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WARNKE NOMINATION



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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF

PAUL C. WARNKE TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS DIRECTOR

FEBRUARY 8 AND 9, 1977





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
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(II)

CONTENTS

Hearing days:	Pa
Tuesday, February 8, 1977	
Wednesday, February 9, 1977	1
Statements by:	
Cohen, Richard, U.S. Labor Party	12
Kemble, Penn, Coalition for a Democratic Majority	17
Lockman, Mark, assistant legislative aide, Liberty Lobby	1:
McClure, Hon. James A., U.S. Senator from Idaho	1
	1:
Stratton, Hon. Samuel, a U.S. Representative in Congress from the	9
Warnke, Paul C., of the District of Columbia, to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service as Director.	
Insertions for the record:	
Nomination of Paul C. Warnke, dated February 4, 1977	
Nomination of Faul C. Warnke, dated February 8, 1977	
Letter to Senator John Sparkman from Paul H. Nitze, dated February 7, 1977	
Letter to Senator John Sparkman from Paul C. Warnke, dated	
Prepared statement of Paul C. Warnke Biographical sketch of Paul C. Warnke	
Biographical sketch of Paul C. Warnke	
Anonymous memorandum re Paul Warnke	- 1
Anonymous memorandum re Paul Warnke— "Arms Control, Before Time Runs Out," article by Paul C. Warnke, the New York Times, February 8, 1977———————————————————————————————————	
Article by Pon Komble from the No. Vol. 75 - 1017	-
Article by Pen Kemble from the New York Times, February 8, 1977	3
Testimony of Paul C. Warnke on "Strategic Arms Limitation Agree-	
ments,' Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign	
Relations, June 28, 1972	
Meetings of General Advisory Committee, 1976-1977	
Mr. Warnke's responses to additional questions of Senator Case	1
Mr. Warnke's responses to additional questions of Senator Percy	
Excerpt of testimony of Paul C. Warnke on "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations," Hearing before Subcommittee of	
Force Reduction Negotiations," Hearing before Subcommittee of	
the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1974	1
Prepared statement of Representative Samuel S. Stratton	10
Prepared statement of Richard Cohen, U.S. Labor Party	Î
Appendix:	-
Letter to Senator John Sparkman from Hon, Larry P. McDonald and 9	
other Congressmen, dated February 7, 1977— Letter and attachment to Senator John Sparkman from Professor	13
Letter and attachment to Senator John Sparkman from Professor	-
Arthur Fisher, dated February 6, 1977	15
Letter and enclosures to Senator John Sparkman from Carl Marcy,	.1.
The American Committee on U.SSoviet Relations, dated Febru-	
ary 11, 1977	18
Letter to Senator John Sparkman from Prof. Sidney D. Drell, dated	150
February 3, 1977	13
Letter to Senator John Sparkman from James C. Roberts, executive	
director, American Conservative Union, dated February 9, 1977	19
Letter to Senator John Sparkman from Robert S. McNamara and	
Clark M. Clifford, dated February 14, 1977	1
Prepared statement of the Communications Workers of America	19
Appendix to prepared statement of U.S. Labor Party	19
Letter to Senator Clark from Stephen I. Schlossberg, General Coun-	-
sel, United Auto Workers	20



WARNKE NOMINATION

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1977

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Sparkman [chairman of the committee | presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Church, Pell, Humphrey, Clark, Biden, Matsunaga, Case, Javits, Percy, Griffin, and Danforth. Also present: Senators Culver, Hart, Hatch, and Schmitt.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator Church [presiding]. This afternoon the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will meet for the purpose of hearing witnesses in regard to two nominations. They are: Richard B. Parker, a Foreign Service officer to be Ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon, succeeding Francis E. Meloy, Jr. who was slain by terrorists in Beirut last June; and Paul C. Warnke, to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The administration has sought to expedite Mr. Parker's nomination so that he might be confirmed and be present in Lebanon before Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visits the Middle East next week.

Mr. Parker presently is Ambassador to Algeria and has previously served in embassy positions in Beirut, Cairo, Rabat, Amman, and Jerusalem.

The committee will first consider Mr. Parker's nomination because of the request of the Department that this be expedited as quickly as possible. Then we will move on to the nomination of Mr. Warnke.

Senator Church. Mr. Warnke, would you like to come forward,

please?

The Foreign Relations Committee now turns to the nomination of Paul Warnke to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Warnke has appeared before this committee in the past and has written many thousands of words describing his views on the present world situation and the role of armaments and military might in national security. I suspect that today it is not Mr. Warnke's writings that arouse the greatest interest, but is the writings of others about him. A most disturbing factor in Mr. Warnke's nomination has been the circulation of an unsigned document which discusses the nominee's views on arms control and has received considerable atten-

tion in the news media.

Because of the prominence this nomination has received, and owing to the anonymous documents to which I have referred, these hearings present us with an opportunity to bring before the Senate and the public an educational discussion of what some people consider to be the most important single question facing the world: How can we control the expansion of our nuclear arsenals while preserving our national security to assure that there will be a habitable Earth for our children and our children's children?

I personally believe that the post Mr. Warnke has been nominated to fill may well be the most important in the Government when one con-

siders the future.

We expect that today's discussions will explore the options open to the United States and other nations in the next few years as we try to reduce the tensions and potential for conventional and nuclear war at any level.

If you have been reading the papers or listening to the news you know that this is a subject about which reasonable and informed men

and women can and do disagree.

In an attempt to make this hearing as meaningful as possible and as broadly based as possible, the members of the Armed Services Committee have been invited to sit with the committee for the purpose of asking questions. I believe that we have Senator Hatch with us, who is most welcome, and who, after the members of the committee have had an opportunity to question the witness, will be given his opportunity to question as a matter of comity to a Member of the Senate.

I might say, Mr. Warnke, before we proceed with your opening statement, it is the custom of the committee on occasions of this kind to limit each Senator to 10 minutes in the first round of questions in order that all Senators can be accommodated. Then we will go to a

second round and a third round, as may be required.

I would like, before Mr. Warnke presents his statement, to recognize that we have with us a former member of this committee and a very distinguished one, John Sherman Cooper and his wife, Lorraine. We want to extend a warm welcome to you both.

Applause.

Senator GRIFFIN. Mr. Chairman? Senator Church. Senator Griffin?

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator Griffin. I have a procedural matter I would like to raise

before Mr. Warnke begins his statement.

In terms of what is before the committee, am I correct that there are two different nominations before us, one nominating Mr. Warnke to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and another one to make him an ambassador for the purpose of negotiating arms control?

Senator Church. Yes; I believe that both posts are confirmable by the Senate, so that there are two nominations to be considered.

Senator Griffin. In fact, I have copies of the nomination here, and I would like that these be put into the record, if they would not ordinarily be put in.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 4, 1977.

To the Senate of the United States.

I nominate Paul C. Warnke, of the District of Columbia, to be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, vice Fred Charles Ikle, resigned.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 8, 1977.

To the Senate of the United States.

I nominate Paul C. Warnke, of the District of Columbia, for the rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to which position he was nominated February 4, 1977.

JIMMY CARTER.

Senator Griffin. I notice that one is dated February 4. That is the one nominating him to be Director of the Agency. The other nomination is dated today, February 8, nominating him for the rank of Ambassador, during his tenure in service as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I would further ask, Mr. Chairman, Isn't it true under the rules of the committee that ordinarily there is a 7-day notice before a hearing

is held on a nomination?

Senator Church. I am told that the ordinary practice is a 6-day waiting period, but that the chairman may waive it at his discretion.

Senator Griffin. I would think in such occasions, of course, where there are routine nominations and there is no indication of controversy waiving the 6 days would make a lot of sense. But in a situation where there is some controversy surrounding a nomination, I did want to indicate, as one member of the committee, that I think it is unfortunate that we do not allow the 6-day notice to run so that the public and others would have an opportunity to prepare for these hearings.

Are there other witnesses to appear?

Senator Church. I believe that there are other witnesses. Do we

have a list of them?

Senator Case. Wasn't it generally understood, Mr. Chairman, that, whether or not technically the nomination as Ambassador came to us earlier than today, Mr. Warnke would be assigned to conduct these negotiations?

Senator Church. [Nods in the affirmative.]

Senator Case. I thought that was quite clear ever since he was named

by the President for the post.

Senator Griffin. I did read that in the paper, but I think in terms of the role of the Senate, we have a role here with respect to both assignments. It is two jobs and he will be wearing two hats. I can see some conflict and some basis, perhaps, for confirming him for one and not the other. But we will, of course, see as the hearing proceeds.

Senator Humphrey. If the gentleman would yield.

Senator Griffin. I yield.

Senator Humphrey. I think the date of the eighth was simply based upon the fact that when the announcement was made, it was assumed that the nominee could participate as the negotiator, as well as the head of ACDA. And I think the State Department, through the President, has made the nomination available only on the date of the eighth out of some inadvertence.

After all, there is a new administration.

Senator Griffin. Yes, sir. Senator Church. That is also my understanding. Senator Case. That there is a new administration?

General laughter

Senator Church. Yes; that there is a new administration.

It was my understanding that when the nomination first came down, it was thought the single nomination would suffice. We were all apprised at the time that Mr. Warnke was to also serve as the President's chief negotiator at the SALT talks. It was later decided that a second nomination, conferring the rank of Ambassador upon him, would be appropriate, if not necessary. That is the reason for the second nomination coming up late.

Senator Griffin. But there are two nominations.

Senator Church. That is correct. Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman?

Senator Church. I will come back to you, Senator Danforth. First,

Senator Matsunaga?

Senator Matsunaga. The notice, of course, is not a matter to evoke surprise. It has been a matter of public knowledge that Mr. Warnke would be presented to the Senate for confirmation as negotiator with Ambassador's rank.

I think the chairman is in the right to waive that requirement.

Senator Church. Your point is well taken.

Senator Danforth?

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire what timetable the Chair is operating on? Is it your view that we are going to vote on

Mr. Warnke's confirmation this afternoon?

Senator Church. No; we have had some other requests by witnesses who wish to appear. I would think it very unlikely that we could hear both from Mr. Warnke and those witnesses and come to a vote on this matter today. It is very likely that we will have to have a second day of hearings.

Senator Danforth. I have a list, and I assume everybody else has been furnished with the same list, with the names of three other witnesses on it: Congressman Stratton, a Mr. Richard Cohen, and a Mark

Lockman.

Are any other witnesses scheduled for this nomination?

