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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND U.N. REFORM

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HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

PART 1

MARCH 22, 1979

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CONFIDENTIAL

1. The purpose of this document is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of the project and to identify the key challenges that must be addressed in order to ensure its successful completion. This document is intended for the use of senior management and is not to be distributed outside of the project team.

2. The project has made significant progress since its inception, with several key milestones having been achieved. However, there are a number of areas where the project is currently lagging behind schedule, and it is essential that these issues be identified and addressed as a matter of priority.

3. The primary challenge facing the project is the lack of resources, particularly in the area of personnel. This has resulted in a number of tasks being delayed, and it is essential that additional resources be identified and allocated to the project as soon as possible. Other challenges include the need for improved communication and coordination between the various teams involved in the project, and the need to ensure that the project remains aligned with the overall strategic objectives of the organization.

4. In order to address these challenges, it is recommended that a number of actions be taken, including the recruitment of additional personnel, the implementation of a more robust communication and reporting structure, and the regular review of the project's progress against its objectives. It is essential that these actions be implemented as a matter of urgency, in order to ensure that the project is completed on time and within budget.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND U.N. REFORM

THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Bonker (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. BONKER. The Subcommittee on International Organizations will come to order.

This will be the first of a series of hearings that we will conduct on the issue of reform of the U.N. system. There has been a period of growing criticism of the United Nations as well as the work itself and U.S. participation in that body.

This particular subcommittee has oversight jurisdiction pertaining to the United Nations. It is important to the subcommittee and its members that we hear directly from our representative in that world body.

The hearings will have a dual purpose. First to assess the goals of the United States in the U.N. and to examine possible reforms and proposals to restructure the United Nations.

In section 503(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1978 the Congress requested a report from the President on reform and restructuring of the U.N. system. The State Department now has made available its report and a set of recommendations which this subcommittee will be considering.

We are privileged to have as our leadoff witness the present U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, who will be followed by Senator Daniel Moynihan, who is presently meeting at the White House.

As the members know, Ambassador Young was formerly a Member of Congress from the State of Georgia. He distinguished himself not only as an active and effective Member of the House, but also as an expert on foreign policy. While he did not sit on the Foreign Affairs Committee, those of us who were privileged to be on the committee looked to Andy for information and advice relating to issues that came before us.

It is a privilege to have you appear before the subcommittee, Mr. Ambassador. We hope that you will address some of the specific recommendations that the President has passed on to the Congress. In addition to that, we would also like to hear from you on U.S. participation in the United Nations.

You may proceed with your written statement, or if you like submit it for the record and proceed informally.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW YOUNG, U.S. PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

Ambassador YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think in the interest of time I will submit the statement for the record and allow whatever time is available for you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee to discuss those issues about which you may be concerned.

I am joined in these hearings by Assistant Secretary Bill Maynes, who has long been involved in the business of U.N. reform and the continued work of our country's involvement in the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, I find that I best understand the United Nations out of my political background and experience. It is essentially a political body that represents not the common consensus one might expect of a single government or any nation that has some political history but it represents a political process in which 151 governments now are involved. They represent the full spectrum of ideological views, of economic needs, of political styles and expression.

There has been an extremely rapid growth from the original membership of 51 states. Much of that has come in the last few years and it has caused, I think, a considerable realignment of the political process that was established by the nations who founded the United Nations, which came together to prevent worldwide wars and moved together to solve some of the problems of the world. In a sense, we have succeeded and a part of that success is in the birth of these new nations, most of which came about under the U.N. system.

Now however, we face a situation where particular privileges that were set aside for the founding members, namely the veto becomes something of a focus of other countries finding ways to balance out the power of the larger states. They have done this by grouping into regional and geographical as well as ideological groups.

We find ourselves caught in a political arena. While we may still be the most significant influence, we are in no way able to control the destiny of the democratic process and certainly not in any way dictate it. But I doubt that we ever were.

And originally we saw the United Nations not as a tool of U.S. foreign policy but as part of a cooperative effort on the part of the United States and other nations to solve worldwide difficulties.

I say all the time that the process of moving toward a consensus is the difficult part when you start out with extremely different perspectives; trying to find a common ground on things you can agree on is quite a political challenge.

We are able to do that both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council more and more now. In fact overwhelmingly the resolutions passed by the General Assembly are passed by consensus and only in rare cases are we not able to negotiate the differences and disagreements that we have.

But I would contend that even when we are outvoted in the U.N., we have succeeded. For if we have succeeded in bringing a problem to a political forum or even if it's talked to death, at least it's talked out

and nothing is destroyed in the way of property; no human life. But we have engaged in an intellectual, national ego battle perhaps and fought it to win, lose or draw. It still has cost this Nation none of its human resources and very little of its material resources. The sum total of U.N. peacekeeping operations all over the world now cost each American citizen about 30 cents a year. While we can't say that each one of these has prevented a war, there is certainly no question that the signing of a peace treaty in the Middle East, for instance, could not have been possible had it not been for the U.N. peacekeeping forces on all sides of Israel that make it possible for us to have the time to negotiate about peace.

I think one of the most significant successes of the past year was the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon, which was the first resolution solely sponsored by the United States that passed the Security Council since the Korean mandate in 1951.

We followed that by the effort to secure the withdrawal of China from Vietnam and are still in the process of trying to negotiate a settlement in the combination of circumstances in Cambodia, Vietnam, and China.

Presently I think the most active issue before the Security Council is the ability of the Security Council to put together a peacekeeping force to bring about a transfer of power in South-West Africa or Namibia. We work together with the five Western members of the Security Council from the last term, Germany, France, England, Canada, and the United States. We have negotiated with the African States, with South Africa and with the liberation movements and we almost have an agreed upon settlement which would put a U.N. peacekeeping force into Namibia and conduct elections within the next 7-month period. So the political process is working and we are making progress even though by no stretch of the imagination are we winning all the battles.

I would say our record is more, far more, influential in the specialized agencies where we are still, I think, the dominant influence, both in values and ideas.

The World Health Organization, most widely known for the eradication of smallpox, also has established the early warning system for worldwide disease which establishes patterns and standards of disease prevention essentially is something that grows out of the U.S. health experience. The International Civil Aeronautics Organization has established air safety standards, standards against hijacking in airports using the kind of radar systems that mandate safety standards for the airports of the world. These are things essentially that have grown out of the U.S. experience in air safety.

I think you could go on talking about drug abuse internationally, not supervised but inspired by the United States through an agency of the United Nations development program which, in conjunction with the World Bank, is responsible for very much of the infrastructure and groundwork that makes trade possible for U.S. business abroad.

I think it's very hard to find a single area of U.S. relationships with the world in which we live that's not in some way influenced by the United Nations dialog and debate and that we don't have a major influence in shaping as a result of our Nation's role in this international system.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Ambassador, may I interrupt for just a moment? We have a recorded vote. It's on funding for the Select Committee on Aging on which I serve, and have a special interest. I understand that we may be under suspension, in which case we might have up to eight votes in sequence. I think at this time we'll go into recess and reconvene the subcommittee as soon as the last vote occurs.

Mr. Ambassador, as a former Member of this body you can understand and appreciate the conflicts that we have. I hope you have the time.

Ambassador YOUNG. It looks like it's going to run longer and you want to reconvene the hearing at another time, we'll be here waiting. Just call back over and let us know.

[Ambassador Young's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW YOUNG, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, these important hearings deal not only with the UN but with our entire foreign policy. For the effectiveness of the UN and our ability to pursue our interests through the UN are greatly influenced by the perceptions we have of ourselves as a nation and the perceptions we have of the UN as a forum of multilateral diplomacy.

The UN serves American foreign policy interests well in part because of the organization's intrinsic values. But to a greater extent, our degree of success really depends on the strength of the vision we impart to our policy and the weight we ascribe to the UN in the management of our global responsibilities.

In retrospect, the era of San Francisco and Bretton Woods was one of grand designs as well as grand illusions. Thirty some years ago, we had, in concert with other governments, pledged ourselves to banish forever the scourge of war and set out to reappraise the political economic and moral principles operative in international relations. In doing so, we perhaps attributed greater promise to the UN than it could ever possibly fulfill.

But we were, at that time, also a nation unparalleled in our achievements, unchallenged in our power and unbridled in our idealism. We did not, then, look at the UN as "our" instrument of global diplomacy but as every nation's joint enterprise of peace.

Today the world is very different from that of 1945. In thirty some years the UN's agenda has doubled, its membership tripled, its budget has grown tenfold. It has not only expanded international institutions it had inherited from the League of Nations, but spawned new specialized agencies, financial institutions, and international commitments.

In the early 50's and 60's the cold war and the rapid process of decolonization changed perceptions of the UN. The UN seemed an important terrain of contest between East and West in which newly-independent countries appeared as a coveted prize in the fluctuating power struggle, pawns in the rivalry of the cold war.

Since the mid-sixties, however, changes have occurred. "Pawns" grew into major figures on the world chessboard with moves of their own and strategies independent of the game of traditional power players. The entire nature of world and U.S. politics shifted. The UN no longer was "our" instrument. And in the interval, our perception of ourself as a nation with global responsibilities also underwent drastic alteration.

While still remaining in the absolute sense the major military, economic and political power in the world, our relative strength has diminished in comparison, not only to the Soviet Union, but to our Western partners and to a significant number of Third World countries as well. In part, this relative change in our power represented a major success of post-war U.S. diplomacy which attempted to assist others to get back on their feet. This development then was healthy. The toll of Vietnam, the energy crisis and our own economic difficulties, have naturally raised legitimate concerns about the extent of our foreign commitments, the limits of our power and the corresponding situation raised serious questions about

the utility of the UN for us, forcing a reassessment of our attitude and approach to the UN and of the UN itself.

It has been hard for some to accept that the UN can no longer be the instrument of Pax Americana. Instead of trying to effectively cope with a new constellation of power within the UN, they remained startled that we do not command automatic and bewildered that our good intentions and designs are not always taken at face value. They became angry rather than seriously reformulating our policies and approaches to the UN. And these reactions put us right in the center of the minefield.

The last few years have witnessed a curious co-existence of conflicting emotions and sentiments about the UN in the American public and policy makers.

Were we not deep down in our collective psyche convinced of the world body's importance, we would not have been so concerned over events at the UN, but would instead have articulated clearly and forcefully why the UN is unimportant. But many have not chosen this difficult road but have preferred to dismiss the UN as unimportant yet paradoxically have felt it necessary to defy it.

There is, I concede, something romantic in standing against the tide and standing up for what is perceived to be right.

I do think, however, that some of our impatience with the UN told more about us than reflected what occurred in the UN itself.

Such an attitude, I submit, was not warranted by events in the UN but was an understandable outward manifestation of our own doubts about ourselves, particularly after Vietnam. We have provided close to 100 billion dollars in foreign aid to a war-devastated Europe and to the emerging countries and, expecting gratitude, we only received—or we thought we received—blame. We have been the largest contributor to the UN budget but thought our influence disproportionate to our investment. Our road to Vietnam led to an overwhelming national self-doubt about both our morals and our strength. In sum, we have conducted a foreign policy that exhausted our energies and our patience. In the UN, we were on the defensive not because we were attacked but because for some time we were without a purpose. Having thus cornered ourselves, we lashed out indiscriminately at our foes as well as at those whom we thought were our antagonists.

Today, we know, in retrospect, that we felt misunderstood in the UN because we misunderstood the UN and the mood of its members. We have depicted the UN to our own public in contradictory terms, describing it as impotent, where nothing would ever happen but where anti-Americanism, and anti-Israel, and anti-democratic sentiments prevailed. So preoccupied were we with our own hurt that we failed to perceive and transmit to our public an image of the UN as an imperfect place but still the only place where nations talked instead of fought with each other. And we have failed to understand the newly emerging countries which wrestle with their own sense of nationhood and must yet find their proper role in international affairs. Most tragically, we have failed to grasp that our influence did not wane; that we draw on a remarkably deep reservoir of goodwill and friendship.

Since those days, the mood in our country has changed and with it have changed our policies and attitude toward the UN. We are not longer on the defensive—without falling into an equally erroneous posture of the offensive. Instead, we are recognizing the influence we have, that in matters of importance we still command enormous support and influence that our ideas and initiatives are welcomed and our leadership is expected. No, we did not turn the tide back into our favor—we have matured to see that it has never been against us.

In the past three years I have had the privilege of serving as United States Ambassador to the United Nations, and my experiences do not lead me to prefer confrontation to cooperation, or to conclude that railing against the body is a substitute for policy or produces any effective results.

In the last two General Assembly sessions, we have worked in an atmosphere of much greater cooperation because our perceptions of the UN and of ourselves are more positive and more constructive. And that makes our work easier and infinitely more challenging.

It is easier because from the outset this administration has placed the UN in the center of our multilateral efforts and has proceeded to pursue foreign policy objectives by taking advantage of the opportunities the UN places at our disposal.

Our efforts for the peaceful settlement of disputes in southern Africa, specifically in Namibia have still not been consummated but the promise of peaceful change would not even be possible without the active participation of the UN and the peaceful transition could not be planned without the tool of UN peacekeeping.

Without the rapport we have established in the UN with the Frontline States, we would not be able to maintain the lines of communication which would permit the international community to play a constructive role in the resolution of the Rhodesian question if the parties to the dispute were ever willing to embrace this possibility.

The pre-conditions for the present dramatic prospects for a Middle East peace were also laid down by collective efforts in the UN, providing, through Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the framework for the Camp David negotiations. And, in a very important way, these conditions could not have existed without the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the Golan Heights, in Sinai and in southern Lebanon.

Arms control negotiations generally received a strong impetus from the UN's Special Session on Disarmament focusing world-wide attention on the urgent need for arms control both nuclear and conventional.

It is not, however, the crises the UN helped solve or the conflicts it tempered but the crises it prevented and the causes of conflicts it addressed which mark the UN's progress. The UN record in matters of global security is not spotless. It has failed to act or get involved in a number of international conflicts, from Uganda to the Somali-Ethiopian war. But it should also be noted that its purview of what constitutes global security has also expanded. What used to be the soft issues in the affairs of international organizations—the elaboration of codes, the setting of standards in economic, social, cultural and scientific fields—have come to represent not only the major load of the UN's work but also perhaps its second important contribution after peacekeeping to the diffusion of international tensions. Thus, in addition to military and political affairs, its global security concerns now encompass economic security questions as well.

The world today is facing critical shortages on many fronts. We live under the constant threat of an energy crisis, the exhaustion of our non-renewable resources and the despoliation of our environment. These are problems that no nation, large or small, can face and confront alone. No government can adequately address its national security needs while disregarding the interdependence among national economies.

Since this interdependence contains the conditions of mutual vulnerability, the threat of global depression and economic stagnation is a principal concern of the ongoing UN sponsored North/South dialogue.

There are hardly any major issues on the global agenda that the UN has not pioneered in legitimizing as a major concern and in encouraging collective action for their resolution. From the Stockholm UN Conference on the Environment in 1972 to the forthcoming Science and Technology for Development Conference in August of this year, the UN has played or will soon play an indispensable role in tackling problems of hunger and food production, population, the human habitat, trade, renewable energy sources and a host of other issues.

The UN is also a major actor in assisting the Third World countries in their development effort. We should, however, not view these efforts simply and simplistically as yet another means of taxing the affluent countries for the benefit of the poor ones. The growth of the economies of the developing countries is vital to the U.S. economy in terms of trade and investment.

In terms of trade, U.S. exports to developing countries is far greater in volume and value than to Europe, Japan and the Communist bloc nations combined. Investment and trade opportunities afforded to American business through our contributions to UN programs and Specialized Agencies far exceed the normal returns comparable business transactions would provide. For example, UNDP generated investment opportunities between 1959 and 1977 were estimated at close to 30 billion dollars. Important as the UNDP and the Specialized Agencies may be for developing areas, the U.S. and other developed countries are also direct beneficiaries of their work. IAEA, for example, provides technical assistance and inspections that promote nuclear safety and inhibit the proliferation of weapons technology.

We delude ourselves, however, if we think that any of the global economic, military and political security problems could find just and permanent resolution without a fundamental reappraisal of the role of the individual as a subject of international law and his concomitant rights. What began thirty years ago with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a statement of intent is slowly evolving into a global compact, a set of rules—conventions and covenants—that proscribes and prescribes the behavior of governments towards their own citizens.

Human rights is not an isolated, separate branch of international affairs or of our foreign policy. It permeates all fields of international activity. It is an integral part of development. As we labor toward disarmament, we think not only of the security of nations but of the peace of peoples. As we negotiate issues of trade, investment, and technology transfer we deal with global economics but in a way as if people mattered.

Since the 35th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights has just concluded less than a week ago, let me focus on its work as perhaps both typical and current of the UN's work in areas of what I called "soft issues."

The UN is an appropriate place and perhaps a litmus test for this Administration's human rights emphasis. This UN Commission did not by extensive debate or the stroke of the pen end violations of human rights. But it did prove that the defense of human rights is not the sole and solitary concern of the United States or of the Western democracies alone but it is beginning to become, slowly but perceptibly, an important issue for a growing number of governments, even affecting their bilateral relationships.

The work of this commission is living proof of how far we have already come and how important a role has been assumed by the United Nations in the promotion and protection of human rights. This Commission has codified a body of international human rights laws that set standards of governmental behavior towards citizens. These include conventions on genocide, civil and political, economic, and social rights, refugees and women's rights, racial discrimination, and is currently working on instruments to prevent torture, and to protect those rights of the child and the freedom of religion.

These instruments, while not self-enforcing, do provide means for individuals and groups to hold their governments accountable. Beyond the setting of standards, this commission is involved in the difficult task of seeking their implementation. Thus, this commission is much more than a side show, off the big stage of global diplomacy. It has become an important forum of public opinion, representing concrete hope for the many victims of repression who have no other recourse than the international community. Were it not, over fifty thousand people would not every year contact this commission on matters relating to the violation of human rights.

There was a time, when this commission could only deal with human rights violations in southern Africa, Israeli-occupied territories and Chile.

Today, though, it is by no means untainted by political considerations, there is public discussion and condemnation of other countries, such as Cambodia and Equatorial Guinea, and—through the confidential procedures it has adopted—the United Nations reviews human rights violations in a broad range of countries, from Uganda to Uruguay, from Burma to Ethiopia.

Of course, members of this commission bicker and argue about means and ends, but that is no reason for us to condemn this UN Commission or lecture other UN members about their shortcomings or slow pace. It should be understood that most UN member states are new nations struggling to create the institutions which we take for granted. Rather than chastise these states, we should encourage them. Of course, there is hypocrisy and double standard. Some governments which do not practice all the democratic principles are often condemned by those very governments who do not practice democratic principles at all. And certainly it does not provide sufficient evidence to dismiss what we have accomplished there or predict that nothing will ever be accomplished. The United Nations is not a collective manifestation of homogenous peoples. It is a mosaic of many images, true as well as erroneous. The richness of the respective cultural traditions, political institutions and legal philosophies of its member states make them express subtle differences and differentiate in emphasis.

No, they do not all think like we do, nor are all interests the same or even complementary. But before we take the road to criticize others, we should rather see what we can ourselves do. In the area of human rights, for example, it is we, among all the significant countries, who have not yet ratified the three most important international instruments for the protection of human rights. We the country that need not take second place in our reverence for these rights, have not seen the urgency to ratify the Genocide Convention, the Social and Economic as well as the Political and Civil Covenants.

If there are a lot of things wrong with the United Nations, at least some of them are our own fault. By not ratifying these treaties we have hampered our own efforts, since we are not entitled to participate in the implementing UN bodies these

covenants have established. Yes, there are many things wrong with the United Nations, with the way it works, or rather fails to work.

The President's proposals a year ago on the Reform and Restructuring of the UN System is one of the constructive steps we are taking to make this organization more effective and more responsive to global needs.

The UN Reform proposals we have made were not motivated by a reasoning that preoccupies itself with what is wrong with the United Nations. We are trying to improve the workings of this international organization because of what is right with it, because we would like to see it function better.

Reforms proposed, however, are not reforms accomplished. We have introduced or discussed with other member states several major reform ideas in the past year. The most desirable and feasible among them fall in the category of peaceful settlement of disputes, particularly as they relate to the effective functioning of the Security Council. We have proposed, and have gained the support of the majority of the permanent members of the Council, that the Council be seized more regularly and routinely with issues and events that might prove to be a threat to international peace and security. We have proposed more frequent, informal meetings among the members and one meeting at least each year at the foreign minister level.

These proposals have not been institutionalized. But in actual fact the Security Council has been meeting with increasing frequency on a broad range of issues. For example, over the past several weeks, the Council has held extended discussions about the situation in Southeast Asia, Namibia, South Africa's raids into Angola, Rhodesia, and the Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territories.

Equally significant is our proposal to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping capabilities by exploring the possibility of states earmarking troop contingents trained in peacekeeping functions, and improving training in peacekeeping.

