

Y4
.F 76/1
Ug 1

U.S. POLICY TOWARD UGANDA

GOVERNMENT

Storage

DOCUMENTS

AUG 1 1979

FARRELL LIBRARY
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

APRIL 26, 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1979

46-677

KSU LIBRARIES



A11900 913675

AY
1/27/7.
124

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, *Chairman*

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
DAN MICA, Florida
MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
WILLIAM H. GRAY III, Pennsylvania
TONY P. HALL, Ohio
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington
MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey
DAN QUAYLE, Indiana

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., *Chief of Staff*

SARAH LISENEY, *Staff Assistant*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York, *Chairman*

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
WILLIAM H. GRAY III, Pennsylvania
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey

JOHNNIE CARSON, *Subcommittee Staff*

STEVE WEISSMAN, *Subcommittee Staff Associate*

DAVID FRANK, *Subcommittee Staff Associate*


STEPHEN D. NELSON, *Minority Staff Consultant*

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

	Page
Robert V. Keeley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs..	3
Keith Wauchope, Uganda Country Officer, Department of State-----	11

(iii)



U.S. POLICY TOWARD UGANDA

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:10 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The meeting of the subcommittee is called to order. Today we are considering what constructive changes can be made in the relationship between the United States and Uganda. Clearly, a new and promising chapter in this relationship should unfold now that Idi Amin has been removed from power.

The downfall of Idi Amin, which was brought about by the courage of Ugandan exiles and the decisive action of Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, as well as by the heroic legislative efforts here on the Hill of such Members of Congress as my very good friend from Ohio, Mr. Pease and a number of the other members of this committee and the House, will allow the people of Uganda to pursue the long road back to political and economic recovery. I believe the United States can play an important role in helping the citizens of Uganda overcome Amin's monstrous legacy—the mass murders, the unbelievable devastation and hatred which have scarred Uganda in recent years.

I can only note parenthetically that it is truly unfortunate that sometime during the 1930's the same kind of action could not have been taken to eliminate the scourge of Hitler from the world at that time.

Testifying before us today is Robert Keeley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. I am sure the subcommittee will be interested in exploring what steps can be taken by the Congress in the short term and the long term, as well as by the administration, to alleviate the suffering of the people in Uganda and to reestablish a firm and lasting foundation for United States-Uganda relations.

In response to Idi Amin's genocidal policies, Congress passed and President Carter signed into law last year a total embargo against trade with Uganda. The law now requires that before trade with Uganda is resumed, the President must certify to Congress that "The Government of Uganda is no longer committing a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights". I would hope we can discuss today what factors will make up that Presidential determination and what assessments the administration has made to date of the new Uganda regime. We might also explore the advisability of repealing our trade embargo against Uganda, a move embodied in legislation introduced

today by Congressman Don Bonker of Washington, which will be cosponsored by Congressman Pease, myself and other Members of the House as well.

However, our primary focus today will concern the need to revise the present law in order to provide immediate emergency humanitarian assistance for Uganda during fiscal year 1979. I believe such a revision requires the immediate and sustained attention of our subcommittee.

Bilateral development assistance to Uganda is currently prohibited under various sections of the law. However, earlier this year, in response to Idi Amin's impending political demise, the House voted to drop Uganda from the list of pariah nations to whom assistance will be prohibited in fiscal 1980. Today I am joining with Congressman Pease, Congressman Bonker and other Members of the House to file a bill which would permit the resumption of humanitarian assistance from the United States to Uganda during fiscal 1979.

I hope that Mr. Keeley will explain to the subcommittee the most pressing material needs of the Ugandan people and describe how Congress can take speedy action to meet those needs. We would also like a description of the current political, economic and military situation in Uganda, as well as the outlook for economic development and human rights.

U.S. citizens and political officials have been sickened and saddened by the incredible destruction and slaughter wrought by Idi Amin. Now that President Nyerere and his armed forces, together with Ugandan exiles, have removed Amin from the world political stage, I believe America has a compelling responsibility to help the Ugandan people rebuild their shattered nation.

Congressional action to send emergency assistance to Uganda, in my judgment, will signify a recognition of that responsibility.

Mr. Goodling, do you have anything to say?

If not, Mr. Secretary, you can proceed. Before you do, however, it occurs to me that Congressman Pease might perhaps want to say a word because he really was a leader of the efforts in the House to mobilize opinion in the Congress and around the country against the Amin regime.

At this moment, perhaps, Don, you would like to say a word.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here for this hearing and am pleased that we have an opportunity to have a hearing on the post-Amin period.

I am grateful to the chairman for inviting me to sit in on this hearing, and also for his consistent efforts to give me credit, or partial credit, for Idi Amin's demise. I think it is a great day for the people of Uganda, one that they waited for for many, many years. I hope it is a lesson for other tyrants around the world that they cannot go unchecked forever, trampling on the human rights of their citizens.

I am more than pleased to participate with the chairman of the subcommittee and my good friend, Mr. Bonker, all three of us having worked a great deal last year on the trade ban, in seeking ways now to look at the trade ban and to lift the ban on aid, so that we can get about the job of reconstructing the Ugandan economy.

Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Chairman, can I say something, a word of caution? I certainly joined in banning aid to Uganda under the

regime that we saw. But I must confess, I am not very happy with some of the things I read about what is going on there right this minute. A man was apprehended that they believed to be a member of the armed forces. While he was lying on the ground, one of the Tanzanian soldiers kicked him in the face.

Now, this kind of thing, if we are going to see more atrocities, there ought to be some warning somehow in whatever we convey—and I have not heard of this legislation being proposed until this minute—there has to be some way of conveying that that is not what we have in mind, either. That we are not prepared to see what we have seen in Iran, which is getting rid of one oppression and replacing it with murder at midnight, unchecked by the moderate and sensible Prime Minister.

It seems to me that we would not be doing our duty to assume quite happily that everything was fine. I am not convinced that it is. If people are suffering we should help, but I think there ought to be some warning that that is not what we had in mind.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think the gentlewoman's observations are well taken. Let me simply say—and I really mean this from the bottom of my heart—that if we had a few people in the Congress in the 1930's like the gentleman from Ohio, the holocaust might never have taken place. I really think that we all owe you a great moral debt for having undertaken to provide the leadership in this fight.

Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT V. KEELEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. KEELEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to express my appreciation for this opportunity to express our policy toward Uganda. First of all, I will review briefly the situation in Uganda and the direction we expect our policy will take toward that nation.

I would then like to share with you the report of our team which has just visited Kampala, following which I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Following the fall of Kampala on April 11, the Uganda National Liberation Front, headed by Yusufu Lule announced the establishment of a provisional government and the appointment of ministers responsible for the full range of functions of that government.