Senator Church. I am informed by the staff that we have received some additional requests since this list was prepared. At 11:30 this morning we received requests from retired Gen. Daniel Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Penn Kemble, the executive director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, which prepared the unsigned memorandum to which I referred.

WHAT IS INVOLVED IN CONFIRMATION HEARING

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, let me make a point which I hope

will be helpful.

It seems to me that what is involved in this confirmation hearing, and I hasten to say that I have not made up my mind on how I am going to vote, is something more than the usual question of interviewing a nominee and yielding, generally, to the President's wishes about his advisers and the people who will execute his policy according to his

best judgment.

What we will be doing in this confirmation vote is foreshadowing the position of the Senate at some later date when I am hopeful that a treaty negotiated by our next SALT negotiator is presented to us. The worst thing that could happen would be for us to confirm a nomination on the basis of our view of the intelligence and integrity of the individual concerned, but with reservations about the philosophy he represents, to have him then negotiate a treaty and then to have the Senate fail to ratify that treaty.

So it seems to me that we are really voting for a philosophy even

more than for an individual in this case.

INVITING MR. NITZE TO TESTIFY SUGGESTED

I think that it would be wise for us to consider the philosophical position of Mr. Warnke as contrasted with the philosophical position of those who do not agree with him, and specifically, that as part of these confirmation hearings, we as a committee extend to Mr. Paul Nitze spoke to me about this letter a few days ago. I offer it for the Warnke's views.

The Chairman [presiding]. We do have a letter from Mr. Nitze, Mr. Nitze spoke to me about this letter a few days ago. I offer it for the record at this point.

The information referred to follows:

PAUL H. NITZE, Arlington, Va., February 7, 1977.

Hon. John J. Sparkman, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Charman: When, some 10 years ago, it became increasingly clear that the United States had become strategically and politically overcommitted in Vietnam, two schools of thought began to emerge as to the proper future direction of our national security policy. In one view, U.S. foreign and defense problems would continue, indeed might become more serious as a result of Vietnam, and could well call for even more emphasis and greater prudence than had been devoted to them in the past. In the contrasting view, the problems of the past had arisen largely from our own errors springing from over-emphasis on foreign policy, and particularly its defense aspects. Those taking the latter view believed our true strategic interests were limited to Western Europe, Japan and Israel; that the USSR presented our only military threat and that that threat could be deterred with forces less capable than those that had already been authorized. Therefore—so the argument ran—significant cuts could and should be made in a wide range of defense programs requested by the Executive Branch. It was hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to make certain parallel cuts, or at least reciprocate by restraining the pace of its own programs.

There can be no question that Mr. Paul Warnke, who has now been nominated to be both Director of ACDA and head of the U.S. SAL/T Delegation, has been one of the most active, vocal and persistent advocates of the second point of view.

In the last year or so, an important debate has arisen over the current state and future trends of the defense situation of the United States and of those countries whose interests are important to us and generally parallel to our own. I believe there is now a wide consensus that the evidence indicates that the situation could become serious at some time in the future, given a continuation of current trends. There are, however, differences of opinion as to how soon this may occur.

It is in this context that I suggest the nomination of Mr. Warnke be considered. I believe that his testimony before the Senate Committee on the Budget, given on March 9, 1976, is relevant; particularly the last few pages thereof. He there makes it clear that he regards the principal deterrent protecting Europe, the Middle East and Japan to be the probability that the U.S. would initiate, if necessary, the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, with the further probability that this would escalate to the nuclear destruction of everything he considers worth caring for and planning about in the United States. He appears to advocate this policy concurrently with taking a highly cavalier attitude concerning significant cuts, not only in almost all elements of those U.S. conventional capabilities but also in those improved U.S. nuclear capabilities that might make such escalation less likely. In listening to his testimony at the time, I was reminded of Secretary John Foster Dulles and his shortlived doctrine of massive nuclear retaliations; in 1953, however, there was the critical difference that we then still had a virtual nuclear monopoly.

I am concerned that Mr. Warnke, who has spoken with such certainty on matters of military requirements, weapons capabilities, and strategy, may nevertheless not be a qualified student or competent judge of any of these matters. It is claimed that he is a superb negotiator. I am unfamiliar with his successes in this area. I recognize that he has certain abilities as an advocate, but at least with respect to defense matters, these do not include clarity or consistency of logic. I doubt that such advocacy has much chance of success against the strategy and

tactics of the highly serious and competent Soviet negotiators.

It is proper that the President's nominations be supported unless there are strong reasons for not doing so. In this instance, however, I cannot bring myself to believe that the Senate would be well advised to give its consent to Mr. Warnke's appointment. This view is reinforced by the consideration that if confirmed, Mr. Warnke would serve not only as Director of ACDA, but also as head of the U.S. SALT Delegation, charged with the basic and detailed negotiations with the Soviet SALT Delegation at Geneva. I do not believe that, in today's circumstances, it is wise to have one man doing both jobs.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL H. NITZE.

CLIFFORD, WARNKE, GLASS, McIlwain & Finney,
Attorneys and Counsellors at Law,
Washington, D.C., February 11, 1977.

Hon. John J. Sparkman, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing on February 8th, I was given a copy of the letter written to you by Paul H. Nitze, dated February 7, 1977. The Committee asked that I provide a response.

Mr. Nitze has failed to understand my position with respect to national security policy. Nor do I believe that his letter adequately portrays the complexity

of today's defense debate.

Initially, he states that two schools of thought began to emerge about 10 years ago as to the proper future direction of our national security policy. One view, he asserts, is that our foreign and defense problems would continue and might call for even more emphasis and greater prudence. He describes the other as holding that "the problems of the past had arisen largely from our own errors springing from overemphasis on foreign policy, and particularly its defense aspects." He states that I have been "one of the most active, vocal and persistent advocates of the second point of view."

Mr. Nitze premises are incorrect. He cites no evidence to prove any such polarization among those who have studied and commented about national

security policy. I do not agree that he has correctly described prevailing trends of thought. If such a division were to exist, moreover, I would fall in the first group and not the second, because I agree that U.S. foreign and defense problems have continued and will continue and that they do indeed call for even more

emphasis and greater prudence.

With respect to the corollary beliefs that he associates with the second purported point of view, I do not believe and do not maintain that our strategic interests are limited to Western Europe, Japan and Israel. I do believe, however, that these are the areas in which military threats to our interests are the least unlikely and that, accordingly, our military capability should be optimized to deal with such contingencies. I would think it quite apparent that the military threat to our interests is posed currently by the Soviet Union and certanly I do not contend that this Soviet threat could be deterred with forces less capable than those that have been authorized. I have, however, questioned in past years whether we were spending more money than necessary for weapons and forces that were not the best designed to cope with realistic defense needs.

Nor have I maintained that we should reduce our military capability in the mere hope that the Soviet Union would make parallel cuts or reciprocate by restraints in the pace of its own programs. What I have suggested is that, in the strategic arms field, we might endeavor to initiate a series of reciprocal restraints, whereby any initiative we might take would be abandoned if there were

not a prompt and matching Soviet response.

I can only conclude that Mr. Nitze listened to and thereafter read my testimony of March 9, 1976 before the Senate Committee on the Budget with something less than his usual meticulous attention. Nothing in this testimony remotely suggested that I regard the prospect of our first use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union as constituting the principal deterrent protecting Europe, the Middle East and Japan. Nor do I advocate any such policy. Instead, (p. 203), I expressed my agreement with Mr. Nitze that what best stops the Soviet Union is that we have a conventional war capability. I stated also my belief that deterrence of an all-out attack on Western Europe is strengthened by the existence of our tactical nuclear weapons and the Soviet recognition that we would use them if needed to protect our vital interests. I submit that this view is completely consistent with established NATO doctrine and that, if it is incorrect, then our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serve no purpose and should all be removed. I do not believe that they should all be removed because, though not the principal deterrent, these weapons constitute, as I stated in my testimony (p. 204), a part of "the spectrum of deterrents."

My recognition of the essentiality of U.S. conventional capabilities was further emphasized in my suggestion that a greater risk than an all-out attack might be a "quick Soviet strike" for a limited objective and that "we should review our defense structure and make sure we have the capability to respond to that kind of contingency." (pp. 204, 206). I believe that similar concern about the adequacy of our conventional forces in Europe was recently expressed in a report by Senators Nunn and Bartlett. My firmly held and expressed position, therefore, is premised on the need for a fiexible response capability and is the

antithesis of the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.

My testimony of March 9, 1976 did state my opinion that an intensive protracted conventional war in Europe would present a substantial prospect of the use of tactical nuclear weapons and that, if the war were to continue beyond that stage, it could escalate into a strategic exchange. I did not and do not present this danger in advocacy of any massive retaliation policy. In this regard, my testimony cited the necessity for being able to continue a conventional conflict. I would find it hard, however, to believe that anyone could maintain that a major war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces is certain to remain conventional indefinitely or that the NATO forces would be willing to accept defeat without resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Advocacy of that position, in my opinion, inconsistent with effective deterrence and inconsistent with our national security. Surely Mr. Nitze does not intend to imply any such defeatist philosophy.

If you or other members of the Committee have any further questions, I will

of course be happy to respond to them.

Very truly yours,

Senator Griffin. Mr. Chairman, if he would be willing to come and testify and submit himself for questions, would it be appropriate for us to listen to him?

The CHAIRMAN. He makes no request for the privilege of testifying. Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed, Senator Case.

INVITATION TO ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE COMMENDED

Senator Case. I think you are absolutely right in suggesting to the members of the Armed Services Committee that they come and join us in this hearing. I understand they have decided not to for reasons of their own. I think they are meeting to decide what they want to do. But I thoroughly approve of your, not only generous, but wise action, because this is, as my colleagues have noted, a matter which relates to more than just the integrity and ability of the nominee for these two jobs. It does involve a question of philosophy and policy. I think now is the time to get it all out in the open.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

I would feel that we were not doing the right thing if we didn't do that, and I speak as one who thinks he has a pretty good idea of the philosophy involved. I don't think there ought to be any chance that the action we take should be discredited by any charge that has any color of rightness that we have railroaded a thing like this through.

I think it would be very unwise, not only from the standpoint of the position of our Ambassador and the head of the Agency, but also, as has been indicated, from the standpoint of the product that comes back from the negotiations and the authority with which our representatives of the negotiations are able to present it to the Senate and to the

American people.

I think it would be wise to take all deliberate speed and to take our time and satisfy every reasonable request for complete consideration.

Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator would yield?

Senator Case, I do.

Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, I would like to concur with Senator Case, and point out that the policy of disarmament and arms control will not be just that of Mr. Warnke. In the final sense it will be that of the President. Mr. Warnke will be his adviser. We had better bear that very clearly in mind.

The President has now expressed himself in this case differently from the Sorenson case. He is going to fight for this nominee; then, so be it. Let's discuss all of the options which the United States may

take into the disarmament and arms control negotiations.

I thoroughly agree that we will come out better and stronger. But let us understand clearly, and let there be no question about it, that the President will join the issue because that is really what is at stake. Mr. Warnke is a public official, if we confirm him, who will be the policy adviser of the President and head an agency, really, at the pleasure of the President, but not the final authority, not the one with the final responsibility.

ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL

For lack of anything else, Mr. Chairman, shouldn't we then ask the nominee if the administration is prepared to join issue on these questions which we wish to ask to give us the basic philosophy which dictated this choice?

Or are you prepared on that subject to speak for the administration?

STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMA-MENT AGENCY, WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS DIRECTOR

Mr. WARNKE. Might I comment, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; Mr. Warnke. We would be glad to hear what you have to say.

Mr. WARNKE. I am afraid that there might be some misapprehension as to just what sort of person I am and just what kind of views I am peddling.

I would like to make it very clear to the committee that I do not have any preconceived positions with respect to the arms control field, that I approach this with an open mind, I think with some background in the area, having had the advantage of participating in the national debate and believing very strongly that there is promise in arms control, promise from the standpoint of enhancing our national security.

Now to the best of my knowledge, the administration's position has not as yet been fully developed and, as has been pointed out by Senator Javits, I would be part of a team in connection with this entire endeavor. I would certainly expect to express my views and to express them strongly, but then, obviously, to accept whatever the judgment was of the President of the United States and then to implement that judgment to the best of my ability.

MR. WARNKE'S POSITIONS ON DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

Now as Senator Church has pointed out, I have written a fair amount and I have testified quite frequently before this committee and before the Armed Services Committee. It has been my feeling that it was responsible to endeavor to precipitate national debate upon some of the defense issues. I cannot guarantee that my positions have always been correct. They certainly have not always remained the same.

I have been prepared to change my mind as further facts developed and if I found that I have been mistaken in the past, I have felt

perfectly free to admit that.

In participating in this debate, I felt that it was important for the security of the United States that we endeavor to air conflicting views, that we try to develop alternatives, that we try to get right on the table the questions that are so basic to our national security.

But I have felt that to a considerable extent the arms control implications have received inadequate attention. That is why I look forward to this responsibility that I am about to assume, provided that the Senate advises and consents favorably.

I felt also that there are certain elements with respect to national defense decisions that ought to be examined very, very closely. I have felt, for example, that we should not make weapons decisions that preclude effective arms control without knowing what it is that we are

doing.

I believe the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, suggested that he wished that they had been able to think through the implications of the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) decision, for example, and find out whether or not a delay might have been preferable to going ahead at that time. That is the kind of question that I think ought to be presented to the Congress and to the public.

I felt also that in many instances, in approving the weapons systems, perhaps the wrong weapons system was being developed as a replacement. I suggested that in some instances the unit cost had become perhaps inordinately high and as a consequence, we were not getting enough in the way of defense capability in the replacement systems.

I have been perfectly free to voice those opinions. I cannot guarantee, as I said, that I have always been right. And here, at the outset of this hearing, I would appreciate the opportunity to state fully my views on what the responsibilities of this office are and the manner in which I would approach those responsibilities.

Sentor HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, might I comment?

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey?

ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR NOMINATION

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Chairman, the question has been asked whether or not the administration is in support of this nomination. Let there be no mistake about it—it is. The President of the United States has asked Mr. Warnke to serve in this post. There have been those of us who have urged upon him that he do this. I think it is a matter of record that for some time he was reluctant to do so. I am proud to say that I was one who urged the Secretary of State and the President to pursue you, Mr. Warnke, relentlessly to get you to accept this assignment.

I am the author of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I authored the first Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament in this Congress and I've always considered it a fundamental part of our national security. I have never felt that an arms race did anything but raise the level of danger. What is important is the necessary bal-

ance, the guarantee of our security.

COMMITTEE'S TASK

So let it be clear before we move that this is no academic exercise That is No. 1.

Second, there are philosophical differences and they need to be aired. I think that the witnesses that have been proposed will do so. They are excellent witnesses. The other witnesses, insofar as I can recall the names, are all men of competence and integrity. They are people who have strong beliefs. If Paul Nitze wants to testify, I think

it would be of great help to this committee. He is a fine, distinguished citizen. I believe you will find after this testimony that his views, while they are oftentimes trumpeted to be greatly different from those of Mr. Warnke, are not that far apart.

But to answer Senator Javits, I think the record is quite clear. This is no backdown. If need be, this is showdown; so let's have it clear.

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman? The Chairman. Senator Percy?

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Javits and Senator Humphrey have made some very good points. I think all of us, in preparing for this hearing, have done our own individual homework. Many of us have talked with Mr. Warnke and put directly to him some of our questions about how he envisions his role as our principal negotiator. I talked yesterday to two previous heads of the agency, both Bill Foster and Gerard Smith, both of whom were overwhelmingly confirmed and are perhaps the most knowledgeable men in the United States on this subject, and both of them assured me and authorized me to say that they enthusiastically endorse Mr. Warnke's nomination and hope that he will be overwhelmingly confirmed.

This committee now has the task of determining Mr. Warnke's qualifications, philosophy, and views on running the agency, and, in the context of all that we have known, we have all read the anonymous memorandums that have been circulated. I have talked with some who support the contentions made in those memoranda, to get the best judgment that I can. They are all well-intentioned colleagues of ours. I think that we should proceed in accordance with accepted procedures to permit our nominee to provide any statement he wishes and on a time limitation have each one of us ask our questions, and we can pursue his philosophy and his qualifications for this most important assignment.

Mr. Warnke knows that he is a nominee for one of the most important positions in this administration. The President has put on the record and was elected on the basis of what he had to say and what he intended to do. If the opinions and judgments of the nominee are comparable to those of the President, I think that was decided by

the American people.

I anticipate at the end, Mr. Warnke, that the Senate will confirm you. But I think by our questions you will know that we care about your work and that we think that it is terribly important for this

country and the world.

The Chairman. I want to say something. First of all, Mr. Warnke, I want to apologize to you for being late. You probably can tell from my voice that I have a very bad cold.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. After being all morning in the steering committee, I decided I ought to take a little cough syrup and rest a while, and that's just what I did.

INVITATION TO MEMBERS OF ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Mention has been made of the invitation to members of the Armed Services Committee, to attend, if they wish to do so, and sit with us in any hearing we have.

Senator Stennis told us that more than likely he would hold hearings after we had acted in order to clear up some of the questions in the minds of some, and that he felt that would remove the necessity or desire to participate in these hearings.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Certainly we have no desire either to rush this matter through. There hasn't been a word said by anyone advocating finishing these hearings in short order, or this afternoon. We want a complete and adequate hearing, as we try to have on all matters coming before this committee. We would like to expedite it in a good, systematic manner.

CHAIRMAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF MR. WARNKE

I have known Mr. Warnke for a good number of years. I knew him when he served in a Defense capacity back in the 1950's, I believe it was. We have both been around here a long time.

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. I knew him when he headed up the International Security Agency. Was that the name?
Mr. WARNKE. International Security Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. International Security Affairs. I was familiar with his work at that time and I followed it closely, along

with other Members who participated in that program.

I have found Mr. Warnke to be a man who has safe and sound ideas and who is not reluctant at any time to state those views. I think we want people of that attitude and that nature to serve in responsible positions such as the one that Mr. Warnke is, I trust, about to take.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

MR. WARNKE'S AND PRESIDENT'S PHILOSOPHIES

Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. I think that Senator Javits, as he usually does, made a very cogent comment about philosophy, and I think Senator Danforth first raised the subject that we have an obligation and the right to feel out and investigate further the philosophy of Mr. Warnke with regard to the positions for which he is being considered.

But I think the record should be set straight that, as Senator Javits indicated, Mr. Warnke is, in fact, going to serve at the pleasure of the President, and so his views are not necessarily exactly those of the President. Secondly, Senator Javits went on to ask if the President is prepared to engage in a discussion of details of position at his point?

I would suggest that that is highly inappropriate at this point because the fact of the matter is the SALT negotiator uniquely is in a position of negotiating or reacting to what is offered. I think it is appropriate for the President to indicate what his overall philosophy is in the area of arms control and I think it is appropriate for the committee to search that out. I think it is appropriate for the committee to do the same with regard to Mr. Warnke. I don't think Senator Javits meant it, but in case anybody thinks he did mean it, I think it is inappropriate to expect that this witness will be in a position to comment in detail on detailed aspects of previous negotiations or upcoming negotiations.

Senator Javits. The Senator is exactly correct.

Senator Biden. That is the only point I would like to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. Senator Griffin. Would the Chairman allow me?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

NO EFFORT TO RUSH MATTER THROUGH

Senator Griffin. Before the Senator came I at least raised some questions and comments about the fact that the notice in this instance was shorter than the 6 days we ordinarily are allowed. I want to acknowledge and thank the chairman for his statement, which I was sure would be the case, that there would be no effort to rush this matter through and that there would be ample opportunity for anyone who wants to testify to come in and testify.

I think that is the way it should be, and I am satisfied.

The Charman. The President talked with me about this case. He did want it expedited because we need a negotiator in this matter right now. We have the right to waive this 6 days if we want to, and I told the President that I felt that the committee would be agreeable to going through with the hearings as expeditiously as might be possible.

That is all we are trying to do.

JURISDICTION OVER NOMINATION

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may be clear, the jurisdiction for the hearing, the proceedings relating to this nomination rests exclusively with the Foreign Relations Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. May I say that Senator Stennis fully recognizes that; he has said to me a half dozen times that the jurisdiction is completely within the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Humphrey. I wanted the message to go out so that there wasn't any reason for undue delay. I mean after we have completed our hearings, it may very well be that either contemporaneously or subsequently the Armed Services Committee might want to have discussions or hearings. But when this committee reports, however it reports, we have fulfilled the responsible jurisdiction under the Reorganization Act we have just completed.

Is that correct?

The Chairman. That is correct. And Senator Stennis wishes nothing done by his committee until we have completed action. The only reason he thinks they may have some hearings is because some members of that committee have presented to him the view that they have an oversight interest in this, certainly with respect to arms matters.