We have been participating in the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on Strengthening the Role of the Organization where several proposals are being discussed to improve the workings of the UN. There have been some significant steps taken to improve the UN's performance and coordination in the social and economic sectors by the creation of the post and appointment of a Director General for Development and Economic Cooperation. In the area of human rights, the Commission is continuing to seek workable means of keeping our proposal for a High Commissioner viable and is promoting continuing improvements in the functioning of the UN Human Rights sector.

The reform process is a slow process. It is not simply a question of our influence we can and should exert. It is also the manner and style through which these reforms take shape and are adopted. Our analyses have shown, and the President pointed out last year, that neither United States nor United Nations interests would be served by drastic reforms through Charter amendments. Most of the reform proposals should not be represented as major watersheds in the UN's steady improvement requiring drastic and dramatic changes. Our strategy is based on a careful progress through practice, application and precedent. Although we have given extensive publicity to our UN reform package, have consulted in capitals and with delegations to the UN; we believe pressure and haste would defeat our objectives.

We cannot reform the UN by wreaking havoc with its system or participating in an emotional campaign on how badly it functions. Reforms will not spring from dissatisfaction but from constructive approaches.

Dissatisfaction only caters to ignorance about global affairs. We must combat that in both the Executive and Legislative branches of our government. I am saddened but not surprised that anti-US sentiments can find receptive audiences in our country. A recent study by UNESCO, and verified by a 1977 Gallup Poll, ranked U.S. students near the bottom, compared to their counterparts in other countries, in comprehension of foreign cultures and affairs.

To reverse this, I believe, you in the Congress and we in the State Department should be much more forceful and articulate about the UN's importance to the American public. The support of this Congress of the UN and this Administration's constructive approach to the UN is a matter of public record. But in addition to funding support—without which the UN is crippled—we need your leadership to help the public understand that our interests are interwoven with those of the UN, to help to be more informed about the states that constitute the international community, their aspirations and needs, and to seek in this interdependent world a steady strengthening of this institution.

Mr. Chairman, it is time to begin to comprehend how much the UN is doing for the United States in economic, political and security matters. Its very existence is tempering influence on big power confrontation and a bridge between the industrialized countries and the Third World. We neither want nor can afford to conduct a foreign policy oblivious to the UN or approach it as if it were yet another field of conflict instead of resolution.

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee will stand in recess for 30 minutes. We'll reconvene at 3.

[A recess was taken.]

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee will come to order.

I apologize to both the witnesses and those in the audience for the interruptions. This is the way we do business in the House, often chaotic but nonetheless we proceed with our schedule.

I do appreciate Senator Moynihan's decision to come back after returning to the other body. He has agreed to return and share with us his thoughts on the United Nations and U.N. reform.

We heard earlier from Ambassador Young, who will return momentarily. We will proceed at this time with the Senator from New York. I might mention, just as a point of introduction, that the Senator, as most people know, served as our official representative to the United Nations, and has a longstanding interest in that body. Senator Moynihan was recently in Europe attending a UNESCO conference and has commented widely on various aspects of U.N. programs.

Senator, we are delighted to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Senator MOYNIHAN. I do thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hall.

As the Senate is equally unpredictable, if not as productive, as the House, I may be summoned at any moment. I wonder if I may put my statement and the attachment into the hearing record at this point and then summarize it for you?

Mr. BONKER. Without objection your statement will be made part of the record. You may proceed.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you for your courtesy.

The purpose of this statement is a simple one. It has to do with this, Mr. Chairman: What we need to keep in mind in our dealings with the United Nations and its associate organizations is that these are institutions founded in the tradition of Western liberal political thought.

President Carter's emphasis on human rights, which we have all very much admired, merely reflect, in fact, obligations which all members of the United Nations undertake when they sign the Charter.

If there is any one central spirit of the institutions which I describe, it is in a curious way procedural. It goes to the way things are done, the way decisions are made, the way situations are assessed.

One of the consequences of the U.N.'s enlarged membership and also the change in political climate in the world is that more and more the United Nations is made up of members whose own political societies are either totalitarian or, at least, not democratic. In a way which is perfectly understandable from their point of view, they have proceeded to distort the procedures of the body. We have not resisted

this or surely, it seems to me, we have not resisted it with the kind of insistence and confidence in our position that we ought to have.

There is one point in particular which I would like to stress today. But let me first say that one of the conspicuous results of all these developments has been the increasing exclusion of Americans as individuals from organizational influence within the body.

You mentioned that I visited UNESCO last December at the end of its biennial conference. Here is an organization which was the very model of liberal, optimistic, democratic expectations. And when I use the word "liberal" I mean it in the large political sense that gave birth to the United Nations. Increasingly the U.N. is under the control of totalitarians whose purposes are absolutely antithetical to those of the organization itself. In the process of taking over, they have, for example, almost completely excluded any American participation in the organization itself.

Although we pay for a quarter of the UNESCO budget, there is not a single American even at the assistant director general level. We don't even have a typist in the Office of the Director General. The Soviets are effectively in control of the largest single division, the education division, such that anywhere in the world, any nation that would turn to UNESCO for help in educational activities is turning to a Soviet organization. The Soviets use it in the most open and direct way. They use it in the most astonishing manner, debasing the very procedures which we associate with such an institution.

There has been, for example, a rather interesting sequence of events having to do with Israel and the Middle East which I comment on only because it shows the pattern. A charge was made against the Israelis for desecrating the artifacts and ruins of previous Islamic cultures during some archeological excavations.

The charge is made. The verdict is "guilty." And a vote is taken. Then, having passed that verdict, they send out for evidence. In this case, they appointed a very respectable Belgian professor, Lemaire, an archeologist at Louvain University, and sent him out to do a study. He came back and reported that this charge was groundless. They got a report which didn't say what they wanted. They suppressed the report. They simply didn't publish the report.

They keep doing things like this almost in a caricature of procedure as we understand it.

Mr. BONKER. Senator, may I ask, is the United States singled out in its lack of active participation in decisionmaking by this body? Or are all Western countries eliminated?

Senator MOYNIHAN. The French keep close to UNESCO. Its headquarters are Paris. The Director-General is from Francophone Africa. The French are fairly influential, but the British seem to me to have lost all influence and in particular we have.

Mr. BONKER. How about Scandinavian countries?

Senator MOYNIHAN. They are not large enough in numbers ever to be very significant. And they are split between always neutralist Sweden. The Swedes will never help you in these organizations; if they have to choose between the Western political tradition or totalitarian traditions, they always somehow come in on the side of the totalitarians. It's a curious pattern.

The one point I would like to make to you, Mr. Chairman, which sums up this fact, this condition that we could spend a long time talking about is that for some time now it has been quite clear that the Soviets have been placing KGB agents in the Secretariat. They have been doing this in direct violation of article 100 of the United Nations Charter.

I can imagine there are many members and many countries that no longer understand why one would complain about this, for the institution is so different from its beginnings that the beginning seems almost totally remote.

Well, I'll tell you why. Because the United Nations was begun with the ideal of an international civil service which would be politically neutral, which would serve the organization and in which individuals would not be representatives, much less agents, of their own country.

To a surprising degree, this was achieved by the League of Nations, which drew its principal Secretariat members from the British and French civil service, which understood the tradition. Indeed that was the only tradition they did know. True enough, the League was not able ultimately to resist the totalitarians, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Communist Russia—but it did not allow itself to be dominated by them. The totalitarians either left the League or were expelled. The League did not give in to totalitarian standards. It said, "We won't do that."

When the U.N. was established it was presumed to continue in this manner. It was specifically written into the charter that no government may seek to influence any member, any national, within the Secretariat. The Soviets have chosen not to do that. I can state with complete confidence that the United States has meticulously obeyed this injunction. In the normal course of things an American Ambassador will know Americans in the Secretariat a little better than he might know some others. But we have no such activities on an organized basis, we deliberately have none.

This matter came to more public light. It has not been much of a secret. But as you know, last May Mr. Chernyayev and a Mr. Enger, the first of the Division of Personnel Administration and the second in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, were arrested by the FBI on espionage charges, along with another Soviet national, a member of the mission. The two U.N. employees were found guilty and have received heavy sentences. So one does not reveal any confidences, when we say this happened.

But something else happened, which I thought was very bad—another part of a pattern of the Soviets, as best I have been able to figure out, to get hold of institutional levers in the best places, such as in personnel departments.

Just last spring, Mr. Chairman, the U.N.'s Secretary General promoted a KGB officer, a Mr. Geli Dneprovsky, from a very high post in the Personnel Division in New York to be head of Personnel in Geneva where, as a matter of fact, the U.N. has more employees than in New York.

Our Ambassador in Geneva for United Nations Affairs, Ambassador Vanden Heuval, protested this. The British Ambassador protested this. They said in effect, "Enough is enough. To put a KGB agent in charge of personnel is to debauch the institution."

Mr. Waldheim went ahead anyway. I think he said something about, "Well, it was up to the Swiss. If the Swiss let him in, it's fine."

Mr. BONKER. Is the person widely known, and officially designated as a KGB officer?

Senator MOYNIHAN. He doesn't wear a badge. It's more difficult, than that to determine, but a couple of years ago two gentlemen wrote a book which dealt with how to tell the CIA agent in an American Embassy. They purchased a little manual on how to tell this person. It works, I can tell you.

It's more difficult with the KGB, but not beyond the analytic capability of anyone who put his mind to it. You follow patterns. Our intelligence services frequently know. Also I think we learn a great deal from the Soviets themselves.

The thing about totalitarian governments is that people flee them. In the case of Dneprovsky, I don't know what our counter-intelligence specialists in this country would have known about it. I didn't know about him. But a Soviet national defected and turned up in Britain and identified these people. After some examination, it all checked out, beyond any possibility of doubt. The Soviets I don't think have denied it. It's beginning to be arrogant behavior on their part.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that in a situation like this we have to protest and say, "We don't like it. It's against the rules. We're trying to build a world that works by rules. This is a violation of it." That's my point.

Mr. BONKER. But if we turned it around, and we had a former CIA agent who is a U.S. citizen working in the United Nations, would that produce a similar problem? In other words, are we precluding citizens who are nationals from being active in world bodies because of their association with an agency?

Senator MOYNIHAN. There's no such thing as a former KGB agent.

Mr. BONKER. I'm beginning to think there's no such thing as a former CIA agent.

Senator MOYNIHAN. One can work for the CIA and leave it. Most people who are public employees and are free to go wherever they want. The question here is, this is the Soviet Government placing an espionage agent in the United Nations and why we are doing nothing about that kind of behavior. The impression is made that we accept it, that we have agreed to it. Indeed, if we were to start making difficulties right now, the Russians, perhaps with some reason, would say, "This is a provocation. Long usage has given us the right do to this and now you are trying to take it away." We shouldn't have allowed that usage in the first place.

But if we let it continue—and it is my impression that it has accelerated—we are going to discover that we have international organizations which are completely run by Soviet spies. They will do their job with reasonable agility. They don't want to be Director General. They don't want to be anything too conspicuous. They just want to be head of personnel departments. And that organization will become actively engaged in an assault upon the political and ideological principles which the organization was designed to further when it was established.

I would suggest to you that nothing would more quickly erode our confidence in these institutions. I think we have to show a respect for these organizations. That involves, among other things, occasional indignation, when people abuse and violate the principles on which they are established.

Mr. BONKER. Well, thank you, Senator, for that provocative statement. You certainly have given this subcommittee something to think about.

Ambassador Young, would you care to join in at this time? Or shall we proceed, considering the Senator's schedule, with questions?

Senator MOYNIHAN. I've said about what I have to say. I'm prepared to go over to the Senate and make an argument against imposing a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget. That's what we're doing this afternoon in the Senate.

Mr. BONKER. Would you care to answer some questions?

Senator MOYNIHAN. Please. I'd be happy to.

[Senator Moynihan's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

I am grateful to the subcommittee and its able chairman for the opportunity to offer my views on the issues which surround the United Nations. Having served as Permanent Representative of the United States at the United Nations, I appreciate the practical problems of the day to day management of our relations with that organization. What is more, those relations are carried on in a certain intellectual and cultural context which, itself, has had an often convoluted history. This latter has been a near lifelong interest, having formed the basis for my graduate study at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy where I sought, in a dissertation, to search out the background to the American decision to join the International Labor Organization in 1934.

It is now some six decades since the United States declined to join the League of Nations, that child of Woodrow Wilson's imaginative vision of a world where relations among states might be regulated in accordance with law. The United Nations, created in the aftermath of the second great war to engulf our civilization, was more readily welcomed. It was an enterprise of the greatest seriousness, elaborately designed, laboriously thought out, altogether the product of the best in the Anglo-American tradition of both constitutional and international law.

What has happened since then? In late November of last year, I was in Paris and observed the concluding days of the twentieth biennial session of the general conference of the United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. I gave a report to the Senate, the full text of which appears in the *Congressional Record* of March 19. (Page S 2965.) Simply put, I offer the thesis that United States intellectual influence in both UNESCO and the United Nations at large has declined dramatically, that this decline stems, in the realm of ideas, from an accelerating unwillingness of the United States to propound and defend the liberal principles which ought properly to govern those organizations. As a consequence, while the organizational forms may be observed, the content of those forms has become increasingly totalitarian rather than democratic, and one conspicuous result of all this has been the exclusion of Americans as individuals from *organizational* influence.

While I do not regard these conditions as beyond remedy, I am drawn increasingly to the conclusion that remedies will not arise spontaneously within the Executive branch without substantial encouragement from the Legislative. For the decline of American influence has been accompanied by a corresponding rise of Soviet influence, and one form of that growth has been especially pernicious. I refer to the presence of agents of the KGB—the Soviet intelligence and security apparatus—within the secretariats of the United Nations organizations.

This, in itself, violates Article 100 of the Charter which, *inter alia*, states that staff "shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization." Article 100 also binds each member of the United Nations to respect this stricture, and "not to seek to influence (the

staff) in the exercise of their responsibilities." I submit that the Secretary-General, and our own government for that matter, have failed utterly to see that these provisions of the Charter are enforced.

If I may cite two paragraphs from my report to the Senate:

"For example, on May 20, 1978 Rudolf P. Chernyayev, a member of the Training and Examinations Service in the Division of Personnel Administration, and Valdik A. Enger, a Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs (Unit for Coordination and Political Information), were arrested by the FBI on espionage charges that they paid \$16,000 for secret Navy antisubmarine warfare documents. A third Russian citizen, Vladimir P. Zimyakin, who was attached to the Soviet Mission at the UN, was also picked up, but was subsequently released because he had diplomatic immunity. On October 14, 1978 the two Soviet UN employees were convicted and six days later were sentenced to fifty years imprisonment each. At the U.S. Government's request, the two were freed pending their appeals. (Mr. Chernyayev, at the P3 grade enjoyed a salary of approximately \$34,000, and Mr. Enger, at the P4 level, received approximately \$41,000.)

"It will also be remembered that in June of 1978, there were press reports describing the disappearance of Valdimir Rezun, an attaché at the Soviet mission in Geneva. He surfaced two weeks later in Great Britain, having been granted political asylum, with his wife and two children. On June 29, 1978, West German newspapers reported that Rezun had identified several important Soviet international civil servants as agents of the KGB, the Soviet secret police. Mr. Geli Dneprovsky, who was Deputy Chief of Services in the Division of Personnel Administration received between \$38,000 and \$48,000 at his P5 grade, was one of those so identified; he was slated to become Chief of Personnel Administration of the UN's European headquarters in Geneva. The Secretary-General of the United Nations delayed his transfer to Geneva on July 5, 1978 pending his investigation into the allegations. On August 29 of 1978, Mr. Dneprovsky assumed the post of UN personnel director in Geneva along with its \$100,000-plus salary; Mr. Waldheim had decided he would leave the decision to bar Dneprovsky's entry into the country up to the Swiss. Western protests about Dneprovsky's espionage affiliations had apparently been unavailing."

Now this much is clear: if Soviet-American détente means anything if the United Nations Charter means anything, the Soviets should get their KGB spies out of the UN.

But they are unlikely to do so unless they perceive some cost—and unless other members of the UN also begin to perceive some cost—to their continued presence. There is no reason whatever for American spokesmen to be reticent on this issue. We ought to say to the Secretary-General in private, quiet session—and to the membership of the United Nations in public, blunt session—that the Russians are in gross violation of the Charter. We ought to make a large point of it, plain and simple. And we ought to make it clear that the United States will no longer subsidize such Soviet violations.

I shall next week, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee comes to consider the State Department authorization legislation which includes authority for our assessed contributions to the UN, testify before the Committee and propose what I regard as helpful action by the Congress. We ought to have in the law a provision that would oblige the United States to withhold from its assessed contributions its portion of funds spent in violation of Article 100. If, for example, we contribute about a quarter of an organization's budget and we find that a salary is being paid a secretariat member who does not operate in accordance with the injunctions of Article 100, we can reduce our contribution by an amount equal to one quarter of that individual's salary. The amounts involved, in total, would of course depend on the scale of the violations.

The Senate and the House are already on record in support of such a concept as it relates to other abuses within the United Nations system. On June 28, 1978, the Senate adopted without objection an amendment I offered to the State Department authorization of that year. My amendment said that the United States would reduce its contribution by an amount equal to its proportionate share of the funds spent on two PLO fronts at the United Nations—the "Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People," and the "Special Unit on Palestinian Rights." The House-Senate conference which then ensued adopted a hortatory provision, perhaps because the Administration had indicated its opposition to the work of these PLO instrumentalities and to American support thereof. On March 13—just nine days ago—Congressman Lester Wolff introduced an amendment in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, now

adopted, which is almost identical to the provision adopted by the Senate last year, and which Mr. Wolff had himself proposed in the House committee last year as well.

In my judgment, actions of this sort can have a salutary effect. Here, I will briefly mention our recent history with the International Labor Organization. In November, 1978, when I was Permanent Representative, it fell to me to draft the letter to the ILO which gave the required notification of our intention to withdraw. The ILO, it will be recalled, had become consumed with anti-democratic, anti-Israel polemic. In this, it had violated its own norms of due process, and become arbitrary in the extreme with respect to the abuses it would consider. So, in November 1977, the two year period of notification expired, and we withdrew. Since then there have been encouraging developments, confirming what we wrote to the ILO in 1975, namely, that our intention to withdraw reflected the hope that we would like to reaffiliate. For in June 1978, the General Conference of the ILO, for the first time rejected the customary resolution attacking Israel. At a meeting of the ILO's Governing Body in November 1978, a report was issued saying that Czechoslovakia had violated Article III of the ILO regarding non-discrimination in employment. The General Conference of the ILO meets again this coming June. We will pay special attention to how the ILO deals with the general subject of violations of ILO provisions in the countries of the Soviet bloc and in the so-called Third World.

My main point is simple: there was a time when we took the United Nations and its agencies seriously, and we must start to take them seriously once again. We must indicate that we are prepared to defend the Charter, and that we will act when it is violated. When we do this we show not our contempt for the world body, but our respect for it and its real purposes. And we show that purpose is not the weakening of the world organization, but rather, its revitalization.

SENATOR MOYNIHAN'S UNESCO TRIP REPORT (S. Doc. No. 96-16)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, at the end of the 95th Congress, I visited Europe to discuss with our representatives there important issues certain to become more prominent as the 96th Congress pursues its work. In Geneva, I met with our negotiators both at the SALT talks and at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations I also visited Paris, where the 20th session of the United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization was about to conclude. Having served as Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, I was especially interested in the importance of those proceedings.

I have prepared a report which summarizes the condition of UNESCO as I now find it, and I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks, and printed as a Senate document.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, it might be of interest that I discuss at some length the question of the blatant Soviet infiltration of KGB agents into the civil service—if we may use that term—of the United Nations system. This placing of Soviet spies in the United Nations is a direct violation of article 100 of the United Nations Charter. It is conspicuous. It is not avowed, but it is well known.

Only last winter, two Soviet spies were convicted in an American court of espionage. Both were employed in the U.N. Secretariat.

Most recently, and more egregiously, a member of the KGB has been put in charge of personnel for the United Nations activities in Geneva. I might note that the Geneva activities of the U.N. are greater than those located at New York.

Those of us who hope that the United Nations might be taken seriously in the world must also hope, I think, that our Government and other democratic governments would take seriously this violation of the charter and one of its most fundamental provisions, which is that the United Nations' Secretariat shall not be perverted to political uses of any one power, least of all a power whose behavior is so at odds with the human rights standards set forth in the charter.

EXHIBIT 1.—UNESCO TRIP REPORT

During the Senate recess in late 1978, I visited Paris (November 28–December 2) for the last days of the twentieth session of the General Conference of the United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. UNESCO's biennial conferences have earned a particular reputation. To some appearance the traditional forms and procedures of the organization are still observed, but the content of its activities has altered profoundly since its founding a generation ago.

