WESTERN SECURITY ISSUES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

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SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS
AND ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
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WESTERN SECURITY ISSUES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS AND ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The joint subcommittees met at 10:30 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The subcommittees will please come to order.

We meet today to examine some of the emerging issues relating to the security of Western Europe. We are all aware, I think, of the growing military capability of the Warsaw Pact.

What may not be well-known, however, is the ability of the NATO alliance to defend its interests using both military and nonmilitary means.

Much has been said in recent weeks about the views of our European allies on the pending ratification of the SALT II Treaty and the modernization of United States and other NATO nations' theater nuclear forces. In order that we might better understand how our NATO allies feel about a number of important factors preserving European security, we are privileged to welcome four distinguished European parliamentarians.

Largely as a result of the United States-Western European cooperation since World War II, the NATO alliance has made a significant contribution toward avoiding another such war and providing for economic progress for both sides of the Atlantic.

As we assess the future here in Congress, we must fully take into account the views of our European allies on whom much of the burden of preserving peace in the future will fall.

Today's hearing provides the subcommittees with a unique opportunity to hear directly from representatives of our allies' legislatures on these very important issues.

Gentlemen, we look forward to your informed testimony.

I will call on Chairman Hamilton if he has a statement.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I simply want to endorse your comments and add that our four distinguished guests this morning are members of the North Atlantic Assembly. They constitute the Presidential Working Group of that assembly, a group which was constituted to undertake the necessary
groundwork for the North Atlantic Assembly to be able to formulate positions on SALT II and theater force modernization at its upcoming meeting in Ottawa, Canada.

We look forward to having a dialog with these gentlemen. They are Mr. Paul Thyness, who is the President of the North Atlantic Assembly and a member of the Norwegian Parliament; Mr. Patrick Wall, who is Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and a member of the British Parliament; Mr. Klaas de Vries, General Rapporteur of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Dutch Parliament; and Mr. Peter Coterier, who is the General Rapporteur of the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and spokesman for the Social Democratic Party parliamentary group on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag.

I understand all of you have prepared statements this morning. They will be entered into the record in full. We would appreciate it if you would begin with a summary of your statements for the record and then we will turn to statements and comments by members of the panel from the U.S. Congress.

You may proceed. I think, Mr. Thyness, you are the leadoff man. We are delighted to have all of you here.

STATEMENT OF PAUL THYNES, MEMBER OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT (CONSERVATIVE PARTY); AND PRESIDENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. Thyness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps I might be allowed first of all to say a few words on the composition of this group meeting with you today. It is, in fact, quite a cross section of European political positions.

Two of us are conservatives in the European sense, not in the American sense, and two of us are Social Democrats, Labour Party. One of each represents parties in power, one of each, parties in opposition. One of each represents a small country and a big country. On the whole, I think we have managed to get a fair cross section.

There is one thing that I think is interesting about this composition. That is that however different we are, small countries, big countries, opposition or government position, we are all agreed on one thing; namely, the necessity to have the SALT II Treaty ratified.

As you would know, the European perspective here is somewhat different from the American. Some of you who go to the North Atlantic Assembly, as you, Chairman Hamilton, do, will know that the North Atlantic Assembly provides a forum for American legislators and Europeans to get together and assess each others' perspective on current issues in a way which I think is most valuable.

SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA

Now, since we have been over here for a few days, we have, of course, seen how the SALT II ratification debate has been suddenly centered on what is happening in Cuba and the Soviet military presence there. If I may, I would like to say a few words on this because as a Norwegian, I have had a particular perspective on that point.
You see, when Norway entered NATO in 1949, we decided not to establish any foreign bases or have any foreign military presence in Norway because we thought that with our proximity to the Soviet Union, that would not be helpful for an eventual détente and for a development toward a more lasting peace.

And that, of course, was accepted by the United States and by our other allies.

Now, it is obvious that the Soviet Union and its ally have a vastly different concept of what constitutes a constructive peace policy, if that is what they think they are doing, and I hope it is. But nevertheless, it is clear that this is not germane to the ratification process as viewed from the European side.

We realize it is so from the American side and we respect that, but in our opinion, the SALT II Treaty and other treaties we may conclude with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact will not usher in any kind of millennium of cooperation. It will not relieve us of the necessity to meet their challenges in a number of other fields which are not covered by treaties.

We simply have to get rid of the rather unrealistic perspective that concluding a treaty on nuclear arms limitations will somehow alter the total picture and relieve us of the necessity of meeting Soviet challenges in the European theater, in Africa, in Cuba, and in other parts of the world, militarily, politically, and economically.

So I think we would have to get that perspective; and this, I believe, is the European perspective on the ongoing process of détente.

Perhaps I might also be excused if I add that there has been some talk in the American media lately about sort of a tit for tat, the Russians taking out their combat force in Cuba and the Americans taking out their troops in Norway. [Laughter.]

But there is quite a bit of difference here.

Let me conclude my oral statement by referring to the burning question that is on the agenda coming up now, which is theater nuclear modernization in Europe. There has been some discussion of this issue, whether the nuclear buildup on the Soviet side with the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber really is something we ought to worry about.

A lot of scenarios have been presented which say, in fact, that it is not necessary to try to create any kind of counterforce to that, but I do believe that in a situation where the Soviet Union has added nuclear capability in addition to a significant conventional superiority in the European theater, there are good reasons to fear that the Soviet Union will develop more assertive policies, gradually eroding European self-confidence and its confidence in the American nuclear umbrella.
After all, the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 have, presumably, been developed and deployed for a purpose, and that purpose cannot be anything else but an attempt to establish a military superiority on the continent of Europe, which in turn would be a very unhealthy state of affairs for Europe, for American interests in Europe, and for the alliance as such.

Therefore, it is my firm belief that it is necessary for the Alliance to make decisions of implementing theater nuclear modernization and, at the same time, go ahead with a SALT III process and further arms control negotiations in order to create an environment in which a spiraling arms race can be avoided.

I think that, perhaps, will be my oral statement. And my colleagues, I am sure, would have their views to offer.

[Mr. Thyness’ prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Paul Thyness, Member of the Norwegian Parliament (Conservative Party); and President of the North Atlantic Assembly

The North Atlantic Assembly is a semi-official organization of parliamentarians that was started 25 years ago—5 years after the signing of the NATO-treaty—by a number of European and Canadian members of Parliament soon joined by a number of prominent Senators and Congressmen from the United States, who felt that parliamentarians in a modern democracy have an increasingly important role to play in questions of foreign policy and defence as intermediaries between governments and people. To discharge these duties members of Parliament needed a forum to provide a greater active involvement in the affairs of the alliance, independent sources of information and broad contact with their colleagues from allied nations.

The organization was first known as “The NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference” and grew from an annual meeting to a permanent body that assumed the name of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1966. It has a bureau consisting of a President, three Vice-Presidents and a Treasurer, one of whom must always be a North American. The bureau is supported by a Standing Committee of one representative of each national delegation, and an international secretariat situated in Brussels.

The Assembly works through five main committees, Political, Military, Economic, Scientific and Technical, and Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee. These committees in turn may establish subcommittees for dealing with specific issues.

The group meeting with you today has been called—for want of a better name—a Presidential Working Group. It has for various reasons not been set up as a subcommittee by the ordinary procedure, and it cannot speak for the North Atlantic Assembly as such. Its main task is to coordinate preparations for the discussions on strategic arms limitations and theater nuclear modernization at the Assembly’s annual plenary session in Ottawa in late October this year.

While it cannot speak for the Assembly it is, however, a singularly representative group comprising the Chairman and General Rapporteur of the Military Committee, the General Rapporteur of the Political Committee and the President of the Assembly. These four people come from two of the greater European allies, United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and two small allies, the Netherlands and Norway. Two are Conservatives, two are Social Democrats. One Conservative and one Social Democrat belong to parties in government, and one of each to parties in opposition. And we are all four of us deeply concerned with politico-military affairs in our respective parliaments.

With the committee’s permission I would now like to turn to my views and impressions of the substance of the matter before us, i.e., European reactions to SALT II and theater nuclear modernization.

I think it is correct to say that broadly speaking both détente and arms control measures have over the years been more popular issues with European politicians and voters than with their North American counterparts. There are a number of reasons for this. One is that the European nations individually cannot match the Soviet Union militarily. The United States can, and NATO collectively can, but
dependence on others will never breed that deep sense of self-reliance that comes from a knowledge of being able to go it alone if necessary. No European nation can do that, and this fact naturally colours European thinking. Another reason is that the European nations are very much aware that they would be the first casualties in any armed conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. And Western Europe, with its small, densely populated territory, has been engulfed in devastating wars twice already in this century. This attitude must not be confused with appeasement or defeatism. For instance in Norway—one of your smallest allies and one of the two with a common border with the Soviet Union—recent polls have shown 84 percent of the people to support a military defence and 65 percent actively to support our membership in NATO. There is no tendency to uncritical accommodation to Soviet wishes. But the perspective is somewhat different from the one commonly found on this side of the Atlantic. For Europeans a normalization of East-West relations and a dialogue between the super-powers is viewed more pragmatically and has somewhat deeper and more immediate significance than is felt by most Americans.

On this background Europeans welcomed the SALT process from the start, and European reactions to the SALT II treaty as it has emerged have been markedly favourable. There are of course critical voices to be heard, but they are few. For the most part European support for SALT II has been overwhelming. The more generalized criticism that surfaces from time to time is directed against the treaty for not being what it was never intended to be, viz. a treaty designed to enhance the security of Western Europe specifically and directly. The primary impulse behind the SALT process has been to secure limitations on the intercontinental nuclear systems, traditionally termed “strategic” systems. This dividing of nuclear weapons systems into “strategic” and “tactical” is imprecise and generally unsatisfactory, in that it leaves out nuclear systems aimed at Western Europe. For that reason and with considerable merit it has lately become fashionable to speak of “Eurostrategic” systems. But this is a fairly recent development, and the fact remains that the negotiations have not, until the very last stage, involved systems of direct and specific relevance to the European theater. It will be remembered that the United States consistently, and with full concurrence of her European allies, has rejected Soviet efforts to include U.S. systems based in Europe. It will inevitably distort the picture if this historic perspective on the SALT II treaty is forgotten.

This is not to say, however, that the central nuclear balance is not a relevant European concern. These systems represent the final and indispensable guarantee for the security of Western Europe, and an agreement that affects this balance also affects European security. But apart from the tiny minority that specializes in the somewhat arcane world of strategic theory where the conclusions one reaches fairly often are of doubtful relevance to the affairs of living and breathing men, most Europeans are content to study the treaty in its broadest terms. These appear to indicate that SALT II does consolidate a position of “essential equivalence” where advantages for one side in certain areas are balanced by concessions in others. It is extremely difficult to see how, as some critics assert, the United States is moving into a position of strategic inferiority, as a result of SALT II. On the contrary it can be argued that without SALT II the prospect of continued “essential equivalence” in the 1980s is more, not less, in doubt. Nor have I seen it substantiated that the treaty in any way undermines or diminishes the U.S. guarantee to Europe. That guarantee has always been a question of trust, unknowable and unproveable, to us and to the Warsaw Pact, and nothing in the treaty challenges that basic trust. I would like to go on record as one who feels this trust, and I know that my belief is shared by the overwhelming majority of my countrymen.

But of course, and here we arrive at the point where the debate on SALT II becomes inextricably intertwined with the current debate on theater nuclear forces, how far can we let the Warsaw Pact get ahead of NATO on any one leg of the Triad without overloading this trust among the nations of the alliance, and without losing credibility in the eyes of the Soviet Union. I think it must be accepted that over the last decade the military balance has tilted significantly in favour of the Warsaw Pact, leading to considerable uneasiness in most Western European countries. In Norway our worry is mainly concerned with the current naval build-up, in other countries the focus is more on Soviet superiority in armour and more recently on superiority in theater nuclear forces. The need to redress the balance has become pressing before the gap creates a situation in which Western Europe becomes highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure.
This means that there is a need for a costly modernization of conventional and theater nuclear forces in Europe, but hopefully kept within reasonable bounds by substantial arms control measures—MBFR and SALT III. But the gateway to SALT III is obviously SALT II, just as it is difficult to believe that MBFR could continue in the wake of a defeat of SALT II. Without SALT II the watch will be put back several years and the climate for negotiations will inevitably deteriorate to a point where we in fact will only be left with the one option of matching the Soviet build-up at all levels, strategic, theater nuclear or Eurostrategic and conventional.

This in a no-SALT environment may prove to be a very difficult task, and much more than with a SALT II treaty in the background. I seriously question the possibility of persuading European public opinion to back nuclear and conventional modernization if the United States rejects the SALT II treaty. In my opinion the acceptance of SALT II would not create a climate in Europe that would undermine military vigilance: rather it would signify, a willingness on the part of the Western World to go along with serious arms control measures, and it would signify a reluctance to participate in an arms race that could erode public support for maintaining an adequate defense posture.

Meeting the Eurostrategic requirements will also require active participation on the part of the United States. Except for the British and French nuclear forces it is the United States that holds the nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. This of course is of crucial importance to prevent a total defeat for our civilization. But the strategic nuclear systems are last resort forces, and not forces that directly counter-balance the kind of pressure that the Soviet Union can exert on Western Europe on the basis of conventional superiority backed by a superior theater nuclear capability. That balance can only be achieved with American participation at all levels. Without SALT II Europeans may have reason to fear that the United States will have to pour so much money and effort into the strategic arms race that the contribution to the defense of Western Europe will suffer.

Seen through European eyes it is obviously a much more attractive alternative to get some measure of stability in the strategic balance through SALT II, and at the same time preserve the United States as an active participant in those fields which are of more immediate concern to Western Europe. And I believe that this also makes good sense in the context of the American security and global policies. U.S. participation is particularly important in the field of theater nuclear force modernization. This is true not only in a technical sense obviously, but also politically. Nuclear defense is a subject that Europeans have particular difficulties handling, as was graphically illustrated in the case of the deployment decision regarding enhanced radiation warheads. The basic reason for this may be that public opinion has been accustomed to draw the line between deterrence forces and warfighting forces, deterrence forces being the central systems which are by and large American, the warfighting forces being the conventional forces in Europe, by and large European. The theater nuclear forces are blurring this line, raising the spectre of a limited nuclear war, with a possible decoupling of American defense from the defense of Europe. This, added to the emotional problems that always surround nuclear weapons, and the Soviet propaganda against each and every step NATO takes in response to parallel acts by the Soviet Union and its allies, makes it very difficult for the European nations to act without strong American leadership.

And act we must. The Backfire bomber and the SS–20 give the Soviet Union a capability to attack Western Europe which has no counterpart on NATO’s side. There is now a missing step in the escalatory ladder. Arguments that this doesn’t matter have considerable force, since the scenarios which we are presented with appear much more to be products of theoretical analysis than of a forecast of what could actually happen. But in a situation where the Soviet Union has this added nuclear capability in addition to a significant conventional superiority in Europe, there are reasons to fear that the Soviet Union will develop more assertive policies, gradually eroding European self-confidence and its confidence in the American nuclear umbrella. After all, the Backfire and the SS–20 have presumably been developed and deployed for a purpose, and that purpose cannot be anything else but an attempt to establish a military superiority on the continent of Europe which in turn would be an unhealthy state of affairs for Europe, for U.S. interests, and for the alliance as such.

