well, I think quite the contrary is true. I think they would have sufficient funds to continue the kind of assistance which they have been doing.

Senator HAYAKAWA. You think they would at enormous sacrifices to the people?

Secretary VANCE. Yes, they have been prepared to make those sacrifices in the past if they thought it was in their national interest to do so.

DIFFERENCES WITHIN SOVIET LEADERSHIP OVER SALT

Senator HAYAKAWA. I did go to the Soviet Union in January with Senator Baker's party, and this is something which puzzled me. Perhaps you can throw some light on it, or perhaps Dr. Shulman or one of your colleagues can.

Are there any differences of view within the Soviet Union and the leadership on SALT II? What struck all of us who were in the party visiting the Soviet Union was the uniformity of the arguments for SALT II presented by everyone whom we encountered. To us as Americans, this ideological conformism first struck us as strange and then later as ridiculous. Are there differences within the Soviet leadership, not only as to the desirability of SALT II but as to the reasons for that desirability as well? Are they not, like us, divided into hawks and doves? I am only asking if there is any difference within that leadership.

Dr. SHULMAN. Senator, the only honest answer to that is, we don't really know. Most of what we who work in the Soviet trade say about this is pretty much guesswork, and it calls to mind Mr. Dooley's observation, "it ain't the things you don't know that hurts you, it's the things you do know that ain't so." But the fact is that we can conjecture that there are different forces and pressures that bear within the Soviet leadership on defense decisions and on SALT. There have been times in the past sometimes when the debate has broken out into the open. That has not been the case now.

All indications are that the Politburo decisions on these matters tend to involve a broad consensus, at least for the last few years. It would be logical to assume that those who worked on the Soviet economy, and who think that that is the Soviet Union's major problem, would have a greater interest in being able to put more resources into that sector than into the new weapons field.

As Secretary Vance said, this is a major concern for them, and it is not just a question of the total number of rubles they put in the defense sector, but it is that the items that are in most short supply in their industrial technology, like labs and scientists and alloys and electronics, are also the very same items that they would need more of if there is not a SALT II Treaty and they have to go higher into new strategic weapons systems.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

SALT ASSURES SOVIET STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY IN 1980'S

Mr. Secretary, by your own admission, SALT II seems to assure Soviet strategic military superiority in the early 1980's.

Secretary VANCE. No, sir, that is not what I said at all.

Senator HAYAKAWA. It is not? Would you please correct that, then?

Secretary VANCE. I would be glad to. I said that during the 1980's, we will continue to have rough equivalence, essential equivalence, whatever you want to call it, throughout that entire period of time. I said there would be increasing vulnerability of the land-based missiles during that period of time, but I then went on to point out that you had to take a look at all three legs of the Triad before you could determine what the total strategic balance was.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much. I stand corrected on this. So there is increased vulnerability, but not necessarily strategic inferiority?

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

SOVIET UNION PREOCCUPIED WITH PAST WARS

Senator HAYAKAWA. The last point I would make is really something of a speech. You said, Mr. Secretary, about the Russians that they still remember World War II. Of course they do, because the Government makes every effort to see to it that World War II is not forgotten. That is really what shocked me so much about the Soviet Union when I visited there.

Now, Russia and Britain, both of which lost millions of men, were on the winning side. Germany and Japan also lost millions of men, and they were on the losing side. American losses were very heavy, but I don't suppose they are commensurate with those of Germany or Russia, but none of these nations go to the enormous trouble to keep reminding us of World War II. Why does the Soviet Union go to such enormous lengths to remind their public of World War II, with military shrines, war museums, parades, statutes to fallen heros, goose-stepping honor guards, and endless military ceremonies? Nowhere in the world have I seen such soldier-worship except perhaps in Nazi Germany during the rise of Hitler. What sort of culture are we dealing with in drawing up a treaty with a nation that is so extraordinarily preoccupied with past wars in obvious preparation for the next one? That is the feeling I got all the time I was there.

Dr. SHULMAN. Senator, let me respond to that. You are quite right in observing that feeling. I will make three observations about it.

The first is, there is a perpetual effort on the part of the Soviet military, which is one of the strongest bureaucracies in the Soviet system, to keep alive the spirit of patriotism in the country. The second point is, there is very good reason why they have to exert so much effort. The Soviet literature is full of instances in which the role of the military is degraded. The sense of the soldier in literature does not give him the respect that he deserves.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Are you referring to prerevolution literature?

Dr. SHULMAN. No, present-day.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Well, how does it get published?

Dr. SHULMAN. Well, it does. In the literature time and again appears the Sad Sack who gets neglected while his fellows who go into the economic field get a lot further ahead. The third point is this. There is a great tendency among the artists and the writers to use World War II themes, because it is a safe theme. You can say lots of things when talking about World War II experiences that would be more sensitive and more delicate in any other context.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you. Dr. Shulman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. I sometimes wonder who did win the Second World War when I look at conditions in Japan and Germany today. I think they may have emerged as the principal victors of that war.

Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROTOCOL EXTENSION

The issue of the protocol extension was raised and commented on yesterday. I raised the issue yesterday, and you commented on it to some extent, Mr. Secretary, regarding not just the protocol, but if this whole treaty were turned down, what the likelihood of Presidential action of various types would be at that time. I won't go through your comments on the record yesterday, Mr. Secretary, but this still concerns me somewhat.

I would like to get some additional comment on it. I think from our look at this, the President has never yet commented directly on it, or I don't believe so. We could find a record of that. They were all statements by press secretaries and others. At least that is what we were able to turn up over night.

I go back to what triggered off some of this speculation—to the James McGregor Burns article in the Atlantic Monthly of March of this year. After a section in there where he talked about his impression that the President was concentrating on foreign policy, he wrote the following paragraph:

> The President's absolute determination to gain a new SALT Treaty dramatically fortified this impression. In discussing this issue, he became more determined, even more solemn than I had ever seen him. He took pains to leave no doubt in my mind about his present intention. While he plans to recognize the Senate's full role in treatymaking, if a SALT agreement is blocked or emasculated in the Upper Chamber, he will ask both House and Senate for a simple majority vote of approval, and if this approval is not forthcoming, he will on his own authority as Chief Executive observe the terms of a SALT agreement as long as he is President. This last plan, probably involving lateral Presidential cutbacks on major defense and weapons

commitments, would doubtless trigger one of the great constitutional debates and political confrontations of this era.

PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS SHOULD SALT BE DEFEATED

Since we could find no Presidential statements directly replying to that, would you care to give your impression of that and what your impression of the President's actions might be?

Secretary VANCE. As I indicated yesterday, I have obviously talked with the President about what the situation would be should the SALT Treaty fail at ratification, which I pray will not be the case. He has indicated to me that he would not wish to be nor choose to be the one who would start another arms race. He has never said to me what is referred to in the piece which you just read.

QUESTION OF PROTOCOL EXTENSION

Senator GLENN. Well, there is a big difference here between protocol, extension of an existing binding agreement, or of a treaty that is in effect, and Presidential authority to extend that, something that has previously been accepted by the Senate as opposed to going ahead on Presidential unilateral authority without Senate OK on something of this import. There is a big difference there to me between a protocol extension, which some of the other members were concerned about, and the chance that the President might feel he would go ahead on his own authority on this absent the Senate approval.

Secretary VANCE. Coming back to the question of protocol extension, I testified yesterday and would be very happy to repeat it here, that the President has indicated to me that he has no intention of extending the protocol without coming back to consult with the Congress.

UNITED STATES WILL ADHERE TO TREATY WITHOUT SENATE CONCURRENCE

Senator GLENN. Let me put it a different way. Do you rule out the possibility that if this treaty were rejected by the Senate, the President will announce that the United States will adhere to its terms nonetheless, provided, of course, that the Soviets do the same and without Senate concurrences?

Secretary VANCE. I have no basis for stating that that would happen. I would not want to speak for the President in this. I would be very glad to ask him but will not speculate now. I have no basis to say that he would do what you suggested.

Senator GLENN. I think it would be good if we could have Presidential comment on that for the record.

Secretary VANCE. Certainly.

[See appendix, page 614.]

SOVIET ACCEPTANCE BEFORE WORLD ON EQUAL STATUS

Senator GLENN. I was interested in another of your statements. You talked about one of the advantages to the Soviets as being

acceptance before the world in a politically equal status, or there were words to that effect.

Secretary VANCE. That is roughly it.

Senator GLENN. I have thought a lot about that. It seems to me that ever since World War II we have been the Nation trying to do good around the world. We have the Peace Corps, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. There were so many things where we were sort of the white hats of the world, if you want to put it in those terms, yet the Soviets have been the ones exporting revolution and terror around the world, and they have been looked at in that way. While they have been building a military equivalency all this time, they have not been generally accepted as being politically good to aline with as perhaps we have.

It seems to me that your statement on that, that they are gaining by SALT a political equivalence with us, may be more important long-term than the arms to which we are agreeing or not agreeing here. What we are talking about, after all, is long-term foreign policy this morning. Would you care to elaborate on your thoughts on that?

Secretary VANCE. There is not really much more that I can say on that than I have already said. I do believe that they consider to be of major importance the fact that the signing of such a treaty, puts them on a basis of equality with the United States in a political sense. This was also the case in the signing of the SALT I agreement, which was of major importance to them. It remains an important factor.

POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE EQUAL TO DESIRE TO ALLEVIATE DANGER

Senator GLENN. Do you or Dr. Shulman feel that while they are alleviating some danger of nuclear exchange with this treaty, that this effort to get into the big leagues of political acceptance around the world, if we put it in those terms, is equal to their desire to alleviate danger, or is this sort of a secondary item?

This is a qualitative judgment here. It seems to me this could be a very major thing for the long term.

Secretary VANCE. I think the major consideration on their part is the danger of nuclear war and the need to regulate the nuclear competition so that there will be a lessened danger of nuclear war. I don't have any question about that.

Senator GLENN. Well, everyone has his own doomsday scenario of what the Soviets are up to, obviously. You can set up one scenario even where they talk SALT, but meanwhile, we don't see much progress in the mutual and balanced force reduction [MBFR] talks. Because of that, they have a huge buildup under way with their conventional forces. If, through SALT, in addition to this, they gain political credibility around the world, then it seems to me they have built up their conventional forces so that perhaps by the 1985 time period or so, they will possibly exceed our conventional forces. They have negotiated a SALT Treaty with us, and at that time they will be in a position to project their political influence, backed by, perhaps, at that time a superior military power to express their long hoped-for, long-expressed goals of worldwide influence or domination.

Is that a scenario we are considering in our long-term foreign policy? What are we doing about it? How would you answer those questions?

Secretary VANCE. I would answer first by saying, insofar as NATO is concerned, we have already indicated that we are going to do what is necessary to strengthen NATO so that it is capable of acting as a deterrent force and is able to carry out its responsibilities and tasks on the battlefield, should it ever be necessary to do so.

One of the concepts of NATO has been that we should couple the improvement of NATO's strength with attempts to work out arms control. Each task reinforces the other. This is one of the reasons that you find our allies in NATO so strongly in favor of the SALT agreement and of ratification of the SALT agreement.

Marshall, did you want to add something?

REASON FOR MBFR BEING HELD BACK

Senator GLENN. Well, before Dr. Shulman answers, let me ask this question. Why have we not gone ahead with MBFR and pushed it harder during SALT? Why has it been held back? Why have these not been parallel tracks that we have been following?

Secretary VANCE. We have tried to press forward on this, Senator Glenn. The big problem that has held it up has been the inability to find agreement between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO negotiators on the question of the data base. That really has been the thing that has hung up the negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Secretary VANCE. It is the question of the data base, how many forces does each side have? There is a discrepancy of some 160,000 between the data which we have insofar as their forces are concerned and the numbers which they have given to us.

We have said that we must resolve that difference in data before we can negotiate the other elements of the treaty. Now, I think once we got over the data base question, we could move rapidly with respect to the treaty.

Senator GLENN. Well, you can make a case that that has been a deliberate holdup on their part, of course, just to allow them to build during this time period.

Dr. Shulman, were you going to answer my question from earlier?

Dr. SHULMAN. I think you were right, Senator Glenn, in your concerns, but obviously SALT isn't the Lydia Pinkham remedy for all things, including lumbago. It isn't clear that this is going to relieve us of our security problems with regard to conventional weapons. That is going to be there whether we get SALT or not. It is perfectly true that the Soviet Union has been seeking an equality of status, but the major limitation for them, I think, has been that although they have by pouring resources into the strategic field to try to overcome their inferiority there, they have acquired a superpower capacity for destructiveness. What they have not been able to do is acquire a superpower status with regard to all the other things that superpowers have to do and should do, includ-

ing their economic strength, the capacity to help new nations in nation-building.

For that reason, and also because I think their own ideology has lost its impact in the world, they are nowhere in the world today regarded as a model to be emulated by the new nations.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a terribly important point.

Senator GLENN. Yes, I agree. I would say if we are having trouble on the data base, I hope the agreed-upon data base which we are exchanging with regard to SALT will be more effective than the one on which we are having problems in MBFR.

Secretary VANCE. I think one of the big benefits of SALT is, we do have a big data base.

Senator GLENN. Yes; we have an agreed data base and we can count them better, too, in SALT than we can in MBFR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it appears to me that during the course of the last few weeks of debate in the public media, quite apart from your testimony here of the last 2 days, there have been two subtle shifts. These may have been deliberate, and they may be subtleties that I see that you do not see.

DOWNPLAYING OF IMPORTANCE OF SALT

The first of these, it seems to me, has been over the course of the last few weeks, it has been somewhat of a downplaying of how important the SALT Treaty is. Now, you have affirmed how important it is, but at the same time you have suggested today, and I quote,

> Nor do we suggest that if SALT is not approved, we could not survive. The issue is whether we would be in a better or worse position, whether our national security and foreign policy would be enhanced and strengthened or hurt and weakened, as some suggest, by approval of the treaty.

That is a fair statement of what the testimony has been about, I think, but it seems to me far below the rhetoric and the overselling of SALT which might have occurred in the public media and in various forums around the country prior to this time.

In short, it seems to me that the claims being made by the administration for SALT, particularly in the last 2 days, have been relatively modest, and understated, and objections have been blurred by pointing out that we live in a very dangerous world, and this is but one of many factors.

Is it fair, in fact, to say that you have trimmed the sails of the rhetoric somewhat and come down to a very substantial limit of claims for what SALT might bring?

Secretary VANCE. No. I believe that SALT is of tremendous importance. I believe that a failure to achieve a SALT agreement would have very serious consequences, as I have tried to point out. On the other hand, in being honest, I cannot say that we would not survive if there were no SALT Treaty. I can tell you without any equivocation that we would be in a much worse state and the world would be in a much worse state if we do not have a SALT Treaty, for all of the reasons I have indicated.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that testimony, but at the same time I would point out some things that the administration has been doing quite apart from SALT which I think are important. I would think maybe not stimulated by SALT, but correlated with it, is the movement toward the M-X missile. There have been heavy statements by you, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, regarding this, even if there is some doubt as to the mode of deployment of the M-X.

I am troubled by that, because SALT in the verification clause may be giving pause to us doing what would be best for our national defense. There has even been discussion, although not officially, of whether we need another type of manned bomber. Granted, the B-1 still, I presume, is killed as far as the Carter administration is concerned, but the FB-111 might be resurrected in some fashion. Clearly, for the B-52, although Secretary Brown asserted yesterday that it would penetrate Soviet defenses without difficulty, I think that is, to say the least, very dubious. We ought to go into that substantially more on the basis of the condition of most B-52's and the flight problems which they have, quite apart from the theory involved.

There has been movement by the administration toward a Persian Gulf strategy toward maintaining South Korean strength, intervention of sorts in Yemen, even shortly after nonintervention was exalted, perhaps undeservedly, as a decisive policy.

I think all of these are very important aspects that have come to give some assurance to the American public that the Soviet threat was in fact going to be met by this administration. I think these are important aspects. In fact, I think they are so important that if the SALT debate continues for a while, we may in fact have a buildup that will bring a great deal of confidence.

SOVIET BUILDUP WILL CONTINUE REGARDLESS OF SALT

The two things that it seems to me would recur if the SALT Treaty was rejected in the midst of all this is the fear that the Soviets would accelerate their buildup and would cause more trouble in various parts of the world. In fact, is there any doubt in your mind, whether SALT is or is not ratified finally, that the Soviets will in any event continue their buildup, and that they will continue to cause trouble in the world? And isn't it simply a matter of judgment of degree as to how much the buildup and how much the trouble? And what confidence is there that SALT will bring less of either?

Secretary VANCE. Senator Lugar, first, let me say I would put a different construction on the steps that have been taken with respect to Yemen, support of South Korea, and the like than you would. Those are wholly consistent with principles which we established at the outset of the administration and have been following ever since then, but this is probably not the time to go into that debate with you.

With respect to the question which you put at the end of your statement, I would answer by saying they will continue in my judgment to build within the limits that are put upon them by the SALT agreement, but those are limits. There are constraints.

For example, in my judgment, instead of deploying one new additional land-based missile, they would deploy a number, probably four or five. That is a substantial constraint. If they were not constrained by the SALT agreement, they would put more warheads on their missiles, both the 19, the 17, and probably the 18 as well. These are merely examples of the kind of constraints that you get from the treaty.

However, they will, within limits, I am sure, go forward and continue to build their forces as we will modernize our forces.

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Vance, isn't the basic constraint on the Soviet Union economic? You pointed out earlier today that they will proceed even at great sacrifice to the people of the Soviet Union, which I think is demonstrable, but at the same time, the gross national product of the Soviet Union, at least according to most estimates, has not been moving ahead very rapidly. In fact, there are a lot of problems there.

There is particularly a food problem this year, a wheat problem which exemplifies a long-term problem that they have had. Why do we assume that because SALT is not ratified they are going to go ahead with four or five missile systems and all sorts of things which will compound each other when in fact the economic constraint is the only one that would finally bring a halt to much of whatever they are going to do?

If they don't move into strategic weapons, they might go into mischiefmaking of some other sort. In other words, in the event that your basic premise is correct that we have a sufficient deterrent of our own and are able to protect our own deterrent, that at least is what we are basing our situation on, why wouldn't they do that, too?

Why do we anticipate that they are going ahead with four or five new systems or multiple-missile systems with SALT or no SALT?

Secretary VANCE. First, we have seen them checking these systems, and we know they could proceed with not too much additional testing to put these into the field. I think it is reasonable to assume that they would do this.

Second, it is true, as you suggest, that they do have severe economic problems. Their gross national product has dropped. They are going to have a severe crop shortage. These will be factors that will affect them and affect them in the future, but in the past they have always been willing to make whatever sacrifices have been necessary to build the military forces which they believe are in their military interest.

Military power has always been probably the cardinal factor of power insofar as they are concerned.

Senator LUGAR. At this point, why would you feel constrained in going back to the Soviet Union and making the same proposals you made in early 1977? Granted, at the time the Soviets, to say the least, were not pleased with your proposals, and rejected them outright, feeling, I suppose, that there was no need really to negotiate. We would then come back to the United States and worry about what we had done wrong. Why would you not want to renegotiate the SS-18 situation or beyond that, the SS-19, when for any number of reasons those threats really are significant to this

country, and would pose probably a lot of problems to the Soviets if they keep developing more and more weapons of this sort?

Secretary VANCE. So far as the SS–18 is concerned, Harold Brown talked about this yesterday, and he will undoubtedly be talking about it again. All I can say is this is a subject which has been discussed previously, and on which the determination was that we were not going to go forward in that, and in return for that they did not press their point with respect to forward base systems. That was negotiated in 1974. That was given when we came into the negotiations.

Harold also pointed out yesterday with respect to the SS–18 that we believe the M–X will give us everything that one would have with an SS–18. Moreover when the issue was put to our Joint Chiefs along with the rest of us in the national security community, the decision was unanimous that we did not want to authorize a heavy mobile because we did not believe it was in our interest to do so.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I confess I do not understand why anyone should expect the Russian bear to change its habits. It seems to me the question is whether we want to wrestle with him with the SALT II muscle on or not.

Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT ENDED CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Mr. Secretary, on a number of occasions this morning, Senators or you have referred to the Cuban missile crisis and what happened at that time as a result of it.

Is the agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis an arms control agreement, in the broad sense?

Secretary VANCE. It is an agreement which places limitation on the actions of what the Soviet Union can do in respect of certain matters in Cuba and, as such, I suppose it can be said to have arms control aspects to it.

Senator STONE. You also told us that every time there has been a dispute relating to an agreement of an arms control nature, when it had been raised, the Standing Committee or the Soviet Politburo itself responded reasonably and, therefore, it could be said that the Soviets have kept their agreements with regard to arms limitations.

Secretary VANCE. I said that with respect to the issues arising under the SALT agreement and the ABM agreement, all of those issues which were raised were taken to the Standing Consultative Commission, and they were all resolved satisfactorily. I did not make any reference to the Cuban understanding or to any other treaties that might in some peripheral way be said to be in the arms control area.

SOVIET VIOLATION OF CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AGREEMENT

Senator STONE. Well, Mr. Secretary, do you assert that the Soviet Union has kept its agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis?

Secretary VANCE. I assert that the actions which have been taken do not constitute a threat to the United States. They are, however, matters which we watch with great care and caution and will continue to do so. We have discussed the actions which occurred some months ago with the Soviet Union, seeking clarification of what those actions were, and, on the basis of that, we conclude that there was not a violation of the 1962 understanding. We will continue to follow it with care and caution.

Senator STONE. Is the fact of Soviet pilots regularly flying as part of the Cuban Air Force a violation of that agreement.

Secretary VANCE. No.

Senator STONE. Is the fact of regular visits by Soviet submarines to Cuba and the upbuilding of base facilities in Cuba for submarines a violation of that agreement?

Secretary VANCE. Not on anything we have seen yet.

Senator STONE. Is it a possibility that Soviet theater-type weapons are now based in or visit Cuba?

Secretary VANCE. Are you talking about nuclear weapons?

Senator STONE. Yes.

Secretary VANCE. The answer is no.

Senator STONE. Nonnuclear theater-type weapons?

Secretary VANCE. Obviously they supply aircraft. Aircraft of the MIG type are used in theaters, yes. They have a military assistance program which has been going on for a long while.

Senator STONE. MIG–25's?

Secretary VANCE. Yes, they have supplied some MIG–25's.

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, what is the agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis?

Secretary VANCE. It is an agreement which is too complex for me to try to remember in detail at this point. I would be glad to supply it to you and discuss it.

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF MISSILE CRISIS AGREEMENT

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, I know the State Department is willing to supply it and discuss it and do so with me individually as a Senator. But do you not feel that it is time that the American people also had full knowledge of that agreement? Would it not be possible for you to disclose that agreement, not just to the members of this committee, but to the American public?

Secretary VANCE. I would have to take that under consideration.

Senator STONE. I wish you would, Mr. Secretary, because one of the issues before this ratification debate is do the Soviets essentially keep their commitments. We do not have to trust them. We have to verify. Do they essentially and historically keep their arms control agreements? The reference to what happened in the Cuban missile crisis has been raised. Coming from Florida and having observed that at close hand and having a lot of people who care deeply about that situation, I am particularly interested in following this up. If our national security is based on a balance between the Soviet strength and our U.S. strength, the possibility of slipping around the intercontinental factors with a revival of Soviet strength 90 miles off our shores would really mess up the balance that we are here to debate. I think the American public would

benefit by the fullest possible disclosure of the agreement which ended that crisis and what has happened between then and now to reassure ourselves that we do not stand another risk of looking toward the land mass of Eurasia, and the Soviet Union in particular, while something happens 90 miles off our shore.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[See appendix, page 614.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Stone.

Senator Sarbanes is next.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROVISIONS OF TREATY APPLYING TO PROTOCOL

Mr. Secretary, do the provisions of the treaty apply to the protocol?

Secretary VANCE. Do the provisions of the treaty apply to the Protocol?

Senator SARBANES. Yes.

Secretary VANCE. What do you specifically have in mind?

Senator SARBANES. Well, I have a number of provisions in mind. For example, there is a provision in the treaty for the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission. Would those provisions apply to the Protocol?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; that would apply to the Protocol.

Senator SARBANES. Now, how does it apply to the Protocol? The Protocol is four articles long. Does one pick and choose the provisions of the treaty that apply, or do we regard the Protocol as part and parcel of the treaty? The provisions that are set out in the treaty—for instance, article XIX, the treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party—has no counterpart in the Protocol. Now, is the Protocol part of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; it is fundamental. It has been from the outset, and it is an integral part of the treaty.

Senator SARBANES. All right, so any provision in the treaty which reasonably would apply to the Protocol has to be read in that light?

Secretary VANCE. Yes. Article IV specifically says this Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the treaty.

Senator SARBANES. That is the provision for which I am looking. Therefore, article XII of the treaty on noncircumvention applies to the Protocol as well, as you indicate in your statement to the NATO Council. Is that correct?

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON MEANING OF NONCIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS

Senator SARBANES. If the Soviets were to appear before the NATO Council and the Council were to ask them the meaning of article XII, the noncircumvention provisions, would they agree with the view which you stated to the Council, or which the United States stated to the Council on the 29th of June, or would they differ with that view?

Secretary VANCE. The statement which we gave is based upon the language of the article of the treaty on noncircumvention. We did not clear it in advance, nor do I believe we should have cleared in advance the interpretive statement which we gave.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, there are a number of common understandings and agreed interpretations that have been set out both for the treaty and the Protocol, and signed by the President of the United States and by Chairman Brezhnev. That has not been done in this instance.

Secretary VANCE. And for very good reason.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I am asking a very simple question. Do the Soviets take a different view of what article XII means and what its import is?

Secretary VANCE. This relates to how we deal with our allies, and that is something that is between us and our allies, and we have treated it as such. They tried to get a nontransfer clause into the article which dealt with noncircumvention. They originally wanted it to be a noncircumvention, nontransfer. We did not agree to that. We agreed upon a noncircumvention clause.

Senator SARBANES. Well, do the Soviets agree with what you have told our allies article XII means, or do they differ?

Secretary VANCE. I have not discussed that with them, and I don't think we should.

Senator SARBANES. Did we feel it necessary to make this assurance to our allies as to what it meant, because our allies understood that the Soviets interpreted article XII to mean something which would preclude them from access to our technology?

Secretary VANCE. We did not say to our allies what the Soviets thought or did not think.

Senator SARBANES. Why did we feel it necessary to make this explicit statement to our allies with respect to the meaning of the noncircumvention article if some doubt had not been raised in their minds as to what it meant, a doubt, I assume, which stemmed from their concern about the Soviet Union's interpretation of article XII?

Secretary VANCE. They did put a question to us, and as allies, we felt it right and appropriate to answer that question, which we did.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATION

Senator SARBANES. Are there other provisions in the treaty or with respect to the Protocol on which one should focus attention in that our view of what it means and the Soviet Union's view of what it means may differ?

Secretary VANCE. Not that I know of.

Senator SARBANES. Other than this one?

Secretary VANCE. I am not sure that they would disagree with this. I am not suggesting that they do.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it is rather important, or at least, it seems to me to be rather important. You made the point earlier that the Soviets have abided by arms agreements. You were careful to distinguish arms agreements from other agreements.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. But even with arms agreements, they have pressed to the margin with any loopholes. We have to give some thought to locate those instances in which our view of what a certain provision means differs from their view of what it may mean. Otherwise, we have planted the seeds of a dispute.

Secretary VANCE. You are assuming that they disagree with this. We responded to a question from our allies because they wanted to know our view with respect to this article of the treaty. We gave them our view. They did not ask for a Soviet view, and there was no need to raise the question with the Soviets.

SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

Senator SARBANES. Do the Soviets understand the constitutional procedures that this country must follow with respect to the ratification of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. I believe in general terms they do.

Senator SARBANES. Including the role of the Senate in its consideration of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. Yes. Yes; I think they are learning that more and more each day.

Senator SARBANES. Has the administration in its discussions with the Soviet Union leading up to this treaty and subsequently tried on its part to make that clear?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

STATUS OF BACKFIRE BOMBER IN SALT TREATY

Senator SARBANES. Yesterday, we talked a bit about the Backfire bomber, and I would like to get back to that question. I had a conversation afterwards with Senator Glenn about this. Are we awaiting a letter from the Soviet Union?

Secretary VANCE. No; we are not.

Senator SARBANES. Was that a prospect that was entertained at one point and has now been abandoned?

Secretary VANCE. No.

Senator SARBANES. It was never entertained?

Secretary VANCE. No; we did not entertain exchanging letters on this. They were to make a unilateral statement and then we would make whatever statement we chose to make after they made the unilateral statement.

Senator SARBANES. Now, that statement is not a part of the treaty. Is that correct?

Secretary VANCE. No; it is not. No. They have always taken the position that dealing with the Backfire was not a part of the treaty. That has been true right from the start. They have said that this is not a heavy bomber, and that it is used for peripheral missions. That is their position, that they never would consider that as being included within the treaty.

Therefore, that has been dealt with outside the treaty by the statement which they have made through their highest authority, speaking for the Soviet Government.

Senator SARBANES. On that point, earlier in responding to Senator Hayakawa about unanimity of view on their part, you made the

point that the SALT Treaty represented a decision taken by the Government of the Soviet Union at the highest corporate level.

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Does that apply as well to the Backfire statement? Is there any reason to perceive the Backfire statement as representing a decision somewhat different in quality from the decisions represented by the treaty and the protocol?

Secretary VANCE. No; not at all. I think this has been discussed time and time again in the Politburo at the highest level.

Senator SARBANES. Well, the statement of position that was received from the Soviets with respect to the Backfire on the face of it differs in its quality from the statement of position received on these other issues.

Secretary VANCE. One set of things is in the treaty. The other is a statement which is without the treaty.

Senator SARBANES. Well, all the others have the signatures of the President of the United States and Chairman Brezhnev or the chief negotiators on both sides, and the Backfire statement has your name on the bottom of it, period.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Mr. Secretary, what makes the unilateral statement on the Backfire bomber, unsigned and not part of the treaty, binding on the Soviet Union?

Secretary VANCE. It was issued at the highest level by the President of the Soviet Union, and is regarded by them, as they state, as a commitment on the part of their Government, but they have always said that insofar as the Backfire is concerned, they would not treat it as part of the treaty, and that is one reason it does not have a signature on it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you regard the commitment made in the unilateral unsigned statement and not part of the treaty as equivalent to any obligation the Russians have assumed under the treaty itself?

Secretary VANCE. I do indeed, and the President has so stated, and said that if there were any violation of that, he would consider that a basis for repudiating the treaty.

Senator SARBANES. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not trespass upon it until the red light was already shining.

Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Even if that were not the case, I would not have made the charge. [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie?

SUBSTANTIAL STRENGTHENING AND EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator MUSKIE. Mr. Secretary, it seems clear that if the treaty is ratified, by 1985 each side will have substantially strengthened and expanded its nuclear capability and its ability to impose destruction on the other side. Is that a correct assessment?

Secretary VANCE. It will have modernized its force and therefore, in that sense it will be stronger. On the other hand, there will have

been a reduction insofar as the Soviets are concerned in the number of strategic systems by the end of 1982.

Senator MUSKIE. I understand that, but the 250 systems to which you refer are of different quality, different destructive capabilities, presumably, than that which they will build into the remaining systems.

Secretary VANCE. I am sorry, Senator Muskie. I could not hear you.

Senator MUSKIE. The 250 systems to which you presumably refer are of an older type and will not compare in destructive capability, as I understand developments, with more modern weapons which will be put in place within the limits of the treaty.

Secretary VANCE. Oh, no, those systems were built since 1965. They are the equivalent of the Minuteman II and of the Polaris. Each one of them could destroy a city. They are very formidable weapons.

Senator MUSKIE. That was not my question. It is my view, having listened at this end of the seniority line for 2 days to all of the questions and the answers, that when 1985 has come and gone, each side will be in a position, a more effective position, to impose greater destruction more effectively applied to the other than it is now, not that such would be the case if there were no treaty.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct. There will be more warheads by that time, and therefore there will be greater destructive capability on both sides.

Senator MUSKIE. Now, I find that a source of great disappointment and also the source of a question. Why should we believe that there will be a greater disposition to roll back the nuclear capability of each side in 1985 than there is now? Once these weapons systems and their refinements are in place, there is a great reluctance to give them up. Indeed, with respect to the new weapons systems that are restrained by the protocol, there is ample indication that those who are restrained do not intend to be restrained with respect to those weapons systems after 1981. In other words, we accepted restraint on deployment of the M–X missile, but not on its research and development. The administration witnesses have been very careful to point out that we will not accept restraint on research and development after 1981, so all of the momentum, it seems to me, from now on, will be toward maintenance of whatever the status quo is in 1985, and not reduction.

SALT III has been built up as that point in the SALT process at which we will begin to roll back nuclear weapons. Maybe somewhere around SALT X we will eliminate nuclear weapons.

I do not believe that a SALT Treaty in 1985, if we negotiate a treaty effective in 1985 or some year thereafter, will represent any reduction below the destructive capabilities that will have been built into each side's nuclear posture by that date. Now, if there is reason to believe that reductions are possible, I would like to know what are those reasons. I just would like to be reassured.

Secretary VANCE. The reasons, I think, are the following.

First, one has to recognize the reality that arms control, particularly in the field of strategic arms, is a step-by-step process. It cannot be brought to the kind of conclusion that we would all like

to see in a short span of time. We have to accept that it is going to take one step after another.

In the past, steps have been taken, starting with the ABM treaty. By putting constraints on the antiballistic missile development, I think a major step was taken in restraining the further development of a system which would have been clearly destabilizing. I think all would agree on that.

Not only was there a ceiling of two antiballistic missile systems per country, but that was then walked back subsequently in 1974, so that there is now only one. Instead of all of the missiles being developed and deployed, as was permitted, there are a lesser number deployed. There is one example.

Then you came to the next step, which was the putting of a ceiling on the development of further weapons and a freezing of the situation in SALT I. It was not the millenium, but it was a step. Again, we have taken another step. It would be better if we could have restrained the situation and cut deeper and put more qualitative restraints on, but it was not possible, but I think there has been some progress.

Both sides have committed themselves seriously to enter into the discussions in SALT III, the objectives of which will include further quantitative reductions and further qualitative restraints. I cannot tell you now how far one will be able to go in SALT III, but I think it is part of this continuing process. We are going to have to recognize it is going to be a slow process which is going to require perseverance and patience on the part of all of us.

Senator MUSKIE. I did not expect that you could give me such reasons. Nevertheless, I think it is important to recognize that they cannot be identified, and I think it is appropriate to entertain a high level of skepticism with respect to the prospects.

It seems to me that one question we must always bear in mind, especially with respect to the other side, the Soviets, is that they may not be using the SALT process with the same objectives in mind that we do. They may be using it for the purpose of gaining advantage. In this complex field of nuclear technology and asymmetrical weapons systems, asymmetrical defense requirements, it can be as complicated as a game of chess, which to me is a complete mystery, because I do not play it. But the result might well be that although SALT and the SALT process creates the impression that each side is seeking to achieve a reduction in nuclear arms, in actuality one side may be and the other side may not be, so one watches each development with great care.

VULNERABILITY OF MINUTEMAN MISSILES

Let me ask two or three questions with respect to the vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles. As I understand it the vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles is primarily associated with the SS–18. Am I correct?

Secretary VANCE. No; you are wrong.

Senator MUSKIE. Would you expand on that?

Secretary VANCE. The vulnerability of our land-based systems would exist whether or not there were the SS–18's. As Harold Brown explained at some length yesterday, the SS–19, and even the

SS–17 have the capability to attack our land-based systems and put them in jeopardy during that period of time. The SS–18 adds to that situation, but it is not just the SS–18.

Senator MUSKIE. Would our proposal of March 1977, have prevented the development of a threat to our silo-based Minuteman missiles?

Secretary VANCE. Would you repeat that, please?

Senator MUSKIE. Would our proposal of March 1977, have prevented the development of a threat to our silo-based Minuteman missiles?

Secretary VANCE. No.

Senator MUSKIE. It would not? If the Soviets agreed to give up all of their SS–18's, would we still face as intense a Minuteman vulnerability problem as we do with them?

Secretary VANCE. Not as intense a problem, but it would still exist.

Senator MUSKIE. What kind of limits would be necessary to preserve the survivability of silo-based missiles?

Secretary VANCE. We started to get at it by putting a ceiling of 820 on ICBM's. That was a way of beginning to get at the problem. That is why it was more important for us in the long run to get the 820 figure than it would have been to get a halving of the SS–18 numbers.

Senator MUSKIE. Why is the limit on the number of MIRVed ICBM's so high at 820? Why do we not insist on a number closer to our proposal of March 1977, which was 550? Or the present Soviet force, which is 608?

Here is a specific example of our having gone beyond what each side has in place now, to make possible an expansion of the ability to focus on our Minuteman missiles.

Secretary VANCE. The answer is that that was the best that could be negotiated in a very tough negotiation between two very powerful nations.

Senator MUSKIE. What was their rationale?

Secretary VANCE. Their rationale for that was that they felt it was necessary to have more than that. They had started off with a figure of 1,300. We came down to 1,200 for the total MIRVed missiles on both sides. That is land-based and sea-based. They wanted no constraints, because the big part of their force, 75 percent of their warheads, as I believe Senator Church indicated earlier, is in their land-based forces. It is a complex kind of negotiation, as you say, because of the asymmetry between the various systems that we have.

Senator MUSKIE. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. May I just have one further question, or one observation?

The CHAIRMAN. You may. You have waited long enough.

Senator MUSKIE. I make it only because I think we have to test this agreement in this sense. It seems to me that what we have to ask ourselves is whether or not the urgency of getting an agreement on our part was so great that we yielded to the Soviets often on points like this without adequate justification in order to get an agreement. I am not sure that their sense of urgency about the agreement in terms of ultimate arms control or reduction of nuclear weapons is as great as our sense of urgency. They may have

other reasons why they feel strongly that they want a SALT II agreement.

In trying to probe those reasons and trying to make our decision on the basis of something as tenuous as that is an impossibility. We have to act on what is before us, and the facts with respect to the defense systems of each side. But the particular question of the ceiling of 820 as opposed to 550 or 608, and I have other related issues that I will have ample opportunity to get into later, seems to me to be without a justifiable rationale, unless there is something that I have not yet heard.

Secretary VANCE. Let me add just one more word so as to make it quite clear. If we could have gotten all of the elements of our March 1977, proposal, then it might have had some effect on the vulnerability question. I want to make clear I do not think it would have eliminated it, but it would have had some ameliorating effect.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, at the outset yesterday I indicated that possibly not all of my colleagues would support a wish list concerning what needs to be done under SALT II, as Senator McGovern postulated this afternoon, I am one of those who happens to support the M-X missile system, and as a matter of fact, if you really want to make it mobile and save the taxpayers some money, you can give it to Amtrak and give the schedules to the Russians, and they will never find them. [General laughter.]

I would like to take this opportunity to tell you as one Senator that I highly respect your ability to field questions of the nature that have been given to you thus far in the last 2 days. I know it is a purely subjective reasoning on your part. I can tell that because many of the answers that you have given you preface with words like "In my judgment," "I do believe," "I believe," "It would be my belief," "I think."

I cannot put myself in the Soviet shoes, and obviously, with as many preconditions to your answers as you have given to date that I happen to note, it is difficult trying to project yourself into how the Soviets really look at this treaty. What are their main reasons for doing things the way they do? Why in the past have there been discrepancies concerning their actions with regard to some of the agreements they have made, not only with this country, but others?

I would like to ask you this question. Is it without precedent for the American people to have us question Soviet representatives or has the Soviet Union ever been asked to send experts in the field, say, that Senator Muskie has talked about, to sit at that table, so that the American people can perceive the answer, no matter how dubious in our own minds, and allowing for the source, answer for themselves, and possibly give us an insight into their thinking?

Secretary VANCE. The suggestion has never been put to them that they bring witnesses before the Congress of the United States. However, there are the normal parliamentary exchanges about which many of you know where there have been exchanges between Members of our Congress and their political bodies.

In the course of those exchanges, these kinds of issues that we are discussing today are discussed between Members of our Congress and the members of their political body.

SURVIVAL OF NATO WITHOUT SALT

Senator ZORINSKY. You are absolutely correct, Mr. Secretary. That is why I would like to ask this question. Earlier you stated that we can live with or without SALT II, although it would be much better with SALT II. Can NATO survive without SALT II? If so, to what degree? I will bring that right back to the comment you made. I have been at social functions, and meetings with European leaders, specifically the West German Government, who on numerous occasions have answered that question for me. I would just like to see if you have about the same outlook that they have given me as to the survival of NATO in the event that SALT II does not become a reality.

Secretary VANCE. It would be a terribly severe blow to NATO and the members of the alliance should this treaty fail of ratification. They have made this clear in statements through the heads of most of the governments of the NATO countries. They have made it clear to us in private conversations as well as in their public statements. Someone earlier today here at this table, one of the Senators, made reference to what Helmut Schmidt had said about the effect of the failure to ratify and the dire consequences that that would have in his judgment for the map of Europe.

So, they would regard this as a very, very serious blow.

Senator ZORINSKY. In your estimation, would NATO survive without SALT II?

Secretary VANCE. I don't know.

Senator ZORINSKY. You don't know?

Secretary VANCE. I don't know.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky.

I need to ascertain the will of the committee. It is now 1:10 p.m. We have all had a round of questioning. According to the committee's schedule, we have an afternoon hearing which is to commence at 2 o'clock featuring General George Seignious, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Ambassador Earle, who is the chairman of our delegation and our chief negotiator in the concluding phases of the SALT II negotiations.

Senator Javits has another question to put. I would like to know from members of the committee if they have further questions at this time. I had hoped that we might have a short adjournment before we commenced the afternoon session.

Senator PELL. I will pass.

Senator BIDEN. I have one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions at the end of the table?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Secretary VANCE. Mr. Chairman, are these questions for me?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

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Secretary VANCE. I have a problem. I have the Polish Foreign Minister, who is here to see me this afternoon, and then I have another meeting with somebody from out of the United States shortly after that.

Senator JAVITS. May I give you the question, Mr. Secretary? And if you choose to answer it now, please do so, or you may answer it later. The question is this. You said in respect of my questioning much earlier today that the United States could "retaliate and destroy the U.S.S.R." I would like to get your answer to the argument which is made against SALT that though we have the power to retaliate, it is by destroying the Soviet population and Soviet cities, whereas they have the power to knock out our ICBM's, therefore, no American President will use it.

As I say, I don't want to make you do it now. You are busy. But I do think that is a question we have to have answered.

Secretary VANCE. I think Harold answered that question yesterday, and he will be prepared to answer it tomorrow. If not, I will be glad to answer it.

[The information referred to appears on p. 329.]

Senator JAVITS. I have one other thing. I would like to announce that Senator Baker is not here, and he asked me to do this. He had to open the Senate, to deal with the Ranking Members meeting, and the Republican Policy Luncheon.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden?

ICBM VULNERABILITY QUESTION

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I think this question of the vulnerability of the ICBM's is a bit of a red herring. It is the thing about which most people have spoken at this committee hearing so far. I do not quite understand it. Either I misunderstand it, or it really is a real problem. Let me go through this very quickly.

As I understand the ICBM vulnerability question, first, it is vulnerable with or without SALT. Quite frankly. it is more vulnerable without SALT because of the fractionation argument.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. The SS-18 without SALT can have up to 30 warheads. Our counter would be to put a shell game, of increasing the number of targets. They in turn can put more warheads on their ICBM's. With the increased accuracy they have on those MIRVed SS-18's, they dramatically increase the prospects of being able to knock out our ICBM's.

Consequently, without SALT II, we are in serious trouble.

Secretary VANCE. No question about it. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. There is still another scenario that is being put up here. This has the Soviets launching a strike against our land-based system, and thereby leaving us so devastated that we no longer have any counter-force capability.

That assumes two preposterous things, it seems to me. No. 1, that the President of the United States, when being told that there is a massive attack coming, will sit and do nothing. That he will watch it track on the radar screen and do nothing, just watch. This strikes me as absolutely preposterous. Although launch on warning is not a doctrine we have accepted, it is not one we have excluded.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. Second, the whole question of the vulnerability of our land-based system is always put in terms of our vulnerability. Since ICBM's are 70 percent of the Soviet strategic system, they are considerably more vulnerable than we.

If you think we have something to worry about, about the vulnerability of our ICBM system, which is only one-third of our strategic force, how would you like to be the Soviets sitting there with the majority, the vast majority of their weapons in that mode?

Last, and I would like you to say simply whether you disagree or agree with the thrust of what I am saying, I think there is a very good reason why the Soviets are staying with the SS-18 and why they didn't want to negotiate down. History shows, if I am any student of history, and perhaps Dr. Shulman should really speak to this point, the Soviet psyche, if you will, needs a heavy missile, that they are used to heavy and they will stay with heavy. They made a judgment absent SALT to go heavy. We made a judgment absent SALT not to go heavy but to go light and accurate. The whole Soviet mode is to stick with what they know, to be incredibly conservative. So, I don't see any magic about staying with their original decision.

I am still not sure I am going to vote for SALT, based on the question of verification. But I have no trouble with the Soviets retaining their heavy missiles.

Secretary VANCE. I hope you will keep an open mind.

Senator BIDEN. But on this question, do you see the SS-18 as a problem for our strategic systems.

Secretary VANCE. Well, I agree with what you said. They have always gone for bigger systems, whether it be the SS-18, the SS-19, the SS-17. This has always been what they have done.

Senator BIDEN. Well, perhaps we can pursue this later with those who find the SS-18 an unsurmountable problem.

Secretary VANCE. I agree with you. I do not think that it is the problem that many have made it out to be. It is something we should be concerned about. but not the problem that many have indicated that it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we all need lunch. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony. This hearing will commence again at 2 o'clock this afternoon here in the Caucus Room.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:05 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Baker, Helms, and Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

This afternoon, we have the chief American negotiator of the SALT II Treaty, Ambassador Earle, and General Seignious, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I understand both of you gentlemen have prepared statements, and you have agreed at the request of the committee to abbreviate those statements in order that we can move more quickly to the questions.

General Seignious, as Director of the Agency, let me ask you to testify first.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS II, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

General SEIGNIOUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have provided my prepared statement, and I hope that it will be included in the record.

I will now give a brief statement drawing on the substance of that prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

SALT IS BIPARTISAN ENDEAVOR

General SEIGNIOUS. I am honestly and distinctly honored to be here today as this committee starts its responsibilities on this very important treaty. I am further honored to speak for SALT II, because I feel that it is a national and bipartisan endeavor that has been the work of three administrations for nearly 7 years. The basic objective of this endeavor has been to enhance the security of the United States.

Twenty-five years ago, when nuclear arsenals were but a small fraction of their present size, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur stated the basic reality of the nuclear age, and I quote him:

> War has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides * * *. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains the germs of double suicide.

SUPPORT FOR ARMS CONTROL TREATY

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, as a former military officer, when I speak for SALT, I am not speaking for good will or for détente or for a political party or for trust. I speak in favor of an arms control treaty that will strengthen the national security of the United States.

Today, equitable and verifiable arms control goes hand in hand with a strong defense. A strong defense, as a matter of fact, makes

arms control possible, for it is precisely because we are strong and intend to remain so that we do not fear to negotiate.

Arms control, carefully conceived and vigilantly negotiated, has defense as its guide and security its result. I could not advocate to the President of the United States, to the chairman and members of this committee, to the Senate as a whole, or to the American people, any form of unilateral disarmament. I could not advocate an agreement that ties our hands while the Soviets are allowed a free hand, and I could not advocate an agreement based on trust. The very survival of our Nation is at stake, and trust is not a basis for national survival.

In the nuclear age, SALT does provide a rational solution to one of the most difficult tasks that faces a strategist, and that is to find some way to limit the forces of your opponent. With no agreed limitation, no matter how many weapons of our own we build, we cannot stop the Soviet buildup. With nuclear weapons, against which there is no adequate defense, the result of such a race is not more security for one, but greater insecurity for all.

Under SALT II, there will be many hundreds fewer Soviet strategic systems and many thousands fewer deliverable strategic warheads in their arsenal than they could have without SALT II. These limits on Soviet systems are not meaningless restraints on totals already too high. Just one group of Soviet missiles, and I think both Secretary Brown and Secretary Vance have testified to this, the SS-18's, technologically could carry 6,000 more hydrogen warheads were it not for SALT.

Under SALT II, the Soviets can have no more than 2,250 strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers, the same as we; no more than 1,200 ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads, the same as we; no more than 10 warheads on the largest ICBM, the same as we; no more than one new type of ICBM, the same as we.

Anyone who says that in the absence of SALT II the Soviets would not significantly exceed every one of these limits is, I believe, ignoring the past, and certainly the trend of the present.

SALT PRESERVES U.S. ABILITY TO MAINTAIN STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE

In addition to limiting Soviet forces, SALT II will preserve our ability to maintain the reality and the perception of strategic equivalence. We will be able to proceed under SALT II with all of the strategic force options that we as a nation have decided are necessary for our security. So we will proceed under SALT to maintain strategic forces that are survivable, verifiable, and equal to the forces of the Soviet Union.

INCREASED SPENDING NEEDED WITH OR WITHOUT SALT

I would, of course, not be truthful as the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency if I said to you that we would not have to increase our spending on these strategic programs, with or without SALT. National security is a continuing and a dynamic, changing requirement, and the scope and pace of Soviet strategic programs leave us little choice but to modernize our own strategic nuclear forces, but there is no doubt that within the

framework of SALT II we can maintain strategic equality and a more viable, flexible, and effective strategic force with less risk and at a much more moderate cost.

SALT II DESIGNED TO BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE

As I will testify in more detail before this committee, SALT II has been designed and negotiated to be adequately verifiable. It meets that standard. This means that we are confident that we can detect and respond appropriately to any violation by the Soviets which could pose a significant military risk or adversely affect the strategic balance. Trust is no part of SALT. As you know we survey the Soviet Union regularly, thoroughly, and accurately, with overlapping and impressive intelligence capability.

I want to stress that many of these strategic systems limited by SALT are very large, complex systems. It takes many months to construct an ICBM silo launcher and years to assemble and deploy a nuclear submarine. This gives us time to monitor activities. When the Soviets launched their latest Delta-class strategic missile submarine, it was, of course, no surprise to us. We had been aware of its construction for years.

New strategic systems have to be tested to have operational reliability. No leader that I know about, American or Soviet, military or civilian, would order five extra warheads on a nuclear missile and have confidence in that system without testing it extensively. We can adequately monitor those Soviet tests.

DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT IS BANNED

The verification provisions of SALT II and indeed the entire process of strategic arms negotiations actually enhance the knowledge we have about Soviet strategic forces. For example, under SALT II, deliberate concealment, including encryption of telemetry, is banned whenever it impedes verification. Without this ban, the Soviets could use any and all means of concealment. Our intelligence task would be greater, and our information would be substantially less.

SALT II, with its clear ceilings and adequate verification, adds an essential element of predictability, a way of fencing the threat and limiting uncertainty about Soviet programs. Neither rational planning nor nuclear stability are served by ambiguity. We still have to plan against the maximum Soviet capabilities possible under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Entrusted with the defense responsibilities of our Nation, all of us would not be doing our job if we did otherwise. But this is a far cry from the increased threat, and the worst case planning that would confront this Nation if there is no SALT.

THREAT OF EXPANDED USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

I might interpolate here and say that worst case planning refers not only to strategic nuclear planning, but also to the threat of expanded use of conventional forces, an area where the Soviets are rapidly extending their capability. If there is a period of high tension and concealed forces on the part of the Soviet Union, not

only would we be threatened with the unpredictability and uncertainty of strategic forces, but also with the unexpected deployment of conventional forces.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to interject a personal note to illustrate a basic point about SALT II, if I may. In 1973 and 1974, I was Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As you will remember, those were the days when SALT I was being ratified and the basic foundations of SALT II were being laid, the guidance being put out.

Since the first time I had anything to do with SALT II, which was at its inception, one of the fundamental goals we had in the Joint Chiefs of Staff was equal aggregates of strategic forces with freedom to mix the forces within the aggregates. I can almost hear it in my sleep coming from the Joint Chiefs: What we want is equal aggregates and freedom to mix.

For us in the military, then, this was practically synonymous with SALT II, equal totals to set the stage for balanced reductions.

The Soviets strongly pushed at that time for percentage reductions, to try to maintain the asymmetry in numbers that was favorable to them under SALT I. I had a boss at that time, the Chairman, who said over and over that if we are going to start reductions, we are going to start them from a basis of equality. We are not going to let them draw us down.

In the process of negotiation, we got the Soviets to agree to this fundamental precept, and we got them to agree to a few other things. For example, to lessen ambiguity, we insisted, against strong Soviet objection, on the inclusion of detailed definitions of systems to be limited under SALT. I know you have seen article II of this treaty, which that has an extensive range of full-scale definitions.

My point in mentioning these two examples is not to maintain that we wrote our own treaty. No agreement constructed on unilateral gain can long endure, even if it were possible to achieve it at the outset. But we have, in my view, carefully guarded our interests.

SALT II IN U.S. FAVOR

The result in SALT II is indeed a complex structure of objectives achieved, mutual advantage, compromise, and trade-off. But in the world of two sovereign nations—achieving what it is possible to achieve in negotiations on basic issues of national survival—the resolution of SALT II was, in my judgment, to our favor.

We have a long way to go in the SALT process. Nonetheless, we should be—and I am—proud of the accomplishments of SALT II. We have established for the first time equal overall ceilings on strategic nuclear forces. We have negotiated equal subceilings on MIRVed systems. We have begun the long sought process of reductions. We have taken the first steps in controlling the technological arms race. We have placed limits on increases in three major indices of central strategic power—launchers, weapons, and throw weight. We have strengthened verification. We have renewed our commitment to the long-term process of strategic arms limitation.

SALT CENTERPIECE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

In crafting a framework of equality between two different strategic forces, neither the mirror image of the other, SALT II is an essential bridge to deeper reductions and further qualitative restraints in SALT III. In my opinion, and I think the testimony of the Secretary of State is in accord with this, SALT has become the centerpiece of the United States-Soviet relationship, and rejection of the treaty would have serious consequences for this relationship and for stability elsewhere.

Some, however, would link SALT to every world problem, and some would decorate SALT like a Christmas tree with burdens that it neither merits nor can endure.

I agree that we cannot quarantine SALT entirely from Soviet actions in other spheres, but to burden SALT—and I think this is one of the key philosophical points in my statement—with every aspect of the Soviet challenge would mean we could settle nothing with the Soviets unless we settled everything. The nuclear threat to everyone's security is so overriding that we cannot wait until that day when we can settle everything.

For those who would discard SALT because of Soviet activities elsewhere, I simply ask, what would they offer in return? What Soviet challenge could they meet in the nations of Africa and Asia by rejecting SALT? Would we be better able to respond to the Soviet buildup in Europe in conventional forces or theater nuclear forces while spending even larger sums on strategic nuclear forces?

A nuclear arms race with the gloves off would not just mean billions and billions more for defense. It would focus our national attention on strategic military rivalry and competition. Our response to other pressing problems—conventional forces, energy and economic problems, inflation, and all the rest—would be bound to suffer.

The point is, I believe that a stable world is an arena best turned to our advantage, where we are a superpower in many, many facets of national life and the Soviet Union is a superpower in one facet of their life, their military power. An unrestrained and tension-filled nuclear arms race is not the recipe, in my book, for a stable economy, and it is not the recipe for a stable world.

SALT II WILL NOT HINDER U.S. COMPETITION WITH SOVIETS

SALT II will in no way hinder our ability to compete with the Soviet Union where competition is required. SALT II, however, will enable us to continue the important process of cooperation, a process in which, as in negotiation, one nation's gain need not be the other nation's loss. SALT ratification will not mean the instant success in the broad spectrum of arms control efforts that are important to our future security and stability. SALT ratification would reinforce, however, our efforts to maintain and enhance adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. In these efforts, we are joined by the Soviet Union and other nations.

SALT RATIFICATION HELP ACHIEVE COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING

SALT ratification could help us to achieve the long sought goal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Such a ban, if joined by nations in South Asia, which are now very unstable in this regard, would be a major plus for nonproliferation.

SALT ratification, if I may quote Chancellor Schmidt, will "create the conditions for progress" at the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna. Nowhere is the imperative for stability more important than in Europe. Where two enormously capable military forces face each other in an arena of historic confrontation.

SALT ratification would enhance the environment for controlling conventional arms in a world of poverty and scarcity for many, in a world that now spends over $400 billion a year on weapons and military forces.

Apart from the collapse of the SALT process itself, the most important casualty may well be the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. As a former strategist for the Joint Chiefs, looking at many military scenarios, I know of none that is more of a nightmare in which to plan the security of this country than the scenario of extensive proliferation of nuclear weapons by nation states in the realm of 15 or 20.

Terrorism and local conflicts could well then escalate to the point where they would threaten our American way of life.

ANTISATELLITE NEGOTIATION CASUALTY TO SALT DEFEAT

One important negotiation that is under way now that I feel would fall if SALT fails is the antisatellite negotiation. I do not believe I need to spell out how important it is to our monitoring capability and the stabilization of the race of nuclear arms in space.

We must arrest that arms race before it gets started. New and exotic weapons in space that technologically could be developed may well be beyond the control of the human mind and the rational efforts of human beings.

No single arms control agreement will bring peace or eliminate all of the engines of war, but this agreement is a careful and a major step forward to limit strategic offensive nuclear arms. It is, yes, a negotiated compromise, but one that does not compromise our own security, nor the stability of the nuclear balance, nor the continuing quest to limit nuclear arms.

SALT II PROVIDES PROGRESS FOR THE PRESENT

I feel from my experience with the negotiating process of almost 2 years, one as an at-large member of the U.S. SALT delegation and one since assuming my present responsibility, and having had the opportunity to speak one-on-one with more than 40 U.S. Senators, including many of you, that this is in fact a consensus treaty that provides progress, although not great progress, but progress for the present. It certainly provides a hope for the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[General Seignious' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS II

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased and privileged to appear before the Committee today to testify in support of the SALT II Treaty. As Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I will concentrate on how SALT II—a strong arms control achievement which reduces the risk of nuclear war—enhances the national security of the United States.

Almost 25 years ago, after the American monopoly had been transformed into a deadly sharing of this enormous destructive capability, the implications of the nuclear age for national security and national survival were foreseen by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur:

"War has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. No longer is it the weapon of adventure whereby a short cut to international power and wealth—a place in the sun—can be gained. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess the chance of the winner of duel—it contains rather the germs of double suicide."

Every United States President in the nuclear age—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter—has appreciated this reality and borne the awesome responsibility it imposes.

Thus, when I speak for SALT II, I do not speak for detente, or for good will, or for a political party, or for trust. I speak for arms control that will enhance the national security of the United States.

The essential criterion for both our defense policy and arms control is the security of the United States. Defense policy and arms control policy are not mutually exclusive. As President Kennedy once wrote, "Diplomacy and defense are no longer distinct alternatives, one to be used where the other fails—both must complement each other."

There is widespread agreement in this country on two fundamental goals:

one, that we should reduce the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers, and

two, that we must maintain essential equivalence in strategic forces with the Soviet Union.

SALT II provides the only way to pursue both goals simultaneously. The Treaty places upper limits on strategic competition and begins the process of reductions. It also helps to preserve a U.S. strategic posture which is equal to that of the Soviet Union. It protects those defense program options we need to maintain a modern, and flexible, and survivable deterrent.

The United States will maintain essential equivalence with the Soviet Union—with or without SALT. But the SALT process—including this SALT II Treaty—enables us to do so at lower, less expensive, and less dangerous levels.

A strong defense coupled with sensible arms control can better enhance our security than either can alone. Each nation must provide for its own defense. But, in the nuclear age, adversaries must cooperate in order to prevent nuclear war.

The chances of war are reduced as the nuclear balance becomes more stable and more predictable. SALT can contribute to this stability and predictability in several ways:

by maintaining basic parity in overall strategic forces, and preventing one side or the other from gaining the kind of numerical advantage which could be exploited militarily or politically;

by preserving the ability of each side to maintain forces which are secure from surprise attack and which can retaliate with an effective second strike; and

by ensuring that both sides have sufficient knowledge about the strategic forces of the other, to enhance mutual confidence that parity and deterrence exist.

The provisions of SALT II help make the balance more stable by limiting both the numbers and the capabilities of strategic nuclear weapon systems. The agreement also enhances our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces.

The SALT II agreement prohibits either side from achieving a numerical advantage in strategic launchers. This is important because a meaningful numerical advantage might be exploited either militarily, for more launchers can send more warheads against the other side's military and civilian targets, or politically, for even the appearance of greater numbers could be powerful diplomatic currency. Questions raised during the SALT I debate and the resolution approving the Interim Agreement reflected Senate concern over the potentially dangerous consequences of numerical disparities. SALT II alleviates this concern by providing for equal aggregate ceilings.

In SALT II, the overall ceiling for ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers is equal for both sides—initially 2400, to be reduced by the end of 1981 to 2250. Under SALT II, there will be no race for advantage in numbers of launchers.

SALT II also places subceilings on specific categories of launchers—especially MIRVed missile launchers.

There is a limit of 1320 on the total of MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers plus heavy bombers equipped for long-range, air-launched cruise missiles. The total number of MIRVed launchers cannot exceed 1200, and the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers—the most destabilizing weapon system—is limited to a maximum of 820.

Within these ceilings, the two sides maintain some latitude in selecting a mix of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bombers. These ceilings will hold deployment of the new Soviet MIRVed missiles, especially their new MIRVed ICBMs, to well below the numbers they could have without the agreement.

Now these ceilings—2250, 1200, 820—are higher than we wanted them to be. We tried to negotiate lower numbers. However, it proved impossible at this stage in SALT to bring the numbers down more. SALT II will help to eliminate the Soviet numerical advantage in launchers, forcing them to reduce by some 250 systems. With equal ceilings in SALT II and a mutual commitment to pursue—in the words of the Joint Statement of Principles—"significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms," I believe we have taken an important next step and opened the way for deeper reductions in the future.

Even with equal numerical ceilings, advancing technology offers the potential for continuing competition and substantial increases in strategic capabilities. At times, the rate of technological development seems to have outstripped our ability to bring technology under control. In the military field, advanced technology has enabled us—some would say driven us—to develop newer, more deadly types of weapons and to make existing weapons even more destructive.

In arms control, technological advances can offset numerical limits. In SALT I, for example, we froze the number of strategic missile launchers on both sides. This capped the quantitative arms race in ballistic missile launchers. But, MIRV technology—which was deliberately not limited in any way in SALT I—enabled both countries to replace a missile which could send one warhead to one target with a missile which can send many warheads to many separate targets. The launcher race gave way to a warhead race. The number of weapon systems remained the same, but their capabilities became even greater and more deadly.

The technological arms race poses as many dangers to stability as does the numerical arms race. The MIRVed ICBM is the most obvious example.

In SALT II, we have limited not only the numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but their capabilities as well. And we have succeeded—not in halting the technological arms race, but certainly in slowing it down. There are a number of qualitative restraints in SALT II, and they are quite specific.

SALT II freezes the number of warheads on existing types of ICBMs and establishes ceilings on the number of warheads that can be placed on SLBMs and on any new type of ICBM. This means that the Soviets will not be able to exploit fully the MIRV potential of their ICBM throw-weight advantage.

SALT II bans new ICBMs and new SLBMs which are larger in throw-weight than the largest current light ICBM, the Soviet SS–19.

SALT II bans new types of ICBMs, with an exception for only one new type of light ICBM for each side. Constraints written into this provision will limit improvements to existing types of ICBMs in such characteristics as throw-weight, launch-weight, number of warheads, length, diameter, and fuel type.

The numerical ceilings and the qualitative restraints are mutually reinforcing. Taken together, they limit the ability of both sides to increase the number of launchers, the number of warheads, and the throw-weight of their missile forces. We have, in effect, capped the major indices by which central strategic power is measured.

The equal aggregate ceilings cap the first index of strategic power—the number of launchers. The subceilings on the number of MIRVed missile launchers and the "fractionation" limits on the numbers of warheads that can be put on a given missile combine to place an upper limit on the second index—the total number of warheads. The ban on increasing the number of heavy ICBMs and the upper limits on the size of both heavy and light ICBMs combine to produce an upper limit on the third index—total throw-weight.

There are other qualitative constraints in the Treaty.

SALT II bans rapid reload systems which, if made workable, could greatly increase the military capabilities of ICBM launchers. To reinforce this, SALT II also bans storage of excess missiles near launch sites.

SALT II also bans development, testing, and deployment of several types of weapons not yet deployed by either side, but which could otherwise be on the drawing boards in either country. Under SALT II, there can be:

no long-range ballistic missiles on ships other than submarines;

no ballistic or cruise missile launchers on the ocean floor, seabed, or the beds of internal or inland waters;

no systems for placing nuclear or other mass destruction weapons in orbit;

no mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

no heavy submarine-launched ballistic missiles;

no heavy air-to-surface ballistic missiles, and

no air-launched cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads.

For the duration of SALT II, there will be no arms race at all in any of these areas.

I know this Committee will be looking specifically at verification in its hearings, but I would like to say a few words here about SALT verification and about how the verification provisions of SALT II build mutual confidence in the SALT process.

The SALT II agreement is adequately verifiable. We are confident we can detect any violation by the Soviets which could pose a significant military risk or adversely affect the strategic balance.

In SALT we don't rely on trust. Trust is not a basis for national survival. We verify Soviet compliance with the provisions of the agreement by using our diverse, powerful, and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. These include photoreconnaissance satellites which survey the Soviet Union on a regular basis. Our various intelligence-collection techniques complement each other. We do not depend on just one source for the data we need. Taken together, these capabilities provide us with a substantial amount of detailed, accurate, up-to-date information on those Soviet forces and activities limited by SALT.

When one considers the verifiability of SALT II, it is important to remember several things about strategic systems:

Many are very large, complex systems. For example, it takes many months to construct an ICBM silo launcher and years to assemble and deploy a nuclear submarine. They can't be constructed overnight. This gives us time to monitor activities.

New systems have to be tested to have operational confidence. As a former military man, I can assure you that no commander is going to place five extra warheads on a missile and have confidence in that system without testing it extensively. We can observe these Soviet tests.

Systems need personnel to run them and extensive logistical and security support. Some charge that the Soviets could stockpile extra missiles and then one night change the strategic balance. However, it is one thing to produce a missile in a factory; it is quite another to have the trained personnel, the logistics, and the launchers themselves—without our being able to spot them. Activities such as these compound the task of keeping deployments hidden, and they increase the chance that we will spot them.

The SALT II agreement was negotiated and drafted with verification in mind. There are a number of aspects of SALT II which are worth highlighting for their contributions to verification and confidence-building.

The Treaty bans deliberate concealment measure which impede verification of compliance. The natural tendency of governments toward secrecy in matters of security has yielded in important ways to the demands of mutual confidence. A notable explicit example is that both countries have limited their freedom to encrypt telemetry associated with missile tests, whenever such denial of information would impede verification.

SALT II bans interference with national technical means of verification.

The counting rules for MIRVed launchers and MIRVed missiles will enhance confidence in verification. For verification reasons, the Soviets have agreed to count as MIRVed a number of systems which in reality are not MIRVed.

The data base exchange is a mutual recognition that confidence requires information—in many cases, information that traditionally has been a closely held secret in the Soviet Union. Provision of this data, now agreed, makes clear that both parties interpret the provision of the Treaty and Protocol in the same way.

To enhance our ability to verify compliance with provisions of the agreement, the Soviets have agreed to ban production, testing, and deployment of the SS-16, as well as the production of components unique to it.

SALT II continues and broadens the mandate of the Standing Consultative Commission, which was established in 1972 and serves as the principal forum for resolution of questions of compliance. Over the past six years, the SCC has proven to be valuable and useful to both parties.

We have a long way to go in the SALT process. Nonetheless, we should be—and we are—proud of the accomplishments of SALT II:

We have established—for the first time—equal over-all ceilings on strategic nuclear forces;

We have negotiated equal sub-ceilings on MIRVed systems;

We have begun the long-sought process of reductions;

We have taken the first steps in controlling the technological arms race;

We have placed limits on increases in three major indices of central strategic power—launchers, warheads, and throw-weight;

We have stengthened verification; and

We have renewed our commitment to the long-term process of strategic arms limitation.

SALT II is an essential bridge to future progress in strategic arms limitations. Not only does it provide specific steps upon which we can build, not only does it provide new verification provisions that will enhance confidence and stability, but also through the joint statement of principles it specifically commits the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue negotiations with the objectives of significant and substantial numerical reductions, further qualitative limitations, and resolution of the issues in the protocol. We intend that these negotiations begin as soon as SALT II enters into force—as mandated by article XIV of the treaty.

The SALT II agreement must be judged on its own merits, and the number one criterion is whether it contributes to the overall security of the United States. Our security, however, is a product of many factors, and today in a highly interdependent world, in a world where escalation from local crisis to superpower confrontation could pose a threat as potentially dangerous as direct surprise attack, the spectrum of arms control efforts is important to this security.

We are now engaged in a broad range of arms control endeavors and negotiations with the Soviet Union and with other nations.

If SALT II is successful, as you yourself have written, Mr. Chairman, "the way will be open for progress on other initiatives." Although ratification of SALT II will not necessarily lead to instant success in other arms control efforts, failure of SALT II will most certainly damage them, perhaps beyond the point of repair.

The implications for our security and world stability are unmistakable and they are very serious indeed.

Beyond the collapse of the SALT process itself, the most important casualty of SALT failure would be our vitally important effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The world is poised on the threshold of a dangerous and rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Such proliferation would create a security nightmare for all nations. A world with many nuclear powers would face much greater risks of nuclear blackmail, nuclear terrorism, nuclear insurrections, and regional conflicts which might involve nuclear weapons. These conflicts could escalate rapidly to threaten the security of every American. I can think of no more unstable a world than one with growing numbers of nuclear weapon states.

The central feature of the international effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or NPT. Under this treaty, 106 non-nuclear weapon states have pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and to demonstrate their compliance with the treaty by placing all their peaceful nuclear facilities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

U.S. nonproliferation efforts are, of course, widespread and diverse. We are working with other countries to turn the spread of peaceful nuclear power into the least dangerous, most productive directions. But we cannot stop the increase in technical nuclear capabilities worldwide. As a consequence, the number of states which could, in a relatively short period of time, contruct one or more nuclear explosive devices, if they chose to do so, increases steadily. Thus, the continued recognition by these states of the importance of maintaining the NPT obligations becomes our primary hope over the long run for avoiding a catastrophic spread of nuclear weapons.

Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was signed in 1968, commits all parties—including the United States and the Soviet Union—"to pursue negotiations

in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date * * *."

Throughout the past 10 years, the international community has frequently stressed the relationship between nonproliferation by the non-nuclear weapon states and efforts by the nuclear weapon states to halt and reverse the arms race. Indeed, the SALT II agreement explicitly recognizes this relationship. The premable to the SALT II Treaty records that it is entered into by the two parties "Mindful of their obligations under article VI" of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

If SALT were rejected, some countries which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco—which creates a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin American—could use the failure of SALT II to justify their own continued refusal to undertake an obligation not to develop nuclear weapons. Other countries—in Europe, Africa, Latin America, South Asia, or Southeast Asia—which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty might use the failure of SALT as an excuse—or a reason—to reconsider their commitment to this treaty when the conference convenes next June to review the operation of the treaty.

The second major casualty of SALT failure would be our efforts to ban all nuclear tests. Nearly 2 years ago this month, trilateral negotiations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom began with a view toward achieving the long-sought goal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Such a ban would build on the achievements of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 signed by President Kennedy and ratified by the Senate.

Taken together, SALT II and a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would reinforce stability in the United States/Soviet nuclear relationship. Taken together, SALT II and a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban would enhance our nonproliferation efforts at the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference next year and in other ways. For example, prospects are good that India would join such a treaty if it were nondiscriminatory. This would convert Prime Minister Desai's stand against nuclear weapons development into an Indian treaty commitment. Such a commitment, if joined by Pakistan, could defuse one of the most urgent threats to nonproliferation.

Nowhere is the imperative for stability more important than in Europe where two enormously capable military forces face each other in an arena of historic confrontation. With the potential for destruction so great, the ultimate security of every European is at stake. Europe, therefore, has a special interest in stability. Failure of SALT, rejection of the process, could lead to the most dangerous kind of instability.

For this reason, it is important to stress today a third major casualty of SALT failure—the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations, which have been our principal effort to maintain and improve stability in Europe. Progress has been slow, but we have made headway. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt put the alternatives very clearly:

"The success of SALT II will encourage the West and the East to find solutions—including arms control measures—for other potentials threatening the military balance of power. I feel sure that the successful conclusion of SALT II will also create the conditions for progress at the MBFR talks."

Specifically, he has concluded, "I do not believe that MBFR can be successful if SALT II fails."

Mr. Chairman, a failure of SALT would lead to a poisoning of the well of United States-Soviet relations, and history has shown that United States-Soviet tensions are felt most acutely in Europe.

The final casualty of SALT failure that I want to mention today is the antisatellite negotiations. In recent months we have made significant progress although several important issues remain to be resolved. Not only would success in these negotiations improve our security and strategic stability as well as protect our intelligence capabilities, but these negotiations also offer us an opportunity to stop a destabilizing technological arms race in space before it gets started. If these negotiations grind to a halt in the aftermath of SALT failure, new and exotic weapons may be developed to the point that they will forever escape our control and our ability to place rational limits.

I have not discussed every arms control initiative being pursued by the United States today, but I believe that near-term progress on any would be doubtful if SALT were rejected. The Soviets could argue that the United States, after 6½ years of negotiations under three Presidential administrations, had, through rejection of SALT II, proven itself to be an unreliable partner in arms control negotiations. In many of these talks—particularly MBFR and CTB—which are important to both of us and to other nations, the Soviets would be in a position to inflict considerable

political damage on the United States by tying the lack of success or even breakdown of these negotiations squarely to our country's rejection of SALT.

A world with no quantitative or qualitative limits on strategic arms, with monitoring rendered more difficult, with many more nuclear powers, with no additional restraints on nuclear testing, with a conventional arms race in Central Europe and in other, tense regions around the world—that is not a secure world for us or for anyone.

Mr. Chairman, security is what arms control is all about. We can build up our own defenses, but so can the Soviets. Arms control agreements offer the only way I know that we can place limits on and even engineer reductions in the Soviet forces arrayed against us. That, as well as strong forces of our own, is national security.

The SALT II agreement that is before this committee today is a solid, substantial package of such limits and reductions:

Without SALT II, the Soviets could have by 1985 one-third more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than they will be permitted under the agreement;

Without SALT II, the Soviets could have by 1985 many hundreds more MIRVed ballistic missile launchers than they are allowed under its terms;

Without SALT II, the Soviets could deploy as many more heavy missiles as they wanted to and could build still larger missiles if they chose to;

Without SALT II, each Soviet SS-18 could carry three times as many warheads as are permitted under SALT II, and thus strike three times as many United States targets;

Without SALT II, the Soviets could build all the Backfire bombers they wanted to;

Without SALT II, the Soviets could develop and deploy as many new types of ICBM's as their engineers could dream of;

Without SALT II, the Soviets could engage in any and all methods of concealment, making our overall intelligence monitoring task far more difficult.

SALT II, I submit, is arms control that strengthens our security. No one who has worked on SALT II should be bashful about its accomplishments. SALT II caps the race in numbers of launchers; it controls several key aspects of the technological arms race. It builds on SALT I and paves the way to SALT III. Then, we can bring the numbers down significantly and tighten our grip on the technological arms race.

No single arms control agreement will eliminate the Soviet threat, or even reduce it to as low a level as we would wish, or enable us to meet all our security needs. SALT II does place real and specific limits on Soviet strategic forces. And SALT II will enable us to maintain strategic nuclear equality with the Soviet Union at a much more moderate cost to the American people.

No single arms control agreement will bring peace or eliminate all of the engines of war. But SALT II does increase stability and reduce the danger of nuclear war. SALT II provides a guide to our future, common survival.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. That is a succinct and eloquent statement which introduces for the first time certain facets of an issue that we have not yet considered, particularly as your statement related to the prospects for success of other negotiations of great importance to the security of this country. I thank you for raising this point.

I think we should hear next from Ambassador Earle before we proceed to questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH EARLE II, CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Ambassador Earle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure and an honor to appear before you and the members of the committee.

Within the objective of obtaining a treaty which is in our national interest, it was the responsibility of the U.S. SALT delegation to negotiate coordinated U.S. positions with the Soviets and to reflect them in agreed treaty language.

COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE TREATY THE WAY IT WAS NEGOTIATED

As the chairman of the SALT delegation, it was my privilege to complete this task that has spanned three administrations. I welcome your statement of yesterday, Mr. Chairman, to the effect that the committee will examine the treaty line by line, article by article, in the course of its deliberations. That is essentially the way it was negotiated.

My formal statement, which the committee has, addresses treaty questions in more detail, and I look forward to discussing any aspects of the text which committee members may wish to consider. But first I would like to turn briefly to the negotiating process itself, and describe one example of how it applied in practice.

Given the importance of SALT to national security, the process by which the U.S. positions were developed was, and had to be, a careful and exhaustive one. Both in Washington and in Geneva, it has been in every respect an interagency process, which assured the full participation of all concerned agencies of the U.S. Government.

In Washington, the President received advice on negotiating positions from the Special Coordinating Committee. We call it the SCC, in this context, the Washington SCC, because we also refer to another SCC, that is, the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva. The Special Coordinating Committee is a subcommittee of the National Security Council, chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and includes the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FINAL DECISIONS MADE BY PRESIDENT ON SCC RECOMMENDATIONS

The final decisions on our negotiating positions were made by the President based on the recommendations of the SCC. Next, these decisions were translated into specific instructions to the U.S. SALT delegation in Geneva. The delegation itself also consisted of representatives from all concerned agencies. It included a chairman, members from the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a public at-large member.

The last incumbent, George M. Seignious II, sits to my left.

In addition, the delegation relied on intelligence and legal advisers, a staff of experts from all agencies concerned, and a small but able supporting staff of interpreters, secretaries, administrators, and security personnel.

We also benefited from visits from nearly 30 Senators, a number of whom sit at this table today, as well as a number of Representatives. Congressional advice contributed to the success of the negotiating process, particularly in connection with data base and verification.

The U.S. SALT delegation operated at all times under instructions from Washington. Meetings between the United States and Soviet delegations were held at several levels. At plenary meetings, held once or twice a week, the two chairmen read prepared formal statements, after which the chairmen held a private meeting while

the remainder of the two delegations split up into small bilateral groups for less formal discussions. The two chairmen also held separate private meetings outside the plenary format as the need arose. Additional groups within the delegations were formed to carry out specific responsibilities. A drafting group, chaired on the United States side by the senior State Department official, and including representatives from the other agencies involved, usually met twice a week, and was responsible for preparing the draft text of the agreement.

A conforming subgroup, chaired on the United States side by the legal adviser to the delegation, operated under the aegis of the drafting group. It had the responsibility to insure that the draft texts of the agreement were up to date and conformed in both languages—no easy task.

All substantive matters addressed by the United States side at any meeting with the Soviets were reviewed ahead of time within the U.S. delegation. All work of the drafting group and conforming subgroup was ad referendum to the chiefs of delegation, just as all work of the delegations themselves was ad referendum to governments.

Our allies were kept abreast of the negotiating situation and were consulted closely on issues of common interest. The SALT delegation periodically consulted with our NATO allies at meetings of the North Atlantic Council called for that purpose. For instance, just in the last 2 years, we met with the North Atlantic Council over a dozen times.

The delegation also made recommendations to Washington on substantive matters based on our own first-hand assessments in the field. On day-to-day matters, we received guidance from the SALT Backstopping Committee in Washington, a subordinate body of the Special Coordinating Committee. As in all other SALT support activities, the Backstopping Committee consisted of participants from all concerned agencies. The delegation in Geneva normally decided questions of negotiating tactics.

As can be seen, the SALT negotiating process has placed a premium on coordinated interagency positions, both in Washington and in Geneva. At all times, the SALT delegation in Geneva operated within the guidelines set under the authority of the President.

ISSUE OF MIRV VERIFICATION

As an example, Mr. Chairman, I would like to describe one issue, that of MIRV verification, to illustrate how differences between the United States and Soviet positions in Geneva were resolved.

The U.S. Government decided early in SALT II to pursue qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including limitations on MIRVed ballistic missiles and their launchers. However, verifying that a fixed ICBM launcher exists is a great deal easier than verifying what kind of missile that launcher contains. Consequently, a number of meetings of the verification panel, that is, the forerunner of the SCC, were dedicated to detailed studies of various counting rules and collateral constraints designed to insure adequate verification of MIRV limitations.

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It was decided that limits on the number of launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's equipped with MIRV's would be adequately verifiable, provided they were accompanied by certain counting rules. The U.S. delegation then entered into negotiations with the Soviets on MIRV launcher limits and associated verification rules.

When the delegations began to draft treaty language in 1975 to implement the MIRVed launcher limit, the United States pressed for type rules for MIRVed missiles and for launchers of MIRVed missiles to make adequate verification of this limit feasible.

SOVIETS AGREE TO TYPE RULES

The Soviets resisted claiming that national technical means of verification could in fact distinguish between MIRV and non-MIRV launchers, but after several years, and I mean that quite literally, several years, they agreed to what we call type rules.

Senator BIDEN. I beg your pardon? What was that?

Ambassador EARLE. Type, t-y-p-e, rules. The verification problem was how to count Soviet MIRV systems that look alike but may be different. For example, the Soviet SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19 ICBM systems have all been flight tested both with MIRV's and with a single reentry vehicle. The MIRV missile type rule eventually agreed upon provides that if a missile has been flight tested with MIRV's, all missiles of that type will be considered to be MIRVed, regardless of their actual payload. Thus, as a result of this agreement, all SS–17, all SS–18, and all SS–19 ICBM's are considered to be MIRVed.

The MIRV launcher type rule provides that if a launcher is a launcher of MIRVed ICBM's or SLBM's [submarine launched ballistic missile] all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of MIRVed ICBM's or SLBM's. Thus, all SS–17, all SS–18, and all SS–19 launchers will be considered to be launchers of MIRVed ICBM's, regardless of the missiles they actually contain or indeed regardless of whether they contain any missiles.

In this connection, the Soviets agreed that all 180 ICBM launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk in the Soviet Union will be included in the MIRVed launcher total, even though in fact some of them do not and never have contained MIRVed missiles.

To achieve Soviet agreement to this concept and to incorporate it into treaty language took the better part of 3 years. However, the resultant confidence in MIRV verification justified the time spent.

SALT II PRODUCT OF THREE ADMINISTRATIONS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, SALT II is a product of three administrations. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all provided the basis for the conclusion of the treaty now before you.

President Nixon concluded the ABM Treaty which avoided a destabilizing competition in strategic defenses. He also negotiated an interim freeze on strategic offensive arms which limited Soviet offensive programs at a time when we were not deploying additional strategic systems.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger achieved a major breakthrough at Vladivostok in 1974 by providing the basic framework

of the SALT II agreement. This agreement included equal aggregate limits on central strategic systems, continuation of the freeze on heavy ICBM launchers, and exclusion from SALT of U.S. forward-based systems, as well as British and French nuclear forces.

President Carter benefited from these and other previous accomplishments, which resolved fully 80 percent of the text and many of the most important issues. In turn, he succeeded in reducing the overall aggregate limit, adding new, lower ceilings on MIRV systems, constraining new types of ICBM's, and completing the SALT II Treaty.

The history of SALT II reflects a careful process of negotiation. In my judgment, the agreements have been carefully crafted to be balanced and to meet the interests of the United States.

SALT II serves our national security by imposing verifiable constraints on Soviet strategic systems, while leaving open our options to provide for the common defense and to modernize our strategic forces. It has taken nearly years to negotiate this treaty. In my view, the time and effort were well worth it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Ambassador Earle's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RALPH EARLE II

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you. I stand ready to assist the committee as you prepare to assess the result of more than 6 years of negotiations.

As the chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation for the past 8 months, it was my privilege to conclude negotiations that have spanned three administrations. I have been associated with the SALT II negotiations since 1972, first as a Department of Defense consultant on matters relating to SALT, then as the representative of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and later as alternate chairman of the U.S. delegation to SALT. Since October 1978, I have been the chairman of the U.S. delegation. Based upon my working experience at the negotiations, I would like to share with you several observations concerning the treaty and protocol provisions, the process by which U.S. positions were implemented, and a few examples of how differences between United States and Soviet positions were resolved.

First, I would like to discuss how the SALT II agreement evolved into the treaty and protocol now before you. Like the ABM Treaty before it, which placed systematic and comprehensive constraints on certain strategic defenses, the scope of the SALT II limitations on offensive systems merits the status of a treaty, and the review process it is now receiving. This treaty will extend through December 31, 1985.

The 19 articles of the SALT II Treaty place qualitative as well as quantitative constraints on launchers of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), launchers of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bombers. For the first time in the atomic age, we have placed equal ceilings for both sides on the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. The treaty also places constraints on the number of launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), the number of reentry vehicles per missile, and the throw-weight of ICBM's and SLBM's. The treaty also contains a number of other constraints, such as a limit on the introduction of new types of ICBM's.

As you know, the SALT II agreement also contains a protocol which is an integral part of the treaty, but which is of shorter duration. The protocol will expire on December 31, 1981. Certain weapon systems that are not currently deployed have been covered in the protocol—mobile ICBM launchers, air-to-surface ballistic missiles, and long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States can go forward with development of these systems during the protocol period and subsequently with deployment if we feel the need to do so after the protocol expires. Alternatively, we can negotiate limitations on any of them in conjunction with appropriate limitations on Soviet systems during SALT III.

The existence of the protocol is itself a product of lengthy negotiations with the Soviet Union, demonstrating how conflicting interests have been reconciled in order

to reach a negotiated settlement. The Soviets took the position that a SALT agreement should deal with these weapon systems. The U.S. took the position that its development programs for such systems be permitted to continue unimpeded. The result is a protocol of short duration which will not affect our plans to develop and test mobile ICBM launchers and long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. By its own terms it will expire on December 31, 1981, and both sides have made clear in the negotiating record their understanding that the protocol limits expire with the protocol.

The SALT II agreement also contains a joint statement of principles to guide subsequent negotiations. Article XIV of the treaty itself establishes a commitment to begin follow-on negotiations once the SALT II obligations enter into force. The joint statement of principles is not legally binding, but rather states a mutual intent. Either side can raise any issue related to the further limitation of strategic arms, including defensive systems, during the course of the SALT III negotiations. Both parties have committed themselves to more significant and substantial reduction in offensive systems and to further qualitative constraints, while also stressing the importance of verification, including cooperative measures to assist in verification. The joint statement of principles reflects our view that SALT II is not an end in itself; it is a second step in a long-term effort to control and reduce the strategic arsenals of both sides.

Another component of SALT II is a Soviet statement concerning the Soviet TU-22M (Backfire) bomber. The Soviet Union has agreed to specific obligations concerning the Backfire, including a commitment not to produce more than 30 aircraft per year. The United States considers these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the treaty.

Still another component of SALT II is an exchange of data, required by article XVII of the treaty. Each side has provided to the other the numbers of its strategic offensive forces in the categories limited by the agreement, and in Vienna last month the sides confirmed agreed figures by category as of November 1, 1978, in the form of a memorandum of understanding. This data base will be updated periodically in the Standing Consultative Commission, the forum established by SALT I to consider compliance questions, discuss ambiguous situations, and develop procedures for implementing the SALT agreements. The United States does not require Soviet data for verification purposes; we rely on our own independent capabilities in this regard. Nevertheless, the data provided by the Soviet Union will assist us in confirming that both parties are interpreting the provisions and obligations of the Treaty in a similar manner.

Finally, there are numerous agreed statements and common understandings associated with the specific terms of the SALT II Treaty. The purpose of these agreed statements and common understandings—of which there are 98—is to minimize the likelihood of misinterpretations or ambiguities once the treaty is in force. These agreed statements and common understandings record, and in some cases elaborate, the common interpretation of treaty provisions by both sides. We have made every effort to minimize the potential for differing interpretations of the treaty provisions. The detail of the SALT II Treaty attests to this effort.

Let me now turn to the provisions of the treaty and the protocol, which I shall describe briefly. Article I of the treaty states the general undertakings by the parties to limit strategic offensive arms.

One of the criticisms of the SALT I agreements was that they contained inadequate definitions or, in some cases, none at all. Article II of the SALT II Treaty contains a lengthy set of definitions covering all the strategic offensive arms limited by the treaty—ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ASBM's MIRVed systems, heavy and light ICBM's, and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's). Definitions of sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles appear in article II of the protocol. These detailed and precise definitions will help to preclude possible misunderstandings about what systems are to be covered by the agreement.

One of the more complex definitions, one that took several years to negotiate, is that for heavy bombers. An airplane will be considered to be a heavy bomber if it is: (1) a bomber of a current heavy bomber type, that is, of the B-52, B-1, Bison, or Bear heavy bomber type; (2) a bomber of a future type which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of the above current heavy bombers; (3) a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; or (4) a bomber of a type equipped for ASBM's. The rule associated with this definition provides that functionally related observable differences (FROD's) will be required to distinguish between heavy bombers and airplanes with the same basic airframe which do not have heavy bomber capability. For example, FROD's, would be required to distinguish between long-

range cruise missile carriers constructed with wide-body airframes and commercial, nonmilitary airplanes with the same basic airframe. Only externally observable differences, not FROD's, would be required for current types of heavy bombers. This will facilitate United States use of some of our B-52's as long-range cruise missile carriers without requiring that all B-52's be included within the 1,320 subceiling.

Associated with the definitions are type rules and counting rules which make practicable the verification of provisions which otherwise would be extremely difficult to verify. Some examples are the ICBM launcher type rule, the type rules for MIRVed missiles and MIRVed launchers, the type rule regarding functionally related observable differences for heavy bombers, and the armament and range type rules for cruise missiles.

A specific example is the set of type rules for MIRVed missiles and for launchers of MIRVed missiles, which solve the verification problem of how to count Soviet MIRVed systems that look alike, but may be different. For example, the Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBM systems have all been flight-tested both with MIRV's and with single RV's. The MIRVed missile type rule provides that if a missile has been flight-tested with MIRV's, all missiles of that type will be considered to be MIRVed, regardless of their actual payload. Thus, all SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBM's will be considered to be MIRVed. The MIRVed launcher type rule provides that if a launcher is a launcher of MIRVed ICBM's or SLBM's, all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of MIRVed ICBM's or SLBM's. Thus, all SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 launchers will be considered to be launchers of MIRVed ICBM's, regardless of the missiles they actually contain.

One of the achievements of President Ford at Vladivostok was to obtain Soviet agreement to an equal overall aggregate ceiling for the two sides, specifically, a 2,400 ceiling. This initial ceiling of 2,400 is codified in article III of the treaty. Also contained in that article is a provision for a subsequent reduced common ceiling of 2,250, to take effect in 1981, negotiated under the present administration.

Article IV of the treaty places restrictions on ICBM launcher construction and places qualitative limitations on ICBM's and SLBM's. The freeze on the numbers of fixed ICBM launchers and of fixed heavy ICBM launchers is carried over from the Interim Agreement. However, new in SALT II are the bans on ICBM rapid reload capability, on excess missiles at ICBM launcher deployment areas, and on excess missile storage facilities at ICBM launch sites. This article also puts a cap on the launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBM's, based on the launch-weight and throw-weight of the Soviet SS-18 ICBM.

SALT II places limitations on new types of ICBM's for the first time. Under article IV, each side is limited to one new type of ICBM during the period of the treaty. The one permitted new type must be a light ICBM, and can be either MIRVed or non-MIRVed. This article provides limitations on the parameters of the one permitted new type of ICBM and on the degree of modernization permitted to existing types of ICBM's. This article also places important limitations on fractionation—the number of reentry vehicles (RV's) per missile. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on existing types of ICBM's will be frozen at current levels. The maximum number of RV's on the one permitted new type of ICBM is 10. SLBM's will be limited to a maximum of 14 RV's, and ASBM's to a maximum of 10 RV's. These limitations place important constraints on the destructive potential of the missile forces of the two sides. In addition, neither side can have an average of more than 28 long-range ALCM's on heavy bombers so equipped, while no heavy bomber of current types (B-52, B-1, Bear, or Bison) can have more than 20 long-range ALCM's

Article V contains the 1,320 subceiling agreed at Vladivostok as well as two other subceilings agreed subsequently. These limitations are: (1) the 1,320 subceiling on launchers of MIRVed ICBM's and MIRVed SLBM's, on MIRVed ASBM's, and on heavy bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles; (2) the 1,200 subceiling on launchers of MIRVed ICBM's and MIRVed SLBM's and on MIRVed ASBM's; and (3) the 820 subceiling on launchers of MIRVed ICBM's. These limitations, especially the 820 subceiling, will place significant constraints on the deployment of the new Soviet MIRVed systems.

Rules for inclusion of weapons systems in the aggregates are provided in article VI. Article VII exempts ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers and space vehicle launchers from the aggregates, but does subject then to separate limitations. Article VIII contains additional limitations on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

Prohibitions on certain weapon systems are provided in article IX. This article bans long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, ballistic and cruise missiles and their launchers on the ocean floor and the beds of inland waters, and systems for orbiting nuclear weapons, including fractional orbital missiles. In addition, there

are bans on mobile launchers of heavy ICBM's, on heavy SLBM's and their launchers, and on heavy ASBM's. These limits provide a significant constraint on the size of strategic ballistic missiles.

Article X provides explicitly for the modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms, subject to the other provisions of the treaty. The dismantling or destruction of excess and prohibited weapon systems under agreed procedures is provided for in article XI. Article XII contains an undertaking by the Parties that they will not circumvent the provisions of the treaty, through a third state or states, or in any other manner. This provision simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. The provision does not impose any additional obligation, nor does it broaden the interpretation of the other obligations in the treaty. It will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our Allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization. In article XIII the Parties agree not to assume during the term of the treaty any international obligations which would conflict with the treaty.

In article XIV the sides obligate themselves to begin, promptly after entry into force of the treaty, follow-on negotiations for further limitations and reductions in strategic arms. This obligation shows the intent of the sides to pursue the SALT III negotiations.

One of the most important aspects of the SALT II negotiations has been the subject of verification. Article XV contains explicit provisions to aid and facilitate verification. The prohibitions on interference with national technical means of verification and on deliberate concealment measures which impede verification have been carried over from SALT I. However, there are additional provisions which explicitly apply the deliberate concealment ban to measures associated with testing, including measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBM's and their launchers. In addition, there is a prohibition on deliberate denial of telemetric information, including telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification. In the absence of a SALT II Treaty and these provisions, the Soviets could take numerous measures to conceal their strategic arms programs from our intelligence. Such measures would reduce significantly the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence collectors and the confidence with which we monitor the strategic balance.

In article XVI, the sides agree to notify each other in advance of each ICBM launch which is planned either to extend beyond the national territory of the launching party or to be a multiple lanuch (more than one ICBM in flight at the same time). This provision is a confidence building measure.

Article XVII establishes the role of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for the SALT II agreement. The mandate of the SCC has been expanded beyond SALT I to include new responsibilities. The SCC will agree upon procedures to implement the provisions of the new agreement. The SCC can also consider questions related to compliance and ambiguous situations. The SCC has established a strong record under SALT I, and can be expected to serve similarly under SALT II.

In addition, under article XVII, the SCC will maintain and update at least twice annually the agreed data base established in the Memorandum of Understanding, in which the sides agree by category on the numbers of systems for each side limited by the treaty. This is a significant accomplishment considering the traditional Soviet desire for secrecy in such sensitive military matters. The data base provides a specific mechanism for facilitating verification of the SALT II aggregates and subceilings, and will serve as an important confidence building measure.

Article XVIII provides for amendments to the treaty, while article XIX provides for ratification, entry into force, and withdrawal under the usual "supreme interests" clause.

The Protocol contans short-term limitations on certain systems, and will expire at the end of 1981. Article I of the Protocol prohibits the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and the flight-testing of ICBM's from such launchers.

Article II of the Protocol prohibits deployment of SLCM's and GLCM's with ranges over 600 km. The United States has made it clear that the associated definitions of SLCM's and GLCM's do not establish a precedent for limitations, if any, that might be placed on these systems after the Protocol has expired.

Article III of the Protocol prohibits the flight-testing and deployment of ASBM's. Article IV of the Protocol states that the Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the treaty, and provides for entry into force of the Protocol.

Given the importance of SALT to national security, the process by which the U.S. positions were developed was, and had to be, a careful and exhaustive one. Both in Washington and in Geneva, it has been in every respect an interagency process

which assured the full participation of all concerned agencies of the United States Government.

In Washington, the President received advice on negotiating positions and tactics from the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC). The SCC is a subcommittee of the National Security Council chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and includes the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The final decisions on our negotiating positions are made by the President, based on the recommendations of the SCC.

Next, these decisions were translated into specific instructions to the U.S. SALT delegation in Geneva. The delegation also consisted of representatives from all concerned agencies. The United States SALT delegation included a Chairman, members from the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a public, at-large member. In addition, the United States SALT delegation relied on intelligence and legal advisors, a staff of advisors and experts from all agencies, and a small but able supporting staff of interpreters, secretaries, administrators, and security personnel. We benefited from occasional visits from nearly 30 Senators, including Members of this Committee. Senatorial advice contributed to the success of the negotiating process, particularly in connection with the issues of data base and verification.

The United States SALT delegation operated at all times under instructions from Washington. Meetings between the United States and Soviet delegations were held at several levels. At Plenary meetings, usually held once a week, the two Chairmen read prepared, formal statements, after which the Chairmen held a private meeting while the rest of the two delegations split up into small bilateral groups for less formal discussions. The two Chairmen also held separate private meetings outside the Plenary format as the need arose.

Additional groups within the delegations were formed to carry out specific responsibilities. A drafting group, chaired on the U.S. side by the senior State Department official and including representatives from ACDA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the JCS, usually met twice a week and was responsible for preparing the draft text of the agreement. A Conforming Subgroup, chaired on the U.S. side by the legal advisor to the delegation, operated under the aegis of the Drafting Group. It had the responsibility to ensure that the draft texts of the agreement were up to date and conformed in both languages. All substantive matters addressed by the U.S. side at these meetings were reviewed ahead of time within the U.S. delegation.

Our Allies were kept abreast of the negotiating situation, and were consulted closely on issues of common interest. The SALT delegation periodically consulted with our NATO allies at meetings of the North Atlantic Council called for this purpose.

We in Geneva received instructions from Washington on all significant negotiating issues. On day-to-day matters, we received guidance from the SALT Backstopping Committee in Washington, a subordinate body of the Special Coordinating Committee. As in all other SALT support activities, the Backstopping Committee consisted of participants from all concerned agencies—the NSC staff, State, OSD, ACDA, JCS, and CIA. The delegation in Geneva normally decided questions of negotiating tactics. The delegation also made recommendations to Washington on substantive matters, based on our first-hand assessments in the field. Naturally, our recommendations on important matters of substance had to be approved in Washington before being carried out.

As can be seen, the SALT negotiating process has placed a premium on coordinated, interagency positions—both in Washington and in Geneva. And at all times the SALT delegation in Geneva operated within the guidelines set under the authority of the President of the United States.

Finally, I would like to go through a few examples to illustrate how differences between the United States and Soviet positions were resolved. The negotiations were carried out essentially on two levels—by the delegation in Geneva and by the Secretary of State directly with the Soviet leadership.

The first example concerns article III, which provides a good case study of how the negotiations worked in actual practice. Article III set forth the equal aggregate ceilings permitted each side. From the outset of the SALT II negotiations, one of the main goals of the United States was to provide for equal aggregate ceilings, consistent with congressional guidlines. It was also believed that the establishment of equal aggregates would make it easier to pursue reductions in subsequent negotiations. Thus, every U.S. negotiating instruction and proposal concerning levels of

intercontinental strategic forces incorporated this principle. Our first specific proposal, tabled in May 1973, suggested an aggregate ceiling of 2,350 for either side.

During the initial phases of the SALT II negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted on preserving unequal ceilings. In October 1973, the Soviets proposed the retention of the unequal ICBM and SLBM launcher limits of the Interim Agreement, supplemented with a new limit on heavy bombers.

There was little movement on this issue until the Vladivostok summit meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev in November 1974, when the Soviet Union finally agreed in principle to an equal aggregate limit of 2,400 for each side.

In 1977, the United States proposed that the 2,400-ceiling be reduced. In March 1977, Secretary Vance proposed deep reductions, from 2,400 down to 1,800 to 2,000. The Soviet Union rejected this proposal as being too radical a departure from the Vladivostok accord. In July 1977, the United States proposed a 10-percent reduction to a new aggregate of 2,160 launchers for each side; at the same time the United States proposed a sublimit of 1,200 on launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's equipped with MIRV's. The Soviet Union countered with an overall ceiling of 2,250 and a MIRV sublimit of 1,250. In April 1978, this issue was resolved on the basis of U.S. agreement to 2,250 for the reduced aggregate, while the Soviet Union agreed to accept the U.S. proposal for a 1,200 subceiling on MIRVed launchers. The United States was successful in achieving reductions below the Vladivostok levels.

The exchange of data on each country's strategic programs, as required by SALT II, provides another case history of how the two delegations resolved outstanding issues. The United States proposed an exchange of information on each category of strategic offensive arms limited by the SALT II accords in July 1975. The data base idea was put forward to reduce the possibility of misunderstndings, and to insure that both sides apply the provisions of the treaty in the same way. The U.S. proposal provided for an initial exchange of information, to occur after entry into force of the agreement, and updated information twice annually thereafter.

The Soviets rejected the United States proposal for several years, arguing that the agreed principle of verification by national technical means made a data base redundant. The Soviet delegation wanted only voluntary exchanges of information. In September 1975, the Soviets tabled a proposal to this effect.

The sides continued to discuss the issue of data base throughout 1976 with little movement toward agreement. In March 1976, the U.S. revised its proposal to call for an agreement on data at the time of signature of the agreement, as opposed to an exchange of information at the time of entry into force. The Soviet Union continued to oppose this concept as a new departure from the Vladivostok accord, and as contrary to the principles of verification by national technical means.

The United States continued to press for an agreed data base after the resumption of negotiations in May 1977. Interventions by several senatorial advisers in support of this U.S. position were of value during this period. By the end of 1977, the Soviets accepted the United States proposal to provide data on the number of strategic offensive arms possessed by each side in the categories limited by the agreement. The sides then began to discuss the categories to be included in the data base.

Both sides subsequently provided data on the current numbers of their systems, but the Soviets continued to question the need for additional procedures to maintain an updated base. In mid-1978, the Soviets finally agreed to maintain and update the data base throughout the period that the SALT II Treaty would be in force.

A third example involves the rules we have worked out to facilitate MIRV verification. The U.S. Government decided early in SALT II to pursue qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including limitations on MIRVed ballistic missiles and their launchers. At that time, a number of meetings of the verification panel were dedicated to detailed studies of various counting rules and collateral constraints designed to insure adequate verification of MIRV limitations. It was decided that limits on the number of launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's equipped with MIRV's would be adequately verifiable provided they were accompanied by certain counting rules. The United States then entered into negotiations with the Soviets on MIRV launcher limits and associated verification rules.

When the delegations began to draft treaty language in 1975 to implement the MIRVed launcher limit, the United States pressed for type rules for MIRVed missiles and for launchers of MIRVed missiles to make adequate verification of this limit feasible. The Soviets resisted, but after several years they agreed to the type rules which will do this job. The verification problem was how to count Soviet MIRVed systems that look alike, but may be different. For example, the Soviet SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM systems have all been flight-tested both with MIRV's

and with single RV's. The MIRVed missile-type rule provides that if a missile has been flight-tested with MIRV's, all missiles of that type will be considered to be MIRVed, regardless of their actural payload. Thus, all SS–17, SS–18 and SS–19 ICBM's will be considered to be MIRVed. The MIRVed launcher-type rule provides that if a launcher is a launcher of MIRVed ICBM's or SLBM's all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of MIRVed ICBM's or SLBM's. Thus, all SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19 launchers will be considered to be launchers of MIRVed ICBM's, regardless of the missiles they actually contain. In this connection, the Soviets agreed that all 180 ICBM launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk be included in the MIRV launcher total, even though in fact some of them do not contain and never have contained MIRVed missiles.

Another case study of possible interest is the heavy ICBM launcher provision, which was resolved in direct negotiations with the Soviets at Vladivostok, and not by the delegations.

The SALT I interim agreement, signed in 1972 by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, froze the number of modern heavy ICBM's at 308 for the Soviet Union and none for the United states. At the Vladivostok summit meeting in 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed that the SALT I freeze on the number of launchers of modern heavy ICBM's would continue, as would the ban on new construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. Both sides further agreed at the same time that United States forward-based systems in Europe would be excluded from the SALT II limits, and that French and British nuclear forces would be excluded from the negotiations. In effect, the United States got something we wanted in exchange for giving up the option to build something we had no intention to deploy.

The modern heavy ICBM is an option in which the United States has no interest. Under the terms of SALT II, the United States can and is planning a light ICBM of equivalent effectiveness as Soviet heavy ICBM's. This is because light ICBM's—like the M–X now entering full-scale engineering developing—can destroy military targets as well as heavy missiles, given their expected accuracy and yield. It is true that heavy missiles can provide some offensive advantage though their greater payload which, absent other constraints, can be converted into a greater number of warheads. But the SALT II agreement limits each side to at most 10 warheads per ICBM, whether they be on a Soviet heavy missile or an M–X. At one time, the United States had a heavy ICBM program—Titan I and II—but for the reasons stated, we deliberately decided to scale down the size of our ICBM's in the early 1960's. No administration since that time has felt a military need to reverse this decision.

More recently, the United States had to decide whether to ban mobile heavy ICBM's or to permit each side such missiles within the aggregate ceilings. After a detailed review, the United States decided to propose to ban mobile heavy ICBM's, and the Soviets agreed to this provision. One rationale for this decision was that if heavy mobile ICBM's were permitted, the Soviets would likely deploy such a missile, but the United States would not, as our military had no interest in such a system. Therefore a ban seemed in our interest, despite the fact that allowing such systems would have given the United States the formal right to heavy ICBM's a right we have no intention of exercising. This decision was taken as part of our effort to constrain further the Soviet ICBM force. For this reason we also negotiated a ceiling of 820 on numbers of MIRVed ICBM's, a constraint which is additional to those agreed at Vladivostok.

These case histories reflect the process of negotiated settlement that took place throughout SALT II. Neither side presented the other with nonnegotiable demands. Both delegations showed enough flexibility to arrive at equitable agreements. The agreements arrived at were not exclusively what we wanted; nor were they exclusively what the Soviet Union wanted. SALT is not a contest, with designated winners and losers. SALT is a true bargaining process in which each side must gain in order for the agreement to endure.

A careful evaluation of the SALT agreements as a whole confirms this judgment. The agreements have been meticulously crafted to be balanced and in the interest of both parties. At the time, principal U.S. objectives in these negotiations have been served:

We have established equal levels of intercontinental strategic forces;

We have begun the process of reducing these forces;

We have imposed important and useful qualitative constraints on offensive systems;

We have produced a Treaty that is adequately verifiable.

SALT II serves our national security by imposing verifiable constraints on Soviet strategic systems, while leaving open our options to provide for the common defense, and to modernize our strategic forces. It has taken nearly 7 years to negotiate this treaty. In my judgment, the time and effort were well worth it.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

COMMITTEE GIVEN PROFUSION OF DOCUMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. This committee has been supplied with a plethora of documents. We have been supplied with the SALT II Treaty and the protocol for our ratification, and we have been supplied with four other documents; the first, a series of agreed statements and common understandings; the second, a memorandum of understanding that will establish an agreed data base by categories of strategic offensive arms along with associated statements of current data; the third, a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines that are to relate to SALT III; and the fourth, a Soviet statement relating to the Backfire bomber.

Now, since the agreed statements and common understandings are necessary to a mutual and adequate interpretation of the text of the treaty itself, and since the Secretary of State has testified that the Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber is as binding as any covenant undertaken by the Soviet Union within the context of the treaty itself, why have we been given such a profusion of documents, some to ratify and others submitted simply for our information?

Ambassador EARLE. If I may address that, I think the treaty and protocol speak for themselves. They have been submitted for ratification. The protocol by its own terms is an integral part of the treaty. With respect to the agreed statements and common understandings, this format, as I understand it, is common practice in international negotiations. They stand or fall with the treaty or protocol. In other words, they are legally binding on both sides. The Soviets have repeatedly acknowledged that if the treaty and protocol are not ratified, the agreed statements and common understandings have no standing in and of themselves.

The question is, why? There was precedent for it, for example, in SALT I and in fact most of the agreed statements and common understandings do not represent obligations, except as amplifications of obligations already embodied in the treaty or the protocol.

We attempted to draw some line between the agreed statements and the common understandings. The agreed statements leaned in the direction of obligations. The common understandings lean in the direction of interpretations. Frankly, over 6 years of negotiations, that line was sometimes violated in one direction or the other, but in any event, as Secretary Vance testified, there is no legal distinction between agreed statements and common understandings.

I think the Backfire issue has been covered at some length by Secretary Vance. I would simply repeat that the Soviets insisted from the outset that SALT, by definition, dealt with strategic arms limitations; that the Backfire was not a strategic weapon; and that

therefore it could not be included in the formal documentation of the SALT agreements.

The memorandum of understanding regarding data base is simply an implementation of something that the parties have agreed to do in the treaty under article XVII, which is to maintain an agreed data base. The memorandum of understanding was the first manifestation of that. It is not legally binding. It simply represents an expression of agreement on certain facts. The individual statements of data supplied by each party to the other, are the exchange of data upon signature of the treaty with a view to updating the data base in the Standing Consultative Commission at a later date.

That is a long answer to a short question, and I apologize.

The CHAIRMAN. This hodgepodge of documents creates some unnecessary questions. I mean, we will have enough questions relating to the substance of the treaty without the distractions created by the legal distinctions, the binding effect of obligations undertaken in the supplementary documents.

I think it would be better for us to eliminate that confusion at the outset. I see no reason, if the agreed statements and common understandings are understood by both countries to be binding, why they ought not to be considered as part of the treaty and incorporated by reference. I see no reason why the Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber ought not to be considered equally binding as any covenant in the treaty itself.

In other words, I see an opportunity for the committee to clear up and eliminate any ambiguities concerning the legal effect of these associated documents by a reservation which would incorporate them by reference.

What would your reaction be to a committee decision of that kind?

Ambassador EARLE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not a very good international lawyer, and I am not a parliamentarian at all, so I really am not qualified to address the issue of whether there is a difficulty here or whether there isn't a difficulty here. Perhaps I am too close to it. I know the status of the documents, and I am not bothered by the fact that they are different. I know the history of how they came to be different. Obviously I would be prepared to report your comment, but personally I am not in a position to respond to it.

LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN NEGOTIATORS

The CHAIRMAN. I can remember when I was growing up, this country was still pursuing a policy of isolationism. That policy was strongly approved in my family. One of the reasons underlying my father's support for isolationism was that he had no confidence in our negotiators. He said, if we ever get involved in a negotiation, the foreigners will always outnegotiate us.

Close examination of our diplomatic history will bear that out, but it is nevertheless a deeply inbred suspicion on the part of many of our people.

We have seen a manifestation of that suspicion in many of the questions that have been asked from this table during the last 2

days. I think it is a healthy skepticism. This committee certainly wants to be sure that there is no possible hidden advantage in this treaty for the Soviet Union. In fact, some of the critics have been saying that the treaty puts very few essential constraints on the Soviet Union while it puts a great many constraints upon the United States.

CRITICISM THAT TREATY IMPOSES GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON UNITED STATES

I would ask you as the negotiator, Mr. Ambassador, and then I would also like a comment from General Seignious, what is your response to this frequent criticism of the treaty, the assertion on the part of critics that it somehow imposes greater constraints upon the United States and that in the course of the negotiations we did not extract sufficient concessions from the Soviet Union?

Ambassador EARLE. Well, Mr. Chairman. almost by definition my response has to be somewhat immodest.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I am asking you to brag. [General laughter.]

Ambassador EARLE. I think we did a good job. One of the purposes of my prepared statement was to indicate that very little that we did in Geneva had not been cleared at the highest level with every agency here in the Government which had an interest, as well as with their representatives over there. To the extent that the tactics in the negotiations were left up to the negotiators, I will be immodest. I think we did a very good job, and I cannot, in review, find anything in the treaty or its associated documents that reaches the result of hidden or even overt advantage for the Soviet Union. Obviously, not everything we wanted is there.

MAJOR CONCESSIONS MADE BY SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. Can you list for the committee some of the major concessions that the Soviet Union made in the course of the negotiations?

Ambassador EARLE. I think I can, and I think the concessions have to be taken into a historical context. I mentioned Vladivostok in 1974, before which time for so many years the Soviet side had insisted on unequal aggregates because of the U.S. forward-based systems and because of French and British nuclear systems.

I called it a major breakthrough, and I believed it to be so, when the Soviets finally agreed to equal aggregates.

As Secretary Vance testified, the Soviets insisted that Vladivostok was "it" and nothing more could be done with respect to numbers. Later in SALT II they did agree to reductions, albeit modest ones, but 2,250 is 150 lower than 2,400.

As I mentioned, together with equal aggregates, the Soviets dropped their insistence on inclusion of U.S. forward-base systems and Allied systems. Although some do not consider Backfire a concession, assuming it to be a medium bomber, the Soviets nevertheless have agreed to constraints on it. We have not agreed to any constraints on any medium bomber in our inventory.

There is the MIRVed launcher agreement which I mentioned in my statement. In my view, it clearly represents something the

Soviets did not want to do; that is, counting against their MIRVed aggregates launchers which were not in fact MIRVed.

The limitation on fractionation of a maximum of 10 reentry vehicles for the new type of ICBM, and the freeze on reentry vehicle numbers for existing ICBM's were clearly major steps for the United States, given the larger throw-weight of the Soviet systems. As accuracy increases, if you cannot translate throw-weight into warheads, then a throw-weight advantage is of little benefit.

Regarding cruise missiles, initially after Vladivostok, the Soviets insisted that every long-range cruise missile on an aircraft would count as one in the overall aggregate. We now can have an average of 28 per airplane, and the airplane which carries them counts as one in the overall aggregate.

The data base, although not really a substantive concession on their part, in a way represented a major concession in their attitude. For the first time in Russian history, not just Soviet history but Russian history, a Russian Government has agreed to make such data on its military forces public. I think it gives us much greater confidence to have that data agreed as we enter into this agreement.

