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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

TO RECEIVE A REPORT FROM AMBASSADOR ANDREW YOUNG
ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO AFRICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY
IN THE AREA

JUNE 6, 1977

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AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S AFRICAN TRIP

MONDAY, JUNE 6, 1977

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark, Glenn, Javits, and Percy.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The purpose of today's hearing is to receive a report from Ambassador Andrew Young on his recent trip to Africa.

During the 18-day excursion, Ambassador Young visited eight African nations: The Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, Gabon, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, and the Sudan.

On his trip, he conferred with Vice President Mondale prior to his meeting with South African Prime Minister Vorster. Ambassador Young also met with mission heads at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and held discussions with a range of African leaders, including heads of the nationalist movements at a United Nations conference in Maputo, Mozambique.

This trip was therefore an important part of new U.S. initiatives in Africa. As I see it, it had two objectives. The first was to present the outlines of U.S. policy toward Africa to those who will be implementing it and to those who will be affected by it. The second was to learn how the leaders of the African Continent are responding to it.

I would like to begin these hearings by asking Ambassador Young to present his views with regard to these two objectives, setting forth the main points he made during his meeting with mission heads and African leaders as to what the broad objectives of U.S. policy are today. Then I will ask him to describe to us the views expressed to him by the African leaders with whom he spoke.

I am also particularly interested in his discussions with the nationalist leaders and the heads of the Front Line States in southern Africa.

Following his statements, we will have discussion and questions. I would now like to ask Senator Percy if he has any comments.

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR PERCY

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to say, Senator Clark, that I enjoyed serving for the past 2 years on your African subcommittee. I am not presently a sub-

committee member, but am very pleased to have an invitation extended by you to all members of the Committee to attend today's hearing.

Certainly the new initiatives that we are taking in African policy are of tremendous interest to the citizens of our own country, to citizens of all African countries, and, in fact, to the world as a whole. The unorthodox approach that has been taken in the articulation of some of our policies has received enough notoriety that we do not have to comment on it.

Ambassador Young, certainly you have focused attention on Africa in a way that has not happened before. Africa can no longer say that it is being neglected by the United States. I think we all agree that outside of the equal importance which we place on peace in the Middle East, Africa is a terribly important part of the world for all of us. To the extent that you can add to our knowledge and understanding from your recent trips, we appreciate very much indeed your presence here today.

Senator CLARK. Senator John Glenn is also a member of the full Committee on Foreign Relations and is present today. Senator Glenn, do you have any comments at this time?

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR GLENN

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I do not. I would just reiterate what Senator Percy has already said, that we appreciate being invited to the hearing today, even though we are not members of the subcommittee.

I, as do the other members present, look forward very much to hearing the report of Ambassador Young.

Senator CLARK. Very well, Ambassador Young, please proceed in any way that you think appropriate.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW YOUNG, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY: CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Ambassador YOUNG. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Senator Percy, and Senator Glenn, it is a pleasure to be here to report to you.

I have joining me today Bill Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He joined us on the trip. Perhaps he will have some comments to add or additional remarks on things that I say.

Senator CLARK. Good.

PURPOSE OF TRIP

Ambassador YOUNG. The purpose of this trip was essentially to build around two previously scheduled meetings. One was our meeting of chiefs of mission throughout Africa, which was scheduled in Ivory Coast, and the other was the conference sponsored by the Council

for Namibia and the Liberation Committee of the United Nations on the questions of Namibia and Zimbabwe.

In between and en route, the Secretary and the President felt that it was important that I touch base with some of the countries in Africa that basically had been our stalwart supporters, to help them understand the sense of direction that our policies were taking.

U.N. AS FORUM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INFLUENCE

In that connection, I think that basically the U.N. is a very logical forum for the development of influence and contact with the 50 independent African States. That happens to be just about one-third of the United Nations' membership. Africa becomes increasingly important in our context because the issue around which all of Africa is united—maybe the only issue around which Africa is united—is the question of majority rule throughout southern Africa. Not only is Africa united on that, but the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Europe feel that way, too.

So, there is a unified sentiment of an overwhelming majority of the nations of the world which makes this a kind of test of any administration's credibility. We have had to address that question and say to the African States that we are serious about moving negotiations rapidly toward majority rule. We also had to give a report to our own Ambassadors, many of whom have been out of the country for a long time.

I should say that I was very pleased that there was virtually unanimous agreement on the part of the Ambassadors from the United States to African nations that this interest in Africa and the direction that the administration is taking are sound. These are men and women who have served through a period when they felt that they did not have the ear of the administration or the Secretary of State, and they were very much encouraged by the policy that they see now emerging. They see this as something for which they have been struggling for a long time.

Essentially, I would say that this is a policy of a commitment to development in Africa as the major contribution that the United States can make; and in keeping with that commitment to development, there is a requirement that progress be made with a minimum of violence and destruction. So, the negotiating efforts in Rhodesia, where we are supporting the United Kingdom, and in Namibia, where we are working along with the four other Western members of the Security Council, all seemed very much in line with their thinking and with the overall policy direction.

AFRICAN WESTERN-ORIENTED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

I have talked in this committee a number of times about what our stake in Africa is. In the meetings with so-called moderate African States, I think I was very pleasantly surprised to hear that they were making much more progress with a kind of pragmatic Western-oriented approach to development, in terms of rural development, in terms of distribution of wealth, in terms of development of human services, schools, hospitals, and the like. Especially was this true in Ivory Coast and in Liberia. Both countries seemed to me to be doing

surprisingly well. They are still essentially poor, but there is a commitment to distributing the resources of the nation. They have profited greatly by the high price of coffee and cocoa.

The pattern of development which began with sound agricultural development seemingly is one that is working best. In the case of both Ivory Coast and Liberia, they are now beginning to take to the task of industrialization, having somewhat established an agricultural base.

SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION CONCERNS

These countries were particularly concerned about Soviet interference in Africa and Cuban intervention. They were very anxious about what the U.S. role had been in Zaire, and frankly were very nervous about it. Yet, when we discussed it, they all agreed that our restrained approach which encouraged and allowed for African initiatives on African problems probably was the best way to deal with the question of Zaire.

We made it very clear that we were not abandoning our allies in any sense, but that neither did we feel that there was a requirement for U.S. military intervention on the African continent, and that our restraint was not a lack of commitment, but really was wisdom on our part. I think they understood that. I don't know that they really wanted to be reassured so much. I think the very fact that we were there visiting them said that they were not forgotten.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

The president of Gabon begins in July as the president of the Organization of African Unity. He was particularly concerned that the U.S. commitment to Africa offered for them their main hope for development.

The thing that I got from him was that the possibility of a genuine non-alignment, even from some of the left-leaning African States, was dependent on a strong U.S. commitment to all of Africa.

U.S.-TRAINED LEADERS

I think that in the Sudan we saw the fruits of a very solid Africa policy that we once had. Many of the young men who are now running that country are American trained, and most of them are Ph. D.'s who came to this country to study in the early 1960's. After receiving training from some of the finer universities in this land in a variety of fields, they have gone back and have contributed to the leadership and development strategies of that country. I think they are an important leadership group, not only in the Horn of Africa, but also in the Arab world and throughout Black Africa.

SOUTH AFRICAN VISIT

Finally, my visit to South Africa was, I think, in some ways the high point of the trip. I was invited there by South African businessmen, and yet I was free to meet with almost anybody that I could within the time schedule and geographic limitations of our trip.

The South Africa part of the trip was not originally planned when we put the trip together, and so we had to squeeze in a time between the Saturday that we left Maputo and Sunday night, when we were due in Zambia. So, we spent really a good 36 hours, most of it in various forms of meetings with businessmen, newspaper editors, black and white students, and community leaders from the black community and from white liberal groups that have supported black aspirations for change in South Africa.

In summary, that is basically what we did for 18 days.
Senator CLARK. Very good, thank you.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

We are particularly pleased to have you before this committee once again. We have profited from your testimony throughout the period that I have been associated with this committee, which is about 2½ years. We are also grateful for your insights today.