Arms control hardly offers a viable solution. There are no reasons to believe that we can negotiate away the Soviet theater nuclear superiority. But some kind
of arms control agreement will be necessary in order to prevent spiralling theater nuclear rearmament. If we do not allow ourselves to fall too far behind in the theater nuclear field there are reasonable prospects for a stabilization to emerge as a result of a SALT III process. I hope, although I realize it is not very likely, that such negotiations could bear fruit in a timely and comprehensive fashion and thus decrease the requirements for some of the modernization of NATO forces that is expected to be decided.

This leads us back to the question of European attitudes toward SALT II, which is obviously the prerequisite for SALT III and in particular with the issues of the noncircumvention clause, the duration of the protocol, and the experiences of the inter-alliance consultation process.

At the outset of the debate in Europe some anxiety was expressed concerning the ambiguity of the noncircumvention clause. If it could involve the American assistance to the United Kingdom in the modernization of its strategic force or the deployment to Europe of cruise missiles for use in the theater role it would indeed have put a different complexion on the treaty, and might very well have had a serious negative effect on European attitudes. In fact I believe that before clarification on this point was obtained some skepticism was created that has been completely dissolved. It is a fairly common phenomenon which we politicians have to live with that initial impressions die hard.

However, the Administration has repeatedly stressed, and has indeed formally stated to the NATO Council, that not only has the United States consistently rejected the inclusion of a nontransfer provision in the SALT II agreement, but it has made it clear that the transfer of weapons and technology to the Allies will continue and cannot ipso facto constitute circumvention. In the light of these clarifications I believe that any serious question on this point has been satisfactorily answered.

Another point of a similar character was the initial debate over the question of the duration of the protocol to the treaty, although this was not only a specific European concern. In my opinion critics to the treaty were quite right in pointing out the danger of the protocol being extended beyond 1981. We all know how easily such provisions become an integral part of an established order. The Administration might very well find itself in the position either having to prolong the protocol, and thereby further postponing the possible deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles, or refusing to prolong the protocol, and thereby appear to undermine ongoing negotiations. But that situation cannot arise when the possible extension of the protocol has been extensively debated and decided against beforehand as the case is now. Under circumstances created by the ratification debate it is the prolongation of the protocol that would constitute a major new departure. Thus one of the weaker spots in the whole package has been effectively dealt with.

It has been said that the United States did not consult with her European allies during the negotiation process, that what was called consultations was more like briefings on a take it or leave it basis.

To my mind this is largely a question of semantics. Consultations is a point on a scale that ranges from the European allies dictating to the United States on the one side, to the Europeans being told flatly what the United States has decided at the other extreme.

The facts as I have understood them are that the Administration deserves high praise for the frequency with which it has informed the allies of developments throughout the negotiation process. In matters that have been of particular concern to the Europeans, for instance the non-circumvention question and the questions relating to the protocol issue, the allies have been given every opportunity to express their views fully before the United States committed herself vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly there have been situations during seven years of negotiation when the consultation process did not function at its optimum. Progress in such negotiations is not always orderly and evenly spaced; sometimes there has been little time for real consultations, sometimes the sensitivity of the issues have worked against the ideal form of consultations.

On the other hand, the European allies have not always earned full marks for active participation. I believe it can be argued that a consistently greater response from the allies would have triggered improvements in the consultations generally.

What is of particular importance is two things. First, that it is very rare to meet anyone who really feels that European interests have been neglected during the negotiations. Secondly, when we hopefully start on the SALT III negotiations,
direct European interests will be much more concretely affected. Here the consultations must be broadened compared to what was natural and necessary during SALT II. If the criticism aimed at the SALT II consultations have served to sharpen the awareness in this respect it will have been of real service to the alliance as such.

I would like to end my statement on the point which I believe is perhaps the single most important one, namely the results to be expected in Europe if the treaty should not meet with the approval of the Senate.

We all know that the role of the legislature is much smaller in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs. For a variety of reasons foreign affairs has always and in all countries been the particular province of the executive power. The corollary is that when it comes to other countries all of us tend to look to a President, a Prime Minister or a Foreign Secretary to speak legitimately and responsibly for a country’s interests. Foreigners will always have difficulties in understanding major differences of opinion between Government and Parliament.

We have witnessed the total incomprehension on the part of the Soviet Union of the role of the Senate in shaping American foreign policy. Here we were faced with a combination of the general problem and a specific problem that has its roots in the vastly different Soviet system. But the Europeans are not immune either to this compound problem. In Europe the parliamentary system of government is prevalent, and since this implies that the government will have to resign if it is voted down in Parliament on a major issue, the system has evolved in a way that has imposed great restraints on the individual member of Parliament. European members of Parliament very rarely have that freedom to exercise an independent and personal judgment which is a matter of course in the United States Senate.

I am very much afraid that rejection of SALT II will never really be understood in Europe. And when people do not understand something they become suspicious, and the explanations they make up are usually rather ungenerous if not outright hostile and accusatory.

If I had no other reason to support the treaty, this would have been enough. It has been alleged that European expressions of support for the treaty have been influenced among other things by domestic pressures. This I believe is true. But it would be wrong to ascribe this pressure to the fear of losing the next election. Few elections are lost on questions of foreign policy, and SALT II is not an issue of that kind. The pressure felt by political leaders stems from a recognition of the vital necessity of ensuring public support at all times for the NATO alliance and the national defense posture, and of the devastating effect non-ratification is likely to have on the credibility of both the United States’ leadership and the aims and purposes of the alliance. We in Europe will be faced with a public opinion problem of staggering proportions, and no doubt the Soviet Union will work that for all it is worth.

I quite realize that this is only one of the many points American leaders will have to consider, and perhaps not a major one seen from this side of the Atlantic. They must have the security of the United States, not of Europe, as their first priority. But in presenting the European interest I base myself on my firm conviction that in the long term there is no conflict of interest between us, that nothing which harms the one can serve the other, and that no dividing influence can serve either.

Mr. HAMiLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Thyness.

Mr. Wall.

STATEMENT OF PATRICK WALL, MEMBER OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT (CONSERVATIVE PARTY); AND CHAIRMAN, MILITARY COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. WALL. Mr. Chairman, may I also say what a privilege it is to be able to testify before your committee.

To repeat what Mr. Thyness has said, we have four parliamentarians from Europe from different political parties and with different views, but we have reached agreement on the SALT II Treaty and we hope that it will be ratified. You have our full thoughts on that.
If I may enter into a slight detail over that treaty, I suggest it is not for us to question any views that Members of the Senate or Congress may have regarding the nuclear balance. That is a problem which must be settled between the two superpowers.

**THREAT OF SOVIET WEAPONS IN EUROPE**

But, as a European, there are two particular issues which concern me. The first one is the fact that today there are powerful Soviet weapons which threaten Europe but not the United States of America. And though it is almost inconceivable, should at a later date an American administration come into office which, unlike all previous administrations, was deterred from using its strategic force to retaliate after a limited theater nuclear attack on Europe, this factor clearly could be of major importance.

And I refer, as Mr. Thyness has done, to the SS-20 and the Backfire. Now, at the moment, Europe’s main protection against the SS-20 is the American strategic nuclear deterrent. In the future, the arms counter to this weapon may lie in the cruise missile. Therefore, I am particularly interested to hear the view which has been expressed that there is no question of extending the protocol of that treaty beyond the date of December 31, 1981, when presumably the limit to the range of the cruise missile would then be removed.

**NONCIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE**

The second issue in which we in Britain are particularly interested is the noncircumvention clause. The new British Government has said quite clearly it believes in the continuance and modernization of the British nuclear deterrent. And, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the Nassau agreement allowed us to purchase your A-3’s and fit them with our nuclear warheads.

In the future, it is conceivable that arrangements might be made between the two governments to purchase an eventual Trident I or cruise missiles or mix the two. Of course, we in Britain could manufacture our own missiles. We already, as you know, make our nuclear warheads, but of course this would be more expensive and it would mean less money available for mutual defense.

Therefore, we would like to see it quite clearly stated, if possible, and I made this point to the Senate with respect to the Senate resolution, that the noncircumvention clause will not prevent any transfer of technology to your allies in Europe.

**MODERNIZATION OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

An associated issue with SALT II, but nothing directly to do with it, is, of course, the modernization of our theater nuclear weapons. I have referred to the Backfire and I have referred to the SS-20. Quite clearly, this is a grave weakness in NATO at the present time.

This, I know, is very much a thing on the mind of your administration, and may I say that we hope very much that a final decision will be reached in December at the next NATO Council meeting on this very important issue. I hope that any possible delay on the ratifica-
tion of the SALT Treaty through other untoward instances like the Cuban issue will not delay in any way this important decision in December.

EAST-WEST BALANCE

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the whole question of the East-West balance. The U.S.S.R. has, I think, quite clearly been outbuilding NATO for many years in all fields, and the balance is tilting dangerously against us. My own country has, in the period 1964 to 1970, and 1974 to 1977, cut its military forces to the bone.

But the new British Government has made it quite clear it intends to give defense a high priority and is doing its best to repair that damage.

Now, President Carter took a very important initiative in 1977 in NATO which caused NATO to wake up, and I would submit that it is very important that this initiative be maintained by our leader, the United States, and by all allies.

If I may conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a few remarks on the area outside NATO. As you know, Mr. Chairman, both SACLANT and SACEUR have expressed their anxieties as to what is happening outside NATO. In fact, one has said it is more important than what is happening inside NATO.

I refer particularly to two areas. The Middle East, because of its oil, and the situation in Iran must give anxiety to all of us. I think in the context of the Middle East, Turkey is particularly important and our ally in NATO deserves the maximum support we can give them.

The second area of concern is southern Africa, particularly as Europe is concerned, because of the vital minerals that come from that part of the world. And I do believe we should do everything possible to see that the Soviet-backed political organizations in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Namibia would not achieve success, particularly after both of those countries have held forms of elections which certainly, to me, anyhow, indicate the trend of public opinion in those two countries.

So if I can sum up, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I believe all of my colleagues and your committee, sir, will agree it is vital to maintain the cohesion of the Alliance inside the NATO area but it is also vital for us to cooperate outside that area, particularly, I would suggest, in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Wall's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Patrick Wall, Member of the British Parliament (Conservative Party), and Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly

In this prepared statement I propose to amplify certain specific issues, namely the strategic nuclear balance, domestic political controversy, and the Euro-strategic and theatre nuclear balance made in my verbal presentation as well as dealing with some points on the East-West balance that we may have to face in the next few years.

THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The balance since SALT I

The SALT I Agreement in 1972 was justified by some as an Agreement that codified strategic parity. It has also been stated that, in fact, it allowed the U.S.S.R. some 50 percent more ICBM Launchers and 45 percent more SLBM
Launchers than the U.S.A. The throw-weight of the deployed Soviet ICBM's was also considerably more than that of the U.S. ICBM's. However, it was claimed that because of superior MIRV technology, and its lead in heavy bombers, the U.S. could afford the Soviet advantage in the number of ICBM Launchers.

In fact, the U.S.S.R. caught up with MIRV technology within two years. In 1974 the Vladivostock understanding prolonged SALT I and was based on essential equivalence in launchers; 2,400 each including 1,320 MIRV Launchers; freedom to determine the mix of weapons and no restriction on the number of warheads in each MIRV, but there was no reference to advanced technology weapons such as the Cruise Missile. It formed the framework of SALT II.

The net result of the failure of SALT I to restrict modernization and replacement has been an unprecedented buildup of the Soviet strategic nuclear capability, with no corresponding American increase.

In fact, since 1975 the U.S.S.R. has deployed the SS-17, 18, 19 and 20. The SS-18 having a throw-weight exceeding twice that of any U.S. missile.

By 1980 the total Soviet throw-weight will be almost double that of the U.S.A. and the number of warheads multiplied by 4 or 5. But the U.S.A. will still have a lead in the total number of warheads.

In contrast the U.S.A. has deployed no new ICBM since 1972 and has only modernised existing Minutemen III's roughly doubling the present 170 kiloton yield compared to the 2 megaton yield of the SS-18. The United States missiles are still more accurate but the Soviet Union is catching up.

Much the same story can be told about SLBMs in which the SSN8 has now been deployed in some 29 Delta class submarines, thus permitting them to hit the U.S.A. from the Barents Sea. Whereas the first U.SN equivalent, "USS Ohio", armed with the Trident I, will not be operational until at least 1980, and the 6,000 mile range Trident II is not expected to be available until the mid-1980s when only 10 "Ohies" will be deployed. However the MIRVed SSNX18 is now becoming operational in the Delta III submarines.

In 1972, the U.S. had some 400 heavy bombers compared to 140 in the Soviet Air Force. The ratio is now nearer to 250 to 135, but the U.S. bombers are mainly B52s, the B1 having been cancelled. On the other hand the U.S.S.R. has so far built some 100 Backfire medium bombers and is expected to have some 300 by 1985.

These figures are taken from various U.S. and British sources and may not be 100 percent accurate but they do clearly show the trend since 1972, which has been wholly in favour of the Soviet Union.

The same overall trend can be found in conventional forces, a trend, which, if continued, will put the U.S.S.R. in a commanding position to impose its will on most of the continents of the earth.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE TODAY AND IN 1985

The ratification of the SALT II Agreement would limit the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to a total of 2,250 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, of which 1,320 can be MIRVed, ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers carrying ALCMs of intermediate range. Within the limits of 1,320 MIRVed Launchers a sublimit of 1,200 is placed on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and a further sublimit of 820 is placed on MIRVed ICBMs. It is estimated that these limits will have the following results by 1985:

(a) MIRVed ICBMs—The Minuteman III production line is now closed down and the new MX delayed and cannot now be operational by 1985. The 550 Minuteman III's can be upgraded in accuracy but the aggregate useful payload or throw-weight of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will not exceed 1 1/4 million pounds and 1,650 RVs (1,650).

The U.S.S.R. can deploy 300 plus SS-18s (308) and some 500 (512) SS-17s and 19s, giving an estimated aggregate throw-weight for the Soviet Union ICBM Force of 8 to 9 million pounds, and 6,000 (5,062) RVs.

It has thus been estimated that in a first strike the U.S.S.R. could eliminate from 70 to 90 percent of U.S. silos whereas the U.S.A. would have the capability of destroying 65 percent of the Soviet ICBM silos.

(b) Un-MIRVed ICBMs—The U.S. 450 Minuteman II and 54 Titan has an estimated 1 million pounds (1.5 million) throw-weight and 1,000 megaton (936) of yield. The Soviet may substitute 300 SIIs by a new ICBM as permitted under the Agreement which could produce an estimated throw-weight of 2 1/2 million pounds and some 6,000 megatons yield.
(c) MIRVed SLBMs—The U.S. are expected to have 21 Poseidon submarines, 10 Trident I backfitted submarines, and 7 (10) new Trident I submarines by 1985, giving a total of 38 (41) nuclear propelled MIRVed SLBM submarines with some 664 (650) MIRVed tubes with some 5,300 (5,700) RVs.

The Soviet Union could, under the Agreement, deploy some 400 MIRV missile launchers. It is expected that the new Soviet Typhoon submarine will carry 20 to 24 missiles with up to 14 RVs. The SSN-18 is expected to have some 7 MIRVs.

