U.S. POLICY AND MAJOR ISSUES IN THE 34TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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U.S. POLICY AND MAJOR ISSUES IN THE 34TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1979

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:05 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Bonker (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Bonker. The Subcommittee on International Organizations will come to order.

This is the first of two subcommittee hearings on U.S. policy and major issues facing the 34th U.N. General Assembly.

We have scheduled another day of hearings on September 19, when the subcommittee will receive testimony from private witnesses. Delegates from over 150 countries will convene in New York City on September 11 through December 21, 1979, for the 34th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The General Assembly agenda will include over 120 items, ranging from administrative questions to problems threatening global peace, security and the environment.

Representatives to the UNGA will address many difficult issues, such as the question of the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people, and whether to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. Their decisions will determine the role the United Nations will play throughout the following year in coping with global problems.

The purpose of this hearing is to examine and assess U.S. positions on key issues facing the 34th General Assembly. We also want to look at the progress in U.S. preparations for UNGA and whether U.S. preparations are sufficient to insure effective U.S. participation in this UNGA session.

We also want to insure that the official delegation to the United Nations will reflect the positions that are consistent with congressional policies in connection with this area.

The subcommittee is particularly interested in U.S. positions on other major donor and Third World countries on agenda items concerning human rights in South Africa, the Middle East, and to form peacekeeping, budgetary, and personnel matters.

The subcommittee is also interested in agenda items on which discussions on proposed actions are expected.

This afternoon we are pleased to have with us the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Charles William Maynes, who is a very capable U.S. representative of the State Department, and who will present the administration's policies for the upcoming General Assembly. Accompanying Mr. Maynes is George Dalley, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Social Affairs.

Again, we will pick up on the second part of these hearings on September 19 to hear from private witnesses.

The subcommittee will also acknowledge the presence of a distinguished member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Charlie Diggs, who will perhaps be asking some questions; and of course, the ranking member on the Democratic side, Tony Hall.

At this time we will proceed, Mr. Maynes, with your testimony. You can either read your prepared statement or summarize and submit your prepared statement for the record; whatever is your pleasure.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. MAYNES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit the prepared statement for the record and briefly summarize what we have written in there.

We believe that the 34th U.N. General Assembly provides us with an opportunity to advance administration and congressional goals of attempting to encourage peaceful settlements of international disputes and build bridges between the industrialized and the developing countries.

At the same time we will be working to protect and if possible build on major administration initiatives in the Middle East and southern Africa.

We have to be frank and acknowledge that neither our specific nor our general objectives will be easy to obtain. We have recently had a nonaligned meeting in Cuba, where the results have been mixed. Particularly on the Middle East, we anticipate a difficult session at the General Assembly.

Moreover, in an age of austerity and tight budgets, we will find it more difficult than in the past to respond positively to worthwhile economic initiatives.

But the Department strongly believes that in this more difficult environment, we must avoid the temptation to shirk our international responsibilities, because to do so would have major and unacceptable costs to our long term foreign policy interests.

We will be operating with a new permanent representative in New York, fortunately a man of the widest experience and highest competence in this field, Donald McHenry.

We have made clear to the developing countries that Andy Young's search for areas of common interest with them reflects abiding interest of the United States and certainly of this administration and that this search will continue to be a very high priority of President Carter and his administration.

In the economic field we face a critical juncture in the North-South relationship. The U.N. General Assembly takes place against a background of serious economic problems and major political change.

On the economic front, the United States believes the debate should focus on specific development issues, where mutually satisfactory action is possible. And we hope that we can receive support for this approach.

In recent months developing countries have begun to pursue their own national interests in a more differentiated manner with many non-oil-exporting developing countries, which are always the hardest hit by oil price increases, beginning to criticize openly OPEC pricing policies.

These countries are increasingly critical of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union and East Europeans to be of any help. And they are also increasingly concerned with the faltering ODA or official development assistance performance of Western countries like the United States.

We want to build on the growing parallel interest between the developed and the developing countries in economic growth and energy stability. We think it is of particular importance that we move beyond the somewhat simplistic bloc to bloc, North/South framework to a broader economic dialog which reflects the range of interests in the international economic system.

Our goals should be practical, realistic and realizable. We seek results rather than rhetoric. And we want to make progress when and where we can. We do not believe that we should permit disagreements on some subjects to become artificial obstacles to movement in other critical areas.

Mr. Chairman, this General Assembly will become the scene of major political developments. Pope John Paul II will make an important presentation to the General Assembly. Fidel Castro is expected in New York and we can expect, will exploit to the fullest his role as chairman of the nonalined movement.

There are also rumors that we could have other major international personalities, such as Yasser Arafat, arrive in New York and other world leaders and representatives from the world press will dramatize events at the General Assembly in a way that commands global attention.

This General Assembly will also take place against a background of great political change. The colonial era has come practically to an end. Southern Africa represents the last bastion. And we are all working hard to reach acceptable solutions on Namibia and Rhodesia.

There are also a number of endemic crisis areas which demand a sustained U.S. political role. These include Southeast Asia and the Middle East. We can review in the question period these issues in somewhat more detail.

The situation in Southeast Asia has changed radically over the last year, with a Vietnamese Army occupation in Kampuchea and brutal Vietnamese refugee policies contributing to a major human disaster affecting all of the countries of the region.

The General Assembly will offer opportunities for U.S. leadership in mobilizing humanitarian assistance and focusing political attention on the problems of Southeast Asia.

In the Middle East our chief priority will be to avoid action which would damage the peace process. Our task will be to try to protect the peace process begun at Camp David, as it is the only viable approach to peace in the 30-year history of the Middle East conflict.

We also will be faced with a number of other very difficult Middle East issues, including the situation in Lebanon, the widespread opposition in the international community to Israeli settlements policy, and the so-called Zionism/racism resolution which reappeared at the Havana conference.

As to southern Africa, the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference has created a new hope for finding alternatives to escalating civil war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Western contact group efforts concerning Namibia also show signs of progress.

The U.S. Government will support U.K. efforts on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and work with other governments of the contact group on Namibia to bring about internationally acceptable solutions in both countries.

Maintaining the momentum provided by the Special General Assembly on Arms Control and Disarmament held in 1978 will be an important objective at the forthcoming General Assembly, which will consider some 40 agenda items concerned with arms control and disarmament.

We will continue our efforts to implement elements of the President's 1978 U.N. reform package. Our major goal should be approval of proposals to rationalize U.N. General Assembly procedures.

We are encouraged in these efforts by the Secretary General's June 24 report, which set forth recommendations for making this Assembly more efficient.

On June 14, I appeared before this subcommittee and addressed the subject of peace, security, and international law. During that testimony, I covered the topic of peacekeeping in detail. I would be happy to take any questions on specific matters.

In the budget and financing area, we have two difficult issues. We plan to seek adjustments in existing U.N. financial procedures where that is warranted. Growth in budgetary levels related to growing U.N. responsibilities also remains a serious problem and requires closer controls.

Finally, we may face a major challenge to our current assessment, 25 percent, by states which believe we should shoulder a larger burden of U.N. costs. We will not accept any increase in our assessment.

We expect to be able to build on the steady, if unspectacular, progress in human rights questions in previous sessions. The tragic plight of the Indo-Chinese refugees, to which I have already alluded, will focus attention on this problem in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

The Pope's appearance will arouse new interest in the question of freedom of religion.

The broad range of other human rights issues on the agenda will provide us with numerous opportunities to demonstrate our national commitment to civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of both groups and individuals.

In particular, we plan to propose initiatives to highlight such continuing abuses as torture, disappeared persons, and a related need to enhance the protection of detained persons.

No matter how imaginative the initiatives developed for the General Assembly, however, the ability of the United States to participate effectively in the human rights work at the U.N. is impaired by our failure to ratify the major U.N. human rights covenants. I hope this

is an issue to which the Congress can direct more attention. These convenants provide for human rights machinery from which we are now excluded because of our failure to ratify these covenants.

Over the past 3 years we have discussed key multilateral issues in unprecedented detail with other major donors and Third World countries, and, where possible, we have coordinated positions. We also have had a wide range of pre-General Assembly, high-level consultations with many countries on both political and economic issues.

These efforts of coordination and many others all affect our position at the General Assembly.

Last year, our delegation to the General Assembly was composed of 59 persons: 5 senior representatives, 5 alternates, including 2 congressional and 3 public members, and 49 others, most of whom were members of the U.S. mission in New York and State Department experts.

We are currently completing this year's delegation list.[1]

Mr. Chairman, the Department welcomes this committee's initiative in reviewing our preparations for the next General Assembly. We hope that in the next 3 months of the Assembly's work, some of you will have an opportunity to visit New York, to monitor events and provide us with your own recommendations and advice.

In any event, I and my bureau will be happy to answer any questions you and other members of the committee may have as the session unfolds. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Maynes. And thank you for the brevity of your statement. The full context will be included in the official record.

[Mr. Maynes' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

INTRODUCTION

The events of the past year, as few years since 1945, have highlighted the major role which the United Nations plays in international affairs. The recently recessed debate on Palestinian rights, the Geneva meeting on Vietnam refugees, the continuing efforts to foster peaceful settlements in Lebanon, Cyprus and Namibia, are only among the more prominent efforts undertaken by member states through the U.N. Because of its extensive network of specialized agencies, and because it is the U.N. through which most countries of the world choose to seek solutions to a vast array of problems, we have found it necessary and desirable to respond to problems of a global nature through the institutional political, legal and economic opportunities offered by the U.N.

Many of these problems and opportunities will be presented and given focus at the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. The 34th U.N. General Assembly provides an opportunity to advance our broad goals of encouraging the peaceful settlement of international disputes and building bridges between industrialized and developing countries. We will have to be careful to protect and if possible build upon major Administration initiatives in the Mideast and southern Africa.

Neither our specific nor our general objectives will be easy to attain. Recent declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement have adversely effected the atmosphere on political issues. Moreover, in an age of austerity and tight budgets, we will find it more difficult than in the past to respond positively to worthwhile economic initiatives. But in this more difficult environment, we must avoid the temptation to shirk our international responsibilities. To do so could have major costs to our long-term interests.

[1] See appendix 1, p. 45.

We will be operating with a new Permanent Representative in New York—fortunately, a man of the widest experience and highest competence in this field, Don McHenry. We will have to find some way of meeting Andy Young's high standards in understanding and responding to the Third World's agenda of issues. We have made clear to developing countries that Andy's search for areas of common interest with them reflects abiding U.S. national interests and will continue to be a very high priority of President Carter.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

The U.N.G.A. takes place against a background of serious economic problems and major political change.

On the economic side, there is widespread concern in the international community over th future prospects for the world economy and frustration over the apparent inability of existing institutions to solve the problems of slow growth, inflation, unstable world energy prices and supplies, unbalanced trade and payments flows, and economic development.

The United States and the industrial countries will no doubt continue to come under attack for not doing enough for the LDC's. Nevertheless, the tone of the North/South economic dialogue has improved somewhat over the past year. The U.S. position that the debate should focus on specific development issues, where mutally satisfactory action is possible, is sound and gaining support. But we should not expect the developing countries to cease demanding more resource transfers and a greater decisionmaking role on global economic issues.

In recent months, developing nations have begun to pursue their own national interests in a more differentiated manner, with many non-oil exporting LDCs—which are always the hardest hit by oil price increases—beginning to criticize openly OPEC pricing policies. These countries are increasingly critical of the unwillingness of the U.S.S.R. and the East Europeans to be of any help. They also are increasingly concerned at the faltering ODA performance of Western countries.

This growing diversification of the international community is of course a long-term process. There will be ups and downs; both directions were evident at the recent UNCTAD V meetings in Manila. But this process is a natural development and will continue in the years ahead as additional countries take their places in the international economy.

As Secretary Vance said in his May 1 Chicago speech on "The Challenge of a Changing World," we welcome pluralism and are determined to work with developed and developing countries to ensure a more equitable world economics system. We want to build on the growing parallel interests between developed and developing countries in economic growth and energy stability. We think it is of particular importance that we move beyond the somewhat simplistic bloc to bloc "North/South" framework to a broader economic dialogue which reflects the range of interests in the international economic system. Our goals should be practical, realistic and realizable. We seek results rather than rhetoric. And we should make progress when and where we can. We should not permit disagreements on some subject to become artificial obstacles to movement in other crucial areas.

POLITICAL ISSUES

This G. A. will be the scene of major political developments.

Pope John Paul II will make an important visit to the United States, including a presentation to the General Assembly, which will focus world attention on the importance of freedom of religion in the contemporary era.

Castro is expected in New York, on the heels of his non-aligned summit spectacular, and will exploit to the fullest his role as chairman of the Non-Alignment Movement.

Yasser Arafat is expected to spotlight attention on the Palestinian question.

Finally, other world leaders and representatives from the world press will dramatize events at the General Assembly in a way that commands global attention.

This G. A. also will take place against a backdrop of great political change.

Cold war has given way to a complex and unstable mix of competition and cooperation, with SALT and arms control a major and continuing policy imperative

Many developing nations increasingly exercise influence in our interdependent world and their national interests must be taken into account.

There is a growing diffusion of political, economic and military power, which is creating new (albeit still unclear) international relationships. These range from oil and industrial power to the proliferation of convention military power—and, potentially, nuclear weapons capacity.

The colonial era has come practically to an end. Southern Africa represents the last bastion and we all are working hard to reach acceptable solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia.

There are a number of endemic crisis areas which demand a sustained U.S. political role. These include Southeast Asia, and the Mideast, as well as southern Africa.

I would like to review these latter issues for you in somewhat more detail in light of the major role they will play in this G.A.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The situation in Southeast Asia has changed radically over the last year, with a Vietnamese army of occupation in Kampuchea and brutal Vietnamese refugee policies contributing to a major human disaster affecting all of the countries of the region.

The G.A. will offer opportunities for US leadership in mobilizing humanitarian assistance and focusing political attention on the problems of Southeast Asia.

Special priority will have to be given to the meeting the threat of imminent famine in Cambodia. The Assembly will also consider what progress has been made in responding to the net flow of refugees from Vietnam. We will seek to work closely with the countries of the region to press for a political solution to the Kampuchean question and an end to Vietnam's military occupation of that country. We may also need to focus attention on Vietnamese internal policies, he root cause of the refugees problem which has arisen.

MIDDLE EAST

Our chief priority will be to avoid U.N.G.A. action which could damage the peace process. Despite defeat of the attempt to exclude Israel and punish Egypt at the WHO, some rejectionist Arab states remain determined to condemn Egypt and Israel and to undermine the authority of the Treaty and the legitimacy of the autonomy talks. The confrontational approach adopted by the Non-Aligned Summit, at the urging of Arafat and the rejectionist Arabs, probably will be reasserted in the U.N.G.A.

Our task will be to try to protect the peace process begun at Camp David, as it is the only viable approach to peace developed in the 30-year history of Mideast conflict. We want to make the point strongly that the process of negotiations is much more likely to produce peace and to promote legitimate Palestinian rights, than the inflammatory language and confrontational rhetoric employed by the NAM. We will stress that a confrontational approach is entirely inappropriate in a body such as the U.G.A. which has a Charter obligation to work for international peace and security.

We also will be faced with a number of other very difficult Mideast issues. These include the situation in Lebanon and the widespread opposition in the international community to Israeli settlements policy. We remain concerned at the Zionism/Racism link which reappeared at the Havana Conference. We may also see General Assembly calls for Chapter VII sanctions against Israel, building on a resolution last year which called for a ban on arms sales to Israel.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Lusaka Commonwealth Conference has put a whole new face on the African debate in the GA by reviving alternatives to escalating civil war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Western Contact Group efforts concerning Namibia also show signs of progress.

The U.S. government certainly will do whatever it can, in support of the United Kingdom's efforts on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and in coordination with the other members of the Contact Group on Namibia, to bring about internationally-acceptable solutions in both countries.

African Front Line states and Nigeria will continue to play a major role in efforts to bring about a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa. Their active cooperation with Western efforts over the past three years, and their highly visible commitment to the Commonwealth initiative, have been critical in the progress obtained and will be decisive in any GA actions.

We anticipate, at the same time, that there will be no let-up in pressures to bring about an end to South Africa's apartheid system. The Third World will seek to assert those pressures through Western industrialized countries' support for Chapter VII mandatory sanctions against South Africa, with attention probably focusing on the supply and distribution of oil.