You will recall that on many occasions when you testified we were here almost alone, and yet we were talking about exactly the same issues and very much the same kinds of considerations.

Let me say at the outset that I was very pleased at the particular emphasis that you gave at the Maputo Conference on America's commitment to a peaceful change in southern Africa. I know that that was not greeted entirely by all of the independent African States with great support. But I think it was a proper and appropriate emphasis, and I want to start by complimenting you on that.

AFRICAN SINCERITY IN HAVING PEACEFUL SOLUTION

I want to ask you a question that we are very much interested in knowing the answer to, and that is whether you feel that the independent states in southern Africa, the frontline states in particular, are sincere and interested in having a peaceful solution to the problems of southern Africa, particularly those of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Ambassador YOUNG. That's a tough question. I think they are interested in having a solution as rapidly as possible. But I think there is very little confidence that it can be done in time. They are very adamant about continuing the armed struggle. As President Samora Machel of Mozambique said, he had heard what I had had to say three or four times, and it was all very interesting, but what is so different now? He said it really does not help to say it. He said that we will work with you, but we want to see what you are going to do.

I think that there is some restraint on the armed struggle. So far there has been very little urban guerrilla warfare, though I understood from former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Garfield Todd, that the nationalists do have a pretty free reign throughout Rhodesia, that they do more or less go most anywhere they want to go. But there has not been anything in the way of massive violence or destruction in urban areas.

I would say that there is a desire for majority rule as rapidly as possible. But there is still a healthy skepticism about our ability to negotiate with Ian Smith.

POLICY DIFFERENCES FROM PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS

Senator CLARK. In that regard, let's look at Machel's question in a somewhat broader light.

What do you see as U.S. policy in the Carter administration, and in what ways do you see that as being fundamentally different from past policies or from policy of the period, let us say, from 1970 to the change in administrations?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think that there is one essential difference in the policy of this administration over that of the last administration. In a sense, I think this policy was beginning to evolve the last few months, though.

Senator CLARK. From the Lusaka speech and so on?

Ambassador YOUNG. Yes; from the Lusaka speech. So there is really no clear break and completely new initiative. It is much more an evolution from that policy.

I think the main difference is on the question of whether or not there can be some tacit agreement with South Africa about its internal situation as a tradeoff for cooperation in Namibia and Rhodesia. I believe it is the thinking of this administration that it is even in the interest of the Government of South Africa to move as rapidly as possible to bring about peaceful change in Namibia and Rhodesia; that the more violent the solution of that conflict, the more radical and militant a neighbor they will have to contend with; and that the pragmatic response that the Mozambique Government has had toward economic relations with South Africa would indicate that it would be in the interest of South Africa to have a negotiated settlement as rapidly as possible.

So, we should not make any concessions as far as the human rights of South African citizens are concerned in connection with our cooperation with them or their cooperation with us.

SOUTH AFRICAN MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT

Senator CLARK. Do you think it is possible to develop a multi-racial society in South Africa in which blacks and whites can live together? What is your own view? You visited South Africa in December, I believe, and now again just a few weeks ago. Do you think it is possible to develop a multiracial society in South Africa?

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, even if I thought it was impossible, I would work for it, because I think it is the only thing that will ultimately survive.

I have a way of feeling that prophesies are self-fulfilling, that if you begin to believe that you cannot get along and that there will be an inevitable bloodbath, there will be. If you believe and work for a rational transformation to majority rule, you begin to find out that some accommodation amongst all of the citizens of South Africa is possible.

What I said to the South African businessmen is that there were really two problems. One is the problem of political integration, and the other is the problem of economic integration. The conventional wisdom is that political integration has to come first, but frankly that was not our experience in this country, though we don't stop to think

about it very much. The private sector began to move toward desegregation in the South as early as 1960-61, while Congress didn't get around to the Civil Rights Acts until 1964. On the particular court cases involving demonstrations in 1960 and 1961, the Supreme Court did not decide on them until 1967. So, people who say that we had a different situation with the support of the courts and the Congress are only partially correct. In response to demands from a people's movement within a country, the private sector was able to desegregate the economy.

Now you already have that going on to some extent in South Africa with some of the American corporations that are involved there.

Now the meeting that I had was largely with South African businessmen. There were no American businessmen there. There were about 200 English-speaking businessmen there and also a few Afrikaaner businessmen. Essentially, you will have to deal with the questions: Can a free market system be devised which serves all of the citizens of South Africa, and how can they expect the citizens of South Africa to believe in a system if they are locked out of it.

I think you see some signs of people beginning to move in that direction. I think it is a matter of time. Time is the enemy there. The levels of aspirations and expectations have a logic and a power all their own. The question is, can we do enough to bring blacks, coloreds, and Asians into the economic mainstream rapidly enough so that a majority of the people in that society have a stake in the economy.

Senator CLARK. I have one other question before I yield to another Senator.

U.S. POLICY PRIORITIES

What are the critical policy areas that have priority at this time in the administration in Africa, as you see it? Are we looking at priorities in terms of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe as a highest priority, or Namibia, or South Africa, or are we really looking at other broader objectives that might not be described as objectives in geographic areas?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think that basically we are looking at southern Africa as a bloc, and we realize that even in terms of the containment of Communist expansion in Africa, the best thing the Communists have going for them is the presence of racist minority regimes in southern Africa. If those were no longer there, there would no longer be any need for the weaponry which the Soviet Union supplies, and the issue then would be one of development.

When it comes to development, I would say that our track record is as good as anybody's.

Following that, I think we have a very definite interest and concern about the Horn of Africa. A stable Zaire is very much in our interest, and building around a number of key crises, I frankly think we have to develop a comprehensive Africa policy.

Here we are at the 30th anniversary of the Marshall plan, and it has been very helpful to read some of the analyses of that plan and about how it got put together. Essentially, it was a plan to contain Communist expansion in Europe through economic development, and, in some sense, we have looked at Africa, thinking that we could have containment without a massive commitment to development.

I think, looking back on Europe 30 years from the time of the introduction of the Marshall plan, that most Americans would agree that that commitment to development in Europe was one of the best investments we have made as a nation. It was really one of the high points in our foreign policy, or in the foreign policy of any nation, for that matter.

We ought to begin to think in terms of that model or of some similar model as we look to Africa as well.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

Turning to Senator Percy, I might say that I know that, because of the reorganization in the Senate, it was not possible for all of us to stay on all of the subcommittees we would have liked. But we are particularly pleased that you came here today. I know that Ambassador Young knows, because he has been here at a number of hearings at which you questioned him, that your work on this subcommittee was really unsurpassed in terms of interest in Africa, in terms of going there. I think you were the first Senator to visit Namibia, and we are very, very pleased that you are visiting with us today.

Please go ahead with the next question period, Senator Percy.

COMMENDATION OF SENATOR CLARK

Senator PERCY. I thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Chairman. I will say what I have said before, and you can use it in your campaign if it will help, or not use it if it will hurt. I think your own leadership in this area has been so far ahead of anyone else's, and you have carried on in the greatest tradition of the Senate. I think a cooperative approach can be taken in the creation of foreign policy, working with the executive branch of Government. It cannot really totally make policy with Congress unless Congress will understand and go along with it and be supportive of it. Your leadership has been creative, imaginative, bold, and well ahead of its time, and, I think, in the greatest tradition of this body. I also think that Ambassador Young's appearance here today is most helpful in that joint process.

U.S. INVESTMENT TO EXERT INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

I would like to pick up, Mr. Ambassador, on the question of your visits with the American business community.

When I was in South Africa a year ago, I met for hours with virtually all of the major American companies, individually or collectively. I came away really convinced, after probing and digging, and having headed, years ago, industrial relations and personnel for an industrial multinational corporation before I was its president, that American companies are at least in the forefront of advanced personnel policies, that we are the best down there, but that we have a long, long way to go.