UNESCO was founded in 1946. Like the United Nations Charter itself, it was the creation of western beliefs about the kinds of societies which ought to exist as a matter of right. That post-war generation was unambiguous; what it envisioned was a liberal world order, built on liberal principles and constitutional doctrines with which everyone was then familiar. Having served as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, I could not have been unaware of this history. After my term of service had ended, I published, in the summer of 1976, an article in the Harvard Journal of International Law entitled "Abiography at Turtle Bay." What we needed to remind ourselves, I wrote:

"* * * is that the Charter is a constitutional document utterly opposed in spirit and hostile in its provisions to totalitarianism. The Orwellian inversion of language has progressed so far in our time that it is easy to assume that no enduring meaning is to be attached to words of any sort, but this is a mistake. The meaning of the Charter is clear. It is a constitutional document drafted in the tradition of Western societies. The similarities with the United States Constitution are obvious enough:

"We the people of the United States * * *

"We the peoples of the United Nations * * *

"The Anglo-American stress on 'fundamental human rights,' on 'the dignity and worth of the human person,' and on 'the equal rights of men and women' is encountered at the outset of the documents and recurrently thereafter. The Charter takes as a given those propositions about 'human rights and * * * fundamental freedoms for all,' which are the common philosophical foundations on which the democratic societies of the West have been constructed. If the Soviets signed, so much the worse for them. In doing so, they undertook as did all others, to promote, through the United Nations, respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion * * *"

The democracies have lost their majority in the United Nations, and the new majority—consisting of states either totalitarian or authoritarian in their internal organization—find themselves in a curious situation. They know that in the strictest sense, their internal systems disqualify them from membership in the organization they are nonetheless coming to dominate. They know that so long as they control the writing and promulgation of United Nations pronouncements on the subject of political principles, their violations of the Charter will go unaccounted. Yet they know, too, that the truth of the matter is against them and, therefore, just as lies must be promulgated, truths must be suppressed.

To enter the world of the Paris meetings in late November and early December 1978 was to come face to face with this process in action. Two matters before the Conference were especially illustrative. The first had to do with UNESCO's effort to promulgate a "Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War." The second concerned two areas of Israeli policy on the West Bank of the Jordan—the state of education and culture in the territory, and the conduct of archaeological investigations in the City of Jerusalem.

Both of these matters had been treated with the trappings of solemnity and high purpose. The forms of objective inquiry had been preserved. Panels of experts and advisers had been convened and their findings were duly reported to the UNESCO secretariat that had commissioned them. But observance of the traditional forms of inquiry—superficially in accordance with the liberal principles which are supposed to undergird UNESCO—was in fact very misleading. As I shall note in greater detail, the exercise in the case of the mass media led toward the adoption of a text which gave away much to the totalitarian bloc, but produced nothing in the way of strengthening the position of the free press in the world; the exercise, in the case of Israeli behavior on the West Bank, led to the adoption of condemnatory resolutions—even though the "experts" convened to study Israeli action had actually concluded that the charges made against Israel were essentially groundless.

The Israeli case, as we shall also note in greater detail, confirms the current *modus operandi* of the organization: certain governments make an accusation against one of the democracies (in this case Israel); the accusation, upon analysis, is found to be a lie; the evidence of the lying is suppressed, and the organization proceeds as if the lie were true in the first place.

It is particularly difficult for Americans to understand that this, in fact, is what is happening. The difficulty is at once simple and complex. The reason is that the forms are still ongoing in UNESCO, which allows us to believe, and to hope, that

what we see there is a temporary aberration which will soon exhaust itself. The more complicated reason is that we do not really understand the importance of this area of "foreign policy" to the overall well-being of the United States and of the other democracies.

For years, the affairs of the United Nations have been regarded as "low politics"—"high politics" being the issues of national security, Soviet-American negotiations, of weapons procurement decisions, or whatever. Matters relating to what the Soviets like to call the "ideological struggle" were always given for lower standing. A Foreign Service Officer, for example, if he were bent on establishing a reputation as a "serious person" so as to advance his career, was well advised to avoid the tedium of international organizations affairs. The United Nations was regarded by the "hardheaded" and "toughminded" as something akin to an irrelevant sideshow, where the only thing that went on was "mere talk".

Our difficulties in international organizations these days are, in part, the result of these attitudes. The United Nations has become a place where the democracies find themselves under a constant, unremitting, ideological and political attack designated to advance the interests of the totalitarians. The themes are manifold—to show the United States as weak and isolated in the world; to establish the legitimacy of totalitarian practices so that those practices can go on undisturbed by criticism or rebuke; to convince as many nations as possible that the "real" balance of power in the world is shifting from the liberal democracies toward the totalitarian states so that those nations will be more accommodating to the strategic and foreign policy ambitions of the Soviet Union especially; to discredit those states which have close relations with the United States in strategically significant areas of the world, so as gradually to force a retreat by the United States from whatever "forward positions" it holds. Thus in the first instance I mentioned, that of the mass media declaration, the purpose was to redefine the language of the Charter in a way that would make it appear that "real freedom" was present only in the totalitarian world, not in the democratic one. In the second instance, that of Israel, the purpose was to discredit what is, after all the sole surviving democracy in the Middle East.

THE DECLARATION ON THE MASS MEDIA

The emergence of the "mass media" as an international issue has been superbly documented by Leonard Sussman, executive director of Freedom House, in his book *Mass Media and the Third World Challenge*. (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1977)

Indeed, the history of the "controversy" reveals the persistent effort of the Soviet Union to gain international acceptance for the doctrine—to quote from a Soviet draft submitted to the 1976 UNESCO biennial conference at Nairobi—that "states are responsible for the activities in the international sphere of all mass media under their jurisdiction."

The Soviets raised the issue of "mass communication policies" in UNESCO as early as 1970. At the 1972 biennial meeting, the Soviet Union and Beyelorussia introduced a resolution calling on UNESCO's Director-General to prepare a draft declaration on "the fundamental principles of the mass media with a view to strengthening peace and international understanding and combatting war propaganda, racialism and apartheid." This Soviet formulation was to remain the working title of the project through 1978 until a so-called "compromise" was finally adopted by the organization. But at this stage, the UNESCO process was still grinding away.

A new draft was produced in March, 1974; it was considered at the 1974 biennial meeting, and postponed once again. Another panel of "experts" from 85 countries met in Paris in December 1975. Their draft still incorporated the Soviet phraseology regarding the state responsibility for the activities of the mass media. Yugoslavia proposed and secured adoption of an amendment to the draft preamble recalling General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted on November 10, 1975, which had declared Zionism to be a form of racism and racial discrimination. For this reason the United States, Australia, Canada, Norway, and the members of the nine European Economic Community countries withdrew from the meeting.

The nineteenth biennial session of the UNESCO General Conference convened in Nairobi on October 26, 1976, and ended its work on November 30. The draft declaration on the mass media was placed before the meeting. The draft still enshrined, in Article XII, the Soviet principle of state responsibility over the media; the equation of Zionism with racism still remained in the preamble. The draft, to

quote Ambassador John Reinhart's report on the proceedings, was "replete with directives on the uses and specific responsibilities of the mass media which generate connotations of government manipulation and control."¹

Against this background, the inevitable parliamentary maneuvering began. It ended with the adoption of a resolution postponing the matter until the next general conference, and instructing the Director-General of the organization to prepare for 1978 a new draft in "broad consultation with experts." In familiar fashion, the United States regarded this as a victory for our side. Indeed, the official report of the United States delegation to the Nairobi meetings noted with exuberance that "the results of the 19th General Conference with regard to communications were indeed salutary for they indicated a willingness on the part of a large majority of member states to avoid sterile and disruptive political debate in favor of identifying specific problem areas and in seeking ways to solve them."²

"Indeed salutary." The same official report had predicted that in the intervening two years there would be a host of UNESCO activities which would "afford greater insights into the various problem areas and help UNESCO in finding step-by-step solutions in a calm and rational way". What really happened was that the Director-General convened his panel of experts—headed by Sean McBride who, *inter alia*, is a recipient of the Lenin Peace Prize. Then, in the fall of 1977, a "new" draft began to be circulated. It retained the same Orwellian title, and the same blatant totalitarian content. The "salutary" outcome of Nairobi was shown, in fact, to have been but another stage in a continuing offensive.

Nothing better illustrates the by now institutionalized willingness to perceive what these disputes are really about than the official American response to the renewed effort against press freedom. We have noted the origins of the campaign in the Soviet Union in 1972; by 1976, we had allowed the issue to be transformed into one involving the "third world" and the "developed world." This, of course, had happened before at the United Nations. The Soviets were the primogenitors of the notion that Zionism was a form of racism; as early as 1971, Soviet propaganda had begun to depict Israel in the role of Nazi Germany. The Soviets also supplied the analytical framework, if we can call it that, for the discussion of the so-called "New International Economic Order," whereby all Third World economic ills were attributable to "neocolonialism." The Communist countries excused themselves, accordingly, from any participation in the funding for Third World economic development. And, now again, an East-West conflict over political principles was allowed to become another "North-South" dispute.

As the issue of the mass media unfolded, we seemingly agreed that we were involved in a dialogue with Mr. Masmoudi of Tunisia, chief "third world" theoretician of the "New World Information Order." We were in fact involved in a struggle with the Soviet Union over the definition of terms employed in world politics. But because we had come to see this as a problem involving our relations with the "Third World," we countered with a solution born of our perceptions of our relations with those countries which *we* could resolve by our acts of penance. In a word, we redefined a totalitarian challenge as a problem belonging to the realm of "foreign aid" and "developmental assistance", not to the realm of the truly ideological. Thus, on November 3, 1978, the United States unveiled what the *Washington Post's* correspondent called a "three part program to help overcome what Western governments have come to agree are legitimate Third World grievances that the world's media are monopolized by the advanced industrial nations."

The three parts are instructive: first, a new satellite program for such countries to beam programs to their remote areas; second, a program to establish regional centers to train third world journalists; third, establishment of a new international organization to coordinate the efforts of advanced countries in improving the media of less developed nations. In that the prospective recipients of this assistance are overwhelmingly states where political liberty is absent, what do we propose? Do we seek to strengthen the world's free press by aiding state propaganda agencies? Do we propose to commit our resources and the resources of international bodies to the subsidizing of media operations built on anti-democratic principles? Such is the matter whereby we seek respite for ourselves in these gatherings.

Once again, however, the *forms* were observed. The latter days of the Paris meetings once again saw the predictable parliamentary maneuverings. They began a "compromise" declaration which won overwhelming approval on November 22,

¹ Report of the United States Delegation to the 19th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, prepared by Richard K. Nobbe, submitted to the Secretary of State, Apr. 6, 1977, p. 33.

² Report on the 19th session * * * p. 37.

1978. (The full text of the declaration appears in Appendix A of this report.) It will be argued that the "compromise" is less noxious than the original, but in reading it, one still encounters the preponderant language of world politics of this period—Marxist-Leninist Russian as rendered into United Nations English. The document, in sum, was rightly described by the *New York Times* in an editorial of November 27, 1978 as "an affront to the very idea of communication." The *Washington Post*, in an editorial of the same day, called it, "a clear erosion of the favor and protection [the American news media] were accorded three decades ago by the UNESCO Charter."

No matter. One fully expects that when the official report of the United States delegation to the twentieth session of the UNESCO General Conference is finally written, it will echo the report of the nineteenth session—whose obtuse optimism we have already encountered. And two years from now, the process will probably repeat itself yet again. An outrageous demand will be served upon us: we will agree to, say, thirty percent of it, and then applaud ourselves for not having given "them" the other seventy percent.

Thus, as Roger Tatarian, former editor-in-chief and vice president of United Press International, stated in an article in the *Washington Post* of February 24, 1979:

"It is now abundantly clear that many member states, largely from the Communist bloc and the developing world, do not regard the declaration as an end in itself—as Western journalists had hoped—but rather as the beachhead for another thrust toward regulation of news."

Indeed, listen to one American representative describe what occurred in Paris in November 1978, as he spoke less than two weeks later. George Daller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs, spoke on December 4, 1978, to the United Nations General Assembly Special Political Committee in New York. The adoption of the mass media declaration in Paris, Mr. Daley said, "signified the triumph of cooperation over confrontation and laid the foundation for a more equitable information order." The United States, he commented, "sincerely desires this pattern to continue."

If it so desires, how can this pattern not continue?

THE RENEWED ASSAULT AGAINST ISRAEL

Though the mass media "controversy" was the most widely reported issue raised at the UNESCO conference, it is important to call attention to some other representative events at the Paris meetings. Routine and predictable, but no less pernicious for that, are, for example, UNESCO pronouncements on the subject of "race and racial prejudice." Such pronouncements derive, in the main, from General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted on November 10, 1975—the notorious resolution which declared Zionism to be a form of racism and racial discrimination. That one act has corrupted all United Nations actions on the subject ever since. Since the equation of Zionism with racism makes Israel an illegitimate state as far as the UN majority is concerned, it therefore follows that Israel has acquired a special role as the subject for an unrelenting campaign of slander and condemnation.

The issues of note relating to Israel were raised at the meetings and the manner with which they were handled speaks volumes for the modus operandi that has become depressingly commonplace in UNESCO. In 1974, Israeli excavations in Jerusalem had been condemned for "altering the historical features of the City." A similar resolution was passed in 1976, and UNESCO financial assistance to Israel—amounting to \$12,500—was cut off. The 1974 action had led to a public law, which withheld U.S. contributions to UNESCO until a presidential determination could be made asserting that the organization "has taken concrete steps to correct the recent actions of a primarily political character." President Ford made the necessary determination in December of 1976 and, last year, the U.S. resumed its contribution of one quarter of the UNESCO budget.

It is not clear what UNESCO made of the avowed U.S. sensitivity on this subject; its actions seem unaffected. The Associated Press reported as follows on November 27, 1978:

"In a 55-6 vote, with 27 abstentions, the conference plenary session approved a resolution condemning what it claims is the systematic cultural assimilation of Arabs living in the territories Israel has occupied since the 1967 war."

(It should be recorded that the six "no" votes were Australia, Canada, Honduras, Israel, Paraguay, and the United States. That is all.)

What makes this event so revealing is the fact that the Director-General of UNESCO had in his possession a report he had himself commissioned, and which

refuted the allegations—but which the Director-General had chosen not to release. The report was written in the main by Paul-Marc Henry, a former deputy director of the United Nations Development Program and now special advisor at the Center for Research for International Development at Paris.

To understand how the Henry report came to be suppressed, and what its suppression signifies, I cite in *extenso* a report on the episode prepared by Andre Lwoff of France, a Nobel Laureate in medicine and president of the International Committee for the Universality of UNESCO:

"On November 22, 1976, the nineteenth General Conference of UNESCO once again expressed its concern about the conditions of the populations in the Arab territories occupied by Israel, on the grounds that these populations 'do not fully enjoy their inalienable rights to education and to cultural life in harmony with their normal aspirations and their national identity.' The General Conference asked the Director General to send a mission to study the situation and the Israeli Government gave its agreement for the dispatch of a group of experts composed of:

1. Paul-Marc Henry (France), special adviser at the Center of Research for International Development, Paris (head of mission);

2. Samuel Cookey (Nigeria), former member of the Executive Board of UNESCO and former Director of the Department of Education Commonwealth Secretariat, London;

3. Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez (Spain), Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the University of Madrid;

4. Pierre De Senarclens (Switzerland), Professor of Contemporary History at the Faculty of Political Science, Lausanne University.

5. Vladimir Velebit (Yugoslavia), former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Jacqueline Henin was entrusted with the task of assisting the mission in its work.

Paul-Marc Henry sent the experts' report to the director general on April 1, 1978 and, on April 17, his own report, the text of the 'mission's report.'

The Executive Board met at the beginning of June 1978. On the morning of June 6, a United States representative asked why the report of the head of mission had not been distributed. The Director General of UNESCO replied that the head of mission had not handed over a report but only a confidential letter passing on the reports of the other members. On the same afternoon of 6 June the United States delegate reiterated his request in urgent terms and the Director General then found himself forced to react 'to observations concerning a document which was reported (sic) to have been drafted by the head of the mission.' The Director General of UNESCO said he had in fact received 'a draft report which set out to provide a synthesis.' It was out of concern, for objectivity, he said, that he preferred not to issue the Henry Report, which he did not consider a satisfactory synthesis. But why then did he deny its existence?

Since the situation had become embarrassing, the Director General then considered himself obliged to add that the mandate which he had received consisted of sending a fact finding mission and that he was not required 'properly speaking' (sic) to submit a report either to the Executive Board or to the General Conference. He added that in future it would be up to the General Conference to decide whether a report ought to be published or not. However, if the report were not issued, on what basis could the General Conference base its decision? Probably on the opinion of a member carefully chosen by the automatic majority, such as the one, for example, who declared during the discussions that the observations of the members of the commission 'bore the stamp of a praiseworthy but excessive (sic) concern for impartiality.' But this was not always the case. Thus one can read in the Henin Report the following passage: 'Arab books are reported (sic) to have been reprinted in Israel under the signature of Israeli authors.' This charge is patently based on gossip and it is not the only case of its type. It was probably to give this document more weight that UNESCO gratuitously endowed Mrs. Henin, a lecturer, with the title of Professor at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations.

Since it was published, the Henin Report was judged satisfactory. One might have thought that the Henry Report, which was said to be unworthy of publication, is of particularly low quality. Fortunately—or unfortunately—this report mysteriously reached Reuters News Agency and found its way onto my desk. The ways of Providence are impenetrable. A reading of this report makes everything clear. One understands why the Director General of UNESCO, after

denying the existence of the Henry Report, describes it as a draft and an 'unsatisfactory' synthesis. The report indeed suffers from 'excessive impartiality' and one can be sure it would have displeased the automatic majority. Perhaps this is why it has not been published.

However that may be, here is an attempt at a synthesis of the experts' principal conclusions. In the Gaza Strip and Sinai, since 1967, the number of schools and pupils has risen respectively from 199 to 347 and from 80,000 to 136,000. On the West Bank of the Jordan, it has risen from 1,188 to 1,548 and from 154,296 to 230,736. Besides this, four universities have been created—there was none before 1967. The quality of teaching has not deteriorated; on the contrary, and "the mission was unable to detect the slightest violation, restriction or obstacle to freedom of religious teaching or human rights, and nothing justifies charges against the Israeli authorities of systematic action against the cultural identity of the populations."

I have obtained a copy of Mr. Henry's report, and the full text of it is reprinted in Appendix B.

A similar procedure was employed by UNESCO when it took up the question of Israeli archeological activity in Jerusalem. Once again, I have reference to the observations of Dr. Lwoff:

"It is on the soil of Israel that the Jewish, Moslem and Christian religions were born. Jews and Arab are Semites and both consider themselves descendants of Abraham. According to a famous phrase, Christianity is an Essene doctrine which has made good, and all the founders of Christianity were Jews. It is not surprising that the capital of Judea, the holy city, has attracted archeologists throughout the ages. Between 1863 and 1967 there were 46 digging companies and nine between 1967 and 1973. Dominicans and Franciscans dig, Armenians dig. American, English, Swedish schools have dug. No criticism has ever been lodged against the diggings except, however, those carried out under the authority of the Israeli Government. This has been the target of numerous complaints from Arab countries, and particularly from Jordan and Morocco which accuse these diggings of imperiling Moslem monuments. The report of Professor Lemaire, who was entrusted with a mission by the Director General of UNESCO, gives short shrift to the charges leveled against the Israeli diggings.

The important fact is that no monument—Moslem or otherwise—has been damaged or endangered by these explorations. The diggings have produced many discoveries. Discoveries concerning the First and Second Temples dating back 27 centuries. Discovery of a building from the period of the Crusades. Discovery of a sixth century church which Justinian decided to have built. Discovery of Moslem buildings built by Abd El Melik. Discovery of a wall which has made it possible to trace the site of Jerusalem's first city wall. In the terms of a representative of the Director General of UNESCO (Report 19 C 113), 'the diggings were conducted with technical and scientific skill by specialists who knew their job.'

A UNESCO General Conference has also recognized that the diggings do not represent a danger for the monuments. Resolution 3.427 proclaims in effect that the diggings 'represent a danger as a result of the illegal occupation' of Jerusalem. It is impossible to be so clear without seeking to do so.

UNESCO's task is to promote science and culture and the Jerusalem diggings reflect the very spirit of its constitution.

THE LEGAL POINT OF VIEW

The General Conference of UNESCO wanted to found its successive condemnations on legal grounds. So it is appropriate to adopt a lawyer's approach.

The question of archaeological diggings was discussed during the negotiations for the Hague Convention in 1954, but the discussion did not produce an agreement. However, Article 39 the Hague Convention defines the procedures which must be followed to modify or amend the Convention. Indeed, the committee of experts appointed by UNESCO to prepare the 1956 Conference made the following remarks: 'The question (of diggings) raises complex problems which ought to be studied with the utmost care and which could only be solved by adopting arrangements embodied in a convention.' The 'recommendation concerning international principles for archaeological diggings adopted by the 1956 UNESCO General Conference can in no way be considered as an amendment or a complement of the Hague Convention. The procedure provided for in the Hague Convention for changes or amendments has not been enforced.

Furthermore, the representative of the Director General declared during the 18th session (1974) of the General Conference of UNESCO: 'First of all, it is appropriate to remark that the Hague Convention of 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property contains no provision which expressly forbids archaeological diggings in occupied territory. However, it is exact that a provision which appears in a recommendation adopted by the General Conference in 1956 'recommends occupying powers to refrain from undertaking diggings in occupied territory. It is not up to the Director General or the Secretariat to interpret these texts.'