Senator Humphrey. I bring it up because, while I do think the point is well taken that these hearings should be exhaustive and we should not deny witnesses the chance to be heard and there should be a full examination of the views and philosophy of the witness and, insofar as possible, the administration on the whole subject of arms control, once we

have completed the hearings I would not want to see unnecessary delay because I know that the President does need the negotiator. I know that ACDA does need a new Director and I want to make such that we get it done.

I know that Senator Stennis appreciates that, but I did not want to see another two weeks go by, for example, waiting to have additional hearings in the Armed Services Committee. If we are going to start that business around here, then there are several committees on which I serve which could ask for extra hearings, too.

That is not the way we play the game. Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman? The Chairman. Yes, Senator Danforth?

INVITING MR. PAUL NITZE REQUESTED

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, I do not want unnecessary delay. I understand the President's desire to have this SALT negotiator appointed as expeditiously as possible. I only reiterate that in my view we are going to be voting for or against, not just a very able and competent individual, Mr. Warnke, but a philosophical position of which he has been the symbol.

I again restate my request that the committee invite Mr. Paul Nitze to come before the committee before we vote on this philosophical position to state the other side of the coin.

I think this is the best way of getting the most appropriate spokesman for both points of view before the committee and before the Senate.

Senator Humphrey. I think it is a question of whether Mr. Paul Nitze wants to come.

Senator Church. Yes. We have also just heard, I think, from Mr. Paul Nitze on this very question. He gave extensive testimony before this committee on the general strategic balance and the whole concept of Triad.

The Chairman. That is correct. I think it was some 2 weeks ago that we had Mr. Nitze before us and he discussed, I believe, every angle of arms control that came up, and he discussed it quite well.

I have a letter from Mr. Nitze. He doesn't say one word about desiring to come. He talked with me about this and I told him we would be very glad to see him up here at any time.

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to call Paul Nitze and ask if he would like to present his views and I will report back to you.

The Chairman. He doesn't suggest it in his letter, so I am not going to act, but if any member of this committee wants to, fine.

PRESIDENT'S NEED FOR NEGOTIATOR

I do want to say this. Back before President Carter had taken office he called me one day and told me that he was going to ask Mr. Vance to become the Secretary of State and he talked with me about it. He said that what we need at this time most of all is somebody who can negotiate. We need a negotiator. Mr. Vance is that kind of negotiator.

I think that that is equally applicable to Mr. Warnke. He has shown by his record that he knows how to negotiate and that the President did want expeditious action on Mr. Vance. We acted expeditiously and nobody complained of it. I think everybody was in favor of it, and I feel that the same thing can be said at this time with reference to Mr. Warnke.

Who wants to ask the next question? Have you anything, Senator

Church?

Senator Church. No, Mr. Chairman. I thought that we might hear from Mr. Warnke and have his introductionary statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. I thought that that had been completed.

[General laughter.]

Mr. WARNKE. I have the feeling, Mr. Chairman, of a certain amount of anticlimax at this point in getting into the act. [General laughter.]

KEY PRINCIPLE MR. WARNKE WOULD FOLLOW AS DIRECTOR

Senator Humphrey has pointed out that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is of course a creation of this Congress with Senator Humphrey being an architect of the Agency. The express purpose that the Congress had in mind, and stated, was to create a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments. And at the same time Congress noted that arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. That's right in the act. And this I regard as the key principle I would follow as Director of the Agency.

I support, of course, and always have supported, a strong national defense, and I regard the objective of arms control similarly as being to enhance the security of the United States, as well as advancing the chances of world peace. In securing these goals, the act establishing the Agency makes arms control and disarmament an integral part of

the process of making national security decisions.

As the committee knows, the Director of the Agency is by statute the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament matters. It is his responsibility to view national security problems from this perspective and to search for and advocate arms control solutions to these problems. In any particular situation the President, of course, may or may not decide to employ arms limitation measures in resolving questions of national security. But I believe it to be of the utmost importance that this alternative be presented at the highest levels of the Government.

So if confirmed as Director of ACDA, I will do my best in this capacity to argue persuasively for arms control initiatives where I believe them to be warranted. In some instances, sound measures of arms limitation may do more to protect this country than new armament

programs.

Also as Director of ACDA, I would seek ways to head off new explosions of arms technology which could ultimately damage the security of this Nation. I would seek ways to limit and reduce arms already in existence so as to make this country more secure. To accomplish this,

any measures of arms limitations that are pursued must be soundly conceived and any agreements that are reached must be adequately verifiable. If the American public is to have confidence in an arms control regime that has been negotiated, then that public must know that their security cannot be undermined through undetected violations by

another party to the agreement.

I think it should also be recognized that some new weapons system developments can help, rather than hinder, the objectives of sound arms control. By the time that long range nuclear armed ballistic missiles had appeared, the development of the submarine launched ballistic missile on nuclear submarines had a positive effect. It improves stability because of the invulnerability of this weapons system and has a consequent stabilizing effect on the strategic balance. The direction of arms control policy must be toward greater stability at lower levels of destructive potential in both conventional and nuclear arms. This will be the philosophy by which I would be guided if confirmed as ACDA Director.

It's been suggested that I have become a symbol of a certain philosophic position. I'm flattered at the attention but I have to reject the characterization. I don't believe that I represent a fixed philosophical position on the issues of arms control. I'm a strong advocate of arms control. I'm also a strong advocate of a strong national defense. I believe the two to be totally consistent and indeed, complementary.

But I believe that if anybody does think that I represent a fixed philosophical position, then some of them will be surprised, and some

others will be disappointed.

SALT TALKS

The control of strategic nuclear arms is a matter of the highest priority. As the Chairman of the U.S. SALT Delegation, I would be the direct representative of the President. In Geneva, my job would be to implement the administration's SALT policy, as developed through the interagency process in Washington. All of the national security agencies would also be represented on the delegation. The basic task would be to embody in unambiguous language the agreements in principle that had been reached between the President and the Soviet leadership. These would be included in the joint treaty text, much of which, I understand, has already been agreed upon.

I am hopeful that the outstanding major issues which have stalemated the SALT talks for the past couple of years can be resolved in a manner fully consistent with U.S. national security interests. I hope also this can be done in a reasonably short period of time. Among those issues, of course, is the status of the Backfire bomber of the Soviet

Union and the development of the cruise missiles.

If in fact we can move ahead with some expedition, this would permit the efforts in Geneva to complete the treaty text by the time of the expiration of the interim agreement on control of offensive arms,

which expires on October 3 of this year.

As you know, that was the SALT I offensive arms agreement which was signed in May 1972. I believe that it's preferable not to have to extend that interim agreement, but rather to move ahead with an agreement based on the principles of the Vladivostok accord.

OTHER POTENTIAL OR ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS

There are other potential or ongoing negotiations of considerable significance. The President, as we all know, has expressed his desire to reach an agreement banning all nuclear explosions as soon as it is practical. Negotiations to that effect would be very difficult, but if successful, they would have a significant effect in slowing the nuclear arms race and reducing the possibility of further nuclear proliferation.

In my opinion, we must be constantly vigilant against this great danger of nuclear proliferation because it perhaps represents the greatest risk that the nuclear field holds at the present time. We should utilize negotiations and all other means at our disposal to reduce the

gravity of that risk.

The mutual and balanced force reduction talks, in Vienna must be vigorously pursued with the objective of easing the military confrontation in Central Europe. A chemical weapons convention, which would place constraints on the possession of chemical weapons and complement the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention, may be within reach at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. That's known, of course, as the CCD.

Controls over the appalling level of traffic in conventional arms must be sought. That, again, is an objective that President Carter has announced, both during his campaign and since assuming office.

The Environmental Modification Convention which bans the hostile use of techniques to manipulate the environment, was negotiated last

summer at the CCD, and will soon be ready for signature.

In all of these matters, it is my opinion that ACDA must be deeply involved. The Agency chairs the backstopping function for the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Talks and works very closely with Ambassador Stanley Resor and his delegation. The U.S. Ambassador to the CCD is traditionally an ACDA official. The Agency is and should remain a major participant in developing and implementing non-proliferation and arms transfer policy. ACDA has always played a leading role in strategic arms limitation policy and negotiations. The ACDA Director must take the lead in all of these and other areas, and I pledge to this committee that I will do so if I am confirmed.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

Above all, in the development of arms control policy and in the negotiation of international agreements, the Director of ACDA must remain in very close touch and consult regularly with the Congress, the representatives of the American people. The ACDA Act provides that the Director shall advise the Congress on arms control. If confirmed, I shall do so on a regular and continuing basis, because certainly, no arms control policy can succeed unless it has the solid support of the American people as expressed through their elected representatives.

[Mr. Warnke's prepared statement and biographical sketch follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE

At the outset of this hearing, I appreciate the opportunity to state briefly my views on the importance of the responsibility involved in this nomination. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is, of course, a creation of the United

States Congress. The express purpose was to create "a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments." At the same time, the Congress noted that: "Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole." This I regard as the key principle that I would follow as the Director of the Agency. The objective of arms control is to enhance the security of the United States as well as advancing the chances for world peace. In securing these goals, the act establishing the Agency makes arms control and disarmament an integral part of the process of making national security decisions.

As the Committee knows, the Director of the Agency is by statute the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament matters. It is his responsibility to view national security problems from this perspective and to search for and advocate arms control solutions to these problems. In any particular situation the President may or may not decide to employ arms limitation measures to resolve questions of national security, but it is of the utmost importance that this alternative be presented at the highest levels of our Government.

If confirmed as Director of ACDA, I will do my best in this capacity to argue persuasively for arms control initiatives where I believe they are warranted. In some instances, sound measures of arms limitation may do more to protect this

country than new armament programs.

As Director of ACDA, I would seek ways to head off new explosions of arms technology which could ultimately damage the security of this nation. I would seek ways to limit and reduce arms already in existence so as to make this country more secure. To accomplish this, any measures of arms limitation that are pursued must be soundly conceived and any agreements that are reached must be adequately verifiable. To have confidence in an arms control regime that has been negotiated the American people must know that their security cannot be undermined through undetected violations by another party to the agreement.

It should also be recognized that some new weapon system developments may help, rather than hinder, the objective of sound arms control. Once long range nuclear armed ballistic missiles had appeared, the development of the submarine launched ballistic missile on nuclear submarines had a positive effect because of the invulnerability of this weapon system and the resultant stabilizing effect on the strategic balance. The direction of arms control policy must be toward greater stability at lower levels of destructive potential in both conventional and nuclear arms. This will be the philosophy by which I will be guided if confirmed as ACDA Director.

