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DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS

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HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUD—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

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PART 1

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM


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PART 1
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



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WASHINGTON: 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1980.

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

WITNESSES

JOHN WHITE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

ROBERT PIRIE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS)

BERNARD ROSTKER, DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

ARNOLD BRODSKY, FINANCIAL DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

	Appropriations	Civilian positions	Reserve officers
1979 actual.....	\$7,830,000	78	715
1980 estimate.....	7,830,000	78	715
Program supplemental ¹	21,895,000	23	
Pay cost supplemental.....	421,000		
Total, 1980.....	30,146,000	101	715
1981 estimate.....	10,982,000	93	715
1981 amendment.....	24,500,000	189	
Total, 1981.....	35,482,000	282	715

¹ Includes \$1,395,000 and 15 positions submitted with the 1981 President's budget in January 1980.

Mr. BOLAND. The Committee will come to order.

This morning we will start hearings on the supplemental request of the Selective Service System for fiscal year 1980, and the budget for fiscal year 1981. There is a substantial increase for fiscal year 1980 and a substantial increase for fiscal year 1981.

We welcome Dr. Bernard Rostker, who is Director of the Selective Service System. Happy birthday on February 1st of this year. How old are you, 36?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. You will miss registration by something like 16 years or so. So you are in pretty good shape.

Mr. BOLAND. Dr. Rostker is accompanied by Robert Pirie, who is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics. How long have you been there?

Mr. PIRIE. I have been there since last June, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. We have looked at your background. You have considerable experience in the military.

We also welcome Mr. John White, who is the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget. You have been serving in that capacity since November 1st of 1978. You probably have been closer to this problem than any other individual in the Government except the President of the United States and some of his advisors. We will place the biographical sketches of Dr. Rostker, Mr. White and Secretary Pirie in the record at this point.

[The biographical sketches follow:]

DR. BERNARD D. ROSTKER, DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Dr. Bernard D. Rostker assumed the position of Director of the Selective Service in November 1979.

Dr. Rostker was born February 1, 1944 in New York City where his mother was a teacher and his father was a clinical psychologist for the Veterans Administration. The senior Rostkers are both retired and reside in San Diego, California.

Dr. Rostker attended New York City public schools. He received his Bachelor's Degree in Economics from New York University in 1964, where he was a Regent's Scholar. He then continued his study of economics at Syracuse University, where he was awarded his Masters Degree in 1966 and his Ph. D. in 1970.

From 1968 to 1970, Dr. Rostker served as a Captain in the Army and was assigned as a staff economist in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). He conducted analyses of and advised the Assistant Secretary concerning manpower requirements, the feasibility of the all-volunteer force concept, and utilization of logistics resources.

In 1970, Dr. Rostker left the Army and joined the Rand Corporation. At Rand he headed the Project Air Force Manpower, Personnel and Training Program, conducting research on policy issues including the structure of Air Reserve components, training strategies and management systems, health care delivery system options, and alternatives to the officer personnel management system.

In 1977, Dr. Rostker left the Rand Corporation to become the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. As such, he was responsible for the policy development and program evaluation in all areas of Navy and Marine Corps military and civilian manpower, personnel and training.

Dr. Rostker was a Department of Labor (Manpower Administration) Dissertation Fellow and a Maxwell Scholar at Syracuse University. He is a member of Omicron Delta Epsilon, the Economics Honorary Society.

Dr. Rostker is married to the former Louise M. Cowen. They have two sons—David, who is 8, and Michael, who is 6.

JOHN PATRICK WHITE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

John Patrick White was confirmed by the Senate as Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget on April 11, 1979. He had been serving in that capacity since November 1, 1978, on a recess appointment.

From May 1977 until joining OMB, Dr. White had been Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics. From 1968 to 1977, he was with the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, where he served as Senior Vice President from 1975 to 1977. From 1964 to 1968, he was on the faculty of LeMoyne College, Syracuse, New York. He was on active duty in the Marine Corps from 1959 to 1961.

Dr. White was born in Syracuse, New York, on February 27, 1937. He received his undergraduate degree in industrial and labor relations from Cornell University in 1959; his master's degree in economics and public administration from Syracuse University in 1964; and his doctorate in economics from Syracuse in 1969.

Dr. White lives in McLean, Virginia, with his wife Elizabeth. They have four children.

ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS)

Mr. Robert B. Pirie is Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics).

Mr. Pirie attended Princeton University and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy. He received a B.A. and M.A. from Oxford University, England, as a Rhodes Scholar.

Mr. Pirie was a career officer with the U.S. Navy from 1955-75. He served in various capacities on nuclear submarines, culminating his service as Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Skipjack. From 1966 to 1969 and from 1973 to 1975, he served on the staff of the Secretary of Defense. In 1972 and 1973, he was on the staff of the National Security Council. In 1975 Mr. Pirie became the first Deputy Assistant Director for National Security of the new Congressional Budget Office. He served in that position until June, 1977, when he accepted the post of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On February 14, 1979 President Carter nominated Mr. Pirie to be Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Pirie is a recipient of the Legion of Merit and the Meritorious Service Medal for his services in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and of the Meritorious Service Medal for his work on the National Security Council staff.

Mr. Pirie, his wife Joan, and three children live in Bethesda, Maryland.

Mr. BOLAND. We are impacted by time. We will continue hearings this afternoon, and tomorrow we will be listening to outside witnesses. We though we ought to give the opposition a chance to make its case. So tomorrow we will be listening to Members of Congress and others who are for and against the recommendation of the President.

Because we are impacted by time, we will put Dr. Rostker's statement and Secretary Pirie's statement in the record at this point.

[The statements follow:]

STATEMENT OF DR. BERNARD D. ROSTKER, DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to present an overview of the President's budget request and his recommendations for Selective Service reform.

On January 23, 1980, the President of the United States, while reiterating support for the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), called for the revitalization of the Selective Service System and said that he would send legislative and budget proposals to the Congress "so that we can begin registration and then meet the future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise." The President also announced, on February 8, 1980, that he will ask Congress to amend the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) to provide for the registration of women, that Selective Service will start the registration process later this spring, that the process of revitalization will include the selection and training of local board members, and that he would request additional funds from the Congress of \$20.5 million in fiscal year 1980 and \$24.5 million in fiscal year 1981 for the Selective Service System to carry out this program.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that the President's statement be placed in the record at this time. (See page 218.)

The decision to revitalize the Selective Service System and to review registration will substantially improve the Selective Service's ability to respond. While the System will still be in "standby", there will now be an actual registration, rather than a registration contingency plan. As the Committee is aware, the President would have to seek additional authority from the Congress before anyone in the pool of registrants could be inducted into the Armed Forces. He has no intention of doing so under present circumstances.

To register, an individual will fill out a simple form (name, address, sex, birth date and social security number) at a local post office, under the supervision of postal employees. After the Selective Service receives the form, the registrant will be sent an acknowledging receipt. No draft cards will be issued. No classification or examination of the registrant will be required.

In order to process the initial registration of two year of birth groups, Selective Service will make use of the keypunch capacity of the Social Security Administration (SSA) and/or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Current plans, reflected in our budget requests, provide for the short term contracting of an interim computer adequate for registration processing and for the use of the U.S. Army Management System Support Agency (USAMSSA) computer to support any contingency that may arise. In fiscal year 1981, a computer center shared with the Department of Defense's Military Enlistment Processing Command will be developed and will expedite the entire registration-induction process. Registrant records within this computer center would, however, be accessible only to authorized Selective Service System employees. In the event of mobilization, the Emergency Military Manpower Procurement System assures an orderly process from registration through examination and classification to induction and training.

Other components of the Selective Service System will also be improved. To plan for the availability of trained local boards, should mobilization ever be necessary, the Selective Service System will work with the Governors during fiscal year 1980 to develop a process for selecting and training a cadre of citizens, who in the event of an emergency would allow us to reestablish local boards. Local board members will be recruited in fiscal year 1981 to serve on a standby basis only. The boards will be prepared in the event of mobilization to process claims and appeals. This would insure the equity of any future draft.

The local boards would have to be supported by area offices, but creating and staffing these at the time of mobilization would be extremely difficult. Hence, we have provided that the Selective Service System would use space in 434 military recruiting service offices upon mobilization. Recruit command personnel, coupled with Selective Service System Reservists and National Guardsmen, would initially augment the System with a pre-trained staff ready to administratively support local board operations.

Carrying out these steps requires that the President's FY80 supplemental and 1981 amended budget requests for the Selective Service System be enacted. Mr. Chairman, I endorse and am fully committed to carrying out the President's recommendations. I am prepared to answer any questions you and the members of the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. PIRIE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS)

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear here today to discuss and amplify some of the issues raised in the FY 1980 Defense Authorization Act with respect to Selective Service which directly affects the Department of Defense.

The Defense Authorization Act for FY 1980 called for the President to send to Congress a plan for the reform of the Selective Service System. The Congress asked for a review of ten issues. These issues cover the following four topics:

- Induction authority;
- Meeting the Armed Forces' personnel requirements;
- Revitalizing the Selective Service System; and
- National Service.

To review these issues, the Administration convened an interagency task force that examined initiatives to maintain and improve our active and reserve forces, and our capability to mobilize trained and untrained manpower in the event of a national emergency. The President's report presents the findings of the inter-agency task force.

INDUCTION AUTHORITY

Congress asked that three questions be examined concerning Presidential authority to induct people into the Armed Forces: The desirability of legislation to provide the President with induction authority in peacetime; whether there should be an Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) draft; and whether registration and conscription should extend to women.

With respect to the first question, the need for induction authority has been, and should continue to be, a matter of mutual agreement between Congress and the President. In any mobilization, the Administration would immediately sub-

mit legislation to amend the Military Selective Service Act to allow the President to begin inductions from the existing list of registrants.

The second question relates to manning our forces. The Individual Ready Reserve is the primary source of pretrained individuals to bring forces to wartime strengths at mobilization and to provide replacements for casualties if war cannot be avoided. At present, our IRR strengths, in the case of the Army, are considerably short of expected requirements. This is primarily the result of reduced accession requirements and longer periods of active service under the all volunteer force. The issue we face is how best to rebuild the IRR, or to reduce our requirements for it. Although a draft for the IRR is a possible way of correcting the shortfall, the Department of Defense has concluded that the most appropriate response is what is recommended in our fiscal year 1981 budget, which concentrates on strengthening the Selected Reserve units so fewer Individual Ready Reservists would be needed to fill out these units in time of mobilization or war. Steps are also being taken to strengthen the IRR to correct the current shortfalls. These measures, as reflected in the fiscal year 1979 and 1980 budgets, are already reversing the decline in reserve strengths, which until last year had been seen each year since the beginning of the AVF.

The third induction authority issue the Congress has posed is whether women should be subject to registration and induction under the Military Selective Service Act. The President has decided to seek authority to register women for service in the Armed Forces. There are 150,000 women serving successfully in the Armed Forces today, and by 1985, it is estimated that there will be approximately 250,000 women in the Armed Forces. It is fair to say that the work women in the Armed Forces do today is essential to the readiness and capability of the forces. In case of war that would still be true, and the number of women doing similar work would inevitably expand beyond our peacetime number of one quarter million. Perhaps sufficient volunteers would come forward to fill this need. Perhaps not. Having our young women registered in advance will put us in the position to call women if they do not volunteer in sufficient numbers. The vast majority of people called in the first few months would be men, primarily for places in the combat arms. But this does not at all rule out calling women for duties not involving direct combat.

MEETING THE ARMED FORCES' PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

The Administration has taken several steps with respect to the active forces to ensure that we maintain our strength. Over the past three years, in spite of a difficult recruiting market, enlistment of volunteers has remained high, first-term attrition has declined, and retention rates at the first reenlistment point have increased. In 1979, the Services achieved a personnel level of 98.5 percent of authorized active duty strength. This is in line with levels achieved over the past five years. However, the Department of Defense remains concerned about its ability to continue recruiting enough people of high mental ability and educational attainment. This is particularly true for the Army because it fares worse than the DoD average with respect to both of these rough measures of recruit quality.

Sustaining the AVF is not only a matter of attracting new recruits, it also depends on the Services' ability to retain personnel of high quality. Reenlistments must provide for a force of experienced career military personnel in order to operate and maintain an increasingly complex force. Service members who joined the AVF in the early years are remaining beyond their initial obligation at a satisfactory rate. First-term reenlistment rates have increased substantially, from 24 percent in 1973 to 37 percent in 1979. An even greater increase in first-term retention—particularly in critical skill areas—is the keystone of our strategy to reduce the need for new recruits.

While retention of first-term personnel is encouraging, retention of career personnel is a matter of growing concern, especially in the Navy. To aid in recruiting and retention, the 1981 budget includes an increase of \$500 million for larger enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, expanded bonus authority, improvements in pay and benefits and increased travel allowances.

As for the Ready Reserve, Selected Reserve strength increased over 19,000 during 1979, for the first net gain in total Selected Reserve strength since 1974. None of the Reserve components declined in strength. Most of the overall strength increase was due to improved retention; however, the Naval Reserve,

Army Reserve and Army National Guard experienced significant increases in new recruits. Use of full time recruiters and other actions taken to improve both recruiting and retention are expected to produce further increases in Army Guard and Reserve strength in 1980. Continued increases in unit strengths are projected in 1981 and beyond. Emphasis is being placed on better utilization of trained personnel and on more intensive and effective unit training programs. These include proposals to allow Guard and Reserve units to participate in major training exercises and overseas tactical deployments for training.

Finally, the Individual Ready Reserve strength of the Army increased by 16 percent in 1979, and is expected to continue to grow.

It is clear then that manpower requirements for the Armed Forces are, by and large, being met by the present system. I would argue that adjustments within the existing framework offer the best chance of continued efficient procurement and allocation of Defense manpower.

Mr. BOLAND. Let me make just a brief statement before we proceed, Mr. White. The purpose of the Selective Service System is, and you say in your statement, to be prepared to supply the Armed Forces manpower adequate to ensure the security of the United States. Since the transition to an all-volunteer force, the size and structure of the Selective Service System has been a subject of recurring debate. With the end of peacetime conscription and registration, it has been reduced to a caretaker operation.

Two years ago, this Administration took the position that the deep standby posture of the SSS was unsatisfactory because it did not provide adequate assurance that it could meet the wartime induction requirements of the most demanding scenario, a conventional war in Europe. At that time the Administration requested an increase of \$3 million in the fiscal year 1979 to bring the Selective Service out of the deep standby position. This Committee rejected the additional funds on the basis that it did not believe that the Selective Service could accomplish what they indicated was their goal—inducting the first individual within 30 days and the first 100,000 inductees within 60 days. It was the view of the Committee that that could not be accomplished within those time constraints without formal registration.

Last year, the Committee was approached with a budget request—a \$2,041,000 supplemental for fiscal year 1979 and a \$9,825,000 level for fiscal year 1980—that purported to be able to deliver the first inductee within 30 days through the use of the state election machinery. The Committee recommended a \$600,000 supplemental appropriation in 1979 to allow the Selective Service to upgrade its data processing system. Funds requested to expand the field structure were not approved. The amount approved for 1980, \$7,830,000, was sufficient to continue Selective Service activities at the 1979 level, including an ongoing level to upgrade computer capabilities.

On February 12th of this year, the SSS formally submitted a revised 1980 supplemental request in the amount of \$21,895,000, and a revised 1981 request in the amount of \$35,482,000. These additional funds are proposed by the Administration for the revitalization of the SSS, particularly through the registration of both men and women age 19 and 20 years old.

Under existing law the President currently has authority to initiate registration of men between the ages of 18 and 26. If this appropriation request is ultimately approved, it is expected that such registration will take place sometime this year. Congress, on the other hand,

would have to approve the registration of women before the President could undertake that action, and it looks like that is down the drain.

With that background, Mr. White, we would be pleased to hear you. And if at any time Dr. Rostker or Secretary Pirie want to chime in, we would be glad to hear them, too. After you complete your statement, there will be a number of questions that we will address to the panel.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate your invitation to appear today. I regard this occasion as an important opportunity to discuss the President's decision on registration, and the specific nature of the actions to be taken to revitalize Selective Service, including registration. On behalf of the President, I would urge your careful consideration and support of the additional funding requested for FY 1980 and FY 1981 for Selective Service reform.

THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

The President's decision. In late December, the Soviets sent their forces into Afghanistan. This was the first time since World War II the Soviets have introduced their own forces into the territory of a neighboring, nonaligned country. In light of the consistent build-up in the Soviet armed forces over the past two decades, the Soviet desire for a warm water port on the Indian Ocean and instability in that region, the invasion of Afghanistan must be regarded as a serious threat to peace in an area of the world where we have vital interests.

President Carter announced his determination to protect our vital interests in his "State of the Union Address" on January 23. To underline our resolve and commitments, the President has placed an embargo on grain, refused the Soviets permits to fish in our coastal waters, called for an Olympic boycott, worked together with our allies to deny technology to the Soviets and continued the Administration's policy of making major improvements in our defense posture by proposing an increase of over five percent in real growth in defense programs and over three percent in outlays in the FY '81 budget.

In addition to these actions, the President called for the revitalization of the Selective Service System. The President made his decision in light of the Soviet aggression and as part of the Administration's overall policy of reinforcing our commitments and resolve.

The Administration is convinced that we must have a SSS that could respond with a high degree of certainty in the event of a future emergency. The elements of revitalization include:

Registration using the facilities of the U.S. Postal Service;

Key entry of registration data on the equipment of the Social Security Administration;

Computer processing on equipment dedicated to the Selective Service mission and sized to handle it; and,

Field structure improvements via the selection and appointment of local board members this year.

The key aspect of Selective Service revitalization called for by the President is registration. This will accelerate the process of systems development and planning and, most importantly, will remove the great uncertainties inherent in waiting until after mobilization to register.

I would emphasize that he has called for registration only; he is not seeking authority to induct, nor will anyone be classified or examined. To carry out this registration the Administration is seeking \$20.5 million in a FY 1980 supplemental now and an additional \$24.5 million in excess of the President's budget for FY 1981.

Let me now move to a discussion of a Selective Service reform. The Administration began studies to define the problems and develop solutions to SSS capability issues long before the recent increase in tensions. In 1977, President Carter commissioned a major review of the issue. Our studies made us very aware of the problems and difficulties involved in moving from a stance of low capability to one on which we could rely. The Administration program was directed toward long-term improvement of data processing and other key elements of the SSS work flow.

What must be emphasized is that Selective Service issues are at bottom national security issues. When the question of peacetime registration was raised last September in the House debate on the Defense Authorization Act of 1980, the Southwestern Asia crisis had not occurred. Secretary Brown and OMB Director McIntyre were on record that registration was not necessary—and I highlight—at that time. The Administration's position as stated on August 1, 1979, was that the President will not hesitate to use his present authority—to require registration—at any time he sees it as a necessary step to preserving or enhancing our national security interest.

As you are aware, in lieu of peacetime registration, the Congress mandated a study of ten questions dealing with Selective Service reform, military manpower issues and national service. We convened an inter-agency study team consisting of SSS and DoD staff supplemented by senior officials and staff of the Departments of Justice, HEW, State, and Postal Service, IRS, FEMA, Labor, and ACTION to review these issues. The work was done starting in October and running through January.

The Congress did not require us to review post-mobilization registration, but we did anyway. A Selective Service staff analysis in draft form dated January 16, 1980, which we have made available to you, recommends post-mobilization registration on the basis of costs and responsiveness in meeting the System's delivery requirements. The applicable section states:

Our analysis of the various face-to-face registration options suggests that the post-mobilization plan is preferable—the post-mobilization option should substantially exceed Defense requirements, employs the fewest number of full-time personnel, and costs the least. While costs and staffing should not be the determining factor, the reduced delivery time provided by the other options is redundant and unnecessary. The post-mobilization option, subject to field testing later this year and the international situation at any time, is recommended as the basis for an effective Standby Selective Service.

This recommendation must be understood in the context of its underlying assumptions. What is at issue is the assurance of responsiveness of pre-mobilization registration as compared to post-mobilization registration. The staff analysis suggests that responsiveness might not differ markedly provided all registration forms were in place at the appropriate postal facilities, that at mobilization they could be distributed to the individual post offices and then completed by the registrants.

A second assumption is that under the great stresses of a mobilization, the registration would be carried out without problems and the forms would be delivered to the key entry facilities, key entered, and a valid computerized data base created. This last step assumes the availability of a large scale and complicated computer system—machines, facilities, programs and staff.

In sum, the SSS staff analysis supposes that this very complex system will be able to handle transactions in the multi-millions, but—and this is the key—only if the supporting work is done before mobilization and all goes well after mobilization. Under standby peacetime planning and programming this would take anywhere from a year to a year and a half. The resulting system would be a contingency plan.

But the President made his decision in the larger context discussed above, including the heightened need for an effective SSS. In summary:

First, to signal the resolve of the American people to deter aggression, and to defend our vital interests;

Second, to accelerate the process of revitalization of the Selective Service System. The issues of system capability will be settled in peacetime; and,

Third, to improve readiness by including as the key element of revitalization, registration. Having the Selective Service data base and system functional and working in peacetime is the best way to assure its responsiveness in an emergency.

I am convinced that the President's decision was the right one and urge your support for the Administration's FY 1980 supplemental and additional requests in FY 1981. These funds are needed now in order to begin this vital effort and assure registration in the near future.

We would be happy to answer questions.

Mr. BOLAND. I assume, Secretary Pirie and Dr. Rostker, that you agree.

Dr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. PIRIE. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Are there any differences in your opinions of it? Is this explanation of post-mobilization registration satisfactory to you now, or has it always been so?

Dr. ROSTKER. It always has been satisfactory.

PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO RESUME REGISTRATION

Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask you, Mr. White, with respect to the President not hesitating to use his present authority to revitalize the SSS or to have pre-mobilization registration, how does he implement that? Is that done through a declaration of a national emergency or through an executive order, or how does he do it?

Mr. WHITE. Short of registration, Mr. Chairman, that can be done under current authority and does not require any specific steps other than directions such as we have had from the President in order to begin doing it. It does require cooperation of Congress because it requires funding.

With respect to registration, when we have determined the appropriate time and place, the President will issue a proclamation calling upon people of specific age groups to register.

Mr. BOLAND. You have no idea when the proclamation may be issued?

Mr. WHITE. We can't say until we receive an appropriation.

Mr. BOLAND. Is there any indication on the part of the Administration that it would delay registration, even if the funds were provided in a fiscal year 1980 supplemental?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir. None whatsoever. Our current intention is to conduct registration in June.

REGISTRATION OF WOMEN

Mr. BOLAND. The fiscal year 1980 supplemental request is for some \$21.9 million, which the Congress will not entirely approve, of course, because you have over \$8 million in there for women, as I understand it.

Is that correct?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. You don't expect to get registration of women? Congress has to authorize that.

Mr. WHITE. While we are seeking authorization to register women, we recognize that it has not been approved by the Congress and therefore if the Congress voted funds for us to register men, we would proceed with that as soon as possible.

Mr. BOLAND. So, if \$13 million were provided for premobilization registration by the Congress within the next few weeks, would you expect that the President would issue that proclamation?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. And our planning would be that we would register probably early in June.

REVITALIZATION OF SSS

Mr. BOLAND. Does the Administration feel as solidly as it did in January when it made its recommendation for the revitalization of the SSS?

Mr. WHITE. Yes. No question about it. Our continued planning enhances the need to do the revitalization.

Mr. BOLAND. Is it conceivable that the events that are now taking place in Afghanistan, and if they continue—if the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates, as it clearly is under the invasion—deteriorating as far as the Russians are concerned—is it conceivable that registration would not be necessary?

Mr. WHITE. I wouldn't anticipate that is the case, no. I think the world has changed. We have got increased uncertainties of which I am sure you are aware, and we intend to go forward with this program.

Mr. BOLAND. The invasion of Afghanistan was one of the elements that sparked directly the statement by the President with respect to the revitalization of the SSS, is it not?

Mr. WHITE. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. That situation seems to be falling apart for the Russians at present. The Russians expected that they would have the support of the masses in Afghanistan, which they do not have—not even

at Kabul. Actually, there is rather effective opposition within the Afghanistan military to the Russians. And at the present time, the only areas which the Afghan military are controlling are areas which don't give them a problem. The Soviets are controlling those areas at Kabul and other areas in the larger cities.

You talked about the draft proposal that was submitted by the SSS with respect to post-mobilization and pre-mobilization registration. In order to highlight it a bit, because I think it is important, let me ask you a few questions with respect to that area—that problem.

Last year the Armed Services Committee recommended that we return to peacetime registration in order to ensure the security of the country. During most of last summer, this Administration opposed—and rather vigorously opposed, as I recall, because they weren't in here for additional funding for it—any return to peacetime registration. What was the Administration's rationale at that time for opposition to registration for men and women?

Mr. WHITE. At that time, Mr. Chairman, we did not think it was necessary, although as you are totally aware, we thought it was important to upgrade the SSS. We did not think it was necessary to go directly to peacetime registration.

And as we said at that time, we would think it was necessary if the world changed in particular ways, if that happened, and then the President would exercise his authority. My earlier testimony states the precise language used at the time.

Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask whether or not the invasion of Afghanistan was the only recent event explaining the change in the position of the Administration? Is it to send the message to the Soviet Union and to indicate the resolve of our country, not to permit this to happen without serious consequences?

You have named a number of areas in which the United States has taken action, and some have become very effective. But is the invasion of Afghanistan the only reason explaining the change in the position of the Administration or OMB?

Mr. WHITE. There is no question. As the President has said, the invasion of Afghanistan was a trigger in this sense, and that is very important.

At the same time, we have been experiencing problems of heightened tensions which I think go beyond Afghanistan. Finally, we have become convinced as I indicated earlier, that in order to assure ourselves that the system, if it were called upon, would work, we need to revitalize it. A critical, perhaps the most critical part of that is registration.

We have looked at the question in that context and that is where we come out.

MILITARY CONSCRIPTION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Mr. BOLAND. There are some who say that our friends who have as much concern, if not greater concern, in the Persian Gulf don't look upon it as we do. That some of our friends don't have registration—some don't have a draft.

What is your response to that?

Do you want to list for the record the number of countries that have a draft and that have registration?

Mr. WHITE. I think it is probably—

Mr. BOLAND. You'd do it for the record?

Mr. WHITE. The short answer is that most of our allies have a draft with the exception of the Japanese, the Canadians, and the United Kingdom. But the allies have responded in various ways and various dimensions. Mr. Chairman, across the whole range of requests for cooperation from the Administration. I will supply a list for the record.

[The information follows:]

Many nations use conscription to fill their armed forces. These nations are listed below. The question as it pertains to registration is difficult to answer and may not be germane to the Subcommittee's interest because registration is a much broader practice in many countries. There, citizens must register with the local police or other government agency for all facets of life, not just conscription. In many nations, citizens are issued and must carry identity cards or internal passports.

COUNTRIES WITH MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

NATO:

Norway
Federal Republic of Germany
Netherlands
Italy
Portugal

Denmark
Turkey
Greece
Belgium
France

Other:

Spain
Israel
South Korea
Austria
Finland
Sweden
Switzerland
Algeria
Cyprus
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Philippines
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
U. A. Emirates
Yemen
Angola

Ethiopia
Mozambique
Senegal
South Africa
Rhodesia
China
Afghanistan
Taiwan
Indonesia
Laos
Mongolia
Singapore
Thailand
Soviet Union
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Equador
Mexico
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela

Mr. BOLAND. You indicated that the Japanese don't have a draft. Is there some particular reason why that nation doesn't have a draft? Is it because we have imposed some particular sanctions on military training by the Japanese?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, and I am not an expert. But there are limitations in the Japanese Constitution with respect to their defense posture. I would have to supply more on that.

Mr. PIRIE. I, too, have to verify this information. It is my understanding that they got enough volunteers for the size armed forces that they maintain.

[The information follows:]

Although conscription is not directly prohibited by Japan's constitution, various interpretations of one article prohibiting forced labor hold that conscription could not be authorized in the future.

At present Japan has no intention or need to consider conscription since enough volunteers have always been available to fill the needs of the self defense forces.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask Secretary Pirie whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense formally recommended to the President a return to registration following the invasion of Afghanistan on December 26?

Mr. PIRIE. The Joint Chiefs had been on record for some time for recommending registration. I am not privy to any conversations or communications between them and the President after Afghanistan, so I can't answer that.

Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask you again, Secretary Pirie, prior to the revised budget submission, what has been the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the issue of registration?

Mr. PIRIE. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been on record since early 1977, Mr. Chairman, as advocating peacetime registration.

Mr. BOLAND. Was the JCS last year in agreement with the Administration's position opposing registration?

Mr. PIRIE. No; they were on the side of peacetime registration.

REASONS FOR A RETURN TO THE DRAFT

Mr. BOLAND. I guess probably this would be a strategic or force structure question. Would you anticipate that military action in the Persian Gulf, designed to defend the oil fields, would require a return to the draft?

Mr. PIRIE. As you say, that is a hypothetical question, depending very much on the degree of involvement, but certainly a very large involvement occupying months, perhaps years, would strain the present manpower supply system we have.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, may I comment?

Mr. BOLAND. Either one of you may comment.

Mr. WHITE. What I am going to say is totally consistent with that—simply to add that the Administration has been on record for some time, I think, since the beginning, that in the event of a major mobilization—it depends on what we mean by "major"—but a major mobilization, we would require induction.

SSS DRAFT DOCUMENT

Mr. BOLAND. You talked about the draft working document. Let's spend a little time on that.

Mr. White and Mr. Rostker, over the past weekend you made available to the Committee a copy of the draft working document, and we made copies of it and submitted it to other members of the Committee and other members of the Congress who were interested in getting it. It was no secret paper: it was a draft by the SSS. It is a draft report by the Director of the Selective Service, Dr. Rostker, as part of the

ultimate report to the Congress prepared pursuant to Public Law 96-107.

POST-MOBILIZATION OPTION

On page seven of that report, there is outlined Option I, known as "Post-mobilization Participatory Registration". You talked about this a bit, Mr. White, in your statement. I think perhaps we ought to spend some time on it because it is an important area that ought to be explored.

In essence, this post-mobilization participatory registration is simply, as I look at it, a continuation of the plan that Mr. Shuck had proposed last year—with a major exception, that instead of using election machinery, you would register through the Postal Service after mobilization occurred.

Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. There are several changes. We would use the Post Office. There is a scheme for sorting the registration material to allow us to issue orders of induction in a speedy fashion. It also provides that the Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration would do the keypunching, rather than contractors.

It proposes the use of computers in other areas of the Federal government in an emergency, rather than relying on our own computer center. It is quite a different plan, but it is a post-mobilization plan, as was Mr. Shuck's concept.

Mr. BOLAND. Most of the other recommendations were minor. The major recommendation was registration by the Postal Service.

Isn't that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. That was a major change.

Mr. BOLAND. Let me quote an important passage from the draft report:

Under this option, Selective Service expects to exceed the current DoD requirements for inductees. Registration will occur at M-plus-4, and induction notices will be issued starting at M-plus-7. Inductions will begin on M-plus-17 at the rate of 7,000 per day. The estimated capacity of MEPCOM, with this sustained rate, 100,000 inductions could be made by M-plus-35 and 650,000 by M-plus-125.

The estimated yearly recurring cost for this option, i.e., base level cost to keep the Selective Service in a true standby posture, is \$9.7 million.

And on page 13,

The post-mobilization option should substantially exceed Defense requirements, employs the fewest number of full-time personnel, and costs the least. While costs and staffing should not be the determining factor, the reduced delivery time provided by the other options is redundant and unnecessary.

As I understand, this was your recommendation to the President. This was the approach that you recommended. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. The analysis in this paper and the numbers you read are based on the Selective Service System fully working out the detailed plans with the Post Office, with the Social Security Administration, with a number of agencies. Those plans have not, in fact, been worked out.

As we say later in the report, it would be quite difficult to meet these kinds of timetables without doing that. In fact, it would be impossible.

Let me also point out, Mr. Chairman, the phrase on page 13 that "this is dependent upon the international situation."

I think what you would have with the post-mobilization option is a contingency plan. No matter how well worked out, it would remain a contingency plan subject to all the fits and starts that we all deal with in contingency plans.

What the President has chosen to do is simply substitute an ongoing registration process for contingency plans, and by so doing, eliminate the uncertainty that has to be inherent with any system that relies upon a standby mechanism for such a massive undertaking as registration.

ORIGINAL FISCAL YEAR 1979 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. BOLAND. Is this the plan that you were going to proceed with in your request for the \$1,395,000 and 15 positions submitted with the 1981 President's budget in January, 1980?

Mr. ROSTKER. I am not familiar with exactly those numbers. We are basically working through these components of the plan, the use of the Post Office and the use of the Social Security Administration.

We are actively engaged with the Post Office to work out the details and they will carry out the registration.

Mr. BOLAND. The first submission of the supplemental, you are familiar with that, are you not?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. It was for \$1,395,000 and 15 positions for the 1980 supplemental, correct? What were you going to do with that money?

Mr. ROSTKER. Most of that money was to work out the joint computer center between ourselves and MEPCOM and the 15 positions, which are incorporated in the additional supplemental also, were to strengthen headquarters in the area of analysis, in the area of alternate service, and in the area of policy development, and people that we were projecting would be involved in the recruitment and training of local board members.

Those numbers are consistent with the later supplemental.

PRE-MOBILIZATION REGISTRATION DELIVERY CAPABILITIES

Mr. BOLAND. As I understand it, the plan that you are now proposing, which is a pre-mobilization registration approach, that the first inductions would be made on M plus 12.

Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is correct, presuming that we can fully work out the entire infrastructure and that we have accomplished the registration function.

Mr. BOLAND. The 100,000 would be reached by M plus 28.

Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. That would be the earliest that we could meet that.

Mr. BOLAND. So, if our math is correct, you would gain only five days for the first induction under the current proposal and only seven days to induct a 100,000 under the current proposal.

CONTINGENCY PLAN VERSUS OPERATING PLAN

Mr. ROSTKER. Mr. Chairman, as I have explained, the analysis that is in here assumes that we fully work out a contingency plan. And

what was not said and what would have been said as we moved from a draft to a final report is that it was a contingency plan.

Mr. BOLAND. Do you want to comment on this, Mr. White?

You have been in the middle of this problem.

Mr. WHITE. I can only comment, Mr. Chairman, by saying that in terms of the analysis that was presented to us in the study, I remember the arithmetic to be as you indicated.

And as the director said, the problem has to do with, (A) the underlying assumptions which have the system totally revitalized and up and operating and then, (B) that everything would go off without a hitch.

Mr. McDADE. When you do the contingency planning, customarily, you do it on a best-case, worst-case, et cetera.

And the Chairman has just outlined what your report indicated based on certain contingencies which always exist in planning.

The best-case, worst-case, what is it?

Mr. ROSTKER. I would guess at this point it is the best case. What we have here is a draft document that was out for comment to a number of agencies that were involved in those processes.

As those comments were coming in, we would have in fact modified that document.

What is clear is that we did not adequately caveat the assumptions as a contingency plan subject to the slips that are true with every contingency plan.

If the system were to work flawlessly, if the system were to work in the way that we have built it, then I think those numbers are about right.

But what we have done is to remove the uncertainties of the contingency plan by simply substituting an ongoing registration system so that we can get over with that massive job of distributing forms of processing registration of keypunching information, entering it into the computer.

What the President has provided is that in peacetime, we should undertake those tasks which are well done in peacetime, consistent with the overall revitalization plan of Selective Service.

Mr. McDADE. So you say. But if your plan slipped, you must have had some contingency planning as to how badly it might slip, didn't you?

DELIVERY CAPABILITY OF PRE-MOBILIZATION REGISTRATION PLAN

Mr. ROSTKER. The question of how large it would slip is covered in the report. We think we still could have met the overall defense requirements with the system totally up.

The system is not totally up. The process by which we would have brought it up would have been and is always subject to Congressional review, and just the normal bureaucratic working out.

Mr. McDADE. The figures the Chairman quoted and what are in the report are your estimates of what would happen given the contingencies and hoping the plan would work at the maximum level.

Mr. ROSTKER. They were my estimates at the time of what would happen at maximum level with no slips. Those are the numbers the Chairman read.

COST OF REGISTERING WOMEN

Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask you about the registration for women. As I understand it, of the \$21.9 million supplemental request for fiscal year 1980, about \$8.5 million would be used for the registration of women.

That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. As I have indicated, there is no way in the world that we are going to recommend \$8 to 8.5 million for registration of women without an authorization.

We don't have the authorization and we don't expect to get it.

Mr. WHITE. We are not requesting it.

Mr. BOLAND. So you don't expect to get it, anyway.

POOL OF REGISTRANTS NEEDED TO MEET MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS

But staying in that area just for a moment, by including women in the numbers registered, the total estimate of the pool achieved is 4 million registrants for each birth year. Is that correct?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. You are requesting funds to initially register two birth years, 19 and 20, or 8 million registrants.

Mr. WHITE. That's correct.

Mr. BOLAND. What is your requirement in terms of the number of people needed in the pool to meet the DoD manpower requirement should we mobilize in the event of an emergency?

Mr. ROSTKER. Mr. Chairman, the women were not fractioned into the requirements to meet the DoD pool. We figured what the pool needed if the total requirements were being filled by males.

Under the emergency systems employed by Selective Service, we need a pool of between 5 and 7 times the numbers we hope to induct.

We believe that the scheme that has been presented to the committee in which we would register two year of birth groups, hopefully this June, a single year birth group next January and continuous registration by next January, would give us a sufficiently large enough pool to meet the emergency requirements of the Department of Defense.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Coughlin.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESIDENTIAL REPORT

Mr. COUGHLIN. I have the message of the President and may I ask who wrote this?

Mr. WHITE. I'm sorry.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The message of the President concerning the registration proposal.

Mr. WHITE. I'm sorry, Mr. Coughlin. The report or the State of the Union message?

Mr. COUGHLIN. The message from the President which was submitted to the Congress on the registration proposal.

Mr. WHITE. The final part of it was largely drafted in my office, Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Let me say that except for Part 3, which relates to the all-volunteer army and the reserves, if I were a high school teacher giving out a grade, you would get a flunk.

OPERATIONS NEEDING COMPLETION FOR PRE- OR POST-MOBILIZATION

Let me ask three specific questions. First of all let's discuss the need of registration to speed up mobilization. The Selective Service report, as the Chairman has pointed out, on page 4, on page 8, on page 9, on page 13, says time and time again that premobilization registration is not the preferred alternative.

Now you say you have to have the supplemental work done before mobilization. But that can be done without registration.

Is that not correct?

Mr. WHITE. Not all of it can be done without registration, Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The computer set-ups can be done before that, can't they?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, they can.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The Post Offices can be set up before then, can't they?

Mr. WHITE. Some of it, yes.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Why do you have to have the actual active registration?

Mr. WHITE. First of all, as I indicated earlier and as the President has indicated, the world has changed. We are in a situation where we have to move more quickly in this area than we had anticipated in the past.

That involves a great many things. Fundamentally, it involves a major review of the revitalization of that system and it involves, in our judgment, a heightened assurance that in the event of mobilization, that system will work.

And the best way that we know short of induction, which we are not proposing, to heighten that assurance is to get the system full up and operating.

Mr. COUGHLIN. That is despite the fact that the selective service system recommends the opposite.

Mr. TRAXLER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. COUGHLIN. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. TRAXLER. I am intrigued. You are going to put the system in operation so it can take advantage of any international crisis that may occur in the future.

All you are doing is registering people. You are not classifying them.

DISCUSSION OF CLASSIFICATION

One of the most significant steps you must take in your system is the classification of these individuals so that they are immediately ready to be inducted.

But this is one of the essential steps in the process and probably is filled with the greatest number of errors. I am sure you would agree, Dr. Rostker, that the classification process itself, including the physicals, conscientious objector application, deferment applications, hard-

ships and dependencies, should be included if you intend really to have the meaningful SSS system you are talking about.

Mr. ROSTKER. I can't agree with you on that, sir.

Mr. TRAXLER. You don't agree with me?

Mr. ROSTKER. The active classification and the undertaking of the physical exam have a very temporary shelf life. The facts around classifications and around physical exams change.

We believe that we can meet the requirements of the Defense Department starting from a constructed registration pool, utilizing the facilities of the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations and provide people to the Department of Defense in sufficient time to meet their mobilization requirements without the classification and examination functions.

REGISTRATION AS A DETERRENT TO SOVIET AGGRESSION

Mr. COUGHLIN. Let me come back to my second question. Let's talk for a minute about the need for registration as a deterrent to the Soviets.

What evidence do you have that registration will be a deterrence to the Soviets?

Mr. WHITE. We don't do calculus on the basis of what in the whole set of action the President has decided upon will be key to that deterrence.

The President's objective was to indicate a wide array of policy areas, steps that ought to be taken and have been taken with respect to that problem.

And this is one of them.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Do you think the Soviets would really be concerned about the fact that we registered young men and women without classifying them or without taking further steps?

Mr. WHITE. If I were a Soviet planner, Mr. Coughlin, I would see it as significant that we are making major efforts to get this system up and operating and doing it quickly, particularly since it has not been operational in the past several years.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Let me suggest that the Soviets are not as naive as the Administration. I don't think that they are going to see this as any major threat to their military posture.

Mr. WHITE. I'm not suggesting it is a threat. I am suggesting that they will see SSS revitalization and registration as an important element of our resolve to do what is necessary in the future to protect our vital interests.

EXEMPTIONS AND DEFERMENTS FROM DRAFT

Mr. COUGHLIN. Let me then, third, follow up a little bit on what Mr. Traxler was asking.

It seems if we are going to ask young Americans to register, they should know for what they are registering.

Can you tell me for what kind of a draft they would be registering?

Mr. WHITE. In the first place, the President does not have authority to induct, as I think you know. And he would have to ask that of the Congress.

Mr. COUGHLIN. What kind of a proposal would he have for which he would be suggesting that young Americans register?

Mr. WHITE. He is not making any proposal at this time. We would anticipate—

Mr. COUGHLIN. Don't you think it is unfair to have somebody register for something when they don't know for what they are registering?

Mr. WHITE. If I may finish. In the event of a mobilization, we would anticipate the President would ask for authority to induct under the Military Selective Service Act. This law lays out how that would happen.

There would be a lottery. Conscientious objection and hardship would be grounds for exemption.

Many of the exemptions formerly in the law were removed in the reforms in 1971.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Would there be student deferments?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Doctors?

Mr. WHITE. No, not under the current system.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Clergymen?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, there is an exemption for clergymen, but occupational, and student deferments were stricken by the Congress from the law in 1971.

May I point out that the process of registration without a draft is one that we should be familiar with for, in fact between 1972 and 1975, that is exactly what happened.

We systematically registered people. We did not classify them and we did not induct them.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Would there be exemptions to this draft for married folks with children?

Mr. ROSTKER. No. It is not provided in the law.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Have the physical qualifications for this draft been determined? Would the star athlete with a bum knee be exempt?

Mr. ROSTKER. The law provides that in a military mobilization we would return to the specific physical requirements in existence in 1945. Today the Secretary of Defense can indicate the physical and mental requirements based upon his judgments as to what is needed in the Armed Forces.

Mr. COUGHLIN. What about mental requirements?

Mr. ROSTKER. The same thing.

Mr. COUGHLIN. So you would be talking about the same kind of draft which was occurring in 1971; is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. No. As I have indicated, if this is done in the context of a military emergency, we would go back to physical and mental standards that existed in 1945.

NATIONAL SERVICE

Mr. COUGHLIN. In the message from the President there is a very cursory evaluation of the National Service proposal, which I happen to favor if we are going to have this kind of mobilization. It says, on both page 57 and on page 59, that this seems to be a fairly workable

alternative. But there has not been adequate time to evaluate this. We have had quite a bit of time. This has been banging around here, and I can't imagine that there hasn't been time to evaluate it.

Mr. WHITE. We looked at the substantial number of alternatives, as we indicated in the report, Mr. Coughlin. And we did it, you will recall, in the context of the very specific requests made by the Congress. That is the relationship of National Service to the Armed Forces. That was the question asked, and that is the question evaluated in the report.

The report is more limited than the broader question of would it be a good idea to have a National Service, per se. That is not what was asked of us.

REGISTRATION AS A SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS

Mr. COUGHLIN. The next to the last paragraph of the message, I quote, you say, "There is no need for a National Civilian Service program at this time. The AVF is adequate to meet projected military personnel needs under present planning assumptions," (quoting from document).

Why do we need registration?

Mr. WHITE. As I said earlier, Mr. Coughlin, we have always assumed that if we had to go to mobilization for a major contingency, we would have to go to induction. We want to be ready to do that if we need to.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, I will yield since I know there are others here who wish to question. Let me say that this whole program appears to be a kind of a useless gesture which will send no signal to the Soviets and the wrong signal to the American people, that we are doing something, when in fact we aren't.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOW REGISTRANTS WOULD BE CLASSIFIED

In looking at the rationale that we were given for supporting this proposal, we are told it is going to send a clear signal to those who are listening for the signal, and that we are deterring aggression and defending our vital interests. It will accelerate the process of revitalization of the SSS, and it is also the best way to assure SSS responsiveness in an emergency.

I have some serious questions as to point number one, whether this whimper can even be heard beyond this room, let alone overseas.

Secondly, I want to come back for a moment to accelerate the process of revitalization of SSS. You tell us that the revitalization of SSS really then is contingent simply upon registration and that classification is not of any consequence to you. You are not troubled by any of the hitches moving hundreds of thousands of people through the classification process. I presume your computer would take care of that.

Mr. ROSTKER. You don't move hundreds of thousands of people in a single day through the classification process. The needs of the Defense Department step up over time. We are confident that from the pool we are asking to register, we will be able to induct at a sustained rate that will meet the needs of the Defense Department.

The revitalization plan calls for the selection and training of a cadre of citizens who in an emergency could reconstitute the boards. We view that as a very key step that should give us the capability of hearing the claims for classification in an orderly fashion and to allow us to run a draft in a fair and equitable manner.

REESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL DRAFT BOARDS

Mr. TRAXLER. The President has told us that all we are doing at this time is reimposing registration. On page 9 of your justifications you describe efforts that will be undertaken to reestablish the local draft board structure.

Mr. ROSTKER. Sir, I think the President has consistently said that he has called for the revitalization of Selective Service, and we have always viewed that to be a multifaceted program. The selection and training of people who in an emergency could serve on draft boards is part of the total revitalization process. That revitalization process also has us moving from a registration contingency plan to an ongoing registration system, so that in an emergency we would eliminate the uncertainty associated with that portion of the program and be able to move on to an orderly, fair, equitable, but speedy draft. We believe the program before you does that.

LOCAL BOARD DETERMINATION OF CLASSIFICATION

Mr. TRAXLER. I submit to you that in my definition of an orderly, fair, and speedy revitalization of SSS, classification, in my opinion, is an absolutely essential part. I recognize that classification requires more of an affirmative action than signing one's name to a piece of paper. Therefore, it may be politically more unpalatable. But I suggest, if we are going to have registration for the purposes that have been set forth in documents submitted to this Subcommittee, then it seems to me, classification is absolutely essential to fulfill your rationale and your purpose, as stated here this morning.

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me discuss the process of classification. In 1971, we went to a major reform which eliminated a great deal of the grounds for deferments. We eliminated occupational deferments; we eliminated student deferments. Today the only basis for judgmental deferment is conscientious objection, hardship and clergy.

What we found when we looked at that is that those three cases depend upon facts that can only be determined by a local board, but are very transitory such as a person's status in terms of hardship changes or a person's status in terms of conscientious objection changes.

What would happen if we went through the classification function is that upon mobilization and the institution of the draft, we would have to be ready to handle, again, all forms of claims on the grounds of hardship, conscientious objection or clergy.

We can't rule out the person's ability, his right to have those claims adjudicated, even after a mobilization takes place. Therefore, we would be going through a massive exercise just to reopen the whole hearings again in a post-mobilization environment.

Now, in our analysis we rejected the classification only option. It is true that, if we went ahead and did the physicals, that those would survive in a better state, but there is nothing in the system that could prevent an individual, even after taking his physical, upon mobilization to enter into the whole question of classification again and then raise again issues of physicals in terms of new-found ailments.

We believe that with the capacity of the Armed Forces, the Military Enlistment Processing Command, that we can run an orderly process, that we can protect people's rights and meet the needs of the Defense Department without going the other extra distance of spending what may be as much as a quarter of a billion dollars to go through a process that we have no confidence would substantially improve our ability to respond.

MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES WITH CLASSIFICATION

Mr. TRAXLER. How much time would classifications save? What would your M-plus be down to?

Mr. ROSTKER. Without physicals, we don't think it would save us anything. We think the examination process would save some time. We could put people through the AFEEs at a faster rate. We would give them a much reduced check instead of a full physical; but we are talking about an area where we substantially exceed the Defense Department's standards now, so we would be pushing people out the door at a rate faster than Defense could absorb them.

We don't think there is a basis for spending the substantial sums of money necessary to go through the act of physical classification.

Mr. TRAXLER. In the absence of appropriation by the Congress, do you foresee the President ordering registration in any event; is that possible?

Mr. WHITE. It is not possible, Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. I will have further questions when we get into specific justifications.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. McDade.