The General Conference of UNESCO which followed, in no way took these remarks into account. The 1956 resolution served as the basis for many later resolutions and recommendations and as the basis for the condemnations which followed. *However, in no case can a resolution or recommendation of a UNESCO assembly, even the General Conference, take the place of an international convention.* The fact remains that since 1974 Israel has been the object of repeated sanctions and all assistance from UNESCO in the fields of science, education and culture has been withdrawn from it. The nineteenth General Conference (Nairobi, 1976) and the twentieth (Paris, November 1978) have once again voted and reaffirmed the sanctions. However, contradicting itself in an absurd manner, the General Conference, while condemning and applying sanctions against Israel, simultaneously asks for its cooperation, for example concerning education in the occupied territories.

UNESCO has given birth to a pyramid of resolutions, recommendations, condemnations and sanctions, all of which lack any legal basis or grounds in law. The pyramid is balanced on its point which is supported by a vacuum.

I may offer a personal note. From December 8-10 I was in Dublin where I received word of the death of former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, and was asked by the President to be a member of the official United States delegation to her funeral. I reached Israel on December 11. After Mrs. Meir's funeral, I toured the archaeological sites in Jerusalem. I might also add that my wife, Elizabeth, visited these very sites last November and stated in a *Washington Post* article of February 20, 1979:

"On November 28, I was in Jerusalem and visited the South Wall with Professor M. Ben-Dov of Hebrew University, now in charge of the site. I have never seen an excavation conducted with such care and historical sensitivity. Far from damaging existing Moslem buildings on the Mount, the Israeli archaeologists have uncovered a previously unknown Islamic palace and complex of five other buildings of the Omayyad period (660-750) adjacent to the Wall. Apparently destroyed in the major earthquake of 747-748, the large buildings were then neglected and forgotten, became buried under debris and eventually built upon by later inferior buildings. Preservation of the remains and schematic reconstruction of the palace have been possible as a result of the painstaking excavations."

MANAGING THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

These episodes, revealing in their face, nonetheless point to another matter which must be of substantial concern. The United States, which contributes its customary one-fourth of the UN budget, seems to have been excluded effectively from the inner workings of the organization. Consider the highest ranks of the UNESCO secretariat. There is a Director General, and he is from Senegal. There is a Deputy Director General, from Spain. Then there are seven Assistant Directors-General, who head the seven sectors into which UNESCO's activities are divided. The head of the education sector is from the Soviet Union, the head of the science sector from Syria, the head of the social science sector from Peru, the head of external relations from Yugoslavia, the head of general administration from France, and the head of public information from Yugoslavia. These are the "commanding heights," and our Frenchman would appear to be the sole "democrat" in the lot. According to the latest Freedom House *Comparative Survey of Freedom*, France is the only one of the above mentioned countries which enjoys a "free" status; of the others, two are "partially free" and three are "not free." (January-February, 1978, Number 44.) More generally, the General Accounting Office surveyed the presence of Americans in UNESCO at the behest of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and its able chairman, Senator Ribicoff, and found, in mid-1977, that of some 71 "managerial" positions, Americans held seven, or about 9.9 percent. The U.S. is underrepresented throughout the UNESCO bureaucracy; even if that underrepresentation could be attributed to a shortage of Americans willing and or able, the exclusion of Americans from the *policymaking level* is clearly a political act.

It is time we took this situation more seriously. Who performs these tasks does make a difference. There are, no doubt, many international civil servants who take seriously their pledge to remain immune from guidance from their own governments. Article 100 of the United Nations Charter is unambiguous as to what and whom UN employees are responsible:

"1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

"2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XV, Article 100.)"

A Soviet national cannot do this, and the question is otherwise moot. Were he of the sort who did not "cooperate" with the Soviet government, it would not allow him to take up the position in the first place.

For example, on May 20, 1978, Rudolf P. Chernyayev, a member of the Training and Examinations Service in the Division of Personnel Administration, and Valdik A. Enger, a Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs (Unit for Coordination and Political Information), were arrested by the FBI on espionage charges that they paid \$16,000 for secret Navy antisubmarine warfare documents. A third Russian citizen, Vladimir P. Zimyakin, who was attached to the Soviet Mission at the UN, was also picked up, but was subsequently released because he had diplomatic immunity. On October 14, 1978, the two Soviet UN employees were convicted and six days later were sentenced to fifty years imprisonment each. At the U.S. Government's request, the two were freed pending their appeals. (Mr. Chernyayev, at the P3 grade enjoyed a salary of approximately \$34,000, and Mr. Enger, at the P4 level, received approximately \$41,000.)

It will also be remembered that in June of 1978, there were press reports describing the disappearance of Valdimir Rezun, an attache at the Soviet mission in Geneva. He surfaced two weeks later in Great Britain, having been granted political asylum, with his wife and two children. On June 29, 1978 West German newspapers reported that Rezun had identified several important Soviet international civil servants as agents of the KGB, the Soviet secret police. Mr. Geli Dneprovsky, who as Deputy Chief of Services in the Division of Personnel Administration received between \$38,000 and \$48,000 at his P5 grade, was one of those so identified; he was slated to become Chief of Personnel Administration for the UN's European headquarters in Geneva. The Secretary-General of the United Nations delayed his transfer to Geneva on July 5, 1978 pending his investigation into the allegations. On August 29 of 1978, Mr. Dneprovsky assumed the post of UN personnel director in Geneva along with its \$100,000-plus salary; Mr. Waldheim had decided he would leave the decision to bar Dneprovsky's entry into the country up to the Swiss. Western protests about Dneprovsky's espionage affiliations had apparently been unavailing.

This is how the United Nations bureaucracy responds when the United States is upset, and upset at a serious matter.

How does it respond when the Soviet Union is upset? The comparison is instructive. I quote some sentences from a news dispatch of December 12, 1978 that appeared in the New York Times:

"A student version of the United Nations General Assembly was barred from the Palais des Nations here today after its opening session yesterday led to a Soviet protest."

The Soviet mission to the international organization in Geneva was said to have objected to the adoption of a mock resolution calling for the ouster of the Ukraine and Byelorussia from the United Nations on the ground that the two republics are an integral part of the Soviet Union. A student delegate, supposedly representing the United Arab Emirates, said that the Soviet Union, like other countries, should have one vote and that the 1945 accord to give it three should be rescinded.

Zoya V. Mironova, head of the Soviet mission, who had been advised of the developments by a staff member, made the protest to the United Nations office.

Luigi Cottafavi of Italy, Director General of the office, then prevented the 500 students, most of them from Swiss and French high schools, from reconvening at the United Nations assembly hall.

Four days later, another dispatch appeared in The Times:

"The United States has questioned the impartiality of United Nations officials who ejected 500 students from the Palais des Nations here at the demand of the Soviet Union.

The United States protest, in a letter signed and delivered by William J. vanden Heuvel, the United States Ambassador, said that Mr. Cottafavi had ousted the students 'in response to pressure from the Soviet Union,' and asserted that the move could only raise 'doubt whether ranking UN officials are capable of maintaining standards of impartiality.'

'My government cannot accept that United Nations officials violate the principles of free debate to appease any one or group of member states,' the letter continued."

An illuminating episode. The UN bureaucracy will not respond to the presence of a Russian spy in its midst; it will, and without delay, evict a group of high school students from its premises—for offending the Russians. Surely, this has something to do with those who work there. But just as obviously, it is not simply a bureaucratic or administrative matter.

This condition is not beyond remedy, but one wonders whether such remedies will arise spontaneously within the Executive Branch without substantial encouragement from the Legislative. It is a matter to which we in the Congress will turn as the pieces of relevant legislation make their way through the two Houses. In particular, I intend to raise before the Senate, as it considers appropriations for the coming year's contributions, the question of withholding funds which will be spent in violation of Article 100 of the UN Charter.

Surely, as a democracy, we have a powerful case to make about these organizations, products as they are of a particular democratic impulse, reflective as they once were of America's status as first power in the world. In this sense, certain things go together. I do not anticipate that the recovery of America's position in world organizations can proceed at a pace much faster than that of the recovery of American self-confidence and self-respect generally, and American power and prestige particularly. But none of these battles is, as yet, irrevocably lost.

APPENDIX A—TEXT OF THE UNESCO COMPROMISE DECLARATION ON A FREE FLOW OF WORLD NEWS

PARIS.—Following is the text of UNESCO's declaration on news organizations as adopted unanimously today by the organization's 20th General Assembly.

Draft declaration on fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the mass media to strengthening peace and international understanding the promotion of human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.

PREAMBLE

The general conference.

1. Recalling that by its constitution the purpose of UNESCO is to "contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Art. I, 1), and that to realize this purpose the organization will strive "to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image" (Art. I, 2).

2. Further recalling that under the constitution the member states of UNESCO, "believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communications between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives" (sixth preambular paragraph).

3. Recalling the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as specified in the charter.

4. Recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and particularly Article 19 which provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers", and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966, Article 19 of which proclaims the same principles and Article 20 of which condemns incitement to war, the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred and any form of discrimination, hostility or violence.

5. Recalling Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965, and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1973, whereby the states according to these conventions undertook to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to indicate all incitement to, or acts of, racial discrimination, and agreed to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their manifestation.

6. Recalling the declaration on the promotion among youth of ideals of peace, mutual respect and understanding between peoples, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965.

7. Recalling the declarations and resolutions adopted by the various organs of the United Nations concerning the establishment of a new international economic order and the role UNESCO is called upon to play in this respect.

8. Recalling the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, adopted by the general conference of UNESCO in 1966.

9. Recalling Resolution 59(1) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted in 1946 and declaring "Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated, freedom of information requires as an indispensable element the willingness and capacity, to employ is privileges without abuse. It requires as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent."

10. Recalling Resolution 110(ii) of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1947 condemning all forms of propaganda which are designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

11. Recalling Resolution 127(ii), also adopted by the General Assembly in 1947, which invites member states to take measures, within the limits of constitutional procedures, to combat the diffusion of false or distorted reports likely to injure friendly relations between states, as well as the other resolution of the General Assembly concerning the mass media and their contribution to strengthening peace, thus contributing to the growth of trust and friendly relations among states.

12. Recalling Resolution 9.12 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1968 reiterating UNESCO's objective to help eradicate colonialism and racialism, and resolution 12.1 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1976 which proclaims that colonialism, neo-colonialism and racialism in all its forms and manifestations are incompatible with the fundamental aims of UNESCO.

13. Recalling Resolution 4.301 adopted in 1970 by the General Conference of UNESCO in the contribution of the information media to furthering international understanding and cooperation in the interests of peace and human welfare, and to countering propaganda on behalf of war, racialism, apartheid and hatred among nations, and aware of the fundamental contributions that mass media can make to the realization of these objectives.

14. Recalling the declaration on race and racial prejudice adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 20th session.

15. Conscious of the complexity of the problems of information in modern society, of the diversity of solutions which have been offered to them, as evidenced in particular by consideration given to them within UNESCO as well as of the legitimate desire of all parties concerned that their aspirations, points of view and cultural identity be taken into due consideration.

16. Conscious of the aspirations of the developing countries for the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order.

17. Proclaims in this *** day of *** 1978 this declaration on fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the mass media to strengthening peace and international understanding, to the promotion of human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.

ARTICLE I

The strengthening of peace and international understanding, the promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism, apartheid and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information. To this end, the mass media has a leading contribution to make. This contribu-

tion will be the more effective to the extent that the information reflects the different aspect of the subject dealt with.

ARTICLE II

1. The exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information, recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international understanding.

2. Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To this end, journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information. Similarly, it is important that the mass media be responsive to concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information.

3. With a view to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to promoting human rights, and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war, the mass media throughout the world, by reason of their role, contribute effectively to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to oppressed peoples who struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign occupation and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their voices heard within their own territories.

4. If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the principles of this declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession.

ARTICLE III

1. The mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.

2. In countering aggressive war, racialism, apartheid and other violations of human rights which are inter alia spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all people, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others, to insure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting the formulation by states of policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and the equitable settlement of international disputes.

ARTICLE IV

The mass media have an essential part to play in the education of young people in a spirit of peace, justice, freedom, mutual respect and understanding, in order to promote human rights, equality of rights as between all human beings and all nations, and economic and social progress. Equally they have an important role to play in making known the views and aspirations of the younger generation.

ARTICLE V

In order to respect freedom of opinion, expression and information and in order that information may reflect all points of view, it is important that the points of view presented by those who consider that the information published or disseminated about them has seriously prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and international understanding, to promote human rights or to counter racialism, apartheid and incitement to war be disseminated.

ARTICLE VI

For the establishment of a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the flow of information, which will be conducive to the institution of a just and lasting peace and to the economic and political independence of the developing countries, it is necessary to correct the inequalities in the flow of information to and from de-

veloping countries, and between those countries. To this end, it is essential that their mass media should have conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and to cooperate both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.

ARTICLE VII

By disseminating more widely all of the information concerning the objectives and principles universally accepted which are the bases of the resolutions adopted by the different organs of the United Nations, the mass media contribute effectively to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to the promotion of human rights, as well to the establishment of a more just and equitable international economic order.

ARTICLE VIII

Professional organizations, and people who participate in the professional training of journalists and other agents of the mass media and who assist them in performing their functions in a responsible manner should attach special importance to the principles of this declaration when drawing up and insuring application of their codes of ethics.

ARTICLE IX

In the spirit of this declaration, it is for the international community to contribute to the conditions for a free flow and wider and more balanced dissemination of information, and the conditions for the protection, in the exercise of their functions, of journalists and other agents of the mass media. UNESCO is well placed to make a valuable contribution in this respect.

ARTICLE X

1. With due respect for constitutional provisions designed to guarantee freedom of information and for the application of international instruments and agreements, it is indispensable to create and maintain throughout the world the conditions which make it possible for the organizations and persons professionally involved in the dissemination of information to achieve the objectives of this declaration.

2. It is important that a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information be encouraged.

3. To this end, it is necessary that states should facilitate the procurement, by the mass media in the developing countries, of adequate conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and that they should support cooperation by the latter both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.

4. Similarly, on a basis of equality of rights, mutual advantages, and respect for the diversity of cultures which go to make up the common heritage of mankind, it is essential that bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information among all states, and in particular between those which have different economic and social systems be encouraged and developed.

ARTICLE XI

For this declaration to be fully effective it is necessary, with due respect for the legislative and administrative provisions and the other obligations of member states, to guarantee the existence of favorable conditions for the operation of the mass media, in conformity with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the corresponding principles proclaimed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966.

APPENDIX B

To the Director General of UNESCO:

DEAR MR. M'BOU. I have pleasure in enclosing herewith, the text of the report on the mission which you designated to visit the Israeli occupied Arab territories. This report has been signed by all the members of the mission and is divided into three parts, including two main annexes (it goes without saying that the texts and documents, which were given to the mission by the Israeli authorities and also by certain Arab authorities, will be added to the final report).

Part I (pages 1 to 17) consists of a general introduction describing the conditions under which the mission was carried out, and includes reflexions (of a general nature) on the situation prevailing in the occupied territories and the different constraints which affect the functioning of the educational and cultural system in these territories.

Part II (pages 18 to 32) is a descriptive section, including the following chapters:

General system of education and teacher-training (paras 26-30);

Higher education (paras. 31-40);

Cultural institutions (paras. 41-43);

Censorship (paras. 44-45);

Recommendations (pages 33 to 36).

Annexes: (one of which has not yet been translated into French):

Annexe I: Educational system (detailed description);

Annexe II: Higher Education (detailed description of existing centres).

I should like to take this opportunity of reiterating the intellectual and moral satisfaction which I have experienced in the accomplishment of this mission, in collaboration with such eminent, qualified and objective colleagues.

I have the honour to be * * *

PART I—GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. The UNESCO General Conference has repeatedly examined the situation of the territories placed under an occupation regime by the Israeli Armed Forces, following the 1967 war.

The relevant Resolutions are as follows:

(a) Resolution 13.1, adopted at the 18th Session;

(b) Resolution 15.1, adopted at the 19th Session.

2. In Resolution 15.1 (22nd November, 1976) the General Conference once again expressed its concern as to the situation of the population of the Israeli occupied Arab territories, who:

“*** do not fully enjoy their unalienable rights to the education and cultural life, commensurate with their normal aspirations and their national identity”.

The General Conference requested the Director General to implement his decision to send a fact-finding mission to the occupied territories to study the situation on the spot, as soon as was practically feasible.

3. After intensive consultation, the Israeli Government (while reserving its position concerning the above-mentioned Resolution) informed the Director General that a group of independent experts—selected and named by him personally—would be invited to visit the occupied territories, in order to be able to submit a report to him which was based on information gathered on the spot.

4. The mandate of this group of experts followed the general terms of the recommendations of Resolution 15.1; that is to say that the group was to “evaluate to what extent the population of the Arab occupied territories had access to the education and culture respecting their national identity.” It was concerned with collecting “on-the-spot information on: the general conditions under which the right to education is ensured and instruction provided in the occupied Arab territories, with particular reference to curriculum content; the nature, origin and content of the text-books used; the numbers, origin, situation and qualifications of teachers; the number and state of educational premises, together with the school-enrollment trend.”

The group was also entrusted with studying the conditions affecting cultural life and especially the means of cultural expression and development available to the population of these territories, the freedom of religious teaching, and the freedom of access to sources of culture and information. To sum up, the task of the mission was to gather on-the-spot “information on the situation of education and that of cultural life”.

Conditions and constraints which affected the progress of the mission in Israel:

5. It was only after prolonged negotiations with the Israeli Government, concerning the composition of the mission and the conditions relating to the operation of their mandate, that the mission were able to go to Israel from 26th February to 7th March, 1978.

It had been agreed that the mission would last for approximately two weeks, that their programme and itinerary would not be determined ahead of time, but would be organized after discussions with the Israeli authorities who were directly concerned locally and on the spot, and who would present certain proposals. Insofar as travelling within the occupied zones was concerned, the Head of mission

would be allowed to take appropriate decisions, while taking the general constraints resulting from the local situation into account.

6. The mission were greeted with great courtesy on the part of the Israeli authorities. The fact must be underlined, however, that the mission operated at the level of the occupation authorities as such, that is to say in conjunction with the military commander of the occupied territories (General Orly) and the subordinate commanders of the different territories—all of whom are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defence.

7. Throughout their entire programme, the mission were accompanied by qualified representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Labour, but from the official point of view, there was no single opportunity provided for a discussion, at an official level and with ministers versed in Government policy, of the attitude towards the occupied territories and their future. *In the circumstances, this attitude is understandable.* The great difficulties that the mission encountered, while trying to conceive feasible plans with regard to certain realistic "scenarios" for the development of the occupied territories and the future of their population, inevitably affected the evaluation of a situation which, however transitory it may appear, remains basically uncertain and problematical.

8. During the first meeting, which was held in Jerusalem, under the chairmanship of General Orly, and in the presence of highly competent representatives of the military government of the occupied territories and of the appropriate ministries, the Israeli authorities' attitude towards the mandate of the mission was clearly defined. The Israeli authorities made a point of insisting on their general reservations with regard to Resolution 151 of the 19th Session of the General Conference while, at the same time, reiterating that the physical presence of the mission in Israel was a proof of the Israeli Government's good-will with regard to the Director General of UNESCO, whose idealistic and objective attitude was much esteemed.

The Israeli authorities proposed an extremely wide programme for visiting scholastic, university, cultural and religious establishments at all levels and in all the occupied regions, while—at the same time—offering to put all logistic means possible at the mission's disposal in order to facilitate their task. The military authorities, being responsible for security, requested to be informed well in advance of any visits which were planned and the consequent movements of the group. It was pointed out that not only the security of the members of the mission was being considered, but security in the widest sense of the term.

9. Confronted with such a situation, the Head of mission and his colleagues, agreed to accept the programme as proposed in its general terms, while stipulating that they reserved the possibility of modifying details at any time by request. At the same time, a list of people the mission wished to have the opportunity of meeting (which had been drawn up in consultation with certain Arab personalities concerned) was given to the Israeli authorities, with the request that they facilitate the contacts (which, generally speaking was done, with the exception of certain people who were met later on in Jordan).

10. On the basis of this general agreement, the military authorities assisted the mission in every way to the best of their ability. They supplied all the automobile and air transport necessary for far-away areas such as Southern Sinai and the Golan Heights.

All the requests put forward by the mission were granted, with the following three exceptions:

(a) It proved impossible for the mission to visit the University of Bir-Zeit as a group. It was only after repeated requests that the mission were finally able to meet Dr. Gari Baramki, Vice Chancellor of the University, in Jerusalem (it was, however, finally possible to assemble all relevant information);

(b) For various reasons, the mission were unable to meet the governmental Commission responsible for censorship, and the information (both written and oral) which the mission were able to gather is quite insufficient;

(c) The Israeli authorities did not deem it necessary to organize contacts with the teaching staff of the different schools, mostly of primary level, which operate under the authority of UNRWA. Here again, certain contacts and visits were able to be organized by the members of the mission without the direct, or indirect, assistance of the authorities.