The control of strategic nuclear arms is a matter of the highest priority. As Chairman of the US SALT Delegation, I would be the direct representative of the President. In Geneva, my job would be to implement the Administration's SALT policy as developed through the interagency process in Washington. All national security agencies would also be represented on the Delegation. The basic task is to embody in unambiguous language the agreements in principle reached between the President and the Soviet leadership. These would be included in the joint treaty text, much of which has been already agreed.

I am hopeful that the outstanding major issues which have stalemated the Talks for so long, such as the Backfire bomber and the cruise missile, can be resolved in a manner fully consistent with U.S. national security interests in a reasonably short period of time. This would permit efforts in Geneva to complete the treaty text to move rapidly ahead so that we can have a new agreement ready for signature prior to the expiration of the Interim Agreement on October 3

of this year.

There are other potential or on-going negotiations of significance. The President has expressed his desire to reach an agreement banning all nuclear explosions as soon as practicable. These negotiations will be difficult but, if successful, they will have a significant effect in slowing the nuclear arms race and reducing the possibility of further nuclear proliferation. We must be constantly vigilant against the great danger of nuclear proliferation and utilize such negotiations and all other means at our disposal to reduce this threat.

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR) in Vienna must be vigorously pursued with the objective of easing the military confrontation in Central Europe. A chemical weapons convention, which would place constraints on the possession of chemical weapons and complement the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention, may be within reach at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. Controls over the appalling level of traffic in conventional arms must be sought. Controls over the Modification Convention which bans the hostile use of techniques to manipulate the environment, negotiated last summer at the CCD, will soon be ready for signature.

In all these matters ACDA must be deeply involved. The Agency chairs the backstopping function for MBFR and works very closely with Ambassador Resor and the Delegation. The U.S. Ambassador to the CCD is traditionally an ACDA official. The Agency is and should remain a major participant in developing and implementing non-proliferation and arms transfer policy. ACDA has always played a leading role in strategic arms limitation policy and negotiations. The ACDA Director must take the lead in all these and other areas and I pledge to do so if confirmed.

Above all, in the development of arms control policy and in the negotiation of international agreements the Director of ACDA must remain in very close touch and consult regularly with the Congress, the representatives of the American people. The ACDA Act provides that the Director shall advise the Congress on arms control. If confirmed, I shall do so on a regular and continuing basis. Certainly no arms control policy can succeed unless it has the solid support of the American people, as expressed through their elected representatives.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PAUL C. WARNKE

Profession: Lawyer.

Personal data: Born January 31, 1920, Webster, Massachusetts. Married to the former Jean Rowe, five children.

Office address: 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20006. (202) 298-0397.

Education: A.B., Yale College, 1941; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1948; Editor in Chief, Columbia Law Review, 1948.

Military service: U.S. Coast Guard, 1942-1946, Lieutenant (Senior Grade). Served in Atlantic Theater in anti-submarine service and in Pacific Theater on tanker and LST, participating in landings in the Philippines and Borneo.

Present position: Partner, Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, Attor-

Previous positions: Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), August 1, 1967 to February 15, 1969; General Counsel, Department of Defense, September 25, 1966 to July 31, 1967; Covington & Burling, Attorneys at Law, 1948–1966

Admission to bar: District of Columbia, 1948; Supreme Court of the United States, 1954

Memberships: American Bar Association and its Section on Antitrust Law; The District of Columbia Bar; Bar Association of the District of Columbia; Federal Bar Association; American Society of International Law; Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs; Council on Foreign Relations

Other activities: Chairman, Board of Visitors, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Board of Governors, Antioch School of Law; Board of Visitors, Columbia University School of Law; Board of Directors, Wolf Trap Foundation; Board of Governors, The District of Columbia Bar; Director, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, International Voluntary Services, Inc.; Executive Committee, The Trilateral Commission; Advisory Committee, Yale Economic Growth Center; Member, China Council of The Asia Society; Member, Foreign Affairs Task Force, Democratic Advisory Council; Advisory Board, Center for Law and Social Policy, Int'l Project; Advisory Board, Center for Defense Information; Defense Advisory Committee, Council on National Priorities and Resources; Former Member, Disciplinary Board, the District of Columbia Bar; Former Chairman, Arms Control and Defense Policy Committee of Democratic Policy Council; Former Director and Chairman of Membership Committee, Health and Welfare Council of National Capital Area; Former Chairman, Board of Trustees, Potomac School, McLean, Virginia; Former Member, Maryland and District of Columbia Advisory Committees to the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

Mr. WARNKE. I'd be happy, Mr. Chairman, to answer any questions,

or at least to try to answer any questions.

I would have to announce at the outset that I don't have all of the answers. Obviously, this is something that will have to be developed over a period of time, and you also have to recognize that I have been out of the Government for the past 8 years and as a consequence, know nothing except what I read in the papers.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Warnke. Senator Case, do you have any questions? Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOW TWO JOBS WOULD BE HANDLED

Mr. Warnke, in these two jobs, have you worked out a way in your

mind to handle them both? How would that be done?

Mr. Warnke. I have worked it out in my mind in very general terms, Senator Case. I would need, obviously, strong support both here in Washington and at the talks in Geneva in the form of a very strong deputy. I would anticipate splitting my time between Geneva and Washington, and as a consequence would ask that the President appoint somebody who would be able to negotiate when I was not there. I would anticipate being there, however, when the key decisions were made on the negotiating front.

Senator Case. We had something like that with Adrian Fisher and

Ambassador Smith, didn't we?

Mr. WARNKE. I believe we did, with Ambassador Smith and I believe at that time. Mr. Farley.

Senator Case. That's right. I believe they operated more in the earlier period than later.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

QUESTION OF HOW TO GET FORMAL AGREEMENTS

Senator Case. The broad questions will be necessarily, properly, and thoroughly explored today. You have on several occasions, and I think in various phases of discussions of arms limitations, suggested that we could make progress by not trying to get an agreement on things ahead of time, but by taking action and doing it with an announcement. I think that is the substance of your position, that we would do this on a trial basis, and if it met with what we considered an equivalent response, fine; if not, then we would stop it.

Is your job going to stultify you from making these original and

innovative suggestions?

I suppose that may sound like kind of an odd question, but the whole business of being against arms negotiations and treaties and being for them is something which you could develop a little bit.

Mr. WARNKE. Well, I certainly have not intended at any point, Sentor Case to suggest that I am against the formal

ator Case, to suggest that I am against the formal agreements.

Senator Case. The question is how you get at them, whether by ne-

gotiation or whatever.

Mr. WARNKE. The question is how you get at them and what sort of circumstances ought to attend the negotiating process.

I have been concerned during the pendency of the SALT talks about the very natural tendency of both sides to try to improve their bargaining position by developing more and more weapons systems.

Now unless you are careful about that, you could end up with a situation in which the very existence of the talks may actually accelerate

the arms race.

What I have suggested sometimes in my writings is that we try to explore the possibilities of getting during the course of negotiations, some concrete measures of parallel restraint. I emphasize parallel restraint because, of course, it would have to be on a mutual reciprocal basis.

I reject any concept of unilateral disarmament on the part of the

United States.

Senator Case. We have precedent for this, don't we? Did you have anything to do with that? President Kennedy did this at one time, I recall.

Mr. Warnke. Back in 1963, Senator Case, I believe it was the American University speech, in June of 1963, in which he announced that the United States was stopping all atmospheric testing and was calling on the Soviet Union for a response. I think that within something like a 2-month span we succeeded in getting the atmospheric test ban signed by the Soviet Union.

So that then was an instance of getting reciprocal restraint.

Now obviously, that can only occur in instances in which both parties figure it is in their interest to do so.

Senator Case. But you can only have an agreement when that is true, in any event.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Now there have been other efforts also at trying to get initiatives started which would result in reciprocal action dampening down the arms race. I think the record of success has been a very, very mixed one. But what I am suggesting is that there is nothing to be lost from trying.

The CHARMAN. If the Senator will yield very briefly.

Senator Case. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I want to say that I remember quite well the speech by President Kennedy. It was a commencement address at American University. I was there. I sat on the platform. And one of the persons who got a degree that day was Robert Byrd, our majority leader in the Senate at this time.

Senator Case. Was Senator Byrd's an undergraduate degree?

[General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no, but it was a great occasion and it was a

speech that attracted attention from all over the world.

Mr. Warnke. Then I believe another example of something similar to this was in 1969, when President Nixon renounced any offensive preparations for and any use by the United States of biological or bacteriological agents. There again it ended up with the Biological Weapons Convention which was signed, I believe, in 1972.

So we have had some success in starting arms control initiatives. In other instances, we have attempted to do so and have been unsuccessful. Now obviously, this is something you would have to monitor very carefully. You would have to make sure that you got an appropriate response and that you got reciprocal restraints, rather than any sort of unilateral action by the United States which was not compensated for.

AMOUNT OF STRATEGIC CAPACITY NEEDED

Senator Case. I think, Mr. Chairman, in my first round, assuming that there may be another, there is one other matter that I would like to open up. That is the suggestion that all American policymakers are divided into two sharply divided and well delineated camps. One of them believes that you don't need any more strategic capacity than is necessary to survive a first strike and deal a crippling blow. The other suggests that the matter of degree by which one side's capacity exceeds the other will have important consequences and that a disparity in capacity has its own consequences, even though neither side can be sure of a successful first strike.

I wish you would talk about that.

Mr. Warnke. On that one, Senator Case, I think I would have to put myself down some place in the middle. I don't believe in the theory of minimum deterrence. I don't think it is sufficient for the United States merely to have the capacity to respond after a Soviet first strike and kill some substantial number of Soviet citizens, because I think you have to look at deterrence both from the standpoint both of military capability and also from the standpoint of perceptions.

I mean, after all, it is the perceptions of military capability that really count in terms of deterrence. No one can be sure what would be the consequence of an actual nuclear war, and, therefore, since I hope that we will never have a precedent for the actual event, we have to be concerned about how the strategic balance appears to the rest

of the world.

I believe, and I have so stated, that if there were any significant apparent disparity between our strategic strength and that of the Soviet Union, that would render us far less secure. It would, for one thing, certainly discomfort our allies who might feel that we were yielding some sort of edge to the Soviets, and it could at a time of crisis encourage a degree of adventurism on the part of the Soviet leadership.

So I believe that in addition to having an assured retaliatory capability, we should also have the forces that are known to possess that capability and that do not appear to be inferior to those of the Soviet

Union.