I questioned them and I ask you now the question: Did you comment to them at any time on how much economic leverage American foreign investment in South Africa can exert on policies that are so reprehensible and repulsive to us, such as apartheid? What specifically have you recommended to the President, what do you recommend to the Congress, regarding levels of investment, and by whom, in South Africa? In this regard, I was told by American businesses that

this almost could be counterproductive—that we can use our influence, but if we threaten to withdraw investment, disastrous consequences would result, and that furthermore we are not that important there so far as investments are concerned.

I would appreciate knowing what you think.

Ambassador YOUNG. I think the policy officially is noncommittal. We don't advise for or against.

Senator PERCY. I know that that is the official policy, and that is what I was told. But that is all gobbledygook. I am just asking Andrew Young to tell us like it is. You know, as a former colleague in the Congress, what are your thoughts? What do you think we ought to do now, having heard both sides, but having lived with this problem and knowing how intensely minorities in this country feel about—to the point where they storm stockholders' meetings, protest at Stanford University—rally against my daughter as a trustee down there—and so forth? This is a very emotional issue.

You have now been on the spot and have heard their side of it. How do you come out? I really don't know what our policy should be and I would like guidance.

Ambassador YOUNG. I think that, as I have met with businessmen in the New York area, and we have been doing this with some regularity, in small meetings, not telling them what to do, but simply discussing the issues with them, I have found that pretty much on their own they have reached the determination that it is not a good long-range investment unless there is some change coming very quickly.

I think Ford Motor Co. has stated in its annual report that it does not intend to put any more money into South Africa. I think that a number of banks have said that they are not putting any more money in; they are relending money that is being generated within the South African economy. The South African economy needs about a half billion dollars a year of outside capital, and it is becoming harder and harder to get that. It is just not good business to invest in a potentially unstable and chaotic situation.

I think, though, that the pressures that are coming from the churches, from students, are probably good, in that they make the business community think of what else they could be doing. I think one of the reasons I was invited, not by American businessmen, but by South African businessmen, is a desire on their part to know what they can do. What I said to them is, very simply, that the economy has to serve everybody; that you cannot call it a free market economy if it is only a white economy. The record of development in the Third World right now is that those free market countries happen to stack up favorably, even in terms of distributing the wealth. You may get a number of countries that are more ideologically oriented to the left which end up sloganizing about revolution, but in many instances they probably have redistributed poverty but have not redistributed wealth.

One of the things that I think was encouraging to me—and I really was not prepared for this—was the success I found in certain places. I used to think of Liberia and Ivory Coast as "Uncle Tom" countries, and I have told them that. But they made a very pragmatic and non-ideological attempt to do something about the rural development of

their poor. Essentially, I think that the free market model can produce revolutionary changes, but only if it is forced to. It doesn't do this voluntarily.

Senator PERCY. What you have said is very understandable to South Africa and to American business. To any investor in South Africa the situation is getting dangerous, highly volatile and very risky. Unless something happens and there is evolving change, it is not going to be a good place to invest.

As a former businessman, I would say that to any businessman in this country, and I said it to Mr. Vorster as well.

I am glad we concur on that, and I think it is a clear, distinct, and easy message. That is going a little bit beyond the official State Department position, which I think is even more helpful to a businessman looking for guidance.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE

I would like to ask you about Namibia. When I indicated to the State Department my intention of going there, I was discouraged from going, and this aroused my curiosity all the more.

I found that the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa was prohibited to visit. We had a low level visit. One man would slip up there occasionally—he had been there 11 times—and make his reports back to the Department. There was no leadership of any kind. When I came back, in my report I asked that it be raised to a very high level. I understand that a task force has been created. Certainly Secretary Kissinger made strong moves in this direction.

Would you say that we have now put our prestige on the line here, that we are now fully committed to providing American leadership in finding a creative and innovative way of bringing independence to Namibia, and that the full force and effect of our good offices are behind that now in this administration?

Ambassador YOUNG. Yes, I think so, but we are not doing it alone. We are doing it in conjunction with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada.

The thing that gives it a new weight is that these are the primary trading partners of South Africa. There is a delegation there now, meeting in Capetown starting tomorrow, to try to take the talks on Namibia a step further. I think the Secretary and the President are fully committed to those talks. We have been somewhat encouraged by them.

Now, negotiating with South Africa is never easy, and it shouldn't be easy. There is an awful lot at stake for everybody concerned.

We have had a very important series of meetings, starting with our contact group—well, even back before that—with meetings with our Ambassador and the South Africa foreign minister. Our contact group of five Western countries went down last month. The Vice President had a meeting with Vorster. Our contact group goes back again this month. We have even received some encouragement from the front-line Presidents, though more, I think, on Namibia than on Rhodesia. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and the Tanzanians generally are convinced that this time the United States is serious. They sense a commitment now that they are willing to put some trust in.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. I appreciate that answer.

AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S ROLE IN U.N. POST

Now I would like to ask you about your own personal role. I would like to go back to January 25, when you were up here for confirmation. I pointed out, in one of my questions, one of the potential problems that I saw. I phrased the question this way:

I would like to ask you about your role as the President's representative and our Ambassador there. As a Congressman, you have been independent. When you get to the United Nations, you will find, as did Senator Symington and I—he was sitting with me at the time and we both served in the United Nations together—that you are going to get cables from Washington directing you do to certain things. Ours were signed by Kissinger, yours will be signed by Vance, but they will be written by some nameless, faceless bureaucrat down the line.

Then I asked what you were going to do about it:

What are you going to do when you get a directive to do something or take a position and vote on something that really is contrary to what you think is in the best interests of the United States and that violates your own personal convictions? What are you going to do?

Then, subsequently, you indicated the process under which the President had put you as a member of the Cabinet and consulted with you and so forth. Then I asked this question: "Then you don't see your desire for independence as a problem in this role?" And you replied: "I really don't. I think we might disagree on tactics, but I doubt that we'll disagree on principle."

Have you and the President had any disagreements on principle that you can share with this committee here in confidence? [General laughter.]

Has the President at any point told you to cool it? Has he ever read to you some of the editorial commentary that has come in the Post or that I read in the Herald Tribune last Friday?

What have been your problems in conducting your role as an unfettered spokesman for your point of view?

Ambassador YOUNG. Are you prepared to be here for 3 or 4 days? [General laughter.]

Quite seriously, Senator, I really have had no policy disagreements with the President or with the Secretary of State, or with the National Security Council Adviser. There have been things that we have discussed. Never has any of them discussed keeping quiet with me. I asked to meet with the President tomorrow because it disturbs me that they are not just attacking me, they are beginning to attack him because of me. I want to assure him that I don't want to be treated like a friend; I want to be treated like an Ambassador that he has appointed. We can still be friends regardless.

While I am sure that he does not agree with everything that I say, we have not disagreed on major policy. Even with the instructions that come from the State Department, I don't believe we have yet received any instructions with which we have had any quarrel. One of the reasons is that we do have a good enough working relationship through Bill Maynes here, the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, that we try to stay ahead of the game. We are able to work together on the preliminary papers.

Senator PERCY. I think the very fact that you said on January 25 to me that you will have an arrangement of sharing with the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, of participation in regular

briefings, and the very fact that you are here together today gives evidence to the fact that you are carrying out exactly what you said you were going to.

I consider myself a student of only one thing—of trying to figure out whether you are speaking for yourself, or whether you are speaking for the President. I have really analyzed this extraordinarily carefully, because I have been looking at the criticism and the brickbats that you have been getting. I will go back to the editorial reprinted in the "Herald Tribune" on Monday. It quotes President Carter. He was asked this question some time ago:

Aren't there any examples of things that you did that weren't absolutely right?

He then mentioned the fact that he had not come out against the Vietnam war early enough, and then he said this:

The fact that I didn't crusade at the very early stage for civil rights in the South, for the one-man-one-vote ruling—it might be that now I should drop my campaign for President and start a crusade for black majority rule in South Africa or Rhodesia.