There are others that I could mention, Mr. Chairman, but those are some. One other that occurs to me, of course, is the Soviet willingness to ban production of a brandnew missile, the development of which they had just completed—the SS-16—because we were concerned about its compatibility with the SS-20 launcher.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much. General Seignious, would you like to comment?

General SEIGNIOUS. I would like to comment in a broader sense. If you measure what the United States achieved out of this treaty in terms of whether or not there was equity in it, and did it assist in gaining a national advantage that would result from stability, international stability, and did it help us in the verification of whatever forces or structures of security that were regulated by this treaty; and if the treaty helped in the verification process; and if it offered us a path to continue the arms control negotiations that are ongoing, such as the antisatellite negotiations, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, and the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations; and if it provides a gateway for continuance of arms control, then in large measure we were successful in negotiating a treaty that added to our national security, because of the specific terms that the Ambassador listed, quality and quantity of constraints that were very meaningful to our national security.

Also, there was the imposition of the ban on deliberate concealment. All of these things, in my judgment, coming out of this treaty add and enhance our national security.

I don't say that it is the millenium, and I don't maintain that, but I do maintain that it is a gateway for future hope, and it is an awful lot better to have a gateway than to have the gate locked.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEGOTIATE SOVIET WEAPONS THAT THREATEN U.S. ICBM'S

Ambassador Earle, with respect to the ABM Treaty, we balanced out with the Soviet Union, notwithstanding at that time their alleged ABM defense of Moscow. Did we seek to negotiate, in SALT II that the Russians would not develop or deploy weapons which threaten our ICBM's, and if not, why not?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Javits, first let me clarify one point. The Soviets still have some ABM systems deployed. Under the protocol of 1974, each side is entitled to one site. Now, with respect to whether we tried to negotiate Soviet weapons which threaten our ICBM's, we did. As Secretary Vance testified this morning and yesterday, in the comprehensive proposal of March 1977, we proposed that MIRVed ICBM's, which are the biggest threat to our own ICBM's, be limited to 550.

However, as Secretary Vance noted, even that would not have done the job. The difficulty, I think, is one of technology at this point, going somewhat in surges, but with the offensive technology surging ahead of the defensive technology. Given no effective ABM defense, the defensive technology is essentially limited to hardening, and the accuracy of both sides' systems was running faster than the hardening was. Actually, even 550, as Secretary Vance indicated, would not have prevented Minuteman from becoming vulnerable. With six warheads each, 350 SS-19's can attack each of our Minuteman silos with two reentry vehicles.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Ambassador, that is just setting up a straw man. You said 550, but it could have been 118. That was our figure. So if we were not asking for enough, that is our fault. We didn't figure out what was enough to keep our ICBM's safe.

It seems to me this would have been one of the toughest elements of this negotiation. That would have made this treaty meaningful. If they can get us with one thing, we can get them with another.

As it stands now, with the reliability of the SLBM's to retaliate effectively in some doubt, this becomes a major question with respect to approving SALT.

General SEIGNIOUS. I would like to comment on that, Senator, if I may. The question is whether or not a negotiated part of SALT II would change materially the vulnerability of our fixed ICBM field. I have been listening to this debate now for a day and a half. We have to meet that head on. I would like to make about three observations.

Senator JAVITS. Just don't take all my time doing it.

General SEIGNIOUS. I will use up mine, if I may.

Senator JAVITS. No, you can't. You are using mine.

General SEIGNIOUS. Well, I think it is an important question, and if I can't use but a third of yours, I will answer it in three increments. The first is that you have to judge the timing of what you want to achieve in a negotiation. If this negotiation had been completed 2 years ago, the accuracy level of the Soviet systems would have been sufficiently ambiguous that we probably would not now be in a position to have to deploy a mobile system. That is point one. I will stop there and cover the other two on another question.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Now, I think we have the measure of that. You feel you did the best you could. Correct?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes.

NO TEST FLIGHTS OF ASBM'S

Senator JAVITS. I am puzzled also by another matter. The protocol provides that you can flight test ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles if they are under 600 kilometers in range, but you may not flight test ASBM's [air-to-surface ballistic missiles] in that 3-year period. Is that correct?

Ambassador EARLE. No, sir; that is not correct.

Senator JAVITS. What is the situation?

Ambassador EARLE. First of all, with respect to ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, they may be flight tested to any range which we desire. The only prohibition is on their deployment. ASBM's are systems that do not exist, and neither side, I believe, currently anticipates having them. They are air-to-surface ballistic missiles.

Senator JAVITS. Well, now, those are not cruise missiles?

Ambassador EARLE. No, sir. The air-launched cruise missiles, or ALCM's, are covered in the treaty itself.

ALCM'S COVERED IN THE TREATY

Senator JAVITS. What is that situation?

Ambassador EARLE. As defined in paragraph 8 of article II, we are permitted to deploy them on aircraft—on bombers—with unlimited ranges, and it results in the bombers for which they are equipped being included in the 1,320 sublimit.

Senator JAVITS. So that whenever they are ready, they can be deployed?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Even during the 3 years?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. And also made available to our allies in Europe?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes, in the context that has been discussed earlier today.

BACKFIRE STATEMENT IN TREATY

Senator JAVITS. The last question I have, which I am also anxious to get resolved is about the Backfire. The Backfire issue appears really in the printed document which covers that situation. It is not signed by anybody. It is just a statement. It appears on page 34 of our printing of the President's message (see p. 43). It says that President Brezhnev handed President Carter a written statement, and we were not given that statement. This is just a paraphrase of it, I assume. Is that correct?

Ambassador EARLE. No, sir; the statement appears in this document (indicating). I do not know if you have this version. It is the document that was sent out signed by the Secretary of State, and the paper which President Brezhnev gave President Carter is quoted verbatim.

Senator JAVITS. OK. Now, the fact is that we have the right, according to this document, to an aircraft comparable to the Backfire. Is that correct? Now, what did we mean when we did that? What did we have in mind, if you weren't restraining or restricting intermediate aircraft, which is what you said? The Backfire is defined as intermediate. What did we have in mind in that reservation?

General SEIGNIOUS. My view is that the executive branch of the Government was being responsive to the guidance that it was given by the Senate at the conclusion of SALT I when equity was a requirement for our negotiations. If it could be interpreted by any Member of the Senate that Backfire was a system that was being measured, then we should retain the equal right to manufacture and deploy it.

Senator JAVITS. So if we have any suspicions about the nature of Backfire or the way it can be used, there is nothing in the treaty that prevents us from doing whatever we wish to about an aircraft which can counter any threat of the misuse of Backfire. For example, it is alleged that by refueling in the air it can reach the United States, and it is not a very big trick to establish that refueling capability.

Therefore, does this provision to which I have just referred enable us to meet that threat, if we consider it a threat, without violating the treaty any more than the Russians are violating it by establishing Backfire?

General SEIGNIOUS. That is correct. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. That is a very important point, because it is a big thing that is thrown at this particular treaty.

U.S. COULD BUILD AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE TO BACKFIRE

The CHAIRMAN. If I may, Senator, I want to clarify his answer. Does that mean we could build an aircraft comparable to Backfire if we chose without violating this treaty?

General SEIGNIOUS. It does. Furthermore, we could build the B–1 or any bomber we wanted to if we wanted to trade it for other limited systems, but the Backfire is not included in the terms of the treaty, and we are trying to say to the Soviets categorically and clearly. "You have said this is outside of the treaty; we then want to let you know that we have the right to build a comparable bomber, medium bomber as you call it, and we do not expect to hear anything from you about it."

Senator JAVITS. Right, and we establish that here and now, correct?

General SEIGNIOUS. Absolutely.

Ambassador EARLE. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. All right. Now, the B–1 would have to be counted in the ceiling.

General SEIGNIOUS. Correct.

Senator JAVITS. But not this one?

General SEIGNIOUS. Not this one.

Senator JAVITS. That is very important. Not this one.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits.

Senator Javits, you nailed it down on all four corners.
Senator Pell?
Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. GAIN IN EXCHANGE FOR ACCEPTING BACKFIRE

Ambassador Earle, in your statement you indicate that in exchange for the Soviet acceptance of our forward bases and the nuclear weapons of our NATO allies, we accepted a continuation of the level of heavy ICBM's, the weapons system, as you point out, that we intended not to take advantage of anyway. My question to you is, what did we get in exchange for accepting the Backfire?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Pell, if I may say, I think it is important to note "In Effect." As I understand it, the negotiations at Vladivostok did not include a straight trade, but all those things happened at Vladivostok. The Soviets appear to consider it to have been a trade. We just consider it a series of individual issues that were negotiated.

What did we get in exchange for Backfire? I think what we got was nothing in exchange for Backfire, once the Soviets had taken the position that it was a medium bomber. What we got was restrictions on the medium bomber. As was just discussed with Senator Javits, we have a right to build a comparable aircraft, but there is nothing in the documentation or in the negotations to the effect that we would be limited to a particular production rate or limited in the upgrading of that aircraft.

General SEIGNIOUS. I might add one thing to that. We have in our Strategic Air Command [SAC] some FB-111's that are not included in the treaty but are targeted against strategic targets. The Backfire, as I understand it, was not even brought up in Vladivostok by President Ford or Secretary Kissinger, and we remained silent to our substantial advantage, in my opinion, because we have, and I think you mentioned this this morning, Senator Pell, over 500 forward based systems in Europe, plus the substantial forces of the United Kingdom and France.

In addition to those, we have medium bombers, targeted on strategic targets, that are not included in the treaty.

Senator PELL. And we also have the carrier-based planes as well, which can strike the Soviet homeland, which we just tend to ignore.

DECISION TO DEPLOY MOBILE MISSILE

I believe, Ambassador Earle, you were engaged in the same activity some years ago. You were negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviets. Some of us on the Hill vigorously opposed the idea of MIRVing. This was about 8 or 10 years ago. We were told that we were incorrect, we had the advantage, we should go ahead with this. Well, we did, and I think those crows have come back to haunt us. Now we are going into a third generation along the same line, in that we are moving ahead on a mobile missile, and we are deploying it or keeping our freedom to deploy it. I wonder if there will be some witnesses 10 years from now who will ask if we were doing the correct thing in moving ahead with the mobile missile, but I am sure we could get agreement. I think we

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would agree we could get agreement on both sides for not going mobile.

Ambassador EARLE. If I may comment first, Senator Pell, it seems to me that they are quite different things. One can make a substantial argument that MIRVing was a destabilizing event. I think exactly the opposite is true of going mobile. The very purpose of making our land-based force mobile is to stabilize the strategic situation, to make that force less vulnerable and, therefore, reduce the possibility of crisis instability, and the temptation on the part of the other side to strike at our land-based force.

Senator PELL. Would you have a similar view, General Seignious?

General SEIGNIOUS. I do have a very similar view, and I would like to develop it in connection with another question later regarding how this impacts upon arms control.

Senator PELL. I agree with you that it certainly is a different kind of development, but I do not have in my recollection the arguments for MIRVing at that time. I do remember my arguments against it. I wonder if whoever it was at that time perhaps did not say it would be a stabilizing force because it would give us extra power. I am sure somewhat similar arguments were made at that time, though I cannot say so for sure.

Ambassador EARLE. Well, Senator Pell, at the time of the development and, I think, of the initial deployment—I am not sure of the dates—of our MIRVed missiles, there was no limitation on antiballistic missile systems, which by themselves were considerably destabilizing, and the MIRV's were developed, as I remember it, primarily to penetrate those systems.

General SEIGNIOUS. I might add at this point, if we are going to develop it, that if one side has the ability to substantially threaten a major element of the strategic systems of the other, that is destabilizing. If both sides have a survival capability, then you have a stable situation as long as you can verify the numbers that the other side has.

Senator PELL. This would be the argument in support of the submarine-based missiles, would it not?

General SEIGNIOUS. That is correct. That is one of the reasons that we have a survivable leg of submarine launched system.

Senator PELL. That is why I have always liked that old triplet:

Put the weapons out to sea
Where the real estate is free,
Far away from you and me.

VERIFICATION OF SALT

I think there is a great deal of sense in that triplet from the very point you are making.

General Seignious, you mention that SALT is adequately verifiable, and we all know about the problems caused by the loss of our stations in Iran. Bear in mind that it takes about 25 launchings, as I understand it, to develop a new weapons system. Would it be fair to say that it is inconceivable that even with a loss of those stations and without the U-2's over Turkey, that through national

means we would know if there were 25 separate launches of a new machine through our present methods of verification?

General SEIGNIOUS. Sir, let me answer that by saying that while we had those two stations in Iran, we had nearly 100 percent confidence.

Senator PELL. For one launch, we had nearly 100 percent confidence.

General SEIGNIOUS. Because we were looking right down the throat of the flight testing. This was a very important part of our historical accumulation of a matrix that is now extensive and comprehensive. So we know, when a flight test takes place, which of the holes in this matrix should be filled.

Now, we have lost that capability, and we have reduced therefore, for the time being, our confidence in monitoring certain launches, particularly if they are able to launch a new type. On existing weapons, if they flight test, we still have a substantial and high confidence that we can read it by use of this matrix. If they launch a new type and begin testing it, the 25 tests that you mentioned, our confidence as of now would be less. But as Secretary Brown once said, if I look at a friend, like Senator Baker, and I see a piece of his cheek removed, by virtue of not being able to see all of him, I still know who he is, but I am not 100 percent sure that the shadow on his face is not changing what I am seeing. But I know perfectly well who he is.

Senator BAKER. It is a shadow. [General laughter.]

General SEIGNIOUS. I am glad it is not a loss, Senator Baker.

Senator PELL. By the same token, for there to occur 25 separate launches of a new weapons system, it would be extremely unlikely, if not inconceivable, that that could occur without our national means of verification being aware of it.

General SEIGNIOUS. In the first place, it would take a substantial period of time, and technology is being improved with our monitoring systems, even with the current technology we would have confidence that we would detect those flight tests and be able to see from our experience what is different about them. If they are denying us information through encryption, we would identify it and immediately react to get something done through the SCC.

Senator PELL. In other words, we would certainly know that a new system was being developed with certitude, and if that were the case, we would not be able to know exactly in what way it was different, but we would know it was new, and then if we wanted to we could denounce the treaty presumably as being a violation.

General SEIGNIOUS. I think that is an accurate way to put it. We would know in due course the changes.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IF SALT IS DEFEATED

Senator PELL. Finally, I was struck with your thought that among the failures of SALT II would be a worldwide effect that would increase the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. I am wondering if you can tell us some of the effects with regard to nuclear proliferation of weapons that would occur if we reject SALT.

General SEIGNIOUS. By persuasion of three Presidents, within my personal cognizance, several countries have abstained or constrained themselves from going the nuclear route. They have always in international forums stated a trust and a belief that the United States was serious as a leader in the world in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Our leadership has been demonstrated in the Non-proliferation Treaty, our leadership in eight or nine treaties with the Soviet Union since World War II, and six arms control negotiations that are ongoing right now.

We are then the leaders in trying to get some handle on this. If we lose the voice of persuasion, which may be a cost of the failure to ratify SALT II then for countries like Pakistan that are right now threatening to go the nuclear weapons route, the voice of persuasion and the voice of trade-off by the President of the United States and, I would say, by the Congress of the United States, would be mitigated and lessened. We know that there are 15 nations at least, that if they deliberately choose to apply their resources, could probably have the technology to go the nuclear device and nuclear weapons route.

If one of them does and it is a small nation-state that does not have a sense of international responsibility, then the threat to our security and of the destabilization of the world would be substantial.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INCLUSION OF NONSTRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE IN PROTOCOL

General SEIGNIOUS. I would like to put one question to you that I intend to discuss. I have discussed the issue privately, and I intend to discuss it again in a public hearing with General Haig when he returns. Obviously the Soviets have an advantage in the European theater on the ground. We in NATO have relied heavily on tactical air power to compensate for the advantage our adversaries have on the ground. The conventionally armed or nonnuclear cruise missile, it would seem, could go a long way toward increasing NATO's capability to penetrate the dense Soviet theater air defenses.

Was the potential of the conventionally armed or nonnuclear cruise missile for NATO defense thoroughly studied before the decision was made to include limits in the protocol? Because in a sense we have tied our hands on what I would not consider to be a strategic weapon.

General SEIGNIOUS. Sir. I would like to defer the substance of a reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they come. But from my experience in the negotiating arena on this subject, it was recognized that neither the conventional ground-launched cruise missile, nor the nuclear ground-launched cruise missile could be deployed technologically or practically during the course of the protocol. In the course of negotiating a definition of a cruise missile, it was made absolutely crystal clear that there is a separation between the air-launched cruise missile, in the treaty, and the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles in the protocol. No

limits are provided on sea-launched or ground-launched cruise missiles of any kind after the protocol period.

The technical application of conventional long-range cruise missiles in Europe beyond 600 kilometers is a military question that is not entirely lacking in controversy. This is because using a conventional weapon beyond 600 kilometers takes acquisition and it takes all kinds of things that I think the Joint Chiefs should address, and I wouldn't want to intrude into their area.

CRUISE MISSILES STUDIES IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Senator PERCY. Do you know of any in-depth studies that exist on this whole issue in the Department of Defense?

General SEIGNIOUS. I do not personally, Senator Percy

Senator PERCY. Would it be possible for your agency to determine if there are such studies, and if they can be made available to me and other members of the committee who would like to see what range of options was presented before the decision was made to include conventional cruise missiles in SALT II? We would also like to know what consideration was given to them.

General SEIGNIOUS. I would be glad to request Secretary Brown to give me the answer to that.

[The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.]

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND INTENTIONS

I would like to inquire into what you believe are the motivations and intentions of the Soviet Union. We covered this subject this morning, but both of you have had such extensive dealings with the Soviets that I would like to get your responses. I think we have to give some consideration in our defense strategy to what Soviet intentions may be. They are our potential adversary. We can, of course never know for sure what their intentions are but we do need to analyze what they are trying to accomplish and do.

Do you, for instance, believe that the extensive Soviet military build-up during this entire period that we have been discussing signals a Soviet intention to prepare, wage, and win a nuclear war, as many people have advocated? What advantage do you perceive the Soviets have gained by increasing their military strength? Has their world influence increased in a comparable fashion?

I would like you both to respond.

General SEIGNIOUS. I would be very pleased to answer that. I think we have to go back a couple of years to the time when Khrushchev made a basic decision along with, I take it, the Politburo, that no longer would they accept the political leverage that the United States acquired at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

Senator PERCY. Was that a post-Cuban missile crisis decision?

General SEIGNIOUS. In my judgment, it was a decision to develop a strategic nuclear capability that was equivalent to the United States, or at least sufficiently equivalent so as not to grant political leverage to the United States. I think that was a deliberate decision.

Since that time, the Soviets have used enormous amounts of their own resources to develop this capability. At first, we were in a monopoly situation. Then we had much better delivery systems. Through the years, by virtue of our not continuing our strategic systems, they have reached a position of essential equivalence or parity.

Now, I do not believe that any scenario, either by the Soviets or by us or by a think tank or by anyone, that says there is a convincing win scenario in a nuclear exchange, I think it just doesn't carry much weight. I don't think, therefore, that you can say that the intent of the Soviet Union is to deliberately embark on a win policy. I think that we have to judge what they do and what they have by way of capability. If they have the capability to threaten the security of this Nation, then we must do what we have to do to deter that threat. That is not to say that we can deliberately accept some doctrine or some scenario—that I think is sophistry—that suggests that they are motivated by a belief that the exchange of 12,000 nuclear warheads or 8,000 nuclear warheads on the territory of the Soviet Union is a win policy. I cannot believe any rational person could think that way.

Senator PERCY. Well, I happen to concur with you. Ambassador Earle?

Ambassador EARLE. That makes three of us, Senator.

I would just comment that a lot of this is a matter of perception, and each of us sees this through our own colored glasses. There are five nuclear powers in the world and four of them have their weapons aimed at the Soviet Union. I think they seek strategic equivalence and strategic balance.

With respect to theater forces, I have a somewhat different view of their motivations.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

ROLE OF SOVIET ECONOMY IN FUTURE MILITARY SPENDING DECISIONS

I am sure that you both have asked yourselves the question of what motivates the Soviet Union to be for SALT II. Why do they perceive it to be in their national interest?

There are some schools of thought which say that the Soviet Union favors controls because they are facing very serious domestic economic restraints. Recent history, however, has shown a Soviet willingness to sacrifice a significant portion of their GNP for military purposes.

How seriously do you believe economic considerations are a restraining factor in their military spending now or will be in the future?

General SEIGNIOUS. Senator Percy, I think the first priority of the Soviet Union was to gain strategic equivalence, irrespective of the imposition on their people, on consumer goods, or otherwise. They felt substantially inferior to the United States—and they were.

I think now that one of the motivations of the Soviet Union is that they realize that strategic advantage is not in the cards. I do not know what they would do that would not evoke a response from the people of this country, the Congress of this country, or the

President of this country, to maintain strategic equivalence. If they add, and add, and add, without constraint of negotiations, then we will be forced, for the perception of power and for the reality of power, to match it.

They believe that they have reached strategic equivalence and cannot reach strategic superiority, so why dissipate more of their resources and why not arrest the technological genius of the United States? If they put us into a corner, and as someone said this morning, if that bear comes out and threatens us to the point where we are challenged, then he will have something on his hands which he cannot handle. I think he respects our technology and our production genius, and I do not think he wants to tangle with that.

PROJECTIONS FOR NUMBER OF WARHEADS BY 1985

Senator PERCY. I have one last question relative to something you said in your statement. You state that there will be no race for advantage in numbers of launchers and they are limited in the treaty. You later say that the race will now continue in another form—the number of warheads. As Senator Baker pointed out very clearly yesterday, in megatonnage they are way ahead of us. Today, in numbers of warheads, we have a 9-to-5 lead.

What are the projections for numbers of warheads, however, by each side in 1985? Do we have a projection for them and for us?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes, sir. It is a projection based on the implementation of the terms of the treaty. It is in the range of 12,000 strategic nuclear warheads by 1985 for the United States, and something over 10,000 for the Soviet Union by 1985. I might add here that if it were not for SALT II, 6,000 additional warheads could be added to their inventory by the unconstrained application of technology to their SS-18.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator McGovern.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BUILDING PUBLIC CONCENSUS FOR ARMS CONTROL

General Seignious and Ambassador Earle, I want to compliment both of you on your statements, because I think you have made a very compelling case for arms control. But here is my dilemma.

General, in your statement you say that SALT will put the arms competition at lower, less expensive, and dangerous levels.

I think this may be true, but the arms race will remain, nonetheless, at very high, very expensive, and very dangerous levels. I believe you would agree with that.

My concern is we will end up with both the SALT Treaty and a very high level, a very dangerous level of military investment, that is a threat on both sides.

Isn't there a danger that this will end up disillusioning people about arms control and, in effect, discrediting the SALT process? If we really want to take initiative to lower the threat of nuclear destruction, we have to develop the political public consensus to do

it. If SALT is perceived as a failure because it does not halt this continued buildup of armaments on both sides, it does not save substantial funds, and it does not make Soviet intentions any more clear, then a good many people are going to say that the whole thing is a charade.

In other words, how do you build a domestic political consensus in favor of arms control if the strongest selling point for this treaty is simply that it is better than no treaty at all and is the lesser of two evils?

General SEIGNIOUS. This is a serious issue, and I am sure it will be so for the American people, because the composite of arms control is much stronger than any one part of it. By this I mean the following.

The Soviet Union, for example, now has a technological lead on us in antisatellite technology. We are negotiating, or attempting to negotiate, right now, an arrest and a constraint on antisatellite technology.

The Soviets have an advantage in conventional forces in the central region of Europe. At considerable expense we could match this, but it would be an expensive proposition. If we can get them to come down to a common ceiling in central Europe, it would be valuable for détente and stabilization in that area. This view is supported by all of our NATO allies.

We are negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to try to cease the testing on nuclear weapons in order to encourage nations that may go nuclear not to go nuclear, and to join the Non-proliferation Treaty.

These aspects of arms control are really predicated on the success of SALT and the SALT process. Whether we Americans do or do not like it, the Soviets view it as a centerpiece of the relationship. Therefore, the composite of all of these things must be looked at. Even though we did not get the reductions that we sought, we did get a few of the constraints, quantitative and qualitative, and verification constraints, that could give us hope that if we are patient and vigorous in our pursuit of reductions we can get them.

You ask how will we get them. I heard you ask that question this morning.

If you can replace 1,000 fixed ICBM's with 200 mobile survivable ones with equal or greater effectiveness militarily, you can reduce mathematically, by my count, 800 launching systems. The Soviet Union will be threatened—as you mentioned, their ICBM's in due course will be threatened by our better, more accurate, and larger missiles. At this time, if they go mobile and they have a survivable number, a fewer number, of weapons that we negotiate down to, then we have a stable situation—as long as you can verify it.

SURVIVABILITY OF LAND-BASED SYSTEMS

Senator MCGOVERN. General, what seems to be emerging in these hearings, indeed, even before these hearings, is a fear, at least on the part of a good many American officials, about the survivability of our land-based system, to which you have referred. Apparently the military doctrine is that land-based missiles are

more vulnerable than the ones located on submarines or carried in bombers.

Is it not true that we only have about a fourth of our strategic nuclear capability on land in land-based missiles, whereas the Soviet Union has about three-fourths of hers on land?

General SEIGNIOUS. The ratio is correct, sir.

Senator MCGOVERN. If those figures are right, are we not then in a much stronger position in terms of survivability than they are?

General SEIGNIOUS. There is a differential that will exist for a period of a few years, in which their capability to kill our fixed missiles will be greater than our capability to kill their fixed missiles. But this is a small segment of the Triad—as you mentioned, on our part it is 30 percent and on their part it is upward of 75 percent. The kill capability is different, and you could not stop where you are now. If you stopped where you are now and said there would be no more consideration for survivable systems, then you would perpetuate an advantage that the Soviet Union is developing.

Unfortunately, we cannot unilaterally structure our forces without paying attention to what the other side is doing.

SOVIET DECISION TO DESTROY U.S. LAND-BASED MISSILES

Senator MCGOVERN. I guess what I cannot get through my head General, is why any Soviet leader, unless he is just completely mad would attempt to knock out our land-based missile system, even if the Soviets had the capability of destroying them all, knowing that 75 percent of our strategic nuclear capability is not on the land in any event. They still have to confront that.

On what basis could any Soviet leader make that kind of judgment, even if one were to concede that our land-based system is vulnerable?

General SEIGNIOUS. He could not. No Soviet leader could make a deliberate decision to attack this country now or in the foreseeable future and hope to survive. It would not be a rational decision. But the rationality of maintaining a stable base in the strategic components of force makes it necessary that we continue to modernize.

If we stopped still and they continued to exercise the technology that is available to them, they would soon be in a position of either perceived advantage or in a position to try political blackmail in a crisis situation, which could put us at risk with a miscalculated decision.

USE OF POLITICAL BLACKMAIL

Senator MCGOVERN. General, I don't understand how we could be blackmailed if we are sitting here right now with 10,000 warheads and 75 percent of them on submarines and bombers. Who is going to blackmail us under those circumstances and get away with it?

General SEIGNIOUS. Senator, I would say that the perception of power that is related to our strength, along with that of our allies, must be at such a level of confidence that no sane leader of an opposing country would challenge us.

If, as you infer, it did not make any difference what our force was, just so we had 200 or 300 missiles, and they may have grown

to the point where they had 10,000, I think, unfortunately, the perception of power is different.

Senator McGovern. But we have 10,000 now and we are not talking about 200 or 300. We have 10,000, 7,500 of which are on submarines and in bombers.

I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman, so I will have to pursue this matter later on.

Thank you, General.

General Seignious. Thank you, Senator McGovern.

The Chairman. Senator Baker.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

RELATIVE ACCURACY OF SLBM'S

Gentlemen, I think the point raised by Senator McGovern is a good point and I would like to pursue it just for a moment.

While a great number of our missiles are on submarines, could either of you give me an estimate of their relative accuracy as compared, say, to land-based strategic systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and their relative payload—that is, their explosive power, and their relative usefulness in destroying the Russian military might, as distinguished from destroying cities?

General Seignious. Yes, sir. I would be glad to address that.

The first advantage of the submarine launched ballistic missile system in the Triad is survivability. The second is that as we proceed with the technology that is being developed, including now the backfitting of the Trident I missile into the Poseidon and the development of the Trident submarine itself, we are increasing the payload and the accuracy of that part of the Triad. In a percentage basis, it is less accurate than the best we have in our ICBM field; but, by the end of the 1980's, if we continue on the programs that we are capable of continuing, they will be, within a small degree, equally as accurate as the ICBM's.

Senator Baker. General, just for the sake of conservation of my time, is it true that while the submarine-based missiles are more survivable because they are under the sea and not visible or subject to immediate retaliation by the Soviet Union, they are also less accurate—at least in today's technology.

General Seignious. That is correct.

Senator Baker. And they carry a much smaller payload.

General Seignious. Than what?

Senator Baker. Than the land-based ICBM's.

General Seignious. Than some ICBM's.

Senator Baker. Than Minuteman, the Minuteman force.

General Seignious. Well, there is a difference between the payload of the Minuteman II and the Minuteman III.

Senator Baker. Well, I do not really want to bog down in detail. As a general matter, isn't the land-based missile more——

General Seignious. That is correct, Senator Baker, for that component of the Triad.

Senator Baker. Their ability to destroy a Russian missile silo, say, is less sure than the ability of a land-based system, isn't it?

General Seignious. That is correct—now. As of now.

Senator BAKER. By the end of the 1980's, you think that the disparity between their capability will be diminished or alleviated?

General SEIGNIOUS. Substantially narrowed.

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator BAKER. Gentlemen, let me ask both of you a question to set the perspective for the balance of the questions I would like to ask.

I am not anxious to create a hostility toward the Soviet Union. I hope there will be and I will work for an improvement in the relationship between our countries. But let us examine, just for a brief moment, what the Russians are up to, where they have been, and where they are headed. Let us take as our point of departure the time just before SALT I. Let's compare the military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union at just before the time of the approval of SALT I, and let's carry it forward through the interim accords at Vladivostok until today, that is, until the consideration of SALT II.

What was the relative military strength, in both strategic terms and conventional terms, between the United States and the Soviet Union, say, in 1972, at the time of SALT I?

General SEIGNIOUS. In 1972, I was director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had intimate knowledge of the relationship in strategic power and conventional forces. In 1972, we had a substantial advantage in technology as it related to accuracy and reliability in central systems. By 1972, we did not have any substantial advantage in the number of launchers. In fact, there was an asymmetry in the number of launchers, particularly in ICBM's, stemming from the negotiating period of SALT I, and stemming from decisions taken by the U.S. Government, not imposed by negotiations, that we would not go forward with an expansion of our land-based ICBM system.

The relationship between conventional forces was such that we had the advantage, again in technology, particularly in aircraft, in Europe. I think at the time we had better tanks, we had better deployability, and we had better airlift. But in numbers of forces, the Soviet Union was superior to us substantially, particularly if you did not include the strength of our alliance arrangements.

Senator BAKER. Everything considered, were we stronger in relation to the Soviet Union in 1972 than we are today, or were we weaker?

General SEIGNIOUS. I think we had a deterrent capability in strategic nuclear forces that was somewhat stronger than we are today. The trend is undeniable, I think. The trend in strategic nuclear forces has been against the United States. I hasten to add that it is due to deliberate U.S. decisions taken under two Republican Presidents and one Democratic President, that we have not moved forward as fast as people think we might have.

Senator BAKER. General, I am not trying to assess blame, though maybe I will do that at another time. Right now I am trying to see where the trend lines are. I am trying to see whether we are going up or down. Are we stronger now than we were then or are the Russians stronger now than they were then?

General SEIGNIOUS. We are stronger now than we were then, but the Russians are stronger than they were then.

Senator BAKER. What is the ratio? Are the Russians stronger now in relation to U.S. strength than they were then?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes.

Senator BAKER. Has the Russian Government involved itself in a significant and major buildup of military forces since 1972?

General SEIGNIOUS. In conventional forces, I would say no, they have continued a modernization program in the Warsaw Pact area which, taken in the aggregate over 15 years, has been substantial. They have continued the exploitation of technology in the strategic nuclear area in order to catch up with us, in order to reach this level of parity that I think has been their goal.

Senator BAKER. Has the Russian Government increased its percentage of commitment of its gross national product to military purposes since 1972?

General SEIGNIOUS. I would defer that to someone who knows the answer. I understand that there has been a substantial commitment, as Secretary Brown testified. I heard him. But I do not know the figures.

Senator BAKER. Well, gentlemen, I suppose it really is not terribly important. But I am trying to establish a basis for a comparison between the United States and the Soviet Union now and then. Is it true that the Soviet Union has been involved in a major and significant improvement, upgrading, and extension of their military capability at a time when the United States has not—since 1972?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes, and we had better do something about it.

Senator BAKER. I agree with you.

Subsequent to Vladivostok, was there also a continuing increase in Russian military might without a commensurate increase in American military might?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes; that is a true statement.

Senator BAKER. So, since the execution of SALT I, through Vladivostok, until today, there has been a steady increase in the relative strength of the Soviet Union and at least not a similar increase in U.S. military strength.

General SEIGNIOUS. Senator Baker, that is a statement that is incomplete because it does not mention the individual decisionmaking of a great nation like our own, and we have not made the right decisions.

Senator BAKER. Well, General, I am not trying to decide why we are that way. I am trying to establish the basic facts.

General SEIGNIOUS. Well, I have told you that.

Senator BAKER. All right.

Are you angry with me about that, for asking? [General laughter.]

General SEIGNIOUS. No, sir. I still call you my friend and I do not see any evidence of that hole in your cheek or the shadow. [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I think the record should show that Senator Baker does not have a hole in his head. [General laughter.]

Senator BAKER. I think the record should show that the Chairman showed more than his usual observance. [General laughter.]

Senator MCGOVERN. Is the Senator from Tennessee trying to prove that we elected the wrong man in 1972? [General laughter.]

Senator BAKER. Is the Senator from South Dakota suggesting a third choice? [General laughter.]

The yellow light has come on and I have not yet gotten past my basic question.

The point I am trying to reach for is this. We have gone through SALT I, we have gone through Vladivostok, and, rather than limiting the arms race, what we have is a head-long plunge for the Soviet Union to upgrade and improve and expand its military capability, and the difference between the U.S. military strength and theirs has steadily deteriorated from our point of view.

SITUATION AFTER SALT II

The question in my mind is what is going to happen after SALT II. What will the situation be for the next few years, say, in 1985, at the expiration time of this treaty?

General SEIGNIOUS. If we as a nation develop a policy of survival of our systems, rather than increase the number of those systems, and if the Soviet Union can be negotiated into accepting a like policy, both sides can reduce nuclear systems and do so without increased costs, and do so at less risk. But this has to be negotiated, and the chances of doing it are about 100 times better with SALT II than without it.

Senator BAKER. General, my time is up, and I will return to this subject, if we have an opportunity, for the next round.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Biden is next. But first, the thing I do not quite understand in this whole sequence is this.

General, whatever the trend has been, it has not been caused by SALT I, nor will it be affected by SALT II since SALT II permits us to build the weapons that we think are necessary for our own defense.

Is that not correct?

General SEIGNIOUS. Mr. Chairman, that is why I kept referring to national prerogatives and national decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not blame SALT I or SALT II for this trend?

General SEIGNIOUS. We cannot blame them, sir. We have the options and we have to exercise the will and the courage of the country to do what we have to do. We cannot artificially blame it on a treaty that does not constrain it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder whether or not the national will to which the General refers as having been absent might have been present had we not budgeted somewhere in excess of $150 billion to Southeast Asia. I wonder if we compared all of what we spent on Southeast Asia and on our total military during that period with what the Soviets spent, I wonder how big the discrepancy would be?

Senator Baker spoke of the so-called relative increase in the size of the nuclear strength of the Soviet Union. I would just like to point out that the changes in the strategic strength which the Chairman emphasized cannot be blamed on SALT. The change in relative stength does not mean that we should vote for SALT nor against it. What I am not sure of is how SALT is relevant.

I would like to speak on that issue, of the relative strength. Can it be proven that somehow within the four corners of the document we are so constraining ourselves that we would preclude ourselves from being able to do what we believe needs to be done in order to rectify any of the slope of that trendline that is referred to. I assume that both you gentlemen are suggesting that SALT does not preclude us from taking the actions necessary to be taken.

General SEIGNIOUS. Sir, if this were a five-sided document that would be equal to the Pentagon, you could not find in this treaty a constraint on strategic nuclear forces that would impair the security of the United States.

QUESTION OF VERIFICATION

Senator BIDEN. I would like to raise two questions—or two general themes. I think that is a better way of phrasing it. One is the question of verification, Ambassador Earle. The committee, on which I serve and before which you will be testifying—there will be a whole series of hearings on this issue that we will be having—has gone into great detail almost exclusively on the issue of verification. The committee has compiled a 17-volume document—if you can call a 17-volume work a document—on this issue of our capability now and in the future. You point out, Mr. Ambassador, that SALT II increases our verification capability. You mentioned telemetry encryption restrictions, FROD's, or the principle of functionally related observable differences, a ban on the SS-16 because the first two stages are precisely the same as the SS-20, and it goes on.

REASONS WHY TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION WAS NOT BANNED

One thing about which I am very curious—and this may not be able to be answered in open session, so I will pursue this matter further, as I am sure my colleagues will as well, both here and in the other committee—is why there is not a total ban on encryption of telemetry. As I understand it, telemetry refers to those signals which come back from the test rocket which tell the ground how things are working. If we intercept that, we can tell not only the footprint of that missile, but what missile it is, what its range is, what kind of missile it is, how it functions, how many warheads it has, whether or not it is MIRVed, and a whole range of other things.

Why is it that we did not say in the treaty that we will not allow and we do not want any encryption of those signals, that we want to be able to read them loud and clear by our national technical means?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Biden, that would be a very desirable arrangement to have with the Soviet Union. I certainly agree with that.

But I think one has to bear in mind that the verification provisions and obligations relate to verifying compliance with the provisions of the treaty. I will not go into any great detail, but it is my understanding that there is considerable telemetry which comes off Soviet missiles which really has no bearing on any provision of the treaty, which would inform us as to parameters which are not limited and so forth.

To reach an arrangement whereby the Soviets would be willing to make all of their telemetry available in an unencrypted form would seem to be to be the subject of a different negotiation, of some sort of "open skies" situation. They simply, and understandably, do not want to give us a hunting license for intelligence which is not necessary or relevant to verification of compliance.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I will not argue with you about its being relevant, because it is. I will make that argument with you in private.

Let me ask you another phase of that question.

Did our five cornered building object to such a provision? Were we as unenthusiastic about the prospect of no encryption whatsoever on telemetry as the Soviets were?

Ambassador EARLE. I think every agency in Washington would like to have had the provision which you suggest.

Senator BIDEN. Would we like to have given the same right to the Soviets?

Ambassador EARLE. I think so.

General SEIGNIOUS. I think that the perception of this has to be more defined.

If you say there should be no encryption on a strategic system that is covered by the terms of the treaty, that would be one formulation. But if you say no encryption of any military flight, I think you would find——

Senator BIDEN. No, that is not what I am talking about. I am talking about your first case.

General SEIGNIOUS. Well, a lot of people in the U.S. Armed Forces would substantially object to the loss of the ability to encrypt telemetry in certain areas.

Sir, I think I should not say anything further in open session.

Senator BIDEN. Would they on strategic weapons?

General SEIGNIOUS. I think we had better wait until we get into a closed session.

Senator BIDEN. Very well.

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO ALLIES

Let me turn to a matter that I know we can discuss in open session.

There has been a doctrine that has been the basis of our whole relationship and attitude toward our NATO allies.

It says that U.S. interests and our military strength are directly "coupled" with the interests and strength of our Western European allies, and that, even though there is superior Warsaw Pact force on the European continent itself, this regional advantage is balanced by the general perception that the United States would bring full force to bear to defend Western Europe if necessary. In other

words, the perception of United States-West European coupling is a central element in our deterrent.

The perennial dilemma that we have seems to be this. If we provide for an equilibrium between the central systems—the ones in the Soviet Union that can hit the United States and the ones in the United States that can hit the Soviet Union—we risk indicating to our European allies and to the Soviets that there could be a nuclear war fought in Europe from which the United States might choose to exclude itself—in other words, decouple itself—because United States-Soviet equality would deter the United States from subjecting itself to nuclear peril.

On the other hand, if—recognizing this—we seek to enhance our deterrent by beefing up forces in the theater, we risk the same decoupling perception that we are planning for the possibility of war in Europe in which we are not directly involved.

Now the Soviets have a new development. They have taken their SS–4's and SS–5's, which were fixed and not very accurate, and replaced many, if not all, of them with their SS–20's, which are mobile and very accurate. Now, the European perception of this is pretty clear to me. They are worried like the devil about the SS–20. I am sure you are aware of that, Mr. Ambassador. They are now saying that we need theater nuclear force modernization. They don't want too much of it—that would be decoupling. But they want some—to show that we are not already decoupled.

I see that my time is nearly up. Perhaps, Ambassador Earle, you could just comment on how you see Soviet aspirations in Europe as regards the theater balance.

You can answer that on Senator Glenn's time. [General laughter.]

Senator GLENN. You have 10 seconds for your reply, gentlemen.

Ambassador EARLE. My paragraph trailed off.

Seriously, I do think the Soviets seek an advantage in theater forces and in conventional forces. To use, perhaps along the lines that you suggested, the hackneyed term of "Finlandization." I think that such a Soviet motivation is a real possibility.

General SEIGNIOUS. I think your statement was a brilliant exposé of a problem which, if looked at in a parallel approach, we can solve. This is adequate modernization of nuclear theater forces and arms control as it relates to both sides.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, gentlemen. I want to get back to this subject and follow up on it.

General SEIGNIOUS. All right.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms is next, I believe.

Senator Biden, I want to thank you for always enlivening these proceedings whenever it is your turn. We appreciate that.

Senator BIDEN. You know, I am not sure what the chairman means by that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I yield my time to Senator Lugar, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Helms.

POST-CUBAN MISSILE CRISES SITUATION

I want to ask a question based on a scenario, really on a synopsis of history that I think you both offered at one point. It was a discussion of the post-Cuban missile crisis situation. I think you, General Seignious, in particular, pointed out that it was your judgment that the Soviets, under Khrushchev, did not want to repeat a situation in which they might feel inferior. Given the strategic position which we had and which they did not have, they tried to move toward equality. In fact, a substantial trend may have begun there, which may still be continuing.

It may be that the Soviets found that as they moved into a position of rough equivalence, they also enjoyed new opportunities with regard to various other theaters of operation, and maybe they are still hopeful of enjoying that, quite apart from what we are doing.

In the course of that, as we have explored this afternoon, for a variety of reasons, the United States may not have felt compelled to match this effort. One reason may be that we were spending money for the Vietnam war, large sums of money. Senator Biden mentioned this.

As many witnesses have pointed out, I think it is also true that a relatively small percentage of our defense budget goes for strategic weapons, and a larger and larger portion goes for pensions, wages of personnel, and things of this sort.

The net effect of this, as we approach this treaty and the negotiating problems that you had, is that the Soviet thrust appears to be a strong one and the momentum of it is still there. Our situation, on the contrary, as I tried to mention this morning, appears to be one now of greater awareness on the part of the public, clearly on the part of public officials, of our possible defense deficiencies, a substantial number of new things are being thought about and old things are being revived. Although a purist would say that SALT ought to be treated on its own and the defense posture of the United States is a different question, the testimony before this committee suggests that the two are intertwined in a great many ways.

SOVIETS DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE SALT TREATY

What I would like to ask of both of you is this. As you faced the Soviet negotiators, why, in your judgment, were they willing to accept any limitations? Why was there a desire to negotiate this treaty? Do you gauge that the Soviets feel that this treaty, by and large, is going to be harmless enough in terms of their overall momentum so that they will not feel constrained and will be able to proceed, really, given our general responses, in a way that continues their momentum?

General SEIGNIOUS. I would like to take a crack at that first because I think it is a central point.

I think that the Soviet Union recognizes the capacity of our Triad as a flexible force. If they attack in an effort to penetrate any one of the parts of that Triad, we have the flexibility to respond with the other two. That is kind of like the situation we are in now with the ICBM.

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To put it in a simple way, I lived down on the coast of South Carolina, where the delta country is, and the land, the creeks, and the marshes come right together. If a deer walking on the land is frightened, or if a shot is fired, the turtles along the water bank go under the water in a survivable mode, and the birds fly away.

The point I am making is the Soviet Union knows it may attack the turtles, the birds, or the deer, but something is going to survive. They do not believe that they have the capability technologically or resourcewise—they had better not believe it, because they would be very wrong—to gain a position of superiority over this country.

EFFECT OF SALT ON UNITED STATES

Senator LUGAR. General Seignious, granted that they may not want to attack us. That may not be their motivation at all. Do you see at least a Soviet advantage in the SALT Treaty, that we might be hobbled in some fashion? In other words, quite apart from the fact that they would not be hobbled, and that they might continue on into theater hegemony here, there, and everywhere, do they see ways of stopping the things that are now underway, defensewise, on our part, by this treaty?

General SEIGNIOUS. I think they would like to arrest some of the innovations that they know we have the capability of deploying. You know some in relation to our Minuteman III.

We have not been standing still, of course. Senator Baker in his questions was trying to establish the trends. Well, the trends are in their favor; but we have not stood still. We have made substantial improvements in all phases of our Triad.

I think one of the values of SALT II is to arrest the momentum in which the Soviets now have an advantage, and to put some upper limits on the quantity, the quality, and the verifiability of these systems.

Senator LUGAR. Of course, one of the judgments we will have to make is whether, in fact, the Soviets feel very hobbled by it. I am intrigued by a "New York Times" editorial of this morning which points out that the problem we have with the SALT Treaty is whether it will get in the way of something that might defend our ICBM's, namely, the M-X?

In other words, I am still trying to make a judgment as to whether in various ways, given the things the Soviets are now about in the world, they may be able to proceed fairly uninhibited; whereas in our catchup situation now, with our desire to defend the weak leg of our Triad, we may be inhibited.

I must say that until very recently the public, as a whole, was not treated to very much of an exposé of the fact that any of the Triad legs had weaknesses.

In the last few weeks we have found that one leg is really in bad shape and, as a matter of fact, it is not going to get well for a long time. At this stage we are scrambling around to make certain that somehow or other, if we are able to cure it with the M-X, we are not constrained in deploying it in such a way that we cause ourselves problems. The "Times" editorial says that so long as we really do not hobble ourselves, probably the whole thing cannot do

a whole lot of harm, and it may, for reasons which have been suggested today—encouragement of Pakistan in the support of the Nonproliferation Treaty, it might even do some good.

But this is a very modest suggestion when it finally comes down to it.

What we are trying to do now, I think, in looking at this treaty, is see whether it should be amended in ways that make certain that our defense is not hobbled. This is what I am driving at in these questions. We must make certain that whatever the Soviets are doing—and heaven only knows, they may have negotiated a treaty that allows them to do their thing—that we are not ensnared in a treaty that does not allow us to do ours.

I presume that your judgment is that we are not so ensnared.

General SEIGNIOUS. We are not ensnared and not prevented, in my judgment, Senator, if we have the national will and the support of the Congress, from deploying the strategic nuclear forces that are necessary to maintain strategic equivalence.

Now I must say that I do not think the treaty or this debate is addressing another phase of the overall defense posture, which is the conventional forces. But, as far as the constraints of this treaty that impose themselves on our decisions, they are nonexistent so far as constraining our own decisions.

BANNING OF KILLER SATELLITE IN SALT II

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask one short question in the remaining time I have.

You said that SALT failure would also with virtual certainty damage the antisatellite negotiations and so forth. We agree that those are very important for our intelligence capability. In fact, they are so important that my question would be why did we negotiate the treaty without making certain the satellites were safe? Why have we not negotiated a situation at this point in which the so-called killer satellite was banned? At least one major method of verification that most of the American public believes is still going to be there throughout all of this may or may not be there, depending upon how this comes out.

Why didn't you get that into the treaty?

Ambassador EARLE. If I may, Senator Lugar, I would like to comment.

In SALT I, and carried over in the present agreement that is before you, there is a provision that each party undertakes not to interfere with national technical means. That includes, among other things, a prohibition on antisatellite activity against our verification satellites.

The Soviets have made it clear to us that an attack on an American satellite could be, and would be, they assume, considered an act of war. So they are prohibited by law—by agreement under the ABM Treaty, under the interim agreement, and under this treaty—from doing it.

Now a further step which General Seignious can address—because I have not participated in those negotiations—is pursuing negotiations not only to bar the operational use of antisatellite

mechanisms, but in some way to limit their development and deployment.

General SEIGNIOUS. And particularly interference, even in a nonhostile mode.

We have hopes that if you look at the composite of the overall arms control negotiations, we can arrest this. If we decided to go all out with putting nuclear weapons into space, there could be technologically exotic means that would be hair-raising. This is why I think the composite of all of these things is important.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RATIFICATION OF SALT II POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON OTHER NEGOTIATIONS

One of the prime things we were going to try to determine today is how the SALT II Treaty fits in with other arms control objectives and the treaty's relationships to other arms control negotiations, in particular.

General, I gather from what you said earlier today that you would anticipate that ratification of SALT II will have a positive influence on other arms control negotiations we are conducting.

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes, Senator Glenn. That is my belief.

Senator GLENN. What has been the track record so far? Did SALT I help us in any of these other negotiations that you can name?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes; I think so.

If you look at the list of arms control related negotiations with the Soviet Union since World War II—I will list a couple of them—I believe you will agree.

Some of these are minor and some of these are very important. The hot-line agreement is one, the hot line of alert between the command posts of the two nations. Another is the Antarctic Treaty. There are also the Limited Test Ban on Nuclear Weapons, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty.

These are all arms control negotiations—but not all of them are since SALT I.

Senator GLENN. That is what I was going to get at. I do not think you would say that SALT I led to all of those.

General SEIGNIOUS. No. SALT I was part of a process, however, and without some of these other things I do not think you would have gotten SALT I and I do not think you would have gotten the ABM Treaty.

Senator GLENN. Well, we sure have not made much progress in MBFR with SALT I being on the books, have we?

General SEIGNIOUS. I would not say we have made substantial progress, but I would say this. In the last 6 months, we have gotten for the first time an indication of some movement in MBFR. I would say that if the environment of a successful SALT II is extant, we have a fairly good chance of moving toward success in MBFR.

Senator GLENN. Well, I would think we stand a danger of trying to overflow the good things that may flow from SALT II, because we have not seen much movement on MBFR, the Comprehensive Test Ban, the Indian Ocean Negotiations, the Chemical-Biological and Radiological Arms Control, the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks, or the Antisatellite Weapons Talks. To think if we sign SALT II that these will all at once open up and we will have great things come from them is wishful thinking on our part, I think.

General SEIGNIOUS. I think that is substantially true if you are looking for a degree of success that is spectacular. But I think if you add up the efforts of quadripartite negotiations in Berlin and the six or seven that are going on now, while we are negotiating from strength, we are not fighting, and there is some hope.

I agree with you that if you have great expectations for immediate success, you will be disappointed.

Senator GLENN. I would think the main thing we can say SALT I led to is SALT II.

General SEIGNIOUS. We hope SALT III follows SALT II, also.

Senator GLENN. In all probability it would have occurred anyway. The Antarctic Treaty and the others that you mentioned I do not believe in any way were hooked up with SALT I.

Let me move on to a different area.

ADEQUATE MONITORING OF LAUNCH WEIGHT

There are provisions in the treaty that require us to be able to monitor such things as launch weight, throw-weight, number of RV's [reentry vehicles] MIRVed versus MRV [multiple reentry vehicle] reentries. You indicated a great confidence in our ability to monitor all provisions of SALT a little while ago here.

Is it your opinion that we can adequately monitor launch weight at the present time?

General SEIGNIOUS. Is this addressed to me?

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General SEIGNIOUS. I think that on ICBM flight-tests from certain launch stations in the Soviet Union, we have a high confidence that we could monitor launch weight to an acceptable level.

Senator GLENN. Let's give the example of liquid missile tests from southern Russia, which would encompass the SS–18.

General SEIGNIOUS. Sir, I really believe if we could defer that to a closed session that it would be better. But without describing why, I would answer that for the major part of such a flight test my confidence would be adequate that we could monitor it.

I would like to explain to you why I made that statement in closed session.

Senator GLENN. I would be glad in closed session to go into it, too, because I have some differing opinions as to our current capability right now and good reasons for them. That is the reason I wanted to take exception to your previous remarks that were rather all-encompassing on our ability to monitor all phases of SALT.

General SEIGNIOUS. I said, "adequately monitor."

Senator GLENN. I will even go along with adequately, without taking exception to it, because I think in some of these areas that

are very important—such as launch weight, throw-weight, RV's and so on—there may be some developments that look promising. But as of right now, I would question some of the assumptions that you appeared to make a little while ago.

APPEAL TO SCC IF THERE IS ENCRYPTION

Here is another matter about which I would like to ask.

A little while ago you said, I believe, that if there was encryption which impeded verification, we would immediately appeal to the Standing Consultative Commission.

General SEIGNIOUS. That is correct.

I don't know why we wouldn't.

Senator GLENN. Well, there are some very good reasons why we would not. Some of our very top intelligence people in this country, to whom I have talked within the last few days, indicate that they think we would be very hard-pressed to make such a presentation to the SCC because it would give away too much about what we are not able to pick up. It would then require us to lay out our intelligence gathering scheme to justify making the Soviets decrypt something which they were encrypting which was vital to us. I agree with that. I think that would be a big hazard for us to go to the Standing Consultative Commission with such a complaint—unless it was a very, very major item so that we did not care whether or not they knew what our lack was.

General SEIGNIOUS. I do not contest that. But I would say that we can challenge the fact that the matrix is not giving us the information we need without specifying in detail what it is.

Senator GLENN. But they are going to know on what specific chattel you want information. A general statement will not do it on verification.

General SEIGNIOUS. Well, a general statement that challenges the capability of what they are testing would do it. But again, I think we should not discuss this openly.

OBJECT TO "WHICH IMPEDES VERIFICATION" IN TREATY

Senator GLENN. I agree. I disagree with the language that was negotiated in that one. I objected strenuously when we had in there the three key words "which impedes verification." When we objected strongly with the Secretary of State, he went back to negotiating. When he came back, he called and indicated that he had thought we made a lot of progress in this area. But when we went into it, even though the language had been massaged around, with the new language in the common understanding, nevertheless the same old three words were there and it has this impact. It lets the Soviets determine what is going to impede verification for us and what is not. If we do not agree with it, we have to appeal.

By setting it up in that way, the ball is strictly in their court. Let me put it this way: They have the whip hand in this whole thing. They are the ones who will determine what they think will impede our verification, and that should not be up to them.

I do not think those three words should have been included in there. It means that we have to go to the Standing Consultative

Commission if we want to complain, and that does, in fact, give away some of our lack of intelligence gathering capability.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Glenn, we will discuss this later. But just for the record, I would disagree with your disagreement as to in whose court the ball is.

Senator GLENN. That is a disagreement to the second power or something, I guess.

TOTAL BAN ON ENCRYPTION

Mr. Ambassador, as far as the negotiations went in Geneva, to your knowledge, did we ask the Soviets for a total ban on encryption?

Ambassador EARLE. We did not.

Senator GLENN. We did not ask them for a total ban. Why did we not ask them for a total ban?

Ambassador EARLE. For the reasons that I stated earlier: We thought it was not appropriate to this agreement; we thought it was nonnegotiable; and it would have been a waste of time to request it. I think issue was taken with my use of the word "relevant." As I said earlier, I think that was a different negotiation or would have been a different negotiation.

Senator GLENN. Well, they did not start encrypting until 1974, as I understand it.

Ambassador EARLE. That is correct.

Senator GLENN. And we did not object at the time they started encrypting, did we?

Ambassador EARLE. We made note of it. We called it to their attention, and it resulted in a long negotiation which ended up with the common understanding in article XV, to which you have referred.

SOVIETS TO ANNOUNCE IN ADVANCE OF THEIR TESTS

Senator GLENN. Did we ask during the negotiations for the Soviets to announce in advance all of their tests?

Ambassador EARLE. We did.

Senator GLENN. Did they turn that down?

Ambassador EARLE. Well, they finally agreed that they would announce in advance all of their ICBM tests, except single ICBM launches which take place solely within their territory.

Senator GLENN. As I understand it, all we are prohibiting is dual ICBM launches—not warheads—just dual ICBM launches. As I understand it, the ones that go outside the Soviet Union and over international waterways they would be required to announce anyway.

Ambassador EARLE. But with a more specific type of announcement now—a bilateral announcement to the United States, as opposed to a general notice to mariners.

Senator GLENN. They are required to make that by international law, just as we are.

Ambassador EARLE. Yes. But they are now required to make a more specific pre-notification.

RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER SOVIET UNION

Senator GLENN. After our loss of the monitoring stations in Iran, did we ask the Soviets for permission to have reconnaissance planes overfly the Soviet Union to monitor?

Ambassador EARLE. Not in Geneva. I do not know what took place elsewhere.

General SEIGNIOUS. Not in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Senator GLENN. Well, I guess that is the subject for another forum.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will defer to Senator Stone.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PERMISSION FOR OVERFLIGHT

My first question is Sentor Glenn's last question.

Did we ask for overflight permission?

General SEIGNIOUS. To the Soviet Union?

Senator STONE. That is who we are checking on these days, yes.

General SEIGNIOUS. Well, ask the Secretary of State, Senator Stone. I don't know.

Senator STONE. But you did not in your negotiations.

General SEIGNIOUS. No, categorically.

Senator STONE. Why not?

General SEIGNIOUS. The Geneva Delegation was not given the authority to do so.

U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OVER TURKEY

Senator STONE. Have the Soviets responded to the question of whether we can monitor their activities by U-2 overflights over Turkey?

General SEIGNIOUS. Senator Stone, I am not going to comment on the U-2 overflights over Turkey. It is not within my competence. I do not have current knowledge of it and I do not think it is appropriate for me to do so.

Senator STONE. Well, if we have lost our Iranian monitoring stations and you have gone into some detail about matrix and background information that we were able to obtain, and it is not exactly top secret classified as it has been in all the newspapers that we are trying to make up for that with overflights why can't we hear about it at this hearing?

General SEIGNIOUS. Senator, if you knew what was in the newspaper and I knew what was in the newspaper, we would have equal knowledge, is that not correct? You know that we would like to enhance the competence of our collection and monitoring capability due to the loss of the Iranian stations. As a Government, we are taking all actions, in multiple areas, that have been identified as having a chance of success. Some are highly sensitive and not

under the control of those two people who are testifying before you today. There are others, besides the U-2.

Senator STONE. General, in the end, whether you tell us how you are going to verify or how you are not, if you do not persuade this committee and the American people that we can make up for the loss of those Iranian stations, you will not get this treaty ratified.

General SEIGNIOUS. I understand that.

Senator STONE. We are clear on that, then.

Somehow we are going to have to be persuaded as a committee, as a country, and as a Congress, that we can verify this.

General SEIGNIOUS. If we cannot do that, then the treaty should not be ratified.

Senator STONE. Good thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say something that I believe everyone knows anyway. We do plan some executive sessions on the subject of verification and we will go into this matter very thoroughly at that time.

Senator STONE. Very good. All I was asking for was whether or not the Soviets gave their permission, and obviously they have not—at least up to now.

SURVIVABILITY OF LAND-BASED MISSILES

On the question of survivability which has come up in almost every round of questioning, is it your position that our Minutemen and land-based missiles are and will be nonsurvivable for the next few years?

General SEIGNIOUS. No, sir.

Senator STONE. What is your position?

General SEIGNIOUS. My position is related really to the question Senator Baker raised: That there has been a trend, an identifiable trend in the improvement of Soviet hard target kill capability. A breakthrough in the flight tests that they had about 18 months ago indicated that they had reached a degree of accuracy on their testing of their ICBM's that—if deployed to the operational forces that they have—would mean that beginning in the early 1980's there would be a gradual, but increasing, threat to the survivability of our ICBM's.

Now, to pick a date and to say that in 1982, at Thanksgiving, more than 50 percent of our ICBM's will not survive, is beyond the scope of anybody's competence, especially when you factor in all of the reliability problems and all of the decisions which I doubt the Soviets have made yet on the rapidity with which they wilI deploy this capability. At some point in time, however, there is a theoretical certainty that the ICBM's that we have in fixed positions in this country will reach such a state of vulnerability that they will become unreliable as a part of our strategic force, and therefore we must seek an alternative to that vulnerability.

Senator STONE. General, in connection with their increasing vulnerability, did you mean to imply in your earlier testimony that only our land-based missiles were vulnerable to the heavy and increasingly accurate Soviet SS-18's and SS-19's? Or, did you also mean to include all airplanes not on ready and all submarines in port?

General SEIGNIOUS. Well, when a missile system gets the yield and accuracy that the Soviet Union is developing, then whatever they target is threatened if that target is not in a survivable mode. So, the answer to you is, yes.

Senator STONE. I just want to get it clear that when Senator McGovern was inquiring about only a third of our missiles are land based and the rest of them are elsewhere and therefore we are very survivable, that is not exactly accurate, is it?

General SEIGNIOUS. No; it is not complete.

Senator STONE. Isn't it more accurate to say that our airplanes that are not in a ready position and that our submarines that are not out to sea are equally exposed, along with those Minuteman missiles?

General SEIGNIOUS. And that is all the more reason why, if you are in a period when you have a portion of your Triad that is becoming increasingly vulnerable, you have to pay attention to the survivability of the other parts and generate that force so that you have more of it that is not vulnerable.

SURVIVABILITY OF SOVIET SYSTEMS IN 1980'S

Senator STONE. In this decade of the 1980's, wherein because of their throw-weight and increasing accuracy we do have an increasing vulnerability, correspondingly, what is the survivability of their systems with what we can do to them during that same period of time, the 1980's?

General SEIGNIOUS. It depends on when in the 1980's, and I will try to answer you gradually.

We have a developing capability, just as they do—not to the same degree because it has been a dynamic change. But our systems—and we have multiple systems—our improved ICBM's can threaten their hard targets, their ICBM's. Our cruise missiles will.

Senator STONE. This is before we have the mobile missile effectively in force——

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes.

Senator STONE [continuing]. We still can increasingly do that?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes; not only by our ICBM's, but by our cruise missiles. Also, we will probably begin to have a sea-launch capability that is improving substantially, but not to the same degree as our improved ICBM.

So, it is out of balance to say that as time goes—1982, 1983, and 1984—the Soviets are making all of the improvements and putting at risk our fixed systems. That is true. But we are also putting at risk 70 percent of their forces and they are putting at risk 30-percent of ours, plus whatever they can target that we have not gotten airborne or put to sea.

Senator STONE. My time is almost up, but I think you are back at that 30-percent situation.

General SEIGNIOUS. No, sir—not intentionally.

Senator STONE. Well, what then, would our exposure be during this period, in percentages?

General SEIGNIOUS. I don't know. It depends on how much money we want to spend to keep airborne alert, how much we want to generate our forces, do we want to deploy bombers and tankers

from the east coast which are threatened by submarine-launched ballistic missiles, do we want to put them further out west so we will have more time to deploy them, and so on. There are many scenarios that could be written. If we are in a threat period, we should do all that we have to do to insure that forces are generated that give us a survivable force.

Senator STONE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

DEEP-CUT APPROACH TO SOVIETS IN 1977

Senator SARBANES. Ambassador Earle, I was interested in your description of the decisionmaking process involving the SALT delegation in Geneva and how it interrelated with the groups back in Washington.

You have been a member of that delegation for some time. Were you consulted and did you counsel the President to present the deep cut approach to the Soviet Union in 1977, which was rejected by them as a basis for negotiating?

Ambassador EARLE. At that time, Senator Sarbanes, I was somewhat in limbo between administrations. I was not officially a member of the delegation and I was not consulted prior to the presentation.

Senator SARBANES. Was there any reason to suppose that the Soviets would have been receptive to that approach as a basis for conducting the SALT negotiations?

Ambassador EARLE. I think there was a reason to hope that they would consider it in the manner in which we presented it, as deep cuts and greater arms control than had been reflected in the Vladivostok agreement.

As you know, they rejected it out of hand.

Senator SARBANES. Since it was rejected out of hand, why was it proposed. Was there no exploration of whether it would be favorably received or of any possibility that it would be favorably received?

Ambassador EARLE. I don't know, Senator Sarbanes, whether there had been any sounding out prior to it. I don't think there was.

UNITED STATES CHECKING INTENTIONS OF SOVIET UNION

Senator SARBANES. What that has done, of course, is it places SALT II in the context to some extent of being judged against the deep-cut proposal of early 1977, instead of being judged in the context of the prior SALT negotiations, SALT I and the Vladivostok accords.

Earlier, in testimony in response to the chairman's questions, you were trying to put aside your modesty to set out what you thought you had achieved. This placed you in the position of comparing what is in this proposed treaty with what had been obtained before. Perhaps you should take a couple of moments to discuss the treaty before us in that context. Then I will get you into the next question as to what context this treaty places us if we are looking ahead toward SALT III. Underlying all of this is whether the

Soviets are not approaching all of this bargaining on a predetermined program of what they want to do and whether every agreement they reach simply constitutes an umbrella beneath which they can do what it was they wanted to do in any event. At what point are we actually checking what they want to do?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Sarbanes, if I understand your question, you are asking me to compare where we are now with the prior negotiations—not including the March 1977 proposal—or comparing it to what?

Senator SARBANES. Well, do you regard SALT II as a better arrangement for us than SALT I and Vladivostok were?

Ambassador EARLE. I do.

Senator SARBANES. Why?

Ambassador EARLE. SALT I was simply a freeze, which gave the Soviets superiority in numbers in both ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. There were no constraints on MIRV's and there were no constraints on heavy bombers.

That is not a criticism of SALT I. The Soviets had ongoing programs in both ICBM launchers, and SLBM launchers which were halted, that in all likelihood would have continued at a time when we were adding to neither portion of our forces.

Vladivostok, as I mentioned earlier, was a further step forward in that we achieved equal aggregates. The Soviets dropped their position that the forward-based systems should be included and that French and British systems should be included.

Since then, we have improved upon it, as Secretary Vance discussed this morning. The 1,320, which was solely for MIRVed launchers, now includes heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles; the MIRV launcher total has gone down from 1,320 to 1,200; the opportunity to have fixed ICBM launchers with MIRV's has gone from 1,320 to 820; and the overall aggregate has gone from 2,400 to 2,250.

Perhaps even more important than any of those are the constraints on reentry vehicles which have been placed upon the Soviets which, as I mentioned earlier, puts a heavy constraint on them in translating their superior throw-weight into usable reentry vehicles.

SALT PERMITS EXTRAORDINARILY SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN STRATEGIC ARMS

Senator SARBANES. Well, some of those things I can see as being achievements and others I cannot. It relates a little bit to some of the language that General Seignious uses in his statement toward the end. He says that without SALT the Soviets could have, and then he goes on with "could have," "could have," and "could have." Now that is quite true. But the question is "would have," would they have done these things, or where are they headed.

This agreement that is before us permits both countries to make extraordinarily significant increases in strategic arms. Isn't that correct?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes, I would agree with that. It is much too high.

Senator SARBANES. Within the limits contained in this treaty, it is probably accurate to say that the Soviet production is not going to be checked, because there is so much room between what they have and where they can go under the treaty. The same thing is true for us. It is thus unlikely that either side will produce to the full limits of what the treaty permits.

Isn't that correct?

General SEIGNIOUS. No, sir, I do not agree with you on that point.

I think that the momentum that they have in almost every phase of the programs that are permitted by the terms of the treaty indicates their capability and apparent intent to proceed to the maximum levels authorized by the treaty. For example, the rapidity with which they are MIRVing their ICBM's up to the limit of 820 is very rapid, and it has been very rapid for the past 6 months to a year.

Senator SARBANES. That is right. They are programed to arm themselves to the full extent of what this treaty allows.

General SEIGNIOUS. I believe that to be true. I also believe what I said previously to be true, that rather than stopping at 820 under the momentum they have on MIRVed ICBM's, they could easily achieve 950 or 1,000 by the 1985 termination date of the treaty. I think that is a relative comparison.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator, we also have some physical evidence that they were going to go beyond 820.

POSSIBILITY OF UNITED STATES EXCEEDING SOVIET UNION IF NO SALT II

Senator SARBANES. If there were no limits, and the United States set out, given its economic and technological position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union not only to match, but to exceed, could we do that? Could we accomplish that?

General SEIGNIOUS. The United States can accomplish technologically what it has to accomplish, but whether it would succeed in gaining an advantage for the United States is entirely another matter. I think once the Soviet Union has the technology, and we have every reason to believe they have it now, both nations have it, that a further piling up strategic nuclear systems on either side could go on into the 1980's, into the 1990's, and into the next century. As you build more and more, you are not buying more and more security. Rather, you are increasing the risk and increasing the expenditure of the resources.

I do not believe that the United States would for one minute be second to the Soviet Union. I think if we ever adopt a policy that says the United States is willingly embarking on a doctrine of being a second-class military power, you lose me among the administration regardless of whether it is Democratic or Republican.

Senator SARBANES. Well, none of us would accept being second. What I am asking is this. Don't we have the capacity to be first if we choose to and set out to do that?

General SEIGNIOUS. In strategic nuclear forces, being first, in my opinion, is an impossibility—depending on the will and the re-

sources of the other side, if there is not a constraint by negotiations.

NEGATIVE BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OFFSET BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator SARBANES. To what extent in the past has a negative balance in the United States or its allies position in theater weapons and conventional weapons been offset by this political perception that you talk about—by the perceived advantage that we have in nuclear weapons?

General SEIGNIOUS. I think that the nuclear monopoly that the United States enjoyed during the period of our strategy of massive retaliation was a deterrent because it was coupled with the conventional forces and the tactical nuclear forces of NATO. This successfully has deterred any armed conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO for over 30 years.

As we move forward, though, into a comparative strategy of parity, then it becomes essential that we redress any trends in tactical nuclear forces and conventional forces that are to our disadvantage.

Senator SARBANES. In fact, it becomes critical, doesn't it? Otherwise, the perceived political problem, the disadvantage which you have outlined and discussed in strategic terms and which you think is responded to by the establishment of the parities in the treaty, is simply shifted down to the level of conventional and theater weapons. We suffer the disadvantage then at that level unless we respond to that situation. Isn't that correct?

General SEIGNIOUS. I think that is correct. If we go into the reduction of strategic nuclear forces, it makes more sensitive the relative capability in theater nuclear forces and conventional forces. You have analyzed it quite correctly.

Senator SARBANES. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, fortunately, you are getting near the end. I prefer to think the chairman calls on us not by seniority but rather alphabetically. [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. If you can come up with any more Amtrak remarks, I will call on you first tomorrow morning. [General laughter.]

WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE A SALT NEGOTIATOR

Senator ZORINSKY. Ambassador Earle, I would like to possibly give the general public, including myself, a feeling for what it is like to be a SALT negotiator. Is it true that you were originally on the SALT II negotiating team in 1972 when it first was formed?

Ambassador EARLE. That is right. I was there on a temporary basis as a consultant to Mr. Nitze, who was then the OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] representative.

Senator ZORINSKY. So you had an ongoing connection as an individual?

Ambassador EARLE. Yes; I became a full-time member of the delegation in 1973.

Senator ZORINSKY. Would you say that being a negotiator on behalf of the United States of America is an experience—is this something that you have enjoyed doing? Has it been frustrating? Just briefly, can you outline it?

Ambassador EARLE. It is almost all of those things, Senator. Certainly it is not a nonexperience. It was indeed an experience. It was frustrating. It was tiring. It was gratifying. It was always interesting, and sometimes it was even fun.

Senator ZORINSKY. A lot of people have asked me, what are those people like that do the negotiating on behalf of the United States? I would imagine it is different from being bonded. As we look at it on the grass roots level, is it like playing poker, where you have chips to use, that you trade off, that you try to equalize an equation, that you attempt to bring parity to the side that you are representing, or maybe even a better deal for them than for the other side?

Ambassador EARLE. Well, it is somewhat like poker, but it is also, I think, more like chess because of the interrelationship of the different issues. On some issues one trades, much like in a bargain to buy a house. I think, really, some of the numbers that appear in the treaty were negotiated more in that sense than with a clear desire for the number that was agreed upon. It was a compromise between the two. They wanted more launchers. We wanted fewer launchers, and so forth.

Senator ZORINSKY. So it is a system of give and take.

Ambassador EARLE. That's right.

Senator ZORINSKY. Therefore, the more objects or leverage that you have in the giving, the more that will offset the taking. Is that about it?

Ambassador EARLE. Well, I said that was only one type of negotiation. I think more issues were decided, if you will, on the basis of sweet reason or logic. Now, I can tell you that we won many more issues than the Soviets did, and that is true, but it is also in part because they came in with more extreme positions than we did.

If you take an issue like the data base, or MIRV verification, there was no give or take there. It was a painful process of exploring and explaining why those things were necessary to the viability of the treaty from the point of view of the United States. They finally accepted this. We didn't give them anything to get data base. We didn't give them anything to get MIRV verification. So, I would divide the issues into at least two kinds: One where there was, if you will, bargaining, and the other where there was just a painful exploration with people who were totally unused to contracts. We grow up with insurance contracts, car purchase contracts, mortgage contracts, et cetera. The Soviets are unused to contracts. Originally, when we proposed article II on definitions, they said, "We don't need definitions, everybody knows what a heavy bomber is."

CONSULTATION PRIOR TO ADMINISTRATION DECISION ON B–1 BOMBER

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Ambassador, let me then ask this next question. Inasmuch as the B-1 bomber does count, if it were to replace a B–52 that would be retired, and I suppose it would have a launcher capability, were you consulted by the administration in any way prior to its abandonment of the construction for the B-1 bomber?

Ambassador EARLE. Me personally, Senator?

Senator ZORINSKY. Yes.

Ambassador EARLE. No; I was not.

Senator ZORINSKY. Were there any people on your delegation who were consulted?

Ambassador EARLE. I don't know. I don't know whether Ambassador Warnke, who was then the chief negotiator, was consulted or not.

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, as a negotiator, don't you feel that the entire delegation should have at its disposal bargaining chips, whether they are going to be thrown away later or sooner, at least at their disposal for their use prior to public announcements of the indefinite postponement?

Ambassador EARLE. I would agree with you, Senator Zorinsky, if I thought that the B–1 had been a viable bargaining chip, but I quite honestly do not think we could have gotten anything for it for this reason. I think the Soviets would much have preferred us to deploy—based on what I heard in Geneva, from them—they would much have preferred us to build and deploy the B–1 than to go to the long-range cruise missile.

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, I would venture to say if I find out you sold your house, I am not going to buy it from you either. What I am saying is, the unknown certainly presents more alternatives, I would think, in negotiating, than knowingly casting aside various options. I mean, I am not making a case for the viability of the B–1 itself, other than its alternative uses as a chip itself.

UNITED STATES WILL DO WHATEVER IT HAS TO UNDER SALT II

General Seignious, I would like to ask you a question before the time runs out. You have made a statement this afternoon, and the same statement was made yesterday by Secretary of Defense Brown and Secretary of State Vance, that this Nation under SALT II will do whatever it needs to do. What does that mean?

General SEIGNIOUS. It means that the terms of the treaty do not constrain the strategic forces that are needed to maintain strategic equivalence. The use of the words "will do" depends on the consent and the support of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States. What I am saying, and I think Secretary Brown said the same thing, is that we are not constrained as a Nation from implementing and deploying the necessary strategic forces. We are not constrained by this treaty. Now, the will to do it has got to come from the people.

Senator ZORINSKY. Right, the will of the American people to do it needs to be present.

General SEIGNIOUS. Exactly.

WILL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INVOLVED IN SALT

Senator ZORINSKY. My question is, how can we get the will of the American people in a complicated formula such as exists before us in this debate, if you don't spell out, we need 15 of these, 200 of those, or whatever the equation is, in order to get that will of the people, or at least seek it.

General SEIGNIOUS. I think it is terribly important that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the President, those who are involved in structuring the forces of the United States, be explicit and give the necessary assurances that we will proceed with the programs that are needed in the coming years to insure that the people of this country and the adversaries of this country know perfectly well that we are not going to be second to any other nation on earth.

Senator ZORINSKY. General Seignious, I would like your observations on this issue: If the Soviets, as we do, feel that total obliteration of each other is what constrains us from using nuclear weapons, why do the Soviets expend such excess sums in civil defense and hardening air raid shelters in opposition to our philosophy?

General SEIGNIOUS. Well, it is all a speculative response, but I would say that the Soviet Union planner is one of the most conservative and redundant type planners in the world. They have embarked on a civil defense program, considerably larger than ours, with the view of doing three things, I think. One is involving the population in the concern for defense in urban areas. Another is attempting to provide safe havens for the Communist leadership so that they can be evacuated from highly threatened areas into areas where some form of communications might permit them to maintain control. Third is in the hope that no option of an escalatory nature would be taken, for example, some limited form of nuclear war that would threaten a part of the Soviet structure and not the other.

My personal judgment is that the expectations of the rewards from civil defense in the Soviet Union fall far short of the objectives.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think, in fact, there is a vote on.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky. You are correct, there is a vote on. It is a vote on the direct election of the President of the United States by way of constitutional amendment.

It is after 5 o'clock. We have had a long day. You have both been excellent witnesses.

Senator JAVITS. May I put one question to the General? I would like to put one thing on the record.

General, you started to answer Senator Lugar, and then never got to it. I think you ought to put in the record a statement as to what the approval of the treaty or the rejection of the treaty would do to the ongoing negotiations on the four matters to which you referred in your testimony, to wit, a Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is not a current negotiation. Two, a ban on nuclear tests, to wit, the Comprehensive Test Ban. Three, the MBFR talks, and the

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antisatellite talks. I think we ought to have something from you as the chief of the department on that question in the record.

General SEIGNIOUS. I would be delighted to provide that, Senator Javits.

[The information referred to follows:]

SALT II AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL

[SUPPLIED BY ACDA]

While the SALT II Agreement must be judged on its own merits—whether it directly adds to or detracts from our national security—it can also be evaluated in the context of other arms control endeavors, which have their own security implications.

The SALT process itself would be the first casualty of a failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty, but our non-proliferation efforts, as well as the comprehensive test ban (CTB), mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), and anti-satellite (ASAT) negotiations would also be imperiled.

Success or failure of SALT can have an indirect effect on these other arms control initiatives. Ratification and entry into force of SALT II will not necessarily make it easier to achieve success in other arms control efforts, but failure of SALT II could close the door to progress on them.

Each of the other arms control initiatives being pursued by the United States has its own rationale and makes a specific contribution to our overall arms control objectives. In the international political context, SALT can have an impact on all these initiatives. In some cases, there are specific substantive connections between SALT provisions and other arms measures, which, when combined, would make an even greater contribution to our arms control objectives.

I will address several other arms control initiatives, as they are related to SALT.

Nuclear non-proliferation.—The proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries poses a security nightmare for all nations.

Throughout the past ten years, the international community has frequently stressed the relationship between non-proliferation and efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to halt and reverse the arms race.

The central feature of the international effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or NPT. Under this treaty, 106 non-nuclear weapon States have pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and to demonstrate their compliance with the treaty by placing all their source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

U.S. non-proliferation efforts are, of course, widespread and diverse. We are working with other countries to turn the spread of nuclear materials and technology into the least dangerous, most productive directions. But we cannot stop the increase in technical nuclear capabilities worldwide. As a consequence, the number of states which could, in a relatively short period of time, construct one or more nuclear explosive devices, if they chose to do so, increases steadily. Thus, the continued recognition by these states of the importance of maintaining the NPT obligations becomes our primary hope over the long run for avoiding a catastrophic spread of nuclear weapons.

Article VI of the NPT commits all Parties to the Treaty—including the United States and the Soviet Union—"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. . . ." Article VI was included in the NPT at the insistence of the non-nuclear states during the final negotiations leading to the treaty. These states made clear that the NPT would not be acceptable to them without this feature.

In ratifying the NPT a number of countries have emphasized the relationship of arms control to non-proliferation.

In May 1975 the FRG declared in part:

"The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international détente, and peace and that in particular the nuclear weapon states will intensify their efforts in accordance with the undertaking and aims embodied in Article VI of the Treaty * * *." (Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 2, 1975.)

In ratifying the NPT the Government of Japan stated:

"* * * The Government of Japan urges the nuclear weapon states which have special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, to take concrete nuclear disarmament measures such as the reduction of nuclear arms and the realization of a

comprehensive nuclear test ban, in accordance with Article VI of this treaty. It urges the nuclear-weapon states not party to this treaty also to take nuclear disarmament measures." (Statement of the Government of Japan, June 8, 1976.)

The most recent party to the NPT, Indonesia, reiterated this basic relationship when it became the 110th party to the NPT on July 12, 1979:

"* * * If, on the one hand, States Parties to the Treaty which are not in possession of nuclear weapons, have, under Article II of the Treaty, the obligation not to receive, possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, Indonesia holds, on the other hand, the view that nuclear weapon states should equally observe the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty relating to the cessation of nuclear arms race." (Declaration of the Government of Indonesia, July 12, 1979.)

The same point has been emphasized repeatedly in resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and was strongly reaffirmed last year at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, which stated in its final document: "The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon states beside the existing five nuclear-weapon states, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear-arms race and to achieve disarmament * * * and all states undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons."

In 1975, a conference to review the operation of the NPT was held. The performance of the nuclear weapon states in living up to their obligations under Article VI of the treaty was particularly controversial. We and the Soviet Union were repeatedly attacked for inadequate attention to disarmament. A number of states (including Mexico, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia) suggested protocols to the NPT which would have imposed a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and sharp reductions in the numbers of delivery vehicles when the number of NPT parties reached 100. Yugoslavia even threatened to withdraw from the Treaty in part because "the nuclear weapon states have not fulfilled their basic obligation under the Treaty:

1. They have not discontinued the nuclear arms race
2. They have not stopped the nuclear weapon tests
3. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons has continued * * *." (Statement of the Government of Yugoslavia, May 30, 1975.)

Another Review Conference will convene next June. We anticipate that the degree to which the nuclear weapon states have lived up to their obligations under Article VI will again be a critical point.

Most responsible non-nuclear weapon states consider U.S. and Soviet willingness to negotiate reductions in the arms race as essential to the success of world-wide efforts to control proliferation. For these states, the discrimination of the NPT was considered an essential but temporary expedient undertaken by them while the nuclear weapon states began the process of reducing their own stockpiles. These states have made clear that they do not find it acceptable that they must continue to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, while the nuclear weapon states continue the arms race unabated. Above all, they do not accept the notion that they must live up to their obligations under the NPT, but we can ignore our own.

If SALT were rejected, some countries which are not parties to the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which creates a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Latin America) might use the failure of SALT II to defend their own continued refusal to commit themselves to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. The government of India has made it clear that India's acceptance of international safeguards on its nuclear facilities is in part dependent on a non-discriminatory comprehensive test ban treaty and on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Other countries—in Europe, Africa, Latin America, South Asia, or Southeast Asia—which are now parties to one or both of these treaties might use the failure of SALT as an excuse—or a reason—to reconsider their commitment to non-proliferation at the Review Conference next year.

Failure to ratify SALT II would weaken our hand in our continuing effort to persuade non-nuclear weapon states to remain non-nuclear. We will hardly be in a strong political or moral position to ask other nations to hold the nuclear line if we and the Soviets have demonstrated that we are unwilling or unable to control and reduce our own massive nuclear arsenals.

Failure to ratify SALT II would strengthen the hand of those in potential nuclear-weapon states who are arguing that nuclear weapons are necessary or desirable in order to attain regional and international power and influence.

The immediate bottom line of failure to ratify SALT II would be a net loss in our ability to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. The ultimate consequence of failure in this larger effort would be a net loss to the security of all.

Comprehensive test ban.—SALT II ratification would strengthen the framework of progress in arms control and thus increase prospects for successful conclusions of CTB negotiations. Failure to ratify SALT, on the other hand, would have a seriously adverse effect on the negotiating climate for CTB.

Taken together, SALT II and a comprehensive test ban treaty would have mutually reinforcing effects in moderating and stabilizing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. Since neither we nor the Soviets could be expected to deploy new types of nuclear warheads without fully testing them, a CTB would, in effect, freeze deployed nuclear warhead technologies at present levels. This does not mean, of course, that no warheads will be available for new delivery systems permitted under SALT II. It does mean, however, that any new systems will have to employ warheads of already proven design. Over the longer term, a durable CTB regime inevitably would involve constraints on overall nuclear force modernization on both sides, which would reinforce those SALT constraints on new types and modernization.

A CTB would place important constraints on Soviet nuclear improvements. In particular, it would constrain further improvements in the yield-to-weight ratios of Soviet warheads, thus preventing them from putting their missile throw weight to most efficient use. Moreover, since a CTB would make it difficult for the Soviets to develop highly fractionated MIRV payloads for their SLBM's, it is likely that we will be able to continue to maintain our large advantage in numbers of SLBM warheads. In addition, a CTB could inhibit the Soviets' ability to field a cruise missile force as efficient and sophisticated as our own.

Ratification of SALT II will establish a more predictable and stable strategic environment and will reduce perceived needs—on both sides—to conduct nuclear tests in order to support new strategic force requirements. Without the constraints on strategic force improvements imposed by SALT II, a much wider range of options would be open to U.S. and Soviet force planners. The unstable strategic competition that would result from failure of SALT would create intense pressures in both countries for major new strategic programs. This would in turn lead to greater demands for development and testing of new warheads for the new delivery systems.

Ratification of SALT II would not automatically produce the flexibility needed at the CTB negotiating table, but failure of SALT could doom this latest hopeful round of negotiations in the decades-old effort to halt nuclear testing.

After seven years of negotiating under three Presidential administrations, failure to ratify SALT II will severely damage our credibility as a negotiating partner. Soviet negotiaters would see little incentive to make the concessions, especially on verification, that would be needed to reach an agreement on a CTB treaty.

Successful conclusion of a CTB Treaty would also have a beneficial effect on our non-proliferation efforts.

Even most of those NPT holdouts which are of concern from a proliferation point of view have adhered to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This suggests strongly that a CTB would attract broad adherence by the non-nuclear-weapon states. Important NPT holdouts might well become parties to a CTB.

A comprehensive test ban—with such widespread adherence—would drastically reduce the potential for regional competition to develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon capability. While some states with a reasonable advanced nuclear industry may be capable of fabricating crude nuclear explosives without testing, a ban on testing would severely inhibit the ability to develop militarily effective devices and would take away much of the political and military incentive to pursue a nuclear option at all.

Finally, a CTB would make a major contribution towards a successful NPT Review Conference next year.

Ratification of SALT II would thus bolster our non-proliferation efforts—not only directly, but also indirectly by opening the way to a CTB treaty.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.—These negotiations, which play such a key role in European security, are at a potentially decisive stage. We are now at the point where if the data base problem can be solved, an agreement could be within sight.

The East has accepted the Western principle of the common ceilings. But disagreement over the current size of the forces causes problems in negotiating, achieving, and verifying reductions. Stated simply, there is a discrepancy between the West's estimate of current Eastern forces and the East's tabled figures. We have

made some progress in determining the areas where these discrepancies lie. Resolution of the discrepancies is the next, essential step.

There is a serious question as to whether MBFR could continue at all in the aftermath of a failure to ratify SALT II.

Anti-Satellite Negotiations.—The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in negotiations aimed at placing limitations both on attacks against space objects and also on the means to make such attacks.

The U.S. goal in these negotiations is to prevent an arms race in weapons for attacking space objects. Such a race would increase threats to both sides' satellites, and it would be expensive. The United States would prefer to avoid such a race by negotiating with the Soviet Union equitable limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

These negotiations are related to SALT in that any restrictions on the means to attack satellites would increase the confidence of each side in the survivability of its satellites used for verification of arms control agreements.

While there remain serious problems, both technical and substantive, for the sides to resolve, I believe it is fair to say we have made progress toward agreement in this area. There is a chance that the arms race in anti-satellite weapons can be avoided. In my opinion, however, there is very little chance of reaching an agreement with the Soviets on anti-satellite weapons if SALT is not ratified. Although the rationale for an anti-satellite agreement would still exist, it is unlikely that the climate in which negotiations proceed would allow progress toward such an agreement.

It is important to emphasize that ratification of SALT II will not automatically produce rapid and major progress on these other arms control initiatives. Failure of SALT II could, however, cripple our efforts in these other areas which touch directly on U.S. security.

The CHAIRMAN. As I was about to say, this hearing is adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, when we will hear Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., July 11, 1979.]

SALT II TREATY

WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senators Garn and Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This morning our witnesses are the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Harold Brown, and Hon. William J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Following the testimony of these gentlemen, the committee will hear from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Secretary, I will forgo my introductory remarks in order that we can save time, and I invite you to proceed to your statement.

[Senator Church's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH

This morning the committee's examination of the SALT II Treaty turns from the political and arms control context to address the strategic balance—those areas of direct military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We will consider the evolving military balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, what military problems we will face over the next several years, and how SALT II figures in the defense planning of both countries.

As I have observed before, we are not here to pass judgment on the character of the Soviet Union. Yet, in our examination of how this Treaty contributes to our national security, it is important that we identify the assumptions we make about Soviet intentions, military policies and doctrine. Of utmost importance is our ability, with or without this Treaty, to field the necessary military forces, to deter a Soviet attack or political pressure on the United States, our allies, or our other interests around the world.

A lot has happened since 1972 when the first SALT Treaty was signed. The euphoria of detente disappeared long ago. Instead of a period of relaxation, of decreased military competition, and of expanded trade relations, over the past decade we have seen the Soviets aggressively pursuing their own interests in different parts of the world, and continuing the buildup of their military forces across the board. We have seen the Soviet Union emerge from a position of military inferiority to obtain rough parity with and in some areas, superiority over the United States.

Over the past ten years, the Soviets have continued to expand their forces facing China, and extensively modernize their conventional and theater nuclear forces in Europe. During the period of SALT I, they have taken advantage of improvements allowed by the Treaty, to field several new types of missiles, each more deadly than the one it replaced.

Now, despite the improvements we have made to our own strategic forces, we are faced by the prospect of the theoretical vulnerability of our ICBMs.

The American people want to understand the implications of this Treaty. They want to know how SALT II will succeed where SALT I has failed to restrain Soviet nuclear might; they want to know how the United States will be more secure with the Treaty than without it; they want to know how SALT II will reduce the costly burden of the arms race.

This morning we again welcome Secretary Brown, who will address the question of SALT and strategic military balance. Secretary Brown is accompanied by William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. After they testify and the Committee has concluded its questioning of Secretary Brown and Under Secretary Perry, we will welcome the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their testimony.

Mr. Secretary, would you proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to follow your example as much as I can, and will be brief in my statement by not reading the bulk of it; however, I will refer to it.

I am very pleased, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, to testify before you today again on SALT, this time SALT and the strategic balance. I would like to submit for the record our joint statement which has been provided to you, mine and Dr. Perry's, and discuss more briefly in oral testimony the key issues you are considering today.

Then, Dr. Perry will elaborate further on some matters; namely, our planned programs to modernize our strategic deterrent, and then we would be happy to answer your questions.

ADEQUACY OF STRATEGIC FORCES

Strategic nuclear forces are only a part of our military capability. They account for a relatively small part of our defense expenditures, even including their associated infrastructure and, depending on how the estimate is made, somewhere between 12 and 15 percent of the total. But, it is only by a strategic nuclear war that the physical existence of the United States could be militarily threatened in the foreseeable future. Thus, our very highest military priority is to assure that our strategic forces are fully adequate, first, to preserve the physical integrity of the United States by deterring strategic nuclear war, because it surely would not be possible to do so if there were a strategic nuclear war; second, by maintaining the perception and the reality that U.S. forces are as capable as those of the Soviet Union; and third, to promote greater stability by limiting the pressures to build up strategic arms and reducing the incentives for either side to resort to nuclear weapons.

U.S. DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

Deterrence of nuclear wars is our most fundamental defense objective. A credible deterrent is achieved when our enemies believe that if they start a course of action that will lead to war, they will either pay an unacceptable price or be frustrated in their attempt to achieve their objective. Essential equivalence, which is our second broad objective, goes beyond deterrence.

It reflects the reality that nuclear forces have a political impact, influenced both by static measures such as numbers of warheads, equivalent megatonnage, throw-weight, and so forth, and by dynamic; that is, war gaming, evaluation of military capability. Maintaining essential equivalence of strategic nuclear forces is necessary to prevent the Soviets from gaining political advantage from a real or perceived strategic imbalance, and also to prevent them from gaining a potential military advantage.

In terms of specific forces, the United States leads in some categories and the Soviets in others. U.S. gaps in some comparative measures are compatible with essential equivalence if the gaps are offset by compensatory U.S. advantages in other measures. The judgment of overall imbalance, whether perceived or real, is not compatible with essential equivalence. Of course, perception is in the eyes of the beholder, and there are differences in judgment on that matter, but essential equivalence does exist today.

THE FUTURE CHALLENGE

Our present strategic forces provide by any standard a credible deterrent. We have both the forces and the targeting and employment policies to allow selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited provocations. While the present balance is adequate in terms of our objectives of deterrence and equivalence, there are challenges that we face for the future and that we cannot ignore.

The first is force obsolescence. The strategic forces operational today, the B–52, the Minuteman, and Polaris/Poseidon, were developed in the 1950's and the 1960's. Since June 1975, as a result of decisions made years ago, we have deployed no additional ICBM's, while over the same period the Soviets, making up for their late start on MIRVing, have produced and deployed over 500 ICBM's of new or improved types.

This exemplifies the greater current momentum of the new strategic system deployments by the Soviets' momentum, evident in qualitative as well as quantitative terms.

They began to deploy MIRV's on their ICBM's a few years ago, and will exceed 5,000 warheads in their ICBM force by the early to mid-1980's. They have tested a new ICBM guidance system which we believe will provide improved guidance accuracies in their deployed forces. The combination of accurate guidance and the large number of warheads expected in the early 1980's will give their ICBM force the capability to destroy most of our ICBM silos with a relatively small fraction of their ICBM force.

That is the most serious single problem we face, probably in terms of threats to our strategic forces, certainly in terms of perceptions of equivalence.

Fortunately, we can afford to have a degradation in the survivability of our ICBM force for a temporary period because our overall strategic capability remains very good thanks to our strategic concept of a Triad, whose other two legs are not now threatened in the same way.

Soviet improvements in their SLBM force, their submarine-launched ballistic missile force, are also significant. They are developing a new nuclear submarine for launching ballistic missiles, and

a new missile. As they deploy the MIRVed version of the existing SS-N-18, submarine-launched ballistic missile, on their Delta submarines, they will sharply erode our earlier lead in the number of strategic warheads.

The projected increase in SLBM warheads is not only a matter of appearances, but also of reality. Under some circumstances, submarine-launched ballistic missiles could pose a significant counterforce threat to our bombers by barrage attack on our present strategic air command bases. Our air-breathing force will in the future also have to deal with growing Soviet air defense threat posed by look-down, shoot-down interceptors and advanced surface-to-air missiles currently under development.

Well into the 1980's, our bombers will, however, be able to penetrate Soviet defenses, and our air-launched cruise missiles will be able to do so indefinitely.

Fortunately, we are also quite confident that through the 1980's, which is about as far as we can confidently predict, our submarine-launched ballistic missiles will remain secure because submarines in which they are located cannot be located by Soviet antisubmarine warfare forces sufficiently well for an ICBM barrage attack to be effective against them, but we cannot simply assume that our submarine-launched ballistic missile force will remain invulnerable indefinitely.

STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION

Maintaining deterrence and essential equivalence through the next decade and beyond will require strategic force modernization in reaction to obsolescence, to vulnerability to attack, or to Soviet defenses, and to the need to maintain essential equivalence.

The first challenge results from our lagging investment in strategic forces during the last decade. The latter two result from a continuing Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces buildup. Without reaction on our part, these would ultimately increase the vulnerability of our forces to destruction either before they are launched or before they reach their targets, thus tilting the worldwide perceptions of the strategic balance.

For these reasons, we have been working to find ways to restore the survivability of ICBM's, to maintain our SLBM survivability in future decades, and to strengthen the survivability of the air-breathing forces.

We have programs in the works to do all of these things. The most difficult issue to resolve has been the survivability of the land-based leg of the Triad. We will deploy a new ICBM in a mobile-basing mode both survivable and verifiable, and the choice has been made of a full-scale, that is, 190,000-pound, M-X for this purpose. That is the largest new missile permitted under SALT II.

In military terms, it will be as capable in the light of the limit on fractionation of payloads as any the Soviets can deploy. Our submarine-launched ballistic missile modernization program is already well underway. This year we will begin deployment of the new Trident I; that is, the C-4 missile, in our submarine fleet.

The first new Trident submarine, launched earlier this spring, will be on patrol late in 1981. Our bomber modernization program

will provide a near-term response to counter Soviet initiatives in air defense. The two competing designs for the air-launched cruise missile begin fly-off flight testing this summer, and we will begin series production next year to achieve an interim operational capability in 1982.

Our modernization program also includes improvements to our strategic command, control, and communications network. Dr. Perry will be going into more detail on those in just a few minutes.

U.S. FORCE RESPONSE TO HYPOTHETICAL SOVIET ATTACK

The aggregate effect of these modernization plans will be to preserve our deterrent and essential equivalence through the next decade. We can't measure deterrence directly, but one way to make an appropriate assessment is to examine how our forces could respond to a hypothetical Soviet attack, and one way to measure that is to look at the total available warheads before they are attacked, after a Soviet attack, and then after a U.S. response.

We have prepared some charts, which I will show you in a minute, that shows the results of these calculations. Let me step over here. Here are the charts which show what happens as a function of time, and they show the total number of warheads on the United States and the Soviet side on-line; that is, before a war began.

[See fig. 2a on p. 310.]

Secretary BROWN. As you see, the Soviet force building during the 1970's has caused a rapid increase of the relative number of warheads the Soviets have on-line compared to those of the United States, which is the blue line. The Soviets are the red. This is one measure. If we used megatons, the Soviets would look better, but warheads are better, although neither is a perfect measure of force capability.

As you see, the U.S. force building measures in the form of additional submarine-launched ballistic missile deployments and air-launched cruise missile deployments cause us to stay ahead during the first half of the 1980's, and then the coming on-line of additional cruise missiles and of M–X warheads causes us to regain much of our lead.

BASIS FOR NUMBER OF WARHEADS PROJECTION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before you remove that chart, let me ask a question or two. That chart projects the number of warheads that the United States and the Soviet Union will possess up to 1990?

Secretary BROWN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the SALT II Treaty would last until 1985?

Secretary BROWN. Actually until 1986, the end of 1985.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the basis for the projection beyond the term of the treaty, which is 1986?

Secretary BROWN. We assume in this that SALT II would remain in effect but that no further reductions would be made. This is an assumption that is neither the best nor the worst. Naturally, as you go further out, with or without a SALT Treaty, the projections become less certain.

The CHAIRMAN. Based upon that assumption, it follows that your projections fall within the limitations of the treaty both for the United States and the Soviet Union.

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On what basis do you assume, then, that the Soviet Union will flatten out its production of warheads from 1984 to 1990, while the United States continues to increase the gap?

Secretary BROWN. Well, they will have taken advantage—not quite of all, but almost all that SALT II allows them by that time. I say not quite of all. They could change by a couple of thousand.

SALT II WARHEAD LIMITS

The CHAIRMAN. SALT II allows them as many warheads as it allows us, doesn't it?

Secretary BROWN. SALT II does not limit warheads directly. It limits the launchers and indirectly the missiles that carry them, and because it limits the number of reentry vehicles on a missile and limits the number of cruise missiles on a bomber, it indirectly limits the number of warheads.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is a very important point. Because of the method that numbers of warheads are controlled by the treaty, it will be possible for the United States to maintain larger numbers of warheads than the Soviet Union.

Secretary BROWN. It will be possible, but it is not assured, both because the Soviets do have some leeway and also because this assumes that the United States goes ahead with its program.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as the treaty is concerned, it would be possible for the United States to maintain a lead in the number of warheads if it decides to build them.

Secretary BROWN. Indeed, that is so. Our projections are that that would probably be so.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

ACCURACY OF WARHEADS FORCE PROJECTION

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you to preserve that chart for posterity? I would be surprised if in 1985 that chart actually proved to be an accurate forecast of what the Soviets will be doing.

Secretary BROWN. I think through 1985 it is probably a good projection, because strategic weapons programs move slowly. They take time. They have to be planned far ahead. They can be provisioned fairly far ahead. I am not saying these numbers will be exactly right. I am sure they won't. They could be 10 or 20 percent off, but they won't be off by a factor of two if the SALT agreement is approved.

If SALT II is not approved, we produce rather different results.

CHART MISLEADING

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, isn't it the case that each individual warhead of the Soviet Union is so much larger than ours that putting their red line under our blue line is quite misleading?

Secretary BROWN. As I said in the introduction to my remarks when I first walked up to the stand, Senator Stone, there are other ways of measuring. If you took megatons, the Soviet numbers would be higher relative to ours. If you took equivalent megatons, they wouldn't be as much higher, but if you ask how many targets can be destroyed, this is the right measure. There is no single correct measure. This is the best, because we are talking about warheads large enough to destroy any reasonably sized urban industrial target, and we are also talking about warheads that are large enough to destroy military targets.

Senator STONE. Silos?

Secretary BROWN. That is another measure. We have charts for all of this. It is my judgment that this is the best measure. You will hear in coming days from people who will produce quite different figures, discussing something quite different. Indeed, these do include silos, but they are subsumed under a larger target system, because the cruise missiles, for example, that are included in here have the highest accuracy of any of these systems, and yes, indeed, they can destroy silos.

Let me mention that without SALT II, all of the projections are more uncertain because one of the things that the SALT II agreement does is reduce unpredictability. But again, by a similar kind of calculation which has a modest reliability, we project that without SALT II, by 1985 the Soviet Union will be up here [indicating] and the United States would be here [indicating].

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, before we leave this chart, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator McGovern.

BASIS FOR PROJECTION ASSUMPTION UNTIL 1990

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Secretary, you are projecting an assumption after 1985 through 1990 which does not show any reduction. I had thought your assumption was that we would then be in SALT III with substantial reductions following the end of the SALT II period in 1985. What is the basis of the assumption that we are going to hold at the same high level until 1990?

Secretary BROWN. As I indicated, you have to make an assumption when you make a calculation, and as I indicated to the Chairman, the assumption we made for this calculation was that the SALT II limits continue to apply. As I indicated to the Chairman, that is neither the most optimistic assumption nor the one that we hope is fulfilled. We would hope that there would be considerable reductions. Nor is it the most pessimistic one. The most pessimistic one would be, well, there is a more pessimistic one for 1985, and if you assume that at the end of 1985 SALT expires and there is no arms limit, then the numbers would be higher than this, but beginning at the end of 1985.

Senator MCGOVERN. I realize it is neither the most optimistic nor the most pessimistic, but is it the most likely? Is that why it is your assumption?

Secretary BROWN. No, if you do not make this assumption, then the number of alternatives gets very much larger. You know, I could give you a chart. In fact, what I would like to give you a

chart of is something that shows that [indicating] for both of them. That is what I would like to see happen, but I am not sure how it would help us.

Senator McGovern. What I would like to have you show us is that SALT III is promising enough so that we are going to see those lines taper down after 1985.

Secretary Brown. I can and have looked at possible SALT III agreements and the numbers that go with them, and they are very much lower. Between now and then, you have to negotiate such a SALT III agreement, and that is not easy.

Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Sarbanes?

Senator Sarbanes. I think it would be more helpful if the Secretary's chart ended at 1985. That would show us what the existing situation was and what the situation would be projected with an agreement.

Secretary Brown. And without.

Senator Sarbanes. Yes, and without. And then, if we had another chart it could show the various options after 1985, which can go in a number of different directions. But it confuses the issue to tack on one assumption of what happens after 1985, which is a very long way away, to the existing situation, and the projected situation between now and 1985, SALT or no SALT.

Secretary Brown. We can easily stop the chart at 1985, and we can look at various assumptions beyond. I worry about the assumptions beyond, including this one, because when you are dealing with what the probabilities are for negotiations in 1985, you really are almost just guessing.

The Chairman. Projections beyond 1985 would depend upon the success of negotiations on SALT III.

Secretary Brown. Yes.

The Chairman. Only a successful negotiation of SALT III will begin to turn the chart downward. I think the whole world wants to see the chart turn downward.

Secretary Brown. Yes.

The Chairman. But we are not there yet. I think, Mr. Secretary, this committee would appreciate it if you would prepare comparable charts showing the other methods of measurement. That is to say, a chart which would make these projections based upon throw weight, megatonnage, equivalent megatonnage, and hard target capability.

Secretary Brown. Yes, we can do that.

The Chairman. If you would, please, we would appreciate it.

Secretary Brown. Certainly.

[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary Brown. Let me point out again that these are just static measures.

[See fig. 2b on p. 311.]

SCENARIO AFTER SOVIET FIRST STRIKE

Secretary Brown. If you look at what happens after a Soviet first strike, which is a scenario which has been mentioned often in the course of these hearings, that shows that the remaining capa-

bility—the Soviets have struck in this, and we have not done anything yet. You will notice that it brings down both curves, because the Soviets use up some of their forces in striking, and they destroy some of ours with those strikes. Again, the situation improves relatively for the Soviets through the early eighties. Then it stays about the same. Then it starts to pick up for us in the 1983, 1984–85 period, as cruise missiles come into the inventory, and again, without SALT, both numbers are higher and the Soviets have a more distinct advantage in 1985.

SCENARIO AFTER U.S. RETALIATORY STRIKE

[See fig. 2c on p. 312.]

Secretary BROWN. Then if you look at what happens after a U.S. retaliatory strike, but a retaliatory strike against Soviet nuclear capability, you find that again the numbers go down, that the U.S. figures cross over the Soviet line on the way up again, in 1983. I would urge you not to take this kind of detail all too serious, because it is a matter of the detail of the calculation.

Uncertainties in the calculations are substantial, and the main point to get from this, from all these charts is that the Soviets will improve their relative position in the rest of the seventies, the early eighties. The United States will begin to recover its relative position as the eighties wear on.

BASIS FOR DECLINE IN SOVIET WARHEADS AFTER 1983–84

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry I came in late, but what is the basis for your prediction that the Soviet line will start coming down after 1983, 1984?

Secretary BROWN. What happens there is that the U.S. cruise missile capability and M–X capability will in a retaliatory strike be able to destroy a good many Soviet warheads.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And therefore what will that mean?

Secretary BROWN. These calculations are a matter of considerable detail and discussion of the detail may not be warranted here. What is happening is, the Soviets use up warheads in trying to attack survivable U.S. capability.

Senator HAYAKAWA. In the diagram prior to that in which no strike has been made at all [see fig. 2a on p. 310.], the first one you had up there, from 1983 onward, the Soviet line remains stable and then starts going down after 1985.

Secretary BROWN. Yes. Well, actually, it is flat, essentially flat. That is because the Soviets by then will have used up most of their capability under SALT II to add warheads.

PUTTING STOCK IN PROJECTIONS

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you a question, please. When you asked us not to put too much stock in these, are you saying they are really not credible? Are they done on a best-case basis? Or a worst-case basis? What do you mean?

Secretary BROWN. There are a number of reasons not to put so much stock in these. First of all, they contain a great many assumptions, not so many in this chart as in the others. The other

charts make assumptions as to how a thermonuclear war would proceed. As I suggested to you on Monday, I do not pretend to know with any certainty how that would happen, and I am not prepared to say to you that you should think, you know, therefore, the assumptions as to what an attack would be like, quite aside from its effects, how an attack would be mounted, what targets would be aimed at, should not be given a high degree of assurance.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Secretary, that flat line there also declines toward the end. Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. Not particularly. I am sure I could go back and look at the details of the assumptions that went in and tell you, well, that assumes that the Soviets are retiring in the year 1989 certain things that have more warheads than things that they are then bringing into the force.

Senator HAYAKAWA. The Soviets have never reduced their capacities in this respect at any time in history, have they?

Secretary BROWN. They have reduced some systems and we have reduced some systems. One thing to remember is, for example, that the United States probably has about half as much megatonnage in its strategic forces or a little less now than it had in 1963 or 1964. Yet we would say, and I believe we would say correctly, that our capabilities are very much larger. That means you have to be careful what you use as a measure of capability.

WARHEAD SIZE COMPARISON ON SLBM'S, ICBM'S

Senator HAYAKAWA. Are our warheads on submarine-launched and land-launched missiles identical, comparable in size?

Secretary BROWN. Some are and some are not. Some are hundreds of kilotons. Some are megatons.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Have those differences been taken into account?

Secretary BROWN. Not in measuring warheads. I said when I began this, Senator Hayakawa, that this is one measure. I happen to think that it is the best, but there is no perfect measure.

If you look at ability to destroy hard targets, neither submarine-launched ballistic missiles nor ICBM's are the best. Actually, cruise missiles are the best because they have the highest accuracy. You can aggregate these figures in various ways, and it is a matter of judgment what is the most important.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BROWN. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Glenn.

CLARIFICATION OF CHARTS

Senator GLENN. I gather the first chart you had here was based on the actual numbers of warheads, the others were relative lines. Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. All three are numbers, but the numbers are not shown. The numbers are classified.

Senator GLENN. Perhaps I misread the charts, because it looked to me as though when they attacked, our numbers did not go down, and when we attacked, their numbers do go down.

Secretary BROWN. No, when they attack, their numbers and our numbers go down. What is shown there is the survival.

Senator GLENN. But you did not show any dip in both lines at that point, did you? That is the reason I thought they were relative instead of actual numbers.

Secretary BROWN. I believe they are actual numbers, but I will take a look and see whether the scales are the same.

MEANINGFUL TEST OF SALT II TREATY

Let me pass very quickly to my last few points. One meaningful test of the SALT II Treaty is to compare the strategic balance of the present and the near future, which is the product of decisions made by both sides a decade or more ago with the balance that will exist in the immediate post-treaty years after 1985. Some contend that in 1985 under SALT the United States will be condemned to strategic inferiority. It appears that the principal basis for this claim is that in 1985 the U.S. Minuteman force will be vulnerable to Soviet ICBM attack, and that we would be unable by use of U.S. ballistic missiles to retaliate in kind against Soviet ICBM's if they attack ours.

That point came up on Monday, and I believe it was raised again yesterday. I don't believe the United States will face strategic inferiority in 1985, or at any other time before or later, if we have SALT II and if we do the things we need and plan to do to modernize our own forces.

U.S. BOMBER, SUBMARINE FORCE CAPABILITY IN 1985

In particular, in 1985, our bomber and submarine force will be far more capable than today, and far more capable than the corresponding Soviet force. In 1985, the United States would have a range of devastating responses open to us for the Soviets to run the enormous risks of an attack on our ICBM's. It bears emphasizing, because it is so often ignored, that even after a total loss of Minuteman missiles, we would not face the dilemma of surrender by inaction or mutual suicide by an all-out attack on Soviet cities and industry, provoking an equivalent attack on ours.

We would instead have surviving bomber and submarine forces still fully capable of selectively attacking military, economic, and control targets, thus negating any gain the Soviets might imagine they could obtain by an attack on our ICBM force. In the aftermath of an attack on U.S. ICBM's, the remaining Soviet ICBM's would not be in sanctuary. Our air-launched cruise missiles and surviving bombers would have the accuracy, the numbers, and the ability to penetrate defenses sufficiently well to allow the United States very significantly to reduce the residual Soviet ICBM force.

The time for cruise missiles to arrive on target would be longer than the time for ICBM's to arrive, but that element of difference is only one among many factors in determining the balance.

The Soviets could not hope to gain political or diplomatic leverage from their advantage in a narrow area, ICBM vulnerability, particularly providing that we act to correct that ICBM vulnerability over time.

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SUMMARY

To summarize, with the programs the administration proposes, we will retain an adequate strategic balance through 1985, and we will improve the relative balance thereafter, though the balance will be less favorable in the early 1980's to us than it is now. The SALT II agreement will produce a more favorable balance for the United States during its duration than we would have without it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Perry is prepared to go into more detail on the modernization programs that would assure our continued essential equivalence, and I think it might be worth your time to hear 10 minutes or so of that.

[Secretary Brown's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE: MILITARY ASSESSMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to testify before you today on the strategic balance and SALT. With me is Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. With your approval, I would like to submit for the record our joint statement, and discuss more briefly in oral testimony the key issues you are considering today. Dr. Perry will then elaborate further our planned programs to modernize our strategic deterrent. Following that, we would be pleased to answer your questions.

My discussions today will be divided into four parts. First is a statement of our strategic policy goals and an assessment of our present forces relative to those goals. Second, I will review the challenge posed by the continuing Soviet strategic force buildup. Third, a description of the U.S. strategic force modernization plan developed in response to this challenge. And fourth, a discussion of proposed SALT II constraints and their impact on the future strategic military balance.

STRATEGIC POLICY GOALS

Strategic nuclear forces are only a part of our military capability. They account for a relatively small part—including their associated infrastructure and depending on how the estimate is made, 12–15%—of our defense expenditures. My estimates given to you two days ago, in answer to questions, were of the direct expenditures on strategic forces. Our non-nuclear general purpose forces consume more of the budget and are much more likely to be used. They have to be relied on for deterring and defending against many threats for which strategic nuclear forces alone, no matter how capable, would not be a credible deterrent, and are still less so in an era of parity in strategic forces. But it is only by a strategic nuclear war that the physical existence of the United States could be militarily threatened in the foreseeable future. Thus, our very highest military priority is to assure that our strategic forces are fully adequate to:

(1) Preserve the physical integrity of the U.S. by deterring strategic nuclear war, and contribute to deterring other actions that, though short of a nuclear attack on the U.S., nevertheless threaten our vital national interests.

(2) Maintain the perception—and the reality—that U.S. forces are as capable as those of the U.S.S.R., that there is no level of nuclear conflict at which the U.S.S.R. could gain a military or political advantage. This will aid both in deterrence of nuclear war and, if it nevertheless occurs, in ending it at as low a level of intensity and on terms as favorable as possible to the U.S. (recognizing that we are dealing with degrees of catastrophe).

(3) Promote greater stability by limiting the pressures to build up strategic arms, and reducing the incentives for either side to resort to nuclear weapons.