MANPOWER POOL NECESSARY FOR MOBILIZATION

Mr. McDADE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to focus once again on your overall plan. As the Committee members have mentioned, this is Presidential response to a perceived threat, a new threat that exists in the world, the reason that we are having this meeting today and discussing whether we are going to register a pool of people; correct?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Mr. McDADE. If you include women—and the President did request, as I understand his statement, that women be included in the draft—8 million people, within the dates—the birthdates that are selected; is that right?

Mr. WHITE. That's correct.

Mr. McDADE. Do you believe it conceivable?

Maybe I should direct this question to the Pentagon side.

Do you believe it conceivable that we could ever need 8 million people in the Middle East?

Mr. WHITE. It is a question, Mr. McDade, first of all, of sizing the requirement. We did that, as Mr. Rostker indicated earlier, based on men only, which is all the authority—

Mr. McDADE. So you cut it to 4 million, but you say you intend to ask to go to 8 million?

Mr. WHITE. That's correct.

Mr. McDADE. Is it conceivable we would ever need a manpower pool of 8 million people?

Mr. ROSTKER. The basic thrust of your question is why we limited the registration at this time to those two-year groups, rather than to registering the total pool of 18 to 26.

Mr. McDADE. It is not just expanding.

Mr. ROSTKER. It gets back to the question of classification and examination. It is important that we have a pool that is many times greater than the Defense Department requirement, because we want to make sure that—and we have specific calculations of the numbers required for the pool size—we want to make sure we can meet this requirement.

One of the things, the law does provide for is a student postponement and allows students to finish the academic semester and then be inducted. Our calculations are based upon a worst-case, that students are in the middle of the semester, therefore they would delay induction until the end, and we would need a pool sufficiently large to meet that requirement.

Mr. McDADE. What, in your judgment, would be the manpower pool required? If you have chosen a total pool of registrants of approximately 8 million, and they fall out for various reasons, what kind of a manpower pool are you talking about?

Mr. ROSTKER. In order for me to meet the requirements of Defense—100,000 in 60 days; 650,000 in six months—I need a pool that is about 3 to 4 million people, and that is what we have provided in this registration scheme.

TIME SAVED; POST- VERSUS PRE- MOBILIZATION

Mr. McDADE. Under your original document that you submitted to the President, you indicated there would be virtually no difference in saving of time between post-mobilization and pre-mobilization registration.

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me make one correction. It was not submitted to the President. It was submitted to an inter-agency group, in the process of writing a report, three weeks from concluding that report and submitting something to the President. This was a working document.

Mr. McDADE. Done by the people in charge of planning?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, but the point is it was still a working document.

Mr. McDADE. But in that working document, let me ask you your conclusion. How much time do you save by post-mobilization vis-a-vis pre-mobilization?

Mr. ROSTKER. If everything worked out as advertised, we would save seven days.

DIFFERENCE IN COST; POST- VERSUS PRE- MOBILIZATION

Mr. McDADE. Would you go back again and state for the record, as I read the report, the differences in cost between pre-mobilization and post-mobilization?

Mr. ROSTKER. The difference in cost—

Mr. McDADE. Total cost.

Mr. ROSTKER. It is about \$2 a person for registration. So if we register one-year group, male and female, or two-year groups of males only, we are talking about \$8 million.

Mr. McDADE. There is a differential between the way you do it, too, isn't there, between pre- and post-mobilization?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. McDADE. What are those cost differentials?

Mr. ROSTKER. Most of those costs were part of the revitalization plan and would have to come up in any event. The difference strictly is the \$2 a person that exists for the registration process. Everything else is about the same.

Mr. McDADE. That is not the way I read your report. I read your report that there is a significant financial difference, roughly 40 million, as opposed to 9.7, depending which way you do it. If you do pre-mobilization, you're operating at a level of about 9 million. If you do post-mobilization, you're operating at a level of about 40.

Mr. ROSTKER. That's not correct.

Mr. McDADE. What are your figures?

Mr. ROSTKER. These numbers include women. The difference is about \$8 million.

Mr. McDADE. So you are saying that the cost differential—you are asking us for 20 and 20, roughly, in the supplemental, and the regular budget—35 in the regular budget—

Mr. ROSTKER. 35.

Mr. McDADE. How much in the supplemental? 21?

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me say that the original \$14 million supplemental was developed in September. It did not incorporate all of the features in the revitalization plan that we now envision. It was, in my view, incomplete. You have to appreciate the timing of the supplemental and the timing of the budgetary process that was going on.

I think it is quite consistent, quite clear that the difference between pre- and post-mobilization is simply, in this year's budget, \$8 million, roughly \$8 million, which is the cost of carrying out the registration itself.

Mr. McDADE. The other is a five-day saving.

Mr. ROSTKER. Seven-day saving. But with the other you are eliminating the problem with the contingency plan and are going to a true and tested system in which you accomplish your tasks in an environment where you have a certainty of accomplishment, rather than putting it all off.

ACTIVITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. McDADE. I conclude by saying that it is an open secret that the Defense Department is negotiating for bases, that we started and

stopped ships, and they are now in the Indian Ocean. And we have task forces over there—that we have 1,800 Marines headed someplace. One day they are described as being in a combat mode, and another day, they are not in combat mode.

I am wondering what we have to do to get the message across and whether this is an essential element, as the President seems to think it is, and apparently all you gentlemen agree, although you didn't some time ago—you didn't a year ago—about the events that have happened in Afghanistan. A lot of people claim it was an attempt to put down what they believe to be an extension of the Islamic revolution within their own sphere of influence, if you want to use that word. Other people claim they have much broader objectives in mind.

I don't sit on the Defense Subcommittee that examined those questions, but I think we can't sit and vote on whether or not to give you his money without some consideration of those factors.

Mr. WHITE. If I may, Mr. McDade, I think those factors are absolutely vital. I have looked at a good deal of information, and I see it to be brutal aggression of the worst sort.

Mr. McDADE. Nobody is disagreeing with that.

Mr. WHITE. I thought there was some question about what their motives were.

Mr. McDADE. Do you think their motives are the Persian Gulf fields?

Mr. WHITE. It is too hard to define their motives at this time, and we ought to be prepared.

Mr. McDADE. You are aware of the thesis that it may not be a thrust at the Persian Gulf fields. It may well be an effort at suppression of a Moslem revolt that is contiguous to their own border as a result of events that occurred in Iran.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Mr. WHITE. I am aware of that thesis. But I think in the context in which we are talking, Mr. McDade, this is, as we have indicated earlier, part of a whole, of which you also indicated. I think it is a very important part of that whole. It has to do with whether or not we are prepared to take some steps which are important steps (but not steps in terms of induction or anything like that) indicating in the society at large and many different areas our resolve.

Registration is an important part of the President's program. I think it would be very unfortunate if the Congress were to decide that it were not important.

Mr. McDADE. The Congress—I don't accept that alternative at all. The Congress can do many things apart from this to decide that what the Soviets have done is terribly important, like support the grain embargo. The Congress has done that, and symbolic gestures, if you will, like saying, "Boycott the Olympics." What we are interested in seeing are effective steps. And not steps which we think may not be meaningful. That is one of the problems we have.

You are talking about saving perhaps seven days by registering all of these people when you could do it and lose only seven days if we did have a national emergency. We are talking about whether we are going to be involved in a land war in the Middle East somewhere, and you say, well, you don't want to speculate whether we will or won't.

We don't either. The judgment that we have to make is whether or not that is a real possibility, whether or not this Administration is going to commit U.S. troops to the Middle East because they believe there is an absolute threat and the Russians are coming down to the Persian oil fields.

Mr. WHITE. In the context of this specific proposal, I think the problem is, the Commander-in-Chief has to be satisfied that this system will respond if he needs it to respond.

Mr. McDADE. I haven't heard that phrase since World War II, "Commander-in-Chief."

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE

Mr. WHITE. This is basically, as I said in my opening statement, a national security issue of the sort you have been talking about. It has to do with responsiveness and the assurance of responsiveness of this system.

Mr. McDADE. A lot of us have been through the Tonkin Gulf Resolutions. We look at the thing with jaundiced eyes, much more equivocal, perhaps, than the Congress used to. I think maybe that is a good thing for the country.

I recognize the symbolism, and in fact said that I thought the President, when he delivered—not the State of the Union Address but a foreign affairs address—should set down a line for the Russians and communicate with them firmly and unequivocally.

And when asked about this question, I said I thought it was an act of symbolism. I am still not convinced that that isn't exactly what it is. I think my colleagues, Mr. Coughlin and Mr. Traxler—we are all concerned about this. We are wondering whether that is the route we ought to take in this country, particularly in these circumstances.

ASSURANCE OF A VIABLE SSS

Mr. WHITE. I appreciate your concern and the responsibilities you have. My judgment is that it is certainly important in terms of the message, but it goes beyond that. We are going to assure that this system would be responsive. Therefore, we need to take these steps, and that is why we are requesting these funds.

It isn't a question of Selective Service's estimate of seven days. That estimate is based on the assumption that the system is up and fully operating and things were fine. I am not prepared, frankly, to make that estimate or to assume that everything will be up and fully operating. We have even found problems—after the President made the decision—that we didn't think we had before; with respect to the funds, with respect to the capability, and so on.

So I wouldn't subscribe to this—

VALIDITY OF THE SEVEN-DAY TIME FRAME

Mr. McDADE. Tell me what the new estimate is.

Mr. WHITE. I do not have a specific estimate. I'm suggesting that it is prudent to have a system operating.

Mr. McDADE. All we have to go on is the report that was done by the people responsible for planning. According to their report, the

difference between pre- and post- is a saving of seven days if everything worked properly—as you say, if the system worked as you hoped it would. And we are relying on Social Security. We are relying on Post Office, on established institutions. If that seven days is not the date that we are to rely on, we have to have some figures. We have to know what you are talking about, what your new figure is.

If there is a new figure, what is it?

Mr. WHITE. In the first place, that estimate is made on the assumption that the system is fully up and operating. To get it to that state would take us about a year to a year and a half.

We are proposing a great acceleration of the revitalization of that system, including registration which we anticipate would be in June. We are cutting back the time considerably that it will take us to get the system to an assured operation basis.

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me add to that. I think it gets back to our little exercise in mathematics.

What we are also talking about is eliminating the uncertainty that goes with any plan. No matter how well we can conceive of this, what we have found consistently is, you peel back the onion and you find problems that you would not expect. What we are really talking about is, for the men only registration, an expenditure of \$8 million to make sure that we eliminate the uncertainty, to make sure that we have an ongoing system and save some time.

I don't think it is really that—

Mr. McDADE. How much time?

Mr. ROSTKER. I don't think that is the important question—whether it is seven days with some uncertainty or 13 days with more certainty or 21 days with still more certainty.

The fact of the matter is, a contingency plan is just that. It will always be viewed by the Soviets as just that.

This is a reasonable—in my view, a reasonable request to the Congress for a reasonable sum of money to eliminate the uncertainties associated with a massive process and allows us to get it done in a more orderly fashion in peacetime.

Mr. McDADE. I would like to hear the man who did the planning, who said there was seven days differential.

You're comment about whether you believe there is a substantial difference—

Mr. ROSTKER. I think, consistently you have to look at it as it is. That is a contingency plan. It is based on working everything out.

The question is, could I work everything out? I can only tell you as the days go by, we find more and more problems. And the best way to solve those problems is actually to exercise the system.

THE SSS IN A MOBILIZATION MODE

Mr. McDADE. Don't you think one of the reasons those problems exist is because you are not in a national emergency mode, in a mobilization mode? You are not in a position where the nation, the Congress, and the President, working together, have said that we want to do this and the nation is behind it.

Mr. ROSTKER. No, I don't. And let me give you an example.

I was assured by my staff that we had adequate forms available, and we made that statement. There is nothing in the draft report that talks about forms.

You will notice there is something in the budget request that talks about forms. When we got into it, we didn't have enough of any one kind. They were packaged in a way that it would have taken a substantial amount of time and effort to break them up and distribute them, whether we were using an election mechanism or whether we were using a Post Office.

It turns out that it is cheaper to reprint a simpler form and distribute them from the printer's plant right down to the Post Office than it would have been to have taken the manpower and the time necessary to go into the warehouse and break up boxes and prepare them for shipping.

Those are the kinds of problems that we are uncovering that make me suspect of my own conclusions at the time. And in fact, as a draft report, we were in the process of modifying these as we were getting feedback from other agencies that have a different view on these kinds of things.

What we are really talking about is a relatively small expenditure of funds to eliminate that possibility by making sure that you have got the registration in the bank.

Mr. McDADE. Maybe you'd better go back and finish the draft.

Mr. ROSTKER. I think we have been back, and it is in the budget request that we have presented to the Committee.

Mr. McDADE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mrs. Boggs?

Mrs. BOGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SSS AND EQUITY ISSUES

What I assume our responsibility is is to look at your request for an additional appropriation to revitalize the Selective Service System. We are doing that apparently in an overall way to avoid duplication and double trouble, if you will, to set up your computerization, your type of forms, and so on that would facilitate draft registration if that were necessary so as to ensure that your money is not being spent unnecessarily now by only saving whatever amount of time is going to be saved.

Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mrs. BOGGS. And many of the difficulties that you would run into as far as being able to go into some sort of draft mobilization are really imposed by law—laws passed by the Congress—namely, that you can't have any kind of loophole for anything except conscientious objectors or physical situations. Also you recognize that under present day circumstances, there will be concerns about equity and related issues which could generate court challenges which would adversely impact on your capacity to meet manpower delivery schedules.

All of these considerations, I assume, were factored into your request for monies to revitalize the Selective Service System and not simply to register 8 million persons.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, very much so.

Mrs. Boggs. On page 12 in your budget justifications, you acknowledge the related concerns about the generation of court challenges.

How can you plan in advance to assure sufficient manpower delivery and to minimize adverse impact in time of need?

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me say that I think one of the most important aspects of Selective Service is the question of equity. It is not second to meeting the requirements of the Defense Department. It is equal to meeting the requirements of the Defense Department.

There is no question in my mind that the reason we have a Selective Service System and a mechanism is to adhere to the rule of law and to do it in an efficient fashion. That is why we have proposed a program to systematically select local board members, and for the first time in the history of the Selective Service System, systematically train them—train them in peacetime so there is no question, if we ever need them, that they know what the law requires of them, what Selective Service requires of them, that they understand their roles and their jobs.

To do that, we have provided a substantial amount of resources in terms of additional staff and funds to provide the development of the program, to provide for the training of the local board members and selection—the whole thing. I view that as a critical aspect of the program.

Mrs. Boggs. In setting up, of course, both the registration and the revitalization of the Selective Service System, you have to expand your computerized capabilities.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mrs. Boggs. I know another law of the Congress—the Buckley Amendment—prohibits you from having access to high school graduate lists for recruitment purposes.

Is registration being seen as a useful tool for getting young people recruited into active military reserve and guard units?

Mr. ROSTKER. That question is under consideration now. No determination has been made at this point. We are very concerned with that.

My own view is that if we do that, it would only be with the permission of the individual and not to create an overall list that would be available to Defense without the permission of the individual involved.

Mrs. Boggs. In the event that we would come to the full drafting of young people necessitating putting our computers to tremendous use, would there be any validity to asking that perhaps because of an emergency situation that the Buckley Amendment be reexamined and the lists be made available—the graduation lists?

Mr. ROSTKER. In an emergency, the prime list would be that of the Selective Service System. While there would be the list of the continuing volunteers, that would be on a secondary basis. And all of our planning—and Secretary Pirie can speak to this in more detail—but all of our planning is based on the prime source being Selective Service.

PROPORTION OF WOMEN TO MEN NEEDED DURING MOBILIZATION

Mrs. Boggs. I note that the Administration envisions drafting only enough women to fill a certain pool of support positions. Apparently another pool of support positions would be reserved for men. Do you

have any idea at this time what proportions of women to men would be drafted?

Mr. PIRIE. We think the number of women of the 650,000 to be inducted within the first six months would be on the order of 80,000.

Mrs. BOGGS. What would the proportion be?

Mr. PIRIE. 80,000 to 650,000, whatever that would be.

DIVERSE VIEWS WITH DRAFT REPORTS

Mrs. BOGGS. The feeling that I receive here is that you had a draft working paper. All of us in the Congress from time to time have been supplied with these draft reports of the various agencies and departments, and have reacted either violently or with great approval to them. And then, of course, once they go out to the representatives of other affected agencies and the comments come back, and once you have some input from Congressional persons and their staff members, those reports are often changed drastically.

I assume the idea of the draft report is to collect those sorts of comments and suggestions, both favorable and unfavorable. Is that correct?

Mr. WHITE. That is correct. And if I may expand on that for one moment, what happened was that in the process of doing this in a deliberate way and having drafts and having them distributed with a target of meeting a 9 February date for our requirements to the Congress, in the middle of this came this emergency. So that system was basically short-circuited at that time.

I think what you are suggesting is absolutely correct. These should not be seen as some final Administration position, because they are not.

Mrs. BOGGS. From a long view of Congressional history, I would like to say that my husband came to the Congress in 1941. We came from sort of a peacenik generation in our college days. We worried through the extension of the draft registration in the first year of his service here and I remember going through the same difficulties last summer when it was suggested that a draft registration be considered.

It is not true that concern about registration has just arisen in recent times. Only about six or seven weeks before Pearl Harbor the extension of the draft passed by one vote.

Last summer, I voted against any registration because I felt that the President had the power under the Constitution to institute it if it were necessary, if there was a clear and present danger to the country. Since that power had not been invoked, I voted against registration at that time.

My duty now as I see it is that if the President does feel there is a clear and present danger, if indeed we do have to set up for registration of young people, that we make certain that you are doing it in the most financially prudent manner and yet provide for the safety of those young people and of the country. So I would hope that what you are doing is spending money in preparation for the revitalization of the Selective Service in a manner that can take all of the information that you are gathering now and put it to the best use for the young people involved and for the country. That is where

we need to have reassurances from you of what you are doing—reassurance that you are not spending money now that isn't necessary, just for registration.

Mr. WHITE. That is a very good question, and at the heart of the issue here today, Mrs. Boggs. We are working very hard at it to see that we only ask for money we need, and that we spend that money prudently and, as you said, for the best interests of the young people and for the country at large.

EFFECTS OF PRESIDENT'S CALL ON RECRUITMENTS

Mrs. BOGGS. I might tell you that the call for registration has already had a very salutary effect upon the recruiting stations in my area. I have a *States-Item* story of February 15 that says the National Guard recruiters report a 30 percent increase of potential recruits since the President's announcement. At the Navy's recruiting office, the traffic has picked up considerably.

"In the past, sometimes we've had problems meeting our goals in the metropolitan New Orleans area," Biggs said, but after Carter's announcement, the recruiting office had no problem meeting its January goal.

After having a "disastrous" month in December, the Marine recruiters in Louisiana reportedly surpassed by one the quota of 83 recruits for January. According to Marine Corps officials, recruiters had a good month nationwide in January. "We don't know what is causing it," said Louisiana Marine recruiting supervisor Lt. Col. Terry Terrebonne. "If we did know, we would bottle it."

I think that answers some of the questions that were raised previously about whether people do believe that this is a serious situation.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Sabo?

Mr. SAGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CLASSIFICATION PROCESSES

Regarding your budget justification documents—here is my understanding of what will happen from reading them. Number one, men and women age 19-20, will register with their age, sex, current address, and social security number. Then, in the case of a military emergency, which I assume would be the start of World War III or the appearance of the start of such an event, Congress authorizes the draft. The Selective Service will randomly select a particular birth-date for twenty-year-olds.

The Selective Service System will then send a mailgram to that individual at the address that you have on record and tell him or her to report to the individual examining station. I think I am accurate so far.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SABO. At that point, the classification occurs, the physical and mental classification. I am inclined to agree that the classification should come at this point if this process exists.

But what also seems rather obvious to me is that this procedure is not dependent upon registration. Basically, the same process could be carried on without registration. In the event of a military emergency,

it would seem to me the Selective Service System can simply conduct a similar lottery of dates and announce that all of those people born on June 5th, 1960, (or whatever date) are ordered to appear at their closest examining station. This would accomplish everything that sending a mailgram, possibly to an out-of-date address, would accomplish. I fail to understand what great advantages there are to going through this whole process of registration, when it could be simply handled at that time without causing all of this very substantial upheaval and distrust in the current Administration proposal.

Mr. ROSTKER. We have examined systems like that. I can't agree with you. There is a problem of—

Mr. SABO. Remember, we are not talking about a current situation of a public announcement tomorrow. We are talking about a situation where it is assumed that we have a major, major military emergency in this country.

Mr. ROSTKER. We believe a system in which an individual in an orderly fashion would go down and register, and then on the basis of a random selection be ordered for an induction, is a lot more certain than a call in the wild that anyone born on January 25th should please go down to an Armed Forces induction station.

Mr. SABO. Do you think your mail addresses will keep current?

Mr. ROSTKER. They have been current in the past. The process requires them to be current. We believe they will be kept current.

But a system in which you made an announcement that anyone born on a given date should register would be impossible to enforce. An individual would simply say, I didn't hear that announcement, I was busy, I couldn't make it.

Mr. SABO. You think there would be massive noncompliance?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think there would be no way—

Mr. SABO. In the case of a major military emergency?

Mr. ROSTKER. There would be no way of controlling the process. There would be no way of knowing if we shipped too many or too few persons to the Armed Forces examining stations, and if it came down to a question of enforcement, I daresay there would be no way of enforcing it.

Mr. SABO. I would assume, in the option I outlined, you would follow up with immediate registration, which, according to your studies, could be placed in 7 days, a week, 2 weeks. I frankly think you would probably have as many people responding to that call, some probably skipping it for non-legitimate reasons, but no more than you would have people skipping for non-legitimate reasons of not receiving a mailgram.

Mr. ROSTKER. I think it is totally consistent with the international situation today for the President to want to take simple steps of providing for an orderly registration, so in the event of an emergency we have an orderly process that is consistent with the law.

What you are suggesting in my view would be a very unorderly process, inconsistent with the law, in which we simply made a call for anybody born on a date to show up someplace. I don't think we can control that.

Mr. SABO. I suspect that could be part of the law, because inherent in your ability to issue the call today is this Congress passing the authority to reinstitute the draft.

Mr. ROSTKER. I think you go from one extreme to another. There are people who say the only way you can make sure that it will work is if you register and classify. Now we propose the other extreme, and that is you do nothing, you simply wait for the conflict to occur, and then make a public announcement.

I would suggest that the President has taken the middle ground, which is to provide for an orderly registration of only sufficiently large numbers of people to meet the requirements. And I think we can look at that, have confidence that it will work, and in fact demonstrate that it will work through the registration process.

TRAINING TIME FRAMES

Mr. SABO. Let me ask another question along a different line. I think it is clear that when an individual is drafted, that doesn't make the inductee a soldier. Inductees have to go through an extensive training process. In modern warfare it may take longer than it used to. From basic training the person has to go on to more individualized instruction.

Would it be fair to say that from the time of induction until the conscript is ready for a combat unit it would be a minimum of 90 days, in many cases longer?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes. And there is also a minimum requirement for an individual deployed—

Mr. SABO. Pardon?

Mr. PIRIE. There is a minimum of 12 weeks of training before an individual can be transported abroad, by law.

Mr. SABO. So for 90 days, and for the technical warfare we have today it could be substantially longer?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes.

Mr. SABO. In order to train these people, we have to have training facilities. If the President were to declare a military emergency today, how many training slots in training camps would be open and available to take in draftees in the next week?

Mr. PIRIE. I would have to provide you an exact answer for the record. I believe that we could expand within the week to ten days by some tens of thousands.

Mr. SABO. That is sort of imprecise.

Mr. PIRIE. It is imprecise. It is an imprecise business. We can tell you what our peacetime capacity is. We can tell you within 30 days that we will certainly be able to accomplish—

Mr. SABO. Within 30 days, how many training slots would there be?

Mr. PIRIE. Within 30 days, I estimate, on the basis of preliminary examinations of the Army training bases that we have done, that there would be certainly room for 50,000 to 60,000.

Mr. SABO. 50,000 to 60,000 in 30 days of additional inductees. But we need registration because it speeds up the process by seven days. But the training slots wouldn't be available for 30 days; is that right, now? Do I understand this?

Mr. PIRIE. That is not precisely the case. It is the case if the Selective Service, let's say, made 100,000 people available to us in 28 days, as the draft report indicated was the best possible outcome of preplanning. Then we would have difficulty in assigning all 100,000.

Mr. SABO. So we are speeding this process up by a week so that we can have somebody on a list so they can wait for the training slots to be available.

Mr. WHITE. That's not correct.

Mr. PIRIE. Not at all.

Mr. WHITE. In the first place, the Administration doesn't agree with the estimate of a week per se. In the second place, there is a great deal of processing that Mr. Rostker can go through once we go to induction. All that has to be done before the people go to a training station, let's say, to be classified, examined, and so forth.

Mr. SABO. I assume we have modern transportation available.

THE EXTENT OF APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST FOR SSS

Mr. ROSTKER. We believe that we are taking a step in peacetime that is consistent with any of the programs we are discussing here, a step that seems prudent given what has happened since December with a very minimal expenditure of funds.

And I think that you have to look at it in that realm. You can't come down to say it is a matter of five-days or seven-days because that depends upon a great deal that has to go on.

With the exception of the registration, the per-head registration cost, almost all of the money we have asked from the Congress would have to be expended to even get us in this ballpark, so that you could make the kinds of comparisons you are making.

Then it has to be—

Mr. SABO. I am just curious. I am now asking a question about the details of your budget, and later on, we will get to particular justifications. Then I want a breakdown of your budget and what the costs are for actual registration versus some of your back-up costs.

That is not my question right now. My question is assuming that we do what you ask and World War III is about to start, and the Congress authorizes induction or the draft system, those are the options that we are talking about. And if this occurred now, how many people could you train?

What I have heard so far is that none immediately. In 7 days, there is no precise answer.

Maybe within 30 days or a month after this Congress had declared war and authorized the draft again, that you might be able to have 50,000 to 60,000 training slots.

For this we are going through this whole hassle over registration. It seems to me that it speeds up nothing.

CERTAINTY IN THE EVENT OF A MOBILIZATION

Mr. WHITE. I think the point is, as we said earlier, Mr. Sabo, is that registration is an integral and key part of the revitalization of this system. It is necessary in order to assure the system will work, if we need it.

We have to have a high degree of certainty in the event of a mobilization that the system will work. If the President were to ask for induction authority and the Congress were to provide it, then at that time, we could begin the process that you described earlier.

What we are asking for, is to increase the amount of certainty in terms of our ability to do that.

We don't have that certainty now.

Mr. SABO. You are asking for a variety of things. You are asking for improvements in your system. But you are also asking us to go beyond that and asking 19 and 20 year-olds to register.

Mr. WHITE. As part of the readiness of the system to respond, that is correct.

Mr. SABO. So registration is not for the sake of registration, but for the sake of the system?

Mr. WHITE. It is for the sake of assuring that the system would be responsive in case of mobilization.

Mr. TRAXLER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SABO. Yes.

Mr. TRAXLER. I think that is an interesting rationale. So if you are going to discover whether the system is going to operate, you have to put all of it into place and have all of it operating. You are telling us we don't know if the system works until you activate this part of it. But you have got a number of other parts that are part of the same body.

How do we know it is going to function as a whole? Using your own logic, I suspect that what we have to do is reinstitute the draft to see if this registration system——

Mr. WHITE. By that logic, if we take it to extremes, we ought to have all of the 18 and 19 year-olds under arms now and then we would be certain that the system works. My point is——

Mr. TRAXLER. You say that you are going to take this first tiny step. You call it a step. I can't measure it. My ruler isn't that small.

You are going to do this and based upon the signing of a piece of paper down at the Post Office, you feel very comfortable that this whole system is going to operate properly.

It seems to me that this is the most miniscule part of the system.

Mr. WHITE. I feel far more confident that it will operate having done this than not doing it.

These are matters of degree and matters with respect to the certainty of the system.

Mr. SABO. Let's assume the answer is accurate, that within 30 days, you would have 50,000, 60,000 training slots available. And we are talking, again, of a national major military emergency, which I assume, if not a declaration of war, is close to it. It is obvious to the whole country.

How many of those training slots would be filled by volunteers?

Mr. PIRIE. Our assumption is that we would do this without volunteers. That is the assumption on which——

Mr. SABO. You assume that no one would volunteer at that point in time?

Mr. PIRIE. We assume that we can't be sure that adequate numbers of the right kind of people would volunteer. That is the basis on which the Selective Service System, as Dr. Rostker said, has based their assumptions of the cost.

Mr. SABO. In your planning, you assume that in the case of a national emergency, a Russian invasion of Western Europe, something like that, there would be no volunteers?

Mr. PIRIE. That's right.

Mr. SABO. It would seem to me that in any terms of reasonable planning, one would have to assume in terms of the numbers of people you could, as a matter of fact, train in 30 days, there would be more than ample volunteers.

I guess I come to this hearing with a basic skepticism and basically opposed to the reimposition of registration. And frankly, listening to the testimony, there is nothing that even creates the hint of doubt in my own mind that I might be wrong.

It is rare that I find an issue like that around here. I think it is loaded with symbolism and accomplishes nothing.

I heartily believe that we are trying to send some message to the Russians, but that they would not be impressed by the fact that we have some virtually meaningless lists of names and ages of people.

It seems to me that it is massive symbolism that accomplishes nothing and creates a substantial amount of distrust and harm in this country, which I don't think is something we need.

Mr. WHITE. If I may say so, Mr. Sabo, I disagree with you. Obviously, the problem—and I have wrestled with it for a number of years—has to do with trying to get some certainty that we can respond in the event of an emergency. And we are not in a posture to do that today.

I think we all recognize that.

The question is what has to be done. We can belittle the steps taken, but these steps are necessary if we are going to have a system that works and that we can be assured works.

Mr. SABO. It seems to me that there are other legitimate questions about our ability to respond to an emergency.

Registration has to be at the bottom of that list. The emergency is not something that you respond to with people who are trained and available for combat a minimum of 90 days later.

Mr. WHITE. We will have to respond in the event of an emergency with both types of people, Mr. Sabo, both pre-trained people and untrained people.

This is only one part of that problem. You're right. But we will have to respond to both.

Mr. SABO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have more questions, later.

Mr. BOLAND. With respect to the summary conclusion of the draft proposal by Dr. Rostker, and I read from page 28, "The Selective Service, over the last several months, has completely revised the plans by which it will register and induct eligible people into the armed services. We believe that we now have a capability to respond in an emergency. The changes which have provided this new capability are"—you list about five changes.

Are you in a position now to respond to an emergency? Do you have the capability to do so? You say so in this draft report. But now the question is, do you really have it?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think we have an improved capability since I took over in November as Director of Selective Service. And I believe what we have learned since we circulated this draft document, this is too optimistic of a statement.

And I use, for example, what we found when we got into looking at the forms themselves, that we had a real problem that was not perceived.

I think the steps we have taken are important. I think we are continuing to take those steps. If we had to do it right now, we certainly could not in any way meet the timetables that have been discussed in this room for the last several hours.

Mr. BOLAND. It seems in a matter like this you have to look at the climate of the times. That is what you were doing, of course. No one objects to that. But the times are very volatile and very flexible, are they not? What you need today may not be what you need tomorrow. And whether or not it is necessary to send this message now to Russia, well, is it? That is a question that people will be asking. I think they have a pretty good idea what our resolve and what our resolution and spirit is.

In view of what the U.S.A. hockey team did to the Russians, do you think that that was a message that was sent about our spirit and dedication and resolution?

Mr. WHITE. I think that is a terrific message.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PEACETIME CONSCRIPTION VERSUS THE INTENT TO MOBILIZE

Gentlemen, in the very beginning, when the President urged registration, I was inclined to really believe that we ought to move in that direction.

But, frankly, the more I read and the more I hear, the more confusion there seems to be.

But Secretary Brown, in the annual report of the Department of Defense, stated, after listing all of the personnel problems, "peacetime conscription will not solve the problems."

In view of that statement, I am not too sure if I understand then why we should have it?

Mr. WHITE. We are not suggesting peacetime conscription, Mr. Stewart. The President is not proposing conscription.

Mr. STEWART. What is the purpose of the registration if it doesn't lead toward it.

Mr. WHITE. The purpose of the registration is to assure that the system will operate if, in fact, it would be required to go to some form of conscription.

And we anticipate that it would only be required in the event of a mobilization.

Mr. STEWART. To follow through on the question that has been raised several times here—and this thing bothers me again—on February 3, 1980, the Deputy Assistant Secretary said:

Although if constantly updated peacetime registration would give us a ready list of people that we could call instantly in an emergency, I think our capacity to call them would exceed our ability to begin training * * *. We would not be able to accept draftees within the first weeks of an emergency mobilization.

I think that you have been talking about saving time. We have been talking about speeding it up.

But now we are going to lose all of the time that we will gain by registering. What is the purpose of registering if we are going to lose the time?

Mr. PIRIE. It is not a question of losing all that time. We can expand the Army training base. I have indicated 50,000 or 60,000 and staff now tells me 70,000 to 80,000 is a better number.

Those are 70,000 to 80,000 people that we can start training within 30 days of mobilization. And the issue is: Will they be available to train? The Selective Service System can deliver those people.

Mr. STEWART. In the draft report by the Director of the Selective Service, it says: "Our analysis of the various face-to-face registration options suggests that the post-mobilization plan is preferable."

Now that report came out on January the 16th. What leads you to conclude now, six weeks later, that the post-mobilization plan is not preferable?

Mr. BOLAND. That is a question that you are going to get many times and we are going to get it many times, too.

Mr. WHITE. Let me underline, first of all, that that is a draft done for circulation by Selective Service. It was not an Administration-considered position at that time. We did not accept the SSS analysis. The world situation makes the year or year and a half it would take to get that system "up" an unacceptable period in terms of risk and in terms of the signal it sends about our resolve.

And what we did when we looked at the issues in terms of—as the Chairman said, the change in the world environment, was that that judgment was not correct, frankly, that what we needed to do was to change the system, to go to a system of accelerated revitalization and to a system of registration now in order to increase that assurance.

Mr. STEWART. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. I think you indicated, in response to a question from Mr. McDade with reference to the cost of the 1980 supplemental of the \$21,895,000, that out of that total it would require only \$8 million to register men only. But that isn't quite correct, is it? You would actually require around \$12–13 million if you were to register men only; is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. A good deal of that additional money is tied up with the revitalization of the System. I am presuming the Committee would want to go ahead with that revitalization in any event. If you stop short of just the registration process itself, we are back to about \$2 a person. So we are talking about \$8 million for the registration function itself.

Mr. BOLAND. Are you still holding that if the registration of women is not provided for in the 1980 supplemental, that we could reduce that amount by \$8 million to \$8-1/2 million?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

ELECTION MACHINERY APPROACH

Mr. BOLAND. Dr. Rostker, you propose a plan which depends very heavily upon the United States Postal Service for the registration function. That approach, of course, is radically different from the recommendations of the last two years. Last year the Administration proposed, as you know, using the election machinery concept, which was a system used in World War I and World War II. That approach registered 10 million men on June 4, 1917. It registered 13 million men on September 12, 1918. And it registered 16 million men on

October 16, 1940. Basically, registration was accomplished in one day. That's a fair statement, isn't it?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Then why are you requesting this substantial sum of money for registration when all indications are that the election machinery approach has worked in the past?

Mr. ROSTKER. I would take exception to that, Mr. Chairman. The Selective Service—not under my tenure, but in previous years—has done an in-depth analysis of the notion that we can register from zero base very quickly. The analysis was based upon interviews with General Hershey and others who were in the System. And I can make the study available to the Committee for your individual use or for the record.

It turns out that a great deal of effort was going on, a lot of the effort was in the states. We note, for example, that four months before the registration—and, in fact, before the Military Selective Service Act was passed—there was something on the order of 1800 National Guardsmen on full-time duty, trying to put together the infrastructure that would allow us to do that.

When I came in, I took a very critical look at all of the various plans. And it was my impression, based upon inputs from the Selective Service staff itself, reviewing the responses from provisional state directors and from unit commanders in the field, that the use of state election mechanisms was not an appropriate vehicle.

Our cost estimates are quite competitive with the use of the Postal Service. For example, in the State of Texas, it required the Selective Service to enter into individual agreements with over 250 organizations that handle the state election mechanism in that state.

What we have with the Post Office is a single line of communication.

Mr. BOLAND. So the bottom line is you wouldn't be very comfortable with the election machinery to register, although Mr. Shuck indicated to the Committee, and indicated to me in a question I propounded to him, that he was very comfortable with the use of the election machinery.

Looking at the dates of the registration, back in 1918 and 1940, it occurs to me that perhaps that registration was really targeted around Election Day—to the election days in those particular states anyhow—with the result that the election machinery was probably in place at the time, so it was a lot easier to do it at that time. Whether or not that is so today, I don't know. But, in any event, I share the belief that USPS—although it is going to be more costly—I share the belief that it will be the easier way of doing it. Also, I don't know whether or not you're going to do this in one day, two weeks, one month, or just how long.

Mr. ROSTKER. We don't think it would be more costly. We have an estimate from the State of California for a reimbursement for use of the election mechanisms there of over \$5 million. We are not addressing nearly those sums.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The bottom line is that under some system it is possible to register 16 million men in one day.

Mr. ROSTKER. I don't think, from the kind of standby system we are talking about, it is possible to have the kind of sustained planning, with a clear target date—

Mr. COUGHLIN. Under a system that was in existence, we registered 16 million men in one day.

Mr. ROSTKER. I don't think it is—

Mr. COUGHLIN. You could devise a system, because it has been devised in the past.

One, doesn't need pre-mobilization registration to register the kinds of numbers of people about which you are talking.

Mr. ROSTKER. This state election mechanism is not a particularly desirable feature under any scenario.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEFERMENTS AND ESTIMATED COMPLIANCE PERCENTAGES

Mr. BOLAND. The legend on page 2 of the justification states—and you have responded to some questions of Mr. Sabo—the last sentence on that page says, "Requests for conscientious objector status, hardship requirements, ministerial students and ministerial deferments will be processed by local boards."

I presume these are the only deferments that would be given?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is correct, the only judgmental deferments.

Mr. BOLAND. You have no idea how many individuals would request this exemption?

Mr. ROSTKER. In the pool of 4 million—we have pretty good estimates on the number of students who would probably request postponements.

Mr. BOLAND. Can you give a percentage? What percentage do you think?

Mr. ROSTKER. I don't have those figures here. I can provide them for the record. But the bottom line is that we need a pool of between 5 and 7, depending upon the calculations.

[The information follows:]

	Percent
Out of induction orders issued:	
Will request deferment/exemption (hardship, conscientious objection, clergy, medical student, sole surviving son, veteran, in reserve, alien, certain elected or appointed officials).....	12
Student postponements.....	34
Other postponements.....	5
Fail to report for induction.....	11
Rejected by AFEES.....	19
Inducted	19
Total	100

This is a 5 to 1 ratio. The estimate in the Congressional Budget Office Report was 7 to 1.

Mr. BOLAND. These categories listed on this page 2 are the only reasons for deferment or exemptions; is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. At the conclusion of the Vietnam War period, it is estimated that as high as 15 percent of young men turning 18 failed to register within the time prescribed by law. You are contemplating a

two-week registration period at Post Offices throughout the country. If your estimates are correct, approximately 4 million men will register during that period. That's correct, is it not?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. The question is: What is your current guess of the actual percentage against that estimated 4 million men pool, the actual percentage you will get that will register?

In other words, what fallout percentage will you consider to be unacceptable—5, 10, 15 percent, or what?

Mr. ROSTKER. We haven't approached it that way. We would expect that we would have the vast majority register. We are looking for around a 98 percent compliance.

Mr. Chairman, I have a table which I can submit for record which shows our registration history and the population base, that consistently we registered more people, in fact, than the census said was in the relevant population. And even in the period at the end of the Vietnam War, we were registering in excess of 99 percent of the people that we believe should have registered.

[The table follows:]

REGISTRATION RESULTS

Calendar year	Registrations ¹	Population base ²	Percent registered
1960.....	1,349,671	1,364,500	98.90
1961.....	1,502,259	1,424,500	105.46
1962.....	1,470,445	1,373,500	107.06
1963.....	1,441,610	1,369,500	105.26
1964.....	1,680,754	1,632,000	102.99
1965.....	2,016,982	1,820,500	110.79
1966.....	1,891,976	1,744,500	108.45
1967.....	1,902,637	1,760,000	108.10
1968.....	1,885,765	1,796,000	105.00
1969.....	1,957,071	1,838,000	106.48
1970.....	1,990,072	1,904,000	104.52
1971.....	1,990,264	1,950,500	102.03
1972.....	1,977,720	1,985,000	99.63
1973.....	1,894,208	1,903,000	³ 99.50
1974.....	1,823,852	1,948,000	⁴ 93.60

¹ From 1960-72 registrations shown are total persons registered during the calendar year. 1973 and 1974 registrations shown are total males registered with years of birth 1955 and 1956 respectively, as of the date registration was terminated.

² From 1960-72 population base figures show the Census Bureau calculated number of 18-year-old males during a given calendar year residing in the 50 States and District of Columbia. Not included are 18-year-old male members of the active Armed Forces or 18-year-old male natives of U.S. territories, possessions, or protectorates. The population base for 1973 and 1974 is based on the 1970 census adjusted for undercount, and further adjusted for immigration, mortality, active duty enlistments before re-registration, and persons institutionalized and not available to register.

³ Shows the percent of 1955 YOB males registered during 1973, 1974, and January through March 1975. The percent as of March 1974, after 15 months of registration, was 92.34 percent.

⁴ 93.60 percent represents 15 months of registration for the 1956 birth group. At which time all registration was terminated. Based on the experience with the 1955 birth group, over 99 percent could have been expected to register.

Mr. BOLAND. Registration is going to be effective with the 19- and 20-year olds. The prior registration was 18 to 26—that's correct. What is the legal basis for just restricting it to the 19 and 20 year olds?

Mr. ROSTKER. The President has the authority to specify the time and place that people would register. What the President will do in the proclamation, is specify the time and place for that group. This does not remove the legal requirements that all those persons subject to the Military Selective Service Act may, in fact, be called at some future time.

Mr. BOLAND. The Commander will stand in recess until 2:00 o'clock. We will meet in the room next door, in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee Room.

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. BOLAND. The Committee will come to order.

We will continue with the general questions, Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INDICATING "RESOLVE" VIA PRE-MOBILIZATION REGISTRATION

I would like to follow up on a couple of things from this morning, if I might. There was a lot of talk about the step of pre-mobilization registration indicating our "resolve."

Do you think the Soviets probably know, or can find out, what is going on in these hearings?

Mr. ROSTKER. I certainly suspect so, Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Do you think they are aware of the fact that probably the pre-mobilization registration will increase our mobilization timing by about seven days?

Mr. ROSTKER. I would suspect, as good central planners, they may be very suspect of contingency plans. And it is certainly that suspicion that led the President to recommend—

Mr. COUGHLIN. Do you think they are aware it would only improve our capability by seven days or 10 days, or something like that?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think they would clearly understand it is an on-going operating system and that we would substantially improve—

Mr. COUGHLIN. They probably know what is going on here.

Mr. ROSTKER. I dare say.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Do you think they would probably be aware that even if we had pre-mobilization registration, we really don't have the training capability to put that into effect anyway.

Mr. ROSTKER. I can't talk about the training capability. That is the purview of the Defense Department.

Mr. COUGHLIN. But it occurs to me, if they have the capability of knowing all that, that the step is somewhat meaningless.

Mr. ROSTKER. I would not agree to that.

Mr. COUGHLIN. How can a meaningless step indicate our "resolve?"

Mr. ROSTKER. I think you have to look at the entire Defense equation and find that the return to registration is a significant step, both in terms of symbolism and in improving our capability. This eliminates any uncertainty that would be accompanied by the registration. I think it is a significant move forward.

A POLICY OF NATIONAL SERVICE

Mr. COUGHLIN. It occurs to me that perhaps it would have been more of an effective tool for the Administration to have proposed for what it would ask in terms of service, such as National Service policy or whatever alternative is suggested.

The analysis of the National Service policy, was it made by your organization?

Mr. ROSTKER. No. We did not participate in that portion of the analysis. The Selective Service only looked at the five questions that related to the posture of the Selective Service System.

Mr. COUGHLIN. There was a great deal of talk this morning about fairness. Do you think a draft by lottery, in which some people will be called upon to serve and others will not, is a fair kind of system?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Do you think it is as fair, asking everybody to do the same thing, as that proposed in some of the National Service proposals?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think, in the construct of the Selective Service law, it is about as fair a system as we can devise.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Have you personally examined the alternative of a National Service program?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, I have not personally.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. I will pass for now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mrs. Boggs.

Mrs. BOGGS. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The National Service idea, of course, has a great deal of appeal. There are so many areas in our national life that need some attention where this concept could be useful. We have paid a great deal of attention to one of these recently in forming FEMA and coordinating a variety of emergency preparedness programs into that emergency management agency.

I do think there are health care areas, areas of civil defense, particularly in times of natural disaster that lend themselves to this idea. We have, for example, seen the need for and have expressed some response to evacuation plans for nuclear accidents and nuclear plants—things of this sort.

I do feel that there is a great appeal to the idea of some type of National Service if young people are going to be asked to give some service to the country at a given time in their lives.

Mr. ROSTKER. We are very concerned with those aspects as they relate to the mission of the Selective Service System. As you, I am sure are aware, an individual who claims to be a conscientious objector must perform National Service through the Alternate Service Program. That program does not exist today in Selective Service. It is an area I am very concerned about.

The budget proposal before you contains personnel and funding for a staff to start planning. And, in fact, we have been working with FEMA, because we see, in a national emergency, a clear linkage between the ultimate service program that we are responsible for and FEMA's role in coordinating, if you will, the homefront, the domestic. So we are very cognizant about that.

There is a requirement under law today that Selective Service run that program. We are providing staff and funds to do that.

Mrs. BOGGS. The civilian preparedness, of course, is as necessary as the military preparedness. I am thinking of such fields as communications, transportation, testing, and the health fields—

Mr. ROSTKER. It is for exactly that reason that we entered into discussions with FEMA to better coordinate—

Mrs. BOGGS [continuing]. Business management, and so on.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mrs. BOGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Sabo.
 Mr. SABO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROBLEMS IN THE VOLUNTEER ARMY

I am not sure these questions have been asked, but I think they should be, in terms of the record for this particular proposal. My understanding is that the proposal for reinstitution of registration has nothing to do with problems that may exist with the volunteer Army.

Mr. ROSTKER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SABO. Whatever remedies are needed for shortages of personnel currently, registration really does not apply.

Mr. ROSTKER. That's right.

Mr. SABO. Registration is only a prelude to what would be considered in some dire and dramatic national emergency.

Mr. ROSTKER. That's correct.

Mr. SABO. I'm curious. I take it you are not prepared to respond to questions on training facilities?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, I really am not.

Mr. SABO. We stand on what we have heard this morning about the availability of training facilities and equipment for that training?

Mr. ROSTKER. That's correct, sir.

Mr. SABO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I suppose our problem here is to try to sort out what we are preparing for. I am not sure that we have done that. What would your perceptions be of the type of event that might bring us to move beyond the actual registration that you are proposing to actually having the Congress consider the reinstitution of the draft?

Mr. ROSTKER. The strict scenario in the planning state of Defense, that the Army, particularly, has used to size this requirement, is a massive land war, a conventional war in Europe. I think it is dangerous in any way to assume that is the only place where one can envision major commitments of forces in other places in the world, primarily within the NATO theatre, that require this kind of response.

I think it is fair to say what the President has proposed is a very mild response that moves us in the direction of preparedness so that we never have to go a step further. We systematically registered people between 1972 and 1975. In 1975, we terminated that registration primarily to save money and about 2,000 personnel positions.

I think the testimony before this Committee, and before other Committees of the Congress, has consistently raised into question the capability of the Selective Service to respond.

I think most of the people who have looked at this have raised the matter of facts as well as credibility, of the need of the SSS to have an ongoing registration system.

CONVENTIONAL WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE

Mr. SABO. Would it not also be fair to say that the one reason to have registration in place, would be a conventional war in Western Europe? The fact is the most crucial struggle would occur rather

rapidly in a European war. It probably would occur within the first 60 days, long before any registrants or conscripts were combat-ready.

Mr. ROSTKER. I can only tell you, from my discussions, which are really informal discussions with the Army planners, that they base this requirement by working out of this scenario. And they assure me this is, in fact, the minimum requirement. And they have been pressing the Defense Department to go further to up the requirement for Selective Service.

But the details of how they do it, I think we really have to leave to the Defense Department. Certainly I have to leave it to them. I am not an expert on that. I cannot give you definitive answers.

Mr. SABO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Stokes.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have one or two questions at this point.

STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY IN MANPOWER NEEDS

Mr. ROSTKER. I understand that in the event of a major emergency mobilization that 100,000 inductees would be needed within 60 days, and that 650,000 inductees would be needed within 180 days.

Mr. ROSTKER. That is the requirement given us by the Defense Department.