ARMS CONTROL

Maintaining the momentum provided by the Special G.A. session on Arms Control, held in 1978, the forthcoming G.A. will consider some 40 agenda items concerned with arms control and disarmament. The G.A. will consider the work of the newly established Committee on Disarmament, the old CCD enlarged to include France, among others. It will also review the efforts of the revived U.N. Commission on Disarmament which met last spring. Several of the issues before the G.A., such as proposals for a comprehensive test ban and a treaty on chemical warfare, are of particular importance to the United States. Consideration of the dangers of nuclear proliferation will take on new significance in light of the nuclear programs being conducted by Pakistan and South Africa.

U.N. REFORM

We will continue our efforts to implement elements of the President's 1978 U.N. Reform package. Our major goal should be approval of the proposals concerning U.N.G.A. procedures developed by our representatives and an ad hoc group of U.N. Ambassadors. We also will want to press our ideas for reform in FC work and in U.N. peacekeeping.

We are encouraged in these efforts by the Secretary General's June 24 report, which set forth recommendations for making the Assembly more efficient. Many of our proposals are incorporated in that report, including those to make greater use of the General (Steering) Committee of the Assembly by having it review the progress of work throughout the session, reduce the number of agenda items through groupings of similar issues and staggering consideration of items over two or more sessions. Other U.S. proposals also are included in the Secretary General's report.

We and other countries which have been concerned by the organizational chaos that affected last year's session are extremely pleased by the Secretary General's report. It is our hope that at this session the Assembly will approve it and begin to institute many of its recommendations.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING

On June 14, I appeared before this Sub-committee and addressed the subject of peace, security and international law. During that testimony I covered the topic of peacekeeping in detail. I discussed recent U.N. peacekeeping operations and how the technique of peacekeeping is one of the truly hopeful innovations of the United Nations. I also discussed our proposals for institutionally strengthening United Nations peacekeeping capabilities. I would be glad to take any of your questions on specific matters.

BUDGET AND FINANCING ISSUES

We face two highly controversial issues.

The Washington Post series on U.N. financial management, though discredited in its major conclusions by the GAO testimony, has nonetheless focused attention on the need to push for adjustments in existing procedures. We plan to do so where that is warranted.

Growth in budgetary levels, related to growing U.N. responsibilities, also remains a serious problem and requires closer controls. We sponsored some proposals at last year's U.N.G.A., including, in particular, a request that the Secretary General identify marginal and obsolete activities so that their cost can be used to offset new requirements. We also voted against substantial supplemental appropriations for the 1978–79 U.N. budget and were successful in obtaining the support of several other major donors.

Finally, we may face a major challenge to our current assessment (25 percent) by states who believe we should shoulder a bigger share of UN costs. We will not accept any increase in our assessment. We are also working with U.N. specialized agencies to develop new techniques to separate technical assistance out of assessed budgets. We appreciate the high priority placed on this matter by the Congress.

HUMAN RIGHTS

We expect to be able to build on the steady, if unspectacular, progress on human rights questions in previous sessions. We have moved beyond having to persuade others that human rights are a vital and continuing concern of the international community, and not a Western ploy.

The tragic plight of the Indochinese refugees, to which I already have alluded, will focus attention on this problem in Southeast Asia, as well as in Africa and elsewhere. The Pope's appearance will arouse new interest in freedom of religion. We plan an active role on these issues. Our efforts to counter racial discrimination are hampered since the Zionism-racism linkage required our non-participation in the U.N.'s Decade Against Racial Discrimination.

The broad range of other human rights items on the agenda will provide us with numerous opportunities to demonstrate our commitment to the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of both groups and individuals. We plan to propose initiatives to highlight such continuing abuses as torture, disappeared persons and the related need to enhance the protection of detained persons. Elimination of discrimination among women and support for programs under the U.N. Decade for Women also will be major objectives. We believe that no groups of rights should be emphasized by the U.N. to the exclusion of the other.

I want to make one last point in this area. No matter how imaginative the initiatives we develop for the General Assembly, the ability of the United States to participate effectively in the human rights work of the U.N. is impaired by our failure to ratify the major U.N. human rights covenants.

COORDINATION

Over the past three years, we have discussed key multilateral issues in unprecedented detail with other major donors and Third World countries, and, where possible, we have coordinated positions.

We consider the success with which Western and African Front Line states have worked together on southern African problems in the U.N. to be a direct result of this effort.

We have just completed two major rounds of coordination, involving representations in scores of capitals and in New York, aimed at protecting Israel's and Egypt's position in international fora and at ensuring as constructive an outcome as possible at the Non-Aligned Summit.

We have had a wide-range of pre-U.N.G.A. high-level consultations with many countries on both political and economic issues.

These efforts at coordination, and many others, all affect the G.A.

U.S. DELEGATION

Last year, our delegation to the GA was composed of 59 persons: five senior representatives, five alternates (including two Congressional and three public members) and 49 others. Most of the others were members of the U.S. Mission in New York, and regional or functional specialists in the Department, who are expert either in multilateral meetings or their own fields, or both. The Washington specialists were physically present in New York during the session whenever agenda items of particular concern to them were active. We have not yet completed this year's delegation list.

Mr. Chairman, the Department welcomes your initiative in reviewing our preparations for the next G.A. We hope that in the three months of the Assembly's work some of you will have an opportunity to visit New York to monitor events and provide us with your own recommendations and advice. In any event, I and my bureau will be happy to answer any questions you and other members of the Committee may have as the sessions unfolds.

Mr. BONKER. I am just going through the clippings that my staff has collected in the past few days.[1] Things do not look very bright for the upcoming session. One article by the Israeli representative to the United Nations appeared in the New York Times just today on the United Nation's decline, and it talks about problems that he perceives. In fact, the United Nations is having a form of confrontation and dissension among member nations. Waldheim sees trouble

[1] See articles in appendixes 2, 3, 4, and 5, beginning on p. 46.

in the 34th session, but I think more specifically it relates to U.S. representation with the new and perhaps continuing problem of official State Department policy as it relates to U.N. activities and votes. We know that now, with the more recent example of our Permanent Ambassador taking action that may or may not be consistent with the established State Department policy. In the New York Times the other day, it was reported that a U.S. representative cast two anti-Israeli votes at a U.N. Human Rights Subcommission meeting in Geneva in the representative's personal capacity, not in his official capacity.

Are we going to have continuing problems with U.S. votes, actions and attitudes that are not consistent with whatever the State Department's established policy is?

Mr. MAYNES. Mr. Chairman, I am very glad you raised the question of Ambassador Carter's votes. Let me explain the nature of the post of a representative on the Human Rights Subcommission.

The Subcommission is a body of the United Nations where representatives from countries serve in their individual capacity. The United States has never instructed its representative to the Subcommission in the history of that body. We do not take the Soviet view that it is impossible for an individual to serve in an expert capacity. Subsequently, the U.S. representative to the Subcommission, the U.S. representative to the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, the U.S. expert on the ILO group of experts, have never been instructed in the history of U.S. involvement with these organizations.

Quite the contrary, the United States left the ILO because we felt that other countries were attempting to politicize the impartial and objective work of the group of experts. The group of experts has been at the heart of the human rights activities of the ILO, and we were seeing a situation where the work of that group of experts was overturned or disregarded by the fall conference of the ILO.

I think it is very important that the United States protect the concept that we can pick distinguished Americans like Ambassador Carter and allow them to vote their conscience in an expert's capacity.

In comparison now, the U.S. representative to the Human Rights Commission, former Congressman Mezvinski, is instructed, and when he speaks, he will be speaking with the full authority of the United States, but Ambassador Carter's role on the Subcommission is really to serve on a quasi-judicial capacity. As a matter of fact, the Subcommission's primary responsibility is to review the thousands, indeed, tens of thousands of letters that are sent to the United Nations alleging practices of discrimination or violation of human rights in various countries around the world.

The Subcommission reviews these documents in this quasi-judicial manner, and then makes recommendations to the full Commission for action. Obviously, that kind of situation, we cannot have our representative instructed in a case where, as I say, he is reviewing in effect evidence and deciding whether the cases proposed seem to reflect a pattern of violations which deserve consideration by the full Commission.

Mr. BONKER. At some point we need consistency or we are going to leave our friends and adversaries in a highly confused state, because U.S. policy may represent one standard at the U.N. level and may represent an entirely different standard according to that person's

conscience at another level. I don't think this exists with this particular case, but politicization is not going to disappear, it is going to intensify. I don't know which agencies are instructed by State and which ones are not. I don't think you could provide me with a list that would have that.

Mr. MAYNES. We certainly could provide you with such a list. The three bodies that I mentioned fall into this category. We also have an expert on the Committee on Contributions which serves in a private capacity; an American expert on ABAQ serves in a private capacity. We have a number of bodies in the United Nations where an individual serves in a private capacity. They tend to be concentrated either in the financial area or in this area like human rights, where we do have bodies, where the individuals are supposed to examine the evidence as objectively as possible and then make recommendations.

I would point out that the Subcommission can take no action of its own. The recommendations it makes have to go to the full Commission and then the full Commission makes its decision.

Mr. BONKER. Is our representative to the full Commission then instructed by him?

Mr. MAYNES. Yes; he is, and our representative to the ILO conference is also instructed. However, there have been U.S. experts who have served in the ILO group of experts who did not accept instructions. A former representative who comes to mind quickly is Earl Warren. You can see that the situation depends on the character of the person that is selected and the nature of the body in which they serve.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Hall?

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maynes. many of the nonalined countries at the conference in Havana supported many anti-U.S. positions. Can we expect this kind of approach at the upcoming session of the General Assembly?

Mr. MAYNES. Let me comment on the nonalined conference in Havana. I think it is important to look at the political context in which that meeting took place. What you have there is a struggle between countries represented by Cuba on the one hand and countries represented by Yugoslavia, Tanzania, India on the other, regarding the fundamental character of the nonalined movement.

In 1973, Fidel Castro decided to join the nonalined movement. He went to Algiers and delivered a speech in Algiers in which he said there was a natural alliance between the nonalined movement and the Soviet Union. At that time, he was denounced from the floor, and as I recall, I think it was even Qadafi who walked out of the meeting.

The meeting was, in short, unsuccessful.

This time around, the Cubans, in the drafts that they wrote never formally advanced the proposition that there was a natural alliance, but the whole thrust of the documents suggested that there was an affinity. The opening section of the document did discuss this critical issue in theoretical terms, but it is not just theoretical. It has implications particularly for a country like Yugoslavia.

The Cuban draft was radically revised. The document reflected the traditional position of the nonalined countries. In assessing, then, the

results of Havana, one has to go to the various sections of the document to determine whether it was good or bad. The results there are mixed. The session on the Middle East is very bad. There is no disguising that fact, and we frankly deplore the kind of decisions which were made there. It is important to note, however, and I think it is important for the Congress to realize, the role that the African countries played in the nonalined meeting dealing with this section. It was African support for Egypt which blocked the effort to expel Egypt from the nonalined movement. It was African resistance which lasted all evening, in an all-night session, which blocked condemnation of Egypt itself.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Maynes, may I just ask, if the gentleman will permit, were there established leaders within the African movement tat provided this direccion?

Mr. MAYNES. There certainly were. I think a very important speech and one that was extremely well received by the delegates was Julius Nyere's speech and initiatives taken by Senegal and Nigeria.

Mr. BONKER. Was Sudan involved in that?

Mr. MAYNES. Mr. Chairman, we were not permitted into the hall.

Mr. BONKER. I can't imagine why. [General laughter.]

Mr. MAYNES. We do not have a detailed account of all of the discussions. We are currently assembling—many of the speeches given in Havana which were denied us are now being published in the press by the governments in question, so surely we will have all of these speeches, but the countries I mentioned certainly played an important role and a helpful role, and as I say, I think it is important that the Congress understand that.

The southern African section of the nonaligned document was revised to reflect the results of the Lusaka Conference. In the rest, there was recognition of the negotiating effort. There was strong criticism of South Africa for not accepting the decisions of the Security Council, and there was strong rhetoric about the relationship which some Western countries, including the United States, have with South Africa, but that language was no different from what has traditionally appeared in documents of this sort.

So, in short, there really was not much difference between the nonaligned document that came out of Havana and other nonaligned documents with respect to southern Africa.

The Indian Ocean section was dramatically revised to delete the attacks on the United States, and to call for general disarmament in the region. The section on Southeast Asia was changed to call upon the countries in the region, and that means Vietnam in particular, to live up to the commitments made at the Geneva Conference. The section on Latin America was revised to delete the attack on the Rio Treaty System and the Inter-American Defense College, but there was strong language on Puerto Rico, strong language on the American base at Guantanamo, and the blockade.

In short, the most difficult section for the United States in the nonaligned document was the Middle East, where there was a clear and dramatic change in the tone of the language used and the strength of the words employed.

Mr. HALL. To follow up on that question, the House just recently passed a fairly costly foreign aid bill. At the time we were passing it, many of the Third World countries, many of the countries attending

the conference in Havana were giving us considerable verbal abuse. Is this going to continue in the United Nations? I am sure many Americans cannot see the necessity of continuing to aid Third World countries that do in fact seem to be stepping up their criticism of us.

It is my understanding that at the United Nations, we have between 15 and 17 countries that always support our positions. Will there be a change in this, and do you also see a step-up of criticism and denunciations of the United States?

Mr. MAYNES. This charge is often made. In terms of the United Nations, itself, I went through the general debate last year looking for evidence of abuse of the United States, and quite frankly, there were only two or three countries that I think fell into the category that you are talking about. One of them was Cuba, which at the last General Assembly delivered, as Castro once again did in Havana, a very abusive statement with respect to the United States. We will have to look at the general debate of the General Assembly to see what kind of rhetoric will be employed, but it is important to point out there were a number of Third World countries at the nonaligned movement that took very courageous stands.

One was Tanzania. Another was India. Another was Panama. As a matter of fact, the Panamanians stood up and formally praised President Carter for his courage in pushing through the Panama Canal in the face of significant domestic opposition. Peru played an important role, and there were a number of other countries. So, I think it would be unfair to the developing countries to imply that somehow they are united against the United States. That simply is not an accurate picture of what took place, but more important, I think we have a longer run interest in fostering ties with a number of these countries that are important to us politically, economically, geographically. It would be very foolhardy on our part to cut ourselves off from a relationship with these countries.

Mr. HALL. With respect to the PLO controversy, is there going to to be a different approach to the PLO, or are we going to follow the same line that we have taken in past years?

Mr. MAYNES. The United States has never had a different approach to the PLO. What has happened in recent months is that there have been rumors that the PLO may have a different approach. Whether that turns out to be true, I really am not in a position to say. But I think you can see from a variety of sources that the PLO is cultivating a new image, attempting to reach out in a way that it did not before. I think the meetings with Kriesky are an example of this, and there have been other initiatives that they have taken. There have been rumors, as you know, in the press that the PLO was or is perhaps in a position to meet the conditions which were laid down some time ago by the United States, on the issue of whether it would enter into some kind of discussion with the PLO. The essence of this question is whether they accept Resolution 242 and the existence of Israel.

There have been many rumors in the past on this subject. They have invariably failed to materialize at the last minute, for one reason or another. While no action has taken place to date, what has been different in recent weeks is a marked increase of speculative rumors. Therefore, they were given more credence. We have yet to see however, the decisive steps that people are talking about.

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Mr. HALL. The President made several suggestions to the State Department in regard to U.N. reform. He suggested a program—I don't know what has happened to that program. Is that again going to be pushed in this session of the United Nations?

Mr. MAYNES. We have in our earlier consultations, and intend to continue pressing for our initial priorities. We do think that there may be an opportunity for the first time in many years to make some progress in reform of the General Assembly. Now, whether that will pan out, I don't know. But, there was at the end of the last General Assembly a great deal of widely shared satisfaction among various regional groups about the way the General Assembly is being conducted. With the United States and countries like Canada taking an initiative, we were able to establish in New York an ad hoc group of states which brought together representatives from all regional political groups.

We had representation from the developing countries, from socialist countries, and from Western Europe. Recommendations were developed, many of which have found their way into the report of the Secretary General to the membership with regard to steps that could be taken to improve the work of the General Assembly. We would like to see continued progress made on this high priority issue during this year's UNGA.

Merging all of these perspectives is a difficult problem, because each member state has its own reasons for either actively supporting some steps of reform, or on the other hand disagreeing on the same set of steps. For example, I was recently in India where they strongly support the idea that there should be a procedural reform in the General Assembly. But they also pointed out that they have parliamentarians who are on their delegation, who are very reluctant to see some of these changes because it provides them with an opportunity to speak in a way which is useful to them at home.

I think, however, that this year offers great potential for success. Given the record, it would be prudent to wait and see before we can really claim success.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Maynes.