The editorial goes on to ask why the President does not discipline or fire Andrew Young:

We will not burden you with the full record of Mr. Young's diplomatic indiscretions and idiosyncracies. It is perhaps enough to note that not for the first time has he just called some of this country's friends racist and dismissed out of hand the administration's official objections to the latest Communist power play in Africa. Any other Presidential appointee would have been out quicker than you can say "John K. Singlaub."

But it ends up this way:

We do not think Mr. Young is the problem. Those who question the administration's Africa policy should look first to President Carter and to his own evident motivation.

Now, he could not have made himself clearer in the midst of the campaign as to how he felt about minority rights in South Africa and minority rights in this country. Are you then testifying to this subcommittee today—and if you want to call us tomorrow after your meeting, we would be happy to hear from you—as of this moment that you believe what you have said and the positions you have taken do represent, as faithfully as you can, the positions and feelings of President Carter?

Ambassador YOUNG. Not always.

Senator PERCY. Where have you varied? Where have you gone further than you think he would have?

Ambassador YOUNG. When I have been talking about African policy, I think I have represented very faithfully the policies of the State Department that have been worked out through policy and planning, through the Africa Bureau right on up through to the White House.

I think that there are two things on which we have not yet defined policy, and maybe I speak out a little bit ahead of policy. I have not made any policy statements. I have really only asked questions.

For instance, I just don't think that you ought to jump to conclusions and have knee-jerk reactions and make Cuba into a superpower. I think you ought to look carefully at what they are doing where, and decide on the basis of careful investigation what is going on. That is all I have said.

I have checked with Mr. Brzezinski today to see if there was any policy paper that I had missed where we had formulated in this administration what our attitude ought to be. He said that that is maybe something which we have not really defined specifically. I think we have maybe just inherited a reaction, and I question that reaction. It is not that I insist what it ought to be one way or the other. I simply think that it is something that a nation as powerful as ours ought not react too emotionally.

I don't think there is anything wrong with that, and I don't think the President disagrees with that, but I don't think he would phrase it that way.

The other thing I think we have differed about is insisting on an understanding that the history of oppression based on race creates a dynamic in the world today that can be terribly destructive if it is ignored. I have said that we have to pay attention to it.

Now, the unfortunate thing is, I have not found another word for it, other than racism, and I need to find one, because everybody gets emotional about that. They do not think about what I am saying; they get hung-up on the word.

What I have sensed around the world, and especially in Africa, is that there is an historic pattern of relationships growing out of the oppression or colonial domination of blacks by whites that just cannot all of a sudden be forgotten. We just cannot say that we are not like that any more and now we are going to work together. The historic suspicions and antagonisms and everything else do come into play on every decision.

I am particularly concerned about that in regard to Rhodesia. I have talked with the Secretary about it, and also with the newly designated Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. They understand this very well. It is a difficult problem to deal with, though. Yet, I think if you go into negotiations around a highly and intensely racial issue, and a racial antagonism that has been going on for several hundred years, without being very conscious of the racial dynamics of that situation, I think you are asking for trouble. I don't want to see my country get into trouble for not facing something simply because it is uncomfortable for a lot of us to face it.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very kindly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Senator John Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO AFRICA

Mr. Ambassador, you have put your finger on something that has been bothering me in the whole African picture for some time in the difficulty of articulating our policy. I get hung-up and lost in this area.

There has been a lot of talk and statements in the papers about creativity, innovative leadership, policy initiatives, analyzing objectives, and so forth, and you said that the President of Tanzania, Mr. Nyerere, is wondering if the United States is serious in its commitment. I am not at all clear on what our commitment is, and I don't believe most Americans are clear about what our commitment is.

I wonder if you would be willing to comment on this.

You mentioned something that perhaps follows on the Marshall plan. So far, we are talking about encouraging majority rule in Africa, and I have not heard any talk about what goes beyond that. Is that our African policy now, to encourage majority rule? Is it thought out beyond that?

Ambassador YOUNG. You know, I think that has been basically our policy for many years. I would say in the Vice President's press conference of Vienna there began to be an articulation of the policy.

Right now I think I would say that our policy is not just majority rule, but a commitment to move as rapidly as possible to achieve a transfer to majority rule without violence, or with a minimum of violence; that to have majority rule after everything has been destroyed is a betrayal of centuries of development. I think we are trying to save as much life and as much of the development and resources of those countries as is possible, and also to save the relationships. I have never heard a single black African leader say that he wanted an all-black state.

In order to have a multiracial society, or a nonracial society, I think you have a certain level of stability involved in the transfer. Also, in order to keep the resources that we require from Africa coming to us uninterrupted, it requires a certain level of peace and reasonableness in the change process.

U.S. ROLE IN AFRICA

Senator GLENN. Is our role mainly advisory? We can show a great interest in the area and we can talk about our interest, but is our role mainly just an advisory role? What else can we do to really move things forward?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think it is a little more than that, but it is very difficult for it to be openly much more than that, because we are also committed, as a matter of policy, to avoid superpower confrontations in Africa. Because the British have the mandate on Rhodesia, their former colony, we end up actively supporting and advising. For instance, our Ambassador and the British Ambassador have been going around together talking to Ian Smith, to the front-line Presidents, and to the liberation movement leaders, trying to put together a reasonable and negotiated settlement in Rhodesia.

In Namibia, the leadership and responsibility is in the hands of the United Nations. So, we are working as one of the five Western members of the Security Council to move Namibia toward majority rule.

In South Africa, we are sort of working pretty much on our own, with the Vice President taking the lead on helping to define what the relationships between our interests are in South Africa, and how we can help them move toward majority rule.

U.S. CREDIBILITY IN AFRICA

Senator GLENN. One of the prerequisites of any leadership, of course, is credibility. How do you see our credibility in Africa now? Are people trusting us now, or do they look at us as just another interfeerer, another interloper coming in from outside?

Ambassador YOUNG. I would say that, right now, our credibility in Africa is higher than it has been in a long, long time. I spent a lot of my time trying to keep the expectations from being too high. I think that even among so-called radical countries, such as Mozambique and Angola, there is a realization that if they are going ever to be nonaligned countries, it is going to require their opening a part of their economy to Western involvement and influence.

Normally these kinds of conferences, such as the conference in Maputo, are conferences where just one speaker after the other gets up and cusses out the West, mainly the United States. But that did not happen this time, except in one or two limited cases. It was largely because Mozambique itself set the tone of moderation and non-alignment.

Senator GLENN. Was this an indication, do you think, that perhaps their leadership is coming more from inside at this point, rather than just being directed by what they think some outside group, such as the United States, would like to hear? Perhaps it was to impress somebody else, another side?

Ambassador YOUNG. No; I think they were very genuinely disappointed with us for many years. It is a case of many African leaders having studied here, having had very good contacts, and expecting the United States to be on their side, or at least to see their constitutional development in our constitutional tradition, to see their armed struggle very much in the context of our revolution of 1776. They were, most of them, all over Africa, educated by American missionaries. I think they were disappointed that they found us supporting the Portuguese, or not able to repeal the Byrd amendment, or tacitly in support of South Africa. They expected more of us than that, and I think now they think we have finally come to the point where our human rights emphasis includes Africa, and where it is a very genuine part of our total foreign policy.

OAU LEADERSHIP ROLE IN DEVELOPING AFRICA

Senator GLENN. Where leadership comes from for the future is all important, it seems to me, whether it is developed indigenously in Africa, by Africans, or whether it is imposed externally which would result in another type of colonialism.

How do you see the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, developing? Do you think that they are going to take a leadership role in really developing Africa? Are there any moves afoot now to strengthen the OAU?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think that the OAU is really very strong on questions of liberation movements, as far as South Africa is concerned; but when you get beyond that consensus, it is really very hard to keep them together. There is not much that everybody agrees on.