Deterrence of nuclear war is our most fundamental defense objective. A credible deterrent is achieved when our enemies believe that if they start a course of action that could lead to war, they will either pay an unacceptable price or be frustrated in their attempt to achieve their objective. Adequate deterrence requires the capability to inflict, regardless of the circumstances, assured destruction on a potential attacker.

Assured destruction is necessary for nuclear deterrence, but it is not, in my judgment, sufficient as a strategic doctrine or as a sole basis for determining the characteristics of our strategic forces. While I have serious doubts about whether a nuclear war, once started, could be kept limited, it would be imprudent to place the United States in a position in which uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow. Massive retaliation may not be appropriate, nor will its prospect be sufficiently credible in all circumstances to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent. Effective deterrence requires forces of sufficient size and flexibility to attack selectively a range of military and other targets, yet enable us to hold back a significant and enduring reserve. The ability to provide measured retaliation is essential to credible deterrence.

Essential equivalence—our second broad objective—goes beyond deterrence. It reflects the reality that nuclear forces have a political impact influenced by static measures (numbers of warheads, throw weight, equivalent megatonnage, etc.), and by dynamic (war-gaming) evaluation of military capability. We need forces of size and character so that we, the Soviets, and third countries perceive that we cannot be coerced or intimidated by larger or more capable Soviet forces.

As long as our relationship with the Soviet Union is more competitive than cooperative—and this is clearly the case for the relevant future—maintaining essential equivalence of strategic nuclear forces is necessary to prevent the Soviets from gaining political advantage from a real or perceived strategic imbalance.

In terms of specific forces, the United States leads in some categories; the Soviets lead in others. The Soviets have more and larger land-based missiles, megatonnage, extensive air defenses, and a larger number of submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We have offsetting advantages, for example, in numbers of warheads (particularly SLBM and bomber warheads), accuracy, bomber forces, and submarine survivability. U.S. gaps in some comparative measures are compatible with essential equivalence if the gaps are offset by compensatory U.S. advantages in other measures; a judgment of overall imbalance, whether perceived or real, is not compatible with essential equivalence. Essential equivalence exists today.

Our present strategic forces also provide, by any standard, a credible deterrent. We have today—and will take whatever measures are required to sustain—survivable forces capable of mass destruction of Soviet cities and industry, even after an all-out surprise attack on our forces by the Soviets. We also have both the forces and the targeting and employment policies to allow selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited provocations.

THE FUTURE CHALLENGE

While the present balance is adequate in terms of our objectives of deterrence and equivalence, we face challenges for the future that we cannot ignore. Indeed, while the strategic balance through 1985 will continue to be adequate, it will be less favorable to us in the early 1980s than it is now.

The first challenge is force obsolescence. Our strategic forces are characterized by a 30- to 40-year life cycle. It typically takes about ten years from the initiation of system development until achievement of complete deployment (what is usually called full operational capability). And the useful operational life of strategic forces is up to about thirty years.

The strategic forces operational today—B-52, Minuteman, and Polaris/Poseidon—were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. No significant new aircraft have been introduced in the heavy bomber force for nearly twenty years (though the medium FB-111 was brought on line in the late 1960s); the last Poseidon submarine was commissioned twelve years ago; and it has been almost ten years since the introduction of Minuteman III into the ICBM force.

We deployed the last Minuteman III in June 1975. That was the culmination of a large US MIRV program for both ICBMs and SLBMs that was some 5–8 years ahead of Soviet programs. But, since that date—as a result of decisions made years ago—we have deployed no additional ICBMs, while over the same period the Soviets, making up for their late start on MIRVing, have produced and deployed over 500 ICBM's of new or improved types. This exemplifies the greater current momentum of the new strategic systems deployments by the Soviets as compared with our own. This momentum is evident in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. Together, these factors affect assessments of essential equivalence and also pose threats to elements of our strategic forces.

The Soviets began to deploy MIRVs on their ICBMs a few years ago and will exceed 5,000 warheads in their ICBM force by the early to mid-1980s. They have tested a new ICBM guidance system which we believe will provide improved guidance accuracies in their deployed forces. The combination of accurate guidance and

the large number of warheads expected in the early 1980s will give their ICBM force the capability to destroy most of our ICBM silos with a relatively small fraction of their ICBM force. This is the most serious single problem we face, probably in terms of threats to our strategic forces and certainly in terms of perceptions of equivalence.

Fortunately, the future vulnerability of the Minuteman force is not the same as vulnerability of the United States. We can afford to have a degradation in the ICBM force for a temporary period because our overall strategic capability remains very good, thanks to our strategic concept of a Triad, whose other legs are not now threatened in the same way. But in recognition of this concern, we have decided to build up the leg of the Triad that is temporarily weak, so that should—at some later time—other parts of our strategic forces become more vulnerable, our overall strategic deterrent will not be eroded.

Soviet improvements in the SLBM force are also significant. The Soviets are developing a new SSBN and a new SLBM (TYPHOON). While Soviet strategic forces have had more delivery vehicles and larger aggregate nuclear yield than the United States, we have had substantially more warheads because of the MIRVs in our SLBM force. This past year the Soviets began deploying the SS–N–18, a MIRVed SLBM. As they deploy the MIRVed version of the SS–N–18 on their DELTA submarines, they will sharply erode our earlier lead in the number of strategic warheads.

The projected increase in SLBM warheads is not only a matter of appearances, but also of reality. Under some circumstances SLBMs could pose a significant counterforce threat to our bombers, by barrage attack on our present Strategic Air Command bases. There is also the potential of our bombers being destroyed with an ICBM barrage attack, whose larger numbers could compensate for the longer bomber escape time, so that even though the bombers get off the ground, they may not escape the area that is barraged. Our air-breathing force will in the future also have to deal with the growing Soviet air defense threat posed by look down-shoot down interceptors and advanced surface to air missiles currently under development. Well into the 1980s our bombers will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses—and our ALCMs indefinitely.

Fortunately, we are also quite confident that, through the 1980's—which is about as far as we can confidently predict—our SLBMs cannot be located by Soviet anti-submarine warfare forces sufficiently well for an ICBM barrage attack to be effective against them. But we are not so sure what ASW capabilities the Soviets may develop and deploy in the 1990s, so we cannot simply assume that our SLBM force will remain invulnerable indefinitely.

STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION

Maintaining deterrence and essential equivalence through the next decade and beyond will require strategic force modernization in reaction to: (1) obsolescence, (2) vulnerability to attack or to defense, and (3) the need to maintain essential equivalence.

The first challenge results from our lagging investment in strategic forces during the last decade.

The latter two result from the continuing Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces buildup which, without reaction on our part, would ultimately increase the vulnerability of our forces, to destruction either before they are launched or before they reach their targets, thus tilting the worldwide perceptions of the strategic balance.

For these reasons, we have been working to find ways to restore the survivability of ICBMs, to maintain our SLBM survivability into future decades, and to strengthen the survivability of the air-breathing forces. We have programs in the works to do all of these things. The longer range of the Trident (C–4) missile will maintain the invulnerability of our SLBM force by expanding the ocean area which would have to be searched to find our submarines. Our cruise missile development will offset improvements in Soviet air defenses as we achieve an initial operational capability in 1982. And our work on a hardened cruise missile carrier will, at a later time, both reduce our vulnerability to a barrage attack on our bomber bases and also allow us to expand substantially the size of the cruise missile force.

The most difficult issue to resolve has been the survivability of the land-based leg of the Triad. We have sought a solution that will satisfy our military need, at a cost in line with past investments in strategic systems and consistent with our efforts to have verifiable strategic arms limitations.

Finding a system that is compatible with all of these things has been a taxing effort. To carry this out we will deploy a new ICBM in a mobile basing mode that is both survivable and verifiable. The President has chosen the full-scale (190,000

pound) MX for this purpose. This is the largest new missile permitted under SALT II.

This missile will in military terms be as capable—in the light of the limit on fractionation of payloads—as any the Soviets can deploy. A comparison of relative ICBM capabilities is provided in Figure 1. Each of the warheads in all of these systems have sufficient yield to provide essentially 100% probability of destroying nearly any soft target (e.g., industrial complexes) in our (or the Soviet) targeting base. The capability which is more often compared is so-called hard target capability. This is proportional to the number of hard targets that each of these missiles can destroy. Figure 1 compares this capability according to the date by which it would be achieved. It is not appropriate to compare the MX with the present SS–18, because the SS–18 exists today and the MX will not be operational until 1986. By the time the MX is operational, the SS–18 may very well have improved its guidance accuracy, which would improve its hard target capability. Figure 1 shows the capability of the SS–18 today and in 1986 allowing for possible improvements in guidance accuracy by that date.

There remain design details to be worked out for the mobile land-based system. These will take some weeks. We expect a decision later this summer that will take into account costs, the needs for invulnerability, environmental concerns and the requirement that the system be adequately verifiable. (The basing system will set a verification standard to which we will hold the Soviets in their own deployments).

Our SLBM modernization program is already well underway. This year we will begin deployment of the new Trident 1 (C–4) missile in our submarine fleet. The first new Trident submarine, launched earlier this spring, will be on patrol in late 1981.

The C–4 missile will significantly enhance our strategic force effectiveness by improving weapon yield, accuracy and range relative to the present C–3. The Trident submarine will also increase the effective size of the force as a result of improved on-station times.

In combination, the Trident submarine and the C–4 missile will provide a significant hedge against future force vulnerability. While we do not expect a serious threat to our SSBNs to develop during the next decade, we must hedge against potential ASW breakthroughs. The C–4 will allow a much greater patrol area as a result of its increased range, and the Trident submarine will be quieter than our present SSBNs, making acoustic detection more difficult.

The Trident submarine allows for future force enhancement as well, by providing room for later increases in SLBM size. We are examining alternative designs of SLBMs which could exploit this potential.

Our bomber modernization program will provide a near term response to counter Soviet initiatives in air defense. The two competing designs for the air launched cruise missile will begin "fly-off" flight testing this summer, and we will begin serial production next year to achieve an IOC in 1982. The cruise missile will provide a radar signature which is less than one one-thousandth that of the B–52, making it very difficult to detect. In addition, the cruise missile will fly at very low altitudes, where ground clutter further complicates detection. Finally, a force of three thousand cruise missiles provides great offensive flexibility—flexibility which can be used to overwhelm defenses selectively, making the task of Soviet air defense planning against cruise missiles very difficult. The programmed cruise missile deployment and our associated cruise missile technology programs will provide the capability to continue to penetrate Soviet air defenses through and beyond the 1980s.

The air-launched cruise missile program also contributes to aggregate measures of essential equivalence by providing thousands of warheads of substantial yield which are guided with very great accuracy. Additional force enhancement and the problem of long term (beyond 1990) bomber obsolescence can be addressed by development of a cruise missile carrier aircraft, or a new penetrating bomber if that proves advisable.

The timing and magnitude of a future cruise missile carrier aircraft program can be adjusted to deal only with force obsolescence (i.e., replacing the B–52), or to provide force enhancement as well. Such a program would also reduce future vulnerability to an SLBM—or ICBM—barrage attack by including aircraft hardening to blast and nuclear effects. Hardening achievable with reasonable designs can increase by tenfold the number of equivalent warheads needed for a successful attack.

Our modernization program also includes improvements to our strategic command, control and communications network. Without a survivable network, we would suffer from the inability to gather information, make decisions, and execute

our forces in consonance with those decisions. This would affect not only our war fighting capability, but also our deterrence and our ability to control the use of nuclear weapons and limit, to the extent possible, escalation. We have analyzed our C^3 system under attack conditions and have initiated both near term and long term improvements required to maintain credible deterrence.

The aggregate effect of these modernization plans will be to preserve our deterrent and essential equivalence through the next decade. We cannot measure deterrence directly. But one way to make an appropriate assessment is to examine how our forces could respond to a hypothetical Soviet attack. Figure 2 compares total available warheads versus time. The first plot (Figure 2a) shows undegraded forces (that is, as they would be before they are attacked). The second (Figure 2b) shows surviving U.S. warheads and remaining Soviet warheads after a Soviet attack. The third (Figure 2c) shows remaining warheads after a U.S. response. The impact of Soviet strategic force building is evident in the adverse trends in the late 1970s to mid 1980s. These trends are the result of aggregate U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear program decisions made throughout the 1970s. The bomber and SLBM improvements resulting from our modernization program, resolutely pursued, will begin to correct these trends by the mid 1980s. And deployment of a new, survivable ICBM beginning in 1986 will reverse them. In short we project that by 1986 we will have by our own programs redressed the threat to the balance. This is evidence both of the need for our programs and of the utility of SALT limits on what we must do to respond.

Essential equivalence is also difficult to measure directly. Figures 3 and 4 compare two static indicators as projected for 1980, 1985 and 1990. Of course, projections for the latter two dates are much more subject to uncertainty—and to future decisions.

These indicators are consistent with our best estimate of Soviet strategic posture under a SALT II agreement and a representative U.S. posture consistent with SALT II. These indicators do not account for reliability or the ability to penetrate defenses. They are static measures.

Figure 3 compares the number and size of U.S. and Soviet warheads. The height of the bar is proportional to the total number of warheads and the width is proportional to the average warhead size. Thus the area in each bar is proportional to the total equivalent megatonnage. We project that we will maintain our lead in total warheads through 1990 while the Soviets will maintain their lead in equivalent megatonnage. This is, broadly, also the current picture.

Figure 4 compares the military capability of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces against soft targets (e.g., industrial complexes) and hard targets (e.g., missile silos). Aggregate military capability against soft targets depends upon the nature of the targets and the geographic distribution (clustering) of the target base. The soft target capability compared in Figure 4 is an appropriate measure of capability against targets clustered in a limited geographic area (e.g., a few square miles). For targets clustered in larger areas, a more appropriate measure is the equivalent megatonnage compared in Figure 3.

The U.S., with its advantage in number of weapons, leads in capability against soft targets in small clusters, while the Soviet Union, with its advantage in warhead yield, leads in capability against soft targets in large clusters.

In Figures 3 and 4, the impact of the U.S. strategic force modernization program is evident in the changes projected during the 1980–1990 time period. It should be noted that in 1985, the hard target capability of the Soviets will have a substantially larger component than ours of prompt (e.g., less than one hour) delivery time that will be redressed by 1990, but is a perceptual problem in the 1985 period, I will return to this issue later in my presentation.

This modernization program is completely consistent with SALT II constraints. We can develop, test, and deploy each of our planned programs—cruise missiles, Trident, MX—in the fashion, and on the schedule, that we have planned. In at least one important respect—Minuteman vulnerability—SALT II will make the solution of a problem easier than without an agreement. SALT II will limit, to well below previously projected levels, the number of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, will freeze the number of warheads on existing ballistic missile launchers, and will limit the number of RVs allowed for new ICBMs. A new mobile ICBM system, regardless of basing mode, will be more survivable because these limits place an upper bound on the number of warheads that can be targeted against the system. SALT II becomes, then, an important step in maintaining the survivability of our ICBMs.

The magnitude of the Soviet threat would not in my judgment be diminished, nor would our ability to respond to such a threat be improved by rejection of SALT II. SALT II will permit all of the actions which are necessary to counter the Soviet

threat. Without SALT II we would need to do more, since the challenge we face would almost certainly be larger in the absence of limits on Soviet actions.

The cost for the United States to maintain the strategic balance is likely to be significantly more if SALT II limits are not in force. The Soviets are capable of deploying significantly more high-quality systems in the absence of an agreement than they would be permitted under the SALT II provisions. Cost estimates of illustrative forces which the United States might deploy so as to maintain the strategic balance in the face of such a Soviet buildup range up to about $15B per year on the average in FY 80 dollars for the next decade. With SALT II, currently planned US forces will cost about $12 billion per year in 1980 dollars for the same period, and that reflects an increase over current spending levels. Thus, without SALT II an additional $30 billion could be incurred over the next ten years. These are very approximate estimates but the nature of the effect of SALT II is clear.

With SALT II we have a framework which can add predictability and stability in the strategic challenges we face. One meaningful test of the SALT II Treaty is to compare the strategic balance of the present and near-future (the product of decisions made by both sides a decade or more ago) with the balance which will exist in the immediate post-Treaty years, after 1985.

I believe it is clear that in 1985 under SALT II we will attain our strategic objectives if we carry out the programs we plan to modernize our forces. That is, in 1985 under SALT, as is true today, Soviet advantages in some areas will be offset by US advantages in others and the overall flexibility, power and survivability of our forces will be such that deterrence, as well as equivalence will be maintained, despite the fact that the Minuteman force will be vulnerable until MX is deployed.

There are some who contend that in 1985 under SALT, the US will be condemned to strategic inferiority. On examination, it appears that the principal basis for this claim is that in 1985, the US Minuteman force will be vulnerable to Soviet ICBM attack and we would be unable, by use of U.S. ballistic missiles, to retaliate in kind against Soviet ICBMs if they attacked ours. In other respects, these critics concede the balance would be rather as it is today—a US reentry vehicle lead (though smaller than now); a Soviet lead in throw weight and concomitantly, megatonnage. Because of the seriousness of the charge—and, I may say, the seriousness of some of the observers by which it is advanced—I want to respond to it directly.

I do not believe the US will face strategic inferiority in 1985—at any other time before or later—if we have SALT and if we do the things we need and plan to do to modernize our own forces. In particular:

In 1985, our bomber and submarine force will be far more capable than today, and far more capable than the corresponding Soviet force.

In 1985 the U.S. would have a range of devastating responses open to it were the Soviets to run the enormous risks of an attack on our ICBMs. It bears emphasizing, because it is so often ignored, that even after a total loss of Minuteman missiles, we would *not* face the dilemma of surrender by inaction or mutual suicide by an all-out attack on Soviet cities and industry, provoking an equivalent attack on ours. We would instead have surviving bomber and submarine forces still fully capable of selectively attacking military, economic, and control targets, thus negating any gain the Soviets might imagine they could attain by an attack on our ICBM force.

In the aftermath of an attack on US ICBMs, the remaining Soviet ICBMs would not be in sanctuary. Our ALCMs in surviving bombers would have the accuracy, numbers, and ability to penetrate defenses sufficient to allow us significantly to reduce the residual Soviet ICBM force. The time for cruise missiles to arrive on target would be longer than the time for ICBMs to arrive, but that element of difference is only one among many factors in determining the balance.

All these facts being true, the Soviets could not hope to gain political or diplomatic leverage from their advantage in a narrow area—ICBM vulnerability. In connection with the political effects of the balance we anticipate in 1985, it is worth pointing out that by the mid-80's, Soviet ICBMs as well as ours will be increasingly vulnerable to a first strike by the other side's fixed ICBMs. Our Minuteman III alone, equipped with MK12A and improved guidance, would have considerable counter silo potential, especially if one considers the possibility of preferentially targeting the limited number of MIRVed Soviet ICBMs. In political terms, the fact that by 1985 the U.S. should be very far along toward solving its vulnerability problem should contribute to the perception of dynamism in U.S. programs that would reinforce perceptions of U.S. strength in units already deployed.

In saying the U.S. could maintain the balance under SALT II, I do not imply that we must have SALT II to do that. For we have the means—and I am confident we would find the will—to maintain the balance against any threat.

But I believe, and think that after analysis you will agree, that the post-1985 balance will be more stable and more certain than would be the case were SALT II rejected. After 1985, assuming ratification and the implementation of planned strategic programs, our force will include a substantially modernized Triad—a full-scale MX in a survivable and verifiable basing mode, the TRIDENT SSBN submarine with C-4 SLBMs aboard, and a force of bomber-launched ALCMs—and vigorous ongoing R&D programs in several key technology areas, designed to assure the continued viability of our deterrent into the 1990s and beyond. Confronting us will be a somewhat similar force whose size, composition and capabilities, measured by all significant indices, in consequence of our verification efforts, will be known to us. Both arsenals, ours and that of the Soviets, will be smaller—less threatening and less threatened—than would have been the case were competition to have been unconstrained. Limitations on arms levels and reduced uncertainty on both sides would allow the balance to be maintained at a substantially lower level of destructive power, with reduced risk and reduced demands on defense expenditures.

We and our adversaries need to constrain the competition. This is not to say that agreements to limit strategic or other armaments can solve problems of political or even of military competition. But carefully drawn SALT agreements—backed by sound verification measures—can accomplish a great deal.

We can and will maintain deterrence and essential equivalence through the 1980s with or without a SALT II agreement. I view SALT not as an alternative to strategic forces, but as a major factor, along with our strategic modernization program, in maintaining the military balance and meeting our broad strategic goals.

To summarize, with the programs the Administration proposes, we will retain an adequate strategic balance through 1985 and improve the relative balance thereafter, though the balance will be less favorable in the early 1980s than it is now. The SALT II agreement will produce a more favorable balance for the U.S. during its duration than we would have without it. It permits us to carry out all of the strategic programs we plan, including those that will improve our relative position in the middle and last 1980s.

I have no doubt that approval of SALT II will improve our military security as well as our overall national security.

FIGURE 1

COMPARISON OF MISSILE MILITARY CAPABILITIES



FIGURE 2a

TOTAL WARHEADS ON—LINE FORCES



FIGURE 2b

WARHEADS AFTER SOVIET 1st STRIKE



FIGURE 2c

WARHEADS AFTER SOVIET 1st STRIKE AND U.S. RETALIATION



FIGURE 3

TOTAL FORCE MEASURE COMPARISON BY YEAR



THE WIDTH OF EACH BAR IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE AVERAGE EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE PER WARHEAD SO THAT THE AREA IN EACH BAR IS PROPORTIONAL TO TOTAL EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE.

FIGURE 4

TOTAL FORCE MEASURE COMPARISON BY YEAR



FIGURE 5

TOTAL FORCE MEASURE COMPARISON SALT AND ILLUSTRATIVE NO SALT 1985



THE WIDTH OF EACH BAR IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE AVERAGE EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE PER WARHEAD SO THAT THE AREA IN EACH BAR IS PROPORTIONAL TO TOTAL EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE.

FIGURE 6

TOTAL FORCE MEASURE COMPARISON OF SALT AND ILLUSTRATIVE NO SALT 1985



THE WIDTH OF EACH BAR IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE AVERAGE EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE PER WARHEAD SO THAT THE AREA IN EACH BAR IS PROPORTIONAL TO TOTAL EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE.



FIGURE 7—BOUNDARY FOR POSEIDON AND TRIDENT PATROL AREAS

48-230 O - 79 - 21

FIGURE 8

TRIDENT IMPROVEMENTS OVER POSEIDON



- WEIGHT — 15% GREATER
- FUEL — ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, MORE EFFICIENT
- ACCURACY — 1/3 MORE ACCURATE AT SAME RANGE
- RANGE — TWICE AS GREAT
- EXPLOSIVE POWER — TWICE AS GREAT

TRIDENT I MILESTONES

- DEPLOYMENT BEGINS — 1979
- 1st SQUADRON OPERATIONAL — 1982
- 250 MISSILES BUILT (2000 WARHEADS) — 1985



FIGURE 9

CRUISE MISSILE DESIGN FEATURES

- LONG RANGE — 2000 MI
- ACCURACY — PINPOINT
- LOW OBSERVABLES — RADAR RETURN 1/1000 OF B-52
- LOW FLYING — 100 FT ABOVE GROUND
- LOW WEIGHT — 20 IN B-52
- LOW COST — LARGE NUMBERS SATURATE DEFENSES

CRUISE MISSILE MILESTONES

- DEVELOPMENTAL TESTS — 1979
- PRODUCTION BEGINS — 1980
- DEPLOYMENT BEGINS — 1981
- FIRST SQUADRON OPERATIONAL (IOC) — 1982
- 2100 MISSILES BUILT — 1986

FIGURE 10



MX FEATURES

- GROSS WEIGHT — 190,000 LBS
- THROW WEIGHT — 7,900 LBS
- WARHEADS — 10
- ACCURACY — MUCH BETTER THAN MINUTEMAN III

MX MILESTONES

- ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT — 1976
- FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT —1979
- FIRST FLIGHT — 1983
- DEPLOYMENT BEGINS — 1985
- 1st SQUADRON OPERATIONAL (IOC) — 1986

FIGURE 11

- ENGINE — COMMON TO ALL
- GUIDANCE — COMMON TO ALL EXCEPT SHIP ATTACK
- WARHEAD — COMMON TO ALL EXCEPT SHIP ATTACK
- AIRFRAME — TOMAHAWK USED FOR ALL EXCEPT AIR-LAUNCHED (AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILE IN COMPETITION)



The CHAIRMAN. All right, Dr. Perry, would you give us your statement, please? Then we will proceed with our questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. PERRY. During the last decade, the Soviet Union has invested on the order of $25 billion per year in its strategic forces. This has led to a very significant buildup in the numbers of warheads represented by the chart that Dr. Brown showed you and the power, the explosive power of those forces, which is not represented in that chart.

GAINING EQUIVALENCE WITH LEAST EXPENDITURE

As a defense planner, the ordinary consideration that we have is how to compete with this, how to gain equivalence with this with the least expenditures, recognizing that we have about $12 billion a year programed for the next 5 years for strategic forces versus that $25 billion.

That is not as difficult as it might seem because of technological advantages we have over the Soviet Union. One of the points that was raised during Dr. Brown's questioning was, why are warheads a better measure of effectiveness for us. The answer is, it is because our technology allows us to have such accuracy in our systems that we do not require large explosive power in order to accomplish the mission.

Therefore, for that reason, we think we can maintain equivalence of the forces with approximately half the expenditures the Soviet Union is making in strategic forces. Nevertheless, that competition can lead and indeed has led to both sides building up their nuclear arms as those charts clearly indicated, and thereby causing less security for both nations. The fundamental question we have is how to ratchet that arms race downward instead of seeing it being continually ratcheted upward.

SUCCESS OF SALT PROCESS

The answer which we have pursued in the early sixties—beginning in the early sixties—is a process called SALT, through which we wanted to mutually agree to bring those down. I think a fair question is, what degree of success have we had in that, and how does that affect our future arms planning?

SALT I's success was in getting the process started. There was a substantial arms control success in the ABM Treaty, but essentially there was no success in reducing the number of offensive weapons. The best evidence of that is, just look to see what happened to the number of warheads indicated on that chart since SALT I. [See chart 2 on p. 106.] Both the United States and the Soviet Union have added about 3,000 warheads since 1972.

The Vladivostok agreement was one more important advance in this process. It did specify upper bounds. It included bombers, not just missiles in the forces, but it still permitted substantial increases in warheads as of that time.

President Carter tried to break that upper spiral with his March 1977 proposal for SALT, and as you well know, that was rejected by the Soviet Union. In fact, it is my belief that any SALT proposal in this time frame that does not preserve the Soviets' right to modernize their ICBM force would be rejected. My judgment is, they have made a very substantial commitment to that. The ICBM is really the only strong component of their strategic forces, and they seem to be resolutely opposed to making any substantial reduction in it.

Therefore, the SALT II Treaty which we have arrived at, while it is a major improvement over the Vladivostok agreement, by reducing launchers, reducing MIRV limits, and establishing a data base, it still allows significant upward spiral of the number of nuclear weapons.

I anticipate that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue the modernization of their ICBM program as indicated in the figures which Dr. Brown showed you, and that we will respond to that, so that both sides then will continue to have significant increases in nuclear warheads.

SALT II GOALS

That is the bad news. The good news that comes with that is that SALT II also establishes a process and goals. The most significant goal is the one to achieve a real reduction in nuclear weapons, not in delivery vehicles, but in actual weapons. My question then as a defense planner is how do we structure our strategic programs in the years ahead to be compatible with that goal, not only to be compatible with it but actually to facilitate the achievement of that goal of getting a reduction, a real reduction in nuclear weapons in the future.

I believe that the answer to that question is to put a significant emphasis on survivability in our modernization program. Survivability then separates the effectiveness of our force from the numbers of weapons we have. It makes it less sensitive to the cheating scenarios which are envisioned in SALT and which cause people to believe that we should have greater numbers.

The second goal, then, besides getting survivability, is to have our strategic forces be composed so as to give the Soviet Union an incentive to give up their very strong dependence on large numbers of warheads in fixed silos. That, I think, is a significant problem. It is a problem we were not able to break through in SALT II. Whether or not we go back to a negotiated treaty with the Soviet Union, the condition which led them to hold onto their ICBM force, I think, will still persist.

Therefore, we have to do something which will serve as an incentive to them to put a smaller value on their ICBM force, which is the cause of the problem.

Now, finally, we have to structure our force in such a way that it can gracefully decline in numbers as we are successful in negotiating treaties which call for a reduction. Now, those three points, the thinking behind those three points has driven our strategic force planning. I would like to describe to you very briefly the modernization plan which has resulted from that.

U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINE SURVIVABILITY

May I have the first chart, please? This is simply a picture of the Trident submarine, which was launched a few months ago.

Our submarines in fact are wearing out. The Polaris are due to retire in the next few years, and the Poseidons will be wearing out by the early 1990's, and this program is designed to replace those submarines. The main point I would make about it, which may not be well appreciated, is that this submarine adds to the survivability of the force, because even though it is a quite large submarine, it is much quieter than any submarine we have built before, and therefore less vulnerable to antisubmarine warfare detection.

More importantly, though, on the survivability issue was dealing with the question of the missile which is in the submarine. This is a chart [see fig. 7 on p. 317] which indicates in simplified form the patrol areas which our submarines have to operate in. I have indicated the boundary for the Poseidon patrol area, which derives from the range limitation on that missile.

The bottom line in green represents the much broader patrol area which we have with our new Trident missile, the reason being that the Trident missile has twice the range of the Poseidon. Therefore, instead of patrolling over 4 million square miles, we can now patrol over almost 20 million square miles. As a consequence, we have taken an antisubmarine warfare problem, which is already very difficult for the Soviet Union, and made it much more difficult. With those approaches, then, I think we have maintained the survivability of our submarine force on into the future.

This is just a very brief example of how we have done this within our technology.

[See fig. 8 on p. 318.]

Dr. PERRY. On the left is the Poseidon missile, and on the right is the Trident. They are identical size, and therefore fit into the same size submarine tube, and yet our technology has enabled us to get a system which has twice the range, twice the explosive power, and considerably more accuracy.

U.S. BOMBER FORCE SURVIVABILITY

Now, I want to go quickly from there to our bomber forces where the major development is the cruise missile program.

This is in response, again, to a survivability issue. As Dr. Brown indicated, the Soviet air defense buildup over the last few years and projected on into the eighties has focused on new radars and warning systems and interceptors and surface-to-air missiles, which enable them to detect, track, and shoot down low-altitude airplanes.

Therefore, we project that our B-52's will not be capable of penetrating the Soviet Union, will not provide a high degree of penetration after about the mideighties. Incidentally, neither would the B-1 have been able to survive in that period, and for the same reason.

For that reason, we have put our emphasis on cruise missiles, and the cruise missiles will be coming into the force beginning in 1981. We will have the first squadron operational in 1982. They

will contribute, then, substantially to the continuing survivability of our bomber force.

U.S. ICBM FORCE SURVIVABILITY PROBLEM

The biggest problem we have in survivability is the ICBM force, and we have been studying and working on that problem very hard for the last few years. I would like to describe briefly to you the result of that study. This is the picture of the M–X missile beside the Minuteman missile.

[See fig. 10 on p. 320.]

Dr. PERRY. The M–X will have 10 warheads, compared with 3 on the Minuteman, and we expect correspondingly to be able to require deploying far fewer of them. We have 550 Minuteman III deployed. We envision we will have a suitable force with 200 M–X.

The biggest problem, however, is our emphasis on survivability. Because of the increase in accuracy in Soviet ICBM's and because of the large warheads which they already had, they will be able to attack our Minuteman silos by the early 1980's. So the question was not, how do we design a missile to replace the Minuteman, but how do we find a basing system for it which will be able to survive this sort of attack?

Our solution to that was to go mobile. Further hardening of silos is simply a losing game. There is nothing that we know how to do in hardening which is capable of surviving an attack with the kind of accuracy we expect the Soviet Union to have by the mid-1980's.

Senator PERCY. Dr. Perry, would you clarify what you mean by much better than Minuteman, so far as accuracy is concerned? Is it classified?

Dr. PERRY. It is classified, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Could you say it as a proportion? Perhaps it is one-third more accurate, or something?

Dr. PERRY. It is about a third more accurate, yes.

I would be happy to give you in a separate session the actual figures we are projecting. This program, though, does deal with the survivability issue. It deals with it in a very effective way.

The point I wanted to derive from that is, even a mobile system can be defeated if the opposing side has a sufficient number of reentry vehicles. Within the limits on reentry vehicles that will be imposed by the conditions of SALT II, the Soviet Union will not be able to deploy a sufficient number of warheads to effectively attack an M–X system. We have sized the system accordingly.

It is easy for us to envision, though, that without control, without some sort of limit on reentry vehicles, the problems of designing a survivable ICBM would be very much greater. The question then I would like to end with today is, where might all this lead into a SALT III, which is precisely the question you were asking earlier.

CONSEQUENCES OF IMPROVED SURVIVABILITY

By 1984 or 1985, we will have a force which is survivable in each leg of the Triad. In addition to that, we will have extra survivability because of the diversity of this force as compared with the Soviet Union, which has its force primarily concentrated in the ICBM's. We will have provided the Soviet Union with an incentive

to shift their emphasis away from fixed silo ICBM's, and we will be prepared for deep reductions.

The very fact that this is a survivable force means that we will be able to reduce the numbers—if we can persuade the Soviets to do that—without any danger to national security. We will not have to be so concerned about the possibility of extra missiles being hidden somewhere, of other countries having missiles that can attack ours, because independent of the numbers of missiles in our force, we will have the survivability of the force.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that summarizes the comments I would make on the force modernization.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Perry.

RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE MISSILE

It seems to me that the last argument you make depends upon whether the Russians develop a mobile missile like the M-X. What are the prospects for this, and would such a missile be permissible under the terms of the SALT II Treaty?

Dr. PERRY. Basically, the force that we are deploying here will give the Soviet Union an incentive to go to mobile forces. Whether they choose to go to submarine mobile forces or ground mobile forces is another question. Should they choose, as we have to diversify and have both forces mobile, it would provide them that incentive.

Secretary BROWN. However, it is also true that whether they go to mobile missiles or not, our force will not become less survivable. Our survivability will be independent to a very high degree of both the nature and the number of their forces.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but if our ultimate objective is to reduce the numbers in a possible SALT III accord then it would seem to me that the logic that has led us to the conclusion that we ought to build and deploy an M-X missile will be necessarily prevalent on both sides.

Dr. PERRY. I don't believe the Soviet Union will be willing to make significant reductions in its missile force until or unless it has a sufficient part of that force in a mobile survivable system. Therefore, it is to our definite advantage to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. I think we have established that point. The next question is, Does the SALT II Treaty inhibit the Russians in anyway from moving from their present static posture to a mobile posture?

Secretary BROWN. No. It allows them either to go to more submarine-launched missiles, if they wish, or to go to land-based mobile systems, after the expiration of the protocol, the same condition under which ours will go forward.

MAXIMUM CEILING ON WARHEADS PERMITTED BY TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. All of us are aware of the fact that the Soviets will have to dismantle and destroy up to 250 intercontinental ballistic missiles that they currently possess due to the terms of the SALT II Treaty. We know that the ceilings for launchers or delivery vehicles will be reduced from 2,400 to 2,250. We also know that within those ceilings, both countries can continue to add large

numbers of MIRVed warheads. What we have not been told yet is what is the maximum ceiling for warheads permitted under the treaty for both countries if both countries choose to build up those ceilings.

Secretary BROWN. Is the question what is the total number of warheads that either could have under SALT II?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is the question.

Secretary BROWN. It is not easy to calculate precisely because, for example, there is no limit to the number of bombs that you can put on a bomber.

A great deal has been made about ICBM's as the most dangerous and destructive of the systems. It all depends on your point of view, I suppose. I think any of these systems is lethal.

But, 820 missiles, MIRVed ICBM's, are allowed; a maximum of 10 warheads per missile; and that would be 8,200. Now there is no way in practice that the Soviets could build up to that number by 1985 because they would have to build a new missile and replace all of their SS-17's and SS-19's with it. I suppose they could, in theory, do it, but I doubt it.

This 8,200 is the maximum number of ICBM warheads you could have.

If you then proceeded to MIRV all the SLBM launchers that would then be allowed to be MIRVed, that would be 380, and you are allowed 14 on SLBM's, and that would be another 5,000. You could go up, then, to about 13,000 or more, I guess, or about 14,000 ballistic missile warheads. Again, 14 is far more than the Soviets have had on any of their submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It is more than we now have, although we tested up to that number.

Again, as a practical matter, they would not build up to that. But in theory that is how many you could have.

It is an enormous number.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is an enormous number. If all of those were built and all of them were ever fired in anger by the two countries at each other, what would be left? Nothing, but gravel and sand.

Secretary BROWN. I think very little would be left at substantially smaller numbers than that. As was discussed Monday and yesterday, 5,000, 8,000, 10,000 on each side, if aimed at urban industrial targets, would pulverize either country.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, looking at SALT I and then at SALT II, would you answer this question, please.

TREATY INHIBITIONS ON DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS NECESSARY FOR U.S. SECURITY

Did SALT I or would SALT II prohibit the United States or inhibit the United States from building any weapon system which, in your view, may be necessary to assure the security of the country in the next 5 years—that is, for the life of the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. In my view, the answer is that SALT II would not inhibit by its terms the development and production of any system necessary to our national security.

The CHAIRMAN. You made a statement a few minutes ago that seemed to me to be very significant. You said that a few years ago we had practically twice the megatons that we have today.

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

MEGATON AS MEASURE OF U.S. CAPABILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Yet today we have a deterrent that is stronger than the one we possessed when our megatonnage was twice as high.

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

I would say that both those statements are correct, and it is evidence that megatonnage is not the best measure of strategic capability.

Survivability, numbers of warheads, ability to destroy the military or urban industrial targets at which they are aimed comprise the proper measure. As Dr. Perry pointed out, if we had more survivable forces, we could in a SALT III agreement go to considerably smaller numbers and still preserve our deterrent and our essential equivalence and our military security.

REASON FOR U.S. SWITCH TO SMALLER MISSILES

The CHAIRMAN. When we first started to build intercontinental ballistic missiles, when we were back at the time of the Atlas, the Titan I and the Titan II, we were building large missiles, were we not?

Secretary BROWN. Their payloads were much larger than the ones that we have now.

The CHAIRMAN. Much larger than that of Minuteman, or Minuteman III or even the M–X?

Secretary BROWN. Right—somewhat larger.

The CHAIRMAN. So, we have chosen to do this. It has not been that the Soviet Union has forced us, either through SALT I or through SALT II or in any other way, to build smaller missiles. That has been our own choice, has it not?

Secretary BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. We chose to build those smaller missiles because we felt they more effectively contributed to the growth and dependability of our deterrent power.

Secretary BROWN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Such a big point is being made of the fact that SALT II permits the Russians to keep 308 big missiles while it does not permit us to build comparable missiles. But that has been our choice all along, hasn't it?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. We have never chosen to build anything as large as the SS–18, and we would not, even if we had that opportunity.

U.S. DECISION CONCERNING PRODUCTION OF HEAVY MISSILES

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to ask you that question. Suppose this treaty were changed by those who decry its deficiency because it permits the Russians to continue to preserve their heavy missiles. Suppose this treaty were changed by the critics through the

adoption of some kind of amendment which would permit the United States to build missiles of the size of the Russian SS-18. In your judgment, would we then choose to build missiles of that size?

Secretary BROWN. No. We would go ahead and build the M-X. As I indicated in my testimony, the M-X has a military capability which is essentially equivalent or very close to that of the SS-18, even assuming an improvement in SS-18 accuracy during the period between now and 1986.

We have a chart that shows this. It compares both the soft target capability and the hard target capability of the Minuteman III, the SS-19, the M-X and the SS-18, and it is contained in my testimony, I believe. I think we have a large-scale chart also.

[See fig. 1 on p. 309.]

Secretary BROWN. There it is.

It shows that in terms of soft target capability the M-X is just as good as the SS-18. In terms of hard target capability the M-X will be better than the SS-18 is now because of the limitation to 10 reentry vehicles. For all practical purposes, it will be as good as the SS-18 can be by 1986.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

I think what you have said is that we never chose to build the big missile once we went to the Minuteman force, and that we would not choose to build the big missile if we were free to do so under the terms of the treaty.

Secretary BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome again to these hearings.

DEMONSTRATING U.S. INVULNERABILITY

I asked the Secretary of State yesterday about the question which I think is one of the major points made by the opposition against ratification of SALT. It is, in effect, the following. If the Soviets undertook a first strike, we would be left powerless except to direct our counterattack at industrial centers, as well as some military and control targets, and no American President would undertake that.

Now you deal with that in your statement. I have one added question—really two questions—in this connection.

First, I think it is a very critical argument and for this reason. I doubt very much that this will actually happen. I believe, along with many other experts—and I would add that I am not an expert, though I think they are right—that what is going to happen is like a chess game. You do not have to make the last move and wipe your opponent from the chess board when you are masters. When the master sees that he is finished, and he may have 10 pieces on the board, he knows he is finished and concedes. This is what we talk about when we talk about the "Finlandization" of Europe and when we talk about nuclear blackmail and when we talk about the tendency of many countries in the world to opt with whom they think is going to be the winner—and I would emphasize the word "think."

So, it seems to me that we have to demonstrate in these hearings our invulnerability, reasonably, to this chess strategy, which is much more important than the prospect that they will actually do it.

I have these questions to ask you on that score, Mr. Secretary.

SALT II EFFECT ON U.S. ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH REST OF WORLD

First, you base your whole thesis, as I see it—and please correct me—I am reading from your statement—upon the fact that, even if our vulnerable ICBM's are eliminated, and this could take place any time between 1980 and 1985—we don't know exactly when but let's assume that as a hypothesis—we would still have enough left, especially, you say, in our ALCM's or our cruise missiles, to have the accuracy, numbers, and ability to penetrate defenses sufficiently to allow us significantly to reduce the residual Soviet ICBM force. I point out that this system will not be ready until after the protocol, as per your own testimony, to wit, 3 years.

So, in this period, what can you explain to us, with respect to this chess game, as to the basis on which the American people can depend that if they ratify SALT II, they will not be outplayed where it counts—to wit, in their alliances, their allegiances, their relationships with most of the world?

Secretary BROWN. Senator Javits, first let me say that I agree with you that military capability counts, even if it is not used. It counts in our own perceptions, it counts in those of our allies, and it counts in Soviet perceptions, perhaps most importantly of all.

It is, therefore, vital that we be seen, not only as being able to destroy the Soviet Union in a retaliatory strike, but that we be seen as essentially equivalent in strategic nuclear terms.

That raises the question which you and others have posed; are you essentially equivalent if they can destroy your military targets and you cannot destroy theirs. The answer is we will be able to destroy their military targets, even if they are able to destroy our ICBM's in the early to middle 1980's.

In the first place, again, let me repeat, they have to be very sure that they can do that. They will have uncertainties, not the least of which is whether the ICBM's will still be there. It is not something on which we will rely or want to rely or can rely. But they cannot rely on their not being there.

Even during the period of the early 1980's, if the Soviets do believe they are able to destroy our ICBM's at that time, even before our air-launched cruise missiles come in, our bombers will be able to survive, penetrate, and destroy military targets. We will rely on different systems or different mixes of systems at different periods. After our air-launched cruise missiles come in, we can stand off. Before our air-launched cruise missiles come in, we will rely on penetration capabilities of our bombers, of which we have confidence in the early 1980's, and we also have confidence in their accuracy.

There are many military targets that can be destroyed by submarine launched ballistic missiles as well. In the early 1980's, those will not include Soviet silos. But all military targets have to be

looked at. We feel we need to be able to target them. We will be able to target them with confidence over this period.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, obviously this is extremely fine tuning. Will our bombers be effective before 1982?

Secretary BROWN. Excuse me, but I would say our bombers would be effective through 1985. There is a substantial overlap during this period. I said we will be able to rely on at least one capabiIity—or at least I meant to say this, I may not have done so—all through this period.

Senator JAVITS. Even if you said 1985, I still think it is pretty fine tuning in this business where we have goofed off for at least 10 years.

Now I am not blaming you. It is we—all of us. It is the administrations, the Congress, all of us. Our perceptions of this thing obviously have been wrong.

U.S. OBLIGATION TO MODERNIZE ITS FORCES

So let me ask you this question. When the American people allow us to ratify this treaty, aren't they simultaneously undertaking a multibillion-dollar obligation to modernize our forces and to keep each one of these programs right on target? Don't we have to lay that out for our people—what it costs, what it means in national discipline, and what it will mean if we do not have the treaty, both in cost and in national discipline? Wouldn't you agree with that?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, I would agree with that. In fact, I tried to do that in my testimony. I tried to indicate—and Dr. Perry has indicated this in even more detail—what we need to do. It is an increase over our past few years' expenditure rate on strategic systems. It is in percentage terms actually a 20-percent or a 25-percent increase.

Senator JAVITS. How much is that in money?

Secretary BROWN. It is $2 billion or $2.5 billion a year on the average.

Senator JAVITS. In fiscal 1980 dollars?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, in fiscal year 1980 dollars.

U.S. MODERNIZATION COST WITHOUT TREATY

Senator JAVITS. Now suppose we do not have SALT. Let's assume that you are the Secretary of Defense and you have to make an estimate. What is the alternative? What will it cost?

Secretary BROWN. In that case, I think it will cost several billion dollars a year additional in order to preserve our security, given what I would expect the Soviets to do under those circumstances.

Senator JAVITS. For a ball park figure, should we say $5 billion to $6 billion instead of $2.5 billion to $3 billion?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. In 1980 dollars.

Secretary BROWN. That is correct.

In either case, we will do what we have to do.

Senator JAVITS. Right.

CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY

But this we are undertaking when we ratify the SALT II Treaty. We must make a change from our policy up to now. Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. I believe that the policy the administration has been putting forth in the last 2 years is consistent with that. I think it has to be continued into future years. I want it clearly understood that to preserve our security adequately, we need to do that with ratification of SALT. Without ratification of SALT, we will have to spend more in order to do that.

PRESERVING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

Senator JAVITS. Not only money is involved here. Is there not also a new concept involved in that we have relied on mutual deterrence and we know the Soviets do not? They rely on winning an all-out war. We are now somewhat revising our concept also, in modernizing in order to better meet their challenge?

Secretary BROWN. To preserve essential equivalence, we need to show the Soviets that they do not have an advantage in attacking military targets, that we, too, can do so. That has always been our strategy, and it has always been in our doctrine. It has not gotten as much emphasis because it is only recently that I think everyone has come to understand that the Soviets, if they do not intend to be able to win a war, certainly place much more emphasis than we have on war fighting capability.

Senator JAVITS. I know my time is up, but please bear with me.

Mr. Secretary, we have not done that. Even if you have urged it and that has been our doctrine, we just have not done it.

Secretary BROWN. We have not done enough.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the reasons we may not have done enough during that period, which has not yet been mentioned, is that we were deeply involved in a futile and foolish war in Southeast Asia, which consumed an enormous amount of the resources of this country.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ENVIRONMENTAL, RADIOACTIVE EFFECTS OF FULL-EXCHANGE WAR

We are talking a great deal about our security and Soviet security, but the question with which we are dealing really concerns our whole world, the planet Earth.

I am wondering what would be your estimate, as a scientist and as Secretary of Defense, of the environmental and radioactive effects upon the rest of the world in the case of a full exchange.

I recognize that in World War II, Poland lost a fifth of its people and the Soviet Union lost pretty close to that. Here we are talking in terms of similar percentages of people in each of our own countries being killed, only in a day rather than over a period of 5 to 7 years.

What would be the effect, genetically and radioactively, upon the world if there were a full exchange of all the weapons presently in our arsenal?

Secretary BROWN. I don't think anyone knows for sure how great the effect would be. It would be substantial.

The United States and the Soviet Union in an all-out exchange would lose much more than 20 percent of their populations in my view. Fallout would cause substantial, prompt casualties outside those two countries, depending on a number of factors. There would be a big increase in radioactivity, and that would have health effects and it would have genetic effects.

I would say that the difference in outcome—that is, the difference in the state of civilization, the number of people left, radioactivity, health effects, and genetic effects—would be very, very much less outside those two countries than it would be in those two countries.

In other words, you would be able to tell the difference between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand and the countries in the Southern Hemisphere that would not have been attacked. But it would have worldwide effects, and serious ones.

Senator PELL. It would have serious genetic effects, as well, and presumably radioactive effects.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, including long-range genetic effects. I think you would get a range of opinion on how serious, but it would be very significant.

Senator PELL. This is a subject that has always interested me particularly. I would be grateful if you would submit a paragraph or two by your experts about what they feel both the radioactive effect and the genetic effect would be on the planet Earth, outside of our two countries, in the event of a full exchange.

Secretary BROWN. There is a National Academy of Sciences report on this and I will see that that is sent to you.

[The information referred to is in the committee files.]

Senator PELL. I would appreciate that. I have not read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I just mention that this report was requested by this committee and it was submitted to this committee. Among other things, it says that in the event of a full exchange, a full nuclear war, if anyone survived, our standards would be reduced to those of medieval times.

Secretary BROWN. That is in the United States and the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, in the United States and the Soviet Union.

It reminds me of Khrushchev's old saying, "The survivors would envy the dead."

Senator PELL. Or, the second strike would just make the rubble bounce.

TRIDENT DEPLOYMENT EFFECT ON MIRVED ICBM'S AND SLBM'S SUBLIMIT

Let me go to more specific points. When do you think the Trident submarines, with their additional MIRVed SLBM's, will cause us to reach the 1,200 sublimit on MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's, and, when that happens, will we then retire the MIRVed Minutemen or will we retire some of the Poseidons?

Secretary BROWN. This is not a decision we have to make yet, because that will not happen, I think, until 1983 or so. At that

time, we might—as I think I said in my statement on Monday—retire some of the Minutemen III. But this is something we would want to decide closer to the event.

We could conceivably retire some of the Poseidons, instead.

Senator PELL. But aren't we now contemplating the retirement of 10 Polaris boats?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. That is not affected by the MIRV limit because those are not multiple warhead, in the sense of multiple independently targetable warhead missiles. That goes under a different sublimit—in effect, the difference between the 2,250 and the 1,320, and that consists of bombers and single warhead missiles.

SALT REQUIREMENTS FOR DISMANTLING RETIRED WEAPONS

Senator PELL. But after they are retired from the strategic fleet, will SALT require that they be decommissioned entirely, or can they be converted into attack submarines?

Secretary BROWN. They could be converted. The Soviets have converted some of their submarines in that way. Before we finally decide irrevocably to retire them, we will look at that possibility very carefully.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

VERIFICATION AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF ARTICLE IV

We are all very concerned about the question of verification and about "killer" amendments that can destroy the SALT Treaty. It occurs to me that there is one amendment that could solve the problem, and that concerns paragraph 9 of article IV, which limits each side to one new type light ICBM. My understanding is that this is the paragraph that causes the problem in regard to verification, and that we were the ones who wanted to get that paragraph in and the Soviets would be delighted to concur in knocking out that paragraph. If that happened, wouldn't that remove our verification problems?

Secretary BROWN. No, it would not, and for various reasons. Mobile missiles would still be allowed after the expiration of the protocol, so it would not solve the mobile missile problem. It would ease the problem of verification of that one type, perhaps, but I am not sure even of that, because it would continue to allow—if you took out that paragraph—changes in existing missiles, modifications of existing missiles within certain limits. Those would still have to be monitored.

The monitoring of the single new type missile is not one of the more difficult monitoring problems. In fact, I would say it is one of the easiest. So, in my judgment, taking out that paragraph would not ease the verification problems.

As I said on Monday, I think the verification problems are fully manageable. But, making this change would not make them significantly more so.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

NEED FOR M-X

In your prepared statement you make a pretty convincing case that in 1985, even after a total loss of the Minuteman ICBM's, we would not face the dilemma of surrender by inaction. You go on to say that the Soviets could not hope to gain political or diplomatic leverage from their advantage in the narrow area of ICBM vulnerability.

I would agree with you in that statement. But, if this statement is correct, why, then, do we need the M-X?

Secretary BROWN. Because the world does not—I hope—end in 1985. The problem continues beyond that. As we have discussed earlier, if the Soviets continue indefinitely to have an ability to destroy our ICBM's and we don't have one to destroy theirs, then they can turn to the other components of our force and work on those—on antisubmarine warfare, on barraging our bombers and cruise missile carriers, and chip away at the other two legs of the Triad, thereby eroding our deterrence.

We do, therefore, need to go ahead with a survivable land-based missile system. This is independent of the particular characteristics of land-based missile systems that give them characteristics aside from survivability or nonsurvivability and that make them a particularly useful part of the strategic force.

ABM-TYPE PROTECTION FOR PRESENT SYSTEMS

Senator PELL. Before moving ahead with mobile missiles—and it would perhaps be an exaggeration to call this a quantum step—wouldn't it be advisable to see if the Soviets and we could work out some agreement to permit a form of ABM protection for the systems we presently have? Perhaps it would require further negotiation at some point. I am reminded here of the systems of pellet sprayers to neutralize incoming ICBM's that Richard Garwin of IBM proposed a couple of years ago.

Secretary BROWN. Yes. I have looked at many of Dick Garwin's proposals and they are always interesting. I myself regard widespread antiballistic missile deployment as very much more destabilizing than mobile missiles could possibly be. I regard the greatest achievement of SALT I—although we tend to overlook it because we are talking about strategic offensive forces here—to be the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which greatly limited antiballistic missile defense systems.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, because this will be the last time you are testifying before the committee in open session—or at least for a while, I believe——

Secretary BROWN. Sadly not, I fear.

[General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. Oh—you are not that fortunate, then.

I want to pick up on a comment Senator Helms made yesterday to the effect that he dislikes being in an adversary position with

you. I dislike it very much also. I want to clarify that I do not think any of us feel that way really.

Secretary BROWN. I do not sense that.

UNDERSTANDINGS TO CLARIFY TREATY

Senator PERCY. I very much want to see this treaty ratified and have admired the work that you have done on it to date and the contribution you have made. But I think we look upon ourselves as partners in this venture, just as we did on the Panama Canal Treaty.

I finally came to the conclusion that I could not vote to ratify that treaty without basic amendments. We worked those out between both sides and we did basically amend the treaty. As a result, the treaty was a better treaty and was accepted by both Panama and the administration.

In this regard, I have come to the conclusion now that there are those who will propose wrecking amendments. I will be no part of that and will not support that activity But I do think that it is absolutely essential that there be some understandings entered into which will remove the ambiguity that now exists in certain sections. I think in those understandings we will not in any way be wrecking the treaty or making it impossible for the administration or the Soviets. Rather, I think we will be clarifying it and laying our position right on the line.

REASSURING OUR NATO ALLIES

As I previously indicated, there are four points that I wanted to raise, and I have only gotten to one of them with you, Mr. Secretary, the point about NATO. The reason I am so concerned about this goes right back to the basic difference of opinion that I, and others, have had in this committee and in the Senate with the administration position on South Korean troop withdrawals. We were told—and the President made a pledge in his campaign that he would withdraw ground forces—that the Pacific powers agreed with that policy and would go along with it.

I found this not to be true. All of the questioning we did of our friends out there showed that they evidenced a facade of support for the President's program, but held a deep uneasiness underneath. I have told you this a number of times. I still, to this date, maintain that the position opposing this policy many of us took is absolutely right and we ought to move very slowly and very cautiously. With the rejection of the North even of a willingness to sit down and talk peace out there, I think we have to keep up our guard to prevent a war in that area. The Congress worked with the President in this, in a partnership, in formulating a policy.

So, too, I think we have to reassure our allies in NATO and we have to put ourselves firmly on record with the Soviet Union as to what we intend to do.

Yesterday, I asked Secretary Vance if, to his knowledge, we have limited our discussions with our allies on cruise missile deployment options. He said no.

ADMINISTRATION DIRECTIVE PROHIBITING GLCM DISCUSSIONS WITH NATO ALLIES

I understand that the administration issued a directive in June 1978 prohibiting discussions with NATO allies about ground-launched cruise missile details, including deployment. Do you or do any of your colleagues in DOD [Department of Defense] who are with you have any knowledge of such a directive?

Secretary BROWN. I do not recall anything like that. What I recall is that I have been discussing ground-launched cruise missiles with my counterpart Defense Ministers in NATO all through the last 2 years.

Senator PERCY. Does any other member of the Department of Defense know of a directive from the National Security Council, signed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, prohibiting discussion with NATO allies about ground-launched cruise missile details, including deployment?

Secretary BROWN. I am informed that there was a requirement that any such discussions be coordinated at the policy level. Perhaps the reason I did not remember it is because I consider myself to be at that policy level and so did not have to coordinate them.

[General laughter.]

Secretary BROWN. I think there may be a genuine confusion here between a prohibition and a request, which seems to me perfectly sensible so that you do not have sixth-level people talking to their counterparts without letting their superiors know what is going on.

Senator PERCY. Of course.

This gets right to the heart of article XII, an interpretation of article XII, and how it would be perceived by our NATO allies and also how it would be perceived by the Soviet Union.

To remove any ambiguity about it, could the members of this committee, under whatever classification you would require, be given the privilege of seeing that directive, issued in June 1978?

Secretary BROWN. I will take a look at it. I think it is something certainly that we can give you more information about. It seems to me that no further clarification of the noncircumvention clause would be needed because of any such memorandum, since I do not think we would want to have either the treaty, or any Senate interpretation thereof, prohibit us, in the Defense Department or elsewhere in the Government, from requiring that approaches to allies be coordinated at the policy level. But, I am sure that is not what you had in mind.

We will get you information on what you have requested.

Senator PERCY. I want to be sure that we know the practical effect of this on our NATO allies and that we will be able to judge ourselves whether or not this will inhibit our ability, or whether there could be a future misunderstanding with the Soviets about our exchanging information with or giving our allies necessary technology; that is, technology necessary for their defense and for our defense in the European theater.

Secretary BROWN. I assert confidently that we will not be so inhibited. We will certainly be happy to make the information available to you in some form.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

SALT-RELATED SLOWDOWN FOR DEPLOYMENT OF GLCM, SLCM

Have any of our programs for deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles been slowed for SALT-related reasons?

Secretary BROWN. No, they have not. I think we have gone ahead at what we considered a reasonable pace with research and development. We have gone ahead and talked with our allies about deployment in the high level group, for example, which is a NATO interallied group, which is chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense McGiffert. We have worked with them on schedules. Those schedules are not really set yet, but not because of SALT. Those schedules have never been such as to have been inhibited in anyway by the prospective SALT II limitations.

GLCM AND SLCM DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Senator PERCY. Then can we assume that the ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles are currently on track, to be deployed in 1982 or 1983?

Secretary BROWN. That is our projected schedule. It is not going to be inhibited by SALT II. We are discussing with our allies the details of the deployments, and that is something that they and we are going to have to agree on. But I can tell you that in all of the discussions thereof, the provisions of SALT II have never been a stumbling block to the deployment issue.

As you know, there are political problems throughout the alliance of various kinds, and those include questions of deployments. But they are neither created by nor exacerbated by SALT II provisions. In fact, they are eased by them.

The indications that I have from many of my colleagues are that a failure to ratify SALT II would make that deployment much, much more difficult to accomplish.

Senator PERCY. Let me ask just one more question on the directive issued in June 1978.

JCS VIEWS CONCERNING ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE

Was there any feeling among members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which you or your colleagues would know, that this directive was a limiting directive. Was there any desire on their part that it be lifted, modified, or amended in anyway?

Secretary BROWN. I received no such indications. But they will be here this afternoon and you can ask them yourself.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

CONCEPT OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

After the SALT I ABM Treaty was signed, there was a view among some in the United States that the Soviets had come to agree with the U.S. concept of mutual assured destruction.

Do Soviet programs since that time and their goals in negotiating SALT II suggest that they have accepted the concept of mutual assured destruction?

Secretary BROWN. That is an ambiguous matter, at best. I would say that their deployments since then certainly do not add cre-

dence to that view. That does not mean that they, especially at the political level, subscribe to the possibility of winning a nuclear war. But some of their military writings and some of their behavior suggest that they think war-fighting capability, at least in the chess playing interpretation that Senator Javits raised, is an important political factor.

Senator PERCY. Gentlemen, we thank you very much indeed for your very great help and cooperation in this matter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator McGovern is next.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SALT II CONCERNS

Just sitting here for the last 3 days, listening to the anxieties that have been expressed by some of our colleagues and members of the administration, it seems to me that there are three that are emerging in addition to some of the technical questions. First is the impression that somehow for the last 10 years we have been standing still on strategic weapons while somehow the Russians have been racing ahead. The second is that our land-based missile system is losing its survivability, to use Dr. Perry's phrase. The third is that the Russians have more throw-weight, more megatonnage in their warheads than we do, or in their missiles. Also, there is the question that Senator Glenn and others have raised about verification.

Let me just take the first three for whatever comments you would like to make, Secretary Brown and Dr. Perry.

U.S. WEAPONS POLICY

There is no member of this committee whom I admire any more than I do Senator Javits, and he put the first point very bluntly when he said that we have goofed off for the last 10 years. This is a view that I think has been expressed by a number of Senators.

I would like to respectfully dissent from that point of view. If we were talking about a national energy policy, or the railways or the cities, or health care, I would agree that we have goofed off for the last 10 years. I would not agree, however, that we have goofed off in the field of strategic weaponry.

For example, in the last 10 years we have been building nuclear warheads at the rate of three every day. So we now have gone from about 5,000 to, roughly, 10,000, each one of them more powerful than the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima.

We have converted our single warhead missiles into multiple warheads and have done that far faster than has the Soviet Union. We have built or modernized 41 submarines that are capable of throwing missiles into the Soviet Union. We have upgraded our bomber force, and we have a network of military bases around the world that makes the Soviet counterpart look pathetic by comparison in terms of real military basing systems on a global basis.

So, I do not think we have been exactly standing still.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE TRADEOFF

Mr. Secretary, to bring the point home, since we talk about our Triad system as the real guts of our strategic defense, is there any one of our three systems—the land-based missiles, the bombers, or the submarines—that you would trade for its Soviet counterpart—after this 10 years of goofing off with them racing ahead?

Secretary BROWN. I think it is clear that their land-based ICBM's have more capability than ours do. I would certainly not trade our overall military capability, our overall strategic capability for theirs. I think we have a superior submarine launch capability. Although our bombers are actually older, they are more capable. I believe, as things now stand, that their ICBM capability in payload, in warheads—not yet in accuracy—but overall for the ICBM's, their capability exceeds ours.

As I indicated on Monday, however, that is just one measure. I agree with you that we have not been goofing off for the last 10 years. The Soviets, however, have been moving ahead on strategic forces during that period faster than we have. We have not been goofing off. For example, we have put multiple warheads on before they did. This is why we have more warheads than they have now, and that is why we are in rough or essential equivalence now.

SURVIVABILITY OF U.S. WEAPON SYSTEM

Senator MCGOVERN. Dr. Perry, you said that the key to our security is the survivability of our weapon system. We have to be able to absorb a potential Soviet strike and still have enough weapons surviving to destroy the Soviet Union, supposedly, for the purposes of deterring the attack in the first place. It apparently is our land-based system about which we are most concerned in terms of survivability.

The first thing I would like to observe is that this underscores—does it not—the wisdom of us placing most of our missiles offshore, rather than putting them on the land where the Soviets have theirs. In other words, while Secretary Brown has just said that he thought the Soviets might be a little ahead of us in land-based missiles, we are clearly ahead in other categories. But since the land-based missiles are those that are least likely to survive, I think that does underscore the wisdom of the Defense Department's decision to place most of our missiles offshore.

You make the case that nevertheless we have to take certain steps to insure the survivability of our land-based system, too, even though we have a minority of our missiles there. So you thus make the case for a mobile land-based system. But why, if survivability is the key, do you have to give the mobile system about which you are talking the capacity to destroy the Soviet land-based systems? Why not just make it mobile? Why do we have to have a chart up here showing that our new M-X is infinitely more destructive and accurate? Isn't the real reason we do that because we not only want it to be mobile, we want it to be able to win a war, knocking out the Soviet land-based system?

It seems to me that this has nothing to do with survivability. It has something to do, perhaps, with a nuclear war fighting capability, where weapons fight weapons. I guess the question I want your

comment on is this. Do you need all of this additional accuracy and throw-weight and power in this M–X simply to insure its survivability? Why don't you just make it mobile? Take the Minuteman III and make it mobile.

Dr. PERRY. I would like to answer that question in two parts.

First of all: The wisdom in our force planning I think has been in its diversity. The ICBM's will become vulnerable about 1982, the bombers about 1985, and the submarines may or may not become vulnerable about 1990, but not before that. So, because each of them is subjected to a different form of attack, which takes a different effort on the part of the Soviet Union, the timing is quite different. That gives us a chance to work the survivability problems one at a time.

For that reason, though, I would not want to give up on the land forces because 10 years from now, when the land forces are survivable again, we may find that the vulnerability problem is with the submarine forces.

Second: Relative to achieving the survivability of the ICBM force, this could be done by having a mobile system which is smaller and which is less lethal than the M–X system. I believe that is the point you are making.

Senator MCGOVERN. The reason I raise that point, Dr. Perry, is this. It seems to me if you go the other way, if you build an M–X that is capable of knocking out the Soviet ICBM's, they are going to retaliate by doing the same thing. They are not going to put themselves into a position where we can eliminate their land-based missile system when that is the main part of their system.

Dr. PERRY. I look at it the other way around. They have already done that thing. They have already developed and are deploying such a system. What we would like to do is give them some incentive to back off their dependence on these big fixed silo missiles. I think having the capability to put an M–X missile in those silos gives us a very good point with which to induce the Soviets to consider backing off that threatening capability.

To me it is the essential requirement to be able to negotiate levels downward in SALT III.

Senator MCGOVERN. I should think that, instead of backing off, what it might do is give each side a temptation to strike first. If either side or both sides have the capability of knocking out the other's offensive strike system, why does that not increase the temptation to hit first?

Secretary BROWN. It is the silos that can be destroyed and the Soviets will be able to destroy our silos in the early 1980's. They will not be able to destroy our SLBM's that way. We will not be able to destroy their SLBM's that way. That is why the situation in the early 1980's, although it will have some problems for us, will not be such as to make us lose essential equivalence.

I would repeat Dr. Perry's point. It is not a matter of us pushing the Soviets into being able to destroy our silo-based missiles. They have gone that route. That is going to be the case in the early 1980's.

What we are talking about doing is making our missiles mobile so that they can survive. Because of their accuracy and their warhead capability they will be able to hit Soviet silos and that

will, indeed, give the Soviets a motive for going away from silo-based missiles.

But, even if we do not deploy an accurate M-X—supposing that the Senate were to attach a reservation, for example, which I certainly do not recommend, saying aim a mile away from the silos so that the silos will not be destroyed, we would still have air-launched cruise missiles that inevitably are going to have the accuracy to destroy silos, and, in the early 1990's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles are going to have that capability. It is not unique to ICBM's.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up, unfortunately.

The Chairman. Your time is up, but I do not think you had your question answered.

M-X MISSILE SIZE INCREASE, SURVIVABILITY ARGUMENT

As I understood it, the question was what is the necessity of increasing the size of the M-X missile so dramatically when the argument for it is survivability.

Secretary Brown. It is a separate decision. It is a decision to have 200 ICBM's with 10 warheads each, for a total of 2,000, instead of 550 with 3 each, which is 1,650. I do not see that as an enormous change, myself.

U.S. "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" POLICY

Senator McGovern. Mr. Chairman, this afternoon or whenever we can get back to this, I do want to have a chance to examine either Secretary Brown or General Jones on this whole question of flexible response. I see this as a terrifying change in our policy. When we move from deterrence to this so-called flexible response, I think we are talking about moving to a nuclear war fighting capability and lowering the threshold at which leaders may be tempted to use these weapons. I think the committee needs to explore that in depth.

Secretary Brown. I think you may very well want to do that, Senator McGovern. But I believe you should recognize that flexible response has always been the U.S. policy, even in the early 1960's in terms of nuclear war—that is, not solely being able to destroy urban industrial capability, but being able to destroy military targets.

By making part of the ICBM force invulnerable, we reduce the incentive for attack in a crisis.

The Chairman. Senator McGovern, I am sure you will have an opportunity to pursue this this afternoon.

This may be the time for me to announce that it is obvious we cannot get to the Joint Chiefs of Staff this morning. We would hope to have half an hour break starting at about 1:30 and to hear their testimony beginning at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

M–X MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the M–X will not be in place and fully deployed until 1987. Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. It will begin deployment in 1986, and it should be fully deployed at about 1989.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I'm sorry, but I didn't hear you.

Secretary BROWN. It should begin deployment in 1986 and should complete deployment in 1989.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

INTERIM CAPABILITY MAKING MINUTEMAN III MOBILE

Would it, therefore, not be advisable to make some of our Minuteman III promptly mobile and, as Senator McGovern has just asked, do they have to be stronger as well as more mobile? This is to say, it would probably be cheaper, and certainly faster, so would this approach not enable us to be more secure during the dangerous period from 1982 until the M–X is fully deployed?

Secretary BROWN. We have looked at that possibility, Senator Hayakawa, and it is possible to make Minuteman mobile. It would have to be redesigned and go through a completely new test program because its guidance system was not designed to be mobile. It is a program that could probably be ready a couple of years before the M–X. It would be quite expensive per warhead, if you want to get as many warheads by deploying mobile Minutemen as you will get by deploying M–X. Well, in fact, you cannot because there are only 1,650 rather than 2,000 that we project for M–X.

It would have no legacy. Those missiles would be 15 years old by the time they are deployed, and some of them are beginning to age. They are still workable, but they are beginning to age. They would still be more vulnerable because of certain characteristics that they have than the M–X would be. I do not wish to go further than that statement in open session.

So, it is a possibility. We think it is not the best choice for the reasons I have given and because we will be able to rely through that period on our bomber and our submarine forces.

Perhaps Dr. Perry would wish to add something to that statement.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Please, Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. I think that is precisely the point I would have made. In my judgment, we do not need an interim capability in the land ICBM force until the M–X is ready. During that period of time, the submarine forces and the bomber forces will be quite adequate.

The concern of when the M–X should be fully operational should be tied to the date by which we believe the submarine forces may be threatened. In my judgment, that will not happen any time during the 1980's. I believe 1990 would be the soonest date by which you might expect a threat to our submarine forces.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I am glad to have your reasoning on this. Thank you.

ABM DEFENSE SYSTEM TO COUNTER ICBM VULNERABILITY

Has there been any thought given to counter the increasing vulnerability of the ICBM, terminating the ABM Treaty, and starting promptly a system of ABM defenses for the threatened silos?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. We have looked at that. For the reason that I indicated earlier—I think I said to Senator Pell that we think going the antiballistic missile route could reopen the whole question of nationwide antiballistic missile deployment. You know, if antiballistic missiles really worked and could protect both countries, and everybody knew they worked, that might be a good route to go. But the most dangerous and destabilizing situation, I think, and it is one that could well result, is if, for example, the Soviets had an extensive antiballistic missile capability deployed and they thought it worked, but it did not work. That I think would increase the possibility of a very destructive nuclear war.

Therefore, we prefer not to go down the antiballistic missile road. It may be that there will be some deployments of land-based missiles that could benefit by some specialized antiballistic missile system that clearly could not be applied to defending urban industrial areas, but I doubt it myself.

Dr. PERRY. I would add to that that the systems that have been considered for ballistic missile defense have been primarily systems that would be not instead of the mobile ICBM deployment but——

Senator HAYAKAWA. Excuse me, but would you repeat that, please.

Dr. PERRY. The systems that have been considered for ballistic missile defense have been systems in addition to a mobile ICBM, and not instead of; it would be enormously expensive—trying to do both of those things.

Today we do not know how to build a ballistic missile defense system capable of protecting the Minuteman fields. They can protect the Minuteman fields against the present Soviet ICBM's, but during the time we would be developing this ballistic missile defense system, the Soviet Union would obviously be motivated to develop various countermeasures to that system. So that would just begin a brand new race of our ballistic missile defense systems versus their penetration aids. It is a race, in my judgment, which we would not be likely to win.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to raise several points, Mr. Secretary, if I may.

VERIFICATION AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF ARTICLE IV

First, with regard to the point Senator Pell made about paragraph 9 of article IV, it is my clear understanding from the briefings I have received as a member of the Intelligence Committee that the least difficulty in terms of verification is with regard to new systems. Our greatest difficulty is with regard to existing systems and modifications of those systems. A totally new system put into effect would be the easiest to verify.

I would just like to underscore my understanding of what you said which is that elimination of that paragraph in article IV would in no way enhance verification capability or diminish the problems related to verification.

Secretary BROWN. I think that is right, Senator Biden.

I think it is true, though, that the new types rule, which limits changes in existing systems to 5 percent, is a more difficult problem. It would have been easier if we had made it 25 percent, but that would not have been a good arrangement for us because we would rather have it at 5 percent, even if we cannot verify that perfectly.

Senator BIDEN. I'd like now to address the so-called heavy missile problem.

Under the treaty, the Soviets are allowed to deploy 308 heavy missiles, or SS–18's. The critics, led by Senator Baker, claim that it is these 308 SS–18s that make our land based ICBM's so vulnerable. The critics claim that an amendment reducing the allowable number from 308 to, say, 150, for the SS–18's would somehow rectify this vulnerability or diminish it or would improve our situation.

I would like to talk about this question in two ways.

SOVIET FIRST STRIKE SCENARIO

First, I would like to talk about the Soviet first strike scenario that we heard about from some very distinguished men on this committee, such as Senator Baker. Then I would like to talk about how this scenario, about which we have heard so much during the last several days, is affected by the contemplated reduction in the number of SS–18's the Soviets would be allowed via the amendment that Senator Baker and others have indicated they would put forward.

If I may, I would like to recite the scenario. It goes something like this.

The Soviets launch a large attack with their land-based system, hitting our 1,054 land-based systems, which is 1,000 Minutemen and 54 Titans, and also simultaneously hitting U.S. subs that are in port and U.S. bombers on the ground. In the process they kill probably 5 to 10 million Americans.

According to this scenario, the President does nothing on warning. He knows that all these missiles are coming, there is no question about that. But under this scenario, the President leaves all of the silos filled and refuses to launch on warning. The bombers will stay in place on the ground, and so forth.

Next, under this scenario, the President is faced with the difficult decision of having either to do nothing or to retaliate against Soviet cities with our remaining subs and bombers—which would be with about 5,000 to 7,000 nuclear warheads—knowing, that there will be a counter retaliation against American cities, killing even greater numbers of Americans.

Thus, so the scenario goes, the President is caught in a dilemma between national impotence and national suicide.

Mr. Secretary, I know from your previous testimony that you do not find this a very reasonable scenario, nor do I. But I do not wish

to attack the scenario. For purposes of my questions, I would like to assume that the scenario is plausible and talk about how 308 Soviet SS–18 heavy missiles fit into this scenario. It is these 308 SS–18's which have generated the alarm that we have heard expressed before this committee and in other quarters of the Congress and the Nation.

Mr. Secretary, I have a series of very specific questions and I would appreciate, if possible, a yes or a no answer. I realize that that is a very unfair thing for a Senator to ask.

NUMBER OF SOVIET MIRVED LAND BASED MISSILES

First, am I correct that under the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets would be allowed 820 MIRVed land-based missiles?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

MIRVED MISSILES REPRESENT PREDOMINANCE OF SOVIET LAND-BASED FORCE

Senator BIDEN. Second, am I correct that these land-based MIRVed missiles would represent a predominance of the Soviet land-based force?

Secretary BROWN. Certainly it would be, by far, most of their warheads. Yes.

SOVIET MIRVED ICBM FORCE

Senator BIDEN. Third, am I correct that during the lifetime of this treaty, this MIRVed ICBM force would consist of SS–17's, SS–18's, and SS–19's?

Secretary BROWN. It is conceivable that they could begin to introduce a new missile by the end of that time; but I think that the answer to your question is yes.

MIRVED WARHEAD LIMITATION UNDER TREATY

Senator BIDEN. Fourth, am I correct that under the treaty the number of reentry vehicles; that is, MIRVed warheads, on the SS–17, will be limited to four?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. On the SS–18, it will be limited to 10?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. On the SS–19 it would be limited to six?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Am I correct that this means there would be 3,080 warheads on the so-called heavy missile, the SS–18 launcher, assuming the development of the maximum allowable number of 308 SS–18's?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. That is 308 times 10.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

So far I like the beat of this, Mr. Chairman. [General laughter.]

Secretary BROWN. So far as it is only arithmetic, I think we can all agree. [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, am I correct that this would leave the Soviets an allowance of 512 MIRVed ICBM's which would be allocated between SS–17's and SS–19's?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Seventh, now that we cannot predict, I know, how the Soviets would choose to make the allocation within their allowable limits. But let us assume, nonetheless, that they chose, with their 512, to use the SS–19.

Now, with 512 SS–19's, each with 6 warheads, the Soviets would then have 3,072 warheads deployed on SS–19's, as well as almost exactly the same number, 3,080 deployed on SS–18's. This would mean a total of 6,152 ICBM MIRVed warheads, which could, under this first strike scenario about which we have heard much, either be launched against the United States or else held in reserve to deter a U.S. response.

Am I correct?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

SOVIET ALLOWANCE UNDER HEAVY MISSILE REDUCTON AMENDMENT

Senator BIDEN. Now, let us ask what the Soviets would be allowed under the heavy missile reduction amendment that we and they have already indicated would not be accepted by them. By my calculations, if the Soviets deployed 150, as opposed to 308, SS–18's, and instead deployed 670 SS–19's, which they would then be allowed within the overall limit of 820, the total number of MIRVed ICBM warheads would be only marginally reduced, from 6,152 to 5,520.

I recognize that on the SS–18's, it is possible to place larger warheads than on the SS–19. But am I not correct that MIRVed warheads on the SS–19's are fully capable of destroying Minuteman silos with a high probability particularly if two warheads are targeted on each of the 1,054 land-based silos.

Secretary BROWN. In the time period about which we are speaking, they would be equally accurate.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, may I beg your indulgence to finish this line of questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. As long as the Secretary's answers are so short, you may continue. [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. This appears to mean that under the treaty, with or without the amendment reducing the number of Soviet heavy missiles, the Soviets would have the ability to launch two MIRVed ICBM warheads at each of our silos and still hold several thousand warheads in reserve.

Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, that is correct, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I have one final question and then I think we may have a conclusion.

SOVIET PRODUCTION OF MIRVED ICBM'S WITHOUT TREATY

Isn't it true that without SALT, the Soviets would be able to build more than the 820 MIRVed ICBM's and place more MIRVed warheads on those ICBM's than they will be able to under the treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. So, without SALT, they would almost surely have a far larger number of MIRVed ICBM warheads.

Secretary BROWN. I believe so.

EFFECT OF PROPOSED "KILLER" AMENDMENT ON MINUTEMAN VULNERABILITY

Senator BIDEN. If we just took the SS–18, which testimony heretofore has indicated potentially could hold up to 30 warheads, that would mean that, without SALT, just on the 308 SS–18's, they would be able to go from 3,080 to 9,240 or thereabouts. My conclusion from this reasoning, Mr. Secretary—and please tell me whether or not you agree—is this. A reduction from 308 to 150 in the number of SS–18's, even if it were accepted, would have a very negligible, if any, effect on the problem of Minuteman vulnerability. This vulnerability must be addressed in ways other than reduction of the heavy missile. Some of those ways were discussed already by Dr. Perry.

On the other hand, if the amendment of Senator Baker and others passes and SALT II is killed, which I believe it would be, we face the uncontrollable proliferation of Soviet ICBM's.

My conclusion is this, and I wonder if you agree or do not agree—I hope you do. [General laughter.]

My conclusion is that Senator Baker's "killer" amendment reducing SS–18's, even if implemented, could not even improve the security of our land-based system.

Secretary BROWN. I agree with that. If there were no SS–18's, and instead they were all SS–19's, that would reduce the number of warheads by about 1,200, which would still leave the Minuteman force just about as vulnerable as it is going to be. If, instead, such an attempt—as I think is very likely, indeed is certain, in fact—prevented the adoption of the ratification on both sides of the SALT II Treaty, then the threat to our land-based ICBM's would increase a great deal above what it would be, under SALT II.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, in fairness I will yield my 10 minutes this afternoon when it gets around to my turn, and I would like to thank the Chair for its indulgence. But I hope this puts to rest what I believe is just posturing on this issue. I do not understand and I cannot even begin to fathom the so-called strategic problems posed by the SS–18. I do not think we should be fooled at all. An amendment to reduce the 308 count does practically nothing, in fact, to impact in any meaningful way on the vulnerability of the land-based system. It is meant to kill the treaty and nothing more.

Secretary BROWN. I will not speculate on motive, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. I am not asking for your reply to that. That is just my opinion.

Secretary BROWN. I made a similar point about the SS–18's not being responsible for the Minuteman vulnerability on Monday. I believe Secretary Vance made it yesterday. You have made it much more clearly today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden, may I compliment you on your questions. It seems to me that you have effectively torpedoed the big-missile argument against the treaty.

Senator BIDEN. I am not saying that there are not other arguments against the treaty but the heavy missiles one is really not a valid one.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Secretary Brown and Dr. Perry.

I have a feeling, Mr. Secretary, that you are being used as a backboard today for arguments among my colleagues.

Secretary BROWN. Oh, it is very relaxing. [General laughter.]

Senator LUGAR. I think it is appropriate because I believe the analysis of Senator Biden is very useful.

REASONS FOR TREATY SUPPORT

I would suggest that there are three reasons why someone such as I could be for the treaty. To begin with, it offers through the process some basis for further reduction, and that point has been made a number of times. The process itself is important. SALT III, if not SALT II, might lead to further reduction. SALT II has a slight reduction in it. Second, it offers at least methods of verification, or at least agreements on that and in the absence of SALT, verification would be more difficult. Third—and I think this is very important in the analysis you have given this morning—there are limits placed upon Soviet developments, against which we can target some of the things that we are doing. For instance, the thought just presented by my colleague, Senator Biden, suggests that without SALT, more SS-18's, or, for that matter, other launchers could be developed, and SALT may limit at least the number that we are trying to catch up with or trying to match in some form.

U.S. ADVANTAGE AS NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE

I think the dilemma that I have with all of this boils down to another comment made by my distinguished colleague, Senator McGovern, today, in response to my distinguished colleague, Senator Javits. Senator Javits said that in the last 10 years we may have goofed off. You indicated you did not feel that was quite appropriate, as you responded to Senator McGovern. In fact, Senator McGovern said that we have produced three warheads a day, that we have MIRV's, 41 submarines, have created the bombers and have created a network of bases that are formidable in the last 10 years of time.

But then he added a line of questioning to which you were still responding back and forth. Why are we attempting to not only make the M–X mobile, but also give it the power to destroy the Soviet ICBM's?

One of the problems many of us have with the whole SALT negotiation procedure is that the philosophy apparently expressed by Paul Warnke with some frequency was the thought that the search for advantages on our part would be destabilizing. The thought that Senator McGovern has suggested this morning I believe has in fact characterized much of the popular feeling about

the Paul Warnke negotiating position; namely, that the search for U.S. advantages was an inappropriate one.

I don't share that feeling. As a matter of fact, I think that negotiations in behalf of one's client often ought to look for advantage. In your judgment, this is not really an advantage, as you have presented it today, but rather an offset of sorts. In fact, you have pointed out to Senator McGovern, that the Soviets already have the potential, or at least they will, by your testimony, in early 1981, or so, to blast out our ICBM's. So we are trying to protect them at this point, as opposed to trying to get ahead. But there is, I think, going to come in the debate on SALT a general debate as to how we look at the defense posture.

PERCEPTIONS OF STRENGTH

Senator Javits stated it well this morning. None of us, at least at this table, believes that a scenario is going to occur such as was suggested by Senator Biden today or by me on Monday, as we went back and forth on this. I do not believe that is going to occur.

What I do believe is likely to happen, as you suggested today in your testimony, is that perception of how the scenario might work is a chess game of sorts. The master chess player sees who has the advantages.

The dilemma it seems to me that we face here, as you have pointed out today in your statement, is in political terms, the fact that by 1985, the United States should be very far along toward solving its vulnerability problem. This is 6 years from now. It should be very far along toward solving its vulnerability problem and this should contribute to the conception of dynamism in U.S. programs that would reinforce perceptions of U.S. strength in units already deployed.

Well, that is not very reassuring, to say the least. As I have talked about the SALT Treaty on the hustings, most of the people with whom I have talked in Indiana would be staggered by the testimony today if they were able to visualize precisely what you have said.

In short, I think you are absolutely correct that we have a lot of catching up to do. Furthermore, you are absolutely correct that we shall have to spend 25 percent more. Whether, in fact, there is this coupling of SALT with the obligations that are required just to get us far along toward solving our vulnerability problem or not.

VULNERABILITY OF U.S. BOMBER FORCE

Here I would like your comment on two specific aspects. You have established in your testimony today and have pointed out the obsolescence of forces and the vulnerability of our land-based ICBM's. But you have said that we still have the bombers and we still have the submarines, and, in fact, we are moving now toward the development of the M-X missile, which people can take for granted.

In response to my question on Monday, you assured me—and you have assured us again today—that the bombers, the B-52's, can get through; in short, that we can count on them. In your testimony, you mentioned specifically the development of shoot-down intercep-

tors and advanced surface-to-air missiles currently under development by the Soviet Union, but you say that well into the 1980's, our bombers will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses and our ALCM's indefinitely.

I do not know how to phrase this in another way other than to simply ask you if this is true. The fact is that I do not believe it. I think there are many members of the committee who will not believe it. It may be that in secret testimony or in closed session you will need to show us that this is true.

My judgment, at least from the sources whom I have visited, lead me to believe that, on balance, the B–52's will not be able to make it. This is not, as a matter of fact, a credible part of the Triad. Not only are the ICBM's vulnerable; so is a second leg very vulnerable in the early 1980's, and not simply after 1985.

Secretary BROWN. The Soviets are spending $10 billion or more a year on their air defenses. They regard the B–52 as a very formidable threat. The question is will their expenditures prove to be, in the future, as they have been in the past, essentially wasted because the B–52's can now get through. Will they continue to be able to get through?

Some concern has been expressed about the age of the B–52's.

Well, the flying time, on average, is about 10,000 hours, as compared to an average of about 20,000 hours on the average Boeing 747, which is a much newer aircraft.

The electronic equipment has needed to be upgraded, and we have continued to do that as much as we could get support from Congress on it.

I called General Ellis last evening. He is the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command [SAC]. I asked him for his judgment about the penetrability of the B–52 aircraft in 1985. He said that, although it will not be as good as it is now, and it will not be perfect, it will be 75 percent or higher. This is a judgment. It is his judgment.

I find it hard to believe that your sources know more about it than he does.

Senator LUGAR. They do not. In fact, General Ellis is a person in whom I have a great deal of faith.

Secretary BROWN. I am sure that you do.

Senator LUGAR. I would not have had that impression of 75 percent. But then, on the other hand, maybe I did not raise the right questions.

Secretary BROWN. Well, you know, it depends upon what we do between now and then. It will require certain electronic upgrades that need to be programed. Most of them are programed. They will need to be funded.

There is always going to be some uncertainty in these estimates—substantial uncertainty. They have never been put to the test. We all pray, of course, that they may never be put to the test.

Again, that is a reason for a diversified force and is a reason for modernization of the force.

Senator LUGAR. The yellow light is on, so let me ask this quick question.

DEPLOYMENT SCHEME FOR M-X MISSILE

My understanding is that the President has rejected a scheme for the M-X missile situation that would have been the trench method, and that he likewise has rejected the pod method. In fact, is there any scheme presently underway for the M-X, or are we not simply in a situation, even as we conduct these hearings, in which this dithers on and the timetable moves right on along with it?

Secretary BROWN. We have not finally rejected any deployment scheme for the M-X. We want to make sure that what we deploy is verifiable so that if the Soviets do something similar, we will not be concerned about its verifiability. But we have not rejected any scheme.

The President, and I, myself, have some concerns about the verifiability of the so-called vertical shelter system. The trench system, and the surface system with hardened shelters are very much under consideration. We will decide among those and others on the basis of verifiability, costs, survivability, and so on.

I have some problems with certainty of survivability of the vertical shelter mode personally. But, in going ahead with the M-X development decision, the President was implicitly saying one of the deployment systems—at least one of the deployment systems—we are sure will be sufficiently cost effective, survivable, and verifiable so that we will go ahead with it. We are going to make that decision on the detailed design of that this summer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had not planned to get into the B-52 issue today, but since it came up, I might ask a question or two about it.

U.S. BOMBER PENETRATION

I am curious about the figure you gave of 75 percent. It is 75 percent of what?

Secretary BROWN. It is 75 percent penetration.

Senator GLENN. In other words, if we sent out a mission of B-52's, they would have a 75-percent chance of getting through?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator GLENN. Is this single plane, or multiplane, or what?

Secretary BROWN. Well, we would not plan to send a single—well, I do not want to go into tactics in open session. That is the average probability for survival for the target.

Senator GLENN. I would be surprised if the SAC Commander ever said that we cannot do our job. But I think if you were to talk to some of the troops flying the airplanes, you would get a different view of the likelihood of their being able to perform their mission, even today, let alone in the future.

Secretary BROWN. Well, I have talked with some of them myself, and I have gotten a sense that they are convinced they can do their mission today and in the future.

Senator GLENN. Talking to the Secretary of Defense may be a little different and produce a different response than when I talked with them.

ESTIMATED DATE TREATY BECOMES ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE

Mr. Secretary, on Monday you indicated that you felt the treaty would be verifiable from the day it takes effect. When do you think the date will be that it takes effect? What is your estimate on that?

Secretary BROWN. There I go on the basis of what those of you on that side of the table think may happen. I would say that when I made my statement, I was thinking of a time like now.

Senator GLENN. The treaty is not likely to get approved immediately. I would be optimistic to say that it might get in some time late this year.

Secretary BROWN. All right, then. I would say it would be adequately verifiable from that date.

Senator GLENN. The President said that it would be verifiable from the day that it was signed. Doesn't that put you at odds with the President?

Secretary BROWN. No. I would say that it was verifiable from the day it was signed, and it will be verifiable from January 1. It does not become unverifiable in the meantime.

Senator GLENN. As I understand it, then, you mean it could be just as verifiable from the day it was signed as from the day it takes effect, which is how you stated it. Is that so?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

MONITORING EXACT PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE ON LAUNCH-WEIGHT/THROW-WEIGHT NUMBERS

Senator GLENN. The plus and minus 5 percent figures that we have on throw-weight and launch-weight—I have been concerned that some of the developments they may be making in preparation for their fifth generation of ICBM's, and since those apparently will be limited by the treaty—we hope—some of those things might come back and show up as improved guidance systems and improved systems of one kind or another—propulsion, or whatever—on some of their earlier ICBM's, and that they could maneuver those well within this launch-weight/throw-weight combination that we have.

This is the reason why I attach a great deal of importance to the 5-percent figure. Are you now saying that today you feel that we can monitor even close to 5 percent of launch-weight?

Secretary BROWN. I want to be careful what I say in open session, especially since we will be having a whole day in closed session on verification, as well as an open day of hearings.

What I would say is that we might have difficulty—in fact we probably would have difficulty—in monitoring the exact percentage of change. We could have made that easier by making this 25 percent, for example. But that would not have advantaged us. It would have disadvantaged us. Even if the number were higher than 5 percent, we will still be able to count the number of reentry vehicles and we will be able to get a good estimate of the weight of

the reentry vehicles. We are not going to be controlling accuracy. That is not, as you know, controlled in the treaty. It has been very difficult to think of how you would control that.

But, had we gone, say, to 25 percent on the launch-weight and throw-weight numbers, the monitoring would have been easier. However, I do not think the verification would be any better because, in fact, we would not have been controlling Soviet capabilities as well.

Senator GLENN. But that would have been tantamount to saying go ahead and build new boosters if you want to, in effect.

Secretary BROWN. No; I do not believe that is the case either. So long as we control the number of reentry vehicles and their weights, I think we are doing very well at controlling Soviet capability.

Senator GLENN. There were a number of reasons why we wanted the lower limits on that. I think had we had higher limits in the 20 or 25 percent range, we would have been telling them, in effect, to design whatever they want and fit it in the same hole. It can be longer, it can be shorter, it can be of whatever dimension, it can have different weights, and it can be, in effect, a whole different booster. So I think there were real constraints on us as to why we wanted the 5 percent.

Secretary BROWN. Not all of the items that are limited to a 5-percent change will be equally easy to verify. Some will be harder and some will be easier.

But I think it is in our advantage to have those limits as narrow as we can make them, even if we cannot monitor precisely to that level of accuracy.

RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET IMPROVEMENT OF FUELS PERFORMANCE

Senator GLENN. Are there any restrictions on their improving the performance of fuels, so long as the fuel stays the same type, either solid or liquid.

Secretary BROWN. They can go from one liquid fuel to another, but not, as you say, from liquid to solid.

FUEL CHANGE ON OLDER SOVIET BOOSTERS

Senator GLENN. If there were new fuel developments, they could use those in their older boosters?

Secretary BROWN. That is right, but they could not use it to change either the launch-weight or the throw-weight. If you changed the launch-weight or the throw-weight, it then becomes a matter of handling capability more than anything else. It does not give them an additional military capability to go from one fuel to a more efficient fuel.

RESTRAINT ON IMPROVED SOVIET GUIDANCE CAPABILITY

Senator GLENN. There is no restraint, also, on their improving their guidance capability; is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. That is correct. Neither on theirs nor on ours.

EFFECT OF FUEL IMPROVEMENTS ON SOVIET NONSTRATEGIC MISSILES

Senator GLENN. If they had an improvement in fuel that we did not pick up immediately, I think that it would be possible, with the range of some of their missiles that are now listed as nonstrategic, that they might be able to reach well inside the United States. Do you agree with that?

Secretary BROWN. That would be a violation, and I believe that we would pick it up.

Senator GLENN. It is once again very important as to why we want to monitor what they are doing.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, although in this case, of course, we are talking about what they do, say, with their SS–20 missiles, and that would be a violation because it would be, then, a new intercontinental missile.

LIMITATIONS ON IMPROVED NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Senator GLENN. Are the Soviets allowed to improve the capability of their warheads?

Secretary BROWN. The SALT II Treaty does not impose any limitations on improved nuclear warheads. If we can get a comprehensive test ban, that will introduce such limitations.

U.S. VERIFICATION CAPABILITY WITHOUT IRANIAN STATIONS

Senator GLENN. We were hard pressed to hit the 5-percent limits with Iran, from what the best analysts that I have been able to contact tell me. I find it difficult to believe that post-Iran, working with very much more sketchy information, that we are going to be able to monitor even close to these limits. I know we don't want to get into, perhaps, a detailed discussion of exact percents, and plus and minuses here on what we think we can do with existing limits, but I think that we are very, very hard pressed to even come within a wide, wide range, far beyond the 5 percent.

Secretary BROWN. We expect to replace the capability relevant to verification of those Iranian stations. Naturally their loss makes it more difficult.

Senator GLENN. Your words "expect to" are very important because we do not have it today, and that is the point of my discussion here this morning. I think that most of our means are prospective, we expect to. That is what concerns me very much, and I hope and pray that they do work out before I sign this treaty.

Secretary BROWN. What I am saying is, I consider that we have adequate verification even without replacing the Iranian stations in kind. But I think that we will replace them. I don't want to go into more detail on that.

U.S. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS OVER SOVIET UNION FOR MONITORING

Senator GLENN. Did we ask for overflight rights over the Soviet Union to monitor?

Secretary BROWN. That was not raised.

Senator GLENN. At any time, to your knowledge, either in the negotiations or at Vienna?

Secretary BROWN. I would rather talk about that in detail in closed session. Briefly, the answer is, we have not asked for overflight of the Soviet Union.

Senator GLENN. Can you tell me why we have not asked for that? It is so simple, and it would solve so many of our problems.

Secretary BROWN. There are lots of ways to solve the problem, such as asking them for blueprints of the missiles, and going to see them would do that, too.

Senator GLENN. I don't think that to ask for overflight to monitor something that they want and that we want, and that we are being denied because we announced in advance, even fits in the same category as asking them for blueprints, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BROWN. The Soviets, as has been shown on other occasions, are extremely sensitive to overflight of their country.

U.S. OVERFLIGHT OVER TURKEY

Senator GLENN. So would we be. What about over Turkey, then? Did we ask for overflight over Turkey?

Secretary BROWN. That is a matter under discussion and I don't want to talk about it more in open session.

AGREEMENT ON NOTIFYING ALL MISSILE FLIGHTS IN ADVANCE

Senator GLENN. Did we ask them to announce their flights in advance, as we do on all of our flights?

Secretary BROWN. We have discussed that with them. As you know, there are procedures for announcing some flights, but we have not achieved agreement on notifying all missile flights in advance.

Senator GLENN. I would only propose, Mr. Chairman, and I know my time is up, but the only thing we have asked them to agree to is what they already have to agree to under international law on their international flights. We announce because we fly over international water, BOA [Broad Ocean Areas]. They are required to do the same thing.

Secretary BROWN. And they do.

Senator GLENN. By great bargaining, it appears that we got them to agree to what they are already required to do by international law. The only additional thing that we got in that agreement was the fact that they will not send two ICBM's off at the same time, so it does not interfere with ABM checks that we also have to run. That it is the only additional thing we got. So that one is a throw away.

Secretary BROWN. Senator Glenn, that does not prevent us from having made the agreement adequately verifiable. I believe that it is useful to pursue the launch notification. It was pursued, as you know, as part of SALT I, as a measure to reduce the chance of inadvertent accidental war, and that is the basis on which it has been pursued in SALT.

Senator GLENN. I believe somewhere upward of 90 percent of their tests are all within the Soviet Union.

Secretary BROWN. The great bulk of their tests are within the Soviet Union, and the way we know that is that we monitor all of them.

Senator GLENN. We monitor launches, but we cannot tell launch-weight or throw-weight, MIRV versus MRV, [multiple reentry vehicle] things such as that which we do need to know. I hope that we develop that capability.

Secretary BROWN. We have it, and we will discuss it.

Senator GLENN. I repeat, I hope that we develop that capability.

Secretary BROWN. We have it, and we will discuss that, I am sure.

The CHAIRMAN. You are both over time.

Senator Stone, you are next.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AGREEMENT ENDING CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Mr. Secretary, yesterday I inquired of Secretary Vance with regard to the agreement ending the Cuban missile crisis. He testified that that agreement is in the nature of an arms limitation agreement. It is not specifically that, but it is in the nature of that. Do you agree?

Secretary BROWN. I heard what he said. It has arms control aspects. It is not primarily an arms control agreement.

SOVIET ADHERENCE TO CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AGREEMENT

Senator STONE. Do you consider that the Soviets have kept to the terms of that agreement?

Secretary BROWN. They have taken full advantage of ambiguities in it, but they have not violated it.

SERVICING OF VISITING SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINES IN CUBA

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, does the servicing of visiting Soviet nuclear submarines in Cuba violate that agreement?

Secretary BROWN. Nuclear ballistic missile submarines would. Nuclear attack submarines, I would have to look into more detail.

[The information referred to follows:]

SOVIET SUBMARINES IN CUBA

[Supplied by: Department of Defense]

It is my understanding that, as a result of an October 13, 1970 exchange between United States and Soviet representatives, President Nixon subsequently announced that servicing of nuclear submarines either in or from Cuba would be a violation of the understanding. This would apply to servicing of nuclear-powered submarines, both SSBNs and SSNs. It would not, however, prohibit port calls by such submarines.

As you know, there is more than one agreement. There were some agreements in 1962. There were some more agreements in 1970. Our view on nonballistic missile nuclear submarines is, I believe, and you ought to refer this to the Secretary of State to get a clearer answer, is that transit would probably be all right, but that a base for servicing them would not be.

Senator STONE. Have Soviet ballistic missile submarines both visited and been serviced in Cuba?

Secretary BROWN. Ballistic missile submarines?

Senator STONE. Yes.

Secretary BROWN No; not to my knowledge.

Senator STONE. Soviet missile carrying submarines have not been serviced in Cuba?

Secretary BROWN. Soviet ballistic missile submarines have not been, I am quite sure.

Senator STONE. And Soviet nuclear submarines in the broader sense?

Secretary BROWN. That, I am not sure. I would have to check.

[The information referred to follows:]

SOVIET SUBMARINES IN CUBA

[Supplied by: Joint Chiefs of Staff]

In the spring of 1972 and again in the spring of 1974, one Soviet diesel-powered ballistic-missile submarine was observed in various Cuban ports [deleted].

SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT OF FORWARD-BASED SYSTEM IN CUBA AS A PRECEDENT FOR SALT III

Senator STONE. Would you agree that it would be a precedent for negotiating SALT III if the Soviet Union were able to establish Cuba as a forward-based system of theirs?

Secretary BROWN. The presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba would clearly violate the agreement that we have with the Soviets, quite outside of SALT, whether it is SALT I, II, or III, and would be a very serious matter. So it is not a precedent that we would be prepared to accept.

NIXON QUOTE CONCERNING SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, on January 5, 1971, President Nixon was quoted in the New York Times as stating that he would regard the servicing of Soviet nuclear submarines either in Cuba or from Cuba as a violation of a new understanding obtained from Moscow last October. Do you agree with that?

Secretary BROWN. I don't want to go further than what I have already said.

Senator STONE. This is what was said in the New York Times.

Secretary BROWN. I don't want to go further than what I have already said about what would or would not be legal. I think what I have said is not inconsistent with that statement.

ASSURANCE OF NO SOVIET THEATER WEAPONS CURRENTLY STATIONED IN CUBA

Senator STONE. Do you assure us that there are no Soviet theater weapons currently stationed in Cuba?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; I can assure you.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY OF MIG-25

Senator STONE. Is the Mig-25 piloted by Soviet pilots in the Cuban Air Force capable of carrying nuclear weapons?

Secretary BROWN. We are not certain that there are Mig-25's in Cuba.

Senator STONE. Secretary Vance said there were yesterday.

Secretary BROWN. We are not certain that there are. Any aircraft is theoretically capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

STYX MISSILE NUCLEAR WARHEAD CAPABILITY

Senator STONE. Is the Styx missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead?

Secretary BROWN. It is not configured for it. We have never seen it associated with nuclear warheads. Theoretically, it is possible, just as it is possible to put nuclear weapons on any aircraft, including a 707. It is possible to put them on missiles, too, but it has never been associated with nuclear warheads.

KOMAR BOAT CAPABILITY TO CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator STONE. The Komar boats that the Soviets have supplied the Cubans are not considered capable of carrying nuclear weapons?

Secretary BROWN. They are not nuclear launchers, no.

Senator STONE. Any type of nuclear launcher?

Secretary BROWN. They have never been associated with them, and they are not considered nuclear systems.

Senator STONE. You feel that the visits of the Soviet submarines, or the servicing of those submarines in Cuba constitute——

Secretary BROWN. I don't think I said that. What I said was that anything that approached a base in nature would be contrary to the agreement, but I don't want to express an opinion because it is not my responsibility to do so, as to what contravenes and what does not contravene that kind of agreement with the Soviet Union.

SOVIET OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN OR FROM CUBA

Senator STONE. It is quite important, I think we have agreed, to establish the limits of what the Soviets are permitted to do offensively in or from the island of Cuba. President Nixon stated in 1971 that servicing a nuclear Soviet submarine, either in Cuba or from Cuba, would be a violation of the new understanding that he had obtained, I believe, with Secretary Kissinger's negotiations—that would have been October 1970. Do you agree with that?

Secretary BROWN. I don't think that we have backed off from that view at all.

Senator STONE. We do hold to that view?

Secretary BROWN. I don't think we have backed off from any agreement that has been made on this in the past, and we have not relaxed our view of any such agreement. Any Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, SALT or no SALT, would be a matter of extreme gravity. It would be a violation of the agreement.

Senator STONE. Just to complete this line of questioning, and reading from the end of that same article, which is written by Mr. Max Frankel, Tuesday, January 5, 1971, front page of the New York Times:

> In September, after watching the construction of some port facilities in Cien Fuegos in central Cuba, and the arrival of two service barges and a submarine tender, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's Foreign Affairs Aide, recalled the agreement by which the United States promised not to invade Cuba in return for a Soviet pledge never again to introduce offensive strategic weapons onto the island.

He said:

> Washington would take a most serious view of the establishment of a naval base in Cuba. In the maneuvering that followed, including some direct conversations between Mr. Kissinger and Soviet diplomats, the Soviets were said to have agreed to "an understanding" that minimized the sense of crisis. Yet, the shore facilities and the barges remained in Cien Fuegos and the tender has continued to cruise in Caribbean waters.

Is the situation since the date of that article basically the same? Can you assert for us that there is no increase of Soviet submarine servicing capabilities either in Cien Fuegos or on the island of Cuba?

Secretary BROWN. There has been no change in the agreements. There has been modernization of equipment there, but there has been no violation of those agreements. Lots of facilities have been built. There has been no evidence whatever, and we are convinced that it is not the case, that there is a Soviet nuclear capability in Cuba.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Senator Sarbanes.

COST TO UNITED STATES OF MAINTAINING STRATEGIC BALANCE

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I want to focus on the comments contained in your statement concerning the cost to the United States of maintaining the strategic balance. Is that cost at about $12 billion currently?

Secretary BROWN. No; it is somewhat less than that in 1980 dollars. For fiscal 1980, it is $10.5 billion that includes some small amount for strategic defensive forces.

Senator SARBANES. That is out of the total defense budget of how much?

Secretary BROWN. The total defense budget in terms of total obligational authority is $135 billion. But these are only direct costs. If you add in some of the indirect costs, because after all these forces use their share of the infrastructure and overhead, then you come out with 12 to 15 percent depending upon how you allocate those costs.

The direct costs are obviously less. They are only about 8 percent of the total budget.

Senator SARBANES. Now, as I understand it, with SALT you expect the $10.5 billion figure to increase to $12 billion. Is that correct?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, $12 or $12.5 on the average over the next 5 years would be more than that sum or less than that sum in 1980 dollars.

Senator SARBANES. Without SALT, you would expect the figure to go to $15 billion.

Secretary BROWN. Yes; but that is speculative because it would depend on what the Soviets do. But I think that it is a reasonable expectation.

Senator SARBANES. And that is out of a defense budget of how much?

Secretary BROWN. Again, in 1980 dollars, we expect the budget to increase slightly above $135.5 billion or so that was requested this year. So all the numbers that we have been talking about are in

the order of 10 percent of the total, and if you include indirect costs, perhaps they would be 15 percent.

If you increase something by $2 billion, then you increase it by perhaps 1.5 percent of the defense budget.

Senator SARBANES. In other words, the difference in terms of the expenditure on strategic weapons, as you project it, between having SALT II and not having SALT II, in the total defense budget is about 2 percent.

Secretary BROWN. That is right, and that is because the strategic forces are a relatively small part of the defense budget.

Senator SARBANES. So, without SALT II, you would have to boost the defense budget another 2 percent over and above what you would have boosted it in any event.

Secretary BROWN. That is what we would anticipate as the change in strategic expenditures. My judgment is, and you have heard from Secretary Vance on this yesterday, that there would be a very substantial increase in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, lots of other things would happen, adverse trends which, perhaps, would cause us to spend much more on defense, those would dwarf these, or could dwarf these in percentages. But even these small percentages applied to a large number and over a period of time amount to a large amount of money. It could be $30 billion over 10 years.

ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS ENVISIONED WITHOUT SALT II

Senator SARBANES. The additional 2 percent that you would spend if there were no SALT II, would be spent for what programs? What, additionally, would the Defense Department be doing with respect to the strategic force?

Secretary BROWN. It depends on what the Soviets did. If they did not change their program, we probably would not change ours very much. If they did change their program, what we did would be reactive. There are a number of things that we could do. We could, for example, put Minuteman III in Minuteman II silos. We could very well do that. We could start to build more of them. We could increase the rate of Trident submarine and missile production. Those are some examples.

Senator SARBANES. You must have a scenario of what you think would happen if there were no SALT II. What would the United States be doing with the increase of 2 percent in the defense budget?

Secretary BROWN. I can give you some examples. I don't have a single scenario of what would happen. In other words, I cannot say, if there is no SALT II ratification, the Soviets will do this, this, and this; we will do this, this, and this.

ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS PRECLUDED BY SALT II

Senator SARBANES. Are any of the things you are considering doing, if there were no SALT II, precluded to you from doing if there is a SALT II?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, there are some. More Minuteman III in Minuteman II silos will be precluded to us by SALT II. Expanding our Trident II production is not as such precluded, but we would

under SALT II have to retire some other systems under those circumstances. If there were not SALT II, we would not have to. These are modest compared to the difference between what the Soviets can do with and without SALT.

AVAILABLE OPTIONS WITH AND WITHOUT SALT II

Senator SARBANES. Is it fair to say that most of the options that you would consider in those circumstances are available to you with SALT II as well as without SALT II?

Secretary BROWN. I would say that most of them probably are, not all, though. I gave you some examples that are not.

Senator SARBANES. But most of the options that you would consider would be available?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. Even the ones that I mentioned to you are not totally precluded. On the issue of Minuteman II to Minuteman III, we could do that until we reached the 1,200 limit under SALT. But I would say that even among the things that we would do to react to Soviet buildups beyond SALT II, most of them would not be precluded by SALT II, at least not for the first few years.

Let me give you an example of one that would be, and perhaps a better example than I have given. It is possible for us, if the Soviets, after the failure of a SALT agreement, go to a big build-up, to build a number of wide-bodied aircraft from which to launch cruise missiles. We are permitted to do that anyway, but in the failure of SALT II we would accelerate it, and we probably would try to put on it as many cruise missiles as we possibly could.

SALT II limits, through 1985 the average number of cruise missiles on such wide-bodied aircraft to 28. Without SALT, we could put on 60. But that would begin to affect us in practice only rather late in the period, 1984 or 1985.

STRATEGIC BALANCE IN 1984

Senator SARBANES. What will the situation be like in terms of the strategic balance in 1984?

Secretary BROWN. I think we will have essential equivalence. I believe that the Soviets will have improved their situation relative to ours, to some degree, but I think that it will still be one of essential equivalence. They will be able to destroy our ICBM's at first strike, but they will not be able to destroy or intercept our bombers or our submarine-launched cruise missiles.

Senator SARBANES. Does that mean that our position relative to the Soviets' can only improve after the SALT II Treaty period?

Secretary BROWN. As compared with when; with now?

Senator SARBANES. Yes.

Secretary BROWN. No. It is probably going to get worse between now and 1981 or 1982, and then as we start to deploy cruise missiles, I believe it will get better. That is our position relative to theirs.

Senator SARBANES. Better compared with 1981 or 1982, but not better as compared with now?

Secretary BROWN. That is a hard distinction to make. I think certainly better compared to 1981 and 1982. It is hard to say because our ICBM's will be more vulnerable than they are now,

and our bomber-leg will be better than it is now. So perhaps it will be about the same as it is now.

STRATEGIC BALANCE NOW COMPARED TO WHAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT SALT I

Senator SARBANES. Leaving aside that SALT I accomplished an ABM Treaty, and avoided the destabilization involved there, does the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union look better to us now than what it would have been had there not been a SALT I?

Secretary BROWN. I think that it is better now than it would have been without a SALT I, and I will give you one example. During the ratification hearings on SALT I, it was predicted by the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moore, that the Soviets, without SALT I, would have 3,000 missiles by about this time. In fact, they have about 2,000. So in that sense, clearly the Soviet force is much less capable, and smaller than it would have been.

Then there is the question of whether the U.S. force is smaller than it would have been without SALT I, and since the United States did not build up to the SALT limits, my answer is, no it is not. So, we are better off compared to the Soviets now than we would have been without SALT I.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator PELL. Senator Zorinsky.

TYPE OF ICBM SOVIETS WILL DEPLOY UNDER SALT II

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you if you are aware of what kind or type of ICBM that the Soviet Union would deploy as their new type allowed under SALT II?

Secretary Brown. We don't really know. There were indications early on that they had in mind to deploy a single-warhead missile as a replacement of the SS-11. The agreement as it now stands allows them to do that, or to deploy a multiwarhead missile, say, of the SS-19 size as a replacement for the SS-17 and 19, but not to do both.

I am not sure which they will do. I would be willing to discuss the details in a closed session, but I don't want to go farther than that in an open session.

NATO'S ABILITY TO SURVIVE AS VIABLE FORCE IF SALT II FAILS

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, I have talked to people and some officials of foreign nations, specifically members of the NATO, concerning the NATO alliance. They have indicated to me some pretty bleak outlooks concerning the future retention of their membership in NATO in the event that SALT II is not ratified.

I was wondering if you have any conclusions on this subject, or what your opinion or feeling would be with respect to the NATO alliance's ability to survive or continue as a viable force in the event that SALT II is not approved?

Secretary Brown. Whether NATO would survive as a real alliance if SALT II is not approved, I don't know, and I would not care

to make a prediction. I am willing to predict, on the basis of what I have heard from leaders of other countries in the NATO alliance, that if SALT II is not approved, at the very least it will shake the alliance very badly, and cause at least some of its countries to reconsider their own security arrangements.

ALLIED ATTITUDES IN A NO SALT SITUATION

Senator ZORINSKY. Do you feel the NATO countries are looking at no SALT agreement as culminating in an arms race and fearing that a war would be taking place in the future would not be in the Soviet Union or the United States, but a greater possibility existing in Europe. And in order to maintain an independence in its own ties from this Nation, they would indicate some desire for neutrality rather than to be hooked in an alliance?

Secretary BROWN. The Europeans do believe that if SALT fails approval, it greatly increases the probability of an all-out arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Under those circumstances, they will feel greatly endangered because some of them do have a concern that a nuclear war would start in Europe, and they would be the first to be devastated.

I think, myself, that that particular fear is probably overdone, but they nevertheless experience it. They have it. What that would cause them to do, and how strongly it would cause them to do it, is not something on which I really want to speculate. But they certainly would examine various alternatives to the alliance—their own nuclear capability, a separate alliance, neutrality. I am sure that all of those would be raised as possibilities.

FUTURE U.S. WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE

Senator ZORINSKY. Would it be necessary in our future position in the event SALT II is ratified by the Senate that any future deployment of weapons be made in the European area?

Secretary Brown. I believe that it is important in view of the Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons build-up, a build-up primarily of SS–20 and Backfire bombers, that an increased capability, a modernization of NATO-based intermediate-range systems like the ground-launched cruise missile, like the extended-range Pershing II be made.