Mr. BONKER. I am pleased that the gentleman raised the question of reform, because this subcommittee is very interested in that subject. The State Department in response to a congressional initiative has submitted a report which contains very specific recommendations. We have already had hearings on this subject, and have noted that not much progress has been made, so I appreciate the high priority you attach to your reform, and after the General Assembly session we hope to pick up on this matter again and see what progress has been made. You can pass it on to our official delegation that at least this subcommittee is vitally interested in the subject, and we hope that there is progress.

Mr. MAYNES. I appreciate that sentiment, and it will be useful to be able to pass on both to senior officials in the State Department and our delegation, the subcommittee's concern in this area.

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee is very pleased to have with us today Representative Charlie Diggs, who is a distinguished member of the full committee.

Mr. Diggs, we invite you to ask questions and make any comments at this time.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your courtesy in extending me an opportunity to ask three or four questions.

Mr. Chairman, you as a former member of the Subcommittee on Africa and I as a continuing member of that subcommittee are well aware of the important component that is represented by Africa in U.N. affairs. Hence the rationale for my presence here today.

Mr. Chairman, may I first of all observe that the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. Dalley, has been selected for another post. As I understand it, this may be his farewell appearance before the subcommittee and before the committee in general. I certainly would like to extend my compliments to him for his performance and for the enlightenment that he has provided so many of us in the execution of his responsibility, and I wish him well in his new assignment as a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board. I am sure that his career development will be concluded there as it is here with distinction.

Mr. DALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Diggs.

Mr. DIGGS. Who are the congressional and public members for the upcoming session?

Mr. MAYNES. Mr. Rosenthal and Mr. Winn from the committee. Mr. Rosen, who is a lawyer from New Jersey, Mrs. Esther Coopersmith, who is from Washington, D.C., and William Winford, who is from New Hampshire.

Mr. DIGGS. I want to get a couple of relatively less important questions out of the way. The property that is in back of our mission——

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Diggs, would you yield for a moment?

Mr. DIGGS. Yes.

Mr. BONKER. We are supposed to have five official representatives and five alternates. The General Assembly picks up next week. As I understand it, there are only four official representatives. There is yet one representative to be assigned.

Mr. MAYNES. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, the situation is more difficult than that. Ambassador McHenry's urgent priority right now is to pick a successor for himself and a successor for the job of our representative to the Economic and Social Council, because the incumbent, Melissa Wells, will be leaving the mission.

Mr. BONKER. So you are awaiting Ambassador McHenry's appointment. That will be his appointment, and the person will then be a part of the official delegation?

Mr. MAYNES. The appointment will be made by the President, but obviously Ambassador McHenry will have a major influence in that choice.

Mr. BONKER. You mentioned the name Smith. Is that an alternate?

Mr. MAYNES. Usually our five Ambassadors at the United Nations are our permanent delegates, and the alternates are the three public members and two congressional members. At this time, because we do not have a full compliment of Ambassadors up there, some of the alternates will be moved to the permanent category.

Mr. BONKER. Are we lacking then—I apologize to the gentleman. I just wanted to pursue this question. Then are we lacking only one permanent delegate?

Mr. MAYNES. Two.

Mr. BONKER. We are lacking two. Then Ambassador McHenry will recommend the one. How about the second position?

Mr. MAYNES. He will have a major influence on the recommendations to the President in both areas. His own successor and the successor to Melissa Wells.

Mr. BONKER. So the five alternates are now in place?

Mr. MAYNES. That is right, they are. I should say that their papers are going to the Senate. They have not been officially confirmed.

Mr. BONKER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DIGGS. What is the status of the property that is in back of the USUN mission in New York City which is owned by the Uganda Government? They have been through some very severe financial crises, and that is a very valuable piece of property. Are they hanging on to that, or do we have a chance to get in? I don't know how we let it get away from us in the first place, but that is another question. Are they hanging on to that?

Mr. MAYNES. At this point, they are holding on to the property. It hink a number of missions, including our own, have talked to the Ugandans about use of some of that space. I don't believe they need a building of that size for their mission, but nothing firm has come of our discussions.

Mr. DIGGS. The OAU for the next year is being headed by President Tolbert of Liberia, and Liberia is considered to be the closest country to ours. In that capacity, he will be appearing before the U.N. That would add an extra dimension to American considerations. I am told that there is pending a prospect that he will be coming to Washington end there is a question of the status of that visit. Has it been decided whether or not that will be an official visit in terms of protocol? To an outsider, that may not seem important, but you and I know that is important. I wondered how strongly the Department is making representations to the White House to see that the visit is properly classified.

Mr. MAYNES. I am not familiar with the details on that visit. I know that we have very close relationships with the President of Liberia. I am sure you can be certain that the State Department will recommend the best possible treatment for him. Mr. Dalley, as a matter of fact, visited Liberia this year as part of our pre-General Assembly consultation schedule, and we have been trying to work very closely with the Liberians as well as other African states. The fact that Liberia is the Chairman of the OAU was the motivating factor for Mr. Dalley's special trip there to allow them to discuss preparations for the General Assembly.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE DALLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Mr. DALLEY. We certainly look forward to Liberia's chairmanship of the OAU because of the historically close relationship we have had with the Liberians. Of course, as the Chair of the OAU, Liberia must represent all of Africa. Nevertheless, we anticipate that under Liberian leadership, the OAU will be moving in directions that we certainly have felt were necessary and important for Africa, particularly in the human rights area.

This week, Liberia is hosting a meeting of African governments that was convened by the U.N. Human Rights Commission to discuss the formation of a regional human rights mechanism and institution for for Africa. I think it is a very hopeful development. It stems from the Nigerian initiative in the U.N. Human Rights Commission 2 years ago, which this year was confirmed in the OAU conference at the summit meeting by a resolution in which the OAU declared itself ready to study the possibility of forming such an institution.

We are looking forward to this Monrovia meeting and making a step toward development of the institution that will reflect African beliefs and African cultural aspects. This will be, I think, very important in developing a view of human rights that is African but yet consistent with many views that we hold here in the West.

Mr. DIGGS. Is your assessment on that point reinforced by the fact that the new President of the General Assembly is also an African; that is, Salim Salim, the Tanzanian representative to the U.N.?

Mr. DALLEY. I think we have always felt that that recognition of the African states in the General Assembly and other African bodies is extremely important because the Africans quite often are the swing votes, the votes that are extremely important for us to try to influence.

Mr. DIGGS. Are there any changes in the status of Mr. McHenry as opposed to the status of Mr. Young? Will it continue to be a Cabinet-level position? Are there any changes at all——

Mr. MAYNES There are no changes. Ambassador McHenry will be a member of the Cabinet. He will participate in the formation of policy, as did Ambassador Young. As one who, first of all, has been a close friend of Ambassador McHenry for some 16 years, and also someone who has worked with him to resolve various policy issues, I can assure you that he will have a full-throated voice on foreign policy issues. He is, I think, a brilliant professional with strong views which he very effectively defends.

Mr. DIGGS. One of the things that came out of the Andy Young affair that disturbed me and, I know, a lot of other people were reports about intelligence activities in and around the U.N., which obviously, if true, were in violation of U.S. Federal statutes. There have been all sorts of funny responses to that, the Justice Department claiming that they had not been asked to make an investigation and then when they were asked, they still came up with funny answers to the questions.

I am sure you have gone into this thing, and from your position you must know something about these kinds of activities. What kind of comment would you make about the tolerance of what is obviously in violation of Federal statutes, intelligence activities on the part of foreign governments in and around the United Nations, and particularly as it relates to our own mission? Are we being spied upon by these foreign agents, and why are they being tolerated?

Mr. MAYNES. Mr. Diggs, the President has personally issued a statement on this question which is an authoritative statement. He has categorically denied, after consulting with the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government, that there was any intelligence activity by any U.S. agency against any of our officials in New York. He has stated that in terms of some of the foreign missions that have been mentioned, they were acting within appropriate limits.

I would also add that U.S. security procedures make the assumption that people will not always act within permissible limits, and we therefore are very careful to protect the security of our Ambassadors in New York and of our mission against the kinds of activities that you are talking about.

Mr. DIGGS. If there is time, Mr. Chairman, I have one final question, if I may, that relates to the whole concept of dissent. I have served as a member of the USUN delegation, and it is like a unit rule. What kind of provisions are made for a member of the delegation dissenting from the official U.S. position which may be established in some instances without even the input of that individual.

Mr. BONKER, Briefly, please.

Mr. DIGGS. Briefly.

Mr. MAYNES. There is a formal dissent channel in the State Department which is used by Foreign Service officers. I know from my own experience we have had dissents from the field or within the Bureau to decisions that are made. There is a formal process which requires a Director for Policy Planning, external to the Bureau against which the dissent is being made, to examine this dissent, and to submit a memorandum to the Secretary concerning the recommendation.

So, there are provisions for dissent, but the issue that you raise is one that has traditionally plagued or provided a creative tension between our missions and our State Department. If you look at the biography of Governor Stevenson, you will see at one point he went to the extent of trying to negotiate a treaty on this with The White House, because he felt that the issue needed to be clarified. We do have this formal dissent channel.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee will stand in recess for 10 minutes.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. BONKER. The Subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Maynes, I just have a few remaining questions.

To follow up on Representative Diggs' comments about the moderate and responsible role African leaders have been playing, both in terms of the recent conference in Havana as well as the upcoming General Assembly. They have been a stabilizing force and potentially pro-West in much of the deliberations, but there will come a time when resolutions will be advanced that deal with South Africa, possible economic sanctions on that country. We are trying to further negotiations in Namibia, possibly with African states becoming somewhat involved with the PLO question.

What is going to happen if we can't vote in a way that is going to be compatible with their interests and concerns and pursue the scenario? Do we lose our block of support within the assembly?

Mr. MAYNES. Mr. Chairman, there never has been, and probably never will be, a complete overlap of interests between ourselves and African states. What the Carter administration has tried to do is to help the country to understand that while there never will be a complete overlap in many areas there is a substantial overlap. It simply was not true, is not true, and will not be true that it is impossible to work with the African countries on issues of common interest.

We have not given up on either Rhodesia or Namibia. We think, as a matter of fact, in recent weeks developments have taken place which are rather hopeful. When we come to a point where our positions do not overlap, I think we should frankly vote our own interests. I think that African countries will understand that, provided they feel that we are attempting actively to pursue areas of mutual collaboration.

I think that one of the accomplishments of this administration is that we have tried in some of the areas where collaboration is more obvious.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Dalley, first of all, do you have any suspicion that the OAU and African leaders will be advancing a resolution that will in fact place economic sanctions on South Africa similar to that which was placed on Rhodesia a few years back? And if that occurs, and we don't support the resolution, how would you anticipate the fallout?

Mr. DALLEY. I believe that if there is a loss of belief or there is a conviction that we are not going to be able to make progress toward a peaceful resolution of transition of power in Namibia, there probably will be a call for a Security Council meeting on Namibia.

Mr. BONKER. I was talking about South Africa and a resolution that would place an economic sanction.

Mr. DALLEY. I am saying if that meeting did occur, there would probably be an effort to pass a resolution of that sort for South Africa. We have said from the beginning of the Namibia process that we would be frustrated in our ability to achieve a success considering the imposition of voting on sanctions against South Africa. We do not know yet what our position will be on that issue when the time comes.

Mr. BONKER. So what you are saying is, whether or not that issue arises depends on progress being made in Namibia.

Mr. DALLEY. I believe so. There is, of course, an underlying concern of Africans in the United Nations that the United States and Western nations have relationships with South Africa. This manifests itself in all specialized agencies and all human rights issues, but as far as an actual effort to have a resolution to impose sanctions, I would say that we are not yet certain that that will occur.

Mr. BONKER. My impression has been that South Africa has not acted in good faith with respect to Namibia. They agreed to elections, and they are trying to back out and hold their own elections.

Mr. DALLEY. Negotiations continue. We feel the door is not yet closed. The unfortunate death of the President of Angola is a complicated factor, as Mr. Maynes mentioned. He was a very important player in the discussions that had taken place.

Mr. MAYNES. Mr. Chairman, if I could comment on that, too, I don't think there is time for the membership of the United Nations or certainly for the United States to be talking in terms of a breakdown in negotiations, or actions by the United States in the event that negotiations broke down. There have been a number of very important developments in recent weeks regarding the Namibia negotiations. We are in active, or I should say, the British on behalf of the western contact group, are in active negotiations with the South Africans.

It would be foolish to be too optimistic given the history of Namibia for the last 30 years. In fact, there is some promise that we can finally resolve this issue, so we would like to talk in terms—not of a breakdown

in negotiations—but of a major challenge which the United Nations will face in conducting probably the largest operation in its history with the exception of the Congo.

Mr. BONKER. Now that Ambassador McHenry has replaced Andrew Young as our representative at the United Nations, who is going to take charge of these negotiations?

Mr. MAYNES. I am sure Ambassador McHenry will himself continue to play a very important oversight role. My guess would be that his successor, the Deputy Permanent Representative to the Security Council, will become the President, who is most intimately involved. We also have a very, very equal deputy chief of the political section up there, who has been Ambassador McHenry's strong right arm during negotiations, John Blackman.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Dalley, quickly, now that you mention the death of President Neto, what is going to be the prospect of moderate leadership in Angola? And although we had not recognized Angola, I follow the country very closely, and they have been very cooperative in the Namibia negotiations. Do you see more radical personalities coming forward? Or the stablization of the country?

Mr. DALLEY. The only answer to that is, we don't know. We don't have any idea what the prospects of succession are in that country.

Mr. MAYNES. I would suspect that even the Angolans don't know.

Mr. BONKER. Does the CIA know? [General laughter.]

I thought they had a permanent office in Angola. [General laughter.]

Mr. MAYNES. I think after congressional action it was closed. [General laughter.]

It was de-funded.

Mr. BONKER. Maybe Holden Roberto will feel he has a crack at it.

Do you anticipate that there will be a resolution of the General Assembly to move their headquarters from New York?

Mr. MAYNES. No. Not only is that not desired by member states, it would also be financially disastrous for the membership, given the fact that New York is now a much cheaper place than Geneva to locate their headquarters, but I would like to take this opportunity to point out that despite press stories which have been less frequent in recent years suggesting that the delegates do not like New York. I think exactly the opposite is true. I think there is probably no other city in the world which provides the advantages that New York does to an institution with so many cultures and races and ethnic backgrounds. The variety of New York is greatly appreciated by all the delegations who feel it is the only city in the world, the only foreign city in the world where they can go and feel that they don't in effect stand out in every crowd.

Mr. BONKER. Is Vienna cheaper?

Mr. MAYNES. No, Vienna is also more expensive.

Mr. BONKER. No prospects of going to Vienna?

Mr. MAYNES. No. There was an article, I know, in the New York Times suggesting that is what the Viennese have in mind. If so, they have not informed the membership, and there is no intention of moving anything out of New York other than what was agreed by the membership many years ago as part of the development of Vienna as a third U.N. city.

Mr. BONKER. You know, the subcommittee held hearings a few months ago regarding U.N. finances, and I rather imagine that there will be further points in the press about financial status and financial records, investment policy and procedures, and the like. These articles do considerable damage to our institutional support in the Congress of the U.N. Will the U.N. delegation be pressing for reforms and improvements, better accounting procedures, better investment policies? We don't have to respond to these charges and make them public, do we?

Mr. MAYNES. We are going to make this a very high priority issue, Mr. Chairman. It has figured prominently in the consultations we have had prior to the General Assembly. As you know, the Department feels and GAO agrees, that the major premise of that series of articles which you mentioned, was incorrect and false. Nevertheless, there are serious financial problems at the U.N. We are intending to make a major effort to try to do something about them.

Mr. BONKER. How about personnel policies? Are you going to be looking into charges that Senator Moynihan has made that there are Soviet spies in the Secretariat, especially in the front office?

Mr. MAYNES. In the Geneva office. The United States strongly supports the position that member states should honor article 100, which establishes the people who work for the Secretariat shall be international civil servants and free from pressure or control from their home government. We have spoken out vigorously on that, and we will continue to. We will speak out wherever we have public proof that other nations are abusing this, but I think we should put in perspective this allegation.

The Soviets are not about to take over the Secretariat of the U.N. In fact, the United States has by far the largest number of employees in U.N. institutions of any other country.

Mr. BONKER. I believe the charge was not so much how many nationals, but KGB agents who were allegedly serving in the Secretariat.

Mr. MAYNES. That is the charge, and as I say, if there is public proof, proof which will be evidence, we will be the first to bring it forward and demand that action be taken.