I think that they have done very well just to stay together. I don't know that we can count on them—I mean, the OAU is sort of like the U.N. [United Nations]. It operates by consensus, and although nobody says it, there probably is a veto power within the OAU. That limits the number of things you can get done there.

But I think there are strong leaders within the OAU.

U.S./OAU COOPERATION

Senator GLENN. Would you see us operating through OAU as a major conduit, or cooperating with them on the side?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think on political matters we can operate very well in conjunction with the OAU. I think, though, that on development questions, for instance, the World Bank is probably going to continue to play a leading role. On development questions, I think the OAU is not going to be as effective as on the banking question. On strictly political questions, I think the OAU will continue to be the place where African opinion is formulated.

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

Senator GLENN. In another area, Cuba is now supposedly represented by troops and other people in some 10 countries. You have had a good deal to say about Cuban involvement in Africa. It was widely reported here, of course, most recently on Cuban involvement in Ethiopia. Some of those views were expressed as being at odds with the State Department.

In general, how do you view Cuba's involvement in Africa, and is there any point at which you would recommend U.S. intervention to counter Cuba's involvement?

Ambassador YOUNG. Right now I think of Cuba as an island of 10 million people that is straining under the pressures of its involvement in Angola. Fifteen thousand troops in Angola are hardly enough to control Angola. I don't know that they are capable of going much beyond that in a military sense. I have even had reports from Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica that Castro told him that he was ready to start withdrawing troops from Angola before the Shaba invasion, but thought that to do so now would have looked like they were running out on an ally. Now I don't really know. I am simply reporting what I was told.

I think that there have been some 2,000 or more reported deaths. Now, I believe that people are people, and I don't believe that Communists are any more sacrificial or long-suffering than capitalists. I don't think they are any more virtuous. I think that they hurt and their families get tired of something they do not really understand. I think it is a great strain on them.

I have asked that we take some time within the State Department and in policy planning to really do an assessment of what they are doing, and, on the basis of that assessment, that we make a policy in our interest. From what I know right now, I see no situation in which we should intervene militarily in Africa.

You know, the Sudan is one little country on the map, and yet it is as big as the United States, east of the Mississippi. I was very interested in listening to the President of Sudan talk about their needs. He said:

You know, we have no shortage of real estate. Anybody can come into our country. They can maybe survive 3 or 4 days, and if they are making any trouble, we can always put them out.

We essentially operate on a European sense of borders, where every yard and every inch is significant. That is not the case in Africa. I don't know that any nation is strong enough to dominate Africa.

I don't know that any nation is strong enough to take the responsibility for development in Africa with all of the problems that go with that.

Senator GLENN. I know that my time is up, Mr. Chairman. What I was getting at was, we have had an indication that Cuba is involved in some 10 different countries, which would indicate quite a massive effort on their part, more than just a little incursion of troops into Angola—at least that has been reported in the press.

Ambassador YOUNG. The Chinese are involved far more than that, though.

You know, there again, we were very upset—and rightly so, maybe—in the beginning of the construction of the Tanzam Railroad. The Chinese built the railroad, and basically now it is keeping three countries supplied with Western goods. I don't know what good it is doing the Chinese, but it sure is doing us a lot of good.

I think that we ought to look at what anybody is doing to see if it is really against our interests.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, the assessment that the Ambassador mentioned being made could perhaps be made available to this committee. I am sure it would be of interest to us to have a copy.

Senator CLARK. Which assessment is that?

Senator GLENN. The assessment that you indicated you were going to ask the State Department to conduct, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador YOUNG. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator CLARK. Fine.

AFRICAN RESPONSE TO LATEST U.S. INITIATIVES

Mr. Ambassador, as I interpret American policy towards southern Africa in the last 10 years, we followed a policy which I think it is fair to say really tilted in favor of the white minority regimes of southern Africa, particularly the Portuguese empire in Mozambique and in Angola, Ian Smith in Rhodesia, and the nationalist government in South Africa. It was not an open policy, but it was certainly a policy.

That began to change, as I think you have testified to earlier, perhaps with the Lusaka speech, and more particularly, I think, with the changes in administration.

My question was going to be, have we, in fact, really restored that kind of credibility. But in answer to Senator Glenn, I think you said that you felt that we now had a very high credibility, and that you were more concerned in a way about expectations being too great.

In followup of that, what really has been the response of the African leaders with whom you visited about the latest U.S. initiatives? I am thinking particularly of initiatives in Zimbabwe and in Namibia.

Ambassador YOUNG. Everybody is extremely hopeful, and I think they really do believe that we can do it. Now, there again, I think the expectations are almost too great. They think that the U.S. Government can tell Vorster, "OK, close it down," and then Vorster can tell Smith, and that will be that.

I think that the changes are not that simple, and even with the genuine commitment on our part, negotiated settlements are still going to be a significant struggle.

U.S. POLICY EMPHASIS

Senator CLARK. One way of looking at our own policy toward Africa seems to be to say that there are two types of African concerns that the U.S. really has today. On the one hand, there are those, such as the Ivory Coast or the Sudan, who are critical of our restrained response, for example, to the crisis in Zaire, and who want to be assured of our continuing support of traditional allies to the United States. On the other hand, there are those, such as the front-line states, who want to see us shifting our focus from a small number of perhaps handpicked allies to what they would identify as more progressive regimes.

How do you see that policy developing? Do you think that we ought to be emphasizing the frontline states and our relationships with those states more directly than with perhaps states such as the Ivory Coast or Zaire, or other more traditional allies of the 1960's and early 1970's?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think that we have some very real interests, mainly oil, in Angola, which we should not abandon, I think it would be in our interest to work toward a genuine nonalignment in those left-leaning states.

I think that in countries like Ivory Coast and Liberia, there is enough development and enough stability so that the private sector can go a long way to help them with some of the problems that they have. Sudan would be kind of a combination. They have a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia in an agricultural development in the Valley of the Nile, and yet that will not work without U.S. technical assistance.

I think that wherever we have the possibility of contributing toward development, what we are doing, really, is creating stable conditions under which American goods and services will eventually be desired.

My approach to Africa is in some ways like the Japanese approach to Asia, and my approach to foreign aid is not necessarily just humanitarian. It is in the long-range interest of access to resources and the creation of markets for American goods and services.

UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY SPECIFICS

Senator CLARK. There was an article recently in the Manchester Guardian which contrasted the current administration policy with that of the previous administration. Let me quote a couple of sentences from that and get your reaction to it.

"Because it is more activist"—commenting on this administration—"the Carter policy will have to be more specific. The administration will have to spell out its goals and its timetable for South Africa, or else Mr. Vorster will calculate, with reason, that both will be modest and moderate."

Are there specifics in our policy that you see with regard to South Africa?

Ambassador YOUNG. They are not specifics, because I think it is very difficult to give specifics. We should not be in the position of negotiating for blacks.

I think that the message that the Vice President gave to Mr. Vorster was a very specific message, that change had to be forthcoming, and that we could not support the policies of apartheid or separate development. But he resisted becoming the architect of what a new South Africa ought to look like. That is something to be worked out by the citizens of South Africa.

One of the proposals the Vice President made in response—I should have made this point to the earlier question—was that they should meet early with a broad range of legitimate nonwhite leaders of South Africa to hear from them as to the process and the approach and the steps to be taken. Vorster's answer to that was that they had already had such meetings; but it is our opinion that many of the legitimate leaders of the nonwhite community have not engaged in such a conference.

ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST LEADER REACTION TO U.S. POLICY

Senator CLARK. Let me switch back now for a moment to Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, and to the reaction of the nationalist leaders there to our own policies.

Robert Mugabe, the political leader of ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union] has, as I read it at any rate in the paper, denounced the U.S. role in the current Rhodesian talks, and has expressed similar skepticism on Radio Maputo, commenting on the United Nations Conference. I am quoting from Maputo Radio here. He said:

So far, we have noticed only a change in form in U.S. policy. In this context, everything leads us to believe that its policy remains the same.