We are encouraged that the new provisional government represents a broad cross-section of the Ugandan people. We are also pleased to note this government's public commitment to human rights, political reconciliation, and economic reconstruction.

In an address to the nation on April 13, Yusufu Lule, the provisional president of Uganda said:

First, we must not indulge in the evil acts of the regime we have just removed. Respect for life and individual rights must be paramount. The rule of law must be established immediately.

These pronouncements encouraged us to move promptly to establish contact with the provisional government with a view to normalizing our relations with that country, with Uganda.

As a first step in this process, we sent a team from our Embassy in Nairobi to Kampala to establish contact with the provisional government, to assess humanitarian relief requirements in Uganda, and to determine the administrative steps necessary to reopen our Embassy in Kampala.

In connection with our normalization of relations with Uganda, we would like for the Congress to lift existing restrictions on aid. As you have already mentioned, the House has taken action to remove a restriction on assistance to Uganda in the fiscal year 1980 Foreign Assistance authorization legislation. Of immediate concern, however, is our ability to respond to Uganda's humanitarian relief requirements during the current fiscal year. Existing statutory restrictions in section 602 of Public Law 95-424, the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, and in section 108 of Public Law 95-481, the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, prohibit us from providing immediate assistance to Uganda other than in the form of Public Law 480 title II food assistance.

While there may be some requirement for such food aid, we anticipate a more pressing need for other forms of emergency assistance. It is in that regard, therefore, that we request the expeditious enactment of legislation which would lift restrictions on providing humanitarian relief. Such assistance would be financed from funds appropriated to meet foreign disaster and emergency humanitarian relief requirements. We do not plan at this time to request supplemental funds for bilateral assistance to Uganda for the current fiscal year. However, we may want to reconsider this possibility once we have fully assessed Uganda's most urgent needs.

If existing restrictions on assistance are lifted, we would plan to provide humanitarian assistance to Uganda, in cooperation with other donors, and in response to specific requirements. We would also be prepared to provide some initial assistance for rehabilitation of those persons displaced by the recent fighting. Consideration of the reestablishment of development assistance, and possibly Public Law 480 programs would be undertaken following the reopening of our Embassy in Kampala.

With reference to the embargo on U.S. trade with Uganda, I can assure you that we are fully mindful of the importance of the resumption of normal commerce with the United States and other nations to the economic recovery of Uganda. We anticipate being able to make recommendations on this subject within the next week or two.

We wish to confirm the provisional government's willingness and ability to carry out its stated intentions concerning respect for human rights. Once we have assured ourselves on this point, we anticipate no problem in the President's reporting to the Congress a determination, as required by law, "That the Government of Uganda is no longer committing a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights," thereby lifting the trade embargo.

We have initiated steps to staff and to reprogram funds to reopen our Embassy in Uganda at the earliest possible moment. If no unforeseen difficulties arise, we would like to have an initial team in place in Kampala by the end of May. I will be visiting Uganda next week as part of our process of normalization of relations, and I would be happy to give the committee a report on that visit after I return about May 11, in whatever form the committee might find useful.

I would now like to share with you the report of our team which recently returned from Kampala. First of all some summary paragraphs.

The mission had substantive conversations with President Lule and with the Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning, Health, Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation, as well as with the principal Presidential Adviser and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Upon their arrival in Kampala they met with the Foreign Minister, who was on his way to Nairobi for talks with the Kenyan Government. As instructed by the Department of State, the team informed the Ugandans that the United States accepts the Ugandan provisional government as the Government of Uganda, is encouraged by the Uganda provisional government's stance on reconciliation and human rights, and we are working to lift aid restrictions and will open our Embassy as soon as possible. The Ugandans received this word with evident pleasure.

The team reported that Kampala is calm and completely under the control of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. There are many control points throughout the city at which identity documents of pedestrians and motorists are checked by the Tanzanian forces. There is, however, no harassment of the civilian population, and all of the soldiers that our team saw were invariably polite and well disciplined in carrying out their duties.

The team reports that Uganda is an economic disaster area. This disaster came about not from the single episode of the war, but is rather the result of 8 years of plundering and maladministration by the Amin government. There is almost no foreign exchange. Industry is at an almost total standstill. Sugar refining is down to 10 percent of pre-Amin levels. Cement production has ceased altogether, as has the manufacture of glass, agricultural implements, and so forth. Uganda's once prosperous agricultural sector has sunk to the subsistence level with cotton, coffee and tea—which are their primary exports—down to only a small fraction of earlier production.

The looting which took place on April 11 to 14 throughout Kampala, as the Ugandans released the pent-up rage at Amin and his cronies—who owned most of the retail establishments—has completely destroyed the commercial life of the city. Every shop in Kampala has been stripped bare of all of its goods and furniture, display windows exist no longer, and office machinery and files have been destroyed. The POL situation—that means petroleum, oil and lubricants, for those who do not know that abbreviation—is desperate with all public service stations closed. Some small quantities of black market gasoline exist at very high prices.

On the bright side, subsistence agriculture and the informal traditional market mechanisms are functioning well. There is plenty of food in the liberated areas. The markets our team saw, both in Kampala and on the road between Kampala and Entebbe, were well stocked and busy. There were, of course, no imported items or manufactured goods, but there were plenty of plantains—casava, onions, green beans, tomatoes, and other staple items of the local diet. Thus, there is no famine and no necessity for emergency food imports at this time. This may not be true in the country at large, however. Many of the unliberated areas are in the more arid, less fertile north, and there may be food shortages there that the Government is not yet aware of.

The new government is starting out under an immense handicap. All of the government offices were looted, furniture and files destroyed. Consequently, the new government is largely operating out of the Ministers' hotel rooms, or the conference rooms in the Nile Mansions Hotel. Nevertheless, the new cabinet has started off at a fast pace. Although the government had only been in place 10 days when the team arrived in Kampala, it had already done an amazing amount of research and organizational planning. The Ugandan Provisional Government has adopted a very strong human rights policy—not surprising for a successor government to Amin—and is pledged to fair and public trials for all accused Amin officials. All of the new government whom we met—whom the team met—impressed us immensely with their energy, commitment to the difficult task facing them, and their remarkable realism. They are beginning their work from an indescribably low point. Their resources are few, but their determination is great. They are counting on the help of the rest of the world in this endeavor and they deserve it. An initial Uganda Provisional Government statement of its aid needs is being sent by a separate message. End of summary.

Now, for some further details which I think you might find interesting. The Entebbe Airport runway is virtually undamaged. The control tower is now in operation, although all of the navigational systems are not. Any sort or size aircraft can be accommodated at Entebbe. The airport buildings are damaged, but not as extensively as we had been led to believe. The airport is still closed to all traffic except small chartered aircraft from Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The airport is controlled by the Tanzanian Forces which, as far as we could observe, provide all the security throughout the liberated areas. The liberation forces are all at the front.