The U.S. therefore, will continue to lead in SLBM MIRVed tubes and RVs.

d) Un-MIRVed SLBMs—The U.S. is expected to retain only some 80 SLBMs and the Soviet some 600.

(e) ALCM Bombers—The U.S. plans a possible deployment of 120 such aircraft with cruise missiles of over 600 kilometres range.

If these figures are approximately correct it will be seen that the U.S. inferiority in all categories of strategic power except accuracy, SLBMs and heavy bombers has been frozen for the duration of the Agreement. The argument, therefore, rests on whether the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will remain credible during the duration of the Treaty. This question, together with that of verification, has been debated during the hearings and must remain an American decision but already the balance is tilting against the U.S.A.

In addition the virtual deadlock of the MBFR negotiations for so long does not appear to indicate a Soviet desire for a balance but rather a drive for further superiority.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTROVERSY

It has always been a matter for concern when the international strategic balance or, for that matter, national defence, becomes a domestic political issue.

To the outsider the U.S. Administration has fallen over backwards to commend this Agreement. There are many arguments in its favour but the briefing of foreign Members of Parliament by U.S. Embassy staff, the knowledge that the Administration is in trouble over other National issues and badly needs successful ratification, makes an experienced politician wonder about the political as opposed to the military need for an Agreement.

This, I fear, is not unusual as opposing Party lines on Defense issues are current both in my own country and in Europe as a whole.

THE EUROSTRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR WAR BALANCE

As currently constituted the SALT II Treaty affects only missiles and heavy bombers of intercontinental range. This has meant the exclusion of a number of systems whose characteristics make them difficult to define but which are of great relevance to Europe. There can be no question that the U.S. authorities have kept their Allies fully informed during all the SALT discussions. However, Europe is menaced by two major new weapons systems that are not included in SALT II—the Backfire Bomber and the SS-20. On the other hand, restrictions on the deployment of cruise missiles are included in the Treaty.

It has already been stated that the strategic balance has tilted against the U.S.A. As far as Europe is concerned the shift in theatre nuclear capabilities in favour of the Warsaw Pact has been even more dramatic.

In January 1978 the U.S.S.R. had about 700 I/MRBM s, 430 medium bombers and 20 plus SLBMs targeted on high priority European targets. By 1985 it has been estimated that there will be some 275 SS-20 missiles and 250 Backfire Bombers deployed against European targets, plus 700 I/MRBM s (some targeted on China) 430 medium bombers and 20 SLBMs.

NATO Europe can produce 150 British and French IRBM s and SLBMs and some 200 nuclear capable aircraft, which is a deterrent but no real answer to the scale of the Warsaw Pact threat, even when backed by the USAF’s F-111s and other aircraft and the USN’s SLBM’s allocated to SACEUR.

Anti-Backfire defences can be improved with the advent of the British Air Defence Tornado and new types of U.S. aircraft based on Britain. But, the SS-20, which is mobile and has a range of some 3,000 miles can, therefore, be targeted on European ports and airfields from inside Russia, it can, therefore only be attacked by aircraft which would inevitably suffer appalling losses.

The counter to the SS-20 may be a new long-range theatre nuclear ballistic missile, an extended-range Pershing or a Cruise Missile, or a mix of all three. The new theatre ballistic missile cannot be operational by 1985. A stretched Pershing

NOTE.—The figures in the text are drawn from U.S. sources and the figures in parentheses from non-Government British sources.
is unlikely to have a range of more than 1,000 miles, and aircraft equipped with intermediate range Cruise Missiles are counted as heavy bombers and included in the SALT numerical aggregates. They are also limited to an average of 28 missiles, with not more than 20 carried in each existing B52 Bomber. Even more important, ground and sea-launch Cruise Missiles are restricted to a range of 600 kilometers (350 miles) by the Protocol to the Agreement, which expires on the 31st of December, 1981. If Cruise Missiles are to have a limited range for the next few years why are not certain specific restrictions on range applied to the Backfire and the SS-20? However there is nothing in the Agreement to prevent new theatre ballistic missiles being developed by the Allies and the U.S. will not be ready to deploy longer-range ground and sea-launched Cruise Missiles until after 1981. Two factors of primary importance to Europe therefore emerge:

i. the Protocol MUST NOT BE extended beyond its expiry date whatever the Soviet Union may demand, and

ii. it must be made plain that Article XII the “noncircumvention” clause will not only permit the transference of Cruise Missile technology from the U.S.A. to her Allies but will also permit the sale, for example of Tomahawk and Trident I, should this be desired.

Administration assurances have been given during the Senate hearings but it is hoped that the Senate will insist on these two clarifications being written into its resolution in such a way as there can later be no misunderstanding.

The Soviet aim may well be the de-coupling of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent from the defence of Western Europe together with the creation of an overwhelming nuclear and conventional advantage against NATO Forces in Europe.

The problem of the theatre nuclear weapons is separate from the Euro-strategic balance, but is related to it. The overall balance in theatre nuclear capability, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is roughly equal to the number of warheads in their respective nuclear stockpiles, but in delivery systems the Warsaw Pact has a considerable advantage and the balance is tilting further in their favour. It is to be hoped that should the Senate not complete its discussion on SALT II this year that this will not delay a NATO decision on TNW which is due to take place in December. Indeed, it might be an advantage that the theatre nuclear decision be taken before the SALT ratification so as to make it clear that such a decision is in fact within the terms of the Treaty.

It must be borne in mind that the balance of conventional forces in Europe is continuing to shift against NATO and is now approximately 2.8:1 in armour, 2.2:1 in tactical aircraft, 2.7:1 in artillery, and 1.2:1 in men. Also that the Soviet Forces have been reorganised in recent years for offensive rather than defensive operations and are fully capable of repeating Hitler's Blitzkrieg.

EAST-WEST BALANCE

It is now obvious that the balance is tilting against the West both in the nuclear and in the conventional fields.

It must, however, be borne in mind that the leaders of the U.S.S.R. may hope to take over Asia, Africa and South Africa and South America, followed by Europe, without running the risk of a nuclear or even a conventional war.

The key to the industrialised West lies in supplies of energy and raw materials. Should the U.S.S.R. secure the dominating influence over the Gulf or over Southern Africa she will control directly, or indirectly, the West's major supplies of oil and key minerals (platinum, chrome, managanese, gold, vanadium, fluospar, asbestos, uranium, titanium, industrial diamonds etc).

Her growing influence in the Third World and in the countries of the Middle East and Africa could enable her to cut off Western supplies at the source or on passage, or, in the case of Southern Africa, to create so much chaos that minerals could not be exported. Industrial Europe, starved of raw materials or energy could then be faced with capitulation or resorting to nuclear war.

The writing is on the wall—in the 1930s the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the U.S.S.R. In the 1970s Afghanistan, Iran, the Horn of Africa, Aden—and then who knows, Kuwait? Saudi Arabia? Turkey? In southern Africa, Angola, Mozambique, followed by Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia and finally South Africa. Thus, the USA could become isolated in a hostile world.

This is, of course, an extreme concept but the fact remains that countries friendly to the West are being rapidly reduced in numbers and the West takes no action. Western influence, quite recently supreme in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, is disappearing and with it the freedom for which we fought two World Wars.
Surely détente means something quite different in the West than in the U.S.S.R. Does SALT also have different connotations? If so, there is little hope for SALT III or, from our concept, of détente.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Wall. Mr. Corterier, would you like to proceed next, please?

STATEMENT OF PETER CORTERIER, MEMBER OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG (SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY); AND GENERAL RAPPORTEUR, POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. Corterier. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to say, Mr. Chairman, how satisfied we all are that your committee as well as the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate take so much of an interest in the impact that SALT II is having in Europe and what it means for the allies and that you also are prepared to look into what should be the next steps after SALT II; namely, the problem of what should be done to overcome the gap that seems to have been formed over the past few years by the Soviet buildup in long-range theater nuclear systems.

GERMAN POSITION ON TNF

One of the reasons why there is such strong support for ratification of the SALT II Treaty not only in Germany, but all over Western Europe, too, is that we see SALT II as a necessary stepping stone as a prerequisite to get into SALT III, where, of course, we hope that some of the problems that are of particular interest to us in Europe can be dealt with.

I have already dealt with this problem of TNF modernization or of the gap that we have right now in this TNF area, and I would like to explain a little bit what the German position on that matter is. We have had quite a bit of debate on this question in Germany this year, but I think that more and more of a consensus is going to emerge on this issue. I think there is general agreement that we have a gap in this area and that we cannot live with that gap indefinitely. And that has been stated again by the Federal Government in its white paper on defense that came out last week.

The question is, of course, what should be done to overcome this gap? And we believe in a parallel approach, as has already been stated by our chairman, Mr. Thyness. We feel that there should be a position on how to modernize our weapons in that area and on the necessary deployment of these weapons, but that at the same time we should have an arms control offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate on these systems.

I would like to add a little bit on the question of Germany not being prepared to deploy these weapons alone on the continent because I think it is important that our American friends understand our attitude on this point, which I think is very important.

We have several reasons why we ask that other allies should participate in deployment. One of the reasons is that Germany is, of course, the country that I think is most exposed in Europe with all of
the problems that it has with Berlin, with the division of Germany, with the problem of the ethnic Germans that we want to bring out of Eastern Europe and so on and so forth.

We have a high stake in détente. Therefore, we believe it would be unfair to single out Germany among the European allies for deployment and to let Germany bear the brunt of a wild campaign that is certainly going to be started by the Soviet Union when NATO comes to a position on deployment and to deployment itself.

We already see the beginning of that if we read the Soviet press and if we hear some of the things that they have to say on this matter. In addition to that, we believe it would be extremely dangerous for the cohesion of the alliance if such an important decision—and I think it is one of the most important decisions NATO has had to make in many years—would be made by just a few countries and others would not participate in it.

I think we would run the risk, in doing so, of getting a split in NATO, of creating almost a second-class status for some of the NATO members in Europe. And I think this would be an extremely dangerous development.

Another argument I would like to put before you, and that may not be as well understood in the United States, perhaps, as it is in Europe, is that we still have to reckon with the fact that many of our neighbors, not only in the East but also in the West, cannot forget about the German role in history, cannot forget about the Second and the First World Wars.

And there is concern in some of these countries that Germany should become too strong, that it should emerge almost as a leader of Europe, and that it should have a role that would be much more important than that of any other country in Western Europe. Of course, this fear would be compounded, I think, if the impression would be created that we would be the only ones who, in conjunction with the United States, would have these new nuclear weapons.

**EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN TNF**

I think if we take all these arguments together, we have a strong case for having a common decision on this question of TNF modernization and of not letting any European NATO countries not participate in that decision. And I think there is also a strong case for having deployment not in all Western European countries—there are some countries like Norway, of course, that have always had a very special policy on nuclear weapons—but I think in most Western European countries we should have deployment.

We hope that it will be possible to make this decision soon, if not in December, which probably would be the best, then early the next year, mainly because we want to get to the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union as quickly as possible and right after the ratification of SALT II.

But we feel it is important to have the TNF modernization decision at the same time as the arms control offer to the Soviet Union because that is the only way to make this arms control offer credible. If the Soviets don't realize that the Alliance is prepared to do what is necess-
ary to redress the balance, if the Soviets don’t realize that the Alliance is united on this issue, I don’t think they would be prepared to seriously negotiate with us.

So, in concluding, Mr. Chairman, we hope that it will be possible to ratify SALT II speedily, despite the problems that have emerged lately, and that after that we will move into these positions inside NATO and, after that, into a next phase of negotiations with the other side in SALT III.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Corterier’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER CORTERIER, MEMBER OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG (SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY); AND GENERAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

No doubt the West is entering a period in which new defense concerns will arise even after ratification of the SALT II Treaty, but the difficulties and problems of Western defense would be immeasurably greater without a SALT II agreement. Without a SALT II agreement the Soviet Union could deploy numerous strategic systems which would constitute a far greater threat to the West. The SALT II Treaty provides greater predictability and transparency of strategic developments and accordingly facilitates arms planning.

The successful conclusion of SALT II will help to:

- Safeguard the West’s capability to preserve a stable balance;
- Provide a sound basis in terms of armaments and arms control policy for a strategy of military balance;
- Create the prerequisites for progress at the MBFR talks and the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid;
- Make it possible to limit nuclear weapons in Europe, especially medium-range weapons systems;
- Create the prerequisites for further arms control and disarmament negotiations, for example with regard to a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests or a ban on killer satellites, radiation weapons and chemical weapons;
- Insure the continuation and the successful conclusion of talks on the limitation of conventional arms exports.

The successful conclusion of SALT II, then, opens up hopeful new prospects for the future of détente in all its aspects. At the same time, it also carries great implications for the security of Europe and the security of the Alliance, particularly in the way it points to SALT III.

Considering the rapid Soviet arms build-up during the last 10 years, it will not be easy during the SALT III negotiations to incorporate into a treaty the principles contained in the Joint Statement of Principles for subsequent negotiations. From the European viewpoint, the main problems will be those resulting from the existing situation in the field of nuclear medium-range weapons. They will certainly not be the sole subject of the negotiations, but the disparities existing in this field, made especially acute by the deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber, will make this subject particularly important in the SALT III negotiations. The aim of these talks must be to ensure an overall strategic balance and to preserve the strategic unity within the Alliance. But parity at all levels cannot be our objective, because that would not be conducive to the strategic unity of the Alliance, but would, in fact, be counterproductive.

We Europeans have an interest in the nuclear weapons systems threatening Europe also being limited in the SALT III negotiations. The arms race must not be shifted to Europe. All the issues of middle range nuclear weapons which are a subject of the SALT III negotiations are currently being discussed within the Alliance, both from the aspect of defense policy (in the High-Level-Group) and from the aspect of arms control policy (in the Special Group). The intention is to elaborate within the Alliance a concept for SALT III aiming at a stable nuclear balance of power and at closing any gaps in our deterrent capability in Europe.

Where this can be achieved with arms control arrangements, this should take priority over the introduction of new weapons systems. This depends on whether or not the Soviet Union is prepared to effect corresponding limitations or reductions of its own medium-range nuclear weapons. This issue must be discussed with the Soviet Union.
On 4 July of this year Federal Chancellor Schmidt said before the German Bundestag:

That the Western Alliance must undertake all measures necessary to preserve its security. The extent to which we can restrict the scale of concrete measures aimed at adjusting to the continuous armament effort within the Warsaw Pact will depend on the degree of success in achieving an effective limitation of continental strategic systems in the East and West through arms control negotiations, for instance in SALT III.