11. During the first meeting the group had with the commander of the occupied territories, General Orly had assured the mission that they would have free scope to establish contacts considered to be indispensable to the accomplishment of their

mandate. Practically speaking, however, most of the visits took place in the presence—and sometimes even with the active participation—of military or civilian Israelis.

12. The mission feels obliged to mention, however, that in strict contrast with the general climate of discipline and concern for security which obtains in the occupied territories and which did not fail to affect the progress of the mission—in a more or less pervasive way—they nevertheless had many opportunities of meeting outstanding Israeli personalities, from governmental as well as university circles, in an informal and frank atmosphere. On these occasions it was possible to exchange ideas freely and to ask questions which greatly transcended the specific scope of the mission.

During a final meeting with General Orly and his colleagues, the Head of mission expressed their sincere thanks to the Israeli authorities for their extreme goodwill, taking into account the inevitable constraints which are attached to the situation of the occupied territories as such, and also to the nature of the very fact of military occupation, during which security considerations (either long or short term) remain predominant.

Supplementary information collected during the mission's visit to the Arab countries concerned:

13. Following the invitation by the governments of the Arab countries directly concerned, the mission visited the following countries: Jordan, Syria (where they also met the official representatives of the P.L.O.), the Lebanon (in order to discuss the question with the UNRWA Director General and his colleagues) and finally Egypt (where they were able to meet the Secretary General of the Arab League, the leaders of ALECSO, and those of the Association of Arab Universities).

14. It is not our intention to consider here, in detail, the views of the Arab governments and organizations concerned. These views are sufficiently well known, and have been the central pivot of numerous consultations within the context of the debates at the Nairobi General Conference, as well as on certain occasions at UNESCO itself. It must, however, be underlined that the authorities, at the governmental as well as the regional level, showed a great interest in the mission, proved by the very fact that it had been allowed to take place, and that first-hand information had thus been acquired.

The mission were given many documents, and certain statistics were checked out. As far as the very special case of Jerusalem was concerned, the municipal authorities of the town (now living in Amman, as are the exiled religious authorities) expressed their point of view vigorously and with great clarity.

It had also been possible to collect supplementary information (in Jordan, Syria and Egypt) about the level of Palestinian students coming from the occupied territories, about the progress of their studies and about their professional organization in the Arab countries. Given the special links which continue to exist between Jordan and the West Bank now occupied by Israel, and the numerous contacts which continue to flourish between the two banks of the Jordan river, the political and university authorities of Amman are particularly well placed to evaluate the situation and its evolution. Not only that, but, the Jordanian universities represent—to some extent—a valid reference system by which one could measure the relative backwardness of the secondary and higher educational institutions in the occupied zones.

15. While in Damascus, the mission met the Director General of Education for the P.L.O., and also other important officials of the civilian branch of the Organization. At this stage one must point out that the P.L.O. is virtually organized like a government in exile (without having the official legal backing) and is responsible for a Palestinian nation which consists of more than three million people, of whom approximately one million lives in the occupied territories, and nearly two million in the Arab countries, a majority of whom are technically "refugees" in the international sense of the term (that is to say according to the UNRWA criteria ratified by the General Assembly of the United Nations).

Concerning the educational and cultural aspect, the P.L.O. is particularly pre-occupied by the problem of maintaining the cultural identity of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. To this extent the Organization's pre-occupations coincide with the mission's concern in that they fear that an educational and cultural system, directly or indirectly based on an alien environment (that of the occupier) runs the risk of causing it ultimately to lose its true significance. The occupation contributes to the erosion of the Palestinian national identity by favouring the emigration of the young to other countries. While at the same time causing the social integration of students trained in foreign universities to be highly

problematical and, generally speaking, by progressively confirming the occupied territories' economic and social dependence with regard to Israel. One can fully appreciate that as far as the P.L.O. is concerned, the university situation, that is to say the existence of university centres situated in the present occupied territories and corresponding to the long term needs of the Palestinian people, should be a key question. It should be noted, for further information, that the P.L.O. suggest that UNESCO should play a more active role in the occupied territories to ensure that the Palestinians have access to the higher education which they need in order to affirm their autonomy and their identity.

International legal aspects concerning the educational institutions in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967:

16. According to the decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council and the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, concerning the present situation which results from the Israeli occupation of Arab territories following the 1967 war (and including the part of the town of Jerusalem which was occupied by Jordan, according to the demarcation line of 1948 and now "administered" by Israel), these territories are to be considered as "occupied territories". The principles of international law and the standards governing the status of the occupied territories should therefore be applied and, in particular, articles 42 to 56 of the ruling annexed to the 4th Hague Convention (1907) and the 4th Geneva Convention (12th August, 1949).

It would appear relevant to reiterate the main points at issue:

17. According to these principles, although the Occupying Power has no actual sovereignty over the occupied territory it is, in some degree, the "manager" of this territory. In this capacity it has not only rights, but also obligations towards the territory and its inhabitants. One of its most important duties is precisely that of the satisfactory administration of the territory.

Given the fact that the occupation is a durable situation, the occupier must necessarily introduce a certain infrastructure in order to ensure military security and public order, as well as to ensure the functioning of the administration of the territory.

This administrative and management function that the Occupying Power is called on to supply should in no way be substituted for the legal system that was in force before the occupation, which retains its validity in its entirety; the Occupying Power must make no changes to the laws or to the constitution except in cases where it can justify that the maintenance of security and of public order specifically require them.

The occupier must administer the territory taking into account the respect for security and public order, of family rights, of private life, of liberty and religious beliefs, in conformity with article 46 of the ruling at The Hague. The 4th Geneva Convention contains a similar clause in article 27.

The general principle is thus that the personal status of protected persons must be respected. The educational domain is of particular importance in this connection. Modification of the educational system cannot be envisaged without violating article 43 of the Hague ruling.

As far as the 4th Convention is concerned, article 50 states that:

"The Occupying Power, with the help of the local authorities, will facilitate the good functioning of establishments devoted to the care and education of children".

The present article does not specify an age limit for the children concerned; the upper limit of 15 years could be taken as a criterion (this is the age mentioned in the other articles of the Conventions), but the limit could also be interpreted as covering adolescents until the age of their majority.

18. It must be pointed out that Israel refuses to recognize formally that the Geneva Convention, concerning the protection of civilians during wartime, is applicable to the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The Israeli authorities, in fact, maintain that the Geneva Convention stipulates a "partial or total" occupation of "territories belong to one of the signatories of the Convention". Now, as it happens, the occupation of the West Bank (of the Jordan) by the Hashemite Kingdom, and then the annexation of this region by Jordan (the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) in 1950, was recognized in 1967 only by Great Britain and Pakistan. As to the Gaza Strip, ever since 1948 Egypt was only considered as an "Administrative Power". The situation of the Golan Heights, as that of Sinai, is clearer, since in these two cases one is concerned with territories based on Syrian and Egyptian sovereignty respectively, and now occupied for purely military reasons.

As far as Jerusalem is concerned, Israel states positively that the section of the town which came under the jurisdiction of the Jordanian authorities before the

1967 war is now an integral part of Israeli territory. This statement is, of course, a unilateral decision which, however and as from now, comprises certain legal effects on the interior level, since the inhabitants of the ex-Jordanian section of Jerusalem are considered as dependent on the Israeli sovereignty in the same way as the inhabitants of Arab origin living in specifically called Israeli territory since 1948.

Considerations relative to Human Rights:

19. Quite apart from the purely legal aspects of the occupation situation, it must be mentioned that the UNESCO Director General asked the mission to take into account all the aspects of the educational and cultural situation in the territories concerned which have particular relevance to his concern with regard to the protection of cultural values and cultural identity.

At the 19th Session of the General Conference held in Nairobi, the Director General had insisted on "the close connection between past and present", and had underlined "the urgent necessity for the preservation and the promotion of authentic cultural values and for the affirmation of a cultural identity which should be not only specific but open-minded and dynamic". The affirmation of a cultural identity is necessary because "the criterion of all true development is to be qualitative and no longer merely quantitative". In this connection, it is worth recalling that article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to education as a fundamental right. Article 13 of the International Convention concerning economic, social and cultural rights and article 5 of the Convention on racial discrimination are also applicable in this connection.

20. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that:

"Each individual has the right to education. Education must be free, at least insofar as basic and elementary education are concerned. Elementary education is compulsory. Technical and professional education must be generalized; access to higher education must be open in full equality to all according to their merit.

Education must aim at the full blossoming of the human personality, and at the reinforcement of the respect of Human Rights, and of basic freedom. It must favour understanding, tolerance and friendship between all nations and all racial or religious groups, as well as the development of the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

Parents have the right to have priority in the choice of the type of education to be given to their children".

Article 27 of this Declaration protects cultural life in these terms:

"Each individual has the right to take part freely in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to participate in the scientific progress and benefits which derive therefrom."

General remarks about the de facto situation of the occupied territories:

21. It must be remembered that the mission had not been entrusted with making an in-depth study on the facts attacking the Rights of Man in a global sense, but to register these facts insofar as they actually directly affect the educational and cultural institutions. Various reports concerning these facts have been prepared and submitted to the appropriate international authorities, such as the International Red Cross and the United Nations (as to the details concerning UNRWA). The documents collected by the mission will be included as annexes to the present report.

Furthermore, the Israeli authorities do not claim that their presence in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip has met with the approval and agreement of the population concerned. They have not attempted to conceal the difficulties they have encountered with their occupation policy, and have admitted, that in this respect, the first three years of occupation had been extremely difficult. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs pointed out with satisfaction (in its memorandum No. 10, dated February 1974 and entitled "The Administered Territories, Aspects of the Israeli Policy") that since July 1970 "the incidents had practically ceased". This does not prevent the fact that relatively numerous and recent incidents, particularly in the West Bank, prove that a certain tension inevitably results from the continuance of an occupation policy as it is felt by the population concerned. This reality is an important factor in the life and evolution of the educational and cultural institutions of the occupied territories. The requirements of military security lead to repressive measures, some of which are of a particular nature, and which have important repercussions on the educational system of the territories, because they impose a series of constraints which manifestly prevent the free exercise of an independent cultural life.

General remarks concerning the problem of cultural identity:

22. The mission was required to examine whether the Israeli authorities had used the educational and cultural institutions, up to the present time, as the

direct instrument of a policy aimed at modifying profoundly the cultural identity of the occupied population. A special chapter of this report is dedicated to the important question of censorship.

Generally speaking, the policy followed seems to stem from considerations of security rather than from a deliberate desire to undermine the foundations of Arab culture. It would be appropriate at this point to distinguish between Arab culture as such and the cultural aspects of the developing Palestinian identity. It is difficult to separate this question from the more general problem posed by the cultural and political co-existence of a large Arabic-speaking population, of Islamic or Christian religion, in Israel proper. In fact, movement of persons between the occupied zones and Israel proper is in effect totally free. It is also difficult to tell whether the messages diffused at all levels by the Israeli authorities and in all fields (via the mass-media for example, and radio and television in particular) are likely, sooner or later, to undermine the Arabo-Palestinian cultural identity. All that one can say at this stage is, that the capacity for cultural resistance by a dominated and occupied population is necessarily less developed than that of a population which participates fully in the political life of the country.

23. In spite of the fact that the mission had neither the mandate nor the possibility to make a comparison between the conditions existing in the occupied territories, and those which affect the Arab population living in Israel, they were given the opportunity of visiting the Israeli radio-television studios and of ascertaining that there was a tendency towards the development of radio and television programmes in Arabic. On the Israeli side, one can discern a certain leaning towards a form of Hebro-Arabic bi-lingualism in the Israeli territory, which is facilitated by the fact that a large number of Israelis themselves originally came from the arabo-phone regions of North Africa and the Near East.

24. It is impossible to evaluate the cultural importance of the mass-media. Let it be borne in mind, however, that all the populations of the occupied territories, and particularly those in the West Bank, have access to television emitted by the Arab countries, as well as to the radio-diffusion. The effects of these contradictory messages would be well worth an in-depth study, which the mission had neither the means nor the time to undertake satisfactorily.

A certain type of reasoning exists according to which the present problems of co-existence in the occupied zones (like those between Israel and the Arab countries), are the result of the inevitable clashes between a society which is young, modern, democratic, highly developed from the scientific and technical point of view, and whose way of life reflects this development on the one hand and, on the other hand, the traditional Arab civilisation constrained by archaic values advancing at a slower pace along the way traced by the western model followed by the Israeli society. This view is certainly widespread not only in Israel but also in western circles. Without any doubt, this stems from an ethnocentric way of thought, which pre-supposes the existence of only one type of rationality and of one model for society, that being the way of the West. It must be added that this rationality is challenged in Israel, even as it is in the West. The debate on this point is in progress throughout the appropriate UNESCO channels and committees. The mission can only take note.

Descriptive analysis of the systems of education in the occupied Arab territories:

25. The critical and descriptive analysis of the systems of education and of the cultural infrastructure is presented under the following headings:

- (a) The general educational system and teacher training;
- (b) Higher education;
- (c) Cultural institutions.

An analysis of the problem of censorship will be the subject of a special chapter. In the last section, and in the form of a conclusion, recommendations will be presented with regard to a possible orientation of UNESCO's policy concerning the occupied territories.

PART II—GENERAL SYSTEM OF EDUCATION AND TEACHER TRAINING

26. A detailed description of the educational systems in the Gaza Strip and Sinai (which follow the system in Egypt), in the West Bank, which follows the Jordanian system, and in the Golan Heights where the system tends to follow that in Israel, is included as an annex to the present chapter. The main body of information, including the figures quoted, is drawn from a document entitled "Educational and structural situation in the Administered Territories", published by the Ministry of Defense for Israel in November, 1977. Statements made by Israeli authorities, by directors of schools and those officials responsible for educa-

tional establishments visited by the mission, have also been taken into account. Further information has also been gathered from independent sources.

27. As far as education is concerned, the major complaints by Arab countries against education in the occupied territories are that:

(a) The standard of education has declined since the occupation, in comparison with the standards in Jordan and Egypt; the countries which were responsible respectively, until 1967, for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank;

(b) The supply of teachers is inadequate in quantity and in quality, due to unsatisfactory training; and

(c) Teachers and students in the various education institutions suffer a multitude of vexations and are the object of arbitrary sanctions on the part of the military authorities.

28. Given the fact that the mission was a straight-forward fact-finding mission and was neither authorized nor equipped to carry out a thorough inspection or a detailed evaluation, it is far from easy to establish comparisons between the standards of education in the West Bank and Jordan itself for example, or between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. It should have been possible to visit schools of a comparable level in the Arab countries concerned; unfortunately the mission did not have the time to do so and, in any case, such comparisons are not easy to make.

It would appear, however, that the results of the "matriculation" examination could be taken as a valid criterion. According to the statistics provided, by the Israeli authorities, the standards have been maintained, and even slightly improved since 1967. We have received no indication from either Jordan or Egypt contradicting this statement. Indeed, students coming from the occupied zones continue to be admitted into the universities in Jordan and Egypt in the normal fashion. This might indicate that the students coming from these zones have reached an adequate level. It must be noted, however, that a quota system exists which guarantees about 1,000 places for students coming from the Gaza Strip—but the quota is not necessarily filled. Jordan also has its quota for each educational district, the West Bank being regarded as a district for this purpose. The University of Amman organizes intensive courses for all its first year students before they go on to their normal university studies. It would seem that there is very little difference in the level between the students from Jordan and those coming from the West Bank. However, compared with the schools in Amman, the general quality of education of West Bank schools had apparently gone down, relatively speaking. This might well be the case, but to be a valid argument it would seem fairer to compare performance in the West Bank with performance in Jordan as a whole.

As far as the Gaza Strip is concerned, the Egyptian authorities recognize that the quality of education in the area is fairly good and that students coming from this zone do well in the Matriculation examination which is the same as in Egypt and, indeed, administered by the Egyptian education authorities.

29. Generally speaking, the mission received a positive impression from the majority of schools visited in the West Bank and Gaza. Students and professors seem positively interested by their work. The level of the teachers, however, does not always appear to measure up to the required standards. This question definitely merits further study. At all events, it would appear that the Israeli authorities were not making any deliberate attempt to lower the quality of education in the educational institutions in the occupied territories. On the contrary, certain Israeli educators maintained that they could have improved the level and brought the quality of education to the standard reached in the Israeli school system, if the Occupying Power had not been tied down by its obligations to follow the Egyptian curriculum in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, and the Jordanian curriculum and textbooks in the West Bank.

30. However, it seems quite clear that the standard of education in the occupied territories is not as good as it could have been in normal circumstances and that the prevailing situation is not favorable to the normal running of the educational system. The main difficulties are:

(a) The censorship of text-books. This question is treated in a more general way in a special chapter. Text-books in the West Bank have to be approved successively by the Jordanian authorities (who are still responsible for the overall system), by UNESCO itself and finally by the Israeli authorities. This cascade of approbations results in long delays before the text-books can be put into circulation. The Arab authorities also complain about the fact that entire passages, regarded as of great historical, cultural or national interest, are deleted from the text-books. For their part, the Israeli authorities claim that they never substitute passages, but merely

delete sections which they consider likely to encourage hatred, subversion and violence;

(b) Conditions of service for teachers. With the possible exception of the teachers who are dependent on the Jordanian administration (that is to say those who were already employed in the West Bank at the time of the Israeli occupation), and who enjoy two salaries—the basic Jordanian salary and also a salary from the Israeli authorities—the majority of teachers considered themselves as poorly paid and are obliged to accept other jobs in order to be able to support their families. One can note a certain desertion of teachers from the teaching profession, which creates undoubted difficulties for recruitment into the teacher-training establishments;

(c) School equipment. The situation with regard to school equipment is not satisfactory, generally speaking, and in particular as far as libraries are concerned (the only library we visited of an acceptable standard was the one at the "El Arouv Teacher Training Seminary/Agricultural School"; and even here it must be added that the Arab section was very poorly stocked). Most of the elementary and secondary schools are poorly endowed. As for science teaching, this cannot be satisfactory without the use of adequate science teaching equipment; theoretical teaching at the black-board is just not sufficient. It is well known that the quality of scientific and mathematical teaching depends on the quality of the professional teaching at all levels (it should be mentioned here, that import duty is imposed by the Israeli authorities, even on equipment specifically imported for teaching purposes);

(d) Frequent interruption of school activities. There were many complaints, particularly in the West Bank, about the occupation authorities descending upon institutions at the slightest provocation and interrogations of a police-like nature which sometimes lead to detention or to the payment of high fines. It is obvious that these interruptions are linked with security reasons, but they are certainly not conducive to continuing and effective work. In fact, the institutions of higher education suffer most from this state of affairs, but so do the secondary schools;

(e) Exit Regulations. All young people between the ages of 16 and 26 years must obtain a permit in order to be able to leave the West Bank (this permit is generally given to them), but once out, they are not permitted to re-enter the occupied territories under six months. This means that students who wish to visit Jordan or other Arab countries with a view to admission into the universities, can find themselves in a difficult position if they are not lucky enough to be admitted and yet are not allowed to return home. Furthermore, students who have permits to study in Europe and America are virtually condemned to a permanent exile unless they can renew their permits in person every year after the first year of their absence. The negative effects of this Regulation are obvious. Some people consider this to be an indirect way on the part of the Israeli authorities to encourage a "brain drain" out of the West Bank.

HIGHER EDUCATION

31. From the point of view of Higher education, one must make a distinction between the situation in the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sinai, on the one hand, and the situation in the West Bank on the other hand.

(a) As for the first-mentioned regions, one cannot but underline the inexistence of university centres in these zones. This can be explained by the fact that until the 1967 war, the Golan Heights were an integral part of the Syrian state, Sinai was an integral part of the Egyptian state and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian military administration. Consequently, the students from these regions who wished to pursue higher studies automatically went to the University of Damascus and to the Universities of Cairo and Alexandria. A detailed section of supplementary information on the present situation in these regions, with particular regard to the running of the system of grants, is included as an annex;

(b) In Cisjordania (West Bank) there are now three centres of Higher education (Hebron, Bethlehem and Bir-Zeit) which can be termed "Universities" from the formal and juridical point of view, although there are serious lacunae in their organization (a detailed description of these centres is also to be found as an annex). In addition, there is a preliminary outline of a higher educational institution at Nablus.

32. It is worth recalling the main criticisms presented by the Arab countries, in general terms, concerning the over-all situation of education in the occupied territories. They can be divided into four categories:

(a) Serious difficulties encountered by students and professors following the repressive actions by the Israeli occupation forces in the Palestinian towns where centres of a university character, or centers for higher professional training exist (Hebron, Bir-Zeit, Bethlehem and Nablus). Cf. "Report of the Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories" UN General Assembly A/32/284, of 27th October, 1977;

(b) Insufficiency of Arab centres of Higher education in the occupied territories in relation to the school population of these zones which is in continual demographic growth, which situation is aggravated by the massive influx of refugees coming from other regions of Palestine (Cf. Resolution 15/19/CG; and relevant documents of the UNRWA/UNESCO Department of Education);

(c) Absence of certain faculties in the university centres of the occupied territories which are absolutely indispensable for the future of the Palestinian students. One can note in particular, that there is neither a faculty of medicine, of civil engineering, of architecture, of agriculture nor of economics. One must also mention the practical difficulties encountered by the Arab students of these centres when they wish to go to universities in the neighboring Arab countries (Cf. various communications from the permanent Delegations of Syria, of Egypt and of Jordan to the Director General);

(d) Lack of autonomy of the Arab university centres in the occupied territories. They are not allowed to draw up their study plans and programmes with any freedom. They have no free access to indispensable texts and books nor to educational material in general. The practices of the occupation authorities are detrimental to the "cultural identity" and the political attitude of the Arab students.