In a subsequent message our team recommended that we send an FAA technician to Kampala at the earliest possible time to assist the Government in assessing what needs to be done to help get that airport back into operation.

The road between Entebbe and Kampala is in relatively good shape. There is an occasional shell crater in the road or along the shoulder, and one sees a few burned-out APC's and other vehicles along the road, but there is remarkably little war damage to the houses along the way, and the population seems to be going about its business as usual. The scene of the worst fighting was a pass between two low hills where a Libyan force coming south from Kampala in an attempt to retake Entebbe Airport was ambushed. According to reliable sources, some 400 Libyans died at this spot. Among the derelict items still on the scene is a GM-21 "Stalin Organ" rocket launcher.

Kampala itself suffered relatively little damage from the fighting. A few buildings, where Amin's soldiers holed up, are extensively damaged, but the destruction from the war is quite localized and limited. The destruction from the looting, on the other hand, is everywhere and extensive. It would be impossible to estimate how many thousands of square feet of store windows have been shattered in Kampala. As far as one could tell, not a single business establishment was missed. The looters took everything that would be of value to them and destroyed the rest. The same pattern was repeated at

government offices. The streets of Kampala were littered with an incredible amount of paper from pillaged filing cabinets. Broken glass was everywhere. Most of the shop owners had not yet troubled to board up their establishments, so the face of the town as one drives down the streets is one of empty, gaping shop windows and store fronts.

As far as the team was able to determine, the Tanzanian Forces did nothing to restrain the looting for the first three days the city was occupied. By that time everything was gone or destroyed. After listening to stories from all sides in Kampala, it is actually not difficult to imagine the spirit that must have seized the looters. For years consumer goods have been of increasingly short supply in Uganda. Luxury articles were reserved for the army, the security apparatus, and other privileged groups of Amin's supporters. The common man could buy nothing; his money was virtually worthless. Furthermore, most of the retail commerce had been expropriated from its original owners and taken over by cronies of Amin. Thus, commerce in the modern sector was seen simply as another manifestation of a regime that was hated as much as it was feared. When the controls were off, it is understandable that the people's frustration and rage burst forth.

THE ECONOMY

The economy of Uganda has been devastated—not only from the war and the looting, but principally from Amin's maladministration and the plundering of all economic assets by Amin and his crowd. The story is truly dismal. During the early years of his reign, Amin systematically expropriated almost all of the industry in the country, and he then allowed it to fall into such disrepair that by now almost none of it is functional. The flight of both expatriate experts and qualified Ugandans from Amin's brutality contributed greatly to this process. At present, Uganda has practically no operational industry other than the breweries at Jinja. Jinja fell the day we arrived, and the first beer Kampala had seen for weeks arrived the following evening, to the unrestrained jubilation of the Kampala populace.

As with industry, cash crop agriculture stagnated under Amin. Prices paid the farmers were held artificially low, and insufficient foreign exchange was devoted to agricultural implements and fertilizers, with the result that most of the country's farmers went back to growing subsistence crops rather than producing commodities for export. The looting has taken care of what was left of the retail commerce in the country. Shops have no stocks; warehouses have been stripped, and there are simply no goods to be bought or sold.

With the road from Kenya still blocked by Amin forces, no petroleum trucks have been able to come through and there is very little POL and hence little civilian motor transport. There is something of a black market, but supplies are soon almost exhausted even here, and prices are very high.

THE GOVERNMENT

Our team met President Lule; one of his two most senior advisers, plus the three most important ministers concerned with the reconstruction of the country, together with a host of lesser officialdom

and some of the remaining civil servants. The new Government impressed them by their obvious commitment to the task at hand. They recognize fully the immensity of the job to be done, but they are determined rather than cowed by the bleak prospects facing them. One of the things that struck the team most was the realism of the people with whom they talked. They recognized that there will be no easy answers. They know that the undertaking will be a long one, and they recognize how desperately they will need the rest of the world to get their country going again.

Obviously, mere determination will not be sufficient to insure success. Just how able these people will be to cope with the problems facing Uganda is at this point impossible to predict. The team said they will give it a good try; they hope they will have the capacity to pull it off. On the negative side, many of the new people have had little or no previous Government experience. They are bright and well educated, a large number are university professors or medical practitioners, but they have never had to cope with administering a state.

On the positive side it can be said with assurance that they will be able to do a much better job than Amin and his Government did—that is not saying much. The new Government is still disorganized. They have no offices in which to work. They are only beginning to fill out their staffs. The files of many ministries and offices have been destroyed, and the Government has no money. It would be hard to imagine a more difficult point at which to start attempting to govern a country.

POLICY AND IDEOLOGY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

We could detect, the team could detect, no ideological bias in any of the people with whom they spoke. They all appeared to be pragmatists. Almost all of them spoke of the need for getting free enterprise going again in Uganda. The team commented this was perhaps because of the audience that they were speaking to at the time. President Lule and the minister of health referred to the United States and the United Kingdom as Uganda's "very special friends," on whom Uganda would have to count more than on any other source of help.

As might have been expected, the new Ugandan Government has adopted a very strong human rights stance. The president and each of the ministers with whom our team spoke stressed to them that the greatest tragedy that has befallen Uganda, more than the deaths, more than the economic deterioration, has been the "dehumanization" of the whole population under the terror of the Amin regime. One minister expressed the situation this way: "We have found," he said, "that so many of our people are no longer real human beings. They have," he said, "little respect for human life. They fear and distrust everyone. As urgently as Uganda needs economic reconstruction, even more it needs," he said, "moral and spiritual rehabilitation." He said that if Uganda rebuilt its economy and neglected its moral regeneration, "We will find ourselves in another eight years destroying our country again."

In line with this policy, we have seen no evidence that the new Government has sanctioned any retaliations on Amin's people. They

told our team that anyone accused of crimes under the former regime would be given fair and public trials. Our team comments that from what they and Western journalists have seen of the files of the State Research Bureau and the Kampala prison, it will not be difficult to obtain convictions.

AID REQUIREMENTS

We have transmitted the Uganda Provisional Government's initial aid requirements statement by separate message. There is no immediate necessity for food. The team felt that there will be a need for medicines and hospital supplies still to be determined. They are sending a subsequent message on that subject.

One of the most desperate needs of the Government is for foreign exchange. The Government may have claims on moneys in foreign banks, but it does not yet know how much, or where it might be located. It has some coffee to sell but, again, no details have yet been established. In the interim it must start buying things, most important, petroleum products. Few, if any, suppliers will give Uganda credit. The oil companies are most reluctant because of the bills owed by the previous regime.