Mr. BONKER. We covered this just briefly, but maybe you can provide a more explicit response. What will be the U.S. position on granting observer status to the PLO?

Mr. MAYNES. The PLO already has observer status in the United Nations. There will be no change in our position on that.

Mr. BONKER. Which is?

Mr. MAYNES. We opposed their observer status. They have it. That is an accomplished fact. The next issue that is posed at the U.N. is the question of how observers are treated in General Assembly debates. There will not be a change in our position.

Mr. BONKER. The last question. This subcommittee will be taking up some human rights issues in the next few months that relate to religious intolerance, torture, and disappearances. Do you anticipate that the U.S. delegation will be advancing these human rights issues in an effort to have the U.N. adjust them?

Mr. MAYNES. We want to give those priority at the General Assembly. We think that the arrival of the Pope is an opportunity

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to make progress on the question of intervention against religious intolerance, but perhaps I ought to let Mr. Dalley discuss this issue, because it really is one that he follows directly.

Mr. DALLEY. As Mr. Maynes has said, we do hope that the arrival of the Pope and the stimulus that he may give to this issue may be conducive toward some progress, some action in the U.N. on this intolerance.

As you know, the Human Rights Commission has been preparing a convention on religious intolerance for some time now, and has been making painfully slow progress. This year we thought there was a minor breakthrough because we were able to incorporate the first three or four articles with a possible preamble for such a convention.

They were noncontroversial kinds of statements, but it was a step forward. They were extracted with a great deal of difficulty from that subcommittee. That was the working party in the Human Rights Commission. Nevertheless, there is some slight momentum that can be furthered by the Pope's arrival.

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee is also supposed to monitor the progress of implementation of the U.S. Declaration of Human Rights. Will that be foremost in the minds of the U.S. delegation?

Mr. DALLEY. It certainly will be. We are trying to build on the progress that we have achieved over the last 2 or 3 years. You mentioned other areas, torture and disappearance. This is an incremental progress in the U.N. because of resistance to our concepts of what these kinds of conventions should have, but I think that there is from the last two sessions of the Commission and even the General Assembly a growing acceptance of the need for the U.N. to begin to speak to the most egregious human rights cases, and disappearance is certainly one. The problem of disappearance is certainly an area where we are seeing increasing interest, and I hope we will be able to make further progress.

Mr. BONKER. I am really encouraged by what is happening in Africa, coming together to form a Human Rights Council and to monitor human rights activity commissions in African states. I think this will work so much better than the United States trying to set a standard and impose its own set of sanctions on violators.

Maybe it is an issue that has got to be addressed by each continent and each country individually. We could help nurture the issues as they relate to other countries and help them build confidence, so they can set up their own monitoring program.

Mr. DALLEY. We are very encouraged by that development. We are certainly going to help in every way we can to be conscious, of course, of the need not to push it too fast or too far, lest our efforts be rejected. I think it is important to have a regional human rights institution and development toward regional concepts. However, we must keep in mind the need for international action and action within the U.N. bodies as well, so that is necessary neither inaction nor counteraction will take place while we wait for regional institutions to be developed. Therefore, we are going to continue to push at the international development level, while we encourage the development of other national and international bodies.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Maynes, approximately how many U.N. forces are now deployed in Lebanon and other areas?

Mr. MAYNES. We have UNDOF in the Golan Heights, UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, UNTSO in the Sinai, UNFICYP in Cyprus, and we have a small observer force in Kashmir.

Mr. BONKER. Are we having any problems with creating volunteers or having countries participate in this enforcement activity?

Mr. MAYNES. No. Service in the U.N. is considered an honor for countries that have participated in U.N. peacekeeping. There are, however, some problems that need to be addressed. Quite frankly, the situation in southern Lebanon is lack of cooperation by the parties concerned, and this was an issue which Ambassador Young addressed in his last statement to the Security Council. The lack of cooperation is creating a serious problem in southern Lebanon, and domestic controversy in many of the troops from contributing countries.

Quite frankly, in such countries as the Netherlands, for the first time in many years one is seeing very strong criticism of Israel for the policy which it is following in southern Lebanon. The U.S. position is that we have not had adequate cooperation from either Israel or from the Palestinians who are above the U.N. forces. So, there is a potential problem there. We also face a problem that some of the smaller states which contributed to UNIFIL have not been reimbursed adequately by the U.N., in part because of withholding by the Soviet Union and Communist China. This is a serious financial burden for a country like Fiji, which has taken on a major international responsibility by providing troops.

As a matter of fact, the Fijian troops have been among the most courageous and effective in the UNIFIL operation.

We also have a problem which I call to this committee's attention, namely, that while the countries that have contributed to U.N. peacekeeping clearly are anxious to continue to contribute as part of their foreign policy effort, we do feel that more could be done to pretrain these troops or train these troops so that they would be in a position to move more quickly when there is a crisis that has been identified by the Security Council.

I think I have reported to this committee before on the case of southern Lebanon. It took many weeks for the Secretary General to round up the troops necessary to put that operation into action. This was an extremely dangerous period, and we frankly feel that at least some of the problems which have subsequently developed in that area could have been avoided if the U.N. had been capable of moving troops more quickly.

Mr. BONKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Maynes and Mr. Dalley, for being here and responding to our questions. We wish you the very best in the upcoming session, and members of the subcommittee will try to make it up to New York for a few of the sessions.

Mr. MAYNES. Thank you very much.

Mr. DALLEY. Thank you.

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

UNITED NATIONS POLICY AND MAJOR ISSUES IN THE 34TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1979

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:07 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Bonker (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Bonker. The Subcommittee on International Organizations will come to order.

This is the second of two subcommittee hearings on the subject of U.S. policy and major issues facing the 34th General Assembly.

Last week the subcommittee had before it Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, Charles William Maynes, who testified on the administration's position on key issues in the upcoming General Assembly.

Today we have the privilege of hearing from some private witnesses who have been official U.S. delegates in previous years. Delegates from over 150 countries are meeting now in New York City through December 21 for the 34th United Nations General Assembly.

The U.N. General Assembly's agenda includes over 120 items ranging from administrative questions to the problems threatening global peace, security, and the environment.

Today we have as witnesses the Honorable Charles Whalen, a former Member of Congress who will be joining us shortly, and the Honorable John Hechinger who was a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the 33d session of the United Nations General Assembly, and Mr. Donald Puchala who is the editor of the publication, "Issues Before the 33rd General Assembly of the United Nations 1978–79."

The subcommittee will note the Democratic Caucus is in session, and therefore, other members of the subcommittee will probably be late in arriving. We are honored to have with us this morning Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, a distinguished member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, from the State of New Jersey.

We will begin the testimony this morning with Mr. Hechinger, whom I mentioned earlier was a public member to the U.S. Delegation to the 33d session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The subcommittee will also note the arrival of Congressman Tony Hall from Ohio who is the ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. Hechinger, you can either proceed with your prepared statement or submit that for the record and summarize; whatever is your pleasure.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HECHINGER, PUBLIC MEMBER, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 33d SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

John W. Hechinger, fourth-generation Washingtonian, graduate of the city's public schools and Yale University, served in the Air Force throughout World War II, overseas in the China-Burma-India and Pacific Theatres. He joined the Hechinger Company in 1946, becoming President upon the death of his father, the founder, in 1958.

Hechinger is the Democratic National Committeeman, re-elected city-wide in 1976 to his second four-year term. He is a trustee of the American University and of the Meyer Foundation, a Commissioner of the D.C. Judicial Nomination Commission, member of the Board of the National Urban Coalition, member of the Yale University Development Fund, and vice president of the Committee for Self-Determination.

Mr. Hechinger served as first Chairman of the D.C. City Council from 1967 to 1969 and as a Special Representative to the United Nations General Assembly in 1978. He has served as president of Columbia Hospital, Commissioner of RLA, trustee of the Public Library, vice president of the Health & Welfare Council, member of the Public Welfare Advisory Committee, co-chairman of the Citizens' Advisory Committee to the D.C. Bar Association, on the Board of the Washington Urban League, the Boys' Club of Washington, the D.C. Bicentennial Commission, and the D.C. City Council Economic and Industrial Commission.

Mr. HECHINGER. Thank you, Chairman Bonker. My statement is rather short.

I consider it a high honor to have been chosen to represent the United States at the U.S. mission.

I firmly believe that the practice of selecting citizens at large to be part of the U.S. delegation to be an excellent practice that should be continued.

I have the impression from my service at the General Assembly that many of the other 151 countries' representatives felt that the U.S. delegation was broadened by the inclusion of public members and they would have liked to have had such representatives in their own missions.

Being a native Washingtonian, I have had some contact with the international diplomatic community over the years and especially from the time I was chairman of the city council of Washington, D.C. during Lyndon Johnson's presidency. I was a regular member of the welcoming ceremony that took place with heads of state on the south lawn of the White House.

I think this exposure cultivated in me an appreciation of the art of diplomacy in the foreign service.

The State Department briefings and I was asked to comment upon this, that preceded the opening days in New York City were really most effective in setting the stage before my joining the U.S. mission. The Department has these sessions highly organized. They bring together the public delegates and the members of the Foreign Service who were assigned to the U.S. mission and the top people from each area of the Department.

In these sessions which are high powered and confidential one quickly gets the flavor of the main issues that are to come before the General Assembly. If it were possible to add one more day of briefing it would allow more time for a question and answer period and would be highly productive.

At these briefings and in staff meetings in New York it is constantly urged upon the delegates and the staff to mingle over cappuccino with members of the other delegations in the United Nations lounge. Let me tell you that assignment is tough and for the most part unrealistic.

I am certainly no shy violet being a politician but I can tell you those people who are gathered in small clusters in the United Nations lounge are folks who are there discussing their own affairs and to break in and say, "Hello, I am John Hechinger, U.S. Representative to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations" will go over like a lead balloon.

I thought I had a brilliant idea which at the time I thought was such a good one that I even offered to pay for it personally. The idea was for the United States to offer to all members of all nations a very properly designed personal name badge on which not only the delegate's name would appear but the name of his or her country.

It is absolutely maddening to see all of these magnificent people and have no idea to whom you are speaking or which side of an issue that person is to be reputed to be on in order to do lobbying for the U.S.'s position that is always urged upon you.

It is very possible that this whole Andrew Young affair in which he was accused of speaking to the PLO representative was caused by the fact that without the name badge he did not have the least idea that he was speaking to a representative of the PLO.

As imperfect as this world is it is demonstrated by the continued inability of the world to remain at peace as evidenced today in every corner of the globe. There is no doubt in my mind from one who has served in the United Nations that as troubled as things are the United Nations serves a magnificent purpose of vastly reducing the tensions and possible conflagrations that would be taking place in far greater number without this great body's continued existence.

I am not unmindful from my position of heading a large organization that there is a need for thorough internal communications.

I discovered that the large complement of approximately 120 members of the U.S. Mission devoted an inordinate amount of time in communicating with the State Department just 250 miles from the United States U.N. outpost.

It seems to me it is one thing for the French and the Russians and all other countries to have to communicate with their capitals but the United States' situation is different. Our State Department requires the United States U.N. to check with it on every dot and tittle, comma and exclamation point. I believe there are budgetary economies that can result from examining this point.

On the other hand I was horrified to learn last fall of the crippling reduction by the Senate of our U.S. appropriation which moneys were intended for our participation in the United Nations associate organizations such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations Relief Agency.

This enormous crippling dollar cut was restored to these working organs of the United Nations that are so vital to world peace and order as they help to balance to some extent the inequity in prosperity among the peoples of the world.

Make no mistake that I found the career Foreign Service officer to be a person extremely competent and hard working, devoting a majority of their evenings during the 3-month session of the General Assembly to burning the proverbial midnight oil without overtime compensation. Much of that labor was devoted to chronicling the day's activity so that every word could be monitored by the State Department.

I feel that much of what takes place at each General Assembly is repetitive. Perhaps 50 percent of the resolutions at the upcoming 34th General Assembly will be the same as the 33d and some resolutions may go back to the 20th Assembly. It therefore seems to me that some cost benefit study needs to be done to streamline and reduce the interchange between the Washington-New York axis with the purpose of saving big dollars at both ends of that axis rather than in the dollars earmarked for the associate organizations.

Due to the heavy workload of the professionals that I referred to a moment ago my experience reveals that a public delegate has to be a devoted eager beaver to be an involved member of the delegation.

At the beginning of each General Assembly specific assignments are made to the public member by designated resolution but unless a public member is determined one is soon forgotten in the rush of the day-to-day activity. I am saying that too politely.

In plainer language I believe firmer direction must be given to the U.S. Mission personnel that once a public member is assigned to a resolution it should be a Mission person's duty to interface with the public member on all matters pertaining to that issue throughout the session.

I feel I was able to keep abreast by dogged determination for I felt I could not follow the issue without being in on every phase of the development. A public member will soon be forgotten if he or she does not have that persistence.

Gobbledegook is the bane of us all. A delegate must force those professional State Department types to "plain speak."

A conversation or briefing hardly begins before a strange patois of acronyms and alphabet soup starts that can leave not only the public delegates but the newly assigned Foreign Service people mystified for 40 minutes and possibly forever.

I must not fail to tell you of my pleasure in serving under Ambassador Andrew Young. To illustrate what his service has meant to the country let me recount a conversation I had at the Secretary of State's luncheon for the African countries.

Ambassador Maguid of Egypt told me that he had served with more than several chiefs of the U.S. Mission who were all distinguished representatives of our Government, but Andy Young had done more for boosting the prestige of the United States among the 50 African nations and indeed the close to 100 nations that count themselves members of the Third World than any previous ambassador in history. High testimony from a veteran of the changing scene at the United Nations.

I worked closely with our new head of the Mission, Ambassador Donald McHenry. I count him as a friend and a soft spoken, thoughtful, highly respected, and effective diplomat with excellent management abilities. Don McHenry was the point man for us in the Namibia and Zimbabwe negotiations between ourselves, the European Nine and the African front line states which were two issues to which I was assigned.

Despite his intense occupation and long long hours he never failed to include me and discuss with me the salient points of the developing compromises which is certainly the most effective way to get the best from the service of a public delegate.

Don McHenry will be a superb head of the U.S. Mission.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Hechinger, for sharing your insights and humor with the subcommittee.

The subcommittee should also note the presence of Representative Floyd Fithian who is a distinguished member of the subcommittee.

We will proceed with our former colleague, Chuck Whalen, who is a distinguished citizen and executive director of "New Directions." Mr. Whalen was a valuable member of the International Relations Committee when he was a Member of Congress and formerly an official Congressional Representative to the 32d Session of the General Assembly.

I trust you did not have difficulty in finding your way to the committee room this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES WHALEN, JR., U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 32d SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEW DIRECTIONS

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee and a special word of welcome to my successor in the Congress, Congressman Tony Hall.

Mr. BONKER. Who is doing a very fine job.

Mr. WHALEN. It does not surprise me.

Mr. HALL. Keep talking.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, we might want to keep that in the record. I have a prepared statement and, if you don't mind Mr. Chairman, I will incorporate my prepared statement in my oral remarks.

Mr. BONKER. Please proceed.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am delighted to have this opportunity to appear before you this morning to recount some of my experiences as a congressional delegate to the 32d United Nations General Assembly. The 3 months which I spent in New York City during the fall of 1977 were among the most rewarding of my legislative career. I hope that Ben Rosenthal and Larry Winn find their new roles equally satisfying.

Mr. Chairman, my testimony this morning will focus upon the three questions which you posed in your letter to me of August 28, 1979. I shall be brief so that there will be adequate time for questions.

In response to your first query, the State Department, in my view, provided very little advance guidance to the congressional and public delegates to the 32d General Assembly. From what I have been able to observe, the same conclusion applies to this year's appointees. In 1977 the extent of the State Department's preparatory efforts was a 2-day seminar held 1 week in advance of the opening of the United Nations session. While helpful, there was just too much material and information to absorb during this "cram" course.

The inadequacy of this preparation, Mr. Chairman, probably had less effect upon Congressman Wolff and me. We were aware of our respective nominations at least a year in advance of the 32d General Assembly. Further, our service on the Foreign Affairs Committee

exposed us not only to United Nations operating procedures but to most of the issues which would confront us in the General Assembly. The public delegates and alternates—Mrs. Coretta King, Mrs. Marjorie Craig Benton, and Mr. Kennedy—had no such presession advantages. Indeed, as I recall, their names were not submitted to the Senate until after the commencement of the 32d General Assembly.