How deep do you think this skepticism among African leaders is, and how do we reestablish a credibility in light of this legacy of mistrust?

Ambassador YOUNG. I tend to believe that that is a tactical skepticism. I mean, it is very hard, when you are trying to run an army, to make it look like somebody is going to negotiate your independence. And so, I think that the people who are involved on the military side are going to always be skeptical of negotiation.

I think that privately they are all hopeful about negotiation, and yet they do not believe that they can afford the luxury of simply relying on negotiation. They feel that they have been betrayed too often.

I think we are under great pressure now to deliver and to maintain a kind of momentum that the first 4 months, in my opinion, has produced. Things have gone so well, though. We will see with the contact group in Namibia in the coming weeks what kind of response they get. I think that may be a more accurate indication of the success of the recent policies than anything which we could say.

SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITION GOVERNMENT COMPOSITION

Senator CLARK. In that regard, it is my recollection that one of the disappointing things about the meeting with Vice President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster is the fact that apparently Prime Minister Vorster indicated that the political authority that

would take over would, in fact, be a kind of Turnhalle group, a group based on ethnic factions or ethnic groups.

Is that discouraging to you? Do you think that that is going to mean the end of the contact group's effectiveness, or do you see that as being not such a major problem?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think there was a difference of opinion in the meeting amongst the South Africans themselves on that.

Senator CLARK. I see.

Ambassador YOUNG. One of the points that is being negotiated right now, indeed, this week, is a clarification of the nature of the transitional administrative arrangements. The contact group made clear in the first meeting that that kind of Turnhalle ethnic grouping would not be acceptable, and at that point the South African Government—well, I don't know whether they agreed, but they did not object.

U.S./BRITISH POSITIONS PROBLEM

Senator CLARK. Lastly, let me ask you a question about an article in the Washington Post which I am hopeful you have read. It appeared on May 31 and was by Jim Hoagland, who has written a book about South Africa. I think he is really one of the insightful writers about that country.

He says a number of interesting things. Let me quote a few and ask for your comments on them. He identifies five points of strain in talking about South Africa. The first is tension arising out of a feeling that there exists an anti-British sentiment among certain members of the administration; second is fear of sanctions against South Africa which would hurt the United Kingdom; third is withdrawal of American support for financial guarantees for whites in Rhodesia, which the United Kingdom is still willing to consider; fourth is the low-key presence of the United States in current Rhodesian negotiations; fifth is Vorster's apparent regression during his meeting with Mondale regarding the point of the interim Namibian Government—the point I just raised with you.

What do you feel about these comments from Jim Hoagland? Do you think there is a problem, particularly with regard to the American position vis-à-vis the British position?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think that the American position and the British position are really very close and that there is a very good working relationship established. I think I have deliberately picked on the British because I am nervous about this. It is the liberal tendency to ignore the racial factors that I think is dangerous. You know, it is not that I think they are bad people; but I think that if you don't think that African leadership is really scarred by the colonial past, if you don't take that into consideration as you are putting your formulation together, I think there is going to be real trouble down the line.

Now, the most recent speech made by David Owen on South Africa was very similar to the speech I made in South Africa the day before. In the conversations with the Vice President and the British Foreign Office, and our staff and the British Foreign Office, I feel that we are working together very well. But there are all kinds of problems. Everybody, including Vorster, has his own domestic political situation to nurse. So, it is not just our agreements, but also how we perceive

our own domestic politics. It is always a very touchy kind of thing, but it is one that I think we are all committed to, because, frankly, we don't really have any choice.

Senator CLARK. I hope that I can impose on Senator Percy's time for just one more quick question.

Senator PERCY. Of course.

U.S./U.N. ACTION ON NAMIBIA, OTHER QUESTIONS

Senator CLARK. As United Nations Ambassador, what possible actions do you see our Government taking, or the United Nations taking, with regard to African questions in the immediate future in terms of Namibia or perhaps other areas of African affairs?

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, I think we have successfully postponed those questions until September. I say "successfully postponed" because I really don't think that U.N. resolutions would be nearly as effective as what is actually going on now. I think the African group is convinced of that also. That was one of the victories of Maputo, and the fact that all of the Western nations went down to Mozambique and engaged in the discussion. We did not agree on everything, but the point I was trying to make was, just as I don't believe that people who basically believe in negotiations should try to tell the folk who believe in armed struggle how to fight, so I don't think that people who basically believe in armed struggle ought to try to tell people who believe in negotiations how to negotiate. To get a standoff on that is, to me, a tremendous victory. It means that we have a few more months to show that our negotiations can be as effective, if not more so, than their armed struggle. Now, all we have to do is deliver.

Senator CLARK. That's a very good summary.

Senator PERCY, thank you for your patience.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S PLAYBOY INTERVIEW

I would like to ask you now about Playboy magazine.

Ambassador YOUNG. Why, what is that? [General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I wonder if you granted an interview to "Playboy Magazine" because of the success of the interview that President Carter granted it? [General laughter.]

I will say this. I had an interview with them years ago. No one paid much attention to it. [General laughter.]

Ambassador YOUNG. Maybe you didn't have any "lust." [General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I had more mail as a result of that than almost from any article I have ever written in my life, and the first 10 letters came from members of the clergy, who did not apologize a bit for having read it. [General laughter.]

Quite seriously, though, I would like to ask you about one comment that you made in that article, and simply because you yourself have offered the opinion that maybe there is a better word for "racism." I am sure you do not mean "bigot"; maybe it is "uninformed," or "underinformed," or "uninitiated." Some other word could be used. But you did describe in the "Playboy" article the alleged racism of previous Presidents.

Would you care to expand on that comment?

Ambassador YOUNG. Yes. I think I tried to go on, I believe in the very next sentence, to explain what I meant by that. I certainly did not mean anything derogatory about the personal lives of either of the two Presidents.

Perhaps the words I would prefer to use might be "insensitivity to cultural differences."

RELATING TO OTHER CULTURES, ETHNIC GROUPS

Senator PERCY. The reason I am really asking this question is that one of the great benefits of hearings of this kind is that it enables us to talk to the American people. In a sense, if a President who goes through the political process that a President has to go through—which is a honing down process the likes of which I have never witnessed in any other form of endeavor in America—if a President still has some of these tendencies, call them what you will, I think it would be helpful for the American people to hear an explanation from you as to what it is that causes us, as a people, many times, not to be able to relate to a large part of the world.

Ambassador YOUNG. I think it is a difficulty in appreciating differences. You know, I was probably the only member of the Congressional Black Caucus to vote for President Ford on the House side, and I have retained a respect for him and a relationship with him, even though we always voted on opposite sides of most issues when we were in the House. So, in no way was I trying to criticize or judge on that issue.

I do think, though, that we have to find a way to realize that the world is not white. Neither is it black or brown or red or yellow. We must realize that we really don't have a sensible world until we take all of these things into consideration. I think until just recently it was possible, because most of the power was white, to make the world a white world. I think one of the things the emergence of the Third World has done is to demonstrate that there are varieties of kinds of power that are in the hands of other kinds of people, and that for the world to make sense, and for us to live in peace, we, I think, have to be very, very sensitive to that.

Now, I think the people who are most sensitive to that are quite often the people who have suffered from it most. I guess I am guilty of being a kind of Southern chauvinist on this. But I am also an American chauvinist, because my criticisms of other countries have mainly come when people have tried to say that race is an American problem and that the Swedes, the Russians, or somebody else, do not have that kind of problem. Learning to live in a world of a whole lot of different people is a universal problem.

Senator PERCY. Isn't this a problem that we not only have as Americans in trying to learn about other people in other countries and continents, but also in trying to learn more about ourselves and about many of the people in this country—be they Puerto Ricans in Chicago who rioted this weekend, or blacks in Chicago where the West and the South Sides went up in flames a few years ago because of their frustrations, bitterness, hatred, and the lack of understanding for them as fellow Americans?