The provisional Government today received—this was on Wednesday, yesterday—a cash grant of 1 million pounds from the British Government. They asked our Government to provide some cash-grant aid as well. Our team pointed to the legal restrictions and suggested that they seek help from the International Monetary Fund. They probably had not thought of that yet, but they took up the suggestion quickly and said they would send a delegation to Washington within 2 weeks.

Now, a few points about our Embassy, which might be of interest to you as well. Our team suggested that we get a permanent party into Kampala as soon as possible, by which they meant as soon as the road from Nairobi to Kampala is open. The inchoate state of the new Ugandan Government, the chaotic conditions of the economy, plus the extreme difficulty in communications combine to make it all but impossible to deal effectively with the new Ugandan Government, or to plan U.S. policy rationally without a presence in Kampala.

As far as our real estate is concerned, our chancery, which we retained under lease, had been sublet to the French Embassy, which has 6 months, according to the lease, to vacate it. However, the French Ambassador promised our team that he would seek new quarters at once and would move out earlier, if possible.

Our Ambassador's residence has been used as an international primary school. We can probably get it back and put it in shape in 3 months. Two of our other houses are also usable. The team recommended that the two remaining of the five we own be sold because they are in very rundown condition and in very poor locations. The British High Commission has offered us temporary office space in their office building.

The administrative situation in Kampala is obviously chaotic, but the British are coping with getting started under these circumstances, and we ought to be able to do so as well. There will have to be extensive support from our Embassy in Nairobi. Several of our former local employees made contact with our team and said they were ready to go back to work if we want them.

In conclusion, our team said that we should become reestablished in Kampala as soon as possible. The psychological boost of our presence will be as important, initially, as our advice and material assistance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Keeley's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT V. KEELEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman: I would like to express my appreciation for this opportunity to discuss our policy toward Uganda. I will review briefly the situation in Uganda and the direction we expect our policy will take toward that nation. I would then like to share with you the report of our team which has just visited Kampala, following which I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Following the fall of Kampala on April 11 the Ugandan National Liberation Front headed by Yusufu Lule announced the establishment of a Provisional Government and the appointment of Ministers responsible for the full range of functions for that government. We are encouraged that the new Provisional Government represents a broad cross-section of the Ugandan people. We are also pleased to note this Government's public commitment to human rights, political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. In an address to the nation on April 13 Yusufu Lule, the provisional President of Uganda, said "First, we must not indulge in the evil acts of the regime we have just removed. Respect for life and individual rights must be paramount. The rule of law must be established immediately." These pronouncements encouraged us to move promptly to establish contact with the Provisional Government with a view to normalizing our relations with Uganda.

As a first step in this process we sent a team from our Embassy in Nairobi to Kampala to establish contact with the Provisional Government, to assess humanitarian relief requirements in Uganda and to determine the administrative steps necessary to reopen our Embassy in Kampala.

In connection with our normalization of relations with Uganda we would like for the Congress to lift existing restrictions on aid. The House has already taken action to remove a restriction on assistance to Uganda in the FY 1980 Foreign Assistance authorization legislation. Of immediate concern, however, is our ability to respond to Uganda's humanitarian relief requirements during the current fiscal year. Existing statutory restrictions (Section 602, Public Law 95-424, the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978; and Section 108, Public Law 95-481, the FY-79 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act) prohibit us from providing immediate assistance to Uganda other than in the form of Public Law 480 Title II food assistance. While there may be some requirement for such food aid, we anticipate a more pressing need for other forms of emergency assistance. It is in that regard therefore that we request the expeditious enactment of legislation which would lift restrictions on providing humanitarian relief. Such assistance would be financed from funds appropriated to meet foreign disaster and emergency humanitarian relief requirements. We do not plan at this time to request supplemental funds for bilateral assistance to Uganda for the current fiscal year. However, we may want to reconsider this possibility once we have fully assessed Uganda's most urgent needs.

If existing restrictions on assistance are lifted, we would plan to provide humanitarian assistance to Uganda in cooperation with other donors and in response to specific requirements. We would also be prepared to provide some initial assistance for rehabilitation of those persons displaced by the recent fighting. Consideration of the reestablishment of development assistance and possibly Public Law 480 programs would be undertaken following the reopening of our Embassy in Kampala.

With reference to the embargo on U.S. trade with Uganda, I can assure you that we are fully mindful of the importance of the resumption of normal commerce with the United States and other nations to the economic recovery of Uganda. We anticipate being able to make recommendations on this subject within the next week or two. We wish to confirm the Provisional Government's willingness and ability to carry out its stated intentions concerning respect for human rights. Once we have assured ourselves on this point, we anticipate no problem in the President's reporting to the Congress a determination, as required by law, "that the Government of Uganda is no longer committing a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights," thereby lifting the trade embargo.

We have initiated steps to staff and to reprogram funds to reopen our Embassy in Uganda at the earliest possible moment. If no unforeseen difficulties arise, we would like to have an initial team in place in Kampala by the end of May.

I will be visiting Uganda next week, as part of our process of normalization of relations, and I would be happy to give the committee a report on that visit after I return about May 11 in whatever form the committee might find useful.

I would now like to share with you the report of our team which recently returned from Kampala.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your excellent testimony. This has been enormously helpful in giving us a better picture of what conditions are actually like in Uganda at the present time.

I think it would be helpful if you could give us the names of the people who comprise the American team, to which you were constantly referring in the course of your testimony. Do you have that now, or do you want to furnish it for the record?

Mr. KEELEY. Our team was headed by our Deputy Chief of Mission in Nairobi, John Blane. He will be going in with me next Wednesday when we make the second trip in there. I do not know the names of the other team members. One was an AID man from Nairobi.

This is Keith Wauchope, our desk officer for Uganda.

STATEMENT OF KEITH WAUCHOPE, UGANDA COUNTRY OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. WAUCHOPE. There was one AID officer from our regional office in Nairobi, his name is Roy Love; and then the administrative officer Curt Bartholomew, came in as well, plus two additional officers whose names I do not know.

Mr. SOLARZ. Where is Idi Amin?

Mr. KEELEY. To the best of our knowledge, he is now in Libya. On leaving Uganda he went first to Libya and talked to Colonel Quadhafi. He then went to Baghdad, seeking help, military help, presumably. He wanted to go to Damascus, but the Syrians apparently put him off. He then went to Tehran. We do not know much about what he did there. He then returned to Libya. The last we heard of him, he was in Libya.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is he traveling on, does he have his own airplane, or does he fly commercial? [Laughter.]