Admittedly, there is a long selection and security screening process which must be followed before delegate and alternate selections can be formally announced. It is my recommendation, Mr. Chairman, that this procedure be instituted at an earlier date, thereby enabling the President to make his appointments several months, rather than several days, prior to the mid-September convening of the General Assembly. In this way delegation members, especially those from the public sector, will have more time for self-preparation. This assumes, of course, that they will be provided the appropriate study materials well in advance of their departure for New York.

Mr. BONKER. I might add, Mr. Whalen, your experience is borne out this year because, in the State Department appearance last week, it was noted that the full selection of delegates has not been made.

Mr. WHALEN. I might throw a little light on that. I believe the public members and, of course, the congressional nominees have been named. There are two slots still to be filled, but these are deputies to newly appointed Ambassador McHenry. One is the deputy U.S. representative to the General Assembly. I know who it will be, but I do not know whether the name has been submitted as yet. Earlier this month, I was in Africa for 3 weeks and met him as he was departing. The other would be Don McHenry's own replacement as U.S. deputy representative to the Security Council.

I think these are more Foreign Service questions.

My suggestion is that the State Department start the procedure earlier. I recognize there is a long selection process, involving screening and security clearing, but there is a definite target date. We know each year the General Assembly will begin in mid-September.

I would hope the State Department might push up by at least 2 months the commencement of this selection process. In this way, the people would be confirmed and would know well in advance that they would be going to New York in mid-September and would have to be provided with the necesary documents and materials substantially before that time for a course of self-study.

Mr. BONKER. It seems to me that people have to prepare for that commitment. Many of the representatives, like Mr. Hechinger, are very busy, and to set aside a large chunk of time to be an effective participant, it takes time to get your private life in order.

Mr. WHALEN. You are exactly correct. I think, as I have noted in my statement, the problem pretty much has recurred this year once again. I just noticed in Thursday's Congressional Record the submission of the names to the Senate.

May I now make one concession to the State Department. Service in the United Nations General Assembly is similar to riding a bicycle—one learns by doing rather than by instruction. Consequently, the productivity of a congressional or public appointee depends upon that individual's willingness and ability to become immersed in the General Assembly process.

To these members I offer two recommendations. First, they should not embark upon their new diplomatic endeavors with starry-eyed misconceptions. Yes, they will be exposed to world leaders and pressing international issues, but even before they arrive in New York, they should be aware of at least three sources of frustration.

A. They do not make policy. The United Nations Act, which authorized our admission to this organization, clearly states that the decisionmaking authority rests with the President. By, in effect, being a part of the executive branch, delegates and alternates are bound by decisions emanating not from the Mission but from Washington. This also means that when called upon to deliver a speech, either during plenary or committee sessions, the appointee will use a script drafted by the State Department.

B. The new environment into which the Delegate is thrust—unfamiliar procedures, issues, and personalities—is further complicated by the fact that these represent a continuing process. For example, most proposals already have been discussed in other fora (ECOSOC, UNCTAD, et cetera) by the same people who will handle them during the General Assembly session. This means, consequently, that the congressional and public delegation members run the risk of being ignored by foreign representatives who, instead, will turn to permanent U.S. Mission personnel whom they know and with whom they have dealt previously.

C. The General Assembly acts only upon resolutions which, as we know from our congressional rules, do not have the force of law. Delegates, therefore, must be prepared to accept the fact that all of the world's ills will not be solved by the time the 34th General Assembly adjourns in December. Instead, there will be an abundance of rhetoric, much of it for home consumption. This, however, is a phenomenon not peculiar to the United Nations. I recall having heard some bombast on occasion in the House of Representatives—though never, of course, in this committee.

Mr. BONKER. Absolutely, and particularly this committee.

Mr. WHALEN. Second, if, at the outset, General Assembly delegates recognize the foregoing distractions, they can take steps which, by the end of the session, will permit them to attain a sense of accomplishment, a feeling of fulfillment. To this end, I make the following suggestions.

A. While unable to make policy, the delegate can contribute to policy formulation. The permanent representative to the United Nations is a member of the President's Cabinet and, therefore, can bring to Cabinet meetings positions proposed by the New York staff. Delegates can help shape these mission recommendations during the thrice-weekly staff meetings or by individual contacts with our United Nations Ambassador.

Career diplomats can go just so far in pressing a point with their superiors. Thus, on occasions when U.S. Mission policy recommendations are rejected by the State Department, congressional and public members can use their independent status—they are not subjected to a "rating" nor do they view an Assistant Secretary as a "superior"—to urge a reversal of this decision. In 1977, for instance, I arranged a Washington conference with top-level officials of several executive departments to encourage a more realistic approach to Third World

economic problems. I must confess that, 3 years later, my principal idea still is being "considered." During the General Assembly's special session on disarmament, 1978, three delegates met with President Carter and persuaded him to accept their views regarding a pending issue.

B. Faithful attendance at the early plenary and committee sessions—during which few substantive matters are considered—will enable the delegate to grasp rather quickly General Assembly parliamentary practices, which are uncomplicated by congressional standards.

C. Specialization, both of focus and effort, will permit congressional and public delegates to compensate for their unfamiliarity with General Assembly issues and participants. The appointee's activities should be confined to one committee and to a limited number of agenda items. Daily appearance at committee sessions not only will expose the delegate to concentrated analyses of the issues, but also increases face and name recognition among colleagues.

D. The delegate should pursue a systematic plan to expand his or her acquaintanceship with fellow committee members. As an illustration, I had two permanent staff of the U.S. Mission arrange frequent—about three a week—luncheon get-togethers with two or three members of the second committee on which we served. The cost, incidentally, can be defrayed by the appointee's representational allowance. By December, I had developed a first-name relationship with approximately 90 foreign representatives. Furthermore, during these meals I was able to acquire information useful to the Mission while, concurrently, informally lobbying American policy positions.

Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to make this closing observation regarding the ability of our congressional and public delegates to play an effective role during a General Assembly session. To be selected by the President to serve our country at the United Nations is an honor which has been bestowed on less than 300 Americans. Nevertheless, in terms of the functioning of the U.S. Mission, the congressional or public delegate is one among equals. Status accounts for little if the Presidential appointee neither understands the game nor knows the players. To become involved in a meaningful way, therefore the congressional/public delegate must become informed and seek out the action. The Mission staff stands ready to assist in this quest, but it is up to the appointee to request this help.

In the final analysis, then, effective participation by a congressional or public member of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly ultimately rests with that individual.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Whalen, for an excellent statement and for your recommendations.

As one member of the committee, I am deeply appreciative of your letters and memos to the committee members. You kept us well informed of all the activities and the issues before the 32d session. You were an outstanding member and I am glad to see your recommendations, and hope they will be used or at least accepted by the State Department in future sessions. We will make sure they have firsthand knowledge of some of the suggestions you have made.

I am going to ask Mr. Hechinger if he can stay a few minutes for questions.

Mr. HECHINGER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BONKER. I would ask your indulgence while we open for questions. I am going to withhold my questions about your experience at the last General Assembly and instead ask about something my wife purchased in one of your stores. [General laughter.]

Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was interested in one of the points Mr. Whalen brought up relating to public members. As it is now, when you are appointed a public member, are there seminars for the public members at all?

Mr. WHALEN. Just the one to which I referred. That is a 2-day meeting which usually occurs about a week before the commencement of the General Assembly session. Both Mr. Hechinger and I addressed the group last week, recounting some of our experiences.

As I mentioned, for those appointed to the 32d General Assembly, this same 2-day seminar was held just prior to our departure for New York.

I would add that I am not sure any additional seminars could or should be held. I am concerned about the fact that the public delegates should know much further in advance of their selection. Furthermore, the State Department should then provide these individuals with the appropriate material so they can embark upon a course of self-study.

As I suggested in my formal statement, I do feel in the final analysis it is up to the individual to become educated and involved in these processes. That can only be done in New York.

Mr. HALL. I can imagine it must be similar to a culture shock, going into a situation like that, not really having any background at all or a feeling for it.

Mr. WHALEN. I am sure it is much easier for the congressional appointees. It must be very difficult for the public appointees, and yet I found that in most instances they became very deeply involved. Mrs. Benton was reappointed to the Special Session on Disarmament and has been very involved in a number of special committees of the United Nations.

Mr. HALL. One other question that I would like for either one of you to answer—as you know, Mr. Whalen, from serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee and being from my district and your former district, I sent a survey out in my district and asked people to rank the issues from energy all the way to welfare programs to appropriations in foreign affairs.

My survey came back and foreign affairs ranked last.

Mr. BONKER. You discovered you went on the wrong committee.

Mr. HALL. I thought possibly I went onto the wrong committee, but thank God Chuck Whalen was before me because I think he set the pace for me.

I find myself voting against the general feeling of my district with regard to foreign affairs.

To take it a step further, we continue to assist Third World countries, and I think the benefits we get in the long run certainly outweigh the problems we have experienced. I talk about those problems relative to stances that they take in international forums such as the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana.

Our constituents continue to ask why we continue to support these countries when, in fact, they do everything they can to embarrass us internationally. We have always had in the United Nations only 15 to 17 nations that are normally with us.

Can we continue to expect the same kind of support? How do we go about the idea of organizing and talking to the various Third World countries to try to get their support? How do we handle this problem that we have, this image that is created by these Third World countries toward us?

Mr. HECHINGER. I believe there is a great deal of softening of this combination attitude from Third World countries during the 34th General Assembly and even before that in the 33d.

As Chuck said, a lot of the bombast is for their home consumption, for one does not really sense it on a person to person basis in committee or at receptions or social gatherings. The vituperation that appears in the public press is really not indicative of the real feeling toward the United States and its prestige and importance within the halls of the plenary and committees.

I think the difficulty is how to make that understood in the Congress and by the people of the United States in order to get the congressional appropriation so vital.

There is a great reliance on the negotiating quality of our own personnel, starting with Ambassador Young. Former representatives have taken a very strong position on this concern by saying, if you are going to keep insulting us, do not expect our cooperation.

One has to be able to separate out the rhetoric. One thing you learn quickly as a U.S. delegate is that much of what is said against the United States is verbal tongue lashing of smaller nations establishing their bona fides with their geo-political groupings. Let's take the verbal lashing and behind the scenes continue to work within the United Nation.

Mr. WHALEN. Let me respond by making four observations. First, I would certainly agree with your view that for the average American, foreign policy issues are low on the agenda. As you know, I happen to head an organization that deals with foreign policy issues. We find the anticipated 200,000 membership has just not materialized, simply for the reasons you have stated.

Second, one of the reasons the United States is the focal point of attack by the nonalined nations is the fact that we are "number one." We are a superpower. Quite obviously, verbal bombast will be directed toward that kind of a country.

As both Mr. Hechinger and I have pointed out, this is not always taken too seriously even by those who deliver these statements, but it certainly does infuriate the American public on occasion.

First, with respect to our continuing foreign economic assistance, we do not do it to try to buy friendship. If it is solely for that purpose, I think it is a mistake. We do it primarily for our own selfish interest. Among other things, we have to recognize that as the developing countries improve their own economies, they represent significant markets for the United States.

If one would check the statistics, I think you would find the Third World market for American goods today is greater than our combined exports to Europe, Japan, and Russia.

Not only will our own economy benefit by the improvement of Third World economies, but also we are very dependent upon these countries for resources, especially minerals. Consequently, we want to put them in a position where they are able to develop themselves to a point where they can provide these resources. And of course, there are political reasons for our continuing to provide economic assistance to certain countries.

Thus, the American public should be apprised of the fact that we extend foreign economic assistance for our own benefit, not just to benefit the recipient nations.

My fourth observation has to do with our role in the United Nations itself. At the very beginning, there were 50 countries and it was one of American dominance. Later on, as more countries joined the United Nations, there seemed to be an American withdrawal or an American ignoring of the United Nations as an institution.

Our present approach, in my opinion, is one of U.S. involvement, expecially since Mr. Young took over as our Ambassador. We recognize today that dominance does not rest with the United States or with Russia, but rather with the Third and Fourth World nations. They control the agenda. Ambassador Young recognized that and acted accordingly. As Mr. Hechinger pointed out, in so doing, he generated a great deal of respect on the part of the representatives of these Third and Fourth World nations.

Mr. HECHINGER. Mr. Chairman, may I be excused?

Mr. BONKER. Yes, sir. We appreciate your presence and your testimony and your public service as a delegate to the United Nations. We hope you will have a chance to repeat your participation.

Mr. HECHINGER. I thank you very much. I am sorry I have to leave.

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee will note the presence of Congressman Bingham from New York.

Mr. Whalen, can you stay with us?

Mr. WHALEN. I can stay.

Mr. BONKER. We will proceed with Mr. Puchala, and then we will pick up on questions with Mr. Fithian.

You may proceed either with your prepared statement or you may submit that for the record and summarize your remarks.

STATEMENT OF DONALD PUCHALA, EDITOR, ISSUES BEFORE THE 34th GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1978–79

Donald J. Puchala is a professor of government, at Columbia University, associate dean, Columbia School of International Affairs, and director, Columbia Institute on Western Europe. He is also the editor (1979) of "Issues Before the 34th General Assembly," a publication of the United Nations Association of the United States of America. Mr. Puchala received a BA from Yale, 1961, an MA from Yale, 1962 (political science), and a PhD from Yale, 1966 (international relations). Selected publications: Western European Perspectives on International Affairs (1967), International Politics Today (1971), American Arms and a Changing Europe (1973), and The Global Political Economy of Food (1978).

Mr. PUCHALA. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to do both.

Let me point out it is a particular delight to meet Mrs. Fenwick for the first time, since I am from New Jersey. I have seen her only by campaign posters.

Mr. BONKER. Does she look like her posters?

Mr. PUCHALA. Much more charming.

Mr. BONKER. I might mention Mr. Puchala is the editor of the up coming 34th session publication. We have for the committee record a copy of his publication on the 33d session.

Mr. PUCHALA. Let me also note, being the editor of "Issues Before the General Assembly" is very much a part-time job. It is an occupation for about 1 month a year. Normally, I am a professor at the Columbia School of International Affairs. The reason I point that out is, coming up on the airplane, I read the report on the opening of the session yesterday and the election of Mr. Salime as president. I recalled that Mr. Salime was my student.

I trust the report that he has become more moderate reflects on the Columbia School of International Affairs, or at least I hope it does.

Mr. BONKER. When we assume a position of responsibility we moderate our views considerably.

Mr. PUCHALA. Definitely, and Mr. Salime has done so, or at least I hope so.

I need not tell you about issues before the General Assembly since you are aware of the publication. Let me simply note this year's edition Issues Before the 34th General Assembly was scheduled for publication last Friday. I presume it is available, and copies will be supplied through the United Nations Association office here in Washington for as many as you desire.

For those of you unfamiliar with it, "Issues Before the General Assembly" is a review of each year's General Assembly agenda plus an analysis in some depth of most of the issues that will be discussed from September to December each fall.

Having worked on it rather intensively this summer, I think we have put out this year one of the more informative editions of "Issues Before the General Assembly," and it is the contents of the publication that I would like to highlight for you today.

In the letter I received from Congressman Bonker, there were four questions addressed.

One concerned the issues before the Assembly that are likely to spark particular controversy this year. I will comment on that in a moment.

The second question is, what possible new resolutions will be introduced this fall. Third, I was asked to comment on what changes in national positions can be expected; and fourth, what are my realistic expectations about American achievements at the 34th Assembly.

I spent some time thinking about these things and writing it down so I think I can be more concise simply to read what I have and then take questions later. I tried to answer all these questions as best I could.

The 34th Session of the United Nations General Assembly opened yesterday. They will consider an agenda of more than 120 items. Reflecting the composition of the Assembly's majority, the greatest number of agenda items will concern the interests, cares, and objectives of the Third World.

Accordingly, much of the debate at the 34th Assembly will be critical of the policies and practices of Western industrialized states, and the United States in particular, and many of the economic resolutions will vent Third World frustrations with poverty and impotence in the form of demands for Western responsiveness.

Though muted, great power rivalries are also set into the coming Assembly's agenda, and they will surface as the world body takes up disarmament issues and certain questions of regional concern, notably those of the Middle East, southern Africa, and Indo-China.

In tone and substance, considerations at annual meetings of the United Nations General Assembly are conditioned both by the traditions of the institution and the backdrop of current events.

We may expect, therefore, that certain United Nations "perennials" will appear again this autumn: Peacekeeping in Cyprus, apartheid in South Africa, self-determination in Palestine, human rights in Chile, general and complete disarmament, goals and obligations in development assistance, problems in United Nations financing, and the like. Debate on these and many other questions will be highly influenced by critical events just past or currently evolving.