Mr. STOKES. Are you in a position to tell how the Defense Department arrived at those figures and those dates?

Mr. ROSTKER. Not in specific detail, I really am not.

Mr. STOKES. Who would be able to provide that information?

Mr. ROSTKER. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Reserve Affairs and Logistics. He communicates to me and provides that requirement.

Mr. STOKES. You would not be able to tell us whether or not these figures include any assumptions with reference to volunteers?

Mr. ROSTKER. I believe those figures do not include volunteers. When those figures were given to us, the assumption was Selective Service should be in a position to respond to the total requirement. To the extent there are volunteers, the actual delivery schedule would be somewhat reduced.

Mr. STOKES. Obviously, then, the Defense Department did not utilize our past experience with mobilization in the sense that we have always—once an emergency has been announced—had a large number of volunteers.

Mr. ROSTKER. Mr. Stokes, I think it behooves, as planners, to hope for the best and plan for the worst. And that is what we have done here. The Selective Service has consistently planned on the basis of meeting the Defense requirement, and that does not factor in volunteers. That is a hedge of safety, if you will.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think I want to walk through that scenario again that Mr. Stokes went through just to be sure I understand it. You received those requirements back in 1977?

Mr. ROSTKER. That's correct.

Mr. TRAXLER. To your knowledge, DoD has not changed its requirements?

Mr. ROSTKER. DoD is in the process of examining the whole training base issue and the requirements. I can tell you, as a matter of informal discussions with the senior Army planners, that they have consistently put pressure on Defense to up those requirements.

Mr. TRAXLER. It was based on a worst-case scenario. Is there a worse worst-case scenario forthcoming that we don't know about yet?

Mr. ROSTKER. For explicit details, you must deal with the Army and the Defense Department.

Mr. TRAXLER. But in 1977 it was their worst-case scenario.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. TRAXLER. I look forward to chapter 2.

What I want to know is did you feel comfortable with the system that you had in place when you received their request that you could deliver that kind of manpower within the time frame they assigned to you under the then and present existing system?

Mr. ROSTKER. I was not the Director then.

Mr. TRAXLER. You have been the Director for awhile.

Mr. ROSTKER. As recently as last summer the Acting Director categorically, in a report to the Congress, said that he did not have the capability to meet the mobilization requirement.

Mr. TRAXLER. It was the position then of Selective Service that you could not meet those requirements—

Mr. ROSTKER. That's correct.

Mr. TRAXLER [continuing]. With the existing system?

Mr. ROSTKER. That's correct.

Mr. TRAXLER. Did you make any recommendation to the Congress for changes then or did the Selective Service?

Mr. ROSTKER. The Selective Service did, particularly in regard to increasing the computer capability, field structure and the like. Some of that was funded; a good deal of it was not funded.

MEETING WORST-CASE SCENARIO REQUIREMENTS

Mr. TRAXLER. How successful could you be with some additional money in meeting those worst-case scenario requirements, without registration? Was it the position of the SSS that you could meet the worst-case scenario requirements with the monetary requests that you made last year, of this Subcommittee?

Mr. ROSTKER. It would be my view, in looking over it, that we could not have made it with the monetary requests that were presented last year. If you are asking me whether, with time and money, we could do better, I would have to say yes. I think the fact of the matter is that any plan we have would be a plan, and as we discussed this morning, what we are talking about is removing the uncertainty inherent with the process of relying on a contingency plan.

Mr. TRAXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Stokes?

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just for a moment, I would like to go back to my prior line of questioning. It appears to me that under the post-mobilization option that the Selective Service System would be ahead of the Department of Defense schedule with reference to meeting the 650,000 inductee requirement within 180 days. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. I am not sure we are looking at the same table. But yes. This is a draft document that was out of comment, that assumes that everything is in place—all of the computers are in place, all of the plans have been worked out with the Post Office, all of the plans have been worked out with the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service—everything is ready to go. It also assumes there will be no slips.

And it is on the basis of that that we made these projections.

Mr. STOKES. That is under post-mobilization?

Mr. ROSTKER. Post-mobilization, with everything worked out.

TIMETABLE ACCURACY

Mr. STOKES. How accurate would you say this timetable would be under current circumstances?

Mr. ROSTKER. If we had everything that I have outlined, I think we are in the ballpark here. I wouldn't want to hang myself on one day, five days, or ten days. But I think we are in the ballpark.

Mr. STOKES. Even with slippage under post-mobilization option, you would be ahead of the Department of Defense's projection?

Mr. ROSTKER. If everything worked out as advertised, if all of the infrastructure was in place, I would say that is probably correct.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SABO. This morning Mr. Pirie testified that 60 to 80,000 training slots would be available at the end of 30 days. You have testified that you can deliver 100,000 draftees at the end of 30 days without volunteers. To the best of your knowledge, has the Administration requested funds to increase the availability of training slots?

Mr. ROSTKER. I am not familiar with the details of the Defense budget, but I will respond for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Army, the military service that would require substantial and rapid increases in strength during a mobilization, currently has the capacity to accept about 70-80,000 individuals for initial training by M+30 days. That capacity may not be adequate to Army needs. The Department of Defense is reviewing these requirements and its programs for the mobilization training base. At this time no funds to increase the capability of the mobilization training base are included in the FY 1981 budget request. However, if increased training capacity is found to be essential to the level of preparedness called for by the current international situation, the Department of Defense will not delay in taking steps to provide for the necessary expansion.

Currently, the Army's training base is planned to be augmented by Army Reserve Training Divisions beginning about M+12. Therefore, DoD can at this time, should an emergency arise, start accepting inductees at about M+13.

Mr. SABO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit my remaining questions for the record.

[The questions follow:]

Questions Submitted by Congressman Sabo

TRAINING CAPABILITY

Question. Mr. Pirie, you testified that at the end of 30 days after mobilization is ordered, there would be 60 to 80,000 training slots available. Are equipment, training aids, uniforms and so forth stockpiled and ready for use?

Answer. The Army has sufficient equipment and other materials necessary to begin training of 70-80,000 individuals within the first thirty days after a decision is made to mobilize.

Question. Mr. Pirie, the SSS has said their proposed mobilization system will produce 650,000 inductees at M+125. Could you tell me if the DoD has the facilities and stockpiled equipment to train 650,000 inductees at M+125?

Answer. The Department of Defense currently does not have the capability to begin training of 650,000 inductees by M+125.

ORIGINAL 1980 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Mr. BOLAND. The original 1980 supplemental request was \$1,395,000; is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. And the original 1981 budget request was \$10,982,000. Is that what the Selective Service asked of OMB last September?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is what OMB gave me last November when I took over. It gets us part of the way. I am a lot smarter, the system is a lot smarter, and I don't think that would be sufficient to even bring us up to a post-mobilization system.

Mr. BOLAND. You say OMB gave you these figures last November?

Mr. ROSTKER. Those were our working figures from OMB.

Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask again: Absent Afghanistan, can we assume that your original \$1.4 million supplemental request was the first step in implementing the plan that you proposed and recommended on January 16th?

Mr. ROSTKER. I can't project without Afghanistan. But it would have been the first step. It would not have been sufficient.

Mr. BOLAND. Would not have been sufficient. Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. No.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Conte?

Mr. CONTE. I have a couple of questions.

In the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I have heard that reserve units are dangerously undermanned and the Individual Ready Reserve, the IRR, is disastrously short. Can you discuss the status of the reserves and the National Guard, and do you know what it would cost to correct these deficiencies? Are you asking for these amounts in the 1980 supplemental and 1981 budget?

Mr. ROSTKER. I am not a spokesman for the Department of Defense. I am not familiar with their requests or their present situation.

Mr. CONTE. Do you know if the Administration is considering drafting reserves?

Mr. ROSTKER. Sir, I just do not know. We are not considering drafting for the IRR. But I am not familiar with the whole range of programs to improve conditions in the reserves.

Mr. CONTE. Do you know this: If the reserves were at 100 percent strength and the active forces filled, would we be concerned about a registration?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, I believe we would.

Mr. CONTE. Why?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think the total requirement is sized against the reserve units and the active units, and that the registration and draft would be the sustaining force behind that. I think the JCS has consistently asked for registration, and this is only the latest context in which the Administration has agreed to come forward with this proposal.

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

Mr. CONTE. Last week we had the Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, and they had no problem with recruitment. But their big problem was retention, and the big problem of retention was the pay wasn't attractive to keep people in.

Mr. ROSTKER. If you go back to the Gates Commission, which recommended the all-volunteer force in 1970, the members saw the need for a strong viable Selective Service System that could respond in an emergency. All of our planning in Defense has been consistent with that call. And as you know, the Chiefs last year came out in favor of a resumption of registration.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I will submit my remaining questions for the record.

Questions Submitted by Congressman Conte

SHORTAGE IN THE IRR

Question. I have heard that our reserve units are dangerously undermanned and that the pool of individual replacements in the Individual Ready Reserve, or IRR, is disastrously short? Can you discuss the status of the Reserves and the National Guard? Do you know what it would cost to correct these deficiencies? Are you asking for these amounts in the '80 Supplemental and the '81 Budget?

Answer. The Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve are up to strength and are ready to accomplish their missions. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have sufficient pretrained manpower to meet their mobilization needs.

The Army Guard and Army Reserve, however, are well below the strength we would like them to be in peacetime. The Army Guard and Reserve are about 120,000 below their peacetime strength objectives; this is about 76 percent of their wartime strength. This is a serious strength shortfall, and we are working urgently to get the Army Guard and Reserve up to a peacetime objective strength of about 660,000, which would be about 93 percent of wartime strength. The Army Guard and Reserve, however, do have presently about 540,000 members who participate actively in peacetime training; despite the shortage of strength, this is a large and capable force.

The Army is short about 270,000 pretrained individuals needed to support a full mobilization, after using current IRR assets at a yield of 70 percent and using 40,000 retired personnel. The Army's three-pronged attack to solve this problem is to increase the strength of the IRR; increase to 90 percent the yield from available IRR personnel by improved management; and to double the number of retired personnel to be used. The Army is taking urgent action to accomplish these three things, and the shortfall, will be eliminated by end FY 85 or earlier, depending on the success of management actions to increase the IRR yield.

It would cost about 1 billion dollars to get the Army Guard and Reserve into the condition we would like to achieve.

We are not asking for this entire amount in the FY 81 Budget. The FY 81 Budget, however, does include an increase of 3.2 percent in real terms for the overall Guard and Reserve Program compared to the FY 80 Budget. The FY 81 Budget represents a considerable increase in funding to improve the Army Guard and Reserve manpower situation. We have not finished formulating the FY 80 Supplemental at this time.

CONSCRIPTION

Question. Is the Administration considering drafting into the reserves?

Answer. The Administration has no plans to reimpose the draft for either the reserves or the active forces.

Question. Would a return to the draft correct the shortfalls in the active and reserve units or would we be buying trouble?

Answer. A return to peacetime conscription would solve the shortage over time. However, it is the Administration's view that conscription is unnecessary at this time. The Administration plans to continue to strengthen the All Volunteer Force. The President's Fiscal 1981 budget requests \$500 million in new budget authority for improvements in our active and reserve forces. These improvements and other management actions are projected to correct the current military manpower shortages by the mid-1980's without conscription.

REGISTRATION

Question. If the reserves were at 100 percent strength and the active forces filled, would we be concerned about a registration for the draft?

Answer. Yes, for two reasons. First, the issue of shortages in the active forces and Reserve Components is independent of the issue of registration. Registration is a step to improve our capability to provide manpower at mobilization that is needed in addition to the levels at which we would like the active and reserve forces to be manned in peacetime. Second, it is important to register to show our determination as a nation to check Soviet aggression.

COST OF ATTRACTING AND RETAINING PERSONNEL

Question. What would it cost to pay our soldiers at a rate to attract and keep young persons in the service?

Answer. The primary requisite for attracting and retaining military personnel is to ensure that their pay is competitive with pay in the civilian sector. We believe this can be accomplished by increasing basic military compensation to keep pace with wage movements in the civilian sector, by making extensive use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, and by selective improvements to the benefit package (such as more liberal education benefits).

SOLVING CONCERNS BY MORE PAY AND BENEFITS

Question. Could we solve our concerns over a draft or a registration by putting more funds in the Defense budget for personnel pay and benefits?

Answer. We have put more funds in the FY 1981 Defense budget in the personnel area. Besides a projected 7.4 percent increase in military pay, there is, for example, an increase in reimbursement for moving expenses, a significant increase in enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, a cost of living allowance for single personnel assigned overseas, and an increase in sea pay for Navy enlisted personnel assigned to sea duty. Though further actions may be required to maintain military pay and benefits at levels competitive with civilian alternatives, I believe achieving such levels will enable us to maintain our military force requirements without use of the draft and at a total compensation cost well within the Nation's capability to support.

USING "NIFTY NUGGET" TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS

Question. As an alternative to registration, would it be possible for Congress to provide the funds necessary to get the Selective Service out of "deep standby" and into a better readiness posture? Then, you could run exercises like the Defense Department's "Nifty Nugget" Exercise to get a better feel for what the requirements are before we start to consider registration.

Answer. Exercise "Nifty Nugget" tested mobilization plans and procedures. It did not nor could not help in identifying DoD requirements for people in time of war. Those requirements are based on plans to fully man all military units prior to their deployment and to replace the casualties that are expected to occur.

Mr. BOLAND. Fine. Thank you. Mr. Coughlin?

EFFICACY OF NATIONAL SERVICE

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow up on the National Service plan. It seems to be very unusual that the Selective Service System, which is sort of in charge of considering all kinds of services, has not considered that plan.

Mr. ROSTKER. I don't find it unusual at all. The Selective Service System is charged with implementing the Military Selective Service Act. That Act does not provide for national service. There are other agencies in government—the Peace Corps, VISTA—which are much more involved in the whole question of volunteer service or national service.

The extent to which we get involved is in an active draft when the law provides for an alternate service program. And we are concerned that we implement that program in a fair and efficient way. To that end we have been working with FEMA and other agencies.

Mr. COUGHLIN. All you are involved in doing is considering the implementation of the Selective Service Act, not alternatives to the Selective Service Act?

Mr. ROSTKER. In the context that we have been working, we are not thinking in terms of alternatives. It has been a merry-go-round just trying to come to grips with the concerns of the Congress and the Administration over the Military Selective Service Act, without trying to consider these kinds of alternatives.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Were you involved in the preparation of this message by the President of the United States, transmitting his proposal for the Selective Service?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, with the chapter that calls for Selective Service reform. We addressed the five questions that dealt with Selective Service. We did not address, neither my organization nor I, the questions that did not deal with Selective Service.

Mr. COUGHLIN. On page 57 of the report, in the discussion of what is called compulsory lottery-based national service, there is the following quotation:

CLNS would not pose particularly difficult administrative problems. Much of its operations would resemble those carried out by Selective Service in the past but with an expanded civilian service alternative attached. Under the McCloskey version of the CLNS, the civilian service component might grow in three years to a processing load of around 1 million persons. Though as many as 4 million persons would have to be registered, examined and counseled each year, this is really the simplest aspect to administer of any national service program.

That does not reflect your thinking?

Mr. ROSTKER. No. Let me say, if we went to a system that had an extremely liberal concept of conscientious objection, we would approach the kinds of things you are talking about. A person could simply, upon induction, opt to go to National Service or opt to go into the military. That is not the standard we work under today.

But the courts have been in the process of redefining over the years the concept of conscientious objection.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The paragraph I am quoting doesn't represent any input from you?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir, it does not.

Mr. COUGHLIN. It could be easily administered and so forth. You are the agency that would probably be in charge of administering it.

Mr. ROSTKER. I hope not.

CONGRESS' REQUEST FOR THE SSS TO ANSWER CERTAIN QUESTIONS

Mr. COUGHLIN. I am simply amazed at the Administration's response to the Congressional request to analyze these problems. It did not include any comments by your organization, which would be in charge of administering it.

Mr. ROSTKER. We had a full agenda with the five questions that we dealt with.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The questions that were posed by the Congress included an evaluation of this.

Mr. ROSTKER. They did. Dr. White was the chairman of the inter-agency group that dealt with this report. We were specifically charged with dealing with the five questions that related to Selective Service.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I guess the more I look at this message, the more I am convinced of my initial appraisal that if I were a high school teacher grading it, it would get a flunk.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STOKES. I was unable to be present this morning due to other Congressional business. I wonder if I might reserve on the record the right to submit questions to Assistant Secretary Pirie.

Mr. BOLAND. Yes, you may have that reservation, and they will respond to the questions for the record.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you.

[The questions follow:]

Questions Submitted by Congressman Stokes

ADEQUACY OF PRESENT MILITARY FORCES TO MEET A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Question. What studies have been prepared which indicate that our present military forces, the all volunteer force, reserves, national guard, etc., are insufficient to meet a national emergency, such as a war with the Soviets? Please cite specific evidence.

Answer. The Department of Defense Substantially Study (Secret), completed in the spring of 1979, documented deficiencies in our current ability to satisfy all estimated demands for combat replacement manpower in a potential NATO defense against a Warsaw Pact attack. That assessment was subsequently refined and updated during OSD analysis of the Army's proposed FY 1978-85 program, in the summer of 1979.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Question. How extensive are current deficiencies in the all volunteer force? reserves? national guard?

Answer. Since fiscal year 1973, and the introduction of the All Volunteer Force, we have continuously manned our active forces within a reasonable range of the Congressional authorization—never having been more than 1½ percent below authorization. For the period ending September 1979 the total active strength of the four Military Services was 2,027,200. This was 98.8 percent of the September 30, 1979 plan as projected in the President's FY 80 budget. More specifically:

ACTIVE MILITARY STRENGTH, END OF SEPTEMBER 1979

[Numbers in thousands]

Service	Objective	Actual	Percent of objective
Army	774	759	98
Navy	524	524	100
USMC	190	185	98
USAF	563	559	99
DOD total	2,051	2,027	99

¹ Projected in fiscal year 1980 President's budget. Marine Corps subsequently reduced its objective to 185,500. Marine Corps actual strength was 100 percent of the revised plan.

The Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve are up to strength and are ready to accomplish their missions. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have sufficient pretrained manpower to meet their mobilization needs.

The Army Guard and Army Reserve, however, are well below the strength we would like them to be in peacetime. The Army Guard and Reserve are about 120,000 below their peacetime strength objectives; this is about 76% of their wartime strength. This is a serious strength shortfall, and we are working urgently to get the Army Guard and Reserve up to a peacetime objective strength of about 660,000, which would be about 93% of wartime strength. The Army Guard and Reserve, however, do have presently about 540,000 members who participate actively in peacetime training; despite the shortage of strength, this is a large and capable force.

The Army is short about 270,000 pretrained individuals needed to support a full mobilization, after using current IRR assets at a yield of 70% and using 40,000 retired personnel. The Army has instituted a series of initiatives and incentives to solve their problems.

CURRENT MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Question. What type of war, or national emergency, if any, is this country capable of fighting at the present time?

Answer. At present, we believe the U.S. could join with its allies in a successful joint defense of NATO Europe against an attack by the Warsaw Pact. There are, of course a wide variety of less demanding potential contingencies, any one of which we are fully capable of meeting. However, we do recognize certain deficiencies in our current Defense capability that require corrective action, and we must continue to enhance our capabilities in the face of the continuing Soviet buildup.

USE OF INDUCTEES

Question. How would the addition of 650,000 men within 180 days of mobilization enhance the national capability to meet an *emergency* situation?

Answer. The 650,000 people to be inducted within 180 days of mobilization will be used, after completion of training, as fillers for bringing later deploying units to full strength and as replacements for combat casualties.

TRAINING OF INDUCTEES

Question. How long would it take to train the additional 650,000 men such that they could adequately fight a war or defend this country?

Answer. Each new inductee is required by the Military Selective Service Act to receive a minimum of 12 weeks of training before being deployed overseas. Plans for inductee training are consistent with this statute.

REQUIREMENT FOR INDUCTEES

Question. What basis is there for projecting an emergency manpower need of 650,000 men within 180 days of mobilization?

Answer. The DoD requirement for 650,000 inductees within 180 days of mobilization is but part of the total manpower requirement for prosecution of a major war if it began with little notice. Most of that total manpower requirement must be satisfied with people already trained at the time of mobilization. This will be true no matter how responsive the induction process, because newly trained inductees will not be available for overseas assignment until after 12 weeks of training.

The balance of the requirement, for filling late-deploying units and replacing casualties, can be met with new inductees. The requirement for inductees is, therefore, based on the rate at which our training bases can be augmented to accept increased numbers of trainees. The stated requirement is designed to maximize the use of the mobilized training bases.

USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS

Question. Would it not be more cost-effective to use the \$13.5 million requested for FY 1980 supplemental funding to beef up the reserve forces, rather than to implement draft registration?

Answer. The FY 1980 Budget Supplemental Request for the Selective Service System is not an alternative to the need for well manned reserve forces. Both are important. The FY 1980 authorization and appropriations already enacted by the Congress include substantial amounts of funds for improvements in reserve manning and equipment.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS COSTS

Mr. BOLAND. The table on page 5 indicates you are requesting \$256,000 in the 1980 supplemental and \$234,000 in 1981 for public affairs.

What will the \$200,000 in 1980 and the \$150,000 in 1981, for contractor support be spent for?

Mr. ROSTKER. That will be spent for preparing material with regard to the announcement of registration, the specifics of time and place. We are planning on preparing master tapes that will be duplicated and distributed to over 7,000 radio stations and over 700 television stations. And we will be preparing material for distribution to over 2,500 newspapers.

This will go through the public service channels. We are not paying for any paid advertising. We are providing the informational material that the television and radio stations can use to get the message across.

PRINTING COSTS

Mr. BOLAND. On the same page, under printing, you are requesting \$250,000 for registration forms, \$50,000 for change of address forms, \$342,000 for registration materials, and \$450,000 for verification letters in 1980.

How many registration forms will be purchased and how long will the supply last?

Mr. ROSTKER. These were based upon the registration of men and women. The \$250,000 would cover the printing of 50 million registration forms. We would be printing 10 million change of address forms, 10 million acknowledgment verification forms.

The remaining money is for a handout flyer at the point of registration, and posters to be put up in every Post Office.

Mr. BOLAND. Is that what you refer to as registration materials?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. You are spending \$342,000 in fiscal year 1980 on this.

Mrs. BOGGS. I assume that all of these forms and the ads on television and so on will specify that all young persons must register regardless of their handicap or whatever. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, those persons in the specific age groups. Basically, the only persons who would not register are those in the active Armed Forces.

Mrs. BOGGS. And you are including within these television spots and so on some sign language and other types of communication with handicapped persons?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think your point is well taken. Frankly, we had not thought about that. But I think those are the kinds of things that need to be refined.

Mrs. BOGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to interrupt.

REIMBURSEMENT TO USPS

Mr. BOLAND. The last item is for reimbursement to the United States Postal Service. You are looking for \$10,600,000 in the 1980 sup-

plemental and \$9,240,000 in 1981. What is the basis for the USPS charge? Is it a flat charge or per form processed or what?

Mr. ROSTKER. This is our best estimate of the cost of using the Post Office. In fact, we would be billed on a reimbursable basis. That is the planning amount, based on the best analysis that the postal officials can give us.

Mr. BOLAND. At what point in time do you expect to make the reimbursement? July? August? September? When?

Mr. ROSTKER. As soon as registration is completed and the Post Office bills us.

Mr. TRAXLER. Before we leave page 5, Dr. Rostker, I noticed that you are going to have three people who are going to be involved in providing information, answering questions, I suspect about Selective Service registration and the draft.

The draft? What draft?

Mr. ROSTKER. There is no draft, sir.

Mr. TRAXLER. I certainly hope not.

Mr. ROSTKER. We get a massive amount of inquiries. We have more speaking invitations than we possibly can accommodate. We are not actively soliciting places to go and people to talk to. But it seems that we are very popular, at least in the college circuit, as well as other circuits.

These people will be an additional complement to the staff to be able to present this information to the public and to answer questions.

Mr. TRAXLER. This makes me very nervous. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REIMBURSEMENT OF ASSISTING AGENCIES

Mr. BOLAND. If you don't start the reimbursement sometime before the end of September, then you won't need the money for the supplemental?

Mr. ROSTKER. We are hoping the registration will occur in June. We could clearly not order the registration without having the funds available to reimburse the Post Office.

Mr. BOLAND. On page 6, under the ADP support, you indicate that the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration will enter the registration data in the computer.

Do you have a list of exactly which locations the registration data will be entered from? If not, when will you have a list?

Mr. ROSTKER. We are working out those details now. Our prime organization is the Social Security Administration. They have indicated that they could do most of the work at three locations and we are in the process of dividing the country up so that we know what the flow is from the registration sites through the Post Office to the specific locations at the SSA data centers.

Mr. BOLAND. How is the cost for keypunching by IRS and SSA determined?

Mr. ROSTKER. We know the number of characters. We know the strokes per keypunch operator.

It is basically 30 cents per registrant and 10 cents for microfilming. That was the planning factor that we worked on with them that allowed us to do that.

I might say that we have received an unsolicited proposal from a contractor who could do a portion of the work. And those rates are

totally consistent with SSA. He is asking for 34 cents. And we plan for 30 cents through SSA.

So we think we are in the ballpark, even consistent with the private sector.

Mr. BOLAND. On the top of page 7, the legend states that the Selective Service will immediately, by using the facilities of a contractor, establish the capability to manage registrant data files, process change-of-address notices, and enter registration data into the Emergency Military Manpower Procurement System in the event of a military mobilization. Has the contractor been selected?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir. We have turned the request over to GSA. There is one unsolicited proposal that has come in, but GSA will make the selection of the contractor.

Mr. BOLAND. Will you have to wait until the supplemental appropriation is provided?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is the problem with a lot of this, Mr. Chairman.

UPGRADING DATA PROCESSING AND OTHER PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Mr. BOLAND. The 1979 Supplemental Appropriations Act contained \$600,000 for the Selective Service System to upgrade and improve its data processing capabilities. How were those funds used?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir. We used \$151,000 to develop a long-term computer plan. That was before my tenure. When I came in we used \$300,000 of those dollars to obtain a contractor to undertake a massive redesign of the system. This contractor was helpful in redoing the plans that appear before you today.

We also used \$148,000 to purchase ten micron transmission devices to transmit data from the regions to the central computers.

Mr. BOLAND. What is the total amount?

Mr. ROSTKER. \$599,000.

Mr. BOLAND. What about the \$600,000 in the 1980 Appropriations Bill for computer updating.

Mr. ROSTKER. \$100,000 would have been used to reimburse the United States Army Management System Support Agency, USAMSSA, to build up the emergency system. And we would have used \$500,000 to pay for our share of the MEPCOM Selective Service Computer Center.

Mr. BOLAND. On page 8, you are requesting \$800,000 in the 1980 supplemental and \$400,000 in 1981 for microfilm and \$20,000 in each year for storage.

Why do you have to microfilm and store the registration data? Can't you store a duplicate copy of the computer tape or disk at another location?

Mr. ROSTKER. You need a hard copy with the individual's signature for a legal verification. We hope to do that with the microfilm. There will be an initial storage charge, but within the very short-term, we will destroy the hard copy and rely strictly on the microfilm.

Mr. BOLAND. Also on page 8, you are requesting funds in both 1980 and 1981 for a number of computers; the Interim EMMPS Support, Interim Computer, Interim Data Management, and the Joint MEPCOM/SSS Computer.

I have some questions to be answered for the record with respect to these computers.

How do these computer requests relate? What do you currently have in computer capability? What is your interim plan and what is your long range plan? Where will the Joint MEPCOM/SSS computer be located? What is the basis for your cost estimates in 1980 and 1981?

[The information follows:]

Reports prepared by the CBO, the President's Reorganization Project Team and confirmed by Federal Computer Performance Evaluation and Simulation Center (FEDSIM) indicate that the existing SSS ADP equipment (e.g. Burroughs B3500/2500 computer) is not adequate to support EMMPS or registration. The long term plan of Selective Service is to establish a collocated ADP facility with the Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM) in the Chicago area in January 1981. The interim computer is to support registration until the collection ADP facility is in operation. The interim data management system provides for the correction of registration errors and the processing of address changes. This will be performed by a contractor until the collocated ADP facility is in operation, at which time this function will be accomplished in-house. The interim Emergency Military Mobilization Procurement System (EMMPS) support at United States Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA) provides for program development and testing of the emergency mobilization system.

Mr. BOLAND. On the same page, you are requesting \$1,280,000 and 156 personnel for the SSS Data Center in 1981.

What is the basis for the request of the 156 personnel?

Mr. ROSTKER. Those personnel handle error corrections. We have based that staffing request on the number of errors, the number of change of address forms that we can expect and the time it takes to process each change of address.

Mr. BOLAND. Why not more than 156 or less?

Mr. ROSTKER. We don't think it would take any more. We have made this determination based on specific transactions. In terms of funds, it would be less if we register only men.

Mr. BOLAND. Of the 23 positions requested in 1980 and the 189 requested in 1981, how many are associated with the request to register women?

Mr. ROSTKER. It is about 70, 72.

Mr. BOLAND. Is that in 1980 or 1981?

Mr. ROSTKER. 72 is the 1981 figure. They are all in 1981.

The 1980 figures are system improvements that are independent of the registration function. The 150 staffing positions are to handle the error corrections, the change of address notifications, to update the files, keep them current.

Mr. BOLAND. Under area offices, you are requesting \$4,550,000 in 1981 for terminals. How many terminals and where will they be located?

Mr. ROSTKER. There will be 441 terminals at the area offices. The area offices will be Armed Forces Recruiting Stations, which, upon mobilization, we will take over.

Mr. BOLAND. And how many are there?

Mr. ROSTKER. We will take over 434.

Mr. BOLAND. Do you plan to lease or buy these terminals? Which is the most cost effective?

Mr. ROSTKER. We believe that it would be more economical to purchase the terminals.

Mr. BOLAND. On page 10, you mention an agreement with the Department of Defense to take over specific Armed Forces Recruiting Offices within 24 hours of mobilization. Those are the 400 plus that you mentioned.

Do you have a list of the exact locations of the Recruiting Offices you would utilize in the event of mobilization?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. You may supply that for the committee's files.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. On page 12, you are requesting \$75,000 in both 1980 and 1981 for planning support of your Alternate Services effort. What will these funds for planning support be used for?

Mr. ROSTKER. These are simply contractor support funds to augment the small staff so that we can come to grips with the whole structure of an Alternate Service program.

To be fully effective, we should have a job bank available upon mobilization to place conscientious objectors in appropriate Alternate Service programs.

That does not exist today. We have been working with the Department of Labor and with FEMA. We do not believe that we can bring that system on line or fully develop the concept with the in-house resources that are provided for in the budget.

So we are asking for a contractor organization.

Mr. BOLAND. Your original supplemental request for 1980 was \$1,395,000 and 15 additional positions. The legend in the 1981 document stated that this would finance the improvement of the data processing systems and the initial capability to meet the emergency manpower needs of the Defense Department.

What would have been accomplished with that level of funding? What would the funds have been used for?

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me take it from the beginning. We would have done nothing in the area of registration, no public affairs.

We had considered some reprinting, but none of the change-of-address verification letters have been provided.

In the area of data processing, we would have had to wait until we had our MEPCOM/Selective Service Computer Center set up and running, which is scheduled for next year.

One of the major holes in our system that we had not come to grips with at the time of the draft report was the whole process of keeping the files current and updated. We were in the mode of, we will register and shove the records in. But, in fact, those records have to be kept updated.

We have to be able to process errors and changes of address. That is a major commitment in this program. And it was not funded in the previous request. The area terminals were not in the budget in FY '81.

We were in the process, as seen in the draft report, of pressing that need upon OMB. But we clearly had missed the timetable to have it in the basic '81 program.

That would have been in addition. There was no funding for recruiting the local board members, although there was some additional funding for policy development to start working out the procedures.

But the major commitment of people, administrative people at

headquarters and regional people, and the cost of developing the training program, was not in the supplemental.

That would have been additional.

Finally, the program of some staff additions for alternate service and for improving our capability and analysis and evaluation was in the basic program in terms of staff additions.

Mr. BOLAND. How about the additional 15 personnel? What would they have done?

Mr. ROSTKER. 5 of the people would have been assigned to the alternate service program. 5 would have been assigned to the analysis and evaluation function and 5 would have been assigned to the policy development area. That would have constituted the 15.

Mr. BOLAND. The SSS currently has 78 permanent positions (civilian) and 20 military positions for which it reimburses the Armed Services. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. The amended supplemental request for 1980 will fund an additional 23 positions. This brings the 1980 total to 101. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Where will those 23 positions be located and what will they do?

Mr. ROSTKER. The 23 positions will be located in the National Headquarters.

Mr. BOLAND. Are all 23 additional positions funded for 6 months?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes for 6 months.

Mr. BOLAND. When will these positions be filled?

Mr. ROSTKER. As soon as I have the authorization and the money to fill them.

Mr. BOLAND. Are additional military positions funded in 1980 or 1981?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, they are not.

Mr. BOLAND. The amended 1981 budget request provides for an additional 189 positions. This brings the 1981 total to 282. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. Where will these 189 additional positions be located and what will they be doing?

Mr. ROSTKER. 25 persons will be in our six regional offices to implement the program of selection and training of potential local board members.

156 persons are scheduled for staffing the data entry function at the new computer facility at Great Lakes.

Mr. BOLAND. What lapse rate is assumed for the 189 positions?

Mr. ROSTKER. Sir?

Mr. BRODSKY. For the 25 positions in the field, there is none because we intend to hire them on the first of October, if authorized. The lapse rate for the 156 persons at the data entry site is 3 months.


Mr. BOLAND. On page 25 is an organization chart. Provide for the record a similar chart with the number of positions in 1979, 1980, and 1981 noted in each box.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.


[The information follows:]

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM


FY 1979 - TOTAL 78
(EXCLUDES 20 MILITARY)



SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
FY 1980 - TOTAL 101
(EXCLUDES 20 MILITARY)



SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
FY 1981 - TOTAL 282
(EXCLUDES 20 MILITARY)



Mr. BOLAND. What additional monies and people are available in other agencies (DoD, IRS, PO) will be required to support the registration effort?

In other words, what is the total, from all sources, cost of the registration effort in 1980 and 1981?

Mr. ROSTKER. All of the moneys associated with registration are in my budget. We would reimburse the other agencies. There are no hidden costs in their budgets.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler

Mr. TRAXLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

COSTS OF POST-MOBILIZATION REGISTRATION AND OTHER OPTIONS

Dr. Rostker, I want to pursue with you Option No. 1 in the draft of your report on page 7. Let's see what that is going to cost us. Option No. 1, you will recall, was post-mobilization participatory registration.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes. I remember the draft.

Mr. TRAXLER. You may become very familiar with it. You may get to like it better and better.

Let's walk through this one, so that I understand what it does, how much it would cost to implement it. First, I would ask you if this option were implemented, would it include the funding for draft board membership training?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, it certainly would.

Mr. TRAXLER. You would treat draft boards very much under Option 1 the same way that they are treated in the President's plan?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, very much.

Mr. TRAXLER. So the funds that would be required then for draft boards under the President's proposal, would be true then pretty much for Option 1?

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely.

Mr. TRAXLER. How comfortable do you feel with the time frames that you have in Option 1? Do you think that those could be met, given sufficient funding to put Option 1 into effect?

Mr. ROSTKER. If we had sufficient time to work out all of the plans and sufficient funds to do all of the positioning, I would have to say that those time frames are in the ballpark. Now, I don't know whether we would stick to exactly the same number of days, but I think it is in the ballpark. There is a certain amount of risk associated with doing this. A certain amount of confusion clearly would occur in a post-mobilization environment. But I think we are in the ballpark and can certainly meet the defense requirements.

Mr. TRAXLER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask unanimous consent that page 7, 8 of the draft, as it relates to Option 1, appear in our record?

Mr. BOLAND. Without objection, we will enter them into the record. [The draft of Option 1 follows:]

OPTION 1. POST-MOBILIZATION PARTICIPATORY REGISTRATION

The discussion of this option reflects major changes from the post-mobilization plans previously presented by Selective Service. Our new plans provide that the USPS register one year of birth group (4 million men and women) four days after notification of mobilization (M+4). USPS employees will review com-

pleted forms, witness the registrant's signature, and provide the registrant with a copy of the form as a receipt. Two weeks later USPS will begin continuous registration of 18 year olds. Selective Service will conduct a lottery on the evening of M+4. The USPS will sort registration cards by lottery number and forward sorted data to IRS and/or SSA regional offices. Selective Service reserve officers will be located at IRS/SSA regional offices and will receive and ensure the security of the registration forms. The IRS/SSA will keypunch registrant data which will be transmitted to a central computer center. The Director of Selective Service, acting for the President and using EEMPS, will issue induction orders starting on M+7.

Concurrently, 434 area offices will open at predesignated recruiting office locations. Fifteen hundred pre-trained personnel will transfer from the Armed Services Recruiting Commands to Selective Service to augment reserve officers already assigned to Selective Service. Area offices will provide administrative assistance to local boards. State Headquarters will also be reestablished to provide administrative assistance to area offices. Regional offices will continue to support both.

Under this option, Selective Service expects to exceed the current DOD requirement for inductees. Registration will occur at M+4 and induction notices will be issued starting on M+7. Inductions will begin on M+7 at the rate of 7,000 per day, the estimated capacity of MEPCOM. With this sustained rate, 100,000 inductions could be made by M+35 and 650,000 inductions by M+125.

The estimated yearly recurring cost for this option, i.e., base level cost to keep the Selective Service System in a true standby posture, is \$9.7M.

Mr. TRAXLER. What do you see as the cost of implementing Option No. 1? Would you walk us through that, please?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think it may be easiest to say—we are talking about substantially the same system, by the fact that we would not actually accomplish the registration and therefore would save, in peacetime, the variable costs associated with registering two million men a year or four million men and women a year. For a rough rule of thumb, that is about \$2 per person. Almost everything else you see in the budget submitted before you should go forward: the alternative service, the local boards, the computer enhancements. We should have ready the public affairs program. We need to do a much better job in printing and posting our forms so that they can go.

Mr. TRAXLER. You would print the forms?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir, we would, in fact, do that.

Mr. TRAXLER. As I understand it, under this option you would exceed the current DoD requirement for inductees.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TRAXLER. You would expect that registration would occur at M plus four? We are not holding you to precise dates.

Mr. ROSTKER. Within that time frame.

Mr. TRAXLER. It might be M plus three?

Mr. ROSTKER. It would have to be moved in the other direction.

Mr. TRAXLER. They tell me you have a tremendous background and you are a shaker. I believe that.

Mr. ROSTKER. Thank you.

I think we will let it stay in the general ball park.

Mr. TRAXLER. Also, induction notices would be issued starting at M plus seven.

Mr. ROSTKER. It could be in that time frame.

Mr. TRAXLER. Inductions would be at M plus 17 at approximately 7,000 per day, which does not include volunteers.

Mr. ROSTKER. Right.

VOLUNTEERS DURING MOBILIZATION

Mr. TRAXLER. In the event of mobilization, I assume there would be some volunteers. That has been the case in all previous mobilization efforts that I know of. There is always a big rush to get in the Navy.

Mr. ROSTKER. Most of these requirements, of course, go to the Army.

Mr. TRAXLER. That's where most of us went.

You estimate you would have 100,000 inductions through the system, not including the volunteers, within M plus 35.

Mr. ROSTKER. It might be a little longer. We could meet the defense requirements.

Mr. TRAXLER. You would have 650,000 within M plus 125 days?

Mr. ROSTKER. Something on that order.

Mr. TRAXLER. Plus volunteers.

I would be pleased to yield to Mr. Sabo.

Mr. SABO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I was intending to pursue the same line of questioning. I wonder if we could get the gentleman to go through the particulars on the various tables in the budget justification.

I assume that Table 3 and Table 4 would probably be a requirement in total of Option 1.

Mr. ROSTKER. Table—

FIELD STRUCTURE AND LOCAL BOARD SUPPORT

Mr. SABO. Field structure and local board support, a supplement of \$754,000 is probably needed by Option 1. I wonder if you would walk us through Table 1 and Table 2. They tend to be rather concise. Indicate to us whether you think those particular supplemental requests would be needed for Option 1, as mentioned by the gentleman from Michigan. I would assume that Table 1 basically, except for maybe some printing, would not be needed. It would seem to me, on printing, that you would probably want an outstanding contract with printing firms decentralized around the country rather than boxes of forms in warehouses.

Mr. ROSTKER. We can't rely on that. We would have to go through and develop a public affairs program. That should be on the shelf, ready to go. There is a need for a permanent addition to the public affairs staff of Selective Service. I think that is true whether we register or not. I am not sure what would happen with telephones, but some of that would be needed to be able to handle the flood of inquiries that have, in fact, come in.

We need to take another thorough look at our registration forms, change of address and verification procedures. I don't think we need to print quite as many, but we certainly have to have a good deal of that stockpiled. Postage totally varies, depending on the registration itself.

Mr. SABO. People actually aren't registering, so you aren't notifying them.

Mr. ROSTKER. We need the verification material ready to go through the computer. We would not have to actually frank it and send it out. We would not reimburse the Post Office for that.

Registration planning is absolutely necessary. It is what we would have to do in peace or in a mobilization to make sure the system is,

in fact, operated. And then the reimbursement of the Post Office would not take place. If this was in a peacetime situation, there would be a need to test the program. We are testing it today by running it. I don't have any figures on what it would cost to build a credible testing program.

If you want to go through Table 2—let me back up. In terms of Table 1, there would be reimbursement to the Post Office to carry on their portion of the planning exercise. That is not in this table because that is assumed in the reimbursement of the Post Office. There would be a considerable amount of funds—maybe a half million dollars or more—to reimburse the Post Office for their planning. There is a certain amount of money that would be needed to reimburse the Social Security Administration and IRS for their planning, but most of those funds are strictly variable and would come out.

The interim USAMSSA computer is a necessity. The interim computer in entering data management—

Mr. SABO. Excuse me. If the gentleman would yield further?

Mr. TRAXLER. I would be pleased to.

Mr. SABO. What about "keypunching"?

Mr. ROSTKER. I said that would come out. There would be some charge by SSA and IRS to handle their portion of the planning, but the keypunching, per se, would come out. The support from USAMSSA is a necessity. That is what gives us whatever little backup we have today. The interim computer, most of that, if not all of that, would come out, as would the interim data management.

The joint computer center, that is a necessity. It was in the original plan, and it must be continued. That is our long-term in-house capability. The data center, the portions that are variable, would come out, the portions that represent fixed capacity and pre-positioning of equipment, would stay in. We would have to work out some kind of a deal with MEPCOM to give us some minimum standby capability for this function, which was not originally planned and which I can assure you is an absolute necessity.

Software development is critical. We are dealing with programs that were based upon hardware that is out of existence. Much of the hardware does not exist today and cannot be maintained today. We need a major job of redoing significant portions of the program. The software development would stay.

Area office terminals and communications are tied in with the revitalization program, and that would stay. As you notice here, we credit this computer area with the \$600,000 that the Committee gave us as a special addition last year.

In terms of Table 3, all of this is related to the revitalization of the system. It is not related to registration. All of the items on this table would stay.

Mr. SABO. Would that be true of 1981 as well as 1980?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir. I think it is absolutely necessary that we go ahead and select and train local board members. If there is one thing we can do to guarantee the fairness of the system in an emergency, it is this act. Without it, I can't tell you who will be adjudicating claims; I can't tell you on what basis they will be doing it. This is our quality control for the future.

The same is true in Table 4. We are working with some very antiquated ADP—word-processing equipment—that needs to be updated. The analysis capability has to be improved, and the plans toward building a viable alternate service program should go forward.

There are some things in the registration area and some things in the computer area that will come out. We estimate it costs about \$8 million each to register men and women I think we have to keep in perspective that what the President has done is to ask the Congress for approximately \$8 million each to register men and women to move us from a contingency plan to an ongoing registration system. I think that is a very modest amount of money. In the realm of our defense program, that is what it really comes down to.

Mr. SABO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. TRAXLER. The difference between Option 1, which you very carefully put together and the President's proposal is only the \$8 million and mobilization time. We are talking about M plus how many days.

Mr. ROSTKER. We are talking about an improvement in a matter of a week or two weeks.

Mr. TRAXLER. At most, 14 days?

Mr. ROSTKER. If we had everything fully worked out—

Mr. TRAXLER. Everything has to be worked out under the President's plan as well, doesn't it?

Mr. ROSTKER. We are moving faster. We would not be here a week after the submission if these were calmer times. A good deal of this was not in the supplemental, as I have indicated, that was originally submitted. We were talking about a substantial period of time to bring the funds necessary for several of these revitalizations on line.

I would be looking at next fall before we got authorization to select and train local board members. We are asking for it now, and we are prepared to move quickly on that program.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Would my colleague yield?

Mr. TRAXLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The \$8 million would come up in both the 1980 and 1981 supplemental?

Mr. ROSTKER. There is about \$7 million in the 1981 plan, because we are registering just slightly fewer people.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The \$8 million in 1980, and about \$7 million off 1981. You could set up the whole plan except for actually physically registering people?

Mr. ROSTKER. You've still got the registration of women in there. You have got to take about \$16 million off the fiscal year 1980 request and about \$14 million off the fiscal year 1981 request to determine the post-mobilization option costs.

Mr. TRAXLER. I am looking at this from the perspective of what do we really need here. We need the system. Do we put this mobilization into operation, or do we need accrual registration? I am looking, really, not so much at the verbiage, but I am looking for the system that is going to get the job done in a reasonably efficient manner. I wouldn't want to challenge your previous statement a few minutes ago, but again I want to say, from my perspective, that I am only looking for a system that will get the job done in a reasonably effi-

cient manner, in a fair amount of time, taking into consideration the various contingencies and the scripts that can be written in which mobilization would be necessary.

ONGOING REGISTRATION AND INTERPRETING VARIOUS CONTINGENCY PLANS

Mr. ROSTKER. We share exactly that concern. It was the view of the President that an ongoing registration system is just much more credible than a contingency plan. I have no quarrel with that judgment. I certainly support it.

Mr. TRAXLER. I guess I come back to where I was again this morning: looking for what we really need. The ultimate system, of course, is to put the draft into effect. Then you really have a system going. Where is your fallback position? How far can you come back? That is what we are talking about today.

Some, I am sure—and we will have this coming before us in the House—some people will be talking about the reinstatement of the draft. I am sure we will be voting on that in the House in the next six months. Others will be discussing whether or not merely registration is meaningful enough without classification, as I said. And others will argue that registration, with capacity for mobilization and induction within 14 days, is adequate to meet foreseeable scripts in terms of even the worst scenario written in the Pentagon.

So, obviously, reasonable people will disagree on this issue, and I guess that is the difficult choice that this Committee has before it. Our options aren't broad; they are narrow. We just have a question of how much money we will put up for you to do the kinds of tasks that the Subcommittee believes ought to be done. Then the House would have to approve our recommendations.

Mr. BOLAND. Following some of the information that you gave to Mr. Sabo with respect to the tables, are you indicating to the Committee that a beefed-up post-mobilization system would cost \$4 million in 1980?

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me provide that for the record. But I think that is basically correct.

[The information follows:]

The Administration is committed to the reactivation of the Selective Service System. This program includes a substantial improvement in a whole range of programs including registration. The registration will not only improve the responsiveness of the System, but most importantly will allow us to eliminate any risk associated with a registration contingency plan. If the Committee decides to only revitalize the System without registration, Selective Service would require fiscal year 1980 supplemental of \$4.7 million and a fiscal year 1981 budget amendment of \$11 million.

Mr. BOLAND. Are there any additional questions?

Mr. STOKES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rostker, so that I am sure that I understand the draft working document that we referred to earlier, dated the 16th of January 1980, is a draft document prepared by you. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. STOKES. This was a document that went to the President?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir, it went to an inter-agency working group chaired by Dr. White at OMB. To the best of my knowledge, it did not go to the President.

Mr. STOKES. Is the post-mobilization option recommended on page 13, the last paragraph, your recommendation?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir. I think the statement that follows says that this option should be considered in the context of the international situation. That is exactly what the President did. As you pointed out, this is a draft document which is subject to corrections and criticisms and comments by a number of people.

Mr. STOKES. So that there is no question about what we are discussing, let me read the paragraph to which I have referred. It says:

Our analysis of the various face-to-face registration options suggests that the post-mobilization plan is preferable. Table I shows the responsiveness, number of pre-mobilization, full- and part-time personnel, and initial and recurring costs for each option. The post-mobilization option should substantially exceed defense requirements, employ the fewest number of full-time personnel, and cost the least. While costs and staffing should not be the determining factor, the reduced delivery time provided by the other options is redundant and unnecessary.

The post-mobilization option, subject to field testing later this year, and the international situation at anytime, is recommended as the basis for an effective standby selective service.

Is that the correct statement appearing in the draft?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is what appears in the draft.

Mr. STOKES. Was that your recommendation?

Mr. ROSTKER. I would characterize it as a draft statement that was put out for comment. I would not characterize it as a "recommendation of the Selective Service System to the President."