We and our European allies are jointly examining that and proceeding with plans, trying to work out the details of what such a deployment would be like, ought to be like, and how it should link together with arms control initiatives to try to get limits and possible reductions on the Soviet intermediate-range system.

NATO POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH NEW DEPLOYMENTS

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, how are you going to get them to agree to that when they will not agree to letting us deploy the neutron bomb, and making preconditions as to how many other countries, for instance the West Germany position; find another country, and England does not count, and "then we will let you deploy here."

Secretary BROWN. There clearly are political problems. I think that it is a test of the will and determination of the alliance. I think that it is also a test of our political skill to work our way through those political problems. It is not the same as the enhanced-radiation neutron bomb weapon because we are now talking about something that deals with what the Europeans sometimes call the Euro-strategic situation that they see as vital to their future.

Nevertheless, the Soviets, you can be sure, will try to prevent such deployments by all possible political propaganda and other means.

Senator ZORINSKY. Originally, they thought that the differential in tank numbers was very important to their future also, and felt the equation should be equal. Evidently it must depend on what type of equality we talk about insofar as deployment.

Secretary BROWN. Again, there are political difficulties within European countries that need to be surmounted for the alliance to move forward on this. We are working on that with our allies. We are working the military issue. We are working the arms control issue. The arms control issue is a very important part of this. If, for example, SALT II is not approved, more than one colleague of mine among the NATO defense ministers has indicated that politically it would become much more difficult for them to agree to the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear systems in their own country, even though they were convinced that it was very important militarily to do so.

SPECIFICS OF U.S. FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, Monday, I believe it was, you indicated that you would speak with the administration concerning their support of what I am going to propose, which is a companion resolution to the SALT II Treaty in order to give a strong indicator to the American public as to how many of my colleagues would support comments that are continually made in these hearings that we are going to do whatever it takes in order to equalize the equation under SALT II. There have been some indications in some areas that we need to play some catch-up. It is only going to be the will of this Congress, the administration, and the will of the American people that is going to allow us to do that, and in order to do that, we are going to have to know what we will have to do.

I was wondering, have you spoken with the administration or is there any possibility, in the future, of you presenting a specific itemized list or time projection, or dollar value or amount, or are we just saying: Trust us, and whatever it takes we are going to do.

Secretary BROWN. In the first place, I am part of the administration, and on Defense matters I speak for the administration. In the second place, we have a program, a 5-year program that Congress is aware of. This morning, for example, Dr. Perry has indicated what we plan to proceed with.

Whether this committee, or the Senate, or the Congress as a whole, wants to express itself on that is a separate matter. Clearly, from what you have said, you think that it is something that Congress ought to address itself to.

We are prepared to make available what our plans are, and to the extent that the Congress wants to endorse them, and to the extent that we are asked to reiterate that those really are our plans, both of those may be very sensible things to do. As you indicated on Monday, neither the administration nor Congress can bind future actions.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator PELL. The Foreign Relations Committee will now recess until 2 p.m., when the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be with us.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

The committee is enjoying its first signs of fatigue this afternoon. The morning session did not end until about a half-hour ago, I am told, and some of the Senators have not yet had an opportunity to return. But they will be coming in, and meanwhile I think that we should get the afternoon session underway.

We are pleased to welcome the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, Gen. David C. Jones; and the Chairman is accompanied by the other members of the Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas B. Hayward; Gen. Lew Allen; Gen. Edward Meyer, and Gen. Robert Barrow.

General Jones, I don't know whether this is accurate, but I am told that only two of the five of you who comprise the Chiefs of Staff, have served in the Second World War. Is that the case, has that much time passed by since the Second World War?

General JONES. I think that that is accurate, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I had to ask that question, having served in the Second World War myself. It is hard to believe that so much time has passed.

General JONES. That is in the context of those who served in combat in World War II. But we have had a couple of wars since then.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very happy to welcome you. We value your testimony, and I understand, General Jones, that you have a statement to make on behalf of the Chiefs. I would invite you to make your statement at this time.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. THOMAS B. HAYWARD, GEN. LEW ALLEN, GEN. EDWARD MEYER, AND GEN. ROBERT BARROW, MEMBERS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General JONES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, after nearly 7 years of painstaking negotiations with the Soviet Union, a period spanning three administrations and five Congresses, the SALT II agreement was signed last month in Vienna. At your invitation, my colleagues and I are here today to testify on that agreement.

I would hope, though, that our presence here can serve a purpose beyond the expression of military advice on the important but restricted issue of the pros and cons of the agreement's provisions. Our larger goal is to attempt to place today's discussions, and the upcoming debate on SALT, into the broader context of United

States and Allied security interests, strategic force posture, and stability.

MOMENTUM HAS BROUGHT SOVIETS TO MILITARY EQUALITY WITH UNITED STATES

As a departure point for today's testimony, I believe a brief summary of how the Joint Chiefs of Staff view the trends in the strategic balance would be in order. We are unanimous in our view that, although each side retains military advantages, Soviet momentum has brought them from a position of clear inferiority to their present status of at least military equality with the United States. In some areas, they have already surpassed us and we are concerned because their momentum will allow them to gain an advantage over the United States in most of the major static indicators of strategic force by the early 1980's. There is room for reasoned debate about the practical implications of this prospect, but it is important that we face up to its reality as we consider our own strategic responses.

UNEQUAL RATES OF INVESTMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS

It is also important to realize that any impending changes in the strategic balance will be the consequence of more than 15 years of unequal rates of investment in force modernization—the product of unilateral choices rather than an outcome of negotiated arms control. Overall, the Soviets have been out-investing us for 10 years and, for the past few years, their total military investment effort has been about 75 percent larger than our own. With respect to investments for strategic forces, the disparity has, for many years, been even larger, with the Soviets outspending the United States by a factor of nearly 3 to 1. Moreover, because of lead times in modern weapons programs, this progressive shift in the military balance will continue into the mid-1980's with or without SALT. A major concern my colleagues and I share is how best to minimize the period, extent, and consequences of any Soviet advantages.

Some believe that a perceived Soviet military edge would lead them to contemplate seriously a "bolt from the blue" nuclear attack on the United States. In view of the very substantial United States retaliatory capability that would survive any Soviet attack, I think this eventuality is highly unlikely. Rather, I anticipate such a disparity would be reflected in a more confident Soviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward more adventurous behavior in areas where our interests clash and where U.S. ability to respond by conventional means could be circumscribed. Such a situation would carry the seeds of serious miscalculation and run the risk of precipitating a confrontation which neither side wants nor intends.

U.S. NEEDS TO DO MORE TO STRENGTHEN/MODERNIZE FORCES

This assessment is not the product of any new intelligence. My colleagues and I—as well as our predecessors—have testified for more than a decade on where the unfavorable trends in military efforts would lead in the 1980's. In light of the superior momentum of Soviet strategic force modernization efforts, we believe that, with

or without SALT, the United States needs to do far more than we have done in the recent years to strengthen and modernize our strategic forces lest the trends toward Soviet superiority become irreversible.

FAVORED DEEPER REDUCTIONS THAN EVENTUALLY AGREED

It is against this strategic backdrop that my colleagues and I have presented our advice during the negotiations and made our judgments about SALT II. We have strongly supported the goal of equitable reductions and limitations in strategic arms. In fact, we consistently favored deeper reductions in the overall aggregate than eventually were negotiated in the final agreement. We recognize that the hardware limitations achieved in SALT II can contribute to our security by providing a cap on, or modest reductions in, numbers of strategically capable systems the Soviets can deploy. However, we also recognize that these limitations, alone, are not a sufficient basis for judging whether U.S. security interests are served by any given treaty.

The larger question is the degree to which any such agreement contributes to our ability to structure and maintain a stable military balance with the Soviet Union. Some may conclude that the agreement, by itself, will arrest the very dangerous adverse trends in Soviet strategic forces, including current and projected qualitative improvements. This is simply not the case.

A recurring theme in U.S. history has been the hope that treaties—which are at best a framework for enhancing security—can somehow serve as the source for such security. Despite repeated disappointments on this score throughout the 20th century, the unique and highly visible character of both strategic arms and the SALT negotiations contains the potential for exaggerated expectations and serious public misunderstanding about the adequacy of our strategic posture and programs.

RAPID GROWTH OF SOVIET ARSENAL SINCE SALT I

Similarly, the focus on constraining what the Soviets could do without a SALT agreement has obscured the more fundamental recognition of what they have done, are doing, and can do within the SALT framework. The span of time in which SALT I has been in force has been a period of rapid unmistakable and rapid progress in the growth and capabilities of the Soviet strategic arsenal. In many measures of strategic capability, this momentum during SALT I has brought the Soviets abreast of or even beyond the United States. This fact is not an indictment of the SALT I agreements, but rather a reflection of the more vigorous Soviet strategic weapons programs undertaken within the constraints of SALT I.

Many in this country sincerely believe that, by exercising unilateral restraint in our own modernization efforts and demonstrating a willingness to negotiate in good faith, we might induce the Soviets to restrain this momentum and get them to agree to deep cuts in both sides' strategic nuclear arsenals. Frankly, although my colleagues and I have consistently supported the pursuit of mutual and balanced strategic arms limitations, we have had serious reservations about the efficacy of such unilateral U.S. restraint in force

modernization as a means to accomplish this goal. Events have borne out our doubts. We believe that the decline in our level of defense effort, in general, and our comparatively limited strategic force modernization, in particular, have lowered rather than enhanced the incentives for the Soviets to negotiate significant reductions in strategic arms.

It is, after all, the Soviet military might which affords them "superpower" influence. Thus, there is little inherent incentive to restrain the dominant component of their national power—especially when our own restraint appears to offer at least the prospect of an exploitable military advantage. The path of unilateral restraint has failed to serve either our security interests or our arms control objectives satisfactorily. Regardless of the outcome of the SALT II ratification process, there is an urgent need to proceed resolutely and deliberately with a well thought out program of force modernization, both to avoid the undesirable international consequences of strategic inferiority and to create the necessary incentives for Soviet agreement to significant reductions as the arms control process continues.

Having sketched the strategic framework as seen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will now turn to the SALT II agreement, itself, and provide an assessment of its contribution to our broader security aims.

CRITERIA ENDORSED BY JCS

Such assessments should be based on realistic and reasonable criteria which avoid both unrealistic expectations and overgenerous appraisals. The criteria which my colleagues and I on the Joint Chiefs of Staff have endorsed are threefold: First, the agreement must stand on its own merits regarding equity and mutual interest, to include adequate verification.

Second, it must accommodate, in fact and in perception, our broader strategic interests, particularly our alliance relationships and the need to preserve our freedom of action in sharing appropriate technology.

Third, it must be a suitable framework for—and be accompanied by—the national commitment and strategic programs required to arrest the deteriorating state of the military balance.

Regarding the first criterion, as I have followed the course of public debate on SALT II in recent months, I have been struck by the confusion that appears to exist in some quarters regarding the difference between unequal provisions within the agreement and the issue of equity of the agreement when taken as a whole.

We should bear in mind that one of the objectives of SALT is to regulate, in a balanced fashion, aspects of two fundamentally dissimilar and asymmetrical force structures. Not only are the force structures different in their composition, but different features on each side's forces are viewed as more threatening by the other side. These differing perspectives have produced a negotiating process marked by various compromises and tradeoffs as each side seeks to protect the essential character of its own forces while attempting to minimize the most threatening aspects of the other side's. The result is an agreement with some provisions clearly favoring one side and some clearly favoring the other. The question of equity,

then, cannot adequately be addressed by a narrow and selective critique of portions of the SALT II agreement. Only a balanced appraisal of the total will yield an adequate evaluation.

Two issues of particular concern to us with regard to equity have been the Soviet's unilateral right to deploy 308 modern large ballistic missiles [MLBM], which was allowed in SALT I and carried forward to SALT II, and the exclusion of the Backfire from the aggregate totals of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles [SNDV's].

Clearly, the desired result would have been a major reduction in Soviet MLBM's in order to have reduced their very significant throw-weight capability and attendant potential to carry large numbers of warheads. Having failed to achieve that objective, we should accentuate our determination to obtain substantial reductions in future negotiations as a major objective. In the interim, limiting the SS–18 to 10 warheads achieves an important restraint on their MLBM potential.

The second major concern is the failure to count the Backfire bomber in the SNDV aggregate totals. While we are well aware of its employment capabilities in peripheral and maritime roles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently recommended that the Backfire be included in the aggregate because it has an intercontinental range capability.

Nevertheless, the United States did obtain some constraints on the Backfire, the most important of which is a production limit not to exceed 30 per year. Furthermore, the United States retains the right to build and deploy an aircraft with equivalent capabilities.

VERIFICATION OF SALT II AGREEMENT

We believe that an issue of great importance is the question of whether the SALT II agreement can be verified adequately to protect our national security. Evaluation of the adequacy of our verification potential involves assessments of our intelligence monitoring capabilities relative to the provisions of the agreement, our ability to recognize significant violations which could pose a threat to the military balance, and our ability to respond to such threats in a timely and appropriate manner.

Detailed evaluation of the various intelligence and assessment efforts that will allow us to monitor Soviet compliance with the agreement is too sensitive a matter to address specifically in an unclassified forum. While informed public debate on all facets of the SALT II agreement is essential to our democratic process, we must avoid any disclosures of intelligence sources and methods that would compromise our ability to gather SALT-related information and even more vital intelligence data.

The many quantitative and qualitative limitations contained in the treaty will pose a stern challenge to our varied and highly capable intelligence systems. Our review of these matters indicated that the U.S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the many provisions of the agreement varies substantially. The difficulty of this task and the loss of important capabilities associated with our collection systems in Iran, make it essential that we vigorously pursue improvements in the capabilities of our monitoring assets.

While recognizing the difficulties associated with verification, we must also acknowledge the important assistance the SALT II Treaty will provide in this effort. With or without SALT, we will be required to keep track of Soviet military capabilities as the basis for our defense planning and ultimately our national security. Certain provisions within the treaty will make the task easier.

COUNTING RULES

Provisions on ICBM's such as "once tested MIRVed, all counted MIRVed" and "look alike, count alike," help resolve potential verification ambiguities; similarly, requirements for various types of externally observable differences assist in distinguishing among various aircraft and cruise missiles.

NONINTERFERENCE/NONCONCEALMENT MEASURES

Most important of all is insuring access to photographic and electronic monitoring data; in the absence of such measures, there would be no restriction on any intelligence-denial measures the Soviets might choose to take, severely compounding our intelligence gathering difficulties—a much greater problem for us than for the Soviets due to open U.S. society.

In this connection, there has been much discussion regarding agreement or lack of agreement on telemetry encryption. The agreed Second Common Understanding to article XV of the treaty states that:

> * * * neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denials impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

Any Soviet attempt to deny or impede our ability to monitor SALT-limited parameters would be regarded by us as a most grave violation of the treaty.

PROVISIONS HAVING IMPACT ON SOVIET PLANS

Thus far in this discussion of equity and mutual interest, I have concentrated on the key issues of most concern to us. There are also a number of important restrictions in SALT II which operate primarily to our advantage. Among the most important provisions having an impact on Soviet plans for the strategic forces are:

Aggregate limits that will require the Soviets to dismantle—or convert to nonoffensive systems—250-plus operational systems; these are older and less capable weapons but still a significant fraction of their total systems and megatonnage.

The various limitations that will enhance the predictability of the range of Soviet force development thus assisting us in our force planning.

The cap on RV fractionation that denies full exploitation of the major Soviet throw-weight advantage for the period of the treaty.

Testing, production, and deployment of the SS–16 banned.

On the other hand, the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal and provide the following options in planning our strategic forces:

We can build an ICBM which fully meets our security requirements.

We can continue with the modernization of our submarine-launched ballistic missile [SLBM] program at the pace we determine.

We can continue to modernize our air-breathing system, including the exploitation of our air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles.

The danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitations in the agreement, but from potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past—and, if we are not careful—in the future.

Although the considerations of equity, mutual interest, and verification are significant, there are other elements in SALT II which contribute significantly to our national security. Paramount among these is the continuing viability of the security relationships we maintain with our allies. Throughout the negotiating period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stressed that SALT should not become a wedge for the Soviets to drive between us and our allies or a medium for inhibiting appropriate modernization of our collective theater capabilities. We have consistently viewed SALT in the context of the broad strategic relationship in which our allies play such a vital role. Our criterion in this area was, and remains, that SALT accommodate the requirement to preserve our freedom of action in sharing appropriate technology with our allies.

We believe that the provisions of the agreement do accommodate these concerns since they will not impede continuation of existing patterns of cooperation. As presently constructed, the protocol restrictions will have no significant military impact provided there is no extension of the current expiration date. Therefore, our principal concerns remain that the protocol not become precedential in nature and that weapons development programs not be unilaterally delayed since these steps could seriously prejudice United States and allied strategic interests.

In the context of the strategic balance and the concerns I expressed at the outset in this statement, our ability to take the necessary programmatic actions to insure essential equivalence is the ultimate test for SALT II. The foregoing discussion should leave no doubt that our options and flexibility are adequate, so long as we choose to exercise them.

The most serious concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this regard is the risk that SALT II could be allowed to become a tranquilizer to the American people, in which case the adverse trends I spoke of earlier could well become irreversible.

In 1972, our predecessors on the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed SALT I with the assurance that certain follow-on actions would be implemented to safeguard our strategic interests. Regrettably, their advice was not heeded. Had it been followed, we would face less perilous strategic prospects in the 1980's and we are convinced we could have achieved deeper mutual reductions in SALT II.

We are seriously concerned lest the Nation repeat earlier mistakes through complacency, an incomplete understanding of the magnitude of the Soviet buildup, or an insufficient appreciation of the broader consequences of Soviet momentum in terms of stabil-

ity, global power relationships, and long-term U.S. interests. Therefore, we consider it absolutely essential that, if the Nation accepts the SALT II agreement, it does so with a full understanding that we will be required to undertake a series of important strategic modernization programs in order to maintain strategic parity within the limits agreed upon. In this connection, the decision to proceed with the development of the M–X missile, capable of carrying 10 reentry vehicles and deployed in a survivable basing mode, is an important step toward this end.

Our confidence in the essential wisdom of the American public and its elected representatives is such that we believe they will consider the facts, focus on the key issues, and choose the proper actions. It is our responsibility to speak out candidly on these issues, acknowledging both the pros and cons of SALT II, and collectively and individually rendering our judgments for this committee and this Congress. All of us intend to honor that responsibility.

None of us is totally at ease with all the provisions of the agreement. I expressed our concerns on the Soviet MLBM's and Backfire earlier and we also have significant concerns with regard to our ability to monitor certain aspects of the Agreement. We believe, though, that the risks in this area are acceptable provided we pursue vigorously challenges to questionable Soviet practices, improvements in the capability of our monitoring assets, and modernization of our strategic forces. In this context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the agreement is adequately verifiable.

SALT IS IN U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

Also, despite differing degrees of concern on specific aspects of SALT II, all of us judge that the agreement which the President signed in Vienna is in the U.S. national interest and merits your support. We believe it is essential that the Nation and its leadership view SALT II as a modest but useful step in a long-range process which must include the resolve to provide adequate capabilities to maintain strategic equivalence coupled with vigorous efforts to achieve further substantial reductions.

If this can be achieved, history will record SALT II as a step forward. Without this commitment, we will find that SALT II made little difference and may have been a net loss. Fortunately, our Nation has the opportunity to make that choice.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention, and we are ready to respond to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Jones for your excellent statement.

JCS FREEDOM TO GIVE HONEST ADVICE

I think that it is important that we establish at the outset what has always been your practice, and the practice of the Chiefs of Staff before you; namely, when you come to testify before a congressional committee of competent jurisdiction on matters relating to the national security of the United States, you always feel free to give us your honest advice, even though at times that advice

may differ from the conclusions reached by the executive branch, by the President, and the Secretary of Defense.

You understand that to be the case, and you will respond to our questions in that fashion. Is that correct, General?

General JONES. Yes, sir, we pledged to do so, as we always have done in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it important that this be stated because it is often said that the advice of the Chiefs of Staff given in testimony before the Congress can be discounted, or disregarded, because your arms have been twisted and that you are forced to say what you have been told to say. I want it to be clearly understood that you are testifying in your own capacity as the chief military official of this country, and that you are free to give us your honest and candid judgment.

General JONES. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

I might add, not only in response to questions, but this was our statement. I think that it is a candid statement, and it is not inhibited in anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. It is your statement.

General JONES. It is the statement of the five of us, and we will certainly respond very candidly to your questions.

SALT IN U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

The CHAIRMAN. You have delivered a statement in which you say "all of us judge that the agreement which the President signed in Vienna is in the United States national interest, and merits your support," within the context of the measures you believe to be necessary to modernize and improve our own strategic forces.

General JONES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, may I ask you, Admiral Hayward, if you concur in that conclusion?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do concur with that in the context of and with the proviso that, this country is prepared to compete with the Soviets.

The CHAIRMAN. General Meyer, do you concur in the statement that General Jones has given?

General MEYER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you, General Allen, if you also concur?

General ALLEN. I do concur.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, General Barrow?

General BARROW. I concur with the conclusion.

VERIFIABILITY OF SALT AGREEMENT

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion. The polling of the jury I think is very sound, very essential, but it is critical that you do the same thing about the verifiability of this agreement, which is also referred to most properly in General Jones' statement, which appears at the bottom of page 8. "In this context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the agreement is adequately verifiable."

The CHAIRMAN. Once again, Admiral Hayward, do you concur in that conclusion?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is adequately verifiable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Meyer?

General MEYER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Allen?

General ALLEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I would like, however, to add a caution, and that is as you poll us on the individual parts of the total judgment that we make, I think you will find that each of us has concerns that differ from those held by the others, and each of us approached the points perhaps in somewhat different perspectives. Nevertheless, I concur that the agreement is adequately verifiable.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, General Barrow?

General BARROW. I do, sir.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, if I may make a point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General JONES. I did not want to imply that we had total agreement by all the Chiefs—I think this is what General Allen was alluding to—in arriving at our conclusion, or that we all have equal amounts of concern on some of the specific issues. We all have concerns, some more on one, and some more on another. But in the two conclusions of national interest and adequate verification, both in the context of those statements, I think all have stated, and all of us do agree and have so stated.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the conclusion that you have reached with respect to these two matters, each in your separate way, are conclusions that the Chiefs of Staff unanimously endorse.

General JONES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

WEAPON SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE STRATEGIC BALANCE

Now, General Jones, I asked the Secretary of Defense this morning, and I would like to ask you this afternoon whether there are any weapon systems that you deem necessary for the preservation of the strategic balance, or essential to the security of the United States in the future that are banned or inhibited or restricted by the SALT II agreement?

General JONES. Not by the words of the agreement or the common understandings, or other provisions. There are concerns about the precedential nature of certain of the features, and there are concerns that we may take unilateral actions, but not with the specifics of the words of the treaty and the dependent documents.

The CHAIRMAN. In your opinion, does your concern dealing with the possible precedential nature of certain provisions relate to the protocol.

General JONES. Mostly to the protocol. But there are others. For example, the provision that long range, conventionally armed air launch cruise missiles count as nuclear armed within the treaty period. We do not intend to have any—and I am talking about beyond 600 kilometers. There could be an aspect of precedent. This

is not a major issue, and certainly not an issue within the treaty period.

Most of it is related to the protocol, but some of it is with regard to the treaty itself.

The CHAIRMAN. It occurs that it may be possible for this committee to address itself to this concern in a way that would obviate it in connection with the resolution of ratification. I think that we must give that serious thought.

U.S. DECISION TO BUILD AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE TO BACKFIRE

My second question has to do with the Backfire. Is it your understanding that there is nothing in this treaty that would prevent the United States from designing and building an aircraft comparable to the Backfire?

General JONES. That is correct.

Mr. Chairman, if I may ask, as we respond to these questions, I want to make sure that all of my colleagues are involved because we are a group of equals with a chairman, and I would like to be sure that they have an opportunity to comment.

The CHAIRMAN. I am in the same predicament on this committee.

That being so, may I suggest that if any of the members of the Joint Chiefs would like to add or object to anything the chairman says, or clarify your own position, please feel free to do it.

Is it currently contemplated that we may have the need for or may want to design and build an aircraft comparable to the Backfire within the next 5 years?

General JONES. I would like to answer it in a broader context, and then turn to General Allen.

In my judgment, we need to keep a penetrating bomber force, and we need to modernize. We have the opportunity, both within the time of the treaty and based on the capability to build an aircraft equivalent to the Backfire that would not count within the treaty. Therefore, I would not believe that the treaty considerations would be the determining factor on what type of aircraft we proceed with. But the basic point is to modernize our penetrating bomber force.

General ALLEN. The current situation is that there is no program to build such an aircraft. There have been proposals for such a program that generally relate to modifications of the F–111 aircraft into a reengined aircraft that would have capabilities comparable to the Backfire even though it would be a smaller airplane than the Backfire.

Those proposals are under consideration, and they will be given additional consideration, but they are not funded or planned at the present time.

ADEQUACY OF M–X VERSUS A HEAVY MISSILE

The CHAIRMAN. My final question relates to the ongoing controversy over the big Russian missile. This treaty, as you know, would permit the Soviet Union to keep in its inventory 308 of its largest missile, the SS–18, while the United States would not be permitted to build a comparable missile.

My question is, If the treaty did not impose any prohibition regarding the construction of large missiles on the United States, would it be the recommendation of you gentlemen that we build a mobile missile or a fixed missile that is larger than the M-X that is planned, or do you regard the M-X as adequate to the security needs of the country looking to the future?

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, we would not build a missile comparable to the SS-18, the very large missile. We might have a little bit more throw weight on the M-X, but it would have the warhead of the type that we are contemplating. So we would not build a missile that would have any substantial difference from the M-X, even if there were not a treaty limit on the light missiles.

General ALLEN. That is correct, sir. We have not proposed a missile the size of the SS-18 in any serious way over the years in which we have been studying follow-on systems. The system that we have settled on, which is called the M-X, is a system which is somewhat constrained by the treaty, since it can be no larger than the largest Soviet light missile. But this restraint is only an issue of slight cost, it is not an issue of effectiveness and we believe that M-X will, in fact, be of comparable military effectiveness to the SS-18, with the fractionation limit of 10 applied to the SS-18.

The CHAIRMAN. The size of our missiles in the current American inventory is the result of a deliberate choice on our part, is it not?

General JONES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask two things, and I will name them both because time is short and sometimes you get lost in one and do not get to the other.

I would like to bring you together with the Secretary of Defense on the issue of what we are undertaking when we ratify this treaty in cost, and in national purpose.

Second, I would like to ask you what I consider a "catch-22" question, which faces us, and in which I would hope to draw upon your high professionalism, which you have admirably shown, all of you in this statement. I think that it is a magnificent construction of the military position of the United States in this strategic problem which we face. But I would like to call also on your high patriotism, which is there just as much as your high professionalism.

COST OF RATIFICATION OF SALT

As to the first question, the Secretary of Defense concurs with you that when we undertake to ratify this treaty, we are not only ratifying, we are making a national commitment, as you said very eloquently and very properly, to modernize our forces. When you speak of the precedential influence, or precedential importance of the points made in your statement, I assume that that is what you mean. You hope that we are not going to follow that slippery downhill path which brought us to where we are.

Therefore, do you agree with the Secretary's estimate that it is going to cost us in 1980 dollars between $2.5 and $3 billion a year extra, over, above, and beyond anything we are doing up to now, if we ratify this treaty, and we are undertaking that commitment at

the same time that we ratify it in order to earn your endorsement of it.

Second, if we don't ratify the treaty, we will have to do the same thing. Here we are not undertaking your commitment, but we really should be, if we reject the treaty, and that that is likely to cost us $5.5 to $6 billion a year in 1980 dollars.

General JONES. Senator Javits, I want to make one thing clear. We have not tied an endorsement of programs to our endorsement of SALT in the context that you put it. We think that it is critical for this Nation to face up to the fact that the Soviets have been spending far more than we have, not only in strategic weapons but on all weapons, for many, many years.

They have spent approximately $100 billion more in investments in systems across the board since the early 1970's than the United States. What we are saying is that, with or without the treaty, if we are going to meet the national security requirements, we are going to have to do substantially more. We believe that it is more than the Secretary of Defense has spoken about and it is broader than in the strategic forces.

We are not talking about massive amounts of money. They are very large when you isolate them, but we are talking about a few percent of the defense budget.

So it is in that context that I would like to make my remarks as opposed to our support of SALT being contingent upon an endorsement of dollars, or an implication of being bought off in that regard. The Nation has to face up to its problems.

We have not tried to come to a judgment regarding what would be required without a SALT agreement over requirements with the SALT agreement, for two reasons. One is: If you don't have a SALT agreement, there can be so many conditions under how it broke down, how it was rejected, that you could come up with varying assessments.

Second: It might obscure the fact that with or without a SALT agreement the Nation has to do substantially more than it has been doing. We would recommend more than the Secretary of Defense has recommended not only in the strategic forces, but in the total.

CHANGING BASIC STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator JAVITS. My next question is the catch-22. This is where we are. We have pursued a strategy of deterrence, to wit, mutual ability to obliterate, speaking broadly.

We are advised—you know better than I do—that the Soviets have pursued a strategy of winning any war, whatever it is. Whether it is an atomic war or any other kind, they are going to win it. They are going to do anything it takes to win it.

We found, after SALT I, that the Soviet momentum has carried them so far that we are certain to be more disadvantaged during the term of this treaty than we believed we would be by our original strategy.

Question: Shall we now change the basic strategic concept of the United States? Otherwise—and this is the catch-22—will we not be right where we are, again running after SALT III, whether it is

desirable or not, because we simply have to have it because we have slipped even further behind and because we are threatened with being even further behind in another treaty period, to wit, 1990.

So the question to you: Must we now review the whole strategic concept of the United States to find some way out of this catch-22 situation which I think Senator McGovern properly complains of—I am deeply impressed with the point every time he makes it—that all we do is slip further and further into the "slough of despond" in this situation. You can't seem to get up these slippery walls with the line that we are pursuing.

General JONES. Senator Javits, I would not advocate a change in strategy. I would advocate having the military capability to implement that strategy, and I am not talking about just the nuclear field but across the board, to be able to implement the strategy.

The problem today is not with the strategy. It is with putting enough effort in to have the capability to meet that strategy and to be able to implement whatever actions the strategy calls for.

Senator JAVITS. You think that the weakness in the strategy up till now is that we have not put our money where our mouth is.

General JONES. Absolutely.

QUESTION OF LINKAGE

Senator JAVITS. My last question is this. I know that nobody likes linkage, and you gentlemen probably don't like it any more than we do. But isn't it a fact that you are not going to get anywhere respecting this slippery path unless we do come to a point where there is some linkage in order to get a more stable world, otherwise we may be looking at the means of destruction and the mutual balance of terror, but the fundamental conditions which produce the danger of war persist and get worse.

General JONES. Senator Javits, I cannot see how we could have a direct linkage in the negotiations, but obviously in the future, as we continue negotiations across-the-board, the actions of the Soviet Union and the restraint of the Soviet Union should and are bound to have some impact on those negotiations. But I would not recommend now a specific linkage between the SALT II agreement that is being considered by the Senate and any specific Soviet actions taking place today.

Senator JAVITS. General, being the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and knowing all about our industrial complex as well as our military complex, and recognizing all our strengths and deficiencies, have we still got our "marbles" if we set our mind to it, are we still able, again, to emerge superior to the Soviet Union, no matter what they did and what they spent, if we get our teeth in the proposition that we have to get superior?

General JONES. As a runner and jogger, if I can use an analogy, Senator Javits, we can win the marathon. We have real problems in the 100-yard dash. Where we cross over is hard to say.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

General JONES. I would like to see if any of my colleagues have any comments on these questions.

Senator JAVITS. I would invite that. I still have 30 seconds.

Admiral HAYWARD. Senator Javits, I would like to associate myself to a degree with your linkage suggestion in that this country must maintain a strategic parity at least, with the Soviets whether in nuclear warfare, or conventional warfare or otherwise. Not only are we concerned about deterrence but with the general provisions of living in this world. My concern is that if we do not have parity, if there is a disparity between our strength as perceived or in actuality, we are going to find the Soviets coercing us and our allies overseas. We are going to see the risk of an outbreak of a war that we did not intend to grow, and that is what we are trying to avoid.

What we see in the strategic sense—which is the purpose of SALT—is, in fact, in the next 5 years a loss in that parity between ourselves and the Soviets; and that has got to be uncovered. We have got to have the conviction to put that back into balance.

I would agree with the Chairman that this country certainly has the capability, and I think it has the will, to do that.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

I am sure that the Chairman will indulge us if other of your colleagues wish to comment on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Javits.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PAST POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Some years back, it was understood that the policy we had in the United States was a policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The point there was that either power, after suffering a strike, retained the capacity to potentially destroy the other, and that would keep the peace.

As long as we have that essential power, does it matter whether one has equivalence or one does not have equivalence, and haven't we changed a good deal in these past years to feel that each side has to keep raising the ante.

I am wondering, General Jones, would you agree with me that the important thing is a question of will. If we suffered a strike, would we have the will to respond with what we have left. If that will is there, that is all we need.

General JONES. Senator Pell, I would disagree. I would agree that an assured destruction capability is an important part of our strategic force. But if we only had that, I believe we would have a very dangerous situation in the world, and I would question whether or not we would have the will. I think that it would have a very serious negative impact on the relationship with our Allies, and our influence in the world, if all we had was the capability to respond to an out-of-the-blue attack on U.S. cities. That is what an assured destruction capability is, to attack their industrial capacity.

I think that it would be a very inadequate force, and it would be very dangerous. We have never had that strategy in all the time that I have been associated with the strategic forces. I spent about half of my career in the strategic forces, and we have always targeted military targets. At times, we have had very limited capa-

bility against certain targets. We have not had just what you call "assured destruction," which is to hit the cities of the other side.

PRIORITIES IN TARGETING U.S. WEAPON SYSTEMS

Senator PELL. Following that question up, in the targeting of our weapon systems, I believe that there is a system of priorities that one has. Do we always include only military targets?

General JONES. No, sir, we have a wide range of military targets, nuclear and conventional, as well as urban industrial.

Senator PELL. But we retain the option, if we want, of destroying the opponent.

General JONES. Yes, sir, within the capability.

ABILITY TO CURTAIL SOVIET ADVENTURISM

Senator PELL. When we had a decisive nuclear edge in the 1950's and in the 1960's, we seemed to be unable to prevent a certain amount of adventurism on the part of the Soviets both in Vietnam and in Korea.

Why do you feel that now, if we have equivalence, we are more able to stop them from adventurism than before when we had an edge.

General JONES. I am not saying that we are more able today. We are less able today than we were before. I believe the strategic forces, along with our conventional forces in the United States and at sea, allowed us to have an advantage in the Cuban crisis although I don't think that we exploited it to the extent we should have. I think that it had an impact.

In Europe, we have peace today, and our Allies in Europe believe that that peace is there because of the NATO triad. The first leg is a conventional capability—and the Warsaw Pact conventional capability is greater than NATO's. The second leg of that triad is the theatre nuclear force—and the Soviets have been gaining an advantage in that area. But the third leg of that triad is the U.S. strategic forces.

There is concern in Europe about not only the theatre nuclear capability, but the United States capability in the strategic forces. It is that threat and possibility of escalation that adds to deterrence. Although it is hard to forecast the precise circumstances under which we would escalate, there is always that possibility. It is a combination of those forces that I think bring peace to Europe. If we had clearly inferior strategic forces, clearly inferior, down to what you are talking about, assured destruction, I think the likelihood of conflict in Europe would increase.

LINKAGE OF M-X SYSTEM AND SUPPORT FOR SALT

Senator PELL. General Jones, in your testimony, you say that your predecessors endorsed SALT I with the assurance that certain follow-on actions would be taken. But those actions were not taken.

To be specific, following up on Senator Javits' question, if we were not contemplating the M-X system, would you have seen fit to recommend support of the SALT II?

General JONES. I don't want to link the two together, Senator Pell, because it is not true. I don't want to give any indication that a decision on M-X was sort of a buying off for the Chiefs to support SALT II. We just don't operate that way.

It is essential to have the M-X, with or without SALT II, and SALT II ought to be considered on its merits.

BETTER OFF WITH OR WITHOUT SALT

Senator PELL. Also following up on previous questions of Senator Javits; would you be able to hazard an opinion, as to whether we are better off with SALT or without, if we did not move ahead with the weapons programs you have in mind? Can you express a view there?

General JONES. It is a Hobson's choice, Senator Pell. I think that the country would be in very difficult circumstances if it did not proceed with programs with or without SALT. As we pointed out, SALT II might not make much difference at all, if you don't proceed.

Senator PELL. Do you see any possibility that with SALT II what we would be doing, eventually and hopefully, is putting a cap on the development of nuclear weapons, but by the same token creating a bulge, with the same idea of trying to build up strike need size, creating an increasing bulge on conventional forces, pressing the Soviets to even further the advantage that they have in the mainland of Europe with conventional forces?

General JONES. No, I don't believe that in the strategic discussion we should worry about the bulge we create some other place. We ought to address the strategic forces, and the importance and modernization of our strategic forces, as opposed to worrying whether they put efforts in other areas.

I want to make one thing very clear. We are hopeful that we can get on with SALT III negotiations. We unanimously hope that we do not get to the 1985 figures that are shown in the projection on the charts, that we can have mutual and balanced reductions in the SALT III process.

To give us increased leverage, we should go with programs, but we are not advocating any program as a bargaining chip—they are needed in their own right. We think, and as is pointed out in the statement, that we would have had a better SALT II if the United States had proceeded with strategic programs in the mid and late 1960's, and 1970's until today.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

RETIRED JCS OPPOSED TO SALT II

Why is it, General Jones, that while the Joint Chiefs support SALT II, so many, or at least it seems the vocal majority of your former colleagues who retired, are in opposition? What would be the reason in your view?

General JONES. I would rather that they speak for themselves.

Senator PELL. They will.

General JONES. I have not gone out and tried to go out and poll people, or work on them, because we are not a part of selling the

SALT Treaty. We give our advice to the Senate and to the President.

There are a number that have indicated that they are in support of the treaty, but I am not trying to be a poll taker in that regard. I am sure that those that are in opposition are sincere. I think that part of it is the feeling that the United States just has not paid adequate attention to the military and the strategic forces for 10 or 15 years, and this is the opportunity to bring home to America the dangers we face unless we do more.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

MEMO OF MARCH 12 ON JCS CONCERNS

Senator PERCY. General Jones, and gentlemen, I am sure that you are aware of a recent syndicated national column, which is usually fairly authoritative, that reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memo dated March 12, raised some very serious questions about the SALT Treaty.

They happened to be three out of the four questions that I have been probing and discussing for several months now. I would be most interested in knowing whether such a memo does exist and any comment you would like to make on it. The memo, according to the report, warned that verification is not assured—you have already commented on that—and hinted that the Soviet pressure to extend the protocol will be very great, indeed, as I presumed it would be. It recommended that a basing mode for the M-X should be firmly determined and decided. It also stated that the noncircumvention clause, article XII which was discussed at great length here, could cause problems for our Allies.

General Jones, could you tell me whether such a memo does exist? Could you and your colleagues also comment on whether or not you feel that article XII on noncircumvention could cause some real problems for our Allies?

General JONES. Senator Percy, recognizing that we were in the middle of the negotiations back in March, and there were some issues not resolved, we sent such a memo. It contains those points. We did express concerns about those points.

With regard to noncircumvention, we wanted to make it clear that our interpretation of that noncircumvention provision did allow us to continue with the pattern of cooperation with our Allies. We have formally told our Allies that. I, for one, do not want to negotiate that with the Soviet Union because that is our interpretation. But I wanted everyone in the Government, in the executive and legislative branches, to understand that interpretation and agree with the interpretation that we can continue with current patterns. That is the concern in that regard.

On the M-X, we were concerned that there might be some decision not to go with the M-X because of questions of verification in a survivable basing mode. A decision was made. We told the Soviets we were proceeding with the M-X. I don't want to negotiate with the Soviets on that either. I want to build the M-X in a mode that will be verifiable and survivable, but not get their permission as to which way to go. I think that we have the right to do it. We

just wanted to be sure that both the executive and the legislative branches of Government support that.

DECISION ON M-X BASING MODE

Senator PERCY. On that point, do the Joint Chiefs feel that a decision can be made now on the basing mode? Do we have enough information to make that decision? Should we make that decision and announce it now?

General JONES. To me, Senator Percy, the decision has been made on the critical aspects, in point that we are going, I believe, to horizontal shelters. The technical question is: Are they connected by a road or a trench? Is the road above ground or below ground? But the basing mode is a multiple protective shelter and I think it will undoubtedly be horizontal with adequate verification capability, and we should not rush too fast into determining how you connect them.

General Allen may want to comment.

General ALLEN. There is no question, sir, that we can make that decision. The decision that is planned to be made this summer will be adequate for the purposes of going ahead with full-scale engineering development. We may leave some options with regard to the subtleties of the design of the connectors between the protective structures and verification techniques for refinement during full-scale engineering development, but we can make that decision. The President has made the basic decision and the process is enroute to making the remainder of the basing decision.

General JONES. I wonder if I could ask General Meyer for a comment.

General MEYER. I would talk to the issue in the March memo concerning verification. You must remember that March was shortly after the incidents in Iran, and there was concern at that time as to what alternate means we might have to be available to replace those losses.

I was not the Chief of Staff then but I happened to be the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and worked this issue. Since then we have had an opportunity to look at the alternatives we have at the present time and those we are likely to have in the future.

We have had the opportunity to have the intelligence agencies brief us in more detail on the aspects of adjuncts that we now feel we can add to counter our Iranian losses. I still have personal concerns with regard to the ability to verify strict compliance with certain aspects of the treaty. However, I am satisfied that after looking at what we have available and provided we are willing to get on with ensuring that the needed systems are available on schedule, that any undetected Soviet noncompliance does not pose an unacceptable risk to our security. And that is my bottom line on whether or not it is, in fact, acceptable or unacceptable.

Admiral HAYWARD. May I make an observation?

Senator PERCY. Yes, Admiral Hayward.

Admiral HAYWARD. With respect to the protocol, Senator Percy, the precedential nature of the protocol has been a concern of the

Chiefs all along. It still is to me, and I think it is with my colleagues as well.

We are adamant that the United States must not permit further constraint of the mobile ICBM, the ground-launched cruise missile and the sea-launched cruise missile beyond the period of the protocol, the last day of December 1981. The United States has made it clear to the Soviets that we expect the protocol to expire. In the testimony in the last 2 days, that has been restated.

Yet there are provisions in the treaty and in the Joint Statement of Principles which cause me considerable discomfort. For instance, in the Joint Statement it says that the two parties will get on with discussions as part of SALT III to resolve the issues that are in the protocol.

Senator PERCY. Yes.

Admiral HAYWARD. I don't see any issues in the protocol. I only see U.S. programs. And we have got to protect those programs.

SENATORIAL CONSENT FOR PROTOCOL EXTENSION

Senator PERCY. I could not agree more with you. It has been a concern of mine for months now. We have talked about it with Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, and twice with the President. We have his iron-clad pledge he will not unilaterally extend it without the advice and consent of the Senate. But I think we have to take into account that just as the Joint Chiefs are a continuing body, we are a continuing body. The checks and balances, I feel, would be better provided for and protected if, regardless of who is President—and there is a presidential election in November 1980—whoever is President is then bound to come back, whether it is President Carter or someone else, to the Senate. He cannot unilaterally extend that protocol, which I think would be dangerous for this country and tie the hands of our Defense Department.

Would the Joint Chiefs concur in principle with that? Would you feel more comfortable and would some of the questions you have raised in that memorandum of March 12 be answered if we built that protection in somehow?

General JONES. I think it would depend, Senator Percy, upon how it is done. I do not recommend and I do not think we recommend reopening negotiations with the Soviets on major issues.

Senator PERCY. I have categorically said I will oppose wrecking amendments to the treaty. I don't want to do that, of course. I don't think this does that at all.

General JONES. I would like to add one point. A policy has been adopted at our urging which I think is the right one, and that is that the ground-launched cruise missile, for example, is not excluded from negotiations. But it should be put in the proper context of negotiating within theatre nuclear systems, such as the SS-20 in Europe, as opposed to being coupled with the long-range strategic systems.

So if that policy continues, although I don't foresee the Soviets restraining the SS-20 adequately to make the GLCM deployment unnecessary that does not mean we will exclude it from negotiations. We will work with our allies.

PRESSURE BY SOVIETS TO EXTEND PROTOCOL

Senator PERCY. Could you clarify why the Joint Chiefs felt there would be extraordinary pressure by the Soviets to extend the protocol?

General JONES. Ever since Vladivostok, the cruise missile has been a key issue with the Soviets. They would like to have far greater restrictions on the cruise missiles—air, sea and ground-launched cruise missiles—than apply today.

Senator PERCY. I have a number of additional questions on that to put to you, and I will come back in the next round or whenever we possibly can. Could you answer the question whether a memorandum of March 12 exists? Would it be possible under proper security measures for us to study it, as well as any update of it to give us your current thinking? We could benefit knowing the arguments used at that time and how subsequent events have fully answered the doubts that existed in your mind on March 12?

General JONES. We will, Senator Percy, insure that you have the critical information contained in that memorandum. There is a memorandum. I think it is a separate subject whether or not the memorandum itself is sent. We will look at that with the Department of Defense.

Senator PERCY. We will negotiate how I get the memorandum. I would like to have the benefit of your thinking at that time, compare it with the concerns that some of us have had, and determine how you resolved the issues to see if it answers some of the questions we have in our mind.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. General, any information you supply to Senator Percy ought not be supplied to him exclusively. We want him to have that information, of course, but I think all members would appreciate it.

General JONES. We will send it to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Any such information should be sent to the committee itself.

General JONES. It all will go to the committee.

[At the time of publication, the information referred to had not been received.]

Senator PERCY. That was my intention, obviously. I thought if I engaged in a unilateral negotiation, it might be easier. [Laughter.]

General JONES. One of my colleagues tells me it is March 16.

Senator PERCY. Four days plus or minus.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern is next.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SALT IN BROADER CONTEXT OF U.S./ALLIED INTERESTS

General Jones and distinguished Chiefs of Staff. General, first of all, I want to commend you for the statement you make at the outset of your testimony on behalf of yourself and your colleagues where you say our larger goal is to attempt to place today's discussions and the upcoming debate on SALT into the broader context of United States and allied security interests of strategic force posture and stability. I think that is what we all want to do, to look at this SALT debate not simply as a question of getting into techni-

cal aspects of the treaty, although that is important and we will do that.

But I commend you as well as the chairman of the committee and my colleagues for having tried to look beyond that to the overall defense and security posture of the United States. I think as Senators, particularly, we have to look even beyond that. We have to try to fit that defense requirement into other sources of national strength, the energy supply of the Nation, the transportation structure, the health of our citizens. If those things are not strong, then our military vehicle cannot be serviced very well either.

HAWKS AND DOVES FAVOR SHARPER REDUCTIONS

There is a curious paradox to me which is developing here with reference to the SALT Treaty, for lack of a better word than these overworked phrases, about hawks and doves. They both seem to agree that they favor sharper reductions than the treaty calls for.

I do not classify you either way, General, as a hawk or a dove, but I note you say that we consistently favor deeper reductions in the overall aggregate that eventually were negotiated in the final agreement. Secretary Brown and Secretary Vance said the same thing. I think Senator Helms, Senator Garn and Senator Hayakawa have all said that, that this treaty does not go far enough in cutting back arms levels on either side. And that has been the position of some of the rest of us who have criticized the treaty and the accompanying assurances on new weapons, that it actually gives us a treaty with escalation rather than a treaty with substantial reduction.

But it does seem that here is the basis for a national consensus, that we all want reductions in arms levels on both sides. Is it your understanding the only thing that stands in the way of that is the Soviet Union's position, their intransigence on agreeing to the kind of reductions that you and your colleagues and all the others I have mentioned here would like to see?

General JONES. I would think the major burden would have to be on the Soviets. But I would have to say that in discussions within the U.S. Government we might advocate a reduction in one area and someone else in another area. So I am not trying to say that there is not some difference of views as to what a lower package would be on our side. But the United States did try, particularly in March 1977, to get fairly deep cuts. And although we had some reservations about certain aspects of the March 1977 proposal, overall we thought it was a good way to go.

REASONS FOR SOVIETS OUT-INVESTING UNITED STATES

Senator MCGOVERN. You say in your statement, General, that overall the Soviets have been out-investing us for the last 10 years, and for the past few years their total military investment effort has been about 75-percent larger than ours.

I would just like to raise some possible explanations for that and get your reaction on it. Do you think part of the reason for that Soviet buildup is the fact that 10 years ago we were so far ahead?

In other words, it was not so much a desire on their part to get ahead of us but to catch up.

Second, do you think that their anxiety about the Chinese played a part, which we don't have to worry about quite so much—they are not on our border. The Russians have them for 5,000 miles. We have the Mexican Army and the Canadian Mounted Police. [Laughter.]

Senator McGovern. But then you have in addition to that a certain amount of dissent and ferment brewing in Eastern Europe in the Soviet satellites. I should think any Soviet planner concerned about the hold they have on Eastern Europe, for example, would look with some trepidation on the impact the recent visit of the Pope had on Poland. It underscores again that even the Pope does have a few divisions, notwithstanding Mr. Stalin's observations.

I raise those questions because I wonder if we sometimes look at all the factors that may have led the Soviets to make this great effort. I am not trying to apologize for what they have done. I am trying to understand it.

General Jones. Senator McGovern, in all my speeches I try to be very balanced by pointing out the Soviets' problems. They have internal problems. They have economic problems. They have the pressure of 1 billion Chinese at their back door. They have national problems which are far greater than ours.

So, in our evaluation of the shifts in the military balance, we do take that into account. And certainly they do deploy about one-fourth of the Soviet Army in the Far East, much along the Chinese border. And I am certain part of the buildup has been because of their concern—we think an exaggerated concern—but a concern about the Chinese and other factors of geography.

But even taking all of that into account, we see 75 percent more in investments in almost every category—tanks, airplanes—and, if you talk strategic systems, the ratio is 2½ or 3 to 1. Even if you take into account all of these other factors, the disparity is great. We are spending less of our gross national product today on defense than we did in the early sixties and they are spending far more, not just as a percentage of their gross national product but in total and in military investment. I think undoubtedly this is going to have dire consequences if we don't do something about it.

MEANING OF STRATEGIC "ADVANTAGE"

Senator McGovern. General, you point out that you are concerned about them gaining an advantage over the United States, but the more I ponder that, the more I wonder what an "advantage" really means any more. Back in World War II when you were a pilot and I was a pilot, I can see where 1,000 airplanes made a great difference one way or another, but Secretary Brown told us earlier today that 5,000 warheads, somewhat less than that, hitting either country would utterly pulverize it.

Now, we have 10,000, the Soviets have 5,000, but theirs are bigger than ours. So probably there is comparable destructive capability. What does either side gain by having any more? What does

it mean to have an advantage after you have already got enough to pulverize the other side?

General JONES. Well, there is an assumption within those numbers that all are deliverable. We in the United States have the advantage today in warheads, but you will note that there is not a major increase in our warheads in the 1980's. There will be some increase, particularly due to the cruise missile. Our concern is vulnerability: vulnerability of our command and control system, vulnerability of our ICBM's, vulnerability of our bomber force in penetration.

So what we primarily are trying to do is address qualitative improvements within the United States, as opposed to great increases in quantity. We are not advocating any change in total-delivery systems. We would like to dispel the idea that we have been in an arms race when they have been outspending us 3 to 1.

We do have serious concerns about the vulnerability of our forces.

Senator MCGOVERN. The reason, general, I asked you about these other factors is I thought it might help explain why they are spending more than we are now. They are trying to catch up to us. They are worried about the Chinese.

General JONES. But I don't think that argument pertains in the strategic field because although the strategic capability the Chinese and the British and the French have is significant, it is a fraction of what we are talking about.

THROW-WEIGHT OF THE SS-18

Senator MCGOVERN. I mentioned this morning one source of anxiety is the greater throw-weight, the greater destructive capacity of a single missile on this SS-18 system. But what would be the relative or practical difference if, say, three or four of the warheads of the kind we have on the Minuteman III were to hit a city like Washington as against a hit from the SS-18.

In terms of what is left of that city, what is the real difference?

General JONES. There is not a great difference, but most of our targets are not cities.

Senator MCGOVERN. Most are not cities?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator MCGOVERN. What are they?

General JONES. Most of them are military targets. There are also industrial targets. Many of the industrial targets are located cities. But we have a lot of other targets: command and control, conventional and nuclear military targets. Obviously, one weapon delivered accurately can do great destruction. Therefore, yield is not as important as accuracy on a hard target.

Beyond a certain yield, it is quite academic on a soft target, but there is a big target mix here.

Senator MCGOVERN. There is not much left of a target in either case, is there?

General JONES. If you are accurate or you have a certain amount of yield, you do reach the knee of the curve in the sense that if you double the yield, you don't destroy a great deal more. That is why

we use equivalent megatonnage as opposed to megatonnage, because it takes into account the size of the individual warheads.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms is next.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, if it is of any interest to you, Skylab is down and did not hit the Pentagon. [Laughter.]

It is down in the ocean.

POSSIBILITY OF SALT PROVING A NET LOSS

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the distinguished chairman of this committee took a poll about certain aspects of this excellent statement. I want to commend you on the construction of it. It is sort of a smorgasbord. You can get out of it anything you want. But nevertheless, it is an interesting statement.

I assume that all of you agree with the concluding paragraph in which you say that the possibility that SALT II may prove to have been a net loss if—and that "if" is that this Nation does not undertake a dramatic increase in spending for defense capability. Is that correct?

General JONES. We all agree. Senator Helms, I don't believe you were here during earlier discussion when we explained this is a paper worked out by all the members of the Chiefs. In fact, there were very high-ranking action officers working on this paper. We all agree with the paper. I would take exception to the word "dramatic" in respect to the total defense budget because we spend such a small part of the defense budget on strategic forces that you can increase the strategic forces substantially without having a dramatic increase in the whole budget. And there is a separate subject of the overall need of the total budget.

SALT IS ESCALATION TREATY

Senator HELMS. Well, General, I think I can safely say, without fear of contradiction, that there is probably no Member of the Senate who is more supportive of national defense than this Senator, and I hope there will be a dramatic increase inasmuch as this is not a strategic arms limitation treaty. It is an escalation treaty, actually, in terms of megatonnage, and that is what kills people, not holes in the ground, not silos, and I am tempted to engage you in a discussion about megatonnage. But we will do that another time.

In your statement you mention in 1972 our predecessors on the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed SALT I with the assurance that certain follow-on actions would be implemented to safeguard our strategic interests. Regrettably, their advice was not heeded, and I imagine that you were referring to the B-1 which was promised but canceled, the M-X, the Trident II, which is now merely on paper, and other things.

Now, I hope you have more solid evidence than is available to this Senator that things will be different, inasmuch as the Soviet Union is not willing to reduce strategic weapons, that the Ameri-

can people and the leaders of this country will recognize the essentiality of spending and sacrificing sufficiently to keep abreast.

SALT IS NOT A PANACEA

Now, I have no interest in lecturing anyone, but it is time, it seems to me, for all of us to level with the American people. I have been a little offended at efforts by the administration to sell this treaty before the terms of the treaty were even established. Last year prior to December 31, over $1.25 million were spent to send various Federal officials around this country assuring civic clubs, talk shows on radio, and other things that this was almost a panacea. I am looking at all five of you, and the six of us know it is not a panacea.

You have been candid enough in this statement to say so. You have been honest enough to underscore the "ifs." I am reminded of what Sam Ervin so often said, that if a bullfrog had wings, he mightn't bump his backsides so often.

ADEQUACY OF SALT VERIFICATION

But I want to ask you a simple question about verification. You weave in and out, General, and I know that it is necessary to use a certain amount of rhetoric in preparation for an appearance before a congressional committee. But I think the question on the bottom line, if I may use that cliche, is can we now verify?

General JONES. I would rather not answer every question, Senator Helms. I would like to ask General Allen.

General ALLEN. The assessment of the adequacy of verification is one which includes several different factors: that is, the kind of data we can actually get, whether we can detect deviations in Soviet activity that violate specific provisions of the treaty, and judgment where if we are not quite certain about our monitoring ability—that is, we might miss something—whether or not what we might miss would be significant in military terms.

We have gone through the provisions of the treaty and reviewed the intelligence assets that we possess, and have concluded that the treaty is adequately verifiable. Now, each of us approaches this judgment in a somewhat different way, I believe, and has different kinds of concerns, because certain provisions of the treaty appear to each of us to be more critical than others. But we tried to take each one of these provisions and examine the true signficance of a deviation that might reasonably occur due to limitations in our own monitoring capability and then reach conclusions as to whether we were adequately protected by what we had.

Our conclusion was that the treaty is adequately verifiable. Yet concerns remain. We must maintain vigorous intelligence programs during the period of this treaty. We must do that with or without the treaty because the Soviet programs will be there with or without the treaty and we must understand what they are. But our conclusion is that it is adequately verifiable.

Senator HELMS. You understand, as I said to Secretary Vance yesterday, I am not in an adversary position on this. But as I listen to your answers, sir, and I respect you, I can imagine the man sitting out there looking at television saying: What did he say? You

probably said yes and no. But you say it is essential that we vigorously pursue improvements in the capability of our monitoring assets. It seems to me you are saying that really, deep down, verification is less than comfortable from our standpoint. And I am certainly not going to debate with you because we are on the same side.

General ALLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. But I am concerned about that aspect and others. Mainly I am concerned about my friend George McGovern and I being on the same side constantly on this thing. [Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. It worries the heck out of some of us, too. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. I don't know what my friend said and I am not sure he does. [Laughter.]

But in any case, with McGovern on one side and Helms on the other, you have the widest wingspan in history, haven't you?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Speaking of wings, Mr. Chairman, you know, if a bullfrog had wings, he might still hit his bottom if he didn't know how to land, and I suggest that maybe we are not landing in the right place in the questioning, myself included.

VERIFICATION CAPABILITY SINCE LOSS OF IRAN POSTS

With regard to the issue of verification, I would like to commend to Senator Helms and others that they avail themselves of the information which is available in the Intelligence Committee and to all of you, you too General Meyer. You made reference to, very obliquely what our capability is since the loss of the facilities in Iran. I would invite my colleague Senator Helms to come with me over to the Intelligence Committee and sit with that 17-volume study and speak to Admiral Inman and others who have forgotten more about verification than we will probably ever know.

JCS RECOMMENDATION IF SOVIETS HAD ADVANTAGE IN 1960'S

I would also like to ask a very straightforward question, General Jones. If in 1961 the Soviets had a 2 to 1, 3 to 1, or 4 to 1 strategic advantage over us, what would you have recommended to the U.S. Government? If in the sixties the Soviets had a 2, 3, or 4 to 1 strategic advantage over the United States, what would you have recommended to the President and the Congress?

General JONES. Are you referencing the Cuban missile crisis?

U.S. STRATEGIC CAPABILITY HAS NOT STOOD STILL

Senator BIDEN. No. Maybe I should be more direct. We are told that the Soviets were strategically disadvantaged to the tune of 2, 3, or 4 to 1, depending upon whom you talked to, during the sixties. And since then they have moved to relative equivalence in strategic weapons. And I would suggest that that does not necessarily signify anything other than any country in such a situation would

have no alternative but to have a massive program in order to rectify the imbalance that everyone acknowledged existed.

This, however, is not to say that the implication of your statement and other members of the Joint Chiefs is not correct, which is that the Soviets may want more than equality. But I do not think that the mere fact they have done what they have done should not be construed as is proof positive by any stretch of the imagination that they are doing anything other than what the United States in their place clearly would have done.

There is not a single doubt in my mind that were we in that position, we would have done precisely, and maybe more, what the Soviets have done in terms of strategic central system capability. That is really the only point I want to make, because although I agree with you, General, that we have to make some improvements in our strategic systems and we particularly have to deal with theatre nuclear force questions in SALT III and a whole range of other issues. But I disagree with the picture being painted today—and, I believe, being painted honestly by all of you. I want to register my disagreement that the United States has stood still, copped out—I forget the phrase being used this morning.

Senator McGovern. Goofed off.

Senator Biden. Goofed off. It is not your phrase but the phrase used this morning. It seems to me that notwithstanding what has been referred to by Senator Church, me and others in this committee, notwithstanding the hundreds of millions of dollars that we might have been able to direct, tens of millions of dollars that we may have been able to direct to other aspects of the military that were directed in Southeast Asia, notwithstanding that, we have still made significant increases in our strategic capability.

Am I correct, General, that the United States now has in its nuclear arsenal, ready to use at a moment's notice, some 9,200 nuclear warheads, as opposed to some 5,000 in the Soviet arsenal?

General Jones. Those numbers are very close.

Senator Biden. Am I correct that this represents an increase in our arsenal of some 3,000 warheads or a full 50-percent increase since 1972?

General Jones. There has been a substantial increase. Now we are at a fairly level point.

Senator Biden. Am I correct at this very moment in saying that we are improving the nuclear yield and the accuracy of our Minuteman III, which is the bulwark of our ICBM force, by procurement of the Mark XII–A warhead?

General Jones. Correct.

Senator Biden. Am I correct that we are also moving to develop and deploy the M–X missile, which will provide us with a much more survivable and accurate ICBM capability?

General Jones. Yes.

Senator Biden. Am I correct in regard to our bomber force, notwithstanding that the B–1 did not go forward, at this very moment we are improving the penetration capability by a variety of electronic, structural and avionic measures, and that penetration capability of our bomber force will be vastly improved when we deploy ALCM's, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, on existing bombers and on new ALCM carriers?

General JONES. I agree with that.

Senator BIDEN. Am I correct with regard to our submarine force, Admiral, which is, I believe the most survivable element of our strategic Triad, that we have steadily improved its capability through construction of the Poseidon submarine to replace the Polaris and through development of the Poseidon missile to replace the Polaris missile, through the development of the Trident I missile to replace the Poseidon missile, and right now through procurement of the Trident submarine and the Trident II missile? Maybe we didn't go as quickly as you would like, but we are doing that, aren't we?

Admiral HAYWARD. That is accurate with the exception of the Trident II missile, which we are not doing.

Senator BIDEN. We are not at this time working on procurement of the Trident II missile?

Admiral HAYWARD. No, sir. We are procuring the Trident I.

Senator BIDEN. OK. Now, General, considering the lead time necessary to develop and deploy these weapons, I think it can hardly be said that we have stood still. And I also think, General, is it not true that the main reason the trend is considered unfavorable is that the Soviet Union is very simply checking up, not because of our negligence but because they are following the road we have previously followed and because there is only so far the road can take you? Eventually you reach a point where all you can do is make further refinements on your own arsenal and keep on the alert. But you cannot keep another nation like the Soviet Union from going down the road and eventually coming relatively close, can you? How can you do that?

General JONES. Senator Biden, I am not particularly uncomfortable with our strategic forces today except in a few areas of vulnerability. If we could stop the Soviets as they were a few years ago or even now, that is a different situation. Clearly, after the Cuban missile crisis they made a decision. They may have made it before that but it is clear they at least made it after the Cuban missile crisis to increase their strategic capabilities.

I recall one statement made in the mid-sixties, that they had given up trying to have equality with the United States. We are sometimes criticized for not raising the alarm high enough as to our capability today. Although there are some problems today, I think overall we do have close to a balance. You can use different charts to prove different things, but we are close together today. But we are talking about the early eighties. We are talking about 1985. We are not talking about the Soviet Union today.

That list you have is quite impressive until you start reading the list of what the Soviets have been doing and are projected to do.

Senator BIDEN. The point I am trying to make is I happen to be inclined to support your position with regard to the M-X. I am not a part of the McGovern-Helms cabal here. [Laughter.]

I am only kidding, George. [Laughter.]

Seriously, I am inclined to support your position. But I think the impression the folks may be getting is that we keep talking about how the United States has, in a sense, crippled themselves, and we have stood still and the Soviets are so much stronger, et cetera.

One last question based on an article I read in "Foreign Affairs." You have all heard of the Committee on the Present Danger, a group which thinks we are not doing enough, to say the least. The article recommended eight points.

EIGHT POINTS RECOMMENDED BY COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

It said, (1) we should pay urgent attention to the survivability and endurance of our information, communications and command control system; (2) rapid development of an alternative basing mode for the ICBM's; (3) development of a more capable follow-on missile to replace our Minuteman III's; (4) procurement of a high quality strategic bomber and cruise missile tanker system with a high pre-launch survivability and penetrability; (5) acceleration of the Trident I SLBM development program, Trident II development and, if possible, Trident submarine construction and renewed study and development of similar SLBM submarines; (6)—there are only three more, Mr. Chairman—rehabilitation of an air defense program for AWACS [airborne warning and control system], F–14, Phoenix and new surface to air missiles; (7) reexamination of token U.S. civil defense programs; and (8) reinvigoration of ABM research and development programs.

I am not suggesting all of those are needed, but is it not true that under SALT II, if we desire, we could do every single solitary one of those items? And if I went too rapidly, I will submit it in writing to you. But I think it is important that we have from the Joint Chiefs an answer to that question because if the answer is yes, we could do them all, I am very, very confused as to how some suggest that SALT II would in any way cripple, as a matter of law, our capability to do all that those who suggest we should be spending more think need be done.

It is a comprehensive list. I don't know if you had a chance to get them all. I went rapidly because the red light went on.

General JONES. They would all be permitted under SALT.

General MEYER. I just happened to jot down those strategic force improvements we have recommended, and six of the nine in the article were ones we had recommended. I didn't jot down the other three. So six of those nine, I can assure you are within our rights within SALT II because we have recommended them.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Hayakawa?

IMPROVEMENTS SOVIETS ALLOWED TO MAKE IN ICBM FORCE

Senator HAYAKAWA. First may I thank you for your good presentation. I will forego the inclination to give a speech. I will ask a few questions on the subject of ICBM. As I understand the treaty, a distinction is drawn between improving and modernizing the ICBM force and the deployment of a new type. What improvements are the Soviets allowed to make in their ICBM force that would be considered simply modernization and not the introduction of a new type? Can the line be drawn clearly?

General JONES. It is plus or minus 5 percent allowed in various parameters.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Plus or minus 5 percent of what?

General JONES. Launch weight, throw weight, parameters such as those. They can improve accuracy. Accuracy is not limited. So long as you stay within these parameters, you can improve accuracy. You can improve reliability, and command and control. You cannot go to a different propellant in basic stages, so there are some limits.

We ought to recognize, though, that many of the systems they have in development may fit within the plus or minus 5 percent. To put it at a simple analogy, they can put a 1979 Chevrolet in a 1973 Chevrolet's place or they can put a Ford or a Plymouth, but they can't go to a Cadillac or a Volkswagen.

But they can make changes within those missiles, either the SS-19, the SS-17, and——

Senator HAYAKAWA. As I understand you——

General JONES. But not a new reentry vehicle.

Senator HAYAKAWA. The line is distinctly drawn, then, between improvement and——

General JONES. They can make improvements. The greatest limitation are on size, warheads—not only the number of reentry vehicles but the size and type of reentry vehicle on the system already.

Senator HAYAKAWA. In that case, won't the Soviet Union be permitted substantially to improve all their ICBM's under SALT II?

General JONES. That is correct. You can improve. It is the definition of improvement. The proposal tried to get some control on qualitative improvements. But it is particularly difficult to verify, qualitative improvements, for example, in accuracy.

SOVIETS BEING CONSULTED ON M-X DEPLOYMENT

Senator HAYAKAWA. All right. One last question. Are the Soviets being consulted on arrangements to make sure that an M-X deployment is verifiable by their national technical means?

General JONES. No, they are not being consulted. They are being told that we are going to deploy the M-X and we will deploy it in a way they can verify by their national technical means. But I do not recommend we have any consultations to ask permission of the Soviets for us to deploy those missiles. We have a right to do so and we should do so.

Senator HAYAKAWA. But you don't intend to consult with them about their means of verification.

General JONES [nods negatively]. I do not recommend so. I know of no intentions to consult with them. We are willing to explain how we would deploy it, but that is different from consultation.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Good. Thank you. Thank you ever so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCGOVERN. Senator Hayakawa, would you yield me a minute you didn't use?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes, I shall.

Senator MCGOVERN. I know my friend Joe Biden was being humorous when he talked about the McGovern-Helms cabal, but just

for the record, I want to make clear that when we are talking about those who would have preferred a treaty with reductions in arms levels rather than a treaty that calls for an increase, we are talking about a rather large group of people, including, I take it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, President Carter, and, I think, most Americans.

So I wanted to protect Senator Helms against the charge that he belongs to a very small group. [Laughter.]

Senator McGOVERN. Those of us that favor and still hope for reductions, I think, represent the mainstream of the Congress and the administration and the country. And I hope very much we can get to that day yet. I think it includes Joe Biden as well.

Senator BIDEN. I will promise to try to stop being humorous. [Laughter.]

General JONES. We did not underestimate the broad character of that cabal you are talking about.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

JCS SUPPORT FOR SALT TREATY

When the President came back from Vienna he made a speech in which he stated publicly the Joint Chiefs of Staff would publicly support the treaty. Had the Joint Chiefs so informed him at that time?

General JONES. We had made our recommendations to him before he went to Vienna, specifically saying that if certain conditions were met with regard to the protocol and so forth, we could consider the agreement to be a modest but useful contribution and in the national interest.

Senator GLENN. Had you informed him that the Joint Chiefs would publicly support him at that time and would support the SALT treaty?

General JONES. Not in those specific words, but I think he took it as a conclusion. Our paper said that if these conditions were met, it would be modest but useful. We were concerned that others might misinterpret the word "public." This is a public session today and therefore we are publicly addressing the SALT Treaty, but we do not intend to go out in public and to be part of a group persuading one way or the other on SALT. We do not think that is our role. So it is with a narrow definition of "public," in the context of appearing here today, that I interpret his statement.

VIEWS OF TWO FORMER MEMBERS OF JCS

Senator GLENN. When those decisions were being made and the recommendations were being made to the President, two of the present five members were not members of the Joint Chiefs. What were the views of the two members that are no longer with you?

General JONES. I would rather they would, if they have an opportunity, express the specifics of their views, but they did endorse the "modest but useful" conclusion with some reservations with regard to equity, and on verification, and—you might, Bob——

General BARROW. Backfire.

General JONES. And Backfire. There was some variation in views there, but in the broadest context I would say the consensus was "modest but useful," supportive of the national interest, with at least one member saying that he could support it in the context of broader national interest issues as opposed to specifics of the military interest.

Senator GLENN. Was there acceptance of SALT by the previous members, though? That is what I am getting at. They may have had some reservations. Did they state their support for SALT to the President?

General JONES. I would say, clearly four endorsed the "modest but useful," one of the four with some reservations as to how to arrive at that modest but useful, and a fifth one with greater reservations than that.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be incumbent upon the committee, since the two previous members had spent a number of years dealing with this subject on the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, that their views be solicited also so that they would be a part of the committee record. Do I need to make a motion to that effect, that we solicit the views of the two previous members of the Joint Chiefs since they had dealt with this for several years?

Senator PELL [presiding]. We will write them and ask them for a statement of their views.

Senator GLENN. Either write them or ask them to appear before the committee at a later session. I think that would be appropriate, that they be able to express their views, since they have had a great deal more experience than General Barrow or General Meyer in dealing with this; not to deprecate either of the gentlemen here, but I think we would be well-advised to get their opinions also.

Senator PELL. I will take this up with the chairman, who is temporarily absent.

Senator GLENN. I will speak to the chairman about it also.

General JONES. Senator Glenn, I am trying to represent that there were differences of views at that time. I would rather they express their views.

Senator GLENN. I understand that, and I agree. I think we should hear them.

General JONES. I would say there were none which came out against it in the context of what I would call strongly against the treaty. There were varying reservations.

Senator GLENN. General Meyer, when you were being considered for nomination, was a discussion of SALT ever made a major issue as to whether you would be nominated or not?

General MEYER. I have never discussed SALT either the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Senator GLENN. How about with any of your other superiors who were going to recommend you?

General MEYER. I have discussed SALT with the Chief of Staff of the Army, my predecessor, General Rogers, for the past 2½ years because I have been his staff officer responsible for SALT.

Senator GLENN. I understand.

General Barrow, how about you?

General BARROW. I have had no such conversations, sir, with any of my superiors. In fact, I tried to stay away from SALT as much as possible. [Laughter.]

LINKAGE OF M-X AND GENERAL ALLEN'S SUPPORT FOR SALT

Senator GLENN. After 3 days here, I agree with you. I would like to, too. The Chiefs have very eloquently expressed their concern over buildups of the strategic systems and the necessity for it, about our strategic systems getting behind and all of the things that were in your combined statement.

General Allen, you in particular, I believe, would be involved with the M-X. Would you have supported this treaty had there been no announcement for the M-X?

General ALLEN. Sir, the linkage of the two is always an awkward subject to deal with and I never know exactly how to treat that. If I may answer you this way, I believe very strongly that the Nation's policy must be a coherent one both in negotiating for arms limitations and in building our own forces as required by what the Soviets are actually doing in terms of their military capability, and I think the two are inseparable.

I believe the Nation's security would be poorly served if we abandon either one of the two prongs of that strategy. For that reason, the decision to proceed with the military programs required to maintain essential equivalence is a very important part, to me, of this country's policy and this country's actions in preserving national security. So is a SALT II treaty. I would find the abandonment of either element equally unacceptable.

Senator GLENN. Had you expressed yourself to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being for SALT prior to the announcement of the M-X?

General ALLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. In the statement that you made, General Jones, you expressed great concern and it is a very eloquent statement. You state: "In some areas they have already surpassed us. We are concerned because their momentum will allow them to gain advantage," and so on. Further on, you say:

> The criteria which my colleagues and I on the Joint Chiefs of Staff have endorsed are threefold. The agreement must stand on its own merits regarding equity and mutual interest to include adequate verification. It must accommodate in fact and in perception our broadest strategic interest, particularly our alliance relationships and so on. It must be a suitable framework for—

And this is emphasized and set off—

> and be accompanied by the national commitment in strategic programs required to arrest the deteriorating state of the military balance.

And the final statement on the bottom of the next to the last page here on verifiability:

> That the risks in this area are acceptable provided we pursue vigorously challenges to questionable Soviet practices, improvements in the capability of our monitoring assets and modernization of our strategic forces. In this context the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the agreement is adequately verifiable.

Those are an awful lot of caveats, and the antithesis to that, to me, would be that unless all of these things are met, you gentlemen would not have approved this. And I would almost say your

statement is damning by faint praise the whole SALT process by all these very, very strict caveats you put on your approval.

General JONES. I would not use the phrase "damning by faint praise," Senator Glenn. We do believe that it can be a modest but useful contribution, but it only provides a framework; we have to do other things. If we don't, it can count very little or, as we point out, it can even be negative.

VERIFICATION SYSTEMS MUST BE BROUGHT IN ON TIME

Senator GLENN. General Meyer, on this verification item, I think maybe your statement was the tipoff, if I heard you correctly a little while ago, and I wrote it down. You said that we must see that verification systems be brought in on time.

General MEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Which indicates they are still being developed. They are not here today. We are buying a pig in a poke, to some extent. Is that correct?

General MEYER. There is an element of risk inherent in bringing in some of the new systems. However, I became satisfied as I reviewed the total intelligence system that there are other systems which will compensate for shortcomings. But as we go on, very clearly the Soviets are likely to take other steps which challenge our ability to verify. And I am insistent that as we go into this treaty that we understand the Soviets and that we look to having systems that can, in fact, give us all the intelligence we need, not just that related to SALT.

SENATOR GLENN'S DOUBTS ON ABILITY TO VERIFY

Senator GLENN. I agree with you completely and my time is running out, unfortunately. I have done what Senator Biden was talking about. I have read all the things at the Intelligence Committee. I spent last weekend over there and 2 days of our legislative break last week. I went out to Wright-Patterson and talked to the foreign technology people out there. I have been to the CIA. I have been everyplace. And I don't think there is anything—unless someone is deliberately withholding something—I think I have all the information on how we are obtaining our information, and I still have some serious doubts.

So I differ a bit from Senator Biden, I think, in this regard. If someone is building us up for some new, big information bomb one of these days, we are being set up as patsies. But with the importance of the launch weight, the throw weight, the MIRV question, whether it is simulated or not, can any of you gentlemen sit and tell me today that you would be confident that we would obtain the necessary information today on Soviet launches going off right now while we sit here to verify those items?

General JONES. It depends upon your definition of verification, Senator Glenn. As you know, in the intelligence business we use various words that relate to certain percentages, and much of intelligence is science but a lot of it is art. In a lot of cases, we are dealing with percentages substantially below 100 percent. We share some of your concerns. It is not a black or white case, in our judgment. But when we look at it in the totality of what SALT II

accomplishes in the way of noninterference and with our intelligence system, in that context when we are asked "yes or no, is it adequate?" We say, "Yes, it is adequate but with reservations."

Senator GLENN. If there is one thing I have been impressed with through all of my looking at this intelligence data, it is that every single person I have talked to on this has stressed the importance of telemetry. We have stressed that over and over again to determine these parameters, and yet on December 21, I believe Gromyko stated, that telemetry was not necessary for verification. We have yet to get the wording of that completely cleared up, to my best information.

General JONES. Yes, Senator, the treaty says that it is.

Senator GLENN. But it leaves them to determine what impedes verification, which is the same problem we have had for the last 2 years on that. It is their choice, not ours. We would have to take the initiative of laying out our intelligence system and going to the S.C.C. in order to prove that we were lacking in the information that they had withheld from us.

General JONES. We agree there is still an ambiguity. I am just saying the specific treaty wording is better than what was discussed earlier.

Senator GLENN. I am over time but I want to finish with one thing. It is obvious we got information which was adequate last July 29. We did the same thing on December 21. We did the same thing on April 19. There is a bigger difference between the second and third of those than there is between the first and second, because it is in that interim when Iran went down. Obviously, we got the information in April from somewhere.

But the question is, Is it adequate to rely on that on a permanent basis? Is it a permanent source? Second, is it adequate and can we rely on it? I think that is the big question and those are the things that are still up in the air so far as I am concerned. I hope they prove to be all of those things so we can approve SALT.

General MEYER. The only thing I would add so you understand my view is that you must assess the risk during that period of time you are talking about, whether or not you can respond to it and whether or not it is significant. And as I have gone through each of the issues, as you have, that is the assessment that I have had to make on each issue independently. And then I must answer for myself the question—"what difference does it make?"

Senator GLENN. I think the difference is, General, I want it in hand. I don't want something that is to be developed. I don't want to be dependent upon the Soviets telling the Turks if we can fly over or not. If we are going to have that as our means, let's get it. Let's have it locked in when we start this thing. If it's going to be ground site somewhere else, let's get that locked in. Let's not be doing pie in the sky stuff that we are still playing around with in 1984 or 1985, hoping to verify and hoping they haven't violated in between on something of this tremendous importance.

General MEYER. I want to tell you that is not the basis of my assessment. The basis of my assessment is not what is coming in in 1984 and 1985. It is now.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I think Admiral Hayward has a word he wanted to say.

VIEWS OF ADMIRAL HAYWARD

Admiral HAYWARD. I would like to make a comment with respect to the previous question. I am uncomfortable with the answer, at least as I reflect on your proposition. My concern has had to do with the many caveats that are in the statement and the position of the Chiefs.

I want to make sure that you understand that I, and I think the rest of the Chiefs, are not raging enthusiasts for many of the features of the treaty.

Senator GLENN. I gather that.

Admiral HAYWARD. And the statement makes that fairly clear. We do have reservations. We are concerned about the protocol. We are concerned about features of the verification. We are concerned about the momentum the Soviets have in many other programs. But, on balance, it is our judgment that, provided this country has the will to compete with the Soviets, provided we are willing to get in there and rectify the imbalances that are going to occur, then we feel that the treaty serves a very useful purpose and we endorse it on that basis.

Senator GLENN. One of the other caveats, though, was the improvement in the capability of our monitoring assets. If we didn't know for sure that would occur, would you withdraw support?

Admiral HAYWARD. I think General Allen could handle this much better than I, but if you look at the track record of the U.S. intelligence systems, it is a very aggressive program which has been very effective. What the Chiefs want to do is make sure we put the pressure on the decisionmakers to continue that kind of improvement.

Senator GLENN. I apologize. I am sorry for running well over my time, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman and Chiefs. I sympathize a great deal with the predicament you have this afternoon, and I think it is a substantial one which you have handled by means of caveats in your statement as well as in your testimony. But let me just review the bidding for a moment. In the last exchange with Senator Glenn, one of you said that the SALT treaty might be a "modest but useful" contribution. Another said that on balance, it is "acceptable provided we have the will to compete with the Soviets."

Now, in your initial statement, you say:

> In 1972, our predecessors on the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed SALT I with the assurance that certain follow-on actions would be implemented to safeguard our strategic interests. Regrettably, their advice was not heeded. Had it been followed, we would face less perilous strategic prospects in the 1980's, and we are convinced we could have achieved deeper mutual reductions in SALT II.

I think that is a tremendously important statement. Here we are again in 1979, and very clearly there is a coupling of what you are suggesting as a mild endorsement, to say the least, with a very substantial program. I don't know how we are going to write that as a treaty. In a technical manner it probably can't be done. There is even quibbling at this table, as a matter of fact, as to whether it should be done. And really, the issue we are debating here back

and forth is in part technically what SALT II has to say about various things, some very mild limitations on the Soviet Union.

We all admit there is going to be vast escalation of their forces under this treaty. Some thoughts about verifiability will be discussed with hopes that somehow that will work out with a degree of confidence. We have at least some hopes that maybe they will be a little bit limited so we can catch up.

That is the whole message of this morning's round with the Secretary of Defense. What is being told the American public, finally, in these hearings is that we have some problems. They have dated back for a long time, and now as they bring SALT out and you gentlemen are brought out to try to give at least some military respectability to the arguments, the problem becomes really acute.

For example, the Secretary of Defense said this morning that by 1985, we might at least be in the ballpark of having come back up to an acceptable minimum. You have said about the same thing this afternoon. The argument has been made this afternoon by some of my distinguished colleagues that we have not been standing still, that we have been doing a lot of things. Indeed, we have.

But you have made the point that although we have not been standing still, it has not been much of a race. The other side is moving two, three, or four times faster in a very dangerous situation. So now we come to this kind of a predicament in which you give a qualified endorsement to SALT but with a very energetic program ahead for the American public.

And the question is, I think, for those of us who must vote on this treaty in committee or on the Senate floor, What should our course be, logically? As you have stated in your part this afternoon, treaties have often been perceived as the source of defense, and there is a long, historical record of people trying to use treaties rather than defense to defend themselves. You said:

> A recurring theme in U.S. history has been the hope that treaties which are at best a framework for enhancing security would somehow serve as the source of such security.

And finally, you sum up:

> The most serious concern of the Joint Chiefs in this regard is the risk that SALT II could be allowed to become a tranquilizer for the American people, in which case the adverse trends I spoke of earlier could well become irreversible.

Now, gentlemen, isn't that precisely what we are likely to run into in this SALT II debate, the thought that a security umbrella by treaty is coming over us in this case? What assurance do you have that if we blandly go ahead and pass SALT II, that any of the things you are talking about; the developments of the M–X, the movement in the Trident, all of the cruise missile development which is now taken for granted as essential, that this is going to proceed?

SUPPORT FOR 25-PERCENT INCREASE IN STRATEGIC BUDGET

Do you really believe that coming to Congress year after year after SALT II has been ratified and the American public has been told essentially we are in better position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, that you are going to have the support you need for the 25-percent

increase in the strategic budget that the Secretary said this morning was absolutely essential, quite apart from perhaps a great deal more than that, if what you are suggesting this afternoon comes to pass?

What will be your reception at that point?

General JONES. Senator Lugar, we realize that there is no way of putting into the treaty any provision that we will do what is allowed within the treaty. We also recognize there is no way we can get a commitment; Congress does not ordinarily commit money on a multiyear basis to programs. We do have concern that we might come up here and programs may not be approved. But this concern does not mean we should not give you our advice. That advice may not be taken, but we know there are no ironclad guarantees.

But we want to highlight in our advice that, with or without the treaty, we need to do something.

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS BETTER WITHOUT SALT

Senator LUGAR. Let's play the devil's advocate for just a moment. Let us say that we are tired of treaties serving as tranquilizers, tired of treaties being given a position of being the source of defense rather than the real thing, and we defeat the treaty and say, now let's take a look at where we are in the world. What things do we need to do without this umbrella, which really doesn't amount to a whole lot?

Isn't it very possible that our defense, the future security of this country, will be in a better position if we simply exit SALT and finally get down to the defense issues that the Secretary of Defense talked about this morning and that you have talked about this afternoon?

General JONES. I do not believe—if there is such an inference there—that you need to shock the American people by rejecting a treaty in order to get the attention of the American people. As I have said in my statement, we are here to try to place this debate in the broader context of the strategic balance, because we have concerns with or without the treaty.

But that does not mean that we advocate—despite our reservations on aspects of the treaty—or that we recommend the treaty be rejected. As part of the process we are saying it makes a "modest but useful" contribution, but it doesn't solve the whole problem. That is our advice. We hope you accept it.

AMERICAN PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION OF ICBM VULNERABILITY

Senator LUGAR. General Jones, do you believe the American public realizes what we have heard in our testimony recently, that in fact in 1980 or 1981 a large majority of our ICBM's could be destroyed in a first strike attack?

General JONES. I am convinced the American public believes that. I have sensed a change in the belief of the American public as to the adequacy of our defense efforts, so I don't have any reservation about the public, once given the facts.

Senator LUGAR. Do you believe the public has that appreciation now, how grave our situation is?

General JONES. I believe it is growing, not to the extent I would like to see it, but when I go around the country—and I don't just "sing to the choir" and talk to friends—I sense in the country increasing concerns about the trends in defense.

VULNERABILITY OF SECOND LEG OF TRIAD

Senator LUGAR. Well, I think you are right, but I am of the opinion, having visited my constituents, that they are totally unaware that one of the legs of our Triad is sick; namely, the ICBM side. Second, they are clearly not aware that the B–52's might not be able to make it. I questioned Secretary Brown about that this morning. He quoted General Ellis as saying there would be a 75-percent penetration probability which seems to me to be very dubious, having visited with General Ellis, too, on that subject, and with other people in the Air Force. What is your judgment about the second leg? It appears to me a highly vulnerable one in the early 1980's.

General JONES. Let me ask General Allen to address that.

General ALLEN. The figure which the Secretary quoted from General Ellis is based upon the integrated strategic operation, which, of course, is a coordinated operation involving weapons from other systems assisting the B–52's as they go in. It is also based largely on the premise that the Soviets continue the programs we see now in the improvement of their ground-based systems, but have not acquired a substantial "look down, shoot down," capability for their air defense fighter-interceptors.

Senator LUGAR. Is that a fair assumption, that the shoot down capability will not be there?

General ALLEN. Our best judgment is that it is a fair assumption for that period of time, that is through 1985, but that becomes a less fair assumption quickly thereafter. For that reason, General Ellis has also said that as one approaches the late eighties, he begins to have substantial doubts about the penetrativity of the B–52's.

Senator LUGAR. His assumptions are appropriate even with the refueling needs for the B–52's, to cross oceans and the vulnerability of the tanker aircraft that have to be in tow? In other words, the problem is not just the B–52 alone penetrating, but all the infrastructure supporting that, and you still have a 75-percent penetrativity of the second leg at that point?

General ALLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUGAR. Well, you, I presume, have got to take responsibility for that. It seems to me to be an incredible situation, one I hope we will be able to examine a little bit more. The point I am trying to make is that even while we are claiming three parts to the Triad, I think one is sick and the second is a lot sicker than is apparent.

I have come to the conclusion at this stage that in any event the American public had better be informed of where we stand, because that has a lot to do with whether we are going to take the SALT situation as a panacea as opposed to moving on. I support you gentlemen and the Defense Department in doing the things we need to do to pull ourselves out of this situation. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

SEVENTY-FIVE PERCENT SURVIVABILITY OF SECOND LEG OF TRIAD

[Supplied by: Joint Chiefs of Staff]

SAC's penetrativity estimate would still be 75 percent. However, the overall survivability of the B-52 force to the target could be somewhat lower as a result of additional losses beyond those inflicted by Soviet air defenses that could occur as a result of a Soviet surprise SLBM attack on our bomber bases.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF MIG-23'S

General Jones, does NATO consider Mig-23's nuclear capable?

General JONES. I believe they would consider some yes and some no. There are many different versions of Mig-23's, Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. Are all versions of the Mig-23's represented in Cuba?

General JONES. No, sir.

Senator STONE. Which ones are not?

General JONES. I believe the B, C, and F are in Cuba today.

Senator STONE. Is the F not nuclear capable?

General JONES. I do not want to go into great detail from an intelligence standpoint, but there is an export version which we have estimated does not have the wiring and design for nuclear weapons. That does not mean it could not be done, but it is not basically configured for that mission.

Senator STONE. How many Mig-23's are there?

General JONES. It is a small number. I would rather not give the number in open session.

SOVIET GOLF II SUBMARINE

Senator STONE. Admiral Hayward, does the Golf II class submarine of the Soviet Union carry nuclear missiles?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, sir, it can.

Senator STONE. For example, does it carry the SSN5?

Admiral HAYWARD. It can. Yes, sir.

Senator STONE. Does the Golf hull get included in the SALT I limits when the new missiles are embarked on the Golf I hull?

Admiral HAYWARD. No, I don't believe it does.

Senator STONE. Well, I am just reading. I think it is Jane's. Does this look like Jane's to you? I am not positive this is Jane's Fighting Ships, but I think it is, and it says SALT I, the Golf class hulls are not included in the SALT I totals. However, if new missiles are embarked, these are to be counted in the overall missile total. Is that right?

Admiral HAYWARD. I think that is accurate, but the new missiles are not in the Golf II submarines at the present time. We are not counting them.

Senator STONE. This also said after the missile conversion of the Hotel class was completed in 1967, 13 of this class, Golf II, were converted to carry the SSN5 system, with 700-mile range missiles

in place of the shorter range 300 mile range Sarks. Is that right, Admiral?

Admiral HAYWARD. The Golf III submarine launchers are counted.

Senator STONE. Golf III.

Admiral HAYWARD. But the Golf's I and II and Hotels are not.

Senator STONE. Does the Golf II carry the SSN5 ballistic missiles?

Admiral HAYWARD. I am not certain of that. I will have to provide that for the record. I do not believe that the Golf I or Golf II are presently carrying or can carry the missiles which we are concerned about.

[The information referred to follows:]

ABILITY OF GOLF I AND GOLF II TO CARRY SSN5 BALLISTIC MISSILES

[Supplied by: Joint Chiefs of Staff]

The Soviets have [deleted] diesel-powered Golf-class submarines.

[Deleted] the hulls do not count against the limit of 62 modern SSBNs. Additionally, there are [deleted] Golf I and II submarines with [deleted] SS-N-4/5 launchers which are *not* accountable under SALT I because the SS-N-4 and SS-N-5 SLBMs were first flight-tested prior to 1965. Under the provisions of SALT II, the [deleted] the [deleted] launchers of the Golf I and II units would not by virtue of the pre-1965 initial flight-test criteria.

Senator STONE. Well, let me just hand this over to you and see if this will refresh your recollection.

[Pause.]

Admiral HAYWARD. The information I am looking at is classified and ought to be presented in executive session.

Senator STONE. The information I just handed you is not classified.

Admiral HAYWARD. There is a disparity between the two, and I would rather not try to clarify it.

GOLF II SUBMARINES IN CUBA

Senator STONE. I see. Admiral, did two G-2 class Soviet submarines visit Cuba in the 1970's?

Admiral HAYWARD. Well, I cannot answer that accurately. I will say this. If there were submarines that called in Cuba that the U.S. intelligence assessed to be nuclear capable, and if it were a fact that they were ones that we were concerned about as carrying nuclear weapons, that would have been a violation of the 1962 Cuba agreement.

Senator STONE. Even if they were Golf II's?

Admiral HAYWARD. That would have been a violation of the agreement, and we would have objected to that. I was not the Chief then, and I would have to examine the record back in those days to give you an accurate answer to the question.

Senator STONE. If it were the case that the Golf II submarines had visited Cuba, and there were two, and they were as recent as 1974, actually carried SSN5 ballistic missiles, would that be a violation?

Admiral HAYWARD. It is my interpretation that that would be a violation.

Senator STONE. Would you check that for the record and let the committee know?

Admiral HAYWARD. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

GOLF II SUBMARINES CARRYING SSN5 BALLISTIC MISSILES INTO CUBA

[Supplied by: Joint Chiefs of Staff]

As I indicated earlier, Golf II diesel submarines carry the SS-N-5 SLBM which is not accountable under the SALT I Treaty or the provisions of SALT II. The SS-N-5 SLBM is assessed to have a nuclear warhead. [Deleted.]

[Deleted] the Golf II submarines which visited Cuba [deleted] 1972 and [deleted] 1974. Characterization of those visits as violations, or non-violations, of an understanding with the USSR is more properly within the purview of the State Department, to which I would defer on the issue.

Senator STONE. Your endorsement, all of your collective endorsement as being a modest contribution——

General JONES. Modest but useful.

CALLING SOVIET HAND ON VIOLATIONS

Senator STONE. "Modest but useful" contribution was and is contingent on this country having the will to compete. Do you also include in that this country having the will to stand up to a violation that our verification shows took place?

General JONES. I think there would be a difference of opinion, Senator Stone, as to the violation in that regard. Clearly, in the SALT Treaty, if the Soviets violate elements of the SALT Treaty, we ought to stand up to them, and it is in that context we are discussing SALT.

Senator STONE. General, if we do not have the will to call a violation that we find out about, what good is verification?

General JONES. We have called the Soviet's hand in the SCC in what we considered violations or anomalies of SALT I, and after some discussions, those were satisfactorily resolved, so we do have the mechanism in SALT. That does not guarantee every one will be resolved, but we do make complaints, and so far we have been successful in resolving those.

Senator STONE. General, I am concerned.

General MEYER. I would like to associate myself——

Senator STONE. Yes, General.

General MEYER [continuing]. With the clear view that where there are clear violations, that we have to have the will to go into the SCC and say so. I think that is absolutely essential during the next 4 or 5 years, if you decide to ratify SALT.

General ALLEN. I would like to say it even stronger than that. I believe the Chairman's statement makes the same point, and that is, it is not necessary that there be clear Soviet violations. It is only necessary that there be a suspicion on our part of a violation for us to be required to make a vigorous challenge of that point with the Soviets. We have said that in the statement, and that is really our belief on that.

Senator STONE. Gentlemen, that is precisely the line of questioning that I have been following yesterday and today with regard to the Cuban situation. I want to be reassured that there have been

no violations that we have not blinked, because if there have been, what good is verification with regard to SALT?

If, and I am not positive this is taking place, but I have to tell you my information is that it did. If Soviet nuclear bearing submarines, not nuclear powered submarines, but nuclear missile carrying submarines have been serviced in Cuba and we have done nothing but gloss it over, I would not have the confidence to proceed ahead with something as major as SALT II. On the other hand, if I can be satisfied that we have the will power to stand up when a salami tactic is being used against us 90 miles offshore, then I can go to the question of balance, verification, and the other questions. But I mean business about this, not only because we live 90 miles away from there, but because all through this whole debate, the Cuban missile crisis and its resolution has been the catalyst for all the discussion, and with good reason, and the chairman started his questioning of the Secretaries of Defense and State by asking them if the Cuban missile crisis reoccurred, what would we be able and willing to do?

He got a good answer. Now, I want to make sure that that is a true and correct posture all the way through, because I still am concerned that the Cuban theater offers us the greatest risk in terms of the Soviets trying to prove they are not the same Soviets they were when we forced them to pull their missiles and airplanes that could carry such missiles out of Cuba.

That is what this is all about, and I will await your report on the Golf II submarines that paid visits to Cuba to make sure that I can be assured, as you apparently are, that they were not ballistic missile carrying submarines.

Thank you very much.

Senator PELL. Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FREEDOM TO PROCEED UNDER PROTOCOL

Gentlemen, does the protocol preclude us from moving forward with any development we would otherwise want to undertake? Are we free under the protocol to proceed as we would proceed without it?

General JONES. Yes, sir, with the protocol ending December 31, 1981, we can proceed.

Senator SARBANES. If that is the case, why do the Soviets want the protocol in there if it is not for some precedential purpose?

General JONES. I think they wanted it to have the opportunity to extend it. They have made it clear that in subsequent negotiations they would like to extend at least certain provisions of the protocol, maybe not the protocol in its entirety.

Senator SARBANES. Of course, there might be tremendous pressure that would build up for its extension, or a tremendous effort to portray the United States as resuming or embarking upon an arms race post December 31, 1981, if we were then to move forward to carry out many of the things that were prohibited by the protocol. Isn't that a concern you have?

General JONES. I think it could be if not handled right. I think it is fair right now to say we are going to proceed with the deploy-

ment of the M-X in a mobile survivable mode in the mid-1980's, that we are going to proceed with the cruise missiles—the ground-launched cruise missile and the sea-launched cruise missile.

With regard to subsequent negotiations, particularly the ground-launched cruise missile, as I mentioned earlier we should not be reluctant to negotiate, but clearly in the context of comparable systems such as the SS-20. I think we can put the onus on the Soviet Union. The reason we need systems such as the Pershing II or other ballistic missiles of extended range and the cruise missile in Europe is because of their SS-20 deployment. If they would eliminate the SS-20, I would be glad to very greatly limit or eliminate the deployment of something like the ground-launched cruise missile. We can put it in that context and, I think, put the onus on them for escalating the theater nuclear systems.

SOVIET VIEW OF ARTICLE XII ON NONCIRCUMVENTION

Senator SARBANES. Do you understand the Soviet view of article XII on noncircumvention to differ from the view which the United States has taken on what that provision means?

General JONES. I do not know what the Soviet interpretation would be. I would not be surprised to see it different from ours, but in this case each has a right to make his own interpretations. That is one of the reasons we wanted to make sure the language in the treaty is so tight. In the case of noncircumvention, we have made our interpretive statement. The Soviets know about it. I am convinced they knew about it before the agreement was signed, and they signed, even though they knew about it. They may have disagreed with it, but they certainly did not go into it blind.

Senator SARBANES. I do not understand that. If they have a different view and can base it on the language, then we have simply planted the seeds of a major dispute.

General JONES. I do not foreclose their disputing it, but I am saying there are a lot of cases in which the decisions are in our hands—the decisions on interpretation, the decisions on protocol, the decision on precedent. They signed it knowing that we intended to continue our practices with our allies in Europe with regard to modernization of nuclear weapons.

Senator SARBANES. Do the Soviets today have a different interpretation of the meaning of article XII on noncircumvention?

General JONES. I don't know whether they have a different one. They know our interpretation and our plans to proceed consistent with past actions.

Senator SARBANES. Suppose the United Nations had a conference on disarmament where the Soviets contended we were violating article XII on noncircumvention, and all the nations there except us and those handful of countries to whom we were supplying information said yes, this article XII says no noncircumvention, and that is what has been taking place.

General JONES. I don't see how all of the nations could do that since our NATO allies were involved in the development of that interpretive statement.

Senator SARBANES. Other than that handful of NATO countries.

General JONES. I think we would have a strong case around the world that the Soviets clearly knew what our plans and intentions were before they signed the treaty. The clear thing is the action; it is up to us. Whether or not we will have the will and determination and wherewithal to do it is something else, but it is not up to the Soviets in this case.

Senator SARBANES. But we included that provision in an agreement between us, and therefore provided them with a basis of contesting the interpretation if we allow that to persist. It is possible for the Senate, of course, considering this treaty, to remedy that potential problem. Final action would have to be accepted by the Soviets in the process of ratification.

General JONES. Obviously, we have concerns in this area, Senator Sarbanes, but I want to be clear; where the decision is up to the United States, we should be willing to make the decision without having to negotiate with the Soviet Union. We in the Joint Chiefs strongly supported not having a nontransfer clause, and the Soviets had pushed hard for a nontransfer clause that, had it been agreed to in the treaty, would have precluded any transfer of arms. We were successful in keeping that provision out of the treaty.

BUDGET CUTS BY EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL BRANCHES

Senator SARBANES. Is it fair to say that the budget requests you have made for upgrading our forces over the last few years have been cut more substantially within the executive branch than by the Congress?

General JONES. I think that is correct.

Senator SARBANES. You think that is correct?

General JONES. I think that is correct, but I want to add that additional cuts are of greater impact than the initial cuts.

It does not mean that the impact of reductions in the defense budget by Congress does not have a substantial impact on our overall capabilities.

Senator SARBANES. My understanding is the congressional cuts in the defense budget submitted by the President, over the last 3 years have run at an average of under 2 percent.

General JONES. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator SARBANES. What percentage cuts have been made in your requests from the time you first put forward your projected military budget to the time it is finally submitted to the Congress by the President?

General JONES. I think it would be an unfair comparison, Senator Sarbanes, because we have a lot of options in our initial submissions. We have a lot of different options, understanding that, in the final submission it will settle out at something less than that.

Senator SARBANES. That is a very important qualification to make. Recognizing that qualification, its importance and its weight, what percentage cut do your requests experience from the time you make them until the President's budget is submitted in the Congress?

General JONES. Let me give you an answer which is not related to a precise year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not come up with a percentage figure, but we went through the needs to reduce the

risk to this country, and we said that a 5-percent real growth in the next 5 years—or as far out as we can see—would reduce the risks to this Nation very substantially.

Senator SARBANES. If you could submit to us the rough percentage cut that your requests experienced by the time the President submits the budget, it would be helpful.

[The information referred to follows:]

ROUGH PERCENTAGE CUT REQUESTS RECEIVED BY TIME PRESIDENT SUBMITS BUDGET

[Supplied by: Joint Chiefs of Staff]

The following table displays the Services' requests, Presidential budgets, and resulting appropriations for fiscal year 1977 through fiscal year 1980. Percentage figures indicate the Executive and Congressional reductions as a portion of the original Service requests.

DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS

[Dollars in billions]

Fiscal year	Service request	Presidential budget	Percent reduction	Appropriation	Percent reduction
1977	122.8	114.3	6.9	109.3	4.1
1978	133.4	120.4	9.7	116.5	2.9
1979	135.7	126.0	7.1	[1] 121.4	[1] 3.4
1979 supplemental	.....	(4.4)	.....	([2])	.....
1980	141.6	135.5	4.3	([2])	.....

[1] Excludes proposed supplemental appropriation for personnel and programmatic increases. Supplemental requested at $4.4 billion—currently reported out of conference at $3.6 billion, and awaiting floor action in the Senate.

[2] Pending.

BENEFITS/DRAWBACKS OF SALT TREATY

As you view the treaty, what are its most important benefits for the United States, and what are its most important drawbacks?

General JONES. First, I would say on the drawbacks that it does not constrain the Soviets sufficiently, so that their momentum cannot result in some serious difficulties in the strategic field, particularly in the early 1980's. We would like to have seen greater restraint on the Soviet momentum. There are specifics in that. We would have liked to have seen the 308 MLBM's reduced. We would like to have seen the backfire counted.

We have concerns about verification. Although we have come to the final judgment on adequacy, that does not mean there are not some concerns.

As to the pluses to the United States, there are a number. One is the capture of the fractionation potential of their large throw weight, limiting them, particularly in the SS-18, to 10 reentry vehicles. Although they still have a potential to fractionate beyond 1985 it does restrict the Soviets. The treaty allows us to have—and this is an advantage—it allows us to exercise the options to improve our strategic capability. There are a lot of subissues. Maybe my colleagues would have an answer.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I know the time has expired, but can we hear from the others? The point was made earlier that the Chiefs differ among themselves on the relative priorities they gave to benefits and difficulties. It would be helpful to us to have a

broader view because someone may underscore either a benefit or a disadvantage which has not fully come to light.

General JONES. I think that is a key point. The Chiefs, as I pointed out earlier, the current Chiefs as well as the previous Chiefs before the July 1 period had various views with regard to the separate issues. In earlier conversation with Senator Glenn, I was not trying to imply that there is unanimity now and that we lacked unanimity before.

Before, some had deeper concerns in some areas than others. We still retain some differences. So there is not a big marked difference between June 30 and July 1. Although I do want to be sure that the two have the opportunity to present to the committee their views, because they are slightly different from ours.

General BARROW. Specifically to your question, Senator Sarbanes, I would say that the biggest plus is the cap, if you will, or the constraint on Soviet growth and momentum, which of course translates into some hope that the arms race will not in fact be a race, and the very opposite of that, my biggest personal disappointment is that the treaty did not go deep enough in the limitations.

Of course, we all know that must have been a most difficult thing to achieve, or it certainly would have been done; 7 years could not produce the cuts which I think so clearly are needed. Those are the two things I would single out in answer to your question.

General ALLEN. To give a brief answer, the fractionation limits on the ICBM's are the most important benefit of the treaty to me. My most serious concern about the treaty is simply the fact that we were not able to get the Russians to agree to substantially greater constraints.

General MEYER. My concerns all along have been with a strict accounting of equity. Specifically, I consider the Backfire, the 308 heavy missiles, our monitoring capability, and the Soviet breakout capability to be inequitable in the strictest sense. However, I am satisfied that the military significance of these inequities is not such as to pose unacceptable risks to us during the period of the treaty. I believe I have a greater concern over these specific risks than my peers here at the table do.

The area of benefit I would attribute to the treaty is a bit different than highlighted by my peers. Perhaps because I am wearing a different colored suit than they are, I am concerned about what happens with the rest of our forces if there is no treaty. I feel that we would have to be devoting such an increasingly large portion of our defense and national budget to strategic weapons that very likely we would have even less conventional and theater nuclear capability than we have now.

From a green suit, Army point of view, perhaps a bit parochial, I think it is important that we put a cap on strategic offensive systems so that we can get on with some of the other things we have to do to respond to our broader strategic needs throughout the world.

Admiral HAYWARD. I would really like to turn that last part into an endorsement of the Chiefs, because we have made it emphatically clear to our superiors that we are concerned about the total cost of strategic systems, which is the reason we want to see them held

down. We want to see some cuts, because we are concerned about the conventional balance worldwide. The competition for those dollars is real, and we are very concerned about it. All the services are.

I think the real advantages have been stated, and in my judgment the most important is the fractionation cap, the limitation on weapons that are on existing missiles today.

I think the equal aggregates is important, because it has other features to it in that we have the freedom to mix. It allows the United States, which has a policy of supporting a Triad, to continue to use the Triad the way we want to use it, which was not true in SALT I. It is an improvement in SALT II. It is an advantage to our side we should make sure we use.

I think the verification rules are very important. We are going to understand much better Soviet strategic developments within the bounds of the treaty than if we did not have that control. It is clear that that is an advantage to our side, to both sides, for that matter, but much more so for the United States. The major limitation with which we all agree is that we did not make a deep enough cut.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ABILITY TO VERIFY SALT TREATY

General Allen, in the past you served as the head of the National Security Agency. Could you respond and tell us your insights as to our concern with verification? I understand you were in that position previously.

General ALLEN. Yes, sir, but whatever expertise I developed there really should remain there. That is, I should not testify on that in open session, and my successor, Admiral Inman, is clearly the most competent to testify on that, and I would prefer it not be in open session.

Senator ZORINSKY. I was not asking you to go into detail, but with your background could you assure us we have the ability to verify this treaty? I don't want to know how we do it, where we do it, or when we do it.

General ALLEN. I am satisfied, as I have stated, that we can verify adequately.

JCS HESITANT TO PROVIDE LINKAGE

Senator ZORINSKY. I have heard from you gentlemen the fact that you do not feel there should be linkage between the treaty and recommendations of what needs to be done with or without a SALT II treaty ratification. I recall phrases like "we must do things with or without the treaty," which I believe earlier, General Allen, you used, and Admiral Hayward making the comment, "provided we get in and compete with the Soviet Union," I understand that you gentlemen see experts in your area. I am not an expert in your area, and that is, of course, why I am here today, to listen to your advice, and your testimony before this committee concerning SALT II. Your hesitancy to link the treaty ratification to what needs to be done concerns me, because I will give you the frightening politi-

cal reality, of this Nation, and that is that there is a lot of distrust by the American public concerning the recommendations from this legislative body. That is why we turn to experts, and how experts show a hesitancy to create that linkage, although they insist that something must be done within the purview of this SALT II treaty or without it. The way we make decisions is based upon letters from the American public, based upon telephone calls from constituents, based upon when we go home and appear at question and answer sessions, town hall meetings, but it is strictly an extension of the will of the American people, and the way to make the American people knowledgeable is to tell them what needs to be done.

Now, General Jones indicated, and I agree with you, we trust the American public to do what needs to be done, but the American public today is looking for leadership, and that leadership must be coming from the experts who are employed by government to provide that leadership.

Now, you gentlemen always find a way to find me through congressional liaison people when you want an affirmative vote on an aircraft carrier, or when you want affirmative votes on destroyers or when we discussed the B-1 bombers, there were ways to get to me which were quite evident. All I am seeking right now is your input and information, and you are hesitant to provide that linkage.

General JONES. We are not hesitant, Senator Zorinsky. You may have misinterpreted. I think the only question on linkage was to come up with nice, precise numbers with SALT and no SALT. I think it is most likely that without SALT we will have to do more than with SALT.

NEED FOR RECONVERTED F-111'S

Senator ZORINSKY. General, with SALT, do we need the reconverted F-111's?

General JONES. That tends to cloud up the picture. We would have to do more without SALT than with SALT. What we want to concentrate on, under any circumstance we see, with or without SALT, is a need to do more. And the need to do more in the strategic field and a need to do more across the board. We would be glad to discuss those specifics, but not try to give neat answers between SALT and no SALT that——

Senator ZORINSKY. When I am being asked to vote for what people are saying is between $20 and $70 billion for the M-X missile system, you will not say we need it, with or without——

General JONES. I say absolutely, unequivocally, we need the M-X, and I will say absolutely and unequivocally——

Senator ZORINSKY. Why not make it with SALT II?

General JONES. We need the M-X just as strongly with a treaty as without a treaty.

Senator ZORINSKY. And you would say that this is a high priority item with or without the treaty?

General JONES. Absolutely. There is no question. I would be willing on weapon systems to give precise answers.

Senator ZORINSKY. How about cruise missiles?

General JONES. We ought to continue with cruise missiles with or without SALT.

Senator ZORINSKY. You are getting into specifics now, which you said you would not do earlier.

General JONES. No, I said I will give you the specifics. The only place I am trying to avoid linkage is in giving neat answers that SALT is going to save you x dollars.

Senator ZORINSKY. I am not looking for those kinds of answers.

General JONES. I am saying maybe without SALT it is likely to cost more. SALT is not a dollar-saving system. With or without SALT, we are going to have to do more, and in that context I would be willing, on any weapon systems, to be precise in any recommendation.

Certainly, we should continue the cruise missile. We should continue with it in all three modes: Air, sea, and ground launch.

Senator ZORINSKY. General, you, the Congress of the United States, and the President, are all looking out for the security of this Nation and the saving of bucks becomes academic if you haven't the ability to repel an aggressor from attacking the shores of the United States of America. As a former MP captain, I know very little about what needs to be done to create parity in the eyes of military leaders, and that is what I am looking for.

General JONES. We are willing to give you our very precise advice in that regard.

EFFECT OF WEAK ECONOMY ON SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP

Senator ZORINSKY. Let me ask a question of you, General Jones. If you might have a feel for this, considering your knowledge of the escalation of nuclear hardware by the Soviet Union, and that is, can you respond to the suggestions that the Soviet Union would be unable to increase its military buildup significantly if SALT is rejected because of the weakness of their current economy?

General JONES. I am not an expert in that area, but every time someone predicts the Soviets cannot do something in the military field, they go ahead and do it. So I am not one to say that they do not have some capability. I am saying there would be economic problems. There would be an economic impact, but they might decide to accept that.

CAPABILITY OF SOVIET UNION TO VERIFY

Senator ZORINSKY. General, all afternoon we have been hearing about our capabilities to verify the Soviet Union, and I know you may not be able to answer this in an open session to my satisfaction, but could you comment in any way on the ability of the Soviet Union to verify our launchings and our missiles? In other words, what capabilities are you aware of that they have concerning verification of us?

General JONES. Oh, I think they have a very good verification capability. They do not have as great a sophistication in intelligence gathering sources as we have. They don't need it, because of our open society. I endorse our open society, although I am a little concerned about some of the information that gets out, and that is

one of the concerns in the SALT debate, that we not get into too much regarding our intelligence collection.

One time I talked to a Soviet attaché, and I said, why don't you publish some magazines and newspapers and have congressional hearings so that we can know more about your system, and he said, you think you make it easy? You give us so much we are confused and we have a hard time sorting out what is right or wrong. [General laughter.]

General JONES. But I would rather have that problem than ours.

Senator ZORINSKY. General, in closing, I want to thank you very much. You have spent a long few hours here under trying conditions. I would like to say that I do hear from the various branches of the service through congressional liaison during the course of the year. I think it is of paramount importance, that even if in a public session like this recommendations cannot be made to me, that they might be made at another place or time. And I want to inform you I will accept all anonymous recommendations, as long as I know who is making them. [General laughter.]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

COVERS OVER SILOS FROM 1975–79

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky. I think one or two of my colleagues have a further few questions. I would like to follow up for a moment on Senator Zorinsky's point, on Soviet verification. I believe it is correct to say that from the period of 1975 to 1979, we had covers for a good technical reason over many of our silos, which was in contravention to SALT I, my understanding of SALT I.

Why did it take such a long time to get those covers off? I address this to either General Allen or General Jones.

General ALLEN. There was a modification program being undertaken on Minutemen silos. Many of the silos are on the northern tier, where the weather is very bad, and a protective covering was installed over the silos being modified. This, by the way, is a practice which is followed by the Soviets in their harsh weather areas as well. However, the Soviets did object and said that this particular environmental cover restricted them from seeing whether the missile was being converted from one type to another. As a result, there were adjustments made in the environmental shelter in which we provided holes and cutouts, and a period of negotiation ensued as to whether that was satisfactory or not.

Eventually, as one of the later processes of the current negotiations, it was agreed that the shelters would be taken down entirely. This will entail some restriction on our ability to carry out those modifications in the coldest weather, but we will be able to proceed with them.

Senator PELL. I have asked Secretary Vance to make available to the committee the correspondence and the request for the removal of those covers, which did take quite a long time. The only reason I am making this point is, I think we should realize that the shoe goes on both feet, as to this question of verification.

Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. I would like to pick up again. You have been very patient, all of you, and I have just a few questions left.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

This morning, I did ask Secretary Brown about an Administration-National Security Council directive in June, 1978, prohibiting discussions with NATO allies about ground launched cruise missile details, including deployment. Are any of you aware of this directive?

General ALLEN. I can answer that for the Air Force, sir, because we are in the process of trying to define the ground-launch cruise missile system which would presumably be deployed on the soil of our European allies. We have been restricted from conducting military-to-military discussions with our NATO allies in detail on this subject. And the reason for that is very clear. It involves the political sensitivity of the field of theater nuclear weapons and how they wiIl be approached by the various NATO allies. We were instructed that these negotiations would be carried out in a high-level group, which Secretary Brown referred to today, and that we would be allowed to carry out those discussions only after some of these political questions have been resolved.

That has not occurred fully yet from the point of view of the Air Force. However, the point that needs to be made very clearly, and this part I am quite sure of, is that the restriction on our discussions with out NATO allies did not relate at all to the ongoing SALT II negotiations. That is, it was not the result of SALT-related matters but rather was the result of general political sensitivity of both ourselves and our allies with regard to the deployment in the theater of additional nuclear delivery systems.

General JONES. If I could add one point, I and my predecessor have briefed our counterparts in the NATO Military Committee Chiefs of Staffs meeting and had discussions on cruise missiles. But there is a clear recognition that the political discussions that General Allen and Secretary Brown referred to have been completed and decisions reached before we proceed with technical discussions at the military level on such issues as basing.

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION WITH NATO ALLIES

Senator PERCY. I served for a number of years on a parliamentary group with NATO and spent a good deal of time over there. I have counseled with General Rogers, and I commend all of you on his selection. He is an outstanding representative. It has been my impression through the years that we really had a marvelous relationship with our military counterparts in NATO and it has been based on our ability to share technical information and their confidence that we have very few restraints. Would you have preferred that no prohibitions be laid down? To what extent has it been relieved? Or are you assured it will be relieved so that we can continue this traditional exchange of technical information regarding weapons systems crucial to our defense?

General JONES. I found no impact on my colleagues from the fact that we didn't have technical military-to-military discussions. I think they realize that the political decisions must lead. So I found

no concerns or reluctance. And I would be glad to give them anything else they want in the context of technical details on the systems. I think we all agree that political decisions have to be made on deployment such as to what countries and under what conditions and whether we have two-key or one-key control before you make these others on basing them at point X and modifying building Y.

Now, obviously, if you don't have those discussions and make those decisions, it might impact on the operational date. It is unrelated to SALT. It is related directly to the political decisions. We hope that later this year we would have positive decisions out of the alliance on the theater nuclear weapon systems modernization.

Senator PERCY. Have any of the other chiefs felt restrained by this directive or feel that it has in any way impeded their sharing information which then in turn leads to a request for technology? Unless they have adequate information they cannot make such requests, and such requests in our judgment are generally always for the common defense of the western world.

General ALLEN. That aspect of the question I don't know. For those of us who have the job of trying to design and issue contracts and implement this system with a very tight time schedule, it has been frustrating. The fact that we cannot work out these details about stationing and about the way in which we will work in the NATO alliance with the system is producing delays that will cause us difficulty in meeting the schedule which we had hoped to meet. In that sense we have been restrained and frustrated, but we understand the necessity of being sure that the political relationships within the alliance are solid on the policies they should follow in respect to our theater collective nuclear forces.

IMPORTANCE OF CRUISE MISSILE TO U.S. DEFENSE

Senator PERCY. I have great respect for political relationships, but I have even greater respect for the fact that those political relationships are going to be more solid if they have a feeling that there is no restraint on exchange of information, particularly with respect to a weapons system where we are infinitely superior. Obviously I would like to get into the area of how important the cruise missile is to our defense. I place very high value on it.

General JONES. Senator Percy, if I may, I would like to differentiate between the specifics of the missile itself and the technology—which I really don't feel any constraint in talking to my colleagues about—and the specifics of where it will operate, what bases it will operate from, what modifications, and the like. In the absence of a decision by our allies and the NATO council and the NATO members on the deployment of this system, it is difficult to discuss specific basing.

So, we hope we can satisfy your concerns in the area of technology, as opposed to the specific basing decision.

Senator PERCY. I go back to General Allen's frustrations. Secretary Brown has indicated he will give us a full understanding of what the concerns were at the time and what has been done now to relieve those concerns. I would appreciate that very much indeed.

SOVIET PRESSURE TO EXTEND PROTOCOL

Secretary Brown indicated that there seems to be no question, and in fact you indicated there is no question that the Soviets would apply great pressure on us to extend the protocol. The Joint Chiefs do not want that extended unilaterally, nor do I.

General JONES. I have not seen direct pressure by the Soviets to extend the protocol. We can infer it from discussions on cruise missile limitations and on the statement of principles, so it is implicit and indirect. It is a fine nuance, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. I would presume that the main thrust of their concern is deployment of the cruise missile. We are obviously in a superior position here. For that reason, we ought to move ahead. Our cruise missile technology is one of the considerations for giving up the B-1 bomber. Would the Soviets have greater respect for a B-1 bomber or a cruise missile, if they had the choice of our dropping one and going ahead with the other? Which would they rather have us go ahead with?

General JONES. I am not sure what they would want. I would have preferred going ahead with both. [General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. If you had a choice of only one.

General JONES. We were going with the B-1 and with the cruise missile. I would rather not choose. I do not think we should give up on the cruise missile. We are talking about more than the air-launched version—the ground and sea-launched versions as well. But I would not want to recommend any inhibiting of the development and production and deployment of those systems. I also recommended the B-1 be procured, and I would not ask for a choice among them. I do not think anything would be served by trying to make that choice.

Senator PERCY. What is the NATO military view on the need to modernize our nuclear theater of forces? Are cruise missiles useful or important to this effort?

General JONES. I think they recognize cruise missiles are important, to the modernization of theater nuclear systems, but the question is which nations, two-key, one-key? Those are the decisions which need to be made. The date that General Allen was talking about is the target date we have established for deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, not a date established by our allies. What we want to do is work with them so that they will make the decisions in concert with us later this year, and we can get on with solving the specific problems of basing.

POTENTIAL USES OF CONVENTIONALLY AIMED CRUISE MISSILES

Senator PERCY. What are the potential uses of conventionally armed cruise missiles in the area, and how soon might these applications come about?

General JONES. We have been testing a conventionally armed version of the ground-launched cruise missile. It would be quite expensive to go against most land-based targets; it's a little different if you are going after a very expensive ship, with a fairly high probability. Against land targets there are considerations of recoverability, for re-use. I would not anticipate any requirement in Europe for a ground-launched cruise missile, with conventional

warheads or conventional munitions, that would go beyond 600 kilometers before 1985, some time beyond that. But we have a lot of work to do before it becomes cost effective with conventional munitions—maybe in runway interdiction. It is an area we are interested in. I know the Navy is interested in the conventional version of the sea-launched cruise missile and, ultimately, in the air-launched version.

Senator PERCY. I thank you very much indeed. As I sum up and interpret all I have heard this afternoon, I would feel that you are not enthusiastic, but given the choice of no treaty or a treaty, you still feel that ratifying this treaty is in the national security interests of the United States. Do I interpret you correctly?

General JONES. That is correct. We have always put this caveat that if we don't do something about our defense posture, it probably wouldn't make much difference at all.

Senator PERCY. That is the condition you place upon it, and the faith you have that the Congress and the administration will continue to do that. Thank you.

General JONES. I think it is up to us to give advice. We hope you will accept it.

Senator PERCY. We appreciate that very much.

Senator PELL. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Can we get the JCS's, the JSM's on the build-up to SALT II here, and what applies through the years, for instance, a staff memorandum?

General JONES. Senator Glenn, I am reluctant, but the ultimate decision will be with others. I am reluctant to establish a precedent that memos we write to the Secretary of Defense and to the President go beyond the President and Secretary of Defense. I am not trying to imply that I want to keep anything from you. I will be glad to discuss any aspect of those memos, but I would hate to set a precedent for my successors—and I am not saying someone may not have previously set a precedent—but our action people, as they write a memo, might keep an eye on the fact it may end up over in the Congress.

So, I would like to be as forthcoming as I can in discussing with you and members of the committee staff what is in these memos. We won't keep anything from you with regard to the critical issues, but there is a difference between that and actually sending the memos.

Senator GLENN. I am sympathetic to your views on that and I think maybe we can get around it, but this has been going on a long time. We have been involved with this thing for many, many years, and I think different items have come up and have been considered by the Joint Chiefs, and have been looked at as being very important in one way or another, and the issue has been resolved.

I think if we can be given a summary of that type of thing which has been gone through here and how you came to your judgments of these things, it might be helpful on a classified basis or for Senators' eyes only, no staff if that is what is required on it, but it seems to me that running through the history of these last 7 years, it might be informative to us on many of these items we have great concern about. You may have considered these things, and for

reasons we are not aware of decided they are not important enough to make a big issue of. Others we have not looked at adequately, yet you may have made more out of them in your recommendations to the President than we would have.

I think it might be important.

General JONES. I think we can; in 7 years if we went through every action it would be thicker than your intelligence matrix——

Senator GLENN. I am not sure we want that much, thank you.

General JONES. Let us, on what we consider to be the key issues, give you sort of a chronology. I must say, a lot of them were not covered in our JCS memos or were handled in other fashion, but we will be glad to give you a track record on the key issues.

HAVE SOVIETS REPORTED ALCM?

Senator GLENN. Have the Soviets reported any ALCM—air launch cruise missiles?

General JONES. Reported any?

Senator GLENN. Yes. Will that be part of the data base that they are going to provide?

General JONES. They have not reported any that would count within the treaty.

Senator GLENN. They have not reported any.

General JONES. None that would be limited by the treaty and reflected in the data base.

Senator GLENN. So, none that would be limited by the treaty. Do we think their ALCM's would have a range that could well be covered by the treaty on existing vehicles, if they want to use them?

General JONES. We did have, with one that was last tested to over 600 km in 1965, some confusion between us, or misunderstanding; that was resolved to our satisfaction. The last time we had seen it was over 14 years ago. I know of no issue with regard to that that is outstanding.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET ANTISATELLITE SYSTEM

Senator GLENN. On their antisatellites—I do not know how highly classified an area we are getting into. Would you want to comment on the effectiveness of their antisatellite system as they have tested it so far?

General JONES. Yes, go ahead.

General ALLEN. The system that they have tested so far has the potential of being effective against our low-altitude satellites. It was tested in that kind of a mode, and it has had some successful tests. On the other hand, it is difficult to assign it a very high degree of credibility because it has not been a uniformly successful program and they have changed parameter with many of the different launches they have made.

Senator GLENN. Would it be useful against an ICBM?

General ALLEN. Would it be useful against an ICBM?

Senator GLENN. As opposed to a satellite.

General ALLEN. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. Have they deployed any antisatellite systems yet?

General ALLEN. They have the systems that are more or less at the ready. It is not a very quick reacting system. The systems that are at the ready are located in the missile test areas. So, I think our general opinion is that we give it a very questionable operational capability for a few launches. In other words, it is a threat that we are worried about, but they have not had a test program that would cause us to believe it is a very credible threat.

ABILITY TO MONITOR SS-16 BAN

Senator GLENN. Another area. On the SS-16 I am a little bit concerned that we will not be able to monitor its being banned. I know they have not tested it for a while and I think it is probably unlikely that they are moving ahead with that system, but there is a pretty good-sized potential there if they decide to move with it, our ability to monitor that is not all that I would like to see it be.

Would you care to make any comment on our ability to monitor whether they are going to deploy an SS-16 or not?

With all their deployed SS-20's—you are aware of the problem—they need the additional stage, and it becomes an ICBM instead of an IRBM [intermediate range ballistic missile] that is what I am concerned about.

General ALLEN. Detection of the deployment of any system in a mobile mode is always a problem. This is a very difficult monitoring task. This fact that production of the SS-16 is completely banned will provide us a better basis for a higher confidence monitoring of the status of its subsequent production following the time the treaty goes into effect. But it is necessary for us, in reaching the judgments about adequate verifiability with respect to the mobile deployments, to base our conclusion on the fact that it would take a fairly significant number of these deployed to make a major strategic difference. We believe that we would be able to detect such a large number.

But it is a fact that deploying some in a mobile mode is a difficult intelligence problem.

JCS CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL AMBIGUITIES IN UNILATERAL STATEMENTS

Senator GLENN. Very difficult. Let me get into one other area because my time is running out.

Is there concern on the Joint Chiefs part about potential ambiguities in these agreements and our unilateral statement that the Soviets are supposed to accept by not disagreeing? We just make a statement. How many of these things have you gone into? I wonder, if you are concerned about these things, could you give us a listing of them, areas of your concern, where ambiguities may still exist and where we have made unilateral statements that they may or may not agree with, but we are assuming they agree with by the acquiescence of their silence, which I hate to depend on.

General JONES. Senator Glenn, I think there is a distinction between a unilateral statement we make that we expect them to

comply with, and a unilateral statement we make—whether it is formal or informal—that says what we are going to do.

The ones we have been most concerned about have been in the latter category, things that are within our authority to do. One was in the deployment of the M–X. We were concerned that there not be any ambiguity with regard to understanding that we did have the right to deploy an M–X in a survivable mode. There are a number of other ambiguities of this nature, such as noncircumvention on which there must be no question that we have an interpretation and we are going to follow that interpretation.

The ambiguities that the Joint Chiefs highlighted, and we highlighted them very strongly, were all in the category where the option is up to us. It is not a negotiation with the Soviet Union, or it is not their having to abide by something we say unilaterally. I am not saying there are not some other unilateral statements that have some implication for them; there are others. But I am talking about the key ones: M–X basing mode; protocol extension, that we clearly state, the fact that it is not precedential; telemetry encryption, that at least we get to the point that the Soviets recognize in the treaty language—and they did—that some telemetry encryption would impede verification.

These are all types—except for the telemetry issue which we wanted and did get it into the agreement—in which we said what we were going to do, as opposed to the other type of unilateral statement in which they are expected to abide by what we say. We tried to avoid that.

Senator GLENN. There are these areas of ambiguity. I would appreciate sitting down and talking to any of you that have any of these concerns on unilateral statements we have made because I am sure we are going to have some understandings, memorandums of whatever, coming out of this committee, and I think we might do a service to all of us—you included—by maybe helping spell out some of these things that perhaps may be still of concern to you, without going back through the whole record of all the negotiating that went on where people made unilateral statements. It is difficult for us to come up at this stage with it without some help. You have followed it a lot longer.

General JONES. We will be glad to.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Gentlemen, I think the converse of the proposition you have just been questioned about is what they [the Soviets] said about their freedom of action and the things they are supposed to do. Should not we have some basis for deciding whether that affects our judgment, in view of the fact that we are the ratifying authority? On that, I would suggest that you confer with our staff, the minority and majority, and go into it, give us the Soviet statements, and compare them to what we said were our understandings of our rights under the treaty and how we intend to use them.

I might point out to you, General, that we have a striking example of what you are talking about and why I agree with you that—especially as a lawyer—you do not ask questions to which you do not know the answer. The example is the Nonproliferation Treaty, in which we publicly stated the day we signed it that if there was a

unified Europe, it would be nuclear power. The Soviets stated precisely the contrary exactly the day we signed it, but we both signed. So far that question has not caused a collision. If it does cause a collision you are no worse off than you were if you had had the collision the day you signed it, you could not get together anyhow.

So, I am not too alarmed by that, but I do think we ought to know just as a matter of information, the other side of the coin. Would you agree with that, gentlemen?

General JONES. On the issues that are of importance to us, obviously, in 7 years of negotiations, in the record there are a lot of things said back and forth which are really, if at all binding, only binding on the person that said them. Those would fill a bookcase.

Senator JAVITS. I am not interested in that.

General JONES. What we are interested in are the ambiguities that are of concern to us, that we were talking to Senator Glenn about. We will certainly expand on it and look at it from their standpoint, but not try to go through the plenary records for 7 years to figure out everything everybody said.

Senator JAVITS. You only gave us three, relating to us.

General JONES. I am not saying there may not be one or two others.

Senator JAVITS. There must be very few that you would consider material. I just think we ought to know. So, we will leave that judgment to you as to what is material in that regard.

NATO REACTION TO SALT REJECTION

The other thing I wanted to ask you is this: In relations with the NATO military people, which you certainly have, do you get any clue to what would be their reaction if this treaty were not ratified? We hear lots of talk. In our business the grapevine is very important. We hear lots of talk about the fact that if we did not enter into the SALT II Treaty Europe might take that as the signal that this is either too hot a game for them to be in, or that, considering the momentum, the Soviets may win it. You do not have to say anything about this if you do not want to.

General JONES. I can, Senator Javits. I talked with my colleagues about 10 days ago, a couple of them; I was in a military committee meeting with them not too long ago. Very frankly, in our discussions we do not talk about ratification and whether or not there will be ratification, and, if not, what would happen. We talked about the treaty, and I do not mean in the context of my trying to sell them on the treaty. We had conversations generally with them in the military committee before we came to our judgment. So, we tried to explain the treaty.

They do have concerns, but the concerns are broader than the treaty and they are the same concerns we have. They have been very comfortable with the fact that the United States has had strategic superiority and they could rely upon that. They are uncomfortable that we lost strategic superiority. They are uncomfortable with the trends, and they are worried about where we are going and where the alliance is going. So it is that broader issue. A disappointment they have, that is shared by us, is that the SALT

process did not solve the problem—we did not expect it to solve it—but would like to have made even a greater contribution to its solution.

I do not think it would have been appropriate to discuss among my colleagues the question, "Would you recommend to your minister that you withdraw from NATO if our Senate rejects the treaty." We are working on the broader issue of the overall balance, not only strategic balance but the theater nuclear balance and conventional balance in Europe. I think that is really the military role.

TREATY RATIFICATION WILL BE ELEMENT OF REASSURANCE

Senator JAVITS. Will the ratification of the treaty be an element of reassurance in view of other disappointments?

General JONES. It may be an element of reassurance, but I would expect that the programmatic actions of the United States would be far more important to them, and how the ratification took place; whether or not there was a recognition in the United States of the trends between the United States and the Soviet Union. That would be the greatest assurance.

There are critics, as there are all over, of the treaty and certain aspects of it. I think the one area that they have the greatest—and should have the greatest—concern or at least involvement is in the theater nuclear systems. I think that we have the opportunity to deploy what is needed within the treaty, unless we make some unilateral decision to extend the protocol or to not deploy something. However, the choice is ours, along with our allies. So, that is the area they should have concern about. We have been urging them to work with their political leaders in coming to a decision on the deployment of long-range theater nuclear systems in Europe.

Senator JAVITS. On the whole their political leaders are very favorable to the treaty and want us to ratify it. I am just trying to equate the military judgment with the political judgment that is all I am trying to do.

General JONES. The military leaders have sat in on the discussions at the military committee level, and the DPC level when the ministers receive the briefings; they have also had separate briefings on it. They have concerns. I do not know, if they debated it a long time they might come up with the conclusion that it made a modest but useful contribution to the alliance's interest, provided we did what is necessary. We just have not addressed that and do not intend to.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Javits. Senator Sarbanes?

AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS IN SALT II

Senator SARBANES. I want to underscore the point that Senator Glenn made on noncircumvention. What provisions in the treaty do you see as ambiguous, or do you find acceptable because we have announced a particular interpretation which has not been contradicted, although not assented to in an affirmative way? Also what provisions may cause you some concern because the Soviets

have announced a particular interpretation to which we have not consented in an active way?

INCREASE IN SPENDING ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS

A second question stems from Secretary Brown's testimony this morning in which he outlined that the present spending on strategic weapons was about $10 billion. That he estimated that with SALT it should rise to about $12 billion in 1980 constant dollars; and that without SALT it would go to $15 billion.

Do you agree with those figures?

General JONES. First with regard to the $15 billion and the $3 billion differential between SALT and no SALT. We have not addressed that, and by design have not addressed it because there are so many variations that could be as to what the Soviets could do and what we would do.

On the $12 billion, the recommendations we have made in our process would in general—and I am talking about strategic offensive forces and their command and control; I am not talking about air defense or anything of that nature—but the strategic offensive forces, my estimate would be that we would recommend about $1 to $1.5 billion more than the Secretary of Defense. Obviously, on outyears on some programs it gets higher. I am talking about strategic offensive forces beyond what the Secretary of Defense was talking about, the $12 billion. Based on my outlook before I came over here in trying to aggregate—because we had not really put it in that context—what we would recommend beyond would be about another billion or billion and a half per year.

But—and maybe it sounds like a broken record—we cannot afford to "rob Peter to pay Paul," to take it out of the conventional forces and put it in the strategic forces. The conventional forces need some additional help, also. So, it is not just a rearrangement within the budget.

General MEYER. May I just add to that, in the recommendation we made it was not just the strategic offensive forces, but it also included ballistic missile defense improvements as well.

General JONES. Yes. We would do additional development on ballistic missiles defense. But the billion to billion and a half was in strategic offensive forces.

Senator SARBANES. The Secretary's figure may be some 15 percent below your figure.

General JONES. We are talking about maybe 1-percent difference in the total defense budget.

Senator SARBANES. But on the strategic it is about a 15-percent difference, under yours.

General JONES. Maybe.

Senator SARBANES. To get back to the question I was asking earlier about the extent of budget cutting you suffered within the executive branch, much has been made of the assurances that were given at the time of SALT, and the trends that subsequently developed and this question of national will. Would the 15-percent figure represent, generally speaking, the executive branch cuts across the board with respect to military investment?

General JONES. No.

Senator SARBANES. Would the 15-percent differential apply to the cut-backs you have suffered to your requests as they have passed through the executive, or would they be even larger?

General JONES. There is not that correlation, and I am not going to be led down the track of, "They cut us 15 percent, you cut us 2 percent." To put it in context, and I think it answers your question; we have stated that about a 5-percent real increase per year in the defense budget would allow us to do things not only in the strategic field, but in the nonstrategic field, in order to at least reduce the risk to the extent we think it is necessary.

Now, if the commitment of the executive branch is a 3-percent real growth, we are talking 2-percent additional real growth. If you do not achieve that 3 percent, then it is something more because we are talking about 5-percent real growth.

Senator SARBANES. If you seek a budget which will give you a 5-percent real growth and the Executive gives you a 3-percent real growth, they have cut you by 40 percent; have they not?

General JONES. They have cut our increase by 40 percent.

Senator SARBANES. That is right.

General JONES. They have not cut our total budget by that.

Senator SARBANES. That is right.

General JONES. You do not cut increases, you cut whatever is submitted.

Senator SARBANES. But they cut your requested increase by 40 percent.

General JONES. I do not follow that. Your mathematics are correct, but I do not follow what you are trying to drive at. What we are worried about is, the country needs to do more and Congress has to do more, as well as the executive branch. Both, for 15 years, have been underfunding our defense requirements.

Senator SARBANES. I am trying to develop the fact that in many respects the Congress has been more lenient toward the defense budget than the executive branch itself with respect to the case put forward by the Joint Chiefs as to what they think is necessary.

General JONES. There could be a logic that I have heard others use and I do not know whether it is true, but previously the budget was cut less internally and therefore more by Congress; now it may be cut more internally and less by Congress. So, I just do not think that track you are trying to develop, that I would agree with the conclusion you are trying to develop. I am saying both need to do more and I do not want to point the finger at either one. I want to point the finger at the Nation as a whole having not done enough over the years for national defense. I think we all share the responsibility. Maybe we have not articulated our needs quite well enough.

Senator SARBANES. At the outset of this questioning you indicated that the figure that the Secretary of Defense is giving with respect to strategic balance is 15 percent below what you consider to be necessary.

General JONES. But if I put that in the total context of the defense budget we are talking about 1 percent.

Senator SARBANES. If I would ask General Meyer, he would probably have some equal tales to tell with respect to what he was getting for conventional weapons——

General JONES. Then I go to my 5-percent number.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. As opposed to what he was requesting with respect to conventional weapons.

General JONES. Fine, then I go to 5 percent versus 3 or whatever else was achieved.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. I think Senator Glenn has one more question.

AFFECT OF SALT PROCESS ON U.S. LOSING SUPERIORITY

Senator GLENN. Do you think the SALT process itself had anything to do with our losing strategic superiority?

General JONES. I would have a hard time concluding that, Senator Glenn. I think I could argue or debate either side of that coin. There are some who say the reason we still have the B-52D around is because of SALT. Before there were aggregate numbers and the need to be as close as possible to aggregate numbers, some would have phased out the B-52D.

I doubt if we had not had SALT I that there would be all that much difference in the overall balance. The Soviets would have done some things with regard to keeping the SS-7's and SS-8's, and probably more MLBM's; but I do not think it has been the dominant factor in the overall shift.

Senator GLENN. I think there has been sort of a psyche developed that we thought SALT was coming along—let us hold off on these things because we will not need to spend the money because SALT is going to solve all that for us.

General JONES. Yes. That is part of our concern. We used the word "tranquilizer" with regard to the future.

COST OF MAINTAINING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Senator GLENN. Do you have any idea at what cost we could have maintained strategic superiority?

General JONES. I would have expected only 2 or 3 percent of the total defense budget.

Senator GLENN. Of the total what?

General JONES. Of the total defense budget over a long period in time, in real terms, 2 or 3 percent. But that would not have solved the other problems we have today with regard to our overall force deficiencies. They are not only in the strategic area. So, I am just grabbing a figure out of the air, but I think it is fairly close, because we only spend, directly, about 10 percent of the total defense budget on strategic forces. I was talking about not a 2 or 3 percent increase of that 10 percent, but 2 or 3 percent of the total defense budget.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. You gentlemen have been very patient here with us this afternoon and I would like to express my appreciation before I turn it back over to the Chairman. Thank you.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, gentlemen, you certainly have. You have been very forthcoming and we appreciate your being here.

The record will be kept open for any followup questions, or questions that were not asked by any of the members of the com-

mittee. The committee will meet again tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock to hear Mr. Paul Nitze and Gen. Edward Rowny.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, before you close, I would like to apologize to my colleagues for answering so many of the questions. With your indulgence, I would like to be sure that each of them felt he had an opportunity——

Senator PELL. Absolutely.

General JONES. If they would like to say something now, would they please do so?

Senator PELL. Absolutely. Lord knows, we at this side of the table have talked quite a lot.

General ALLEN. I would like to say something in response to a statement which Senator Percy made before he left, that he regards the Chiefs as supporting the treaty with a great lack of enthusiasm.

I would like to speak for myself in saying the following: My concerns, shared by my fellows, are very great for the security of the country. There are many things which we are convinced need to be done. For the most part they need to be done whether or not there is a treaty. There are concerns in our minds as to whether these will be done, and concerns about the will and the determination of the United States to meet the challenge that we are certain the Soviets will provide to us over the next decade or so.

I have very deep concerns on these matters and a very firm insistence that we display to you, as the statements and the things we have put on the record have reflected these concerns. But in fact I believe that the treaty itself—in the narrow question of whether we should have this treaty or not have it—could have a positive influence on the security problems that are coming ahead. It does make a useful contribution and my support for that should not be described as unenthusiastic. Our concerns are in the broader security area.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. Admiral, General, any other statements?

General BARROW. Good night, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Senator PELL. Fine, General Barrow.

Thank you for being with us. The meeting is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, July 12, 1979.]

SALT II TREATY

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Stone, Sarbanes, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

Last evening, pursuant to my own direction, Senator Pell announced that the hearings this morning would start at 9:30. Subsequently, because of a change in circumstances, we had to move the hearing back again to 10. For whatever confusion this caused, I apologize, both to the press and to the witnesses and to Senator Pell, who made the original announcement.

We are prepared now to proceed.

OPENING STATEMENT

This morning the committee continues its consideration of the SALT II agreement. Over the past 3 days, we have heard the executive branch present its case for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Today, with the appearance of Paul Nitze and Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny, the committee will hear dissenting approaches to, and analyses of the strategic military balance and the SALT II agreement.

Mr. Nitze has had a long and varied career in Government, beginning with the Strategic Bombing Survey, which assessed the effects of the air war in Germany and, later, Japan. In 1960, he was named as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs by President Kennedy. In 1963, he became Secretary of the Navy and in 1967, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

From 1969 to 1974, he was the representative of the Secretary of Defense on the U.S. SALT delegation.

Lieutenant General Rowny, who will appear after Mr. Nitze, has had many varied Army assignments, including the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development in 1969 and commander of the I-Corps in Korea in 1970. In 1973, he was appointed the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. SALT delegation. He served in this position until he retired in June of this year.

Mr. Nitze, we welcome you. You have favored the committee with a lengthy and detailed statement which will be incorporated in the record of these proceedings. It is my understanding that you have an abbreviated statement that you wish to present to the committee.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Before we turn to Mr. Nitze's testimony, I would like to announce that we will follow a somewhat different procedure this morning. For the last 3 days, I have been exercising my prerogative, and Senator Javits his, and each Senator his respective seniority right by commencing the questions in the center of the table and moving down to the ends. That has put the junior members of the committee at a continuous disadvantage as some of them have had to wait until noon or half past noon to ask their questions. So, today, in an attempt to equalize things, we will begin at the end of the table and work toward the middle.

If there is no objection to that procedure, I think it is only fair.

There is one other thing I should like to stress.

Mr. Nitze, we have called you in this first week, along with General Rowny, because we wished, at the outset of our deliberation to present both sides with respect to this treaty, and not to leave to those who oppose this treaty the burden of presenting their position in the second or third week of these hearings.

We welcome you this morning and we invite you now to proceed with your testimony.

Senator Javits, did you have any remarks at this time?

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR JAVITS

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed, may I say, for the minority that we, too, have awaited Mr. Nitze's appearance with great interest. I know that he will have on this side of the table—and I know I speak for all of my colleagues—a most respectful and considered hearing.

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR PERCY

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, would you mind if I said a few words to Mr. Nitze in view of my long friendship with him?

We have had an abundance of material from the administration that has been extraordinarily helpful in providing information to us. But we just could not have operated unless we had a comparable source providing objective material on the other side of the argument. Paul Nitze has been just absolutely invaluable to every member of this committee who has gone to him for advice and counsel on various parts of this treaty and for factual material. We very much appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Are there any other statements at this time? [No response.]

Mr. Nitze, we await your testimony. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL NITZE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. NITZE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Javits, and Senator Percy.

It is an honor to appear before your distinguished committee, Mr. Chairman.

The issue before the Senate is broader than merely whether or not to consent to the ratification of the SALT II agreement signed at Vienna on June 18. The Constitution also places on the Senate the responsibility to advise with respect to treaties brought up to it for consideration.

For some time, the SALT II proponents have been explaining the agreements in a manner intended to praise them. In so doing, they have given what I believe to be a one-sided and misleading picture. The Senate is entitled to a more critical and balanced analysis.

AGREEMENTS UNEQUAL IN LEGAL, PRACTICAL EFFECT

Supporters of the agreements stress equality in the main provisions of the treaty. Despite the superficial appearance of equality, the agreements are unequal, both in their legal and in their practical effects.

The supporters assert that the agreements put a cap on the so-called arms race and initiate a process of reductions in offensive strategic nuclear armaments. On the contrary, the limits in the agreements are so designed and are so high that they put no effective limit on Soviet offensive strategic nuclear capabilities. Rather than forcing a reduction, there will be a continuous and large increase in Soviet capabilities during the term of the treaty. There will be some increase in our capabilities as well; but in net terms, the strategic balance will move from a position not far from parity to one of Soviet strategic nuclear superiority.

SALT II VERIFIABILITY

The SALT II proponents assert that the agreements are adequately verifiable. Strict adherence to many of the provisions of the agreements cannot be confidently verified. But the agreements so one-sidedly favor the Soviet Union that verifiability, in my view, is not the major issue. What could be gained by cheating would be less significant than the shift in strategic capabilities permitted without the necessity for cheating.

SALT II AS FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS

It is also asserted that, despite their shortcomings, the agreements are a good and necessary foundation for the negotiation of better future agreements—SALT III, SALT IV, and so forth. To the contrary, there is no evidence whatever that, as the strategic nuclear balance shifts further in favor of the Soviet side, the Soviet leaders will become less resolute in pressing every possible advantage.

It is almost certain that, if SALT II is ratified as signed at Vienna, SALT III will be less favorable to the United States and more favorable to the U.S.S.R. than SALT II.

Further, there is the broader political question of how best to deal with the Soviet Union. Is unequal and one-sided accommodation by us the best way to assure the cooperation of the Soviet leadership toward world progress and toward peace?

Again, history gives no support to that hope. I believe we are headed for difficult times ahead in our relations with the world, and particularly with the Soviet Union, whether SALT II is ratified or not.

Finally, the Senate must resolve the question of whether, in times of increasing danger, including military danger, it is wise to let down our guard or whether it is time to pull the country together for the major effort that is required on many fronts.

NITZE PAPERS CONCERNING SALT II

As many of you know, I have, over the last 3 years, revised and kept up to date a series of papers concerning SALT II. The first of these is a condensed summary of the status of the SALT negotiations. The second is an analysis, in words, of the 15 central issues raised by SALT II. The third is an analysis of the probable evolution of the strategic nuclear balance in numbers. The fourth is a set of charts which display those numbers graphically.

Using the State Department Selected Document 12A, which contains the full Vienna documentation, I have brought those four papers up to date and have attached them as annexes to this statement. The changes required from the earlier drafts were not substantial. I have also included as additional annexes two further papers. The first is entitled, "A Method for Dealing with Certain Fallout Questions." The second is a copy of my February 6 statement before the House Armed Services Committee addressed to the survivability and endurance of U.S. deterrent forces.

I have included the paper on fallout which, at the request of Secretary Brown, was reviewed and confirmed for accuracy by the Defense Nuclear Agency, because it demonstrates the incorrectness of the overkill argument which is so frequently relied upon by the more ardent wing of the arms control community.

AGREEMENTS ARE UNEQUAL IN LEGAL, PRACTICAL EFFECTS

Annexes I, II, and III fully support the assertion that the agreements are unequal both in their legal and in their practical effects.

In legal terms, the Soviet side is permitted 308 modern, heavy ballistic missile launchers; we are permitted none. The destructiveness of those missiles alone is greater than the destructiveness of all our strategic missiles, both ICBM's and SLBM's combined. The Soviet side is permitted up to 10 reentry vehicles [RV] on their existing ICBM's. We are permitted no more than 3.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a point of clarification on that sentence?

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Nitze, it seems as though that statement that we are permitted only up to 3 reentry vehicles and the Soviets 10 on their ICBM's is a little misleading. Isn't it true that they are only permitted 10 on their SS-18's and on the SS-17 and SS-19 they are restricted to 4 and 6 respectively, and that under the

agreement we are allowed to build a new missile on which we can put 10. Your statement, therefore, is a little misleading.

Mr. NITZE. In that one sentence I could not bring out all of the facts that are involved. It is perfectly clear that the SS–17's are permitted 4, the SS–19's are permitted 6, the SS–18's are permitted 10. It is also true that we have tested 7 on our Minuteman III's, but that we unilaterally have agreed that we will not deploy more than 3 on our Minuteman III's, even though we have tested more than that.

What I said is correct. I think it understates the significance thereof, because each one of the 4, 6, and 10 RV's on the Soviet missiles today have more than three times the yield of our present reentry vehicles, and even after we have deployed the new Mark 12A RV's that Harold Brown talked about, their RV's will all have at least double the yield of ours.

So, what I have said here in fact is an understatement of the case and not an overstatement.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NITZE. In practical terms, the Soviet side can be expected, by the expiration of the treaty in 1985, to have approximately the same number of launchers and warheads as we, but due to the greater size of their missiles and warheads coupled with their rapidly improving accuracy, they will exceed us in every other measure of strategic nuclear capability. They will have twice the area destructive capability, five times the ICBM plus SLBM hard-target kill capability, three times the megatonnage, and twice our throw weight.

If our obsolescent B–52's can get off their bases, arrive close enough to launch their cruise missiles, if those cruise missiles can penetrate to their targets through unconstrained Soviet air defenses, and if no allowance is made for the offsetting capabilities of the Backfire bombers, we will have a continuing, in fact growing, superiority in what is called delayed counter military potential, but this will not be sufficient to offset the other factors.

When one takes all factors into account, including the fact that the initiative is apt to be theirs, that their command control and wartime intelligence facilities are substantially harder and more diverse, that they have more and harder hard targets, that their active defenses and their civil defense preparations are substantially greater than ours, it is quite evident that strategic parity is slipping away from us and that the Soviets can be expected to achieve meaningful strategic superiority probably by 1982, and most certainly by 1985, unless we take the most urgent and prompt steps to reverse current trends.

SOVIET THREATS CONCERNING SALT II RATIFICATION

The Soviet leaders threaten us with dangers ahead if the Senate does not consent to the ratification of the SALT II terms exactly as signed at Vienna. No one can guarantee that their threat is a bluff. The point might be the core of a valid issue if one could truly say that acceptance of the treaty as drafted would bring us safety. That is not the case. We are not at a crossroads between safety and

perplexity. There is no formula for salvation in making these inequitable provisions into the supreme law of the land.

However the Senate may vote, there is trouble in prospect. Amendment of the treaty does not assure Soviet acceptance of the amended terms, nor does failure of the treaty assure strategic balance, but neither will acceptance of the Vienna draft assure strategic balance; to the contrary, it will tend to nail down dangerous strategic imbalance.

REDRESSING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

That brings me to the heart of the problem posed by SALT II. To accept the case that is being made for the Vienna terms, with all its fallacies and implausibility, can only incapacitate our minds and wills for doing the things necessary to redress the strategic balance. The first step out of danger is to recognize danger.

We have to come to terms with the plight we are in before we can correct it. In Lincoln's words, "First, we must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save the country."

The executive branch has decided to proceed with the engineering development of the M-X missile. It has not decided on its deployment mode. I understand a decision on the deployment mode is expected by August 1. I should think your committee would wish to assure itself that that deployment mode is at least generally as effective as the multiple protective shelter system previously recommended by the Pentagon and is recognized by the Soviet Union as being permitted under the terms of the agreement.

I should think your committee would wish to assure itself that granting the Soviet Union the unilateral right to deploy modern heavy ballistic missiles is made equitable merely by our decision many years ago not to contribute to crisis instability by deploying such destabilizing weapons.

I should think your committee would wish to assure itself of the adequacy of the Soviet commitment not to increase to an intercontinental radius the capability of their Backfire bombers when none of the U.S. bombers have the capability to hit their targets in the Soviet Union and return to the bases from which they take off.

I should think your committee would also wish to inquire into the executive branch's plans to implement the U.S. commitment in the Vienna agreements promptly to resolve the issues left undecided by the protocol.

I should also think your committee would wish to consider whether the numerous shortcomings of the agreement signed at Vienna can be corrected merely by reservation or whether significant clarifications and improvements in the actual terms of the agreement are acquired. I frankly think they are required, but it is the Senate that must decide that.

Finally I should think the Senate as a whole would wish to assure itself of the adequacy of the U.S. strategic programs actually planned and budgeted by the executive branch and consistent with the terms of the agreement to deny the Soviet Union the hope of achieving strategic nuclear superiority.

I believe that those plans as described by Secretary Brown yesterday with direct costs of $12 billion a year are inadequate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Nitze's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL H. NITZE

The SALT II Agreements signed at Vienna for submission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratify, consist of a Treaty, a Protocol, and a Statement of Principles. These are amplified by a number of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. There are also certain unilateral statements.

1. The SALT II Treaty

The Treaty is to run to December 31, 1985. Significant points regarding its contents follow:

a. The aggregate number of strategic nuclear launch vehicles (SNLVs) [1]—i.e., launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), plus launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), plus "heavy bombers," plus launchers for air-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers (ASBMs)—is to be limited initially to 2,400 each for the United States and the Soviet Union. By December 31, 1981, the initially authorized limit of 2,400 SNLVs is to be reduced to 2,250.

b. Within the permitted aggregate number of SNLVs a sublimit of 1,320 will be placed on the number of launchers for ICBMs carrying multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), plus launchers for MIRVed SLLMs, plus aircraft equipped to carry armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with a range greater than 600 kilometers (which are also to be counted under the SNLV ceiling as "heavy bombers").

c. A sublimit of 1,200 is to be placed on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers plus MIRVed SLBM launchers.

d. A sublimit of 820 is to be placed on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers. Within this 820 limit the Soviet Union will be permitted to have a number of fixed modern heavy ballistic missile (MHBM) launchers equal to their present force level—which is 308 (or 326 if 18 operational MHBM launchers at the Soviet test range are counted).[2] The United States—which has no fixed MHBM launchers—will be permitted none in the future. New ballistic missiles with a launch-weight or throw-weight greater than that of the Soviet SS-19 will be considered to be MHBMs, and ballistic missiles with a launch-weight or throw-weight greater than that of the Soviet SS-18 will be banned.

e. Any missile booster of a type which has been tested with MIRVs is to be considered to be a MIRVed missile booster. Any launcher of a type from which a MIRVed missile booster has been launched will be considered to be a launcher for MIRVed missiles. Any launcher of a type, any one of which has launched or contained an ICBM, will be considered to be an ICBM launcher. What is meant by "type" has not been precisely defined.

f. It is agreed that any test of an ICBM with more RVs than have previously been tested on that type of ICBM will cause it to be classified as a "new type." Although the U.S. has tested seven small RVs on the MINUTEMAN III on two occasions, none of our deployed MINUTEMAN missiles carry more than three RVs, and the United States has agreed not to deploy more than three in the future. The Soviet Union has tested and will be permitted to deploy four RVs on its SS-17, six RVs on its SS-19, and ten RVs on its SS-18 type missiles. It has been reported in the press that the Soviets have demonstrated that the front end of an SS-18 has the capability to release at least 14 objects. The Soviet Union has agreed that after May 1, 1979, it will not test procedures for releasing more objects than the permitted number of RVs.

Furthermore, any missiles having a different number of stages, or using a different type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid), than a missile flight tested prior to May 1, 1979, even if it does not differ from such a previously tested missile by five perecnt in length, largest diameter, throw-weight or launch-weight, will be considered a "new type" missile; as will any missile, even though it does not differ in number of stages or type of propellant, that does differ by more than five percent in length, diameter, throw-weight or launch-weight from any previously tested missile. It is noteworthy that no list of previously tested Soviet missiles and their characteristics is provided and that the above limitations may not fully apply until after the 24th "new type" missile flight test.

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[1] In the SALT documents, the phrase "strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" (SNDV) is used, but less precisely, to describe this aggregate.

[2] In the Second Common Understanding to Article VII, the Soviet Union agrees to dismantle or destruct 12 of these launchers and convert the remining 6 to test launchers.

The sides have agreed that each side will be permitted to flight test and deploy one "new type" ICBM (MIRVed or unMIRVed) during the Treaty period. No "new type" MHBM may be tested. There is no limit on the number of "new type" SLBMs which the sides are permitted to test and deploy during the life of the Treaty.

g. During the period of the Treaty there will be a ban on the flight testing and deployment of a larger number of RVs on any "new type" ICBM missile than the largest number already flight tested by either side on an ICBM (i.e., 10) and a similar ban on SLBMs (i.e., 14). B-52s, B-1s, BEARS, and BISONS will be limited to 20 ALCMs per bomber. The average number of ALCMs carried on all ALCM-carrying aircraft is to be limited to 28.

h. As a general rule, United States' B-52s and B-1s and the USSR's BEARS and BISONS are to be counted as "heavy bombers" and thus counted under the ceiling on SNLVs. Also, all aircraft equipped to carry ALCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers are to be counted as "heavy bombers." If new bombers, such as the B-1 type bomber reported to be under development in the USSR, are deployed, agreement by both sides is required for them to be classed as "heavy bombers."

i. The Soviet BACKFIRE bomber is not to be counted as a "heavy bomber" (unless equipped to carry ALCMs of range greater than 600 kilometers).

The Soviet Union has made a statement—outside the contractual forms of the Treaty—of its intention not to give the BACKFIRE a radius of action sufficient to attack the U.S. mainland targets and return to its bases in the USSR, and not to raise the production rate of the BACKFIRE above the present rate. Mr. Brezhnev orally agreed that the future production rate would not exceed 30 per year.

Soviet "heavy bomber" variants (these include BEARS and BISONS reconfigured to reconnaissance, tanker, and antisubmarine roles but still retaining their bomb bays) are not to be counted as "heavy bombers." But all U.S. "heavy bombers," including some 230 mothballed B-52s, are to be so counted.

In addition to "heavy bombers" (currently including BEARS, BISONS, B-52s, and B-1s), only bombers newly constructed for the specific purpose of carrying bombs or missiles may be equipped to carry ALCMs.

j. Cruise missile range is defined as the maximum distance the missile can achieve measured by projecting its flight path onto the earth's surface. Thus, the operational range, after allowing for zigs and zags to avoid defense, will be significantly less than the range from launcher to target. With respect to ICBMs, intercontinental range is specified as being 5,500 kilometers or more. No specification has been agreed as to the range cutoff distinguishing SLBMs classed as SNLVs and submarine-launched missiles considered to be for tactical use only.

k. There are no limits on the number of missiles or warheads which may be produced and stored. The storage near launching sites of ICBMs in excess of those needed for permitted launchers is banned, and storage facilities for such ICBMs are prohibited. The development, testing and deployment of rapid reload systems for ICBM launchers is also prohibited.

l. Both sides agree not to take any action which would circumvent the purposes of the agreements. The extent to which this would ban the transfer of components or technology associated with weapons limited by the Agreements is not clear. The USSR interpretation has been reported to be that the transfer of components, blueprints, and technology directly pertinent to such weapons is precluded by such a ban. The United States has assured its allies that we do not consider ourselves so limited.

m. Both sides have provided data as to the broad categories of launchers it had deployed as of June 18, 1979.

n. There is agreement in principle to refrain from interfering with the national technical means unilaterally controlled by the respective sides for verification of compliance with the terms of the agreements by the other side. Encryption of telemetry is permitted provided it does not interfere with the national technical means of the other side operated in conformity with international law and necessary for verification of the terms of the agreement. What this means is unclear.

o. The start of additional, and the relocation of existing, fixed ICBM launchers is banned.

p. Six exotic type weapons, not now contemplated for developing by either side, are banned (bottom crawlers, fractional orbit ballistic missiles, MHBMs on mobiles, submarines, or ASBMs and MIRVs on ALCMs).

2. The Protocol

The Protocol is to cover the period to December 31, 1981, when it will terminate (unless earlier renegotiated).

The only significant restriction in this Protocol, beyond those in the Treaty, concern mobile ICBMs, ASBMs, and launchers for armed ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

a. The flight testing or deployment of mobile ICBMs and of ASBMs is to be banned during the period of the Protocol. After the expiration of the Protocol, the Treaty language, unless earlier amended, would permit the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBMs and ASBMs, but launchers for each missile would have to be counted under the pertinent limits. Testing of mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs during the Protocol is not prohibited, provided that no missile is fired from such launchers.

It has been reported that the Soviets have raised serious disagreement with a United States' assertion that the deployment of a multiple, vertical, protective shelter system would be permitted under the terms of the Treaty after the expiration of the Protocol as being a mobile system. They insist that a mobile system must have transporter/erector/launchers; each one of which must be counted as an ICBM launcher.

b. During the period of the Protocol the deployment of armed and nuclear armed ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers (GLCMs and SLCMs) is prohibited, and remotely controlled reconnaissance vehicles not distinguishable from ALCMs, GLCMs, and SLCMs.

3. The Statement of Principles

The negotiations for the next stage in SALT, with the Principles serving as guidelines, are anticipated to follow-on soon after the completion of SALT II. The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on the following targets:

a. Significant and substantial reductions in the aggregate numbers of SNLVs.

b. Qualitative restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types and the modernization of existing type of offensive arms.

c. Resolution of the issues in the Protocol in the context of the negotiations relating to these principles.

d. Further limitations must be verifiable by national technical means using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of national technical means.

e. Each party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms.

Annex II

Considerations Bearing on the Merits of the SALT II Agreements as Signed at Vienna

Assuming that currently projected U.S. and U.S.S.R. defense programs are continued in a manner consistent with SALT II

1. U.S. SALT II objectives and the constraints within which those objectives have had to be sought

The SALT II negotiations began six years ago. The U.S. objective was a treaty of indefinite duration, limiting offensive nuclear forces, to match the treaty limiting ABM defenses which had just been ratified. It was intended that the SALT II treaty should provide equal limitations on the two sides such that essential equivalence in offensive nuclear capabilities would be assured and such that "crisis stability" could and would be maintained. "Crisis stability" was the phrase used to describe a situation in which neither side could hope to gain in relative capabilities from initiating the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. It was hoped that, if these two objectives had been met, a foundation would have been laid for a reduction in the resources both sides would consider necessary to devote to their offensive nuclear armaments.

It was recognized that there were four constraining considerations which must be taken into account in achieving the primary U.S. objectives. One constraint was that the limitations strategically important to the U.S. should be verifiable. The second was that the legitimate interests of our allies must be taken into account and the terms of the agreement be reasonably acceptable to them. The third constraint was that the limitations be such that it would be economically and politically practicable for the United States to deploy those permitted forces necessary to maintain essential equivalence and crisis stability. The fourth was the the terms of an agreement be negotiable; that is, be acceptable to the Soviet side and also be ratifiable by the Congress.

Early in the SALT II negotiations it was evident that there were potential conflicts among these objectives and constraints, and that difficult choices would have to be made in finding an optimum solution. One such conflict was between the objective of maintaining crisis stability and the constraint of verifiability. It had long been recognized that limiting the number and quality of missiles was much more important than limiting the number of launchers. But it would require cooperative measures to monitor the production and storage of missiles; satellite sensors would be inadequate. The Soviets refused to agree to cooperative measures. ICBM silos, however, could be photographed from satellites, and counted and their size estimated. It was also recognized that it was more important to limit the aggregate throw-weight of a force than the number and size of its launchers. This proved to be impossible to negotiate. Verifiable and negotiable controls over missile accuracy also proved to be unattainable. The basic and primary currency of the negotiations thus became limits on the number of launchers, not limits on missiles or their characteristics. This has proven to be the wrong currency.

During the course of the six years of the SALT II Negotiation, the originally formulated three U.S. primary objectives and the first three of the constraints have been progressively compromised so as to accommodate one aspect of the fourth constraint—that the terms of the agreements be acceptable to the Soviet side, thereby facilitating their negotiability. At the same time, the U.S. side has been inhibited in publicizing Soviet recalcitrance in the negotiations because of the other aspect of the fourth constraint—that the agreements be ratifiable by the Congress.

The first casualty among our original objectives was that of achieving a treaty of indefinite duration. That objective was given up in the summer of 1974 in order to announce a negotiating breakthrough at the Moscow conference which otherwise would have been without result. Each negotiating "breakthrough" since the Moscow conference has involved a further retreat from our original objectives.

What we have gained from these concessions has been a series of relatively unimportant adjustments in what otherwise would have been the Soviet program for deployments over the next six years, more than offset by limitations on our programs for future deployments. In esssence, most of the negotiating process has been one of trading marginal adjustments to their large strategic program versus more significant adjustments to our much smaller one.

The following sections deal with the principal considerations involved in arriving at a judgment on the merits of the agreements as they appear to be emerging from that process and from the differential strategic nuclear programs of the two sides.

2. The ICBM balance to be expected by 1985

a. The MIRVed ICBM balance

This component of the overall balance is of particular significance. It is likely that if deterrence fails, this component, because of its power and accuracy, its short time of flight, the greater reliability of its command and control, and its known location, would be the key element in an initial strike and any initial counterforce response. This exchange could well determine the military outcome of the war.

(1) The U.S. has closed down the MINUTEMAN III production line and has delayed the initial operating capability (IOC) date of a follow-on missile to 1986 or beyond. Therefore, there is essentially no possibility of the U.S. having any deployed MIRVed ICBM launchers by the expiration date of the treaty in 1985 other than the 550 MINUTEMAN III silos currently deployed. The accuracy of the MINUTEMAN III has recently been significantly upgraded and it is planned to substitute MARK-12A warheads (with approximately double the yield) for the MARK-12 warheads currently deployed on 300 of the MINUTEMAN III. No other significant changes in MINUTEMAN III are now planned. The useful payload of the MINUTEMAN III is approximately 2,400 pounds. The maximum permitted number of reentry vehicles on the MINUTEMAN III is three RVs. The aggregate useful payload (throw-weight) of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will therefore not exceed 560 x 2,400 which equals approximately a million three hundred thousand pounds. The aggregate number of MIRVed ICBM warheads in the U.S. force will not exceed 550 x 3, which equals 1,650 RVs.

(2) The USSR is permitted by the proposed terms of the agreement to deploy in excess of 300 SS-18s and approximately 500 SS-19s and SS-17s. The SS-18s have a useful payload approximating 16,000 pounds, the SS-17s and SS-19s have a useful payload approximating 7,000 to 8,000 pounds respectively. The SS-18s have been flight tested with an many as ten RVs, the SS-17s four RVs, the SS-19s six RVs. It can therefore be anticipated that the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's MIRVed ICBM force will approximate nine million pounds of throw-weight by 1985, and that the number of RVs deployed on those MIRVed missiles will approximate

six thousand, each RV having a yield two to four times that of the U.S. RVs. There is no reason to believe that the accuracy of the Soviet MIRVed RVs by 1985 will be significantly less than that of the improved accuracy of the MINUTEMAN III RVs. The U.S. is developing its more radical accuracy improvement, the Advanced Inertial Reference System (AIRS), for incorporation in a new follow-on missile to be deployed after 1985.

(3) If current accuracy is no better than approximately a fifth of a mile, it would be difficult for them to eliminate more than 70 percent of our MINUTEMAN silos in an initial strike, assuming that they target two of their RVs on each silo. If their accuracy approximates fifteen hundredths of a mile, around 90 percent of our silos would be vulnerable to such a two-on-one attack. A two-on-one attack would require less than half of the MIRVed ICBM RVs they are expected to have available by 1985. When their accuracy exceeds an eighth of a mile, more than 80 percent of our silos will become vulnerable to an attack by a single RV against each silo, provided that additional RVs are programmed to substitute for missiles that fail during their launch phase.

(4) If we were to use all our MINUTEMAN III, taking account of their improved accuracy and the substitution of MARK-12A for MARK-12 RVs, it is unlikely we could destroy more than 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM silos.

b. The unMIRVed ICBM balance

The utility of large single RV unMIRVed ICBMs, which can have very high megatonnage and thus very high fallout potential, is largely as terror weapons to deter the other side from using its surviving deterrent in a second strike.

(1) Until 1985 or beyond the U.S. is expected to have 450 MINUTEMAN II, each with a throw-weight of less than 2,000 pounds and carrying a single RV in the megaton range. These would give us approximately 700,000 pounds of throw-weight and 550 megatons of yield in our unMIRVed MINUTEMAN ICBM force. In addition, we may choose to maintain the 54 TITAN missiles which were deployed prior to 1965. They have an aggregate yield of some 450 megatons.

(2) In coming down to the 2,250 limit, the Soviet side can be expected to retain at least 360 non-MIRVed ICBMs during the life of the treaty. It now being agreed that each side will be allowed to test and deploy one new type of ICBM (MIRVed or non-MIRVed) during the period of the Treaty, it is likely that the Soviet side, having little need for a new MIRVed ICBM, will test and then deploy a new non-MIRVed ICBM with a throw-weight of approximately 8,000 pounds and a warhead yield of 15 to 20 megatons, and substitute it for approximately 360 of the currently deployed SS-11s. The aggregate throw-weight of such an unMIRVed ICBM force could be in excess of two and one-half million pounds, and its megatonnage approximately six thousand megatons.

3. The SLBM balance by 1985

SLBM forces at-sea are particularly difficult to find and destroy. They can be expected to endure beyond the initial exchanges. They should, therefore, be prime candidates for being held back as strategic reserve forces to influence the later phases of a war or influence the period of war termination and beyond. It is not expected that SLBMs will achieve high accuracy by 1985. The reliability of SLBM communications constitutes a continuing problem.

a. MIRVed SLBMs

The U.S. is scheduled to have the following MIRVed SLBMs by 1985:

21 POSEIDON boats, each with 16 missiles, each missile carrying eight to ten RVs, the yield of each RV being 40 kilotons;

10 POSEIDON boats, each "backfitted" with 16 TRIDENT I missiles, each carrying approximately eight RVs, each missile with a substantially longer range (4,000 miles), and each RV with more than double the yield of the 40 kiloton POSEIDON RV;

7 TRIDENT boats, each with 24 TRIDENT I missiles.

It was thus expected that we would, by 1985, have 38 nuclear-propelled MIRVed SLBM submarines with some 664 MIRVed missile tubes with a theoretical loading of 5,312 RVs. Some 60 percent of these might be at-sea at any given time, giving us some 3,200 MIRVed RVs at sea. Assuming a reliability rate of 80 percent, this amounts to approximately 2,550 at-sea reliable RVs, representing an aggregate yield of approximately 200 megatons. In the event of a crisis, it should be possible, in a number of days, to increase the at-sea force by some 25 percent.

The Soviet side, if they deploy close to the full 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers permitted under the MIRVed ICBM limit, will be able to deploy close to 380 MIRVed SLBM launchers and still stay within the 1,200 limit on MIRVed missile

launchers. It is expected that the new Soviet TYPHOON submarine will be significantly larger than the present Soviet SLBM submarines and will carry 20 to 24 missiles each with up to 14 RVs; their smaller MIRVed SLBMs, the SS-N-18, are expected to have no more than half that number of MIRVs. The TYPHOON missile could have the throw-weight of the projected U.S. TRIDENT II missile, development of which has not yet been authorized. The TRIDENT II missile is planned to be approximately twice the size (volume) of the TRIDENT I missile, but cannot be deployed prior to 1985.

It is probable, nevertheless, that the U.S. will continue to have a lead in the number of MIRVed SLBM tubes and RVs into the 1985 time period. However, the accuracy and yield of the U.S. SLBM RVs are substantially less than those on the U.S. ICBMs. The U.S. SLBM force does not now, and is not expected to by 1985 add significantly to our capability against Soviet hard targets, such as hardened silos.

b. UnMIRVed SLBMs

The U.S. is expected to phase out at least half of its unMIRVed POLARIS force by about 1985 and thus to have no more than 80 unMIRVed SLBMs by that time.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, can be expected to retain over 600 unMIRVed SLBM tubes. Some of these may carry multiple, but not independently guided, RVs (MRVs) as our POLARIS missiles do today. Such missiles may be as useful as MIRVed missiles against small area targets that are not very hard, such as airfields.

4. The bomber/cruise missile balance in 1985

The essential characteristic of the bomber/cruise missile forces is that while—particularly on the U.S. side—they have great potential power, it is only that portion of the force that is on alert prior to the initial attack that can be expected to survive, and the bulk of even that portion of the force must be used within the initial eight hours of a nuclear war or it too runs the danger of being lost.

The B-1 issue was incorrectly stated by the administration to be a choice between relatively cheap cruise missiles and expensive B-1s. Cruise missiles have to be launched from some kind of survivable platform, preferably one that can endure in a nuclear war environment for more than a few hours. The Executive Branch's position is that this preferably should be an aircraft. Thus, one requires a bomber/cruise missile system consisting of bombers and tankers so based as to give a high probability of prelaunch survivability for those that are on alert, whose take-off is sufficiently rapid and which are so hardened against nuclear effects that it becomes difficult to barrage their escape routes; bombers that are able to penetrate close enough to the target to launch cruise missiles to destroy or suppress defenses; and cruise missiles able to penetrate area and terminal defenses and accurate enough to kill targets they are aimed at. The cruise missile is thus only part of a multifaceted system. The bomber that launches it and the tankers that refuel the bombers are equally essential parts of the system. The system is greatly improved and the enemy's defensive problem greatly increased, if some of the bombers have the capability for rapid take-off, are hardened against radiation, are more confidently able to penetrate Soviet defenses and thus launch SRAMs, other types of missiles, or gravity bombs, close to the target.

The B-1 program having been cancelled, the 1985 bomber/cruise missile balance depends critically on whether a Soviet barrier defense around the northern perimeter, and on the eastern and western flanks, of the Soviet Union against the B-52s is possible, upon the number of cruise missiles that will be able to penetrate new Soviet terminal defenses, upon the number of B-52s equipped with cruise missiles that we deploy, the prelaunch and escape survivability of our B-52s and their tankers, and the extent to which a portion of the bomber force can be reconstituted, after it is flushed on warning, so as to endure in a war environment, protracted for more than a few hours.

Without limitations on air defense systems, including forwardly deployed, area and terminal defenses, the effectiveness of U.S. cruise missiles may be degraded during the mid to late 1980s. Limitations on air defenses are not to be included as a part of the SALT II agreements and the Soviet does not appear to be willing even to discuss this issue as part of the SALT III negotiations.

The U.S. contemplates deploying some 120 aircraft equipped with intermediate range ALCMs. The majority of these aircraft are planned to be B-52s; however, some type of aircraft carrying a larger number of ALCMs than does a B-52 is also being considered; the average number of ALCMs per ALCM carrier cannot, however, exceed 28.

As it now stands, if we maintain 550 MINUTEMAN III launchers, plus our 496 POSEIDON launch tubes, and deploy the 168 TRIDENT tubes, this would total 1,214

MIRVed missile launchers. This number would exceed the 1,200 limit on MIRVed missile launchers. Therefore, unless there is a further delay in the TRIDENT program, we will, in any case, have to phase out a small number of POSEIDON or MINUTEMAN III launchers. If we propose to deploy more than 120 ALCM-carrying planes, we will have to phase out additional POSEIDON or MINUTEMAN III launchers to stay within the 1,320 limit. It is uncertain that the Navy would recommend phasing out POSEIDONs or the Air Force the MINUTEMAN III.

Even if we assume 120 deployed ALCM-carrying aircraft, it would be unlikely that more than some 50 percent would be on continuous alert or that more than some 90 percent could be brought to readiness under conditions calling for fully generated strategic forces.

The Soviet Union faces a much simpler problem. The U.S. has no substantial air defenses and the Soviet BACKFIRE is not to be counted under any of the proposed limits. Even if BACKFIRE production is limited to 30 per annum, the number deployed will grow to significant numbers, they can be dispersed to a larger number of fields than our B-52s, and their chances of surviving an initial exchange are thus enhanced. In view of our limited defense, BACKFIRE carried cruise missiles would not need to have a range greater than 600 kilometers. If the Soviets exploit their current technology, they could deploy a significant number of such short-range ALCMs on BACKFIREs prior to 1985. The potential of the BACKFIRE to survive the initial exchange of a nuclear war coupled with its capability to penetrate very limited U.S. defenses would contribute significantly to a greater possibility of Soviet domination of the subsequent phases of such a war.

Whether the FB-111H (which is 40 percent the size of the BACKFIRE) can penetrate depends, among other things, on whether U.S. tankers can survive in sufficient numbers for the required multiple inflight refuelings of the FB-111Hs. If the FB-111H were to carry ALCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers, they would have to be counted under both the 2,250 ceiling and the 1,320 ceiling.

5. The definition and verification problem

It is impossible to verify compliance unless what is to be limited and the nature of the limitation have been clearly defined and the definition agreed in depth between the parties.

It is evident that six years of negotiation failed to produce such clear and agreed definitions. The main provisions of the treaty concern limitation on the number of various types of missile launchers. But the definition of what is a launcher is purely circular; for instance, ICBM launchers are defined as "launchers which have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs" and "if a launcher contains or launches an ICBM that launcher shall have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs". We are told by the Executive Branch that the U.S. can deploy the thousands of silos required for the "shell game" ICBM deployment system because the definition of "launcher" is unclear, and we can interpret it to refer to the canister which will contain the MX missile and not the silo which contains the canister. On that interpretation the Soviet Union could claim that none of the modern Soviet missile silos are launchers either; their most modern ICBMs are also canisterized with the device that cold launches them contained within the canister. With such uncertainty as to what the definitions mean verifiability becomes impossible.

Similarly, we are told that the principle constraint in the treaty is the limitation of "new" ICBMs to one type. A "new ICBM" is defined as one having a different number of stages, or using a different type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) than a missile flight tested prior to May 1, 1979, even if it does not differ from such a previously tested missile by five percent in length, largest diameter, throw-weight or launch-weight; as will any missile, even though it does not differ in number of stages or type of propellant, that does differ by more than five percent in length, diameter, throw-weight or launch-weight from any previously tested missile. It is noteworthy that no list of previously tested Soviet missiles and their characteristics is provided and that the above limitations may not fully apply until after the 24th "new type" missile flight test.

In view of the fact the Soviets have tested some 20 types of ICBMs prior to May 1, 1979, with a wide range of weights and dimensions, that in the past we have believed that we could monitor these characteristics to an accuracy no greater than ±15 percent, and that the Soviets have provided no data base as to the characteristics of types tested prior to May 1, 1979, it would be a bold man who would assess we can be certain the Soviets will be effectively limited to one "new" ICBM type.

Even where the limitations appear to be precisely defined, compliance is in many cases difficult to verify. The range of ALCMs in one place in the treaty is related to maximum range tested, in another place to "capability to fuel exhaustion": what happens if it is never tested to "fuel exhaustion?" Different types of ALCMs are to

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be distinguished on the basis of "extremely observable design features," but these do not necessarily bear on the range of the ALCM. Can one be sure of observing ALCM tests in a manner adequate to determine range by any criterion? How do you distinguish an ALCM from a GLCM or SLCM, or assure that an ALCM cannot be launched from a sea- or land-based launcher? How do you determine whether it is armed, and, if so, conventionally armed or nuclear armed? How do you determine that a new missile having the throw-weight of an SS-19 and carrying a bus similar to an SS-19 bus, but with a single RV, is not capable of being deployed as a MIRVed missile? How do you determine that a missile tested both from land-based launchers and SLBM submarines cannot be deployed as an ICBM? How do you determine that retired missiles or missiles taken out of retired launchers or extra, newly produced missiles are not being stockpiled to be available for relatively prompt deployment on soft pads or for reload in surviving launchers?

In many instances unambiguous verification of the SALT II limitations will not be possible. For this reason the arms control community now uses the phrase "adequately verifiable." It is correct that "verifiability" is not an absolute requirement; it is a means toward the end of a good agreement. A wholly verifiable bad agreement is still a bad agreement. If those provisions of an agreement which are strategically significant to us are adequately verifiable, the agreement might be a good agreement, even if its less important provisions are not confidently verifiable. The difficulty, however, rests in determining which provisions are "strategically significant" to us and what is meant by the word "adequate." Both phrases lend themselves to subjective judgments and thus to blatant misuse. If one assumes that no capabilities beyond those required for a "minimum deterrent" are significant, then none of the SALT II limitations are "strategically significant": they may assure the Soviet Union strategic nuclear superiority without denying us a "minimum deterrent."

6. The active and civil defense aspects of the problem

The United States has, over the last twenty years, phased out most of its continental air defense capabilities. The Congress has forced the virtual deactivation of the U.S. ABM defenses permitted under the ABM treaty. In the mid-sixties the U.S. Navy was told that it was not to ask for equipment, men or funds for the purpose of developing ASW capabilities designed to attack Soviet SLBMs; as far as we know that order has never been rescinded.

The USSR has persistently put relatively more emphasis on active defensive capabilities than has the United States.

The Soviet Union has devoted a truly enormous effort to air defenses. It has deployed 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers and approximately 2,700 interceptor fighters. It has deployed thousands of inter-netted air defense radars and ground-control-interceptor centers. It is apparently about ready to deploy a new high capability mobile phased-array radar/missile system called the SAX-10. It has recently been reproted that the SAX-10 is being deployed on surface ships, thus affording the Soviets the beginnings of a capability to deploy a forward barrier defense against our bomber aircraft.

The Soviet Union has maintained and somewhat improved those ABM capabilities it had earlier deployed in the Moscow area. It is significantly increasing the capabilities of its phased-array ABM "early warning" radars around the periphery of the USSR. This is permitted under the ABM Treaty on the assumption that, in the event of war such a network, being close to the periphery, could be destroyed with limited effort. It is also assumed that the even more powerful radars in the Moscow area could, with greater effort, be destroyed. However, the large Soviet phased-array radar deloyments, when coupled with the development of a transportable phased-array ABM radar and high acceleration interceptor combination, could give the USSR a reasonably rapid break-out toward an important "damage limiting" ABM capability, particularly against U.S. SLBM RVs.

Even more important are the civil defense aspects of the problem. Many who have carefully studied the problem concur that a well executed civil defense program—to evacuate most of the population of Moscow and Leningrad would take several days—can reduce fatalities by a factor of five to ten as well as substantially reducing industrial damage and the time necessary for economic recovery. There is now little doubt that the Soviet Union is working on civil defense much harder than was realized as recently as two years ago.

It was reported earlier this year that the Executive Branch would request an expansion of the U.S. civil defense program to include work to enable more rapid evacuation of our urban population in the event of a crisis. Approval of such a program could have been of major importance. Later, however, the President reversed his position. It should be noted, however, that, even if that program had been

approved, our program would have cost about one-tenth of what the Executive Branch estimates the Soviets are spending on civil defense.

7. The number and hardness of targets problem

The potential effectiveness of offensive nuclear forces should be judged in the light of the target structure they might be called upon to strike. From the standpoint of the military outcome of war, were deterrence to fail, the most important targets are hard targets (silos; launch control facilities; command, control, and communication bunkers; nuclear storage facilities; and the like). It is because of their strategic significance that they have been hardened. The list of Soviet hard targets is larger than ours, and the targets are generally harder. Their list is growing while ours is not. The Soviets will, by the mid-1980s, have twice as many hard targets as the United States and on the average they will be twice as hard.

Against soft targets the important criteria are soft target (area) potential, i.e., (EMT), megatonnage, number of warheads, and the relative effectiveness of the civil defense measures on two sides.

8. The break-out problem

The essential effort in the ABM Treaty negotiation was to assure that neither side could break-out of the agreement and thereafter rapidly deploy a significant ABM defense. That was why the main emphasis was put on preventing the deployment of a widespread ABM-capable radar network, the element requiring the longest leadtime.

In the early SALT II negotiations the break-out problem with respect to offensive systems was given much attention by the U.S. side. This effort was put to one side in the interest of negotiability. This has resulted in provisions that leave rapid break-out by the Soviet Union entirely feasible.

For instance, the proposed provisions designed to limit Soviet ability to reload their silos cannot be counted on to be effective for more than a number of hours.

Those who actually have worked on and designed cruise missiles say that any bomber with hard points on its wings can rapidly be converted to carry cruise missiles and that any cruise missile operable from a plane can rapidly be adapted to be launched from ground- or sea-based launchers.

New Soviet transportable air defense systems, designed to counter the U.S. SRAM/cruise missiles have a substantial break-out potential in an ABM damage limitation role.

9. The command, control, communication and pre- and post-attack intelligence problem

Second strike deterrent forces will fail in their purpose if responsible civil authority is not able effectively to command and control them. This requires that responsible civil authority survive an attack, have time for a considered and intelligent decision, and be able to communicate with those in immediate control of the launching of surviving forces. For these decisions to be intelligent and effective, continuing information, both as to the status of our own forces and those of the enemy, is essential.

Neither those in the Executive Branch, nor those outside it, have confidence in the current status of what is called our C^3 + I. In fact, improving its effectiveness and survivability is given the highest priority by most analysts of our strategic posture. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has put a vastly greater effort than has the U.S. into providing themselves with redundant and survivable C^3 + I systems capable of enduring, if necessary, through a protracted nuclear war. They have also been developing antisatellite and other capabilities which could deny us pre- and post-attack intelligence.

It was hoped that the SALT II provision obligating each side not to interfere with the other side's national technical means of verification would give useful protection to our pre-attack technical intelligence capabilities. With the ambiguous resolution of the test range telemetry encryption problem, much of our technical intelligence capability becomes dependent on unilateral Soviet decisions.

The diminishing survivability and endurance potential of our strategic forces to be expected during the treaty period sharpen the need for improved U.S. post-attack C^3 + I.

10. The relation of the strategic nuclear balance to the theater balance, conventional and nuclear

At all times since World War II the soviet Union has had superior nonnuclear forces on the European central front and on its northern and southern flanks. This has, in part, been due to geography, the USSR enjoying the central position and

interior lines, and, in part, to the greater effort that has been made by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact than by NATO.

In the years up to the early 1950s this was offset by the U.S. nuclear monoply. Later the conventional deficiency was in large measure offset by U.S. superiority in theater nuclear weapons. Today that theater nuclear superiority has disappeared and it has proved necessary to assign a number of our POSEIDON submarines to cover targets of interests to NATO, and thus maintain a theater balance. It has been estimated that the Soviet Union has two to three times as many theater nuclear weapons, with six times the area destructive potential, ten times the throw-weight, and twenty-five times the megatonnage as we. As the Soviets deploy increasing numbers of SS-20 MIRVed missiles, BACKFIRE and other high performance theater bombers, maintaining a theater nuclear balance will become increasingly difficult. In addition to the theater nuclear imbalance, we must consider the substantial and one-sided Warsaw Pact chemical warfare capabilities. More and more of our suviving strategic nuclear forces will be called upon for assignment to offset theater imbalances. This consideration is rarely taken into account when the strategic nuclear balance is being examined; it should be.

Moreover, the SALT II agreement could have a serious negative effect upon the evolution of the conventional balance. The European NATO countries have hoped to exploit cruise missile technology in its theater conventional weapon applications. Agreement that armed cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers are to be limited in SALT favors the Soviet side. It supports the erroneous Soviet claim that nuclear ballistic missiles deployed in the Soviet Union for peripheral area missions, with medium or intermediate ranges, which under SALT II can be up to 5,500 kilometers, are not "strategic," while cruise missiles deployed in NATO Europe, if over 600 kilometers in range, whether nuclear or conventionally armed, are "strategic."

In specific terms, the SALT II agreements, particularly now that the Soviet position that conventionally armed cruise missiles, as well as nuclear armed missiles, are to be limited, has been accepted, may prevent the United States from transferring technology important to the conventional defense of Europe as well as prohibiting the deployment by the U.S. of conventionally armed cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers.

These limitations will also result in the U.S. Navy being effectively limited to cruise missiles with less than 600 kilometers in range, while countries not party to the agreements will not be so limited, and can then significantly outrange it.

11. The impact of the agreement upon the United States' ability to reverse current trends

The Vladivostok Accord did not restrict the USSR from deploying those new weapon systems it planned to deploy, but neither did it restrict us from deploying those weapon systems necessary to maintain stability and rough equivalence, and thus reversing the current trends. It did not restrict the ability of the United States to deploy the B-1, the MINUTEMAN III and the MX missile in a survivable deployment mode, TRIDENT II, ALCMs, GLCMs, and SLCMs of any range, continental air defenses, more durable and reliable command and control, or enhanced civil defense preparations.

U.S. program decisions and delays in making decisions since Valdivostok plus the terms of the probable SALT agreement now make it impossible to maintain crisis stability and rough equivalence, at least during the period of the treaty and probably for many years thereafter.

It is argued by some that the restrictions in the agreements, as they apply to the United States, are of little significance; they do not keep us from doing anything we now should, or would want to, do during the period of the agreements. This depends in large measure on whether or not the agreements permit the deployment of a multiple protective structure system (MPS). Under this concept the U.S. would construct a large number of vertical protective shelters or silos, each capable of holding a canister containing an ICBM (a MINUTEMAN III or a follow-on missile such as the MX) and its launch mechanism; or, alternatively, a canister which would contain no missile or launch mechanism but which would be indistinguishable from those that did. The canisters containing the missile and launch mechanism would, periodically and randomly, be moved and substituted among those that did not. The U.S. is reported to have told the Soviets that it considered that such a system was a mobile system and thus permitted under the treaty. The Soviet side is reported to have told us that deployment of such a system would be in violation of both the letter and spirit of the agreements.

The Executive Branch is now searching for a truly mobile system which would both provide the necessary survivability and durability and be affordable. Whether

they will be successful is still very much in doubt. What is not in doubt is that any such system will be considerably more expensive than the MPS system and cannot be operational until after the expiration of the treaty.

Under the provisions of the SALT II agreements, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how we can reverse recent adverse trends. Beginning in the early to mid-1980s, we would have to rely on an ICBM force useful, if deterrence fails, only if the President decides to launch it from under an attack in the few minutes he may have available to do so, a bomber force largely capable of enduring for no more than a few hours and thus having to be used within that time span or else lost, and an SLBM force at sea of less than 25 boats, each boat constituting four percent of our "enduring" deterrent power and thus worth enormous Soviet efforts to negate.

12. The situation in the absence of an agreement

The proponents of ratification of the treaty emphasize that whereas the USSR now has some 2,500 strategic launchers, under SALT II they will have to reduce these to 2,400 some months after entry into force of the agreements, and to 2,250 some three years thereafter. They assert that in the absence of an agreement, the Soviet side may not make any such reductions and may well add some 400, or even more, new strategic launchers to those to which they would be limited under SALT II.

Based upon past experience, this is unlikely. This most careful student of Soviet past defense budgets and programs, William Lee, tells us that he can identify little, if any, modification in the general magnitude of Soviet defense budgets and therefore of defense programs in response to international events or changes in U.S. programs. Whereas it is generally said that the increased Soviet emphasis on expanding its intercontinental strategic capabilities was in direct response to the Cuban missile crisis, Lee finds no evidence that this is so. The Soviet five-year planning process is so interrelated and complex that anything beyond marginal adjustments is extremely disruptive and, in the past, has rarely occurred. He also notes the difficulty the Soviets would have in increasing the percentage of their GNP devoted to defense, which he estimates has now risen to approximately 18 percent.

Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviet side, in the absence of SALT II, would not decrease the number of its strategic launchers to 2,250 and, instead, would increase them.

It should be noted, however, that the 300 launchers they are expected to phase out to reach 2,250 are obsolescent ICBMs and SLBMs which would add little to their overall capability. Their presently programmed forces, largely composed of new missiles, will provide them with such an excess of MIRVed hard target kill capability, of unMIRVed megatonnage, and of RVs needed for target coverage, that it is hard to see what strategic benefit more of the same would give them. Increased intermediate range systems to cover requirements against European NATO and China are not limited by SALT.

It is now anticipated that, as the Soviet side completes their deployment of new ICBMs and SLBMs, they will concentrate more heavily on adding to their defensive capabilities. This is where the principal gaps in their warmaking potential now lie. In particular, they are expected to add more attack submarines designed for an ASW role, and aircraft with improved look-down/shoot-down radar capabilities, and to deploy improved antiaircraft systems such as their SAX–10 mobile antiaircraft batteries, etc. For the Soviet Union to shift resources back to offensive forces from a contemplated strengthening of their defenses may not be disadvantageous to the United States.

The more important question is what the United States can be expected to do under the SALT II agreements—and in the absence of such agreements—to reverse currently unfavorable strategic nuclear trends.

13. The question of strategy

Fundamental to the debate over SALT II and over our strategic nuclear program is the question of what strategy to follow, if deterrence were to fail, and the relationship of strategy to deterrence.

Some start from the assumption that a nuclear war is "unthinkable"; that those who do think about it must be Dr. Strangeloves; that deterrence has nothing to do with the military strategy either side intends to follow in the event deterrence were to fail; that, regardless of strategy and of the probable balance of the initially surviving and then enduring nuclear forces, there could be no meaningful winner or loser in a nuclear war.

Others believe that a nuclear war is thinkable, that the United States can best avoid a nuclear war, while preserving its independence and honor, by thinking

seriously about nuclear war and taking prudent and timely actions to forestall it. They view the quality of deterrence to be importantly affected by the strategy we intend to follow and could effectively implement, if deterrence were to fail. They question the wisdom and credibility of a so-called minimum deterrence strategy. Under such a strategy, deterrence would depend on the United States' ability and will to launch, in response to a Soviet attack, a few hundred missiles, warheads or megatons (they are generally imprecise about which) against Soviet cities and industry protected by extensive active and passive defenses. The fact that the remaining U.S. military forces and U.S. population and industry would then be defenseless against ten thousand megatons or more of a Soviet third and fourth strike capability would be ignored.

Few now overtly support the minimum deterrence approach. They are more apt to describe their position with such phrases as "sufficiency" or "flexibility." This leads to the question of how much of what is enough? That judgment in turn must rest importantly upon the relative emphasis placed on the counterforce aspect of nuclear strategy and on the countervalue aspect. Neither aspect can be ignored. If our counterforce capabilities, survivable after an initial Soviet strike, were sufficient to out-fight Soviet residual forces, while our other forces were capable of holding Soviet population and industry in reciprocal danger to our own, the quality of deterrence would be high because the Soviets would know we were in a position to implement a credible military strategy in the event deterrence were to fail.

If our strategy were restricted to a revenge attack on, for instance, the 200 largest Soviet cities, the military forces required to support such a strategy would be relatively small. Such a strategy, however, would be suicidal if implemented, vastly more destructive to us than to the Soviet Union, and militarily hopeless. One could, therefore, have only limited confidence in deterrence based upon an implied determination to execute such a strategy to defend vital U.S. interests.

Those that claim that we are stronger than the Soviet Union now and will continue to be so during our lifetimes, more or less regardless of what we do, must equate forces designed to support such a minimum deterrence strategy with superiority.

14. The continuing negotiation problem

It has been characteristic of the SALT negotiation process that the U.S. Executive Branch, in justifying proposed agreements, has stressed its hope that their deficiencies will be corrected in future agreements. This argument characterized the justification of the SALT I Interim Agreement. That agreement specified that its terms were not to prejudice, in any way, the scope or terms of the long-term comprehensive agreement contemplated for its replacement, the negotiation of which both sides had agreed should begin immediately after entry into force of the Interim Agreement. Despite the best efforts of the U.S. side, the terms of the Interim Agreement have, in fact, prejudiced the terms of SALT II. The nature of the continuing programs of the two sides and the political and psychological pressures on the U.S. made it difficult to achieve any other result.

SALT III negotiations are contemplated to begin shortly after SALT II is ratified and enters into force. Two hurdles must be met by the U.S. negotiators during those negotiations. The first is the expiration of the Protocol on December 31, 1981; the second will be the expiration of the treaty at the end of 1985. It is likely that negotiations will concern themselves with both subjects and that the Soviet side will press for the extension of those provisions of the Protocol which they would have preferred to see in the treaty, and link that pressure to the SALT III treaty negotiation. The question of whether the U.S. can expect to prevail with respect to its hopes for SALT III will largely depend on the relative bargaining position of the two sides during the negotiations. The evolution of the relative strength of the two sides in the strategic nuclear arena is almost certain to be negative during the entire period prior to expiration of the SALT II Treaty. If the MX and TRIDENT II versions of the "largely-common missile" are then close to their IOCs, this could have some offsetting bearing on the negotiations. The impending deployment of the MX version could, however, be destabilizing if a basing mode capable of assuring its survivability and endurance were not concurrently available.

If the SALT II Treaty were to approach expiration in 1985 without replacment and without a survivable and durable U.S. ICBM component, the U.S. could face unprecedented dangers. We would then have to take seriously both the then existing degree of Soviet nuclear strategic superiority and Soviet superiority in break-out potential. To avoid the attendant risks, we could well be under pressure to agree to a SALT III far less favorable to the U.S. even than SALT II.

15. The political and diplomatic consequences of a shift in the strategic nuclear balance

Some proponents, rather than taking exception to the main thrust of the analysis contained in the preceding sections, argue a different series of points along the following line:

a. The United States' March 1977 comprehensive proposal leaned over backward in attempting to be fair to the Soviet Union. It offered them complete assurance against any significant counterforce threat from the United States while not assuring comparable protection for the United States.

b. That proposal was wholly unacceptable to the USSR, and any proposal which would in fact assure stability and rough equivalence at lower levels of nuclear armaments would be even more unnegotiable.

c. To insist on such an equitable agreement would assure that there would be no success, at least in the next few years, in negotiating a SALT II set of agreements. Such a delay would risk a breakdown of detente.

d. Rather than risk such a breakdown, it is wiser to negotiate the best deal that is now reachable, preserve at least the outward forms of detente, and open the way to follow-on negotiations for a better deal in the future.

e. And in any case, a deterioration in the state of the strategic nuclear balance will have no adverse political or diplomatic consequences.

To some of us who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in 1962, or the Middle East crisis in 1973, the last and key judgment in this chain of reasoning—that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences—comes as a shock. In the Berlin crisis of 1961 our theater position was clearly unfavorable; we relied entirely on our strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Krushchev's ultimatum. In Cuba, the Soviet Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying. In the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced; both sides compromised.

It is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect international politics and diplomacy from the underlying real power balances. The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence—military, economic, or political—rest.

In any international crisis seriously raising the prospect that the military arms of the United States and of the USSR might become engaged in active and direct confrontation, those directing U.S. and Soviet policy would have to give the most serious attention to the relative strategic nuclear capabilities of the two sides. Unequal accommodation to the Soviet Union would then have resulted not in cooperation and peace but in forced withdrawal.

ANNEX III

THE BALANCE IN NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LAUNCH VEHICLES (SNLVs)

	1977		June 18, 1979		Consistent with SALT II 1982		1985	
	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.
ICBMs								
- MIRV	550	82	550	608	550	820	536	820
- Non-MIRV	504	1,474	504	790	504	390	504	360
TOTAL	1,054	1,556	1,054	1,398	1,054	1,210	1,040	1,180
SLBMs								
- MIRV	496	16	496	144	640	296	664	356
- Non-MIRV	160	776	160	806	160	680	80	620
TOTAL	656	792	656	950	800	976	744	976
HEAVY BOMBERS								
- Non-ALCM	346*	160	340*	156	331	64	226	90
- ALCM Carriers	0	0	3	0	15	0	120	0
TOTAL	346*	160	343*	156	346	64	346	90
TOTAL SNDVs	2,056*	2,508	2,053*	2,504	2,200	2,250	2,130	2,246

*Excludes 230 mothballed B-52s U.S. plans to scrap.

THE BALANCE IN NUMBERS OF WARHEADS

	1977		June 18, 1979		Consistent with SALT II 1982		1985	
	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.
ICBMs								
- MIRV	1,650	560	1,650	4,120	1,650	5,752	1,608	5,752
- Non-MIRV	504	2,584	504	1,700	504	970	504	480
TOTAL	2,154	3,144	2,154	5,820	2,154	6,722	2,112	6,232
SLBMs								
- MIRV	4,368	48	4,320	432	5,456	2,912	5,648	3,752
- Non-MIRV	480	1,320	480	1,350	480	1,080	240	1,324
TOTAL	4,848	1,368	4,800	1,782	5,936	3,992	5,888	5,076
HEAVY BOMBERS (ALCMs, SRAMs, Gravity Bombs)								
TOTAL	2,584	640	2,560	624	2,824	260	4,504	420
TOTAL WARHEADS	9,586	5,152	9,514	8,226	10,914	10,974	12,504	11,728

THE BALANCE IN AREA DESTRUCTION POTENTIAL - EMT ($nY^{2/3}$)

	1977		June 18, 1979		Consistent with SALT II 1982		1985	
	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.
ICBMs								
- MIRV	507	462	507	3,040	664	4,751	651	4,751
- Non-MIRV	741	4,115	741	1,956	741	1,155	741	1,934
TOTAL	1,248	4,587	1,248	4,997	1,406	5,906	1,393	6,686
SLBMs								
- MIRV	586	30	645	272	878	995	920	1,282
- Non-MIRV	174	1,015	174	997	174	855	87	933
TOTAL	760	1,046	820	1,269	1,053	1,851	1,007	2,216
HEAVY BOMBERS (ALCMs, SRAMs, Gravity Bombs)								
TOTAL	1,795	640	1,771	624	1,837	260	2,137	420
TOTAL AREA DESTRUCTION	3,370	6,160	3,839	6,890	4,297	8,018	4,538	9,322

NOTE: Decimal points not rounded off.

THE BALANCE IN HARD TARGET KILL POTENTIAL - CMP ($nY^{2/3}/CEP^2$)

					Consistent with SALT II			
	1977		June 18, 1979		1982		1985	
	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.
ICBMs								
- MIRV	22,539	10,464	22,539	105,194	46,175	211,169	45,279	211,169
- Non-MIRV	13,188	24,036	13,188	7,182	13,188	29,170	13,188	126,912
TOTAL	35,727	34,501	35,727	112,376	59,364	240,340	58,467	338,082
SLBMs								
- MIRV	9,377	336	9,899	3,024	14,059	13,871	14,723	18,469
- Non-MIRV	697	3,040	697	2,968	697	2,702	348	2,254
TOTAL	10,074	3,376	10,597	5,992	14,757	16,574	15,072	20,724
TOTAL PROMPT CMP	45,801	37,877	46,324	118,368	74,121	256,914	73,539	358,806
HEAVY BOMBERS (ALCMs, SRAMs, Gravity Bombs)*								
TOTAL DELAYED CMP	148,675	16,000	146,275	15,600	158,729	8,000	229,112	33,000
TOTAL CMP	194,477	53,877	192,599	133,968	232,851	264,914	302,652	391,806

*It should be noted that bomber CMP differs from missile CMP in that the former arrives in 6 to 10 hours in comparison to 10 to 40 minutes for the latter.

NOTE: Decimal points not rounded off.

THE BALANCE IN MEGATONNAGE

	1977		June 18, 1979		Consistent with SALT II 1982		1985	
	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.
ICBMs								
- MIRV	280	420	280	2,760	430	4,314	423	4,314
- Non-MIRV	1,026	7,326	1,026	3,297	1,026	1,935	1,026	4,590
TOTAL	1,306	7,746	1,306	6,057	1,456	6,249	1,449	8,904
SLBMs								
- MIRV	220	24	241	216	364	582	383	750
- Non-MIRV	105	909	105	939	105	777	80	796
TOTAL	326	933	347	1,155	469	1,359	464	1,546
HEAVY BOMBERS (ALCMs, SRAMs, Gravity Bombs)								
TOTAL	1,624	640	1,600	624	1,624	260	1,624	420
TOTAL MEGATONNAGE	3,256	9,319	3,253	7,836	3,550	7,868	3,537	10,870

NOTE: Decimal points not rounded off.

THE BALANCE IN THROW-WEIGHT (M/lbs)

	1977		June 18, 1979		Consistent with SALT II 1982		1985	
	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.	U.S.	S.U.
ICBMs								
- MIRV	1.32	2.82	1.32	6.23	1.32	8.82	1.29	8.82
- Non-MIRV	1.17	6.90	1.17	2.96	1.17	1.38	1.17	2.52
TOTAL	2.49	7.72	2.49	9.19	2.49	10.20	2.46	11.34
SLBMs								
- MIRV	1.60	0.04	1.58	0.36	1.99	1.04	2.06	1.34
- Non-MIRV	0.18	1.29	0.18	1.35	0.18	1.15	0.09	1.05
TOTAL	1.78	1.33	1.76	1.71	2.17	2.19	2.15	2.39
HEAVY BOMBERS	3.32	1.23	3.26	1.25	3.32	0.51	3.32	0.72
TOTAL TW (M/lbs)	7.59	10.33	7.51	12.15	7.98	12.90	7.93	14.45

U.S. SYSTEMS

	MT/Warhead (y)	Nos/Warhead (n)	Total MT (yt)	EMT ($ny^{.666}$)	CEP (nmi)	CMP ($ny^{.666}/CEP^2$)	TW (K/lbs)
Minuteman	1.2	1	1.2	1.13	.2	28.25	1.6
Minuteman III (NS-20/MK12)	.17	3	0.51	0.922	.15	40.98	2.4
Minuteman III (INS-20/MK12)	.17	3	0.51	0.922	.12	64.03	2.4
Minuteman III (INS-20/MK12A)	.335	3	1.0	1.448	.12	100.56	2.4
Titan II	9.0	1	9.0	4.32	.7	8.82	8.3
Polaris A-3	.22	3	.66	1.09	.5	4.36	1.1
Poseidon C-3	.04	Avg. 9	.36	1.05	.25	16.80	3.3
Poseidon C-4	.1	8	.8	1.73	.25	27.68	2.9
Trident	.1	8	.8	1.73	.25	27.68	2.9
B-52 (w/Gravity Bombs)	1	4	4	4	.1	400	9.6
B-52 (w/ALCMs)	.2	20	4	6.85	.08	1,070.31	9.6
B-52 (w/SRAM + Gravity Bombs)	.2 + 1	8 + 4 = 12	5.6	2.74 + 4 = 6.74	.2/.1	68.5 + 400 = 468.5	9.6

U.S.S.R. SYSTEMS

System	MT/Warhead (y)	Nos/Warhead (n)	Total MT (yt)	EMT ($ny^{.666}$)	CEP (nmi)	CMP ($ny^{.666}/CEP^2$)	TW (K/lbs)
SS-7/SS-8	3	1	3	2.08	1.0	2.08	4
SS-9	20	1	20	7.35	.5	29.4	13.5
SS-9	3.5	3	10.5	6.91	1	6.91	13.5
SS-11	1.0	1	1	1.0	1	1.0	2
SS-13	.75	1	.75	.826	1	.826	1
SS-18 Single	20	1	20	7.35	.2	183.75	16
SS-18 (1977)	.75	10	7.5	8.26	.2	206.5	16
SS-18 (6/18/79)	.75	10	7.5	8.26	.17	285.81	16
SS-18 (1982)	.75	10	7.5	8.26	.15	367.1	16
SS-18 (1985)	.75	10	7.5	8.26	.12	573.61	16
SS-19 (1977)	.75	6	4.5	4.96	.2	124.0	8
SS-19 (6/18/79)	.75	6	4.5	4.96	.17	171.62	8
SS-19 (1982)	.75	6	4.5	4.96	.15	220.4	8
SS-19 (1985)	.75	6	4.5	4.96	.12	344.4	8
SS-19/SS-17	15	1	15	6.07	.2	151.75	7

SOVIET SYSTEMS (continued)

System	MT/Warhead (y)	Nos/Warhead (n)	Total MT (yt)	EMT ($ny^{.666}$)	CEP (nmi)	CMP ($ny^{.666}/CEP^2$)	TW (K/lbs)
SS-17 (1977)	.75	4	3.0	3.3	.2	82.5	7
SS-17 (6/18/79)	.75	4	3.0	3.3	.17	114.18	7
SS-17 (1982)	.75	4	3.0	3.3	.15	146.67	7
SS-17 (1982)	.75	4	3.0	3.3	.12	229.17	7
New Missile (1982)	15	1	15	6.07	.15	269.78	8
New Missile (1985)	15	1	15	6.07	.12	421.53	8
SS-N-6	1.0	1	1.0	1.0	.5	4.0	1.6
SS-N-6	.5	3	1.5	1.89	.75	3.36	1.6
SS-N-8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	.5	4.00	1.8
SS-NX-17	.75	1.0	.75	.826	.25	13.22	2
SS-N-18	.5	3	1.5	1.89	.3	21.0	2.5
SS-N-18	.2	7	1.4	2.39	.3	26.56	2.5
New MIRV	.2	14	2.8	4.79	.25	76.64	5
BEAR/BISON	1	4	4	4	.2	100.00	8
New Bomber	1	5	5	5	.1	500.00	8

1977 - U.S./U.S.S.R. ICBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. ICBMs						
Titan	54	54	486	233.3	476.3	448.2
MM II	450	450	540	508.5	12,712.5	720
MM III (NS-20/MK12)	550	1,650	280.5	507.1	22,539	1,320
MIRV TOTAL	550	1,650	280.5	507.1	22,539	1,320
NON-MIRV TOTAL	504	504	1,026	741.8	13,188.8	1,168.2
TOTAL	1,054	2,154	1,306.5	1,248.9	35,727.8	2,488.2
U.S.S.R. ICBMs						
SS-7	139	139	417	289.12	289.12	556
SS-8	19	19	57	39.52	39.52	76
SS-9 (Single)	164	164	3,280	1,205.4	4,821.6	2,214
SS-9 (MRV)	100	300	1,050	691	691	1,350
SS-18 (Single)	22	22	440	161.7	4,042.5	352
SS-18 (MIRV)	22	220	165	181.72	4,543	352
SS-11 (Single)	455	455	455	455	455	910
SS-11 (MRV)	455	1,365	682.5	859.95	3,439.8	910
SS-17 (Single)	10	10	150	60.7	1,517.5	70
SS-17 (MIRV)	10	40	30	33	825	70
SS-19 (Single)	50	50	750	303.5	7,587.5	400
SS-19 (MIRV)	50	300	225	248	6,200	400
SS-13	60	60	45	49.56	49.56	60
MIRV TOTAL	82	560	420	462.72	10,464.8	822
NON-MIRV TOTAL	1,474	2,584	7,326.5	4,115.45	24,036.3	6,898
TOTAL	1,556	3,144	7,746.5	4,578.17	34,501.1	7,720

1977 - U.S./U.S.S.R. BOMBERS

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. BOMBERS						
B-52 (SRAMS Gravity Bombs)	150	1,800	840	1,011	70,275	1,440
B-52 (Gravity Bombs)	196	784	784	784	78,400	1,881.6
TOTAL	346	2,584	1,624	1,795	148,675	3,321.6
U.S.S.R. BOMBERS						
BEAR and BISON	160	640	640	640	16,000	1,280

1977 - U.S./U.S.S.R. SLBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. SLBMs						
Polaris A-3	160	480	105.6	174.4	697.6	176
Poseidon C-3	400	3,600	144	420.8	6,720	1,320
Poseidon C-4	96	768	76.8	166.08	2,657.28	278.4
MIRV TOTAL	496	4,368	220.8	586.08	9,377.28	1,598.4
NON-MIRV TOTAL	160	480	105.6	174.4	697.6	176
TOTAL	656	4,848	326.4	760.48	10,074.88	1,774.4
U.S.S.R. SLBMs						
SS-N-6 (Single)	272	272	272	272	1,088	435.2
SS-N-6 (MRV)	272	816	408	514.08	913.92	435.2
SS-NX-17	12	12	9	9.91	158.64	24
SS-N-8	220	220	220	220	880	396
SS-N-18	16	48	24	30.24	336	40
MIRV TOTAL	16	48	24	30.24	336	40
NON-MIRV TOTAL	776	1,320	909	1,015.99	3,040.56	1,290.4
TOTAL	792	1,368	933	1,046.23	3,376.56	1,330.4

JUNE 18, 1979 - U.S./U.S.S.R. ICBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. ICBMs						
Titan	54	54	486	233.3	476.3	448.2
MM II	450	450	540	508.5	12,712.5	720
MM III (NS-20/MK12)	550	1,650	280.5	507.1	22,539	1,320
MIRV TOTAL	550	1,650	280.5	507.1	22,539	1,320
NON-MIRV TOTAL	504	504	1,026	741.8	13,188.8	1,168.2
TOTAL	1,054	2,154	1,306.5	1,248.9	35,727.8	2,488.2
U.S.S.R. ICBMs						
SS-9 (Single)	120	120	2,400	882	3,528	1,620
SS-18 (MIRV)	188	1,880	1,080	1,189.44	41,155.2	3,008
SS-11 (Single)	215	215	215	215	215	430
SS-11 (MRV)	455	1,365	682.5	859.95	3,439.8	910
SS-17 (MIRV)	140	560	420	462	15,985.2	980
SS-19 (MIRV)	280	1,680	1,260	1,388.8	48,053.6	2,240
MIRV TOTAL	608	4,120	2,760	3,040.24	105,194	6,228
NON-MIRV TOTAL	790	1,700	3,297.5	1,956.95	7,182.8	2,960
TOTAL	1,398	5,820	6,057.5	4,997.19	112,376.8	9,188

JUNE 18, 1979 - U.S./U.S.S.R. SLBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. SLBMs						
Polaris A-3	160	480	105.6	174.4	697.6	176
Poseidon C-3	352	3,168	126.72	396.6	5,913.6	1,161.6
Poseidon C-4	144	1,152	115.2	249.12	3,985.92	417.6
MIRV TOTAL	496	4,320	241.92	645.72	9,899.52	1,579.2
NON-MIRV TOTAL	160	480	105.6	174.4	697.6	176
TOTAL	656	4,800	347.52	820.12	10,597.12	1,755.2
U.S.S.R. SLBMs						
SS-N-6 (Single)	254	254	254	254	1,016	406.4
SS-N-6 (MRV)	272	816	408	514.08	913.92	435.2
SS-NX-17	12	12	9	9.91	158.64	24
SS-N-8	268	268	268	220	880	482.4
SS-N-18	144	432	216	272.16	3,024	360
MIRV TOTAL	144	432	216	272.16	3,024	360
NON-MIRV TOTAL	806	1,350	939	997.99	2,968.56	1,348
TOTAL	950	1,782	1,155	1,270.16	5,592.56	1,708

JUNE 18, 1979 - U.S./U.S.S.R. BOMBERS

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. BOMBERS						
B-52 (SRAMS Gravity Bombs)	150	1,800	840	1,011	70,275	1,440
B-52 (Gravity Bombs)	190	760	760	760	76,000	1,824
ALCM Carriers	3	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	343*	2,560	1,600	1,771	146,275	3,264
U.S.S.R. BOMBERS						
BEAR and BISON	156	624	624	624	15,600	1,248

*Excludes 230 mothballed B-52s U.S. plans to scrap.

1982 - U.S./U.S.S.R. ICBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. ICBMs						
Titan	54	54	486	233.3	476.3	448.2
MM II	450	450	540	508.5	12,712.5	720
MM III (INS-20/MK12A)	300	900	303	434.4	30,168	720
MM III (INS-20/MK12)	250	750	127.5	230.5	16,007.5	600
MIRV TOTAL	550	1,650	430.5	664.9	46,175.5	1,320
NON-MIRV TOTAL	504	504	1,026	741.8	13,188.8	1,168.2
TOTAL	1,054	2,154	1,456.5	1,406.7	59,364.3	2,488.2
U.S.S.R. ICBMs						
SS-11 (MRV)	290	870	435	548.1	2,192.4	580
SS-18 (MIRV)	308	3,080	2,310	2,544.08	113,066.8	4,928
SS-17 (MIRV)	200	800	600	660	29,334	1,400
SS-19 (MIRV)	312	1,872	1,404	1,547.52	68,768.8	2,496
New Missile (Single)	100	100	1,500	607	26,978	800
MIRV TOTAL	820	5,752	4,314	4,751.6	211,169.6	8,824
NON-MIRV TOTAL	390	970	1,935	1,155.1	29,170.4	1,380
TOTAL	1,210	6,722	6,249	5,906.7	240,340	10,204

1982 - U.S./U.S.S.R. SLBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. SLBMs						
Polaris A-3	160	480	105.6	174.4	697.6	176
Poseidon C-3	336	3,024	120.96	352.8	5,644.8	1,108.8
Poseidon C04	160	1,280	128	276.8	4,428.8	464
Trident C-4	144	1,152	115.2	249.12	3,985.92	417.6
MIRV TOTAL	640	5,456	364.16	878.72	14,059.52	1,990.4
NON-MIRV TOTAL	160	480	105.6	174.4	697.6	176
TOTAL	800	5,936	469.76	1,053.12	14,757.12	2,166.4
U.S.S.R. SLBMs						
SS-N-6 (Single)	200	200	200	200	800	320
SS-N-6 (MRV)	200	600	300	378	672	320
SS-NX-17	12	12	9	9.91	158.64	24
SS-N-8	268	268	268	268	1,072	482.4
SS-N-18	176	1,232	246.4	420.64	4,674.56	440
New MIRV	120	1,680	336	574.8	9,196.8	600
MIRV TOTAL	296	2,912	582.4	995.44	13,871.36	1,040
NON-MIRV TOTAL	680	1,080	777	855.91	2,702.64	1,146.4
TOTAL	976	3,992	1,359.4	1,851.35	16,574	2,186.4

1982 - U.S./U.S.S.R. BOMBERS

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. BOMBERS						
B-52 (SRAMS Gravity Bombs)	150	1,800	840	1,011	70,275	1,440
B-52 (w/ALCMs)	15	300	60	102.75	16,054.65	144
B-52 (Gravity Bombs)	181	724	724	724	72,400	1,737.6
MIRV TOTAL	15	300	60	102.75	16,054.65	144
NON-MIRV TOTAL	331	2,524	1,564	1,735	142,675	3,177.6
TOTAL	346	2,824	1,624	1,837.75	158,729.65	3,321.6
U.S.S.R. BOMBERS						
BEAR	60	240	240	240	6,000	480
New Bomber	4	20	20	20	2,000	32
TOTAL	64	260	260	260	8,000	512

1985 - U.S./U.S.S.R. ICBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. ICBMs						
Titan	54	54	486	233.3	476.3	448.2
MM II	450	450	540	508.5	12,712.5	720
MM III (INS-20/MK12A)	300	900	303	434.4	30,168	720
MM III (INS-20/MK12)	236	708	120.36	217.59	15,111.08	566.4
MIRV TOTAL	536	1,608	423.36	651.99	45,279.08	1,286.4
NON-MIRV TOTAL	504	504	1,026	741.8	13,188.8	1,168.2
TOTAL	1,040	2,112	1,449.36	1,393.79	58,467.88	2,454.6
U.S.S.R. ICBMs						
SS-11 (MRV)	60	180	90	113.4	453.6	120
SS-18 (MIRV)	308	3,080	2,310	2,544.08	113,066.8	4,928
SS-17 (MIRV)	200	800	600	660	29,334	1,400
SS-19 (MIRV)	312	1,872	1,404	1,547.52	68,768.8	2,496
New Missile (Single)	300	300	4,500	1,821	126,459	2,400
MIRV TOTAL	820	5,752	4,314	4,751.60	211,169.6	8,824
NON-MIRV TOTAL	360	480	4,590	1,934.4	126,912.6	2,520
TOTAL	1,180	6,232	8,904	6,686	338,082.2	11,344

1985 - U.S./U.S.S.R. SLBMs

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. SLBMs						
Polaris A-3	80	240	80.66	87.2	348.8	88
Poseidon C-3	336	3,024	120.96	352.8	5,644.8	1,108.8
Poseidon C-4	160	1,280	128	276.8	4,428.8	464
Trident C-4	168	1,344	134.4	290.64	4,650.24	487.2
MIRV TOTAL	664	5,648	383.36	920.24	14,723.84	2,060
NON-MIRV TOTAL	80	240	80.66	87.2	348.8	88
TOTAL	774	5,888	464.02	1,007.44	15,072.64	2,148
U.S.S.R. SLBMs						
SS-N-6 (MRV)	352	1,056	528	665.28	1,182.72	563.2
SS-N-8	268	268	268	268	1,072	482.4
SS-N-18	176	1,232	246.4	420.64	4,674.56	440
New MIRV	180	2,520	504	862.2	13,795.2	900
MIRV TOTAL	356	3,752	750.4	1,282.84	18,469.76	1,340
NON-MIRV TOTAL	620	1,324	796	933.28	2,254.72	1,045.6
TOTAL	976	5,076	1,546.4	2,216.12	20,724.48	2,385.6

1985 - U.S./U.S.S.R. BOMBERS

	NO. LAUNCHERS	NO. WARHEADS	TOTAL MT	EMT	CMP	TW
U.S. BOMBERS						
B-52 (SRAM Gravity Bombs)	150	1,800	840	1,011	70,275	1,440
B-52 (w/ALCMs)	120	2,400	480	822	128,437.2	1,152
B-52 (Gravity Bombs)	76	304	304	304	30,400	729.6
MIRV TOTAL	120	2,400	480	822	128,437.2	1,152
NON-MIRV TOTAL	226	2,104	1,144	1,315	100,675	2,169.6
TOTAL	346	4,504	1,624	2,137	229,112.2	3,321.6
U.S.S.R. BOMBERS						
BEAR	30	120	120	120	3,000	240
New Bomber	60	300	300	300	30,000	480
TOTAL	90	420	420	420	33,000	720

FIGURE 1. THE BALANCE – CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT SALT PROPOSALS
Time Urgent Counter-Military and Soft Target Destruction Potential



FIGURE 2. THE BALANCE – CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT SALT PROPOSALS
Delayed Counter-Military and Soft Target Destruction Potential



THIS FIGURE ASSUMES THE U.S. PROGRESSIVELY EQUIPS 120 B-52s EACH WITH 20 ALCMs OF HIGH ACCURACY. IT INCLUDES NO ALLOWANCE FOR THE POTENTIAL OF AIR DEFENSES. IT ALSO INCLUDES NO ALLOWANCE FOR THE POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT ON BACKFIRE OF CRUISE MISSILES WITH LESS THAN 600 KM RANGE THAT INCORPORATES THE TECHNOLOGY OF CURRENT SOVIET DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS.

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FIGURE 3. THE BALANCE – CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT SALT PROPOSALS
Warhead, Megatonnage and Throw-Weight



THIS FIGURE DOES NOT INCLUDE ALLOWANCES FOR BACKFIRE CAPABILITY

279-3-3-78-3
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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF CALCULATIONS IN FIGURES 1, 2, & 3 WITH SEC DEF BROWN'S FIGURES IN FY 1978 BUDGET AMENDMENT TESTIMONY, TABLE 2

Static Measures of Strategic Balance
(U.S. as % of Soviet)

	BROWN'S		FIGURES 1, 2, & 3	
	1977	1986 (B-52/CM)	1977	1985 (B-52/CM)
WARHEADS	240%	126%	216%	147%
MEGATONS	35%	25%	38%	31%
THROW-WEIGHT	75%	48%	78%	53%
COUNTER-MILITARY POTENTIAL	160%	67%	132%	78%

279-3-3-78-4
R7-3-79

Annex V

A Method for Dealing With Certain Fallout Questions

1. Three major sets of subvariables need to be analyzed to estimate the number of fatalities or casualties the U.S. should expect to result from the early (deposited in the first 24 hours) downwind (it is assumed people in the ground zero area would be killed by other effects) fallout, from a U.S. attack designed to maximize fallout casualties in a Soviet population defended by a well thought-through and executed civil defense program.

2. One set of subvariables concerns the nature of the attack—the number of U.S. weapons detonating, their yield and fission fraction, their height of burst, their location and spacing in distance and in time of burst, and the nature of the soil where they burst. The number of weapons will depend, of course, on whether the retaliating forces are alert forces or fully-generated forces, whether they are launched on warning or not, on targeting doctrine, and on policy regarding the maintenance of reserve forces. The attack can then be converted into a fallout pattern describable in terms of square miles per megaton of fission yield covered by fallout of different degress of intensity normalized to H + 1 hour intensity and also in terms of mean times of deposition.

3. A second set of subvariables concerns the effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program—the degree of evacuation called for, the time available for evacuation, the degree of compliance with the plan to be expected, the area over which people are evacuated, the resulting densities per square mile, the protection factor (PS) of the fallout shelters made available, their blast resistance, the time people are prepared to stay in shelters if necessary, and the procedures they follow once they leave the shelters.

4. A third set of subvariables concerns the amount of biological radiation damage judged to be surely lethal, to cause 50 percent probability of lethality, to require hospitalization, to shorten life, or to cause little probability of any permanent damage; and the relation of biological radiation damage to Rs absorbed over time.

5. It is desirable to establish a reasonable and definable nominal value for each subset. One can then test the elements of each subset for sensitivity against the nominal values for the other subsets. Paragraphs 6 through 17 illustrate the method proposed.

6. Let us assume that as a first approximation our analysis of the third set of subvariables indicates values of 1,000 R, 450 R, 200 R and 100 R of instantaneous whole-body mid-line radiation to be the cutoff points between the five classes of damage listed in paragraph 4, and that we are particularly interested in the 50

percent lethality condition; i.e., biological radiation damage equivalent to an instantaneous whole-body mid-line dose of 450 Rs.

7. Let us assume that our analysis of our second set of subvariables has indicated that approximately 80 percent of the Soviet urban and industrial population will have been evacuated, distributed in a density which the U.S., for lack of better information, must assume to be an equal density over a million square miles (thus giving an average density of 200 per square mile), equipped with shelters with a PF greater than 200, prepared to stay in those shelters for 2 weeks if necessary, and prepared to act thereafter with some prudence when the residual radiation levels call for prudence. Let us further assume that our analysis indicates that people so protected will not be exposed to biological radiation damage in excess of the equivalent of 450 Rs of instantaneous radiation to the body mid-line unless the intensity of the radiation in the area, normalized to H + 1, was significantly greater than 5,600 R per hour.

8. Let us assume that our analysis of the first set of subvariables assumes a situation where the U.S. retaliates after an initial Soviet attack, where it has had strategic warning and has therefore fully generated its forces, and that it does not launch its retaliatory attack actual detonations on U.S. soil have been confirmed. Let us assume that the analysis indicates that the U.S. could, under these circumstances, penetrate with an attack designed to maximize fallout fatalities in the Soviet Union of a weight equivalent to 1,000 MT of fission yield. Let us assume further that our analysis indicates that the maximum number of square miles which can be covered with fallout more intense than 5,600 R per hour, normalized to H + 1, is by an attack pattern in which the 200 R contours of 28 groundburst weapons (assuming winds of 25 miles per hour) are made to coincide in an additive manner to the greatest extent possible, thus adding up to a 5,600 R contour. The area enclosed in such a contour, assuming 28 100-KT fission yield weapons can be so superimposed, would be approximately 100 square miles; this is equivalent to 35 square miles per megaton of fission yield of 35,000 square miles for 1,000-MT fission yield attack. Such an attack would expose 3.3 percent of the Soviet evacuated plus rural population to a biological damage done of 332 Rs or more, which could be lethal to some, but less than the 450 R level posited in paragraph 6.

9. The above assumptions are set forth merely to illustrate the method of analysis proposed. The first task of the analysis would be to assess whether the assumed nominal values are in the ballpark of central interest or whether other nominal values for each set would be more useful. The second task would be to analyze the sensitivity of the outcomes to the individual subvariables in each set. The third task would be to get some handle on the confidence levels and ranges of uncertainty in the individual values and in the aggregated nominal values of each set.

10. There follows a summary of the considerations which led to the above tentative nominal values.

11. The highest intensity of the downwind early fallout from a small weapon is estimated to be about the same as for a large weapon and more dependent on wind velocities and windshear than on weapon size. The area covered by fallout of any given intensity is estimated to be roughly proportionate to the fission yield of the weapon detonated.[1] The reason for this is that the cloud is elipsoid-shaped, the area of its horizontal cross section increasing roughly proportionately to the total yield (i.e., fission yield plus fusion yield). The fallout from a larger weapon falls from a greater height and therefore takes longer to descend; a greater percentage of its aggregate radiation has therefore already decayed before it reaches the ground.

12. The intensity of the fallout is proportionate to the fission yield and diminishes radically with the scaled height of burst, being quite small if the fireball does not touch the ground. The maximum intensity comes from a ground burst. The following paragraphs assume that attacks designed to maximize fallout are fused for ground burst.