Important among these are the less than encouraging outcomes of the UNCTAD meetings in Manila, the Arab rejections of the Egyptian-Israeli peace initiatives and Egypt's isolation, the conclusion of SALT II, the conclusion of the Tokyo round of the multilateral trade negotiations, warfare in Indo-China, the plight of the boat people, the results of the summit conference of the Organization of African Unity, and the results of the Havana conference of nonalined heads of state.

Then, too much of the economic discussion will be set in the context of escalating energy prices, rising inflation, and deteriorating employment conditions around the world.

If the various pre-Assembly caucuses have accurately previewed this fall's United Nations meetings, discussion at the 34th session will be serious and debate will be pointed.

Concerning issues likely to spark considerable controversy, since the General Assembly debate tends to be sensitive to evolving news events, it is very difficult to predict with any certainty where the major controversies will emerge.

For example, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia question could be divisive and explosive at the 34th session if the Commonwealth plan and the London conference come to naught, as they appear to be coming to naught, or alternatively, it could be soft-pedaled to offer impetus to extra-United Nations diplomacy.

I would suggest, on the basis of what is going on in London presently, that Rhodesia is going to be projected into the General Assembly with some gusto and the vitriole will fly on all sides.

Similarly, the SALT II agreement could be treated noncontroversially by a world majority which seeks to encourage ratification. Or it could be criticized by those who see the superpowers falling short of their obligations to stem their arms race. It might be further criticized by those who see aspirations for hegemony in American-Soviet collaboration.

Likewise, the issue of Egyptian-Israeli dialog and its results under the Peace Treaty of March 1979 may bring an Arab led Third World down upon Egypt and generate rebuttal and recrimination, or the nonalined countries might take a more moderate stance, reflecting debates at the Monrovia meeting of the Organization of African Unity and the meeting of nonalined heads of state in Havana.

My feeling is that on both of these occasions, the Third World majority was a good deal more moderate than advocates of hard line pressure upon Egypt would have desired. It remains to be seen what will happen here.

Nonetheless, certain anticipations can be made. In the Middle East, the set of questions concerning Palestinian autonomy, Israeli settlements, human rights in occupied territories, hostilities in southern Lebanon, and alleged Israeli nuclear weapons will set the Government of Israel against Arab adversaries and the patrons and clients of each against one another.

If American sponsored efforts to revise resolution 242 in such a way as to gain PLO acceptance of the State of Israel succeed in the Security Council, Assembly debates on the Middle East could be somewhat muted. Overall, however, there is little likelihood of significant movement on Middle Eastern issues this year.

Other questions likely to bring to the surface differences among countries include, first, the issue of Kampuchea (Cambodia) which could generate a confrontation over credentials if the Government installed after Vietnam's invasion seeks to take the seat of the deposed Pol Pot regime. They had somewhat of a scuffle about that yesterday, but it has been postponed to the Assembly for debate. I do not know what is going to happen on that one.

The importance of that issue is not Kampuchea versus Cambodia, but the Soviet Union versus China and both clients of the respective powers. The debate will bring to the surface the differences between the Soviet Union and China in the Far East, and that is something Americans could well sit back and watch rather than participate in.

Similarly, the question of the status of Puerto Rico may be raised again this fall despite American displeasure. Cuba has pressed the Puerto Rican question in the Committee of 24 on decolonization for a number of years, probably both to bolster the cause of nationalist factions on the island and to embarrass the U.S. Government by assigning the colonialist label.

The 33d Assembly refused to consider the question. With Fidel Castro's coming to New York, and especially in the context of successful American efforts to embarrass the Cuban Government at the time of the Havana Nonalined Conference by raising the issue of Russian troops on Cuban soil, "Puerto Rico" may be pushed with a vengeance. If this happens, lively rebuttal and debate will follow.

In the disarmament area, the primary source of tension within the United Nations system remains the cleavage between nuclear weapons and nuclear supplier states on the one hand, and nonnuclear states on the other.

Dissension surrounds the question of adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Nonnuclear states are voicing considerable dissatisfaction over what they view as deception and delay on the part of nuclear suppliers, who are insisting upon the institution of effective safeguards before transferring nuclear materials or technology.

This restrictive behavior, the nonnuclear states claim, is both a serious obstacle to their economic development and an infringement of the Nonproliferation Treaty where nuclear states committed themselves to transfer materials for peaceful purposes.

Also dividing nuclear and nonnuclear states is the question of whether the superpowers are meeting their Nonproliferation Treaty obligations to pursue arms control. Thus, in whatever context the nuclear/nonnuclear issue arises—that is, under the disarmament question per se or the review of the Nonproliferation Treaty or the SALT II discussions or even technology transfer—accusations and rebuttals are likely to be heard.

Finally, there is the question of economic development. Members of the Group of 77 are interpreting 1979 as a year of disappointments. I must say, prior to coming here I read Secretary Maynes' statements. I disagree rather enthusiastically with his feeling that this was a good year as far as North-South economic relations are concerned. From all that I have read and observed, it is a terrible year. I think the frustrations and animosities are probably going to come to the surface at the General Assembly this fall with some force.

The frustration is bound to be voiced in the General Assembly this fall, especially since the lack of progress toward a new international economic order has occurred in the context of generally worsening global economic conditions.

There are any number of specific items under which this debate could reach the forum. There is the question of the review of the multilateral trade negotiations and the review of the UNCTAD Conference; the review of steps toward making the United Nations Industrial Development Organization into a specialized agency; or any number of development items that will occur on the agenda.

I would wager in many of these instances the accusations and the pushing and pulling about changing the structure of the international economic system will come out.

I agree with Secretary Maynes when he said the West is going to be rather unsympathetic to moves on the part of the less developed countries because of our fight against energy-induced inflation and lagging employment. But I see a very tense North-South debate on economic questions this fall.

I also anticipate rather inconsequential debates. It is going to hark back to the sixth special session in many ways, or at least that is my feeling.

With regard to possible new resolutions on significant issues of global concern, I do not see very much new coming this year. It is really not going to be a year of innovations so much as one of continuing work on old business.

Part of the reason for this is, there are a number of issues that come under the category of "let's wait and see." Some examples are Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; Namibia; Indochinese refugees and the boat people, which is probably in abeyance because of the new Geneva Conference and the positive results which came from there; the question of western Sahara is not in the immediate concern of many at the present time; SALT II—most of the world could adopt a "wait and see" posture on that, and similarly with the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.

The Assembly might possibly declare the 1980's a decade of developments and it might possibly declare the 1980's a decade of disarmament but, in any case, neither of these are terribly spectacular initiatives.

The Syrian Government is currently pushing a new resolution concerning alleged Israeli nuclear weapons development. The Czechoslovak Government is sponsoring a new resolution on enhancing international confidence. These are variants on past initiatives, and both are of relatively minor importance as they stand.

The 34th Assembly is likely not to rank as one of the more innovative of the United Nation's annual sessions.

Changes in national positions: Again one can only gaze into a very cloudy crystal ball on the question of national positions.

Evidence from the events of the past year suggest that the 34th session is much more likely to see a hardening and underlining of conventional and traditional national and group positions than any significant changes.

For example, debates over Kampuchea and Vietnam-China war will illuminate strictly and differentiate between the Soviet and Chinese positions. Respective parties in the Middle East, with the exception of Egypt, will also stand more steadfastly and distinctly because this year's so-called "peace initiatives" polarized the region's political forces.

Likewise, North and South are likely to exaggerate their positions and mutual demands because the year's dialogs have not been productive.

A few changes of position might be in evidence at the 34th session. For example, the Government of Egypt will likely appear in New York, as it did at Monrovia and Havana, as an advocate of Middle Eastern conciliation. It would appear that President Sadat has passed a point of no return in his peace policy. Therefore, he must continue to search for a pathway out of isolation by attracting new adherents to his viewpoint.

Egyptian diplomacy at the 34th session is therefore likely to be energetic and anxious, and its conciliatory themes will register marked departures from Cairo's past policies.

There may also be some movement in African positions. I personally think this is very interesting. In many ways, the Monrovia meeting of the Organization of African Unity this year was an historic event of some significance. At least three noteworthy results emerged, each of which could well be reflected in African positions at the 34th Assembly.

First, the OAU summit acknowledged that independent African states had experienced major failures in both economic and political development and that if these should continue, the continent's future would be unpromising.

What is notable in this is, this sober assessment represented a new deference to realism and a newly serious attitude toward development.

Second, the conference ended in a call for greater attention to human rights on the part of African governments and, significantly, the striving for human rights was linked directly to the goal of economic development. Development was deemed impossible in the context of stifled human rights.

Third, the African heads of state seriously discussed the establishment of an all African peacekeeping force.

Overtones in this discussion suggested growing concern about Cuban military presence in Africa and about dangers for Africa in becoming a theater of superpower rivalry.

Whether or not any of these themes will be reflected in African stances at the 34th Assembly is impossible to predict. If they are, they would represent important new departures in Third World attitudes toward development and human rights and in African attitudes toward regional security and the Cuban-Soviet connection.

Realistic expectations for American achievement at the 34th session of the General Assembly.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Puchala, if you could quickly summarize, we could go for a vote and come back.

Mr. PUCHALA. Let me simply note on this last point that I am not a part of the U.S. Government and I do not know what the expectations of the Government are.

My own expectation about any General Assembly is, not very much by way of substance comes out of it. The major policy decisions and major diplomatic moves are not made there. On the other hand, a great deal in the way of symbolism comes out of it, and it offers excellent opportunity to demonstrate to the world what one stands for and cherishes at the value level in international affairs.

My feeling is, the United States does far too little of this in the General Assembly and tries instead to score debating points in the way everybody else does. If we convince others of the rectitude of our positions rather than the awesomeness of our power, I would argue that we have accomplished something. This is what I would hope for.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD J. PUCHALA, EDITOR, ISSUES BEFORE THE 34TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 34th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, opening on September 18, 1979, will consider an agenda of more than 120 items. Reflecting the composition of the Assembly's majority, the greatest number of agenda items will concern the interests, cares and objectives of the Third World. Accordingly, much of the debate at the 34th Assembly will be critical of the policies and practices of western industrialized states—the United States in particular—and many of the economic resolutions will vent third world frustrations with poverty and impotence in the form of demands for western responsiveness. Though muted, great-power rivalries are also set into the coming Assembly's agenda; they will surface as the world body takes up disarmament issues and certain questions of regional concern, notably those of the Middle East, southern Africa and Indo-China.

In tone and substance considerations at annual meetings of the United Nations General Assembly are conditioned both by the traditions of the institution and the backdrop of current events. We may expect therefore, that certain UN "perennials" will appear again this autumn—peacekeeping in Cyprus, apartheid in South Africa, self-determination in Palestine, human rights in Chile, general and complete disarmament, goals and obligations in development assistance, problems in UN financing, etc. But, debate on these and many other questions will be highly influenced by critical events just past or currently evolving. Important among these are the less-than-encouraging outcomes of the UNCTAD V meetings in Manila, the Arab rejections of Egyptian-Israeli peace initiatives and Egypt's isolation, the conclusion of SALT II, the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of the MTN, warfare in Indo-china, the plight of the "boat people," the results of the summit conference of the Organization of African Unity, and the results of the Havana conference of non-aligned heads of state. Then too much of the economic discussion will be set in the context of escalating energy prices, rising inflation and deteriorating employment conditions around the world. If the various pre-Assembly caucuses have accurately previewed this fall's UN meetings, discussion at the 34th Session will be serious and debate will be pointed.

ISSUES LIKELY TO SPARK CONSIDERABLE CONTROVERSY

Since General Assembly debate tends to be sensitive to evolving news events, it is very difficult to predict with any certainty where the major controversies will emerge. For example, the Zimbabwe Rhodesia question could be divisive and explosive at the 34th Session if the Commonwealth Plan and the London Conference come to naught, or alternatively, it could be softpedaled to offer impetus to extra-UN diplomacy. Similarly, the SALT II agreement could be treated non-controversially by a world majority which seeks to encourage ratification. Or, it could be criticized by those who see the super-powers falling short of their obligations to stem their arms race. It might be further criticized by those who see aspirations for hegemony in American-Soviet collaboration. Likewise, the issue of Egyptian-Israeli dialogue and its results under the Peace Treaty of March, 1979 may bring an Arab-led Third World down upon Egypt, and generate rebuttal and recrimination. Or, the non-aligned countries might take a more moderate stance reflecting debates at the Monrovia meeting of the OAU and the Havana meeting of non-aligned heads of state, and hence deflate the issue at the 34th Session.

Nonetheless, however uncertain anticipating might be, it is probable that a number of questions will sharply divide the Assembly. In the Middle East, the set of questions concerning Palestinian autonomy, Israeli settlements, human rights in occupied territories, hostilities in southern Lebanon and alleged Israeli nuclear weapons will set the Government of Israel against Arab adversaries, and the patrons (and clients) of each against one another. If American-sponsored efforts to revise resolution 242 in such a way as to gain PLO acceptance of the State of Israel succeed in the Security Council, Assembly debates on the Middle East could be muted somewhat. However, there is little likelihood of significant movement on Middle Eastern issues this year.

Other questions likely to bring to the surface differences among countries include first, the issue of Kampuchea (Cambodia) which could generate a confrontation over credentials if the government installed after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia seeks to take the seat of the deposed Pol Pot regime (which this year opened a Permanent Mission in New York). The Kampuchean issue, of course, is much more than a question of credentials because it pits southeast Asian clients of the Soviet Union and China against each other, reflects the rivalry of the two communist great powers, and therefore assumes high stakes.

Similarly, the question of the status of Puerto Rico may be raised again this fall despite American displeasure. Cuba has pressed the Puerto Rican question in the Committee of 24 (on de-colonization) for a number of years, probably both to boster the cause of nationalist factions on the island and to embarrass the United States Government by assigning the "colonialist" label. The 33rd Assembly refused to consider the question. However, with Fidel Castro's coming to New York, and especially in the context of successful American efforts to embarrass the Cuban Government at the time of the Havana Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State by raising the issue of Russian troops on Cuban soil, "Puerto Rico" may be pushed with a vengeance. If this happens, lively rebuttal and debate should follow.

In the area of disarmament and arms control the primary source of tension (within the UN system) remains the cleavage between nuclear weapons and supplier states on the one hand, and non-nuclear states on the other. Dissension surrounds the question of adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Non-nuclear states are voicing considerable dissatisfaction over what they view as deception and delay on the part of nuclear suppliers who are are insisting upon the institution of effective safeguards before transferring nuclear materials or technology. This restrictive behavior, the non-nuclear states claim, is both a serious obstacle to their economic development, and an infringement of the NPT where nuclear states committed themselves to transfer materials for peaceful purposes. Also dividing nuclear and non-nuclear states is the question of whether the superpowers are meeting their NPT obligations to pursue arms control. Thus, in whatever context the nuclear/non-nuclear issue arises (i.e., under disarmament, the NPT review, SALT, or even technology transfer and the UNCSTD) accusations and rebuttals will likely be heard.

Finally, there is the question of economic development. Members of the Group of 77 are interpreting 1979 as a year of disappointment, frustrating to their aspirations for movement toward a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This frustration is bound to be voiced in the General Assembly this fall, especially since

lack of progress toward a NIEO has occurred in the context of generally worsening global economic conditions. The specific issues or items that will bring the displeasures of the Less Developed Countries to the surface are numerous; there will be a report on the Manila meeting of UNCTAD, a report on the conclusion of the MTN, a report on UNCSTD, a report on development assistance, a debate on development strategy for the next decade, a report on steps to make UNIDO into a specialized agency, and any number of such "development" items that will bring forth demands from poorer countries for global economic change. These will probably be met rather unsympathetically by the OECD countries that are currently fighting energy-induced inflation and bracing for a new recession. North-South economic debate at the 34th Session might well be reminiscent of the Sixth Special Session.

POSSIBLE NEW RESOLUTIONS ON SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF GLOBAL CONCERN

At the time *Issues Before the 34th UN General Assembly* was prepared (August, 1979) it did not appear that there would be any significant new initiatives this fall. This is partly because a number of issues are at a "wait-and-see" stage (e.g., Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Namibia, Indo-Chinese Refugees, Western Sahara, SALT II, even Egyptian-Israeli negotiations). The Assembly might possibly complete work on a development strategy for the 1980s, and it could possibly declare the 1980s another disarmament decade. However, these initiatives are both highly uncertain, and in any event unspectacular. The Syrian Government is pushing a new resolution concerning alleged Isreali nuclear weapons development, and the Czechoslovak Government is sponsoring a new resolution on enhancing international confidence. But these are both variants on past initiatives, and both are of relatively minor importance as they stand. The 34th Assembly therefore is not likely to rank as one of the more innovative of the UN's annual sessions. There is, however, a sufficient amount of "old business" on the agenda to keep delegations fully occupied through the fall.

ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN NATIONAL POSITIONS

Again, one can only gaze into a very cloudy crystal ball on the question of national positions. Evidence from the events of the past year, however, suggests that the 34th Session is much more likely to see a hardening and underlining of conventional and traditional national and group positions than any significant changes. For example, debates over Kampuchea and the Vietnam-China war will illuminate and strictly differentiate respective Soviet and Chinese positions. Respective parties in the Middle East (with the exception of Egypt) will also stand more steadfastly and distinctly because the year's "peace initiatives" polarized the region's political forces. Likewise, North and South are likely to exaggerate their positions and mutual demands because the year's dialogues have not been productive, and little movement toward accommodation seems possible given economic conditions.

A few changes of position, however, might be in evidence at the 34th Session. For example, the Government of Egypt will likely appear in New York as it did at Monrovia and Havana as an advocate of Middle Eastern conciliation. It would appear that President Sadat has passed a point of no return in his peace policy. Therefore, he must continue to search for a pathway out of isolation by attracting new adherents to his viewpoint. Egyptian diplomacy at the 34th Session is therefore likely to be energetic and anxious, and its conciliatory themes will register marked departures from Cairo's traditional themes.

There may also be some movement in African positions. In many ways the Monrovia meeting of the OAU this year was an historic event of some significance. At least three noteworthy results emerged, each of which could well be reflected in African positions at the 34th Assembly. First, the OAU summit acknowledged that independent African states had experienced major failures in both economic and political development, and that if these should continue the Continent's future would be unpromising. What is notable is that this sober assessment represented a new deference to realism and a newly serious attitude toward development. Second, the conference ended in a call for greater attention to human rights on the part of the African governments, and significantly, the striving for human rights was linked directly to the goal of economic development. Development was deemed impossible in the context of stifled human rights. Third, the African heads of state seriously discussed the establishment of an all-African peacekeeping force. Overtones in this discussion suggested growing concern about Cuban military presence in Africa and about dangers for Africa in becoming a theater of super-power rivalry.

Whether or not any of these themes will be reflected in African stances at the 34th Assembly is impossible to predict. If they were, however, they would represent important new departures in third world attitudes toward development and human rights, and in African attitudes toward regional security and the Cuban-Soviet connection.

REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS FOR AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENT AT THE 34TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

As an outside observer I am unfamiliar with the actual objectives of the United States Government concerning the 34th Assembly. Therefore, I can comment only upon what I would hope to see this country accomplish this autumn. As a political scientist and serious student of the United Nations for many years, I can conclude that little of substance is actually accomplished by any government acting in the United Nations, especially in the General Assembly. But this is unimportant because accomplishments of substance are made elsewhere. The General Assembly is important for symbolic reasons, and it is toward symbolic ends that the United States should aspire at the 34th Session. Debates within the General Assembly and its committees offer excellent opportunities for countries to exhibit the values that guide their national and international behavior, and they are therefore opportunities for the Government of the United States to demonstrate exactly what it stands for and cherishes. Yet, it seems to me, much that is positive in American values is confused and lost in U.S. diplomacy (especially UN diplomacy) because we dwell so often in multilateral forums upon what we are against. If I have not badly misinterpreted American values, I would say that we as a people are in favor of the protection of human rights, especially protection against political oppression. We are also in favor of human material well-being—food, shelter, health, and the dignity that comes from gainful employment. We value human life and we cherish peace; we respect cultural, ethnic, political and economic diversity; we value international cooperation and organization for their own sake. We stand for a good many things with which much of the world can readily identify. Why then have we fallen so short of convincing most of the world that we indeed hold these values? Whatever the reasons—and there are many—our participation at the 34th Session of the General Assembly can provide opportunity to project our values more positively. If our Government persuades at least one other UN member that the United States can be respected because of its values, rather than feared because of its power, we will have achieved a great deal at the General Assembly.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you for an excellent statement.

I think it is probably prudent if we adjourn the subcommittee. I know the staff will submit individual questions, and maybe the members, for your written response.[1] I am sorry we have to cut short this session.

I have found it most informative and I want to thank the witnesses for their time this morning and for their excellent statements. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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[1] Additional questions submitted in writing and responses thereto appear in appendixes 6 through 9. At publication, Mr. Puchala had not responded to written questions.

APPENDIX 1

U.S. Delegation to the 34th Session of the U.N. General Assembly

Representatives

The Honorable Donald F. McHenry, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, United States Representative to the United Nations (Designate).
The Honorable Benjamin S. Rosenthal, United States Representative from the State of New York.
The Honorable Larry Winn, Jr., United States Representative from the State of Kansas.
The Honorable Esther L. Coopersmith, Public Member.

Alternate Representatives

The Honorable William L. Dunfey, Public Member.
The Honorable Howard Rosen, Public Member.
The Honorable Richard W. Petree, Ambassador, Alternate Representative of the United States for Special Political Affairs in the United Nations.

APPENDIX 2

Articles From the New York Times

[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1979]

The U.N.'s Ongoing Decline*

(By Yehuda Z. Blum [1])

When Skylab recently crashed in Australia, The Daily Express of London commented that the United Nations building in New York, "the world capital of humbug and hypocrisy," would have been a more suitable target. For all its facetiousness, this statement aptly illustrates the growing disenchantment with the United Nations and the steady decline in its standing and prestige, as reflected also in its constantly diminishing resonance in the news media.

The United Nations General Assembly is about to convene for its 34th session. It is worth recalling that when the organization came into being in 1945 in San Francisco, it was designed to become a "centre for harmonizing the actions of nations," as Article 1(4) of the Charter put it, in the pursuit of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations among nations. Instead, it has declined into a forum of confrontation and dissension among nations.

The fundamental reason for this decline is no doubt the transformation of the United Nations over the years into a body dominated by an unholy alliance of dictatorships and totalitarian regimes whose respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter and for the rule of law in international relations is matched only by their domestic observance of the rule of law and human rights.

This majority in recent years has trampled under foot every provision of the Charter that it perceives as inimical to its bloc interests, and in particular those provisions designed to safeguard the rights of the minority within the organization.

The democracies within the United Nations have now dwindled to a minority of about 30 states out of 150. Ironically, this minority keeps the United Nations going, financially speaking. It contributes over 70 percent of its budget, with the United States alone accounting for 25 percent.

By contrast, all the Arab members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries combined contribute 0.84 percent of the budget, with Saudi Arabia contributing 0.23 percent (one-third of Israel's dues).

However laudable the principle of universal representation proclaimed by the Charter, the current situation in which 10 percent of the world's population can muster a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly is, to put it mildly, highly grotesque, particularly when this new strength is put in the service of totalitarian practices incompatible with the United Nations's principles.

It is perhaps also because of this unrepresentative character of the United Nations that virtually all major international issues—especially those directly affecting major-power interests—have been settled outside the United Nations (Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam, Germany, Israel-Egypt, disarmament, strategic-arms treaties) even if on occasion those solutions were subsequently rubber-stamped by the United Nations.

It is in this surrealistic atmosphere that United Nations organs ponitificate in a manner that can only further undermine the United Nations's already shaky standing. For frequently, those organs consciously adopt mendacious resolutions, as was the case in the notorious equation of Zionism with racism. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then the United States' chief delegate, on that occasion rightly admonished the United Nations for "the terrible lie that has been told here . . . [It] will have terrible consequences. . . . People [will] begin to say, as indeed they have already begun to say, that the United Nations is a place where lies are told." His warning has gone unheeded.

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[1] Yehuda Z. Blum is Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations. He also holds a chair in international law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

This process has also affected the United Nations Secretariat, which, as a result of the manipulation of the staff by the totalitarian majority, has been gripped by a deep sense of frustration. Recruitment to this avowedly independent staff is now based on national pressures rather than on merit and proper qualifications.

In a situation like this, it would be all the more imperative for the Secretary-General to assume the role of a guardian and custodian of the Charter and of its principles and to remind the tyrannical majority of its obligations under it. Admittedly, this may prove more difficult than the politically more expedient course of towing the majority line.

True, the Secretary-General is defined in Article 97 of the Charter as "the chief administrative officer of the Organization"; yet this should not be construed as barring him from becoming also the "keeper of the United Nations' conscience."

The United Nations of 1979 no longer resembles the organization its founders intended it to be.

It has consistently violated its own Charter.

The authentic Charter is no longer in effect. A return to it should have been one of the most urgent tasks of the upcoming session of the General Assembly. This, however, will not come to pass.

[The New York Times, Friday, Sept. 7, 1979]

U.S. Disclaims Anti-Israel Votes*

(By Bernard Gwertzman)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 6.—The State Department dissociated itself today from two anti-Israel votes cast at a United Nations human rights subcommission meeting in Geneva, saying the United States representative had been acting in a "personal" capacity.

The representative, W. Beverly Carter, one of the highest-ranking blacks in the State Department, voted yesterday with the majority on two resolutions critical of Israeli policy.

The first urged Israel to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization and to restore to Palestinians the right of self-determination. The second called on Israel to stop bombardment of southern Lebanon and said the subcommission "deeply deplores the violation of the fundamental rights of the Arab population in Palestine.

Mr. Carter holds the title of Ambassador at Large for State and Local Governments. He is former Ambassador to Tanzania and Liberia and served for three years as the United States representative at the United Nations Human Rights Commission's Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination.

'PERSONAL AND EXPERT CAPACITY'

Asked about the votes in the subcommission, the State Department spokesman, Hodding Carter 3d, said that Ambassador Carter served in the human rights posts "in a personal and expert capacity, and as such is not subject to instructions."

"Thus, Ambassador Carter's vote does not represent the position of the United States," the spokesman said. "The United States would not have supported those resolutions."

Other officials said that the human rights subcommission was intended to be a panel of experts not under instructions from their governments. But they added that the United States and other Western countries were the only ones that followed such a practice in the 26-member group.

"To my knowledge, we've never issued instructions to the American on that subcommission," a State Department official said.

The State Department said later that Ambassador Carter's travel and per diem expenses are paid by the United Nations and not the United States Government when he is in Geneva as a member of the human rights panel.

FUROR AT NEWS CONFERENCE

The department's comments provoked a furor at the regular State Department news conference, particularly from Israeli correspondents.

Reporters asked the spokesman repeatedly to explain how an ambassador at large could also be seen as a nongovernmental "expert." But the department's spokesman, who is not related to Ambassador Carter, stood by his statement.

The Human Rights subcommission action was widely reported in Israel and drew condemnation from some American Jewish groups.

Ambassador Carter, a former newspaper editor, was involved in controversy in 1975 with Henry A. Kissinger, then Secretary of State. Mr. Kissinger blocked his appointment as Ambassador to Denmark because, as Ambassador to Tanzania, he had allowed his embassy to establish contacts with guerrillas who kidnapped three American students.

This violated Mr. Kissinger's policy of not negotiating with "terrorists," even though Ambassador Carter did succeed in obtaining release of the hostages.

American black leaders brought pressure on Mr. Kissinger, who promised that Mr. Carter's career would not be hurt. He was later named Ambassador to Liberia.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 17, 1979]

U.N. Assembly, Opening Tomorrow, to Focus on Mideast, Africa and Cambodia*

(By Bernard D. Nossiter)

United Nations, N.Y., Sept. 16.—For the next 13 weeks, the halls here will resound to angry denunciations of Israel, Egypt and the Camp David accords, to bitter attacks on white rule over blacks in southern Africa and clash between the rival regimes in Cambodia.

The 34th annual meeting of the General Assembly opens Tuesday, a forum for the sentiments of 151 Governments ranging from the Seychelles, population 60,000, to China, population 900 million. The gathering will be rich in oratory and resolutions. Its practical consequences for the troubled areas of the world are a matter of dispute.

"It's a place to blow off steam, for foreign ministers to make a splash on their television at home," a veteran official here said.

But even those most scornful of the annual meeting, delegates from the West and other countries typically outvoted by the Assembly's overwhelming majority of third world nations, do not dismiss out of hand the flood of words.

GROWING INFLUENCE OF P.L.O.

As one delegate observed, no nation enjoys being isolated. "There is an interplay between New York and national capitals" that can erode the hardest of positions, the delegate said. Israeli diplomats, for example, acknowledge the growing influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization among Israel's warmest supporters, an influence that partly reflects the words and deeds here.

The new session, moreover, is likely to reveal that the third world's automatic majority is less solid than it has been in the past. The third world is divided on a wide array of issues, from how closely to cling to Moscow's political line to the price of oil.

Drama is expected in the opening days when the candidates supported by China and the Soviet Union fight it out for the right to represent Cambodia. Peking's ally, Pol Pot, was driven from his capital of Phnom Penh by Vietnamese forces in January. Moscow supports the delegate from Prime Minister Heng Samrin, who was installed by Hanoi. The Russians and their friends will assert that Heng Samrin is in control and that his representative must occupy the place reserved for Cambodia. But several other countries, including Indonesia and Thailand, as well as China, will contend that the world body must not reward aggression.

U.S. WILL BACK POL POT

The Pol Pot Government killed tens of thousands of its own people. Nevertheless, the United States is expected to line up with the Chinese behind Pol Pot (an American official held his nose as he spoke of this) on the ground that the Moscow-Hanoi candidate was put in place as a result of foreign force.

A close vote is expected, with many delegates abstaining from backing what they regard as equally obnoxious regimes. The expectation here is that the outcome will be similar to that of the recent conference of third world countries in Havana. There, Pol Pot's representative lost his seat, but it was left vacant and not given to his rival.

More than politics is at stake here. The struggle over Cambodian representation is hampering efforts to provide food and medicine for the starving and disease-afflicted Cambodian population. United Nations officials are struggling with ways to aid both camps but have not yet succeeded in figuring out how.

The diplomatic theater here will be enlivened by some notable personalities.

POPE AND CASTRO EXPECTED

Pope John Paul II is scheduled to address the Assembly on Oct. 2, and President Fidel Castro of Cuba is expected to report on the conference of countries professing nonalignment, where he succeeded in asserting his leadership role despite his regime's close ties to Moscow. No date for Mr. Castro's address has been announced, however, largely for fear of an assassination attempt. The new chief United States delegate, Donald F. McHenry, will be closely watched to see how his quiet diplomacy compares with the flamboyant and freewheeling style of his predecessor, Andrew Young.

Inevitably, the Middle East will be at the center of the Assembly's attention. But it is hard to find a delegate who expects more than ritual resolutions to be approved, condemning the Camp David peace accords. The third world, the Soviet bloc and a growing number of Western Europeans insist that the core of the problem lies with the Palestinians, and that the Palestinians go unrepresented as long as the P.L.O. does not take part in Middle East negotiations. But even some of the P.L.O.'s supporters in the third world agree that this cannot happen until the organization openly and firmly agrees that Israel has a right to a secure existence. The speeches and resolutions here are seen at best as a verbal war of attrition designed to move both sides and their backers.

The discussion of southern Africa, at least initially, is seen as an exercise in marking time. It is widely recognized, even by the strongest backers of black majority rule, that the real action rests elsewhere. No consequential moves can be made here affecting Zimbabwe Rhodesia as long as the talks in London continue between leaders of the Patriotic Front guerrilla alliance and the biracial Government of Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa.

In much the same way, nations here will watch rather than act on the quest for an independent South-West Africa, or Namibia. The United States, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany have drawn up a plan for United Nations-supervised elections in Namibia to end both the guerrilla war there and South Africa's control. There is, however, a growing suspicion among black African nations that South Africa is deliberately prolonging the negotiations, and this mood could find expression before the Assembly session ends.

APPENDIX 3

[From the Washington Star (morning edition), Sept. 11, 1979]

Non-Aligned Nations Face Test of Unity on Issues Before U.N. Assembly Session [1]

(By Louis Halasz)

UNITED NATIONS—The shaky unity of the non-aligned world, barely preserved during the explosive Havana summit of 94 of its members, will be put to an even more severe test in the U.N. General Assembly session that opens next week.

The main problem that will face the non-aligned majority of U.N. member states is that their technique of compromise by consensus, real or imagined, is still not the customary way of resolving problems in the world organization, where decision by voting is often unavoidable.

If things are pushed to the phase of voting, dissent brewing under the formal facade of unity may well break into the open.