Mr. KEELEY. I believe he is flying in a Libyan aircraft that they sent down to pick him up, but I am not absolutely sure about that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you tell us if there is any continued organized resistance in Uganda on behalf of Amin?

Mr. KEELEY. I would not characterize it as "organized resistance." However, the remnants of Amin's military forces are still largely in Uganda. Apparently they mostly moved toward the north, which is his home district, which is in West Nile, up in the northwest corner. Some of them have gone into Zaire; some have gone into Southern Sudan. They are looting, killing, doing horrible things as they move along. I do not think they are resisting the Government; they are just looking after themselves, apparently.

Mr. SOLARZ. How many are there?

Mr. KEELEY. I do not think we can give you a reasonable estimate, probably some thousands.

Mr. SOLARZ. And have they maintained any kind of organizational cohesion, or are they just simply a rabble?

Mr. KEELEY. I think the latter. I think it is every man for himself now.

Mr. SOLARZ. And they are, as far as you know, attempting to resist the advance of the Tanzanian forces?

Mr. KEELEY. No; I do not believe so. The Tanzanians have sent three task groups north, one to secure the airports at Gulu and at Nakasongola, which are toward the north of Kampala; another toward Amin's home district; and another to clear the road to Kenya.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, there is no longer any possibility that Amin could return and stage a kind of military comeback.

Mr. KEELEY. I do not believe so. I do not think you could rule it out absolutely, but I think you are right that those forces have become a rabble, and it would be very difficult to get them organized again.

Mr. SOLARZ. Was there any manifestation whatsoever of indigenous popular support for Amin over the course of the last several months?

Mr. KEELEY. I saw no reports of that character whatsoever. Of course, our information came mainly from the liberation forces and the Tanzanians entering. But they continually reported that they were greeted as liberators by the populace as they moved through the countryside.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we have any idea what Amin's intentions are at this point; is he going to settle into retirement in Benghazi or join Arafat somewhere?

Mr. KEELEY. I am afraid we could only speculate on that. As of last week he was still seeking military support from some of the governments that have been friendly to him, but apparently unsuccessfully. I do not know what his future intentions are.

Mr. SOLARZ. Where is his family?

Mr. KEELEY. His family, which is rather large, is in several places; some in Libya and some in Iraq. I think some in Zaire, also.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why did the Libyans come into Uganda and why did they leave?

Mr. KEELEY. I am not sure that we know too much about that. They responded to an appeal from Amin. My feeling about it is that Colonel Qadhafi and the Libyans felt that this was somehow a Muslim-Christian battle, and that the Christians were trying to overthrow a friendly Muslim leader; and that the Muslims would be slaughtered. As you know, he takes a rather "holy war" view of the world. I think that is why he sent his forces down there, in effect, to protect a Muslim regime and Muslim population.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, why did they leave?

Mr. KEELEY. Because they were soundly beaten by the Tanzanians and suffered enormous casualties, as you can see from that report.

Mr. SOLARZ. How many troops did they send in originally?

Mr. KEELEY. I am not sure I have an accurate figure; it was around 1,200 at the maximum.

Mr. SOLARZ. And how many of them were killed or wounded; do you know?

Mr. KEELEY. I think their casualties were at least half that, and probably a third killed, maybe more. It was a debacle.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you give us some more precise indication of what kind of aid Uganda could use in the current fiscal year? You indicated that agricultural assistance did not appear to be necessary, but

it was not clear to me what kind of precise aid they can use which we might be in a position to give.

Mr. KEELEY. They have asked for all sorts of things. We have received the subsequent message that was promised, it is a very long list. I am not sure it is based on very sound information or analysis. It does include some agricultural assistance. I think they have enough food. I would say that their immediate needs are such things as petroleum supplies, gasoline, trucks and other forms of transport to move food from the rural areas, where it is grown, into the cities. Hospital equipment and medicines to get those services going again. Then, whatever is needed, probably repair work to the basic utilities, the water system, the electricity system, and so forth, all of which are completely broken down.

Mr. SOLARZ. Has the administration given any thought to how much aid we would like to give for the remainder of fiscal 1979, and to what extent this can be provided by simply reprogramming existing resources?

Mr. KEELEY. I am afraid it is too early for us to come up with a figure, or the precise kinds of aid. I think that is why we want to get a mission established there as soon as we can, preferably within the next couple of weeks, but surely by the end of May, to give us that kind of reporting on exactly what is needed. At the moment we just do not have sufficient information.

Mr. SOLARZ. But the administration would like to be in a position to provide assistance before the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. KEELEY. Very definitely.

Mr. SOLARZ. And that would require us to repeal the existing prohibition.

Mr. KEELEY. Absolutely.

Mr. SOLARZ. And we do have the capacity to actually get assistance to them before the end of the fiscal year?

Mr. KEELEY. Yes; I think we could do some reprogramming. I do not know how much money is available—we are drawing to the close of the fiscal year—but there must be some available.

Mr. SOLARZ. What I am trying to get at, this is not just an academic exercise you are asking us to go through.

Mr. KEELEY. No, absolutely not. We would like to get emergency relief assistance there just as soon as we can, in the quantities that they can use and we can provide.

Mr. SOLARZ. And you will also be giving thought, I gather, to a longer term relief that we can structure and program in fiscal 1981.

Mr. KEELEY. In fiscal 1980 we would like to start development aid.

Mr. SOLARZ. Fiscal 1980, I am sorry.

Mr. KEELEY. Yes; we would. We would like to start in fiscal 1980 with a regular aid program, but that is going to take a good bit of study to decide where we could be most effective.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have the U.S. missionaries been harmed in any way?

Mr. KEELEY. Not so far as we know. I am not sure of the number. Keith, was it about 200 that we had there at the end?

Mr. WAUCHOPE. At the start of the conflict, in the latter part of October 1978, there were approximately 135 or so. During the course of the conflict about 40 of them left. So, we might just have 80 or 90 in the country at the present time.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, as I understand it, the President has the right to waive the embargo if he comes to the conclusion the new govern-

ment is not engaged in a consistent violation of human rights. Given that waiver provision, is there any need for the actual repeal of the embargo?

Mr. KEELEY. No. Our lawyers think that we could recommend to the President that he simply notify the Congress that the human rights situation has improved and therefore the trade embargo is off.

Mr. SOLARZ. And is it your legal interpretation that once the President issues that waiver, the embargo is completely null and void in perpetuity, or is the waiver a kind of temporary waiver which, if circumstances change, would have to be withdrawn?

Mr. KEELEY. The preliminary opinion we were given was that it would be a permanent lifting of the embargo, and to reimpose it would require new legislation.

Mr. SOLARZ. When do you anticipate that waiver will be forthcoming?