Senator Case. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time on this first round.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Church.

RELEASE OF PENTAGON PAPERS

Senator Church. Mr. Warnke, you will certainly recall the "Pentagon Papers" which dealt with our involvement in the Vietnam war. I understand that the copy assigned to you as Assistant Secretary

of Defense for International Security Affairs and two of your then assistants, Morton Halperin and Leslie Gelb was the document used to produce copies of the "Pentagon Papers" subsequently released to

the press.

That copy was sent from the Pentagon to the RAND Corp., as I understand it, in highly classified form. However, I understand that use of the document was restricted as follows: any of the three designees could have access, but the authorization of two of the three was needed for any other access. I understand further that upon request of Henry Rowen, the president of the corporation, Mr. Halperin and Mr. Gelb authorized release of that copy to Mr. Daniel Ellsberg.

First of all, is the above account correct, to the best of your

knowledge?

Mr. Warnke. To the best of my knowledge, it is, Senator. I don't have first-hand information on it. I might add to that account a few comments.

Senator Church. Please.

Mr. Warnke. What was then known as the "OSD Task Force Studies" was being completed during the end of the Johnson Administration. A decision was reached in the Department of Defense to make copies of those task force papers available to some of the officials who had been involved in Vietnam decisionmaking. Accordingly, I was authorized, along with Dr. Halperin and Dr. Gelb, to have a copy put in a Department of Defense approved storage facility at RAND and it was so transferred by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

It is my understanding that thereafter access to those documents was provided to Dr. Ellsberg and that he disregarded the security

classifications.

Senator Church. Why, again, was the document furnished to the

RAND Corp. in the first place?

Mr. WARNKE. Because of the fact that I did not have classified storage facilities of my own, and I was putting some of my own private

papers in that same facility at that point.

This was approved, of course, by the Department of Defense. I would like to point out also, of course, that access to those papers could only be granted to somebody who had top secret clearance. And my understanding is that Dr. Ellsberg had that clearance from the Department of Defense at that time.

Senator Church. Did you know in advance of Dr. Ellsberg's re-

quest for access to the Pentagon Papers?

Mr. WARNKE. I did not.

Senator Church. Did Mr. Halperin or Mr. Gelb consult with you before they gave access to Dr. Ellsberg?

Mr. WARNKE. They did not.

Senator Church. To the best of your knowledge and belief, did you take any action or make any decision which you anticipated might

lead to the public disclosure of the Pentagon Papers?

Mr. Warnke. I did not, Senator. As a matter of fact, I thought that the procedures were adequate to insure that there would be no disclosure. The problem, of course, was not that the security requirements were inadequate; it was just that the security requirements were not abided by.

CHARGES IN UNSIGNED MEMORANDUM

Senator Church. Last week, Mr. Warnke, an unsigned memorandum, which was very critical of your nomination as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was circulated here in the Senate. I think it was a very unfortunate and highly improper way to oppose your nomination. But I suppose, given the circulation of that anonymous document, that you've seen a copy.

Mr. Warnke. I have seen a copy, yes.

Senator Church. According to that memorandum, you are charged with advocating the, and I quote from the memorandum, "the unilateral abandonment by the United States of every weapons system which is subject to negotiation at SALT," as well as many others which are not under discussion.

Does that statement accurately reflect your thinking? Mr. WARNKE. It does not, Senator Church, no.

Might I make one comment on that?

As I understand it, specific weapons systems are not the subject matter of the SALT discussions in any event. What we are talking about at the present point is what sort of numerical limits would be put on certain nuclear weapons launchers. The decision as to whether we have a B-1 bomber or some other type of bomber is a decision to be made by the United States within the confines of any sort of numerical limits that are agreed upon in SALT II.

So I suggest that even the issue is not the correct issue. And obviously, I deny that the position that I would take on that issue is as

represented in the memorandum.

Senator Church. Is the memorandum correct in attributing to you the view that the United States was and continues to be the initiator in the United States-Soviet arms race?

Mr. WARNKE. That is not my view, Senator. What I have said on a number of occasions is that obviously both sides have to pay attention to what the other one was doing, and that as a consequence, there is

a certain amount of superpower aping.

I think that it is a fact. I think that it's a quite natural fact. But in many instances, the Soviet Union has been the one that led in initiating some sort of an arms system. I am not sure what the numerical ratio is between the two, and I think that that is irrelevant.

ARTICLE ENTITLED "TWO APES ON A TREADMILL"

Senator Church. Which reasoning led you to write the article that appeared recently in Foreign Affairs?

Mr. Warnke. Foreign Policy magazine, Senator.

Senator Church. Foreign Policy, yes.

And that article was entitled—

Mr. Warnke. Entitled "Apes on a Treadmill." Senator Church. "Two Apes on a Treadmill."

You have been charged with advocating unilateral disarmament because you have suggested, as you do in your article, that the United States might take certain kinds of unilateral action which are designed to prompt reciprocal action on the part of the Soviet Union. Isn't it true that we have done this before? As I recall, prior to the time we entered into a limited test ban treaty, President Kennedy unilaterally called off all further American tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water as a gesture of the bona fide intent of the United States to bring an end to tests that were polluting the air we breathe and the water we drink, and that this led to the consummation of the treaty with the Soviet Union banning such tests.

Mr. Warnke. That is my understanding, Senator, yes.

Senator Church. So your advocacy of certain types of unilateral action does have precedent and did, in fact, lead to a treaty that has been generally hailed as the most significant single breakthrough in the effort to bring an end to the nuclear arms race.

Mr. WARNKE. I believe that to be true, yes, Senator.

VALUE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL PURPOSES

Senator Church. When your nomination was first announced, I read in the Washington Post a statement that was attributed to you, which, unfortunately, I do not have before me, but which, if I recall it correctly, was to the effect that strategic nuclear superiority in the absence of nuclear monopoly is of little value in assisting us in achieving our political purposes. I think that that is a rough translation

based on my memory of the article.

The article then went on to suggest that this comment was highly controversial and was one of the reasons why your nomination might be opposed. I think that certain Generals were asked to respond to questions based upon that comment in recent hearings of the Armed Services Committee. I read the statement as very conventional. I thought when I read it that it expressed what had been the general view since the beginning of the nuclear era; namely, that in the absence of a nuclear monopoly, with both sides having accumulated a very sizeable nuclear arsenal, the very purpose of the arsenals was deterrence or a kind of stalemate that would prevent either side from going to nuclear war.

If this is the case, doesn't it follow that nuclear arms could not be effectively used for achieving certain political goals once both sides had accumulated a sufficient arsenal to make the resort to nuclear arms

an irrational act?

Mr. Warnke. That certainly was my intention in that comment, Senator Church. As I recall, it was made in the course of a debate with former Senator James Buckley. What we were addressing was the question as to whether or not the Soviet strategic developments had made it difficult for the President of the United States to use our possession of strategic nuclear arms for political purposes in a confrontation.

I said, and I believe it to be the case, that no sane American President would start a nuclear war in order to gain the political advantage in some sort of noncrucial confrontation with the Soviet Union. I believe that that would be an obvious statement, perhaps too obvious even to be made. But to the extent that that statement has been interpreted as a suggestion that I believe the Soviet Union could safely

be given strategic nuclear superiority over the United States, I regard that as being an incorrect construction, both of my statement and certainly of my views.

I have suggested repeatedly and I would continue to take the position that we could not yield strategic nuclear superiority to the Soviet

Union.

That is my position.

Senator Church. My time is up. May I, Mr. Chairman, have a brief followup question?

U.S. GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE IN NUCLEAR FIELD

Isn't it true that since early in the Nixon Administration the objective of the American Government has not been that of achieving and maintaining a strategic superiority, whatever that may mean, in the nuclear field, but of achieving and maintaining a parity which will enable nuclear negotiations to proceed, and that such a principle is

represented by the Vladivostok agreement?

Mr. Warnke. That, again, Senator, Church, is my understanding. I believe that the term "strategic nuclear parity" was developed during 1969 in the first year of the Nixon administration, and I think it was a realistic recognition of the fact that neither one of us could gain strategic nuclear superiority unless the other side decided to allow them to do so.

We are now in a position in which, because of the awesome strategic nuclear arsenals on both sides, there is in effect a parity, which has been known as the balance of terror, that exists at the present time.

Obviously, we could not allow that situation to become one in which the Soviet Union had the superiority that we had at one time. But they are also in a position in which they don't have to allow us to retain a strategic superiority because they have the means to cancel out that advantage.

It is a nuclear stalemate, and the question is how can you preserve that nuclear stalemate; how can you preserve a stable nuclear balance and reduce the risks that it may become unstable because of other

developments?

I think that is where the role of arms control comes into play. Senator Church. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits?

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WHAT MR. WARNKE BELIEVES

Mr. Warnke, if you will follow me, I think we can crystallize what you believe in, and I will ask you a question about it. But I think it's very important to crystallize what you believe.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir.

Senator Javits. I have picked this both out of the New York Times publication of this morning and your own statements. First, you believe that we cannot be Numero Uno. That is what you say at the very beginning, because if we are, then "effective agreement on control of strategic arms is hardly possible."

Correct?

Mr. WARNKE. I believe that to be correct, yes.

Senator Javirs. We have to seek to maintain parity, and here is your definition:

Our strategic nuclear forces must not only be strong enough; they must be known to be strong enough to deter the Soviet Union from using its strategic nuclear forces against us or our allies.

Mr. Warnke. That is my view, Senator Javits, ves.

Senator Javits. The next point comes in your own statement in which you say,

The direction of arms control policy must be toward greater stability at lower levels of destructive potential in both conventional and nuclear arms.

Mr. WARNKE. Again, that is my position, Senator Javits.

Senator Javits. That is the aspiration you have?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator Javirs. Then you say how you will do it, that you will do it in this way:

I would seek to head off new explosions of arms technology which could ultimately damage the security of this Nation.

That is in essence the methodology you would use.

Mr. WARNKE. That is my understanding, Senator Javits, of the purpose of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as established by the Congress of the United States.

Senator Javits. Therefore, you would adopt, and I now turn to the New York Times, a policy of restraint. I quote: "A policy of restraint

while calling for a matching restraint from the Soviet Union."

Mr. Warnke. I don't believe, Senator Javits, that I would be in a position to implement that kind of idea in connection with the SALT talks except, of course, in conjunction with a policy that had been developed and approved by the President of the United States. And that might very well depend upon the negotiating situation at that point.

Senator Javits. You say, and I quote from what you just answered

to Senator Case, "that there's nothing to be lost from trying."