33. Detailed comments on each establishment, on the personalities encountered and on the documentation which was collected are included as annexes.

34. Insufficiency of true universities.

The mission are obliged to state that the present "university centres" are totally insufficient to measure up to the needs of the population of the occupied territories, taking into account their demographic expansion and also the great number of potential young students qualified under the category of "refugees". This insufficiency is even more obvious if one compares these centres with the universities of the State of Israel and those of the neighbouring Arab countries.

One only of these centres can in fact be considered as a true university *stricto sensu*, comparable with the other universities of the Arab world and, moreover, accepted as a member of the Association of Arab Universities. The centre at Hebron is basically an establishment devoted to Islamic religious formation. The Bethlehem centre concentrates on Humanities and Natural Sciences. It is still too soon to speak about the university centre at Nablus, since it has only just begun to operate. It is only the centre at Bir-Zeit, therefore, that can be considered as a university *stricto sensu*.

35. Basic lacunae in the composition of the universities.

Not only are the four universities mentioned insufficient in themselves to satisfy quantitatively the needs of a rapidly growing school population, but they are lacking certain faculties, departments or institutes which are indispensable for the formation of students with regard to activities contributing to the general development, such as medicine, pharmacy, chemistry, civil engineering, architecture, electronics and agriculture. There is, in fact, no existing infrastructure to promote scientific and technical studies at a high level. The fragmentary character of certain aspects of the teaching of social and political sciences must also be underlined.

36. Obstacles regarding the choice and recruitment of professors.

(a) First of all there are obstacles of an economic character, given the insufficiency of the material resources at the disposal of the universities;

(b) There are also administrative problems whenever there is question of professors coming from abroad. It is difficult, for example, to obtain the services of "visiting professors" under the existing rules. These difficulties, which are theoretically administrative, are in fact political.

37. Difficulty of access to educational equipment.

Access to educational equipment is not merely complicated by economic difficulties but also by those difficulties which are linked with censorship (see the chapter on censorship, paras. 44 and 45).

38. Violations against the freedom of teaching.

The mission were unable to detect any violations, restrictions or obstacles with regard to the freedom of religious teaching or that concerned with Human Rights (apart from the suppression of certain texts for reasons of security).

On the other hand, the violations and difficulties which stem from the activities of the security forces have already been pointed out, and contribute to a deterioration of the moral climate under which the university work operates.

39. Problems encountered by the students.

These problems stem basically from the absence of certain faculties, which cause serious professional frustrations for many young Arabs, and which add to the economic difficulties encountered by their families in the financing of their children's studies in other Arab countries. Moreover, many highly qualified young Arabs are unable to find professional employment commensurate with their diplomas in their home territory. Naturally students are more sensitively aware to political problems than other people and are directly affected by the repercussions of the constraints of all types which are linked to the situation in the occupied territories.

40. General remarks.

If the cultural identity of the populations concerned was exclusively concerned with the religious beliefs and practices of the Musulman and Christian Palestinians, it would be unfounded to accuse the Israeli authorities of a systematic action opposed to this cultural identity. Insofar as the general question of "westernization" is concerned (particularly with regard to co-education, the promotion of role of women and the predominance of lay or secularizing currents of thought) it has already been pointed out that this is a question which goes far beyond the specific problem of the occupied territories.

CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

41. As their approach to the analysis concerning the cultural institutions, the mission made up of the four basic objectives within the framework of the operations to be undertaken as first priority by the national fund for the promotion of culture:

- (a) Polyvalent centres for research and creativity;
- (b) Cultural programmes on radio and television;
- (c) Publications;
- (d) Festivals and exhibitions.

Throughout their whole visit to the occupied territories, the mission was not invited to visit a single cultural centre. It would appear that, apart from the social welfare and community centres (as found in Sinai), not one single "cultural foyer" or "cultural club" exists—to our knowledge. Nor, to our knowledge, is there a single municipal theatre where local groups could perform within the Arab municipalities of the occupied zones. This is obviously in strong contrast with the remarkable cultural manifestations of all sorts which go on in Jerusalem or in other Israeli towns. Certain remarks have already been made about radio and television. It should be remembered that there is a possibility of sixteen hours' listening-time in Arabic on the radio and six hours of television in Arabic. The programmes are varied and reach a large listening and watching audience, even in Jordan. One can but remark (while reserving final judgment based on deeper study of the question) that the concern for health or social education seems to override the concern for cultural activities as such in these programmes. In this context, it should be noted that remarks have been made by certain Palestinians concerning the fact that, as far as folklore music is concerned, numerous Israeli songs are—in fact—Arab songs, altered to a greater or lesser degree.

42. Festivals and exhibitions are all submitted to prior authorization by the military authorities, and are sometimes forbidden or cancelled at the last minute. The mission did not have the opportunity of making an in-depth study on this point.

43. Cultural life, as educational life, is in fact dominated by the question of censorship, which is dealt with in the following chapter.

CENSORSHIP

44. There is a Censorship Commission based in Jerusalem which the mission were unfortunately unable to meet. As a result, the mission are unable to answer the following question concisely:

- (a) According to what precise criteria are publications either accepted or refused;
- (b) What are the working methods of this Commission, and how frequently does it meet;
- (c) What is the composition of the Commission and, specifically what level of knowledge of the Arabic language and civilisation is possessed by each one of the censors, who are responsible for deciding on the publication or the non-circulation of a given product.

The only useful information gathered was that, as it happens, all questions to do with censorship are centralized in Jerusalem and any delegation of power

(concerning censorship) to the local commanders of the occupied zones has been abolished.

45. Education—School text-books.

There have already been numerous and precise reports drawn up about the content of text-books and the alterations that they undergo. Particularly noteworthy on this subject is the report by ALECS, dated 1975, a report by the Jordanian Ministry of Education and a report by the P.L.

The main areas where this censorship is exercised are essentially literature, history, geography and religious questions.

As far as literature is concerned, the books are watered down by the suppression of all poetry or patriotic prose, or any allusion to a sacrifice for the country. The Pre-Islamic poets are no safer than the contemporary poets. In addition to this, the use of mementos has grown, either to replace certain works that are permanently banned, or to serve as a palliative to the delays involved in the re-printing of works originating from Arab countries. All these books, moreover, carry the reference "Military Commandment of the West Bank." in Hebrew then in Arabic, instead of the true origin (Jordanian Ministry of Education for example).

Where History and Geography are concerned, the problems are obvious: truncated maps, special optics introduced with regard to events concerning the region or the neighboring Arab countries, the almost systematic replacement of the word "Palestine" by "Israel".

The delay caused by the re-printing of text-books (that is to say the delay due to the length of time required by the censors) sometimes leads to historical aberrations: a text-book on Geography for example, for use by the sixth year primary grade, printed in June 1977, includes a chapter entitled: "The Libyan Kingdom" (p. 46 to 60 of the book).

As far as books on religious education are concerned, among the grievances that are voiced, the following recur repeatedly: the suppression of the notion of Djihad or "Holy War" and of "martyrs" of noble causes. The only book on religious education which was given to the mission by the Israeli authorities "At tarbiyya al Islamiyya" (for the use of the third year in the secondary schools) is immune from this criticism, since it contains two chapters where the following ideas are clearly explained:

- (1) The notion of Djihad, and the appropriate verses from the Coran;
- (2) The obligations of the Musulman state with respect to the families and children of soldiers killed for the just cause of Djihad (p. 259 to 265).

It would therefore appear, in this connection, that the Israeli Censorship Commission usually proceeds by elision and sometimes by the cutting-out of entire paragraphs which, naturally enough, weakens and removes the interest from the chapters concerned. It seems that the Commission does not act either with the tact, the intellectual rigour, or the necessary information.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Guided by the spirit and letter of the instructions given them by the Director General, the mission attempted to look towards the future, rather than to dwell unduly on the present circumstances which dominate the situation in the occupied territories and which are fundamentally based on the political and military status quo. It is perfectly apparent that the indispensable improvements, which should be incorporated into the present system in order to favour the valid expansion of education and culture in the occupied territories, are also dependent on a decision of political order.

2. It is only insofar as the Israeli authorities might be able to lighten the military and police control that they exert in the occupied territories, that it would be possible to give the necessary impulse to the educational system at all levels, and particularly at university level.

3. It is only insofar as it might be possible to establish a real programme of economic development in the specific interests of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, that a positive orientation could be given to the programmes for professional formation and to the setting up of university centres planned to mould the most qualified elements of the population in view of their economic and social responsibilities, and to avoid an emigration which would be prejudicial to the cultural identity of the Palestinians.

4. It is important that the present regulations concerning the movement of students to universities in the neighbouring Arab countries, and their subsequent return to the occupied territories, should be relaxed. The "Open Bridges" policy, which has been practised with success with Jordan and which encourages the

movement of persons other than students, should be extended largely to include the latter and also the members of the teaching body.

5. As far as the internal security of the occupied territories is concerned, it is important that the policy followed by the occupation authorities should, in actual fact, not lead to interference (of an arbitrary and unforeseeable nature) in the satisfactory running of the educational and cultural institutions.

6. Concerning censorship, the Censorship Commission should undertake a revision of the lists of banned works, in a less restrictive sense. For example, the parcels of books sent by Arab countries, and which could be of great service to pupils and students, could be examined in detail instead of being sent back en bloc. The censorship of school textbooks should be relaxed and, in any case, speeded up. An Arabic speaking UNESCO representative should be consulted by the Commission.

7. With regard to university education:

(a) It is essential that the present system of grants be extended in the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sinai, where there is no existing university centre, and that the running of the system should be facilitated by the free movement of students to the university centres of their choices outside their own territory;

(b) It is essential that the university centres of Bir-Zeit, Hebron, Bethlehem and Nablus, should receive a large-scale contribution of help to enable them to resolve their pedagogical and economic problems as quickly as possible. It is also important that these Universities should be considered qualified as full parity members of the Association of Arab Universities.

(c) It should be remembered that the Mayor of Bethlehem has suggested the possibility of the creation of "a bank for international cooperation" to provide for the cultural aims of the West Bank);

(c) The existing university centers must have access to the indispensable pedagogical equipment, and must benefit from international support, in one form or another, in order to participate fully in the cultural and university activities of the Arab world.

8. As far as primary and secondary education is concerned, it is essential that the status of the teaching profession should be improved by a rapid review of the salary scale and fringe benefits. It is also essential that the members of the teaching body should not suffer from a transfer and promotion policy which is based on the concern for security rather than that of satisfactory running of the system. It is essential that the teachers and professors should benefit from a permanent well-structured and systematic programme of in-service training, comparable with that which has been developed in the scholastic system coming under UNRWA's responsibility.

The schools must have access to better pedagogical equipment, better endowed libraries and to scientific educational equipment which measures up to the standards fixed by UNESCO. At least some part of the equipment should be locally produced.

9. The mission were informed of a proposal suggesting the creation of an "Open University", either outside the occupied territories, or in the occupied territories themselves. This question is well worth examining. At the same time it must be pointed out that the P.L.O. informed the mission that the Organization wished to see establishments already in existence in the occupied territories made use of in order to satisfy the true university requirements.

10. The Israeli Government could therefore be requested to:

(a) Relax the circulation regulations and facilitate the visits by students and professors from the occupied zones to the Arab countries; and facilitate the visits by professors coming from the Arab countries and the return of the students to the occupied territories;

(b) Abolish the customs duty on the importation of teaching equipment, including scientific equipment;

(c) Relax the preliminary censorship of teaching equipment, and facilitate the entry of cultural equipment of every description;

(d) Patronize cultural activities of every description and encourage the active participation by the populations of the occupied territories in audio-visual activities.

Para. 12. During a final meeting with General Oriy and his colleagues, the Head of the Mission expressed their sincere thanks to the Israeli authorities for their extreme goodwill. Taking into account the inevitable constraints which are attached to the situation of the occupied territories as such, and also the nature of the very fact of military occupation, during which security considerations (either long or short term) remain predominant.

Para. 28. According to the statistics provided by the Israeli authorities, the standards have been maintained, and even slightly improved since 1967. We have received no indication from either Jordan or Egypt contradicting this statement.

Para. 38. The Mission was unable to detect any violations, restrictions or obstacles with regard to the freedom of religious teaching or that concerned with human rights.

Para. 40. If the cultural identity of the populations concerned was exclusively concerned with religious beliefs and practices of the Musulman and Christian Palestinians, it would be unfounded to accuse the Israeli authorities of a systematic action opposed to this cultural identity.

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittee wants to look into some possible reforms. I received the impression from your testimony that you were interested in more than just reforms; that you would like to see a basic overhaul of the apparatus, finding a way to restore or at least institute some political balances, and avoid an East-West clash in the U.N., which is set up to ameliorate the differences.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to reform anything as such. I just want the Soviets to abide by their solemn commitment not to put those spies in the Secretariat. If Dag Hammarskjold had known this he would have been absolutely indignant. He would have thought this was a desecration of an institution of great, noble, and important purpose.

Mr. BONKER. What evidence do we have that Soviet spies now occupy positions within the Secretariat?

Senator MOYNIHAN. In the first place two of them were convicted, in a Federal court in New Jersey, last fall.

Mr. BONKER. But you think that's ample evidence for a more pervasive representation of Soviet spies in the Secretariat?

Senator MOYNIHAN. It is my judgment that it is widespread. As I point out, the Dneprovsky episode was blatant and scandalous and the British Ambassador joined us in protesting in Geneva.

Mr. BONKER. What do you think the United States ought to do about this?

Senator MOYNIHAN. Say we do not like it and we will not abide by it. I am proposing in the Senate side something perhaps a bit more than a purely symbolic act, that we make an assessment of what proportion of our contribution goes to pay KGB salaries and just withhold it, that's all.

Mr. BONKER. Do we need to identify who those people are?

Senator MOYNIHAN. No, we don't. We can make our own judgments and let the Russians disprove it. You can say, "No, we're not going to allow this. The Secretariat is off limits. Your mission is filled with KGB agents." Any country may have intelligence officers in its own diplomatic establishment.

Mr. BONKER. When you were the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. were you aware of these activities, and if so did you attempt to do anything about them?

Senator MOYNIHAN. We were beginning to sense it. We were beginning to have the feeling that it was going on. I think we probably know a great deal more about it now.

Mr. BONKER. Is it your judgment that the present Secretary General and other high officials are in complicity with the Soviets in making these placements?

Senator MOYNIHAN. No; the Secretary General responds to the pressures put to him. He has no other way to do his job than to try

to mediate between the pressures that he has. If he has no pressure not to do this and a lot of pressure to do it, he'll do it.

Mr. BONKER. There's an expression in my part of the country that comes from the Forest Service. They say the only thing that keeps them upward is equal pressure on all sides.

Senator MOYNIHAN. There you are.

Mr. BONKER. Do you recommend we apply some pressure?

Senator MOYNIHAN. That is exactly what I recommend. I don't know why it has become difficult to find a rhetoric that reassures people about this. If you care about the United Nations, you care that this does not happen. If you don't give a damn about the U.N., or if you are hostile to the U.N., nothing could please you more than to see these incidents take place because, in 10 years time you will look up and everybody will know this place is no good; they will want to get out of it or stay away from it. It will have become discredited.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Senator, I guess one of the reasons for the subcommittee meeting today is to question you and to get some ideas relative to reforms. You talked about procedures. Are "procedures" and "reform" the same word?

Senator MOYNIHAN. They can be. When procedures become corrupted and one tries to reestablish them, I suppose it can be called reform.

Mr. HALL. Besides what you talked about relative to the KGB and reforms, are you interested in seeing within the United Nations some other reforms? Or do you think we ought to change?

Senator MOYNIHAN. No, Congressman, I don't have any large thoughts on that. Ambassador Young will say much more on this subject. I do think that we must say to people that there are things we will not have, we will not tolerate, because they are so much in violation of the basic Charter.

It fell to me when I was at the United Nations to draft the letter from the Secretary of State, informing the International Labor Organization that we were giving them 2-year notice that we intended to leave because the Soviets and the Arab blocs were just absolutely debauching the procedures. In that letter we said, in effect, "We don't expect to leave. By the time this period is over we expect that you will have understood our point and then we will withdraw it."

But the 2 years went by and nothing changed. And we left. And, without wishing to exaggerate, may I offer you what is really not much above the level of impression—but I offer you the thought—that since we left, things have in fact changed.

My doctoral dissertation was on how we joined the International Labor Organization. I know more about this than anybody else in the world wants to know, I assure you. I don't even think my thesis advisers read the dissertation, it was so long and dreary. So it's a private little world I live in. But I follow it.

Last year, for example, at the International Labor Conference in June, the up-until-then ritual defamations of Israel were dropped. They didn't happen. Czechoslovakia was found in violation of certain employment discrimination provisions in the ILO chapter.

We were never asking that the ILO do anything more than what its own charter provided. The American labor movement knows what

that charter provides, because it was drafted by Samuel Gompers in Paris in 1919. Our labor movement has been close to that place for a very long time. We joined the ILO, when we didn't join the League and didn't join the World Court, because the labor movement cared about this. People there know that what we are asking for is right. The ILO is not supposed to violate its own charter. And once we left, some of that stopped, which leads me to hope that we may be going back.

Thus, I would reiterate my main point about reform: there's nothing in these organizations that we would hope for that isn't provided for in their charter.

Mr. HALL. Senator, what is Congress role as it relates to the U.N., in your opinion? What is our role?

Senator MOYNIHAN. We have a larger role than just levying the taxes in order to pay for one-quarter of it. I know you think that that's what you're doing here.

Without wishing to be disrespectful to the Department of State, which I am not, I nonetheless think that about 20 years ago in the Department of State it was decided that the United Nations doesn't matter, nothing important happens there, nothing important is ever going to happen there, it just doesn't matter.

"High-track" politics and "low-track" politics were established in the Department of State. High politics has been security politics. Low politics has involved things like the United Nations, or other things under the heading of "humanitarian activities." A failing of the American imagination is that we've never understood that ideological argument is the most important argument of any kind, that what people think is the most important thing about them. We have just left this out. It has not been a place for a successful career in the Department of State. It has not been a place where anybody pays any real attention.

That is why in some respects with the changing membership this slide began. It would be helpful to remember just how seriously we did want to take the United Nations. When the United States alone had the atom bomb, Mr. Baruch went up to New York and made a speech and proposed we turn it over to the Security Council. That's taking the place seriously. We now don't even seem to mind if the Russians fill up the Secretariat with spies. What difference does it make? It makes a very great deal of difference, I think.

Mr. HALL. So what do you see Congress doing?

What should Congress do?

Senator MOYNIHAN. What we are doing now. Take testimony. Collect our thoughts.

Our State Department is a very old institution. Only the British equivalent is older. It's a secret, but we have money over there that Benjamin Franklin gave us for Ambassadors who don't have private resources. The State Department has had money in the bank for 200 years. That is a long time.

Remember that among the members of the United Nations, there are only seven which existed in 1914 that have not had their form of government changed by force since 1914. If you were to list the median number of years, the number of years since that median U.N. member has last had its government changed by violence, I think it would be about seven.

The traditions of the State Department are very old, very fixed in the tradition of bilateral relations. But the fact is that with all but a handful of the nations in the world, our most important relations with them are of a multilateral sort, especially in the United Nations sense. I note that other relations aren't important, but that our most important relations with these states are in the multilateral sense.

When I was at the U.N. we sat down one August day, I believe, and drew up a list of five categories which would make a country important to us. Did we buy anything much from it? Did it buy anything much from us? Did we have any investment there? Did it have any critical materials? We took the membership of the U.N. We went down and we checked the important countries under those rather loose criteria of importance. These were going to be countries with which we had a bilateral relationship. If a country did not meet any of these standards, then clearly the most important thing about it would be our relationship with it in various international organizations.

Out of 147 members of the U.N., I think that about 85, as I recall, came under the heading of "multilateral countries." The only important relationship we had. What do you suppose our relationships with Sao Tome and Principe are? These two are tiny islands in the South Atlantic. We don't have any relationship with them except in the General Assembly, where they have the same vote as China.

I'm taking Ambassador Young's time and I'm taking your time. But I might offer one example. I was having dinner with the Egyptian Ambassador, a very distinguished diplomat. We had been in India, so we talked about that a little and talked about his colleague in New Dehli.

And he said, "You know, it was that Indian resolution in the Security Council that led to the Yom Kippur war. You know that, don't you?"

I said, "The what?"

He said, "You know, the Indian resolution."