Mr. STOKES. How do you account for the word "recommendation" that appears in the middle of the page above the paragraph immediately preceding that?

Mr. ROSTKER. This was a draft document that was not intended to go to the President. It was put out for comment through working-group channels. The document is subject to revision, and I think it is fair to say that the Selective Service has always been viewed in the context of its relation to the international situation, and that caveat stands.

Mr. STOKES. Can you tell me how much time went into this draft document?

Mr. ROSTKER. I came on board in the very end of November, and we worked on it steadily over the month and a half that ensued.

Mr. STOKES. When you say "we," who does that include?

Mr. ROSTKER. The Selective Service staff.

Mr. STOKES. How many people are we talking about?

Mr. ROSTKER. I don't have a count. But basically, the planning staff at Selective Service, a dozen people or so.

Mr. STOKES. A dozen or more?

Mr. ROSTKER. That's right.

Mr. STOKES. Any idea of the man-hours required for this draft?

Mr. ROSTKER. I have no idea of the man-hours required.

Mr. STOKES. It wasn't anything the staff just threw together, was it?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, it was not something they just threw together.

Mr. STOKES. The staff very carefully reviewed the evidence and conducted the research?

Mr. ROSTKER. The document is a draft, is subject to revision in the first place, and second, it must be considered within the strict sense of how the Selective Service can support this plan. The President

made a determination that, in his view, an ongoing registration system was more credible than a contingency plan. No matter how well the plan sounds on paper, it is just that: a plan on paper.

Mr. STOKES. I understand all that. I understand what the President did. I am not blaming you for what he did. All I want you to do is tell me: are you repudiating your own document?

Mr. ROSTKER. I am not repudiating my document. I characterize it as what it is: a draft document. In fact, most of this document appears as the Presidential statement which was submitted to the Congress last week.

THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Mr. STOKES. Would you tell us what the international situation is at this time that would cause you to say, "junk this"?

Mr. ROSTKER. I am not saying, "junk this." I am saying the best position of the Selective Service has to be taken in light of the international situation.

Mr. STOKES. That isn't my question. My question is: What is the current international situation?

Mr. ROSTKER. I think it is quite clear—and it was covered this morning—that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has substantially changed the international situation. It is the view of the President that this action required us to go further in strengthening national defense than the Administration originally planned for last summer or last fall.

Mr. STOKES. Then, you see the invasion of Afghanistan as a threat to the vital interests of the United States at this time?

Mr. ROSTKER. I certainly do.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Bevill.

Mr. BEVILL. I do not have any questions at this time.

Mr. BOLAND. Dr. Rostker, thank you very much. You have been a very interesting witness for a fairly long day, and you carried the burden—it is a burden, too. I certainly understand your position. I understand the position of the President.

We may have some problems in interpreting the draft report and the final recommendations of the President, but, in any event, we are delighted to have you. And thank you very much for your presence.

Mr. ROSTKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Your justification will be inserted in the record. The Committee stands adjourned.

[The justification follows:]

Selective Service System
Fiscal Year 1981 Budget Justification

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INTRODUCTION

On January 23, 1980, the President of the United States, while reiterating support for the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), called for the revitalization of the Selective Service System and said that he would send legislative and budget proposals to the Congress "so that we can begin registration and then meet the future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise." The President also announced, on February 8, 1980, that he will ask Congress to amend the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) to provide for the registration of women, that Selective Service will start the registration process later this spring, that the process of revitalization will include the selection and training of local board members, and that he would request additional funds from the Congress of \$20.5 million in FY 1980 and \$24.5 million in FY 1981 for the Selective Service System to carry out this program.

The FY 1980 Budget Supplement and the FY 1981 Budget submitted to Congress on January 28, 1980 did not reflect the President's decision to accelerate the revitalization of the Selective Service System or to reinstate registration. This report presents the revised appropriation necessary in both FY 1980 and FY 1981 to implement the full program. The tables presented here use the FY 1980 Appropriation as a base against which to show the funds necessary to revitalize Selective Service and reinstate registration.

THE "NEW" STANDBY SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

The President's decision to revitalize the Selective Service System and to initiate registration substantially improves our ability to respond. However, the Selective Service and the draft is still in "standby". No one is being drafted and the military is still operating under the AVF system. All that has happened is that Selective Service will substitute an actual registration system for a registration contingency plan and accelerate the process of improving the other components of the Selective Service System.

If activated, Selective Service will employ the procedures incorporated in the Emergency Military Manpower Procurement System (EMMPS). A major feature of EMMPS is that it eliminates pre-mobilization classifications and examinations. After mobilization, and a Random Sequence Number (RSN) lottery, all registrants will be administratively classified 1-A, ready for induction. Induction orders would be centrally issued in RSN order by the Director of Selective Service. After receiving an induction order, a registrant would either report to an Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station (AFEES) for examination (and if found physically and mentally qualified, would be inducted), or would request a deferment or exemption. Requests for conscientious objector status, hardship deferments, ministerial students, and ministerial deferments would be processed by local boards.

REVITALIZING SELECTIVE SERVICE

Working within the EMMPS procedures, we can highlight the new standby system by examining six subsystems which make up the registration-to-induction process. The subsystems are:

- A registration process that is reliable and efficient.
- An ADP system (hardware and software) that can handle Selective Service's pre- and post-mobilization requirements.
- A system for the promulgation and distribution of orders for induction.
- A claims process that can quickly insure all registrants' rights to due process are protected.
- A field structure that can support the claims process.
- A revitalization of National Headquarters in order to manage the registration and field structure.

Registration.

HOW:

While the President has the legal authority to order registration, classification, and examination, he has decided to proceed with only registration at this time. Both classification and examination would require substantial additional expense. In addition, classification would require the immediate reestablishment of local draft boards, and physical examinations would have to be repeated at the time of induction. Neither of these additional steps was thought to be appropriate in the pre-mobilization context.

The United States Postal Service (USPS) has agreed to undertake the task of face-to-face registration. The USPS is ideally suited to undertake this task because it is a single command infrastructure with facilities and personnel, and a communication/transportation network extending to every corner of the country. There are over 34,000 classified post offices and the USPS employs over 650,000 people. Postal locations are widely known. USPS has also provided similar services for the Department of State (passport applications) and for the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (alien registration). In 1979 alone, the USPS processed over one million passport applications, and registered over 4 million aliens.

When the registration begins, young men and women will be asked to go to their local post offices to register. They will fill out a simple

form with their name, sex, address, date of birth and social security number. The forms will be checked at the postal windows to insure that they are legible and complete. The completed forms will then be sent to the Selective Service System where the information will be entered into computers. Thereafter, the registrant will receive a short letter indicating he or she has been registered and asking that the Selective Service System be kept informed of any change of address.

WHO:

When the draft was suspended in 1973, Selective Service was operating under a series of legal and regulatory reforms designed to correct the inequities of the draft during the Vietnam period. Specifically, the lottery was instituted in 1969, student deferments were eliminated in 1970, and occupational deferments were eliminated in 1971. Regulatory reforms cancelled the "oldest first" policy and replaced it with the policy of year of vulnerability/youngest first, thus reducing the years of uncertainty which characterized earlier drafts. It is our intent to carry out these reforms, and to register only sufficient year of birth groups to insure that we can meet the needs of our Armed Services.

We intend to ask young men and women born in 1960 and 1961 to register this spring with Selective Service at a time and place, and in a manner yet to be prescribed by the President. In January 1981, we will ask those born in 1962 to register and, at the same time we will also initiate continuous registration of 18 year olds, i.e., young men and women will register on, or about the day they turn eighteen, as was the practice in the past.

If it ever becomes necessary to draft anyone, we will operate under the concept of random selection based upon year and date of birth, i.e., the prime age group are those who reach age 20 in the year of the draft. We believe that registering only those born between 1960 and 1961 will provide a sufficiently large initial pool of people to more than meet the needs of the Department of Defense. In the unlikely event that it becomes necessary to increase the size of the pool in 1980, we will undertake a supplemental registration of those born before 1959, who are subject to the MSSA. The size of the pool will, however, increase overtime as 18 year olds register each year, and Selective Service keeps current the records of those previous registered.

WHEN:

The Administration is currently developing plans and will determine in the near future exactly when registration will take place.

BUDGET:

Using the original FY 1980 appropriation as a base, the following major programs and funds are necessary to implement this portion of the President's plans:

- A public affairs staff to handle the media and other requests for information about the Selective Service, registration and the draft. This includes a public information program by which Selective Service will prepare and provide materials to the public affairs departments of electronic and print media announcing the details of registration.
- An improved telephone answering and inquiry system to handle the phone calls flooding Selective Service Headquarters and Regional Offices.
- The printing and distribution of registration forms, registration materials (fact sheets, posters, etc.), change of address forms, verification letters and appropriate postage.
- The development of detailed plans and procedures to carry out the initial and continuous registrations.
- The cost of reimbursing the USPS for registration.

Table 1
Registration

	(\$000)	
	FY 80 SUPP	FY 81 INCREASE
Public Affairs:		
Contractor Support	200	150
Personnel (3)	56	84
Telephones	54	120
Printing:		
Registration Forms	250	
Change of Address Forms	50	
Registration Materials	342	
Verification Letters	450	500
Postage	1,275	1,900
Registration Planning	275	125
USPS Reimbursement	10,600	9,240
Totals	13,552	12,119

ADP Support.HOW:

In order to enter the initial registration data for two year of birth groups (8 million men and women) into a computer, we will use the keypunch capacity of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA). Both agencies have agreed to suspend part of their operations to support Selective Service. For example, the IRS has over 4,000 data entry terminals located in ten regional centers, which are conveniently located near USPS centers. During the tax return period of January to June, the IRS has about 6,000 data entry personnel onboard. During the non-tax period of July to December, the staff is reduced to about 1,500 personnel.

The present Selective Service computer is inadequate to either manage our data files, to run EMMPS, or to support our area offices and the claims process. Current hardware cannot be expanded to support these tasks. In deciding how best to meet our computer needs, we also want to make sure that any new ADP system facilitates the entire registration-to-induction process. Responsibility for this process is shared by Selective Service and the DOD's Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM). Selective Service is responsible to:

- Register those subject to the MSSA.
- Determine the order of those who will be called for service.
- Classify individuals.
- Order registrants to take physical and mental examinations.
- Issue orders for induction.
- Adjudicate claims for deferments, postponements, and exemptions.

The Military Enlistment Processing Command, through their 67 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) is responsible to:

- Provide physical and mental examinations.
- Induct qualified registrants into the Armed Services.

To provide short term ADP capability, our budget submit ensures we have (1) an immediate capability to maintain and process registration data and issue orders of induction, if necessary; and (2), within a

year, provide for improved interface with MEPCOM. Selective Service will immediately, by using the facilities of a contractor, establish the capability to manage our registrant data file, process change of address notices, and will be ready to enter the registration data into the EMMPS in the event of a military mobilization. We have a formal agreement with the Department of Defense that the U. S. Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA) will support EMMPS. The compatibility of EMMPS and the USAMSSA computer was tested and demonstrated capable in December 1979.

The USAMSSA computer and contractor support is only temporary. Selective Service and MEPCOM have agreed to develop a joint computer center by January 1981. We believe that a joint center has many advantages. It will reinforce the link between the two organizations, e.g., after mobilization the volume of data transmitted each day would be substantial and a joint facility would minimize delays and the need for an expensive telecommunications network. It would put Selective Service on a computer solely dedicated to the military manpower procurement mission, and would help insure the coordination of manpower flows into the AFES. The computer center will have sufficient data input capacity to handle our requirements for continuous registration and data file update (change of address). It will also have the ability to support, upon mobilization, our local boards through 434 area offices which would be established. Computer terminals in each area office will be linked to the central computer and will be used, upon mobilization, to enter and update claims information.

BUDGET:

Using the original FY 1980 appropriation as a base the following major programs and funds are necessary to implement this portion of the President's plans:

- The keypunch, microfilm and storage of the registration forms.
- Interim support of the EMMPS system on the USAMSSA computer.
- Interim computer and data file management of registration data, e.g., 25 percent of the registrant population moves each year according to census statistics.
- The establishment of the Joint MEPCOM/SSS Computer Center.
- A Selective Service Data Entry Center to handle registration keypunch and file maintenance after January 1, 1981.
- Development of computer programs and systems (software) for the maintenance of registrant files, update and integration of EMMPS with the file management system and area office terminals.

- The area office computer terminal network to allow for an accurate and efficient management information system in support of local boards.

Table 2
Data Processing
Management Information Systems

	(\$000)	
	FY 80 SUPP	FY 81 INCREASE
SSA/IRS Data Entry:		
Keypunch	2400	1200
Microfilm	800	400
Storage	20	20
Interim EMMPS Support - USAMSSA	100	
Interim Computer	1280	850
Interim Data Management	1600	600
Joint MEPCOM/SSS Computer	500	991
SSS Data Center:		
Personnel (156)	15	1280
Keypunch Equipment		288
Office Equipment		75
Site Preparation		78
Microfilm Service		312
Supplies and Telephones		169
Base Maintenance Support		118
Software Development	1092	724
Area Offices:		
Terminals		4550
Communications		50
Funds from Base FY 80 Program	-600	-600
Totals	7,207	11,105

Promulgation of Orders for Induction.HOW:

If activated during a military emergency, there will be a single national draft call based upon the individual's random selection number. Actual induction orders will be issued by the Director of Selective Service, by direction of the President and under authority of Section 5(d) of the MSSA. Using the Selective Service master registration file, induction orders will be transmitted as Western Union Mailgrams. The Mailgrams will contain the following information:

- Identification of the inductee.
- Orders to report to a specific time to a designated AFES.
- Information on procedures to follow if unable to comply with the induction order.
- Information on exemption and deferment rights.
- A simple claims form.
- The address of the inductee's local board/area office to which claims should be sent.

The area office, upon receipt of a claim will notify Selective Service Headquarters and will process the claim according to standard Selective Service procedures. MEPCOM will also be notified of individuals ordered to AFES and will report their status to Selective Service Headquarters.

BUDGET: None.

Claims Processing and the Selective Service Field Structure.HOW:

Local draft boards are not necessary in the registration process. However, in the event of a mobilization, they will be required to process claims for exemptions and deferments. We are developing plans to select and train local board members for availability should such an emergency occur. The selection procedures will ensure that people who serve on local boards in the future will be representative of the community as a whole and will have the training needed to provide for consistent application of the law nationwide.

Selective Service, working with the Provisional State Directors and State Governors, will develop criteria and selection procedures. The FY

1980 Supplemental Budget contains funds and requests for new personnel to develop the guidelines and supervise the selection and training of 8,500 local board members (6 people), administer the program (5 people), and carry out the selection and training (25 people). We will also develop and test a training program in FY 1980.

The recruitment of local board members will start early in FY 1981. Approximately 8,500 local board members are needed for almost 1,900 local boards. The actual training of members will take place at 85 training conferences held across the nation. We project an annual attrition rate of about 20 percent. Each year the new local board members will receive initial training and all board members will be advised of procedural changes which may take effect.

Selective Service has also streamlined procedures to reconstitute essential area offices in support of local boards. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Selective Service have agreed that, "in order to facilitate the operation of the Selective Service in support of the manpower procurement needs of the Department of Defense, we must better coordinate our planning and post-mobilization manpower systems. In addition, it is appropriate that DOD, like other Federal agencies, provide support to the Selective Service during a national emergency. Such support from DOD might include but not be limited to, computer and data processing, selected personnel, and facilities. However, DOD should not in any way be involved in the process by which the Selective Service adjudicates claims for deferment or exemption."

Selective Service has a cadre of 715 military reservists who would reactivate the system during an emergency. We have also entered into an agreement with Defense to take over specific Armed Forces Recruiting Offices within 24 hours of a mobilization. Fifteen hundred Recruiting Service personnel will augment the Selective Service reservists for about 45 days after mobilization. These personnel will be identified by name, provided training and will participate in training exercises and field tests.

Selective Service has also restructured the summer training to test our ability to mobilize State Headquarters and reestablish area offices. Selective Service reserve officers will visit the Armed Forces Recruiting Offices scheduled to support Selective Service during a mobilization. Equipment and personnel in these offices will be inventoried and local contacts with GSA, OPM, and the telephone company will be made. The FY81 budget also has funds to allow Selective Service to fully participate in NIFTY NUGGET 80.

BUDGET:

Using the original FY 1980 appropriation as a base, the following major programs and funds are necessary to implement this portion of the President's plans:

- Increase Selective Service staff to develop, administer and supervise a program for the selection of local board members.
- Develop a training program to insure that local board members are knowledgeable of Selective Service procedures and regulations.
- Development of plans and procedures for the reconstitution of area offices consistent with support agreements with DOD.
- A Selective Service mobilization tests consistent with the DOD NIFTY NUGGET 80 mobilization exercise.

Table 3
Field Structure and Local Board Support

	(\$000)	
	FY 80 <u>SUPP</u>	FY 81 <u>INCREASE</u>
Local Boards (8,500 Members)		
Policy Development:		
Personnel (6)	124	194
Administrative Support:		
National Headquarters Personnel (5)	57	97
Regional Offices Personnel (25)	30	627
Training and Recruitment:		
Development	360	
Implementation	83	2507
Revised Reconstitution Plans	100	100
NIFTY NUGGET Test		150
Totals	754	3675

Revitalization of National Headquarters.

The President's decision to revitalize the Selective Service System dictates several initiatives in the National Headquarters. The budget provides funds to update our wordprocessing and telecommunications capability, increase security at Selective Service Headquarters, and augment our staff in two critical areas.

Selective Service is responsible for a viable Alternate Service Program which can become operational upon mobilization. Experience with conscientious objectors during earlier periods points to a series of problems that must be addressed. Court cases and the evolutionary

change in attitude on the part of the general public predict a much greater use of the alternate service option than ever before in our history. In addition, the problems of national standards, equity and timeliness of placement could lead to court challenges that could impact the capacity to meet manpower delivery schedules. A staff of four with appropriate planning support is provided in the budget.

There is also an urgent need to develop a staff capability to perform systems and operations analysis studies of all aspects of the Selective Service System, including the development of a systematic program of operational testing. This is particularly important for an organization like the Selective Service, where many of its component systems are inactive and must operate smoothly upon mobilization. A staff of five is provided in the budget.

Table 4
Headquarters Revitalization

	(\$000)	
	<u>FY 80</u> <u>SUPP</u>	<u>FY 81</u> <u>INCREASE</u>
Wordprocessing & Telecommunications Equipment	108	
Alternate Service:		
Personnel (4)	79	108
Planning Support	75	75
Analysis & Evaluation:		
Personnel (5)	95	132
Agency Security	30	17
Totals	382	332

SUMMARY.

The FY80 Supplemental and the additions to the FY81 Budget will allow the Selective Service to carry out the President's program of revitalizing the Selective Service System, reinstitute registration of men, and initiate the registration of women. An analysis of the FY80, FY80 Supplemental and the FY81 Budget is presented in the following table.

ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN REQUIREMENTS
(\$000)

1980 Enacted	\$ 7,830	
Pay Raise Supplemental	<u>421</u>	\$ 8,251
<u>Program Supplemental:</u>		
Costs Associated with Registration (Table 1)	\$13,552	
Data Processing Costs (Table 2)	7,207	
Costs Associated with Field Structure and Local Board Support (Table 3)	754	
Headquarters Revitalization (Table 4)	<u>382</u>	<u>21,895</u>
Total 1980 Budget Authority Requested		\$30,146
<u>Changes for FY 1981:</u>		
Decreases (Non-Recurring Costs):		
USPS Reimbursement	\$-1,360	
Registration Planning, Forms & Publicity	- 792	
ADP Development Costs & Interim Contract Support	-3,498	
Development Costs - Training Program	- 360	
Word Processing & Telecommunications Equipment	- 108	
Miscellaneous	<u>- 13</u>	<u>-6,131</u>
Increases:		
Postage	\$ 625	
Joint MEPCOM/SSS Computer Center	491	
Area Office Terminals & Communication Lines	4,600	
Data Entry Center (Including Personnel)	2,305	
Local Board Member Recruitment	2,424	
NIFTY NUGGET Test	150	
Annualization of New Positions	806	
Miscellaneous	<u>66</u>	<u>11,467</u>
Total 1981 Appropriation Request		\$35,482

1980 AMENDMENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION
 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
 SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	19 80 actual	19 80 estimate	19 80 estimate
90-0400-4-1-054			
<u>Program by Activities:</u>	<u>Supplemental Request Pending</u>	<u>Proposed Amendment</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>
10.00 Mobilization Readiness (costs- obligations)	1,395	20,500	21,895
Financing:			
40.00 Budget authority(appropriation)	1,395	20,500	21,895
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71.00 Obligations incurred, net.....	1,395	20,500	21,895
72.40 Obligated balance, start of year.....	---	---	---
74.40 Obligated balance, end of year.....	-250	-750	-1,000
90.00 Outlays.....	1,145	19,750	20,895

OBJECT CLASSIFICATION (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 90-0400-4-1-054		1980 actual	1980 estimate	1980 estimate
Personnel compensation:		Supplemental Request Pending	Proposed Amendment	Revised Request
11.1	Permanent positions.....	229	55	284
11.3	Positions other than permanent.....	---	58	58
11.000 Other personnel compensation				
11.8	Special personal services payments.....	---	23	23
Total personnel compensation.....		229	136	365
Personnel benefits:				
12.1	Civilian.....	21	20	41
12.000 Benefits for former personnel				
21.0	Travel and transportation of persons.....	---	24	24
22.0	Transportation of things.....	---	2	2
23.000 Travel, communications, and utilities				
23.2	Comm., Utilities & Other rent----	102	1,227	1,329
24.0	Printing and reproduction.....	560	532	1,092
25.0	Other services.....	483	18,411	18,894
26.0	Supplies and materials.....	---	5	5
31.0	Equipment.....	---	143	143
32.000 Bonds and structures				
33.000 Insurance and bonds				
34.000 Grants, subsidies, and contributions				
41.000 Insurance claims and indemnities				
42.000 Interest and dividends				
43.000 Refunds				
.....				
.....				
99.0	Total obligations.....	1,395	20,500	21,895

1980 AMENDMENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES

PERSONNEL SUMMARY

Identification code	1980 actual	1980 estimate	1980 estimate
90-0400-4-1-054			
	<u>Supplemental Request Pending</u>	<u>Proposed Amendment</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>
Total number of permanent positions..	93	8	101
Total compensable workyears.....	85	7	92
Full-time equivalent of other positions.....	(0)	(3)	(3)
Full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours.....	(0)	(0)	(0)
Average GS grade.....	10.17	9.13	10.08
Average GS salary.....	\$27,497	\$16,505	\$26,626

1980 AMENDMENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES

DETAIL OF PERMANENT POSITIONS

	19 80 actual	19 80 estimate	19 80 estimate
	<u>Supplemental Request Pending</u>	<u>Proposed Amendment</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>
Executive Level IV.....	1	---	1
ES-6.....	1	---	1
ES-4.....	1	---	1
ES-3.....	1	---	1
ES-1.....	1	---	1
Subtotal.....	5	---	5
GS/GM-15.....	6	1	7
GS/GM-14.....	13	---	13
GS/GM-13.....	16	1	17
GS-12.....	4	2	6
GS-11.....	11	---	11
GS-10.....	2	---	2
GS-9.....	8	---	8
GS-7.....	4	1	5
GS-6.....	12	---	12
GS-5.....	7	2	9
GS-4.....	4	1	5
GS-3.....	1	---	1
Total permanent positions	93	8	101
Unfilled positions, end of year.....	0	0	0
Total permanent employment, end of year..	93	8	101

1980 AMENDMENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES

SUPPLEMENTARY SOURCE DOCUMENT (In thousands of dollars)

Identification code	Function	Line No.	Def.	Leg.	19 actual	1980 estimate	19 estimate
			(D) (I)	(S) (N)			
90-0400-4-1-054							
A. ANALYSIS OF BUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS						Revised Request	
Budget authority	054	40.00	D	N		21,895	
Total						21,895	
Outlays	054	90.00				20,895	
Total						20,895	
Memorandum entries:							
Appropriation to liquidate contract authority							
Limitations:							
		9			<u>NOT APPLICABLE</u>		
		9					
		9					
		9					

1980 AMENDMENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES

SUPPLEMENTARY SOURCE DOCUMENT (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	19 actual	1980 estimate	15 estimate
90-0400-4-1-054			

B. DISTRIBUTION OF OUTLAYS

Revised
Request

	Line code			
From new authority-current.....	311		20,895	
From new authority-permanent.....	312			
From obligated balances.....	313			
From unobligated balances.....	314			
From new appropriations to liquidate contract authority (memo entry).....	315	() () ()		

C. CHARACTER CLASSIFICATION

	Function	MC	Character code			
Budget authority	054	1	3800-04		21,895	
		1				
		1				
		1				
		1				
		1				
		1				
Total.....					21,895	
Outlays	054	2	3800-04		20,895	
		2				
		2				
		2				
		2				
		2				
		2				
Total.....					20,895	

GPO : 1974 O-325-967

1981 Budget Amendment
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	19 81 actual	19 81 estimate	19 81 estimate
90-0400-0-1-054			
	<u>Request Pending</u>	<u>Proposed Amendment</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>
<u>Program by Activities:</u>			
1. Mobilization Readiness.....	7,469	24,500	31,969
2. Reserve Program.....	3,513	---	3,513
Total programs costs, funded <u>1</u> /	10,982	24,500	35,482
Change in selected resources (undelivered orders).....	---	---	---
10.00 Total obligations.....	10,982	24,500	35,482
<u>Financing:</u>			
<u>Budget Authority</u>			
40.00 Appropriation.....	10,982	24,500	35,482

1981 Budget Amendment

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1981 actual	1981 estimate	1981 estimate
90-0400-0-1-054			
	<u>Request Pending</u>	<u>Proposed Amendment</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71.00 Obligations incurred, net.....	10,982	24,500	35,482
72.40 Obligated balance, start of year.....	2,800	---	2,800
74.40 Obligated balance, end of year.....	-3,000	-2,000	-5,000
90.00 Outlays, excluding pay raise supplemental.....	10,705	22,500	33,205
91.20 Outlays from civilian pay raise supplemental.....	10	---	10
91.30 Outlays from military pay raise supplemental.....	67	---	67
1/ Includes capital investment as follows: Request pending, \$700 thousand. Proposed amendment, \$4,250 thousand. Revised request, \$4,950 thousand.			

1981 Budget Amendment
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES
OBJECT CLASSIFICATION (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	19 81 actual	1981 estimate	19 81 estimate
90-0400-0-1-054			
Personnel compensation:	Request <u>Pending</u>	Proposed <u>Amendment</u>	Revised <u>Request</u>
11.1 Permanent positions.....	2,412	1,858	4,270
11.3 Positions other than permanent.....	40	750	790
11.5 Other personnel compensation.....	---	20	20
11.8 Special personal services payments.....	4,288	50	4,338
Total personnel compensation.....	6,740	2,678	9,418
Personnel benefits:			
12.1 Civilian.....	332	211	543
13.0 Benefits for former personnel			
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	200	1,773	1,973
22.0 Transportation of things.....	10	---	10
23.1 Standard level user charges-----	260	-60	200
23.0 Rent, communications and utilities			
23.2 Comm., Utilities & other rent----	359	1,910	2,269
24.0 Printing and reproduction.....	180	520	700
25.0 Other services.....	2,109	13,159	15,268
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	57	58	115
31.0 Equipment.....	735	4,251	4,986
32.0 Lands and resources			
33.0 Government contracts			
41.0 Grants, subsidies and contributions			
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities			
43.0 Interest and dividends			
44.0 Refunds			
99.0 Total obligations, costs	10,982	24,500	35,482
21			

1981 Budget Amendment
 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
 SALARIES AND EXPENSES

PERSONNEL SUMMARY

Identification code	1981 actual	1981 estimate	1981 estimate
90-0400-0-1-054			
	<u>Request Pending</u>	<u>Proposed Amendment</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>
Total number of permanent positions..	93	189	282
Total compensable workyears.....	96	177	273
Full-time equivalent of other positions.....	(3)	(26)	(29)
Full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours.....	---	(1)	(1)
Average ES salary.....	\$50,112	\$50,112	\$50,112
Average GS grade.....	10.17	5.06	6.68
Average GS salary.....	\$27,497	\$11,612	\$16,116

1981 Budget Amendment
 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
 SALARIES AND EXPENSES

DETAIL OF PERMANENT POSITIONS

	1981 actual	1981 estimate	1981 estimate
	<u>Request Pending</u>	<u>Proposed Amendment</u>	<u>Revised Request</u>
Executive Level IV.....	1	1	1
ES-6.....	1	1	1
ES-4.....	1	1	1
ES-3.....	1	1	1
ES-1.....	1	1	1
Subtotal.....	5	---	5
GS/GM-15.....	6	1	7
GS/GM-14.....	13	---	13
GS/GM-13.....	16	1	17
GS-12.....	4	12	16
GS-11.....	11	12	23
GS-10.....	2	---	2
GS-9.....	8	2	10
GS-7.....	4	6	10
GS-6.....	12	14	26
GS-5.....	7	9	16
GS-4.....	4	67	71
GS-3.....	1	65	66
Total permanent positions.....	93	189	282
Unfilled positions, end of year.....	0	3	3
Total permanent employment, end of year....	93	186	279

1981 Budget Amendment
 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
 SALARIES AND EXPENSES

SUPPLEMENTARY SOURCE DOCUMENT (In thousands of dollars)

Identification code	Function	Line No.	Def. (D) Indef. (I)	Leg. (S) No leg. (N)	19 actual	19 estimate	1981 estimate
90-0400-0-1-054							
A. ANALYSIS OF BUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS							Revised Request
Budget authority	054	40.00	D	N			35,482
Total							35,482
Outlays	054	90.00					33,205
	054	91.20					10
	054	91.30					67
Total							33,282
Memorandum entries:							
Appropriation to liquidate contract authority							
Limitations:							
	9				NOT APPLICABLE		
	9						
	9						
	9						

307-104

1981 Budget Amendment
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
SALARIES AND EXPENSES

SUPPLEMENTARY SOURCE DOCUMENT (in thousands of dollars)


Identification code	19 actual	19 estimate	1981 estimate
B. DISTRIBUTION OF OUTLAYS			Revised Request
	Line code		
From new authority—current.....	311		30,482
From new authority—permanent.....	312		
From obligated balances.....	313		2,800
From unobligated balances.....	314		
From new appropriations to liquidate contract authority (memo entry).....	315	() () ()	

C. CHARACTER CLASSIFICATION

	Function	MC	Character code		
Budget authority	054	1	3800-04		35,482
		1			
		1			
		1			
		1			
		1			
		1			
Total.....					35,482
Outlays	054	2	3800-04		33,205
	054	2	3800-04		10
	054	2	3800-04		67
		2			
		2			
		2			
		2			
Total.....					33,282

GPO : 1974 O-335-067

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM




25


Bernard Roskoff, Director

February 11, 1980

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
READINESS REGIONS



February 1, 1980



WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1980

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND PUBLIC WITNESSES

WITNESS

HON. PETER A. PEYSER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. BOLAND. The Committee will come to order. We will continue with the hearings on the recommendation of the President for pre-mobilization registration. Today we will be hearing from Members of Congress and outside witnesses who have signified their request to the Committee to appear on behalf of the recommendation.

We are pleased to have the distinguished Member of Congress, Peter Peyser as our first witness. I don't think we could have a better one to open this nice day.

Mr. PEYSER. I appreciate the opportunity of being here with you, and my good friend from Florida who is here this morning as well. In order to save time, I would like to make a brief summary of my statement.

First of all, it is not my intention to speak on the question of whether there should or shouldn't be registration. It is not my intention to speak on the question of whether men or women should be included in the issue. My concern—and of course, it ends up getting reflected in the appropriations that this Committee would recommend—is the whole idea that the President and the Administration has advanced on using and registering at this time basically the 18, 19, and 20 year-olds, starting with 19 and 20, and then picking the 18 year-olds up.

I feel, Mr. Chairman, if we in truth are trying to send this so-called message of determination and an honest feeling of concern in this country over the international crisis, that it is grossly unfair, discriminatory, and I view it as totally out of keeping with our democratic process to call for registration of this particular age group and not include, as we have in the past and as the law presently allows for, the registration of persons 18 to 26 years of age.

Now, it is very interesting for me to note that the military at this point, the Defense Department, states that while the 19 and 20 year-olds make the best soldiers, we want to have the best and so we are going to register them first. Well, I would note that the Defense Department of 15 years ago did not take that point of view and felt that the soldiers in the 20s and mid-20s were the best combat type troops to have.

From my own experience, Mr. Chairman, having served on active duty for three and a half years, in the National Guard for over 11

years, soldiers in their 20s made, if you were going to evaluate, as good if not better soldiers than those at 18 or 19. But I don't really think that is the issue. It seems to me the issue is, why should we pick one age group, such as we are doing here, the youngest, and say they are the ones that are going to be faced with this particular problem. Because if we carry the thought of registration through, it ultimately could mean a draft. And if we carry the steps of a draft through, it eventually could mean a military confrontation.

It seems to me to say that the 19 year-olds and the 20 year-olds at this point should be the only ones to have to face this initial problem, if it should be reached, is grossly unfair. Mr. Chairman, I have sons ranging in age from 18 to 26, three of them. So I am not arguing on any personal situation, because obviously, from the point I am arguing, all of my sons would be subject to this draft—not draft, but registration.

And I think for the Congress to appropriate monies on the basis of only the 19 to 20 year-olds registering at this time is something I would very much oppose.

Now, I have talked with Mr. Rostker on this and he indicates to me that it would take an additional appropriation covering fiscal year 1980 and 1981 if we were registering men, which seems to be the indication of how the Committee and the Congress is going at this point; that over the fiscal supplemental for 1980 and fiscal year 1981, we would be talking about \$20 million additional over that two-year period if we were to register all men from ages of 18 to 26 as potential people that could be called in a draft.

I would like to urge this Committee, Mr. Chairman, that in any action we take—and certainly I would again urge this on the floor of the House—that if we are going to make this kind of a move, let's make it in the way, one, we have in the past; two, which obviously shows far more substantial numbers of people involved. If we are trying to create an impression of strength and unity on this issue, and move so that the House would act on your appropriations, which would then, for the two-year period we are talking about, increase the present level you now have in mind by \$20 million and include the 18 to 26 year-olds.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity of presenting this point. I think, since I first announced my stand on this issue, in my own area in New York, certainly from even the groups that are involved here, have felt that in fairness, to start with this group, it should include the 18 to 26 year-olds and not just the 19 and 20 year-olds. I think that would be the feeling throughout the country, and hopefully in the Congress itself.

And I thank the Chairman for this opportunity and would welcome any opportunities to answer questions.

[The complete statement follows:]

Statement of

Rep. Peter A. Peyser (Dem., N.Y.)

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak here today on the President's budget request for appropriations to reinstitute registration for men, and possibly for women also, between the ages of 19 and 20.

I know that many issues will be discussed here today, but I wish to speak directly to only one aspect of the President's program; and that is the age levels of the individuals that will be required to register. Under the President's proposal, 19 and 20 year old men and women will be required to register at their local post office and will potentially be the first to drafted in the event of a mobilization. I believe that isolating this narrow age group and placing the brunt of responsibility on them is patently unfair; and unwise in view of past practices by the selective service system.

Traditionally, we have had registration for the 18-26 age group and that is the range which I believe should be subject to registration if we are to have a registration system at all. There has existed authority to register our youth since 1948. That authority, which as you know exists today, has provided for registration of the 18-26 year olds. To be sure the authority is discretionary, and the President can require registration for any age group within this range. But I maintain, and I believe the facts will bear me out, that from the point of view of fairness and of obtaining the best soldiers in the event of mobilization, registration should include the 18-26 age group.

Selective Service officials have indicated to me that it is important to register 19 and 20 year olds as they are the ones who will make the best soldiers in time of war. My own experiences in the Navy during World War II indicate otherwise. I found those in their twenties to be the most mature, the best trained and the most capable of functioning during stress situations. The practice of the Selective Service from 1948 to the institution of the lottery draft in 1970 supports this conclusion. Regulations issued in 1948, and Presidential Executive orders issued in 1956 and again in 1965, specify that the induction sequence should include nonvolunteers in the 19-26 age group in the order of their date of birth with the "oldest being selected first". (Executive Order #11241, August 24, 1965). If, as I am now informed, the 19-20 year olds make the best soldiers, why did we follow a contrary induction policy for so many years and through two wars?

Even when the lottery system was instituted in December, 1969, and the potential draftee was put in a first priority category at age 20 (the category in which he was most vulnerable); the subsequent order of liability for the draft was the 21 to 26 age group before any 18 or 19 year olds were to be called. This again indicates a preference for the older registrants.

I realize that the administration will provide for eventual registration of the 18 to 26 age class by requiring present registrants to maintain their status until they reach 26. This plan will take several years to complete and with the present volatile situation throughout the world today, I do not believe that we can afford delay our actions on this matter. Also, as I said

before, I do not think that one small class of youngsters should face the potential of a draft while others are allowed to escape this responsibility.

There is a question of the increased cost involved in registering a large number of potential draftees. The administration has requested \$20.4 million in Supplemental Funds for FY 1980 to register 19 and 20 year old men and women; and \$24.5 million in FY 1981 to register those who turn 18 this year. Therefore, based on registration cost estimates supplied by the Selective Service, my proposal would cost an additional 20 million for FY 1980 and 1981 to register men 21 thru 25 and 40 million dollars additional to register men and women in these age groups. After the initial first time cost I do not foresee any additional costs in subsequent fiscal years.

I realize that in the present atmosphere of fiscal restraint a proposal of this sort might not meet with enthusiastic approval. But I maintain that if the Administration is serious about the need to create the proper mechanism for an emergency mobilization, then we must be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure that the best men, and women as the case may be, are available for conscription; and that all our young citizens share in the responsibility forced upon them.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Peyser. I think the point you raised is a point that has been raised by others. As you have indicated to Mr. Rostker, the Director of the Selective Service, that it would require some \$20 million more to register those between the ages of 18 and 26. One of the reasons why the SSS didn't feel that it ought to register those 18 through 26 was because of cost effectiveness. Of course, after their twenty-sixth year, they would drop out of the pool.

It was the feeling of the SSS that it would not be worth the extra \$20 million to register those 18 through 26. That was about the extent of their response to the problem you raised.

I think it is wise to look at this area. There does seem to be some discrimination against those who are in the 19 and 20 year-old age bracket.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Chairman, if I can just comment for a moment on that. The inconsistency there seems to be that the purpose of this registration, as I heard it announced, was that we were going to, by this registration, illustrate to basically the Soviet Union that we had a determination as a people to, because of the moves they had made in Afghanistan, to show a show of a certain type of strength by at least making this preliminary step.

Now, if this isn't really the intention, I don't think we ought to be fooling with registration at all at this point. But if that is, I see no reason that we shouldn't include the 18 to 26 year-olds if we are serious.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you.

Mr. Coughlin?

Mr. COUGHLIN. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Young?

Mr. YOUNG. I don't have any questions of Mr. Peyser. I would like to compliment him on a very well thought out and presented statement.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Stokes?

Mr. STOKES. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mrs. Boggs?

Mrs. BOGGS. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. You got away easy today.

Mr. PEYSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. We were delighted to have you.

WITNESSES

BARRY W. LYNN, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
DAVID LANDAU, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witnesses are Mr. Barry Lynn of the United Church of Christ and Mr. David Landau of the American Civil Liberties Union. You are both in favor of this. I have been reading about the two of you in the paper. You have been getting a lot of press lately. In any event, we are delighted to have you and you may proceed as you wish.

Mr. LYNN. I chair the Committee Against Registration and the Draft, which is a national coalition of 45 organizations opposed to steps toward registration or conscription. Mr. Landau is the vice chair.

If this is acceptable to the Committee, I would like to make a brief summary of my statement, and then let Mr. Landau summarize his statement, in order to save some time here this morning.

Mr. BOLAND. Fine.

Mr. LYNN. It is my very firm belief that the requests you have before you this morning for a supplemental appropriation for 1980 for the Selective Service System of \$20 million is a potential invitation to disaster. There is no action likely to be taken by the Congress this session with such broad social and legal ramifications as reinstituting draft legislation.

A vote in favor of funding a registration program cannot be viewed simply as a vote on the collection of a few million names and addresses. It is correctly perceived by many Americans as a vote affirming the reactivation of perhaps the most inequitable and capricious bureaucracy established in the United States in the last century, and also as a vote affirming President Carter's so far largely unilateral commitment to defend militarily the entire Persian Gulf area and Southwest Asia.

All but one member of this Subcommittee, after very careful consideration last September, voted to strike draft registration from the 1980 Defense Authorization bill. The climate in the world has changed since that time, but the need for draft registration has not. The President's decision to link public concern over events in Iran and Afghanistan with a call for draft registration is misleading and destabilizing. It feeds war hysteria without substantially improving military preparedness.

It does, however, generate a new system of surveillance of our young people and likely will lead to a renewal of intergenerational conflict. Although polls still show majority support for draft registration generally, majority sentiment from 18, 19 and 20 year-olds is now clearly opposed to the President's proposal. This alone should suggest great caution on the part of the Congress.

I would ask you to reject outright, at the very least, the \$16 million requested for the proposed processing of eight million young men and women this year. This funding should be rejected for the following reasons:

1. Draft registration is totally inconsistent with basic principles of freedom;
2. Registration is not important for military preparedness;
3. Registration now is tacit support for a questionable foreign policy, and;

4. Registration is a socially divisive act likely to polarize the nation.

That has proven to be a wholly inadequate and inequitable law. Even if one believes that a peacetime registration draft is permissible in theory, if handled equitably, it is impossible to view the present Act as acceptable. To revitalize this shabby statute through the funding of registration would be a tragic error.

When the framers of the Constitution considered the issue of a national military force, they agreed that Congress should have the power to "raise armies." They never intended for those armies to be conscripted. It was controversial enough just to give Congress the power to pay for a national army of volunteers, not beholden to any state.

There is simply no duty of military service imposed by our Constitution. There is nothing unpatriotic or un-American about opposition to the registration or the draft itself.

When Mr. Carter mentioned at a recent press conference that 55 nations have conscription, he conveniently omitted two salient examples. First, that every communist dictatorship does have a draft, and secondly, that Great Britain, our closest philosophical ancestor, does not.

First, in my judgment, both constitutional history and the massive due process violations in the existing law render peace time registration constitutionally suspect.

Second, registration is not necessary for military preparedness. The requirements for Selective Service depend upon a mobilization timetable generated by the Defense Department, which purportedly outlines the needs from Selective Service in the event of an emergency. It is the now increasingly familiar first inductee in 30 days, 100,000 inductees within 60 days.

However, before debating how to reach those objectives it is important to recognize that this timetable makes certain assumptions which are subject to considerable question.

First, it assumes there will be virtually no voluntary enlistments.

Mr. Rostker admitted to Mr. Sabo yesterday that he assumed no one would volunteer, even for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. This assumption violates my notion of common sense and is contradicted by evidence from every other American conflict, including the one in Vietnam.

Other assumptions in the generation of this worst case scenario are open to similar questions. What is crucial to remember is that these requirements have not been changed since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The timetable, because it is based on worst case planning, already includes exigencies like Iran and Afghanistan. Nothing has changed in these technical requirements before or subsequent to President Carter's decision to reinstitute registration.

There are also practical reasons for not needing inductees prior to 30 days before mobilization—or after mobilization. Given the present training base capacity of the United States, it is unlikely that vast numbers of draftees could be used prior to 30 days after mobilization. Optimistically, Army Reserve training units are not to be manned, equipped and organized until at least M plus 19. Additionally, persons in the Delayed Entry Program numbering 50 to 100,000 in any given month would also be trained during the early days of the mobilization.

Even if you accept the mobilization timetable as accurately reflecting military needs, there is clearly a way to meet it without preregistration, a fact abundantly clear in the draft report from the Selective Service that was discussed yesterday.

Fundamentally, it is the obligation of a government of a free society to take the path least intrusive upon individual freedom when it goes about solving problems, including that of national defense. Since there is a way to avoid imposing registration and still be militarily prepared, I believe it is incumbent upon the Congress to take that route.

This Subcommittee will make the critical initial decision on whether to waste millions of tax dollars and disrupt millions of lives, when in

fact the defense of our country will not be strengthened by these enormous fiscal and human costs.

A third general area, in my judgment, registration at this point would be a tacit endorsement of a very questionable foreign policy. Once again, it appears that the President is asking the Congress to validate a foreign policy commitment made by him alone, not so unlike the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which Mr. McDade discussed yesterday. The President has decided that the entire Persian Gulf area is to be protected by any means necessary. What I fear is that the President is backing the country into a position where a draft itself is inevitable.

Mr. Carter has done nothing to provide personnel necessary for new bases, or an otherwise expanded presence, in that part of the world. There are many of us who doubt whether a substantial military commitment to the Persian Gulf is wise. There are even more that are certain that a land troop commitment of draftees would be a catastrophe. Yet it appears that this is in the mind of the President somewhere; otherwise, it seems odd that he would link the registration decision so directly and absolutely to crisis in that part of the world.

A final objection that I have to this proposal is I fear that registration is a socially divisive act which will again polarize the Nation. Mr. Landau will discuss this in much more detail.

In summary, I simply do not believe that the Administration, at least in its incarnation here yesterday, deserves to have registration funded. Their house is built, their whole case for draft registration is built like a house of cards. As soon as there is a breach of reason, it seems to collapse. Virtually every Committee member here yesterday asked important and reasonable questions of the Administration. I don't frankly believe that you or the American people that you represent got very satisfactory answers.

I would like to turn now to David Landau for reiteration of some of these points and elaborations.

[The complete statement follows:]

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
OFFICE FOR CHURCH IN SOCIETY
110 MARYLAND AVENUE, N. E. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
PHONE: 202-543-1517



TESTIMONY
of
BARRY W. LYNN
before the
HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

February 27, 1980

Mr. Lynn serves as legislative counsel for the Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ.

He also chairs the Committee Against Registration and the Draft (CARD), a national coalition of 45 peace, religious, womens', student, and civil rights organizations.

Mr. Boland and Members of the Subcommittee:

My name is Barry W. Lynn. Currently I am serving as legislative counsel for the Office for Church in Society of the United Church of Christ. I am an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ and a member of the District of Columbia bar. I do not claim to speak for all members of this denomination, but our most representative body, the General Synod, has consistently reaffirmed (most recently in 1979) opposition to registration for the draft in peacetime. I also chair the Committee Against Registration and the Draft (CARD), the national anti-registration coalition which now contains 45 peace, religious, womens', student, and civil rights organizations. I have been working actively in the areas of Selective Service, military and veterans benefit law for the past six years.

It is my firm belief that the request you have before you this morning for a Supplemental Appropriation for 1980 for the Selective Service System of \$21.9 million is an invitation to disaster. There is no action likely to be taken by the Congress this session with such broad social and legal ramifications as reinstituting draft registration. A vote in favor of funding a registration program must not be viewed as a vote merely on the collection of a few million names and addresses. It is correctly perceived by many to be a vote affirming the reactivation of perhaps the most inequitable and capricious bureaucracy established in the last century and a vote affirming President Carter's so-far largely unilateral commitment to defend militarily the entire Persian Gulf area and Southwest Asia. I would even suggest that the vote on this \$21.9 million funding of draft registration may be the 1980 equivalent of the vote on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

All but one member of this subcommittee after careful consideration last September voted to strike draft registration from the 1980 Defense Authori-

zation bill. The climate in the world has changed since that time, but the need for draft registration has not. The President's decision to link public concern over events in Iran and Afganistan with a call for draft registration is misleading and destabilizing. It feeds war hysteria without substantially improving military preparedness. It does, however, generate a new system of surveillance of our young people and likely will lead to a renewal of inter-generational conflict. Although polls still show majority support for draft registration generally, majority sentiment from 18, 19 and 20 year olds is now clearly opposed to the President's proposal. This alone should suggest great caution on the part of the Congress.

I would ask you to reject outright, at the very least, the \$13.5 million requested for the proposed processing of 8 million young men and women this summer, as well as substantially reduce the funding of data processing improvements. Apparently, approximately \$3.7 million of these improvements are necessary only to conduct the registration. This funding should be rejected for the following reasons: (1) Draft registration is totally inconsistent with basic principles of freedom, (2) Registration is not important for military preparedness, (3) Registration now is tacit support for a questionable foreign policy, and (4) Registration is a socially divisive act likely to polarize the nation.

Draft registration is inconsistent with fundamental principles of freedom

There are few organizations established with the Federal government which have such a direct and intrusive effect on individual citizens as the Selective Service System. The President is asking Congress to appropriate funds to register persons under the existing Military Selective Service Act. That statute, both in wording and moreso in application, has proven to be wholly inadequate and inequitable. Even if one believes that a peacetime registration or draft is permissible in theory if designed equitably, it is impossible to view the present act as acceptable. To revitalize this shabby statute through the funding of

registration would be a tragic error.