Mr. KEELEY. I am hoping to look into that question specifically on the visit next week, and when I get back on May 11, I think we will be able to make a recommendation to the President, if things look all right on the human rights front, that he should lift the embargo right away.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question, and that is, our country often takes its lumps when tyrants are overthrown and we supported them, and a new government comes into power which resents the support which we gave to the government which in their view was suppressing their own people. If there is any country in the world where we were identified with the opposition to tyranny, it is Uganda.

I am interested in whether your team had any sense of the existence of any kind of resultant good will toward the United States by virtue of the fact that we were one of the few countries in the world which did take some kind of concrete action designed to facilitate the isolation and eventual overthrow of the Amin regime.

Mr. KEELEY. I think you are absolutely right, we enjoy tremendous good will in Uganda because of the stance we took in closing our Embassy a long time ago—that is 5½ years ago. We were the only country that took the initiative in that regard, many other countries kept their missions open. The British broke relations, but that was under a severe provocation. Amin broke relations with some people, such as Israel.

But we, I think, established a very good record with the Ugandan people and the exiles through our actions, through the trade embargo and so forth. I think we enjoy a very good reputation there now, and they are looking to us for help.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. I too want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for very informative testimony. We look forward to rereading it when it is reproduced.

Following what my colleague from New Jersey was mentioning earlier, everything I have read about the provisional President would indicate to me that he truly believes in "forgive and forget" "live and let live", etc. I think the Prime Minister of Iran also agrees with that, but he is not able to carry it out because of Khomeini and his forces.

My question is, I suppose, one, are we making it perfectly clear to both the forces that are occupying this country now, as well as the Ugandans, that we do not expect this kind of reprisal; and second, is this provisional President in a good position to make sure that there are not any other forces in the country that would prevent him from healing the country's wounds, letting live, and forgiving, and so on?

Mr. KEELEY. Yes, we have made our attitude on that point clear to them. I certainly intend to reiterate it next week when I talk to them in Kampala. I think their intentions are the very best. The problem is, how much control do they exercise in the countryside, they do not have an army of their own; they do not have a police force, all that has disintegrated.

So, I do not see how they could guarantee that there will not be individual reprisals of one person against another in revenge for killings that have gone on during those 8½ years. But they will certainly try. I think anybody in the nature of a leader of the previous regime who comes into their custody will be treated by the proper legal norms. However, I do not think for some time they are going to be able to establish law and order in the countryside to prevent individual reprisals. Certainly, there will not be anything in the way of a government campaign.

Mr. GOODLING. Is there a force similar to the Khomeinian force in Iran, that could make it very difficult for the position of the President on restoring national unity without reprisals?

Mr. KEELEY. I do not believe so. I do not believe there is any force of that kind, it is quite a different situation. The most dangerous forces in the country now are the remnants of Amin's army.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. I am so heartened by what you tell us, it is exactly what I hoped to hear. I hope very much that you will convey to the President and the Ministers our congratulations, our warm appreciation of what they have said in regard to the moral and spiritual development of their people. I think one does as much with a recognition of good things as one does with condemnations. If we could tell them how much it means to us to have heard from you concerning their intentions, and how heartening it is to think that this is what the Ugandan people will be handed in these next few years.

I would like to ask you two things. One, you spoke of all the laws that inhibit any kind of aid going directly to Uganda right now. Does the President's waiver apply to all those laws, or do you need legislation?

Mr. KEELEY. We need legislation. The President's waiver applies only to the trade embargo, it does not apply to the aid legislation.

Mrs. FENWICK. So, we need specific legislation.

Mr. KEELEY. That is correct. The only kind of aid permitted under current legislation is title II, Public Law 480.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes, you told us that. I wondered if the waiver was across the board, but I guess it is not.

The second thing, I have been wondering, what effect will it have on the nations of Africa, in your opinion, that the Arab countries were lined up, so to speak, that Amin found his natural haven in Libya, Iraq, Iran, and even sought asylum in Syria? I mean, what

effect is that going to have on the African nations. Will they not regard, perhaps, these Arab nations in a slightly different light?

Mr. KEELEY. It could very well be. I am afraid that is an area I could only speculate about. Of course, Amin has long had close connections with some of the more radical Arab States, so it was a natural from that point of view, there was not anything new in it. He has been supporting the more radical Arab position for many years, ever since 1972 when he kicked the Israeli Mission out of Uganda.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. KEELEY. So, I would think they would find it natural, although a bit peculiar. On the other hand, he has been a militant Muslim in a basically Christian country, so his behavior is in effect an aberration.

Mrs. FENWICK. For example, Mr. Nyerere, President Nyerere could not have welcomed the presence of Libyan troops when his own troops had to fight them. I mean, that ought to make a difference, and his latest Libyan incursion and fight in Chad. I would think all these things would begin to show the meaning of the two-edged sword, at least, for the Arabs sometimes.

Mr. KEELEY. I think you are correct in that. I think the Libyan intervention made a lot of people unhappy, not only because it was Arabs or Libyans, but because it was a foreign intervention in what was really not their business.

Mrs. FENWICK. What would be the effect on the rest of Africa of the fact that there were Tanzanian troops that did the overthrow of Uganda; is that generally regarded as OK, we hope?

Mr. KEELEY. I think people have somewhat mixed feelings about that. But since Amin was regarded as such a tyrant by so many others, I think people are more inclined to excuse whatever it took to overthrow him.

However, just looking at it from the legal point of view, Amin started it by invading Tanzania, occupying a piece of Tanzanian territory, annexing it and saying, "It is now part of Uganda." Nyerere's first reaction was to retaliate against that. The Ugandan forces withdrew before he built his forces up, but he then crossed the border and said his objective was to destroy those Ugandan military forces that had annexed part of his territory so they would not be able to do it again.

Our lawyers, and many other people's lawyers, I think, consider that a justified act of hot pursuit.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you.

Mr. KEELEY. That is how it differs from the Cambodia-Vietnam situation, I believe.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEELEY, I, too, am heartened by your report. Tell me about the law enforcement situation in Uganda. Are there efforts underway to build a Ugandan army, a new Ugandan army to take over the security arrangements in the country?

Mr. KEELEY. Yes, I would say these efforts are very tentative at this point because they have not fully pacified the country yet, and they are preoccupied with most of the Ugandan liberation forces that were associated with the Tanzanians that moved to the North and are pursuing the remnants of Amin's forces.

I would think the first thing they would want to do is reestablish their police force to deal with problems such as the looting that we

talked about, rather than an army. I think they will find some of the policemen still around and so able to help, but probably most of them are frightened of retaliation and revenge at this point and have thrown their uniforms away. But I think in pretty short order they will be able to develop some sort of a police force. That would be the first priority, I would think.