13. The intensity of fallout is generally described in terms of "dose rates normalized to H + 1." This is the number of Rs per hour being radiated by the radiating material at 1 hour after the detonation, whether or not it has by that time settled from the cloud and reached the earth. The aggregate numbers of Rs which this material will have radiated from 1 minute after the explosion to infinity time is about 9.3 times the H + 1 rate.[2]

It will take from 3 to 6 hours for half the early fallout from a megaton-range weapon to hit the earth.

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[1] See figure III-19 of reference 1, "Physical Vulnerability Handbook—Nuclear Weapons," AP-550-1-2-69-INT, June 1, 1969.

[2] Figure 9.20 in reference 2. "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," Glasstone, revised edition, reprinted February 1964.

The percentage of the 1 minute to infinity radiation which has already been radiated at any given time is given in Table 9.22 in Reference 2.

For fallout which arrives 6 hours after the explosion, the initial rate of radiation will be one-tenth the rate normalized to H + 1.[3] The sum of the radiation to be expected from such fallout using the first 2 weeks after its deposit will be roughly 20 percent of the 1 minute to infinity sum, as opposed to 37 percent thereof if the radiation had all been deposited at H + 1.

14. Figure III-19 in Reference 1 estimates the square miles covered by radiation of given intensity (normalized to the H + 1 rate) per kiloton of fission yield, assuming ground burst. it will be seen that the square miles for 2,800 R per hour are roughly one-tenth the square miles for 1,500 Rs, which in turn are roughly one-tenth the square miles for 200 Rs, assuming that a 25-miles per hour wind is average for the USSR.[4] Fourteen weapons with overlapping fallout contours would cover as many square miles with radiation of 2,800 R per hour intensity as would 1 weapon with 100 times the fission yield. There may be problems in designing an attack of 14 weapons which would avoid fractricide, the merging of cloudforming stems, and shifting wind patterns, and thus approximate fully additive contours. It is evident, however, that, except for small, abnormal "hot spots," multiple overlapping fallout contours are necessary if any appreciable area is to be covered with fallout exceeding 2,800 R per hour normalized to H + 1.

15. At this point let us examine a case involving a sheltered population in an environment in which fallout of an H + 1 intensity of 2,800 R per hour has been deposited at the equivalent of H + 2 hours. The shelter provides a PF of 200. By H + 2 the rate will be 44 percent of the normalized H + 1 rate or 2,800 times 0.44 divided by 200 equals 6 R per hour; 4 hours later it will be 1.5 R per hour. The peak biological damage dose during the 2 weeks will be 27 Rs, that remaining at the end of the 2 weeks will be 16 Rs.[5] These amounts are far below the threshold of short- or long-term damage.[6]

It should be noted that if the shelters had an effective PF of 50 rather than 200, the peak biological damage would be 108 Rs, and the amount aborbed and uncompensated for by the body's recuperative powers at the end of 2 weeks would be 64 Rs—both numbers being at or below the threshold of long-term damage from whole-body exposure; the latter being less significant than the reduction achieved by a provision that, where necessary, people, on emerging from the shelters, would spend no more than 12 hours per day outside their shelters for the succeeding 12 weeks.

16. The problem to be analyzed then becomes that of the 2nd to the 14th week by which latter time the rate will have declined by a further factor of ten. After 2 weeks the fallout will have decayed to one-one thousandth of its H + 1 intensity; that is, to less than 3 R per hour; by the 14th week it will be less than 0.3 R per hour. A person walking about in ordinary clothing over average terrain has a PF of 3 (to the body mid-line), reducing these figures to 1 R per hour and 0.1 R per hour. At biological dose levels below 100 Rs, the body can recuperate to the extent of 80 percent of the radiation absorbed at a rate of 10 percent per day. The biological damage dose absorbed during the period of 2 weeks to 14 weeks would be approximately 150 Rs, even if no further protective measures were taken. See Tables III-34 and III-35 in Reference 1. This added to the 16 R from paragraph 15 would be approximately 166 R. The weight of attack would have to be doubled to reach 332 R.

17. The most significant variable not analyzed above may well be the percentage of the evacuated population that is able and willing to follow the civil defense plan and properly executes the instructions given.

In part, this depends upon the thoroughness of prior preparation, including the availability of expedient shelter construction equipment, water containers, dosimeters, radios, etc. The time of year and the expected weather conditions can have a bearing. Studies by SRI at Huntsville indicate that there are an average of 10 days a year around Moscow when the wind chill factor is such that expedient shelters cannot be dug. In any case, the Soviet leadership could be expected to see to it that the initiation of nuclear conflict did not arise at a time of year radically unfavorable to its interests.

The question of the degree to which the population would, in fact, execute civil defense instructions, even if there were no physical impediment to doing so, would appear to be importantly influenced by the time available for execution. If there had been many days of strategic warning, the full array of expedient shelters could

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[3] Figure 9.19 in reference 2.

[4] This assumption is based upon summer-time conditions; at other times of the year it would probably be significantly higher resulting in a decrease in the square miles contained in the 200 R contour.

[5] See figure III-34 in reference 1.

[6] The Army wartime allowable emergency exposure dose is 150 R.

have been constructed in advance of evacuation. If the Soviet side were to allow a week for actual evacuation to take place, it should be possible to enforce a high rate of, at least initial, compliance.

A more difficult problem may well be that of estimating how prudent the behavior of people will be after they emerge from their shelters. If only 3 percent of the dispersed population has been in areas of high initial radiation, the problem should not be serious; outside assistance should be available, and evacuation to areas of less intense initial radiation should be possible. If the radiation is not so concentrated but spread over a much wider area, the initial problem may be less severe for them but the longer-range problem more serious.

All these matters merit much more rigorous and detailed examination.

18. The material available on the modes of attenuation of radiation levels should all be pulled together. It is said that the roughness of the earth attenuates by a factor of 1.1 to 3; the usual best number given is 1.4. It is said that rain can also attenuate by a factor of 1 to 3; the usual best number given is a factor of 2. Decontamination of an area 20 meters or larger in radius can have an appreciable effect in reducing radiation.

19. Information on the longer-range effects from isotopes of strontium, iodine, and from plutonium, etc., should also be pulled together.

It is generally agreed that the concentration of plutonium from a large weapon explosion is so diluted as not to be dangerously above the medically permitted threshold for workers in plutonium fabrication plants.

The strontium problem is largely related to milk. Cows concentrate the strontium in their food into their milk. Soviet civil defense manuals call for monitoring both the grass cows eat and the milk they produce. Many publications list strontium-90 as the most hazardous fallout component. Uptake of strontium-90 can be reduced by increasing ingestion of uncontaminated calcium from powdered milk, for example, or Tums. Also, there are medical chelating agents that can increase the rate of elimination of strontium-90. This could help reduce long-term hazard from fallout.

There appear to be similar ways of reducing the long-term problem from isotopes of iodine.

Annex VI

Statement of Paul H. Nitze Before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on February 6, 1979

Assessment of deterrence depends significantly on our day-to-day alert forces. Our day-to-day alert forces must have adequate survivability in the face of any attack which might be made against them. The surviving forces must be appropriate for their mission, responsive to command and control, able to penetrate defenses intended to blunt their effectiveness, and capable of putting out of action the targets that must be eliminated if we are to pursue a rational strategy were war to come.

In addition to these straightforward considerations, insurance against unforeseen vulnerabilities can be provided by utilizing a diversity of forces.

The objective of diversity is to distribute our deterrent capability through different forces having a variety of survival modes, defense penetration techniques, and attack characteristics so that no single breakthrough by an opponent, either in destroying our forces before launch, or in defense against our surviving and counterattacking forces, would significantly reduce our second strike and reserve capability. Moreover, such variety would also lessen the vulnerability of our forces to a single force-wide weakness.

A minimal approach to diversity is a triad of forces providing two different survival modes and two different penetration modes for (a) time-urgent hard and soft targets, (b) non-time-urgent hard and soft targets, and (c) targets enduring more than a day. Both survivability and confidence in the ability of the force to penetrate should be considered when matching specific systems to target classes, as shown in Table 1 on the next page.

Table 1 divides targets into three classes; time-urgent, non-time-urgent, and enduring, and each of these into hard and soft.

You will note that only our SLBMs can now be expected to have a capability to endure more than one day, and they have little capability against hard targets.

TABLE 1

STRATEGIC FORCE EMPLOYMENT, SURVIVAL, AND PENETRATION CHARACTERISTICS

	APPROPRIATE TARGET CLASS						SURVIVAL MODE	PENETRATION MODE
	TIME-URGENT (Within 15 to 40 mins)		NON-TIME-URGENT (Within 6 to 12 hrs)		ENDURING (Within 1 to 30 days)			
	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft		
ICBMs	yes	yes	1/	3/	1/	1/	Hardened and dispersed	Hyper-sonic reentry, low radar cross-section, chaff and decoys masking real versus false targets, ABM Treaty limitation on ABM defenses
SLBMs	2/	yes	2/	yes	2/	yes	Concealed mobile	Hyper-sonic reentry, high arrival rates
BOMBERS with ALCMs	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	Take-off on warning but vulnerable if not promptly used	Low altitude flight, reactive defensive avionics, and variety in penetration and defense suppression modes (SRAMs, ALCMs, etc.)

1/ Only if deployed in MVPS mode.

2/ Only if SLBMs are provided with RVs with a combination of higher yield and greater accuracy.

3/ Only if deployed in either MVPS or air mobile mode.

You will also note that it is only the ICBMs that have a significant capability against time-urgent hard targets.

Our bomber cruise missile capability is limited to non-time-urgent targets. Few, if any, of our heavy bombers are expected to endure more than a day or so. They must be used within the first few hours. Those that disperse or return suffer grave danger of destruction on their bases.

To achieve the capabilities to fight a war, and thus to deter one, we must both give our SLBMs a greater hard target kill capability and give our ICBMs the ability not only to survive for an immediate launch but to endure for more than a day.

The ICBM force has played a dominant role in determining the military capability of our strategic forces.

The central issue that must be considered is what to do about our ICBM force to restore the declining credibility of that leg of our deterrent. Some of the alternatives are as follows:

a. Accept the intrinsic vulnerability of our fixed silo-based missiles and count on only a small residual ICBM force surviving an attack, thus essentially being driven to acceptance of a dyad.

b. As in (a), accept the vulnerability of our ICBM silos but deploy a larger missile in the silos to increase the power of those few ICBMs which might survive.

c. Adopt a launch-under-attack policy.

d. Provide dedicated ICBM silo defenses.

e. Re-base our ICBMs in a mode which maintains adequate ICBM survivability and endurance, and thus satisfies our crisis stability and sufficiency requirements.

Alternative (a) outlined above is consistent with Option 1 stated on page 1 of the "Questions" attached to the Chairman's invitation to testify.

Alternatives (b), (c), and (d) above are consistent with the Chairman's Option II. Alternative (e) is consistent with the Chairman's Option III.

Alternative (a) results in a dyad and eventually a monad. A survivable and enduring U.S. counterforce-capable ICBM system is required to ensure a diverse enduring retaliatory capability against all types of targets. A dyad will not meet that requirement.

Deployment of a larger missile in the MINUTEMAN silos, alternative (b), does nothing to solve the silo vulnerability problem and in addition has the negative feature of a threatening, but vulnerable, U.S. first-strike counter-force capability. Accordingly, it would increase crisis instability and the prospect that deterrence would fail.

Alternative (c), launch-under-attack, refers to launching a threatened force once unequivocal assessment is received that an attack on that force is in progress, and before the attack reaches a point where it prevents a launch. It requires highly reliable command, control, and communication systems and extremely rapid decision-making. The decision time projected to be available varies, from about 3 minutes in complex scenarios utilizing SLBM attacks on communication modes and pindown of MINUTEMAN, to about 15 to 20 minutes in a straightforward ICBM attack on MINUTEMAN. However, an important issue surrounding the launch-under-attack option is "launch what against what Soviet targets—upon what degree of evidence that an attack of what size is underway against what U.S. targets?" Extremely difficult considerations are involved in answering that complex question. Should the President be asked to resolve them in the few minutes which may be available to him, or should the answers be preprogrammed into a computer? Neither alternative is without immense dangers.

Alternative (d), that dedicated ICBM silo defenses be deployed as a solution to our current and future silo vulnerability problem, would require Soviet agreement to modify the ABM Treaty so as to allow for the eventual deployment of dedicated defenses.

Dedicated ICBM defenses can be of significant benefit when used as an overlay to an already reasonably survivable ICBM system. Against a maximum threat, it would be possible to complicate any Soviet attack with a preferential ABM defense of an MVPS deployment.

A number of alternate basing concepts, alternative (e), have been proposed which enhance ICBM survivability through a multiple vertical protective structure system (MVPS),[1] air mobility, other forms of MAP employing transporter/reactor/launchers, or by other deceptive actions. As stated in General Allen's letter of December 29, 1978, over the last ten years about 30 alternate basing modes have been investigated in detail; and after extensive reviews and evaluations, the MVPS system is found to be the best technical solution that retains the unique, positive characteristics of the ICBM force.

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[1] A multiple protective structure (MPS) system employing vertical structures.

Purely mobile concepts tend to rely on strategic and/or tactical warning both to enhance survivability and to reduce operating costs. Air mobility has much the same survival and durability vulnerabilities characteristic of the bomber force and therefore does not contribute significantly to force diversity. Land mobiles are dependent on warning, and are vulnerable to an area Soviet barrage attack.

Since the MVPS ICBM deployment concept achieves survivability through uncertainty in location, its deployment may raise questions concerning verification. In assessing this problem it should be emphasized that the advantages the MVPS basing offers in increasing survivability and thus enhancing stability and deterrence, and thus reducing the risk of war, far outweigh the strategic significance of uncertainty in verification. It should also be noted that all alternate basing concepts currently under consideration raise similar verification issues.

Two additional points should be made. It is wholly feasible for the U.S. to give the USSR high confidence that we are not deploying more than one cannister containing a missile per MVPS launch complex. If the Soviet Union wished to give us similar high confidence, if they developed an MVPS system, they also could do so. If they wished to deny us verifiability of the number of ICBMs they deploy, they can do so, whether they deploy an MVPS or not.

It is reported that as a part of the current SALT II deliberations two demarches were made by the U.S. side to the Soviets stating that we interpret the SALT II provisions to permit the deployment of an MPS system after the expiration of the Protocol.

The demarches referred not to multiple silos but to hardened launch points (which, as phrased, could include not only vertical structures but also horizontal structures). The Soviet side focused on the distinction between vertical structure deployments and horizontal structures protecting mobile transporter/erector launchers. They unambiguously stated that a vertical deployment mode would involve additional fixed ICBM launchers which are prohibited by the Treaty. They also implied, however, that the horizontal shelter deployment mode, if associated with transporter/erector/launchers (TELs), might be considered to be a mobile system permissible after expiration of the Protocol but requiring that each TEL be counted under the ceilings on numbers of ICBM launchers.

The Soviets might or might not respond to a U.S. deployment of an MVPS system. It would be feasible, by the late 1980s or the 1990s, for the Soviets, in the absence of SALT, to deploy more highly fractionated payloads with up to about 20 to 30 RVs per SS–19-type missile, and up to about 30 to 40 RVs per SS–18-type missile. These RVs would have to have smaller weight and thus yield, and therefore would have to have improved accuracy to maintain the same single shot kill capability. There would be severe technical problems involving accuracy and reliability, and financial and availability of fissionable material considerations could arise. But it is not certain that such considerations would preclude such a Soviet response.

SALT II limitations can be helpful if continued beyond 1985. The currently agreed SALT II provisions include a maximum fractionation limit of 10 RVs per ICBM and 14 RVs per SLBM. The number of RVs in the overt threat is therefore limited under SALT II but only until 1985.

However, even if the Soviets developed and deployed highly accurate, high fractionation RVs and even if they covertly deployed additional missiles, an MVPS system would exact a very high price for each U.S. missile destroyed. An MVPS system would restore the stable pre-1978 situation in which an attacker could not expect to destroy, in an initial attack, as many missiles as he expended in that attack.

Modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces with emphasis on survivability and endurance together with careful attention to the roles assigned to each part of the force structure should greatly diminish the likelihood of any rational Soviet decision to attack these forces or, directly or indirectly, to threaten such an attack. It would also provide the best hope for survival should any such attack, intended, or resulting from an unintended chain of events, occur. In the longer run, it should also make equitable and constructive arms control more feasible and more likely.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nitze, for a very succinct and at the same time comprehensive statement of your objections to the treaty as presently written.

I have been asked to announce that Senators Glenn and Lugar expect to attend the hearing this morning. Senator Biden is here, but he and other Senators may be called away from time to time

because of a meeting of the Intelligence Committee, so they will be attempting to cover both bases at once this morning.

Now, in accordance with my earlier announcement, we will begin at the ends of the table instead of at the middle. First, I will recognize Senator Hayakawa of California.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I would like to pass for now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Then, Senator Muskie, who surely must have been the most patient member of the committee for the last 3 days, I will call on you.

Senator MUSKIE. I may have been silent, but not necessarily patient, Mr. Chairman. [General laughter.]

Actually, I appreciated the opportunity to enjoy the prerogatives of juniority once more after all these years. I found it an excellent learning experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie, would you pull the microphone up a little closer to you, please?

Senator MUSKIE. Certainly.

I am not often accused of being too quiet.

Having just come from a session of the Budget Committee, I suppose I should get into the budget implications of Mr. Nitze's testimony, but I would prefer to get into another area of his testimony, if I may.

COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IMPROVEMENT

The Committee on the Present Danger, as I understand it, Mr. Nitze, has made a number of recommendations for improvements in U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Are any of these recommendations prohibited by SALT II?

Mr. NITZE. It remains to be seen. One of the principal recommendations of the Committee on the Present Danger is that we should do what is necessary in order to improve the survivability and durability of the ICBM component of the Triad of our deterrent forces. It is asserted by the executive branch that all of the alternatives which they have had under consideration, including what has been called the multiple protective shelter system, are permitted by the treaty. I believe this is wholly dubious. I cannot see how the treaty is to be read to permit the multiple protective shelter system.

This illustrates one of the difficulties with the treaty. The treaty as a whole is ambiguous. The definitions are imprecise. The treaty rests upon the theory that one limits the number of launchers, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, as launchers of bombs and cruise missiles, but there is no definition of what a launcher is. It does say that any fixed ICBM launcher which has contained an ICBM or which has launched an ICBM of that type will be considered to be a launcher—a fixed ICBM launcher.

I would have thought that the silos that are proposed to be built for the multiple protective shelter system would in fact be additional fixed ICBM launchers which are prohibited by the treaty. If you read State Department document No. 12A, article IV of the treaty makes this clear. The State Department says that the canister

containing the launch equipment would be considered to be the launcher.

Now, if you take that view of the case, and certainly the Russians do not take that view of the case, then all of the Soviet canisters which contain launch equipment, or could be made to do so, would also be launchers, and all of the silos that one proposes to count would not be countable.

So, there is ultimate confusion in the draft of the treaty. Jan Lodel in his article on how this came about says that we left the definition of launcher vague for the very purpose of having it vague.

Now, frankly, I do not believe that in a treaty of this seriousness one should leave its central provisions purposefully vague. I think the Russians have made it clear that in their view the multiple protective shelter system would be inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the treaty, and I believe we would not act to deploy such a system in the face thereof.

I think it is for that reason that the executive branch has not gone forward with the multiple protective shelter system and is up in the air as to what it proposes to decide on as a deployment system for the M–X.

Whether they come up with something that will work and will be consistent with the terms of the treaty, I do not yet know. If they do not, then the treaty does prevent the United States from doing that thing which is most essential to offset the major developing threat to the survivability of our deterrent.

That is why I say that I should think this committee would want to get it very clear from the executive branch and be sure that the language is so amended, and that the Soviets accept the amended language, so as to make it clear that the system we propose to deploy is in fact permissible under the treaty.

Senator MUSKIE. I understand that yesterday the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that in their judgment none of the recommendations of the Committee on the Present Danger would be prohibited by the treaty.

Mr. NITZE. To put it frankly, I think they have been misled by the White House as to what the treaty says, what it means, and how it is interpreted by the White House.

Senator MUSKIE. Hasn't a copy of the treaty been made available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. NITZE. Yes, but they were told that it would be interpreted to permit the MVPS [Multiple Verticle Protective Shelter] system. And I am sure the Russians have made it clear that they do not consider that any such deployment would be consistent with either the letter or the spirit of the treaty.

I have talked to those who have been on the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC] and know the record of the Standing Consultative Commission. If you go through all of that, it is clear that there is no basis and background for thinking that deploying a multiple protective shelter system with multiple silos would be consistent with the treaty as signed at Vienna.

UNITED STATES/SOVIET INTERPRETATIONS OF TREATY AMBIGUITIES

Senator MUSKIE. Is it your view that with respect to every ambiguity in the treaty or every question in the treaty, we should be bound by the Russian interpretation of that ambiguity, and they should be bound by ours?

Mr. NITZE. No, but this is a central, not a marginal issue I lived through SALT I, and I saw what happened with respect to the ambiguities in SALT I. The main point that we were trying to get across in SALT I and particularly in the interim agreement, was to be sure that there would not be a proliferation of large ballistic missiles. We thought deployment of large ICBM's would be the most destabilizing thing which could happen, that it would really increase the threat of war, if either side had many large MIRVed ballistic missiles. That said we interpreted the treaty to mean that any missile larger than the SS–11 would be considered a heavy ballistic missile.

The Russians went ahead with the SS–19, which is three times the size of the SS–11. In the testimony the other day I understand that there was a good deal of discussion, Mr. Biden, between you and Harold Brown about the relative importance of the SS-18's and the SS–19's. The initial problem arose with the SS–19's, and that was that the Russians interpreted what was a light ballistic missile quite differently than we interpreted it. Not nailing that distinction down was a fatal mistake in the Interim Agreement. I would hope that the United States does not make the same kind of a fatal mistake with respect to SALT II.

Senator MUSKIE. Mr. Nitze, I am trying to get at this point. I have been writing legislation for a great many years. You have been involved in international negotiations for a great many years. Surely it is no mystery to either of us that in order to achieve legislation, in order to achieve agreement on treaties, it is often necessary to resort to ambiguity in order to reach an agreement. I doubt that this treaty is unique in that respect.

Now, what I am asking you is, whether, whenever there is ambiguity in this treaty, we should be bound by the most pessimistic Soviet interpretation of an ambiguity—which we are inclined to interpret with no serious challenge up to this point in a way that would be favorable to us—and whether in the reverse they should be bound by our worst case interpretation from their point of view of an ambiguity.

Now, there is an ambiguity in your testimony about which I would like to ask a question.

DEPLOYMENT OF MODERN, HEAVY BALLISTIC MISSILES

You say, I think, your committee would wish to assure itself that granting the Soviet Union the unilateral right to deploy modern, heavy ballistic missiles is made equitable. Now, the recommendations of the Committee on the Present Danger do not specifically recommend that we begin to deploy modern, heavy ballistic missiles beyond the M–X. No one in any administration since I have been in the Senate has urged that we embark on such a program.

Now, what is your position on the heavy ballistic missiles? I mean, are we granting them something that we want and that we

are denying ourselves? Is that your position? I mean, what is the meaning of that sentence and that paragraph? Are you urging us to reject the treaty because we should be deploying modern, heavy ballistic missiles other than the M–X?

Mr. NITZE. You have dealt with two points, Mr. Senator. The first one was whether or not we should insist that every ambiguous provision in the treaty should be interpreted in the way in which we wanted it to be interpreted, or be sure that it could be.

Senator MUSKIE. I asked that question because I have no doubt in my mind that we are free to proceed with the research and development of an M–X missile and different modes for deploying it. I have no doubt about it, and you do. Your argument against my conviction is that the Russians in your judgment would deny us that right.

Mr. NITZE. You did not permit me, Mr. Senator, to reply.

Senator MUSKIE. I posed that question because I have a 10-minute time limit, and I want to make sure you get all of the implications of my question.

Mr. NITZE. I think I understand your question, Mr. Senator. My point is that this question as to whether or not a multiple protective shelter system may be deployed under the treaty is not a minor ambiguity.

Senator MUSKIE. I did not suggest that.

Mr. NITZE. I believe it goes to the heart of a very important question. Second, I do not believe that the language is ambiguous. I think the language is clear. I think it is not a question of the Russians later raising an objection to it. The Russians have, prior to the signing of the treaty, made it clear to our Government that they consider this to be in violation of the language and the spirit thereof, and I think to go into a treaty on which, on a major point, there is a clearcut difference of opinion is wrong. It should be clarified in advance, and that clearly on other minor questions—you can't get every question straightened out, but certainly the hope is that you will get as many as possible as clear as possible, and not have ambiguities on the main points.

Senator MUSKIE. The fact that the Joint Chiefs disagree with you still does not in your mind identify this as an ambiguity?

Mr. NITZE. I have been over it with the Pentagon. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now looking at a different system which the President has not yet approved, which may be consistent with the terms of the treaty. I believe that they are doing so largely because the White House told them the previously proposed systems were inconsistent with the treaty.

Senator MUSKIE. They were asked specifically yesterday about MPS [multiple protective structures] as I understand it.

Mr. NITZE. I then have a quarrel with them. I suggest you look into it and get the facts and satisfy yourselves. I do not have a quarrel yet with you, but I say I may have a quarrel with them.

Senator MUSKIE. I don't object to you having a quarrel with me. I see that my time for asking questions has expired, but I would still like to have an answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to say, Mr. Nitze, that there is one part of Senator Muskie's question to which I believe you have not yet responded.

Mr. NITZE. I have not yet. I would like to.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to give you time to do that. The part that I have reference to is Senator Muskie's question as to whether you would advocate the construction of heavy missiles of the kind that the Russians are permitted under the treaty or whether the M-X missile that we propose to deploy is in your judgment satisfactory.

Mr. NITZE. Let me expand your rephrasing of it a little bit, because I thought Senator Muskie started off by saying that my sentence here was ambiguous. I don't believe it is ambiguous, but just to——

Senator MUSKIE. We always disagree on ambiguity.

Mr. NITZE [continuing]. But to answer the question as posed by you, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that we should go to a modern, heavy ballistic missile. I think those missiles are destabilizing. I regret that the Soviet Union have either the SS–18 or the SS–19. Both of those came about by virtue of the fact that we were unable to get a clearcut cutoff line in SALT I between a heavy missile and a light missile. They agreed that there wouldn't be any more heavy missiles. We tried to get them to agree to a definition, and they would not agree to a definition, so we then made a unilateral statement that we would consider any missile larger than the SS–11 to be a heavy missile, 69 cubic meters of volume. We stated that we would consider anything over 70 cubic meters to be a heavy missile.

They went ahead with the SS–19, which has twice, three times the power of the SS–11. I forget the increase in size. But that is where the problem really came about, because they went ahead, contrary to our understanding of what the agreement was about, and then in addition to that they went to replacing the SS–9's with SS–18's—we had already given them the right to 308 very heavy ones, which are seven times the size of our Minutemen. That is the kind of a thing that gets you into real trouble. This is why SALT I was not a step forward to a better future agreement. This is why SALT II is even worse than was the Interim Agreement part of SALT I.

Senator BIDEN. SALT II doesn't solve that problem, though, does it?

Mr. NITZE. I think not, because it solves it at too high a figure.

Senator STONE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that tomorrow we start in the middle of the table? [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Since we got started this way, I think we will continue.

The next Senator up for questioning is Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC IMBALANCE PROBLEM

Mr. Nitze, in testimony we have heard thus far, it was suggested that the limits provided by SALT II are high enough that the Soviet Union could continue developing its programs and that the verification issue would not pose that much of a problem because doing legally what they might do under these limits they would simply proceed without the dangers incurred by cheating.

It has been suggested to us by the Joint Chiefs and others, that we can do a great number of things under SALT II. The great fear, of course, is that politically we will not have the will to do those things. As has been suggested by members of the committee, we could have done a great number of things under SALT I, many of which we have not done. The Joint Chiefs specifically say that in 1972, in giving their assent, they did so on the basis that we would do a number of things that seemed rational and in our own defense. We did not do so.

You have summarized this, I believe, in your own testimony, in which you say;

> That brings me to the heart of the problem posed by SALT II. To accept the case that is being made for the Vienna terms with all its fallacies and implausibilities can only incapacitate our minds and wills for doing the things necessary to redress the strategic imbalance.

My question is this. It is a broad question, to say the least, but it is the one ultimately on which we will be voting as members of this committee. Given the fact that the Soviets may proceed and that we could but may not, proceed with many programs; given that, we may pin down the M–X question, but may not, are we better off to vote no with regard to a SALT II. Is it better to reject the treaty and thus force the issue with this country of the things we must do to defend ourselves, or are you saying really in your statement that to adopt SALT II is literally to forget or if not to forget, at least to incapacitate our minds, as you put it, and wills for doing the things that we need to do. Are you suggesting in essence rejection of the treaty as the course that we ought to follow?

Mr. NITZE. What I have in mind is, that the country would be way ahead if a majority of the Senate were to get behind certain specific propositions. The first proposition would be that we do intend to maintain into the indefinite future an adequate and full deterrent, and do not propose to concede strategic nuclear superiority to the Soviet Union.

If that requires amendments to the treaty of a clarifying and improving kind, I have in mind that a majority of the Senate should back those amendments. If then the Soviet Union were not to negotiate or were to be recalcitrant about that negotiation, I think it would shift somewhat the burden of responsibility to where it ought to be—Soviet recalcitrance.

In any case, I think that such action by the Senate would transmit an important message to the world. I think much more is involved in this SALT debate than merely the details of the treaty, and even of our defense program. I think the country as a whole looks upon the United States as having conducted its policy in a weak and vascillating manner for a long period of time. They have seen us abandon one friend after another. They have seen us be inconsistent. Would-be friends no longer can count on what we will and can do.

They have seen the authority and the confidence that they can have in the nuclear umbrella, the shield which we have maintained over the noncommunist world, become doubtful. They have seen the confidence that people can have in it decline. They have seen us adopt a policy with respect to the Soviet Union which is no

longer based primarily upon making it clear that we propose to help others maintain their freedom.

Our present policy is primarily one of trying to accommodate, trying to get good will from the Soviet Union by tripping over ourselves in attempts to be "fair" to them. I think all kinds of good things would happen if a majority of the Congress were to say that this is no longer the way to act, that we are going to do what is necessary in order to reassert our position in the world, not in any aggressive way, but where we are no longer patsies and where the country will see we are not prepared just to accommodate, for instance, to a threat by the Soviet Union that bad things will happen if the Senate makes an amendment to the treaty.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Nitze, I agree with your general analysis, but what I am still trying to pin down is really, technically, how do we proceed in this respect? For example, are you suggesting that as a reservation for the treaty or as a principle that the Senate resolve to build an M-X missile, to deploy it in a specific way, and to do certain things with regard either to the B-1, the F-111, or the Trident? In other words, should we agree that the Congress should do these things?

The predicament I think some of us have is that we have in front of us a SALT Treaty and a good agenda of things we ought to do, but we are not certain exactly how you couple the two together. Second, if I may suggest, your council would be very important as to what type of amendments really are going to achieve this.

For example, Senator Biden yesterday analyzed a potential amendment to delete SS-18's from the Soviet arsenal, and suggested, and I think appropriately so, that with SS-17's and SS-19's there are thousands of warheads still available so that a simple deletion of part of the SS-18 might not make a whole lot of difference except, as he suggested, that it would be a "killer" amendment if the Soviets did not accept it.

I suppose that I am asking if SS-18 reduction is not enough, should we go after the 17's, the 19's, the Backfire? In other words, what is our agenda with regard to changing the strategic balance or to tailoring it in such a way that with regard to this specific treaty it were to make differences, while at the same time we hope that our political will will be sufficient to do the things strategically in terms of defense spending that we ought to do.

Can you offer us some technical advice really as to how to proceed with this treaty?

Mr. NITZE. As I suggested earlier, I see no way in which reservations can possibly cure the problem or even help it much. I believe that amendments are necessary in order to cure the problem.

TREATY AMENDMENT RELATING TO SS-18 DEPLOYMENT

Second, what kind of amendments will be helpful, or at least which do I think the Senate should consider? There has been some discussion about the unilateral right of the Russians to deploy SS-18's. I would not recommend that we build equivalent modern, large heavy ballistic missiles, but I would think that it would be useful to assert now an equal right and make it clear that we

would like to see that right be as close to zero for both sides as possible.

I see no reason why that should be a "killer" amendment.

Senator BIDEN. May I ask for a clarification? Did you say you think we should assert the right to build if we wanted to?

Mr. NITZE. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Wouldn't that further weaken the perception of our resolve when we have the right and then do not do it? Won't there be a whole lot of people like yourself around the country who will be saying, look, they have the right to do it and they are not doing it?

Mr. NITZE. I do not believe that for a minute. I think this would put us into a better position to negotiate SALT III. We have to establish an equality of right now or there is no hope in SALT III of getting rid of heavy missiles. Otherwise, in SALT III, we are going to talk about reductions in the number of launchers from the current levels. The way I read the statement of principles, it effectively prevents us from raising the question of what kind of launchers are to be reduced. Let's say the number of MIRVed launchers is reduced from 820 to 500 in SALT III. The Soviet side will keep the 308 modern heavies within the 500 limit and the disparity between the power of their MIRVed ICBM's and ours will go up, not down.

FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS

Senator BIDEN. The quality and right of forward-based systems you would like to build into the treaty, too?

Mr. NITZE. The business of forward-based systems has been a fraud, if I may say so, right from the very beginning of the negotiations. It has long been evident that what one ought to do is to compare their systems that bear upon the regional theaters with our systems which bear upon the same theaters, and one ought to compare the intercontinental systems with the intercontinental systems.

We have tried to do that. If you look at it that way, the Soviets are the ones who should be giving compensation to us with respect to the balance in theater systems. It is clear that their capability in what are called Euro-strategic systems is vastly greater than ours. Otherwise, why is it that we have assigned to covering European NATO targets some of our Polaris submarines merely in order to offset that imbalance. And even then we don't by any means fully offset it.

We should have been the ones to have gotten compensation from the Russians because of the disparity in the theater capable systems rather than the other way. We have, through weak negotiations, bought avoidance of negotiating about the forward-based system at least three times, to my knowledge. Now we propose to pay for it again. It is an outrage to negotiate in that way. We were relatively so strong at one time that we could afford some improvident negotiation. We are in a position now where we cannot afford to negotiate improvidently.

Senator BIDEN. Our theater is Moscow. Their theater is Bonn.

Mr. NITZE. That is right. That is what the West Europeans are worried about. The Europeans are worried about a possible break in what they call the continuity of the deterrent. They want to have an overlap between the conventional, the tactical nuclear, the theater nuclear—what they call Euro-strategic—and the intercontinental. They feel that the enormous growth in Soviet theater strategic forces, the SS–20's, the Backfires, the Floggers—that whole range of systems—is going to break that continuity of deterrence.

Senator BIDEN. I am sorry, but I have been trespassing.

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Lugar be given some additional time since he yielded some of his time to Senator Biden.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Is there objection?

[No response.]

Senator PELL. Without objection, then, Senator Lugar, please continue.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO TREATY

Mr. Nitze, let me try to redirect your thoughts now to specific amendments. You were sort of giving once again the general parameters. You did suggest specifically that we ought to negotiate for the right to build an SS–18 even if we didn't do it. Can you give me maybe one other suggestion during my remaining minute?

Mr. NITZE. Yes, I certainly would do something about the Soviet Backfire bombers. I think the way in which the Backfire has been handled is grossly inadequate. There was supposed to be an exchange of letters of equal legal validity as the treaty. It didn't end up to be an exchange of letters. I had earlier understood that the Russian assurances would really give us some assurance against the Backfires having an intercontinental capability. It seems to me that the letter does no such thing.

All the Russians agreed to was not to increase the radius of the Backfire, to an intercontinental distance. Within that limit, they can make the Backfire the longest ranged bomber in the world. There is no bomber that will go from the main Soviet bomber bases over targets in the United States and back to those bases. I forget how many miles it is. I think it is something like 12,000 miles. There is no bomber that can do that without refueling or even with refueling, except under the most extraordinary circumstances.

It is wholly vague as to what the relationship is between Mr. Brezhnev's oral commitment that the production rate would not be greater than 30 per year and the treaty. I don't see this included in any document signed by them. We were told that this exchange on the Backfires was going to have equal legal validity to the treaty. It doesn't seem to me that it does. It seems to me that whole thing is a wilderness.

Clearly, the Backfire is capable of being an intercontinental bomber. It can or has the capabilities of so doing. It ought to be controlled. I think there ought to be a separate and equal limit on the number of Backfires and U.S. cruise missile carriers. That would have some degree of equity. In any case, I am sure there are

things that could and should be done with respect to straightening out the Backfire problem.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Senator PELL. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nitze, I appreciate your being here to testify. Certainly many of us can learn from your longstanding contact concerning initiatives such as we have before us today.

OBSERVANCE OF SCC ACTIONS

You make an issue of the Backfire bomber, and I would like to ask this question. Have you ever observed any of the actions of the Standing Consultative Commission, which is the arbitrating body as to defining verification issues between the Soviet Union and this Nation?

Mr. NITZE. The Standing Consultative Commission is a separate organization from the delegation, but we shared offices and we were right next to each other, so I saw a great deal of their operations. I knew the head of the Soviet side of the Standing Consultative Commission, as well as the head of the U.S. side, and saw them frequently.

ASSURANCES CONCERNING BACKFIRE BOMBER

Senator ZORINSKY. You pointed out before that you felt it was a disaster the way the assurances for the Backfire bomber evolved through the discussion with Brezhnev. In the event they produced more than 30 bombers per year, and this Nation had the evidence to confront them and took it to this Commission, would we, do you feel in your heart, have the ability to say, what are you going to do about it, and get a direct answer from the Soviet Union?

Mr. NITZE. I think there would be two or three types of problems that would be involved. The first one would be to be clear in our own minds as to what the meaning of the Soviet letter is, when they say it won't be more than 30 a year. Starting when? We don't know quite when they begin the year. Is it from the date of ratification, the coming into force of the treaty, the calendar year, or some other time?

Supposing they are now producing at a rate of 45. What is the beginning of production? From what point do you count production? I am sure the Russians would come up with some very fancy definition as to the start of production. We ran into this problem in SALT I on the question of how many submarines they had under construction on May 26, 1972. We thought it was clear how you counted. You counted from the time that the main parts of the submarine went into the assembly hall, but lo and behold, on the last day, Mr. Smirnov came in and said, no, it was much earlier, when you started building the reactor.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Nitze, do you not believe this Commission could be used as a forum for this line of communication to resolve these questions?

Mr. NITZE. The Commission is not a Commission with any independent authority. It is a forum in which representatives of the

two governments come together and exchange notes prepared and delivered under instruction from their governments.

SALT I VIOLATIONS RESOLVED BY SCC

Senator ZORINSKY. Do you know of any violations that have come before that Commission that were not resolved under SALT I?

Mr. NITZE. No, but how were they resolved? They were resolved by accepting what had been done in violation. For instance, with respect to the tests of the SA-5 antiaircraft system in an antiballistic missile role, I believe there were a number of tests before we even found out about it. Then we were uncertain as to whether they really were tracking the incoming RV's.

Then, finally, when we protested that they had, we believed, made maybe 40 such tests, they agreed at that time that this was in conflict with the statement on what constitutes a test in an ABM mode. They agreed to stop, but we don't know yet whether or not those 40 tests were adequate for them to get all of the information they needed.

Now, if you call that getting satisfaction, it is very dim satisfaction. Similarly, with respect to their commitment, or at least what we thought was their commitment that they would not have more than one ABM test range. We said that it is our understanding that you have one ABM test range at Sary Shagan. They did not tell us that was wrong, but then later it turned out they had two.

Was that a violation or not? They said, you should have known we had two.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Nitze, your assumption is that many of these are not resolved to your satisfaction, or to whose satisfaction? This is your evaluation as an individual?

Mr. NITZE. No, I believe that if you ask anybody who had anything to do with it, they——

Senator ZORINSKY. I have asked people on this Commission, and they seemed thoroughly satisfied as to the answers given, the corrective action taken. I just wonder if you have an insight into the Soviet Union mind or a direct connection somewhere that I am not aware of. In other words, what I have heard this morning is evaluations, hypothetical situations as deriving from your concerns, and we all as Americans are concerned, but as Senator Muskie previously pointed out, it is a process of interpretation, and certainly for you to say this is the way the Soviet Union interprets it would indicate to me that you have some special knowledge of how the Soviet mind works that other people on the other side of this issue are not aware of.

ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CORRECT STRATEGIC IMBALANCE BANNED BY SALT II

But specifically, Mr. Nitze, what action needs to be taken to correct this strategic imbalance that apparently in your mind exists currently and in the minds of many people, I might add. And which of these actions that you feel would gain us parity or equity are currently banned under SALT II?

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Mr. NITZE. As I said earlier, the primary one which is in doubt, is the method of assuring the survivability of our ICBM's—I think that the original multiple protective shelter system, the shell game system is effectively banned under SALT II. I think that can be important, although it is possible that the new system——

Senator ZORINSKY. Now, that is your feeling, that it is banned; the treaty doesn't specifically say it is banned?

Mr. NITZE. I believe the treaty language specifically bans it. I think that the treaty—the specific treaty language—bans it, and I know that the Russians interpret the language that way.

RUSSIAN INTERPRETATION OF TREATY LANGUAGE

Senator ZORINSKY. How do you know that?

Mr. NITZE. I think that any good lawyer——

Senator ZORINSKY. How do you know the Russians interpret it that way? Who have you talked to in Russia that interprets it that way?

Mr. NITZE. The State Department has so told me.

Senator ZORINSKY. Who in the State Department?

Mr. NITZE. I do not want to go into the names of who, but I will tell you——

Senator ZORINSKY. How can I verify that? They do not tell me that.

Mr. NITZE. All right. I will tell you that the Secretary of State has told me that the original multiple protective shelter system is not consistent with the treaty.

Senator ZORINSKY. The Secretary of State has told you that? The current Secretary of State?

Mr. NITZE. Yes, and the Secretary of Defense has told me that. When I said to him that in my view the multiple verticle protective shelter system is effectively banned, he said, the important word is the word "effectively." I said, well, isn't that the important word? Shouldn't it be the important word?

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, can we use them or can't we?

Mr. NITZE. He said, technically, it may not be banned. I said, well, technically, we may be able to find some fancy way around it, but isn't it effectively banned? He said yes.

Senator ZORINSKY. But the Soviets have not told you that?

Mr. NITZE. No, but the Soviets have told the State Department that. Ask them.

Senator ZORINSKY. I have, and they indicated otherwise, sir.

Mr. NITZE. Well, get them to give you Ambassador Semyonov's response to our demarche on the subject.

ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CORRECT STRATEGIC IMBALANCE BANNED BY SALT II

Senator ZORINSKY. Would you enumerate what other things that you feel are necessary to gain us parity are also banned by SALT II.

Mr. NITZE. The deployment mode of our ICBM's, as I say, is the main thing. I think some of the cruise missile limitations will be or can be embarrassing. For instance, under the protocol cruise mis-

sile limitations, it is possible that the Navy will not be able to outrange—can be outgunned in cruise missiles by—the Libyan Navy, which I think would be——

Senator ZORINSKY. By whom?

Mr. NITZE. By the Libyan Navy. I think our Navy could be outranged by the Libyan Navy. I think this would be unfortunate. The main things that we have to do, I think, other than what I have mentioned, are not banned by the treaty but require action by the United States. Having watched what has been going on in the strategic nuclear field since 1965 I am not confident we will do so. From 1965 on, our main hope was that we could, through arms control negotiations with the Russians, put a real cap on Soviet and United States development, and that we would be able to achieve an equal and stable balance between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves. This has been the main hope of many of us, including me, for many years. It was only after it became clear that we could not do it, that the determination and recalcitrance of the Russians in the negotiations to accept no treaty that was not lobsidedly favorable to them, made it impossible, that I came to the conclusion in 1974 that it was no longer possible to see any way in which we could get an equal treaty, and that we would have to do ourselves those things which would maintain for us an adequate deterrence.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Nitze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Nitze.

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nitze, thank you for your testimony, which I have listened to with great interest. I have found your writings to be of great interest and I thank you for those too.

CLARIFICATION OF "MAJOR EFFORT" STATEMENT

First of all I would like to ask you a question about your statement,

> Finally, the Senate must resolve the question of whether in times of increasing danger, including military danger, it is wise to let down our guard or whether it is time to pull the country together for the major effort that is required on many fronts.

I am rather puzzled as to what you can possibly mean by this "major effort." That is, obviously you must mean something in the way of beefed-up missile and other strategic arms programs. We go beyond that. We are traditionally not a warlike nation. Just before the outbreak of World War II, when war in Europe was imminent, I think a national poll indicated something over 85 percent of the people believed we should not get involved in foreign wars. So it took something like Pearl Harbor to cure us of that particular position, if that is a cure.

Now, at the present time we are opposed to—many people, perhaps most of the young, are opposed not only to the draft but even to registering in case the draft might be necessary. We have a severe national post-Vietnam syndrome, so that no one even dares

to suggest sending troops to safeguard our oil supply in the Middle East or to interfere in Nicaragua, southern Africa or on any side.

What do we mean by pulling the country together for major effort? We need civil defense, such as the Russians already have. I am sure you cannot get much support for that. What is involved, Mr. Nitze, in a major effort?

Mr. NITZE. I said as a preliminary to that that we first have to recognize that there is danger.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes.

Mr. NITZE. I mean that seriously. When the President of the United States tells us that we are militarily much stronger than the Soviet Union and will be so during our lifetimes and it is not necessary to ask for additional sacrifices from the American people, why should the American people pay much attention to this danger? Why shouldn't they pay attention to those things that are right before them, such as gas lines and the energy situation?

Why should they? Nobody tells them what the facts are, certainly not the executive branch. It has long been my view that one of the principal roles of the President of the United States is that of a teacher to the American people on the important facts which face the country as a country. I do not see that being done with respect to the international situation and the threats which face us in the international situation.

It is only if that is done, I believe, that there is a possibility that the American people can be pulled together. I believe that the American people feel and sense that something is going wrong in the world and something is going wrong in our relationship to the world.

I know of no opportunity that has existed for there to be a real debate on these issues which could get to the American people and would give them an opportunity to see and judge what is going on. I believe that all of the polls indicate that if the American people thought that it was necessary to make a greater effort in order to keep the Soviet Union from having military superiority over the United States, that they would willingly see the United States Government spend up to $20 billion a year more for defense than is now being spent.

Frankly, Harold Brown's estimate that if we don't have a SALT Treaty we might have to spend $15 billion a year on strategic nuclear efforts rather than the $12 billion that he thinks is necessary if we do have the treaty is incorrect—I think we need the $15 billion in any case, whether or not we have a treaty. I do not believe he has made in his $12 billion estimate any adequate allowance for what is necessary in order, for instance, to have a replacement for our aging B–52's.

I think we should go forward with a revised version of the B–1, which I think is absolutely essential; perhaps not a swing-wing one but a fixed-wing one, which would be less expensive and I think would be the most cost-effective carrier for the cruise missile. I am sure that the appropriations for that are not included in the $12 billion figure which he mentioned.

I believe that the appropriations for what is necessary in order to give us a command and control system which should be able to survive more than the first few hours of a nuclear war are inad-

equate—I do not believe he has enough money in there for that. The Committee on the Present Danger believes that this question of the vulnerability of our command and control system has perhaps the highest priority among the things we need to fix.

Granted, that improving our command and control isn't barred by the treaty, but it is not being adequately done. My point is that we have been living somewhat under the illusion that the SALT agreement somehow or other would fix this problem of the strategic nuclear threat. I certainly share that hope and have for many years.

This SALT II Treaty is not the answer to what has been our hope. We now have to get at doing what we can do ourselves in order to meet our strategic problem. The problem, of course, is broader than just the strategic nuclear field.

We have a problem in the conventional strength of our forces in Europe and in the Far East and in the Middle East, and we have a problem in the balance of theater nuclear strength. In the past we have been able to shore up those weaknesses at the lower levels of capability because we had superiority at this highest level of potential violence.

It is not that this highest level of potential violence is the level that is apt to be used. It is that the balance as it exists at this highest level casts a shadow before it. It makes a difference as to how people will decide what they are going to do with respect to any crisis which involves the contingency that there might be a meeting of the military forces of the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

I cannot imagine anybody on either side going into such a serious crisis without giving deep consideration to a hard-nosed evaluation of the relative strategic nuclear balance. Thus, treaty or no, I see no alternative to increasing significantly our defense expenditures.

But when you say significantly increasing our defense expenditures, one should look at it in light of the magnitudes that are under discussion. In the 6 years from 1956 to 1962, the direct expenditures on U.S. strategic nuclear forces averaged $30 billion a year in today's dollars—the dollars consistent with the $12 billion to $15 billion that Harold Brown was talking about.

So what we are talking about is that today our expenditures are one-third of what they were in the 6 years from 1956 to 1962. Under the treaty, Secretary Brown expects to raise them to—what is it—it is 12 out of 30—to 40 percent of what they were earlier.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Perhaps it would help to use as a reference point the fact that we spend $7 billion a year on the food stamp program.

Mr. NITZE. Well, I am not sure that I would use that reference. The point I am trying to make is even if we went up to the $15 billion a year, it would be half of what we were doing during the 6 years from 1956 to 1962.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I understand.

Mr. NITZE. Beyond that, if you look at it in comparison with what the Russians are doing, I believe it to be true that the Russians are spending three times as much on the strategic nuclear part of their defense program than we are. I believe if you look

at what they are putting into the military hardware part of it, the percentage is even higher than that because of our high expenditures on manpower.

Granted that we have some degree of technical superiority if we let it loose, but we are not letting it loose. We are hamstringing it. You know, many people do everything they can in order to inhibit its being used. Under those circumstances I do not see how we can possibly hope to maintain parity.

M–X DEPLOYMENT RIGHT AMBIGUITY

Senator HAYAKAWA. Because I have a very short time left, let me ask a much more limited question. If I understand your question correctly, you see an ambiguity as far as our right to proceed with the M–X, as far as deployment is concerned. How would you eliminate this ambiguity?

Mr. NITZE. As I said, I understand that the executive branch proposes by August 1 to come to a decision as to what kind of deployment mode it wishes to advocate for the M–X. Frankly, it amazes me that the executive branch would go ahead and sign the treaty before it had figured out how it proposed to proceed with the main thing which would offset the growing threat. It is doing things backward.

One would think you would first decide what you wanted to do before you sign the treaty, to be sure the treaty is in conformity with what you want to do. But that isn't the way they have done it. But now I would recommend that one wait until they make up their minds on August 1 and then carefully look at their new scheme, which, as I understand it, might work. But it is a very complex scheme. It not only has above-ground hardened garage shelters, and maybe roads and maybe railroad tracks, but it also has transporter erecter launchers. Further, it has another new thing a cover which hovers over the transporter erector launchers. It has several different moving pieces.

But maybe it will work. I would look at that carefully and see whether it will work—whether they can persuade you it has a good chance of working. We should see how much more it is going to cost than the protective shelter system, which they earlier believed was the one that really would work.

I don't think one can do anything now, but I would certainly insist on knowing what the deployment scheme is by August 1, be sure it promises to be effective, and assure that both sides agree it is permissible under the treaty.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Nitze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

I believe our next questioner is Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nitze, there are two parts to the problem about which you have testified. One is what the treaty prohibits and the other is what the country ought to do that is permitted by the treaty even if no amendments were made to the treaty. As to what the country ought to do which would be permitted by the treaty, you have been eloquent, outspoken and clear, but that is not the province of this

particular committee meeting nor is it the function of this committee with regard to the SALT Treaty at this time.

MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS FOR ICBM SURVIVABILITY

But what you have said about this treaty, which is disturbing and which is, I think, as important as anything we have heard up to now, is that the multiple protective shelters [MPS] which you feel vital to the survivability of our current intercontinental ballistic missiles are in some question, and that without them, our survivability is diminished or nullified.

I take that not only from your testimony today but I take that from an article in the Washington Post as of June this year in which the reporter states this, and I ask for your comment:

> Throughout the preliminary SALT II skirmishing, Nitze seemed willing to trade his support for, or at least his nonopposition to the treaty, for a firm administration commitment to a system capable of protecting the land-based missiles.

I take it that means our current Minuteman III missiles.

Mr. NITZE. Yes.

Senator STONE. "The treaty is unacceptable if it prevents us from solving this problem," he told me, arguing that his reading of article IV, which bans the construction of additional fixed missile launchers, would apply to the shells of his shell game plan. But suppose his interpretation of the agreement was wrong. Suppose the treaty was interpreted as permitting MPS, or suppose the administration came up with some alternative way of protecting our missiles which was clearly allowed by the treaty?

"Then I would say that nothing in the agreement prevents us from meeting satisfactorily our strategic requirements," he replied.

Mr. Nitze, what about that? If the treaty permits MPS, or in the previous initials we used to call it MAP [multiple aim points] would you think that the essential ingredient to the survivability of our current missiles would be at least permitted by the SALT II Treaty?

Mr. NITZE. Yes, I do. What the newspaper man quoted me as saying, in the second sentence you quoted, I did say and meant and still mean.

Senator STONE. Was it not also the case that when the House Committee on the Armed Services in 1978 reported a recommendation for MAP, which now we call MPS, that the Secretary of Defense Brown's testimony would be in accord with what you have just told us? I quote from page 14 of that committee report, quoting Secretary of Defense Harold Brown before the committee.

"Only the land-based ICBM today is suitable for attacking time-urgent hard targets." Let me intersperse. That must mean the silos that the Soviets have. Is that right?

Mr. NITZE. They are included.

Senator STONE. And also their time-urgent hard targets.

Mr. NITZE. It also includes command and control facilities, airfields, nuclear storage facilities, things of that kind.

Senator STONE. Yes. Let me go on with Secretary Brown's testimony.

These missiles are also provided with a sophisticated and survivable command and control system which allows rapid retargetting and reporting of missile status up to command level for added flexibility and the efficient use * * *.

The rest is deleted, and then it recommences:

We believe that strategic forces should be highly survivable to insure stability and that ICBM's may need a multiple aim point deployment to achieve this.

In this way, the resource exchange ratio may be made very disadvantageous for the attacker. The key to retaining the appearance of retaliatory posture only is system survivability. With a highly survivable system we can insure having enough missiles remaining after an attack without building what would appear to be a threatening first strike capability.

This is true even if the missiles have high individual capability against hard targets.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. NITZE. Yes, I do.

TREATY AMENDMENT RELATIVE TO MULTIPLE AIM POINTS

Senator STONE. Do you feel, then, that State Department document number 12A, which refers to canisters as opposed to silos themselves, do the job, or do we need an amendment to the language of the treaty making it legal, if we choose to do so, to survive our current missiles by having multiple aim points?

Mr. NITZE. I do.

VERIFICATION OF BACKFIRE BOMBER PRODUCTION LIMITS

Senator STONE. Is it not the case that we intend to monitor the Backfire bomber and we have accepted—at least the administration has accepted—the statement by President Brezhnev as to their production limits, and that we intend to monitor by monitoring their production outputs? Is that not the case? That is what we seem to find acceptable as far as their backfire.

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

U.S. MINUTEMAN III PRODUCTION, SURVIVABILITY, VERIFIABILITY

Senator STONE. And isn't it true that we have stopped building Minuteman III missiles and our assembly lines have shut down?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

Senator STONE. And therefore, cannot the Soviet Union monitor safely along the same line of quid pro quo, our Minuteman strength by the fact we are not producing any more?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct, and I think no one in the executive branch would deny that. I have talked to them and they agree that the Russians don't have any problem in verifying the number of M-X's that we might deploy in whatever mode we deploy them.

Senator STONE. And therefore, the multiple aim point is verifiable from the Soviet point of view and adds the dimension of survivability which all the administration witnesses said was our main problem in all the graphs they showed us which show the exposure during the early eighties. It is the survivability of our Minutemen that they are worried about, isn't it?

Mr. NITZE. It is indeed, but I want to add one other point for clarity. The executive branch would say Soviet verification is not the problem; the problem is, could we verify a mirror image of the

system that we deploy if the Soviets deploy it. Frankly, I think that is a red herring. There is no possibility that the Russians would deploy a mirror image of the system that we deploy. Their situation is entirely different. They have a much bigger land mass. They don't have extreme environmentalists who keep them from being able to use substantially all the roads and all the area they have. They can use a strictly mobile system; that is what they would go to. They would not go to the kind of a system we are talking about.

So that the idea of putting ourselves to greater expense and hazard just in order to satisfy an unreal debating point is another instance of playing to the galleries and cosmetics without looking at the reality of what we are trying to do.

NITZE OBJECTION TO TREATY

Senator STONE. Don't you maintain that the key, central objection you have to this treaty is its ambiguity, or prohibition, of multiple protective shelters or multiple aim points on our side, when in fact those are verifiable to the Soviet side?

Mr. NITZE. No, I would rephrase that one. This is the first time I have differed with you, Mr. Senator. Our ICBM vulnerability problem is only one of the points that trouble me. There are many other points that I object to.

Senator STONE. I am talking about within the four corners of the SALT II document that we are faced with, is this the number one objection that you found?

Mr. NITZE. Well, you said before, isn't this my main and only objection? It is the No. 1 but it is not the only one.

TREATY AMENDMENT CLARIFYING MPS PROBLEM

Senator STONE. If the amendment were made to clarify that we can implant MAP's or MPS', would you feel that we would have made a major contribution to the survivability and strategic balance from our point of view of United States forces during the life of this treaty—in other words, up to the middle 1980's?

Mr. NITZE. It would have made a major contribution to assure permission to deploy what is necessary. But nothing happens unless we deploy it. We had the right to go forward with the B–1 but we killed it. We got nothing for it. There are two things that are involved. One is permission and the other is doing.

I would be happy if we did all that was both necessary and permitted.

Senator STONE. Mr. Nitze, all we did in the Senate was to make it legal, and when the time comes to vote on the question of appropriations and authorization—I see that the red light is on, so I have to observe it.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Stone. That brings us to Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ARTICLE XII INTERPRETATION

Mr. Nitze, do you feel it is possible that article XII could be interpreted to restrict our transfer of technology with respect to,

say, cruise missiles to NATO? It is my belief that it could be interpreted that way; therefore, to remove any doubt about it, it would be well to advise the Soviets as well as reassure NATO through some understanding accepted by the Senate.

Mr. NITZE. My understanding is that the executive branch has so told our allies that they do not consider themselves inhibited by article XII from transferring technology and even equipment, in certain instances, to our allies. I also understand that Mr. Brezhnev said quite clearly that he does not interpret it that way.

But this is one of the cases which differs from the case that Senator Muskie raised. Here I believe that the ambiguity is of a kind where it could be adequate for us to take the action which you describe.

TREATY UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO NATO ALLIES

Senator PERCY. So, it would be well to make it a part of the process itself and have the Senate adopt an understanding in that regard?

Mr. NITZE. I agree.

SOVIET PRESSURE TO EXTEND PROTOCOL

Senator PERCY. With respect to the concerns expressed that the protocol not be unilaterally extended by the President, President Carter has made it clear that he does not intend to extend the protocol. The Joint Chiefs have indicated that there probably would be great pressure from the Soviets to extend the protocol beyond its termination date of 1981.

Do you feel that there would be pressure from the Soviets to extend the protocol; if so, why; and do you think it would be desirable for the Senate to adopt an understanding in that regard that would then bind all future presidents, so there could be no misunderstanding, that the protocol ends as of the termination date?

Mr. NITZE. I would have thought that the protocol just by its own language ends on that date and that the real question at issue is under what circumstances could amendments or new provisions be agreed to between the two parties and become valid, dealing with similar subject matter and running for a longer time.

The agreement itself states that the first thing that is to happen is renewed negotiations between the two sides to resolve the issues left by the protocol. So we are obligated to begin right away negotiations on the issues left unresolved by the protocol, and those have to do primarily with cruise missiles and with mobiles. Those are the two main things covered by the protocol.

So that you are going to get into the negotiations right away. I would have thought that the Russians would probably link negotiations to the things that they want in the protocol with what we want in SALT III. But you ask as to what would be a cure. Clearly, any new agreement relating to the subject matter of the protocol, I would think, should come back to the Senate for a two-thirds vote.

I don't see what more you can do about it than that, but that would seem to me to be an appropriate solution to that problem.

Senator PERCY. That is exactly what I think should be adopted so that it is crystal clear. Our capability in cruise missiles is an important part of our future defense strategy.

SOVIET PRODUCTION OF MIRVED ICBM'S WITHOUT SALT II

Without SALT II, would the Soviets, in your judgment, build more than 820 MIRVed ICBM's by 1985?

Mr. NITZE. I am not sure. I think not. The way they have designed their program fits in with their 5-year plan. Having studied the past history of their programs and the history of their design bureaus, I think we know much more now about the way in which they design their programs and make their decisions than we did in the past. They keep rather a constant level of effort in each design bureau. They have a rather constant schedule of one new design of a major system per 10 years, plus one modernization every 5 years. They overlap these between design bureaus so you can pretty well project what kind of new systems they are going to put out at what time.

When they put together the 5-year plan, it is a very detailed and interrelated kind of a process of allocation of equipment, of time and of manpower. To modify that in midstream except for minor adjustments is a difficult thing to do.

I would be surprised if they would make major modifications in their program by virtue of ratification or nonratification of the treaty. They could. You cannot guarantee that they wouldn't. One of the things that they might do would be not to phase out the 250 SS–7, SS–8 and SS–11 launchers that they would have to phase out in order to get down to the figure of 2,250 launchers by 6 months after January 1, 1982.

They might not phase those out. But in any case, what do they have to phase out? They only have to phase out the launchers. There is nothing which would prevent them from storing the missiles. Those missiles can, of course, be used either for reload or launched from quickly readied soft pads. You don't get much assurance from just the phasing out of the launchers.

The second point is those are not the most modern missiles. If you look at the figures in my annex III and you assume they had 250 more of those particular missiles, you will find that that changed the ratios only marginally in the important measures of effectiveness.

So the question you ask, would they in fact produce more of the new, modern missiles which are limited by the 820 figure, well, they might, but I don't really think so. I think when they get to this limit of 820, they have two things in mind. One of them is to replace some of those 820 with the fifth-generation missiles which they have under development. And in part they have in mind switching some of their effort to the place where it would do the most good, and that is increased defensive capabilities.

They should put more effort in their modern air-to-surface defenses, including modernized air-to-surface missiles and interceptors and look-down, shoot-down radars like our AWACS [airborne

warning and control system] and interceptors to go with them, and also in attack submarines and various devices to improve their ASW [anti-submarine warfare].

I would think a diversion from that to increased modern missiles would be a misdiversion of effort.

SS–18 WARHEAD LIMITATION

Senator PERCY. I believe technically it would be possible for the Soviets to put 30 or 40 warheads on their large missiles, the SS–18. They are limited by the treaty to putting 10 warheads on each missile. Do you think that is a real limitation? Without the treaty, do you think they would possibly go substantially higher up to the limits of 30 or 40 warheads on each?

Mr. NITZE. Frankly, I think this is one of the most overplayed so-called assets of SALT II that I know of. The executive branch has made a great deal about this limit of 10 RV's on the SS–18's. The thing that threatens us most when you look at the whole panoply of Soviet forces are those over 3,000 big RV's on the SS–18's. The SALT supporters have somehow or other turned this into a great asset for us.

But the points to bear in mind are the following. In the first place, the limit of 10 expires in 1985, unless one can predict with some certainty how SALT III is to read. Nobody can do that with any certainty. The limit to no more than 10 doesn't do us any good until we deploy the M–X in some new deployment mode. We are not going to deploy the first M–X in a new deployment mode until 1986. We are not going to get it fully deployed until 1989.

This limit of 10 which they assert gives predictability gives no predictability for the time period when you want it.

Next point. The 10 per SS-18 I believe to be the optimum number of RV's for that throw-weight, considering what we estimate—and it isn't only I—as their possibilities for accuracy up to 1985. If you are going to optimize your hard target kill capability, you have to have an optimum relationship between yield and accuracy. The relationship of around 750 kilotons of yield with an accuracy of about one-eighth of a mile gives you the optimum hard target kill capability for targets around 2000 PSI hard.

They would be silly to go to 20 or more until they improve their accuracy, just as we would be ill-advised, I believe, to deploy 7 RV's on our Minuteman III's. I think that is why we agreed not to so do, because it would decrease our capability, not increase it.

Therefore, all this threat of an increase to 20 or 30 or 40 by 1985, is, I think, one of these things that is just being advanced for sales reasons, but it isn't something that one seriously should worry about.

There is one other point. It isn't even clear that the limit of 10 can be verified. They have tested at least two additional launch positions, and many believe they have got at least four additional launch positions. Nobody can guarantee that, at some time, they haven't deployed 14 RV's on those SS-18's.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HEARING PROCEDURE

The Chairman. Before recognizing Senator Sarbanes, may I make a couple of announcements. It is clear that we will have to hear General Rowny this afternoon. My best estimate of time, giving us a half-hour for lunch, would be at 1:30 this afternoon, when the committee will reconvene here for that purpose.

The second announcement is that the committee will meet in executive session tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock. And I ask the staff to convey to those members of the committee not present that the executive meeting will take place in S–116 at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Now, Senator Sarbanes, please.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EXTENT OF NITZE OPPOSITION TO ACTUAL TREATY TERMS

Mr. Nitze, to what extent is your opposition to SALT II based on the view that its adoption will contribute to the illusion that we have provided for our security and therefore lead to a letting down of our guard in the sense that we will not take a lot of measures which you feel we should take. As opposed to the actual terms of the treaty itself.

Mr. NITZE. It is a combination of both, Mr. Senator.

Senator SARBANES. That is why I asked to what extent.

Mr. NITZE. As we went through it earlier, there are specific things in the treaty which I believe may prevent us from doing what is necessary to turn the adverse trends around, but I think it unlikely, in the event the treaty goes through, that the executive branch will ask for or that the Congress will approve and appropriate funds for programs beyond the $12 billion per annum direct cost program which Secretary Brown discussed yesterday.

I do not believe that that level of effort will be adequate to reverse current trends. The numbers which are included in annex III, in the papers that accompanied my prepared statement, all assume that the executive branch had gone forward and the Congress had approved all the programs that Secretary Brown discussed here yesterday.

Certainly it includes the new guidance system on the Minuteman III's. It includes the 300 Mark–12A new RV's on the Minuteman III's. It includes seven Trident boats being operational by 1985. I am told by the Navy that it is highly doubtful that they will actually get seven, but their target is still seven. It seems more likely that they will get six.

It includes 120 B–52's, each equipped with 20 air-launched cruise missiles with a very high accuracy. I am told by the contractors who are building the ALCM's, or at least bidding for the ALCM contract that all the contracts provide for, in the current plans, is 95, not 120, bombers by 1985 equipped with ALCM's, but I have included the full 120 that I think they will come to in the long run.

I don't know what it is that the executive branch includes in the $12 billion program that I haven't already included and allowed for.

Senator SARBANES. You and the Committee on Present Danger have listed a number of things that you think should be done. Yet

with respect to those items, they could be done if we chose to do them, even under the SALT II Treaty.

If all of those things were done, or if there was a commitment to do them, would you be opposed to the SALT II Treaty? Doesn't your opposition really stem from your view that if you reject this treaty, you sound the alarm and can then go ahead and do all those things?

Mr. NITZE. I think that brings out that there is more to this problem than merely the detailed terms of the treaty. One of them is the question of what our defense program is. But the other is what is the correct and the wise course to take in our relations with the Soviet Union?

Frankly, I believe that it is unwise to unequally accommodate the Soviet Union. I believe we have been following a foreign policy course of weakness and inconsistency for too long a period of time. I believe the United States is being pushed around in the world by one country after another; that it is time for the United States to stand up and not be a patsy inviting being pushed around.

For us to make the supreme law of the land an unequal agreement that is full of holes and ambiguities will transmit a negative message. Many people say that this is the message of willingness to accommodate that we need to transmit; that dreadful foreign policy things will happen if we don't ratify this treaty. I happen to believe the reverse, provided that a majority of the Senate—I think it would be unfortunate if only 34 senators voted against it—were to stand up and say we are going to see to it that this is a reasonable and responsible treaty, that, I think, would convey a foreign policy message which is more important than just the hardware involved.

"MODEST, BUT USEFUL STEP" ARGUMENT

Senator SARBANES. Let's move away from either the view that dreadful and horrible things will happen if we don't approve the treaty or that extraordinarily wonderful things will happen if we do approve it and come at it, as the Joint Chiefs did yesterday, with the argument that it is a modest but useful step.

The Joint Chiefs, who are very sensitive to America's power and it's role, said yesterday that there are a number of important restrictions in SALT II which operate primarily to our advantage.

Among the most important provisions the Joint Chiefs saw as having an impact on Soviet plans for strategic forces are: One, the aggregate limits that will require the Soviets to dismantle or convert the non-offensive systems, 250-plus operational systems. They are older and less capable weapons, but still a significant fraction of their total systems and megatons.

Two, the various limitations that will enhance the predictability of the range of Soviet force developments, thus assisting us in our force planning.

Three, the cap on RV fractionation that denies full exploitation of the major Soviet throw-weight advantage.

Four, the ban on testing, production, and deployment of the SS–16.

On the other hand, the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal and provide the following options in planning our

strategic force. One, we can build an ICBM which fully meets our security requirements. Two, we can continue with the modernization of our submarine-launched ballistic missile program at the pace we determine. Three, we can continue to modernize our air breathing systems, including the exploitation of our air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles.

The Chiefs then went on to say the danger to the United States does not arise from any specific limitations in the agreement but from potential consequences of unilateral actions or inactions in the past and, if we are not careful, in the future.

Do you regard the specifics which the Chiefs have set out in terms of limitations upon the Soviets, and in effect, the lack of limitations upon us or the maintenance of options for us, as significant? What are your comments on those specifics?

Second, isn't the issue as they state it, and again as I put it to you earlier, not so much the terms of the treaty but whether we will do with the treaty those things that can be done and which you and others feel ought to be done?

Mr. NITZE. Let me begin with the four items that they emphasized as being important limitations on the Soviet Union. The first one is the phaseout of the 250 obsolescent missiles. As I stated earlier, I think this is really an insignificant point. I do not believe that the capability of those 250 missiles is worth much to them.

You look at the aggregates of area destruction and hard target kill capability with those missiles in or out and there really is only a marginal difference. As I said earlier, all you are talking about is the launchers, not the missiles.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think the limitation on the number of launchers so that it cannot escalate indefinitely is significant or is of any particular use?

Mr. NITZE. To go back to the beginning of the negotiations, even at the time when we started in SALT I it was clear that we should not limit the number of launchers; that what we should have limited was the aggregate throw-weight of the forces of the two sides, and within an aggregate limit on ICBM throw-weight which is the lifting power of the ICBM force. It then would be much better to have a large number of ICBM launchers on both sides.

The ideal situation would have been 5,000 launchers on each side, each one limited to a capability of launching a missile that couldn't be MIRVed, where the throw-weight was only 100 kilograms. Technically, you cannot MIRV that size missile. Under those circumstances the deployment on both sides would have been wholly stable. We got into strategic instability by virtue of low launcher limits and no adequate throw-weight limitations. And this is what is going to plague the United States in negotiating SALT III.

If, in SALT III, we come down in the launcher limit but don't come down in the throw-weight limit, the diversity between the two sides and the instability of the resulting arrangement is going to be even greater than it will be under SALT II. We have been dealing with the wrong currency when we deal with numerical launcher limits.

Senator SARBANES. But wasn't that wrong currency established by SALT I, not SALT II?

Mr. NITZE. That is exactly what I am saying. I said we started with the wrong currency in SALT I because of an excessive concern with verification because we thought we couldn't precisely verify production and we couldn't verify storage so we couldn't adequately verify the number of missiles or the number of warheads in inventory. So in order to get something done, we started down the wrong line.

One talks about the step-by-step process. You can go step-by-step to success and you can go step-by-step to failure. So the step-by-step argument is not a very good argument. If you walk the plank, you go step-by-step.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nitze, do you have anything further to say in answer to the Senator's question? The 10 minutes are up, but I do not want to cut you off.

Mr. NITZE. Yes; I would like to go through his next points. The second one is predictability. I don't see that this treaty gives us any worthwhile predictability because the treaty is too short. The first casualty of the negotiations occurred, when President Nixon negotiated the so-called breakthrough of giving up a treaty of indefinite duration for an inadequate 10-year agreement—now in effect a 6-year agreement—which is going to concentrate the problem at the end of 1985.

And third, I don't think the cap on the RV fractionation, as I pointed out earlier, is worth much to us. It expires by 1985 before it could be of any real use.

Now, with respect to the testing and production of the SS-16, that I believe is linked to the protocol [sic]. As Senator Percy has just said, we are going to see to it that the protocol doesn't continue unless something extraordinary comes up.

Also, the SS-16's have already been produced and are in storage. They can be broken out of storage at the time the protocol ends. So this seems to me to be a weak argument on which the Chiefs are resting.

Now, when it is said that the positive things are that we can build the M-X, that is helpful, but it is not clear that we can delay it in the optimum deployment mode. Certainly we can continue to modernize SLBM's, but the real problem there is the rate at which we can build modernized SLBM's. We are falling behind because we don't have the capacity to get out more than what will be six or seven Tridents by the end of the period of the treaty.

We can modernize cruise missiles but the extent of this depends on what happens to the protocol and whether we trade something out there or not.

I am not persuaded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff arguments. They are weak arguments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nitze.

Senator Javits, we come to you.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Mr. Nitze, first let me say that I think the country should be grateful to you for what you are doing. I may not be with you, or I may. We will see. But the important point is that you are probably

as experienced as anybody, having spent 35 years in these negotiations.

None of us can equal your expertise or that of the Joint Chiefs or that of Ambassador Earle or that of Mr. Warnke or any of you. We have to have opposition briefs if we are to make an honest judgment. I express that because I think it is only fair to you. I know there is nothing you get out of this except the feeling that you are doing what you think is right for our country.

I am very impressed with the need for crystallizing the areas of proper debate, so I am interested in two things that you have said in your statement and in your summary, which, incidentally, is excellent and we thank you for it. We thank you, though you are probably the main opposition witness, for consolidating it as well as you have.

DEGREE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET STRATEGIC PARITY

In your statement you say:

> There will be some increase in our capabilities as well, but in net terms, the strategic balance will move from a position not far from parity to one of Soviet strategic nuclear superiority.

Am I right in saying, therefore, that it is your judgment that right now we are not far from parity?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

Senator JAVITS. Between the two?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

Senator JAVITS. So what we have to guard against is the fact that in the intervening 5-year period we should not be adversely affected, because if we end up at the end of the 5 years with the same position we are, to wit, not far from parity, we have gained all the advantages that are claimed, if any—there may be, and I think there are—in continuing the SALT process, not destabilizing our European allies, whether they are right or wrong about desiring the SALT II Treaty—they obviously do—et cetera. And that is just about where we are.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. NITZE. Let me amend what I said before—what I said about not far from parity. I believe we have slipped over the edge, and I would like to demonstrate that we have slipped over the edge into what I believe to be inferiority today. When one talks about strategic inferiority, however, I think the margin ought to be significant—it is hard to be sure that you have all of the figures exactly right. Therefore, one has to be rather vague about it if the margins are close.

If you would look at annex III in my prepared statement—the attachment with the numbers in it—I think you will see that when one looks at the number of warheads, the increase on the Soviet side is quite large within the period from 1977 to 1979. The Soviet number of warheads has gone from 5,100 to 8,226. The number of their MIRVed ICBM warheads has gone from 500 to 4,000, an eightfold increase.

When you look at the next table on area destruction, the Soviet area destruction potential of their MIRVed missiles has gone from less than 500 to 3,000.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Nitze, would you forgive me if I interrupt you, because 10 minutes goes fast.

Mr. NITZE. Please let me go on. I would like to complete my point.

Senator JAVITS. Please let me make this point to you. I consider you an expert; therefore, I have accepted your conclusion, to wit: You have said from a position not far from parity, which is now. I accept that. Why don't you? You said it.

Mr. NITZE. I said it, but what I am trying to clarify now is that it is on the wrong side of parity.

Senator JAVITS. All right. I will accept your amendment. But it is still not far from parity even if it is on the wrong side.

Mr. NITZE. All right, because we are still ahead in the number of warheads and we still have certain advantages.

VERIFICATION ISSUE

Senator JAVITS. Now, you also said later on in that same page: "But the agreements so one-sidedly favor the Soviet Union that verifiability is not the major issue." So for practical purposes today you don't raise verifiability as a major issue in this debate, do you?

Mr. NITZE. No. For the reason that I went on to explain in that pertinent paragraph of my prepared statement—because the increases in the capabilities which they can achieve without cheating are so great that it is hard to see changes that would come about from cheating which would be greater.

As was pointed out yesterday, as I understand it, the Minuteman would be vulnerable even if there weren't the SS–18's because the 19's alone would constitute a sufficient threat. I believe Harold Brown said that therefore the 18's aren't strategically important. He must not have mentioned that if they had only the SS–19's they would virtually exhaust their ICBM's in destroying ours. But, in any case, if a switch in forces as important as the Soviet SS–18 force, which will be a more important force than all our SLBM's and ICBM's put together, is not strategically significant, then I don't know what is strategically signficant.

If we are assured that by cheating they cannot do anything which will be strategically significant, but strategic significance is to be measured by 3,000-megaton-range warheads of great accuracy, then of course you have no standard. The problem here is that without strictly violating SALT I, they went forward with these SS–19's, and that certainly was strategically significant. And then you double on top of that with the 18's. These are the changes that have gone on that are strategically significant, and we haven't reacted to them.

SALT II EFFECT ON STRATEGIC BALANCE

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Nitze, that brings me to the heart of the problem, as it brought you to the heart of the problem. In your statement you say,

> That brings me to the heart of the problem posed by SALT II. To accept the case that is being made for the Vienna terms, with all its fallacies and implausibilities, can only incapacitate our minds and wills for doing the things necessary to redress the strategic imbalance.

I ask you this. Aren't we perfectly free, except for your reservation about our minds and wills? Aren't we perfectly free to redress the imbalance if we wish to even though we signed SALT II? Isn't that really the issue you propose to us: that what you really are against is the fact that we are not adequately redressing the imbalance, not that SALT II prevents us from it?

Mr. NITZE. As I said earlier at great length, I believe it does prevent us from doing the multiple protective shelter system, and I think the substitute therefor that the executive branch has under consideration may or may not be adequate to protect our Minuteman. Therefore, that issue as to whether or not the treaty does, in fact, inhibit us from doing what is necessary in order to redress the balance is still in doubt.

Senator JAVITS. So we are down now to the focal issue of if the M-X can be built and if your objections to the M-X do not convince us, then we ought to ratify SALT II. That is it. We are now down to the key point of decision.

Mr. NITZE. No; we are not. It isn't the M-X missile. In the first place it is the M-X missile's deployment mode, which is important. Second, what we really ought to be doing is deploying the multiple protective shelter system for our Minuteman missiles right now in order to meet the time gap which otherwise will arise.

Third, even if we were to do those things, there still remains the point that you have just read, and that is that accepting the case that is made for the Vienna terms, with all its fallacies and implausibilities, will incapacitate our minds for doing the things that are necessary.

I believe, as I said earlier, that it is wholly unlikely the executive branch will ask for, or that this Congress will support if the executive branch does not ask for it, appropriations for the strategic nuclear portion of our defense budget above the $12 billion per annum that Harold Brown asked for.

Now, would you really guarantee that they would approve programs above that figure? I don't think that is adequate to redress the balance. In other words, I think it will incapacitate our minds and will. And that is more important than the specific provisions of the treaty.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Nitze, with all respect for you, and I do respect you enormously, on the issue of our minds and wills we are just as expert as you. That is why I am trying to pin down what your fundamental objection, based on your vast experience and professional understanding, is. And as I understand it now, it is the fact that you are not satisfied that we can build the M-X or that we can deploy it in the proper way as you think it. And there again, there are other experts, not only you.

So, frankly, I do not see it. I would welcome, if you are able to prove it to us, the weaknesses in SALT II that should say to us don't take a little step, don't take any step, you are better off without anything. I don't see it. I don't see why we shouldn't take a little step as long as you think we are slightly behind, so long as we believe, we Senators, that we have the mind and volition to fully add to it and we are not prohibited from doing it by the treaty.

Mr. NITZE. I still do not believe that you have fairly summarized my position.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, to each his own. [General laughter.]

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

Mr. Nitze, this whole point about what are we precluded from doing was the very reason why I read the eight or nine recommendations of the Committee on the Present Danger to the Joint Chiefs yesterday. I think it is a central issue, whether or not Senator Javits has properly or correctly characterized your position.

Because of the concern about the basing mode of the M-X, the MPS system, several days ago I put forward eight recommended reservations and/or understandings. I won't ask you to comment on them now but I would like you to look at them. One of them specifically speaks to the question of deployment of the M-X missile. I think we can do it. If the reservation is adopted, there it is clear we can deploy it in whatever way we decide is best for us.

But again, you have not had a chance to see that. I will submit that to you and just ask for your comment on it later. But I would like to move to something else. I really do have respect for your significant expertise, sir. I have tried to read as much as I could of what you have written and said, and I have tried to become informed about your overall position.

One of the things that seems to come very clearly across in your warnings of the last 20 years to the country and to the political leadership is your concept of nuclear superiority.

For many years now, most Americans and most political leaders have accepted the notion that the most important criterion for judging the adequacy of our strategic forces is that we have enough force to withstand a Soviet first strike to enable us to retaliate—mutual assured destruction.

From what I have heard you say, I know that you agree that with or without SALT, we will retain or have now the ability to respond in a massive way; that is, with a sufficient second-strike capability even though it may not be targeted the way you would like.

What I understand you to be saying is that this criterion, this mutual assured destruction criterion, this mad concept, is no longer or maybe never has been an adequate criterion upon which to judge the strength and value of our strategic forces.

As I understand it, what you are saying is that we need to be able to respond to more complex scenarios than the scenario that is often used and that I related and you have alluded to today. Someone obviously informed you of my view of the SS-18 and my questioning about that issue.

The scenario that we hear a lot about is that the Soviets seek to take advantage of the increasing accuracy and power of their ICBM's by launching a first strike. They know where our silos are already. They are already targeted, and because of that they can knock out the 1,054 or the vast majority of the 1,054 land-based systems.

The scenario goes on, and you know it much better than I. And it is one which I find not very plausible. But I don't want to argue about the technical aspects of that plausibility, the technical possibilities of that occurring and the war game scenarios that we must write. I don't have the technical knowledge that you have to do that. I would like, however, to allude to the comment made by Senator Javits. Although I don't have as much political wisdom as he after 7 years in the Senate, I think I have a little flavor for how politics and politicians, whether they sit in the Kremlin or in the White House, think. I understand a little bit, anyway, what mode they have to go through.

POLITICAL RESPECTS OF WAR GAME SCENARIO

What I find most perplexing about this concern over strategic superiority is the political scenario that you would have to envision in order to see that come to the fore. It would go something like this. A Soviet general walks in and says:

> Well, Comrade President; today all systems are operational. And you know, Comrade President, none of our missiles has ever been tested, because to test an individual missile means to destroy it. But all of our missiles, Comrade President, come off the assembly line. I am sure they are up to high Soviet standards and they will operate well.
>
> Now, of course, Comrade President, we have never conducted a massive attack before, and I am sure that the admonitions of some of our scientists who say that after the first explosion, the accuracy of the remaining missiles which haven't hit would be affected, thereby not being able to knock out all the targets and hardened silos, is not a correct concern.

And he would say:

> Comrade President, we in Soviet military trust your political judgment that the American President is a gentle and even-tempered man, and indeed, a man so timid and devoted to peace that even after withstanding a massive attack which kills millions of his people and knocks out a third of his force, he will not direct U.S. missiles be launched against us.
>
> And oh, just one more thing, Comrade President. We also have to trust your wise political judgment that the 5,000 to 7,000 nuclear warheads that will be remaining that could be directed against us and wipe out most of Soviet society will not be used. After all, Comrade President, we don't want to destroy Soviet society.

Mr. Nitze, I do not mean to be facetious but I really do think that it is another way of saying is it really credible that a Soviet leader would strike and stake the future of Soviet society on a technically perfect attack against more than 1,000 ICBM's, which represent only a fraction of our force, and hope that the President of the United States would be such that he would not retaliate because he is such a moral man?

As I have read what you said, I recognize that you do not believe the first strike really will occur. But as I understand what you have said and read what you have written and have read what has been written about what you think, you concentrate on the problem of perception. The perception is that if the Soviets even appear to have the possibility of a successful first strike, that may translate into a usable psychological or political advantage giving the Soviets muscle to work their will in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, China, the Far East, the Middle East, wherever the hot spots happen to be.

U.S. STRATEGIC INFERIORITY PERCEPTIONS

You indicated that you think it is time for people to stand up for America. That was the phrase you used, that we are being pushed around, that we are not responding. It is here that I take issue with you. I have traveled extensively through Europe. I met with, I think, just about every single solitary European leader with the exception of Mrs. Thatcher, because the last time I was there, she wasn't.

I have not heard anybody at all in Western Europe, including some of the top military people, suggest that they believe there is a strategic superiority that the Soviets have or are likely to have. Where they get most of their information, it seems to me, is from very bright men in the United States like yourself who keep saying that this perception which you are worrying about people getting, and that they don't have until people in this country tell them that they might get it.

In other words, I have heard no one independently say to me that they believe that the United States is strategically inferior to the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I would only point out that your question has taken 10 minutes, and I know you are about to put it.

Senator BIDEN. I am not going to put it. I will just make it a speech. [General laughter.]

You know, you quoted Abraham Lincoln, who said first we must disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save the country. I would like to take the liberty of paraphrasing President Lincoln and say, Mr. Nitze, that maybe we should say first we must disenthrall ourselves of the false concept of nuclear superiority and then we might be able to save the world.

It seems to me that the perceptions that we are all saying we are worried about are self-generated perceptions. I don't hear anybody else anywhere saying them but us. Foreign leaders say to me: But your so-and-so and so-and-so and so-and-so said such-and-such.

That is the end of my speech, Mr. Chairman. I will wait for another time to ask questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether under the circumstances of time constraint I should give you equal time, Mr. Nitze, but I will give you a reasonable time to respond.

Mr. BIDEN. I really did have a question, Mr. Chairman.

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Mr. NITZE. It is hard to sort out how to address this. Let me start with the idea of mutually assured destruction. Back in the late sixties and the beginning of the seventies, around 1970, we did have the hope that we would be able to negotiate with the Russians on the basis of mutually assured destruction, that both sides would cooperate to see that neither could have a militarily useful capability against the other and really threaten his retaliatory forces.

By the fall of 1970 it was clear that they were not going to agree with that. They said we are prepared to assure ourselves that you are deterred, but we are not going to do anything to assure you that we are deterred; that is up to you.

Senator BIDEN. To deter a first strike or a retaliation.

Mr. NITZE. It was more general than that. It was deterrence in general.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY

Let me address now the question of superiority. I have been misquoted as saying that I favored a position for the United States today of trying to achieve strategic nuclear superiority. I do not believe it is possible for us to do so within the foreseeable time period, let's say by 1990. I think I have made that clear in everything I have said.

I think it is important to deny the Soviet Union effective strategic nuclear superiority. Many people in the executive branch have said that nuclear superiority is impossible because neither side would permit the other side to attain it. That is exactly what this debate is about. The debate is precisely about that, as to whether or not we, in the face of incipient Soviet strategic nuclear superiority, are going to do those things which are necessary to keep the Soviets from getting it. That is what this debate is about.

Senator BIDEN. With all due respect, that is not what the SALT debate is about.

Mr. NITZE. I believe it to be about that because I believe the SALT debate is a broader debate than just a debate about the treaty. I believe it is a debate about the treaty, our defense policy, and also the broad thrust of our foreign policy. I think all of those things are involved in this debate and it is wrong to say that it is just about one-third of it when it is about the broader subject.

Next, on the question of the scenarios that you talk about, I believe that the Soviet Union does not want a nuclear war but they do want nuclear superiority and they do want to exploit it. I believe that it does bear upon any serious crisis in which the danger of confrontation between American forces and Soviet forces is imminent; that everybody involved, both we and they, will look to what we believe would be the relative outcomes in the event it were to escalate to nuclear war, even though both sides will try to avoid a nuclear war.

I do not believe it is that difficult to make a distinction between nuclear superiority and nuclear inferiority. It was perfectly clear at the time of the Cuban missile crisis that the Soviet Union could do great damage to the United States. It is true that a small number of nuclear weapons can destroy a great deal of urban territory. That was possible at that time.

Senator BIDEN. Why didn't it work in Czechoslovakia?

Mr. NITZE. Well, you had your speech; let me have mine. Just let me continue. It was true at that time that no one had any doubt but that we had effective strategic nuclear superiority. That was one of the reasons why we went into the Cuban missile crisis with confidence. It was true earlier that some people said that that was only due to the fact that we had local superiority in naval terms around Cuba and that it had nothing to do with our strategic nuclear superiority.

That is false with respect to the Cuban missile crisis and it is demonstrably false with respect to the Berlin crisis which just preceded it. There the Russians had definitive local superiority.

They had three divisions on the outside of Berlin. We couldn't do a thing about them. They backed down because of our strategic nuclear superiority.

Therefore, it is true, I believe, that in important crises, the shadow of superiority at the highest level of potential violence does make a difference.

My final point is this. The Soviets do not think the President will not fire back. They cannot be sure of it. I am sure they would hope that he would not, but they cannot be sure of it. Why do you think they are putting 20 times as much into the civil defense program as we are? Why are they really working at it? They cannot possibly be putting that amount of effort into civil defense unless they were trying to prepare for the contingency that the United States might strike back.

Senator BIDEN. I hope someone clarifies that civil defense issue.

The CHAIRMAN. We will look next to Senator McGovern.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nitze, I agree with the opening observation of Senator Javits that we need this kind of opposition dialog even though I disagree with much of what you have said. Painful as it is, I suppose I would have to recognize that people with the views I have are part of the present danger that your committee perceives. [General laughter.]

As a gentleman, I will skip the other part of that equation.

AMERICA'S CHANGING GLOBAL STATUS

As I have listened to the discussion here this morning and read your statements, I find two primary differences between us: Not just between you and me, but between the views that we represent. First, we both see a changing world that is much different than it was in the years right after World War II when we had a nuclear monopoly and were talking about the American century.

Since then, we have gone through Vietnam with all of the incalculable loss of American resources and energy that that venture represented. We have had frustrations with a critically weakening energy crisis. We have seen our ally in Iran collapse in recent days despite enormous military shipments from us.

This morning we read that the Congressional Budget Office is reporting two serious problems that heretofore were thought not to be possible at the same time: a serious recession and very high inflation.

Now, these are all frustrating, but whereas I find these frustrations both at home and abroad happening largely for political and economic reasons, or perhaps because of the emergence of hundreds of nationalistic states around the globe, you seem to explain these frustrations largely in military terms. You seem to say that America's changing global status is due largely to a shift in the military balance, if I read you properly. At least that seems to be the thrust of the Committee on the Present Danger.

Mr. NITZE. I did not mean to suggest that, Mr. Senator.

Senator MCGOVERN. As I look at each of these trouble spots that I think concern you and concern all of us, I don't find any of them,

really, that stem from our military weakness or that would respond to a greater show of military force on our part.

The second difference is that you seem to think the United States is in danger as a country, or at least our leadership, and perhaps the public, is in danger of falling into kind of an appeasement psychology of the kind that characterized Britain at the time of Munich.

Like my friend Joe Biden, I see a much different mood in this country today and in its leadership, a much tougher stance. I don't think it is fair to suggest that President Carter is Chamberlain or that the Soviet Union is Nazi Germany or that this treaty is Munich, but the danger of your position—and you have been talking in larger terms here today, and I think that is appropriate, as the treaty ought to be evaluated in these large-scale terms—is that your position will lead to greater reliance on military measures abroad, either by threat or by intervention, including even the threat of limited nuclear war, which you describe as a scenario that may be thinkable, when as a matter of fact, most of these problems, as I have said, are political or economic.

"CAMPAIGN OF FEAR" CONCERN

I fear that you and your committee are encouraging a campaign of fear in the United States that actually undermines democracy's constraints on the executive and military power. I would appreciate if you would just respond to that concern, which not only I share but which I think a great many other people.

Mr. NITZE. You suggest that my position and that of the Committee on the Present Danger overestimates the military component of foreign affairs. We certainly have tried not to do that, because I think it would be wrong to overestimate the military component. Certainly the Soviets are very careful in their description of what constitutes the correlation of forces, that it includes political, social, economic, all kinds of matters, but that it also has an essential component—the military component.

The second point is this. You suggest that many of the issues that have arisen around the world do not necessarily involve consideration of U.S. military involvement. I agree, and I tried earlier, when I was talking about the consequences of the strategic imbalance, to say that in an important crisis which raised the possibility, the probability of a confrontation between U.S. military and Soviet military forces—in that kind of a contingency, such as the Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin crisis, or perhaps a Soviet attack on China—everyone on both sides would indeed think through the probable outcome of escalation if it were to occur.

Now, you said that I was talking about tactical nuclear war as being something which was thinkable. Frankly, I think that all these things have to be thinkable if you really want to prepare for them and thus avoid them. The object of policy is to avoid nuclear war, and how do you avoid it? Do you avoid it by not thinking about it? I would think that that is the surest way of making a mistake, if you don't think about it. You have got to think about it, and you have to be prudent about it.

Senator McGovern. The point of that question, Mr. Nitze, is, you seem to be saying it is possible for either the Soviet Union or the United States to fight and survive a nuclear war. What I am suggesting to you is, that lowers the threshold and leaders might consider that option. You have described the scenario, and I do not want to go into all of these things that Senator Biden mentioned in which the Soviets might consider a first strike on the theory that if it were aimed at our military system rather than our population, and therefore only killed a few million Americans, that we would not retaliate.

Mr. Nitze. No, I suggested that the Soviets do in fact—I am sure this is correct—consider that in a controversy involving a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union it is not excluded that it will escalate to being nuclear; at first perhaps tactical nuclear weapons might be used in the theater only, but then it might escalate up into being an intercontinental war. In the event that it escalates into an intercontinental war, they are quite sure that they then propose that they end up that war militarily in a superior position, and that they propose that as much as possible of their leadership and as much as possible of their population survive. They do not think that both sides would necessarily be totally destroyed, but they are determined that it would not be their side which would be totally destroyed.

I believe that if they would achieve that condition of strategic superiority—they are not sure they have achieved it yet, but if they do achieve that condition—they believe they will then be in a stronger negotiating position and action position prior to any such confrontation between Soviet and United States forces. That I am sure they do believe. One can read their literature and one can see what their preparations are. They are all consistent with that position.

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Senator McGovern. It depends, as I understand your argument, on them having a civilian shelter program in effect that would save their population. When I was in the Soviet Union recently, Mr. Nitze, I could not find any of our Embassy officials, from the Ambassador on down, who were aware of any such Soviet shelter program. They told me, and I think they were well informed, that they were puzzled somewhat by the argument that you and your associates make about this amazing Soviet shelter buildup. They just do not see the evidence of it.

Mr. Nitze. I remember 3 years ago when I first wrote an article which suggested that there might be something to the program described in the Soviet civil defense manuals, but I didn't know whether or not there was. An interdepartmental governmental committee was then created to look into the matter, and the first thing they found was that the only person looking into the Soviet civil defense program in the CIA was one person half-time at that time. Then when they began to look at it they concentrated on one city in particular, as a test case. They took a series of detailed photographs and then analyzed them on the basis of interrogation of the Soviet emigrees from that particular city.

By the time they got through with that, they had hard evidence that there were detached blast shelters in that city for some 27 percent of the population, if you assume that one square meter is necessary for a person, and some 54 percent if you assume a half a meter. You can check that out in both classified and unclassified testimony. I am not suggesting, however, that that one city is necessarily representative of all their cities.

Senator McGovern. Mr. Nitze, my time is up. I can only tell you that that information is not known by the American Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. Nitze. At the time, the American Embassy was asked whether there was anything to what I had said in my article in Foreign Affairs that the Russian civil defense program might be serious. They came back saying unanimously that there was nothing to it, but I am telling you that those who have looked into the hard evidence have found that evidence to prove overwhelmingly that it is so.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Pell?

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EFFECT OF SOVIET CIVIL EVACUATION WARNING

Following up on that fallout thought, would it not be a fact that there is no greater signal that would put us on the alert and get our bombers away from the ground and our ships out to sea than would the lead time that the implementation of that shelter program would involve?

Mr. Nitze. That is quite true. I think it would take at least 3 days for them to evacuate Leningrad and Moscow. It would take less than that for the other cities. During that 3-day time, we ought to have warning and we ought to get our forces on generated alert. They would also have their forces on generated alert. The safest and, most useful way to compare the capabilities on both sides is to assume generated alert on both sides and then analyze it out to the end. It turns out very badly for us in that method of analyzing it.

NATO CONCERNS ABOUT TREATY

Senator Pell. Going to another point that you mentioned, that is, the viewpoint of the European leaders, or Europe, I believe it was last Tuesday you suggested that our European allies have publicly come out in favor of the treaty largely because they do not dare do things that are hostile to Moscow.

As has Senator Biden, I have had the opportunity to be in Europe a good deal, as chairman of the Senate Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly. I must say I do not recall one conversation with any of my colleagues whom I met over there from all of the different NATO countries who once expressed this thought. I am sure you have your sources. I know this was my reaction. I am wondering if you could give us any more evidence as to this view of yours.

Mr. Nitze. I think that the European NATO reaction is really quite complex. I would like to spend just 2 minutes if you would permit me to go into the complexity of it. As I suggested earlier, I

think the thing that is primary in their minds is maintaining what they call the continuity of the deterrent from conventional forces to tactical nuclear forces through what they call Euro-strategic nuclear forces, to our central forces, the U.S. intercontinental capability.

They are concerned with the rapid growth of the Soviet SS-20's, Backfires, Floggers—that whole set of systems which is not being offset by us—and they fear there will be a break at that point in the continuity of the deterrent. The Germans in particular would like to see us deploy in Europe ground-based cruise missiles of sufficient range to hit the U.S.S.R. and perhaps Pershing II's which could also hit the U.S.S.R.

They do not think that it is politically feasible for them to support that kind of program against the opposition of the left wing of the Social Democratic Party unless it is somehow coupled with a negotiation concerning the limitation of the gray area systems. They do not see how such a negotiation can be initiated except as part of SALT III. They don't see how there can be a SALT III if SALT II is not ratified.

Therefore, they would like to see SALT II ratified for this purpose. They do not claim themselves to understand the question of the evolution of the strategic balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. They think we know, or ought to know, more about it than they do and are prepared to rely upon United States judgments on that score.

So, when you talk to them in detail, you will find that most of them say that they hope the treaty will be ratified. But they have other reasons as well. Their leaders must take that position. Certainly Mr. Schmidt would be in poor shape with the left wing of his party if he were to stick his neck out against SALT II. After all, the President of the United States is for SALT II. For Mr. Schmidt to stick his neck out in a way in which he would be pilloried both by Washington and by Moscow, would be totally imprudent. It would be imprudent for Giscard d'Estaing to do that. It would be imprudent for Mrs. Thatcher to do that. But if you talk to their staffs, they are concerned that under this treaty the strategic balance may well shift to the advantage of the Soviets and the deterrent protecting Europe become decoupled.

In the event that the agreements help shift the strategic balance to the Soviets, that would be the loss of an essential element of their protection. That has been our nuclear umbrella. Many of them are more frightened about the U.S.S.R.—at least that was my impression—than I am. The Committee on the Present Danger is full of confidence compared to many of the Europeans I talked to over there.

UNPUBLICIZED NATO REACTIONS TO SALT TREATY EVIDENCE

Senator PELL. There are several questions I would like to get through in the time I have remaining, but let me wind up this one, and you might wish to do this in classified form. Since your reaction is so completely different from mine, and I admit, I talked more to parliamentary leaders and elected people than I did to staff people, would you submit perhaps for the record whatever

evidence there is that backs up the thought that our European allies have publicly come out in favor of the treaty largely because they do not dare do things that are hostile to Moscow? We would be interested in that.

You might not want to bag somebody, so perhaps you could submit this off the record or in a classified form.

Mr. NITZE. No, I don't want to mention names, but I will—I can submit for the record a memorandum which will outline just exactly the argument that I have just made.

Senator PELL. But you cannot submit for the record the evidence to back up the charge?

Mr. NITZE. More or less, but I don't like to——

Senator PELL. That is what we would like. There are many more highly classified matters than that that have come before this committee. As I say, to convince us, we would like to see the specifics. We know the arguments. We have read the arguments, but we would like to know the specifics of who they are, what nations they are that feel that way. If you would submit that, we would appreciate it. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

ARLINGTON, VA., *July 25, 1979.*

HON. CLAIBORNE PELL,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PELL: During my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 12, you asked a question regarding a statement of mine made during a televised debate between Senators Culver and Garn. I enclose a copy of that statement.

The particular paragraph which you must have had in mind reads as follows:

"How would our allies react? Today they are so uncertain as to the consistency of our policy and the reliability of our support that they are unwilling to stick out their necks on anything that might irritate Moscow. With firm Senate majority action indicating a new U.S. policy direction they would have grounds for renewed hope."

What I had in mind in writing that paragraph was Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's experience with respect to the neutron bomb. In that instance he was led to believe that the U.S. would welcome a request on his part that we proceed with development and deployment of the neutron bomb. He took that decision in the face of an intense and wide-spread political and propaganda campaign by Moscow against the neutron bomb. After Chancellor Schmidt had taken his position, President Carter reversed his decision, leaving Schmidt isolated both before Moscow and Washington. His opponents in the left wing of the Socialist Democratic Party capitalized on his predicament. No European leader is about to expose himself to a similar risk.

This episode illustrates that it would be imprudent for European leaders to take positions that would irritate Moscow and on which they are uncertain of Washington's support. To come out against ratification of the SALT II treaty would certainly fall within that category.

What Europeans think and say with respect to ratification of SALT II is, however, more complex than this single consideration. I brought out those complexities as fully as I am able in my response to you at the hearings.

Subsequently, you asked that I inform you as to the Europeans on whose judgment I tend to rely. Earlier in June I attended a conference near Oxford, England, at which representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, as well as conservative and labor members of Parliament, were present. There were also representatives of the German Ministry of Defense and Foreign Office present. The French had similar representation. I believe my testimony in answer to your question accurately reflects the consensus of the group's views.

You might also be interested in reading Francois de Rose's piece in Foreign Affairs, Raymond Aron's recent articles, the editorials in the London Economist, and Eugene Rostow's recent testimony before your Committee.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL H. NITZE.

Enclosure.

NBC SALT SPECIAL (LIVE) JULY 10, 1979

Acceptance of the SALT II agreements without amendment would signal to the world that we propose to continue unequal accommodation of the Soviet Union.

For too long we have been weak and vacillating in meeting the unyielding determination of the Russian Communists in their pursuit of unchallengeable power. We have hoped that fairness and unilateral restraint on our part would somehow change them into something they are not and do not want to be.

The inequities and the ambiguities of the SALT II agreements reflect Soviet persistence in refusing to concede on the principal issues, and a U.S. desire to accommodate.

The growing impunity with which countries around the world today ignore U.S. interests, and do not ignore Soviet interests, is a direct reflection of that disparity in approach.

Our allies are in disarray. They have seen U.S. support being withdrawn from one friend after another and criticism substituted for friendship. If one seeks protection from the crocodile by throwing overboard one fellow passenger after another, one is soon left to face him alone. The time has come to stop feeding the crocodile.

The Soviet leaders threaten that bad things will happen if the Senate were to exercise its Constitutional responsibility to advise with respect to treaties and to withhold its consent if its advice is not accepted.

Suppose a majority of the Senate were to come to the conclusion that reservations were not enough and that certain clarifying and improving amendments to the text of the agreements were necessary to make them reasonably equitable and useful and therefore acceptable. Suppose a majority of the Senate were to indicate its support for defense programs, covering both our strategic nuclear forces and our conventional forces, adequate to reverse current adverse trends. Suppose further that the Soviet Union were to prove recalcitrant in negotiating with respect to those clarifying and improving amendments. What might then happen in the world?

I believe those events would carry a profound message. They would be a signal to the world that the U.S. is no longer prepared to accept the role of the patsy inviting others to push it about.

How would the Russians react? After an inital propaganda blast, I believe they would treat us with renewed respect; they might even reconsider their initial refusal to renegotiate SALT II.

How would our allies react? Today they are so uncertain as to the consistency of our policy and the reliability of our support that they are unwilling to stick out their necks on anything that might irritate Moscow. With firm Senate majority action indicating a new U.S. policy direction they would have grounds for renewed hope.

The Soviets are not ten feet high; they are not loved in the world: they are disliked but they are feared. Most of mankind would hate to see a further spread of the dead hand of Moscow control. But only the United States is in a position to give the lead in frustrating the unlimited expansion of Soviet power. Today the Senate is the key to whether that leadership will be given or will not be given.

TREATY RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIETS

Second, in your statement you belittle the restrictions that are placed on the Soviets. Is there any conceivable way we would be better off without those restrictions? For example, as I understand it, if there were no treaty the Soviets would not be required to reduce 250 systems; the Soviets would not be limited to 820 MIRVed ICBM's; the Soviet ICBM's would not be limited to 10 warheads; and the Soviets would not be permitted to encrypt certain telemetry.

Would we be better off with those provisions removed, in your view?

Mr. NITZE. No; I did not say that. I just said that I thought those were not very important restrictions.

COMMITTEE ON PRESENT DANGER—VIEWS ON TREATY REJECTION

Senator PELL. I see. To the best of my recollection, I do not recall whether you have ever specifically recommended that the Senate reject SALT II. If your concerns about the treaty are not addressed through amendments or through planned U.S. defense programs, would you recommend rejection?

Mr. NITZE. What I have suggested here today is that I do not believe that the agreements can be cured merely by reservation. I believe that the Senate will find that amendments are necessary. I would hope that those amendments, those clarifying and improving amendments could be negotiated with the Soviet Union. I would not hesitate to approve those amendments just because there was a possibility that the Soviets would then be recalcitrant and refuse to negotiate.

Senator PELL. To back up for a moment, do you recommend rejection of the treaty as it now is?

Mr. NITZE. I would prefer to see majority action of the Senate in favor of the package which I have described.

Senator PELL. I understand, but if that does not happen, from the viewpoint of people thinking like you, would we be better off as a nation to reject the treaty as is or to ratify it?

Mr. NITZE. I discussed that with the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger, and we decided that the time had not yet come to take a position on that.

MPS VERIFICATION QUESTION

Senator PELL. Thank you. You claim that the Soviets have objected to the multiple protective shelter system as not permitted under SALT II, but is my understanding based on the testimony by Secretaries Vance and Brown that the Soviets only raised questions about the verifiability and were assured that the MPS system would be verifiable.

Are you suggesting that we misheard Secretaries Vance and Brown?

Mr. NITZE. I am, or they may have spoken in error.

Senator PELL. Well, we can go back to the committee record for that. It was my understanding that the questions had been raised only about the verifiability of an MPS system.

Mr. NITZE. I may be ill-informed, but I certainly understand it to have been the other way.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

CHINESE INCORPORATION INTO SALT PROCESS

My fifth and final question is this. From your experience, provided we get over the hurdle and we do go ahead with SALT II, in one form or another, when do you believe the Chinese will have to be cranked into the SALT process? Because they are about equivalent now with France and the United Kingdom, and it is generally considered that we will have to take them into account at some point.

Mr. NITZE. With respect to the French and the British, we have taken them into account by the very closest consultation continu-

ously during the entire SALT process. I would think that over time perhaps the Chinese would wish also to be consulted during the course of the process.

Senator PELL. But won't their weapons have to be cranked in?

Mr. NITZE. Well, their weapons are cranked in today by the Soviets. The Russians certainly raise the question of Chinese capabilities continuously and have for years; in fact, I think to an exaggerated extent, because clearly they can cover China with other weapons. You know, the SS-20's can cover all of China. They do not really need to allocate any of their intercontinental range weapons for the Chinese contingency.

Obviously, if we were to contemplate any problem with China, we would have to contemplate intercontinental range weapons.

Senator PELL. I see that my time is up. Thank you.

Mr. NITZE. The Soviets do want to have both the gray area weapons like the SS-20's and some of their intercontinental ones as a protection against China, so they raise it all the time.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nitze, here we are. Just the two of us are left to deal with each other. I do not think I will adopt this procedure again. It is too close to lunchtime for me. [General laughter.]

I do have a few questions.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET NUMBERS OF WARHEADS ESTIMATES

I have been looking at the numbers on your annex, and I call attention to the second page of your annex, in which you are estimating the numbers of warheads that the United States and the Soviet Union will have as of June 18, 1979. Do you see those two columns?

Mr. NITZE. I do indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. You have estimated that as of June 18, 1979, the United States will have 9,514 warheads, and that the Soviet Union will have 8,226. Since we are talking about 1979, you are quoting present figures. But, the figures we have been supplied with are quite different from your figures.

We have figures of approximately 9,200 warheads in the American arsenal, and approximately 5,000 warheads in the Soviet arsenal. Could you explain the discrepancy in those figures?

Mr. NITZE. If one goes to the preceding page, which just gives the number of launchers, as you will see, I have put down 608 Soviet MIRV launchers and 144 SLBM launchers. Now, that is the number from the data base as presented by the Soviet Union for June 18, 1979, but I think probably those figures were presented in conformity with the counting rules in the treaty, which means that you count launchers in the final phase of construction or conversion as well as those that are operational.

I think the United States in the past has been counting only those that are operational. In taking the number of warheads, I took the appropriate number of warheads to the 608 MIRVed ICBM launchers, which may include warheads or missiles where the launcher is still under construction and not yet fully deployed. That I did not realize until after I had done these figures.

I think that may explain at least part of the difference.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Thank you.

Then the projections you make for 1982 and 1985 consistent with SALT II, assuming the SALT II Treaty were ratified, I think, do not differ very much from the projections we have received from the Government. That would show that in 1985, the United States would possess about 12,500 warheads and the Russians about 11,728.

Mr. NITZE. Might I just make a comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. I know that in terms of megatonnage, there would be a definite Soviet advantage. In terms of numbers, there would be a slight American advantage. Are those correct assessments?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct. I might also point out here that I have assumed the new Soviet missile—they are entitled to one new type—will be deployed before 1985. These figures also assume that that new missile will be a single warhead solid propellent missile and not a MIRVed one.

If it is a MIRV, one would have to raise the Soviet total by an appropriate number, a couple of thousand.

WARHEAD CAPABILITY OF SOVIET SS-18

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we have heard testimony from the Secretary of Defense and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the SS-18, the large Russian missile, has a capability of carrying up to 30 warheads. Do you disagree with that assessment?

Mr. NITZE. As I have indicated earlier, it has sufficient throw-weight for such a number. The front end of the missile, however, is clearly not now designed to carry 30 warheads, but it is a great big missile. It has a throw-weight of about 16,000 pounds, which means that RV's in the front end of it can weigh about 8,000 pounds. The warheads that they have in there now weigh about 750 pounds each, or something like that, so the 10 warheads that are in there take up less than half of the throw-weight.

They could expand the number and conveniently go up to the 12 they have demonstrated that they can probably launch. They have tested at least 12 launch positions. But if they were to go up to 20, they would have to reduce the weight of each individual warhead by half. They would lose yield by a greater fraction than the decrease in weight. You gain proportionate yield if you have bigger warheads. So, these 20 would each have a yield much less than half of the yield of the current ones.

In order to compensate for that decreased yield, they would have to then greatly improve the accuracy.

Now, with the accuracy anticipated for the SS-18, which is really just as great as the accuracy of our Minuteman III with its improved guidance system, you come out with the best aggregate hard target kill capability with 10 RV's. You lose aggregate hard target kill capability if you go to 20, and you certainly would lose it if you go to 30. You would then lose accuracy as well because of the large number of release maneuvers.

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So, this suggestion of 20 to 30 RV's on the SS–18, I think, is a meaningful possible risk only if one looks out beyond 1985, at which point the limitation to 10 in any case will have expired.

ESTABLISHMENT OF CEILING ON NUMBERS PRINCIPLE

The CHAIRMAN. Apart from the question of the number of warheads that is permitted under the treaty, do you think it important to establish in the SALT process the principle of a ceiling on numbers, regardless of what you may think of the ceiling at this point? Is it important, in looking ahead, that we establish the principle of imposing limitations on the fractionation of warheads?

Mr. NITZE. I would have thought it would be much more useful to impose a limit on the aggregate throw-weight available to the two sides. This would be the meaningful limitation, and you want to get that throw-weight, particularly the aggregate throw-weight of the ICBM forces—of the fixed-based ICBM forces of the two sides—down to a minimum figure.

That is what you want to reduce.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, that is not denied to us in terms of future negotiations, is it?

Mr. NITZE. It is not, but I think the format of SALT II tends to deny it. This is why I think this unilateral right of the Soviets to the heavy ballistic missile is so pernicious, because it does give them a very large throw-weight component which they are not going to give up easily. You know, 300 times 16,000 is 4.8 million pounds of throw-weight. That is about 5 million pounds of MIRVed ICBM throw-weight, for 308 missiles. That is much too much even for their entire ICBM force.

When we started off in these negotiations in the early 1970's, we thought that the object should be to limit the aggregate MIRVed ICBM throw-weight of each side to something below 3 million pounds if we possibly could. Here, just in this one set of missiles, you have 5 million pounds, which is an intolerable amount. The whole object of a useful long-term treaty should be to try to get that down. The number of RV's is a secondary consideration.

LIMITATION ON WARHEADS, REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS

The CHAIRMAN. Now, apart from the ideal way to proceed in SALT, which might well have been a different way, we have come along in a process in which we have sought to limit the number of launchers, and SALT II would reduce the number of launchers from the present 2,400 to 2,250, and we have sought in SALT II to limit the number of warheads, and you have said that the opportunity to limit megatonnage is not denied to us in the future.

Given the course we have taken, the limitation on warheads as well as the reduction in the number of launchers are helpful steps, are they not?

Mr. NITZE. In the long run, I believe they are counterproductive.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been a part of this process for a long time. You have been aware of the course it has taken.