Is it true also that it is increasingly important and in our self-interest with regard to the so-called North-South dialogue? It did not end up as a brilliant success in Paris, but at least it did not fall apart—and it is going to continue. It is going to have to continue because a large part of the resources on which we depend for our economic well-being lie in the hands of the lesser-developed countries. This brings a huge power struggle between, say, the Soviets, the Americans, the Chinese, and everyone else for access to those markets and those resources. Isn't it in our self-interest that we had better understand this?

Ambassador YOUNG. It certainly is. I think that one of the things that comes out of these conferences—and the Paris conference is a good example—is that the private agreement is never expressed in public. I think that the rest of the world knows that the United States of America is not just going to give away everything by trying, out of some fit of guilt, to appease the problems of the developing world. They know that it is going to require hard bargaining to produce an economic order that benefits everybody.

I think the Paris conference moved in that direction. But it is still very new, and it is hard to have a public agreement. I don't think the Secretary could make agreements yet. The North-South dialog is something that we in the United States just started talking about a year ago. If, after the Second World War, it took us 3 or 4 years, knowing what we had been through, to come around to understanding the political and economic necessities for a Marshall plan, it is going to take us a while to work out complicated formulations of these questions.

Senator PERCY. Again, I think it is so vital that the executive branch and the Congress work together. Under the initiative of our Chairman, I joined with other Senators in a letter in which we asked to get together with Secretary Kissinger. We did—we met with him on a number of occasions, and we worked with him on the dramatic speech in which the United States took the initiative for the first time in this dialog. I think, once again, that the President took the initiative without a lot of specificity, but the United States certainly let it be known that we were sympathetic and that we want to start to work with him.

SOWETO VISIT

Could you tell this subcommittee why, in your judgment, you were not permitted to visit Soweto in South Africa?

Ambassador YOUNG. I did not want to visit Soweto.

Senator PERCY. Pardon?

Ambassador YOUNG. I did not want to visit Soweto.

Senator PERCY. Is that why you did not visit there?

Ambassador YOUNG. Yes. I never made a request to visit Soweto. The reason I did not was that June 16 is the anniversary of the turmoil of a year ago when several hundred people were killed. I did not want my presence in any way to be blamed for anything that might happen this June.

We did meet with leaders of Soweto, both in the home of Harry Oppenheimer, and in the U.S. Information Center, and it seems that we met with half of Soweto on the streets of Johannesburg. The

South African press created such a furor about my arrival that, everywhere we went, we just had crowds of people, and they were not all black. It was very interesting.

Senator PERCY. I was there just before the riots. I hope I did not precipitate them; in fact, I am sure that I did not.

[General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. In fact, my presence was not at all noticed while I was there. I was able to go in quietly and to leave quietly. But when I left, I found myself so repulsed by what I had seen that I publicly said—and I said to the leadership of South Africa—that I really thought I was on Mars. I just could not believe I was on Earth in the 20th century when I saw the indignities. To see the disparity between the cost of the payment of a schoolteacher for a child from Soweto, for a white child, and for a colored child, to see the materials furnished in their schools, to see the poor facilities available for them to educate them for the future—it was amazing. There were such indignities. In a house that is your own, which you cannot buy, but you can rent—except for a few token sales—you have to ask the permission of a white supervisor to have a friend stay overnight in your home. When you go off to work in the morning, you have to let all the first-class buses and taxis go by, which may all be empty, and wait to get on a bus that is jam-packed and labeled “second class.”

I discussed these problems with the Prime Minister. I said that, in my definition, a conservative is someone who sees change coming and is a part of it, but who wants to ease the movement of events. Someone who stands there rigidly and lets events sweep over him is not even a part of the process and is not a conservative, in my judgment.

SOUTH AFRICAN TALKS

Did you have any down-to-earth talks with the South Africans about how long these indignities can be imposed on a people while expecting to maintain any degree of stability and hoping to keep half a billion dollars of investment flowing down there?

Ambassador YOUNG. I did not talk with any government officials. I did talk with the business community. I did talk with black community leaders and I did talk with the student leaders. I found that there was a growing commitment to reasonable forms of change and a sense of urgency that was not there before. There was a kind of hopelessness when I was in Soweto 2 or 3 years ago. There is none of that any more. There is an idealism and a determination. I was pleasantly surprised to see a commitment on the part of the to a religiously oriented nonviolence—3 years ago. I was sort of shouted down for suggesting this.

Senator PERCY. I think this is an opportunity for you. If you did not meet with them, you can talk with them. I certainly tried to be as forthright in the report I issued as I possibly could. I sent a copy over to their embassy here.

SWAPO INVOLVEMENT IN CHANGE PROCESS

When I talked to Mr. Vorster about Namibia and said that I did not think there would ever be peace there unless SWAPO [South

West Africa People's Organization] was a part of the process of bringing about change, he described SWAPO as "a bunch of Communists conceived in sin." I asked him if I could quote him on that, and he said, "Absolutely." "But," he said, "you can also say, providing you precede it with what I've said, that if they want to have SWAPO involved in their conference, they can. It's up to them." That is what I said later.

Can you tell this subcommittee what the involvement of SWAPO is now; that is, the domestic SWAPO, whose members are looked upon as "Uncle Toms" in a sense by the outsiders? I understand the domestics themselves recognize that they need some participation, some involvement, and some moral support from those who have escaped the country and are outside and providing a tremendous force, I suppose, to the movement of events in Namibia.

Ambassador YOUNG. We have been trying to keep SWAPO informed of the progress. They are not involved in the Turnhalle talks. They are involved with our Western contact group and we do communicate with them regularly.

It is a very difficult part of the equation because they are scattered all over the world. I think that is another one of the things I am a little anxious about, that we not have agreements on one side and not be able to contact the other. So, it is important, I think, to build regular bridges with all parties concerned.

Senator PERCY. I agree. I meant both inside and outside. I am rather interested in the fact that so many of the outside leaders who are considered radicals have their master's degrees and Ph. D.'s from the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois, and similar institutions. They are American-educated and are far more reasonable and rational about what they foresaw for the future than I thought they would be.

Mr. Chairman, I have just two more questions to ask and then I will be finished, but I would be happy to yield to you.

Senator CLARK. No. Please go on.

U.S. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE

Senator PERCY. I have a question on bilateral assistance. Both Senator Clark and I are very much interested in this, and have been very much supportive of the programs that you have recommended.

Did the leaders to whom you spoke express a preference as to the form of U.S. bilateral assistance—whether this should take the form of military aid, or economic aid, or a mixture of the two? If they did talk to you about it, would you share with us your response to them?

Ambassador YOUNG. The only persons who talked with me in any way about military assistance were in the Sudan. The Sudanese say that their army is used 80 percent of the time for development purposes. Essentially, they were concerned only about the C-130's, which have already been approved as a means of hauling goods back and forth across the gigantic country, and about certain defensive capabilities, such as radar installations and possibly anti-aircraft weapons. There was, however, much more concern for what we call technical assistance or development.

AFRICAN PREFERENCE FOR U.S. ROLE IN RHODESIA

Senator PERCY. With respect to Rhodesia, our presence in Rhodesian negotiations has been described as low key. The highest ranking regular representative that I believe we have there is our Ambassador to Zambia, Ambassador Low. Is this the role preferred by the Africans?

Ambassador YOUNG. I think so. It is preferred by the Africans because they do not want it to seem like a Western power play. I think Ambassador Low just happens to be a good man. If he were back here as Assistant Secretary, he would probably still be one of those names. But having been Ambassador in Zambia through this period, he probably knows the participants better than anybody in the State Department, and he is a very sound choice.

U.N. AMBASSADOR'S RELATIONSHIP WITH VICE PRESIDENT

Senator PERCY. Good.

I would like to ask you about your relationship with Vice President Mondale. I think he is doing just a magnificent job, and I think everyone in the Senate can be extraordinarily proud of him. He is carrying forward his job, which is a difficult job, with tremendous dignity and presence, and I think he is accomplishing a great deal on behalf of our country.