Mr. PEASE. Do we have any notion at all of how long Tanzania intends to keep parts of its army in Uganda?

Mr. KEELEY. The Tanzanian Government has said that they do not want to stay there at all any longer, but they feel they have to for the time being in order to provide the security and law and order that is necessary in that situation.

The do not want to leave too soon and have the situation collapse and Amin perhaps return, or the place just become chaotic. They are thinking, I believe, in terms of about 3 months now. I do not know, that may be optimistic, we will have to see. But keeping those forces there is very expensive for the Tanzanian Government, which is not a rich government. So, they have a strong incentive to bring them back home as soon as they can.

Mr. PEASE. All right. We are talking a lot about aid to Uganda. You mentioned before that Tanzania has suffered real economic hardships in pursuing this action against Idi Amin. Are we amenable to considering ways to help Tanzania recover from that burden?

Mr. KEELEY. We are right now looking into ways to help the Tanzanians. We already give them a considerable amount of aid. They receive aid from a great many countries. They are one of the major aid recipients in Africa. I think we may be able to find some ways to help them, although it is late in the fiscal year to find funds that are not committed to other purposes. We are looking at several possibilities now.

I think we will be able to do something for them, I cannot tell you how much.

Mrs. FENWICK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PEASE. Yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. We have had testimony before this committee on that point, and there were 23 organizations in Tanzania trying to hand out money, and the poor Tanzanians having difficulty doing the paperwork for those 23 organizations. So, I think they are being helped.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much.

What about internal dissension? The new government is quite consciously an umbrella government, as I understand it, drawing representatives, at least, from each one of the major tribal groups and geographic groups in Uganda. Are there any signs that we are aware of that there are going to be challenges to that government from non-Amin forces?

Mr. KEELEY. So far we do not detect any of that. Of course, it has only been 2 weeks and 2 days that they have been in Kampala, or 3 days.

I think that they are so busy trying to solve these immense problems that they face that they do not have too much time for internal bickering. It may come later, but so far they seem to be holding together pretty well.

Mr. PEASE. You mentioned that the British had provided some aid to Uganda. Are we aware that other nations, private voluntary

organizations and other groups, the United Nations, perhaps, are moving to help Uganda at this stage?

Mr. KEELEY. We do not know of any other nations that have offered immediate aid to this government like the British. There are international organizations involved in Uganda, have been involved and have teams on the ground. Some of them had to evacuate to Nairobi during the taking of Kampala. But the International Red Cross is there, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. development program, and they will all be studying the immediate emergency needs of that government. We hope that they will be able to help to the extent they can.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Pease.

I was somewhat concerned by the apparent assistance which Kenya seemed to be giving in the closing days of this conflict to the Amin regime. I wonder if you could comment on that and let us know to what extent Kenya was in fact attempting to assist Amin.

Mr. KEELEY. I do not think we could characterize the Kenyan position as assisting Amin. The position they took was that they would be neutral in that conflict between the Amin regime and the Tanzanians. What they actually did was to permit normal commerce and trade to go on with Uganda because of their firm belief that they should not penalize landlocked states by cutting off their trade routes to the sea. There are a number of countries, including southern Sudan and eastern Zaire, that depend on Kenyan roads, railroads, and so forth, ports.

They did decide that they would not permit anything to go into Uganda that would help the war effort, that would help the Amin regime in prosecuting the war. That is how they defined "neutrality" in that situation. I do not think that you could characterize it as actually helping Amin or helping the Libyans.

Mr. SOLARZ. Does the composition of the new government reflect the tribal and ethnic composition of the country?

Mr. KEELEY. Yes; it does. Not every tribal group is represented. There are about 11 major ethnic groups in Uganda. When I say major, that is with substantial numbers of people, say, more than 200,000 or 500,000. The major ones are represented and there is a good balance between the northerners and the southerners, which is the basic split in the Ugandan ethnic picture. They are about half from northern tribes, and about half from southern tribes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it the intention of the current leadership to establish a multiparty democratic society as soon as conditions permit?

Mr. KEELEY. From the people we have talked to, there are somewhat divided opinions on that. Most of them want to establish a democratic system. Some would favor a multiparty system; others might not. I think it is a bit early for them to decide that question. When they first came to power they talked of a 2-year timeframe before they would restore full democratic institutions. I would hope they could do it much sooner than that. Of course, a lot depends on conditions in the country, but they certainly want to go in that direction.

Mr. SOLARZ. Will former President Obote be likely to play an important political role?

Mr. KEELEY. That is difficult to predict. He has no role in the present provisional government, although a couple of the ministers are former Obote loyalists who presumably are looking after his interests. I simply cannot predict whether Obote will play a role in the future in Uganda or not.

Mr. SOLARZ. Does the President intend to make a decision on whether to issue the waiver on the embargo after the next team returns?

Mr. KEELEY. That is our intention, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. When are you returning?

Mr. KEELEY. May 11.

Mr. SOLARZ. When are you leaving?

Mr. KEELEY. Sunday, April 29.

Mr. SOLARZ. And that is the President's intention.

Mr. KEELEY. That is right.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, you are probably aware of the controversy that recently developed over this article on the CIA in Oregon Magazine. I would like to know whether the CIA did give technical assistance to the Amin regime, as alleged in that article. If so, what was the nature of that assistance?

Mr. KEELEY. I am afraid I cannot comment on that. I was in Uganda at the time the man who wrote that article says he was there. It strikes me as strange that I never encountered him. He must have been under very deep cover.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, was he there, or was he not?

Mr. KEELEY. He says he was there, I never met him.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, have you attempted to check?

Mr. KEELEY. On whether he was there?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.

Mr. KEELEY. I take his word for it. I just do not think he played the major role he says that he did, or he would have been a bit more conspicuous.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, do you know for a fact whether the CIA was providing any assistance to the Amin government?

Mr. KEELEY. I do not.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know of any kind of relationship that the CIA had with the Amin government?

Mr. KEELEY. I could not comment on that. As you know, we do not comment publicly on intelligence matters.

Mr. SOLARZ. I gather the overthrow of the Amin regime was largely the work of the Tanzanian army.

Mr. KEELEY. That is correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. There were, however, Ugandan exiles who were involved. What was the rough balance of force there? In other words, how many Tanzanian troops were there and how many Ugandan exiles were there?

Mr. KEELEY. The original Tanzanian force numbered some 25,000. I do not know how many ended up in Uganda and how many stayed in Tanzania in a support mode; but it must have been 20,000. The Ugandan exile group started out with about 600 and built up to 1,000 and then, as they moved into Uganda, they began recruiting more people. They perhaps ended up being about 2,000, something like that. They are probably more numerous than that now because they continue to recruit additional people.