When the Framers of the Constitution considered the issue of a national military force, they agreed that Congress should have the power to "raise armies". They never intended for those armies to be conscripted. It was controversial enough just to give Congress the power to pay for a national army of volunteers, not beholden to any state. Our Constitutional forebears were fully aware of the colonial experience where conscription (where practiced at all) was limited to a compulsory training in musketry and a few weeks duty defending the borders of the colony from direct attack. It would be unthinkable that men like Thomas Jefferson could have supported a national conscription campaign which would raise men or women to be sent to a front 10,000 miles away from the U.S.

There is simply no "duty" of military service imposed by our Constitution. There is nothing unpatriotic or un-American about opposition to the draft and Selective Service. When Mr. Carter mentioned at a recent press conference that 55 nations have conscription, he conveniently omitted two salient examples: every Communist dictatorship has a draft, and Great Britain, our principal philosophical ancestor, does not.

The constitutionality of a peacetime draft registration has never been decided by the Supreme Court. Challenges to Selective Service statutes have invariably come during a time of war or declared national emergency. All cases upholding emergency registration and conscription echo the holding in the challenge to the 1948 Selective Service Act that found a wartime draft "is a valid exercise of the war power. It is calculated to function -- it functions today -- in time of peril." U.S. v. Nugent 346 U.S. 1 (1953). The emphasis is on a present state of peril which clearly requires additional personnel for the defense of the nation's interests. Such an exigency does not exist today. Compulsory registration to meet what I believe to be an unconstitutional end, peacetime conscription, is itself a due process violation.

In addition, registration and corollary duties existing under the Selective Service Act currently to keep Selective Service notified of address changes and other alterations of lifestyle impose a formidable barrier to incipient ideas of privacy under the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. Young people must not be catalogued in America again.

It should also be clear that if this subcommittee appropriates the funds for any registration, it will be a registration of both men and women. Under current interpretations of law, male-only registration cannot withstand Constitutional scrutiny and would not survive a Fifth Amendment challenge on "equal protection" and "due process" grounds. To withstand such scrutiny, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achievement of those objectives" Califano v. Webster 430 U.S. 313, 316-317 (1977). A merely rational justification will not suffice under developing case law in this area. Statutes which have a grossly disparate effect, beneficial or burdensome, on one sex are subject to the requirement that strong, demonstrable reasons for the difference exist. Elimination of women from the registration requirement appears to run afoul of the Supreme Court warning that "legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection." Orr v. Orr 99 S. Ct. 1102, 1113.

Registration of women would recognize the considerable evidence that women, both in the past, and increasingly in the present All-Volunteer Force, have done exemplary service in the many technical, administrative, clerical, logistical, and medical areas which constitute 80% of military jobs.

A vote for the FY 1980 Supplemental Appropriation is indeed a vote for equality of the sexes -- but it is a vote for equal injustice under law.

Registration is not necessary for military preparedness

The requirements for Selective Service depend upon a mobilization timetable generated by the Defense Department. In 1976 the Defense Department accelerated its mobilization timetable. The timetable below purportedly outlines the previous and current needs from Selective Service in the event of a major emergency mobilization:

	<u>Current requirements</u>	<u>Previous requirements</u>
1st delivery of inductees	M+30 days	M+100 days
100,000 inductees	M+60 days	M+150 days
480,000 inductees	Not applicable	M+230 days
650,000 inductees	M+180 days	Not applicable

This new timetable makes certain political and military assumptions which are subject to considerable question:

(1) It assumes there will be virtually no voluntary enlistments. The former Selective Service Director Robert Shuck wrote a letter to Senator Carl Levin (July 10, 1979) indicating: "The requirements for Selective Service deliveries envision very limited volunteers or possibly no volunteers. If there is a surge of volunteers, the number of inductees needed would be lowered to prevent the overcrowding of the AFES or training bases."

This assumption is contradicted by evidence from every other major American conflict. There is no data to support the presumption that young people would not come forward if the national security were truly threatened. (For example, approximately 290,000 persons volunteered in the two months following Pearl Harbor. Projecting this trend with today's population base yields 394,000 volunteers. That would apparently exceed the most optimistic figures on present training base capacity.)

(2) This timetable is based on a questionable "worst case" scenario

which includes:

(a) Massive early casualties. (A GAO estimate in June, 1979 projects over 200,000 casualties in the first 4-5 months of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.)

(b) Simultaneous preparation for fighting "one and one half wars" -- a lengthy conventional war against the Soviets and a smaller conflict in the Third World.

(c) No warning or preparation time before the outbreak of the major conflict.

The bases for such assumptions have never been explained. The closest thing to an explanation for the casualty rate, for example, is that the projected conflicts will have the "intensity" of the Yom Kippur Arab-Israeli War. Casualty rates for the Arab-Israeli conflict were multiplied by a numerical factor (the exact figure is still classified) to project possible American losses.

What is crucial to remember is that these requirements have not been changed since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The timetable, because it is based on "worst case" planning already, includes exigencies like those in Iran and Afghanistan. Nothing has changed in these technical requirements before or subsequent to President Carter's decision to reinstitute registration.

There are also practical reasons for not needing inductees prior to 30 days after mobilization. Given the present training base capacity of the US, it is unlikely that vast numbers of draftees could be used prior to M+30. Optimistically, Army Reserve training units are apparently not to be manned, equipped and organized until at least M+19. Any volunteers would utilize this early training capacity. Additionally, persons in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) numbering 50-100,000 would also be trained during the early days of a mobilization.

Even if you accept the DoD mobilization timetable as accurately reflecting military needs, there is clearly a way to meet it without registration. The President's report claims only that registration will permit inductions to occur

at M+13. It does not claim that the Selective Service System (SSS) could not meet the requirement of M+30 induction without registration. In fact, earlier drafts of this report contained a much less expensive and less intrusive post-mobilization registration plan which could have met the DoD timetable. This was deliberately deleted from the final report issued on February 11, 1980.

I did obtain from Senator Mark O. Hatfield two days ago, a copy of the document submitted to the President from Selective Service. The American people had a right to see just what this "post mobilization" registration plan looks like. It is the obligation of the government of a free society to take the path least intrusive upon individual freedom when it goes about solving problems. Since there is a way to avoid imposing registration, it is incumbent upon Congress now to take that route. This subcommittee will make the critical initial decision on whether to waste millions of tax dollars and disrupt millions of lives when in fact, the defense of our country will not be strengthened by these enormous fiscal and human costs.

The plan discussed in detail in the newly acquired document is much more sophisticated than that developed last year by SSS Acting Director Shuck. This involves registration of one birth group, 4 million men and women, 4 days after notification of mobilization (M+4). USPS employees will review complete forms, witness the registrant's signature, and provide the registrant with a copy of the form as a receipt. Two weeks later USPS will begin continuous registration of 18 year olds. Selective Service will conduct a lottery on the evening of M+4. The USPS will sort registration cards by lottery number and forward sorted data to IRS

and/or SSA regional offices. Selective Service reserve officers will be located at IRS/SSA regional offices and will receive and ensure the security of the registration forms. The IRS/SSA will keypunch registrant data which will be transmitted to a central computer center. The Director of Selective Service, acting for the President and using EMPS, will issue induction orders starting on M+7.

Concurrently, 434 area offices will open at predesignated recruiting office locations. Fifteen hundred pre-trained personnel will transfer from the Armed Services Recruiting Commands to Selective Service to augment reserve officers already assigned to Selective Service. Area offices will provide administrative assistance to local boards. State Headquarters will also be reestablished to provide administrative assistance to area offices. Regional offices will continue to support both.

Under this option, Selective Service expects to exceed the current DoD requirement for inductees. Registration will occur at M+4 and inductions notices will be issued starting on M+7. Inductions will begin on M+17 at the rate of 7,000 per day, the estimated capacity of MEPOOM. With this sustained rate, 100,000 inductions could be made by M+35 and 650,000 inductions by M+125.

One-day registrations are well-known in American history, and have been extraordinarily successful -- under genuine national security emergencies -- even before the advent of advanced computer technology. On June 4, 1917, 10 million men were registered. October 16, 1940 16 million men were registered.

I want to stress that I am not endorsing the plans developed by Selective Service, largely because I am extremely skeptical of the DoD timetable itself and the assumptions which underlie it. However, what is abundantly clear is that this Administration has, with the decision for registration, taken a step which cannot be justified even if we accept that timetable as valid.

Registration is a tacit endorsement of a dubious foreign policy

The President has chosen to link his decision to begin draft registration explicitly to international events in Iran and Afghanistan. The Administration is indicating clearly that registration is a sign of national resolve taken because Soviet troops are present in Afghanistan.

Once again, it appears that a President is asking Congress to validate a foreign policy commitment made by him alone. The President had decided that the Persian Gulf area is to be protected by any means necessary. What I fear is that he is backing the country into a position where a draft itself is inevitable. Mr. Carter has done nothing to provide personnel necessary for new bases, or an otherwise expanded presence, in that part of the world.

The President could have called for the redeployment of troops from the Western Pacific or Europe; he did not. The President could have announced major new initiatives to improve living conditions, pay, or benefits for voluntary military service; he did not. The President could even have called up the Reserves or begun to at least locate Individual Ready Reservists; he did not. Soon he may find that there is only one other path to back up his military commitment -- conscription. Should Mr. Carter be re-elected, I believe it quite likely that he will return to the Congress next year for draft induction authority itself.

Frankly, there are many of us who doubt whether a substantial military commitment to the Persian Gulf is wise. There are even more that are certain that a land troop commitment of draftees would be a positive catastrophe. Yet it appears that this is in the mind of the President somewhere; otherwise it seems odd that he would link the registration decision so directly to the crisis in that part of the world.

I am not clear that the Congress, much less the American public has sufficiently considered what military steps it is willing to take. Granting the FY1980 Selective Service supplemental appropriation, however, is a very clear

sign of affirmation that President Carter is heading down the right road. I am firmly convinced, however, that such a decision will be viewed as a step toward heightening tension throughout the world as well as heightening dissension within the United States.

Registration is a socially divisive act which will again polarize the nation.

The Administration plans registration at least of men this June or July. Present plans call for a 5 day registration period for those persons born in 1960 and a separate 5 day period for those born in 1961. Registration will occur at post-offices. Official spokespersons for the Administration have stated that they expect "no problem" with non-registration. Such facile statements notwithstanding, recent history suggests otherwise.

For example, enormous numbers of persons deliberately or erroneously failed to register during the Vietnam-era draft registration. Studies comparing live male births with draft registrations 18 years later show sizeable discrepancies of over 100,000 persons in some years, or 4%. (Deaths alone do not account for this difference. In addition, many resident aliens were registered.)

LIVE MALE BIRTHS AND DRAFT REGISTRANTS

Live male births, 1953.....	2,034,000
Draft registrants, 1971.....	<u>1,990,234</u>
Difference.....	43,766
Live male births, 1954.....	2,090,000
Draft registrants, 1972.....	<u>1,977,720</u>
Difference.....	112,280

(Sources: National Center for Health Statistics of the Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, and public record of the Selective Service System.)

Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and other Selective Service officials serving in the 1960s and early 1970s believe closer to 10% failed to register each year.

It is also important to recognize that non-registration is viewed as a serious problem by many other agencies of government. The Defense Department's

study of the AVF, America's Volunteers (1978) indicates: "Enforcement is a key issue in peacetime registration.... Should the registration meet widespread resistance and strict enforcement be ordered, costs could be very high. The FBI is not eager to enforce SSS registration, absence without leave, or other SSS or military regulations.

"Major resistance to registration could adversely effect voluntary enlistments and seriously aggravate AVF recruiting difficulties. More importantly, signs of public hostility to the US military could seriously degrade the deterrent value of our forces and could invite adventurism by potential adversaries."

Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office issued a study of Selective Service in 1978 which indicates that between 100,000 and 250,000 men from any age group would fail to register on time or at all.

The Administration presently claims it has no prosecutorial policy in regard to non-registrants. They have done nothing to suggest any interest in reducing the present penalties of up to 5 years in prison and up to a \$10,000 fine. The same kind of prosecutorial disparity will occur now as occurred during the Vietnam-era draft, with some US attorneys ignoring all but the most flagrant abuses, while other zealous prosecutors go to great effort to track down non-registrants. Any method used to locate non-registrants will substantially affect the privacy of individuals and/or their existing government files.

The President's Report notes that the Social Security Administration's computers contain "the most comprehensive data base available" (but not current addresses) and the IRS has the best list of current addresses. Initial processing will use these computer facilities (no reference is made to the data bases). It appears quite likely that these files will be used through cross-checking to identify and locate non-registrants. (The registration form at the post

office will even contain a space for the optional insertion of one's Social Security number.)

Even more intrusive possibilities include use of high school records (voluntarily or otherwise), scrutiny of high school yearbooks, or wide-spread use of peer group informants. Every invitation is present for the kind of massive surveillance campaigns used against anti-draft groups in the 1960s, where the CIA, FBI and even Army Intelligence used intrusive surveillance on both persons also arguably violated broad Federal statutes and those merely exercised protected First Amendment rights.

The release of the Selective Service's report on why registration is unnecessarily intrusive will in fact fuel non-registration sentiment. Young people are patriotic and sincerely interested in their role as citizens. However, they resent -- as do all other Americans -- being used as pawns in purely political decisions. They have, frankly, been totally misled by their President about the need for registration.

In summary, I do not believe the Administration -- in its present incarnation as exemplified by the testimony yesterday -- deserves to have registration funded. Their case is built like a house of cards -- it crumbles under the breath of any wind of reason. The Selective Service report obtained this week is such a wind. It is little wonder that the Administration did not want it released to the public.

I strongly urge this subcommittee to stop the funding of registration -- and to, therefore, stop registration itself. You would be doing our country a great service by avoiding the upheaval registration will cause.

Mr. LANDAU. The ACLU appreciates the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee. Yesterday you went into an exhaustive review of the Selective Service, their draft report. I won't go into all of the points that we think are crucial, but I would like to highlight a few key points and key questions that are raised for us by those two reports.

Last September the House of Representatives overwhelmingly rejected draft registration by a two-to-one margin. And as the Subcommittee recognized yesterday, the Administration was adamantly opposed to registration at that time, and indeed, the Administration played a crucial role in the defeat of draft registration last September. At that time the Acting Director of the Selective Service, Robert Shuck, had developed a plan to upgrade Selective Service and to increase its mobilization requirements, capabilities up to Defense Department timetables without pre-mobilization collection of data, that is, without peacetime registration.

In November 1979, the President appointed Bernard Rostker as Director of the Selective Service. He prepared the draft report which was the subject of much discussion yesterday. This draft report strongly recommended against peacetime registration. Instead, Mr. Rostker developed an efficient and highly credible plan for meeting DOD's emergency requirements without pre-mobilization registration.

He stated that peacetime registration would be redundant and unnecessary. The President, without any basis in fact, rejected this plan and ordered the report redrafted so it would recommend peacetime registration.

Since then, the President has put forth a view that the Selective Service System is in such a dire state of disarray that peacetime registration is the only way to improve our readiness to meet and deter perceived threats from abroad. In his February 9th report to Congress, the President not only does not discuss why Mr. Rostker's recommendation was rejected or was unacceptable, but fails to list it as an option.

We believe that the President's use of the draft and draft registration to effectuate ostensible foreign policy goals is dangerous and misleading. This Subcommittee is familiar with DOD's emergency mobilization requirements. The President's plan, which he submitted to Congress, of course, would meet and also exceed this timetable. His plan would deliver the first inductees on the 13th day; 100,000 within 28 days; and 650,000 inductees within 117 days.

The Rostker plan, on the other hand, would also not only meet but exceed DOD's mobilization requirements. Mr. Rostker's plan would deliver the first inductees on the 17th day, 13 days ahead of DOD's schedule; he would deliver 100,000 inductees on the 33rd day, which is 27 days ahead of the schedule; and 650,000 inductees within 124 days, or nearly two months ahead of schedule; and all of this without peacetime draft registration.

The President's plan saves a mere seven days over the Rostker plan. The chart on page five of my testimony illustrates this point. We believe Mr. Rostker's plan is a carefully constructed, well structured and highly efficient approach to emergency mobilization. It even provides for safeguards for unanticipated breakdowns in the system. All

of these facts point to one conclusion, draft registration is not necessary.

President Carter has made inappropriate use of the draft and its system as an instrument of foreign policy, but the draft and its system cannot be brandished about like the Olympic boycott or grain embargo. There must be more of a justification in demonstrating our resolve to the world. The moral and social implications of the draft are simply too great to permit any less than a conclusive showing that such a system is required today.

We can't underestimate the harsh impact of the draft on the youth of this nation. Citizens who already fear a Big Brother government will be further alienated by this system. By 1985, all young people ages 18 to 26 will be under a legal obligation to notify the government of their whereabouts at all times. Those who fail to do so will be subject to up to 5 years in jail and \$10,000 in fines.

In 1972, according to Selective Service and Census data, we had 112,000 non-registrants. Yesterday Mr. Rostker predicted that we would have within 90 percent compliance with the law, but his report predicts compliance to be within 98 percent. If just 10 percent of 19 to 20-year-old males do not comply, that means 400,000 potential draft felons.

Does the Administration seriously intend to investigate, prosecute and fill our jails with that many young people? And how will this be done? Through the FBI? Through the cross checking of Internal Revenue Service and Social Security data? Or through the combing of high school yearbooks, college entrance lists and drivers licenses?

Is this the price we must pay for the foreign policy and domestic failures of the President? We can't underestimate these questions of enforcement. They have not yet been answered by the Administration. Recent history has demonstrated, during the Vietnam war, that anti-draft activity will become one of the excuses for widespread political surveillance and disruption.

In the past some of this surveillance was legal, but much of it was not. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies were drawn into the political arena because the draft, in the absence of an imminent threat to the nation, proved widespread hostility, particularly when draftees were used to wage an unpopular war. Dollars that were intended to weed out saboteurs, espionage agents and criminals were directed at antidraft activity.


I, for one, do not look forward to a new antidraft era. We must face the fact that there will be resistance. Already in this country we have seen hostility growing. We read in the paper every day about more and more demonstrations against the President's proposal. Soon, old enforcement mechanisms will have to be thrown into gear.

I would like to make one final point on the registration, and particularly as it concerns the registration of women and the constitutionality of the entire system. Mr. Rostker's plan, as well as the President's plan, includes the registration of women. If Congress appropriates money without first amending the military Selective Service Act to include women, it is the judgment of the American Civil Liberties Union that such a registration would be an unconstitutional sex base classification.

If the Subcommittee appropriates, and Congress later approves, money for males-only draft registration, the American Civil Liberties Union will go to court to stop it. Severing the issue of women from the general issue of draft registration will likely result in a judicial invalidation of the entire system.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we urge this Subcommittee to reject the President's fiscal year 1980 supplemental appropriation request to conduct draft registration. Mr. Lynn and I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The complete statement follows:]



STATEMENT OF
DAVID E. LANDAU, STAFF COUNSEL
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WASHINGTON OFFICE on
THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

We appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. The American Civil Liberties Union is a nationwide organization of over 200,000 members dedicated to the preservation and enhancement of the Bill of Rights. Throughout its history, the Union has played an active role in the debate over the Selective Service System. Indeed, the ACLU traces its origin to the National Civil Liberties Bureau which was founded in 1917 to assist conscientious objectors during World War I. Since that time it has consistently opposed the inequities of the Selective Service System in judicial, legislative, and other public forums and today continues to oppose peacetime military conscription and an active Selective Service System as a severe infringement on individual liberties.

The issues before the Subcommittee today reach far beyond the mobilization capabilities of the Selective Service System. The Selective Service System is the cornerstone of a system of compulsory military service. Its sole function is to provide inductees into the Armed Forces. The shift from the service's current stand-by status to an active mode signals a return to a system of conscription. We strongly object to the reactivation of the draft system until Congress and the nation have had an opportunity to evaluate our military personnel requirements and to fully debate the drastic consequences of the various proposals for reviving the active Selective Service System.

We urge that Congress not rush to judgment and that a full set of hearings be scheduled to address the host of

unanswered questions raised by the Presidential recommendations for draft registration. These questions have been greatly enhanced by the release two days ago of the draft report by the Director of the Selective Service which rejects the resumption of peacetime registration.

The immediate issue before the Subcommittee is whether peacetime draft registration is needed as soon as possible. President Carter would have us think so. But the facts about draft registration overwhelmingly point to a contrary conclusion.

Last September, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly rejected draft registration by a 2-1 margin. At that time, the Administration was adamantly opposed to registration. On June 8, 1979 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said in a letter to Senator William Cohen:

"Our view and the view suggested in all studies of the question that I have seen, is that the critical step towards achieving our goals is not immediate collection of names through registration, but rather the immediate improvement of our ability to prepare for processing people, and in case of mobilization actually to process them, through the Selective Service System."

And, on July 23 Stuart Eizenstat wrote in a letter to Representative John Sieberling:

"The Administration opposes new legislation to reimpose peacetime registration for the draft. The President already has adequate authority to require registration if circumstances warrant. We do not believe it is necessary to impose this burden on our nation and its youth at this time when there are effective ways to improve the capability of the Selective Service System so that it can respond quickly in time of emergency."

At that time, Acting Director of Selective Service Robert Shuck had developed a plan to upgrade Selective Service and increase its mobilization capabilities up to the Defense Department timetable without pre-mobilization collection of data, that is, without peacetime draft registration. In November, 1979 the President appointed Bernard Rostker as Director of the Selective Service. Mr. Rostker prepared a draft report and recommendations for the President pursuant to the congressional mandate to President Carter to make recommendations on Selective Service reform. This draft report, which was not released until Monday, strongly recommended against peacetime registration. Instead, Mr. Rostker developed an efficient and highly credible plan for meeting DOD's emergency requirements without pre-mobilization registration. He stated that peacetime registration would be "redundant and unnecessary."

The President, without any basis in fact rejected this plan and ordered the report redrafted so that it would recommend peacetime registration. The President then suppressed the original draft and attempted to generate the illusion that the Selective Service System was in such a dire state of disarray that peacetime registration was the only route to improve our readiness to meet and deter perceived threats from abroad. In his February 9 report to Congress the President not only does not discuss why Mr. Rostker's recommendation was rejected, but fails to list it as an option. As I will demonstrate below,

this use of the draft and its system to effectuate ostensible foreign policy goals is dangerous and misleading.

Our emergency mobilization requirements are based on DOD's predictions about possible wars--predictions and assumptions which are very questionable. Assuming their validity, however, DOD needs its first inductees on the 30th day after mobilization, 100,000 inductees within 60 days after mobilization and 650,000 within 180 days or 6 months after mobilization. The President's plan would not only meet but exceed this timetable. His plan would deliver the first inductees on the 13th day, 100,000 within 28 days and 650,000 within 117 days. It would require the expenditure of an additional \$21 million this year.

The Rostker plan, on the other hand, would also not only meet but exceed DOD mobilization requirements. His plan would deliver the first inductees on the 17th day--thirteen days ahead of the DOD schedule--100,000 on the 33rd day--twenty-seven days ahead of schedule--and 650,000 inductees within 124 days or nearly two months ahead of schedule, and all of this without peacetime draft registration. The President's plan saves a mere seven days over the Rostker plan. The chart below illustrates this point.

	DOD Requirements	Presidential Plan (pre-mobilization registration)	Rostker Plan (Post mobilization registration)
1st Inductees	M + 30	M + 10	M + 17
100,000. Inductees	M + 60	M + 28	M + 33
650,000 Inductees	M + 180	M + 117	M + 124

M = Mobilization day

Mr. Rostker's plan is a carefully constructed, well-structured and highly efficient approach to emergency mobilization. It even provides for safeguards for unanticipated breakdowns in the system.

Mr. Rostker's plan, as well as the President's plan includes the registration of women. If Congress appropriates money for registration without first amending the Military Selective Service Act to include women, it is our judgment that such a registration would be an unconstitutional sex-based classification. If this Subcommittee appropriates and Congress approves money for a males-only draft registration the ACLU will go to court to stop it. Severing the issue of women from the general issue of draft registration will likely result in a judicial invalidation of the entire system. I would like to make two final points about both the President's and Mr. Rostker's reports. First, both assume no voluntary enlistments. This assumption is

contradicted by evidence from every other major conflict America has participated in. Based on voluntary enlistments after Pearl Harbor, a major conflict today would bring upwards of 400,000 additional volunteers, well over DOD training base capabilities. Thus, in the early stages of a major conflict, draft inductions would not even be necessary.

Second, DOD's emergency requirements, the basis of all Selective Service reform have not changed since the crisis in Southwest Asia. And even if DOD were to increase its needs in the near future, Mr. Rostker's plan would still easily meet those upgraded requirements.

All of these facts point to one conclusion: draft registration is not necessary. President Carter has made an inappropriate use of the draft and its system as an instrument of foreign policy. But the draft and its system cannot be brandished about like the Olympic boycott or a grain embargo. There must be more of a justification than demonstrating our resolve to the world. The moral and social implications of the draft are simply too great to permit any less than a conclusive showing that such a system is required today.

The President's move to reinstitute draft registration will have a harsh impact on the young people of this country. Citizens, who already fear a Big Brother government, will be further alienated by this massive surveillance system. By 1985 all young people ages 18-26 will be under a legal obli-

gation to notify the government of their whereabouts at all times. Those who fail to do so will be subject to up to five years in jail and \$10,000 fines.

And how does the Administration intend to enforce this act? The Rostker report predicts compliance to be within 90%. But if just ten percent of 19-20 year olds do not comply, that means 400,000 potential draft felons. Does the Administration seriously intend to investigate, prosecute and fill our jails with that many young people? And how will this be done--through the FBI, through the cross-checking of IRS and Social Security data, or through the combing of high school yearbooks, college entrance lists and drivers' licences? Is this the price we must pay for the foreign and domestic policy failures of the President?

The ACLU strongly objects to the use of wartime national security measures when the President himself says that war is now apparently only a remote possibility. For this nation, a system of conscription has always been a last resort when our security is imminently threatened. It must rest upon what James Madison called "the impulse of self-preservation." Americans have historically recognized that an institution such as conscription which imposes total controls on the citizen should not exist in peacetime.

The citizen who is drafted loses most of his or her individual rights. Free speech and expression are severely limited in the military. Privacy is unknown. The right to reside where one

wishes; to pursue an education; to select one's own employment and to negotiate working conditions through collective bargaining; to travel or not as one desires and can afford; to marry and raise a family--all of these are destroyed by a draft. Most important, the draft compels a citizen to confront the perils of serious injury, physical and mental permanent disability and loss of life.

The impact of a draft upon a citizen who is conscripted is alone sufficient to bar its imposition absent a compelling justification. But since it is an integral part of the national security state, the draft also has a broad adverse impact on society. Unless the nation is imminently threatened the draft and draft registration will create hostility in the general population. It breeds contempt of the government for abridging the rights of its citizens and engenders militant opposition which is not afraid to take direct action against the system. The government, in turn, cannot permit this disruption. It therefore not only must enforce the system against those who resist it, but also must take costly steps to prevent disruption and in some cases even to silence its critics.

During the Vietnam War, anti-draft activity became one of the excuses for widespread political surveillance and disruption programs. The CIA investigated anti-draft groups to determine if they were being run by foreign governments. The

FBI had to investigate criminal violations of the draft laws. The Army looked into the potential of the groups for disrupting the war effort. Some of the surveillance was legal, much of it was not. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies were drawn into the political arena because the draft in the absence of an imminent threat to the nation fermented widespread hostility, particularly when draftees were used to wage an unpopular war. Powers that were intended to weed out saboteurs, espionage agents and criminals were directed at anti-draft and anti-war activities. If these powers were unchecked, as they have been for the last thirty years, law enforcement and intelligence systems tend to operate outside the Constitution, stifling dissent.

The imposition of the draft at this time would begin the resurrection of wartime national security measures in the absence of a compelling justification. As during the Vietnam War, hostility towards this system would grow rapidly and old enforcement mechanisms would be thrown into gear. Even in the absence of war individual liberties would begin to erode in the name of national security as if we were waging war.

Moreover, the peacetime military draft invites the President to take wide unilateral military action without first obtaining the consent of the American people. In the end, the distinctions between peace and war will be erased as in the society George Orwell described in his book 1984.

A return to draft registration at this time will be a significant retreat from the foundation of human liberty upon which this nation was built. As Daniel Webster said about the draft on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1814, "the question is nothing less than whether the most essential rights of personal liberty shall be surrendered and despotism embraced in its worst form." The ACLU believes that nothing short of the preservation of the nation can justify the draft. If we move toward it for any other reason we have not learned the lessons of history and we have forgotten the difference between freedom and totalitarianism. We urge this Subcommittee to reject the President's FY 1980 supplemental appropriations request to conduct registration.

Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much. I take it, Mr. Lynn, that you are opposed to any registration. Any draft? You are totally opposed to the Selective Service System. Is that correct?

Mr. LYNN. I don't think that can fairly be either the position of the United Church of Christ or of the Committee.

Mr. BOLAND. Exactly what is your position?

Mr. LYNN. We are opposed to the reimposition of draft registration or conscription under the circumstances that we see in the world at this time. And since the existence of this coalition, which began in April of 1979, some of the organizations within the committee against registration and the draft would oppose Selective Service at any point—but that is not the position taken by this coalition at this time.

Mr. BOLAND. Do you favor post-mobilization registration yourself?

Mr. LYNN. That is my personal view.

Mr. BOLAND. Again, do you favor post-mobilization registration?

Mr. LANDAU. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I am sure during the last couple of days you have heard much discussion here. You are probably familiar with the various National Service Plan kinds of concepts, which would be compulsory.

How do you feel about a compulsory National Service Plan?

Mr. LANDAU. The ACLU believes that should a draft ever become necessary or be instituted, we do not believe it would be constitutional to require as part of that service civilian service.

We believe the issue of whether alternatives must be provided for people to—who object to military service based on religious grounds, is a separate issue. To a general civilian component to compulsory military service—we believe there is nothing in the Constitution that would authorize the Congress to enact such a program.

The war powers clause relates only to military service, and not to civilian service. And we believe the 13th Amendment would act as a bar.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You are opposed to any National Service Plan?

Mr. LANDAU. Yes.

Mr. LYNN. The only thing I would add to that is I am concerned about the kind of economic dislocation that compulsory service, particularly at some kind of subsistence wage, might create for people who are now marginally employed. For example, the person who is earning \$9,000 or \$10,000—if we have a compulsory national service program that involves the private sector, as Mr. McCloskey's plan does, for example, I am very concerned that there will be a temptation for private employers simply to abandon the persons who are now employed at a \$9,000 or \$10,000 rate, and replace them by a subsistence wage, \$3,000 national service employee.

I have discussed this with Mr. McCloskey many, many times, in many forums, and I don't feel that he has a very satisfactory answer to that problem, with his system.

If we go entirely to the Federal government to supply the funding for such a program, then we are talking about—I have seen estimates as high as \$23 all the way to \$40 billion. I am not sure that that kind of service, in a very practical sense—beyond what Mr. Landau said—is important.

Mr. COUGHLIN. How do you suggest we provide for military requirements?

Mr. LYNN. I think we have a volunteer system which, from the military's perspective, is working very adequately. I am sure you are familiar with some of the data from the last fiscal year. We have had an increase in the size of the ready reserve of 40,000; selective reserve and National Guard strength increased by 20,000, in the voluntary system.

Mr. COUGHLIN. So the military service would consist primarily of the disadvantaged and the poor?

Mr. LYNN. We have tended to see that happen always, even with the conscription system. In fact, it is quite possible a credible argument can be made that it was first for poor people in our society under the draft, and it is under the present system, which at least pays them something close to a credible amount of money for peacetime service.

But I think it is—it troubles me that the society as a whole does not adequately permit the kind of job opportunities for minority young people that it should.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I am talking about supplying our military training requirements.

Mr. LYNN. The military training requirements, as far as the military is concerned, are more than adequate now.

What troubles me is some of the treatment of people when they get into the military. The sexual and racial discrimination which does exist—I don't think anyone here would deny.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I am talking about how we provide the military training.

Mr. LYNN. I favor military volunteers, not compulsion.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. I have no questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question: one of the big arguments has been that registration now would only save seven days in the event of a need to actually implement Selective Service. Can either of you see any scenario under which a seven-day period might make a difference? In the days of propeller-driven aircraft and powder type explosives—was one scenario.

Today we have jets and we have intercontinental missiles, nuclear weapons. Do you see the possibility where seven days could make a difference?

Mr. LYNN. I obviously don't see any way that that kind of time could make a difference. I envision that in the unlikely event of requiring a draft at any time, we would be facing either quick nuclear confrontation, in which seven days would be irrelevant, or a long, protracted, drawn out land struggle, as we found in Vietnam, that would take a long time—and where seven days wouldn't make any difference in that context, either.

I have great difficulty—in fact, I find it impossible to envision a scenario that requires a seven-day advantage that would be gained by pre-registering everyone in these appropriate age groups.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler?

Mr. TRAXLER. It just occurred to me—as we approach these questions and the Committee goes to mark-up, one of the things that we

would be concerned about—and I'm sure would be in the Committee's mind—the event that the Committee does not accede to the President's wishes—you don't have to answer this question, if you don't choose to. I feel uncomfortable with it. I am not an expert in international relations, but for our purposes today perhaps I would choose to be.

It would be said by some that the failure of this Committee to adopt this—the President's proposal—would send a signal to the Russians that we are lacking in resolve, and that we are not backing up our words with deeds, and that the failure to support the President's pre-registration pre-mobilization registration proposal, would be seen by the Russians as a sign of weakness on the part of the Congress and the people of the United States.

There are some options that this Committee has and you addressed yourself to one of them, the pre-mobilization post-mobilization activation of the Selective Service. For instance, you put all the pieces and parts in place. You are familiar with the conversations that took place yesterday.

What I want to know is what would your reaction be to this kind of criticism that might be directed towards this Subcommittee or the Congress, ultimately, if it failed to approve the President's proposal? Indeed, are we turning our backs on the national interest? Do the Russians perceive this as a sign of weakness? How would you respond to that kind of criticism?

MR. LANDAU. I think the Russians realize that the draft registration doesn't mean anything. The fact that you are collecting names—we know it does not significantly enhance mobilization.

What will send a signal is the other parts of the President's proposal, in terms of Selective Service, the kinds of things that will really fix it to bring it out of deep standby, slightly, and the post-mobilization plan. The fact that we collect a list of names, I don't think will demonstrate anything.

It is misleading to the American people to suggest that that will demonstrate our resolve.

MR. LYNN. I would concur with that. I don't think that the Soviets—my fear is always that they have a lot of this information before we do, including the draft report from Selective Service to the President. They see the figures; they know what a trivial step this really is, in an international sense. They also, I think, recognize how significant a step it is in a domestic sense, that the young people who are about to be registered feel—and I think not at all irrationally—the fear that this system of surveillance is inappropriate, that it will lead, in fact, to a system of conscription, particularly because the President has taken such pains to link his decision on registration explicitly to events in Southeast Asia.

And since he has never talked about registration before in a favorable light, to link it to those events leads young people to question whether that conscription is not just around the corner. And I am afraid that that is really the position the President is backing the American people into by making these unilateral statements.

We will support, by any means necessary, including military means, this entire Persian Gulf area. I don't think there was a serious discussion with even some members of his own party, much less the American

people or the Republicans, about whether this commitment was thoroughly justified.

Mr. TRAXLER. I take it that as we look into the Russian mind, the distinction between post-mobilization registration and pre-mobilization registration is not measurable.

Mr. LYNN. I am sure of that. And I think there was some comment made about the hockey victory on Friday night, and I honestly believe—all kidding aside about it—that that probably sent a much stronger signal than this could possibly do.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Stokes?

Mr. STOKES. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Yesterday when Mr. Rostker testified, I asked what was there about the international situation that caused the Administration's desire to have pre-mobilization registration.

He said the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

It seems to me that if we predicate registration upon the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, then we might experience a similar situation anytime any other country invades another country.

I further questioned him about whether this action represented a threat to the vital interests of the United States. He said yes.

I am sure that many Americans find it difficult to understand how the invasion of a country 8,000 miles away from the United States constitutes, in and of itself, a threat to the vital interests of the United States.

I would be interested in any comments that either one of you have on that point.

Mr. LANDAU. I think I would agree with what you have just said, Mr. Stokes, in that—and add that it is our belief that the nation—there has to be some proof that the nation's interests are imminently threatened—the preservation of our nation is under a direct threat—for a system of conscription to be cranked up in this country. That is certainly what our history has been in this country.

We even rejected a draft in the War of 1812, after the nation was invaded. We had a draft in World War I and World War II when I think there was a consensus that this nation's interests were directly threatened. It was only after World War II that we have ever had a draft in peacetime, and we saw what kinds of consequences that led to in terms of the President being permitted to take unilateral military action and the kinds of disruption that occurred in the lives of millions of young Americans.

I think the President, at least in my mind, has failed to demonstrate any proof whatsoever that our nation's interests are directly threatened by the activities in Southwest Asia.

Mr. STOKES. I understand that the ACLU does favor the Selective Service plan for post-mobilization. Is that correct?

Mr. LANDAU. In part, yes. In terms of the actual beefing up of the Selective Service personnel and the computer. We have problems with the aspect of the plan for training local draft board members and selecting them, without first Congress amending the Military Selective Service Act to provide more due process protections.

We feel although Mr. Rostker has stated publicly that he intends to take a close look at due process of—during classification and exam-

ination—we feel that regulations in this area are inappropriate. This is an area for Congress to legislate.

We do have a problem with the training of local draft board members.

Mr. LYNN. Some of us also have some serious problems, as I indicated in part earlier, about how you arrive at the notion of what the Selective Service needs to deliver, to assume that there would be no volunteers. Even in the event of one and a half wars being begun simultaneously, one does have to ask what kind of wars we would possibly be talking about that wouldn't generate any volunteers at all, since the Vietnam war generated 20,000 through volunteers each month.

To suggest that no one would volunteer—just violates my ideas of common sense.

Mr. STOKES. I remember posing that question to Mr. Rostker yesterday. He indicated that their plan was based on the assumption that no one would volunteer, which doesn't make very much sense to me either.

On page five, Mr. Landau, you say: "If the Subcommittee appropriates and Congress approves money for male-only draft registration, the ACLU would go to court to stop it."

Do you want to comment upon that statement.

Mr. LANDAU. Yes. We believe that since 1976 the Supreme Court has promulgated a high standard for judging statutes which discriminate on the basis of sex. We believe that a male-only draft registration would violate the equal protection notion of the United States Constitution, and we would be going to court—if the males-only draft registration was enacted and started, we would be going to court probably on behalf of males who would claim that they were being discriminated against on the basis of their sex because women were not also included.

We believe that registration must apply on a gender-neutral standard.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mrs. Boggs?

Mrs. BOGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lynn and Mr. Landau, thank you for your interest and your testimony.

I was very curious to know what your source of information is for your statement that in all probability the Russians have a copy of the draft working paper of the Selective Service System pending before the Members of Congress.

Mr. LYNN. My statement was—I said, what I always fear is that some of these supposedly secret documents that seem to be—and slipping around so easily in Washington—my suspicion is even regardless of when they had it, it certainly now is a public document, and they recognize as we do now the minuscule amount of preparedness that is gained by pre-registration.

So even if in some theoretical sense it might disturb the Soviets to have pre-registration, since they and we and everybody seems to know now that it means only a seven-day difference, I don't think, in terms of their own intelligence gathering, that that would not seem significant to them, as I believe in my judgment, it is not serious for us.

Mrs. Boggs. You have no personal knowledge, no contacts within the Soviet Union, or within the embassies and so on that would lead you to make such a statement?

Mr. LYNN. Not specifically about this, no. I'm sorry if that was at all misleading.

My point is, they are as aware as we are, because leaks do occur in this city, specifically on this report.

Mrs. Boggs. Then I can assume that the statement you are making about the state of mind of the Russians, the impact of this type of legislation upon the Russians and so on, is simply your own assumption.

Do you have any special input from any special organization? Have you had briefings by the State Department, by the Department of Defense, by the National Security Advisor?

Mr. LYNN. I have raised this question with the Selective Service Defense officials, and National Security Council people, over the past several weeks, at the White House. I keep asking them what is your evidence to support the contention that this has some impact on our foreign policy, or specifically on the Soviet Union. And literally no one has ever said they have any evidence. They continue to make the assertion that after several weeks now that this plan has been out and available, for them to have no concrete information leads me to believe that the Soviets, in fact, are not losing any sleep over this proposal—that the only people losing sleep over the proposal are our own young people. And that disturbs me very, very much.

Mrs. Boggs. I can assure you that that would disturb me very much, too, in a much more personal way.

What I am trying to establish here is the fact that yesterday we were asking the head of the Selective Service System questions about national defense and about foreign policy that were really beyond his purview.

I also think that those questions are really beyond your purview as well, if you'll forgive me for saying so. I appreciate the work that you do very much in guaranteeing individual liberties—that is something I am devoted to—and for giving us the testimony representing many, many groups who are likewise devoted to individual liberties and certainly to the advancement of this country and its goals.

But I do think we are here as an appropriations committee listening to testimony of the government agency charged with carrying out the President's decision to invoke his constitutional powers. We are responsible for making certain that it does this in a manner that is protective of individual liberties and, at the same time, is financially and economically sound and that it will, be able to dovetail into any kind of post-mobilization system that you seem to agree with.

So I simply wanted to make the statement that I don't think that this is a place that we can decide upon foreign policy decisions. I don't think that the persons who have been before us are the ones who really have the authority to answer those questions.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BOLAND. At some point in your statement, Mr. Lynn, you indicate that the President has done nothing to provide necessary personnel in the Persian Gulf area or to expand our presence in that area.

That isn't quite correct, because I am sure you are aware, as is Mr. Landau, that there are negotiations going on now with the country of Kenya to provide bases. So you're not quite right.

Mr. LYNN. I think I meant specifically to have the personnel to fill the bases that are now being negotiated or to expand the presence.

Mr. BOLAND. You can't provide the personnel unless you have the bases, of course. I guess the first requirement is that there is an agreement on the bases.

Mr. LYNN. I agree with that, but I said this in the context of kind of backing into a corner. But the President may be doing—because if you expand the size of the military requirement, but you don't have some very serious proposal for either the redeployment of troops or the voluntary acquisition of those troops, you do back yourself into a corner. And the corner looks like it is conscription.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Lynn and Mr. Landau. We appreciate your presence.

WITNESS

HON. PATRICIA SCHROEDER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

Mr. BOLAND. We will now turn to a very distinguished Member of the Congress, Patricia Schroeder, who has expressed her opinion on this matter and other areas and is an effective spokesman in this and many areas.

We are glad to have you. We are sorry that we kept you waiting. Had you been here at 10 o'clock, we would have put you on.

Ms. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We were having a hearing over in Cannon, and I underestimated the time that it takes to get myself from one building to the other.

I thank you all very much for doing these extensive hearings, and I think it is wonderful that you are giving people an opportunity to come and discuss this lead-in into I think a very serious decision that we in the Congress are going to have to make.

I would ask unanimous consent to put my statement in the record, and I know that you have been listening—

Mr. BOLAND. I would like to have you read it. If you highlight it, you will go on for 20 minutes.

Ms. SCHROEDER. You will be glad I just summarized two things on the back. Now that is a lot better deal. Right?

Mr. BOLAND. You have had experience with your own Committee. They come in with a statement and say I will highlight it, and then for a half an hour, they highlight, and they could have gone through the statement in five minutes.

Any way you want to handle it, you are entitled to all of the time that you want provided you are through at 11 o'clock.

Ms. SCHROEDER. Let me move along then. Let me say that having served on the Armed Services Committee for seven years and also having been a personnel and labor attorney before I came here—personnel in these kinds of issues—this has been one of the areas in which I have been very, very interested, and it has been my expertise.

As you know, I carried that amendment where this whole report emanated from, where the Congress I think in its wisdom determined that best we get policy out of this and have some people look at this that really had some ideas and could look at it in a little calmer light than we can.

And now that the report is out and you have had extensive testimony about it, I think we are making a very hard decision as to which way we go.

I think we are put in a very difficult position, as a Congress. I am sitting here talking probably off the top of my head, like I shouldn't but we have had the President say that this is a very important thing to do and it will show resolve.

And yet I must say that if it is sending a message to Ivan, I don't think it is much of a message. Had we had draft registration on line last summer and decided that we would call up when we got concerned about Cuba, we would be waiting for the first person to come out the other end. We are three or four crises down the road.

I guess my whole concern has been that I think registration and the draft and the selective service, as it is currently on line—and that is what we are talking about—is really kind of a World War II solution, and we are in the 1980s. What we really need, after listening to hours and hours of writing this testimony, by the Joint Chiefs and everybody else, we need skilled, trained people. Those are the people that should be identified.

Our real problem is the people that we lose after we put money and investment into them for six to 10 years, people who know how to fly planes, and who know how to maintain computers, who know how to fix things, and so forth, that we really need to retain those people, that we need skills so much more than we need warm bodies, because unfortunately technology has taken us all over, and all of this equipment that we have out there, if you can't maintain it, it won't quite do the job.

So having a lot of 18 to 20 year-olds' names on a list probably won't do the job. If you want to do registration by skills, that might make some sense. I think the post-mobilization regulation makes sense in case you do find a scenario where you really need that.

And part of our problem is we have had pay caps on our service people since 1973, anything we can do to beef up benefits to keep the people in that we have made investments in. And there are significant investments when you are talking about pilots, for example. You are talking about \$1 million per pilot.

Anything we can do to lure people into the Reserves, by better benefits and better training. We must have the services treat the Reserves and the National Guard as really a main line of defense rather than kind of a secondary line. And I think we are aware of the fact that we haven't put the emphasis on the Reserves and National Guards that we should have.

Again, the chiefs all come in and say, "One of our problems is we can only allow our pilots to fly 150 hours a year, and they can't get their skills up. We don't have the bullets we need. We don't have the things we need for really going out and maneuvering." Any money we put in there sends a much stronger message to the Russians than enacting this procedure.

In fact, I worry a bit that enacting this procedure, with the report and all that we now have in our hands, might lull Americans to sleep and think now that we have had young people go down and register in the Post Office, I don't think that is quite the solution.

I have been taken to task by many for my position on women here. And I would just like to put that out, since I thought it would be only viable to do that. I feel very strongly that the groups who say that women will not participate when their country needs them are wrong. They have never looked at the history of American women.

I can't believe anybody is going to advocate surrendering rather than calling up women. That is ridiculous. If women are needed, women of course will participate.

My position has been that the issue here is look at whether registration solves the immediate problem we have. It may be a symbol, but we don't have money to buy symbols. It may be nice, if you have money, to buy everything, but that is not what we are talking about. And the immediate, urgent things we need are the skills; we need to retain the people; we need to beef up the Reserves; and we need to do everything we can for readiness, operations, and maintenance.

That, in essence, is where I come from in my rapid summary of the overview.

I thank you very much for allowing me to come.

[The complete statement follows.]

STATEMENT OF U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PATRICIA SCHROEDER

The President's call for the reinstitution of draft registration is a sad commentary on the way this administration views the important job of providing for this nation's defense. The emphasis is all too often placed on show rather than substance—lessons are ignored—illusions are presented as solutions. The tragedy of Vietnam which led to the end of the draft has been all but forgotten as the President fans the flames of controversy, contained in this call for registration. Meanwhile our nation's security is no more assured this year than last and certainly registration will do nothing to improve it one year from today.

The world situation may seem much more uneasy than it was when I successfully led the floor debate against registration last September. But the advent of Soviet hostilities in Afghanistan and Iranian terrorism, although serious events by any standard, do not warrant a return to mobilization. And that is what registration is purported to be all about—our ability to mobilize in a time of crisis. No matter which source we accept, we still will get only a few days added mobilization capability with registration than without.

The House Armed Services Committee recently finished its military posture hearings. Witness after witness reiterated that the counting of warm bodies that would be accomplished by registration will not solve any of the problems of today's All Volunteer Force. Retention of mid-level trained specialists is the primary AVF problem and the proposed registration will do nothing to solve that. The best quick relief to some of our readiness problems would be achieved by beefing up the national guard reserve forces. No matter how little money is involved in registration, it would be better used in solving these problems than in putting on a show.

Another alternative use of this money was suggested by the Secretary of Defense, when he noted that the operations and maintenance budget was at a bare minimum. Let's purchase a few more flight hours—a few more ops tempo days for our ships—a few more spare parts. Service registration will not provide one iota of improvement in our defense posture. It has become clear that we are buying symbols with this gesture rather than improved readiness.

In the past fiscal year we directed the new head of the Selective Service System to report to us on several registration issues. In following the progress of the ensuing study, I was told that it found that registration would do little to improve our ability to mobilize in a crisis and therefore was not recommended. Not until

the day of the President's State of the Union message did anyone know that the administration was about to ignore this advice and call for a return to the registration of our youth. The reasons for this decision are unclear. It is apparent that some meetings that were to be held were cancelled, comments that were called for were never received. It is possible to conclude that the policy was made by a small group in the upper echelon of the White House staff.

Perhaps the worst part of the President's decision on registration is the rationale he gave for it. According to the "Carter Doctrine" it now falls on our shoulders to protect our vital interests in the Persian Gulf. It is not clear how registering the youths of this nation will serve this goal, and it is not clear why our interests are greater than those of our allies. How much better off we would be if we could find an energy policy that would free us of our dependence on Persian Gulf oil.