Diplomats and observers trickling back to U.N. headquarters from Cuba generally agree that President Fidel Castro did succeed in formally pushing the movement in the direction of the Soviet bloc, even if only at the cost of a lot of ill will generated by his heavy-handed suppression of opposition.

Even the dubious "moderate" victory of inserting into the final communique a condemnation of "the policy of domination and hegemony"—code words meaning the Soviet bloc—was more than counter balanced by other passages.

Those passages denounced the "exploitation of human rights issues as a political instrument" and "the exploitation of the right of the individuals to leave their country for political purposes," such as promoting the uprooting of Jews from the Soviet Union for resettling in Israel.

The litmus test of non-aligned unity is the fate of Cambodian representation in the United Nations. At present, that representation is still provided by Thiounn Prasith, Pol Pot's ambassador here, and by protocol it is he and his men who will occupy the Cambodian seat on the floor of the assembly as it opens next week.

Their removal can be effected in two ways; either they leave on their own volition—which is out of the question—or the Credentials Committee, established on the first day of any new assembly, has to rule against them. In any case, whether that committee decision favors Pol Pot or Vietnam's Heng Samrin, it would be challenged and the full assembly would have to make the decision.

It also is possible that Vietnam's numerous proponents would opt for the Havana non-solution of simply declaring the seat vacant for the time being.

But there already is another item on the assembly's agenda pertaining to Cambodia, submitted by the five countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It demands that the session discuss "the threat to peace and security" represented by the continuing conflict in Cambodia, since "there is a real danger that (it) would further worsen at the end of the current monsoon season."

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APPENDIX 4

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1979]

Waldheim Sees Troubles in 34th General Assembly[1]

(By Lee Lescaze)

United Nations, Sept. 12.—The 34th U.N. General Assembly that opens next week promises to be one of the most difficult in the international organization's history, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said today.

Problems of the Middle East, Indochina, disarmament, Cyprus and southern Africa that have long divided the world are expected to provide flashpoints during three months of debates that will see an extraordinary number of important visitors to the United Nations.

The Oct. 2 visit of Pope John Paul II will be one of the earliest and will draw the largest crowds. At least a dozen national leaders have indicated they will address the General Assembly, among them Cuban President Fidel Castro.

Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat also may decide to speak to the General Assembly, depending on the course of the Middle East debate.

The Palestinian issue, Waldheim told a news conference, remains the crux of the Middle East problem. Asked if he considers the U.S. policy of refusing to have contact with Arafat's PLO an obstacle to solving the problem, Waldheim replied, "I think Andrew Young has given us the answer." Young resigned as U.S. ambassador here after violating that policy.

Waldheim has proposed that an international conference on the Middle East with representatives of all concerned parties be convened in Geneva. In recent talks with world leaders, he said, "I got the idea that this was an idea which has considerable support."

The time is not yet right, however, Waldheim said. The Soviet Union told him such a conference should not take place soon, he said. The United States opposes such a conference because it supports the present negotiation on Palestinian autonomy under the framework of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

On other issues, Waldheim said:

World leaders generally support SALT II and he hopes the chances for U.S. Senate approval of the treaty will not be damaged by the debate on Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

The political and humanitarian problems of Cambodia are "one of the greatest challenges of the General Assembly." He stressed that the United Nations is pushing to increase shipments of food and medicine to Cambodia.

He sees no improvement in the situation since seven months ago he publicly deplored a lack of political will among the world's nations. Narrow national interests continue to be the basis for most nation's actions, he said.

He is encouraged that North and South Korea are in contact through intermediaries and the United Nations will do what it can to further those communications.

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APPENDIX 5

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1979]

Israelis Seen More Isolated at U.N. Than Ever Before [1]

(By Lee Lescaze)

United Nations, Sept. 15—Israel begins the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations Tuesday more isolated in the world body than ever before.

For years, any U.N. debate, including those on women's rights or postage stamps, has included denunciations of Israel by Arab nations and their supporters, but Israel now finds itself with fewer friends to stand up against the anti-Israel majority, according to a number of Western diplomats.

Even the United States and Canada, which with Costa Rica are the only nations always voting with Israel, have made public their concern about Israel's military activities in southern Lebanon and its construction of settlements on Arab land captured in the 1967 Six-Day war.

On some crucial issues, such as the 1975 anti-Israeli resolution equating Zionism with racism, the Western European nations and some Latin American and African countries voted with Israel or abstained. But these nations do not stand up for Israel when it is condemned these days—as it frequently is—for Lebanon or the settlements question, the two issues diplomats say have deepened Israel's isolation.

Israel's response to criticism here has been to stand on its head Groucho Marx's famous dictum that he would not want to belong to any club that would have him for a member.

Israeli Ambassador Yehuda Blum and his aides have attacked the United Nations, saying in effect that any organization that condemns Israel does not deserve to be respected.

"I would prefer to have the majority behind me," Blum said in an interview, "but the decisive criteria for us has to be whether we believe we are right in what we are doing.

"Our isolation is the latter day translation of the Jewish condition," he said. Lebanon and the settlements, he said, could be replaced by other issues. "No matter what we do we would come in for this kind of criticism."

One diplomat here said, however, that "Lebanon and the settlements have made it easier for nations to vote against Israel—less afraid of being called anti-Semitic." Guilt over the holocaust is ebbing, he added, citing the West German decision to send its foreign minister to meet with Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat.

An ambassador whose country usually supports Israel criticized Israeli public relations tactics. "If they are trying to make it easier on their friends here, they are not yery smart," he added.

Many of Israel's friends agree.

"Israel has drifted into a policy in Lebanon that no one can defend," another diplomat said. "It's running a quisling movement in another country and running it with arms."

A U.N. force comprised of troops from Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, France, Fiji, Nepal, Nigeria and Senegal is stationed in southern Lebanon and has been frustrated—and shot at—by the Lebanese Christian forces of Maj. Saad Haddad, which are armed by and allied with Israel.

On his last day in the Security Council chamber, Andrew Young said the strength of Israel in its early days "was that it was based on a moral foundation and yet Israel now is rapidly spending its moral capital, wasting it in pursuit of violence and destruction in Lebanon" and in the building of settlements.

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"What he called moral capital was in a certain sense a guilt complex," Blum commented. The Begin government finds its critics—including its Israeli critics—wrong.

A new generation has grown up for whom the origin of the Middle East problem was the Six-Day War, Blum said. That means that Israel is an occupying power. "Those of us with longer memories know better," Blum said.

A supporter of Israel who thinks Israel's course is dangerous for the Jewish state's future spoke in almost the same terms but with a different message.

The new generation he described included Palestinians who grew up in refugee camps and watched U.N. resolutions fail to do anything to improve the Palestinians' lot. Now their determination to affect change coincides with changing perceptions in the world.

Israelies have a quick explanation for the world's change—oil.

"I wouldn't want to equate one's moral capital with oil," Blum said of nations that have distanced themselves from Israel in recent years. "All the criticism fits into the pattern of forming better relationships with the Arabs."

Blum went on the offensive against the United Nations last week with an article in The New York Times declaring the world body is in a steady decline because it is dominated "by an unholy alliance of dictatorships and totalitarian regimes."

When the anti-Israel resolutions begin to pour forth at the General Assembly, Blum will be firing back. The Jewish people have always been called names, Blum said. "The great change in the Jewish people's status is that when people call us names now I can get up and exercise my right of reply," he said with a smile.

Israel's siege mentality, created by the history of the Jews and the belligerence of Israel's neighbors, is evident at the United Nations.

If Lewis Carroll were writing today, Chaim Herzog, Blum's predecessor, once observed, Alice would only have had to wear a Star of David in the U.N. building to hear people cry "Off with the head."

Herzog was Israel's representative in 1975 when the 22 Arab nations and their supporters won U.N. approval of a resolution equating Zionism with racism.

"The Jewish people will not forget this scene nor this vote," Herzog said then. "We shall not forget those who voted to attack our religion and our faith. We shall never forget." There were 70 votes for the resolution, 29 against it, 27 abstentions and 16 nations absent.

Any lessening of Israel's isolation would be helpful, diplomats friendly to Israel believe. Andrew Young reportedly has been urging African nations to resume diplomatic relations with Israel, but the Israelis are not working hard to encourage new friendships.

APPENDIX 6

Letter From Subcommittee Chairman Bonker to Hon. John Hechinger Requesting Responses to Additional Questions for the Record

Congress of the United States,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C., September 25, 1979.

Hon. John Hechinger,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hechinger: Thank you very much for your excellent testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations on September 19, 1979 concerning U.S. preparations and policies for the 34th U.N. General Assembly.

Unfortunately, the Subcommittee was unable to receive your views on several issues which would be particularly useful for the hearing record. Therefore, if you would be kind enough to submit in writing a concise response to the following questions we would be most grateful.

1. In your testimony you suggested adding one more day of briefings for public members of the U.S. Delegation. Would you suggest any other improvements which might better prepare public members of the U.S. Delegation for the G.A.?

2. During your testimony you indicated that the U.S. Mission devoted too much time in relating to the State Department, and that the exchange between the U.S. Mission and the State Department could be "reduced and streamlined." Please describe what specific measures would resolve these problems.

3. What specific measures would improve coordination of work and cooperation between U.S. Mission personnel and public members of the U.S. Delegation?

4. What degree of input did you have in formulating the U.S. position on issues facing the G.A.?

The Subcommittee would hope to receive your response no later than October 15, 1979. If you have any questions, please contact Carole Grunberg, at the Subcommittee at 225–5318.

Sincerely yours,

Don Bonker,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

APPENDIX 7

Responses of Hon. John Hechinger to Additional Questions Submitted in Writing by Subcommittee Chairman Bonker

October 3, 1979.

Hon. Don Bonker,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Bonker: I have been testifying before Congress in various capacities for a very long time, but I must say that you and your committee are the only ones, I believe, who have ever listened.

To have developed the thoroughness of your questions impresses me no end and I will do my best to answer them very briefly numbered paragraph by numbered paragraph.

1. I testified that I thought the briefings were excellent and that another day should be added for more thoroughness. Beyond this, I don't believe further indoctrination would be necessary.

2. My main suggestion to reducing and streamlining the interchange between the U.S. Mission and the State Department is to not require it to the extent that it is now engaged in. As I indicated, many of the resolutions are carryovers from previous G.A.s and our position is quite clear and unchanging. It would seem to me that we ought to put an ambassador and staff in charge at the U.S. Mission in which we have sufficient faith in their capabilities to recognize only when there is a deviation that should be carefully cleared with the State Department.

3. The only specific measure necessary is to see that orders are given to the U.S. Mission personnel that it is their duty to interface with the public member to which they are assigned and such assignments be made on a very clear one-to-one basis. Furthermore, for those U.S. Mission personnel who do not have a direct assignment of a public delegate that they be instructed that they should involve themselves with the public delegates in the same manner that they do with the permanent ambassadors assigned to the General Assembly.

4. I had some very interesting definite input in regard to ten or fifteen words in a resolution on Zimbabwe and ten or fifteen words in regard to the use of nuclear strengths. It doesn't sound like very much, but I felt the debates that I had with the State Department, while being cheered on by the U.S. Mission in New York, were great victories and these two experiences were among the most notable of my service in the General Assembly.

Again, I am impressed with the care with which you are involving your committee in this matter and hope that I have been of some help.

Sincerely,

John W. Hechinger.

APPENDIX 8

Letter From Subcommittee Chairman Bonker to Hon. Charles Whalen Requesting Responses to Additional Questions for the Record

Congress of the United States,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C., September 25, 1979.

Hon. Charles Whalen,
Executive Director, New Directions, Washington, D.C.

Dear Chuck: Thank you very much for your excellent testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations on September 19, 1979 regarding U.S. preparations and policies for the 34th U.N. General Assembly.

Unfortunately, the Subcommittee was unable to receive your views on several issues which would be particularly useful for the hearing record. Therefore, if you would be kind enough to submit in writing a concise response to the following questions we would be most grateful.

1. During the hearing you stated that the State Department's preparations prior to the G.A. were inadequate to ensure your effective participation in the G.A. as a Congressional member of the U.S. Delegation. Were the State Department's or U.S. Mission's preparations and briefings during the G.A. also inadequate?

2. In monitoring the activities of the G.A., do you feel that the State Department exercised too much or too little control over the U.S. Mission and the U.S. Delegation?

3. You stated during the hearing that while public and Congressional members of the U.S. Delegation do not "make" policy, they may contribute to policy "formulation." What degree of input did you have in formulating the U.S. position on issues facing the G.A.? How can public and Congressional delegates contribute effectively to policy formulating?

4. Did the State Department or the U.S. Mission give you instructions concerning contacts with the P.L.O.?

5. If a resolution is brought to a vote without advance warning and our delegate has not been instructed how to vote on the particular resolution, is the delegate instructed to abstain and request instructions from the State Department? Should our delegates be permitted greater flexibility to exercise their own judgment in voting in such instances?

The Subcommittee would hope to receive your response no later than October 15, 1979. If you have any questions, please contact Carole Grunberg at the Subcommittee at 225-5318.

Sincerely yours,

Don Bonker,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations.

APPENDIX 9

Responses of Hon. Charles Whalen to Additional Questions Submitted in Writing by Subcommittee Chairman Bonker

New Directions,
A Citizens' Lobby for World Security,
Washington, D.C., October 2, 1979.

Hon. Don Bonker, M.C.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Don: Thank you for your letter of September 25 and the kind comments contained therein. I certainly enjoyed appearing before your Subcommittee—it was like old times! It is regrettable that your "class picture" session limited the opportunity for questions.

The following are my views concerning the five additional queries which you posed in your communication.

1. Once a General Assembly session commences, all U.S. U.N. Mission personnel are confronted with severe time constraints. Thus, there is little opportunity for the Ambassador or his senior deputies to conduct lengthy briefing sessions for Congressional and Public Delegates. As I noted in my opening statement, much of the learning process rests with the individual delegate. However, by following some of the recommendations which I outlined in my testimony, Delegates can successfully complete an "on-the-job training program" by mid-session.

With respect to the educational efforts of the mission, Congressional and Public Representatives were kept abreast of operational activities during the one-hour mission meetings held on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings. Ambassador Young met privately with the delegates on several occasions to discuss broad policy questions. Mission officers were most cooperative in working with me on issues coming before the Second Committee, on which I served, and in arranging luncheon meetings with delegates from nations who sat on this committee. Finally, Ambassador Young was instrumental in setting up for me a meeting in the State Department with top level officials whom I pressed to adopt a particular course of action favored by those of us involved with Second Committee matters.

In summary, those permanently assigned to the U.S. Mission were willing to give their time and advice to the uninitiated, such as myself, but with many other concerns on their minds, they had to be asked. This is the thrust of my opening statement—Congressional and Public Delegates cannot sit back and wait for something to happen; they have to seek out the action.

2. As I stated during my formal remarks, the United Nations Participation Act, enacted by Congress, clearly states that the President (through the State Department) establishes the policies pursued by the U.S. U.N. Mission. Therefore, it is not a question of "too much or too little control"—complete control has been vested by law in the Executive Branch.

3. I contributed to policy discussions in several ways.

A. During mission meetings I voiced suggestions concerning positions which Ambassador Young should advocate during Cabinet sessions or when he contacts State Department officers with decision-making jurisdiction.

B. I met privately with Ambassador Young on a number of occasions at which time he solicited my views concerning pending issues.

C. Ambassador Young and I engaged in a three-way telephone conversation with Father Theodore Hesburgh (in South Bend, Indiana), Chairman-designate of our delegation to the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology, and Ambassador Wilkowski (in Washington), State Department coordinator for the Conference. We tried unsuccessfully to get their approval of a more vigorous mission lobbying effort to secure New York as the site of the 1979 Conference. As the Subcommittee knows, the General Assembly, sensing that the U.S. "invitation" was only pro forma, overwhelmingly voted in favor of Vienna as the Conference host.

D. As previously mentioned, I "invaded" the State Department to take the case directly to those responsible for establishing policies relating to the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Public and Congressional Delegates can utilize the same approaches, or variants thereof, during the policy formulation process.

4. To my knowledge, during the 32nd General Assembly, no instructions were given Congressional and Public Delegates concerning contacts with the P.L.O.

5. In this era of instant communication, no vote is cast in the General Assembly without prior clearance from the State Department. While, from a personal standpoint, it might be desirable for the U.S. Mission to have greater decision-making flexibility, it must be remembered that the mission is an instrument of policy, contributing only to the formulation of that policy.

I hope that the foregoing has been responsive to your questions.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr.,
President.

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