This quote makes it very clear that we in Europe must also attempt to make progress in arms control negotiations. In other words, when the Atlantic Alliance takes a decision on the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Europe, it must remain clear that this decision in its implementation will also depend on progress or non-progress in the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic of Germany is not a nuclear weapons State. Therefore, it must not create the impression of striving to participate in deciding on the production of nuclear weapons. Such a decision must remain the responsibility of the United States. We continue to set store by not being forced into any special role within the Alliance. The forthcoming decisions must be taken by the Alliance as a whole. The coherence of the Alliance is also a decisive factor determining the success of arms control negotiations. On the basis of the Harmel Report a broad consensus on détente policies developed within the Alliance over the last ten years. This consensus must now be extended with intensified efforts to all fields of arms control policy and be brought to bear at the SALT III negotiations. Our joint objective must be to curb the increase of Soviet systems in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles and reduce the disparities in the Euro-strategic field. In this connection, a limitation of the existing modern Soviet systems—SS–20 and Backfire—could be useful as an initial concrete objective. However, we should not attempt to deploy an equal capability in Europe specifically against the SS–20 because in the final analysis we can counter the resultant threat only with the entire range of systems available for deterrence, including American strategic arms. Technological developments on the substrategic level have rendered the differentiation between strategic weapons of intercontinental and of continental range useless, and even politically dangerous. Security within the Alliance is indivisible. It should not be measured on the issue whether a weapons system has a range of more than 5000 kilometers or not. There is only one security in the Alliance and this covers the territory of all alliance states. There should not be any zones of a different security. For the same reason, there can be no isolated TNF arms control in Europe. Rather, when adopting a joint strategy to curb the escalation of arms and when reaching arms control agreements, the link with the overall strategic balance of power must be preserved. The chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Herr Herbert Wehner, formulated the objective of our efforts as follows:

Of course we must not simply trivialize or accept any gap in the system of deterrence which might lead to a miscalculation by the other side. The deterrent must continue to make it impossible to wage war. That involves our reacting to challenges and taking the necessary decisions jointly. At the same time, we must ensure that all—I repeat: all—possible forms of arms control are used to prevent armament and counterarmament resulting in a new arms race. After all we are already in the midst of such an arms race, and we should try to do everything within our power to stop it from assuming immeasurable dimensions.

In other words, we must render unto the Alliance all that it requires to remain capable of defence, which is our defence too; that is perhaps the soundest basis for peace and for our objective of consolidating peace through détente. For us, for our policies, and for the fate of our people there can be nothing more important than to undertake all efforts to preserve and safeguard peace, which again means that together with our Allies we should take advantage of every opportunity for further agreements on détente.

We must therefore undertake a two-fold interactive effort, that of harmonizing our defence efforts with the requirements of arms control. The SALT III negotiations on nuclear medium-range weapons represent a very complex problem. They will doubtless require closer consultations than has been the case until now with SALT II. In the case of SALT II, the Allies were consulted adequately and comprehensively, but for SALT III two parallel efforts are nevertheless necessary here to:

(a) make possible further reductions of the strategic intercontinental capability of the United States and the Soviet Union, and
(b) reduce disparities in the field of continental nuclear weapons in Europe. It is to be welcomed that in the future there will be no more unilateral U.S. arms limitations in the TNF field, as there are in the present Protocol. The statement which was delivered on behalf of the U.S. Government at the session of the NATO Council on 29 June in connection with the statement of intent of the SALT II Treaty and which Secretary of State Vance quoted at the hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 10 July, represents a step in this direction and guarantees strict reciprocity in the future limitation of noncentral systems.

The Alliance will also have to adapt organizationally and technically to the political and military requirements arising in this context. The experience gained so far with the High-Level Group and the Special Group is most positive. The importance of the political, military and strategic issues arising in connection with SALT III justifies new organizational and technical efforts. SALT III negotiations will affect matters relating to European security to a far greater extent than SALT II did. They will continue to be basically bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the consultations will naturally have to be much more intensive than has been necessary until now. The consultations will have to include the elaboration of negotiating positions. We need suitable arrangements for the Allies to be able to have a say in the negotiations, which is not the same as participating in them. A new institution along the lines of the Special Group might be a solution to this problem.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, sir.

Mr. de Vries.

STATEMENT OF KLAAS DE VRIES, MEMBER OF THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT (LABOUR PARTY); AND GENERAL RAPPORTEUR, MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. de Vries. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great honor for me to be here today to offer some views on issues of central importance to Europe, the Alliance and your own country.

EUROPEAN POSITION ON SALT

In my prepared statement you will find extensive reasoning on the attitudes of the Allies toward SALT. I will be very brief commenting on that at this very moment. I think Mr. Thyness has described adequately what the position of the Europeans is.

Europe favors SALT and favors ratification of SALT. I hope that your colleagues in the Senate will be able to reach a decision on ratification pretty soon. I would like to comment in this context on the issue of linkage, which is, of course, at the moment very much in everyone's mind.

I think that if one thinks about linkage, applying linkage, three things should be kept in mind. One thing is that the Alliance, and especially the leading power in the Alliance has to clearly distinguish between what its vital interests are and what its nonvital interests are.

There are different levels and different means to cope with issues rising at those different levels. The other thing that we have to keep in mind is that if we apply linkage generally in our policies, we will probably add more complexity to decision making in our own countries.

We will overburden our democracies and overburden our bureaucracies with the complexity that is almost impossible to handle, and I think that might provide a very effective blockage for decisionmaking that we are all in need of.
SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

Third, I would think that if we apply linkage, especially in connection with Soviet troops in Cuba, that we would have to look at what the results of that linkage would be for things that are linked to SALT II ratification. I think that nonratification of SALT or the prolongation of the discussions in the Senate, the postponement of decision-making on this issue will have an effect on a great many issues.

It will have an effect on the security discussions in Europe, and it will probably have an influence also on one issue that is very dominant in the minds of European governments and the American Government as well, which is theater nuclear modernization.

TNF AND ARMS CONTROL

I think that Mr. Coterier was absolutely correct in describing that most European countries are very much interested in developing a parallel track in the course of TNF modernization to make decisions on the arms component of the issue, at least parallel with serious arms control.

As I mentioned, I think it would be very difficult to define what the arms control position would look like if you don’t know what the status of SALT II will be.

Mr. Thyness suggested that a question people have to ask themselves on TNF is, do we have, really, to worry about the Soviet buildup in this area? I don’t really think that that is the question we are dealing with. What we want to deal with is, how do we prevent a new arms race in this area? How do we constrain specifically the Soviets from just continuing their buildup? And what are the means we have to talk reason into this process also, which is not very simple because the whole problem of theater nuclear modernization is a very complex problem.

ROLE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE

Chairman Zablocki was at the seminar in Brussels and we all appreciated that. He has seen what difficult discussion this causes, one of the most difficult being what has the role of theater nuclear forces been so far in Europe.

Henry Kissinger, in his much-discussed speech during that conference, has pointed out that there has been no concept, really, no clear concept. No one was really clear on the doctrinal aspects of theater nuclear forces in Europe. And that has led to a conglomerate of arsenal which has proved to be impractical and probably almost suicidal.

So there is a problem. And, of course, we are trying in the intellectual communities and defense establishment to determine what we need for the future. But that is really the kind of complexity that I don't think public opinion, at least in my country—and I would like to say a few words about that if you allow me—is prepared to tackle at the moment.

I think that the position of public opinion, the attitude of public opinion, in my country is most adequately described by saying that
the gap that people perceive or think that the Russians might perceive is not the gap that public opinion in my country perceives.

What my people are mostly concerned about is the number of nuclear weapons that we have already, the stockpile of 7,000 to 9,000 weapons. And the question that is very much on their minds is, do we really need to add weapons to that in order to come to a better force posture in Europe and to take away possibilities of nuclear blackmail or take away risks of failing deterrence?

So I think that a lot of discussions have to be dealt with in the context of this issue which do not really try to address only the SS-20 threat and the Backfire threat, which are very real, which pose very real worries, but we will have to address this issue in a larger context and clarify the concepts of the role of theater nuclear weapons in general.

The position of my Government has been so far that it is awaiting the results of the groups established in the NATO context, the High Level Group and the Special Group, and the Government is not prepared to take a stand on that. I think for a parliamentarian who has to judge what his government's decisions will be, it would be very hard for me to be specific on what my ideas are.

Could I just footnote one remark made by Patrick Wall? Patrick and I have had a longstanding dispute on the engagement of NATO in areas beyond NATO's formal boundaries. My feeling has always been that talking about southern Africa in terms of vital minerals and talking about the Middle East in terms of oil and talking about Turkey in terms of Turkey as a means of preventing the Russians from going to the Persian Gulf, is not going to be very effective in our policymaking.

NATO: A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE

The main problem that NATO poses, and Chairman Zablocki witnessed the discussion we had in the group we had in Brussels, is that NATO is a defensive alliance which, for that reason, has probably chosen the lowest common denominator of common interest of the countries as a whole. And I think if we go below that level and start talking about coordinating our foreign policies, we will run into tremendous problems.

And, of course, the views of very many countries on southern Africa and on the Middle East have different angles and people have different perspectives on that, but I think it would be very difficult to get NATO involved in the Persian Gulf, in southern Africa, and I don't think anyone should really hope that would happen. It would just create tremendous difficulties.

What I think should happen is that we in the alliance should try to come together much more often and much closer on the discussions of foreign policies which we have to pursue. I think if we can find fora for that, we might be able to coordinate policies in order not be counterproductive in other areas that are of mutual concern to all of us.
May I just offer this for your consideration.

[Mr. de Vries’ prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KLAAS DE VRIES, MEMBER OF THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT (LABOUR PARTY); AND GENERAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. Chairman, in the course of the U.S. debate on the proposed SALT II Treaty, the question of European attitudes toward the Treaty has emerged as a pivotal issue. While Administration officials have forcefully characterised Allied support of ratification as unequivocal and broad-based, other witnesses have advanced a number of rationales which, if true, would significantly depreciate the value of official endorsements of SALT II by European governments. In brief, the Congress has been warned that it can draw little comfort from public expressions of European support; indeed that these declarations may even have been proffered under duress.

Let me begin by observing that there can be no disputing the fact that Europe has overwhelmingly declared its clear support for the Treaty. To be sure a few isolated, and not entirely unpredictable, objections have been heard. But they have been drowned in the flood tide of public European support for the Treaty. The North Atlantic Council, individual national governments, prestigious centres of security and foreign policy research, and leading newspapers have all gone on record endorsing Treaty ratification.

Thus, it seems astonishing to have to respond to the suggestion that, at worst, we do not really mean what we say, or, at best, that what we have said should be discounted.

To suggest the European governments would knowingly and deliberately prevaricate on an issue of such signal importance as strategic arms limitation is tantamount to declaring that there is no basis for trust in relations between the proud nations of the Atlantic Alliance. SALT is not a partisan issue in Europe. Indeed, support for SALT may be one of the few issues in 1979 on which European leaders—Conservative, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and others—find themselves in basic agreement.

The theory that there is a disparity between official and private European views usually relies on one or the other of two lines of argument:

One, that the Administration has “arm-twisted” European governments into expressing support in order to save the prestige of the Presidency; and

Two, that public sentiment in favour of detente and arms control runs so strongly in Europe that no public figure can prudently speak out in favour of vigilance and defence.

Lest these theories gain credence through unfurled repetition, I feel that I must challenge each of them in turn. First, I cannot accept the suggestion that the Administration has pressured European governments into endorsing SALT II against their will. Of course Europe recognises the importance to Alliance cohesion of a strong American Presidency. But this should not suggest that Europe would support SALT II against its better judgement for the sake of helping a particular President’s standing in public opinion polls. Europe is vitally interested in American leadership. It is not interested in helping to create the illusion of American leadership.

Second, the claim that pro-disarmament euphoria is so rampant on the European continent that no one can prudently speak out for military preparedness simply cannot be reconciled with the facts. The NATO Allies have agreed to a 3 percent increase in defence spending and committed themselves to the Long Term Defence Programme. The French Government has just announced a 15 percent increase in its defence budget. The United Kingdom Government has declared that it intends to undertake greater defence expenditures. NATO has held to a firm position in the MBFR talks and has just bought the expensive AWACS programme. NATO countries are re-equipping their forces with F-16s, Tornado aircraft, and Leopard tanks.
Why did NATO insist on preserving technology transfer and cruise missile deployment options under SALT II? Some SALT critics would have us believe it both ways: that Europe publicly supports the Treaty out of a lack of will to stand up to the Soviets, yet privately opposes the agreement because it allegedly denies them the hardware needed to stand up to the Soviets. You cannot have it both ways.

Let me turn now to the line of argument that approval of the terms of the Treaty themselves is not a primary factor accounting for European support, in other words, that European disappointment with the terms of the Treaty yielded to a higher priority: European interest in preserving progress toward detente.

I wonder if anyone—European or American or Soviet—can actually declare himself totally satisfied with the terms of the Treaty? Even the Administration acknowledges that it is disappointed with the height of the ceilings and the degree of strategic force modernisation permitted both Parties under the accord. By definition this negotiation required some compromises to be made on both sides or else there would have been no agreement. Disappointment over certain negotiating outcomes cannot stand in isolation from other considerations and be allowed to constitute a basis for rejecting the Treaty.

The question is not whether Europe approves 100 percent with the provisions of the agreement. The question is whether these provisions on balance are acceptable and whether this Treaty, now laid on the table for rejection or acceptance, is better than no Treaty or a reopened negotiation. And in making that assessment obviously judgements about the provisions of SALT II must be weighed along with other considerations, including the value of SALT II as one step in the long-term process of SALT and within the overall framework of detente.

Of course European support of SALT II reflects a desire to promote a lessening of East-West tensions and a certain anxiety that rejection of the Treaty might occasion a new Cold War. No one denies this. But what is not to be accepted is the view that Europe’s interest in detente is so pre-eminent that we are blinded from the recognition that arms, vigilance, and the will to defend ourselves are still required in this, the 30th year of the Alliance. Maintaining military security while simultaneously pursuing detente have long been the twin pillars of Alliance strategy. They have not suddenly become mutually exclusive in 1979.

This leads me to a second point. Europeans are intimately familiar with the terms of the Treaty. The degree of co-ordination and consultation has been extraordinary and unprecedented. SALT II is not something that has suddenly been thrust upon the Europeans for approval or disapproval. It is an agreement that was methodically worked out under three American administrations in concert with the European Allies. Europe had every opportunity to express reservations about provisions considered during the course of formulating negotiating positions, and in those cases where Europe did insist on measures to protect certain interests more stringently—for example, on technology transfer—the United States accommodated European recommendations. Ambassador Earl’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee underscores the unprecedented degree of consultation and co-ordination within the Alliance on SALT II. The much appreciated and publicly applauded effort of three successive Administrations to inform and consult its Allies has found its deserved reward in that all European Allies became intimately familiar with the Treaty and were able to support its final version.

Turning now from the subject of European attitudes generally, I would like to put forward some personal views on the merits of this Treaty. In explaining the basis for my strong support of SALT II, I want to touch on four main themes: (1) SALT II and the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent, (2) SALT II and European defence options, (3) European interests in SALT III, and (4) SALT as an element in a broader framework of East-West relations.

**SALT II AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERREN**

The question of whether SALT II entails negative implications for the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent has centered on the fact that the Soviet Union, is allowed to maintain 308 heavy missiles (SS9s now being replaced by SS18s) while the United States is permitted none. It is argued that this permanent advantage in throw-weight when married to the inevitable improvements in accuracy will give the Soviet Union a convincing first strike capability, that is, Soviet leaders will have a high confidence possibility of taking out 90 percent of United States land-based missiles with only a small proportion of their own land-
based systems. With only the bomber and submarine proportion of the United States deterrent force remaining, a United States President would allegedly be deterred from retaliatory action. The critics do not actually believe that such a scenario will take place but rather that the perception of superiority that this situation will create will be manipulated by Soviet leaders to obtain their political objectives. This superiority will, it is alleged, be used for nuclear blackmail. The critics argue that under this situation nuclear weapons retain considerable political utility.