Mr. NITZE. And I got defeated and resigned as a result.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not suggesting that the course we have taken has been the ideal one. What I am asking is whether the

limitations imposed by SALT II relative to warheads and relative to the number of launchers is in itself an accomplishment that is one that you would not object to. Do you regard it as a net plus for the United States or as a net loss at this juncture?

Mr. NITZE. I regard it as being almost meaningless. I think that the ceiling on the throw-weight of the SS-19's—what are called light missiles although they are really heavy missiles with a throw-weight of 8,000 pounds—is much too high. It is three times what we thought should be the cutoff point between light and heavy missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. But isn't that about the size of the M-X missile we proposed to build?

Mr. NITZE. It is, and both we and the Russians would be much better off if neither of us had missiles as big as the M-X.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. NITZE. And certainly if neither of us had missiles as big as the SS-18.

ICBM DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY

The CHAIRMAN. You have referred several times to the insignificance of the reduction by the Russians of 250 intercontinental ballistic missile systems. We have had previous testimony to the effect that those 250 weapons, though obsolete, would have the capability of obliterating all the major cities of the United States. Would you agree or disagree as to the accuracy of that statement?

Mr. NITZE. I would agree—in the same sense that people say that weapons on one Polaris submarine could obliterate a number of Soviet cities. It is perfectly true that a small number of missiles can do enormous urban damage, but when one looks at what bears upon strategic nuclear superiority and when one looks at the military targets, the hardened targets, those are the things that take numbers of weapons and competent weapons. It is in that field that these 250 weapons are not very effective.

The CHAIRMAN. But they are not ineffective in their capacity to destroy vast numbers of our people and all of the major cities.

Mr. NITZE. A small number of weapons can do an enormous amount of urban damage.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY AFFECT ON FUTURE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. The one part of your testimony this morning that I have found difficult to accept has dealt with this concept of strategic nuclear superiority and how it might affect our future relations with the Soviet Union in the case of a crisis or confrontation. I have understood what you have said, but I have had difficulty believing it or finding it plausible. I will tell you why, and then I want your response, because I think these issues are critical to decisions this committee must make.

As I understood your argument, you referred once or twice to the Berlin crisis and to the Cuban crisis. In those cases of confrontation between our two countries you said that the United States enjoyed having a clear superiority over the Russians in nuclear weapons,

and was thus able to secure its objectives, and that our nuclear superiority was a definite factor in the outcome.

Now, I agree with that proposition, but that was during a time when the Russians did not have anything approaching nuclear equivalence with the United States. We had a preponderant advantage, and there have been some who have suggested to this committee that it was the very experience of Berlin and Cuba, particularly Cuba, that led the Russians to conclude that they would have to embark upon a very ambitious, a very expensive catchup program with the United States to achieve what is now called a rough equivalence.

All of the testimony that we have had suggests that they embarked on this strategy. You yourself have said so this morning. So, according to your estimates, here we sit with more than 9,000 nuclear warheads, while the Russians have more than 8,000. Looking ahead, we see 12,000 and 11,000, respectively, by 1985 under the limitations permitted by the SALT Treaty.

It seems to me that once the two sides have achieved this kind of equivalence, then the old arguments based upon Berlin and Cuba are dubious. This is especially true in a scenario in which both sides with such massive arsenals contemplate what you have called the probable or relative outcome of a nuclear war. I should think there would not be much left of either side, once that situation has come about.

RATIONAL DETERRENCE CONCEPT

The whole concept of deterrence is based upon the supposition that both sides will be rational. If both sides are not rational, this whole build-up is the greatest squander of talent and money in the history of the world. So, we must assume rationality on both sides. When the arsenals have grown as large as ours have on both sides, it seems to me that the contemplation of a full-scale nuclear exchange is the ultimate insanity.

Mr. NITZE. If you will look at my figures, which deal with the countermilitary potential rather than just the number of warheads, you will see that from 1977 to June 18, 1979, the Soviet hard-target kill capability has gone up by a factor of 10, and that it will double by 1982. You will see, looking at 1985, that it is approximately six times ours. If you look at all of our ICBM's together, we have about a sixth of their capability in hard-target kill capability.

I believe that the ICBM's, being the most accurate and the most alert weapons, are the decisive weapons in the initial phases, in the initial exchange, of a war and particularly in the military outcome of the initial phase. I believe that this can make a substantial difference; a difference of sixfold in that capability when coupled with the fact that our hard targets are less hard than theirs and they have twice as many as we, and they have the initiative can be militarily decisive.

Under those circumstances, one can contemplate that after the initial exchange the remaining situation might be quite one-sided. You are suggesting that both sides would act rationally because the next move after such an attack, if such an attack would take place, would be ours. Under those circumstances, you are faced with not

the kind of horrible destruction that in any case will flow in a nuclear war, but with quite a one-sided destruction—kind of a broken back attack by our side with grossly inferior forces against much more survivable and much more coordinated and effectively controlled forces on the other side. That is not a prospect which I think a rational President would face with equanimity and should not. It is a horrible prospect.

Now, what he will decide to do is indeterminate, but what is left to him is revenge, not a rational strategy.

The CHAIRMAN. The figures you project with respect to hard-target kill capability and survivability of our weapons systems and all the rest depend to a very large degree, do they not, upon the action that we take to improve the invulnerability or the survivability of our deterrent force.

Mr. NITZE. To get the vulnerability down by 1985—to do something about it by that time—I believe the only thing you can do is the MPS system applied to the Minuteman. As far as the M-X is concerned, the first one will not be there until 1986, which may be late.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have pretty much exhausted this topic. I understand the point you make. It just seems to me that one would have to be irrational to assume that the Soviet Union would take the monstrous risk of striking at us—even if we have not deployed the M-X missile—without any way to ascertain that we would not launch our own missiles upon warning of attack, and thus not leave them as targets for the Russian missiles. Furthermore, it seems ludicrous for the Russians not to assume, in such a desperate situation where the estimates given to us suggest that between 10 and 20 million people would be killed in this country even by the most surgical of strikes, that an American President would not retaliate against Russian cities, given our already established capability of destroying Russian cities and the Russian population.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN TREATY REQUESTED

I find it hard to conceive of that happening. Your testimony, Mr. Nitze, has been very valuable. I do want to ask you one other thing. Would you provide for the committee a listing of changes that you think should be made in the SALT II Treaty, either by way of amendment or by way of reservation, so that the committee may have those recommendations before it, when it marks up the treaty?

Mr. NITZE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

ARLINGTON, VA., *July 25, 1979.*

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You asked that I provide for the Committee a listing of changes that I think should be made in the SALT II treaty, either by way of amendment or by way of reservation.

The administration would prefer that the Senate give its consent and withhold its advice. I believe the Senate should withhold its consent and tender its advice. I believe the Senate should call on the President to seek, in further negotiations with

the Soviet Union, an improved treaty in conformity with the proper canons of arms control. Those canons include the following:

(a) The limitations should be equal.

(b) The treaty should limit missiles and warheads, not just launchers.

(c) The limits should be precisely defined: i.e., there should be a clear distinction between fixed and mobile launchers; range definitions should specify payload to that range; throw weight should be normalized to a given distance; the controlled parameters of previously tested missiles should be provided as a data base from which to monitor whether missile tests are of a "new" missile or of a modified "old" missile.

(d) There should be separate and equal limits on such gray area systems as Backfire bombers, SS–20 missiles, FB–111 bombers, and carriers of intermediate range cruise missiles.

(e) The permissibility of deployment modes, such as MPS, ALPS, and various mobile systems, required for the survival of retaliatory ICBM systems should be made explicit.

(f) Reductions should provide for reductions to lower and equivalent levels in capabilities, or in measures directly related to capabilities such as throw weight, and not merely in numbers of launchers.

(g) If these changes could be agreed the treaty should continue indefinitely, subject to amendment by both parties and to abrogation by either party on appropriate notice.

As a matter of highest importance—the modifications necessary to improve and clarify the treaty should be made integral to the text of the authenticated final contract. It would be ineffectual for the Senate to try to mend the deficiencies by reservations, qualifications, and interpretations which would be mere unilateral expressions in the instrument of concurrence without actually affecting the contractual context.

After the President has sought to carry out the Senate's advice, the Senate would then have another opportunity to judge whether it had proved possible to obtain, through renewed negotiations with the Soviet side, sufficient improvement and clarification to warrant ratification of the resulting document.

Sincerely,

PAUL H. NITZE.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Nitze, for your testimony.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

MR. NITZE'S ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MUSKIE

Question 1. The Committee on the Present Danger has made a number of recommendations for improvements in U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Are any of these recommendations prohibited by SALT II?

Answer. One of the recommendations pertains to the deployment of ICBMs in a Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) mode. That mode is effectively banned by provisions of the treaty. Article IV bans construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. Article II specifies as ICBM launchers all launchers of a type such as has been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or has contained or launched an ICBM. I know no way to argue successfully that the additional silos required for an MPS system would not be launchers, would not be fixed, and would not be of a type which will contain an ICBM.

Question 2. Would you still recommend the MX in an MPS mode if there were no controls on Soviet missile or warhead inventories? Why?

Answer. I believe that an MPS deployment can be so designed that the incremental cost of additional protective shelters beyond the initial planned deployment of 25 shelters per missile would cost no less than $500,000 to $1,000,000 per shelter, measured in current dollars. I believe the equivalent cost to the Soviet Union of adding incremental reentry vehicles would be in the range of $2,000,000 to $5,000,000 per reentry vehicle, measuring Soviet costs in terms of what it would cost the U.S. to do the same thing. The differential in reentry vehicles versus shelter cost is a more secure protection than the fractionization limitations in the treaty, particularly in light of the fact that the fractionization limit in the treaty expires prior to the first possible deployment of the MX missile. There are no missile or warhead inventory controls in the treaty.

Question 3. You (Paul Nitze) have made a recommendation that the treaty be amended to include a provision stipulating that the United States has the authority to deploy the MX missile in an MPS mode. Why is it necessary to include that in the treaty? Isn't it true that, once the treaty is ratified, if we go ahead and build the

MX based on our unilaterial understanding of the treaty provisions, the Soviets will either have to accept that decision or to abrogate the treaty? if this is so, why then should the Senate open up the treaty to revisions by the Soviets by insisting on amending the treaty in the way that you recommend?

Answer. For its own security, the United States is going to have to redress the growing vulnerability of its ICBMs. The best way, and least costly way, to do this is to deploy the MX missile in an MPS mode. In my judgment doing so would be contrary to the terms of the SALT II treaty. The necessary and proper thing is to get the treaty amended so as to permit what the treaty terms as drafted would make impermissible. The worst way to proceed would be to go ahead with ratifying the treaty as drafted while harboring an intention to act later on, unilaterally, in disregard of its terms. Such a unilateral step, if ever taken would surely weaken our position for objecting to any Soviet unilateral actions in violation of the treaty. Ratifying the SALT II terms would authenticate them as a contract and make them part of the supreme law of the land. That is a most solemn step—not to be undertaken in expectation of having to find tricky ways to extricate ourselves form its effects. In the conduct of external affairs and defense policy we should ahere to the Apostle Paul's precept: "Let all things be done decently and in order."

Question 4. You have stated a fear that the Soviet Union, having achieved strategic superiority, will use that superiority to coerce U.S. leaders. You also argue that U.S. superiority has checked Soviet adventurism in the past. How has U.S. stragetic superiority affected Soviet behavior in the past? Did U.S. superiority, for example, have any impact on the Soviet actions in blockading Berlin in the late '40s, in taking over Eastern Europe, in the Middle East or Africa? Specifically, how would the Soviet Union coerce U.S. leaders in the future?

Answer. I shall start with a quotation. "If the Soviets ever were to achieve superiority, I am convinced they would make every effort to exploit it politically, and even militarily." The words are not mine. They are Secretary Brown's, excerpted from his speech before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association in New York on April 5 of this year. I suggest that it would be appropriate to address a similar question to him.

My own answer is necessarily a long one, because I think it advisable to make clear the meaning of basic terms as I use them—starting with "strategy." I recommend the definition of it given by Edward Mead Earle some 35 years ago:

". . . As war and society have become more complicated . . . strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors, economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times. . . . In the present-day world, then, strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory."

Three sorts of relationships between such counterpoised evaluations are possible. I quote from a colleague:

"Situation A. The side that would probably prevail in the event of war is identifiable. Each side is so aware and discerns the other side's awareness. The strategic estimates are congruent. In confrontations, the constraints on the two sides are disproportionate, but the probability of war is low.

"Situation B. In event of war, neither side could be sure of prevailing. Each side so discerns the matter and is aware of the other side's estimate. The strategic estimates are congruent. In confrontations the constraints on the two sides are about equal, and the probability of war slight.

"Situation C. Each side assumes the advantages of Situation A tilts its way, or one side assumes while the other thinks the relationship is Situation B. Their strategic evaluations are discrepant. The danger of war is heightened."

As an Englishman, John Garnett, has put the matter, "Strategy is more about peace than it is about war." My friend, Charles Burton Marshall, has elaborated on that thought as follows:

"In that view of things, policy is carried on in awareness of adversariness. To say that is not to portray policy as everlastingly scheming hostilities. The contingency of war, however, does remain ever in the background. Policy makers bear in mind a cluster of ideas concerning hypothetical combat—its scope, the range of participants, the presumptive theaters of action, the types and numbers of forces and weapons, the environments of operations, the targets, the duration, the conse-

quences measured in material damage wrought on the respective sides, the impact on civil and military will to persevere, and the final outcome. Components of matching importance are estimates of the putative adversary's perceptions concerning all these matters and concerning this side's perceptions—including this side's perceptions of adversary perceptions—and so on, in multiple reciprocation." Marshall's explanation continues:

"Such mental pictures having to do with the making of hypotetical war are integral to preserving actual peace, for the counterpoised sets of concepts, however imperfect, gives clues for calculating the threshold of hostilities and therefore bear on gauging leeway for pressing issues or determining when to temporize or back away. Thus, their interrelation is a key to strategic equilibrium and stability or their opposites."

The phase in which the United States came to terms, step by step, with the idea of strategy as a settled and ongoing aspect of the conduct of policy occurred in the aftermath of World War II with the emergence of deep issues between the two principal victors in that war—a divergency over the conditions of peace. Since then the centralness and intensity of the shadow of war as it has borne upon the relationship between them has varied from one issue to another. Through most of the intervening period—and as a result of circumstances which I believe it is unnecessary to elaborate here—the basic situation has been Situation A as described above, with the U.S. in the inherently advantaged position. That relationship has been lapsing—and the emerging reality is the Soviet Union's efforts to succeed to the advantaged situation rather than settling for strategic stabilization in the mode of Situation B.

On the basis of this background, I can now move on to the various parts of the question. In particular, I wish to comment on the reference to our having checked Soviet adventurism in the past. I take adventurism to mean, as the dictionary puts it, "ill-considered or rash improvisation or experimentation . . . in defiance of consistent plans or principles." With that sense in mind, I think the Soviet Union has quite consistently avoided adventurism and has generally maintained coherence between purposes and means. I should expect the Soviet Union to continue to do the same in the future—but I surely do not expect its conduct not to be basically affected by the great shift in strategic ascendancy now in the making.

"Did U.S. superiority . . . have any impact on the Soviet actions . . . in taking over Eastern Europe . . .?" At the time of those actions, U.S. policy was still preoccupied with hopes of achieving a nonstrategic order on the basis of perpetuating the grand victorious coalition of World War II as the core of the new permanent world organization to enforce global peace. Would an aroused U.S. have been in position to prevent what happened? I cannot answer. I know of no way to reconstruct history by hypothesis.

"Did U.S. superiority . . . have any impact on the Soviet actions in blockading Berlin in the late 40s . . .?" I put aside the matter of "superiority." Surely the bringing to bear of manifest U.S. strength had a cardinal effect on the outcome. The intention to stay on as a factor in the future of Central and Western Europe, enunciated by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in the autumn of 1946, was wholly vindicated. The Soviet Union's test of U.S. strength of purpose drew an answer that has been of determining importance ever since.

"Did U.S. superiority . . . have any impact on the Soviet actions . . . in the Middle East?" A definitive answer is not feasible at this time. One must take into account Moscow's assertions that the Soviet Union's achievement of proximate strategic parity with the United States provided the essential setting for the petroleum embargo of six years ago—a phenomenon whose effects are still reverberating. The Soviet Union remains a resourceful adversary of United States policy in the region—and the final score is far from being in.

"Did U.S. superiority . . . have any impact on the Soviet actions in . . . Africa?" Except for the Congo instance in its earlier phase, I do not recall any issues over the future of Africa being drawn between the superpowers during the time when U.S. strategic supremacy was manifest. Surely the trend of affairs has been changing—and unfavorably to our interests—since the lapse of that supremacy.

There are of course many pertinent instances to test the reliability and importance of strategic ratios besides the ones mentioned in the question—Azerbaijan, Korea, the Soviet input of missiles into Cuba, for example. These three instances illustrate my point about Soviet wariness as opposed to adventurism. In each of them the Soviet Union launched an action on the basis of a mis-estimate of the U.S. response and then was quick to recognize error and extricate at the price of backing away from explicit objectives. Instead, I think we can expect henceforth more and more perseverance at our expense, and our Allies' expense, as the shift in strategic

factors becomes more and more clarified—unless this country takes timely action to reverse existing trends. I certainly do not expect a phenomenon without precedence in general affairs—to wit, a great displacement in strategic ratios without any material consequences.

I shall not venture to answer the last portion of the question—"Specifically, how would the Soviet Union coerce U.S. leaders in the future?" In my understanding, it appears to ask for precise scenarios on future occurrences. In Louis Thiers' phrase, "Prophecy is a gratuitous folly." All such scenarios appear ridiculous until the moment when they become true.

Question 5. What kind of political crisis would have to arise to provide sufficient justification for the Soviets to attack the United States? Under what kinds of circumstances would the Soviets attempt to coerce the United States through threats of use of strategic nuclear forces?

Answer. With that general picture of futurity in mind, I turn to the second part of your question concerning "kinds of circumstances" under which the Soviets might "attempt to coerce the United States through threats of use of strategic nuclear forces."

The question requires precision in thinking and terminology. Let me begin with the term "intention." An intention is formed when an entity transfers a preference from the conceptual realm of wishing and converts it into a purpose by devoting means to actualizing it. The intention embraces both the purpose and the means, and rationality pertains to maintaining coherence between them. In a situation involving a plural number of entities, intentions tend to overlap. Persons and groups tend to come to cross purposes. Patterns of intention have to be adjusted. Consent operates when community or compatibility between sets of purposes is established. Coercion operates when one entity resolves a conflict of purpose by nullifying another's means to do otherwise than comply. Consent and coercion are concomitant parts of reality in international affairs as in other aspects of human existence. Nations that make their policies rationally must necessarily mold their purposes to their means. To fail to do so is the path to bankruptcy in policy.

Now, in the departed past the United States existed in a strategic backwater. In general the country was in position to formulate its purposes without having to take imminent adversary forces into account. Circumstances requiring continuous strategic calculations even under conditions of formal peace were no part of the national experience. Strategy (the word was no part of the American vocabulary then) was reduced to a matter of managing military engagements sequentially during the intervals when war interrupted the normal course. Conducting policy in times of formal peace under the necessity of having the contingencies of war continuously in mind is something new in national experience—dating only since the aftermath to World War II. In all that time the Soviet Union has been the strategic adversary—the only ongoing strategic adversary in our national experience. Through most of that time—thanks to a combination of factors—the inherent, residual strategic advantage remained with the United States, both the superpowers knew it, and each knew that the other knew it. That interplay of cognition—shaping the intentions formed on both sides—was a basic circumstance in world affairs.

That preponderance has lapsed. If by failure of perception or will or both, we acquiesce in its shifting unequivocally to the adversary side, now in the near calculable future the United States will pass into a situation drastically different from anything in its experience—imposing the continuous necessity of adjusting national purposes to the constraints inherent in being on the disfavored side of the strategic equation between ourselves and an adversary whose preferences for the future are systematically at odds with our own. Awareness of being at disproportionate hazard will become a ruling circumstance in our national existence. The shadow of coercion will be a reality that the country will have to learn to put up with.

What about the ultimate exercise of coercion—an attack on the domestic base of the United States—focused on in the first part of your question? While I should expect the Soviet Union to push its designs relentlessly in dealing with a strategically disadvantageous United States, I should doubt that the Soviet Union would coldbloodedly choose to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. Irrespective of the probability, I would not rule out the possibility. In any serious crisis they would expect themselves, and would expect us, to act rationally in accordance with the true state of the strategic nuclear balance. If we were to give signs of acting in a way which they considered irrational and if they saw gains to be made by preempting rather than be subjected to an irrational attack by us, they might preempt.

I have trouble comprehending the use of the word "justification" in the question. I take "justification" to refer to the process of ensuring or demonstrating some

action to be warranted according to law or under the canons of reason, propriety, and righteousness. It would be an exercise of fantastic imagination for me to try to spell out a set of hypothetical circumstances such as to lend those qualities to a Soviet launching of hostilities against this country. If such a deplorable event should ever come to pass, I suppose it would be a result of Soviet calculations or miscalculations of necessity, advantage, opportunity, and expediency according to Soviet lights and would not be determined by considerations of reason, propriety, and righteousness as you and I would see them.

In thinking about strategic relations one should try to stay within the bounds of realistic imagination as distinguished from fantastic imagination. The faculty I refer to is called for by the pertinent phrase in the preamble of the Constitution—"to provide for the common defense." The root meaning of the verb "provide" is "to see ahead." That function must be put in proportion. To paraphrase a colleague of mine, Burt Marshall, "This province of life's affairs is akin to navigating in thick weather: one must look intently ahead because it is impossible to see ahead." To quote further from the same source:

"Yet one can venture some prophecy. Trends in the external realm will surely be more ominous, threats to the United States more formidable, and challenges more exigent than those experienced in the three decades since the onset of the strategic rivalry called the cold war. Premises long basic to United States policy will continue to be overturned by emerging realities. The relationship will contend on the world scene, but the United States-Soviet strategic equation—and how it is viewed by the principals and by others, however aligned—will have pervasive effects on the interplay of those forces."

Question 6. How would you recommend the United States respond to a Soviet threat to attack the United States?

Answer. The question is too imprecise to permit a meaningful answer.

Question 7. If U.S. strategic nuclear forces are fully alerted and U.S. military and political leaders are prepared to respond quickly to a Soviet attack, why, under any circumstances, should the Soviets believe that the United States would be coercible?

Answer. Significantly inferior forces, even though ready and fully alerted, will continue to be significantly inferior forces if the other side with superior forces is also alerted and ready. If those in charge on both sides act rationally, the fact of that relative superiority and inferiority will be reflected in their actions and registered in the outcome.

Question 8. Specifically, how will the Soviet Union achieve strategic superiority in the 1980s?

Answer. I refer you to Annex III of my prepared testimony. In it I describe the systems projected by the respective superpowers over the next five years. If each one carries out the programs as indicated, the Soviet Union will achieve strategic superiority in the 1980s.

Question 9. Specifically, how does the SS-18 missile provide advantages to the Soviet Union?

Answer. The 308 SS-18 missiles provide the Soviet Union with some 3,000 highly accurate reentry vehicles of the megaton range. Those RVs will in themselves have more destructive capability than all of our ICBMs and SLBMs combined. It may well be true that the SS-19s could by themselves threaten the survivability of our Minuteman silos. If the Soviet Union had only the SS-19s and not the SS-18s as well, it would have to exhaust substantially all its MIRVed ICBMs in order to take out our Minuteman silos. This would be an unprofitable exchange. It is the existence of both the SS-19s and -18s which will enable the Soviet Union to threaten our Minutemen silos while still keeping more than half of its MIRVed ICBMs in reserve. This is a very great advantage indeed.

Question 10. If the Soviets have such an impressive capability to destroy our land-based missile force, but have no capability to destroy our submarine-based missile force, could the United States not improve its strategic nuclear posture by drastically reducing its land-based missile force and placing its retaliatory force at sea and in the air?

Answer. I think it advisable to correct some assumptions in the question. To attribute to the Soviet Union "no capability to destroy our submarine-based missile force" is wrong. At best, one can count on the survival of a substantial portion of whatever fraction—perhaps a half—of the force would be at sea at the time of a Soviet strike. The rest—in port for repairs and replenishment and for relief of their crews—would in all probability be destroyed. As for our intercontinental bombers—the portion on alert at that moment, probably less than a third, might reasonably be counted on to escape intitial destruction.

The residual forces in either category would be subject to further discount. Some of the presumptive surviving submarines would surely be in transit rather than at firing station. Not all surviving bombers could be counted on to get through to their targets. A further imponderable factor pertains to circumstances in the immediate sequel to a first strike. How much damage would have been done to centers for command and control and to facilities for communication? One would have to know the answer before attempting to appraise how cogent the residual retaliatory forces would be.

These considerations must be stressed as offsets to the implication in the suggested alternative for the United States to "improve its strategic nuclear posture by drastically reducing its land-based missile force and placing its retaliatory force at sea and in the air." The choiced implied there is one between jeopardy and safety. The option is not that clear. Even the Navy's and the Air Force's instrumentalities have to remain on or near the land—and therefore targetable by a first strike—in large portion for large parts of the time.

Properly recast, the question would be: If the Soviet Union's capability to destroy our submarine-based missile forces and our intercontinental bombers is somewhat less than its impressive capability to destroy our land-based missile force in a first strike, could not the United States improve its strategic posture by reducing its land-based missile force and relying instead on missile submarine forces and intercontinental bombers, compensatorily augmented, for retaliatory missions?

The answer is an unequivocal no. For one thing, no such augmentation is feasible within the period covered by the treaty. No way of accelerating our SLBM deployment is within reach. According to information from the Navy, even the seven TRIDENT submarines estimated to become operational by 1985 in Annexes II and III of my prepared testimony probably will not be ready by then. In view of the cancellation of the B-1 program, it is highly unlikely that the process of replacing our aging B-52s can get under way before the expiration of the treaty. Suppose, however, that all of these deficiencies were corrected. Even in that hypothetical circumstance, it would still be unwise to abandon the most reliable and cost-effective leg of the triad—and the one most responsive to command and control. Without it, our retaliatory power would not be heavy enough or versatile enough to provide the basis for a reliable deterrent. Making our ICBM retaliatory power survivable is an irreducible requirement.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will reconvene in 20 minutes, at 1:30, to hear General Rowny.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 1:40 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, McGovern, Stone, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa and Lugar.

Also Present: Senator Cranston.

Senator GLENN. The hearing will be in order.

OPENING STATEMENT

General, we apologize for these truncated hearings, and appreciate your forebearance with the format and the split nature of things here today.

Senator Church, our chairman, read his opening statement this morning that applied to both of our witnesses today, and since we did go so late, he has asked me to open the hearings and he will be here as soon as he can.

General, with that introduction, we will be glad to welcome your statement, or an abridged version thereof. In either case, your entire statement will be included in the record. We welcome you to the hearings.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. EDWARD L. ROWNY, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE TO SALT

General ROWNY. Senator Glenn, it is a pleasure to see you again. I am indeed honored to have this opportunity of appearing before the Foreign Relations Committee today. I shall do my best to provide you with the information you need on this highly complex subject.

Debates, exchanges, and arguments of this type are not my metier. I have spent all my adult life as a professional soldier. Less than 2 weeks ago I retired from that profession and consequently do not have a staff. Nevertheless I will try my best to answer your questions. Further I will be happy to talk to you individually or collectively as you see fit.

I am encouraged by what I have seen and heard eminating thus far from this committee. The statements have been largely unemotional and balanced and I hope that they will stay that way, and I will do my best to keep them that way to the end that we can really come to an understanding of what this very complex subject is all about.

Senator Glenn, as you and as most of the other members know, for more than 6 years I was the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. I was told I had been selected for this job because of my experience as Chief of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR] Working Group in NATO and because I had on numerous occasions expressed my belief in the utility of limiting strategic arms. I continue to hold this belief. I might add that my start in this field began as far back as 1945 when I worked for General Marshall on strategic and political affairs. I was one of the four officers sent to Yale to study international relations, and then I would say that I spent more

than half of my career in and out of various jobs in Europe and in NATO.

As far back as 1961, I wrote my first paper on the utility of arms control.

Senator GLENN. That was utility?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

SUPPORTED JCS GOALS IN REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS

As the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I have tenaciously supported their goals aimed at achieving significant reductions in strategic arms consistent with maintaining our security. If such goals were to be achieved, our long-term objectives of enhancing deterrence and strengthening global stability would be served. I believe that an agreement which reduces the strategic arms of the Soviet Union—equal to those of the United States in numbers as well as in overall capability—is in our Nation's interest.

Over the 6-year period that I was the JCS representative to SALT, I expressed my views to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in numerous messages and memorandums. At their request, I submitted an assessment of SALT in a classified memorandum dated January 6, 1978. I brought that assessment up to date on January 5, 1979, and again on March 27 of this year.

TREATY DOES NOT MEET MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS

On May 21 of this year, after an announcement that "agreement in principle" had been reached on the remaining issues of SALT II, I made a final assessment. I concluded that—even though the contributions to the negotiations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff made it a considerably better treaty than would have otherwise emerged—this treaty does not meet minimally acceptable standards.

The agreement we now have before the Senate and the Nation establishes the conditions which threaten our security for the years to come. I stated in my assessments that it was my judgment, based on years of continuous negotiations with the Soviets, that a treaty meeting the criteria of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was, and is, attainable.

However, as negotiations were concluded on less than satisfactory terms, I asked to be relieved of my duties and requested retirement. My request was approved and I was retired from active military service on June 30.

SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS OF TREATY

I would like to state at the outset that there are some positive aspects of the treaty which was signed in Vienna on June 18, 1979. The treaty establishes the principle that there should be equal and lower ceilings of strategic offensive arms. It calls for numerical reductions that will bring the Soviet Union down to levels closer to our own.

The treaty would establish, to the extent that numerical limitations contribute to that goal, a degree of increased predictability concerning the strategic programs of the Soviet Union. It limits the

Soviet Union's heavy missiles and new light ICBM's to a maximum of 10 warheads for such a missile. In theory, the Soviets are limited to one new light ICBM for the period of the treaty. The treaty contains certain provisions which are an aid to verifiability of missile launchers.

Finally, for the first time, a strategic arms limitation treaty provides for an exchange of data concerning numbers of strategic offensive arms.

However, most of these positive features are, regrettably, more theoretical than actual. Additional other useful features which a second arms control treaty could and should have treated, were not dealt with because of Soviet intransigence which could, in my opinion, have been overcome.

The agreement in principle that there be equal ceilings of strategic arms remains an achievement more in theory than in practice because a significant number of Soviet strategic systems are allowed to go uncounted. Moreover, the ceilings are set at such high levels—again at Soviet insistance—as to be virtually meaningless. Indeed, the JCS were in the forefront in seeking substantially larger reductions for both sides.

SOVIET REDUCTIONS LITTLE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

Furthermore, the capabilities of the Soviet systems are so great that the reductions agreed upon have little military significance. The Soviets will have to reduce to the lower ceiling of 2,250 by 1982. The United States, having at that time only about 2,050 less capable operational systems, would still need to build up if it were to achieve equality with the Soviet Union.

Since qualitative improvements are virtually unrestricted by the treaty, the numerical limitations imposed upon the Soviet Union will not give us any meaningful degree of predictability. That is, qualitative improvements allowed, because they are more difficult to verify, could afford us less predictability and hence less stability.

The freeze on the number of warheads per existing MIRVed missile and the limitation to 10 warheads on a new type ICBM allows the Soviets a total number of warheads far greater than are needed by the U.S.S.R. to destroy the ICBM's and other military and hard targets in the United States.

EXTENSION OF FRACTIONATION LIMITS PAST TREATY EXPIRATION

There is an important point with regard to the fractionation limits which is frequently overlooked: these are limits which expire with the treaty in 1985. While it is our hope that these fractionation limits can be extended beyond the expiration of the treaty, it is difficult to imagine what leverage the United States will have for assuring that these fractionation limits are continued.

Moreover, in view of our argumentation that the protocol should not establish precedents for the future, it is clear the Soviets will apply this same argument to the post-treaty period and argue that fractionation limits expire after 1985. After 1985, the current throw-weight potential of Soviet missile systems will permit them to deploy still greater numbers of reentry vehicles on their ICBM's and up to 20 to 30 on their heavy ICBM's.

In sum, it may be a relatively meaningless limitation. By 1985, the Soviets will have been permitted under the treaty a level of MIRVed warheads which places the United States in jeopardy while leaving the Soviet Union in the position to go even higher. While the treaty in theory limits the Soviets to one new type of light ICBM, in practice the provisions of the treaty permit the Soviets to deploy several new types of missiles. Finally, the provisions regarding the verifiability of the treaty are insufficient to make the treaty adequately verifiable.

The net result, therefore, is an agreement which gives a superficial impression of being a positive step in the direction of arms control but which, in fact, contravenes fundamental and vitally important arms control principles—such as securing meaningful reductions and leaving the signatories with a stable strategic balance. In the following paragraphs, I will try to develop these views in more detail.

SALT TREATY NOT IN NATIONAL INTEREST

A sound, objective, and unemotional approach would be to test the treaty against standards by which its worth could be measured. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, establishing such criteria, have maintained that a SALT Treaty would enhance our military security and hence would be in our national interest if it were equitable and verifiable, if it contributed to deterrence and stability, if it strengthened European security, and if it contributed to Allied coherence.

The emerging treaty, in my view, is not in our interest since it is inequitable, unverifiable, undermines deterrence, contributes to instability and could adversely affect NATO security and Allied coherence.

Let me look at each of these points in greater specificity.

TREATY IS INEQUITABLE

First, the treaty is not equitable. Let me cite only three major examples:

(1) The treaty grants the Soviet Union a unilateral right to 308 launchers for heavy ICBM's. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized from the outset that Soviet heavy missiles would pose a serious problem, we did not press hard enough for the elimination of the Soviets' SS–9's and SS–18's.

Further, the United States was not even compensated for this large asymmetry. These 308 Soviet heavy missiles alone possess more destructive power than all of our ICBM's and SLBM's combined. To say that the Soviets can have heavy missile launchers and we cannot is comparable to having said in the naval disarmament conference in the 1930's: "You can deploy battleships but we agree only to deploy destroyers."

It has been stated that we accepted this inequality in a trade for the Soviets not counting our so-called "forward-based systems" [FBS], and the nuclear systems of our Allies. Evidence of such a trade is not supported by the record.

I clearly recall the days just before Vladivostok when the Soviets sent us signals in Geneva that they would drop their FBS argu-

ments. Once told that by insisting on including our FBS, the Soviets would be required to count their more numerous systems—which could strike our systems and our troops in Europe, as well as our NATO partners—the Soviets realized it was to their advantage to drop the FBS argument.

(2) The second example of inequity is that the treaty fails to count in the aggregate some 375 Soviet Backfire bombers with intercontinental capability. These Backfire bombers, which our intelligence community estimates can strike targets in the United States on one-way unrefueled missions, will thus not be counted and will be allowed to run free while all our bombers—to include mothballed B–52's and prototype B–1's—will be counted. The record shows that the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave consistent advice that the Backfire should be counted in the Soviet aggregate. The principle violated in this treaty is that all intercontinental systems should be counted in the aggregates.

ASSURANCES ON BACKFIRE MILITARILY WORTHLESS

The so-called "assurances" on Backfire are militarily worthless. It has been stated that the Backfire would add only a marginal capability to the total Soviet capability for causing destruction in the United States. To add one-third to the already large destructive power that the Soviets can inflict upon the United States can hardly be called marginal improvement.

Importantly, by not being required to count these 375 central systems, the Soviets will then not need to reduce an equal number of ICBM's or SLBM's from the 2,250 total. Those who would denigrate the Backfire as a slow-arriving, follow-on strategic force would then have to accept that our own B–52's are in a similar second-class category.

Those unfamiliar with the negotiating record tend to sell the FBS horse again and again and have used it here again as a rationalization for not counting Backfire. The simple fact is that the Soviets dropped their FBS argument because it was in their own self-interest to do so.

If we were to count our FBS the Soviets would be required to count their systems. The Soviet systems are several times as numerous and an order-of-magnitude greater in destructive power than our FBS and Allied nuclear systems combined. To give credence to the Soviet FBS argument, which is not an issue with the Soviets in this SALT agreement, is to undermine our support to NATO and our commitment to article V of the NATO Treaty, that an attack on one of our Allies is an attack on all its signatories, including the United States.

I have listed two major inequities in this treaty, the 308 heavy missile launchers and the Backfire. Now the third major inequality is that the treaty, even if one believes overall equal aggregates are achieved—a point I have just disputed—still fails to provide, as called for in Public Law 92–448, for equal *levels* of strategic forces. You will notice the emphasis I place on *levels*—there is a difference in meaning between ceilings and levels. The ceiling in this room is rather high. The water level in my bathtub is considerably lower.

Under the treaty's provisions as written, the Soviet Union will stay ahead of the United States in strategic capability. Even the limits on the number of warheads per missile will still afford the U.S.S.R. significant advantages—at least 3-to-1—in the most critical area, that is, the ICBM reentry vehicle category.

The definition of a new type light ICBM is so loosely drawn that during the life of the treaty it will not effectively preclude the U.S.S.R. from developing and deploying more than one new type of ICBM. Thus the large unconstrained potential of the U.S.S.R. which will put the U.S.S.R. strategically ahead of the United States in the early 1980's can be further exploited once the treaty expires.

TREATY NOT SUFFICIENTLY VERIFIABLE

Certain aspects of the treaty are simply unverifiable; for example, cruise missile ranges. Moreover, many of our difficulties in verification stem from the differences between the closed society of the U.S.S.R. and the open society of the United States. The Soviets play their poker hands close to the chest whereas our cards are face-up on the table. Soviet intelligence collectors have relatively free access to our defense plans and activities, while we must rely upon highly sophisticated but vulnerable national technical means for our verification. The Soviets' penchant for secrecy has prevented the inclusion in the treaty of cooperative measures which would greatly improve the ability to verify the provisions of the agreement.

The U.S.S.R. has consistently refused to agree to provisions necessary to assure sufficient verification of, for example, mobile ICBM's, MIRVed ICBM's, MIRVed SLBM's, new types of ICBM's, heavy bombers and cruise missiles. Moreover, the U.S.S.R., unlike the United States, has been encrypting telemetry of its ICBM tests. The treaty expressly permits the Soviet Union to encrypt telemetry in the future, thus seriously inhibiting our ability to verify that not more than one new type of ICBM is being tested. Encryption has only one purpose: To deny information.

Moreover, using verification as a pretext, the Soviets have obtained our agreement to provisions that could restrict not only strategic but our nonstrategic systems—for example, our conventionally armed cruise missiles.

TREATY UNDERMINES DETERRENCE

It permits the U.S.S.R. a 3-to-1 numerical and 5-to-1 throw-weight asymmetry in ICBM warheads—the quickest arriving, the most powerful, and the most destabilizing of all strategic systems. Rapid improvement in Soviet ICBM forces is causing our ICBM's to become increasingly vulnerable, further undermining deterrence. This vulnerability will not be corrected during the life of the treaty. Even our plans to deploy the M–X missile in the mobile mode do not help. That missile cannot start being deployed in the basing mode until 1986, and completed until 1989 at the earliest.

My main concern with deterrence is not that a future Soviet leader may feel he can launch an all-out attack against the United States. I believe any rational Soviet leader would know that such an action would wreak untold damage on the Soviet Union by our

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survivable remaining forces. What I am concerned with is that a future Soviet leader, looking at the overall strategic balance, the overall strategic calculus if you will, would be encouraged to take greater risks in pursuing his political goals than he might otherwise take. Thus, I link deterrence closely to restoring stability in the event of the inevitable crises which are certain to occur.

TREATY DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY

Closely allied to this notion of deterrence is that the treaty does not contribute to stability. Because the treaty does not actually put a brake on the momentum of the massive Soviet buildup, the United States will for the first time not be able to maintain essential equivalence or nuclear parity. This, and forcing Soviet efforts into unconstrained and unverifiable qualitative improvements, will undermine predictability and hence stability.

This strategic inferiority of the United States will inhibit favorable solutions in any future crises, such as the Berlin crisis, or the Cuban missile crisis, or the October 1973 war. There will be a growing realization at home and abroad that the Soviet Union has a decisive advantage in capabilities which will allow it—the Soviet Union—to be more confident and thus less inhibited in its foreign policy initiatives. It will allow the Soviet Union to move against nations friendly to the United States with greater certainty.

TREATY COULD WEAKEN NATO

The protocol to the treaty constrains, for the most part, U.S. systems. Precedents established by that protocol constraining our systems are, at the insistence of the Soviets, likely to be carried forward after the expiration of the protocol. These dangers, magnified by the ambiguity in the treaty's provision on noncircumvention, could preclude the transfer of technology and weapons to our allies and thus weaken NATO.

The crucial problem facing the United States is the large and continuing buildup of strategic forces by the Soviets. This momentum has continued unabated while SALT I and SALT II were being negotiated and there is no evidence that it will slacken as a result of the agreement on SALT II. The false expectation that the strategic arms negotiations would result in constraining Soviet momentum explains at least in part the cancellation of the B-1 and delays in U.S. programs such as cruise missiles and M-X.

UNITED STATES TO BECOME STRATEGICALLY INFERIOR TO SOVIETS

Even if SALT did not explicitly prohibit any of our programs, the greater momentum of the U.S.S.R. will cause the United States to fall behind the U.S.S.R. strategically. By any objective measure, the United States will become strategically inferior to the Soviet Union in the early 1980's. Thus, the treaty would sanction and codify the strategic inferiority of the United States. This is not only important to our own political relationship with the Soviet Union but to our relationship with our allies as well.

We must recognize that since its inception, NATO has recognized that it must rely upon the strategic power of the United States to deter a theater war in Europe, or indeed, even a conventional war.

It has been stated that without this SALT II agreement, the Soviet Union could increase its number of strategic nuclear delivery systems by a third, or to about 3,000. While theoretically possible, the Soviets would, in my judgment, not choose to increase the number of their strategic systems. Why? Simply because we expect them to have by the early 1980's sufficient numbers of warheads to place at least two powerful and accurate ICBM weapons on every military and hard target, and sufficient numbers of SLBM and bomber weapons to cover all the other targets in the United States.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of the consequences of the Soviet Union having by 1985 three times as many reentry vehicles on ICBM's as will we. Each of these Soviet reentry vehicles will be more powerful and as accurate as our ICBM reentry vehicles. Reentry vehicles on ICBM's are much more significant than other nuclear weapons because they are the ones possessing greater destructive power, high accuracy, and almost complete reliability.

A prudent Soviet planner would not increase his numerical advantage any further—he would move into the relatively uninhibited area of enhancing qualitative improvements. Thus, in the absence of a treaty the Soviets probably would not increase numerically because they have no need to do so. The Soviets can prepare to exploit their large throw-weight potential by improving their existing forces qualitatively.

Thus, as I mentioned earlier, they will be able quickly to deploy a greater number of SNDV's [strategic nuclear delivery vehicles] shortly after 1985 when the treaty expires. Accordingly, it behooves us to act now to convince the Soviets that it is in their long-term interest to curb their continued buildup in Soviet strategic offensive arms and to divest themselves of their huge potential for further qualitative improvements which this treaty sanctions.

The challenge facing us, therefore, is to make it clear to the Soviets that the United States will not enter into a treaty which is unequal and which will sanction their strategic superiority.

SOVIETS WANT AND NEED SALT TREATY

The Soviets want and need a SALT Treaty because of their desire to be recognized as a superpower and because it will allow them to enjoy the advantages they receive from a continuation of détente. Moreover, the Soviets feel a treaty is a necessary step on the way to achieving most-favored-nation status and to acquiring the credits they so sorely need.

Finally, SALT legalizes a condition they will soon achieve: strategic superiority.

Chairman Brezhnev is personally committed to pursuing an agreement on SALT and thus we can expect him to enter into a more evenhanded agreement—one which is equal and which provides for essential equivalence between the both sides. The Soviets will only do so, however, if we make it clear that the United States

will do whatever is necessary to stay even. We must make it clear we will not accept strategic inferiority.

The less expensive solution for the United States and the Soviet Union as well—indeed the more sensible solution—is for the Soviets to scrap those systems which give them strategic superiority. Should they elect not to do so, then we have no choice but to enter into a vigorous program to restore parity.

From my experience in dealing with the Soviets, that is for over 6½ years at 385 meetings—some 1,000 hours in face-to-face meetings—I am convinced the Soviets understand and even respect this kind of stance. If they think that we are bluffing, we possess the capability to prove them wrong. We can afford to do so. In fact we cannot afford not to, otherwise the risks which a prolonged period of United States inferiority will bring about will prove destabilizing and bring about serious military and political results.

If we succeed in persuading the Soviets to slow down and to reverse their momentum, we can then start on the road toward achieving the type of arms control which is consistent with maintaining our security. If we fail we must take immediate and vigorous steps to insure our security as an overriding priority.

More than 6 years at the negotiating table convinces me that a treaty meeting the criteria of acceptability established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was—and still is—attainable. I do not accept the view that attempting to improve a flawed treaty will result in any more than a temporary hiatus in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor will it keep for long the two sides from returning to the negotiating table to seek a more evenhanded agreement which will be in the long-term interest of both sides.

TREATY TILTS BALANCE AGAINST UNITED STATES

My assessment of this SALT Treaty indicates that it contains pluses and minuses. Something as complicated as this SALT Treaty cannot be, nor should it be, characterized in black or white terms. Having said this, the treaty as it now stands heavily tilts the balance against the United States. This treaty will not enhance our security.

I am concerned that if SALT is a continuing process of which this agreement is an example, then our weaker leverage and negotiating power in SALT III will only result in a continuation of the strategic inferiority of the United States. Agreeing to a bad agreement is worse than no agreement. A poor SALT II will make it impossible to negotiate a good SALT III.

Mr. Chairman, I repeat my previously stated considered and professional military judgment that as currently drafted this treaty is not equal and not adequately verifiable. It will neither enhance deterrence nor add to stability. It could detract from NATO security and allied coherence. This SALT agreement is not in the interest of the United States.

[General Rowny's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny

For more than six years I was the Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. I was told I had been selected for this job

because of my experience as Chief of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) Working Group in NATO and because I had on numerous occasions expressed my belief in the utility of limiting strategic arms. I continue to hold this belief.

As the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I have tenaciously supported their goals aimed at achieving significant reductions in strategic arms consistent with maintaining our security. If such goals were to be achieved, our long-term objectives of enhancing deterrence and strengthening global stability would be served. I believe that an agreement which reduces the strategic arms of the Soviet Union—equal to those of the United States in numbers as well as in overall capability—is in our nation's interest.

Over the six year period that I was the JCS Representative to SALT, I expressed my views to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in numerous messages and memoranda. At their request I submitted an assessment of SALT in a classified memorandum dated 6 January 1978. I brought that assessment up to date on 5 January 1979 and again on 27 March 1979. On 21 May 1979, after the announcement that "agreement in principle" had been reached on the remaining issues of SALT II, I made a final assessment. I concluded that—even though the contributions to the negotiations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff made it a considerably better Treaty than would have otherwise emerged—that this Treaty does not meet minimally acceptable standards. The agreement we now have before the Senate and the Nation establishes the conditions which threaten our security for the years to come. I stated in my assessments that it was my judgment, based on years of continuous negotiation with the Soviets, that a Treaty meeting the criteria of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was—and is—attainable. However, as negotiations were concluded on less than satisfactory terms, I asked to be relieved of my duties and requested retirement. My request was approved and I was retired from active military service on 30 June.

I would like to state at the outset that there are some positive aspects of the Treaty which was signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979. The Treaty establishes the principle that there should be equal and lower ceilings of strategic offensive arms. It calls for numerical reductions that will bring the Soviet Union down to levels closer to our own. It would establish, to the extent that numerical limitations contribute to that goal, a degree of increased predictability concerning the strategic programs of the Soviet Union. It limits the Soviet Union's heavy missiles and new light ICBMs to a maximum of ten warheads per missile. In theory, the Soviets are limited to one new light ICBM for the period of the Treaty. The Treaty contains certain provisions which are an aid to verifiability of missile launchers. Finally, for the first time, a strategic arms limitation treaty provides for an exchange of data concerning numbers of strategic offensive arms.

However, most of these positive features are, regrettably, more theoretical than actual, and moreover have serious negative aspects. Additional other useful features which a second arms control treaty could and should have treated, were not dealt with because of Soviet intransigence which could have been overcome.

The agreement in principle that there be equal ceilings of strategic arms remains an achievement more in theory than in practice because a significant number of Soviet strategic systems are allowed to go uncounted. Moreover, the ceilings are set at such high levels—again at Soviet insistence—as to be virtually meaningless. Indeed, the JCS were in the forefront in seeking substantially larger reductions for both sides. Further, the capabilities of the Soviet systems are so great that the reductions agreed upon have little military significance. The Soviets will have to reduce to the lower ceiling of 2250 by 1982. The United States, having at that time only about 2050 less capable operational systems, would still need to build up if it were to achieve equality with the Soviet Union. Since qualitative improvements are virtually unrestricted by the Treaty, the numerical limitations imposed upon the Soviet Union will not give us any meaningful degree or predictability. That is, the qualitative improvements allowed, because they are more difficult to verify, could afford us less predictability and hence less stability. The freeze on the number of warheads per existing MIRVed missile and the limitation to ten warheads on a new type ICBM allows the Soviets a total number of warheads far greater than are needed by the USSR to destroy the ICBMs and other military and hard targets in the United States. There is an important point with regard to the fractionation limits which is frequently overlooked: these are limits which expire with the Treaty in 1985. While it is our hope that these fractionation limits can be extended beyond the expiration of the Treaty, it is difficult to imagine what leverage the United States will have for assuring that these fractionation limits are continued. Moreover, in view of our argumentation that the Protocol should not establish precedents for the future, it is clear the Soviets will apply this same argument to the post-

Treaty period and argue that fractionation limits expire after 1985. After 1985 the current throw-weight potential of Soviet missile systems will permit them to deploy still greater numbers of reentry vehicles on their ICBMs and up to 20 to 30 on their heavy ICBMs. In sum, it may be a relatively meaningless limitation. By 1985 the Soviets will have been permitted under the Treaty a level of MIRVed warheads which places the US in jeopardy while leaving them in the position to go even higher. While the Treaty in theory limits the Soviets to one new type of light ICBM, in practice the provisions of the Treaty permit the Soviets to deploy several new types of missiles. Finally, the provisions regarding verifiability are insufficient to make the Treaty adequately verifiable.

The net result, therefore, is an agreement which gives a superficial impression of being a positive step in the direction of arms control but which in fact contravenes fundamental and vitally important arms control principles—such as securing meaningful reductions and leaving the signatories with a stable strategic balance. The following paragraphs develop these views in more detail.

A sound, objective, and unemotional approach would be to test the Treaty against standards by which its worth could be measured. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, establishing such criteria, have maintained that a SALT Treaty would enhance our military security and hence would be in our national interest if it were equitable and verifiable, if it contributed to deterrence and stability, if it strengthened European security, and if it contributed to Allied coherence.

The emerging Treaty, in my view, is not in our interest since it is inequitable, unverifiable, undermines deterrence, contributes to instability and could adversely affect NATO security and Allied coherence.

Let me look at each of these points in greater specificity.

First, *the Treaty is not equitable.* To cite only three major examples:

(1) The Treaty grants the Soviet Union a unilateral right to 308 launchers for heavy ICBMs. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized from the outset that Soviet heavy missiles would pose a serious problem, we did not press hard enough for the elimination of the SS–9s and SS–18s. Further, the United States was not even compensated for this large asymmetry. These 308 Soviet heavy missiles alone possess more destructive power than all of our ICBMs and SLBMs combined. To say that the Soviets can have heavy missile launchers and we cannot is comparable to having said in the naval disarmament conference in the 1930s: "You can deploy battleships but we agree only to deploy destroyers." It has been stated that we accepted this inequality in a trade for the Soviets not counting our so-called" forward-based systems" (FBS) and the nuclear systems of our Allies. Evidence of such a trade is not supported by the record. I clearly recall the days just before Vladivostok when the Soviets sent us signals in Geneva that they would drop their FBS arguments. Once told that by insisting on including our FBS, the Soviets would be required to count their more numerous systems (which could strike our systems and our troops in Europe, and our NATO partners), the Soviets realized it was to their advantage to drop the FBS argument.

(2) The second example of inequity is that the Treaty fails to count in the aggregate some 375 Soviet BACKFIRE bombers with intercontinental capability. These BACKFIRE bombers, which our intelligence community estimates can strike targets in the U.S. on one-way unrefueled missions, will thus not be counted and will be allowed to run free while all our bombers (to include mothballed B–52s and prototype B–1s) will be counted. The record shows that the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave consistent advice that the BACKFIRE should be counted in the Soviet aggregate. The principle violated in this Treaty is that all intercontinental systems should be counted in the aggregates. The so-called "assurances" on BACKFIRE are militarily worthless. It is has been stated that the BACKFIRE would add only a marginal capability to the total Soviet capability for causing destruction in the United States. To add one-third to the already large destructive power that the Soviets can inflict upon the United States can hardly be called marginal. Importantly, by not being required to count these 375 central systems, the Soviets will then not need to reduce an equal number of ICBMs or SLBMs from the 2250 total. Those who would denigrate the BACKFIRE as a slow-arriving, follow-on strategic force would then have to accept that our own B–52s are in a similar second-class category. Those unfamiliar with the negotiating record tend to sell the FBS horse again and again and have used it here again as a rationalization for not counting BACKFIRE. The simple fact is that the Soviets dropped their FBS argument because it was in their own self-interest to do so. If we were to count our FBS the Soviets would be required to count their systems. These Soviet systems are several times as numerous and an order-of-magnitude greater in destructive power than our FBS and Allied nuclear systems combined. To give credence to the Soviet FBS argument—which is not an

issue with the Soviets in this SALT agreement—is to undermine our support to NATO and our commitment to Article V of the NATO Treaty that an attack on one of our Allies is an attack on all.

(3) The third major inequality is that the Treaty, even if one believes overall equal aggregates are achieved—a point I have just disputed—still fails to provide, as called for in Public Law 92-448, for equal levels of strategic forces. Under the Treaty's provisions as written, the Soviet Union will stay ahead of the United States in strategic capability. Even the limits on the number of warheads per missile will still afford the USSR significant advantages—at least three-to-one in the most critical area, that is, the ICBM reentry vehicle category. The definition of a new type light ICBM is so loosely drawn that during the life of the Treaty it will not effectively preclude the USSR from developing and deploying more than one new type of ICBM. Thus the large unconstrained potential of the USSR which will put the USSR strategically ahead of the U.S. in the early 1980s can be further exploited once the Treaty expires.

The Treaty is not sufficiently verifiable.—Certain aspects of the Treaty are simply unverifiable, for example, cruise missile ranges. Moreover, many of our difficulties in verification stem from the differences between the closed society of the USSR and the open society of the U.S. The soviets play their poker hands close to the chest whereas our cards are face-up on the table. Soviet intelligence collectors have relatively free access to our defense plans and activities, while we must rely upon highly sophisticated but vulnerable national technical means for our verification. The Soviets' penchant for secrecy has prevented the inclusion in the Treaty of cooperative measures which would greatly improve the ability to verify the provisions of the agreement. The USSR has consistently refused to agree to provisions necessary to assure sufficient verification of mobile ICBMs, MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, new types of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and cruise missiles. Moreover, the USSR, unlike the U.S., has been encrypting telemetry of its ICBM tests. The Treaty expressly permits the Soviet Union to encrypt telemetry in the future, thus seriously inhibiting our ability to verify that not more than one new type if ICBM is being tested. Encryption has only one purpose; to deny information. Moreover, using verification as a pretext, the Soviets have obtained our agreement to provisions that could restrict not only strategic but our non-strategic systems—for example, conventionally-armed cruise missiles.

The Treaty undermines deterrence.—It permits the USSR a three-to-one numerical and five-to-one throw-weight asymmetry in ICBM warheads—the quickest arriving, the most powerful, the most destabilizing of all strategic systems. Rapid improvement in Soviet ICBM forces is causing our ICBM's to become increasingly vulnerable, further undermining deterrence. This vulnerability will not be corrected during the life of the Treaty. Even our plans to deploy the M-X missile do not help, as it cannot be deployed in a multiple basing mode until 1986 at the earliest.

My main concern with deterrence is not that a future Soviet leader may feel he can launch an all-out attack against the United States. I believe any rational Soviet leader would know that such an action would wreak untold damage on the Soviet Union by our survivable remaining forces. What I am concerned with is that a future Soviet leader, looking at the overall strategic calculus, would be encouraged to take greater risks in pursuing his political goals than he might otherwise be. Thus I link deterrence closely to restoring stability in the event of the inevitable crises which will occur.

The Treaty does not contribute to stability.—Because the Treaty does not actually put a brake on the momentum of the massive Soviet buildup, the United States will for the first time not be able to maintain essential equivalence or nuclear parity. This, and forcing Soviet efforts into unconstrained and unverifiable qualitative improvements, will undermine predictability and hence stability. This strategic inferiority will inhibit favorable solutions in any future crises, such as the Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin crisis, or the October 1973 War. There will be a growing realization at home and abroad that the Soviet Union has a decisive advantage in capabilities which allow it to be more confident and thus less inhibited in its foreign policy initiatives and to move against nations friendly to the United States with greater certainty.

The Treaty could weaken NATO.—The Protocol to the Treaty constrains, for the most part, United States systems; precedents established by that Protocol constraining our systems are, at the insistence of the Soviets, likely to be carried forward after expiration of the Protocol. These dangers magnified by the ambiguity in the Treaty's provision on non-circumvention, could preclude the transfer of technology and weapons to our Allies and thus weaken NATO.

The crucial problem facing the United States is the large and continuing buildup of Soviet strategic forces. This momemtum has continued unabated while SALT I and SALT II were being negotiated and there is no evidence it will slacken as a result of agreement of SALT II. The false expectation that the strategic arms negotiations would result in constraining Soviet momentum explains in part the cancellation of the B-1 and delays in US programs such as cruise missiles and M-X. Even if SALT did not explicitly prohibit any of our programs, the greater momentum of the USSR will cause the United States to fall behind the USSR strategically. By any objective measure the United States will become strategically inferior to the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. Thus, the Treaty would sanction and codify the strategic inferiority of the United States. This is not only important to our own political relationship with the Soviet Union but to our relationship with our Allies as well. We must recognize that since its inception, NATO has recognized that it must rely upon the strategic power of the United States to deter a theater nuclear war in Europe, or indeed, even a conventional war.

It has been stated that without this SALT II agreement the Soviet Union could increase their number of strategic nuclear delivery systems by a third—to 3000. While theoretically possible, the Soviets would in my judgment not choose to increase the number of their strategic systems. Why? Simply because we expect them to have by the early 1980s sufficient numbers of warheads to place at least two powerful and accurate ICBM weapons on every hard target, and sufficient numbers of SLBM and bomber weapons to cover all the other targets in the United States. I cannot over-emphasize the importance of the consequences of the Soviet Union having by 1985 three times as many RVs on ICBMs as will we. Each of these Soviet reentry vehicles will be more powerful and as accurate as our ICBM reentry vehicles. Reentry vehicles on ICBMs are much more significant than other nuclear weapons because they are the ones possessing greater destructive power, high accuracy, and almost complete reliability. A prudent Soviet planner would not increase his numerical advantage any further—he would move into the relatively uninhibited area of enhancing qualitative improvements. Thus, in the absence of a Treaty the Soviets probably would not increase numerically because they have no need to do so and can prepare to exploit their large throw-weight potential by improving their existing forces qualitatively. Thus, as I mentioned earlier, they will be able to quickly deploy a greater number of SNDVs shortly after 1985 when the Treaty expires. Accordingly, it behoves us to act now to convince the Soviets that it is in their long-term interest to curb their continued buildup in Soviet strategic offensive arms and to divest themselves of their huge potential for further qualitative improvements which this Treaty sanctions.

The challenge facing us, therefore, is to make it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States will not enter into a Treaty which is unequal and which will sanction their strategic superiority. The Soviets want and need a SALT Treaty because of their desire to be recognized as a superpower and because it will allow them to enjoy the advantages they receive from a continuation of détente. Moreover, they feel a Treaty is a necessary step on the way to achieving most-favored nation status and acquiring credits. Finally, SALT legalizes a condition they will soon achieve: strategic superiority. President Brezhnev is personally committed to pursuing a SALT agreement and thus we can expect him to enter into a more even-handed agreement—one which is equal and which provides for essential equivalence on both sides. The Soviets will only do so, however, if we make it clear that the United States will do whatever is necessary to stay even. We must make it clear we will not accept strategic inferiority. The less expensive solution for the United States and the Soviet Union as well—indeed the more sensible solution—is for the Soviets to scrap those systems which give them strategic superiority. Should they elect not to do so, then we have no choice but to enter into a vigorous program to restore parity. From my experience in dealing with the Soviets they understand and even respect this kind of stance. If they think we are bluffing, we possess the capability to prove them wrong. We can afford to do so—in fact we cannot afford not to. Otherwise the risks which a prolonged period of United States inferiority will bring about will prove destabilizing and entail serious military and political consequences. If we succeed in persuading the Soviets to slow down and to reverse their momentum, we can then start on the road towards achieving the type of arms control which is consistent with maintaining our security. If we fail we must take immediate and vigorous steps to insure our security as an overriding priority.

Six years at the negotiating table convinces me that a Treaty meeting the criteria of acceptability established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was—and still is—attainable. Like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I strongly favor arms control. I do not accept the view that attempting to improve a flawed Treaty will result in any more than a tempo-

rary hiatus in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor will it for long keep the two sides from returning to the negotiating table to seek a more even-handed agreement which will be in the long-term interest of both sides.

My assessment of this SALT Treaty indicates that it contains pluses and minuses. Something as complicated as this SALT Treaty cannot be—nor should it be—characterized in black or white terms. Having said this, the Treaty, as it now stands, heavily tilts the balance against the United States. This Treaty will not enhance our security. I am concerned that if SALT is a continuing process of which this agreement is an example, then our weaker leverage and negotiating power in SALT III will only result in a continuation of the strategic inferiority of the United States. Agreeing to a bad agreement is worse than no agreement: a poor SALT II will make it impossible to negotiate a good SALT III.

Mr. Chairman, I repeat my previously stated considered and professional military judgment that as currently drafted this Treaty is not equal and not adequately verifiable. It will neither enhance deterrence nor add to stability. It could detract from NATO security and Allied coherence. This SALT agreement is not in the interest of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, General, for a very well-thought-out statement, and it certainly presents your views. I know the trauma you must have gone through in making your decision to take the action that you have taken.

We do have a vote on the floor, and that is what those buzzers were. We are down to our last 6½ minutes before we have to be there and vote. Some of the Senators that were here and left during your statement will be back momentarily. They left to cast their vote. So if we could stand momentarily in recess, I hope you will bear with us, and they will be back for questioning momentarily.

Senator Pell is arriving, so he can start his questioning now.

Senator PELL. Thank you, General Rowny, for your statement, which I had a chance to read, or at least go through during the luncheon period. It is good to see you here.

REASON FOR REMAINING MEMBER OF DELEGATION

I think, General Rowny, that it is quite unusual for a member of a delegation, who had very real doubts about the matter under negotiation, to have stayed with it as long as you did. What was your reason for remaining as a member of the delegation after the period when you knew that you could not support the treaty in its present form?

General ROWNY. My philosophy was "Hope springs eternal." I hoped throughout the negotiations and believed right to the end that my expressed views and concerns would be favorably considered. I strived to make it a better treaty. With all due modesty, I felt that my presence on the SALT negotiating team was making it a better treaty through my insistence on representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views.

So I stayed on in the hopes that a good treaty would emerge in the end. It was only after I had learned that agreement on the remaining issues had been reached and after my assessment that I could no longer support the treaty, that I concluded that my conscience forced me to leave.

Senator PELL. Did you ever tell a member of the Soviet delegation that you could not support the treaty?

General ROWNY. No, sir, I did not.

Senator PELL. In discussing the inequities of the treaty, you cited the fact that the Soviets will have a right to 308 launchers for their heavy interballistic missiles. Why is that an inequity since under the treaty we can do just as effective a job against the Soviet missiles, as the permitted Soviet heavy ICBM can against ours?

General ROWNY. Senator Pell, I disagree with the assumption that the M-X will be just as good as the Soviet's heavy missile. Certainly, the M-X, when it is deployed, and it has yet to be developed, will possess 10 reentry vehicles. But by that time, which will be after the treaty expires, the Soviets will be able to utilize the potential of their Soviet heavy missile and equip it with 20 to 30 warheads.

Soviet officials assume that the M-X will be just as effective as the Soviet heavy missile. I disagree with that assumption. The Soviet SS-18 is approaching the accuracy of our ICBM's. It has six times the throw-weight and hence twice the potential yield of each RV we expect to achieve on our M-X. Therefore I simply do not accept the proposition that our future M-X will equal the existing Soviet SS-18. Under the treaty the M-X is prohibited from being equal to the SS-18 but is limited to one-half their potential.

Senator PELL. Is this based on the theory that the explosive area is an important one? If you are destroying a city or a group of buildings, it is. But if you are destroying a missile site, the size of a missile is not important, it is the accuracy of it.

I thought that we had made a decision some time back that with our Minuteman III, we could fractionate it to seven. We decided not to do it, because we felt three were enough to achieve what we wanted with the accuracy we had.

General ROWNY. The fractionation limits on a small missile, like the Minuteman with 2,500 pounds of throw-weight is an entirely different category than the fractionation limit of 10 on a missile with 15,000 pounds of throw-weight. You have to put two factors into the equation: yield and accuracy. Suppose the Soviet missiles were not as accurate as we think. They could, then, make up for the lack of accuracy with additional yield.

DEFINITION OF FORWARD BASE SYSTEMS

Senator PELL. In your statement, you say: "The Soviets stopped pressing for the inclusion of our forward base system because the Soviets would have to count theirs also, and theirs are more numerous than ours."

This came up in the questioning yesterday or the day before, I forget which, that the definition of a forward base system is a system that can strike the homeland of the other. I don't see how the Soviets have more than we do. They have about 150 systems, and we have about 700, not counting the French and the British and much less the Chinese.

General ROWNY. I guess the quickest answer is that I don't accept, and I don't think that we should accept the Soviet definition of a forward base system.

Senator PELL. What is your definition?

General ROWNY. My definition is that a strike on our troops in Europe, or on our Allies in Europe, is a strike on the United States.

You need to consider the theater balance in Europe. When you take into account the forces which we and our Allies in Europe which could strike the territory of the Soviet Union, and those which they have which could strike our so-called forward base systems, you will find that the Soviets have at least 2, and possibly 3 times as many delivery vehicles, 10 times the destructive power, and somewhere up to about 20 times the throw-weight of our systems.

As I said in my statement, if you buy this FBS argument, then you are saying, "We don't believe in article V. We believe only in exchanges of strikes against respective homelands." This is the Soviet concept.

Senator PELL. But isn't your definition of a forward base system unique, because what you are saying is that the Soviets would have a forward base system because they can strike our people in Europe.

General ROWNY. I do not believe my definition is unique; it is simply not the Soviet definition of FBS—a definition which we have never accepted. In fact, we used to use another term which never got much currency: "AROS" [allied regional operational systems]. Somehow FBS caught on because people listened to the Soviet argument more than to ours.

Senator PELL. Wouldn't you agree that most of your colleagues on both sides of this question would agree that a forward base system is a system that can strike the homeland of the other.

General ROWNY. No, sir, I would not.

Senator PELL. You would not?

General ROWNY. No, sir.

Senator PELL. Who shares your view?

General ROWNY. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, most of the people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and many in the State Department, and ACDA. As a matter of fact, I would be hard pressed to name who, on our side, accepts the Soviet definition.

Senator PELL. My recollection is that when we discussed this with the Joint Chiefs or with the Secretary of Defense the general assumption on both sides of this green cloth was what I said constituted forward base systems.

Now, if the Soviets had armies of occupation stationed in Mexico, Cuba, or Greenland, then presumably you would count our weapons of intermediate range that could reach them as forward base systems?

General ROWNY. No, sir. I simply do not buy the Soviet definition of forward base systems, nor do I accept the implication that we have occupation forces anywhere.

Senator PELL. What is the difference between what I said, if they have an army of occupation?

General ROWNY. I can give you a simple answer, Senator. We have friends to the north of us in Canada and we have friends to the south of us in Mexico. We are friendly with them and they are friendly with us. So your question, sir, is a hypothetical one.

Senator PELL. But if we withdrew our troops from Europe, and we had no troops there as hostage, then would you agree that on the forward base systems along the lines I mentioned, 700 for us and about 150 for them?

General ROWNY. No, sir. It would depend on whether or not we withdrew from the NATO Alliance. If we withdrew from the NATO Alliance, which I don't recommend, and I don't think we would do—

Senator PELL. We certainly would not.

General ROWNY. Sir, I take very seriously our NATO commitment: An attack on one is an attack on all of us, including the United States.

Senator PELL. This is a question of definition, and we disagree on this.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir, we do.

RISK TO U.S. SECURITY BY INABILITY TO VERIFY

Senator PELL. In connection with verification, do you believe that our own American national security is put at risk because of our inability to detect certain types of Soviet cheating, and what kind of cheating do you envisage?

General ROWNY. Senator, I don't like to take as a starting point on verification discussions of cheating scenarios. My view is that the provisions of this treaty are insufficient to do what the treaty should do, that is, make its provisions adequately verifiable. I think we could have—and should have—tighter and better provisions. Therefore, I don't turn to cheating scenarios as my first point of analysis.

Senator PELL. Thank you, General.

Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rowny, in your testimony you hit head on, I think, a fundamental question of our hearings, and that is, should we ratify this treaty.

As I read your testimony, your answer is no. Is that correct?

General ROWNY. Senator, I am not well versed in your responsibilities. What I would like to do is give you the facts and my best assessment. When you have heard them. I would like you to make up your own mind as to what to do.

Senator LUGAR. We will. But as I gather what you are saying, you say that this treaty misses on a good number of bases that you have enumerated, and furthermore you have suggested that from your experience with the Soviets, they understand and even respect this kind of stance. You are talking about strength.

"If they think we are bluffing," you say, "we possess the capability to prove them wrong. We can afford to do so. In fact, we cannot afford not to."

ASK SOVIETS TO DO AWAY WITH STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Now, in essence, as I gather what you are saying, we should attempt, first of all, amendments to the treaty to meet each of the various objections, and you have made a number of specific ones. The preferred route, as I gather from your testimony is that we

should ask them to do away with their strategic superiority. That is, specific missile systems that make this treaty asymmetrical. Is that right?

General ROWNY. The second part is right, Senator. The first part, that is whether or not you, as a Senate body, should amend this treaty, or whether you should use some other parliamentary technique to get this treaty reopened for negotiations, is something I think you have to decide.

It is my view that this treaty, if reopened to negotiations, could be made an evenhanded treaty, one in my view that the Soviet would accept. We would need to show them that we possess determination and will. Since it is in their long-term interest to have a treaty which is evenhanded, I think that the Soviets would accept such a treaty.

The technique for bringing this about I would leave to your better judgment.

Senator LUGAR. You are leaving the parliamentary situation to us so that we could send the treaty back to the President to renegotiate, or we could amend the treaty and thus the President would have to present those amendments to the Soviets.

Either way, your point is that we need to get back to the bargaining table.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator LUGAR. Your assertion is, when we get back to the bargaining table, from your experience, the Soviets will be willing to bargain. Is that correct?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator LUGAR. Their desire for this treaty, in your judgment, is sufficient that they will recognize that we are not bluffing. I suppose, adding to that would be your supposition that we would be taking steps as a Congress along the route of military preparedness that would give some visible evidence that we are prepared to do those things that we must do. Is that not correct?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Taking the second point first, we certainly need the wherewithal with which to bargain. You cannot, as the sayings goes, negotiate with mirrors. So I would say that we should take those steps immediately and vigorously which would move us on the upward road to restore the strategic parity which we will lose in the 1980's.

Having started up this path, we should go back to the Soviets and say: "Look, you pick any point on this curve you want. We would prefer, and have always preferred, a lower point on the curve. We believe it is to your interest to move to a lower point on the curve, just as it is to our interest to do so." I believe that with that kind of talk, the Soviets would say, "All right, we will buy your proposition."

Senator LUGAR. So that type of a renegotiation does bring genuine arms limitation because you are suggesting a lower level, particularly on their side, with regard to the strategic weapons you have described. Doing away with that does away with the threat and essentially the world comes off better, if we are interested in genuine disarmament in this world.

General ROWNY. In Geneva, I talked to many Senators such as yourself. I guess I talked to 24 out of 27 who came to Geneva. The

question repeatedly came up: "Well, General, you are telling us that you are negotiating a treaty, and yet you want more programs, you want a 40-percent greater U.S. budget for strategic arms. How can this be, what kind of a treaty is it?" And, Senator Lugar. I would answer:

"Well, Senator, we are doing the best we can. Of course, the levels should be lower. Of course we want to lower them." "Why isn't it lower?" "Well, Mr. Senator, we have not yet gotten down to brass tacks."

Senator LUGAR. You negotiated a treaty, as you pointed out, in which the ceilings are all so astronomically high that it takes astronomical dollars on both sides to reach them, and it serves as a very inadequate base for SALT III, which is the hope for a delivering point, as we move, then, toward disarmament.

General ROWNY. I would agree, Senator Lugar, except for the term "astronomical." I think the cost would be very high, perhaps not astronomical.

SEND SALT III BACK TO BE RENEGOTIATED

Senator LUGAR. General Rowny, critics of the point of view you have expressed will say that your optimism about the Soviets going back to the table is astonishing. As a matter of fact, the President of the United States, and, as I recall, a good number of other people are going into rhetorical flourishes on this situation, and have said that the Soviets are not prepared to negotiate changes quite apart from very substantial changes that you are talking about here.

They have said that it is all over. Gromyko has said that it is all over. Apparently, Brezhnev has said the same thing. Here we start these hearings, with leadership on both sides, saying that the ballgame is over.

Who are you, General Rowny, to come before us today, given this august testimony by the leadership of this great Nation, and indicate as a matter of fact that the Soviets do want to get back to the table, as opposed to having no treaty at all, and as opposed to the United States and its population being terrified with the thought that somehow if this Senate begins to amend this treaty, or sends it back for renegotiation.

You are saying that, as a matter of fact, this is what we ought to be doing, and that we will serve the people of the world as well as country by doing so. But what do you base this optimism on?

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, I don't like to make this sort of comparison because it sounds like I'm a biblical character, but I guess I'm a voice in the wilderness.

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

General ROWNY. I guess I will continue to be the voice in the wilderness because this is my conviction based on dealing for over 6½ years face to face with the Soviets. This face-to-face negotiation usually took place with both my Soviet counterparts—the Soviets gave me double coverage—two generals against one.

Having dealt with the Soviets over a long period of time, and having studied not only Soviet but Russian history I think I know something about the Soviet mentality and how they will react. I

have a deep conviction that the Soviets need this treaty. They need it, in my opinion, more than we do. Therefore, they will come back to the negotiating table. I think it is as simple as establishing the willpower to bring this situation to fruition.

Senator LUGAR. This is a very critical point of testimony. I know you know that, but it should be underscored that this is going to be a leap of faith, I suspect, that we take if SALT is rejected.

Now, if, however, they don't come back to the table, your program, as I understand it, is to say, there are some things that we have got to do in any event. That we can afford to do those things, and we cannot afford to fail to do them. As a matter of fact, in the event that somebody wants to get in this type of competition, economically we are stronger and ultimately more resourceful, and we will prevail. Is that a fair statement of where you have us headed, then?

General ROWNY. That generally represents my thinking. There is no objective reason why the United States cannot match the Soviets at any point of the armament or disarmament curve they choose. We are economically stronger, we have twice the gross national product of the U.S.S.R. We have tremendous innovative ability within our research and development community. There is no objective reason why we should allow ourselves to get into a position of strategic inferiority.

Senator LUGAR. As opposed to this treaty, as now written, which you have suggested does bind us moving toward a strategic inferiority, and might in fact almost legalize or make permanent that inferiority. Is that the danger to which you point?

General ROWNY. Sir, that is exactly right.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Senator PELL. Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, since I have just arrived, maybe you had better give me one passover, just one.

Senator PELL. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator McGovern.

With your reference to the voice in the wilderness, I say, you must have faith, deliverance came eventually to voices in the wilderness in the past, too. So, perhaps, I would not be forecasting anything.

I appreciate very much your statement today. It was a forthright statement, and one, I know, which expresses your very heartfelt views.

SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ALLOWED TO GO UNCOUNTED

You state that the number of Soviet strategic systems were allowed to go uncounted. Can you tell us what those systems are?

General ROWNY. I was thinking, for the most part of the Backfires. These planes, intercontinental systems under our definition and by virtue of our intelligence, will, under this treaty, go uncounted.

Senator GLENN. That was mainly Backfire.

You also say the qualitative limits were left virtually unrestricted. Could you explain that?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. As you know, we failed to get any meaningful qualitative limitations on accuracy or similar items which really count. The two qualitative limitations we got were, first, a limit for the period of the treaty to one new type of ICBM, and, second, a fractionation freeze.

In the first case, the limitation to one new type of ICBM, the definition eroded so much during the course of negotiations that the Soviets can, in fact, develop and deploy more than one new type of ICBM.

The fractionation limit is a qualitative limitation in the sense that it limits the Soviets to the existing numbers of reentry vehicles on ICBM's and to 10 RV's their heavy ICBM's. My main concern here is that since we have not blunted the momentum of the Soviet Union at expending resources, they can exploit that potential of the ICBM's after the treaty expires. Unless, of course, you presume that somehow the treaty limitations on fractionation are going to continue.

Senator GLENN. You also mention encryption which inhibits our ability to verify that they are not testing more than one ICBM new type at a time. Would you go into that a little bit?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I think the way the encryption provision came out is simply meaningless. As you know, Senator, we don't encrypt the telemetry on our ICBM's. On December, 22, 1978, we thought we had this treaty in the bag. As a sweetener, we expressly permitted encryption. As a result the provision agreed to has three parts. One, the Soviets are permitted to encrypt. Two, a side may not encrypt, however, if it deliberately impedes verification; so this is a subjective judgment. Three, the encryption may not deliberately impede verification of the provisions of the treaty.

The Soviets worked very hard to keep all provisions out of the treaty which would require telemetry. Therefore, I don't know what, if anything, we got from this provision on telemetry.

Senator GLENN. It is my understanding that on December 21 Mr. Gromyko made the statement that we did not need telemetry for any verification. Is that correct?

General ROWNY. I think he said that we did not need telemetry to verify the provisions of the treaty. Thus they fought very hard to keep such provisions out of the treaty.

Senator GLENN. I have been very much against the inclusion of those words "which impedes verification" because that is what leaves it up to the Soviets as to what impedes verification. It does not leave it up to our people. I objected to those words all the way through for almost the last year or year and a half, from the first time that they were suggested. I don't think that we should be leaving it up to the Soviets what impedes verification, and it means we have to take it to the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC], and we have to lay out what our problems are with not having enough information to be able to verify, which I don't think we would do except in the most extreme cases.

General ROWNY. Exactly, Senator Glenn. I don't know how we would prove our case. We would, for example, say: "We think you are deliberately impeding the verification of a provision of this treaty." The Soviets would say: "No, we are not." We would then say: "Well, you are encrypting." They would answer: "Yes, but we

are not encrypting any information that deliberately impedes a provision of the treaty." We then lose the argument.

Senator STONE. How can we tell if they are encrypting anything if we have not broken their code.

Senator GLENN. We just receive a signal, but we don't know what is going out on that signal. We don't know the information on it. That is the problem. We can receive a signal, but we just don't know what is on it.

General, you indicate a 3-to-1 numerical superiority of the Soviet Union coming out of this on numbers, and a 5-to-1 on throw-weight, and later on in your statement, you say that by 1985 the Soviets could have three times our reentry vehicles on ICBM's. Could you go into those figures, I find them rather devastating.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. Very quickly, the arithmetic is this. We have 550 Minuteman III's, with 3 RV's each which makes 1,650; 450 Minuteman II's at 1 RV each brings the total to 2,100. Add the 54 Titans and you get 2,154 RV's. On the Soviet side, 308 times 10, is 3,080 already. Now, if you grant the Soviets an average of 5 RV's for their SS-17's and SS-19's, for the other 512 that they are permitted under the 820 ceiling, this is another 2,600 odd. Add to this their 580 RV's on SS-11's or SS-13's and you get more than 6,000 reentry vehicles on Soviet ICBM's versus 2,000 on ours. Soviet ICBM's have comparable accuracy to ours. Each ICBM on their side has a yield upward of a megaton. On our side, after we get the Mark 12-A deployed, they will have a huge asymmetry in numbers and a greater asymmetry in throw-weight.

Senator GLENN. Wouldn't your figure of three times the RV's on ICBM's in 1985 include allowing them to use their greater throw-weight on their SS-18, or an additional number of RV's on the 308?

General ROWNY. No, sir. My figures represent what they are permitted under the treaty. They are permitted 10 RV's under the provisions of this treaty, and they are putting 10 on their SS-18's. I am simply saying that it is perfectly legal for them to have over 6,000 RV's on their ICBM's compared to 2,000 on ours.

Senator GLENN. If, then, they prepare their breakout so that it came at the end of 1985, so that they add another 20 or so per booster on the SS-18, that would add on to that?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. They could increase their number of RV's by another 3,000 to 6,000.

Senator GLENN. I see.

EXTENSION OF THE PROTOCOL

You also thought that the protocol would probably be extended. Now that was a major issue yesterday with the Joint Chiefs. I am sure that you probably saw or watched yesterday and heard their testimony on this. You obviously do not share their viewpoint on that. Do you wish to comment on the protocol extension?

General ROWNY. My view, Senator, is that the protocol only constrains U.S. systems. Therefore, it would be my preference not to have a protocol. As a matter of fact, the Joint Chiefs recommended that there not be a protocol at all.

I have asked myself, what purpose would a protocol serve? In earlier days, my Soviet counterparts talked about what they were

going to do as soon as the protocol expired. Therefore, I see the very strong possibility, in fact probability, that they will do things after the expiration of the protocol to make sure that the protocol establishes a precedent. I was very much impressed with Secretary Kissinger's statement in the Economist on the 3d of February that in his view the protocol would be considered a precedent by the Soviets.

So it is a very simple equation. Why a protocol? If there is a protocol, it must serve a purpose. In the Joint Statement of Principles you will see that the Soviets said that they will seek a resolution of the protocol in SALT III. Therefore, even if the protocol is not extended, they are going to insist on reevaluating it.

Senator GLENN. I agree that there will be a tremendous push to extend the protocol at the end of that time period, and I do not share the optimism that might have been expressed by some yesterday that we would make sure that it is automatically terminated. I don't think that that is going to automatically occur.

General ROWNY. I don't want to be misunderstood, Senator Glenn. I would do everything I could, as a Senator, to make sure that the protocol will not be a precedent. I am simply expressing the opinion that the Soviets will strive mightily to see that the limitations of the protocol will continue into SALT III. And I believe they will have a lot of leverage to see to it.

Senator GLENN. What cheating do you see occurring under this, as far as verifiability goes, that we would not have adequate time to respond to?

General ROWNY. Again, Mr. Senator, I like to talk less about cheating than I do about the provisions of the agreement. The Soviets habitually insist upon provisions which are so broad, or so much in their interest, that it gives them a lot of leeway and advantage.

When I joined SALT II, the first question I had to face was: "What are the dimensions of a silo?" The debate in SALT I was how do you measure an increase of 15 percent. A 15-percent increase in length is a 15-percent increase in volume. An increase of 15 percent in diameter is a 32-percent increase in volume. A 15-percent increase in both dimensions equals 52 percent. So you can see what happens when the provisions of the treaty are loose.

Senator GLENN. There is still some very major ambiguities in this. My time is up, so I will try to come back to those a little bit later, the heavy bomber, the launcher, all these definitions are left considerably more vague than I would like to see them.

Senator PELL. Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rowny, the people of this Nation owe you a debt of gratitude. You are a man of courage. You have demonstrated so many times that you put your country ahead of your personal gain. I want you to know that as one Senator, I am grateful to you and I am aware of the many sacrifices that you have made.

I want to compliment you on your statement. There was no hemming or hawing in what you said.

General ROWNY. Thank you, sir.

ASSURANCES GIVEN TO NATO ALLIES ON ARTICLE XII

Senator HELMS. I have a few questions that I would like to address to your attention. To your knowledge, were any assurances given to our NATO Allies with regard to the provisions of article XII, which is the noncircumvention article?

General ROWNY. I am aware, Senator, of a statement that we made to the NATO Allies that we would interpret article XII in our own fashion.

Senator HELMS. Do you mean that it was an oral statement?

General ROWNY. No, sir. It was a written statement that Mr. Vance transmitted, I think, through Ambassador Bennett to the NATO Allies, saying: "This is our interpretation of article XII."

Senator HELMS. I know that this is somewhat of a subjective question, but how valid are those assurances in your judgment?

General ROWNY. I think that article XII is so loosely drawn—it is so vague—that it means all things to all people. I think the United States will be tested on this article. I think we are going to find out just what it means the first time an issue comes up.

We say: "No, our action does not contravene the treaty; there is no circumvention." The Soviets will say it is. It is going to be completely a matter of subjective judgment of the parties as to whether it does or it doesn't amount to circumvention.

Senator HELMS. In other words, if you were a NATO Ally, you would not consider that money in the bank, necessarily?

General ROWNY. No, sir, I would not.

Senator HELMS. What do you think is the likely response of the Soviets to any transfer by the United States to our NATO Allies of advanced U.S. technology?

General ROWNY. I have no doubt, Senator, that the first time there is any serious transfer or attempted transfer, the Soviets are going to say: "This contravenes the spirit of the agreement. 'Look, article XII says: There will not be any circumvention of the treaty.' "

Senator HELMS. If that is your answer concerning technology, it would be even more emphatic as to weaponry itself, wouldn't it?

General ROWNY. I think that it would apply equally.

Senator HELMS. Like a cruise missile, or a Trident submarine, and so forth.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

IMPROVEMENT OF ARTICLE XII

Senator HELMS. That being the case, how could article XII be improved, in your judgment?

General ROWNY. Well, I think that article XII could only be improved as a result of a real meeting of the minds. In other words, this is, and that is not circumvention. I am not suggesting that this would be very easy. But I am suggesting that if you write a contract between two people, the contract ought to mean something and not to be interpreted variously by the parties involved.

Senator HELMS. Maybe you will want to do this in writing a little later on as to precisely what might be done to article XII, what written assurances the United States might make.

I would like, as one Senator, to have your suggestion as to possible legislation that the Senate might consider in concert with this treaty process to take care of the concerns of our NATO Allies.

As I mentioned a day or so ago, General, I was in London last week, and I met with 75 members of the House of Commons. While there has been some expression here that our Allies are satisfied, I can testify that they are not satisfied. They are greatly concerned. I think that probably you are aware of that, too.

Now, let me move on, if I may. You stated in your testimony that consideration of the so-called FBS had nothing to do with the United States backing down, or attempting to ban Soviet deployment of their SS–9 and SS–18 heavy ICBM's. I wonder if you would go a little more into detail on that subject?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. In the summer of 1974, when I was a member of the negotiating team, this matter of the so-called FBS—I keep saying so-called because FBS is their terminology—was being debated. This issue was the subject of some controversy and some considerable discussion between the two Soviet generals and myself.

It was during this discussion that I kept repeating the U.S. position, which I defended and put to them:

> Look, if you are going to want us to include our so-called FBS, you are going to have to include your like systems. Here are our systems, and here are your systems. Our systems, depending on which ones you include, may be up to 500 or so. Here are yours, which are 2,000 or more. The 2,000 that you have possess about 20 times the megatonnage of ours. Even if you can't put all your weapons on their targets, you have at least 10 times the destructive power—an order of magnitude over us. If you insist on including our so-called FBS, we are going to insist on your including forces which can strike our FBS, our Allies' nuclear systems, and our troops in Europe.

I told the Soviets an attack on NATO was an attack on the United States.

I got signals at that time that the Soviets saw that there was something to our argument. I reported this signal back to the Joint Chiefs who took it to the President. The President said: "Secretary Kissinger, if the Soviets want to include FBS, tell them no." As a matter of fact, the term used was "stonewall."

Much to everyone's amazement, except mine and a few others, the Soviets did not press the FBS issue. It was not a serious issue at Vladivostok. It disappeared, and it is only now coming back into the debate during this ratification process. I have heard practically nothing about FBS since Vladivostok from the Soviets.

Senator HELMS. That may be the answer to my next question. I wanted to ask how our FBS systems compare with the equivalent systems in the Soviet Union.

General ROWNY. I would say, roughly, theirs are at least twice as numerous with 10 times the potential destructive power.

Senator HELMS. You are talking about megatonnage, aren't you?

General ROWNY. No, sir; in terms of megatons the difference can be as much as 20 or 25 times as high. I am talking about what weapons can actually be put on targets and can actually be used. I am talking about destructive potential.

Senator HELMS. Megatonnage is what kills people, isn't it?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. The megatonnage is even higher than the destructive potential they will have.

Senator HELMS. Twenty to 25 times?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Dealing with the FBS raises another related issue, which is of concern to me, namely the fact that the Soviets have such an overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons. This is the thing that has almost been obscured in the discussion, and I think that it is of paramount importance. I think that the country and the Senate, all of us, will make a great mistake if we push that aside and give it no consideration.

General ROWNY. I would like to add at this point, Senator Helms, I share that view. If I have shown more interest and zeal in strategic arms, it is because that has been my job. But as I look at the threats, the greater ones are in the conventional field. However, we were able to rationalize those asymmetries in the conventional field in the past because the NATO Allies could rely on the U.S. strategic umbrella.

Now that our strategic umbrella is being folded on NATO, this conventional asymmetry is becoming even more stark.

Senator HELMS. Let's assume that we achieve what they call "nuclear parity" with the Soviets through amendment of this treaty, or a renegotiation of it, what effect will this have in contributing to overall stability?

General ROWNY. I think that it would have a great deal, Senator, because I think a condition wherein one side is strategically superior to the other automatically confers instability. The other side is going to try to catch up. It is my contention that the Soviets have caught up, and is rapidly moving to greatly surpass us. This treaty will permit them to do that. That is why I think a stable situation is one of essential equivalence or parity. It is even more stable if the numbers are lower.

So, I say, again and again, let's get at what arms control is, or should be, all about, and that is lower numbers.

Senator HELMS. I agree that we ought to get to an arms reduction treaty.

Mr. Chairman, my time is just about up. I want to say that this gentleman is perhaps the most knowledgeable American in this field, and I do hope, and I am going to suggest formally to the chairman, that he be included at an early date in executive sessions of this committee, so that we can go into some very sensitive matters about which he has probably more knowledge, I would say to my friend from Illinois, than any other American whom I can think of.

I want to say to you again, General, that you are a great American, and I appreciate your coming here today.

General ROWNY. Thank you very much.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. General Rowny, I have just been reading your statement here, and that is why I asked for a little time before I was recognized.

You make the argument that the treaty undermines deterrence. It has always been my understanding of deterrence that it was that level of military power that would prevent any country from attacking us, knowing that if such an attack occurred, we would have

enough surviving capability to inflict unacceptable damage on them.

Wouldn't we still have that and more under the terms of SALT II?

My friend, Senator Helms, keeps reminding us that it is megatonnage that kills people. I hope everyone understands that a megaton is a million tons of TNT. It would not take quite a million tons to kill anybody. But we have thousands of these warheads, infinitely more powerful than the one that incinerated Hiroshima. How many more do we need to maintain deterrence?

General ROWNY. As I mentioned while you were outside the room, I think that any rational Soviet leader would not attack the United States with a bolt out of the blue.

Let us here put aside Salvador de Madariga's statement that in the ultimate case, there are no totally rational leaders. Let us assume that they will be rational. If you present a Soviet leader with a situation where he sees himself in a strategically superior position, that will embolden him at the bargaining table or in some kind of a crisis situation. It will allow him, perhaps inadvertently, to move by degrees to a higher degree of confrontation. He may not really know where he is going, or when to pull out.

I am saying that with equality, with parity between partners, there is much more incentive for restraint than if one is superior to the other.

Senator MCGOVERN. I don't understand that concept, General. Why would anybody be emboldened simply because they had more nuclear weapons. I have asked almost every witness this, not to be obstreperous, but because it seems to me that that is a key question.

I really don't understand why it makes any difference, within certain reasonable limits, who has the most warheads, or the most launchers, once you accept the fact that either side could absorb the first strike and still destroy the other. Who really cares what the numbers are?

I don't see where this would give any Soviet leader the boldness to risk anything that might set the stage for a nuclear exchange.

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, I think that in almost any crisis that may come up, and I think that there will be crises, the spectre, of the possibility of somehow slipping into a higher degree of confrontation will loom large. Based upon my reading of Soviet literature and Soviet military writings, they put military power in a much higher relative position than does the United States. They rely on military power. The more they have the more bold they become.

In their writings, they do not shrink from the notion of fighting a nuclear war.

Senator MCGOVERN. I don't doubt at all that leaders of all great powers factor in military powers as one of the considerations. All I am saying to you is, it seems to me that military power becomes meaningless after a certain point, when you are talking about nuclear weapons, if each side knows that the other has the capacity to destroy it.

General ROWNY. I think it is not meaningless.

Senator McGovern. It does not seem to me, then, that the exact balance, and you argue in your statement that we lose equivalence for the first time. I don't know whether that is true or not. It does not seem to me that it is, as I read the treaty. But even if I were to concede that point to you that the Soviets are going to end up with more megatonnage, more millions of tons than we have. We have a study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and the Congressional Budget Office, and they independently conclude that even if the Soviets hit first with everything they have, we could still respond to that with enough power to destroy 80 percent of their economic and nonmilitary facilities, laying aside the amount of human life that would be destroyed.

That being the case, I don't see where it makes much difference whether they would, then, say that they have got a couple of thousand more nuclear weapons left than we have.

General Rowny. What I am saying is, I don't think that a Soviet leader would go through the steps of rational calculation in time of crisis. A Soviet leader, knowing he had superiority, might do things which he would not otherwise attempt to do.

If the Soviet were merely equal—the United States would be in a more comfortable position. The Soviets throughout their writings and conversations do not have a high regard for U.S. resolve. Although their leaders say that they don't want a nuclear war, and I believe that, what the military write and say is that if they get into a confrontation, nuclear weapons will be used. Their writings are full of—replete with—war fighting scenarios. That I don't like. I am willing to allow them to be equal, but not more equal.

So long as they are equal, that is fine. If they are more equal, then we had better correct that situation. The preferable way is to have them come down, which is what they ought to do, and which is what we ought to insist that they do.

Senator McGovern. You and I are in complete agreement on that, that both sides ought to come down. But do you hold to this theory that is sometimes expressed that there is a possible scenario under which they would attack the land-based missiles, assuming that we would not retaliate?

I have heard this theory expressed, maybe not so much in these hearings, but I keep reading about it. There is the theory that some of our military planners have under which, unless we go ahead with very sophisticated systems like the M-X, the Soviets might knock out our land based missile system, and our President would not retaliate for fear that it would bring the rest of the missiles in on our cities. Do you hold that theory?

General Rowny. Senator, all the scenarios are laden with assumptions, they are all difficult, and they are all hard to follow. I am saying, simply, that a Soviet leader in some crisis situation, knowing that he has nuclear superiority, and knowing that his military does not shrink from using nuclear weapons, especially if he believes in his civil defense system, will be more adventuresome and take greater risks. It is that frame of mind that I want to prevent.

Accordingly, I don't know what the scenario might be. I do think that if I can prevent the situation I have described, I will put the

President of the United States in a better position. I see no reason for taking risks that we do not have to take.

Senator McGovern. Obviously, General, you will not have any argument with me on risk taking. I don't think that any of us want to take any needless risk, but it does seem to me that the greatest risk of all is for both sides to continue to escalate. If I have any real serious reservations about this treaty, and I do, it is because it does not put enough limits on either side.

I just would like to stress as strongly as I can, as someone deeply concerned about the security of this country, that I reject the notion that any rational person, either in this country or in the Soviet Union, would ever contemplate the use of nuclear weapons to achieve a political objective, or to achieve any other kind of objective.

General Rowny. I think the whole answer comes down to the fact, that a Soviet leader may be willing to use a single nuclear weapon in a demonstrative way. It is that kind of a scenario that I want to try to prevent.

Senator McGovern. I cannot conceive of any American President that would not respond to a nuclear attack on this country by ordering a nuclear attack on the attacker.

General Rowny. My point is, Senator McGovern, I don't want to put our President in that position if I can avoid it.

Senate McGovern. I don't see where this treaty does that, where it really changes that equation. We have to assume a certain amount of sanity on both sides, with or without the treaty.

I guess my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Pell. Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take just a couple of minutes to make a statement first, and then use the remaining time for questions.

I do so, first, to join Senator Helms in saying that I believe, General Rowny, your testimony before us, and your meeting with us in executive session will be extraordinarily helpful. I respect the fact that you made a very hard decision. Because you could not support something any longer, you resigned and took retirement before you had intended to.

General Rowny. Thank you. I might say that it was not easy. I did not relish it, and it was not with any sense of joy that I did it.

Senator Percy. I know that. In the military, the tendency is to just go along, and we respect the fact that you have chosen to stand your own ground, and pick your position. We deeply appreciate your appearance here today, and we will value personal consultation with you.

SOVIETS TO USE MILITARY SUPERIORITY FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE

I would like to comment particularly on one sentence in your statement. You indicate:

> My main concern with deterrence is not that a future Soviet leader may feel that he can launch an all-out attack against the United States. I feel that any rational Soviet leader would know that such an action would wreck untold damage on the Soviet Union by our survivable remaining forces.

But you are concerned that they might use that military superiority to their political advantage around the world.

I totally concur with you in that. I think that is our great concern. It is interesting that the two most credible and strongest opponents of this treaty have both come to the same conclusion. In an off-hand comment this morning, I am sure well thought through, Paul Nitze came to the conclusion that he did not believe that the Soviet Union wanted to wage a nuclear war. This is an utterly responsible statement. It is so easy to demagogue this issue, to wave the flag and imply that the motive of the Soviets is to make a nuclear first-strike on the United States of America. That position has no credibility.

The last trip I took to the Soviet Union was with Hubert Humphrey. We walked through the Leningrad Cemetery where a half-million Soviet men are buried. The Soviets lost 20 million people in a war that was waged entirely with conventional weapons. We realized at that time that the deep-seated desire to avoid an all-out confrontation goes from the most humble Soviet citizen right straight through the top.

I know from talking with Anatoli Dobrynin that the Soviets refused in the early years of the Nixon administration to sit down and talk with us about any kind of a SALT Treaty because we were selling the ABM by implying that they were planning on making a nuclear attack on this country.

They are rational people. They are tough minded. They are going to bargain hard. They will not only gain parity, but they will want to gain military superiority. But I think that is because of the political leverage that it will give them. I do not believe, and I think that it is a great disservice to state that they are planning a nuclear attack and, therefore, think that they can win a nuclear war. Anyone who says that, I think is irrational. What is the position that you have come to?

General ROWNY. Senator Percy, the Soviet leaders are, particularly the military, very conservative planners, and very conservative people. They are great students of Clausewitz whom they quote quite often to the effect that if you can get your objectives without using your forces, that is the way to do it. I think that is what they intend to do.

Senator PERCY. I think they intend to use their military power to achieve their foreign policy goals and objectives. I think they want to extend their influence all over the world, and in every part of the world that they can possibly extend it. I think they want to maintain their firm grip on Eastern Europe, and I think that by having a huge military establishment they can help to insure that.

I think, like in Afghanistan, and other countries in Africa, they intend to attempt to influence these countries and use the leverage of their military power.

Here we are, the Foreign Relations Committee, we are holding hearings on SALT and on disarmament. It is unusual to have so many witnesses both supporting and opposing this treaty, indicate that our military strength must be maintained.

If we intend to have a foreign policy in this country, we had better realize that we had better have military strength behind it. I think the Soviets have realized that as well. It is in our vital

national interest to maintain and strengthen our own power. Politically, economically, militarily, and socially we must be strong. If we are a weak military power, and slip behind, and allow ourselves to slip behind, we are going to fall behind in every single other area.

The strength of America in these areas is absolutely essential to promoting both our own interests and the interests of the free world. That is why the NATO countries and many other countries look to us to maintain our military strength.

I don't think that it serves our interest, however, to misread Soviet intentions, either by minimizing Soviet capabilities or by magnifying them. If we study the Soviet-American strategic balance, I think that we have to be very realistic about it. We must have the foresight, and we must have the wisdom, and we must have the will and be willing to sacrifice when necessary to forestall the Soviet drive for strategic superiority, both by hard bargaining in our Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and by our own independent military decisions.

I think that if the Senate ratifies this treaty , we will state that it can only be based upon our willingness to build the necessary strength for the future, to keep that level of parity and prevent the Soviets from achieving military superiority. Let them be on notice that we are never going to be second to them. That is the position the President took, and he received his strongest support from Congress when he addressed that one particular issue.

If the Soviets realize that they are not going to be able to overcome us and that we will have the strength to keep going, then I cannot see that they are going to engage in the race. They will only engage in the race if they think we lack the will to stay even with them or just slightly ahead.

I think these hearings alone, for that reason, are extremely important, and we respect your position on it.

General ROWNY. Senator, for a long time I paid taxes to both Virginia and Maryland. If it would help, I would pay taxes to Illinois, too, for that statement. [Laughter.]

Senator PERCY. We appreciate that.

U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF HEAVY ICBM'S

General, do you believe that the United States must or should deploy heavy ICBM's in order to maintain national security, and have our previous decisions against deploying heavy missiles been incorrect in your judgment?

General ROWNY. Senator, the question of heavy missiles, in my opinion, is not well understood. I think that this issue needs considerable in-depth discussion.

Our decision not to go with, or to abandon the heavy missiles at an early date was based on some good sound reasons. At that time, the reasons held up. However, we are in a dynamic situation. You will remember that at first we thought we could not live with an ABM Treaty, and then we decided we could. Now some 7 years later, one of the options being studied in connection with our vulnerability of Minutemen, is some type of missile defense. These things move.

At the time we thought that if we went to smaller systems, the Soviets would follow suit and would build smaller systems. We believed they would see the wisdom of not building all that power.

The second reason was that we believed we could keep a qualitative edge for much longer than we did. We have been surprised again, and again, and again. Only as late as several months ago, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Soviets surprised us with the large and substantive qualitative improvements they have made in their missiles.

Now, even though our original reasons are not valid, I still do not want to build 308 heavy missiles. I want the right to do so, but even better, I would like to be accorded compensating measures or have him get rid of his heavy missiles. In other words, if a neighbor of mine has 308 rattlesnakes in his backyard, he is not being a very good citizen. Does that mean that I need rattlesnakes? No, I would prefer that he got rid of his rattlesnakes. If I could go to a policeman, or a court and say, "Make him get rid of his rattlesnakes," I would be happy. Without the policeman or the court then I will have to do whatever is necessary. Maybe not get 308 rattlesnakes myself, maybe I would get some mongooses, or mongeese.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, General.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator Stone?

SOVIET REJECT OF U.S. MARCH 1977 PROPOSAL

Senator STONE. General Rowny, back a couple of years ago, did you accompany Secretary of State Vance to Moscow, when this administration made its first major arms control proposal?

General ROWNY. Do you mean in March 1977?

Senator STONE. That is right.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir, I did.

Senator STONE. Shortly after the Soviets rejected our suggestions for deep cuts and a freeze on the modernizations of ICBM's, Dr. Brzezinski gave a Washington news conference, which has been reprinted in full in Aviation Week, and in that he explained the nature and rationale of our proposals for significant cuts.

What he said was, "What we were trying to accomplish, and what we intend to accomplish is to move forward to genuine disarmament. That is to say, to obtain a significant reduction in the level of the strategic confrontation." Why did the Soviets reject that approach, in your experience?

General ROWNY. In my opinion, Senator, they rejected it because they thought we were not serious, and if they stood up, we would back down.

In the fall preceding that visit, late in 1976, I told General Brown, the Chairman, that I had been with the negotiations for 3½ years and I thought I ought to move on. I wanted to do something else.

He asked me to stay on with the new administration. He said I could provide some continuity to the negotiations and be of use to the Joint Chiefs.

I was delighted when the administration developed its March 1977 proposal. I took this proposal to the Joint Chiefs, and after some difficulty, convinced them that the new proposal was in our interest even though it entailed risks. The Chiefs decided: "All right, despite the risks we will back the March 1977 proposal."

We took the proposal to the Soviets in Moscow. We offered them a very good proposal, one which was still more favorable to them than to us. They said: "Nyet." At that point, we should have said: "We stick to our guns."

If you want an opinion other than mine, Mr. Senator, on April 13, 1977, Secretary Brown made a brilliant speech in Rochester, N.Y. He explained what was behind the March 1977 proposal and apparently tried to resurrect it. Let me read you one or two sentences from his speech.

Secretary Brown said:

> These two proposals—

Remember there was not only a comprehensive but a deferral proposal—

> particularly the comprehensive option are far reaching. They would have a real impact on United States and Soviet strategic weapon systems. They would provide us with a chance to deal with a key source of instability, ICBM improvements. The proposals are also equitable. They would serve the interests of the Soviet Union no less than our own.

I ask you to read that speech. It was a good rationale for a good proposal, a proposal we lost but should not have lost.

Senator STONE. General, when we did not stand up behind our own proposal, we ended up with the current SALT II Treaty. How does that differ substantially from the offer that we made them in terms of our own national security?

General ROWNY. I think that it differs markedly.

Senator STONE. How?

General ROWNY. In the first place, the 1977 proposal would have required deep cuts from 1,800 to 2,000, and not the 2,400 level. That would have amounted to significant reductions.

Second, it would limit MIRVed systems to 1,100 to 1,200, and not to 1,320. One of the most significant limits was that on MIRVed ICBM's, the most destabilizing, the most powerful and the most destructive of all systems. That level would have been 550 instead of the high level of 820. Finally, we said:

> You, the Soviets, should get rid of over one-half of your heavy ICBM launchers which are causing so much of our difficulty. You should reduce these heavy ICBM launchers to 150.

There were other provisions in that proposal, but those I have mentioned are the main ones.

I think we lost out by not pursuing that very good proposal.

Senator STONE. Did those good proposals, or the earlier ones, as compared to what we now have, substantially reduce the risk of a Soviet or United States first strike.

General ROWNY. Yes, it would have reduced it substantially. Remember that those 150 would have come out of the 550 MIRVed ICBM total, which would have left only 400 for the other MIRVed systems. This would have reduced the asymmetry considerably.

They would be permitted only 400 RV's or ICBM's instead of the 6,300 they are now permitted.

So it would have cut a 3-to-1 asymmetry, which this treaty permits, to something less than 2-to-1 asymmetry in ICBM reentry vehicles. That to me would have been the most significant advantage. Further it would cut the total Soviet aggregate substantially, and would have cut into our forces as well. It would have amounted to arms control.

SURVIVABILITY FACTOR OF SALT TREATY

Senator STONE. What is the first strike, and even more importantly, what is the survivability factor of this particular treaty as to the United States, and as to Russia?

General ROWNY. Most estimates say that the Soviet Union, if they chose to unleash a strike at the United States, could destroy 90 percent of our ICBM's and other hard targets in the United States.

Senator STONE. What would that yield us in terms of response to strike back?

General ROWNY. Well, it would allow us to retaliate with the 10 percent or so which would be left, plus, up to one-half of our SLBM's which are effective only against soft targets.

Senator STONE. What could we do?

General ROWNY. It would force us into a mutual assured destruction doctrine, in other words, killing people and destroying industry. Most judgments of our uniformed military officers, and the Secretary of Defense's judgment is that this would be destabilizing.

We should stay as far away as possible from this destabilizing doctrine.

Senator STONE. I would like to read you Dr. Brzezinski's comment in his news conference as to what the purpose of our proposals then were, and whether you would agree with that, and how that relates to what we now have before us.

He said in March, and reported in the April Aviation Week,

> It is our feeling that the framework defined by Vladivostok is so high in its numbers, so open-ended in its consequences, so susceptible to quantitative as well as qualitative improvements, that in some respects it comes close to a misstatement to call any such arrangement, arms limitations. All it is, really, is an arrangement for continued arms competition, and we have gone to the Soviets with a proposal, which we crafted as best we could, in order to convince them that maybe the time is right to take a significant step toward reductions.

General ROWNY. I wish that I had written it myself, Senator. Brzezinski and I are not Poles apart.

Senator STONE. Now, as of today, and with this treaty proposed to us, how does it relate to Dr. Brzezinski's comment about the then status of negotiations? Is it open-ended? Is it so high in its numbers? Is it susceptible of quanitative and qualitative improvements, so that it comes close to a misstatement to call any such arrangement, arms limitation?

Is it really an arrangement for continued arms competition?

General ROWNY. I would say that with the possible exception of the open-ended question, the rest of your questions are well put. The quantitative limits are indeed high. The qualitative limits are

indeed modest. The levels in every case are such that the United States would have to build up to reach the agreed-upon ceilings.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. General, I join with my colleagues in thanking you for your appearance and thanking you for your patriotic service to our country.

I find a number of threads moving through your testimony which I think are important and on which I would like your comments.

You make the statement:

> Since qualitative improvements are virtually unrestricted by the treaty, the numerical limitations imposed upon the Soviet Union will not give us any meaningful degree of predictability.

Then, we see that idea reiterated again when you say:

> In sum, it may be a relatively meaningless limitation.

By this you mean the fractionation of the Russian big ICBM's.

> By 1985, the Soviet Union will have been permitted under the treaty a level of MIRVed warheads which places the United States in jeopardy while leaving them in the position to go even higher. While the treaty in theory limits the Soviets to one new type of light ICBM, in practice the provisions of the treaty permit the Soviets to deploy several new types of missiles.

Then, finally, on another page the same idea is continued.

> Because the treaty does not actually put a brake on the momentum of the massive Soviet buildup, the United States will, for the first time, not be able to maintain essential equivalence or nuclear parity.

Now, all of this indicates that the restraints in this treaty are only one sided. They are on the United States. It indicates that the opportunities for qualitative improvement and so on are also one sided. They are in favor of the Soviet Union.

So, General, I ask you this. First, did you mean to convey that impression? Second, doesn't that squarely counter the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they said that they approved of this agreement within the context of their testimony, to wit, that the United States would show the resolution to materially upgrade its nuclear deterrent as permitted by this treaty during the time the treaty is in effect?

General ROWNY. Senator Javits, there are several points I was trying to convey. The first is that the numerical limitations by themselves are not a very good measure of essential equivalence because it involves mixing not only apples and oranges but weapons the size of basketballs with those the size of tennisballs.

For example—and I could develop this point if you like—the ICBM reentry vehicle is some 75 to 100 times as powerful in its destructive potential as is the SLBM reentry vehicle. Counting ICBM and SLBM RV's is to equate very disparate weapons.

What I am saying is that you should not put much stock in numerical limitations. You should not aggregate different systems but compare ICBM RV's. These are the important RV's.

My second point is that although we wanted to get qualitative limitations, we failed to get them in this treaty. The qualitative limitations that we did get were two: the putative one new type of ICBM, which really can be contravened, and the second is the

fractionation limit, which is an ephemeral limit since it runs out in 1985.

Finally, so far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, I have tremendous respect for the Chiefs. I have worked with them and know the difficult position in which they are placed.

I came in at the creation of SALT II, right after 1972. If you will look at the three assurances which Admiral Moorer and the Chiefs said they would have to have to accompany their support for the Interim Agreement, and if you look at the several assurances the current Chiefs want, you will find that they are almost identical. The Chiefs wanted then to be able to expand and improve our intelligence capability. They wanted to be able to move ahead with new systems, and they wanted more R. & D. I think that the administration then had the best of intentions in promising the Chiefs these assurances. But not one came to pass. So you can see why I'm cautious concerning assurances in view of my past experiences.

Senator JAVITS. But aren't you second-guessing the Joint Chiefs? They don't agree with you. They've set the criteria. They come here and are polled; each of them separately is polled. Each says he is for this treaty, it is the thing we ought to do. He says, "Here are our criteria and the treaty meets them reasonably enough, so we recommend it."

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, I would ask you to explore carefully their views, ideas and consciences and to explore mine. I would then ask you to make up your own mind.

Senator JAVITS. That is fair. That is what I wanted to get from you.

The fact is that in this and in other matters you are diametrically opposed to their views, and to other views.

Let me give you another example.

You say in your statement: "Even our plans to deploy the M–X missile do not help, as it cannot be deployed in a multiple basing mode until 1986, at the earliest."

The Secretary of Defense took exactly that point and sketched out for us the phasing of the U.S. defense system which in the early years had a certain reliance upon the bomber, and in the later years had a reliance upon the Trident and other more sharply targeted submarine based missiles, and so on. He said that the M–X, which we are now determined is right to do, comes along at exactly the right time, and all the timing fits. You say that it does not.

What are we to make of that? Again, are we to take our choice between you and the military and defense authorities who we have in office now?

General ROWNY. Senator Javits, I think you have to look at Secretary Brown's assumptions and his calculations. Most people, and especially those in uniform, will agree that we lose essential equivalence in the early 1980's. We will not be able to deploy the first M–X's in a mobile basing mode until 1986, and not complete the deployment until 1989. By the time we can deploy our first M–X the treaty will have expired. The fractionation limits cannot be extended unless we possess some leverage that is not apparent

to me. What I am pointing out is that the M-X in a mobile basing mode will not solve the current problem of this treaty.

Senator JAVITS. So you also challenge the fact that in that period of time we will be able to work qualitatively on the accuracy of the missiles which will not be affected. Even if you assume 90 percent destruction of the ICBM's, which they certainly do not assume—but let us just assume that—this is only 25 percent of our deterrent, whereas with the Russians it is 75 percent. He says that we have more than enough left and that it is going to be so accurate as fully to be able to retaliate in the way that our plans provide. You say no to this.

Is that correct?

General ROWNY. That is correct, I say that logic is faulty.

Senator JAVITS. It is very important to see where the issue lies. That is what I am trying to get from you.

The last point I want to make concerns a statement you made that interested me very greatly. I quote:

> What I am concerned with is that a future Soviet leader, looking at the overall strategic calculus, would be encouraged to take greater risks in pursuing his political goals than he might otherwise be.

General, is that consistent with your finding that the Russians have qualitative superiority that will increase and improve, even if we enact this treaty? And if we do not, you certainly must assume that it is going to increase and improve even more. So, how are you helping the situation of that calculus by advising us against the treaty?