Would you describe your own relationship with him? What do you understand his responsibility to be with respect to African affairs, and again confidentially, how are you getting along?

[General laughter.]

Ambassador YOUNG. We get along just fine.

I think it was I who introduced him to the President.

Back in 1974, I invited him to come down to speak for my campaign, and, at that time, Governor Carter introduced him. They first got to know each other on that occasion, I think. He and I have been good friends from a long way back. He is one of the people for whom I have always had great deal of respect and admiration. I could not think of anything better for our foreign policy than to have him intimately involved in it, not only in our Africa policy, but in any other aspects of policy.

I think that one of the things we are seeing in this administration is that crises do not wait to happen until you are ready for them. I think one of the things that the Secretary of State very wisely has done is to make sure that all bases are covered and that there is a comprehensive foreign policy that covers the globe. Now, Africa probably has more problems than any place else in the world right now. There are more crises on the front burner there than there are elsewhere.

Because South Africa is the key to that, it took a very smart, tough, and yet sensitive human being to say the things that were said to Vorster and yet still maintain a relationship at all. I think that the Vice President really did a marvelous job in those meetings.

COMMENDATION OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Senator PERCY. I think that members of this committee are on this committee because of their deep interest in foreign policy. The importance that we attach to foreign policy relates to the security and

well-being of every citizen in this country. We could not be more pleased with the fact that the Vice President and you have been assigned special responsibilities to one of the two areas of the world that have suffered from U.S. neglect, Latin America and Africa.

The First Lady of the land is down in Latin America right now. The President's only outside trip has been to Europe, and he is personally, with the Secretary of State, attending to problems in the Middle East. We cannot say that our areas of concern are being neglected at all by this administration.

We thank you very much indeed for your presence and your answers today.

Ambassador YOUNG. Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Senator Clark.

AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S "RACISM" REMARK

Ambassador Young, I don't wish to ask the question again, because I understand that Senator Percy has asked it, but I had to go out to do a television stint and I want to be sure that I understand your answer and that it is of record.

I think it should be fair—and I am sure that Senator Percy, with his customary skill, did it fairly—to ask you frontally about the alleged charge that Gerald Ford—now I am not going to talk about Nixon because that would get all mixed up with lots of other things—but that Gerald Ford is racist, or words to that effect.

Has that been answered to your satisfaction? I think he is entitled to an answer of record.

Ambassador YOUNG. I think so. As I use the term, Senator Javits, I am racist. I don't think you can be born in the 20th century and not have been contaminated by the problems of race. I think it is something with which we all struggle. The only thing that concerns me or that bothers me is when we are not struggling.

Senator JAVITS. I will tell you why this worries me. I know you well enough to tell you, even in public.

We don't have all that many friends in high places, and it worries me when that happens with a man whom I think is a friend.

Ambassador YOUNG. I do, too.

Senator JAVITS. That worries me. I am old enough to say that it worries me. I hope you will think about it and that it will worry you, too.

Ambassador YOUNG. It has worried me. I have, as I said, considered President Ford my friend, and I still do.

MARSHALL PLAN FOR AFRICA

Senator JAVITS. Good. Thank you for answering that again for Senator Percy and for me.

A thing I wanted to ask you about substantively was your very interesting suggestion of a "Marshall Plan" for Africa. I have just been to the CIEC [Council for International Economic Cooperation] meeting in Paris. I have been through a really tortured week. Here are our problems. I would like you to address yourself, not necessarily

here, but here if you can, in a considered way, to our problems. Here they are.

The Marshall Plan was built on the cooperation among those who received the Marshall Plan aid. That was its great strength—they disbursed it in the way that they thought was best. We operated in an advisory capacity. With the way so much of Africa is now tearing itself apart, including the activities of Mr. Amin, and others, I question if that earlier method is now remotely possible. Second, the general attitude, as I detected it, seemed to be not only a distrust of business, any kind of business—American, European, Japanese, probably Russian business, too—any business, but a very heavy dependence solely upon government operation. This is trying to engage in a battle against poverty, want, illness, and so on with one hand, probably the right hand, tied behind one's back. So much of the resources of our world are tied up in the business system.

Third whom are we helping—many dictatorships, many of them terrible dictatorships. We are not helping nice democratic beneficent regimes. How are the avails going to be distributed? Are they going to go to some favorite group, which is the social order, the economic order, and the pecking order generally in many of these countries, or are the people going to get a crack at them?

Also, what are they going to do for us? Are they going to assure us of some reasonable source of supply of natural resources in a cooperative way at reasonable prices? Are we going to be able to tell them, "look, you are being destroyed by the oil price as much as we are, so help us to do something about it in our mutual interest?"

All of this assumes a "Marshall Plan" which is designed with the necessary money, credit, and technical skill to put these countries in great shape.

Now, this is what troubles me. I will yield to no one, Mr. Ambassador, not even to you, as being a better friend of those people than I am. For 30 years I have worried, and I am suggesting this to you because I think many of our fellow countrymen are worried. I don't think there is any reluctance to do it. I think that Senator Clark found, when he brought up to us the Sahel and other matters, as did everyone who has been there, that this is probably the most needy place on earth and the least able to help itself.

I was interested in your suggestion because it is a very important idea. But how do we go about it? I will tell you something else. Even if your plan is a 20-year plan, that would be OK. I realize that this is not Europe, with everything ready and prepared for you to step up to bat right away.

This is my concern.

Ambassador Young. I would think that these are the issues that would be the basis for discussion, and I think that all of them can be solved. When we are talking about 50 different nations and a gigantic continent, it would probably take several years just to get these questions satisfactorily answered. I don't believe that that is too long.

I think it would be better to take the time to think about that, because I feel that Africa has to go through some leadership development of its own. I do not mean to say that there are not competent leaders there. But, for instance, the economic community of West Africa is very new, and it may be that, in a couple of years, it will be

ready to answer these questions and be the kind of working unit to which we could relate. Most of those countries in the West African community, with the possible exception of Benin and Guinea, would already be favorable and very supportive of us and would have opted for a free market system of development. West Africa probably is the headquarters of African capitalism. So, you would not have that distrust of business nearly to the same extent in that part of Africa as you would in some other parts.

I think that we would have to have very good answers to an approach that I would think would be essentially a basic human needs approach, where we would think in terms of an agreed upon strategy for development that would help the poorest of the poor within those countries. I think the answer to what it would do for us is it would probably save the American economy.

If we are going to have an economy that functions at 100 percent of capacity, we are going to require additional markets. I think one of the reasons for the expanded French interest in Africa, and the so-called Afro-Latin strategy of Giscard, is the fact that they have a tremendous balance-of-payments deficit. They see African markets as a potential for relieving that deficit.

I think David Owen's speech on South Africa and the new British position on South Africa pointed to the fact that, as far as Great Britain is concerned, the fastest growing markets in Africa are in Nigeria and in West Africa, and that those were creating new pressures of economic interest, and new markets, which are in our interest as well.

Now, this is not something that I am interested in plunging into. I think what we are now doing through the World Bank, and through our bilateral aid programs, is what we ought to be doing now. I think if we are going to have something really significant 2 or 3 years from now, maybe now is the time to start thinking about some of the questions which you have raised.

Senator JAVITS. I thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I also would suggest that with the same intimacy and the same freedom that you speak—and you know how much I approve of that—I hope you will also address yourself to the African leadership, its shortcomings, its deficiencies, and what it can produce for its people if it would give them half a chance.

I thank you very much.

Senator CLARK. Ambassador Young, is there anything you wish to add?

Ambassador YOUNG. I would only say that I am always grateful to come to this committee and to be with so many good friends, with people who, long before I was on the scene, were dedicated to facing these questions.

Senator CLARK. We thank you for your attendance and comments and wish you well in your very difficult task ahead.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]