I think these are the issues that both men and women should examine the call for registration. They are the issues I will be examining.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Pat.

Mrs. Boggs.

Mrs. Boggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You don't suppose that is a chauvinist approach, do you, Pat?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. He hasn't figured out that we know what we are doing.

Mrs. Boggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mrs. Schroeder for your testimony.

Your request last summer for a report did investigate the report that was compiled. As you know it was compiled, as were the budget requests for the Department of Defense, in a time frame where we were trying to do two things:

One was trying to implement the period of detente. We were hopeful that SALT II would be ratified, and second, we were thinking that we were in a national and international situation which would allow us to go forward in trying to balance the budget. So we had two situations there, the atmosphere in which this report was devised.

Also, as you know draft reports, like the one we are working with now, are put out by the lead agency. Then they are sent for review among various related agencies.

Recently I have been having a great deal of difficulty with an Interior Department report that came to our attention, previous to its going to the 20 other agencies that it was to be reviewed by. Some of its suggestions have people up in arms. It was released prior to comments and review of the other agencies. I think that is what has happened to this report.

I do think that we have to view it in that context, that it was made as a draft report and in the national and international climate of detente and balancing the budget.

I think that—just as the Defense Department budget is going to be considerably altered—we are now talking about MX, we are talking about Trident, et cetera. Then the Selective Service report has to take into account the new situations as well.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. First of all, let me say I think we all realize the climate has changed, and we all regret it very much. But, really, the climate changing doesn't have anything to do with our readiness. I mean, hopefully, we are constantly ready, because we all know how fast the climate can change in the world that we live in.

And if we were all operating under the premise last summer that we really didn't care about readiness, I think that would be wrong. I don't think anybody in this body, I think that is why we felt so

strongly about trying to get it out of politics, out of symbols, and having another group look at it.

So I understand that, and the climate has changed. But hopefully our need for readiness, that really doesn't impact on that. And we should be looking at that constantly, no matter what the climate is.

I think it is a thing that we have been neglectful of, because there is always the temptation to channel the additional money into weapon systems or something else and presume you will pick up readiness another year.

Let me respond though to this report, because I have followed that very carefully. This was a little different than most reports, because we did a time certain on it. We asked them to report by February 8th or 9th, as you know, because we wanted to look at it again this year. We had on the group representatives of all of the different agencies that were really active in this, whether it was the Department of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget. We even had ACTION and Peace Corps looking at the all-volunteer groups approach.

And all those groups did start meeting in the fall, and have been brought along with this, so it isn't quite like the normal sequential referral through agencies, which I am aware of in what you are talking about. This was the final draft until the "State of the Union Address," and that is a bit disconcerting.

I realize the budget was put together under different circumstances. And when I hear all of the budget chiefs telling me and testifying in front of my Committee that the main problem is retention, retention, retention, keeping those skills in, and yet see that when the budget was prepared last summer, we really didn't put in enough money to even keep salaries up with the cost of living.

I am just saying we have to look at all these very hard choices today in this changed scene. I think the draft report is really fairly reliable, and nobody is saying they didn't have input along the way. I don't hear any of the agencies really quibbling with that.

I think everybody is very concerned about readiness and what we do in the climate and the budget. We are still equally concerned with this inflationary spiral as to what we do in the budget.

If we look at what all of the service chiefs said at the beginning of this year, after the climate changed, when they are saying we need retention, it seems to me that we'd do best to take our money and put it in that budget for retaining people and dealing with some of these other things rather than going along with that.

I am very pleased that we do have the report, in retrospect, because I think it was done by cooler heads and everybody having input. I think we should look at it very seriously.

Mrs. Boggs. One of the points made by the head of the Selective Service System was that the reactivation of training local draft board personnel should best be done during peacetime, when all heads are cooler.

The impression that I received from the testimony of the people before us, who were charged with the responsibility of putting this into place, was that they needed \$8 million in order to use their computers to get their public relations program going, to take certain steps that would ensure individual liberties and equities, and so on, and that the time to do it was in a calmer period such as we are in now.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Let me say that the gentleman was probably correct if you were talking a World War II scenario, but it is the 1980s. The thing that concerns me about what they are proposing is that when they do all this, what will we have? What will be the end result?

We will have computer printout sheets with millions of names of our generation of Americans that the census will tell you we are the most mobile in America, and that is tough competition, because we are all fairly mobile. But we will have names and addresses of people who move more than anyone else in America, and that's it. We won't have any classification, any physicals, or anything else.

Now, a lot of people say we need to do this, this may incite people to go into the volunteer Army, into the Reserves. And yet everyone has said that that has never been proven.

But even if you look at it, our maximum shortfall you could assess last year, the maximum, giving the worst case, was maybe 17,000 people in the military. This year they are recommending that cut back 14,000 of those slots, and then they are going to contract them out.

If you really want to do something about readiness, give the President the right to mobilize people who are contracted out. That will give you a lot of readiness really fast, but what you are really doing is collecting millions of names without any classification, not anything, really.

And sure, it is nice to have all that. But look, in World War I—not II—we registered 10 million people a day, with none of the capabilities we have today, none of the preparation or anything else.

It just seems to me that there is a temptation to say let's do everything. I am not sure we have that choice with the budget constraints we have this year.

Maybe if we could do everything, fine, you could do this. But it seems to me that all of the other things seem to be of much higher order and are much more necessary.

And again, I think we can lull everyone to sleep, because you really have to say, "What are you going to do with those lists of names?" There isn't anything you can do to have any kind of a response after you collect them all—at least for seven months. That is a long time in the world as it is today.

Mrs. Boggs. That is very true.

And so would it be the seven months that apparently it would take us to register the people in time of mobilization?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. That's right.

But we could do all sorts per day in World War I. You get on the airways and tell everyone to come in. What takes the time is the training, the classification, and the getting them prepared.

Each year it seems to take longer, because we get more and more sophisticated weapons. That is the reality of 1980. I guess I am looking at it as a personnel lawyer, but if someone from a corporation said, "We have an empty slot, and we are going to canvass everyone in the entire city that would be available," it would not be efficient. You try to target in and figure out what you have to do.

And today we need to train people. If you want to register skills, if you want to mobilize people who have been contracted out, if you want to do any of those things, they are on line. They are skilled; they are ready to go.

This doesn't really give us any readiness. I think that we have to just plain deal with that.

Mrs. BOGGS. I know I am taking too much time, Mr. Chairman, but we of course are not dealing with the registration of women, because there is no authorizing legislation.

But would you tell this Committee how you feel about the registration of women if young men are registered?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I have always said that if the country needs registration to defend this country and the draft, then of course women will have to go. We drafted women nurses in Vietnam, and we almost came down to drafting women in World War II.

It is unfortunate that some groups have tied equal rights to registration. That's wrong.

Obviously, we drafted 18 year-olds before they could vote; and that is kind of an important equal right, but it has never really been coupled in the Constitution. And, unfortunately, the mass media has picked that up as if equal rights, then combat. No, that's not how it is. You can be drafted with or without it, and we have had precedent for that.

If women are needed, then I think certainly women should go.

My question is—is, if this is needed? I don't think this is needed, and I don't think is a wise choice at this time, given the tremendous budgetary constraints.

Mrs. BOGGS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You mentioned in your opening statement and now about the National Guard reserve forces. Would you support compulsory reserve service?

Ms. SCHROEDER. If someone thought that was needed, I might really look at that seriously. Most of the Western world uses their reserves and the National Guard much more efficiently than we do. I think we have tended not to use them. We have tended to give them junk. We have tended to really not pull them into the mainstream and put training facilities or training exercises on that were meaningful and so forth.

I think that is probably the way we have to go just because of the dollar problem: you can't have a large enough standing army to do it. Maybe you don't need every single soul in there, but you make the benefits enough so that enough people will come in that you really do have a large and viable reserve. That might be a very logical solution.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You tend to support the compulsory reserve service?

Ms. SCHROEDER. I would be more inclined to do that, because I can see something on the end. Again, I am not sure you need it for absolutely everyone. I don't know what you do with 32 million teenagers in compulsory reserves, so you have to find a way to put people in.

I would prefer to do it with educational benefits and so forth.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Stokes—Mr. Traxler, I am sorry.

Mr. TRAXLER. I want to welcome our distinguished colleague. It is always a pleasure and a delight to hear her presentation, especially since she is a member of the Armed Services Committee and has developed some expertise in this area.

A number of us on this Subcommittee are wondering how we got this.

Ms. SCHROEDER. Just lucky. The luck of the draft.

Mr. TRAXLER. I wonder, Mrs. Schroeder, if you would care to comment on an issue that has been troubling me, and perhaps some other people on this Subcommittee as well. It will be the determining factor as to how we really come down on this issue before us of what could be done.

I have an article here that Mr. Stokes was kind enough to lend me. I can't tell you which paper it came from—I suspect, one of the Washington papers—by Joseph Califano, Jr. He is a guest columnist, and in the course of his case for reinstating the draft instantly—now; not later—he wants to eliminate the all-volunteer service.

He says as follows, and I presume he is talking about registration: "The issue of revitalizing the draft system is a litmus test of American determination in the face of Soviet aggression."

What I would like your opinion on is: in the event this Subcommittee or the Congress fails to act on the President's proposal as submitted to us, is it your thought that this would be misconstrued as a sign of weakness by the Soviets?

Ms. SCHROEDER. Absolutely not. In fact, that's why I said—probably I shouldn't be so candid—as I opened my remarks, but we are really underestimating the Soviets, and their military planners, if we honestly think that they are afraid of this. I cannot imagine a Soviet planner being afraid of 32 million names on a computer printout sheet, names of people that aren't trained, classified, or anything else. I really can't imagine that.

Now, if you are going to do something, if you took the same money and deployed it in different ways, whether dealing with reserves, skills that you are going to register so that you really know where all of the pilots are in America or all of the computer specialists are, or something, then I can see that a military planner would say, "My goodness, now they have got something." But if you have just got names—no, I really don't see that as being anything that they really—I think that is more for our own domestic consumption than it is for the Soviet consumption, and they aren't as easily caught up with the slogans and that kind of thing. They are sitting there playing a very, very tough game of poker with their cards.

The one thing they aren't is dumb, and I honestly think they will have that figured out in seconds.

Mr. TRAXLER. Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I can't find much to disagree with.

Ms. SCHROEDER. I don't believe it.

Mr. YOUNG. That is a very unusual development; isn't it?

Having had the privilege of serving earlier on the Armed Services Committee, I know that Mrs. Schroeder could not have served as many years as she has without having a really good knowledge of the defense capability of the United States as well as a good working knowledge of the relative posture between the U.S. and the Soviet forces.

Now that I have set her up as an expert, I would like to ask this question: In what set of circumstances do you see the possibility where you would support registration and/or a draft?

Ms. SCHROEDER. Well, boy, oh boy, you almost need a chart. There are a whole series of things.

Number one, the question is: Does registration, as we are talking about today, under the old Selective Service Act that has been with us since World War II, meet 1980 problems? My answer to that is: "No."

We should be registering people by skills, by training, and so forth. That kind of a Selective Service begins to make a whole lot more sense than when we just needed strong, young 18 year-olds who could carry big, heavy things. Technology has moved way ahead of us. Even in Vietnam, for every eight people we drafted, only one went into a combat position. Our notions that we get from watching the late-night movies really aren't the 1980s and the Russian planners know that.

I think what we need to spend our time doing is looking at those things—I am talking about it from a personnel management, labor lawyer thing at this point—look at the thoughts you need; you look at how much you may have to increase them and you figure out how do you target it so that you have got a response that really meets those needs. I don't think the Selective Service, as we know it now, would meet those needs.

Clearly, if you give me a scenario where we really are looking at a World War I/World War II type thing, long-range, massive numbers, where you do really need lots and lots, then the Selective Service, as we are dealing with it today, would have some relevance. But that doesn't seem to be the type of world and type of response we have had since 1945. I would respond, in a World War I/World War II type of thing, that I don't think those would be very feasible in the future.

I think we ought to take our Selective Service and revamp it. It is really out of date for what we need today, the personnel skills we need today. Show us a corporation that would still be in business if they were still using the same personnel recruitment manual that they had in 1940.

Mr. YOUNG. I don't disagree with what you have said, but maybe you misunderstood the question. I really meant what set of international circumstances or military circumstances—the U.S. versus the Soviet Union—what would have to develop in that relationship before you would support an actual registration and drafting of young Americans to serve in the military? What would justify a draft?

Ms. SCHROEDER. Where do the Russians have to go? What country do they have to invade?

Mr. YOUNG. Or threaten.

Ms. SCHROEDER. Again, you sat in on many of those briefings with me. The briefings that we had is if the Russians start to roll through Europe, they would probably roll through Europe in days. Now, clearly, if they roll through Europe, we would all be for draft and registration, but they would be all the way in the ships and coming over here and we would still not be—you know, we would still have seven months before we would even have anybody going if we had registration on line.

I guess that's why I am saying I don't see that that fits any scenario today. I understand what you are saying. I think you are almost saying to me, "Mrs. Schroeder, you are probably against Vietnam, but

would you be for defending Europe?" I am for defending Europe, and I am for saying let us look at where we may be today, whether it is Vietnam, the Persian Gulf or anywhere.

I would like to debate those, but let's look at those and see what gives us a response. And I don't think draft registration gives us a response in the time-urgent need that we have in the 1980s. We need time-urgent response, as you remember the general saying. Time-urgent response, you don't have with draft registration.

Mr. YOUNG. Again, I don't disagree with the way you have answered my question.

I have one other question on a little different tack. Last year, when I supported your amendment on this very same issue, I took the position that if what those who wanted to register, if what they really wanted to do was locate where these young men were, why not just put a question on the census form that was going out? That would be just as valid; that would be just as current as the registration now, because, as you say, that age group is very mobile, they are moving from one part of the country to another.

Are you aware of any change? My understanding was that the goal was to locate the 18-26-year-old men. Do you see anything different in this approach today that we are talking about other than to locate where they are?

Ms. SCHROEDER. Not really. And I still think that the best solution of all is that you predisposition the forms in Post Offices, and if you need anybody, tell them to go to the Post Office and that would be most current and up to date. Again, the Census Bureau tells us—and I have made that inquiry: I used to chair the Census Committee—they tell us that 18-22-year-old males are the worst in the world to keep track of. They live a different place every month almost.

So, you are either going to have a huge bureaucracy having to change the addresses every month to make sure your card index is ever-current, or you do this post-mobilization thing where you have the forms out in the Post Office and you tell them, "You get down there tomorrow and do it," and then it is up to date, because anything else is probably out of date unless you maintain a huge bureaucracy to increase every year to keep track of them.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you for your response to the question. It is nice to be on the same side on these questions.

I would like to talk to you about Nicaragua later today.

Ms. SCHROEDER. All right.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentlewoman from Colorado for the leadership that she has given.

I have just one question: Assuming that you were not a member of the Armed Forces Committee, that you were a member of this Committee having received the President's legislation as a member of Congress—a responsible member of Congress wanting to act responsibly in terms of the President's legislation, what would your position be on this bill?

Ms. SCHROEDER. I would hope it would be the same as mine. But I have to say that, in all honesty, it is a very tough thing. I think the President decided to move in disregard of this report, without calling or consulting anyone or without really discussing whether the Persian

Gulf was that significant or whether this was real readiness. He has laid it out there as a symbol, and we get into this bind as politicians where you have to explain your vote. Sometimes people don't like to do that. Nevertheless, that may be why the country is in the trouble it is in. A lot of us should have explained more votes than we did. This will be a vote that you may have to explain to the American public because it has been laid out there as a symbol, and it is a take-it-or-leave-it type of thing.

The only thing I have to say is it would be wonderful and I would say buy off on it as a symbol if it is normal times and nobody is worried about money and all that. I think it is a dangerous symbol right now.

I think we have to say, "Look, we agree with the premise that readiness is a problem. We agree with that. We just think in the budgetary constraints, the money can be spent for readiness somewhere else much better," and come up with another way.

I honestly would hope you would do that, because you guys get stuck with the pursestrings, and there is never going to be a year tougher than this one, I think, for dealing with those kinds of things.

Normally, the easiest thing would be to go along and figure you will make up for it in other ways, too. I don't think it is the kind of year where we can do that. It pains me to say that. I don't like to have to say that, but I think we have to say that "We agree with your premise. We think the conclusion was drawn too fast. Let's do these things instead."

Mr. STOKES. Don't you think that the American people ought to be concerned about a nation that spent \$114 billion for military preparedness last year; \$128 billion this year; and is proposing \$156.3 billion next year, while saying at the same time that we are not ready to go to war? Don't you think there is something wrong with that?

Ms. SCHROEDER. That has always amazed me, on my Committee, to sit there and watch everybody come across the river every year, and I think, "What did we deny them last year? Maybe I better deny them something." But I never won, and they are always saying, "It is even worse this year." There are days when I have to ask that same question, Mr. Stokes. I think that is a very profound one. Who's in charge.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Sabo.

Mr. SABO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me commend the gentlewoman from Colorado. I am sorry I missed a portion of your testimony.

Ms. SCHROEDER. It was really fast.

Mr. SABO. What I heard I liked.

Let me ask a follow-up question similar to Mr. Stokes' question. I think Congress has several options. Obviously, number one is to support the President's proposal, which I personally oppose. Second option would be to do nothing, which I am not sure is the correct decision, either. The third option is to provide some funds for what is called "Option 1" in the Selective Service-draft document. This option would provide some updating for the Selective Service System, but not include registration as a portion of it.

I happen to agree with you on how out of date the registration would become. I think it is impractical. I am wondering what your

reaction is to what is called "Option 1" of the Selective Service draft, whether you have had a chance to look at it and whatever recommendations or observations you would have.

Ms. SCHROEDER. I think that makes more sense to move into registration, the post-mobilization—and that is the beginning of where the Congress started last year. As you know, we started to bring Selective Service out of the mothballs. I think they asked for 10.8, and we gave them 9.6 or something around there, but we gave them almost everything they wanted, and we began that process. And it is a logical follow-on.

If I can just add a bit to the question that you—and Mr. Stokes were asking, too. I think one of our colleagues, who is the ranking minority member in the House Armed Services, Congressman Dickinson from Alabama is doing an excellent presentation—he has been doing these one-minute TV spots—talking about how our money is being spent and about the weapons systems we are procuring in the most efficient manner and so forth. And the tragedy has been we still tend to focus on the systems rather than the folks.

Napolean used to say, "if you judge materiel to morale, morale is three times more important." That may be part of our readiness problem: that we tend to focus on the materiel and not the morale. I think it is because they are fascinating things, and we tend to get hooked into them with our districts and building them and everything. And that may be a problem.

But that position certainly makes more sense to me than proceeding with the registration at this time—which I don't understand.

Mr. SABO. Is it your judgment that there is a case to be made for that Option 1 above and beyond registration at this time?

Ms. SCHROEDER. I would still prefer that we really look at the one tragedy of the whole study was that we were taking Selective Service as it is on the books. As you know, President Ford put it all on ice when he stopped the registration, and we have not looked at it in that interim period.

I feel very strongly that if we looked at it, we would find all sorts of problems with it, all sorts of inequities and everything else. And we would like to have even done that in the study when we voted last fall, but there wasn't time to reinvent the wheel.

So, I would still say that, in the best of all possible worlds, I would prefer that we go back and look at Selective Service and say, "This may do great things for late-night movies, but let's talk about what kind of personnel needs we have in the '80s." But it is not fair to criticize the study for that because we didn't give them those kinds of parameters to look at.

Mr. SABO. I thought one of the more incredible things in the testimony I heard yesterday was, if one were to go from registration to actual reimposition of the draft, the medical standards used would be those of 1945 or 1940. The change in medicine since then has just been incredible. I would expect that there would be a whole host of things that were reasons for exemption then that are not now. Other things might have been discovered that would be reason for exemption today that we probably didn't know existed over 30 years ago. It is clearly just incredibly out of date.

Ms. SCHROEDER. You are right. As I say, show me a corporation that still is using their 1940 personnel manual.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you.

May I very quietly suggest that if we have another Member of Congress to appear before this Subcommittee, we would be accused of filibustering, or as Senator Mark Hatfield would say, "extending the debate", so we have only one other Member coming during the course of the day.

I am sure our guests who are here who are not members, appreciate Congressman Schroeder's testimony here this morning.

WITNESS

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID CORTRIGHT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SANE

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witness is Mr. David Cortright, Executive Director of SANE. You represent the Committee on SANE Nuclear Policy?

Mr. CORTRIGHT. Right. Thank you for allowing us to represent our membership on the issue. I served three years during the Vietnam War period, and was a draft-induced volunteer, so I think I have familiarity with both sides of the picture here.

SANE has long worked to prevent war and foster international peace. We were very active back in the early '60s with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We are one of the early organizations to oppose the Vietnam War and have continued to focus on working for arms reversal and a peaceful, productive economy.

In keeping with this tradition for seeking restraint in U.S. arms policy, we are here today to express our absolute and unequivocal opposition to the President's proposal for a viable military registration. The justification we have heard is to create a rapid mobilization capability.

What has been stated here today and yesterday, the new Selective Service report indicates that the present system is more than capable of handling a very rapid mobilization. DOD, for example, requires 100,000 inductees within 60 days.

Well, the Selective Service System says it can now produce that number in 35 days, 34 days, and the President's time would bring that down to 26 days. At the same time, DOD says it needs 650,000 inductees within 180 days, Selective Service says it can deliver that number now in 124 days, and the President says he would do it in 117 days.

The point is that we now have more than enough capability to meet even the most extreme standards established by the Pentagon for rapid mobilization capability.

We should note, moreover, that these mobilization requirements are themselves based on extreme worst-case analyses. The Pentagon requirement was revised in October of 1977 on the basis of the highly improbable scenario of war and a terrifying estimate of casualties. I did some personal checking on this a couple of years ago and asked an official of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and he referred to "hordes of divisions

coming across the German border" and blithely said that it would depend on when the war would "go nuclear" and has since come out—this mobilization requirement is based on an assumption of hundreds of thousands of American casualties within the first few weeks of any war.

I would hope that before we willingly go off and accept such scenarios that the representatives of the American people here consider whether we want to go ahead on the basis of such plans.

The Pentagon's mobilization requirement also is faulty because it assumes, as has been indicated earlier, that there would be no volunteers in the case of an emergency. I think this is an absurd, cynical assumption which impugns the integrity and patriotism of Americans.

If the United States were truly threatened, there would be plenty of volunteers. There would be no shortage if the cause were considered just and necessary.

I would submit that Americans are not lacking in patriotism, but we do not want to be deceived by false crises. The President's call is an inappropriate response to what I think is an exaggerated threat.

The catalyst for the present discussion is, of course, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Certainly the Soviet intervention should be condemned as a brutal and criminal act. A recent policy statement adopted by the SANE National Executive Committee strongly protests the Soviet invasion and demands an immediate withdrawal.

But the question is, does this Soviet action provide a scheme to take over the Persian Gulf and does it justify confrontationism and war preparation?

I would submit that it does not. If the Soviets are really coveting the Gulf, we would assume they have set out in an odd direction. Moreover, if they are trying to really influence the Iranians, they have taken a very curious policy. The actions they have taken have really only hardened anti-Soviet sentiment in the Gulf region and strengthened the resolve of states like Iraq which used to be very close to the Soviet Union to resist all super power encroachment.

I would say a different analysis of Afghanistan—equally probable, I would say—would see their action as essentially defensive as a desperate attempt to prop up a wobbling satellite shaken by internal revolt.

The Soviets, in my opinion, seem to have acted to preserve their influence rather than to expand it elsewhere. The pro-Soviet PDPA government that came into power in 1978 has been losing ground to its domestic opponents for nearly a year and was on the verge of collapse, according to many reports, when the Soviets came in in December.

So far, as is clearly indicated in the headlines, the Soviets have not been able to gain control of the situation and have, in fact, apparently sparked only more revolt. They have stumbled into, I believe, a Vietnam type quagmire which would be very familiar to Americans. They are now the despised foreign invader, saddled with an unpopular and corrupt client government.

Why should we think this kind of a situation directly threatens American security?

As Congressman Stokes said earlier, it is hard to convince our organization that the vital interest of Americans is threatened by a Soviet invasion 8000 miles away. The whole premise that we need to prepare militarily to take over or to defend the Gulf—Persian Gulf oil fields is erroneous. I don't think it is possible to secure the supply of oil through military means. The facilities are too fragile, too prone to sabotage, and I think are not defendable by military means.

There is the other question which was mentioned earlier which is that our allies, in Europe, who are much more dependent upon the oil than we, do not support the kind of confrontation approach that the Administration has developed.

I would submit that the United States is already more than strong enough to take care of its legitimate military needs. We have a vast, stupendous military apparatus in this country. We have 30,000 nuclear warheads which are more than sufficient to deter any conceivable nuclear threat.

We have a 2 million member armed forces, backed by 800,000 reserves and the most technologically advanced military machine in the world.

As Congressman Stokes said, we spend \$100 billion a year on this military establishment. I should think that this is more than adequate to meet any serious threat to American security.

I don't think we should allow the present crisis to be used to lead us down the dangerous path of foreign interventionism. I think the real threat we face here with this question of military registration is that we may be preparing ourselves for new Vietnams and new foreign interventionism.

We all have to recognize that the easily expandable force levels that a draft provides a Commander-in-Chief are an invitation to adventurism and Vietnams. I think we should be aware of our own history and recognize the propensity that we have had to get involved in these misguided foreign interventions.

We should oppose the draft on that basis. I believe that we do not need to get involved in foreign interventions. We have more than enough military capability to defend our legitimate interests.

There is a lot of talk these days from the far right about appeasement. The word has been used to discredit those on the left who would urge restraint. I think the term should be turned around and applied to those who would appease the insatiable thirst of the arms complex who have built up larger and larger military forces and squander more and more of our resources on larger and more expensive weapons.

I think it is time to turn our priorities around and come to our senses and halt the drift toward interventionism and potential war.

Thank you.

[The complete statement follows:]



A CITIZENS' ORGANIZATION FOR A SANE WORLD

Testimony of David Cortright
 Executive Director of SANE
 before the Appropriations Subcommittee
 on HUD-Independent Agencies,
 on Military Registration
 U.S. House of Representatives,
 February 27, 1980

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We are pleased to be here today to represent SANE's national membership on this important issue. SANE has long worked to prevent war, and foster international peace and cooperation. Our organization played a key role in the lobbying effort for the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, we were one of the first organizations to oppose the Vietnam War, and we're currently focusing on a range of initiatives for arms reduction and a peaceful, productive economy.

In keeping with our tradition of seeking restraint in U.S. arms policy, we are here today to express our absolute and unequivocal opposition to the President's proposal for revival of military registration. The Administration's request is unnecessary militarily and dangerous politically. Draft registration increases the risk of foreign interventionism and, ultimately, nuclear war.

The President claims that pre-registration is necessary to mobilize swiftly if we are challenged militarily in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere. Yet the Selective Service System itself has said that 'it already possesses the capacity to act quickly, and that advance registration does not provide significant improvement in our ability to respond. The Selective Service System's January 16 report, "Improving Capability to Mobilize Military Manpower" specifically recommends against advance registration, labelling it "redundant and unnecessary". As the Selective Service report shows, and others have testified here today, a post-mobilization registration could produce the first draftee in 17 days and the first 100,000 draftees in 35 days. This capability represents an extraordinarily quick reaction, considerably faster than required by the Pentagon, and is more than sufficient for any national emergency.

Contrary to White House claims, the President's plan of advance registration would yield very little improvement in the rate of mobilization during an emergency. Press secretary Jody Powell and chief domestic advisor Stuart Eizenstat have claimed that advance registration would speed inductions by 90 to 100 days, but the Selective Service report shows that the President's proposal would give only a seven day advantage in getting people to the induction stations. For example, the first 650,000 draftees in an all-out emergency could be inducted within 117 days under Carter's plan--as opposed to 124 days under the current system. This is a marginal and insignificant difference which is clearly not worth the cost and potentially massive social disruption which an unpopular advance registration plan would produce.

The present Selective Service System is more than capable of meeting Pentagon mobilization requirements. The Pentagon says it needs the first 100,000 draftees within 60 days; as noted earlier, the present system can deliver this number in 35 days. The Pentagon says it needs 650,000 inductees within 180 days; the present system can deliver them in 124 days. The rush to impose advance registration

is thus clearly unnecessary.

It's important to remember, moreover, that these mobilization requirements are themselves based on extreme worst case analyses. The Pentagon's mobilization requirements were revised in October of 1977 on the basis of a highly improbable scenario of war and a terrifying estimate of casualties. I did some personal checking on this a few years ago at the Pentagon and was astounded to hear an official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs referring to "hordes of divisions coming across the German border" and blithely assuming that such a war would "go nuclear". The mobilization requirements now in force are based on a calculation of hundreds of thousands of casualties in a matter of weeks. I would hope, before we willingly march off in acceptance of such scenarios, that the representatives of the American people seriously consider whether we want to prepare for such an eventuality.

The Pentagon's mobilization requirements are also faulty because they assume that the only source of manpower in an emergency would be the draft, that no Americans would volunteer. This is an absurd, cynical assumption which impugns the integrity of Americans and denies their patriotism. If the United States were truly threatened, the citizens and youth of this country, certainly come forward to defend their homeland. There would be no shortage of volunteers--if the cause were considered just and necessary.

Americans are not lacking in patriotism, but we do not want to be deceived by false crises. The President's call for military registration is an inappropriate response to an exaggerated threat.

The catalyst for the present war hysteria is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Certainly the Soviet intervention should be condemned as a brutal, criminal act. A recent policy statement adopted by the National SANE Executive Committee strongly protests the Soviet action and demands an immediate withdrawal.

But does the Soviet action imply a grand scheme to take over the Persian Gulf, as has been implied? And does it justify confrontationism and war preparation? If the Soviets are coveting the Gulf, they seem to have set off in an odd direction. There is no oil in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. And if they are trying to win favor with the Iranians, they have certainly adopted a very curious policy. Their actions have only hardened anti-Soviet sentiment in the Gulf and strengthened the resolve of nations like Iraq (a former Soviet client) to resist superpower encroachment.

A different analysis of the Afghanistan crisis sees the Soviet action as essentially defensive, as a desperate attempt to prop up a wobbling satellite shaken by internal revolt. The Soviets seem

to have acted in Afghanistan to preserve their influence rather than to extend it elsewhere. The pro-soviet PDPA government had been losing ground to its domestic opponents for nearly a year and was on the verge of collapse when the Soviets entered in December. So far the Russians have not been able to control the situation and seem to have only sparked further resistance. The Soviets have apparently stumbled into a Vietnam-type quagmire which should be very familiar to Americans: they are the despised foreign invaders saddled with an unpopular and unstable client. Why should we think that such a situation threatens American security? We are right to condemn the Soviet action and work through the U.N. and other international agencies to demand a withdrawal, but we should not be led blindly into an overreaction which could mire us in our own Vietnam, or worse, lead to the brink of nuclear confrontation.

No one questions the right of the U.S. to defend itself, or the need for military forces which are adequate to meet legitimate national security requirements. But America already has a vast, stupendous military apparatus which is more than sufficient to meet any conceivable threat. Our 30,000 plus nuclear warheads are many times more than necessary to deter strategic attack. Our two million member armed forces, backed by 800,000 Reservists and the most technologically advanced military machine in the world, are more than adequate to defend our nation. If serious threats to American security arise, Americans would surely respond, as they have in the past, to the nation's defense. But we must not let the present overreaction lead us down the dangerous path of foreign adventurism and war.

There is much talk these days of appeasement. The word is used to discredit those who urge restraint. But it should be turned around and applied to those who would appease the insatiable thirst of the arms complex, who would have us build up even larger military forces, squander our resources on still larger and more expensive weapons and impose a peacetime draft. It is time to stop appeasing those who wrap themselves in the flag and demand that we divert every national priority to the cause of war preparedness. Let us come to our senses and halt the drift to war.

Mr. BOLAND. Any questions?

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

Mr. Cortright, your remarks seem to go more to the foreign policy and defense policy, rather than to the question of registration. You mentioned the Administration's confrontationist approach, I think was the way that you said it.

Is it your opinion that the Administration should not attempt to at least give some message to the Soviets that we don't really like the fact that they invaded Afghanistan?

Mr. CORTRIGHT. I think it is proper for us to oppose the Afghanistan invasion and to use any diplomatic means at our disposal to mobilize international opinion against it. Actions in the U.N. are proper and correct. I think we should continue along this path.

The Soviets are injuring themselves greatly by what they have done. Cuba has lost a lot of its support within the nonaligned movement. These tactics I think we should employ, and we should work with our allies and other nations around the world to mobilize this kind of diplomatic pressure.

I don't think the circumstance requires a direct military action.

Mr. YOUNG. Of course, it is my understanding that the President has not suggested any direct military activity. The President is merely asking that we register young men and women. He has asked that we not go to the Olympics and some other symbolic things, rather than direct confrontation.

I don't think he has come up with any kind of a direct confrontation.

Another question on the same subject. You said you didn't think it would be possible to secure the oil fields. I also detected from your statement that you didn't think it would be appropriate for us to attempt to secure the oil fields.

Mr. CORTRIGHT. Correct, I think, in both cases. The Center for Defense Information has just put out a very careful analysis of the military requirements of taking oil fields which illustrates that the enterprise would be extremely shaky and uncertain.

Moreover, I don't think it is appropriate and proper. In fact, I think if there was such an attempt, we would face the most severe oil cutoff that we have seen yet. The whole Western economy of the—of the United States and of our allies would be severely disrupted by any attempt to militarily intervene in the Persian Gulf states.

Mr. YOUNG. The reason I question you on that point is, suppose that those who believe that the Soviets are not attempting to gain control of that oil reserve, suppose they are wrong and that the Soviets really are attempting to gain control of the Persian Gulf oil fields and the seas over which it is transshipped.

Then, is it again your opinion that we should not attempt to prevent this?

Mr. CORTRIGHT. As I said, I don't see any evidence that they are, in fact—

Mr. YOUNG. Suppose that's wrong.

Mr. CORTRIGHT. If it is clear they are, then the United States and its allies should get together and develop a joint response to it. The allies in Western Europe are much more dependent on that oil than we. I think we should develop with them a joint response.

Mr. YOUNG. Wouldn't it be better to be prepared in advance as a contingency? If you start to draw up plans during a period of crisis, your plan is usually as crisis-creating as the crisis itself. You need to be prepared in advance is my opinion.

I used to be a Boy Scout. They always said "Be prepared", and I believe that being prepared is a good way to go and a good message.

Mr. CORTRIGHT. I said, as I indicated, I think we are more than prepared and capable of defending our interests. I understand that in the present crisis the United States has put approximately 25 major combat vessels in that region on very short notice, three aircraft carriers—

Mr. YOUNG. And left the Pacific virtually void of any American naval presence. That great two-ocean navy we used to have is down to a very minor one-and-a-half-ocean navy, when the second ocean is the Indian Ocean, leaving the entire Pacific pretty much void of a powerful American naval presence.

I think that does invite a little adventuristic activity on the part of the Soviets. I don't want to get into a debate with you on this point. The President knows more than either one of us about the situations in the world. There comes a time when you have to start to trust the President on some of these decisions.

Enough said. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Cortright.

WITNESS

STATEMENT OF MR. CHAPLAIN MORRISON, WASHINGTON AREA COALITION AGAINST REGISTRATION AND THE DRAFT

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witness is Mr. Chaplain Morrison, Washington Area Coalition Against Registration and the Draft.

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to allow our organization to present its views before the Subcommittee.

Ever since the draft was introduced in Europe in the 18th Century, it has been linked with the willingness and capacity of national governments to engage in foreign wars. Expansion of the draft by Congress in 1963 enabled President Johnson to commit the United States to a full-scale conflict in Vietnam two years later without any Congressional declaration of war.

In his recent "State of the Union Message", President Carter coupled his proposal for draft registration with an extension of the concept of American vital interests to the Persian Gulf region and a commitment to go to war to protect those interests.

The Administration's war threats have recently been the subject of comment by the author of the cold war doctrine of containment and a leading expert on Russian affairs, George Kennan. According to Kennan, there is no evidence to support the Administration's assumption that the Soviet Afghan intervention "was a prelude to aggressive military moves against various countries farther afield."

But as a result of that unfounded assumption, he continues—I am quoting from Kennan again—"A war atmosphere has been created. discussion in Washington has been dominated by talk of American military responses, of the acquisition of bases and facilities, of the

creation of a rapid deployment force, of the cultivation of military ties with other countries all along Russia's sensitive southern border. Never since World War II has there been so far reaching a militarization of thought and discourse in the capitol. An unsuspecting stranger plunged into its midst could only conclude that the last hope of peaceful, non-military solutions had been exhausted—that from now on, weapons, however used, could count . . . we are now in the danger zone. I can think of no instance in modern history where such a breakdown of political communication and such a triumph of unrestrained military suspicions, as now marks Soviet-American relations, has not led in the end to armed conflict."

This is George Kennan's warning; and it is in this atmosphere of self-induced war crisis that the President is trying to reintroduce draft registration. Not because his Selective Service officials considered it necessary. To the contrary, in the suppressed report of January 16, "The post-mobilization option for registration is recommended as the basis for an effective standby Selective Service."

It was in the face of this Selective Service recommendation that the President and his foreign affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, decided to take the first step to reinstitute the draft.

Fortunately, the young men who are going to be asked to do the actual killing and dying are less persuaded than the President about the need to wage war on behalf of our "vital interests" in the Persian Gulf. The Washington Area Coalition Against Registration and the Draft is one of a multiplicity of organizations which sprang up spontaneously in response to the President's war talk and his reversal of his position on draft registration.

The Coalition is presently organizing teach-ins at colleges and high school throughout the Washington area, something being done all across the country, to build support for a massive mobilizing against the draft in Washington on March 2nd.

What we are witnessing, in my opinion, are the beginnings of a nationwide movement against resumption of the draft, which will continue to grow until the principle is reestablished that the United States government exists, in the words of our Declaration of Independence, to secure to its citizens their unalienable rights to "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness," and that this means that it cannot, without their consent as individuals, deprive them of that liberty and train them to murder people overseas in the name of its "vital interests." Too many people remember Vietnam and the fact that the war there brought us to slaughter and inflation.

In a recent article in Harper's Magazine entitled "Winning at Dominoes," T. D. Allman writes that it is an irony of Vietnam that American prestige in Southeast Asia was never so low as when we were waging war for it and never so high as now that we have lost the war.

"Our oddly appealing civilization" Allman concludes, "wins the most converts when we let them discover its appeal for themselves." But Allman's most significant point is about the horror of the war game called dominoes:

"One of the most terrible truths the Indochina war revealed—it is perhaps also a saving grace—is how little even the most horrible events affect the security of the people only a short distance away. . . .

Which is worse? That ghastly truth or the crimes committed in an attempt to pretend it isn't so."

These are the lessons we have learned from Vietnam which we shall be carrying to the colleges and high schools all over the country. And we believe that the youth are capable of learning from them. If you try to force them again to do your killing and dying overseas in the name of your "vital interests," I foresee a generational revolt which will make the 1960s look like a picnic. Spare us that agony. At long last, let us instead give peace a chance, by voting down draft registration and the effort to bring back conscription.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WITNESS

JORDAN FOX, PRESIDENT, STUDENT GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION,
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witness is Mr. Jordan Fox, President of the Student Government Association of the University of Maryland.

Mr. Fox. Good morning. This is my first time testifying before a congressional Subcommittee. I have asked my friends for advice on what to say, and how to say it. They have told me to be flexible yet firm, decisive yet compromising, confident yet humble, direct yet evasive. Have I listened to their advice? Yes and no.

Mr. BOLAND. The first paragraph indicates you have. I think it is a pretty good paragraph.

Mr. Fox. On behalf of the 31,000 students at my institution, I have come today to voice our emphatic opposition to draft registration. We are supportive of any measure which would enhance our national interest, improve our military and deter Soviet aggression. But we believe there is a difference between being strong and smart and strong and stupid. We differ with draft registration because we maintain that it represents the latter.

Three weeks ago, student opposition to draft registration was limited to the ad hominem appeals of a few. But the emotions on the other side were stronger as President Carter successfully equated his registration proposal with nationalism. But now we are seriously questioning the specific benefits of draft registration and we suspect we are not the only ones. I consider the overwhelming vote cast last night against draft registration on our largely conservative campus to be a significant indication of the growing intellectual and practical opposition to President Carter's announcement.

The Selective Service report disclosed this week has provided legitimacy to this growing movement. I should note that I was one of the 300 student leaders invited to the White House in mid-February and at that time I had supported registration, at least on a conceptual level. Although I was concerned about the context in which it was proposed, I wondered who could successfully argue against creating the mechanism needed to have a strong military defense. But President Carter failed to define clearly why registration was necessary and I, and others, left unconvinced of its merits.

Mr. Bernard Rostker was correct when he characterized draft registration as an unnecessary and expensive intrusion on the lives of American adults. The White House is retreating now, saying that the world situation has altered so dramatically since January 16 that it demands the reinstatement of draft registration.

What they mean by this is unclear. January 16 is a month after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and two months after the takeover of our embassy in Tehran. The message from the Selective Service is, and has been, clear—in terms of military strength, in terms of expense, in terms of capabilities in an emergency—draft registration is a waste of time and money.

Yet President Carter insists that this action is necessary to send a signal to the Soviets; however, registration by definition is a coercive act—you have no choice but comply. This is a symbol? \$45 million for what?

Perhaps we should have a \$45 million symbolic tax break or a \$45 million symbolic energy program. With \$45 million we could establish a new and exciting symbolic Department of Symbolism. But \$45 million, coupled with the impositions on the citizens of this Nation, seems a heavy price to pay for this "signal." National resolve must be associated with the support from the Americans for American policy and not presidential dictum.

So if registration fails to supply military benefit and fails to send anything more than a whimper to the Soviets, then what is the motivation and justification for providing the funds necessary for implementation?

There are two possibilities.

One is that this action is politically motivated. If this is the case, we will resist being the beasts of burden for any political campaign. Before we will submit to this imposition, we will want to know why. November 1980 is not a good enough answer.

The second possibility is that draft registration is the first step towards the reinstitution of a peacetime draft. President Carter separates the two and insists one does not lead to the other. But history tells us that the longest period registration has ever existed without a draft is a month and a half. You see, if you're against the death penalty, you don't turn around and order the electric chairs.

Over the next few days, the major student governments in the nation will receive the text of the Selective Service draft report. We will inevitably be asking some tough, pointed questions and expecting reasonable answers. We'd like to nip draft registration in the bud now. The main question is what specific benefits does draft registration offer this nation to warrant the expense and intrusion it demands? Aside from the usual rhetoric, the answers are not very convincing.

Thank you for your consideration of my testimony.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much, Jordan. Any questions?

Mr. COUGHLIN. You indicated there was an overwhelming vote cast last night against the draft registration at the University of Maryland. What was that vote? And what was the question that was asked?

Mr. Fox. It was to the student legislative association, 36 representatives from the student body who discussed the Selective Service report,

our need for military strength—and from that report overwhelmingly supported or opposed draft registration.

Mr. COUGHLIN. 36 people?

Mr. Fox. Yes.

Mr. COUGHLIN. What was the vote among the 36?

Mr. Fox. There were four people against.

Mr. COUGHLIN. That is not representative of the 30,000 students of the representatives.

Mr. Fox. It is the majority of the students, as any representatives represent the democracy.

Mr. YOUNG. That was the same question I was going to ask.

Mr. Fox. We will disseminate the information, which has not been well known throughout the student community. When I went to the White House I was one of 300 students. A lot of people were not aware of the types of information that has come to our knowledge, at least in the past few days, from the release of that Selective Service report. I imagine that when the other information becomes known to the students around the nation they will respond, and that response will be negative.

We don't mind giving our lives and giving our names to the Post Office, as long as it is of benefit to this nation.

Registration is not of benefit to this nation, and I don't believe it will have a favorable response among the student community.

Mr. BOLAND. I don't think I've ever heard the University of Maryland labeled as a largely conservative campus.

Mr. Fox. The student body is very conservative.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Fox.

WITNESSES

BERNIE FRIEDMAN, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, COLLEGE DEMOCRATS OF AMERICA

STEVE NUDEL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COMMITTEE, COLLEGE DEMOCRATS OF AMERICA

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witness is Mr. Bernie Friedman. You were at the White House, too?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

Mr. BOLAND. Well, here we are. We are glad to have you.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman and honorable Committee members, I am Bernie Friedman, National President of the College Democrats of America and the co-chairman for the Student and Youth Coalition to Defend Democracy. I would also at this time like to introduce Steve Nudel, who is the Executive Director of College Democrats of America, of the National Committee.

One week ago we announced the formation of our Coalition because we were concerned with the monopoly that a few student groups have had on the issue of draft registration. These groups have minimized the threat to the free world posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We wanted the public to know that young people are not as naive or gullible as these groups would like to believe.

The members of our Coalition are in regular communication with their local chapters throughout the country, and have found little of

the sentiment expressed by the anti-registration groups. We are all elected officials and—as you can sympathize—are concerned with re-election. If we have misread the feelings of our members we will be removed from office, but we believe that we represent the opinions of a majority of our members.

As a coalition representing a wide range of political philosophies, we may disagree on a number of issues, but we do agree on the need for draft registration. When we announced the formation of our coalition we issued a statement which I would like to read at this time:

"There has been much discussion of student views on draft registration and events in the Persian Gulf area. Some student organizations have made statements which may mislead the public into believing that young Americans have little concern with U.S. foreign policy interests and that they are unwilling to make sacrifices to defend democracy and our economic well-being.

"Claiming to speak for students these groups have stated that students do not see Afghanistan as a vital interest and that they are opposed to draft registration.

"We believe that they are misrepresenting the views of the majority of students and working youth in this country. Our own discussions indicate that students are well aware of the threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the danger to the United States, Europe, Japan, Israel and other democracies if the Persian Gulf falls under Soviet control. We have also found that a majority of students are not opposed to registration for the draft. Public opinion polls of students and working youth support this."

The actions of many of these groups in regard to Afghanistan are in sharp contrast to their silence on a number of human rights issues which many young Americans believe are important.

They have said nothing about their plight of the boat people. They have said nothing about the starvation and murder of the Cambodian people. They have said nothing about the exile and persecution of human rights activist Andrei Sakharov and others who have suffered for speaking up.

The interest of young people in international affairs does not begin and end with the question of draft registration.

As young people, we realize the consequences of draft registration. We know that we will have to bear the brunt of such actions, however, we believe that the best way to avoid war is to show aggressors that we are willing and able to fight.

Massive anti-draft registration demonstrations will only signal the Soviet Union that it is free to commit even more dangerous aggressions, which will bring the world closer to war.

We therefore support a variety of mobilization plans, including draft registration, which will convince the world that the United States and its allies intend to hold firm in their resistance to the spread of totalitarianism.

If the draft is reinstituted, however, we hope that the inequities of the past will be remedied. The system must be changed to end the drafting of a disproportionate number of poor and minorities.

Since all sectors of society, and particularly students, have benefited from the freedoms we enjoy, all of us must be called upon to de-

fend those freedoms. We will be studying the President's specific proposals to determine whether they are in fact equitable, but we welcome his initiative.

THE YOUTH AND STUDENT COALITION TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY

CO-CHAIRMEN :

Richard B. Abell, National Chairman, National Federation of Young Republicans.

Bernard Friedman, National President, College Democrats of America.

Chris Mueller, National Chairman, Young Social Democrats of America.

OTHER MEMBERS :

Kelly Alexander, Member, National Board of Directors, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Representative to the United States Youth Council for the NAACP Youth and College Division.

Roger Caster, President, New Jersey Student Association.

Daniel Curtain, National Chairman, Frontlash.

Steve Gible, National Chairman, College Republican National Committee.

Gary Davidson, National President, American Student Federation.

Charles Klien, President, Maryland Young Democrats.

Abe Morris, Representative, North American Jewish Youth Council.

William Ross, Executive Director, Recruitment and Training Program, Inc.

Don Shelton, Deputy Director of Veteran Affairs, National Black Veterans Organization.

Kenneth Simon, President, United States Youth Council.

William Sloane, National Committeeman, Pennsylvania Young Democrats.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that this is not a time to be shackled by out-model slogans and rhetoric. We must not let a vocal minority control the debate and determine the issues. We have called for a calm and reasonable public debate on the issue of draft registration.

Educational seminars, such as the ones proposed last week, should include both sides of the issue. We believe that presented with the facts, students and young people will continue to support draft legislation.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Bernie.

Steve, do you have anything to add?

Mr. BOLAND. Any of the members?

Mr. COUGHLIN. I just want to commend you on your statement. Having been on a number of college campuses recently, I think both the perspicacity and the loyalty of young Americans and students, in particular, are unquestioned.

I think that there is a great deal of difference in the sentiment, now than in the past, particularly in the Vietnam era.

I think, at the same time, we want to look dispassionately at the facts, at the kind of registration that is being proposed.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. What we are trying to do basically with the coalition is to draw the issues back into perspective in the student and youth community.