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

Senator Javirs. Why do you say that? In the event of necessary leadtime, it takes years to make one of these weapons systems, and if the Soviet Union moved ahead on a weapons system and we restrained and they did not follow our restraint, why would we not be very materially disadvantaged in the time interval in which nuclear blackmail might be an enemy capability in an extreme situation?

Mr. WARNKE. Because, Senator Javits, I would not recommend initiating any such unilateral action unless you had adequate leadtime,

and I believe that my writings have indicated that.

Senator Javirs. You also said in your presentation that you would have a close fidelity to the security of the United States.

Is that your No. 1 priority?

Mr. WARNKE. That has to be the No. 1 priority of anybody involved

in national security policy positions in the U.S. Government.

Senator Javits. Therefore, you would not advocate the so-called restraint policy, or what my own assistant called informal and demonstrative restraint tactics, except consistently with the complete ability to be equally prepared, taking into account leadtime, technology, technical advance, technical resources, every conceivable consideration?

Mr. Warnke. That is correct, Senator Javits. Moreover, when you are at a time of active negotiations, I would not advocate taking any sort of restraint action except on the basis of concrete measures of parallel restraint which had been talked out with the Soviet Union.

In other words. I do not think that in a negotiating context I would advocate the kind of approach that I suggested in my 1975

article.

Senator Javirs. Give us that again. You would not advocate that, and why not?

Mr. WARNKE. Because if you were actively negotiating with the Soviet Union, it would strike me as being poor negotiating tactics to take a unilateral—not previously announced—initiative of that kind.

I would think that under those circumstances you would discuss with the Soviet Union what would you do if I did such and such and get some kind of an understanding from them in advance.

Senator Javits. And then monitor that understanding? Mr. WARNKE. And then monitor that understanding.

Senator Javits. So you would then lock it in front and back, as you would say?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator Javits. That is the way that you want us to understand

that policy of restraint?

Mr. Warnke. I would say that a restraint policy in connection with negotiations would be a part of the negotiations. They would have to be part of a policy which had been approved by the administration as a whole.

Senator Javirs. Would you take the Congress into your confidence

in that regard in some appropriate way?

Mr. WARNKE. I would regard that as being an essential part of the function of the ACDA Director, yes.

Senator Javits. Good. I think that that makes things much clearer. I see I have time to ask you one last question.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1968 DOD POSITION AND MR. WARNKE'S

In 1968, Dr. Foster, a gifted man who long served the Defense Department as Director of Research and Development, described the policy of the United States in respect to this matter of nuclear arms competition as follows: Page 110, hearings of April 1968, before the Senate Arms Services Committee. Dr. Foster said:

Our current efforts to get a MIRV capability on our missiles is not reacting to a Soviet capability so much as it is moving ahead again to make sure that whatever they do of the possible things that we imagine they might do, we will be prepared.

Then he went on to say:

I see it as our moving ahead to make sure that if they make that move, we have already covered ourselves. Another way of describing it is indeed the way you have described it to the questioner, that we are reacting to them, but we are not reacting to anything in fact. We are reacting to something that they might be able to do. Hence, we are taking action when we have no evidence, or very little evidence on the other side of any such action. So I don't think of our moves as being reactions in that sense.

That was the classic position of the DOD in 1968. How is yours different?

Mr. Warnke. I think mine would differ from the standpoint of whether or not you would have an alternative course of action, which would be arms control of an effective and verifiable nature. I think that is the position you have to take, the position announced by Dr. Foster, if there is no chance of arms control. Obviously, you have to assume the worst and prepare for the worst and go ahead with every weapons development that seems to promise greater military capability.

The question is of course whether or not there is an arms control

alternative, and that's what ought to be explored.

To take just that MIRV example, had we been able to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union in advance of the development and deployment of MIRV's, I think our security today would be greater than it is because there would be less of a spectre of the possibility of the development of a first strike capability on the part of the Soviet Union.

So, if we could have had MIRV's all by ourselves, then obviously, that would have given us a strategic superiority of some consequence. But since it appears that within something like 5 to 10 years they tend to follow up with a technology of their own, then the question is, assuming that the weapons development went ahead, would you be better or worse off when both sides had it?

And I think in many cases, if you could have an effective, verifiable arms control agreement, that would be better than the technological

development when it's in the possession of both sides.

Senator Javirs. In such a case, you would have had either an understanding as to restraint or you would not be restraining the United States?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator Javits. This is the essence of what has been charged against you. By the way, Mr. Chairman, the Kemble article in the "New York Times" claims that the authors of this memorandum to which Senator Church referred, have come forward and proudly claimed it. I wish they would write a letter to the committee identifying themselves. I think it would be very helpful to all of us.

MR. PENN KEMBLE'S REQUEST TO TESTIFY

Senator Pell. If the Senator would yield there, I made a statement on the floor yesterday and then we got an angry phone call this morning saying Mr. Penn Kemble has asked to testify. I would support his request that he be permitted to do so.

Senator Javits. Yes. Thank you very much.

Mr. Warnke. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator Javits?

Senator Javits. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Senator Pell. Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONGRESSIONAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

Mr. Warnke, you mentioned the congressional role and I am very glad that you did because I think that we have lost sight of the fact that there is the congressional role that really created the agency,

which I trust you will be heading.

I remember Mr. Walter and Mr. Mac McGill in the "World Federalist" and Senator Humphrey, who took the lead, and Senator Joe Clark and I went down to the White House and persuaded them not to leave it as an executive agency but to give you the backing of the board.

At that point the new Kennedy administration did not know whether they would get through, and they found that they had more

political support than they realized. I trust you do, too.

You also mentioned the Environmental Warfare Treaty and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. Both of these treaties actually came out of congressional initiatives. They were sections or whole parts of resolutions I introduced in the Congress in the last 10-year period-

Mr. WARNKE. I recall that, Senator Pell.

Senator Pell [continuing]. And became international treaties. That is one of the real satisfactions of this job, to see an idea become a treaty.

ANONYMOUS MEMO AND NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE

I would like to insert in the record at this time a copy of the anonymous memo that has been discussed, and also for the record, I think, the exchange that took place today in the pages of the New York Times of your, Mr. Warnke's statement, and also the rebuttal of Mr. Kemble.

I ask unanimous consent that that be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done. The information referred to follows:

MEMORANDUM-RE PAUL WARNKE

Paul Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, is under consideration for appointment as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Since leaving the government at the end of the Johnson Administration, Mr. Warnke has played an active role in the national debate over defense policies. He has lectured and written on the subject; he has been prominently associated with a number of citizens' organizations formed to lobby for reductions in defense spending (among them the Council on National Priorities and Resources, the Project on Budget Priorities, and the Center for Defense Information); and he was the principal advisor to Senator George McGovern on National Security Issues during the 1972 presidential campaign.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is responsible for advising the President on arms control negotiations. It participates in choosing the American negotiation team and provides various back-up services to our negotiators. It can be expected to continue to play an important role in the SALT negotiations. The record which Mr. Warnke has established shows him to hold views on U.S./ Soviet relations and on strategic issues which pose the gravest questions about his suitability to lead A.C.D.A. in fulfilling these functions.

Simply stated, it is hard to see how the American side in SAL/T can be effectively upheld by someone who advocates, as Warnke does, the unilateral abandonment by the United States of every weapons system which is subject to negotiation at SALT (as well as many others which are not under discussion.)

The "Alternative Defense Posture", a campaign paper which presented Mc-Govern's defense budget proposals, and which was strongly defended by Warnke, advocated, among other things, discontinuation of deployment of MIRVs, Minuteman III, and any other steps to upgrade U.S. ICBMs; dismantling of all Titan ICBMs; cessation of conversion of Polaris to Poseidon submarines; halt to development of a B-1 prototype; cessation of deployment of the Safeguard system; and cutting by more than half the Army's surface-to-air missile capability and the Air Force's interceptor force. A supplemental document, the "Report of the McGovern Panel on National Security", which Warnke led, also opposed U.S. MIRV programs, the B-1, improvements in missile accuracy and the development of hard-target capability, the Cruise missile, the ABM and bomber defense, and the development of AWAC. Arguing that the United States should rely on submarines "the primary element in our strategic forces," the Panel argued against "expensive replacements or additions" to our land-based ICBM or strategic bomber forces "even if these should become increasingly vulnerable." (p. 12) But even while advocating this overwhelming reliance on submarine forces, the Panel opposed MIRVing the Polaris/Poseidon force and opposed development of the Trident submarine.

On various occasions since the 1972 elections Warnke has reiterated many or most of these proposals. At no time in the SALT negotiations have the Soviets advocated, even as a bargaining position, such sweeping cuts in American stra-

tegic forces.

II. Warnke, himself, gives evidence of perceiving the ironic disparity between the levels of unilateral disarmament which he advocates for the U.S. and those which Soviet negotiators urge upon us in the SALT talks. Thus he proposes, in the Spring, 1975 issue of Foreign Policy magazine ("Two Apes on a Treadmill"), that we move away from negotiations and toward a policy of unilateral initiatives. The following excerpts illustrate his ambivalence about continuing the SALT talks.

"In trying to end this irrational arms competition, total reliance is now placed on negotiations looking toward formal agreements. But the ongoing process seems

to aggravate the problem. . .

"The mindless build-up has continued while the negotiators wrestled with the difficulties of designing formal controls for two nuclear arsenals that developed on different lines. . .

"Moreover, while the negotiators fumble for formulas and the summiters pursue their loftier processes the existence of the negotiations and the agreements al-

ready reached are used to justify new nuclear weapons programs.

"Accordingly, rather than creating a climate in which restraint can be practiced, the existence of the negotiations themselves has been an occasion for acceleration of strategic arms development. The question inescapably arises whether, under our current defense policies, we can afford to negotiate about arms control. . .

"I would not like to see the SALT talks stop. .

"But if we must accept the insistence that the momentum of our strategic weapons programs must be maintained in order to bargain effectively, the talks have become too expensive a luxury. . .

"Insofar as formal agreements are concerned, we may have gone as far as we

can now go. .

"We should, instead, try a policy of restraint, while calling for matching re-

straint from the Soviet Union. .

"The chances are good—that highly advertised restraint on our part will be reciprocated. The Soviet Union, it may be said again, has only one superpower model to follow. To date, the superpower aping has meant the antithesis of restraint. . .