General ROWNY. Senator, I do not think that I am advising against the treaty. There are many good aspects of the treaty.

My advice to the Chiefs and my advice to you, sir, is that this treaty locks us into certain inequalities. It is an unequal treaty and an unverifiable one. And this need not be. It is my contention that this treaty can be and should be negotiated on an evenhanded basis. In my view it is not too late to do this.

Senator JAVITS. So that is really your thesis. You want a treaty, but you think we will do better if we reject this one and try for another.

General ROWNY. Senator Javits, I don't say reject this treaty. I think that may be too strong. But I think we ought to try for a better treaty.

Senator JAVITS. Great nations cannot bluff, General.

General ROWNY. I beg your pardon?

Senator JAVITS. I said that great nations cannot bluff.

General ROWNY. I would not bluff.

Senator JAVITS. We can only reject it. That is all we can figure on. We cannot figure on a better trade. You would advise us to reject it because you think we can get a better one, but you are for a treaty.

General ROWNY. I am for a treaty, and I do not think I would be bluffing, sir. I think the Soviets need a treaty as much as we do. And since they want a treaty, this would be a very good avenue to pursue. If I am wrong, I think we will have lost nothing and stand to gain a great deal by trying. We are not going to improve our situation by postponing the problems we face to some possible

future date. I do not see a more favorable situation coming down the pike—and it will certainly be much more expensive for us.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Senator PELL. Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I have already had my turn.

Senator PELL. Senator Muskie.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rowny, as I understand what you have been emphasizing over and over again about the SALT negotiations, is that we could have had a better treaty if we had tried hard enough. You are saying that the Soviets would have conceded more if we had insisted strongly. You have emphasized this in so many ways, using so many ways of expressing yourself, that you have very clearly conveyed to me the idea that it was self-evident, that it was so evident to you, that it should have been evident to our other negotiators.

Do you mean to say that?

General ROWNY. Senator Muskie, what I am saying is that I wish the other negotiators shared my conviction that if we had negotiated tougher we could have achieved a better treaty. I am saying that arms control became the centerpiece of our policy. In my view arms control should not have taken an overriding position over our security interests.

Senator MUSKIE. I understand that.

But you have emphasized this point so much that I want to know whether what you are talking about is a gut instinct on your part that no one else felt, or whether it was based upon some solid evidence that was available to others who also had the responsibility for representing us in these negotiations.

What you are saying is serious. These negotiations have been going on for 10 years. You have been involved for 6. I happen to know personally many of those who have been associated with this, and I do not happen to believe that they were interested in giving away things that they did not need to give away or that they were interested in not getting concessions they could not get.

So, I am curious as to why a better bargain that was so clear to you and so reachable from your point of view was not perceived by anybody else in these negotiating teams under three presidents.

General ROWNY. Well, Senator, in the first place, I do not think I am alone in my view. I think there are quite a few people who saw these things as I saw them.

I will not get into specific personalities. But I will say that those who negotiated this treaty in Geneva at times had their hands tied.

Senator MUSKIE. But who is tying whose hands?

General ROWNY. I am saying that policy makers in Washington to a great extent tie the negotiator's hands

We Americans go into the negotiation arena having negotiated away most of our negotiating leverage. We have these great debates within our own Government. We say that what we aim at in Washingtion is our bottom line and we are going to stick to it. Then we try it out on the Soviets and do not stick to our bottom line. The Soviets say to us: "Look, you have to give in every negotiation." And our people say: "Sure you have to give in a

negotiation." So we ratchet down. Then we ratchet down again. We give concession after concession. It is easy to document what I have said. Most of the time we were the demandeurs. We would, time and again, go to the Soviets with a proposal. Then we'd say "If you don't like this proposal we'll offer you a second. Or a third."

After several such exchanges the Soviets would start picking the cherries from the pie. The proposal they would accept was the best portions of all of ours.

Senator MUSKIE. But General, that is no different than any negotiating session, whether you are negotiating wages and hours or arms limitations. It is a question of give and take. I understand that.

General ROWNY. Senator Muskie, the basic difference is that we did not understand, and do not yet sufficiently understand the Soviets. We mirror image them. We look at them through our own eyes. We are peoples of different cultures who hold different objectives. It is not like wages and hours where we are all Americans.

Senator MUSKIE. General, I am interested in those observations but I am trying to get at a point, which to me is critical.

If for 10 years we have been represented by people at these negotiations who overlooked an obviously better bargain for the United States in terms of our national security, that is a serious charge to me. I think it ought to be based upon something more solid than one person's gut reaction to other personalities.

General ROWNY. Senator Muskie, let me say again that I do not think it was always the fault of the negotiator but more often the fault of the instructions under which he worked.

Senator MUSKIE. But General, instructions are part of the negotiations.

General ROWNY. Yes sir, but the most important part——

Senator MUSKIE. Well, they set the parameters and obviously they operate and do this within the context of what they get directly from the negotiators and the feel of the environment in which the negotiators are operating. It is a team effort with give and take between those who necessarily have to stay in Washington, while the negotiators are operating in the field.

This communication ought to be so sensitive and so clear that if the kind of reaction you are describing as being yours in that negotiating environment was actual and based on fact that could be communicated, it should have been, and if it was communicated and was disregarded, then somebody is seriously at fault.

General ROWNY. Again, let me say that the negotiators in the field often had their hands tied. I am not putting all the blame on them. There are some negotiating positions which we gave up unnecessarily at the negotiating table. But most of our failures were as a result of the inter-agency process in Washington where we debate our positions until we arrive at the lowest common denominator. In our zeal for a treaty, and in telegraphing that zeal, and by going to the Soviets again and again, we have telegraphed to them that we want a treaty and we want it pretty badly. I am saying that that is bad negotiating tactics.

As Mr. Meany once said, "If you cannot get up from a negotiating table, you had better not sit down."

Senator MUSKIE. But General, you just told us a few moments ago that the Russians told you they wanted a treaty badly.

General ROWNY. Yes, they do. That is what makes our zeal for a treaty such bad policy for the United States.

Senator MUSKIE. But you are saying that our conveying our desire for a treaty to the Soviets created a disadvantage for you, but the Soviets telling you that did not create a disadvantage for them.

Weren't we supposed to communicate to each other the urgency of our shared objectives in a treaty?

General ROWNY. I see those two objectives not as antiethical, but as mutually reinforcing. I say the fact that we wanted a treaty pretty badly and telegraphed it to the Soviets allowed them to come in with extreme positions while we, time and again, came in with reasonable positions.

Senator MUSKIE. But they telegraphed the same thing to you.

General ROWNY. On the contrary, I am saying that we did not perceive and still do not perceive that the Soviets——

Senator MUSKIE. Only you perceive it, then?

General ROWNY. I think a few other people perceive it, but I think others are only now beginning to perceive it.

Senator MUSKIE. I find this very difficult to understand, General. How could you perceive something to which everyone else was blind? Your perceiving it put us at a disadvantage, but their perceiving it did not put them at a disadvantage.

General ROWNY. I would like to answer, Senator, that not everyone else was blind.

Senator MUSKIE. Well, who are the others?

General ROWNY. Let me say that at one time we had a fine team in Geneva when we had Mr. Nitze and now Secretary Brown on the team.

Senator MUSKIE. But I want to know who to blame. If what you are saying is true, General, I want to be able to blame somebody.

General ROWNY. Senator Muskie, I am not looking for someone to blame.

Senator MUSKIE. But I am.

General ROWNY. I am looking to put our security interests and our negotiating into a proper context.

Senator MUSKIE. I want to blame somebody, because you are describing the document as to which we have to say yes or no. You are describing the document as one that was naively negotiated in the face of clear-cut opportunities, from your point of view, to get a better bargain that was overlooked, and as to which your superiors tied the negotiators' hands.

That is a serious charge and I want to blame them because, if it is true, we should have a better product before us.

Isn't that so?

General ROWNY. You have tried to place blame in rather stronger terms than I would, but I would essentially agree with you that we should have a better product before us.

Senator MUSKIE. I am trying to get at something that is tangible and so far I have not gotten it. Your gut instincts may be great. I think mine are pretty good, too. But I think you have to have something more than that upon which to operate.

I would like to ask a question on a slightly different point and I have only a little time left.

Let me see if I can find your exact quotation.

You say that under the treaty—by 1985—the momentum of Soviet development will be such that they will have achieved a greatly superior advantage over us than we now have. That is the thrust of what you said.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir—even earlier than 1985.

Senator MUSKIE. Yet, you say, if there were no SALT Treaty, the Soviets would, in your judgment, not choose to increase the number of their strategic systems. Now, if they would not choose to do so without a treaty, why should they choose to do so with a treaty? If they would not do so without a treaty, then isn't that the strongest argument for not having a treaty at all?

General ROWNY. No, sir, because this line of arguments puts all the weight on the wrong factor, that is on numbers of systems. Once the Soviets have enough weapons, once they can put more than two weapons on every hard target in the United States then a prudent Soviet planner would not place his resources into producing more weapons. He would choose to go into making qualitative improvements.

I am saying once again that our emphasis is all on the wrong factor. We are only looking at numbers of systems. It is one factor, but only one factor, and the poorest of all criteria for judging essential equivalence.

Senator MUSKIE. Mr. Chairman, I see that the red light is on. I would like to pursue this point, and maybe others will. I feel that it is very important.

Senator PELL. May we have unanimous consent to give Mr. Muskie another 5 minutes?

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I would decline Others have been waiting for their turn. I will wait for the next round.

Senator PELL. Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. I have no objection, while the iron is warm, for Senator Muskie to continue.

Senator MUSKIE. I would defer to the other side of the table but thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

Senator PELL. Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say thank you especially at this moment because I am very interested in what Senator Muskie has been saying and the subject he brought up. I wanted to talk about the very same thing.

But before I continue, I want to join with Senator Helms, Senator Percy, and others, General Rowny, who have thanked you for being here. Thank you for the sacrifices you have made in order to be here. We are very grateful, indeed, for your devotion to our country.

In your statement you say the following: "The treaty grants the Soviet Union a unilateral right to 308 launchers for heavy ICBM's. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized from the outset that the Soviet heavy missiles would pose a serious problem, we did not press hard enough for the elimination of the SS-9's and SS-18's."

This raises a question in my mind.

You were there, sir.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And you were among those who did not press hard enough.

General ROWNY. Let us say that I did not have the overriding vote. I wish I had been chief of the negotiating team but I was not. I did my best.

Senator HAYAKAWA. All right, you were not the chief of the team. You were just one of the people there and there were other people outranking you in this particular situation who set the tone of the negotiations.

General ROWNY. That is right.

ATMOSPHERE OF TREATY NEGOTIATION

Senator HAYAKAWA. General, I have a bit of background in psychology and group dynamics and other arcane subjects. I am fascinated with the questions that Senator Muskie has raised and the answers you have given, which seem to impinge on the fact that there are certain attitudes of the negotiators that sort of predetermined the outcome.

You said that we telegraphed to them that we wanted a treaty very, very badly. You used the expression "our zeal for the treaty." In other words, what I guess I am trying to ask is what was the atmosphere here? Were our negotiators being too eager to please, too eager to be accommodating, or can we pin it on an individual and ask, as Senator Muskie has, who shall we blame for giving away the store, or, do you think that the Soviet representatives who speak for a totalitarian system are in a better position to negotiate than their democratic opponents who have among themselves profound differences of opinion. Whereas the representatives of a totalitarian state, as I feel from my own experience, seem to have agreed upon a position and point of view and set of tactics before they come to a meeting so that we are automatically at a disadvantage?

Is it as if there is a trained and coordinated football team against one that has no background and training and coordination? What was the atmosphere of this treaty negotiation? Am I at all correct in saying that we did seem too eager to accommodate?

General ROWNY. Sir, there is one point I made to Senator Muskie that I would like to repeat again.

First, I do not think that you can blame the negotiator who is working under a set of instructions. He is constrained by his instructions. Second, in my opinion, you cannot blame any one or several persons. We, as Americans, are all to blame.

Let me get philosophical, sir, since you have practically invited me to do so.

We Americans are by nature fair-play guys. Our nature is to engage in give-and-take. We say: "Look, we are going to sit down and negotiate this treaty as though one side was labor, the other business." The Soviets are not labor and we business. We do not share the same objectives. You can go way back. The Soviets do not spring from the same roots. Greek rationalism is not part of their heritage. Nor is Roman law. Nor is chivalry. The Soviet tradition is

an authoritarian one. They do not know separation of church and state or separation of powers. The Russian penchant for secrecy and their whole apparatus puts the Soviets into a particular world. This gives them a particular mentality which has been written down in various works. Some people have studied what has been written. Most have not read and studied the Russians and continue to make the same mistakes.

If I were to state who the culprit is, I would say that we, all of us, are the culprit. We don't understand the Soviets. We don't realize that if you scratch a Soviet you scratch a Russian, and if you scratch a Russian you scratch a Tartar.

We don't appreciate that the prescience of the Marquis de Coustine equals that of his countryman and contemporary—deTouqueville. Marquis de Coustine concludes: "I don't blame the Russians for what they are but for pretending to be what we are." We have not studied the Soviets; we simply don't know them.

I could give you example after example of how I learned from my own mistakes. Let me give you one quick example which involves compromise.

One afternoon I sat down with my two generals and said: "Look, the solution to this problem is simple. I will give you A, B, and C and you give me D, E, and F." They appeared to nod approval, so I went to my Ambassador and said, "Look, I would like to try to work out this compromise at tomorrow's meeting." The Ambassador agreed.

So, the next day I said, "Generals, we will give you A, B, and C," if * * * " But at this point Minister Semenov said, "This concludes the meeting." I said, "Wait a minute. I have not yet gotten to D, E, and F." He said, You have said all you need to say." "You evidently don't think A, B, and C are important or else you would not have offered them. Besides," he said, "we don't offer D, E, and F."

Well, I learned my lesson quickly.

The next day I went back to my generals and said: "Look, if you give us D, E, and F, we will consider giving you three items and I'll tell you what they are later." One of the generals said: "What do you think we are—crazy?"

So, just as their mentality is different from ours on compromise, so it differs basically in negotiating style and philosophy. What it really comes down to is that we, as Americans, have deep-seated psychological principles and so do the Soviets.

So I repeat my answer to Senator Muskie that we should blame ourselves. We don't really work hard at learning about the people with whom we negotiate.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I am very grateful to you for that answer. You really threw light on the fact that we, in a diverse and open society, make a virtue of trying to see the other fellow's point of view. I think that no such virtue is recognized in a totalitarian society. The real essence of virtue is to stick with the dogma of that society at that particular time. I guess this is just as true of North Koreans vis-a-vis South Koreans as it is of Soviet negotiators.

General ROWNY. Yes, Senator Hayakawa, they are dedicated people, dedicated to what they believe. They repeat what they are told over and over again. Logic or rationale seldom have anything

to do with the issue. It is right because Lenin said it is right. It is right because Brezhnev said it is right.

The most frequent answer I received to a tough question was: "Brezhnev says so." When I asked, "Well, what do you say," they would reply, "We say what Brezhnev says." "Well, what does Brezhnev say?" "He says what Lenin says."

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I, too, would like to compliment you. You are a very decent person to come here and expose yourself to some of our possibly devious ways, in some areas, to get you to say some of the things we would like to hear you say, and in other instances to hear you say some of the things that we do not want to hear you say.

Still, you are the one who took the time and put yourself in a position to be here for us to interrogate. I appreciate that very much.

DEPLOYMENT OF REENTRY VEHICLES ON HEAVY MISSILES

I would like to ask you about a comment you made expressing concern that in 1985, the Soviets would deploy a greater number of reentry vehicles on their heavy missiles. How long do you think it would take for that deployment to be accomplished?

General ROWNY. Sir, probably 9 months to a year after the treaty expires.

Senator ZORINSKY. Certainly in your estimation you would think that the greater numbers of reentry vehicles on the heavy missiles would increase the vulnerability of our missile system?

General ROWNY. Sir, I do indeed.

What I say is, that if we design a multiple protective system, to take care of 10-RV missiles, we will have built it just in time to be obsolete. If we build an MPS for a certain set of numbers, we will find that those numbers of weapons will be increased shortly after the treaty expires in 1985.

Senator ZORINSKY. If you think the increase in numbers is of a crucial nature, then how would you respond to Mr. Nitze's assertion that the Soviets lose effectiveness with the heavy missiles if they deploy more than 10 warheads on each—because to deploy more than 10 requires the Soviets to reduce the size of each individual warhead?

Would you comment on that, please?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

I do not know exactly what Mr. Nitze said, but I know that the Soviets could deploy 20 to 30 warheads on their SS-18. Each warhead would be of comparable yield and accuracy to ours. I would say, from my past experience that Mr. Nitze would not disagree with what I have said.

Senator ZORINSKY. He indicated that the capability for 30 warheads would be there, but that there would not be a cost-benefit ratio, so to speak, because by increasing the numbers, the value of

the destructive power of each individual missile would have to be reduced. He used some weight equation to which he referred.

Let me ask you about your statement, where you say the following: "Backfire bombers, which our intelligence community estimates can strike targets in the United States on a one-way unrefueled mission, will, thus, not be counted and will be allowed to run free while all our bombers will be counted."

Is the FB-111 a bomber?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir, but it is not an intercontinental heavy bomber and the Soviets have not said that it is.

Senator ZORINSKY. Is it being counted?

General ROWNY. No, sir.

Senator ZORINSKY. Then this is a false statement.

General ROWNY. No, sir. The Soviets have not insisted by the definitions that this be counted. They have never said that a FB-111, a 115,000-pound bomber, as compared to the 285,000-pound Backfire, should be counted.

Senator ZORINSKY. This does not say anything about the Soviet interpretation. This is your statement.

General ROWNY. I am saying that all of our B-52's, even those which are mothballed, and all of our B-1 prototypes, are counted under the treaty.

Senator ZORINSKY. I see.

Then it is not true to say that all our bombers will be counted.

General ROWNY. All of our B-52's and B-1's will be counted, That is all U.S. bombers limited by the treaty.

Senator ZORINSKY. But it really does not say that inasmuch as we do have some bombers that are not counted.

General ROWNY. We do not have any heavy bombers which are not counted in the treaty.

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, it does not say that either.

General ROWNY. Sir, the treaty only deals with heavy bombers, that is bombers of intercontinental range.

Senator ZORINSKY. Can the FB-111 position from a geographical area like England or the NATO countries reach the Soviet Union?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator ZORINSKY. So they do have the capability, even though they are not of a heavy-type dimension, like the Backfire.

General ROWNY. Sir, the definition of a heavy bomber is that it be equal to or superior to the bombers which are being counted. Those are the Bear and Bison for the Soviets and the B-52 and B-1 for the United States. The Backfire is within 10 percent of the B-52 in its range capability.

Senator ZORINSKY. Do you think the people on the ground who would be killed by a nuclear weapon would really care how far that plane had flown or how big it was?

General ROWNY. Sir, I think our friends in NATO would have a great deal of concern if we would agree that our FB-111's, our A-6's, and our A-7's, be counted in this treaty while Soviet systems, which are at least twice as numerous and have 10 times the destructive power of ours, would not be counted.

If you buy the Soviet argument, which I reject, a system is to be counted if it can attack the other's homeland. I am saying that we do not buy that argument. We reject it. An attack on one in NATO

is an attack on all, including the United States theater forces which are more than tilted in the Soviets' favor.

Senator ZORINSKY. Let me ask you another question.

Ambassador Earle, the other day, in previous testimony, indicated that as Chairman of the SALT negotiating team he was not informed in advance of the administration's shelving of the B–1 bomber.

To the best of your knowledge, was that ever discussed with the negotiating team? Were you aware of it prior to the announcement being made?

General ROWNY. No, sir.

Senator ZORINSKY. The point I wanted to make with him is was it ever even thought to use it as a chip and to hold back the announcement until after the negotiating team had a chance?

General ROWNY. No, sir. I was stunned when I heard the announcement that the B–1 was going to be scrapped. I think Ambassador Earle shared my surprise.

You may have heard Senator Tower's encounter with academician Schukin when he asked him about the B–1. Mr. Schukin is the number two man on the Soviet side. Senator Tower asked Schukin: "We gave up the B–1, what did you give up?" Academician Schukin said, "Mr. Senator, I will have you know that we Soviets are neither pacifists nor philanthropists."

Senator ZORINSKY. How did you actually find out about the President's determination about the B–1?

General ROWNY. I read about the decision in the newspaper.

Senator ZORINSKY. Were there any thoughts by the negotiating team at any time to use the B–1 possibly as a chip?

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, I didn't give a thought to the notion that the B–1 was going to be scrapped. I was stunned when I learned it would be so.

Senator ZORINSKY. So, as far as you were concerned, you still felt that at some negotiating session you would have the ability to utilize that possibly as leverage within the negotiating itself?

General ROWNY. Well, you cannot use a system you announce you are going to scrap as a negotiating chip.

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, you did not know that.

General ROWNY. No, sir. But certainly if I had known that there was a possibility of scrapping it I would have argued differently with the Soviets.

We talked about the B–1 with the Soviets and then suddenly, like a bolt out of the blue, we heard that the B–1 had been scrapped. It simply did not enter into our negotiations.

Senator ZORINSKY. That was one of the most often asked questions after the announcement was made by the administration. My constituents asked me what they gave up in return. Inasmuch as the SALT negotiations were going on at the time, I, as you, was a little amazed that no mention had been made to the negotiating team in advance.

Senator STONE. If the Senator would yield, is that what you meant, General, when you said that we gave away things that we did not have to give away—that we yielded?

General ROWNY. No, sir. I was talking about those systems we had on our books, or in being. We gave some of those away.

That trend started way back in the 1960's—around 1964 or 1965—when I was working for Mr. McNamara. We scrapped 300 B-58 bombers which were only several years old.

Let me repeat here that I did not know and I did not believe that the B-1 was going to be scrapped. I was rather stunned to learn that it would be.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I have just arrived, so I will defer for the moment.

Senator PELL. We have all had one turn. Are there others who would like to ask further questions?

[A show of hands.]

Senator PELL. I see some hands.

Senator SARBANES. Let me defer for now, Mr. Chairman.

General, I apologize to you. I was tied up with another meeting that I simply could not miss. But I am very interested in your testimony and this opportunity to question you.

Senator PELL. Let me say that I would hope if Members do have more questions, they would not feel compelled to use up their 10 minutes.

Senator Percy, do you have any questions?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

Gentlemen, I have just been at the hearing that Senator Glenn called as chairman of our Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke is testifying about the President's trip to South Korea. I quoted there some of the things you said here which I felt were very significant. And now I want to comment on something we discussed in that meeting. It relates to the intentions of the North Koreans and the huge military buildup that is now the subject of a good deal of discussion between us and the President on whether or not he should go ahead with his pledge to withdraw U.S. ground forces. So many of us have strongly disagreed with this policy from the start.

The whole buildup, really, is not only for possible invasion, but also certainly for the political leverage it provides.

While you are here you are now free to comment as an individual and not on behalf of the Joint Chiefs. Would you comment on whether or not you feel that the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea and all of the paraphernalia we would have to take out with us—if I could call it that—would be contrary to our national interest and would be perceived to be a weakening of our resolve in that area? Would it cause concern, in your judgment, as to our intentions to remain a real Pacific power in the perceptions of such countries as Australia and New Zealand all the way up through Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, and so on?

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, I have not been in Korea since I commanded the I-Corps in Korea. As you might know from my biography, I commanded the six U.S. divisions and two Korean divisions on the line guarding Seoul.

I have three comments.

First, I was struck then—and I have always been amazed—at the tenacity of the North Koreans and at the extent of their propaganda machine which extends to some 37 countries. For a country as weak as they are to put so many resources into so many countries all over the world always seemed to me to be something which was unreal. So I have never underestimated the North Koreans.

My second comment is that we have talked a lot about our NATO Allies but we must not forget that we have Pacific Allies. A loss of strategic superiority in the umbrella is going to be just as important to the people in the Far East as it is to NATO.

Third, I think it would relate to something Senator Muskie said.

I have made a number of statements about our negotiating ability, which I believe to be true. These statements are backed up by facts, and therefore they are more than mere allegations or assertions. They are demonstrable.

I do not want to leave the impression that all of the negotiating techniques are in their hands, that they have everything in their favor. We have some traits which work in our favor. An example reflects back to Korea.

Early in the negotiations one of their generals said to me: "Look, I don't understand the United States. In 1949, your Secretary of State drew a line and said that the United States was not interested in anything beyond that line. So, we told our North Koreans to go down and liberate South Korea. Then, all of a sudden, you Americans went absolutely berserk. You mobilized your forces and you threw everything into Korea, "I just don't understand the volatility of the United States." Whereupon, I said, "General, you'd better believe it."

I think our volatility is one of our strengths. We seem to be slow to realize what the situation is. But once aroused, and once we understand, we can and do move.

So, I do not want to leave a completely bleak picture that we cannot negotiate. We have certain cards we can play, if we would only use them.

Senator PERCY. Let me get to the general question of having no illusion that, even if we ratify this arms agreement, it will lead to an immediate major reduction in military expenditures.

So many of us fought our beloved colleague, Senator Mansfield, on his proposal to withdraw ground forces from NATO. I felt this was not a wise policy. So, too, in South Korea, many of us have fought reducing those ground forces so long as the present situation exists and so long as there is a major buildup in North Korea and Kim-il-Sung has not at all changed his intentions of communizing and uniting the whole Korean peninsula. Would you feel it ill-advised for us to withdraw ground forces from South Korea?

General ROWNY. Again, let me say that I have not been in Korea for quite a while and have not examined the situation in detail. I will just give you what I have picked up by collateral reading and conversations with those in the know. I would be extremely conservative in this area and not underestimate the enemy. If we have made one major mistake in the past 10 to 20 years it is that we have consistently underestimated—not overestimated—our adversaries.

I think the record will show that our National Intelligence Estimates, by and large, underestimated rather than overestimated our adversaries. One of the cardinal sins of a military leader is to underestimate his enemy.

In this context, I would say we should go very, very cautiously and very carefully. I see very little to be saved monetarily by withdrawing our troops from Korea. It is not much cheaper to deploy part of your troop structure in the United States than in Korea. In Korea they can show a U.S. presence. To repeat, I would be extremely cautious and reluctant to make any withdrawals unless I were sure of what the consequences would be. I see no reason for acting to the contrary.

PRESSURE TO CHANGE POSITION ON SALT

Senator PERCY. Have you in anyway been pressured or talked to about changing your position when it became apparent that you might oppose SALT?

General ROWNY. Sir, many high ranking military and civilians have tried to persuade me to change my mind in my assessments.

Senator PERCY. In no way have you been subjected to any pressure?

General ROWNY. No, sir, if you mean pressure to which I have succumbed. But there was much attempted persuasion.

Senator PERCY. Many past or retired Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some Chiefs themselves have come out against SALT. There have been some implications that all of those currently serving are united in support of it and therefore pressure must have been put on those still holding office. Is there anything you can tell us for the record on whether or not you know of any pressure that was put on the Joint Chiefs? Or, is it, as I perceive it to be, a matter of negotiating with them so that in good conscience they could support it and they finally did not agree to something until such time as there was a package they could support?

General ROWNY. I think I would rather leave that line of questioning for the Chiefs, Senator Percy. I have stated before that I have enormous respect for the Chiefs. They have very difficult positions. They have spent a lot of time with me, trying to understand the situation. They have devoted an inordinate amount of time to trying to understand SALT. I have a great deal of sympathy for their position.

I just want to say that when I was advising the Joint Chiefs, I gave my advice to the Chiefs through channels. Now I am trying to do the same thing, by giving my advice to the Senate. Here again, I am sticking to the channels of duly constituted authority.

Senator PERCY. Thank you. I have one last question.

You are opposing this particular treaty and its ratification. Are you opposing the principle of a step-by-step approach? Would you rather see us try to embrace a comprehensive arms control approach? Would you feel that there would be any basis for success in that? Is there any other suggestion you would want to make if this cannot be ratified, or are you simply saying we should go back to the bargaining table and improve our position?

General ROWNY. I guess I can bound the problem, Senator. I can say that the Soviet claims for complete and general disarmament, which go back to Czar Alexander's and Czar Nicholas' times are pure propaganda. Complete and general disarmament, that is, completely giving up all of one's weapons, is not disarmament. Complete disarmament as a policy is no policy at all. It has no value other than for propaganda.

On the other hand, I do think that a step-by-step process accurately describes our situation. We should be able to take another step and not step off the precipice. I see no way of getting to SALT III from this SALT II agreement. Therefore, I think that this treaty should be improved. All I am saying is: "Let the treaty be equal, let it be verifiable." Then this treaty will be a step, and a proper step, as part of a continuing process. Otherwise, I think we are kidding ourselves that there can be a SALT III following this treaty.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Senator PELL. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUPPORT FOR SALT I AGREEMENT

General Rowny, do you think that SALT I was a good idea?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I think that taking the initiative for the interim agreement was a good idea.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think the agreement should have been approved—not the process of negotiating to try to get an agreement, but the agreement that was arrived at?

General ROWNY. Sir, I think I would have made it certain that my three assurances would first be met. I would have said, "Look, I want to see these assurances put into concrete terms".

Senator SARBANES. What were those assurances that you think would have been essential?

General ROWNY. The three assurances the Chiefs then asked for are these: One, that our intelligence community, which was falling apart, be improved and augmented so that we have a good intelligence capability, particularly monitoring capability; two, that the programs we need for our strategic posture which is falling behind—be vigorously pursued. The Chiefs named them: The M-X, the Trident, the cruise missiles, and the B-1; three, that we need a stepped-up, vigorous research and development program to utilize our technological advantage to good effort.

There is one other thing I would like to say. The Soviets badly wanted the ABM Treaty, and we wanted the interim agreement, a freeze on offensive arms. We traded. I would say the first concession leading to our long line of concessions was our agreement to give the Soviets the ABM Treaty, which we wanted, without a comparable treaty or a comparable agreement on offensive arms on our side. I think that this concession started our habit of making concessions which has not been rectified.

When the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement were approved, the United States said that we would extend the ABM Treaty after a 5-year period if, and only if, there were a satisfactory treaty on offensive arms.

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Five years later, in 1977, we did not make that statement stick. I think we could have and we should have.

Senator SARBANES. None of these assurances were precluded by SALT I. We could have done them if we had chosen to do them. Is that correct?

General ROWNY. I think that is correct.

SALT I HANDICAP ON SALT II

Senator SARBANES. When you started negotiating on SALT II, to what extent do you think you were handicapped in trying to reach an agreement that you would have preferred by the existence of SALT I and its terms?

General ROWNY. I think we were handicapped in that even in SALT I there were certain things that were carried over which were needlessly carried over—such as the statement at that time that the Soviet's right to heavy missiles would be carried over and that it would be a part of the new limitations. I think right there we should have said, "Look, part of this interim agreement shall be a freeze on weapon systems; but this heavy system, which is not three times, but seven times as large as our Minuteman, shall be excised." I think we would now be in a lot better position.

U.S. MAINTAINING STRATEGIC PARITY OR SUPERIORITY

Senator SARBANES. Do you think it is possible, if SALT II is approved, for the United States to maintain strategic parity, or even superiority, if the United States were prepared to commit the resources to do so?

General ROWNY. Let me put it the other way. Our ability to restore the strategic inferiority which we are going to suffer in the early 1980's, would be much easier to accomplish if this treaty were different. If the heavy missiles, for example, were not there and if the Backfire were counted it would be a more equitable agreement.

Senator SARBANES. Let us assume that the choice is the treaty or nothing. What is there in the treaty terms that keeps us—if we have the will to commit the resources—from assuring parity, and indeed even superiority, if we chose to pursue that course?

General ROWNY. The way I would answer that, sir, is I would not accept the assumption that the choice is this treaty or nothing. I do not think we have to accept this treaty as a given, and I would not do so.

I do not relish spending $30 billion or $40 billion unnecessarily. Why spend all of this money only to have to tear down systems? Or to have the MPS obsolete? The object is to get arms control. Therefore, I would not accept the assumption: "This treaty or nothing."

I think we could have a better treaty and it is achievable.

Senator SARBANES.With this treaty, if we commit the resources, can't we do a whole host of things that would maintain strategic parity, and even better?

General ROWNY. I would say that we could do a lot of things if we spent a lot of money and started right away. We could begin sooner to restore the essential equivalence which we are losing in the early 1980's.

Senator SARBANES. Did you mean that a better treaty was attainable?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. At what point did it go off track? You were there for 6 years, watching this process unfold. Was it off track when you got there? Did it seem to be moving on track and then at some point did something happen to derail it? If so, what happened? What leads you to that assertion?

I am interested in exploring your idea that, in effect, a better treaty could have been achieved.

General ROWNY. It is hard to say when you are in a day-to-day negotiating process and are working at trying to get an agreement at what point it finally turns the corner and therefore becomes unacceptable.

As I mentioned earlier, I was in a state of depression about the whole situation—it was more a disappointment than a mental condition. Then I was greatly rejuvenated when this administration said: "Look, we are going to go after arms control and we are going to see that this thing comes out right."

The March 1977 proposal, was a real shot in the arm. When my old friend, Prof. Sid Drell, came to Washington and debated against Arbotov and told him that this was a good proposition, I was delighted. Here we were all talking about the same thing. I would say that the failure to stick to the March 1977 proposal, to me, started a downhill slide which from then on was, as the Navy calls it, damage limiting. One tries then to get the best treaty one can so that the Senate's subsequent job is easier.

Senator SARBANES. You say that a shot in the arm was given by the deep cut 1977 proposal.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. That was really the approach that you preferred and wanted to take, wasn't it? You felt it would have lead to better results?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. I think every witness here from the administration would agree with that—the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and so on.

We are told that this deep cut was turned down out of hand as a basis for further negotiations. Negotiations had proceeded on the basis set by SALT I and its consequences, and that proceeding down another path was not feasible.

Is that not correct?

General ROWNY. I did not share that judgment and I do not share that judgment.

I think that the Soviets then bluffed and came in very strong, and we folded.

Senator SARBANES. When you say "we," who blinked on our side when they bluffed?

General ROWNY. Well, whoever is the ultimate authority, in the administration.

Senator SARBANES. If we had stuck to it, what do you think would have happened?

General ROWNY. I think if we had stuck to it, we could have negotiated that March 1977 proposal. I think the arguments that

the Secretary of Defense made in his Rochester speech, on April 13 and the arguments which were attributed to Mr. Brzezinski were sound. I think that those are the arguments which could have, and should have, prevailed. I tried everything I could to resurrect what I thought was a mistaken notion that just because the Soviets say "nyet" we should turn away.

My own view is that the Soviets were trying out a new President. They said: "Look, we have a new boy on the block so let's try to see who has the strongest will." There were other issues involved, but I think they took advantage of the situation, particularly when they saw that we had two proposals. I think we should never have complicated the situation by presenting a second proposal, the deferral proposal, at the same time. In effect, we said: "Look, we really want the first proposal, but if you don't like it, here is a second proposal." This is poor negotiating procedure.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, may I please be allowed just one followup question?

Senator PELL. Without objection.

CHANCES FOR RENEGOTIATION IF SALT IS REJECTED

Senator SARBANES. I think you have sketched out a very interesting scenario.

That was over and done with back then. You may be right that if we had held firm, we would have been on a different basis. But they went ahead. They negotiated a treaty and it has been signed. Do you have any reason to think now, if this treaty is turned down, that you are going to be able to go back and negotiate a better treaty?

General ROWNY. There is little doubt in my mind, Mr. Senator, that we can, and that we should do so.

Senator SARBANES. On what do you base that?

General ROWNY. I base that opinion on 6½ years of face-to-face negotiating with the Soviets. I base it on 30 years of studying the Soviets: their history, their literature, their people, their politics and their military writings. I base it on a study of our own American psychology and the Soviet psychology. I base it on the studies that Bill Lee has made about the limits to which the Soviets can spend more money for their military forces. I see the Soviets wanting to be recognized as a super power, I see them wanting to realize the advantages they achieve from continuing détente. I see them being able to get most of what they want under another treaty which is equal and verifiable. We Americans are problem solvers and the Soviets are competitors. I think that if we ratify or codify a treaty with inequalities in it the situation will be hard to reverse. One hears that nothing is impossible. But it is going to be close to impossible to go back to the Soviets and get a better treaty after SALT II is signed and ratified—that is, if this SALT II is signed and ratified.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two questions, General Rowny. First, let me follow the excellent line just taken by Senator Sarbanes. Nonetheless, Gener-

al, as I understand it, the turndown of 1977 was in March and you remained on duty until June 1979. Is that right?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. In all of that time, what did you do about protesting this turndown and why our country was a sap in the negotiations?

General ROWNY. Senator Javits, I protested to a point. I protested it until after the attempt was made by the Secretary of Defense to try to get the March 1977 proposal back on track, some time after April 1977, after Secretary Brown's excellent analysis got very little attention, I said that there is no point in pressing any longer for the March 1977 proposal.

I made periodic assessments from that time which I have listed here on the record. I did not just jump to the conclusions last assessment in a hurry.

Senator JAVITS. So, your period of protest was from March to April of 1977?

General ROWNY. Yes sir, until the end of April 1977.

Senator JAVITS. Then you did exactly what the administration and the Secretary did. You continued the negotiation.

Senator ROWNY. Yes, sir.

BACKFIRES DO NOT REPRESENT LONG-RANGE BOMBERS

Senator JAVITS. I have one other question which I did not ask you before but which I wish to ask you now.

In your statement you say: "These Backfire bombers, which our intelligence community estimates can strike targets in the United States on one-way unrefueled missions"—now here again, we are assured by the Defense Department that these Backfires do not represent long-range bombers. Do you disagree with them technically? Do you say that this is not true?

General ROWNY. Senator Javits, the Joint Chiefs have consistently held that the Backfire is an intercontinental bomber and have so stated. The Department of Defense says the Backfire has intercontinental capabilities. The intelligence community backs this up.

Senator, insofar as verifiability goes, the Soviets made two contradictory statements—Mr. Brezhnev made one statement—and then Gromyko made another statement 2 years later about a radius mission under entirely different parameters. Although the two statements were diametrically opposed, we did not seriously challenge the reason for the inconsistencies.

To me there is no doubt that the Backfire bomber can take off from bases in the Soviet Union, fly on unrefueled missions, at a rather high altitude profile and low speed, strike targets in the United States, and recover in a third country.

That is the way our B-52's operate and how our B–1 would have operated.

Senator JAVITS. Without refueling?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir; without refueling.

Our B-52's cannot go to Moscow and back.

Senator JAVITS. I know, but our B-52's can land in England. Where do you figure the Backfire can land?

Senator STONE. If the Senator would allow me—in Cuba.

Senator JAVITS. That is fine. That is why we are asking.

General ROWNY. I am glad to have some help here.

Senator JAVITS. Would you adopt the idea that they could land in Cuba?

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, there is no doubt about it.

Senator JAVITS. And be invulnerable to us, 90 miles from our shore?

Wouldn't that be assured destruction?

General ROWNY. Assured destruction of what, sir?

Senator JAVITS. Now let's not be children. Cuba is within rifle-shot of Florida.

General ROWNY. Senator, Backfire pilots could even bail out, crash, or simply land in the United States and all we would do is to intern them.

Senator JAVITS. A kamikaze.

General ROWNY. One way recoverable missions—not kamikazes.

Senator JAVITS. Well, isn't that what a kamikaze was?

General ROWNY. No, sir. That is the normal way—well, not the bailing out, although it was back in Doolittle's time. We started that 30 years ago when we went on so-called one-way missions.

The Soviets Backfire pilots would find a safe haven at least in Cuba, and I won't speculate in what other areas, too.

Senator JAVITS. Do they have safe haven in Cuba? Do you think that any chief of staff, worthy of the name, would entrust these aircraft to that kind of chewing up?

General ROWNY. The damage would have been done. They would have already dropped their eggs and have done their damage. Once the pilots land in Cuba are we going to kill this guy because he has already done his job?

Senator JAVITS. I didn't say anything about killing the guy. I am talking about the plane. The recovery which our people claim for the B-52's is 75 percent. Are they wrong?

General ROWNY. No, sir. I think they are right.

Senator JAVITS. What recovery do you claim for these planes?

General ROWNY. I would say 75 percent of the alert force.

Senator JAVITS. If they land in Cuba?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Well, we will find out about that from your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General ROWNY. Certainly, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Are there any other questions?

Senator HELMS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you.

General Rowny, the hour is growing late and I know you are weary. I appreciate your patience.

You know, last year the administration spent well over $1 million sending all manner of bureaucrats around this country to every possible Rotary Club and any other meeting where they could get five or six people together to sell SALT. I saw the computer list of the hundreds upon hundreds of appearances by these people. In a couple of cases, friends in other States have sent me a transcript of what was said. I was a little bit appalled at the

speciousness, to be charitable, and the misrepresentation, to be more accurate. Frankly, some of them made it appear that the choice between approval of SALT II and not approving SALT II was sort of like choosing between drinking hemlock and drinking lemonade.

Not long ago, a young man was nominated by the President as an Under Secretary in one of the domestic departments having nothing to do with foreign relations or national defense or anything related to SALT II. Before he was confirmed, he announced to the press that his major responsibility was going to be traveling around the country helping the President sell this Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, as it is so called.

Now this young fellow is a fine young man, but he knows just about as much about SALT II as a hog knows about roller skating. This is what we are up against, and it bothers me that even in these hearings I found myself wondering whether the terminology is not so technical that it defies the comprehension of the people out there, listening to television and trying to read about it in the newspapers, to the extent that the newspapers can transmit the information.

Now who in Chinquapin, N.C., can tell you MIRVing means multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. But you have served a good purpose here today because you have stated your case in terms which I believe the vast majority of the American people can understand.

Now I am not going to prolong this hearing, but at the risk of retracing a step or two——

General ROWNY. Senator, may I just comment on your remarks?

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

General ROWNY. I would share your view that this is not the kind of decision that should be taken to the American people before it is fully explored within the confines of duly appointed authority.

I was asked many times why I don't go out and speak against this treaty. I said that I would speak to my bosses and keep this issue in the proper channels. Between my retirement and today I have been asked numerous times to give press conferences. I said I would talk to the Senate. They are the ones who are involved.

I think that those kinds of sales campaigns of which you have spoken are not conducive to proper understanding. The people will not take the time that you have taken—and I am glad to see that you are taking this much time—to understand this very complex and very difficult subject. I appreciate that very much. I think that premature and incorrect sales campaigns—that is, sales campaigns on emotional lines—are to be avoided. I so stated to the Chiefs and I got the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to write a letter to the Secretary of State last year on one of the brochures that was put out which did not represent a balanced or coordinated view.

I think we should not sell the pros and we should not sell the cons to the American people. We should bring these issues first to the duly appointed authorities.

Of course, in due time these items get reported. I think that is fine. But I think going around the back door, so to speak, is not the way to get at a difficult and complex Treaty like SALT.

Senator HELMS. I agree with you entirely. What you are saying is let's level with the American people and give them both sides of the picture.

My faith in the people of this country is that given the truth, given the facts without embellishment, they make pretty good judgments. They love this country and want to see it protected. They are not anxious to see billions of dollars thrown away and neither am I. You have made clear that you are not anxious for that, either.

We have a distinguished playwright in North Carolina. I will not mention his name, but when he hears me discussing him he will write to me again. He wrote to me about 2 weeks ago and said, "Jesse, you have to vote for this treaty because we cannot face the prospect of a nuclear holocaust."

Well, General, who in the world disagrees with the assertion that we cannot face a nuclear holocaust. Everybody, of course, is in favor of motherhood and against sin—or I reckon, and sometimes I wonder. These propagandists—and I use that word advisedly—who have been sent at the expense of the taxpayers all across the country for literally hundreds upon hundreds of appearances all over America have used a carefully prepared speech, and just about all they have mentioned have been warheads. They have convinced the people that this is just about all there is to the treaty.

Isn't it a fact that the warhead situation is about the only aspect of this treaty which is really favorable to us?

General ROWNY. I would say that right now there are two out of five critical parameters which are favorable to us. Warhead numbers is a favorable one, and that tapers down to zero by about 1985. The hard target kill capability is still in our favor today, but that crosses down into the unfavorable category somewhere in 1980 or 1981. The other three—and they are the most crucial—throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage, and urgent hard target kill capability—are in the Soviets' favor and continue to be in the Soviets' favor. When you take the total of these, the situation is very much in the Soviets' favor from 1980 onward.

Senator HELMS. Equivalent megatonnage, when you boil it down, guts, feathers, and all, is destructive potential, isn't it? It is determined by what you have described as equivalent megatonnage.

Now is it not so, General, that in equivalent megatonnage, by 1985, under this treaty—and I am including all weapons—the Soviet Union will exceed us by about 2 to 1?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir, at least 2 to 1.

Senator HELMS. About 9 to 4 or something like that at a minimum, right?

General ROWNY. Yes.

Senator HELMS. As for prompt, destructive potential, that is, the ICBM destructive capacity, by 1985, under this treaty, the Soviet Union will have us outnumbered 6 to 1—is that correct?

General ROWNY. It depends upon your assumptions. Let's say that you use the most conservative assumption. Then it would be at least 4½ to 1—in the urgent hard target kill capability—in the Soviets' favor.

Now you can, with certain assumptions, say 6 or 7 to 1. To me, 4½ to 1 are pretty big odds against us. Therefore, I will give the most conservative estimate and say only 4½ to 1.

Senator HELMS. I want to say to you that I thoroughly agree that we ought to have gone back and said no, we are not going to have this, so let's negotiate something that makes sense.

Several times during these hearings I have said that this is not a limitation treaty, it is an escalation treaty. I think the arithmetic verifies that. It is not a matter of who favors nuclear war and who does not. Nobody in his right mind favors nuclear war.

You have helped immensely in making that clear, General. I did not mean to take my full 10 minutes, but I see that I have. Let me thank you again for coming.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rowny, in your exchange with Senator Muskie, I thought his questions were very important because, in a way, he was testing not only the scenario of the negotiations but, I think likewise, was testing your credibility as a witness.

He was suggesting that you were there and, on the basis of your 6½ years, you were offering these thoughts as to how the negotiations went. But at the same time he was challenging you to state whether or not anyone else saw the same picture. Furthermore, as you proceeded and made the assertion that we wanted—that is that United States wanted a treaty very badly and we proceeded avidly to try to get it—Senator Muskie wanted to know who is to blame. If we were pursuing this avidly and we were telegraphing our signals, who is to blame for this?

You have suggested by going back all the way to 1965 that there could be a lot of people to blame—Republicans, Democrats, people who were nonpartisan, lots of people who did not understand the Soviet negotiators.

Very specifically, in the period in which we now find ourselves, that is, following this April 1977 situation, when hope died that 150 SS-18's would be destroyed, or other aspects of those particular negotiating points were to be pursued, we knew then and know today that the President of the United States has wanted a treaty very badly. As a matter of fact, I can recall at the time that he said he was going to initial this treaty he told members of the Foreign Relations Committee that world peace did depend upon it.

We heard assertions yesterday that the NATO Alliance may depend upon it. Even at this late date, if there is anyone in doubt as to who is emotionally involved in this, it is the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State. They are giving the instructions. It is not negotiators like yourself or other people over there who are left to your own devices. They were saying to get a treaty and furthermore get it in time to sign it on the date so that we can have a summit now, not later on, but now, so that in the schedule of the Senate this year and with elections coming on we can get on with it—now.

I think that is very important to establish. There is no doubt in my mind and maybe not in yours. But it just seems to me that when we ask who was giving the instructions, the President of the

United States was giving the instructions. Occasionally, I suppose, he delegated this responsibility to other people.

Now, if the President does not understand the Soviets, then, of course, we have difficulty, especially if he is pressing for a treaty, and this is obvious. If he does not really know what is a good treaty, we have a great deal of difficulty.

I thought it was interesting that columnist Joe Kraft in today's Washington Post said the "sky is falling" argument, the blockbuster argument that peace is gone, had pretty well been dissipated with only 3 or 4 days of these hearings underway. I think you have demolished it. I think it is gone altogether, as of this afternoon. The alternative which you have presented is, essentially, to say to us that if we are truly interested in making the world safe we should negotiate fewer armaments. If we are truly interested in saving money, we should renegotiate this treaty.

Furthermore, if the Joint Chiefs were uneasy yesterday afternoon—and they certainly were—as to whether the Congress would ever prepare to go the route of the strategic expenditures, why they are relieved of that problem if we don't have to go that route by eliminating the destructive mechanisms. You are asserting, albeit yourself, that we can make a better deal, that the Soviets will negotiate.

This becomes a critical point. Senator Muskie is absolutely right. If you are wrong and the Soviets do not negotiate, then your backup position is that we will need to go ahead anyway and do the things we should have done, and this still is something we can afford to do and they probably cannot. This still is a debatable proposition, but maybe is a better course of action than signing a miscast treaty that locks us into difficulty; or, as Senator Sarbanes pointed out earlier, it does not preclude our doing things, but given the scenario of our politics in this country for the last few years, we are rather doubtful, certainly the Joint Chiefs are and I am, too.

So, the course you have suggested may, in fact, be the safer one for us.

Let me guide you back through this once again because I think it is critical.

Are you asserting that if the Senate says no to SALT, at some point the Soviets will be willing to negotiate another SALT Treaty? If you are saying this—and this is my question that goes beyond the first round—who should do the negotiating?

I ask that question on this basis. If the Senate were to simply say no, and we send it back, and the President asserts that he is going to go ahead and do these things anyway as Commander in Chief, as he has already told an interviewer, that does not really offer a very promising set of negotiating circumstances. If we were in trouble before, we really would be in trouble then. Is it not the better course for the Senate, tedious as it may be, to try to rewrite the treaty—in essence, to tell the President, if he is not able to negotiate with the Soviets, what he ought to do? What are the bottom-line things that are required for our security?

What would be your advice?

General ROWNY. I would have two comments, Senator.

On the first, I do have a deep conviction that if we go back to the Soviets and say that this treaty is unequal and unverifiable and we want a treaty which is even handed, while I think there will be a lot of kicking and screaming for some time, the din will soon die out. I think that we will not have a war over it. The Soviets are not going to build much more than they are building now. If they do, let's put it this way. It has been said here before that it would cost us $12.5 billion now with the SALT Treaty. I think that is understated. As the Chiefs said yesterday, I think it would be more like $14 billion or $14.5 billion a year now under the SALT Treaty. Without a SALT Treaty, it would probably cost us about $16 billion.

I would much rather go back now and try to have a SALT Treaty which did not need that $14.5 billion, got us to lower levels, and put us on a better course. If I did not get that and was proven wrong, I do not see that we will have lost anything. I think that we have to be equal to the Soviets and I think, in the long run, they will see the futility of any other solution. I do not think we will have to spend more money than we are otherwise going to spend for very long. Therefore, I think this is a good way to proceed. I do not think they have an endlessly elastic economic base, and I think we have to spend whatever it takes to stay even.

As I said before, whatever point of that curve they want to put their finger on, whether it be Brezhnev, or Ogarkov, we are going to match the Soviets. And we should say: "Look, it is in your interest as well as ours to come down to lower levels."

I do have that pronounced conviction.

As far as putting the blame on anyone, as I said, the blame is on all of us, really, because it is a national attitude that if we are decent the Soviets will act decently. Further, we mirror image and like to think that if we do certain things they will follow suit. We just have to get out of that mentality. That is what I think this educational process on SALT is all about, and I think that is what this is—an educational process.

Now, as to who negotiates, I would establish two qualifications for our negotiator: One, that he had negotiated before and had done it successfully. If I could find another Mr. Meany, who really knows how to negotiate, that would be fine. The man I see now on the scene, Mr. Strauss—seems to know what he is doing. But he should spend 4 or 5 years learning the Russian language. I think you have to know the Soviet language. Until you know the Soviet language, you do not begin to understand the Soviets. And you must know some of their history, too. You have to get out of your mirror imaging and saying that he is looking at these situations the way we are. You have to have an empathy, and the empathy in large part is putting yourself in his shoes. What is he doing? What is he getting out of it? How does he look at this thing?

Senator LUGAR. But to what extent should we try to right the scene? Can we take a chance and sort of start from scratch with a new team of negotiators and send them over there to have a go at it?

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, I think that here again I am out of my depth. I would subscribe to what Secretary Vance said earlier. I do hope that you will go at this thing in some depth and listen to all sides before making up your minds. I think that you will do

this. I cannot sit here now and advise which is the best parliamentary course of action on which to proceed. On this I am out of my depth.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Senator PELL. I have a couple of questions that I would like to address to you, General Rowny.

Am I correct in saying that there is no weapon system that we are contemplating building that we are prohibited from building under SALT II?

General ROWNY. I think that is not accurate, sir. I think we are prohibited now from building, for example, conventionally armed cruise missiles. I think we are effectively prohibited from doing that because under the treaty they would have to count as strategic arms. So, that in effect is a stopper that effectively prohibits us from building them. The Chiefs have said that we should not count nonstrategic systems, but they were overruled. That is one example of the type of thing that we would be prohibited from doing. I think I probably could think of others.

Senator PELL. I wish you would. What would be another example?

PROHIBITION OF CONSTRUCTION OF MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS

Senator STONE. If the Chairman would yield, I would like to insert a question along with that question.

Does the SALT II Treaty as it faces us today prohibit the construction of multiple aim point or multiple protective shelters regarding our current Minuteman missiles?

General ROWNY. Senator, that is a matter of some opinion. The treaty, as written, says that deliberate concealment is to be prohibited. Certainly the multiple aim point system is deliberate concealment. The Soviets have said before—and in my view will say again—that if we go ahead with one of these systems, it will be deliberate concealment. So, in my view, they will challenge whatever system we build.

Personally, I would be more comfortable if, having figured out what system I wanted, I nailed down agreement with the Soviets that I could build it under the treaty's provisions before I spent that money. They have objected in the past to a system we then had on the books. Of course, this is another system. I would want to be sure that we are not committing $30 or $40 billion to something only to have them say that it was not permitted under the treaty. I think there is a better way of doing that.

But, as I said, that is a matter of opinion.

Senator PELL. Let me follow up this line of thought.

As I understand it, in any case, the protocol expires in 1981. You are quite correct that this does put a limitation on our cruise missiles. But it does expire on that date.

So I will come back to my original question. Is there any weapon system that we have contemplated building that is denied to us by SALT I?

General ROWNY. Well, if you call this multiple aim point system a weapon system as a whole, that could possibly be one.

Senator PELL. But we have not made a decision on that, have we?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir, we are contemplating going ahead with the multiple aim point system.

Senator PELL. I thought we had decided only on the M–X?

General ROWNY. Yes, but not yet on the specific mobile basing mode; what we call the multiple aim point [MAP] system. That is a very serious question and the MAP system may be prohibited by this treaty.

Senator PELL. Would the Joint Chiefs agree with you that M–X is prohibited by SALT II?

General ROWNY. I don't know. I think it would be fair to say that the Chiefs would prefer to see these issues as unambiguous and cleared up. At least that is my view. But you had probably ought to ask them, sir.

Senator PELL. Well, I intend to oppose the M–X, but I have a strong feeling that it will probably pass in the Congress. If we go ahead with it, do you believe that that will be considered a violation of SALT II by the Soviets and SALT II will presumably then be denounced?

General ROWNY. I think the Soviets will raise quite a bit of objection to it, and whether or not they finally abrogate the treaty or not, I cannot judge.

Senator PELL. I think we agree that anything we presently contemplate doing will not be affected one way or the other by SALT II, do we not—any program of weapon construction?

General ROWNY. As I said, I thought of those two, and perhaps I can upon reflection think of some more. But right now I cannot think of other things which are on our books and are prohibited. For example, as for unarmed pilotless vehicles—we have said in the treaty that we have no intention of building these during the period of the treaty. I think we would not have said this in another context. We may have very good reasons for building unarmed pilotless vehicles in the future.

Senator PELL. I believe the record will show from yesterday's meeting with the Chiefs that they asserted that there was no weapon system that was being contemplated that was denied them by SALT II. I cannot go much higher than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Wouldn't it be correct to say that under this treaty several systems that the Soviets presumably are developing would be prohibited, and they would actually have to reduce their heavy missiles, even though they would be older ones?

General ROWNY. No, sir, they do not have to reduce any of their heavy missiles.

Senator PELL. I thought they had to reduce 250 missiles.

General ROWNY. They have to reduce 250 systems of some kind, which will probably be some of their older systems.

Senator PELL. But their missiles are heavier than ours, I believe.

General ROWNY. Mr. Senator, to turn that around, I see no particular reason or advantage to favor them or to give them a reward for having gone ahead. We negotiated a freeze in SALT I, and during the period of time from then until now they built more and more systems and continued their momentum. I do not look at their giving up 250 systems as any great concession to us. In other

words, when we agree on equality why reward the other fellow for having to come down to equality?

Senator PELL. I think your words are very correct on how you look at this. I think this whole thing is an Alice in Wonderland exercise on how one looks in the looking glass.

General ROWNY. Yes; it is more and more curious the longer you look at it, sir.

Senator PELL. I think the record should show, at least as I look at it and as the Joint Chiefs seem to have looked at it, that this treaty does not prevent us from taking any steps we are contemplating. It does require a reduction on the part of the Soviets and certain restrictions on prevention of some of the systems which they were contemplating.

General ROWNY. Sir, let me reverse that a bit. It does not prevent us from having to have to build up. In other words, if I could get them to come down, in that sense it does prevent something. It forces me, if I want to get equality, to build up, something which I do not relish and do not want to do.

Senator PELL. Well, we hope the American people will decide which side of Alice's looking glass they will peer through.

Senator JAVITS. General, it just occurs to me that you ought to fill in one thing.

You said that this ought to be renegotiated. It took us 7 years to get this treaty. How long would it take us to renegotiate another treaty?

General ROWNY. That is hard to say, Senator—2, 3, 4 years, I don't know. Maybe a year or two, maybe more. I would think at least that we would then be on a better track toward getting a good treaty. If we continued the process, that is what we are really after in these negotiations, we would fulfill our purpose.

Senator PELL. General Rowny, thank you very much.

This concludes this meeting.

This committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning, when we will be hearing from former SALT negotiators. We will meet again in this room.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

[The following information was referred to on page 165.]

SECRETARY BROWN'S ANSWER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PELL

Question. Secretary Brown, could you submit for the record the details of the U.S. negotiating proposal of March 1977 and indicate specifically, as you indicated earlier, what portion of this proposal's details were achieved in SALT II?

Answer. The SALT II Treaty provisions and the proposal of March 1977 are compared below in each major area of limitation. This comparison shows that (while the proposal did not succeed in reopening issues settled in Vladivostok), comparing the March 77 Comprehensive Proposal with the final result, the March 1977 proposal opened up some new issues for discussion, especially in the area of qualitative limits and new sublimits.

AGGREGATE LIMITS

The March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal sought to: reduce the overall aggregate to 1800-2000 strategic delivery vehicles; reduce MLBM (heavy ICBM) launchers to 150; reduce MIRV launchers to 1100-1200; and, limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to 550.

The SALT II Treaty: reduces the overall aggregate to 2250 strategic delivery vehicles; limits MLBM launchers to 308 (as at Vladivostok); reduces the MIRV launcher aggregate to 1200; and, limits launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to 820.

ICBM RESTRICTIONS

The March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal banned all the modifications to existing ICBMs as well as banning the development, testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs. Further, the number of flight-tests of existing ICBMs was to be limited to six ICBM tests (and six SLBM tests) per year. With regard to the Soviet SS-16/20, the March proposal sought arrangements to distinguish between the SS-16 and SS-20 and no further development or deployment of the SS-16. Mobile ICBMs were to be banned.

The SALT II Treaty contains limitations in new areas that were introduced by the March proposal. Specifically, origin of the new types and RV fractionation limits can be traced directly to the March 1977 proposal. Development of new types of ICBMs is banned in SALT II except for one new type of light ICBM. Modifications of existing types are limited (though not as rigidly as proposed in March 77). Existing ICBMs are not permitted more reentry vehicles than the maximum currently deployed on them and new types of ICBMs and ASBMs will be limited to 10 reentry vehicles. (SLBM RV numbers are also constrained—to 14 per missile.) The production, testing or deployment of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM is also prohibited as well as certain components of it. Reflecting the inability to solve the ICBM vulnerability problem by negotiation, SALT II permits the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers after 1981. There are no limits on numbers of flight-tests in the SALT II Treaty.

CRUISE MISSILES

The March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal sought to ban the development, testing and deployment of all cruise missiles, nuclear-armed or conventionally armed, with ranges over 2500 kilometers. It also proposed that cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers should not be deployed on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

SALT II has no range limit for air-launched cruise missiles. Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers will count in the 1320 aggregate. The SALT II Treaty also permits the development and testing of GLCM and SLCM to any range, and contains no limits on GL/SLCMs after the expiration of the Protocol. The deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on airplanes other than those counted as heavy bombers is banned in SALT II.

BACKFIRE

The March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal did not include the BACKFIRE in the overall aggregate provided that in no instances it would be deployed as a strategic weapon. The United States was willing to consider "a list of constraints" which would preclude its deployment as a strategic weapon.

Assurances, considered as legally binding and essential to the obligations of the SALT II Treaty, were given by the Soviets that limit production of BACKFIRE to 30 airplanes per year and that limit increases in the airplane's intercontinental capabilities. The BACKFIRE is not counted in the overall aggregate.

TELEMETRY

The March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal did not explicitly address telemetry. The SALT II Treaty bans the use of concealment measures that impede verification including deliberate denial of telemetry information when such denial impedes verification. In this regard, any telemetry encryption that impedes verification is, ipso facto, considered to be such deliberate denial and is prohibited.

State Department's Responses to Additional Legal Questions for the Record

The Legal Adviser,
Department of State,
Washington, August 2, 1979.

Hon. Frank Church,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Following Secretary Vance's appearance before the Committee on Foreign Relations on July 9 and 10, you provided us with a series of written questions for the record on the legal status of the SALT II documents transmitted to the Senate.

In response to your request, I am pleased to enclose a memorandum of law, including specific answers to the Committee's questions.

I hope you will find that the enclosed materials respond satisfactorily to the interests and concerns of the Committee. Of course, we are prepared to provide additional material or to address any further questions you may have concerning the legal aspects of the SALT II treaty.

Sincerely,

Herbert J. Hansell.

Enclosures.

Memorandum of Law

Subject: Legal Status of the SALT II Documents

I. THE SALT II FRAMEWORK

On June 22, 1979, President Carter transmitted to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, including the Protocol thereto.[1] The Treaty sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties through December 31, 1985. The Protocol, which is an integral part of the Treaty, sets forth additional obligations with respect to certain weapon systems through December 31, 1981.

In addition, the President transmitted to the Senate, for its information, the following related documents:

A series of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, setting forth interpretations and supplementary provisions concerning various articles of the Treaty;

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[1] S. Ex. Y., 96th Cong., 1st Sess.

A Data Base Memorandum setting forth agreed numbers for each Party, as of November 1, 1978, of the strategic systems limited by the Treaty;

A Statement of Data by each Party updating the numbers in the Data Base Memorandum as of the date of signature of the Treaty;

A Joint Statement of Principles setting forth agreed negotiating objectives for the next phase of strategic arms limitation talks; and

A Soviet statement setting forth commitments limiting the capabilities and production rate of the Soviet Backfire bomber, together with a response by President Carter confirming the essential relationship of those commitments to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

It is common practice for States to supplement treaty texts with such ancillary agreements, notes, minutes, agreed statements, understandings and other similar documents for the purpose of elaborating treaty provisions, or of making the treaty provisions more effective.

The SALT II Agreement is similar in its framework to many treaties that have been transmitted to the Senate in the recent past. The President has followed the usual U.S. practice in such cases of requesting the advice and consent of the Senate to the treaty, and transmitting the various ancillary documents to the Senate for its information.[2]

II. LEGAL STATUS OF THE SPECIFIC SALT II DOCUMENTS

Under international law, States are bound by obligations contained in international agreements to which they are parties, and provisions contained in documents

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[2] Recent examples of treaties having a similar framework may be found both in the case of arms control treaties and in the case of important treaties in other areas:

In the case of SALT I, the United States and Soviet Union concluded an ABM Treaty (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow, May 26, 1972; S. Ex. L 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.; 23 UST 3435, TIAS 7503), and an Interim Agreement, including an attached Protocol (Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow, May 26, 1972; S. Ex. L, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.; 23 UST 3462, TIAS 7504), and also negotiated a series of ancillary Agreed Statements. The President requested the advice and consent of the Senate to the ABM Treaty and the approval of both Houses of Congress to the Interim Agreement, and transmitted the Agreed Statements for the information of the two Houses.

In the case of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States of America and Spain (signed at Madrid, January 24, 1976; S. Ex. E, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.; 27 UST 3005, TIAS 8360), the United States and Spain concluded the Treaty, and also negotiated a subsidiary agreement and procedural annexes. The President requested the advice and consent of the Senate to the former, and transmitted the latter to the Senate for its information.

In the case of the 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, signed at Washington and Moscow, May 28, 1976; S. Ex. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.), the United States and Soviet Union concluded the Treaty, including an attached Protocol, and also negotiated a related Agreed Statement. The President requested the advice and consent of the Senate to the former, and transmitted the latter to the Senate for its information.

In the case of the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, signed at Geneva, May 18, 1977; S. Ex. K, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.), the United States and the other States involved concluded the Convention, and also negotiated a series of related Understandings. The President requested the advice and consent of the Senate to the former, and transmitted the latter to the Senate for its information.

In the case of the 1977 Panama Treaties (Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, signed at Washington, Sept. 7, 1977; S. Ex. N, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.), the United States and Panama concluded the two Treaties (including attached Annexes, Protocol and Agreed Minute), and also negotiated a lengthy series of ancillary agreements, minutes, notes and letters. The President requested the advice and consent of the Senate to the former, and transmitted the latter to the Senate for its information.

In a number of these instances, the ancillary documents contained important obligations designed to implement or make acceptable the provisions of the treaty in question. For example, the SALT I Agreed Statements included supplementary obligations not contained in the Treaty or Interim Agreement, such as the requirement that ABM deployment sites be separated by at least 1300 kilometers, the prohibition of ABM interceptor missiles with mulitple warheads, the prohibition on significant increases in the dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, and the prohibition on significant increases in the number of test and training launchers for ballistic missiles. S. Ex. L 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. Similarly, the Agreed Statement to the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions included a requirement, not contained in the Treaty, that development testing of nuclear explosives—whether or not conducted for ostensibly peaceful purposes—be treated as weapons tests and be subject to the more stringent limitations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, signed at Moscow, July 3, 1974; S. Ex. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.)

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ancillary to such agreements may be equally binding. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [3] provides that a treaty is to be interpreted in accordance with:

* * * (a) any agreement relating to the Treaty which was made between all parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. * * *

The legal status of such agreements and instruments is not affected by the manner in which a State Party chooses to consider or approve them in accordance with its own legal and constitutional procedures.[4] Specifically, the legal status of various SALT II documents is not affected by the manner of their transmittal to the Senate: obligations contained in the ancillary documents transmitted for the Senate's information are, under international law, equally binding on the Parties.[5]

The legal status of the ancillary SALT II documents in as follows:

A. Agreed statements and common understandings

The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are a series of interpretations and supplementary provisions relating to specific articles of the Treaty and Protocol. They were concluded during the negotiations to elaborate in detail the meaning and application of Treaty articles, and to provide certain supplementary provisions to make those articles effective. The negotiation of ancillary documents of this character is quite common in international practice, both in the arms control area and in other international negotiations.[6]

The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are contained in a document signed by the two Presidents, which begins with the statement that:

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics * * *

This statement constitutes a clear acknowledgement by the Parties that the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are intended as legally binding by the two Governments in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty. Under the principles enunciated in the Vienna Convention, these Statements and Understandings will clearly be binding on the Parties under international law, and fully authoritative as to the Parties' obligations under the Treaty. (These Statements and Understandings are, of course, wholly dependent upon entry into force of the Treaty and have no independent legal status; therefore, these documents will have no legal effect unless the Senate grants advice and consent to the Treaty.)

These conclusions are consistent with the manner in which the comparable SALT I statements and understandings have been treated by the Parties. For example, the procedures of the Standing Consultative Commission for dismantling and destruction of excess strategic systems under SALT I specifically implemented these statements as well as the provisions of the SALT I agreements themselves;[7] and the

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[3] Done at Vienna, May 23, 1969; S. Ex. L, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. The Vienna Convention has been signed by the United States and submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, but not yet ratified. The Convention is not yet in force. Nonetheless, it is widely considered as a restatement of existing customary international law, and has been recognized as such by the International Court of Justice (see *Namibia* Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. para. 94; *ICAO Council* case, 1972 ICJ Rep. para. 38; *Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction* case, 1973 ICJ Rep., para. 36 ff.), and by recent international arbitrations (see Briggs, *United States Ratification of the Vienna Treaty Convention*, 73 A.J.I.L. 470, July 1979).

[4] See Article 46, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

[5] For example, the ancillary documents to the Panama Treaties include provisions as to the use of land and water areas, the use of defense installations, the transfer of title and interest in port, rail and other facilities, compensation and benefits for employees, taxation, duties, claims, criminal jurisdiction and the like, which were clearly intended as legally binding as between the Parties. (See Agreement in Implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty; Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty; S. Ex. N, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.).

[6] See, for example: Agreed Minutes to Articles I, IV, V and VI and Annexes I and III to the Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, done in Washington, March 26, 1979; Agreed Minute to the Agreement in Implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty (see above); and Exchange of Notes related to the U.S.-Brazil Agricultural Commodities Agreement, signed at Rio de Janeiro, April 23, 1966; 17 UST 1622, TIAS 6118.

[7] The implementation of the SALT I agreements, and the resolution of issues related to compliance with their provisions, are described in the Administration statement on Compliance with SALT I Agreements forwarded by Secretary Vance to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 21, 1978.

Parties have treated various of these statements in the Standing Consultative Commission as obligations to which the other Party was bound.[8]

It is therefore clear that the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are legally binding on the Parties.

There is no difference in legal effect between Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. This difference in terminology was a historical result of the SALT I practice of dividing these ancillary statements into those in which Parties "agreed" not to take certain actions, and those which stated the Parties' "understandings" as to their obligations under the SALT I agreements. This distinction was carried over in the early stages of the SALT II negotiations, but was eroded over time and eventually discontinued altogether. In the SALT II Treaty, as finally signed, the Agreed Statements and the Common Understandings both contain interpretations and supplementary provisions, and there is no difference in their introductory language or format. Their international legal effect is precisely the same.

B. Data Exchange Documents

The Data Base Memorandum of Understanding is a document signed by the two Heads of Delegation on the date of signature of the Treaty. The Memorandum states the agreement of the two Parties "for the purposes of the Treaty" on the number of systems, in various categories limited by the Treaty, possessed by each Party as of November 1, 1978; and it further provides that the Parties will update this data at the time of entry into force of the Treaty. Each Party also provided, on the same date, a statement signed by its Head of Delegation updating these numbers for its strategic systems as of the date of signature of the Treaty.[9]

The only specific obligation contained in the Memorandum is the requirement to update the agreed data as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. This requirement is legally binding.

Furthermore, the Memorandum clearly qualifies under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention (cited above) as a document which may determine the interpretation of Treaty provisions. Accordingly, the various numerical restrictions contained in the Treaty and the definitions associated with them would be interpreted, in part, on the basis of the agreed facts stated in the Memorandum. For example, any possible differences as to whether a specific existing system is or is not subject to a particular provision of the Treaty might be resolved by resort to the agreed data in the Memorandum.

The Statements of Data are statements by each Party as to the numbers of its own systems. Neither statement binds the other Party.

C. Joint Statement of Principles

Article XIV of the Treaty provides that the Parties will begin, promptly after entry into force of the Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. The Joint Statement of Principles is a statement, signed by the two Presidents on the date of signature of the Treaty, of agreed negotiating objectives for this next phase of SALT discussions.

The Joint Statement is similar in format and in purpose to the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;[10] that document was a political statement and did not create any legal rights or obligations. Similarly, the Joint Statement does not contain binding international legal obligations in addition to those contained in the Treaty, but rather sets forth intentions of the Parties with respect to the next phase of negotiations. These subsequent negotiations will seek to develop one or more agreements containing legal obligations, but neither the scope nor content of any such agreement is legally constrained by the Joint Statement.[11]

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[8] For example, in connection with U.S. observation in 1977 of nets covering an ICBM launcher at a Soviet test range, the U.S. representative in the Standing Consultative Commission cited two Agreed Statements as grounds for inquiring as to the consistency of this Soviet practice with Soviet obligations under the Interim Agreement. Although the Soviets argued that these provisions did not apply to the activities in question, they did not challenge the binding character of these provisions. (The Soviets subsequently removed the net covering.) See the Administration report cited in note 7.

[9] Article XVII of the Treaty requires that the Parties maintain the agreed data base by notifying each other at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission of any changes in the relevant categories.

[10] Signed at Washington, June 21, 1973; 24 UST 1472, TIAS 7653.

[11] Any such agreement obligating the United States to reduce or limit its armaments would of course be subject to the requirements of Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573) concerning authorization or approval by Congress.

D. Backfire Statements

The Soviet Backfire bomber is not included among those aircraft which are treated as "heavy bombers" under Article II(3) of the Treaty for the purpose of inclusion in the numerical aggregates set forth in Article III. However, the statements made at the Vienna Summit on this question establish legally binding limits on the capabilities and production rate of the Backfire.

The Soviet Backfire statements were provided by President Brezhnev to President Carter in return for U.S. agreement to the exclusion of the Backfire from the numerical aggregates of the Treaty; in replying to these statements, President Carter made it clear that the United States was entering into SALT II on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statements and that it considered the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty. The Soviets had been informed in advance how the President would respond. They offered their statements with this knowledge, did not object to the exchange, and proceeded with signature of the Treaty on that basis. Under international law, this exchange is clearly sufficient to establish the Soviet assurances as legally binding.

It is not unusual in international practice for governments to conclude binding agreements in the form of an exchange of statements, rather than a single text signed by both, so long as the Parties indicate a meeting of the minds on the substance of their agreement and an intention to be bound thereby. The validity of this practice is specifically confirmed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [12] and the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.[13]

Furthermore, oral statements may be used to constitute international agreements, and can be as legally effective as written instruments. A number of precedents exist in international [14] and United States [15] practice which confirm that oral statements may create legally binding obligations.[16] The 1978 amendments to the Case Act recognized that international agreements may be oral in form.[17]

The Backfire exchange was clearly the result of bilateral negotiations conducted for the purpose of resolving differences related to the provisions of the SALT II Treaty. The Soviet commitments were given in return for U.S. agreement not to insist on counting Backfire in the Treaty aggregates. President Carter made clear that the United States entered into SALT II on the basis of the Soviet commitments and considers those commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

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[12] Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention includes in its scope of coverage any "international agreement concluded in written form * * * whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation * * *."

[13] Restatement § 115, comment C states:

* * * The legal relations of the parties under their agreements may be evidenced in one or more instruments. More than one instrument may result from * * * the fact that the agreement is in the form of an exchange of notes or other communications * * *.

For example, the Parties in the Panama Canal Treaties conducted such exchanges of notes relating to postal services and facilities, air traffic control services, and certain research institutes. Similarly, the Parties to the 1971 Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan on the Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands (the Okinawa Reversion), 23 UST 446, TIAS 7314, exchanged such notes on submerged lands and Voice of America facilities.

[14] For example, in *Denmark* v. *Norway*, 3 Hudson, World Court Reports 148 (1938), the Permanent Court of International Justice held that an oral statement by the Norwegian Foreign Minister to the Danish Minister, acquiescing in Danish plans concerning Eastern Greenland, created binding obligations. The Court stated that:

* * * The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature * * * given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of his government in response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign power, in regard to a question falling within his providence is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs * * *. *Id* at 192.

[15] For example, in connection with the 1923 U.S.-Turkey extradition treaty, Secretary of State Hughes assured Senator Lodge that a series of Turkish oral declarations (regarding sanitary problems and the administration of justice in Turkey) communicated to the United States at the time of signature of the treaty could doubtless be regarded as constituting binding international commitments. *See V. Hackworth, Digest of International Law* 35 (1942).

[16] The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does define the term "treaty" solely in terms of written instruments. However, Article 3 of the Convention specifically recognizes that:

The fact that the present Convention does not apply to * * * international agreements not in written form, shall not affect * * * the legal force of such agreements * * *.

Similarly, § 115, comment C of the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States points out that:

* * * There is no rule of international law that prevents an oral agreement from constituting a binding international agreement * * *.

[17] Section 708 of P.L. 95-426, October 7, 1978, amended 1 USC 112b to require the transmittal to the Congress of "any oral international agreement".

Under the circumstances, the exchange of statements constitutes a collateral agreement stating binding obligations in the context of a bilateral negotiation. Moreover, any violation of these obligations would be equivalent to a violation of the Treaty itself. In the event of such a violation, the United States would legally be entitled to take the same actions as it would if the Treaty itself were violated. In particular, the United States would have the right to suspend or terminate its observance of the Treaty in whole or in part.

The Soviet Backfire commitments are, like other ancillary SALT II documents, dependent upon and ancillary to the Treaty itself. The Soviet Backfire statement was clearly given in the context and for the purpose of the Treaty. The entry into force of the Backfire commitments is therefore contingent on the entry into force of the Treaty itself, and they will remain in force throughout the duration of the Treaty. But as a practical matter, these commitments must be observed immediately by the Soviet Union from the date on which they were given, since any increase in the Backfire production rate over the present rate of 30, or in the Backfire's capabilities, would be contrary to the object and purpose of these commitments, and therefore inconsistent with Soviet obligations under international law.[18]

Answers to Questions for the Record on the Legal Status of the SALT II Documents Transmitted to the Senate

Question 1. Is there any difference in legal status between an "Agreed Statement" and a "Common Understanding"?

Answer. No. All paragraphs in the document entitled Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are equally binding between the Parties under international law. The designation of any paragraph as an "Agreed Statement" or as a "Common Understanding" is immaterial to the paragraph's legal status.

Question 2. Do the Agreed Statements and/or the Common Understandings represent binding obligations of the two Parties, and if so, are they of less binding effect than provisions of the Treaty and Protocol?

Answer. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are formally agreed interpretations and supplementary provisions concerning the various articles of the Treaty. They are legally binding on the two Parties, and have the same binding effect as the provisions of the Treaty and Protocol.

Question 3. Would any of the "other documents" become obligatory if they were made a part of the Treaty?

Answer. Incorporating these various documents into the Treaty would have no effect on their obligatory character. Obligations of the Parties contained in the ancillary documents are fully binding in their present form; their inclusion in the Treaty would not make these obligations any more or any less binding.

Question 4. If the Senate subjected its consent upon the condition that one or more of those documents be modified, would the President feel constrained to do so upon bringing the Treaty into force?

Answer. If the Senate were to condition its advice and consent on one or more modifications of these other documents, the President could not ratify the Treaty unless and until the Soviet Union agreed to those modifications in the process of exchanging instruments of ratification.

Question 5. In your view, what would be the effect of a Senate clarification or reservation to the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings? What would be the effect should the Senate decide to attach the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings to the resolution of ratification as understandings?

Answer. If the Senate were to condition its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty on a clarification or reservation affecting the terms of an Agreed Statement or Common Understanding, the President would not ratify the Treaty unless and until the Soviet Union accepted that condition in the exchange of instruments of ratification. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are legally binding in their present form, and attaching them as understandings to the Senate's resolution of ratification would not change their status or make them more binding.

Question 6. What is required of the United States in the statement of objectives contained in the third paragraph of the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations? Specifically, what is required of the United States in subparagraph (3), which speaks of "resolution of the issues" included in the Protocol to the Treaty?

Answer. The Joint Statement does not impose any legal obligations on the United States; it is a political statement of agreed negotiating objectives for the next phase

[18] Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, a State is obliged to refrain, during the period between signature and entry into force of an international agreement, "from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of that agreement.

of strategic arms limitations talks which Article XIV of the Treaty obliges the Parties to conduct. Subparagraph (3) of the Third Section of the Joint Statement expresses the intention of the Parties to consider whether further limitations of any sort whould be placed on any of the systems dealt with in the Protocol; it does not "require" the United States to agree to any limitations in this regard. The limitations in the Protocol will not serve as a precedent for any limitations which may be negotiated in the next stage of SALT negotiations.

Question 7. As to the exchange of statements on the Backfire bomber:

(a) What is the effective date and termination date of each Statement?

Answer. These commitments on the part of the Soviet Union were effective, as a practical matter, as of the date they were made. The statements were given in connection with the execution of the Treaty, and President Carter made it clear that the carrying out of these commitments was essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty; therefore, like the other ancillary documents, the Soviet Backfire commitments are dependent upon the Treaty's entry into force. They will continue in effect throughout the duration of the Treaty.

Question (b) Would a violation of those assurances be the equivalent to a violation of the Treaty itself?

Answer. Yes. In the event of such a violation, the United States would legally be entitled to take the same actions as it would if the Treaty itself were violated. In particular, the United States would have the right to suspend or terminate its observance of the Treaty.

Question. (c) What effect do the assurances have upon the right of the United States to develop a comparable aircraft? Would the same restrictions apply to any new comparable U.S. bomber?

Answer. The United States has the right to an aircraft comparable to Backfire; President Carter explicitly affirmed this at the Vienna Summit. Any such U.S. aircraft would in no way be affected or restricted by the Soviet assurances.

Question. (d) Are the statements regarded by the Soviets as being of the same force and effect as the Treaty itself?

Answer. Under international law, the Soviet Backfire commitments are clearly equally as binding as the obligations contained in the Treaty. The United States insisted on receiving these assurances as a basis for signing the Treaty. We informed the Soviets that we would regard the Soviet Backfire commitments as essential to obligations assumed under the Treaty, and would so state. The Soviets undertook the commitments against this background and have not objected to President Carter's explicit statement at Vienna that the carrying out of the Soviet commitments were essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

Question 8. The Senate may, constitutionally, condition its consent to the SALT II Treaty upon two kinds of conditions—amendments to the resolution of ratification (e.g., reservations, understandings, declarations, etc.) or upon amendments to the text of the Treaty or Protocol.

(a) Would the Administration regard the various conditions available to the Senate as equally binding? Would material labeled an "understanding", for example, be considered as obligatory, legally, as the same material added as a "reservation"—or as an amendment to the Treaty's text?

Answer. The binding character of conditions attached by the Senate to its advice and consent depends not on their designation but on their substantive character and content. For example, an "understanding" requiring that a particular provision of the Treaty be interpreted in a specific manner would have the same legal effect as a "reservation" to the same effect, or a requirement that the interpretation be incorporated into the text of the Treaty as an amendment.

Question. (b) Can the Senate be assured that the President will not bring the Treaty into force without causing each of those conditions to take effect—i.e., will the President obtain the acceptance of the Soviets to all Senate-imposed conditions if the Treaty is brought into force?

Answer. The President will not ratify the Treaty unless the Soviet Union accepts, in the exchange of instruments of ratification, all such conditions included by the Senate in its advice and consent, irrespective of how those conditions are designated, i.e., as reservations, understandings, declarations, etc., or as amendments.

Question. (c) If the Senate were to add a simple policy statement—in the form, say, of a "declaration"—to its resolution of ratification, would the President feel constrained, constitutionally, to transmit that statement, as a part of the instrument of ratification, to the Soviet Union?

Answer. The U.S. instrument of ratification will include any statements or conditions concerning the Treaty documents which are incorporated in the Senate's resolution of ratification.

Question. (d) Suppose the statement were made in a simple Senate resolution adopted at the same time as the resolution of ratification; would the content of that resolution be transmitted to the Soviet Union?

Answer. If the Senate were to adopt a separate resolution—in addition to its resolution of ratification—there would be no legal requirement that the content of that resolution be transmitted to the Soviet Union. However, if the Senate wished to adopt such a procedure, the Administration would be pleased to consult in this regard.

Question. (e) If such a resolution were adopted which set forth the Senate's understanding or interpretation concerning various Treaty provisions, what would be its legal force and effect?

Answer. Statements of understanding or interpretation not included in the Senate's resolution of ratification and the U.S. instrument of ratification accepted by the Soviet Union would not be legally binding per se. However, if provided to the Soviet Union prior to the exchange of instruments of ratification, and not contradicted by the Soviets, they would constitute persuasive evidence of the manner in which the Parties interpret the Treaty.

Question 9. If the Soviet Union proposed Treaty modifications in its instruments of ratification, would the President feel constrained, constitutionally, to seek Senate advice and consent prior to agreeing to those modifications?

Answer. Yes. The President could not exchange instruments of ratification with the Soviet Union if the Soviet instrument were conditioned on modifications to the Treaty, unless the Senate were to give its advice and consent to those modifications.

Question 10. (a) Are there any U.S. documents, statements, or other communications that affect the meaning or interpretation of the SALT II documents formally transmitted to the Senate?

(b) Are there any U.S. documents, statements, or other communications that affect U.S. and Soviet obligations as contained in these SALT II documents?

(c) Are there any documents, statements, or other communications of the Soviet Union or its representatives that affect U.S. or Soviet obligations under SALT II, or the meaning and interpretation given by the Soviets either to these obligations or to the formally transmitted SALT II documents?

(d) Have there been any expressions of intent by either the United States or the Soviet Union with respect to the development, production, deployment or possible use of strategic offensive arms that are relevant to SALT II but that are not contained either in the SALT II documents formally transmitted to the Senate or in existing treaties?

Answer. All obligations undertaken with respect to SALT II are contained in the documents transmitted to the Senate.

Needless to say, statements have been made by both sides over the course of the seven-year SALT II negotiations which relate to various provisions of the Treaty. The important U.S. statements of this character have been incorporated into the transmittal documents furnished to the Senate. These statements do not alter the Treaty, but will be relevant to its interpretation. The Administration stands ready to provide to the Committee additional summaries from the negotiating history in answering particular questions that may arise concerning the meaning of the Treaty.

Question. (e) Will all subsequent agreements, understandings, undertakings, or clarifications relevant to U.S. or Soviet obligations under SALT II, or to the meaning and interpretation of these obligations and the documents formally transmitted to the Senate by the President on June 22, 1979, be promptly transmitted to the Senate?

Answer. The Administration will keep the Senate fully and currently informed of any significant developments relevant to SALT II which may arise during the Senate's consideration of the Treaty. The Administration will, of course, comply with the reporting requirements of the Case Act (1 U.S.C. 112b) with respect to any future agreements related to SALT II. In addition, it will report periodically to the appropriate Senate Committees with respect to future discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the interpretation and application of SALT II.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHURCH

Question 1. What were the U.S. negotiating objectives for SALT II following ratification of SALT I?

Answer. Following ratification of SALT I, our general negotiating objectives for SALT II, as described in President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to the Congress in January 1973, were as follows: establishment of essential equivalence; maintenance of the survivability of strategic forces; retention of the right to modernize and replace older systems, without upsetting the strategic balance; adequate verifiability; and preservation of the security of third parties.

Question 2. How did these objectives change over time?

Answer. The agreement achieved at Vladivostok in November 1974 was a first step toward fulfilling our initial objectives. That agreement provided for equal ceilings on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and on launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs. In addition, at Vladivostok, the Soviet Union agreed to drop its insistence that U.S. forward based systems (FBS) and the nuclear systems of U.S. Allies be included in SALT II.

The Comprehensive Proposal put forth by President Carter in March 1977 embodied and refined the basic SALT II objectives set forth in 1973. In particular, that proposal and the subsequent SALT II negotiations gave further emphasis to substantial reductions in strategic forces and restrictive qualitative constraints to slow the momentum of the technological competition in strategic weapons development, particularly MIRVed ICBMs. These objectives were set forth in a three-tiered proposal in May, 1977, which formed the framework of the subsequent treaty.

In sum, U.S. basic objectives remained essentially unchanged throughout the course of the negotiations.

Question 3. Do the SALT II Treaty and related agreements fulfill these objectives.

Answer. The SALT II Treaty has to a significant degree met the original U.S. SALT II objectives:

"Essential equivalence."—As Secretary Brown has testified, despite offsetting asymmetries in some systems and measures, overall equivalence in strategic systems exists today and with planned strategic force modernization programs will continue to exists under SALT II.

Survivability of strategic forces.—SALT has enhanced the survivability of a diverse triad by limiting the potential overall Soviet threat while allowing the U.S. to proceed with the modernization of each leg. While SALT by itself could not ensure the survivability of the Minuteman force, SALT II will permit steps to improve land-based ICBM survivability through mobility. Moreover, SALT II, by constraining throw-weight and number of warheads, reduces the cost and eases the task of fielding a more survivable mobile ICBM system to deal with the threat to Minuteman ICMBs.

Replacement and modernization.—SALT II places no constraints on the ability of the U.S. to proceed with the design, production, and deployment of those systems needed to meet the requirements projected for the period through the late 1980's.

Adequate verification.—SALT meets our stated objectives in a number of ways. The Treaty prohibits interference with veification by National Technical Means (NTM), which is the basis for independently monitoring Soviet compliance. To reinforce this capability, the Treaty bans deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by NTM and explicitly prohibits encryption of telemetry which would impede verification of compliance. The Treaty also establishes counting rules which, for example, facilitate verification of MIRV limits by ensuring that any type of missile which has been tested with MIRVs is considered to be MIRVed.

Allied security.—SALT II will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our Allies; nor will it preclude cooperation on modernization. In addition, the Allies will continue to share in the more secure and stable strategic relationship which SALT has established with the Soviet Union. Inclusion of, or compensation to the Soviets for, Allied nuclear systems in the SALT limits was successfully rejected.

In addition to the above, the U.S. met to a significant degree most of the basic objectives reflected in the March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal.

Substantial reductions.—SALT II calls for reductions in the total number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers to a level of 2250. This require the Soviets to dismantle or destroy over 250 deployed strategic systems.

Qualitative limits on new ICBMs and modifications to existing ICBMs.—Under SALT II, the Soviets can no longer test or deploy new types of heavy ICBMs and neither side can test or deploy more than one entirely new type of light ICBM. Existing ICBM throw-weight and RV numbers, among other elements, are tightly constrained.

Limits on MIRVed ICBMs.—SALT II established a new ceiling of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers, lower than the probable planned Soviet deployment and limited the total number of MIRVed ballistic missiles to 1200.

Backfire commitments.—The Soviets have undertaken binding commitments on the Backfire production rate and certain improvements in Backfire capability.

SALT III principles.—The Joint Statement of Principles commits both sides to pursue further qualitative and quantitative limits on SALT III.

Question 4. In recalling U.S. objectives for SALT II, a major statement of objectives was contained in President Nixon's 1973 Foreign Policy Report to the Congress. That report concluded:

In sum, a future (SALT) agreement should:

Establish an essential equivalence in stragegic capabilities among systems common to both sides;

Maintain the survivability of strategic forces in light of known and potential technological capabilities;

Provide for the replacement and modernization of older systems without upsetting the strategic balance;

Be subject to adequate verification; and

Leave the security of third parties undiminished.

How would you appraise the current SALT II agreement against the criteria listed above?

Answer. See answer to 3.

Question 5. Are they the right criteria; which are the most important?

Answer. The objectives established at the outset of SALT II, upon which we based our negotiating objectives, reflect the main factors defining the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. All of these criteria are important and interrelated, and it would be misleading to argue that some are more important than others. At the same time, depending on trends in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, certain objectives might receive more emphasis in the negotiations.

Question 6. What criteria determined which items were to be dealt with in the Treaty itself and which were to be dealt with in the Protocol or held for SALT III? Has the U.S. position on the matters to be covered in the Treaty, Protocol, or SALT III changed over the course of the negotiations?

Answer. In May 1977, the U.S. proposed to the Soviets that the SALT II agreement consist of a Treaty to last through 1985, a Protocol, and a Joint Statement of Principles to guide negotiations in SALT III. The intent was to embody in such a package much of the substance of our Comprehensive Proposal of March 1977 in a manner negotiable with the Soviets. We explained that we would place in the Treaty provisions on which we felt the two sides could reach agreement for the full period up to 1985; in the Protocol would go issues which were not amendable to long-term solutions but for which shorter-term solutions were possible. Other more ambitious SALT objectives, such as deeper reductions, would be reflected in the Joint Statement of Principles for SALT III.

These general guidelines were followed throughout the negotiations after May 1977.

Question 7. What key aspects of strategic force programs are not addressed by the SALT II agreement, for example, air defense, missile limits versus launcher limits, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and missile accuracy? What is the effect of their exclusion?

Answer. At the beginning of the SALT II negotiations, it was agreed that the SALT II Treaty would deal only with limitations on strategic offensive arms; thus, the Treaty contains no provisions limiting defensive systems. We found no reason to alter this basic approach during the course of SALT II, particularly since the ABM Treaty ensures the penetrability of our land- and sea-based missiles. However, limits on defensive capabilities, such as air defenses or ASW capabilities, are an area we will be exploring fully in our analysis of U.S. negotiating objectives in SALT III.

During the course of the negotiations, we proposed measures, e.g., restrictions on new types of guidance systems, which would have had the effect of inhibiting qualitative improvements in such areas as missile accuracy. In the end, we did not pursue them because verification of such constraints would have been very difficult and in some cases impossible, and because we concluded that they would not effectively ensure a secure Minuteman force. Minuteman vulnerability was a problem SALT did not create and could not solve once accurate MRIV systems had reached a certain stage of development. Thus, we concluded that the only feasible solution to the Minuteman vulnerability problem was a programmatic one coupled with limits on fractionation and MIRVed ICBMs—as reflected in the decision to proceed with the mobile M-X. SALT III negotiations will pursue further qualitative controls on offensive arms and counterforce competition.

It was decided early in SALT I (and maintained in SALT II) that it was advisable to negotiate limits on launchers instead of missiles. There were several reasons for this decision. First of all, it was recognized that in the nuclear age, with missile flight times of 20 to 30 minutes, it was really numbers of launchers which counted. Although reloading of launchers was possible in principle, the existence of extra missiles for reloading launchers was unlikely to be a major factor in the strategic balance.

Reloading a silo after a missile has been fired from it would be a major, time-consuming operation which would, in practice, have to be attempted in the middle of a nuclear war. Further, the sides have agreed to ban missile launchers with rapid reload capability and the storage of extra missiles near ICBM launch sites. Thus, the absence of missile number limits does not in any way affect the viability of the SALT II Treaty.

We will reexamine the necessity for missile number limits in the context of assessing our objectives in SALT III. Of necessity, this will involve a reassessment of the decision that the SALT I and II agreements should be verified by national technical means rather than by intrusive measures such as onsite inspection. National technical means alone are inadequate for verifying limitations on missile numbers, but are fully adequate for verifying numbers of launchers, rapid reload capability, and missile storage near ICBM launch sites.

Question. 8. Is the standard of the Jackson Amendment to the 1972 SALT I agreement adequately met by SALT II (e.g., that the U.S. is not limited to force levels inferior to those of the Soviets)?

Answer. The SALT II Treaty satisfies the requirement in the Jackson Amendment that SALT II not limit the U.S. to levels of intercontinental forces inferior to those of the Soviet Union. First, the Treaty imposes equal aggregate numerical limits on the strategic delivery systems of each side—the principle measure of equivalence in levels of strategic offensive forces. The Treaty also provides for equality in several other strategic measures of major importance, in particular numbers of MIRVed missile launchers. Finally, all of the Treaty provisions taken together in combination with programs to modernize U.S. strategoc forces ensure the essential equivalence of the overall U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. These factors are the real tests of consistency with the Jackson Amendment.

The legislative history of the Senate's approval of the Interim Agreement suggests that throw weight was to be taken into account in judging the overall equality of the Treaty limits. We have taken this factor into account in the negotiations. We insisted on—and got—a series of provisions which constrain the throw weight of Soviet systems as well as their ability to utilize effectively their large throw-weight missiles. For example, for the period of the Treaty, we have frozen the number and size of their heavy ICBMs and the number of warheads on their heavy ICBMs, far below what they could otherwise achieve; we have placed limits on the Soviet force of MIRVed ICBMs below what they would have deployed in the absence of SALT II; and we secured for ourselves the right to deploy a new missile—the M-X—which is as capable as their SS-18. The Treaty's terms will give the U.S. great flexibility, if we feel it is necessary, to substantially increase our overall throwweight.

On the whole, we believe that the Soviet lead in ICBM throw-weight does not outweigh the other U.S. strategic advantages, such as our lead in missile accuracy, numbers of warheads, effectiveness of our bomber and SLBM forces, and better diversity and reliability.

Question. 9. If the U.S. has 2,250 of the strategic arms limited by SALT II in 1982, it will be prohibited any further such arms. Under our declaration to the North Atlantic Council that numerically limited arms can be transferred, but prohibited arms cannot, could arms, such as SLBMs, which are limited to the 2,250 overall aggregate be transferred in that they are both numerically limited and additional such arms are prohibited to us?

Answer. Yes. It is the U.S. position, consistent with our interpretative statement and the provisions of the Treaty that cooperation and transfer of technology or systems of a class limited numerically but not prohibited by the Treaty would not be precluded merely because the U.S. was itself at the maximum level permitted for that class. Any contrary position would amount to the inclusion in the agreement of compensation for Allied systems, something the USSR long sought and we successfully resisted. The purpose of the numerical ceiling is to stabilize the central systems of the U.S. and USSR. It is not their purpose to impede the right and ability of the U.S. to assist its Allies in their own effort to maintain their security.

Question 10. Is it logical to argue that we can transfer systems which both sides want, but agree they must be numerically limited, while we cannot transfer systems which are prohibited, mainly because neither side believed they were desirable?

Answer. Yes. As a matter of logic, we would not have prohibited systems available to us for transfer to others. As a matter of policy, many of the more important systems that we have taken care to permit under the Treaty are precisely those for which we wish to retain options for cooperation with our Allies.

Question 11. Mr. Secretary, what principles of international law support the interpretation that the Non-circumvention Provision, Article XII, allows transfers by us to our Allies of systems numerically limited by the Treaty, such as submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, but does not allow the transfer of prohibited systems, such as surface-ship launched ballistic missile launchers of range greater than 600 kilometers.

Answer. Basically, the non-circumvention provision merely reflects the existing principle of international law that treaties be adhered to in good faith, and not circumvented or evaded. The transfer by the United States or prohibited systems to its NATO Allies would undoubtedly involve a direct violation of the express prohibitions in Article IX against the development and testing of such systems and would be a clear circumvention of these provisions. We would not accept Soviet transfers of prohibited systems to its Warsaw pact allies.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that the provision will not interfere with patterns of Allied cooperation and collaboration and joint modernization plans. In particular, we have advised the North Atlantic Council and the Congress that transfers of numerically-limited systems are not necessarily precluded, and that requests for such transfers would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis.

This view is clearly supported by the history of the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. During the SALT I negotiations, the U.S. rejected Soviet attempts to secure acceptance of a right to increase their number of SLBM systems in response to Allied increases and, in the end, acknowledged the fact that the NATO Allies legitimately possessed modern ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers in addition to those permitted to the United States by the Interim Agreement. During the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets proposed a highly restrictive prohibition on transfers of strategic offensive arms to other States or assistance in their development. The United States refused to accept a non-transfer provision of any kind; the Soviets accepted such a non-circumvention clause and did not insist on a non-transfer clause.

Under customary rules of treaty interpretation, where a proposal by one side is rejected by the other, it is inferred that its substance is not carried over into other agreed treaty provisions. In light of the history described above, international law supports the validity of the present U.S. position that the non-circumvention provision merely reflects the inherent obligations of treaty parties, and does not necessarily prohibit transfers of numerically-limited systems.

[The following information was referred to on page 201.]

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question 1. The impact of nonratification.—My impression is that the Europeans would view the nonratification of the Treaty with profound misgivings. They are particularly sensitive to the impact such a development would have on the climate of East-West relations. To Europeans, East-West relations are an everyday reality and a failure to ratify SALT could only have harmful consequences for the network of relations so far established. They further appear to believe that such a development would also adversely affect other essential negotiations with the Soviet Union and also would most likely result in the diversion of resources away from conventional to strategic forces. This is my impression of how West Europeans would view Senate rejection of the Treaty. What is your impression, Mr. Secretary?

Answer. I concur with your assessment of the possible impact which nonratification of the SALT II Treaty could have in Europe. As you know, in testimony before the Committee, I expressed serious concern about the future implications for NATO should SALT II be rejected by the Senate. My concerns, echoed by other witnesses, are reinforced by our observation that the Europeans have come to view SALT II as an important element in their own security posture and now see it as the key to developing detente and arms control in Europe.

Without SALT II, prospects for major European-wide arms control efforts would become, at best, much poorer; at worst, they would become impossible. Both the United States and the Allies, however, would immediately be faced with a changed political and military environment which could severely impair the functioning and cohesion of the Alliance. Nonratification would mean, for the United States, in-

creased spending on central strategic systems. In such an event, Europeans would fear that—

Their own political and military planning would be seriously disrupted;

There could well be a diversion of U.S. defense expenditures from specific Alliance programs to increased expenditures on central systems;

Their relations with the Soviet Union could well be in doubt, as would our own; and

Prospects for further progress in establishing arms control measures in Europe would be dimmed.

Perhaps most important, defeat of the Treaty could leave an impression in the eyes of the Allies that the U.S. was incapable of carrying through major diplomatic initiatives with NATO's chief adversary, thus calling into question U.S. leadership as chief spokesman for the Alliance.

Question 2. The Consequences of Strategic Parity for European Security. Is it your experience that our European Allies believe that strategic parity (or essential equivalence), as institutionalized by SALT II, undermines the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent? In other words, do U.S. central systems retain the capability to deter a Soviet theater threat to Europe, or has SALT in some way diminished the credibility of our willingness to act on NATO's behalf?

Answer. I believe that the NATO Triad, composed of conventional forces, theater nuclear forces and strategic forces, forms a cohesive whole which no aggressor can afford to confront impunity, because to do so would pose unacceptable risks.

Essential equivalence in central strategic systems, hardly a new concept in NATO thinking (it has been studied and discussed at NATO's highest levels since 1968), does not change the doctrinal and military relationship between the elements of that NATO Triad.

Essential equivalence on the strategic level underscores the importance of maintaining theater nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. We are now seeking, with our Allies, approaches to the modernization of theater nuclear forces and we hope, by the end of the year, to come to decisions as to the kinds and sizes of modernization programs required to ensure that this crucial element of the NATO Triad maintains its viability into the next decade. The efforts undertaken jointly with our Allies under the Long Term Defense program and through NATO RS&I (rationalization standardization, and interoperability) will improve NATO's conventional capability.

At the same time, we must seek to avoid an unconstrained competition in theater forces. In order to avoid such an exacerbation of the competition between the USSR and the Alliance, we are investigating the extent to which arms control efforts in the theater can serve the security interests of the Alliance by restraining the growth of the threat which confronts it. Such an investigation is, as you know, the role of the Special Group on arms control which was recently formed in NATO.

This effort takes place against the prospect of the more stable security environment which SALT II will provide and the impetus that European force improvement and SALT II will give to other arms control efforts. It will also take place against the backdrop of an absolute United States commitment to the defense of Europe—a commitment which no would-be aggressor can afford to delude himself into thinking that essential equivalence will somehow diminish.

In my view, our Allies join with us in the belief that SALT in no way undermines the credibility of the US strategic deterrent or our willingness to act in NATO's defense. Our central systems, in combination with our theater nuclear and conventional forces, will continue to serve as the ultimate symbol of our commitment to the defense of Europe.

Question 3. Do you consider that the Soviet Union has regional concerns which justify the current level of Soviet theater nuclear forces, or do you consider that the current modernization of Soviet theater nuclear forces is intended to establish a theater preponderance vis-a-vis Western Europe; a preponderance that could be used to intimidate Western Europe and gain political advantage?

Answer. The Soviets began deploying M/IRBMs and medium range bombers capable of reaching targets in Western Europe in the mid-fifties, gaining, by the 1960s, a substantial preponderance in such capabilities compared to those deployed by the U.S. and NATO Allies in the European theater. NATO, Since the early 1960s, has had many fewer long range theater nuclear weapons than the Soviets.

During the era of U.S. strategic superiority, there was little concern in NATO About the Soviet advantage in these theater systems. Facing the vastly superior U.S. strategic forces, the Soveits could only perceive that any action they took with long range theater nuclear forces in Europe would evoke a response from the U.S. strategic forces. However, over the past few years, the United States and the Soviet

Union have reached a state of parity in strategic forces. The Soviets are proceeding with the rigorous modernization of their long range theater nuclear forces with the SS–20 missile and Backfire bomber. These newly-deployed theater nuclear systems are far more capable than previous Soviet theater systems. With the exception of the SALT II constraints on Backfire, these systems are not at present constrained by SALT or other arms control agreements.

We believe that, whatever the Soviet Union's intentions, both its earlier and its modernized TNF exceed the USSR's reasonable defense needs. The basic question thus becomes whether the Soviet Union, possessing strategic forces equivalent to ours, somehow could make the mistake of attacking Western Europe in the mistaken belief that the Soviet homeland was safe from U.S. nuclear retaliation. Such a Soviet mistake would be founded on the belief that the U.S. could be held in check by the balance in U.S./Soviet strategic forces and by a paucity of long range nuclear forces in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union.

Thus, the need for modernization of NATO's long-range TNF capability is clear. On the one hand, modernization will meet the military threat which increased Soviet TNF capability poses to NATO; on the other, modernization will prevent perceptions that NATO does not have a full range of capabilities to respond to aggression. Over the past year, the United States and its Allies have begun the formulation of plans for the required improvements in NATO's TNF. Simultaneously, the U.S. and its Allies are looking for acceptable arms control solutions which would diminish the threat, restrain nuclear competition in the theater, and contribute to theater deterrence.

Question. 4. Given the fact that Western Europe has been targeted for the past 25 years by Soviet IRBM's, why is it said that the SS–20 represents such a quantum change in the threat to NATO?

Answer. The SS–20 is a significant improvement in Soviet theater nuclear force capability. In the first instance, the SS–20 is a MIRVed system, with each missile carrying up to three warheads, while the older SS–4 and SS–5 systems which it replaces are single-warhead missiles. Equally important, the SS–20 represents a considerable improvement in accuracy over the SS–4 and SS–5 systems. Finally, it is a mobile weapon, thereby giving it a higher degree of survivability in the event of an attack and making it more difficult to counter than the older systems.

In response to this situation, the United States and its Allies are continuing their two-pronged approach to the problem of Soviet TNF. On the one hand, NATO's High Level Group is currently considering the nature of Allied systems which might be deployed to meet the need for an evolutionary upward adjustment in the long-range component of NATO TNF's which will maintain the level of deterrence required in the theater; on the other, NATO's Special Group is considering arms control approaches which might prove to be in the Alliance's interest.

Question. 5. Is it sensible to encourage the perception that a separate European balance could exist, independent of our central forces?

Answer. The concept of a separate European balance independent of U.S. central systems is dangerous. Encouraging the perception of such a balance would tend to undermine the continuum of nuclear deterrence at both the strategic and theater levels—and it is that continuum which is central to NATO's defense.

The NATO deterrent, as it stands today, is made up of a mixture of hardware deployments and political commitments designed to deprive a potential aggressor of the confidence that an attack in Europe could succeed while remaining limited to Europe. To this end, we have deployed substantial U.S. forces in Europe to ensure that NATO theater forces can fulfill their part in the deterrence of aggression. At the same time, seven Presidents of the United States have made it clear that the U.S. is committed to use nuclear forces, including central systems, in the defense of Europe. The United States' commitment to NATO is part of the NATO Triad of defense which, by combining conventional forces, theater nuclear forces and U.S. strategic forces, acts as a deterrent.

Question. 6. A consensus appears to have been formed at the technical and bureaucratic level—and I refer specifically to the NATO High Level Group—on the need for NATO to introduce into Europe additional long-range nuclear systems capable of striking the Soviet Union. However, the political dimension of such a decision does not appear to have been adequately addressed, a fact which was certainly clear during my recent discussion with Chancellor Schmidt. Is there a political consensus on the need for these systems and a willingness to base them?

Answer. As you know, the U.S. and its NATO Allies have concluded in the NPG High Level Group that there is a need for an evolutionary upward adjustment in the long-range component of NATO TNF. At their most recent meeting in May, NATO defense ministers reaffirmed that it would be necessary to modernize theater

nuclear forces and, in particular, discussed the modernization of NATO's longer-range theater nuclear forces. While final decisions are in the process of being worked out, there is an Alliance determination to find a politically acceptable formula for the maintenance of a credible NATO theater nuclear deterrent posture.

At present, individual NATO member nations are giving full consideration to questions involving the technical aspects of TNF modernization and to the political decisions required. These are national political decisions which will require individual national political leadership to consider all the factors which will have influence in their various countries as well as in the Alliance.

In short, the process of reaching a political consensus on the modalities for modernizing long-range TNF systems are in the process of being worked out at national levels. The U.S. is taking a leadership role in building the consensus and is striving to create a climate in which the Alliance will collectively decide how to proceed.

Question 7. Given the political sensitivity of the basing decision, is it considered necessary to proceed with deployment of new systems before attempting restraint through negotiation or do the existence of US programs in advanced states of development constitute bargaining counters?

Answer. The Soviet Union has already deployed, in the course of its TNF modernization program, a substantial number of new systems, which have greatly increased their capabilities in comparison to older systems. NATO's NPG High Level Group (HLG), in its considerations of NATO defense needs, has noted this Soviet modernization as one factor requiring an increase in NATO's long-range theater nuclear capabilities. Also, NATO TNF are aging and will require modernization during the 1980's in any event. We are examining how the new capabilities represented by cruise missiles and modern ballistic missiles can best support the maintenance of a credible deterrent in the theater. We believe that an evolutionary adjustment in long-range theater capability is required, with or without arms control negotiations aimed at the theater threat, to insure that there are no real or perceived gaps in deterrence.

Thus, looking forward from this point, we seek to ensure that NATO is not at a military or political disadvantage because of inadequate theater force levels, including theater nuclear forces. This means that NATO will do what is required to protect its interest by modernizing its deterrent. At the same time, arms control which serves to constrain the Soviet threat and helps to stabilize the military balance would complement modernization efforts in meeting our security requirements.

Question 8. Given the propensity of the Soviet Union to follow the West in deploying weapon systems, can we be sure that the introduction of cruise missiles in Europe would be in the long-term interest of Western security?

Answer. At the present time, the United States enjoys an important lead in cruise missile technology. From our point of view, cruise missiles can be an important addition to NATO defense. Cost-effective, relatively survivable and highly capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses, cruise missiles offer distinct advantages in the context of NATO's overall defense posture.

It has been argued that Western deployment of long-range cruise missiles will encourage Soviet acquisition of these systems via an action-reaction pattern. The Soviets are already threatening Western Europe with long-range nuclear systems—SS–20 and Backfire for example. If the Soviets were to deploy cruise missiles in the European theater, they might improve their force militarily, but this would not change the basic character of the nuclear threat which faces Western Europe. Further, it should be noted that the Soviet Union already possesses cruise missiles, albeit primarily sea-launched antiship missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. It is entirely possible that the Soviets may choose to devote more attention in the future to cruise missiles, whether or not the West deploys such systems. However, we believe that the first order concerns of NATO should be how the Alliance reacts to the basic nuclear threat. What particular systems the threat is composed of, while militarily important, is not our overriding concern.

[The following information was referred to on page 205.]

State Department's Response to Senator Glenn's Request for Presidential Comment on Action if Treaty Is Rejected

In the absence of the limitations set forth in the SALT II Agreement, the strategic defense decisions of the Administration would depend, in part, upon the course of action taken by the Soviet Union. We would be in an entirely new and less predictable situation. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union might exercise re-

straint in some areas, but they are less likely to do so in others. In particular, they are not likely to reduce to the levels required under SALT, and might well increase the numbers of their strategic launchers. In this case, the United States would have to respond, and the Administration would submit appropriate proposals to the Congress. However, if the Soviets exercised some restraint, we believe that it would be in our interest to exercise some restraint as well. Again, we would propose to the Congress that the United States do whatever is necessary to guarantee strategic parity and mutual deterrence. The Congress would be free to enact any legislation it deems appropriate and would not be bound by the terms of a treaty that had not been ratified.

[The following information was referred to on page 213.]

SECRETARY VANCE'S RESPONSE TO QUESTION ASKED BY SENATOR STONE CONCERNING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE UNITED STATES AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. SENATOR STONE DOES NOT FEEL THAT THIS RESPONSE ANSWERS HIS REQUEST ADEQUATELY, AND HAS REQUESTED A MORE EXTENSIVE REPLY.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., July 27, 1979.

Hon. RICHARD STONE,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR STONE: The President has asked me to respond to your July 24 letter to him on Soviet military presence in Cuba. I very much appreciate your calling to our attention reports of a possible high ranking Soviet command structure in Cuba.

I wish to reaffirm the President's statement to you that it is the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere. However, there is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of the presence of a Soviet military base. Apart from a military group that has been advising the Cuban Armed Forces for fifteen years or more our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are any other significant Soviet forces in Cuba. At the same time the President directed that we give increased attention to the situation and monitor it closely. This is being done. The President raised the question of the Soviet presence in Cuba with President Brezhnev in Vienna and made clear to him that a Soviet buildup would adversely affect our relationship.

You have also raised questions on the 1962 understanding in your letter to the President and during the appearances of Secretary Brown and myself before the SFRC. The United States and the Soviet Union both recognize that an understanding on Cuba exists. This understanding is reflected in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence of October and November, 1962, (particularly the letters of October 27 and 28, 1962) and in communications between the two governments in the Fall of 1970 concerning the establishment of Soviet naval bases in Cuba. We have no evidence that the Soviets are in violation of this understanding.

President Nixon addressed the scope of the understanding in 1971, and stated, "in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding". Subsequently, in the early 1970's, submarines did make occasional port calls. According to the understanding with the Soviet Union such port calls do not constitute violations.

You have asked that we assure the American people that they have full knowledge of the understanding. The essential understanding is in the public record. The Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons could not again be introduced into Cuba. In 1970 it was made clear that this understanding included sea-based systems.

Although the October 27 and 28, 1962, letters and many other documents from this period are not classified, there are additional diplomatic exchanges, made in confidence, which must remain classified. They are consistent with publicly available documents. The principle of confidentiality of diplomatic communication is respected throughout the international community and is carefully applied in our relations with the Soviet Union to ensure the free flow of communication that is essential to the maintenance of world peace. A breach of confidentiality in this context could easily impair our ability to deal with the Soviets in the future.

If you wish any further background, please do not hesitate to inform me.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

CYRUS VANCE.