I think if we look at it intellectually instead of from an emotional perspective, if we look at the facts intellectually and what is happening in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, I think students and young people will be able to understand the reasons for many of the initiatives that the President has taken.

What we are trying to do is demonstrate to the American people that most young people are not swayed by the emotionalism of a small vocal minority on this issue.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Friedman, the names and the organizations that you read off now are all supporters of this statement?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Right.

Mr. YOUNG. Can you estimate how many students would be represented by these many organizations?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is difficult to estimate.

Mr. YOUNG. More than 36?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would say that it would be in the millions, almost, I would think. Each one of these organizations—for example, my organization, College Democrats of America, has 800 chapters among college campuses. That alone is quite a lot.

Mr. YOUNG. So you have no doubt that you are speaking, and these many other organizations are speaking for a majority of American students.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Correct. As I indicated in the testimony, we have been in daily communication with our members, with local club chapters. And being elected officials, we would be foolish to go out on a limb on such volatile issues if we didn't have the backing of our membership.

Mr. YOUNG. So you actually consulted as many of the organizations as you could, members of the many organizations rather than sitting down in a meeting and deciding what you think they stood for.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. BOLAND. What about the umbrella organization, the Youth and Student Coalition to Defend Democracy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is a coalition. We felt that a small vocal minority was forming and getting the monopoly of media attention, attention among the American people.

And last Thursday, we held a press conference, in fact here on the Hill, inaugurating our Student Youth Coalition to Defend Democracy.

The members that are listed were the initial signers of our coalition. And even today, we have a few more organizations that have been in contact with us and will be signing.

Mr. BOLAND. I notice that you have a number of state organizations. What has happened to the Massachusetts Young Democrats?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I'm not sure. I have been in contact with their president, Lewis DeJo, on this issue.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you.

WITNESS

CHRIS MUELLER, YOUNG SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witness is Chris Mueller of the Young Social Democrats. You are the last witness and probably the most effective, the Young Social Democrats.

Where do you come from?

Mr. MUELLER. New York State.

Mr. BOLAND. How many Young Social Democrats are there?

Mr. MUELLER. Couple of thousand.

I thank you for the opportunity to speak today. My name is Chris Mueller. I reside in New York State and am National Chairman of the Young Social Democrats, the youth section of the party of A. Philip Randolph, Eugene Debs and Norman Thomas.

I am a member of the coalition of youth organizations which include the College of Democrats of America, College Republican National Committee, the Young Republican National Federation, the NAACP Youth and College Division, the North American Jewish Youth Council, the National Black Veterans organization, the Recruitment and Training Program, the United States Youth Council and Frontlash, a youth-labor project for political participation.

I am here to urge you to approve the appropriation of the necessary funds for the purpose of registering all young people between the ages of 18 and 26 for possible future military conscription.

The role of the Soviet Union in world affairs is an aggressive one. The Soviet Union continues to ignore détente. The invasion of Afghanistan is just the latest link in a consistent chain of violations.

The dominant power in the Persian Gulf region today has become the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan has demonstrated the Soviet will to meet resistance with brute force. We should not underestimate the importance of the Persian Gulf for the United States and its allies.

The Soviet Union presently outspends the United States in new military programs by better than 2 to 1. Perhaps as much as 18 percent of their GNP is devoted to total military programs, almost twice the 4.9 percent of the U.S. GNP spent on defense.

This is the lowest level of allocations in real terms in the United States since 1940. We have been outstripped by the Soviet Union.

First, there are a number of ways in which we can demonstrate Western resolve to defend the rights of the free nations of the world.

Second, we should enforce restrictions on the transfer of technology and strategic hardware to the Soviet Union.

We should continue to speak out in defense of human rights everywhere.

Third, we should stand firm against Soviet aggression by upgrading our military preparedness.

Draft registration is an effective means toward this end. Polls show that Americans overwhelmingly favor registration, as do we of draft age.

Many young people show that they feel that registration is their part in a policy to counter the Soviet Union. At campus meetings, during youth conferences and in union halls, I have found general support for registration. There is, however, a string of organizations

which oppose registration, stage demonstrations, hold media events, and garner favor with the liberal new left.

This loose network does not represent a consensus among young people. Many young people who oppose the draft may be sincere; however, their efforts are subverted and exploited by pro-totalitarian organizations who often dominate these coalitions.

The draft is the most democratic way of apportioning the responsibility of military service. Even a more attractive, better paying volunteer army will not relieve the disproportionate share borne by poor minority youth of defending this republic.

Student deferments unfairly benefit an already privileged section of our society. Military service must be shared fairly. Specifically, members of both sexes aged 18 to 26 should be eligible for the draft.

There should be alternative service for conscientious objectors. Sufficient opportunities can be provided by the Peace Corps and Vista, in home support services, and through elderly and child care programs.

We should not be lured into misleading and deceptive arguments about choices between guns and butter. We are still the wealthiest nation in the world and this means that we can reduce interest rates, put people back to work, and provide for an adequate defense.

For these reasons, I ask this Committee to appropriate the necessary funds for draft registration.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Mueller.

In your statement, you urge the approval of funds for the purpose of registering all young people from the ages of 18 to 26.

You know the 1980 supplemental request is only for the age years of 19 and 20.

Mr. MUELLER. I understand that.

Mr. BOLAND. You favor that position?

Mr. MUELLER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mrs. Boggs.

Mrs. BOGGS. I'm sorry that I didn't have an opportunity to hear your testimony. I am bouncing between my two Subcommittees today, going back and forth.

I thank you for appearing. Because I didn't have an opportunity to hear you, I have no questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Where you at the White House?

Mr. MUELLER. No, I was not.

Mr. BOLAND. Were you asked to go?

Mr. MUELLER. No, I was not.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much.

That completes the hearing for this morning. This afternoon, we will be meeting in Room 2154 of the Rayburn Building.

This Committee will stand in recess until 2:00 this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SESSION

WITNESS

HON. JOHN F. SEIBERLING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. BOLAND. The Committee will come to order.

We will continue our hearings this afternoon on the recommendation for registration. We are delighted to have as our first witness this

afternoon, a distinguished Member of the Congress from the State of Ohio, the Honorable John F. Seiberling.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure for me to be here. I certainly commend you for the thoroughness with which you are going into this subject.

I know it is a matter of great importance to the people of the area you represent and it certainly is to mine.

I would like to ask your permission to put my entire written statement in the record and I will try to hit the highlights of it.

Mr. BOLAND. That will be fine.

Mr. SEIBERLING. As, of course, you know, last year the Congress, with the active support of the Administration, rejected a provision in last year's defense procurement bill which sought to require the President to register all males 18 years old for the draft.

And at that time, the President himself and various top administration officials ranging from the Secretary of Defense to the Acting Director of the Selective Service System, all stated that there was no need to resume registration for the draft.

They argued that with a slight increase in funds, at that time, as I recall, it was \$2½ million, the Selective Service System could develop the capability of registering and inducting personnel in emergency mobilization well within the Defense Department's timetable.

I have included in my statement specific excerpts from a letter to me from Stuart Eizenstat; Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower to Senator William Cohen; a statement by Robert Pirie, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Reserve Affairs and Logistics, to Senator Cohen, and a statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, a letter to Senator Cohen.

All of these statements make the point that draft registration from an operational standpoint was unnecessary, that the Selective Service System, for much smaller sums of money, could develop the capability and develop it rapidly to deliver manpower in the event of an emergency.

Nevertheless, the President, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, announced that he was going to ask for resumption of draft registration.

And last week, at a meeting at the White House, a briefing on defense matters, I asked the President personally what had changed since last year.

The answer was in generalities. The President called on the Secretary of Defense for an answer. The Secretary of Defense said it would take between 30 and 90 days longer to deliver manpower without draft registration.

And the Secretary of Defense came over to me after the meeting and said, "You know, it will take at least 3 weeks longer without registration." And I said, "Well, 13 days, to be precise, if your previous statements are correct." And he said "That's almost 2 weeks."

So you know, we begin to get the idea that the case to be made is not an operational case, but it is a case of symbolism.

Now I wrote a letter on February 11th to the new Director of Selective Service and asked him the same question I asked the President.

He wrote me a letter, which I got yesterday, in which he merely cited his testimony before the Armed Services Committee, which,

again, did not make out any specific operational need for reinstituting registration.

I also, last week, wrote a letter to the President reiterating my question to him, and I haven't yet received a reply to that.

To me, however, the most devastating statement of the lack of need for reinstituting registration is the draft working document from the director of Selective Service, which I presume your Subcommittee already has had access to.

I read it over a couple of days ago. It states unequivocally that the Selective Service, over the last several months, has completely revised the plans by which it will register and induct draft-eligible people into the armed services.

And states further: "We believe that we now have the capability to respond in any such emergency."

The interesting thing to me is that the timetable, the post-mobilization timetable that the draft working document puts forward, reduces the gap between pre- and post-mobilization delivery of inductees even further, to 7 days in the case of M+30 (for the delivery of the first inductee), to 9 days in the case of M+60 (for the delivery of 100,000 inductees), and to 8 days in the case of M+180 (for the delivery of 560,000 inductees).

Now I have seen nothing, Mr. Chairman, from the Administration that rebuts any of the operational statements in that report. They have tried to downplay its importance by saying it is a draft working document. And yet, their official statements are absolutely devoid of any facts rebutting the conclusions of the document.

And the President has reiterated that we need to show our resolve and that is, in effect, what Mr. Rostker said in his letter to me.

I suggest that all of the statements that have been made show that draft registration is not necessary in peacetime. I call your attention particularly to the quote on page 2 of my statement from Assistant Secretary Pirie, in which he says: "Peacetime registration is not needed from an operational point of view because registration can be conducted after M-Day in time to obtain the first wartime inductee by M+30, as we desire." He then goes on to say that we are going to need pre-trained individuals for the first 90 to 120 days following mobilization, regardless of the status of registration or the draft.

Thus, peacetime registration does nothing to meet our pre-trained individual manpower needs.

So it does seem to me that the burden is on the proponents of draft registration to justify this from an operational standpoint. The Russians presumably read the newspapers and the Congressional Record the same as we do. They know what the Administration's experts have said. They know what registration will do and what it will not do.

Presumably, they take at face value what the reports and the Administration has said about what draft registration will do to strengthen our defense.

I took the position, Mr. Chairman, at the time we had the debate last year that I would support both registration and the draft if the proponents could convince me that it was necessary from the standpoint of defense.

But in the absence of facts that show that operational considerations require it, it seems to me that it is divisive. The students are already demonstrating in your state and in mine. We are going to turn off another generation of people who are prepared to do whatever is necessary to defend their country.

But they are not prepared to have their privacy invaded and their liberty for anything less.

And, therefore, I suggest that draft registration will be counter to what the President desires and will send the wrong message, a message, of disunity and a message of pretense, rather than a message of substantive power.

I would like to suggest to the Subcommittee that instead of recommending the appropriation of the amount of money that the President has requested for this purpose, that they recommend only sufficient money to allow the Selective Service System to build the capability that they said they could build to meet these manpower deadlines, which is something between \$2½ and \$4 million, as I understand it.

I would be glad to answer any questions that you may have.
[The complete statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. SEIBERLING
ON SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM APPROPRIATIONS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today as a public witness on proposed appropriations for the Selective Service System.

As you know, President Carter announced in his State of the Union Message on January 23 that he would seek to obtain funds from Congress to resume registration for the draft. Specifically, the President announced that he intends to register 19 and 20 year old males later this year. Starting on January 1 1981, the President proposes to register those men born in 1962, with continuous registration of those turning 18 from that point on. The President has also requested congressional authority to register young women for the draft.

In order to upgrade the capability of the Selective Service System to function in an emergency mobilization, as well as to provide for registration itself, the Administration is requesting approximately \$21.9 million in supplemental fiscal year 1980 funds, and fiscal year 1981 funds of roughly \$35.5 million, as amended following the decision to resume registration.

Last year, Congress, with the active support of the Administration, rejected a provision in the fiscal year 1980 defense procurement bill (H.R. 4040) which sought to require the President to resume registering 18 year old males for the draft. At that time, the President himself, and various top officials ranging from the Secretary of Defense to the Acting Director of the Selective Service System stated repeatedly that there was no need to resume registration for the draft. Administration officials argued repeatedly that, with a slight increase in funds and personnel, -- a far smaller amount than what is now requested -- the Selective Service System could develop the capability of registering and inducting personnel in an emergency mobilization, well within the Defense Department's timetable. During congressional debate on draft registration, Administration statements included the following:

"The Administration opposes new legislation to reimpose peacetime registration for the draft. The President already has adequate authority to require registration if circumstances warrant. We do not believe it is necessary to impose this burden on our nation and its youth at this time when there are effective ways to improve the capability of the Selective Service System so that it can respond quickly in an emergency.

...We are confident that, if adequate funds are provided by the Congress, the Selective Service System will be able to develop the capability to meet our requirements."

--Stuart E. Eizenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, letter to Congressman John F. Seiberling, July 23, 1979

"The Department of Defense agrees that there are shortcomings in the Selective Service mobilization plan, but does not agree with the conclusion that peacetime registration is necessary. The Department of Defense views registration in peacetime as a reasonable claim by a nation on its citizenry if it is necessary, and - equally - as an unreasonable demand if it is not necessary...It remains the view of the Department of Defense that a post-mobilization registration plan is feasible, and that it is better to proceed with preparation and testing of that option than to reinstate peacetime registration. In 1917 the nation conducted a registration within 18 days of passage of enabling legislation while at war. I believe it is reasonable to expect that we could do better in the future, provided that we make use of modern technology and that we plan prudently."

--Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, & Logistics, letter to Senator William S. Cohen, September 13, 1979

"We believe that peacetime registration is not needed from an operational point of view because registration can be conducted after M-Day in time to obtain the first wartime inductee by M+30, as we desire. Our schedule for obtaining wartime draftees is constrained by our capacity to expand the peacetime training base. ...Thus, we are going to need pretrained individuals for the first 90 or 120 days (following mobilization) regardless of the status of registration or a draft. Peacetime draft registration cannot meet our pretrained individual manpower needs."

--Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics, letter to Senator Cohen, September 17, 1979

"We are concerned that the Selective Service System cannot now meet the 30-day (mobilization) requirement. That circumstance does not, however, lead to the conclusion that peacetime registration is necessary. In the near term, we think that the proper course of action is to enhance the standby ability of the Selective Service System, including its computer resources, its staffing and its planning. The Acting Director of the Selective Service System has testified that he is confident that, if adequate funds are provided by the Congress, the Selective Service System will be able to develop the capability to meet our requirements...Our view and the view

suggested in all studies of the question that I have seen is that the critical step towards achieving our goals is not immediate collection of names through registration, but rather the immediate improvement of our ability to prepare for processing people, and in the case of mobilization actually to process them, through the Selective Service System."

--Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, letter to Senator Cohen, June 8, 1979.

In the face of these rather comprehensive reasons why we should not resume registration for the draft, on what grounds does the Administration justify its decision to seek funds for the resumption of registration in 1980? As I understand it, the Administration's case for such a dramatic reversal of policy is essentially that, first, the resumption of draft registration, in context with other actions such as the cutback of grain sales to the Soviet Union, is an effective symbol of U.S. displeasure with Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan; and, second, that operationally, the resumption of registration provides the President with the greater certainty that draftees will be available in the event of a fast-breaking, high casualty war in Western Europe.

While Administration witnesses before this Subcommittee have emphasized both the symbolic and the operational justification for the resumption of registration, the President's main argument has been the former - that it is necessary to send the Soviet Union a "message" demonstrating U.S. resolve in the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The symbolic gesture of resuming draft registration when there are other workable alternatives to upgrade the mobilization capability of the Selective Service System places an unnecessary burden on our young people, and will be a divisive issue in the months to come. The Soviets will not be fooled by such an empty gesture. In fact, I suspect that they know as well as anyone else that the resumption of peacetime registration does nothing to address our mobilization capability that could not be done without resuming peacetime registration. I suggest instead that a needless resumption of draft registration, and the domestic dissent which is sure to follow, will send a very different message to the Soviets than the one the President intends to send.

Nor has the Administration made a good case for the operational necessity of resuming registration. The inadequate operational justification is readily apparent in statements made by Administration officials before your Subcommittee yesterday. I was actively involved in last year's successful campaign to defeat the draft registration provision in H.R. 4040. At that time, I took the position that if I were convinced that registration, or the draft itself, were necessary to provide adequate manpower for national defense, I would support it. Since the President's announcement, I have requested both the President and the Selective Service Director to provide me with an operational justification for the resumption of registration. Thus far, I have received no such justification.

The central argument which the Administration appears to be making is that the Selective Service System does not now have the capability of meeting the Defense Department's emergency mobilization timetable. In the February 11, 1980 Report to Congress on Presidential recommendations for Selective Service reform, the Administration states that the "ability of the Selective Service to meet this (mobilization) schedule has been the subject of a number of critical reviews.... Each study concluded... that (the) Selective Service 'does not presently have the capability to meet the Department of Defense wartime manpower requirements from our "deep standby" status.'" (Page 8). In a congressional staff briefing at the Old Executive Office Building on February 21, and again in testimony before your Subcommittee on February 26, Deputy Director of OMB John P. White stated that it would take at least a year for the Selective Service to gear up to have a credible post-mobilization capability.

Yet the "Draft Working Document" from the Director of the Selective Service System, dated January 16, 1980, states unequivocally that the "Selective Service, over the last several months, has completely revised the plans by which it will register and induct draft eligible people into the Armed Services. We believe that we now have a capability to respond in an emergency." (Page 28). Significantly, this document, which details a post-mobilization registration plan, was

released to Members of Congress only after it had been leaked to the press. This "Draft Working Document" examined a number of pre- and post-mobilization registration options, and concluded that the "post-mobilization option, subject to field testing later this year and the international situation at any time, is recommended as the basis for an effective Selective Service." (Emphasis added).

The key conclusions of the "Draft Working Document" are devastating to the Administration's present position. These conclusions are:

- 1) That post-mobilization registration is an effective means of meeting the Defense Department's emergency mobilization timetable: "Every participatory registration option can more than meet the DOD manpower requirement. The post-mobilization option is by far the most cost effective, and least intrusive, and is the option chosen by Selective Service."
- 2) That pre-mobilization registration would not substantially improve the delivery schedule of inductees in an emergency mobilization, but would be significantly more costly. According to the Document, inductions would begin on M+17, 100,000 inductions could be made by M+35, and 650,000 inductions by M+125, at a cost estimate of some \$9.7 million. With peacetime registration in effect, inductions would begin on M+10, 100,000 inductions could be made by M+26, and 650,000 by M+117 (saving seven, nine, and eight days respectively over post mobilization registration) at a cost of over \$25 million.
- 3) That post-mobilization registration is the preferred option: "The post-mobilization option should substantially exceed Defense requirements, employs the fewest number of full time personnel, and costs the least."
- 4) That, given the effectiveness of the post-mobilization plan, the resumption of registration is unnecessary: "While costs and staffing should not be the determining factor (in selecting an option) the reduced delivery time provided by the other options is redundant and unnecessary."

The Administration has tried to downplay the importance of the "Draft Working Document" on the grounds that it is a preliminary draft and is overly optimistic about Selective Service capabilities. Yet the Administration's official statements are devoid of any facts rebutting the conclusions of the document. The President has simply failed to provide any operational justification for his decision to resume the process of draft registration. For the sake of sending an empty symbol to the Soviets, we are placing significant restrictions on the privacy of our young people, and creating disunity at a time when we need to demonstrate national unity.

In the face of all the contradictory evidence about the need for resuming draft registration, I urge the Subcommittee to strike those funds requested for the process of registration itself. I am sure that the House will support a reasonable increase in appropriations for the Selective Service to take the system out of deep standby, and acquire the equipment, personnel, and field structure it needs to be ready to respond effectively in an emergency mobilization. I personally will support it. But the available evidence will not lead me to support an appropriation for the resumption of registration itself.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Seiberling, for a very knowledgeable statement.

I take it that you would favor post-mobilization registration, which would be one of the options that the SSS recommended in its draft report.

Mr. SEIBERLING. I would, indeed. And as a matter of fact, I recognize that the armed services do have some manpower problems, particularly in the area of trained and skilled personnel and the non-commissioned officer grades.

And draft registration has so far not been shown to answer those needs. They also have a problem with respect to the reserves.

I know that the Armed Services Committee is working on both of those problems. I personally will favor moving ahead to address that. Perhaps I ought to mention one other thing, and that is that last year, Congressman Montgomery got the GAO to make a study of draft registration in response to a request he made.

They made a rather curious report in which their summary report stated that the Selective Service did not have the capability of meeting both mobilization manpower requirements.

And therefore, they supported draft registration.

But when you read the actual report, what they were saying was that it did not then have the capability. And I personally called (his staff) GAO Director Staats and told him I thought his conclusion was not supported by the actual facts that he set forth in his report.

And he said, well, he appreciated very much my calling him on it. And as a matter of fact, he, too, was going to raise similar questions with respect to that particular report.

He conceded it was based on the then capabilities of the Selective Service System without the supplemental money that they said they needed in order to develop a credible post-mobilization capability.

So in case that matter is brought up, I think it is important to have it in that context.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Coughlin?

Mr. COUGHLIN. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler?

Mr. TRAXLER. John, what if this Committee were to recommend to the House and the House were to concur in a post-mobilization registration program?

How do you perceive that that would be received by the Russians? Would they see us as failing to follow through with any strong message to them of our dissatisfaction with their venturing into Afghanistan? Or would they interpret that as a "sign of weakness"?

Mr. SEIBERLING. I think, realistically, in their own inner councils, they would realize that we were merely dismissing what was basically a gesture.

I think the Russians are very realistic. They look at our actual power and they evaluate that, not gestures. I think it will be construed by some and the media, and possibly in other countries as being favored by Congress to back up the President. I think we are in a box to that extent. I think we have to look at the overall view, and I think it would be a terrible thing to say to our young people, you know, we realize that the President has put us in a box, and therefore,

politically, we think, and diplomatically, we think we have to go along with that—and impose it on you—even though we know that it isn't going to accomplish anything in terms of our actual capability.

I think in the long run, that would be more harmful to this country than facing up to the facts of the situation, particularly if it is coupled with statements from people like myself who opposed it last year.

We are prepared to reinstitute the draft or national universal service of some sort, if, indeed, that is necessary for national defense.

But the case has to be made not just allow ourselves to be pushed into a position because we want to back the President. I want to back the President and I think my record shows I have backed him.

But I don't think that we should do the wrong thing merely because it temporarily might be misconstrued in some quarters.

Mr. TRAXLER. I think the recommendation on the part of the Administration relative to increased defense spending is somewhere close to 5 percent for the next year, and for each of the next several years over and above inflation.

Mr. SEIBERLING. I think it is perfectly clear. I think the gentleman makes a good point. It is perfectly clear that the Congress is going to do a lot of other things to back the President up.

We are going to increase the defense budget. We have backed him up in some of the other tough things he has done about technology and grain and the Olympic games, and that's simple. But the others are not.

I think it would be quite abundantly clear—that's the message that the Russians are going to get, that they have stirred up the sleeping giant again. And they are going to find that they are confronted with tremendous increases in our defense effort.

Mr. TRAXLER. Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, let me just follow up on that angle one bit.

You don't think it would send some appropriate signal if Congress supported the President for registration and if our young people went and registered in substantial numbers? You don't think that that would send a signal to the Russians?

Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes, to this extent. It says that the President and the Congress are prepared to pay a political price to show that we mean business.

I don't think we need to call forth our young people to pay that price merely because of the symbolism involved. We can send a message to the Russians in far more concrete terms than that—by beefing up our conventional military threat, or positioning supplies, for example.

Mr. COUGHLIN. But we have to be willing to do that. Wouldn't that show that our young people are behind the President?

Mr. SEIBERLING. I think they have demonstrated that they are behind the President already. But there is another way out. If we want to go that far, we can do what Congressman Weaver has suggested.

He has put in a bill to provide for voluntary registration.

I think you will find that far, far more people would voluntarily register than the armed services could possibly use in the first 30 days

of mobilization. That would be one way to try it out if there is some feeling that we need to show our nation's resolve and our young people's resolve.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, John.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Next we have Mr. Patrick Lacefield, National Coordinator of the March 22 National Mobilization Against the Draft.

WITNESS

PATRICK LACEFIELD, NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF THE MARCH 22 NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AGAINST THE DRAFT

Mr. LACEFIELD. First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Committee, for the opportunity to testify here on behalf of the March 22 Mobilization.

My name is Patrick Lacefield. I am National Coordinator of the March 22 National Mobilization Against the Draft, which is a coalition of national peace, religious, community, student and women's organizations, as well as anti-draft coalitions in Chicago, Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. We range in politics from the United States Student Association to the Americans for Democratic Action to Students for a Libertarian Society, but we are united in our opposition to the Administration proposal for registration, to any resumption of the draft, and to the \$20.5 million supplemental appropriations request by the Selective Service now before this Subcommittee.

On March 22, we intend to bring thousands of citizens—young and old, black and white, liberal and conservative—to Washington to rally against registration and the draft.

Today, I would like to briefly tell you why we are against the supplemental appropriations for Selective Service required for registration.

In our view, registration is the first step down the road to conscription. The Carter Administration knows it. The American people know it.

Ten years ago, the draft was a central question for American youth, their parents, and the society at large. Grades and relationships, war and peace, citizenship and exile, indeed life and death hung in the balance. Today, at the dawn of the 1980s, the question is the same.

Shall American youth be subject to registration and, ultimately and inevitably, conscription into the armed forces to bolster the perception of American military might and provide a solid foundation for an interventionist foreign policy in the Third World? One answer to President Carter is, "No."

We reject Administration claims that the armed forces of the United States are inadequate to the task of protecting our national interests. We believe that standing armed forces of two million troops, backed by ready reserves of 800,000 and the most technologically advanced military machine this world has ever known, are more than sufficient to protect any legitimate security interests.

The by now much quoted January 16 Selective Service report that the Administration initially sought to keep from seeing the light of

day characterized advance registration as "redundant and unnecessary" and would—according to Selective Service chief Bernard Rostker—save only seven days in an emergency situation.

The Administration claims draft registration is necessary as a response to the crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We forthrightly condemn the holding of hostages in Iran and oppose Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, as we oppose all violations or self-determination and national independence.

However, the Administration is cynically using the crisis in Afghanistan to implement plans for a military build-up conceived long before the events in Southwest Asia. Rather than deal with the complex dynamic of social change in the Third World, the Administration is playing a card—draft registration—that is clearly irrelevant and inappropriate to the situation at hand.

A much larger conscript force could have prevented neither the crisis in Iran nor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Instead, a boost in the military manpower tool and increased mobilization readiness in the current political context could act as incentives to ill-advised and hasty military intervention in the Third World.

Unlike many in the high councils of power, we are unwilling to consign the lessons of Vietnam to some dusty closet. One of those lessons was the extent to which conscription facilitated a massive build-up of United States forces in Vietnam which peaked at half a million troops.

We also believe as a coalition that peacetime conscription runs counter to the American historical tradition. Throughout our 204 years as a nation, many eloquent voices in the House and the Senate have sounded off against the ultimate violation of individual and civil liberties which conscription in peacetime represents. We would do well to recall that peacetime conscription is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon and that many of our ancestors came to these shores to escape military conscription in 19th Century Europe.

Like Congressman Seiberling, I believe that should the vital interests of this country be threatened, I have no doubt that American youth would voluntarily respond to their country's call to service, and I might suggest that that might well be the litmus test for the legitimacy of a particular call-to-arms.

The Carter Administration's proposal for draft registration does involve a historic departure from past practice by including women. We oppose registration and the draft for both men and women.

We believe the Administration has used the issue of registration of women as a diversion to focus attention away from the more central issue of registering anyone at all. Such a proposal makes a mockery of the legitimate struggles of women for political, social, and economic equality. We do not feel the inclusion of women into the Selective Service System should be confused with any real progress toward equal rights.

Selective Service Director, Bernard Rostker, has called registration "a simple act for a simple purpose." We reject such a statement. We see nothing simple about taking the first step along the road to the involuntary conscription of American youth into the military. Neither is there anything simple about the obvious corrosive effects on civil

liberties and democratic rights, not to mention a heightened militarism that would ensue from the onset—with the onset of registration and the draft.

The decision this Subcommittee makes may well determine the very possibility of democratic social change and peace at home and abroad in the decade to come. On behalf of the March 22 National Mobilization Against the Draft, I urge you to vote "no" on the supplemental appropriations request of the Selective Service System.

Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much, Pat, for the well-delivered statement.

Mr. Coughlin?

Mr. COUGHLIN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask about one statement relative to vital interests. You said that you thought in the case where the vital interest of the United States were threatened that enough young Americans would be willing to volunteer.

Mr. LACEFIELD. Yes, I did.

Mr. YOUNG. Who is going to determine what those vital interests are, though, and when they are being threatened?

The President seems to believe now that some of our vital interests are about to be threatened. Maybe there is a difference of opinion as to what our vital interests are.

Mr. LACEFIELD. I think, although the groups in the coalition would, as I said, differ in their political approach to these things as to exactly what vital interests are and where they would draw the line, I think fundamentally what we would like to call for is some kind of debate about what those vital interests are, rather than an assumption that the Persian Gulf or General Zia in Pakistan or whatever is a vital interest—assumed to be a vital interest without the kind of debate in the Congress and the public and the press that we think is necessary.

Mr. YOUNG. It appears that one vital interest that the President sees as vital to the United States is the continuing flow of oil from the Persian Gulf area—the oil reserves themselves as well as the shipping, and he seems to suspect that the Soviets may have in mind a further move beyond Afghanistan toward the Persian Gulf area.

What would your group's position be if the oil reserves and the sea lanes were being threatened? Would you consider that a vital interest as the President seems to?

Mr. LACEFIELD. I think there are a number of ways to approach that. First of all, I think we would support the President's interest—the President's drive to try to reduce the dependence of the United States on foreign oil.

First of all, I would think in reaction to an emergency, that would be something that could be done immediately. I think the problem you have is trying to extrapolate just how you ensure the flow of oil from the Middle East when a great many of the countries in a very delicate political position aren't able publically to commit themselves, say, to the Carter Doctrine or what have you in the Middle East.

I think it is questionable in our minds the extent to which armed force, short of massive military intervention, could keep those sea lanes open.

Mr. YOUNG. But again, do you think your organization would consider it vital to the interests of the United States to keep that oil reserve or that oil shipment from coming under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union?

Mr. LACEFIELD. I think that's fair to say, yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much.

Mr. LACEFIELD. Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witness is Daniel Kornstein; Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

WITNESS

DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION
AND COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE AND MILITARY AFFAIRS,
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR, CITY OF NEW YORK

Mr. KORNSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving the Association of the Bar of the City of New York this opportunity to present the views of two of its committees on the Administration's request for a supplemental budget to resume Selective Service registration.

The Association's Committee on Federal Legislation and Committee on Military Justice and Military Affairs are jointly studying the legal issues raised by Selective service registration and possible resumption of the draft, with a view to submitting to Congress one or more comprehensive reports on these issues.

In the meanwhile, however, we do appreciate this opportunity to address the questions presently being considered by this Subcommittee—namely, the resumption of Selective Service registration and in particular the registration of women.

Turning first to the issue that has generated the most public debate, if Selective Service registration is resumed, we favor the registration of women for the draft evenhandedly with men.

As we understand the President's proposal, registration of women is all that is being proposed at this time. It is for a later day to consider whether women should actually be drafted if the draft is resumed, what numbers of women should be drafted, and in what proportion to men, and what functions women can or should perform in the military. Our committees expect to be considering these issues in a future report.

While there will continue to be sharp debate over the need or propriety of drafting women into the armed services, we believe that it must be acknowledged that there are many military functions that women are capable of performing effectively and are performing effectively today. Therefore, the principal issue raised by conscription of women is one of fundamental fairness—whether, if the draft is resumed, the burdens of the draft and the resulting disruptions of careers and life plans should be borne by young men alone, or whether young men and women should share these burdens.

We believe that the burdens should be shared equitably.

But in deciding whether to authorize funds for the registration of women, this Committee need not reach even this issue of fundamental fairness. Rather, by authorizing funds for the registration of women at this stage, with nothing more, this Committee and Congress will merely make possible the future consideration of whether and under what circumstances women should be drafted if the draft is resumed in the future.

On the other hand, by failing to authorize funds for the registration of women at this stage, Congress and the Executive Branch will be foreclosed from further consideration of these issues. At the very least, failing to fund the registration of women now might make it much more expensive in the future for women to be registered.

Turning to the balance of the Administration's proposal, we are disturbed that the President plans to defer the introduction of legislation dealing comprehensively with a reinstitution of the draft until a military mobilization. Indeed, we understand that the President's projected timetable for the induction of draftees in the event of a crisis proceeds on the assumption that Congress will enact a draft law in but one day.

We believe that there are many important issues raised by any resumption of the draft that Congress ought to deliberate carefully. Among these issues are what exemptions and deferments, if any, the law should provide and whether the new law should make any change in the definition or treatment of conscientious objectors from that recognized in the past.

Although we do not take a position on whether a new draft law necessarily should provide for exemptions, deferments, or conscientious objector status, we nevertheless believe that Congress should have the opportunity to address these issues calmly and deliberately before a national emergency arises, and not in the crisis atmosphere of a military mobilization that requires immediate Congressional action.

We are encouraged that the Administration's proposal seeks to assure that the new local draft boards and appeal boards will be representative of the community by ethnic breakdown, occupation, age, and sex. However, we have very serious misgivings about the manner of registration contemplated by the Administration's proposal.

Although we have not had an opportunity to study the President's proposal in depth, we understand that it contemplates the registration to consist merely of registrants furnishing their names, addresses, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers on forms filed with the Post Office. No classification would occur until a registrant receives an induction notice, at which point he or she would have about 10 days to report for induction or to file an appeal with a local draft board seeking an exemption or deferment.

Should a national emergency arise requiring the induction of substantial numbers of persons into the armed services, the failure to provide in advance for the classification of registrants until the time of induction could lead to chaos. We are concerned that by the time a national emergency arises, it will be too late effectively to process the large number of claims for whatever exemptions and deferments, if any, the as yet unwritten draft law may provide.

Waiting until the eleventh hour to process these claims not only threatens our military capability to respond to a national emergency. From the standpoint of those who will be subject to a draft, the consideration of claims for exemption and deferment in a crisis atmosphere, without adequate time for due deliberation, will almost inevitably impair the registrants' rights to be afforded procedural due process.

The need for due deliberation by the local draft boards is particularly important if the Administration's current disposition to consider

all claims to exemption and deferment case-by-case without broad categories of automatic exemptions or deferments becomes law.

We are especially concerned about prejudice to the due process rights of registrants claiming conscientious objector status, assuming that the new draft law will make some provision for conscientious objection. The consideration of claims to conscientious objector status typically requires one or more interviews with the registrant, examination of the registrant's religious background and training, and review of affidavits and other materials submitted by persons familiar with the registrant's beliefs. This process takes both time and dispassionate judgment, two commodities that will likely be in short supply in the event a national emergency requires rapid mobilization of our armed forces.

Therefore, without reaching the question of whether it is necessary or appropriate at this time to resume registration for the draft, we recommend that if registration is resumed, funds be appropriated at the outset to provide for the administrative machinery necessary to classify registrants at the time of registration.

I would be glad to take any questions you might have.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much for your statement. We understand the President's projected timetable proceeds on the assumption that the Congress could enact a draft law in one day. Actually, that would never occur. That is a concern that you don't have to worry about. At least in my judgment.

Mr. KORNSTEIN. I'm glad to hear that.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Coughlin?

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kornstein, you indicate you concurred in the appropriation of funds for the registration of women, even though that has not been authorized. Are you aware of the difference?

Mr. KORNSTEIN. I understand that.

Mr. COUGHLIN. We would have to have a waiver of the rule, which is unlikely.

Mr. KORNSTEIN. We are aware of that, but we are trying to treat that broad issue at this time. It has been something that has, even in today's "New York Times," been talked about on the front page.

Mr. COUGHLIN. We have some difficulty because registration of women is not authorized. Yet you ask us to appropriate the money. That means we would have to get a waiver of the rules of the House, and it is unlikely we would be able to get it.

Mr. KORNSTEIN. We are aware of that.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Secondly, am I correct in understanding that you would oppose registration unless it also provided for classification at this time?

Mr. KORNSTEIN. That is the sense of our committees, yes. Whether we would actually oppose it—

Mr. COUGHLIN. That's what I'm trying to find out.

Mr. KORNSTEIN. Our committees have not come to an opinion on that. They would strongly favor and recommend a classification to be used at this time with registration. I am not authorized to say whether we would oppose it if there were no classification.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler?

Mr. TRAXLER. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Sabo?

Mr. SABO. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Kornstein.

WITNESS

JOHN H. OWEN, PRESIDENT, NORTH GEORGIA COLLEGE

Mr. BOLAND. Next we have Mr. John H. Owen, President of North Georgia College.

Mr. OWEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for letting me appear today before this Committee on behalf of the National Service Committee of the Association of State Colleges and Universities.

I speak in favor of registration of both men and women.

The recent holding of hostages in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan by Russia has shocked the citizens of this nation into realizing that we have de-emphasized our armed forces to a dangerous low level and that we cannot depend on the trust and peaceful talk of other world power countries. This is a feeling that hasn't been experienced since World War II and makes all of us realize that it is essential for us to maintain a strong national security and an armed force second to none.

The time is right, and there is currently a strong feeling of patriotism and enough national concern for reinstating the registration of both men and women.

Registration would give our young people an opportunity. They have an opportunity now under a volunteer program, but there is no real urge to join. They want to be challenged and know that their talents are needed and that they will make a contribution. This needs to be universal and everyone should be required to serve in one capacity or another with no deferments except for medical reasons. This does not necessarily mean with our armed forces, but may be other types of service to country.

There is a need to demonstrate a national will and show to the world that we are ready to make the decisions necessary for the survival of this Nation. There is a strong feeling that this will does not exist at this time.

Registration would provide a source of information should we require it. We have no data base for mobilization, and registration would provide a ready available file in case of a national emergency, and should be a start toward organization when it becomes necessary.

No one wants war, and readiness is our best prevention of it.

The twelve-member National Service Committee of the Association of State Colleges and Universities polled its twelve members concerning the registration and draft. They have talked to numerous students. These members represent colleges and universities across the Nation, including Alaska. The results were as follows among the members of the Committee:

1. Favoring registration of men—100 percent yes.
2. Favoring registration of women—100 percent yes.
3. Favoring registration and draft of men—92 percent yes, 8 percent not immediately.
4. Favoring registration and draft of women—84 percent yes, 16 percent no.
5. The evidence of opposition to registration on campus were as follows: 12 percent yes, 60 percent no, 12 percent not certain, 12 percent limited.

There is a very positive feeling among men and women students that women should register, but approximately 50 percent feel that women should not serve in combat.

The volunteer army does not give us sufficient men and women of higher intelligence to operate the sophisticated and complicated equipment used by our armed forces. We have forgotten that we need qualified personnel for a quality armed forces. Our citizens want the best doctors, good engineers, and quality educators, but they want to spend as little as possible on our national security which might some day determine their very existence.

Our reserve components and the National Guard are not fully staffed at this time. The Army alone is required to double the number of reserve officers we are now producing by 1984 in order to meet our needs. We need a strong reserve, and registration might encourage more qualified young people to participate in the reserve units. As you well know, reserve units are required to be ready for combat in 30 days.

The general consensus is that the majority of the young people of this Nation would stand up and be counted in favor of the registration when they realize that it is necessary. The minority opposing registration will be heard, but even they will follow, for we wonder what they would do to protect their freedom to protest if it was taken away?

We have a great nation and enjoy many privileges that do not exist in other countries of the world. If we wish to enjoy the freedoms and benefits of this nation, then we should share in the responsibilities to protect them. The previous generations have shared these responsibilities, and there is no reason to feel that the current generation will do otherwise.

Gentlemen, I thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Owen.

How many institutions are there in the Association of State Colleges and Universities?

Mr. OWEN. I would say there are roughly around 200. They include all of them except the land grant colleges, any of the state institutions, state colleges and universities other than the land grant colleges.

Mr. BOLAND. They are all members of this Association?

Mr. OWEN. That's right, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Coughlin?

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your statement, Mr. Owen. I want to quote from the first page of your statement, where you said, "This needs to be universal and everyone should be required to serve in one capacity or another with no deferments except for medical reasons. This service does not necessarily mean with our armed forces, but may be other types of service to country."

This isn't what we are considering.

Mr. OWEN. No, but it is something that is worth considering.

Mr. COUGHLIN. And the registration that we are presently considering would be at least for service under the present draft law, which is a lottery system.

Mr. OWEN. Understand that, sir. Yes, sir. But I really feel that this other should be taken into some consideration at some time.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I couldn't agree with you more.

Mr. OWEN. I understand.

Mr. COUGHLIN. If that has not been taken into consideration—if we do not have a universal service program or a National Service program, with opportunities for alternative service, how would you have a lottery type draft where some would be called on to serve and others would not?

Mr. OWEN. We think we have some today and some in the past that did not qualify. There are physical defects and these types. But there are certain ones that might be overage, this type of thing, or have served in the armed forces, that might be needed for other purposes.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Even beyond that, we would be talking about a draft pool of say four million men. We need 650,000 or something like that. And so by lottery you would select 650,000 people to take a couple of years out of their lives to serve, and others wouldn't.

Mr. OWEN. That's right.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You support that?

Mr. OWEN. I would support that, sir.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You think registration for that kind of a service program is a worthwhile aim?

Mr. OWEN. I do.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Sabo.

Mr. SABO. I am just curious. Has the Association of State Colleges and Universities adopted a resolution on this subject?

Mr. OWEN. We presented our findings to the State colleges. We have done a survey since our last meeting and this will be presented to them, sir. This is a committee's report itself that has been made since this came up. We met last in the fall.

Mr. SABO. This is not the full organization?

Mr. OWEN. That's right. This is a committee's report.

Mr. SABO. Let me just indicate that you made lots of comments about the status of the volunteer army. I would suggest to you that the proposal we have before us really has nothing to do with the current status of the volunteer army.

The Administration has testified that the current proposal for re-instituting registration is totally unrelated to what current personnel needs are and things they need to do to keep our military personnel fully adequate for current situations.

Mr. OWEN. I agree with you. But what I said here was that I feel like registration itself is needed in order to increase the strength of what we are getting in the Army. I think we are getting certain ones under the volunteer army; that we need a larger number that are better qualified, I think, in our army.

Mr. SABO. That may be a debatable point. But it has nothing to do with the proposal that is before us. The proposal we have before us is to provide for registration for some unforeseen emergency. It has nothing to do with the ongoing strength of the military forces in this country.

Mr. OWEN. I was pointing out that I thought that this would be needed, because I do not feel that what we have today is doing the job, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Owen.

Mr. OWEN. Thank you.

WITNESS

STATEMENT OF WOMEN USA PRESENTED BY MARGARET MASON, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR

Mr. BOLAND. We now turn to Margaret H. Mason, Legislative Director of Women, USA.

Ms. MASON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a bad cold, so I hope you will bear with me.

Mr. BOLAND. I share that concern with you myself.

Ms. MASON. I am pleased to appear before you today to testify on the Administration's request for funds for draft registration. I am presenting this testimony on behalf of Bella Abzug—

Mr. BOLAND. No one can present testimony on behalf of Bella Abzug.

Ms. MASON. Ms. Abzug regrets that she is unable to be here today and asked me to extend her warm greetings to her former colleagues.

Mr. BOLAND. She is one of my favorite gals.

Ms. MASON. Women USA was founded by Ms. Abzug, former Congresswomen Patsy Mink and Yvonne Brathwaite Burke, Maggie Kuhn, head of Gray Panthers, Gloria Steinem, editor of Ms. Magazine, and Brownie Ledbetter, a southern human rights activist, to provide educational information and action services to grassroots women throughout the country.

On January 31, 1980, Women USA held a press conference to which we invited women leaders to join us in opposing compulsory draft registration for men and women. Among those who stated their opposition to draft registration for men and women alike were representatives of the National Organization for Women, the National Women's Political Caucus, the U.S. Student Association, Rural American Women, the Gray Panthers, the IWY Conference Continuing Committee, the National Congress of Neighborhood Women, the ACLU Women's Rights Project, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Women USA adamantly opposes draft registration for men and women. It is an unnecessary gesture which will do nothing to increase our country's capability for self-defense, may in fact foster the "appearance of national disunity" which Mr. Carter has said he's so anxious to avoid, and will only contribute to a national war climate that appears to have political overtones.

Mr. Carter has said that draft registration "is needed to increase our preparedness and is a further demonstration of our resolve as a nation." As this Subcommittee is aware, the Selective Service's January 16 draft report to the President recommends against registering young people and maintains that "we now have a capability to respond in an emergency." The report effectively refutes President Carter's contention that registration will "increase our preparedness" in

noting that "pre-registration" would save only seven days over "post-mobilization"—registering people after an emergency is called—and in concluding that "pre-registration" is not cost effective and is "redundant and unnecessary."

But Mr. Carter apparently has chosen to ignore this recommendation, and has called for a plan to require all 19 and 20 year-olds beginning this summer and 18 year-olds beginning in 1981 to report to their local post offices and enter their names onto computerized lists for possible induction into the armed services. It would be much more productive to continue the discussion of neutralizing Afghanistan through diplomatic means, in our opinion.

President Carter has said that there has been "a gross overreaction" to his call for registration. He apparently would like us to believe that registration is an important enough symbol to intimidate the Russians, but not important enough to warrant national attention and debate. Those few of us who warned against deeper U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the Gulf of Tonkin scare in the 60s know that the best time to stop a war is before it begins.

Any realistic discussion of draft registration must be based on the recognition that registration is a prelude to the draft, and the draft is a prelude to war. There has never been a time in our nation's history when we have had registration without also having a draft.

Feeding our sons and daughters into the draft registration machinery can only have detrimental, divisive effects on our country. The terrible events in Iran and Afghanistan are not sufficient justification for the shift from Mr. Carter's moral equivalent of war campaign—which was supposed to make us self-reliant in energy—into a new cold war campaign that would sacrifice American lives to back up our dependence on foreign oil and the shamelessly profiteering American oil monopoly.

We should not be talking about sending teenagers to die in the Persian Gulf or using tactical nuclear weapons there, as the Pentagon reportedly has said would be necessary in that area. We should instead be using this period to press hard for energy conservation and the development of policies that will lead to energy self-sufficiency.

If anything, the Iranian hostage crisis shows that military power and nuclear warheads cannot protect American citizens, and what is needed are basic changes in our foreign policy so that we don't wind up siding with dictators who are hated by their people, or taking unilateral actions that alienate our allies in Europe or the oil-producing nations and that can lead us closed to nuclear war.

The Administration's policies are taking us down a dangerous path, and draft registration is one of the steps down that path. Women have always led anti-war movements, and we are speaking out now against efforts to make another war thinkable and acceptable. As feminists, we reject the male establishment's war reflex as the solution to international problems, and suggest that this is the time for serious and delicate diplomacy rather than threats of military force. We must never give up on peace.

The preoccupation with events abroad, important as they are, has directed attention away from domestic issues, and has obscured the departure from the 1976 Democratic party platform evidenced by

President Carter's FY '81 budget. Women know that when military spending goes up, the programs we care about most get lost. The FY '81 budget puts a freeze on the number of public service jobs—which were already slashed in last year's budget—while anticipating that unemployment and inflation will continue to rise. Programs for education, health, child care, nutrition, housing and nurses training are underfunded or even reduced. And women—who have higher unemployment rates than men and earn less when they work—will again bear the brunt of wrong government policies.

The issue of whether women should be registered along with men has been used as another diversion from the real debate. The President's statement that women must register for the draft to show that they deserve equal rights is as specious as his whole registration ploy. Women are not looking for special privileges on the basis of gender; if we have registration, regardless of whether or not we have the ERA, then clearly both men and women should be included.

Women have made sacrifices, fought and died in every war our country has been engaged in. It is insulting to suggest that we must prove our patriotism or our dedication to equal rights by blindly accepting this ill-advised draft registration proposal. We insist on our right to debate and reject the premise that registration is necessary or desirable. Women, as well as men, have an equal right to refuse to be drafted, just as women have an equal right to volunteer for the armed services, if that is what they choose to do.

Should the Congress and the President institute registration for men and not for women, it is inevitable that there will be a court challenge, and we believe that on the basis of previous court decisions, exclusion of women on the basis of gender will be found unconstitutional. We repeat our belief, however, that neither men nor women should be required to register.

The issue of draft registration must be carefully considered and fully debated before any decision is made by Congress. The contents of the recently revealed January 16 Selective Service report provides additional compelling evidence that this Subcommittee should continue with extensive hearings on registration, and finally, reject the President's request for funds for draft registration for men as well as for women.

Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Miss Mason.

This is a Bella Abzug statement?

Ms. MASON. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. She put in everything but the kitchen sink, I must say.

Ms. MASON. I will try to answer any questions. But if there are some I don't feel I can answer, I will be happy to pass them on to her and have her respond in writing.

Mr. BOLAND. I think you did a beautiful job.