It is my belief that this strategic superiority argument is based on a highly selective and inadequate interpretation of weapons criteria. The current asymmetry in United States and Soviet force levels is the result of differences in force structure and military planning. The United States has developed smaller, more accurate missiles, while the Soviet Union has, largely because of technological restraints, developed larger missiles with heavier throw-weights. It must be noted that throw-weight is only one of a number of criteria that can be used to measure strategic power. Accuracy is far more important in terms of destructive capability since very large warheads tend to be less efficient than smaller warheads. In terms of accuracy and the numbers of warheads, the United States has a decided lead over the Soviet Union.

It is therefore unreasonable and distortive to single out one element of the strategic picture in order to prove a picture of United States inferiority. Asymmetries in one area should be measured against advantages in others. In the composition of the two strategic arsenals is very different. The Soviet Union has placed a very heavy emphasis on its land-based forces. It has relatively small bomber forces (none on permanent alert as with Strategic Air Command) and while it has a large number of submarines, only 15 percent of these are on station at any one time. The United States on the other hand has fewer than 25 percent of its warheads in Minuteman silos, and by the 1980s with the deployment of Trident and the cruise missile this proportion will be even lower. It has a formidable bomber force and proportion of which will shortly be equipped with air-launched cruise missiles and a substantial force of Poseidon/Polaris submarines, 60 percent of which are permanently on station. It is estimated, for example, that owing to higher alert rates and multiple warhead advantages, approximately 2,446 United States as against 140 Soviet SLBM warheads are at sea. As these characteristics indicate, a direct comparison of the effectiveness of either strategic force is to say the least complex. It is for this reason that the term "essential equivalence" has come to describe the current balance.

With regard to the specific disparity in heavy missiles it is necessary to ask whether given the opportunity the United States would seek to construct an equivalent number of heavy missiles. The answer would be certainly negative because it has no need of them.

Finally, the question of Minuteman vulnerability: the suggestion that the Soviet Union will in the 1980s have the capacity to destroy United States land-based forces may be mathematically provable but such action would depend on so many uncertain variables as to be beyond rational comprehension. Such variables include human error, equipment failures, the effect of atmospheric turbulence caused by the first explosion on incoming warheads, and also the "fratricidal" effect on these warheads. In addition to these uncertainties, a Soviet leader would have to gamble that a United States President would not launch his ICBMs as soon as he knew Soviet missiles had been dispatched, and that he would not retaliate with his remaining force of submarines and bombers. Such risks may seem reasonable in the artificial vacuum of theoretical strategic planning and force exchange calculations but they have little to do with the choices that face political leaders in the real world. If the vulnerability argument is without military logic then the political advantage that is said to accrue from it is likewise without foundation.

It is therefore unfortunate that when based on so many questionable assumptions the concept of Minuteman vulnerability has been allowed to become an established truth, almost an article of faith on which critics of the SALT process base their arguments. The effect of their criticisms could be to weaken our self-confidence, create doubts in the minds of friends and neutrals, and suggest to Soviet leaders possibilities that do not actually exist. Thus, the final result of their arguments is to undermine deterrence. The eventual theoretical vulnerability of fixed land-based systems was inevitable once MIRV'd warheads entered the strategic arsenals, and had nothing to do with the SALT process. In the words of Secretary of Defence Brown, "Minuteman vulnerability was not a problem created by SALT, nor is it a problem we can solve with a SALT agreement."
we would have the same problem without such an agreement, only in that case we would have other problems as well". It is not a question of establishing that a number of fixed points can in theory be hit by a certain number of missiles, but of deciding whether in the realm of practical politics this paper certainly would translate into a tangible political advantage.

If the United States Administration is concerned that this is a weakness that should be fixed then it has the MX mobile missile under development. Currently, the Administration is studying the basing problem in order to establish a mode that will give the necessary mobility and yet be verifiable under a future arms control agreement. However, it should be noted that in discussing the vulnerability of land-based systems the Soviet Union has far more to fear than the United States. She places a far greater reliance on her land-based missiles than the United States and does not possess an equivalent Triad of forces.

**SALT II and European Defence Options**

It has been argued that while the Treaty places no limits on Soviet theatre systems such as the SS20 and Buckfire bomber, thus allowing the Soviet Union a substantial advantage in the theatre field, it imposes limitations on the development of ground and sea launched cruise missiles which could be used to offset this advantage. Thus, some analysts have worried that, over time, many Europeans might conclude that the United States—in order to reach an agreement—has mortgaged systems that are most likely to serve Western, rather than American, interests.

While acknowledging that the restrictions on GLCMs and SLCMs are for the duration of the protocol and therefore officially temporary, nevertheless critics assert that under a SALT III climate these limitations will be extended. Some have suggested that it is hopelessly naive to believe the West will be able to turn back the clock on 'temporary' arms limitations and plunge ahead with new and previously banned weapons as though they had never been prohibited.

The Allies' access to cruise missile technology is also linked to the provision in the Treaty which bars circumvention of the Treaty provisions through third countries. Critics believe that the wording of this provision is so vague that the United States will be able to use it to prevent the United States sharing certain crucial military technologies with its Allies.

The argument that SALT excludes Soviet medium range systems represents a curious approach since it was the firm position of the United States, with complete Alliance support and approval, to keep forward based systems and medium range theatre systems out of the negotiations. Thus having successfully resisted Soviet pressure to include these systems it is slightly distortive to complain that SALT II will fail to constrain them. Moreover, it should be noted that the Alliance has exactly the same freedom as the Soviets to augment its theatre systems if it sees the need.

On the question of the restrictions on cruise missiles contained in the Protocol, the Administration has made it clear that the availability of options for theatre nuclear forces is unaffected by the Protocol. Specifically, testing of ground and sea launched missiles can go forward to unlimited ranges. The prohibition against deployment of ground and sea launchers of cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km will expire well before such systems could in fact be deployed. Thus the decision on the utilisation of cruise missiles within NATO will be decided through consultation within the Alliance, most likely at the Ministerial meetings in December. Administration officials stress that the Protocol was a compromise to settle a bargaining impasse and to leave time for more definitive negotiation while not imposing, in the meantime, any practical limits on the United States or NATO. They stress that the Soviets have indicated that they recognise that the Protocol will expire according to its terms.

Concerning the issue of non-circumvention, it is evident that the Soviet Union pressed hard for a very restrictive ban on transfers of technology and equipment covered in any way by the agreement. The United States however did not agree to such a clause. The non-circumvention clause is therefore very general and does not more than state an obligation which the United States would be under in any event. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Administration officials have affirmed in the most explicit language that the non-circumvention clause will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with America's allies, nor will it preclude co-operation in modernisation or continued nuclear or conventional co-operation with the Allies.
I will not comment at length here on the relationship between strategic and theatre forces except to emphasise that while the Protocol has ensured that a number of options remain open to the Alliance, close consultation will be necessary to decide whether these options are actually needed, under what circumstances and how they will fit into future arms control negotiations. In particular, it will be necessary to consider whether a decision to deploy these new options in Europe and thus provide Europe with a more substantial regional capability could be interpreted as a serious step to loosening the United States strategic commitment.

EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN SALT III

It is already accepted that once SALT II is signed the United States and the Soviet Union will proceed with negotiations on further limitations on strategic arms. SALT II includes a statement of principles and guidelines concerning a SALT III negotiation. While the United States originally wanted the statement of principles to set fairly explicit and ambitious targets regarding further reductions and modernisation restraints, it accepted the Soviet position of a fairly generalised statement. The Soviet Union is expected in SALT III to argue again that United States and Allied theatre nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union must be taken into account in arriving at new ceilings.

It has always been difficult to restrict the negotiations to strictly bilateral issues since from the earliest days the Soviet Union raised the issue of the French and British nuclear forces and of American nuclear-capable aircraft stationed in Europe and capable of striking Soviet territory. Now, with the development of the strategic cruise missile, the controversy over the Backfire bomber and the emergence of the SS20, attention has been focused on a number of systems whose characteristics defy precise definition and which will complicate any further negotiations.

Since these "grey area" or theatre systems have particular significance for Europe, it is evident that European interests must in some way be represented. However, several complex issues remain to be settled: namely, what sort of negotiating forum would be set for what particular weapons and for which particular participants?

The most realistic formula of the various proposals that have been circulated would be a continuation of the bilateral dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union with consideration of those theatre systems under United States or Soviet control. It is difficult to see any multilateral negotiation making much progress and several countries are opposed to dealing with theatre systems in isolation from strategic systems. Furthermore, the French have refused to participate in any negotiations on their nuclear forces and while the United Kingdom has not made its position clear its willingness to see restraints placed on its strategic force is doubtful. This would inevitably mean that the Soviet Union will ask to be given compensation for the French and British nuclear forces. It will also mean continuing the present system of Alliance consultation as a means of securing European involvement. However, it may be possible to secure more permanent involvement through a new institutional mechanism. Whatever the mechanism, it must be made clear that Alliance participation means all members or at least those who participate in the basing or ownership of nuclear weapons.

As long as a satisfactory consultation mechanism could be established a continuation of the bilateral approach would certainly be the most likely to achieve progress. This approach would have the advantage of maintaining the essential continuity of nuclear systems and counteracting the tendency to try to separate the theatre and strategic levels. It would also facilitate matching constraints as, for example, United States constraint on the ground launched cruise missile in return for Soviet restraint on the SS–20.

SALT II AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Some critics have suggested that United States conduct in the SALT negotiations should have been linked to Soviet behaviour in other areas, in other words, a SALT agreement would have been conditional upon Soviet actions in areas such as developing countries, human rights, etc.

It is clear that SALT is one component of many that constitute the East-West relationship, and as an effort to establish understanding and a mutually acceptable framework in nuclear armaments it is clearly an important component. SALT therefore forms part of overall United States defence and foreign policy and just
as it is influenced by developments in other areas so it will itself contribute to the general climate of East-West relations. Thus while SALT cannot be separated by developments in other areas it cannot be made responsible for them and cannot be used as a mechanism to influence them. It would have been wrong for the United States to have made concessions in SALT II in order to influence Soviet actions and it would have been wrong to have suspended SALT II in order to punish the Soviet Union. Above all, it must be stressed that SALT II is of substantial interest to both sides and must be judged on the basis of its own merits.

CONCLUSION

While re-emphasising my support for the Treaty, I wish to endorse the criticism voiced by several observers that not only are the levels too high but that the Treaty does too little in checking the momentum of armaments development. As has been pointed out by opponents and supporters of the Treaty alike, the Treaty does nothing to constrain the development of planned United States strategic systems, including the MX, Trident and submarine missile, and cruise missiles, as well as new generations of Soviet strategic systems. I join those who urge that the next round of negotiations seriously tackle the unnecessarily high levels and potentially destabilising qualitative developments.

Despite this criticism, I support the current Treaty because it is an essential element of the East-West relationship and because it establishes a framework of mutual understanding and confidence which will permit the eventual acceptance of lower levels of forces. The Treaty provides a number of important steps in this direction:

- It reinforces the perception and reality of balance by establishing equal levels of intercontinental nuclear delivery systems.

- It will limit Soviet MIRVd ICBMs, the most threatening part of their force, to 820.

- It will prevent increases in the maximum number of warheads deployed in ICBMs, thus limiting Soviet ability to exploit their throw-weight advantages.

- It will channel Soviet activity into certain areas and thus simplify United States planning, and it will constrain the deployment of Soviet strategic nuclear forces well below the levels which could be deployed in the absence of an agreement.

I believe that the SALT II Treaty will make a positive contribution to the future security of the Alliance. Failure to ratify this agreement would represent a reversal in the efforts to secure a more stable relationship between East and West. The SALT process has provided an important framework for the communication and exchange of information necessary for the building of mutual confidence. Such confidence is a prerequisite if stability is to be assured.

One great American once said that your country would never negotiate out of fear and never fear to negotiate. Successive administrations have conducted the SALT negotiations in this spirit. I sincerely believe that the Treaty that is now before the United States Senate serves the security interest of the nations and peoples of our Alliance. At the same time, this Treaty is a true expression of Western determination to contribute to restraining weapons systems, that, if used, could destroy civilisation itself.

Chairman Zablocki. Again, I want to thank you gentlemen for coming.

Mr. de Vries has referred to the NATO conference. NATO in the 1980's was discussed in Brussels in the last week of August. It was, I think, very productive. However, we did not come to any conclusions. We normally do not at those type of conferences, but I do believe it did give us an opportunity to air our views and try to resolve our differences and try to coordinate our future efforts.

ROLE OF NATO COUNTRIES IN SALT

This brings me to the underlying thought I believe all four of you have touched upon, and that is the role that European countries, particularly NATO alliance countries, have played or should play in
future negotiations on SALT, particularly SALT III, which is of the greatest concern to European nations.

True, not everyone is satisfied, certainly I am not, with SALT II to the point that we could say there are no problems and that it is the most perfectly negotiated treaty. Nevertheless, it does set ceilings and it has demonstrated progress, and we hope that SALT III will follow, the negotiations and preparations for which are already under way.

Some have questioned whether there was consultation. Mr. de Vries in his prepared statement says “Europeans are intimately familiar with the terms of the treaty.” I might say probably more so than some of the Americans.

Mr. de Vries. I didn’t suggest that at all, sir. [Laughter.]

Chairman Zablocki. No, you didn’t say that. That is my aside that I am adding. You also said: “And the degree of coordination and consultation has been extraordinary and unprecedented.”

U.S. CONSULTATION WITH NATO ON SALT

On the other hand, Mr. Corterier has said that in the future, consultation should have to include the elaboration of negotiating positions. By that do you imply, perhaps, that there has not been a sufficient amount of consultation during the process of negotiation?

Could you advise us, and the others as well, as to how this can be corrected? You do mention the special group. Have you any other ideas to what extent—since I might say we as Members of Congress are not always consulted by our executive branch as to the process of the negotiations.

I do hope that our European allies will be fully informed as the process continues. I am sure you will all agree that the two major powers cannot resolve the problems that European nations will face or the world will face in disarmament.

Mr. Corterier. Mr. Chairman, I didn’t want to suggest that there wasn’t adequate consultation during SALT II. Maybe at the beginning it wasn’t as good as it could have been, but I think both sides had to learn. When SALT II started, I think there was a great lack of information on the part of the Europeans. They hadn’t had a chance to study the issue enough. So I think in the consultations at the beginning they didn’t come up with very much in terms of views and suggestions for the negotiations.

But as I see it, this improved during the negotiations. And later on, of course, the Europeans were able to influence the Americans to a considerable extent, namely in what concerns the protocol and article XII of the treaty, where, of course, the interests of the Europeans were strongly concerned.

But now in SALT III I think we have a different situation. I think you will have two major areas of negotiations there. One is the task to get more cuts in central strategic systems. And I think we all hope, of course, that they will be very deep.

Second, you have a second area where you will, hopefully, deal with the long-range theater systems in Europe. Now, as far as that second area is concerned, it is obvious that the European interests are concerned very, very strongly indeed, much more than they ever were in SALT II.
So I think in order to be able to negotiate in that area, the Americans will need very, very close consultation and cooperation with the Europeans, and something, I think, that goes beyond what we have had in SALT II. There, I think, it is really necessary to work out negotiating positions in common.

And I am only talking about the second area. I am not talking about the central system. I am talking about the second area where really European interests are at stake. I think we have to think of new machinery, and this special group, I think, may be a good example of what we should do if we could maintain that special group.