Mr. SOLARZ. In your discussions with the provisional government, did they indicate that they expected their foreign policy would be nonaligned, or did they indicate that they expected to be in the Western camp; or how did they characterize their foreign policy position?

Mr. KEELEY. In the first statement they issued as an outgrowth of the conference in Mosttl, before they went into Uganda, I believe they took a position that their foreign policy would be nonaligned.

Mr. SOLARZ. And we do anticipate that all the Tanzanian troops will withdraw.

Mr. KEELEY. Yes, certainly, as soon as they can.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we expect that President Nyerere will attempt to exercise a continuing political influence on the new government, or has he taken the position that once the Tanzanian troops are out the Ugandas should decide things for themselves?

Mr. KEELEY. I think his position is that it is up to the Ugandans to run their own affairs. He certainly would prefer to have a friendly government in Kampala, rather than an unfriendly one. There is traditional cooperation amongst the three states in East Africa, even though the East African community has collapsed or broken up. They still have a lot of reasons to cooperate together because of common services such as ports, airports, railroads, and so forth.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. FITHIAN. I will pass this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, if you pass, Mrs. Fenwick.

Mrs. FENWICK. I always have something to say. [Laughter.]

I notice that England gave a million pounds. Is that not the most practical thing, perhaps, instead of looking into whether they need desks, and filing cabinets, and trucks? What would be the most efficient, quick way? Would it not be better just to give them some money to buy trucks or whatever they need, wherever it could be found, maybe in Italy or somewhere else?

Mr. KEELEY. My personal view would be to agree with you entirely that the best thing we could do would be to give them a check for \$1 or \$2 million. I am not sure my colleagues in the State Department or in AID would agree with that, since that is not the traditional way we give aid.

But I think this is a somewhat unique situation.

Mrs. FENWICK. For the rest of 1979, it would be fine if we had about \$5 million and could just say, "Do the best you can with it."

Mr. KEELEY. And give us an accounting.

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes, of course. [Laughter.]

Now, about elections, when you say full democratic system, is that what you are referring to?

Mr. KEELEY. That is right.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you.

What does it generally seem like—as long as we have a little extra time? You say the houses are not too badly damaged along the roads. The people, did they look thin, frightened, angry, happy, undernourished?

Mr. KEELEY. No, I do not believe so. I think they looked in pretty good health. The part of the country that our team visited—and as a matter of fact the part of the country that the Tanzanians came

through—was the most fertile part, agriculturally. The people there are generally well off. They grow their own food. There is no land problem in Uganda, everybody has his own house and his own plot of ground.

Mrs. FENWICK. What is the population?

Mr. KEELEY. Of the country?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. KEELEY. It is probably around 11 million now, I believe; maybe that is too high. About 11 million.

Mrs. FENWICK. And what was the tribe that you spoke of, the Acholi?

Mr. KEELEY. The Acholi are one of the northern tribes, up toward the Sudanese border, but south of it. The main tribe in the Kampala-Entebbe area is called the Baganda. The country is called Buganda, it used to be a kingdom under a king in the old days.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Keeley, from the basis of your testimony it would seem there probably is not any need to adopt legislation repealing the embargo when in fact the President will issue a waiver in the next week or two, the next few weeks. But on the question of repealing the existing prohibitions on aid, I think the question which came up a little bit earlier reflects what may be a concern on the part of some of the members, that we might end up in a situation where the new government in its own way is as bad as the old government. Now, your testimony, of course, has been very encouraging. You indicated the new government has every intention of attempting to provide due process to those who are accused of participating in the activities of the previous regime.

It seems to me that politically it might reduce some potential opposition to this legislation—although I do not anticipate much in any case—if perhaps instead of simply repealing the prohibitions, we added to them a Presidential waiver similar to the waiver which exists in the embargo legislation, giving the President the right to waive the prohibition if the new government is not engaged in a consistent violation of human rights. In that way we can assure people who are concerned about the possibility of the new government being just as bad as the old one that none of the aid will be forthcoming unless the situation is such as to enable the President to certify that the new government is not engaged in the same abusive patterns of violating human rights as the previous government was.

Does that sound reasonable to you?

Mr. KEELEY. It certainly does. I think that makes a lot of sense.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I just have one area. First of all, let me apologize for not being at the hearing earlier.

I want to feel assured that the policy we are going to pursue in the next 30 to 90 days is of such a nature that we will not lose the opportunity to reward this development, which we all welcome, obviously. I would hope that any delay, either because of the administration or the Congress, could be avoided. I think the timeliness of a response is almost as important—perhaps even more important—than the nature of a response over the next couple of months.

I would welcome the thought that perhaps the President by a stroke of the pen could do what the committee might otherwise have done as far as lifting the embargo. But on the matter of dollars, or aid, that leads me to believe that is a little longer process. The question is whether or not the administration has some flexibility, some contingency, some area in which they can act prior to the somewhat longer process, even if everybody is for it around here, that it takes the Congress to respond on this kind of an opportunity.

What is your judgment on that score?

Mr. KEELEY. Well, we have been studying the aid possibilities. The feeling is that there are probably adequate funds available this fiscal year that we could use, if we could get the restriction on any kind of aid lifted. In fiscal 1980, I do not believe there is any program for Uganda because when that budget request was developed, of course, it was still the Amin regime.

So, I think we may have to either make revisions in that request or come in with a new request. That has not been decided yet. We have been focusing on the remainder of this fiscal year because, as you say, we want to move very quickly. We can look at the fiscal 1980 picture later.

The most important thing is to lift the restrictions on aid because that keeps us from doing anything at all.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, it would be ironic, I think, having completely cut Uganda off because of the existence of the Amin regime, were we now unable to provide them assistance, given the fact that the Amin regime has been overthrown.

Mrs. FENWICK. Would the gentleman yield?

Notwithstanding any other law, or provision, if the President were granted the right to a waiver in all matters concerning aid, would there be a couple of millions lying around in contingency funds, that could be shipped over at once under those conditions?

Mr. KEELEY. I would hope we could, yes; I am not sure.

Mrs. FENWICK. That would be the most efficient, do you not think so?

Mr. KEELEY. I would personally think so, yes.

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. If there are no further questions, let me thank you, Mr. Secretary, for some very interesting and illuminating testimony.

I want to encourage you when you go over to Kampala to convey to President Lule and the members of his government the fact that our committee certainly, and I think the Congress as a whole, does want to be helpful, and that we fully anticipate the necessary legislation will be rapidly adopted.

Mrs. FENWICK. And how much it meant to hear the words that he has told you.

Mr. KEELEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mrs. Fenwick, I will certainly pass that message to him.

Mr. SOLARZ. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