Incidentally, on page 3, the second paragraph, you indicate, "There's been no time in our Nation's history that we have had registration without also having a draft."

That isn't really quite so. The draft ended in 1973, and the last person was drafted in December 1972, but registration actually went on until early in 1976.

Ms. MASON. I am aware of that.

Mr. BOLAND. That isn't quite accurate. It isn't too bad either.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You certainly covered a broad field, as the Chairman mentioned. I would not want it to be left unsaid that you said we should never give up on peace. And I think all of us feel that way. There may be some differences as to how you get there, whether you get to peace through strength or through appeasement. We may have some differences in that area. I want to let that statement be in there without saying that we agree on this statement. We may disagree on how to get there.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Ms. MASON. All right.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Margaret. We were pleased to have you.

WITNESS

JAMES HUBBARD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY/
FOREIGN RELATIONS DIVISION, THE AMERICAN LEGION

E. PHILIP RIGGIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE
COMMISSION, THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. BOLAND. Our next witnesses are Mr. James Hubbard, Deputy Director, Foreign Relations Division and Mr. Philip Riffin, Deputy Director, National Legislative Commission of the American Legion.

Mr. RIGGIN. I am here to introduce Mr. Hubbard and assist in any way, if I can, in responding to the Committee's questions. Mr. Hubbard will present the testimony.

Mr. HUBBARD. I am pleased to present the views of the 2.7 million members of my association, The American Legion, on the important subject of Selective Service. The resolution appended to this statement we believe is comprehensive and thus properly addresses the issues which must be considered by this Subcommittee. The resolution was adopted unanimously by the delegates at the 61st National Convention in Houston in August of 1979.

The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, as amended by Congress in 1971, provides that the Selective Service System shall be maintained as an active standby organization with a complete registration and classification structure capable of immediate operation in the event of a national emergency, and personnel adequate to reinstitute immediately the full operation of the System.

The current DoD manpower requirements in the event of an emergency call for the first deliveries or registrants for induction to the M plus 30, with the first 100,000 inductions by M plus 60, and 650,000 by M plus 180.

The present system is no more than a centralized planning activity whose basic task is to plan for a potential reinstitution of the draft under an emergency condition which may arise in the future. Given the current authorized manning levels in the Selective Service System, to transform the agency into an organization capable of providing the necessary manpower to our armed forces under the time constraints required by current planning will be a very formidable undertaking.

The Administration has recognized the difficulty in revitalizing the System in light of aggressive Soviet behavior in several areas of the world, notably Cuba, where they maintain MIG 23 nuclear-capable aircraft and a combat brigade, and in Afghanistan where an outright invasion and governmental take-over has been accomplished.

Accordingly, the Administration has requested an additional \$45 million in FY 1980 supplemental appropriations and FY 1981 appropriations to remove the Selective Service System from its "deep standby" status and make it operational to the point of registering all males of the ages 19 and 20.

The American Legion supports these efforts to revitalize the Selective Service System as being the minimum necessary to support the manpower needs of our armed forces.

Civil libertarians have argued that induction in the armed forces constitutes a violation of civil and individual rights and amounts to a form of involuntary servitude.

At this point, I would say every American, and I quote, "Owes to our Nation not only a portion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it." The author of that quote was George Washington.

That Constitution grants the power to our Federal government "to provide for the common defense" and grants the power to Congress "to provide for calling forth the militia . . ." I do not believe that our founding fathers intended any restraint on how that militia was to be called forth.

We are not aware of a single precedent-setting court ruling declaring registration, which is all the Administration is requesting at this point, or even peacetime conscription unconstitutional.

Religious groups who argue that the System is unfair or immoral should face the fact that we are a nation of individuals who have banded together and formed a government for the common good? I think not.

To be sure, there have been times in the recent history of the Selective Service System when inequities and unfairness existed. Fortunately, our government, acting on behalf of those it governs, forced changes. By the time the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the System had operated for two years with a random sequence lottery; no occupational, student, or paternity deferments; and permission for registrants to appear in person before local boards. This last provision is significant.

Historically, the cornerstone of Selective Service System has been the jurisdiction of the local board over all eligible personnel in its area to include the responsibility for registration, issuance of induction orders, and the initiation of deferment requests for individual registrants. We believe that the local board has had and should retain the responsibility to each registrant and the community at large. This is possible only if action to initiate classification remains with the local board.

The Selective Service System, operating at the "grass roots" level as provided by the Military Selective Service Act, touches more people of this Nation than any other agency, with the possible exception of the Internal Revenue Service. It touches them in a most unique

and sensitive way. When inductions are required, particularly during a war in which this Nation may engage, the Selective Service System operators render judgments which affect the lives of our citizens—a very serious business.

It therefore behooves everyone connected with the operation of the System to make sure that the operation functions on a decentralized and personalized basis. This can only be accomplished at the community level by a board made up of respected citizens of that community.

People who wish to apply for deferments based on religious convictions are entitled to do so under the law. A panel of representatives from each applicant's community, we believe, is the most equitable method of judging each application on its merits.

Mr. Chairman, In October 1971, a Select Committee on Manpower of The American Legion issued the following statement:

We are unalterably opposed to allowing the Selective Service System induction authority to expire on June 30, 1971. The standby draft is impracticable and the delay involved in activating it in a national emergency by Joint Resolution of Congress would endanger the national security of this country.

In spite of this recommendation, the induction authority expired and a deep standby posture was implemented and the seeds of our armed forces present manpower problems were sown. Indeed, the standby posture is so deep that the Selective Service System until last November had not had a permanent director for two years.

We urge this Committee to issue a favorable report on legislation to revitalize the Selective Service System. I would like to submit for the record the resolution which was adopted by the American Legion.

[The resolution follows:]

61ST NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, HELD IN HOUSTON, TEX.,
AUGUST 21-23, 1979

RESOLUTION 25

Committee: National Security.

Subject: Universal Military Training and Selective Service.

Whereas, The American Legion has long supported a system of universal military training, which would insofar as possible require every citizen of our nation to share his equitable portion of the burden of defending our country and a system of military manpower procurement sufficient to meet the needs of present and foreseeable defense commitments including wartime demands; and

Whereas, the effectiveness of the present all-volunteer military service program has fallen short of expectations in its ability to meet our nation's requirements on a vital and continuing basis; and

Whereas, the Selective Service System has proven itself to be fully effective in meeting the vital defense needs during all wars this nation has been engaged in during its history, as well as the requirements of the peacetime army since World War II until the all-volunteer program was instituted; and

Whereas, The American Legion believes that a revitalization of the Selective Service System to include registration, classification, physical examinations and other aptitude examinations would have the secondary effect of stimulating interest in our National Guard and Reserve programs; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, by The American Legion in National Convention assembled in Houston, Texas, August 21-23, 1979, that while complimenting our fine men and women now engaged in the military programs of our country, we reaffirm our continued support of: (1) the principle of universal military training which will require insofar as possible every person to share his or her patriotic obligation to support the national defense of our country; (2) that we support the re-establishment of a completely operational independent Selective Service System, including registration, classification, physicals and presidential induction authority to be

effective upon an individual's 18th birthday, and if not called to service by the 22nd birthday, then released, believing same to be essential to correct the current shortage of manpower in our active armed forces and Reserve components; (3) that annual registration of 18 year old men and women be resumed as soon as feasible; that annual conscription of up to 200,000 men and women for the Army's Individual Ready Reserve be instituted as soon as practicable; (4) that we call upon Congress to enact laws which will re-establish the Selective Service System to accomplish the purposes of this resolution, with no deferments for educational purposes, but with educational benefits for service concurrently provided, and that we support budgetary support of these mandates in order to make them viable and effective.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Hubbard.

Mr. COUGHLIN.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have looked at the resolution which was adopted by the American Legion, that is appended to your very fine statement.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I agree with you in principle. I guess my concern is what the American Legion adopted in that resolution and what you have mentioned in your statement is not what we are really talking about here.

The first thing the Legion resolved was, one, that the principle of universal military training—they are in support of the system of universal military training. We are not talking about that principle here. We are not talking about any kind of universal service proposal in this registration; you understand that?

Mr. HUBBARD. Yes.

Mr. COUGHLIN. And you say that you support registration classification, physicals, and Presidential induction authority. And you realize we are not talking about that either?

Mr. HUBBARD. I understand that.

Mr. COUGHLIN. And the third thing that you support is the annual registration of 18-year-old men and women and conscription is up to 200,000 men and women for the Army's ready Reserve. We are not talking about that either.

Mr. HUBBARD. I understand that.

Mr. COUGHLIN. The things in your resolution that was adopted by the American Legion are not really subjects we are talking about here.

Mr. HUBBARD. The fourth part of the resolution calls on the Congress to reestablish a Selective Service System. That is primarily the part to which my statement is addressed.

Mr. COUGHLIN. We never disestablished the system. This Subcommittee has funded it year after year. It was never totally disestablished.

I guess you are aware of the previous testimony that pre-mobilization registration would only speed up mobilization by a very insignificant amount, seven days plus or minus. Are you aware of that? It would not be a significant increase.

Mr. HUBBARD. I am aware of the January 16th report, and I tend to believe that the seven-day figure, in the eyes of a battlefield commander, when he is to receive replacements, seven days could be a very long time for a unit, under fire. Seven days could be very critical.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You are aware that there is no proposal to classify people involved in this?

Mr. HUBBARD. I am aware of that, sir.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Are you aware that, at least, the best testimony we have is even if you did induct substantial numbers of people, you wouldn't have the training capacity to train them?

Mr. HUBBARD. I am aware that that statement was made. I questioned that. I am of the opinion that if the Pentagon needed that kind of—the numbers of troops that are inductees that we are talking about here that they say they need, that they would find a way to train them.

Mr. COUGHLIN. At least, according to the best testimony we could get a capability is simply not there to train that large number over a very rapid period of time.

I guess my question then comes down to whether this pre-mobilization registration proposal, which is a very bare bones kind of an operation, is really tied into the objectives that the Legion has?

Mr. HUBBARD. The pre-mobilization proposal, which is under discussion at this point, is, as I say, the minimum necessary. It is a form of an insurance policy, as it were.

I would think that the post-mobilization registration plan is probably a little like buying health insurance after the patient is ill. It provides a questionable method of coming up with the manpower and locating the people. It is waiting too long, or closing the barn door after the horse leaves if you want to put it another way.

Mr. COUGHLIN. My concern is doing something that gives the American people the idea we are doing something which is strengthening our national defense when we really aren't, when we are really not increasing our mobilization time frame, we are really not providing additional trained people; we are not classifying people; we are not doing anything. But we are giving the impression that we are doing something, and that might be an illusion. That worries me. We are deluding people that we are doing something to increase our military preparedness when we are really not.

Mr. HUBBARD. The provision for registration-only may qualify as that kind of delusion. But if you follow that registration up with classification and even perhaps physical examinations, that is a big step.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I couldn't agree with you more, but that isn't what are being asked to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler.

Mr. TRAXLER. Yes.

I appreciate your bringing the views, Mr. Hubbard, of the American Legion to us. I think you have followed this closer than we have. On this Subcommittee we sort of drew this assignment by an act of the draw. We almost got drafted on this one. So we are not the Armed Services Committee. It is uncomfortable—at least I speak for myself—to make these kinds of decisions, without having served on the Armed Services Committee, and not having been totally briefed on issues of war and peace, how much mobilization is necessary, and what kind of training facilities may be available at this point time.

My recollection is that we are going to, in the first 124 days under the post-mobilization proposal that was in the draft SSS report, going to register 650,000 men. Assuming also that we had called the National Guard and the Army Reserves we would have another 600,000. If we had on top of those men an additional 400,000 volunteers, how could we handle all this in the first four months?

I recognize you are not DOD, but this is a staggering number of people to feed into this pipeline almost instantaneously. It is an in-

credible number of people. I know the casualties in the early weeks of a European war would be staggering, also. The question is: How can the pipeline expand that rapidly, to handle all of these people?

I was interested in your response on the need for replacement troops. And we recognize that if a unit is decimated, replacement is essential then, there, and now. Seven days could make the difference, obviously. But I am saying, also, that I wouldn't want the record to indicate perhaps, or leave an impression that the difference between the President's proposal and post-mobilization is all that we are talking about, because certainly we are talking about volunteers that are instantaneously going to respond. At least I hope that would be the case, and I would feel confident about that.

Mr. HUBBARD. If I might comment on that, Mr. Traxler. The Reserve, active Reserve-National Guard units are some 200,000 men short on their strength authorization right now. The individual ready Reserves—I think the number of 780,000 needed. They are 500,000 short, so there is a problem there.

Also, mobilization would be a very traumatic experience for this country, because we don't have the people available to supply units with trained replacements. DoD has already indicated that.

Mr. TRAXLER. As a personal aside. I would feel more comfortable if we were addressing the question of the ready Reserves. I think that would be a more significant message to Moscow.

Mr. HUBBARD. I tend to agree with you on that score.

As far as the Pentagon's ability to handle the number of people we are talking about, I might respectfully recommend that you ask the Pentagon.

Mr. TRAXLER. Thank you.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Sabo.

Mr. SABO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question, also, that should be addressed to the Pentagon, really. I am just curious if you might know the answer. What are the requirements, if you know, of additional training for Reserves if they were called back? Do you know that offhand?

Mr. HUBBARD. Off the top of my head, I believe the plan is to commit Reserve units, actively formed Reserve units, selected Reserves, within 30 days, I think. I am not sure that is a fact, but I think that is the case.

The individual ready Reserves, which would serve as combat fillers for combat casualties—in some cases, I am afraid the selected Reserve units would have to be disbanded, if you will, to provide the individual replacements needed to active duty units.

Mr. SABO. Is that a question we might be able to submit to DoD for the record?

Mr. BOLAND. Yes.

Thank you very much, Mr. Hubbard.

Question Submitted by Congressman Sabo

Question. What are the requirements of additional training for Reserves if they were called back?

Answer. Unlike the call-up of the Guard and Reserve for Korea, when a large number of Reservists were called up who had never served on active duty, current law requires that all persons serving in the Selected Reserve do an

initial tour of active duty training. The few exceptions include those who are in the so-called delayed entry program. All personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve have served on active duty. Consequently, it can be said that the Ready Reserve would be ready to take on their wartime tasks as soon as they could be transported to the places where they were needed. However, because it would take time to move actives and Reserves to where they were needed, we would anticipate using whatever time was available to provide refresher training or retraining if that was deemed advantageous.

The additional training that would be desirable varies among the components and among units within the components.

Units requiring little or no additional training include the air units of the Naval Reserve, Army National Guard units and Army Reserve units available for the fifty thousand call-up, elements of the 4th Marine Division and all of the 4th Marine Air Wing. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units are capable of mobilizing and moving out to their wartime bases within hours.

The remainder of the Selected Reserve generally would profit from several weeks additional training. Some limiting factors that may impact on the length of training will be the availability of training facilities such as training areas and ranges.

The personnel in the IRR will require more time to become proficient as they generally do not have the opportunity to train in peacetime. Many of these personnel will profit from several weeks training to process, integrate into units and become more proficient in their specialty and participate in team training.

WITNESS

EDWARD F. SNYDER, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Mr. BOLAND. We have come to the end of a long couple of days and we are delighted to have Edward F. Snyder, Friends Committee on National Legislation. You have waited for two days. We are glad to have you.

Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Boland, and members of the Committee. We appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today.

We appeared before this Subcommittee last year also to express our opposition to funding—

Mr. BOLAND. It was a lot different last year.

Mr. SNYDER. That's exactly right. That is what I would like to talk about, if I might.

Since then, there has been a vote on the House floor on the basic question of draft registration with nearly a 100-vote margin in opposition to it.

Also, last year, the Administration was opposing draft registration and beginning in 1981. Now it favors it beginning in 1980.

It seems clear to us that the Administration's reversal was caused by several factors—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which came during a period of intense public frustration over U.S. diplomatic personnel being held hostage in Iran, all as a Congressional and Presidential election year began.

We now have extraneous considerations involved. We want you to urge this mission on its merits and seriously question arguments to support it for "symbolic" or "message-conveying" reasons.

Draft registration is not a vote on whether one is a patriotic American. If patriotism is being tested, all should be asked to stand and be counted—not just those under 21. And effective demonstration of national will and resolve would call for sacrifice by a much larger

and more representative group—perhaps a “draft” surtax on personal incomes; some kind of compulsory energy conservation, or imposition of an excess profits tax on corporations.

Now we feel that a draft registration vote is a measure of whether one opposes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Draft registration, as a response, is remarkably unimpressive, as a number of people have pointed out. Peacetime registration saves only 7 to 13 days in total mobilization time and is unnecessary to meet the Department of Defense’s stringent mobilization timetable.

It would provide inductees faster than training camps would absorb them. And amazingly, Selective Services assumes that there would not be volunteers in a national emergency.

In our view, embargoes of grain or high technology and Olympic boycott and other measures are a more direct and effective expression of opposition to Soviet aggression.

Nor should the draft registration be seen as an endorsement of the Carter Doctrine.

Unfortunately, the Administration has firmly linked the two. The President’s reversal on draft registration was first made public in his January “State of the Union Message,” in which he said: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

In his draft registration statement later, and in the statements of some of his aides, the Carter doctrine is put alongside the draft registration issue.

We feel that this may lead in a vote on draft registration for the Administration to assume implicit and explicit support for the Carter doctrine.

We believe that this would be very dangerous. There are many serious questions about the possible use of the United States military forces on a unilateral basis in areas immediately adjacent to the Soviet Union.

These should be extensively discussed and debated by the Congress. There should be, but there is not now, a legislative vehicle like the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which could provide a focus for discussing these basic issues.

But whether or not there is a Congressional resolution spelling out the Carter Doctrine, we urge Members of Congress to separate these issues and focus on the precise issue of draft registration.

We are confident that if you do that on its merits, you will arrive at substantially the same decision that you came to last September.

Indeed, the only thing which has changed significantly is that the Selective Service System representatives have apparently improved their post-mobilization registration plan to cut nearly in half the time when the first person would be inducted, from 13 to 7 days.

One final word about some of the hidden costs involved in draft registration.

Registration is only the first step. It seems highly likely it would be followed by much more extensive steps—classification, examination, lottery, draft board reactivation, and induction.

Even before some of these steps are taken, there will be other more important costs. History shows that a number of young people would refuse to register for the draft because they are conscientiously opposed to participation in a war system.

Indeed, the number of nonregistrants might be higher than in the past because of heightened sensitivity following the Indochina war, because there would be no other way to evidence their conscientious objection.

Failure to register is punishable by up to five years in prison and a \$10,000 fine.

The Department of Justice would undoubtedly feel impelled to follow some policy of pursuing, trying, convicting, and imprisoning nonregistrants, all in order to put a name on a computer list in preparation for an emergency which does not exist.

This is a great waste of taxpayers' money and would lead to acute disruption of the lives of these young men and women, many of whom are highly motivated and are devoting their lives to the service of their fellow human beings.

Even a highly conservative estimate of 2 percent nonregistrants on a 4 million base, that would be a 2-year age group of men or one-year for men and women, means 80,000 nonregistrants, which is more than three times the average Federal prison population of 25,000.

We urge you to reject any money in the bill for draft registration. [The complete statement follows:]

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD F. SNYDER IN BEHALF OF THE
 FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION BEFORE THE
 HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUD/INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
 REGARDING FUNDS FOR THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
 FEBRUARY 27, 1980

We appreciate this opportunity to express specifically our opposition to any funds for draft registration. While our Committee does not purport to speak for all Friends, opposition to conscription has very broad and deep support in the Religious Society of Friends in the United States.

Last year we appeared before this subcommittee to oppose funds for draft registration, which was then the subject of authorizing legislation in the House Armed Services Committee. Later, on September 12, the full House rejected by a 100-vote margin the Armed Services Committee's proposal to begin draft registration of eighteen-year-olds in January 1981.

You now have before you an Administration request for an additional \$21.9 million in FY1980 supplemental and \$24.5 million for FY1981 to begin registration of those under twenty-one.

Last year the Administration opposed draft registration beginning in 1981. Now it favors registration beginning in 1980.

It seems clear to us that the Administration reversal was caused by several factors--the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which came during a period of intense public frustration over U. S. diplomatic personnel being held hostage in Iran, all as a Presidential and Congressional election year began.

The draft registration issue, which was decisively defeated last September in the House, has now become mired in a host of extraneous considerations.

We urge you to consider this issue on its merits and seriously question arguments to support it for "symbolic" or "message-conveying" reasons.

Draft registration is not a vote on whether one is a patriotic American. If patriotism is being tested, all should be asked to stand and be counted--not just those under twenty-one. An effective demonstration of national will and resolve would call for sacrifice by a much larger and more representative group--perhaps a "draft" surtax on personal incomes; compulsory energy conservation, or imposition of an excess profits tax on corporations.

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION
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Nor is the draft registration vote a measure of whether one opposes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Draft registration as a response is remarkably unimpressive. Peacetime draft registration saves only seven to thirteen days in total mobilization time and is unnecessary in order to meet the Department of Defense's stringent mobilization timetable. It would provide inductees faster than training camps could absorb them. And, amazingly, Selective Service assumes there will not be volunteers in a national emergency. Embargos of grain or high technology, an Olympic boycott, and other measures are more direct and effective expressions of opposition to the Soviet aggression.

Nor should draft registration be seen as an endorsement of the Carter Doctrine. Unfortunately the Administration has firmly linked the two. The President's reversal on draft registration was first made public in his January 23 "State of the Union Message," in which he announced the Carter Doctrine:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The President said February 8 that draft registration would be a "further demonstration of our resolve as a nation. . . . Our objective is plain: to deter Soviet aggression." Stuart Eizenstat, a chief Carter aide, said registration "will send a strong message to the Soviet Union."

If Congress, in this context, votes for draft registration, the Administration may assume implicit or explicit support for the Carter Doctrine. This would be dangerous. There are many serious questions about the possible use of United States military forces on a unilateral basis in areas immediately adjacent to the U.S.S.R. when U. S. "vital interests" are "assaulted." These should be extensively discussed and debated. There should be--but there is not now--a legislative vehicle like the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which could provide a focus for discussing these basic issues. But whether or not there is a Congressional resolution spelling out the Carter Doctrine, we urge members of Congress to separate these issues and focus on the precise issue of draft registration.

We are confident that if members examine draft registration on its merits they will arrive at substantially the same decision they came to last September. Indeed, the only thing which has changed significantly is that the Selective Service System representatives have apparently improved their post-mobilization registration plan to cut nearly in half the time when the first person would be inducted--from thirteen to seven days.

We urge you to examine again the position statement of the Office of Management and Budget and the Selective Service System fact sheet in your files distributed to members of Congress last summer.

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We urge you to recall again the reasons for the House vote against draft registration last September. They are still valid.

We reiterate our own position:

We oppose draft registration as unnecessary and as a first step toward reactivation of the military draft in the United States. President Ford ended registration because it was a waste of money without induction authority. Commencing registration is the first step back to the draft.

We oppose conscription because in peacetime it imposes more totalitarian controls over, and denies more civil liberties to, law-abiding citizens than any other institution in our form of government. It gives the military establishment unwarranted influence over our nation's youth. It denies American history and tradition, which favor volunteerism over compulsion.

We oppose conscription because it is an integral part of the war system, which makes deliberate destruction of human life a national policy tool. This is deeply abhorrent to our religious values.

We believe the tremendous human and material resources now devoted to the illusory search for security through arms in our own and other nations should be used instead to build alternative institutions to settle disputes without resort to threats or use of force and to move rapidly toward comprehensive worldwide disarmament.

We hope this Subcommittee will also consider the hidden costs involved in draft registration. Registration is only the first step. It seems highly likely it will be followed by much more expensive steps: classification, examination, lottery, Draft Board reactivation, and induction.

Even before some of these steps are taken, there will be other more important costs. History shows that a number of young people would refuse to register for the draft because they are conscientiously opposed to participation in the war system. Indeed, the number of non-registrants might be higher than in the past because of heightened sensitivity following the Indochina War and because there would be no other way to evidence their conscientious objection.

Failure to register is punishable by up to five years in prison and a \$10,000 fine. The Department of Justice would undoubtedly feel impelled to pursue, try, convict, and imprison non-registrants--all in order to put a name on a computer list in preparation for an emergency which does not exist. This is a great waste of taxpayers' money and would lead to acute disruption of the lives of these young men and women, many of whom are highly motivated and are devoting their lives to the service of their fellow human beings. Even a highly conservative estimate of 2% non-registrants on a 4,000,000 base (2-year age group of men, or one-year for men and women) means 80,000 non-registrants--more than three times the average federal prison population of 25,000.

Edward F. Snyder, Draft Registration, 2/27/80 - 4

This year the question of women and the draft has been directly raised by President Carter through his request to revise the Military Selective Service Act to permit registration of women, and the inclusion in the money request before your Subcommittee to register women.

We oppose the registration and induction of women as well as men. It seems clear to us that if Congress attempts to register men without registering women, that legislative act will be challenged in the courts and subjected to lengthy legal attack as in violation of the equal protection provision of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In conclusion, we urge this Subcommittee to reject the President's request for funds to register either young men or young women for the draft.

This is a symbolic gesture, taken against the advice of Selective Service officials, in an election year. It communicates a sense of war fever to the American public and an unimpressive sense of resolve to the Soviet Union. It could be interpreted as Congressional support of the still undefined Carter Doctrine, an open-ended commitment to U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf.

The House overwhelmingly rejected draft registration on its merits last September, and should do so again.

* * * * *

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Snyder.
The Friends Committee on the National Legislation is based here in Washington.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Who makes up the committee itself?

Mr. SNYDER. Our committee is composed of 200, approximately, Quakers, who are appointed for most of the Friends' bodies in the United States. And these delegates, representatives, come to Washington once a year. They make our policy. They determine our legislative priorities.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much.

I must say that your statement indicates the frugality of the Friends, in that you got about 500 words here on one page.

Mr. Coughlin?

Mr. COUGHLIN. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Traxler?

Mr. TRAXLER. No questions.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Sabo?

Mr. SABO. No questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD E. PAUL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. BOLAND. The Committee has received a statement from the distinguished Member of Congress, Ron Paul. The statement will be placed in the record at this point.

[The statement follows:]

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. RON PAUL, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUD AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

Mr. Chairman: In deciding whether to revive registration, we cannot separate it from the draft, since registration has as its only purpose preparing for the draft.

We must not allow our young men—and women, as the courts will mandate, no matter what Congress says—to be sent off to die in another no-win land war in Asia.

Drafting young people will not rectify a ridiculous foreign policy that has seen the American taxpayer subsidize both the highway and the trucks that Soviet troops used to invade Afghanistan.

Spending millions on the Selective Service System is not only fiscally irresponsible, it is militarily, economically, practically, constitutionally, and politically wrong.

THE MORAL CASE AGAINST THE DRAFT

The concept of natural rights was uniquely incorporated into our Constitution. For the first time in history, a clearly written contract between the people and the State recognized that men are endowed by their Creator with the inalienable rights of life and liberty.

Coming from God, these natural rights are not subject to the authority of the State.

Military conscription, therefore, is incompatible with this concept of natural rights.

Even registration, with the intent to conscript, violates civil liberties, just as registration of guns, with the intent to confiscate, violates Constitutional rights.

Is there any reason to believe that a free society can be preserved with compulsory service? I don't believe so.

The patriotism and volunteer spirit necessary for the security and defense of a free nation are goals we all seek, but I doubt if they can be instilled in our citizens by force or threats of force.

No draft has ever been fair, and cannot be. Conscription of every eighteen year old is untenable. Therefore, any draft not only violates the rights of each individual drafted, but also is inequitable and therefore immoral.

Only by accepting the notion that our rights are the gift of the State, can we submit ourselves and our children to conscription or national service.

If compulsion is an acceptable way to fill the ranks of the military, then it is acceptable for any purpose deemed vital by the State.

Only a clear understanding of natural rights will enable us to preserve the individual liberty and free economy that are the glories of our country.

Freedom cannot be preserved with coercion. For moral reasons, we must reject registration, the draft, and any form of compulsory national service.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE AGAINST THE DRAFT

Any action taken by the Federal government must be authorized by the Constitution or the action is illegal. Conscription, its proponents argue, is authorized by Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1, 12, 13, and 14: "Congress shall have power . . . to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; . . . To raise and support Armies. . . ."

Conscription is obviously not explicitly authorized by these or any other clauses, so its proponents fall back upon an implicit authorization. But conscription is not authorized by the Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly. In *Paper No. 41*, James Madison wrote:

"It has been urged . . . that the power 'to lay and collect taxes . . . , to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,' amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction."

In 1814, Daniel Webster opposed conscription in the House of Representatives: "Where is it written in the Constitution . . . that you may take children from their parents, and parents from their children, and compel them to fight the battles of any war in which the folly or wickedness of government may engage it? . . . Such an abominable doctrine has no foundation in the Constitution. . . . (I) f it is to be assumed, that all powers were granted, which might by possibility become necessary, and that government itself is the judge of this possible necessity, *then the powers of the government are precisely what it chooses they should be.*"

Finally, in 1865, the States approved the 13th Amendment, which provides that "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States. . . ."

If conscription is not authorized by the Constitution, registration is not either, for registration has no purpose except as a means to execute conscription. Neither Congress nor the President has the authority to draft or register anyone.

THE MILITARY CASE AGAINST THE DRAFT

The Soviet Union, over the past ten years, has engaged in the greatest military build-up in history. In the face of this, every American wants the best possible national defense for our country.

But that does not include the draft, which is neither cost-efficient nor militarily effective. In fact, a draft would harm our military preparedness.

When we need to spend more on weapons research and development, it doesn't make sense to allocate billions to training unwilling 18-year olds to fight World War III.

We need, not foot soldiers and bayonets, but highly technological weapons operated by highly trained professionals. It makes no sense to train resentful young people who will leave as soon as their hitches are up. And a draft in today's society is bound to include girls as well as boys. What this will do to military discipline is unimaginable.

Do we really want our defense in the hands of people who must be forced to fight for their country? Instead we should drastically increase pay, to attract and hold the right kind of soldiers, reservists, and national guardsmen.

The late Admiral Ben Moreel, whose Seabees set such a magnificent example during World War II, refused to accept any draftees. Not only was the draft one

of the "greatest intrusions on individual freedom in the history of the Republic," said the Admiral, but it was also militarily ineffective.

Basil Liddell Hart, the great British military historian, summed up conscription as not fitting "the conditions of modern warfare and its specialized technical equipment. . . . Success increasingly depends on individual initiative, which in turn springs from a sense of personal responsibility—these senses are atrophied by compulsion. . . ."

Our country should be defended by the best. The draft—and what it does to an army—ensures the opposite.

THE ECONOMIC CASE AGAINST THE DRAFT

It has been frequently argued, even by proponents of an all volunteer defense force, that a voluntary force must be more expensive than a drafted force. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Defenders of the draft are quick to point out that defense manpower costs increased from \$22 billion in 1964 to \$50 billion in 1976. But a 1977 Rand Corporation study showed that virtually none of this increase could be attributed to the all volunteer force: "The end result is that *the volunteer force has added less than \$300 million to the cost of defense manpower—about two-tenths of one percent of the defense budget.*"

In its December 31, 1978, report on the All Volunteer Armed Forces, the Department of Defense wrote:

"When adjustments are made for phased-out AVF programs and for changes in turnover costs, returning to active force conscription is estimated to save about \$250 million per year. . . . No costs have been included for enforcement of draft laws or for higher disciplinary rates such as the Services experienced before the AVF. It is assumed that a return to a draft would not result in re-institution of the GI Bill. To reinstate the GI Bill educational benefits adds about \$1.5 billion to the Veterans' Administration budget annually, swamping all other changes considered. . . . The results from this study suggest that the savings from a return to the draft may be overstated by many commentators . . . and do not provide a sufficient or even a good reason for abandoning the AVF. . . . The results of this study do not support a return to the draft."

The costs of the AVF and a conscripted force are virtually identical, even though we have maintained a large standing army. If our armed forces were reorganized into a smaller, highly trained and highly effective corps equipped with the most advanced weapons; if we elected to *pay* our soldiers rather than give them benefits in kind; and if we made other changes (such as not encouraging retirement after 20 years), our manpower costs could be drastically reduced.

We cannot hope to match the manpower of the world's dictatorships. What we lack in quantity we must make up for in quality. The draft cannot perform this function; it, rather than the AVF, is the costly and wasteful approach to defense manpower.

THE POLITICAL CASE AGAINST THE DRAFT

If the draft, or even registration, is reinstituted, young Americans will feel a resentment unknown since the Vietnam war.

It is a serious matter to disrupt a young man's education, or career, for even the best of reasons. And the draft will not be seen as such.

The politicians associated with bringing back the draft will suffer demonstrations and organized voting campaigns against them.

College and university communities, especially, will be active, as will many high schools. Campus anti-draft rallies in 1979 and 1980 have already drawn as many as 1,100 students.

Parents too will often be unhappy about having their children dragged into the army.

Nothing will mobilize young Americans like the draft. Politicians interested in staying in office should beware.

No one will work and vote on behalf of a candidate because that candidate is for the draft. Plenty would work and vote *against* him for this reason.

Anti-drafters will be single-issue people *par excellence*.

The draft is wrong Constitutionally, morally, economically, militarily, and practically.

It is also wrong politically.

THE PRACTICAL CASE AGAINST THE DRAFT

Renewed registration will cause widespread resistance. Another draft would be a nightmare. And it simply would not work.

The lesson is all too clear from Vietnam: many who obeyed the law, and went to fight, were wounded or killed. Even if they returned unharmed, the reception from their neighbors was cold and unfeeling.

Those who broke the law and fled to Sweden or Canada received not ignominy, but amnesty.

The draft might function after a fashion in peacetime. But given another no-win war where the United States isn't directly threatened, the numbers streaming overseas would be boggling.

If we fought a war the conservatives liked—to defend Taiwan, for example—the liberals would leave.

If we fought a war the liberals liked—defending guerrillas against South Africa, for example—the conservatives would leave.

And in today's ERA climate, any renewed draft would be bound to include the girls along with the boys.

This would increase the difficulties of an unwilling army tenfold. Teenage boys and girls together, away from home against their will, are going to pay more attention to each other than to the drill sergeant.

It just doesn't make practical sense to spend billions registering, inducting, and training young people who don't want to go.

Far from strengthening our armed forces, the draft and its morale problems would undermine the military.

The draft is wrong Constitutionally, morally, economically, militarily, and politically. And it just wouldn't work.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

Mr. BOLAND. The Committee has received a statement from the distinguished Member of Congress, John Cavanaugh. This statement will be placed in the record at this point.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF REP. JOHN J. CAVANAUGH
SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUDINDEPENDENT AGENCIES
OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
FEBRUARY 27, 1980

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to submit these prepared remarks for the inclusion into the Record of this Subcommittee's deliberations on the Supplemental Appropriations necessary to carry out the President's proposal to resume registration for a military draft. In response to the current Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter has submitted to the Congress a request for funding to begin registration of 19- and 20-year old men and women. That proposal would cost an estimated \$45 million over the next two years and would contribute nothing to the resolution of what I consider to be the most serious shortcoming of our current system of military manpower procurement, that is the inherent unfairness and inadequacy of that system. It will not appreciably reduce the time required for mobilization in the event of any armed conflict, nor will it have the intended purpose of sending a message of resolve to the Soviets. Rather, I fear that the President's proposal will serve to confuse the issues involved, give to the American people a false sense of security, and continue the All-Volunteer Force concept of military manpower procurement which has preyed upon the economically and educationally disadvantaged segments of our society.

This Subcommittee has heard ample testimony from leading experts in the field of military manpower management, including Dr. Bernard Rostker, Director of the Selective Service System, which indicates that we can expect to save approximately seven days in the mobilization process as a result of registration. That mobilization process, however, will take from 90 to 120 days to bring the first recruit from induction to a fully-trained status. The Administration has premised its argument for the need to reinstate registration on the assumption that there would be no voluntary enlistments in the first days of any mobilization, an assumption with which I cannot agree. There have been serious questions raised as to the capacity of the current system of training bases to accommodate an influx of voluntary recruits in the initial phases of any mobilization. There must be a comparable

capability on the part of our Armed Forces training system to process and train large numbers of inductees rapidly and efficiently, but I believe that the Administration has yet to make the case that that capacity exists.

Aside from these questions of the effectiveness of President Carter's proposal to reinstate registration, though, I believe that the President's proposal is an ineffective answer to the wrong question. The more appropriate question involved in any analysis of our current military manpower procurement system is simply this: Given a clearly identified and generally accepted consensus of the defense needs of the Nation, upon whom does the obligation fall for actually meeting those needs? Upon only those to whom our society offers no other alternatives for meaningful employment? Upon those to whom the educational process in this Nation has failed to provide with a basis upon which to improve their lives? Upon those with no skills and no opportunity other than military service, to acquire those skills? Only when this issue has been satisfactorily addressed and resolved can the Congress move ahead to fashion a suitable mechanism for building a type of military fighting force which can best protect American interests and values in the years ahead in the fairest possible manner and at a reasonable cost.

The element of unfairness is the most serious of the many inadequacies which have plagued the All-Volunteer Force concept since the draft was ended in 1973, and yet it remains the least widely recognized and least often discussed. There are today a disproportionate number of blacks and other minorities to, lacking other economic and educational opportunities in our society, are afforded only the alternative to enlist in the Armed Forces and serve their country under what most middle class citizens would consider substandard conditions. Of the Army's 129,284 non-prior service recruits in FY 1979, 36.2% were Black; another 5% were of other minorities. This system of racial and economic conscription has served as a social safety valve since 1973 and can no longer be tolerated. It is essential that this Nation intensify its efforts to provide true equality of opportunity for all, and at the same time institute a system in which members of all economic and social strata are asked to contribute to meeting the needs of the society. It is my belief that, just as the rights and privileges which are guaranteed by the Constitution accrue to all within the society, so too

should the obligations for the protection and maintenance of those freedoms fall upon the citizenry without distinction or discrimination.

Even while relying to a disproportionate degree upon the least advantaged in our society, the system has been unable to meet congressionally authorized troop levels. In FY 1979, for the first time since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, all branches of the Armed Services failed to meet their recruiting objectives. The U.S. Army, for example, was able to meet only 90% of its needs, and was forced to substantially lower its educational standards, effective October 1, 1979, and the Marine Corps, after lowering its recruitment goal by 10,000 accessions, still was unable to meet 100% of its needs. Recruiting shortfalls have been even more acute within the reserve components, with some units below 50% of authorized strength. This downward trend can only continue to deteriorate in the years ahead, as there are now fewer young people attaining the age of 18 every year. Today, the Armed Forces must attract every one of four eligible young men to meet authorized levels; by 1985 they must attract one in three, assuming no increase in authorized strength.

I have proposed legislation in the Congress calling for the creation of a Public Service System whereby the youth of America would be called upon by means of a random selection process to serve their country in either a military or civilian capacity. Because I believe that any compulsory system can offer the widest possible flexibility to those asked to serve, and because I believe that this country will in the years ahead will be faced with increasing demands for other social services and will have available a decreasing supply of resources with which to meet those demands, I have included civilian alternatives in my proposal. Our country does, in fact, have many needs beyond those of the military which are equally essential to our national interest. The care and protection of our natural resources, the health care and social needs of our poor and elderly, the obligations which our Nation owes to its veterans, the redevelopment and revitalization of our urban centers are all areas of current commitment by the Federal government; and yet these needs are becoming increasingly difficult to meet at the current cost.

Regardless of whether Congress accepts my proposal or chooses another mechanism to utilize in addressing the needs with which our country is faced,

it is essential that it address those needs and assess the fairness and adequacy of our current military personnel system. I am deeply concerned that the tenor of the current debate over registration will divert the national attention from the even more serious, though less widely recognized, shortcomings in our current system and serve only to confuse the real issues which I have outlined above. Rather than reacting to the recent and unprecedented Soviet invasion into Afghanistan with an ill-conceived and ineffective proposal to revive registration for a military draft, the President should, in conjunction with the Congress and the support of the American people, embark upon the effort to devise a new system such as I have proposed, as fair and as flexible as possible, with which to meet the manpower needs, both civilian and military, of this country in the years ahead. That, I believe, is the real issue which must be addressed and which I hope this Subcommittee will consider in its deliberation on this issue of critical importance to the future security and well-being of this country.

STATEMENT OF WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE

Mr. BOLAND. The Committee has received a statement from the Women Strike for Peace. The statement will be placed in the record at this point.

[The statement follows:]

TESTIMONY OF WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE OPPOSING DRAFT REGISTRATION, BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, FEBRUARY 27, 1980

Women Strike for Peace opposes the draft registration for both men and women. We see such a program as a prelude to reinstating the draft and we see the draft as one more step in an upsurge of militarism in this country. The draft would furnish the Administration with unlimited numbers of bodies to carry out foreign adventures—this time to “protect our interests” in Middle East oil, an interest that assumes a US right to that oil, contrary to any international law.

The framers of our Constitution held that conscription is inconsistent with the character of a free society, believing that only wars of self-defense are justified and that if our country were threatened by a foreign foe there would be no need to draft our young. With a peacetime draft, the executive branch of government has a pool of manpower with which it can conduct unpopular foreign wars, wars not formally declared by Congress, wars whose purposes are obscure or unacceptable to the men and women who might fight and die in them.

We fear that registration is part of a dangerous process of whipping up a war hysteria at home—it could be the first step toward unleashing forces which could result in a nuclear war. A recent seminar of 650 doctors, scientists and allied professionals meeting in Cambridge, Mass. on February 10, concluded that planning for nuclear war is madness.

It is significant to us that our European allies do not share the Administration's view of the magnitude of the threat to US security or world peace in the events now occurring in Afghanistan and Iran. In our view, aggressive gestures by the United States (and the draft registration has been portrayed as such) threaten our own security more than they are likely to gain political objectives they purport to serve.


Therefore, we strongly oppose any funding for draft registration and urge members of the Subcommittee to vote against any appropriation to that end.

Respectfully submitted,

ETHEL TAYLOR,
National Coordinator.

EDITH VILLASTRIGO,
National Legislative Coordinator.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you very much. We appreciate your presence here. We will stand adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.



APPENDIX

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
AFTER BRIEFING

FEBRUARY 8, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

On Monday, February 11, I will transmit to the Congress a comprehensive report on strengthening this nation's capacity for rapid personnel mobilization in an emergency.

The United States is committed to peace -- a peace that allows every nation to live in an atmosphere free of coercion or intimidation. We pursue that goal through many kinds of national strength -- the strength of our ideals, the strength of our economy, the strength of our alliances and our relationships with other countries, the strength of our national will and unity, and the strength of our military forces.

We maintain a strong military establishment not for aggressive purposes, but as a bulwark to be used against aggression and war. Military readiness may be the best guarantee that military force need never be used. Even in the nuclear age, we must be prepared for conventional conflict -- and deterring such conflict may depend on the timely availability of our forces.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan poses a serious threat to a region that is vital to the long-term interests of the United States and our allies. It represents the first time since World War II that the Soviets have used their military force to invade an independent nation outside the sphere of the Warsaw Pact. This brutal act of aggression has called forth the condemnation of the whole world -- and a series of firm and measured responses from the United States.

These responses include continuing to increase necessary defense spending, restricting the sale of grain and high technology products to the Soviet Union, and seeking to prevent the summer Olympics being held in Moscow. We have made it clear to the Soviet Union that it must pay a severe price for choosing the path of violence and aggression.

Registration for the draft is needed to increase our preparedness and is a further demonstration of our resolve as a nation. It will improve our capacity, if circumstances require, to increase the size and strength of our armed forces -- and that capacity will itself help to maintain peace and to prevent conflict in the region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.

Our objective is plain: to deter Soviet aggression. A vigorous effort to improve our current capabilities will help achieve that goal.

Accordingly, I will take the following actions to allow us to meet personnel requirements in an emergency:

- I will seek from Congress funds to register American young men under existing law.
- I will seek additional authority to register women for non-combat service to our nation.

- I will take steps to enable the Selective Service System to carry out registration in the most economical and efficient way, using the U.S. Postal Service for the registration process, the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration for computer support, and the Department of State for overseas registration.
- I will develop new procedures for the selection and training of local draft board members. Registration does not require that we reconstitute local boards now, but as part of our effort to revitalize the Selective Service machinery we are developing plans to select and train local board members for availability in the event of a mobilization emergency.

I will request additional funds from the Congress of \$20.5 million in FY '80 and \$24.5 million in FY '81 for the Selective Service System to carry out this program.

In peacetime, our military manpower policy continues to rely on voluntary enlistment. I will continue to strengthen the All Volunteer Force. My 1981 budget requests \$500 million in new authority for better recruitment and retention in our active and reserve forces.

My decision to renew registration is in no sense a move away from the volunteer force, which is performing its mission well. We are maintaining our armed forces with volunteers, and recruitment is holding up well.

In developing the All Volunteer Force, we have always recognized that it would have to be supplemented by the draft at a time of national emergency and mobilization. Should that time ever come I am committed to ensure that the draft would be fair and non-discriminatory.

Renewing registration for the draft now will save us critical time in the event of mobilization. This additional readiness could range from several weeks to several months, depending on the state of the Selective Service machinery and the nature of the emergency.

The process of registration in peacetime is simple. Individuals will go to their local post office and fill out a brief form. No draft card will be issued. No classification or examination of the person registering will be required. If mobilization is required in the future, the Congress would have to authorize through separate legislation registrants to be inducted into the armed forces. We must be prepared if the need arises.

My decision to register women is a recognition of the reality that both women and men are working members of our society. It confirms what is already obvious throughout our society -- that women are now providing all types of skills in every profession. The military should be no exception. In fact, there are already 150,000 women serving in our armed forces today, in a variety of duties, up from 38,000 only 10 years ago. They are performing well, and they have improved the level of skills in every branch of the military service.

There is no distinction possible, on the basis of ability or performance, that would allow me to exclude women from an obligation to register.

I am very much aware of the concern that many Americans feel about the issue of women in combat. There are almost as many

job categories in the military services as there are in civilian life, and many of these categories do not involve combat. In the All Volunteer Force, women are now successfully carrying out tasks which, in the event of hostilities, would involve deploying them in or near combat zones. But women are not assigned to units where engagement in close combat would be part of their duties, and I have no intention of changing that policy.

In every area of our national life, women are meeting the responsibilities of citizenship. That is as true of the military services as it is of the political arena or the economy of our nation. Just as we are asking women to assume additional responsibilities, it is more urgent than ever that the women in America have full and equal rights under the Constitution. Equal obligations deserve equal rights.

I urge the Congress to act on my proposals promptly. The registration of young people is an important element in our overall response to Soviet aggression. It signals our resolve and enhances our military preparedness. This step, along with the others we have taken, displays our commitment to peace and our readiness to defend it.

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
AFTER THE BRIEFING

FEBRUARY 8, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

FACT SHEET
SELECTIVE SERVICE REVITALIZATION

The context of the decision

Last fall, the Congress asked the President to report on a range of Selective Service and military manpower issues by February 9, 1980. As this report was being prepared, Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia caused the President to initiate a series of measured and calculated actions demonstrating our resolve and strengthening our defense posture. The President's decisions to revitalize the Selective Service system and to reinstate registration were part of this series of actions. The studies which were underway when the decision was made will facilitate the implementation of registration and the Selective Service revitalization; they did not precipitate the decision.

Registration of women

The President's decision to seek authority to register women is consistent with this Administration's support of equal rights for women and recognizes the increasingly important role they play in our Armed Forces. Women presently constitute 8 per cent of the Armed Forces. By 1985, this figure is expected to rise to 12 per cent. The Administration remains opposed to the assignment of women to combat. The decision to seek to register women does not represent a change in that policy.

Age groups registered

While the entire 18- to 26-year-old age group could be required to register under the Military Selective Service Act, the President has decided that registering this whole group would exceed our presently foreseeable mobilization needs. Consequently, only 19- and 20-year-olds (those born in 1960 and 1961) will be required to register this year. Starting on January 1, 1981, those born in 1962 will register, and there will be continuous registration of 18-year-olds (each person will register when he or she turns 18).

Registration, classification, and examination


While the President has the legal authority to order registration, classification, and examination, he has decided to proceed with only registration at this time. Both classification and examination would require substantial additional expense. In addition, classification would require the immediate reestablishment of local draft boards, and physical examinations would have to be repeated at the time of induction. Neither of these additional steps was thought to be appropriate in the pre-mobilization context.

Process of registration

When the registration process begins later this year, young men and women born in 1960 and 1961 will be asked to go to their local post offices to register. They will fill out a simple form with their name, address, date of birth and social security number. The forms will be checked at the postal windows to insure that they are legible and complete. The completed forms will then be sent to the Selective Service system where the information will be entered into computers. Thereafter, the registrant will receive a short letter indicating he or she has been registered and asking that the Selective Service system be kept informed of any change of address.

Status of local draft

Local draft boards are not necessary in the registration process. However, in the event of a mobilization, they will be required to process claims for exemptions and deferments. We are developing plans to select and train local board members for availability should such an emergency occur. The selection procedures will ensure that people who serve on local boards in the future will be representative of the community as a whole and will have the training needed to provide for consistent application of the law nationwide.



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