So far it is only the task to write up a report, and then it will be phased out again after the December NATO meeting. If we could maintain that and even expand it, I think it would be a good idea.

I was pleasantly surprised yesterday in our talks in the State Department that they seemed to think along the same lines.

Chairman Zablocki. I am sure that it is the intent of our government to work as closely as possible with our European allies.

SENATE RATIFICATION OF SALT

While my Codel was in Europe last month we attended the UNCSTD meeting in Vienna and visited Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia and then ended up in Brussels in the NATO conference.

The prime question of our European counterparts was what will be the outcome of SALT II in the Senate insofar as ratification? And that, of course, was prior to the revealing of the Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

It is definitely our Government's position that there is no linkage between SALT II and that situation in Cuba. They are separate issues.

On the other hand, there will be indirect consequences because some of the Senators who were not sure how they were going to vote are taking this particular issue in Cuba as an excuse for not voting for SALT.

And those who are opposed to SALT II and have already announced will be further fortified in their position in opposition. And yet we should remember as far as the Cuban military force is concerned that it has been there since 1962. Admittedly, however maybe the mission of their presence has changed, and that is our concern. If they are trainees, we didn't raise the issue in the missile crisis. We didn't raise the issue then and subsequently there was no agreement on personnel, just on equipment.

It may have been a shortcoming of the United States at that time that we did not include personnel. But I am confident, after this issue is resolved and I am sure both sides are going to try to find a way to do it, that SALT II will be ratified.

But I would have to amend my prognostication as to when it would be. It will not happen at the end of this year; or rather more likely early next year.

But again I want to reassure you gentlemen that there is no intentional linkage.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO

Mr. Chairman, I have just one further question. At both conferences, whether it involved a discussion of science and technology transfers or the future of NATO the security of Europe was a major issue and
there were questions as to the United States' commitment to NATO.

We tried to reassure our European friends that the credibility of Americans to make commitments is real and that there should be no question about it. Nevertheless, some did argue that there is a need for the United States to reassure NATO allies of the credibility of America's NATO commitments.

How do you gentlemen react to that?

Mr. THYNNESS. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to answer that in the first instance, I would say that I hear of this need for reassuring Europeans much more often on this side of the Atlantic than I do in Europe. [Laughter.]

Chairman ZABLOCKI. That is typical.

Mr. THYNNESS. Of course it is a vital question, but in my country it is very rarely asked. We are perfectly confident that the Americans take our alliance deadly seriously and that we can trust that they will live up to their commitments to us, as I hope we are going to live up to our commitments to the alliance, too.

So sometimes I am a little bit surprised by meeting this question on this side of the Atlantic. But as a Norwegian Member of Parliament who has been dabbling in foreign affairs for a long time, I would like to say that this, at least in Norway, is absolutely no question.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without identifying the countries, we visited nonaligned as well as allied countries during this trip, and we did receive such concern. I am very happy it is not in your country.

Mr. THYNNESS. It is such a central question, really, that I accept the fact that it is necessary from time to time to reiterate and repeat the obvious. That is part of the political game and we will never get away from that. But in Norway we do not feel any doubt about the Americans' intentions.

Mr. WALL. Could I repeat that, Mr. Chairman. As far as my country is concerned there are no doubts whatsoever and there never have been, if I may say so.

As a kind of sideline on this, I think two issues would help this. I mentioned them. As long as it is quite clear that your allies will receive the technology that is needed on new weapons systems and that there are weapons in Europe that can hit Russia if Russia hits us with the SS-20, I think that would be an added reassurance.

I don't think any reassurance is necessary, but if you get my meaning, it would help to confirm the reassurance.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. That is a very difficult problem to resolve.

Mr. WALL nods affirmatively.

Mr. CORTIERE. I agree with my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, that Europeans believe in the American guarantee, although if there should be too many Americans traveling to Europe and telling Europeans they shouldn't believe in that guarantee any more, I think that might hurt us in the long run. [Laughter.]

Therefore, I am not sure if Mr. Kissinger was very well advised to raise these doubts at this very moment and at a time when, as I have said before, these very important but also difficult decisions that NATO has got to make in December are being debated and discussed in Europe.

So I don't think we want that kind of debate right now. We should concentrate on the tasks that lie ahead, and I am confident that we will be able to solve them together.
Mr. de Vries. I totally agree with Dr. Corterier. What Dr. Kissinger did in Brussels was really not the message that we needed at that juncture. I have Dr. Kissinger's speech here, and what he said was "And therefore, I would say, which I might not say in office"—that is quite a curious distinction—"that European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean or, if we do mean, we should not want to execute." I mean that is a message that is really so contrary to everything that the administrations have been saying and what we have been hearing here that it is bound to puzzle a lot of people's minds as to what this could possibly mean.

I agree with my colleagues; I do not think Europe does not believe in American guarantees to come to its defense with all the means that might be necessary and might have to be considered. But I feel that what Dr. Kissinger said might not only be an inaccurate description but that it might undermine the faith we have in such reassurances and might lead our adversaries to think that possibilities exist which are not real.

And I think to create that kind of possible misunderstanding could be very dangerous.

Chairman Zablocki. Well, I cannot speak for Dr. Kissinger but I would suspect that if he had an opportunity to give that speech again, he would modify it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say that I am impressed by the fact that although we have a conservative from Norway and a conservative from Great Britain, a Social Democrat from Germany and a Labour Party man from Holland, that everything seems to be sweetness, light, and unity in the alliance.

[Laughter.]

TNF AND ARMS CONTROL

I am impressed by the fact that you have all indicated your acceptance of SALT II. You have all indicated a rejection of any linkage; and three of you, at least, have supported what I think you call, Mr. Corterier, a "parallel approach" with regard to the theater nuclear force modernization and SALT III and other arms control efforts.

Mr. de Vries, I am not sure about your position on that point and I would like to ask you specifically: Did I understand you to in a way reject a parallel approach with regard to those two matters?

Mr. de Vries. Well, sir, as I said, it is impossible for me to make up my mind as long as my Government has not made up its mind. The position of our country has been regarded as being rather important since the Germans chose to involve us, for reasons which we appreciate, and we hope that they would do that more often.

[Laughter.]

But I don't think that what we want is, if there is a concept of nonsingularity on the part of the Germans, to have some kind of concept to replace that of singularity of Holland.

I think that what our country is trying to do is trying to solve, in consultations with other allies, how this problem has to be tackled. And as I indicated, in Holland this is a very difficult issue to deal with.
But I think that the question that our Government has to face in Parliament, and since our Parliament is rather responsive to moods of the country, is what moods we will have to respond to in the country. It is going to be very difficult to find a way to solve this problem in a way that will be agreeable to all allies.

That is the goal, however. I think we must reach as much unity as we can get on the approach, and I think that the two models which are under consideration at the moment, either the parallel approach that Mr. Corterier advocated, and maybe an approach that would give preference to an arms control negotiation to establish that it is possible or is not possible to get the constraint we all want from the Russian side.

**IMPACT OF SALT REJECTION BY SENATE**

Mr. Hamilton. Suppose you don’t get ratification of SALT II by the U.S. Senate this year. What impact is that going to have on the decisions on theater nuclear force modernization?

Mr. de Vries. I think it is going to make it very difficult. All the parties at this table have indicated an interest in having this parallel approach. There might be, like I indicated, some minor differences on that subject, even, but I think without a credible arms control approach, it would be very difficult. And I don’t see how the alliance could possibly pursue a credible arms control approach in the context of SALT III as long as the status of SALT II has not been clarified.

Mr. Hamilton. I wonder if each of you would comment quickly on what you think the impact would be in Europe in the event of a rejection of SALT II in the U.S. Senate.

Mr. Thyness. Well, sir, it is not an easy question to answer because I don’t think anyone in Europe has seriously entertained the notion that the SALT II Treaty would be rejected. But if that should happen, I foresee grave consequences for the alliance in many fields, and they will probably also reflect on this particular question of theater nuclear modernization.

I think most people in Europe are willing to go along with a reasonable increase in defense expenditure and other measures that might be necessary, but I do feel very strongly that they want to see their leaders do everything possible to reduce the necessity for increasing armaments and nuclear arsenals.

**GRAVE CONSEQUENCES OF REJECTION**

Mr. Hamilton. What do you mean, “grave consequences”? That sounds like our State Department talking, Mr. Thyness. I don’t know what “grave consequences” means, and neither do the people in Indiana, my State. What do you mean by “grave consequences” if it is rejected?

Mr. Thyness. Well, I have gone into this in my written statement to a certain extent, and perhaps it would be a good thing to refer back to that and read to you a few sentences here.

I think that if the SALT II Treaty which has been negotiated by the American Government, several governments, in fact, is rejected
by the Senate, I think that is a sort of position that foreigners will have difficulties in understanding.

We are accustomed, all of us, to look upon the responsible spokesmen of a country as speaking for that country. That means Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Secretaries of State. And the internal political processes of other countries are always difficult to judge.

So I think that people will not understand what is behind the rejection. They will make up explanations which would probably be rather ungenerous, perhaps hostile, perhaps accusatory. I see the specter of the military industrial complex being raised again, and I am quite sure that our adversaries will add fuel to that fire.

I think we will have a situation in which people are genuinely in doubt about the aims and the goals of the alliance, and that would certainly not create a climate in which people are willing to go along with nuclear or conventional armaments.

So I think we will be facing a grave public relations problem in Europe which will reflect on the concrete, specific questions that are facing the alliance now.

Mr. HAMILTON. And on U.S. leadership.

Mr. THYNNESS. And on U.S. leadership. That, of course, is a very important thing. If I may add from a slightly different angle, I think that it is important to realize that the United States has always been and will always continue to be the real cement in the NATO alliance. Norway will feel a very modest responsibility for what is happening in Turkey, Greece, Portugal if the United States is not there to bind it all together. And I suspect that the same goes for most other countries in the alliance.

Mr. de VRIES. I think that American leadership is really the thing that will dominate all the discussions. If SALT is concerned with our vital interest and it would turn out to be impossible that the top levels of the American Government could agree on the perspective of what the vital interests of the United States are and what the alliance's are. I think that would be devastating to the leadership position of the United States.

It might create so many questions in NATO about the relation between the twin pillars of NATO, détente, and defense; might create questions about the credibility of Western determination to help constrain the arms race in nuclear weapons; would expose the West to all kinds of propaganda from all sides; and would undermine all possibilities, however limited they might be, for a nonproliferation treaty.

I think it would raise a great many issues which would be very difficult to cope with and certainly would almost, to my mind, be disastrous.

Mr. CORTERIER. I agree with everything that has been said by my colleagues so far. I too believe the impact would be extremely negative. I believe there would be a fear about East-West relations as a whole. I think these relations have focused very much in the past few years on the SALT negotiations. And if SALT fails, I think people would feel that all the results we have so far out of détente would be in jeopardy.
I think there would be particular concern in Germany, as I have already said, with our concern for Berlin, with our concern for our people in East Germany, and their fate, of course, has been alleviated to a considerable degree as a result of détente.

And there would be concern, I think, also on the part of many Eastern Europeans who have had very clear gains out of détente. In addition to that, as has always been said, I think there would be a general fear that no arms control results could be had any more in the next few years, not only in the SALT area but also in the other areas.

We have already touched upon SALT III, and I think it is obvious you cannot have SALT III if SALT II fails. But there are other negotiations, too, that should be mentioned in that context, our negotiations in Vienna, and I cannot see the Russians agreeing to anything there after SALT II has not been ratified.

I think we should also think of the CSCE, the conference in Madrid. I think there is now a very clear possibility that CSCE should move more into the area of arms control, mainly as far as confidence-building measures in Europe go.

And I think that, again, this would not be possible to tackle after a failure of a SALT II treaty.

Mr. Wall. Of course, Mr. Chairman, one must give you an off-the-cuff reply to a very important question. But my own impression is that the effect on Britain would be nothing like as dire as has been expressed by my colleagues for continental Europe.

Naturally, we would regret it. It would make SALT III obviously impossible, which we all hoped would follow up, and is, as a matter of fact, of more concern to my own country because we are also a nuclear power, as is France.

But I don’t think it would have anything like the impact on public opinion in Britain as it would have in continental Europe.

On the specific issue about which this question arose, I would like to say again that we do believe that the long-range theater nuclear, or the threat of theater nuclear force, problem, particularly the long-range issue in it, is of vital importance, and we believe that that should be settled as soon as possible.

Unless that is settled as soon as possible, we don’t believe NATO would have the leverage against the Soviet Union to allow us to negotiate SALT III on a reasonable basis, so we think it should come first and then SALT III.

So as I say, on the broad question, if we don’t get SALT II, we don’t get SALT III.

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Winn.

Mr. Winn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to tell you, gentlemen, how much I have enjoyed your testimony here today. And as parliamentarians, I want to congratulate you on your briefness in your opening statements. We are not usually privileged to that from many of our witnesses.

I was going to ask the same general types of questions as the two chairmen have asked. You are strongly in agreement that we ought to go along with SALT II, and you are eagerly looking forward to SALT III. And I sort of read in between the lines that you think that SALT is going to provide all the answers.
As for MBFR and the way the negotiations have been stalling around for 7 years, I just wondered if you were satisfied with the way the negotiations were proceeding and why do you think that SALT III is going to be the answer when MBFR is standing in concrete?

Mr. THYNNESS. Well, I share your concern, sir, with the lack of progress in the MBFR negotiations. As a matter of fact, I think this has been one of the real disappointments in the whole process of East-West dialog that has taken place.

But I would like to reserve myself against your statement that we think that SALT III will solve all of the problems.

Mr. WYNNE. I was reading between the lines, but it sounded kind of like that.

Mr. THYNNESS. Well, let me fill out what should be between the lines in my opinion. That is that SALT III might conceivably bring us a step forward. But neither you, sir, nor I will live long enough to see all of the problems between the East and West solved.

That is not to say that we should not proceed. And that is not to say that what we might achieve in a SALT III process will not be of immense importance to us all. I do believe there is a good chance of achieving results in a SALT III process that would be very much worth having.

Mr. CORTIER. I agree SALT III will certainly not give us all of the answers, but I believe it is very important to get into it as fast as we can because I think there is a very real danger that after SALT II, the arms race might move into that area. As long as we leave it without any agreement or without any negotiations, of course the Russians are free to do whatever they like and that gap could widen even more.

So I think we have an interest to start them as quickly as possible to try to get some answers out of them.

As far as MBFR is concerned, I agree with you that these negotiations have been extremely slow. I agree that the Russians should have been more forthcoming. But I do not think it would be fair to say that there has been no movement at all and that there have been no results at all so far.

I think there have been some considerable movements already. For instance, the Russians at the beginning of these talks insisted that their superiority in Europe in conventional weapons and in soldiers was a good thing because this had preserved peace since the Second World War.

In the meantime they have had to give up that position and they have agreed to parity in MBFR as they have in SALT II. So they just could not avoid the impact of that parity argument in MBFR.

In addition to that, I think they have realized in the meantime that they will not get national subceilings, as they have always asked to, and in that respect get a droit de regard in alliance matters. I think they have pretty much come around to accepting a common ceiling, as we want them to.

Of course, there are still the important data questions and other questions that are still involved. But I have always felt that it would be difficult to see a situation where a major breakthrough in MBFR would be possible before a successful conclusion of SALT.
I think these two negotiations have really been more or less tied together, and I think we will have to wait for ratification of SALT II to get a first agreement in MBFR. But I think that agreement is possible and it should be possible quite soon after ratification of SALT.