He explained that after the United States vetoed that particular resolution, Egypt decided there was no choice. War came. OPEC came. Everything else came because of the Indian resolution.

I said, "There was an Indian resolution and I missed it?"

Later I talked to Dr. Kissinger. I said, "Is that so? Is that what happened?"

He said, "Well, it wasn't the only reason we had the Yom Kippur war. But it was certainly one, maybe the main."

I went back through the files of the Department of State, went through the files on India. Nobody in Washington ever cabled me in New Delhi to say the Indians were up to no good in the U.N. No instruction that said, "You go and see the Foreign Minister and say, 'Why are you doing this in the Security Council? Can't we get you to withdraw it? You're just sort of doing this to make the Islamic, Moslem population feel that you're looking after Palestine and so forth.'"

It never occurred to the Department of State that what was going on in the U.N. might have some relationship to what was going on in New Delhi. Yet, this episode might have been ended in New Delhi, if we had said, "this is very important to us. Your U.N. Ambassador is

doing something which really isn't important to you. Would you just drop it?" But the question was never asked.

If you can point out the importance of multilateral relations to an ambassador in Reykjavik or Conakry, you give him something important to do. You say to him, "We care about how the nonaligned are going to vote on this. When you go to the nonaligned conference, we would hope you might be interested in taking this position." The State Department has never made this connection. It is beginning to try.

The "nonaligned" arrive at U.N. meetings with their positions fixed. They have agreed in a previous setting what their position is going to be. There is no way to turn them around. You cannot influence them by the time they get to New York or Geneva. You have to influence them either at that meeting where they won't let you in for good and proper reasons or before they get into the meeting, in other words, in their capitals.

Our State Department has to learn to anticipate these events and see that there are countries with which really the most important relationship we have is multilateral. If it does that, it will immediately focus its attention to United Nations activities.

That's all I have to say. Ambassador Young is waiting very patiently. I'd like to thank you and the subcommittee.

If you have another question, Mr. Hall, I can give a short answer. We have a tradition of unlimited debate in the other body. It's catching.

Mr. BONKER. It's contagious. We're still under the 5-minute rule here.

I want to thank you, Senator, for your time and your testimony, giving the committee your thoughts and concerns about the U.N. and sharing some of your personal experiences. There will be a lot for us to digest in the short term. But you've given us plenty to think about. Thank you.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hall.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Ambassador, as chairman of the committee I want to apologize once again for all the interruptions and delays. I know that as a former Member of this body you can appreciate the problems here. Your patience is appreciated.

Ambassador YOUNG. I enjoyed the session, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BONKER. Shall we proceed with questions? Or would you like to continue with your opening statement?

Ambassador YOUNG. Let me try to pick up one thing that I was beginning to try to put together. And that is the tremendous difficulty in integrating this entire political system. I think that much of what Senator Moynihan said about neglect of the U.N. system by the State Department has been true in recent years and the best indication of it is the number of ambassadors we've had in the last 10 years.

I'm the ninth ambassador from the U.S. Government in the last 10 years. Any organization with 151 nations represented, the political potentials and possibilities are just too vast and enormous to allow these frequent changes.

I would also agree with Senator Moynihan that the emphasis on multilateral diplomacy in the State Department system generally has been neglected. I think Assistant Secretary Maynes has gone a long way toward correcting the examples Senator Moynihan gave about not being contacted in India. In fact, nowadays, barely a week

goes by that we don't have ambassadors in the field going in to see governments about something. We've done it so much that we're getting complaints from the ambassadors at the United Nations because they accuse us of sicking their superiors on them.

But I think that part of it is just a communications problem—it's possible for our Government to communicate with all of its ambassadors within a 4-hour period all over the world but very few nations have that technical capability.

So I would say that the majority of the ambassadors at the United Nations function on very loose rein. That presents problems for us many times. But it also makes it a fluid political situation. You get additional leadtime on the issues. For instance, for the last two meetings of the nonaligned movement we've had observers there. I met with the Yugoslavs before they hosted the most recent nonaligned conference to get some idea of the directions that the conference might move and to give them some of the U.S. feelings on those issues. So I think we are learning to make this entire system work.

But we are overcoming a period of neglect and I think that that's going to take some time because the system is changing and growing as we go along.

Mr. BONKER. Something I might mention at the outset. I can see now why you are a diplomat. You chose those areas of agreement with Senator Moynihan, ignoring those areas of obvious disagreement. We may touch upon a few of those things in the question period.

The question of voting comes up from time to time because of our financial commitment to the U.N. and the fact that with so many members now representing Third World countries our vote has diminished in value in the General Assembly and perhaps as a result we've lost influence not only in voting and decisionmaking in the General Assembly, but in the various agencies that are related to the U.N.

When we look at our own system of government, our founding fathers came up with an ingenious formula for allowing larger States to have representation based on population, but still the Senate can reconcile protection for the other States.

Is this a genuine and continuing problem with the U.S. participation in the U.N.? And if it is, is it possible to find a way to weigh the vote, or at least to make our participation and decisionmaking more representative of our size and financial commitment to that body?

Ambassador YOUNG. This is hard to do diplomatically, especially after your compliment. But one of the things that is a problem with the U.N. (and Senator Moynihan is right) is that there are many totalitarian governments. There is a sense in which the majority of those governments are more often proven right than any one of those governments, including ours.

Look back on some of the things that the General Assembly voted on in the last decade that we opposed: for all of the flak that we took for years on the Panama Canal, it turned out that we in our Government now have decided that it's a much better policy for the United States to have a treaty with the people of Panama that we have negotiated with them and both countries ratified. And the entire world respects that. Yet for years, the entire world condemned us for basing our relationship on a treaty from 1903 that no Panamanian signed.

I think you can cite numbers of examples like that. For instance, our policies on Vietnam through an entire period have caused us to be condemned. But I think you and I in other sessions of our terms in Congress essentially took a position about our involvement in Vietnam that was much more consistent with the world view.

It is difficult when some of our decisions are being challenged and questioned. But, as I said, I don't think we ever lose in the General Assembly. Sometimes it might be helpful for people to have a political forum to gang up on the stronger nations, that might prevent war.

The increasing number of items that come up before the General Assembly every year is an indication that more and more people are willing to bring their problems to the U.N., even when they come to the U.N. to blame us. It's better to have them blaming us in a political forum than organizing terrorism against us and our interest in their countries out of frustration; not being able to have a format to express their grievances against us because we are so powerful. And it does not diminish our power by entering into a debate, win, lose or draw.

What was the percentage of consensus resolutions recently? Between 60 and 66 percent of the resolutions were negotiated on the basis of a consensus. Normally we are the center of molding that consensus.

Mr. BONKER. That confirms what Senator Moynihan had said about General Assembly decisionmaking, that most of it is consensus, which is the way it used to be around here; with the committee shaping the issue and by the time it reached the House floor, it was a very lopsided vote.

You are saying first of all, that just because a country has a totalitarian regime doesn't mean that it shouldn't have representation, it shouldn't have a voice in the world body. That was one point that the Senator alluded to.

Ambassador YOUNG. There is a weighted voting morally, I think, in the U.N. that I think people are very much aware of. There are some nations that dare not even speak on an issue because they are laughed at. People value certain nations, even when they are poor and difficult, if they are struggling and if they are fighting for principles within their own sphere of influence.

Some of the Caribbean islands for instance, have a tremendous amount of influence. Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, because they have had a long intellectual and moral heritage of trying to maintain democratic governments and protect human rights. So when they speak, African, Latin American, Asian delegates tend to respond and we of the West respond also.

There are other countries that could make the same kind of speech and be just as right. But if everybody knows that they are not in any way practicing that at home, nobody takes them seriously.

Mr. BONKER. The point the Senator raised was that since these countries were totalitarian and since they are large in number in that body, that somehow they influence decisions that are not in our best interest.

What you are saying, and what my observation is, is that most of the substantive issues are shaped before they reach the floor for a vote; that there are not really many votes that you could point to that were terribly close or that were to our disadvantage or to the benefit of the Eastern countries.

That is why I wondered why the point was raised in the first place, about totalitarian regimes somehow not having, or having their proper role in that body, or that somehow we were losing influence through votes that were taking place in plenary sessions.

Ambassador YOUNG. There are some votes that we do lose out on. In the special session on disarmament there was one issue put forward by the Soviets—to suspend the use of napalm. We took a beating on that. We did not want to do it. Other nations of the world, including some that use napalm, voted for it. We have tended not to be hypocrites. If there is something on which we are vulnerable and have a problem with, we admit our problems and we stand up for what we think is right about this country. I think sometimes we are criticized at home for that kind of position. But I think it maintains our credibility around the world very much.

I think Assistant Secretary Maynes wanted to make a comment about that.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
AFFAIRS**

Mr. MAYNES. I just wanted to make a comment about the weighted voting question. In a very meaningful sense there is a form of weighted voting in the U.N. I think we have to recognize its reality. When the organization was created, a privileged position was given to the United States and the other four permanent members of the Security Council in the form of a very important weighted vote, which is called the veto. Also the powers that are given to the Security Council are mandatory, whereas the powers given to the General Assembly are recommendatory. So there is a total difference between the role and function of the Security Council and the General Assembly and in the body that has the mandatory power, the United States enjoys a veto.

I'd also point out that as a permanent member and also as the largest contributor there is an informal rule in the U.N. that the United States is a member of every committee which it wishes to join. We, by a matter of tradition and right, we are on all the committees of whatever size that we wish to participate in. This again gives us a voice that few other governments can aspire to in the organization.

A final point that I would make, which is a form of indirect weighted influence anyway, is at least from the standpoint of the other governments of the world, that the United States is seen as having a very significant influence on the organization, just by the power of our expertise, particularly in the specialized agencies.

If you look at where the impulse for new programs comes from, it usually starts in the domestic agencies of the U.S. Government, which have an important program which they feel must have some sort of international aspect to it if it's to succeed.

Probably the best example of that is our own decision inside the United States to abolish smallpox. We tried to do it and we found we couldn't do it unless we abolished smallpox everywhere. So we went to the World Health Organization and persuaded them to accept that as a priority program.

We have done this in the field of measures to try to stop oil spills at sea where IMCO has adopted a convention at our request, this

last year within the field of air safety where ICAO has adopted one series after another of safety standards that are basically in defense of interests that we'd like to see promoted.

In the field of nuclear safeguards within the United Nations, a whole new international institution, the IAEA, persuaded other governments to accept a common financial burden to finance something that is basically, we feel, in the interest of the United States.

When we talk about U.S. influence in these organizations I think we have to take a broader view of what influence is and recognize that most of the rest of the world sees these organizations as designed to help them, obviously, but certainly defending U.S. interests. They would regard us very much as hypocrites if we contended anything otherwise.

Ambassador YOUNG. It might be fair to say that there is almost nothing good that we have wanted to introduce to the world that the world has rejected. We have not been able to stop other people from introducing some things in the way of resolutions that we think are bad. I think we have been able to stop programs that essentially we feel are harmful, with very few exceptions.

Mr. BONKER. If we are going to be truly democratic we shouldn't try to stop the passing of resolutions if we practice what we preach about democracy.

Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, the President's U.N. reform package addresses many, many areas for reform and restructuring. But he does not address the reform or the possible reform of international terrorism, hijacking, disarmament, monitoring global resources, strengthening the world monetary system. Why were these reforms left out of the report? Why can't we address these issues?

Ambassador YOUNG. Can you read that list slowly for me?

Mr. HALL. International terrorism. Hijacking. Disarmament. I didn't mention strengthen UNEP. Global monitoring resources. And strengthening the world monetary system. These issues were left out of the President's report.

Ambassador YOUNG. It's not because they are not a part of the system. I mean, the entire North-South dialog has focused on the question of strengthening the world monetary system. Interestingly enough though, the United States formal position has been against any monetary reform.

I think that we have had initiatives. In fact, I would say that the whole U.N. program is an antiterrorist program and that as we can bring problems to political solution we eliminate the explosive tensions which lead to terrorism. I think we have not demonstrated that we can do that totally as yet.

If one would say the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations or the Committee of 24 has been looking into the entire decolonization question, largely in African colonies and of the 50 African countries, as long as we were fully supporting the committee and pressing things on through aggressive diplomatic action, countries were achieving majority rule without violence. It was when we got to the point where one of the countries was a close ally of ours, Portugal, that we relaxed our diplomatic initiatives in Africa and the entire situation began to deteriorate into violence and terrorism. We are

trying to recoup that in Namibia with limited success and so far with no success in Rhodesia.

But what we are trying to do there again is very similar to what we've been trying in the last 2 years, to deal with problems that had been either neglected or where we may have been on the defensive, say, from 1965 on.

I would say one of the better functioning specialized agencies and one that we have largely been responsible for supporting has been the U.N. environmental program. There is a very good working relationship between UNEP and our EPA.

I think we do have the full support of the nations of the world in moving ahead on that.

I think most of these things are in the U.N. process in some manner.

Mr. HALL. One of the objectives of this subcommittee meeting is to assess the role of the United States in the U.N. and to talk about reforms. I would pose the same question to you as I posed to the Senator relative to what reforms do you want to see in the U.N., if any?

Ambassador YOUNG. Can I ask Mr. Maynes if he would take that after I finish, and give you the official answer? Let me just talk with you as I see it. This is a political process that we had let slip away from us and I think part of, say, the difficulties that Senator Moynihan talked about in UNESCO came about because, in a political dispute, we cut off funding for a couple of years. During that period, UNESCO ran without us by getting an interest-free loan to cover the money that we were not putting in.

In the meantime, a lot of the American positions that were important to that bureaucracy were not replaced. So we came back to UNESCO at a later date, having lost a considerable amount of the advantage that we had in the bureaucracy by having formed it.

So I think there's an ongoing political and institutional problem in the U.N. system that's particularly critical now, that most of the agencies in the U.N. system are getting close to 30 years old, that the U.S. citizens that went into these agencies, citizens and civil servants in the early days got key positions are coming up for retirement or there are hundreds of them now at retirement age.

We have not as yet trained young international civil servants to move in and take over and move up the ladder rapidly so that they are in a position to replace people at the top.

I have seen our job as improving our political posture within the system and seeing to it that U.S. personnel throughout the system bring some of the best talent that we have to their particular jobs and to try to find ways to bring overall coordination of the political and administrative processes at the U.N.

As we begin to do that I think some of the issues that are on the U.N. reform agenda will happen automatically. For instance, we have proven in the U.N. system the validity of peacekeeping. I would say that our peacekeeping proposals for strengthening peacekeeping were almost happening automatically as a result of the Security Council voting to put a 7,500 peacekeeping force in Namibia. Various countries realized that if we're going to have to do this kind of peacekeeping then without the Security Council mandating it or countries having agreed to it officially, more and more countries now are beginning to set aside units in their military for peacekeeping purposes and more

and more countries are willing to train people and allow their soldiers to be involved in U.N. peacekeeping.

So things are happening as a result of making the system work. I think that the approach that we've tried to take on U.N. reform and the whole question of the economic and social council restructuring are making progress. We took the lead in that restructuring to try to get a Director General for Economic Affairs that would help in the policy coordination. We were able to do that successfully, though I must confess, the position really hasn't begun to function yet, though the person is in place. We are taking a similar political initiative in regard to a high commissioner for human rights or some sort of senior level civil servant involved in the human rights machinery of the U.N.

So we are working on a number of these reform issues in the normal routine of U.N. work.

Mr. MAYNES. Maybe I could just add two general points. One is that I think the best way to reform the U.N. and our role in it is also to reform U.S. foreign policy. I think the restoration of idealism and commitment of the U.S. Government to a progressive foreign policy, which is what this administration is trying to bring about, is more critical to reform of the U.N. and our role in it than any mechanical reform.

In that regard I think that Senator Moynihan's point about the relationship between bilateral and multilateral policy is a central insight and one on which he deserves credit in the sense that I think he helped point that out in his tenure as ambassador.

As we've tried to go to the nonaligned countries to talk about the issues that come before the U.N. though, I suppose it's an evident fact of political life that just as we are interested in their understanding our problems, they are interested in our understanding their problems. Here I think the importance of initiatives by the administration, like its African policy, are absolutely central to our role in the U.N.

There are problems that our Government is going to have to address if it wishes the understanding and support of other countries for problems that we consider of vital interest to the United States and I think what the administration has attempted to do in its African policy, Middle East policy and disarmament initiatives, as all those are very central to our role in the U.N. in terms of the mechanical policies we would like to see adopted, we think would make the U.N. a more effective instrument for us and for others. They are laid out in the President's report and I might just comment on those that we are trying to give priority.

We are trying to give priority to reform of the Security Council. Since 1973 there has been a rebirth of activity by the Security Council. You can see this just in the pattern of meetings in the Security Council. By the late 1950's the Council was barely meeting at all. In fact in 1959 I think it met only four times the whole year, basically because everyone knew there was a paralyzing stalemate in the Council. Every time you went there you got a Soviet veto. So there was very little incentive for going to the Council.

A major development I think in the United Nations has been the shift in attitude of both the Soviet Union and China toward use of the Security Council. That isn't to say that everything we would like to see or they would like to see can get through the Council. But the

Council has become more viable as an instrument. Its membership has been meeting as often as 100 times a year in recent years.

We would like to see it however address more issues more automatically in anticipation of crisis than it does. Right now the Council basically concentrates on three issues: Cyprus, the Middle East, and southern Africa.

We took the initiative, for example, to urge that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, be taken to the Council because we think it is a body that should be concerned with all significant breaches of international peace and security.

We have worked hard to see if we could arrange ministerial meetings of the Security Council, perhaps once a year, to review the international peace and security situation. We came close to that last fall when I think we had eight or nine foreign ministers to discuss the southern African issue. But these are all issues in the Security Council that we attach considerable importance to. We are going to continue our effort to try to have the Council more automatically involved in anticipation of crises and their solution.

In the peacekeeping area we have also offered a number of proposals. One of them was Vice President Mondale's offer to the U.N. to make available to it our experience in the Sinai peacekeeping effort in the use of so-called Eyes and Ears of Peace. You may have noticed in the newspaper the last couple of days we have offered to make that experience and technology available.

In the case of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Namibia we have worked with the Western members to obtain the adoption of a General Assembly resolution on peacekeeping which was adopted the last session.

We would like to build on that to see more countries earmark troops for service in U.N. peacekeeping operations. We would like to see better training of those troops so that when they arrive in a peacekeeping situation they know what to do.

If you take the case of the Lebanon peacekeeping operation, it was 6 weeks before we could get the full number of troops on the ground. Meanwhile you had an explosive situation and the Israelis were unable to withdraw until the full number of U.N. troops had arrived. At any moment you could have seen a sparking of conflict again. We would like to see an adequate number of trained troops so that when the Secretary General acted at the request of the Security Council we could move those troops fast enough to have an immediate impact on the situation.

Also, as Ambassador Young indicated, we are very active in trying to pursue the restructuring exercise in the U.N. which would strengthen the hand of UNDP as the principal source of technical assistance and source of coordination and coherence in the U.N.'s development efforts.

I could go on in other areas. But I will stop there.

Mr. HALL. This will be the last question.

One of the reforms you talked about was related to Congress and their role as far as foreign policy as it relates and as it fits into the U.N. policy. I am reading the Ambassador's statement here relative to human rights.

You say:

This Commission has codified a body of international human rights laws that set standards of governmental behavior towards citizens. These include conventions on genocide, civil and political, economic and social rights, refugees and women's rights, racial discrimination, and is currently working on instruments to prevent torture, and to protect the rights of the child and the freedom of religion. These instruments, while not self-enforcing, do provide means for individuals and groups to hold their governments accountable.

We don't have a very consistent policy on human rights. I am somewhat concerned about this issue from the standpoint of what the Foreign Affairs Committee has done in the last couple of days with respect to a couple of votes.

You say, "provide means for individuals and groups to hold their governments accountable." My question is, so what? You know? If we cannot demonstrate in some way through the U.N. or through this Government that in fact we are not going to continue to mouth human rights policies without action, what good does it do to raise this cry continually? I see it on various amendments. I made the statement yesterday that it's very convenient for us to mouth human rights policies for countries we don't care about, countries that really don't have a heck of a lot of use to us. It is very easy to make a point on human rights violations with Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, Panama, et cetera.

When it comes to countries like Iran, the Philippines, the human rights argument goes right out the window. I'm trying to figure out exactly how to phrase my question. The thing that really depresses me, and I've only been here 3 months, is we are so inconsistent, we are so hypocritical on this issue, both in Congress and in what we're doing in the U.N.

How can we reform the U.N. if in fact our foreign policy in Congress, what you talked about, to me appears to be hypocritical on the question of human rights?

Ambassador YOUNG. We always say that we have had more experience in the development of human rights in this country than anywhere in the world, that we have helped the world to define the concept. I would point to the process of return to civilian governments by military governments that has been fairly rapid in the last couple of years. For a long time the whole trend seemed to be going toward military dictatorships. That trend has been, I think, effectively reversed and the tendency now, whether it be Panama, Nigeria, Ghana, Peru, or the Dominican Republic, the tendency is for military governments to hold elections and return to civilian rule.