Mr. Winn. If the Soviets said they were going to wait and there would be no agreement before SALT II, what makes you think that they will not wait so that there will be no agreement before SALT III?

Mr. Cortenier. Do you mean in MBFR?

Mr. Winn. Right.

Mr. Cortenier. Well, I think that it is a matter of the results we have gotten so far. I think it would be difficult for them, after having achieved agreement or at least having come close to agreement in some important areas which I have tried to outline, to say that we now would have to wait another 3 or 4 years, because that is the minimum you will need for SALT III, in order to have a first agreement. I think that would be very difficult to argue.

So I think it is clear that even if the outstanding issues are still difficult, they could be handled within another half-year or a year and a first agreement would be possible.

Mr. Winn. You are more optimistic than I about MBFR.

Mr. Wall.

Mr. Wall. I think the direct answer to your question is a Churchillian phrase that jaw-jaw is better than war-war. Personally, I have considerable doubts as to the possible success of either détente or SALT III or CSCE or MBFR, but that doesn't mean we should stop trying.

I believe the Russians use all these organizations for their own benefit, trying to twist them their own way, and I believe the only possible future success of these negotiations is if we negotiate from strength. That means both military strength and political strength.

I believe that individually and collectively, we haven't deployed much of that strength in the past decade, particularly politically, and the Russians have been allowed to get away with far too much.

Mr. de Vries. Sir, if I might add a little comment, I don't think that the MBFR process has not provided us with great results so far. I think when it started, the two sides were so far apart in terms of the effect of conventional forces, in terms of what their ideas were about the other's forces, that we really have seen a tremendous convergence in thinking on these issues.

And since more or less the principal issues or the issues in principle have been solved by the Soviets agreeing to parity on a conventional level in Europe also, which for them, having had traditionally large conventional superiority, of course is really a big step, I think we are approaching a state in which we might expect the remaining issues can be resolved.

One of these issues, of course, is the gap between our estimates of their forces and their own data, about 150,000 troops. I think that with some determined bargaining, we should be able to solve that problem also.

But I think the Soviets want to be sure that at the central strategic level, they know what is going to happen in the coming years in order to be able to strike a bargain in an area where they traditionally have had quite a preponderance over the Western forces.
Mr. THYNNESS. May I be allowed to add one sentence to what I said formerly, after my colleagues have spoken? I do not think we should construct too many excuses for the lack of progress in the MBFR negotiations. When they started, there was no question of linkage. And then suddenly, progress in MBFR was linked to progress in the CSCE. And when that was concluded and there was no progress in MBFR, it was linked to SALT II. And now we are starting to link it to SALT III.

I think actually we should look at it as a separate piece of negotiation and conclude that so far it has not lived up to its expectations. Hopefully, it will do so in the future. But I do not think that SALT III will necessarily mean a breakthrough in MBFR.

RELATIONSHIP OF SPAIN AND FRANCE TO NATO

Mr. WInn. I would like to see if we can get some quick answers on several questions because the other gentlemen are waiting for their time. I wonder how do you assess, briefly, the attitudes and moods in Spain on joining NATO, and do you believe that France will ever rejoin NATO?

Mr. de Vries. I think that we ought to leave that decision up to Spain itself. Spain has not made up its mind. It has other preferences and I think that their political decisionmakers should be allowed to find out, when it is time to eventually apply for membership, if they want to.

Mr. WInn. How about France?

Mr. de Vries. France, as far as I can see, is not inclined to come back into the military structure. It wants to maintain its own military force outside NATO, as far as I can see.

Mr. Corterier. I agree with that, although it is a sad statement to make because it is still a very bad setback for the alliance that France is not fully integrated.

As far as Spain goes, I would suggest that we should concentrate ourselves at the present time on Spanish membership in the EC. This is very important to them. They are all agreed on that. All the major political parties want to get Spain into the EC, and the EC, after all, is a Western organization. As soon as they are in there, they can no longer say that they are neutral in any way or nonaligned, as some have suggested some time ago.

And I think after that, they should probably be prepared to consider membership in NATO, too. The major difficulty right now is that in the Socialist Party, there is still a majority against joining NATO.

As a German Social Democrat, I and some of my colleagues have a dialog with our friends in Spain. We invite them to come in. But I think it will take time. We should not press them too much on that. We should give them time.

Mr. Wall. I think it is vitally important that Spain does come into NATO. As Mr. Corterier has said, the Government party wants to appear to want to, and the opposition Socialist Party does not. I believe we should encourage them in every way to come into NATO, but not to pressure them.
As I understand from colleagues in Spain, there is a considerable Russian propaganda effort in Madrid to prevent this from happening. Clearly, it would be very advantageous as Spain runs across the NATO lines of communication. Therefore, I think every effort should be made to encourage them to get into NATO.

With regard to France, our NAA Subcommittee met representatives of the French parties about, what, 6 months ago? And naturally we brought this up. And I am sorry to say that all the parties, from the extreme right to the Communists, said not a chance of coming into a military organization, although, of course, there is increasing cooperation.

As you know, sir, there is considerable cooperation from the French Navy and quite reasonable cooperation from the other two services. So I think we must accept them not coming back. But one hopes that cooperation will increase.

Mr. Thyness. Well, on the question of Spain, I would like to say that I think it is important, if and when Spain decides to join NATO, that this is a decision that has broad political support in Spain. It should not be a one-party, even though a majority-party, decision.

So I think the best course is probably to let Spain know that whenever they want to join NATO, they would be welcome, but not to put any pressure on them.

As to France, I think the French position on NATO is of such long standing now that it would be difficult for any government to change it. But I do believe there is a movement within France toward greater practical cooperation. But I think it has been so firmly established that it would be difficult to change it.

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Pease.

Mr. Pease. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GAP IN THEATER NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

I, too, would like to welcome our distinguished guests and commend them on excellent presentations this morning. This has been an extremely useful session, from our point of view.

I have a number of questions and, perhaps, comments. I was pleased, Mr. Corderier, to hear you make reference to the desire to spread the deployment of weapons beyond the borders of West Germany. Having just spent 2 weeks in Eastern Europe during August, I can assure you that the east Europeans are concerned about Germany becoming too strong.

Let me pose a general question. You have talked a lot this morning about the gap in theater nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in Europe. I recall in the last couple of decades that the United States spent a great deal of money when we were told that there was a bomber gap, and there was some question about whether there was. And then we spent a great deal of money when we were told there was a missile gap, and there is some question about whether there was.

Are you thoroughly convinced that there really is now a gap that requires an unusual response from Western Europe and the United States?
Mr. Thyne. Yes, sir; I am firmly convinced and I think there is quite solid evidence that there is, in fact, a gap. If you compare a model of the Backfire bomber to a model of the nearest thing we have in the West, the F-111, it looks like mother and child. And the SS-20 is a weapon which we have nothing comparable to. So I think in fact there is a gap and it is quite easy to demonstrate that.

Mr. Wall. Yes. The problem is the SS-20 can fire on Europe from inside the Soviet Union, way inside, and we have nothing to counter it except aircraft. And if you send aircraft in, they will be shot out of the sky. In any case, the missile is mobile and an aircraft isn't the right answer.

I am not saying that NATO should have an equal number of equally long-range missiles to counter the SS-20. That is obviously nonsense. But I would like to see that NATO had the power to hit the Soviet Union with a long-range missile if they started hitting us with the SS-20.

In other words, not as a direct counter. The Pershing at the moment is about the only one, and that has what, a range of about 470 miles. That is nothing to compare to the SS-20, which is estimated at anything between 2,000 and 3,000 miles.

Therefore I do believe there is this gap, and it could well be filled by the stretched Pershing and other cruise missiles.

Mr. Courna. There has been a gap in the long-range theater nuclear weapons for a number of years because even before the SS-20, the Russians had the SS-4 and the SS-5 and we had no similar systems in Western Europe.

But at the time, we could live with that gap because there was a massive superiority of the United States in strategic nuclear weapons and warheads and everything. So it was easy to fill the gap in that way.

But now, as we are about to ratify strategic parity in the SALT II Treaty, I think we have another situation and we can no longer live with that gap. Of course, it has been compounded also by the fact that the SS-20 is a much more dangerous system than these older systems were.

So I think we really have to do something about it.

Mr. de Vries. Might I, in the event that you think we agree on everything, say that I have a little difficulty in addressing this gap perception problem. In the discussions which people have on these subjects, they talk in terms of perceptions and perceptions of what the other might perceive that we believe that he believes about our perceptions. Those discussions become intellectually very difficult.

I think that the basic question really is not do we have similar systems or can we counter the SS-20, because the SS-20 is a system which is almost impossible to counter, but can we address the Soviet threat on significant levels of escalation with the nuclear inventory that is available on our sides.

Of course, over the years we have been doing that in NATO with a great number of systems. There are about 500 tactical aircraft capable of reaching Soviet territory. We had Poseidons integrated into the strike plan for theater missions. We have had the F-111's in Europe for a long time, whose presence was amplified a couple of years ago in England, with two more squadrons. So there has been always a means to address the threat from that side.
The perception of what is credible and what is not credible to the
Soviet mind, of course, is one which could puzzle us for a long time. I
don’t know whether it is really very helpful to argue this case in terms
of similarity or countering SS-20’s. I think we ought to be sure that
we can do what we might need to do. I am not sure that we need new
systems for that.
I think that the Poseidons, especially when they would be equipped
with new missiles, which your Government is intending to do, might be
accurate enough and credible enough to the Russians to prevent them
from thinking that they could exploit anything in political terms or
military terms in Europe.
Mr. Pease. I appreciate that divergence of opinion within the panel.
What I have a hard time understanding is the reasoning. Apparently,
I gather, the reasoning is that the Soviets can use the SS-20 from
Russian territory and wipe out the cities of Europe without the United
States getting involved with the strategic weapons which would wipe
out the Russians.
Or conversely, for those who want a modern Western equivalent of
the SS-20, I assume the scenario is that the Russians wipe out Western
Europe with the SS-20, and in the meantime Western Europe is
wiping out Moscow and Leningrad with whatever it has. And in the
meantime, the United States and the Soviet Union are saying, well,
that will just be where the fight is, we won’t get involved.
I find both of those scenarios really stretching credibility. Is there a
different scenario or do you accept and see some credibility to one of
those?
Mr. Wall. Could I put it this way? The Russians have got a so-
called tactical weapon to which we have only a strategic counter, and
that strategic counter at the moment is your strategic forces. There­
fore, you are going to escalate straightaway. If we have a tactical
counter to their tactical missile, then our defense is much more
credible and your own strategic forces are not directly involved.
It is not a question of whether we believe you won’t use them; it is
a question of what the Russians believe.

DISTINCTION AMONG TACTICAL, THEATER, AND STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. Pease. Do you make a distinction among tactical forces,
theater forces, and strategic forces?
Mr. Wall. Well, certainly SALT II does.
Mr. Pease. Well, if we are talking about battlefield weapons, the
neutron bomb and things of that sort, I can understand that. But I
cannot understand what the difference is between a theater nuclear
missile which, discharged from the Netherlands, will land in Moscow,
and a strategic weapon which, discharged from the United States,
will land in Moscow.
Mr. Corterier. Of course, the risk is shared. If you fire that
weapon from Western Europe, the American President might feel that
the Russians would not retaliate against the United States but against
Western Europe. Or else, of course, the Russians wouldn’t do that
but retaliate against the United States.
But the risk is shared in that case. I also think we do not think in
terms of striking cities so much but in terms of striking military targets
because the SS-20 is so much more accurate than the older systems
were. Its real role, I think, is going to be counterforce.
I have heard, because you were talking about scenarios, the following scenario: that they would make a conventional attack, that we would be able to stop that attack, and then they would be tempted to use the SS-20 and these long-range theater systems in order to get the attack going again, and that they could hope to get away with this type of escalation because the West would not be able to reply in kind.

The only option open to the West would be to immediately retaliate with the central systems. That is one of the scenarios I have heard.

Mr. Pease. If you will pardon me, I really have a difficult time following that. If there is a conventional war that goes on for some period of time, surely the United States is going to be fighting side by side with Germany, the Netherlands, and all the other NATO members.

How would the Russians conceive that they could then use theater nuclear weapons in Europe without involving the U.S. strategic forces?

Mr. de Vries. Sir, one of the issues at stake is the credibility of the U.S. engagement in a war like that. And I totally agree with you, I cannot see how one could not believe that would be credible.

The distinction between tactical or theater and strategic central systems has always puzzled me very much because why, in terms of the real situation—not in terms of arms control—but why would a nuclear missile launched from a submarine be considered to be central and something very special in comparison with a theater system which might have the same payload?

If you talk about the SS-20, sir, these systems are supposed to be very selective in strike. But one can wonder what is selective about a weapon that has three warheads with a 150-kilotons payload. The 150 kilotons is seven times Hiroshima, and if they started using that in Europe, I can't see anything of Europe left.

I think it would be about time for them to realize that in a contingency that would develop, they would have to reckon with total devastation on their part, too. I think if they would start using SS-20's on Europe, it is about time to think about hitting the Soviet Union very hard, too.

Mr. Thyness. I am not foreign to your way of thinking, sir, but nevertheless, we must guard against putting too much stress on our way of thinking and from that postulate how the Soviet Union is thinking. If you put the main stress on the deterrent value of our military forces, then I think we must also at all times address the capabilities, not the perceived intentions, but the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.

And after all, they haven't poured billions into developing Eurostrategic systems simply for the fun of it. They must have some general idea in mind that these forces may be useful. Personally, I do not believe it is a healthy state of affairs if there is general strategic parity and a vast superiority on the Warsaw Pact side, both in the theater nuclear field and in the conventional field.
Mr. Pease. I appreciate that and I am searching for a good understanding of your reasoning. Let me if I can, Mr. Chairman, follow up with two specific questions:

NATO DEFENSE SPENDING

First, NATO agreed to try to achieve a 3-percent real growth rate in defense spending in each nation. The United States is one country which has fallen behind so far, although as the price of ratifying SALT, we may make it 5 percent rather than 3 percent.

But the Warsaw Pact immediately met and agreed to increase their defense spending. Does that mean that our 3-percent increase no longer allows us to catch up, to eliminate this gap? Will we have to have another 3 percent or 5 percent? What is to lead us to believe that the Warsaw Pact will not follow suit in an escalation of conventional arms?

Secondly, and tied in with that, if we tried to modernize our theater nuclear force in Western Europe to offset the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber, what would lead us to believe that the Soviet Union will stand still and allow that to happen without taking additional steps which will preserve whatever gap exists now?

Mr. C stature . Well, I think we must realize that the Russians have real difficulties in going on raising their military budgets in the same way they used to in the past. I think there have been many studies, many also in this country, one by the CIA, indicating that they are not going to have the same economic growth rate over the next few years that they had in the past, and that in that respect they will find it more difficult to get high increases in military spending in the same ways as in the past.

Then I would like to point out the difficulties they have with their allies right now. Romania has refused to go along with these defense increases, and Poland has never publicly opposed the Soviets on this, but privately, if you talk to Poles, you can hear often that they don’t want to go on spending more and more.

So I think the Russians have a problem on that score.