I would say that that's directly attributable to the debate and dialog in the international community but more particularly, to the discussion of the concept of civilian authority and human rights by the leadership of this administration both in the Congress and in the executive branch.

I go places around the world. I'm asked about human rights. People automatically want to try to explain to me what their problems are. When I talk with them about their political prisoners and the problems respecting the freedom of the press and things like that, quite often these are new concepts that have not been introduced to them before and we can count on some results with very little efforts in terms of the release of political prisoners around the world simply as a result of casual private discussion.

The debate on freedom of the press and UNESCO, which was so controversial here, I think has had an enormous educational effect. I remember saying to one editor that the press could not be an agent of a government because governments were basically the ones that were violating most of the human rights around the world and can't they see that it's necessary at times for the press to attack a government and point to the freedom of the press that we have in this country to attack and reform a government.

For a country that's less than 20 years old this requires some nerve. Yet we've seen in that country a deliberate opening up, coming into this country asking members of our press to establish bureaus there, assuring them that they will have freedom to criticize the government and to report the events as they see it.

To me, the changing practice in the reporting in one nation of 50 million or more people is of tremendous significance. I don't see the debate and dialog over a resolution, whether it came out the way we wanted it or not, in any way as a failure. It successfully raised the question. And we are seeing some of the things implemented as a result of the educational process on human rights, which I think this Government leads.

But when I try to talk about our hypocrisy on human rights, I do so because I think it gives us more credibility, that we're not talking as a nation that is perfect, looking down our noses at every other nation. We're talking as a nation continually struggling to implement human rights in our Nation and inviting them to join with us in the process of protecting the rights of their citizens and being able to learn from them about some of the mechanisms.

One of the things we have not done very much in the Congress, though, is respond to these conventions the Government has signed, like the Convention on Genocide and the covenants that the President signed. There's a backlog of conventions and treaties that have been negotiated by various administrations that have not been ratified by the Senate as yet.

Mr. MAYNES. Might I add something?

Mr. HALL [presiding]. Sure.

Mr. MAYNES. I think, Mr. Hall, that the cry of the double standard is the cry that's the strongest argument both of those that are opposed to any human rights policy and those who are also its strongest supporters. People who oppose our human rights policy use the double standard argument to try to defeat the policy completely. And those who would like to see the policy much more activist also use that argument. It's an argument that will always be with us.

I think that instills a creative tension, if you will, in the policy. But I think we have to understand what is taking place in the world because there really has been a historic change in the way that nation-states look at human rights.

Prior to World War II the idea that there could be any international standards to which governments could be held accountable for the treatment of their people was absolutely unheard of. For centuries governments had been allowed to treat people as they treat rocks and trees. They were to be disposed of as the sovereign state wished to dispose of them.

But because of World War II there were international standards that were established and we spent 30 years trying to develop a body of legislation on that.

Then, starting about 1970 the international communities moved from codification to implementation. That is a very gainful process because it gets into the question of which countries are chosen and why have they been chosen and not other countries.

It's going to be difficult. But I think it's not a process that we can turn back. It's also not a process that we should be worried about or ashamed of because there have been many helpful developments in the last several years.

At Belgrade for the first time in the history of the nonaligned movement there was a passage on human rights in the declaration that had never been there before.

One thing that this administration has succeeded in doing is putting human rights on the international agenda as a legitimate topic for discussion. The Human Rights Commission the last 2 years, for the first time in its history, has investigated the human rights problems of more than the three target countries—Chile, South Africa, and Israel—or Israel's occupation of the West Bank in Gaza. It has moved on to discuss the human rights situation in Kampuchea and Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Uruguay, and a number of other countries.

So there has been a movement away from the so-called double standard.

There are developments taking place in Eastern Europe where you have had individuals set up human rights committees. I would even cite the fact of Iran. Mr. Bazagan was the Iranian chairman of the League of Human Rights. There is an international consciousness here that I suppose involves a double standard for everyone. But I think also it involves progress for everyone.

Mr. HALL. Is it possible or, let's say, advisable to have a consistent policy on human rights as it relates to the world?

Ambassador YOUNG. I don't think so.

Mr. HALL. Is that too idealistic?

Ambassador YOUNG. No; I think because every country is at a different stage of development it's important to keep the pressure on every country to move further from where they are. I think we do a very good job of dealing with civil and political rights in this country. We've got all sorts of mechanisms for protecting our political process and the security of our elections.

You are talking now about public financing of congressional campaigns. I see all this as part of the improvement of the human rights machinery in our country.

Because we are so far ahead of everybody else in civil and political rights, in many respects, we forget that we probably have a lot of learning to do about some of the economic rights. We just took the responsibility as a government on the Humphrey-Hawkins Act to provide every citizen with a job. There are other countries that have almost no political civil rights that have done a great deal more with the problem of unemployment than we have.

So I think that being willing to learn as well as teach is important. In Iran, in fact, we would have been better off both we and they, had we put more pressure on them several years ago in addition to the economic reforms that they were pushing very rapidly, encouraged them and helped them to understand the need for comparable political and social development. Because we relaxed and maybe looked the

other way at some of the political and social inequities in that system, the whole thing was overthrown.

It's not a help to our friends when we don't continue to talk with them and press them about their human rights. I think there is something inevitable about human rights. I think it grows out as our Declaration of Independence says, "That all men are endowed by their Creator" with these rights and now that you've got television and satellites and things like that, everybody knows what everybody else's rights are and so the internal pressures all over the world, I think, are being generated by mass communications.

If we can, through the U.N. system and through the example of our country, help people to learn how to respond to these internal pressures I think we are really helping them. It'll be different in the Soviet Union than it is in South Africa because it's a completely different kind of problem and situation.

But I think we have to try to deal with all of them in ways that are appropriate to the amount of power and influence we have in those countries.

Mr. HALL. I appreciate very much your taking the time. We probably should not be talking about reform in the U.N. but reform in the U.S. Congress because I've only been here 3 months and I'm kind of embarrassed to be the only Congressman here. But I understand the needs of the various subcommittees that go on at the same time. I know the Ambassador does too.

We really should have some reforms here because we have distinguished visitors visit us and we have to continue to run to other subcommittees and votes and we really don't get the information that we need.


I have enjoyed this. It's been very informative for me.

Thank you very much.

Ambassador YOUNG. Thank you.

Mr. HALL. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:52 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]



APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.N. SYSTEM, SUBMITTED BY THE CAMPAIGN FOR U.N. REFORM

SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS FROM PRESIDENT CARTER ON THE REFORM & RESTRUCTURING OF THE U. N. SYSTEM *

Introduction

- **A central concern of U.S. foreign policy must be to build a stronger and more effective U.N. system.
- **Prepared to participate in a Charter Review Conference if a substantial majority of member states believe outcome likely to be productive.

Dispute Settlement Machinery

- **Requested Secretary of State to conduct thorough examination of existing mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes with view toward promoting their greater use.
- **Will continue to treat establishment of fact-finding missions as a procedural matter not subject to veto.
- **Favors annual meetings of foreign ministers to review state of world peace in light of reports prepared by Secretary General.

International Court of Justice

- **Would permit private parties indirect access to International Court of Justice by giving national appellate courts recourse to ICJ for advisory "preliminary opinions" on issues of international law.
- **Will, at an appropriate time, request the Senate to re-examine the Connally Reservation in order to demonstrate new U.S. adherence to compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Peacekeeping Capability

- **Further efforts should be made to create a U.N. Peacekeeping Reserve composed of national contingents trained in peacekeeping functions.
- **Prepared to assist Secretary General with airlift of troops and equipment for peacekeeping force authorized by Security Council.
- **Will explore possibility of establishing a Special Peacekeeping Fund in the order of \$100 million.

(Continued on Next Page)

*Submitted to Congress on March 2, 1978 Pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1978.

Decision-making Process

- **Believes there is no prospect for adoption of weighted voting in the General Assembly.
- **Believes that curtailment of veto would not be in U.S. interests.
- **Prepared to offer very small new states some form of associate status short of full membership.
- **Prepared to give substantially greater weight in U.S. national policy to General Assembly decisions arrived at by consensus.

Human Rights

- **Will press for establishment of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.

U.N. Finances

- **Favors, as a long term goal, the development of autonomous sources of income for the international community.

U.N. Economic System

- **Will seek improved central management and leadership in the U.N. Secretariat.
- **Will sustain the UNDP as the major channel for U.S. voluntary contributions for technical assistance programs.

The President's Report on The Reform and Restructuring
of the U. N. System

Section 503 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978 calls for "a major effort by the United States towards reforming and restructuring the UN system". We welcome this expression of interest by the Congress. How the United Nations might be improved so as better to carry out its responsibilities is of central concern to this Administration. I believe that an active and imaginative leadership by the United States can do much to strengthen the United Nations.

Today, the international community faces a series of critical and global problems which must be of concern not only to us but to all governments:

- How to achieve international peace and security.
- How to make progress toward a more stable and equitable international economic order.
- How to enhance the quality of human life.
- How to extend and protect the elemental human rights of all peoples.

The successful management of any of these problems is beyond the reach of the individual nation-state, no matter how powerful economically or militarily it might be.

The world organizations such as we have in the United Nations and its sister agencies provide the universal framework within which to harmonize diverse views and interests in addressing global problems. If we are to develop adequate machinery for management of the world's common problems, a central concern of our foreign policy in the remaining years of this century must be the building of a more effective UN system. To this end, this Administration is committed to working for a stronger and more effective United Nations.

The UN system can be justifiably proud of major successes. It has served the common interest in its peace-keeping activities and in its pathfinding work in economic development. It has served mankind well in areas of health, communications, education and a host of other fields. Still, the United Nations -- like many other institutions, domestic or international -- has frequently failed to meet popular expectations and the objectives of its founders. The need for reform of the United Nations dates back almost to its

very inception, as changing circumstances required changes in its structure, procedures and priorities. At the same time, we often fail to recognize how successful the UN system has been in adapting itself to these changed circumstances. Reforms may not have been as rapid and dramatic as some would desire but they were as effective and pervasive as was possible.

A purely "engineering" approach that attempts to construct a theoretically "effective" global institution is apt to be sterile. It is easy enough to assemble a shopping list of reforms. But such an exercise will be largely diversionary, unless it takes account of the political context in which the United Nations operates.

It is, therefore, in the spirit of realism and profound respect for the views of other Member States of the United Nations that we approach the urgent need for reform and restructuring of this organization. We hope that it may be possible to reach agreement in the United Nations on at least some of them.

Although the Charter itself provides for formal amendment as a procedure, this has not been a principal method of change in the life of the United Nations. The amendment procedure is a slow one and becomes practicable only when there is a sufficient convergence of interests among Member States with respect to the proposed change. Indeed, the great strength of the Charter -- like our own Constitution -- lies precisely in the fact that it has not created a static institution but has permitted evolutionary change and fresh approaches. Even today the possibilities for improving the functioning of the organization within the existing constitutional framework are extensive. Far-reaching reforms involving Charter revision may well have to await the development of a much greater community of interests in the United Nations. Despite this, we would be prepared to participate in a Charter review conference if a substantial majority of the Member States came to believe that the outcome of such a conference was likely to be productive.

Section 503 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act states that, in developing a program of UN reform which the United States should present to the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, appropriate consideration should be given inter alia to the seven areas of concern. These are addressed below. I am also forwarding to you as an attachment the Secretary of State's detailed analysis of various reform proposals.

A. PEACE, SECURITY AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW

Establishing More Effective UN Machinery for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Member States are generally reticent to submit disputes to third parties despite the existence of ample machinery for that purpose. It is not likely that the creation of additional machinery for arbitration, conciliation or mediation would in itself induce greater use of third party services.

However, we are prepared to examine with other Member States why existing machinery has remained so little used and to explore ways of increasing the awareness of Governments of the facilities which are available.

Therefore, I have requested the Secretary of State to conduct a thorough examination of existing procedures and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes with a view to promoting their greater use, including the United States.

We shall examine with other Member States, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, opportunities for strengthening the role of the Security Council in the peaceful settlement of disputes. We will explore the possibilities for greater use of informal meetings or sub-committees of the Council for the purpose of following up on Council resolutions. As part of such effort we favor holding annual private meetings at the Foreign Minister level for the purpose of reviewing the state of world peace and security in the light of reports prepared by the Secretary General.

We shall continue to treat the establishment of fact-finding missions as a procedural matter not subject to veto, so long as mandates are clear and non-prejudicial. We are prepared to examine with the other permanent members of the Security Council the possibility of a formal, joint voluntary statement to this effect. In this connection, it will be our policy to use technology available to us from aircraft reconnaissance to share with the Council pertinent factual information when the parties to a dispute agree.

Fostering Greater Use of the International Court of Justice

We support, if possible through amendment, the adoption of a procedure which would permit private parties to have indirect access to the Court on questions of international law essential to their courses of action. To this end, we would support a national appellate court, before rendering its own judgment in a case, having recourse to the International Court of Justice for an advisory "preliminary opinion" on issues of international law.

We will examine every treaty which the United States negotiates with a view to accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over disputes arising under the treaty, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute. Where one of the parties to the treaty will not accept the Court's jurisdiction, every effort will be made to include another dispute settlement provision.

I have also requested the Secretary of State to give thorough study to existing disputes with other States and identify those which could appropriately be submitted to the Court.

At an appropriate time, I shall request the Senate to re-examine the Connally Reservation, so that we may demonstrate the United States new adherence to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute.

Strengthening the United Nations' Peacekeeping Capabilities

We believe that further efforts should be made to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping capabilities, for example by the creation of a UN Peacekeeping Reserve composed of national contingents trained in peacekeeping functions.

We are also prepared upon request from the Secretary General to assist with the airlift of troops and equipment required for establishing a UN peacekeeping force authorized by the Security Council.

In order to be in a position to respond quickly to a request for assistance from the Secretary General, I am proposing that the Department of Defense initiate whatever contingency planning may be necessary.

In order to make a UN Peacekeeping Reserve a more effective force, we shall explore with other UN members arrangements for training of earmarked contingents as well as personnel of UN observer missions by the United Nations.

We shall examine with the United Nations ways to upgrade the technical equipment available to observer missions and peacekeeping forces and to enhance their observation and communications capabilities through modern technology.

We intend to press for progress in the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

We shall explore the possibility of establishing a Special Peacekeeping Fund to help cover the initial costs of peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council. The Fund might be in the order of \$100 million to be constituted over a reasonable period of time through such means as might be agreed upon.

Strengthening the United Nations' Role in the Field of Disarmament

The Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament will convene in New York in the spring of this year. Member governments at the UN, including the US, are preparing proposals so that the United Nations could deal better with questions of arms control and disarmament. A variety of possible procedural and organizational improvements to this end is being considered.

B. DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Weighted Voting in the General Assembly and Modified Veto Powers in the Security Council

There is no prospect for the adoption of a generally applicable weighted-voting system in the General Assembly. Even on a limited basis it has little likelihood of being accepted. In fact, pressure for change has been in the opposite direction: to replace weighted-voting in global institutions where it now exists with decision-making procedures on the model of the General Assembly. The trade-offs proposed, which involve sharp curtailment of our veto power in the Security Council, are not in US interests. Nor do we believe they would serve the organization well.

Therefore, it would be better to employ our efforts toward defining voluntary but common standards to curtail the use of the veto in the Security Council and reduce the necessity of invoking it.

We are also prepared to examine the offer to very small new States of some form of associate status with the United Nations, short of full membership and voting privileges.

Consensus Decision

Consensus offers an alternative to formal voting as a way of arriving at decisions. It is increasingly used in the General Assembly and other UN organs. We hope that genuine consensus will become the principal method of conciliation in the continuing North/South dialogue in the United Nations. We are prepared to give substantially greater weight in our national policy to decisions so arrived at.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS

Improving Coordination of and Expanding United Nations Activities on Behalf of Human Rights

We are taking several steps toward achieving a better system of coordination of human rights activities among UN organs and agencies as well as with non-UN regional organizations. Presently, the US Delegation at the 1978 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights has been instructed to press for the following reforms:

- the strengthening of existing special procedures for dealing with private communications on human rights matters;
- more expeditious consideration by the Commission of evidence under the procedures established by Resolution 1503 of the Economic and Social Council;
- scheduling more frequent regular sessions of the Commission;
- establishing a new UN senior post as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

As a longer range goal, we shall explore ways to render the Commission freer from political influences. To this end, we would urge that member governments appoint representatives to the Commission with more specialized background in human rights.

We shall explore the possibility of changes in the schedule of meetings of the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities so that action on private petitions receive more expeditious treatment.

D. FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS

Meeting the UN Deficit

The United Nations faces serious financial difficulties largely as a result of the continuing refusal of certain Member States to pay assessments for peacekeeping operations and because of the practice of making some payments in non-convertible currencies. As of September 30, the resulting deficit was more than \$120 million. For years some states, including some responsible for the deficit, have suggested they would participate in a balanced program of voluntary payments of sufficient magnitude to eliminate the existing deficit. We believe this approach should be explored anew.

Adjusting Assessments to Reflect Ability to Pay

If the UN scale of assessments were to reflect more accurately the current ability of Member States to contribute, a principal result would be to increase the assessment for this country significantly above the present 25 percent ceiling. Because the U.S. is largely responsible for a major deviation from the capacity-to-pay principle, we believe it would be unwise to seek immediate adherence to that principle without Congressional authorization for the higher appropriations that would be required.

Supplementing UN Finances from Outside Sources

Debate surrounds almost all of the proposals which aim at the production of autonomous revenues for the UN system through contributions from commerce, services, or resources regulated by the UN. Further study is required. Provided that any autonomous revenue is subject to the same continuous scrutiny and control of governments as current Member State appropriations are and further as long as we and the other nations retain adequate control of the budget, the United States favors as a long-term goal the development of autonomous sources of income for the international community. We are therefore prepared to join in further exploration of various proposals in this field and would support moves in the United Nations to undertake a study along these lines.

E. ACHIEVING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Restructuring the Economic and Social Sectors

Some of the most promising possibilities for reform in the UN system exist in the field of economic and social affairs. The 32nd General Assembly endorsed wide-ranging recommendations on the restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the UN system. These are in line with basic UN objectives for reform:

- the development of an enhanced planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation capability in the UN Secretariat;
- improved central management and leadership in the UN Secretariat;
- better policy analysis, research and data-gathering capability in the Secretariat on international economic and social issues;
- increased efficiency and effectiveness in development assistance programs.

Our efforts will concentrate on full implementation of this program in the months ahead.

Better Coordination of UN System Technical Assistance

The most practical approach to assure that the UN technical assistance activities make effective contributions to development hinges on three conditions: first, that technical assistance programs be primarily funded by voluntary contributions, centrally coordinated and programmed by the UNDP; second, that supporting technical assistance by assessed contributions to the specialized agencies complement the work of UNDP, provide common benefits which may be enjoyed by countries other than the primary recipient nation, and be limited in scale; and third, that voluntary contributions be placed on a firmer, more assured, long-term basis.

It will be our policy, therefore,

- to sustain the UNDP as the major channel for US voluntary contributions for the technical assistance programs of the UN system;
- to support a strengthened role for the UNDP representatives;
- to support an enhanced role for the UNDP in setting standards for project appraisal, execution, monitoring, evaluation, data-gathering, and quality control;
- to press, simultaneously, for reduced direct involvement by UNDP headquarters in the details of appraisal, execution and monitoring of individual projects;
- to work through appropriate intergovernmental bodies such as the ECOSOC Committee on Program Coordination in order to obtain from responsible Secretariats compatible information on technical assistance activities and programming, budgeting and accounting methods so that governments can better formulate a coherent policy to guide the constituent programs;
- to support an expansion of evaluation efforts within the UN system, in particular by the Joint Inspection Unit;
- to work towards long-term voluntary pledges by donors for the technical assistance activities in the UN system;
- to work with other donors toward a common approach to technical assistance in assessed budgets of the specialized agencies.

Improving United States Participation

We must improve our capability to manage United States participation in the work of the organizations and programs of the UN system.

To this end we must:

- ensure that our policy objectives in each UN agency are coordinated and integrated with overall US foreign policy objectives;
- monitor continuously US participation in each international organization and program; identify and analyze problem areas, and establish policy objectives with regard to each of these multilateral institutions;
- assure the most effective involvement of the different Departments and agencies of the Executive Branch in the activities of these multilateral institutions; and
- bring our multilateral diplomacy to bear on achieving greater effectiveness, efficiency and economy within each of the organizations and programs of the UN system.

The Department of State is developing a policy analysis and resource management process through which we shall endeavor to formulate annual action programs for each of the UN agencies. I am expecting the heads of the other responsible Executive Departments and Agencies to work closely with the Secretary of State to provide him with whatever assistance is necessary.

Improving the Secretariat of the United Nations

The future success or failure of the United Nations will be determined not only by the wisdom and sense of responsibility of its membership, but also by the type and quality of the personnel that must carry out the work of the organization.

As part of any general exploration of possible measures to strengthen the United Nations, we are prepared with other interested countries to take common steps toward ensuring promotion of the best qualified staff.

s/Jimmy Carter

March 2, 1978

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