As far as the question of will they not build up even more if we modernize is concerned, I think one has to have in mind—and it has been pointed out before, I think, by Patrick Wall—that we do not want equality in that area.

We need it if we get an arms control agreement because I think there should never be an agreement where we would not have parity with them, but I don’t think we need it militarily. We don’t need to have exactly the same number of systems they have.

What we want is a limited number of systems to be able to respond in case that is necessary in order to keep enough flexibility for us as far as escalation goes and in order to make our deterrence more credible. But we don’t need the same number of systems.

So I don’t see the danger as much as you do.

Mrs. Fenwick. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Pease. Surely. I would be happy to yield.
MILITARY SPENDING SPIRAL

Mrs. Fenwick. This was gone into at length in our panel in Brussels, and I think my colleague’s worry is one which concerns every one of us: Will we be starting a spiral in which military spending mounts and mounts?

But the fact is that while we were disspiraling, so to speak, spending proportionately less, this caused a more rapid acceleration in the Russian spending. In other words, what I think we are beginning to learn is that balance itself is a deterrent though we may not need actual parity.

Dr. Luns was one of the most impressive speakers in Brussels. He spoke at length about arms and money, the disparity in arms and the seriousness of it, because of the perceptions not only in Europe but in the Soviet Union. But he finally said that more important than all of this, because arms and money can be, in a sense, secondary, are the will and courage of the people.

I think what Russia really wants to know is whether they are going to have a perfectly easy “perception victory” through the political effect of their military might, or whether they are going to meet the kind of resistance that says no, enough. I think that is the deterrent to war, not acquiescence in waiting for a nuclear holocaust as the only response.

And this was really one of the great advantages of going to the Brussels conference. Dr. Luns was most compelling, I thought, in the final speech of the session.

Mr. Wall. I think figures can mean something or nothing. After all, for the last 10 years or so you have been spending approximately 5.7 percent of your GNP on defense, and the Russians have been spending something probably like 13 or 15, so there has been an imbalance over many, many years.

Insofar as Britain is concerned, we are spending about 4.7 of our GNP, compared, I think, to about 5 percent of yours. We are now going to increase that, so I think the real answer is that we must spend as much as we can afford, our economies can afford, and our social systems can afford. And I know that leads to endless arguments as to how much that should be.

But I think the point Dr. Corterier made is important, and that is that the Soviet economy is on the rundown. The Soviet manpower problems are serious. The cohesion of the U.S.S.R. is not what it was. I can put it that way. The eight Soviet Muslim republics are going to outnumber the Russians in the next few years.

All these indicate to me that the Soviets will not be able to go on at their same amount of expenditures on their military unless they are prepared to cut further their standard of living, which will raise great difficulties not only in the satellites but in the Ukraine, Lithuania, and other places.

So I think what really matters is that it is seen that the Western alliance is spending enough to not equal the Soviets but to counter their various threats, and really as an indication of our intention to stand up for what we believe in.

Mr. de Vries. Could I say something on that? I took national pride in your comments on Dr. Luns’ speech. [Laughter.]

But I do feel that we should not confuse ourselves by trying to express the will we have to stand up by throwing around percentages.

Mrs. Fenwick. I didn’t mean to mention any.
Mr. de Vries. Absolutely. I have compared over the years Russian spending to our spending, rubles to dollars, et cetera, and you are really in quite a discussion to figure out where you should be in such a discussion. I think that basically what we want to do is have a defense posture and implement the defense plans that are necessary for our own securities. And whether that will express itself finally in percentages of our defense expenditure is, of course, something that remains to be seen.

But I think it is for parliamentarians not very useful to talk about percentages being added to a defense budget before they have seen what the menu is actually.

Mrs. Fenwick. I agree.

Mr. de Vries. It is like entering a restaurant and paying the bill before you have seen-----

Mrs. Fenwick. What is on the menu. Exactly.

Mr. Thyness. I would like to add I am very much in agreement with both Mrs. Fenwick and my colleagues, but I do think we are addressing the problem you are mentioning, also, through many sets of negotiations in which we are concerned, but all evidence of history tends to show that if you are going into a conference chamber, you must do so from a position of reasonable strength and balance and not from a position of demonstrable inferiority.

I would also like to say, since percentages have been mentioned, that of course we ought to get much more out of our defense expenditure than we actually do.

[Mr. Wall nods affirmatively.]

Mr. Thyness. And this is one of the great weaknesses of the alliance, that we have not been able to develop more cooperation on R. & D. and weapons procurement which could give us much more value from our money than we are actually getting today.

Mr. Pease. Mr. Chairman, I won’t ask any more questions. I really do appreciate the responses I have received. I think they have been very helpful to me. It is just that I have a difficult time with the concept that you have to markedly increase your defense spending in order to prepare for disarmament or arms control, which seems to be one of the premises.

And second, I have difficulty understanding why anyone would believe that the Soviet Union having achieved whatever measure of superiority it has will allow that to erode. They are in a much better position, being an authoritarian government, to impose spending discipline on their people than we are.

Thank you.

Chairman Zablocki. If I may just add a footnote that you can more effectively negotiate from a position of strength rather than weakness.

Mr. Pease. Well, there is no doubt about that.

Mrs. Fenwick. Could I say one word? It isn’t that the whole point of spending on arms is to come to arms control. It is to have peace, and not to unleash a war.

Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Findley.

Mr. Findley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor to have the chance to address a few words to this distinguished group. I do appreciate the fact that you have come here to exchange ideas with us. I am sorry I did not hear all of the discussion, and I am in the unfortunate position of having to leave in just a few minutes.
There is a gap that troubles Dr. Kissinger. It troubles a lot of people. I see quite often in the headlines prominent Europeans as well as people in this Congress speaking of a concern about the gap of various sorts between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

One way to close the gap is to increase our defense spending. Another way is to enhance the cohesion of the alliance itself. And in recent years, we seem to have spent most of our energy and resources on trying to negotiate a peaceful world with what might be described as the enemy: MBFR and in SALT. In other words, we have tried to work out understandings with the center of potential hostility.

I believe that in that process we have severely neglected the prospect of negotiating within our community of liberty-loving nations a better system of cohesion. If we could achieve better cohesion, we would instantly close the gap. And if the Soviet Union knew for an absolute fact that the resources of all the NATO nations would be brought to bear against any advance it would make, there would be no advance.

I think we would all agree on that point. But there is doubt about the actual response of the United States, the response of every individual member of NATO. We have an integrated command structure. We have a paper alliance. But we really will not know until a moment of crisis comes what the response will be.

Dr. Kissinger quite eloquently raised the question as to the credibility—the diminishing credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment to Western Europe, and it is something we ought to consider.

Now, is the answer everyone owning a lot more nuclear weapons and various sorts of conventional armor? That is one possibility. Another way is to work diligently and really try to think with courage and imagination about new institutional structures through which these great nations could act in concert and be perceived as acting in concert, no matter what challenge would come along.

All of you know that I have held this interest for all of my public career, and I believe it is more needed today than ever before. But perhaps it is less likely to happen, given the mood of separatism and ultranationalism, than in the past. But it is one way we could close this gap.

We could sharpen the perception of the Soviets on what they could expect in case they indulged in mischief. And we could accomplish this without spending an extra dime for defense.

Mr. de Vries. Could I just say, Mr. Zablocki, that I think this is an element which has been neglected to an extent that is almost irresponsible in the alliance. I appreciate Mr. Findley's comments. I think it is extremely important that we try to get our act together as an alliance, and, indeed, not only to work on military schemes.

NATO, of course, is an organization that creates all kinds of military thinking. But the political dimension of the cohesion of the alliance might be far more important in the long run. And I think if we would be able to find mechanisms, institutions that could be helpful in enhancing the internal cohesion in the alliance and overcome the disparities between the regions in the alliance, because, of course, those are probably at the very basis of a possibility of losing cohesion, the problems we have on the southern flank, for instance. If we can't.
solve those in a political way which will contribute to whole countries feeling that they are members of the same organization standing for the same values, if we can't solve that problem, we are in far more a mess than we could possibly be by not spending a little more on defense.

Mr. Findley: Mr. Chairman, I forgot to mention I had not seen Mr. Wall since the general elections, and I have noticed that his smile is much broader than before. [Laughter.]

Mr. Wall. Perhaps I could reply to that, Mr. Chairman, by saying, as one who has tried to work with Mr. Findley on this particular issue, we all entirely agree with him that anything we can do to get better cohesion in the alliance must be done.

ELECTED EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

But I think it goes beyond that and I know he thinks it goes beyond that. I would add a word of hope that I think the fact that we now have an elected European parliament—and that is another important election we have had recently——

Mr. Findley. It is a good start.

Mr. Wall. [continuing]. Will gradually bring us together. And I hope we will be speaking more in one voice on political and military matters. How this dovetails in the future into NATO remains to be seen, but it is an important matter we must consider.

The Americans always used to hope, I believe, Mr. Chairman, many years ago when I used to visit this country, for a United States of Europe. I think that is a long way away, if it ever comes, but I do believe it is a very important step that has been taken in having an elected parliament.

And I believe that all of our experiences are that once one has an elected legislature, they want more power themselves and that therefore they will come into the field, whether the treaty allows it or not, of foreign affairs and defense.

One other issue, if I may, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Findley did mention it. I think we tend to concentrate too much on the nuclear issue. That is obviously because we are discussing SALT II. But I would suggest that the flanks, which I did mention earlier on, are very important.

COOPERATION BETWEEN MARITIME POWERS OF ALLIANCE

May I take this opportunity to correct what may have been a misapprehension which my friend Klaas de Vries took up. I am not suggesting for any moment that the NATO boundaries can be expanded. They can't be. What I am suggesting is there should be much better cooperation between the maritime powers of the alliance, yourselves, Britain, and France, particularly, in trying to get a balance of sea power in the great areas of the South Atlantic.

Mr. Thyness. I would like to say, Mr. Findley, that I agree with most of what you said. But I would like to go on record here as believing in not one single line of approach but in several. I think we need to advance in parallel both in the political cohesion of the alliance in working toward greater cooperation, particularly on R. & D. and methods of procurement.
At the same time, I do think we need to follow a diligent line in negotiating with our adversaries, and I think we do need to beef up our defenses a bit here and there.

Mr. Findley. I agree with you.

Mr. Corterier. I agree with most of what you have said, Congressman Findley. I just believe that you may have made the picture a little bit too somber. I think there have been very clear indications that the alliance is able to act, like the long-term defense improvement program which was adopted. We have major procurement programs going in Europe, like AWACS, which has been decided in the alliance. We are starting to get the Tornado now, which is an important European project, deployed, and things like that.

So I think we should not create the impression that nothing is being done. I agree with you more needs to be done, and we all certainly hope it will be possible to get new, important agreements inside the alliance in December.

I agree very much with what you say about the need to set up new machinery and to find ways and means of strengthening that. I think that is one of the most important tasks that lies in front of the alliance.

Chairman Zablocki. Mrs. Findley. Excuse me, Mrs. Fenwick.

[Laughter.]

Mrs. Fenwick. What a good idea. [Laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further comments. I think it is wonderful to see you all here and to know that we are all in this together. Thank you.

Chairman Zablocki. I think this meeting has been very productive and the exchange of views is, as always, most welcome.

Personally, I am heartened by your rather optimistic outlook as to the future of the alliance, and I hope we have left you with an assurance of the U.S. commitment as well as our intent to see that SALT II will be ratified. Indeed, if we fail to ratify it, it will pose additional problems in Europe and threats to the security of Europe.

I hope you gentlemen will not mind if, after having the transcript, a brief summary would be prepared to be inserted in the Congressional Record of your views and our interchange.¹

I want to thank Mr. Thyness, Mr. Wall, Mr. Corterier, and Mr. de Vries. Hopefully, we again will have an opportunity to exchange views at a future date. Thank you for your coming.

I understand you have a luncheon commitment, and we are leaving you ample time to make that.

The subcommittees are adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m. the joint subcommittees adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

Biographies of Witnesses

PAUL THYNNESS (NORWAY)

Mr. Thynness is a Conservative member of the Storting (parliament) for Oslo. He was born on 10th April 1930 in Aker. He studied at the University of Oslo and at Nuffield College, Oxford. Mr. Thynness started his career as a journalist and was active in the Conservative Party, of which he became Director of Research in 1956. From 1961 to 1965, he acted as Secretary of the Conservative Parliamentary Group. Co-editor of the Conservative Yearbook (1958–61), he wrote the history of the Conservative Parliamentary group. He has also published a study of the political philosophy of Edmund Burke. In 1963, Mr. Thynness held the post of State Secretary to the Prime Minister. Mr. Thynness was Chairman of the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs (1972–77), and Vice-Chairman of the Norwegian Arms Control and Disarmament Council until 1979. He is currently President of the Norsemen’s Federation.

Mr. Thynness, who has been a member of the Storting since 1965, was Vice-Chairman of the Defense Committee from 1966 to 1973. He is currently a member of the Storting’s Foreign Affairs Committee and has been Deputy President of the Odelsting (Upper House), since 1975. Mr. Thynness has been a member of the North Atlantic Assembly since 1967 and a leader of his delegation since 1973. He fulfilled a four-year mandate as Chairman of the Military Committee (1974–77). Vice-President of the Assembly in 1977, Mr. Thynness was elected President in November 1978.

PATRICK WALL (UNITED KINGDOM)

Mr. Wall is a member of the House of Commons (Haltemprice, Yorkshire), first elected in 1954. He is a member of the Conservative Party. Born October 16, 1916 and educated at Downside, he served with the Royal Marines (1935–50). He gained the rank of major in 1949; was Commander 47 Commando RMFVR (1951–56). From 1953 to 1963, he was a member of the Westminster City Council. In 1955, he was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; in 1956–61, President of the Yorkshire Young Conservatives; in 1958–59, Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; in 1963–72, Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party Defence Committee; and since 1970, has been chairman of the Conservative Fisheries Subcommittee. He was a delegate to the United Nations 17th General Assembly (1962). He is also Vice-Chairman of the British Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. He is a former member of the Assembly of the Western European Union and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He is currently Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

PETER CORTIER (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY)

Mr. Cortier is a member of the Bundestag (Baden-Wurttemberg), first elected in 1969 and of the Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.). He was born June 19, 1936; studied law at Heidelberg, Freiburg and Bonn Universities and at the Higher School of Administration in Speyer. He holds a Doctor of Law from the University of Bonn. He has been a lawyer and a civil servant at the Ministry of Housing and Town-Planning.
He is a member of the Bundestag's Committee on Foreign Affairs and alternate member of the Committee on Defense. He is a former member of the European Parliament. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and General Rapporteur of its Political Committee.

KLAAS DE VRIES (NETHERLANDS)

Mr. de Vries is a member of the Second Chamber of the States-General (parliament) and of the Labour party (P.v.d.A.). He was born April 28, 1943. He was educated at Hamline University (liberal arts), St. Paul, Minnesota, and studied Dutch law at Utrecht University. From 1968 to 1971, he was a civil servant at the Ministry of Justice, and, since 1971, has been a collaborator in public and administrative law at the higher school of economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. In 1970–71, he was a member of the Municipal Council of Delft. First elected to parliament in 1973, he is Chairman of the Second Chamber Committee on Defense and a member of the committees on the Interior and Civil Defense, as well as an alternate member of the committees on Foreign Affairs and Justice. He is currently serving as General Rapporteur of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.