"It is time, I think, for us to present a worthier model . . . We can be first off

the treadmill." (pp. 25-29)

III. Warnke's preference for a unilateral initiatives approach to arms control seems to find its roots in two ideas: (1) that the U.S. was, and continues to be, the initiator in the U.S./Soviet arms race, and, (2) that, in the nuclear era, any concern about equivalence or relative strength of strategic forces is unwarranted.

Warnke has repeatedly expressed the view that new American weapons developments will be "destabilizing" and will stimulate the arms race, but almost never expresses a similar concern about Soviet arms build-ups.

In the above cited article he writes:

"As its only living superpower model, our words and our actions are admirably calculated to inspire the Soviet Union to spend its substance on military power and weaponry. Ex-President Nixon asserted repeatedly that he could not negotiate effectively if he went to the bargaining table with the Soviet Union as the world's second strongest military power. There is every reason to feel that we have pursuaded the Soviets on this score." (p. 23)

In a debate with Senator Buckley in 1972 he expressed the same view:

"As a superpower, Russia has only one example to follow. We can be quite sure that it will follow any bad example we provide." (Strategic Sufficiency: Fact or Fiction?, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 37.)

Warnke begins with the assumption that American policy makers have taken too dim a view of Soviet intentions. He chides the U.S. for having engaged in "defense expenditures based on the most apocolyptic assumptions of hostile intentions and capabilities." (Ibid., p. 22.) And his McGovern Panel Report complained that "we are transfixed by implausible risks of external aggression." (p. 1.) The Center for Defense Information, to which he is an advisor, argues in its current bulletin that "the U.S. needs a more realistic view of the Soviet Union than the obsessive one that has dominated U.S. foreign policy for many years," and describes the Soviet military posture as largely defensive. (Defense Monitor, December, 1976.)

From this assumption Warnke is led to the conclusion that it is American actions which are constantly spurring the arms race and interfering with the progress of arms reduction. Defending McGovern's proposed unilateral freeze on nuclear arms production, Warnke argued that "construction [of U.S. nuclear weapons] would simply unsettle the situation and provoke another round." (N.Y. Times, September 13, 1972.) The McGovern Panel Report excoriated the American administration for having "committed itself to a major new expansion in the arms race," (p. 7) and for seeming "determined to use the SALT agreements as

a hunting license to step up the arms race." (p. 10.)

The Report makes no similar criticisms of Soviet actions. Even on the single greatest obstacle to further nuclear test ban agreements—Soviet refusal to permit on-site inspection—the Report finds no fault with Soviet policy, but attempts to shift the blame onto the U.S.: The difficulty of reaching agreement for on-site inspections no longer is reason for not negotiating a test ban. It is now an excuse."

Warnke's view of what "destabilizes" the arms race was born well before his leadership in the McGovern campaign. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 13, 1971, "Warnke . . . contended that continued deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system and multiple warheads for offensive missiles only lessened chances of reaching an arms-control agreement." (N.Y. Times, July 14, 1971) The fact that two arms control agreements subsequently were reached (in the view of most observers not despite, but because of, such continued deployment) apparently has had no impact on Warnke's thinking. The imbalance between his vehement criticism of U.S. policy and relative silence about Soviet activities is rendered all the more remarkable by the fact that these views were expressed over a period when the Soviets have been engaged in a massive arms build-up while the United States had leveled off its force levels and was cutting, in constant dollars, defense outlays-a situation which has led to a recent report by C.I.A. analysts and independent experts warning that the Soviets may be driving toward all-out nuclear superiority. (see N.Y. Times, December 26, 1976)

IV. Warnke's opinion that we ought not to concern ourselves with the question of equivalence in nuclear forces seems to be composed of the notions that, a) we are ahead of the Soviets in strategic forces, and b) that even if they are ahead of us, it doesn't matter. This is compounded by some faulty technological

assumptions.

Thus, the Center for Defense Information, to which he is an advisor, argues: "If there is any measure of military power or accumulation of hardware by which the U.S. towers over all the other countries in the world, it is in its massive

strategic forces." (Defense Monitor, June, 1976)

The Project on Budget Priorities, headed by Warnke, asserts that "[the U.S.] will continue to lead them in the numbers of missile warheads well into the 1980s, no matter what the Russians do," (Military Policy and Budget Priorities-Fiscal Year 1975, p. 13) a statement which simply flies in the face of the

facts of Soviet MIRV development and the option, available to Soviet planners,

of turning to the use of smaller warheads.

In his debate with Buckley, Warnke expressed the view that "when both sides have assembled thousands of warheads, the numbers game is not worth playing." (Op. Cit., p. 21) In the same speech he denies that there is even political advantage in nuclear superiority:

"Even substantial nuclear superiority, short of nuclear monopoly, could not be a decisive factor in any political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union." (p. 46)

There seems to be a certain ironic tension between these views on the irrelevance of equivalence and his constant criticisms of the U.S. for spurring the arms race. Why, one wonders, if equivalence doesn't matter, is each new Ameri-

can weapon "destabilizing"?

V. Summary.—Warnke supports unilateral arms reductions to levels far below anything being proposed in current arms limitation talks. He doubts the usefulness of such talks, preferring to see unilateral U.S. initiatives. He believes that American policy has long been overly fearful of Soviet intentions, and that it is primarily American actions which have spurred the arms race. He believes that the U.S. is far ahead of the Soviets in strategic forces, but that even if the Soviets are far ahead of us, this would not matter in the current era. Irrespective of whether he is right or wrong in any or all of these views, they are in marked contrast to the views expressed by President-elect Carter in the Presidential campaign, and they are views which are not shared, for the most part, by a majority of Americans.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 8, 1977]

ARMS CONTROL, BEFORE TIME RUNS OUT

(By Paul C. Warnke)

Washington.—We cannot, for obvious reasons, forfeit a major position in world affairs. And we must continue to rely on the executive as our principal spokesman internationally. But the retention of a strong world role and the maintenance of an effective defense posture will require that the President and his chief foreign affairs advisers begin to talk more sense to the Congress and to the people.

The proposition that we must remain ahead of the Soviet Union in most if not all perceivable elements of military power is a fallacy that inflates defense spending. It impacts particularly on the field of strategic arms. If the controlling criterion for world prestige is to proclaim that militarily "We're Number One, then effective agreement on control of strategic arms is hardly possible, and the Vladivostok undertaking will be used to justify rather than to limit moderniza-

tion of nuclear forces.

As its only living superpower model, our words and our actions are admirably calculated to inspire the Soviet Union to spend its substance on military manpower and weaponry. Ex-President Nixon asserted repeatedly that he could not negotiate effectively if he went to the bargaining table with the Soviet Union as the world's second strongest military power. There is every reason to feel that we have persuaded the Soviets on this score and that they too will not negotiate from a position of military inferiority. If we insist on remaining Number One, because there are incalculable risks in being Number Two, then the Soviets have the wherewithal to escape that subordinate position. They will continue to struggle to catch up by exploiting the quantitative and qualitative permissiveness of the Vladivostok agreement. We will be told that we dare not allow them to do so.

The contention that, whatever the practical military utility, we will incur political disadvantages unless we maintain a lead across the spectrum of strategic and conventional forces, is both a recipe for endless escalation of defense cost and a self-fulfilling prophecy. [Former Secretary of State] Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its hearing on détente that whether or not one superpower has true nuclear superiority, "the appearance of inferiority—whatever its actual significance—can have serious political consequences."

To a degree, this is true. Our strategic nuclear forces must not only be strong enough. They must be known to be strong enough to deter the Soviet Union from

using its strategic nuclear forces against us or our allies. But a lead in number or size that can be seen to be insignificant will have political consequences only if the other side concedes them a meaning they would otherwise lack. Where we can see that a Soviet military development is not significant, it's sheer conceit

to fear that our allies will believe otherwise.

A look at today's key issues shows clearly how few of them can be affected hopefully by superior military strength. We couldn't ignore the Soviet Union as an international power in the many years when we dwarfed its strategic nuclear forces. Today both countries know, and the rest of the world knows too, that we dare not fight one another. The respective strategic nuclear forces serve only as offsets, not as exploitable resources. They are not translatable into sound

political currency.

In trying to end this irrational arms competition, total reliance is now placed on negotiations looking toward formal agreement. The history of the SALT negotiations shows the process of formal agreement on nuclear arms control to be complex, prolonged and uncertain of eventual success. The accomplishments to date have yielded few if any real dividends. The limitation imposed on antiballistic missile systems in SALT 1, and further tightened at the Moscow summit last June, should at least have brought about tacit mutual restraint in the further accumulation of offensive strategic weapons. With no defensive missiles to overcome, a fraction of the existing strategic forces on either side is adequate to wreak devastation on the other's society, and initiation of nuclear war thus means national suicide.

But, in definance of the dread logic, both the Soviet Union and the United States

have continued to move ahead.

The mindless buildup has continued while the negotiators wrestled with the difficulties of designing formal controls for two nuclear arsenals that developed on different lines. The tentative agreement outlined at the Vladivostok conference would provide a tent big enough to accommodate just about everything each side

now has or contemplates.

Moreover, while the negotiators fumble for formulas and the summiteers pursue their loftier processes the existence of the negotiations and the agreements already reached are used to justify new nuclear weapons programs. The Vladivostok understanding is defended as the best that can now be achieved. It could well be a significant step forward toward effective nuclear arms control, but not if, as suggested in [former] President Ford's post-summit press conference, the Vladivostok ceilings must also be treated as a floor for U.S. strategic forces. When the floor meets the ceiling, little living room remains.

Accordingly, rather than creating a climate in which restraint can be practiced, the existence of the negotiations themselves has been an occasion for accelera-

tion of strategic arms development.

The "bargaining chip" argument can certainly be questioned. Indeed it has been, but unsuccessfully. It can reasonably be maintained that if our strategic nuclear posture is not now strong enough for us to bargain effectively, we should not be bargaining at all. But we are in fact continuing to bargain and to build up redundant strength as we do so. The acquisition of more, and more esoteric, nuclear arms adds exponentially to the difficulty of devising effective formal controls. Our testing and deployment of MIRV's in the early days of SALT is a striking case in point.

I would not like to see the SALT talks stop. The process itself should be, for both participants, an educational experience. Acceptance of common concepts

on strategic matters is itself a form of progress.

One can even harbor hope that an effective formal agreement may eventually be developed. But if we must accept the insistence that the momentum of our strategic weapons programs must be maintained in order to bargain effectively,

the talks have become too expensive a luxury.

Insofar as formal agreements are concerned, we may have gone as far as we can now go. If so, the verdict on whether the Vladivostok Accord is better or worse than nothing is not yet in. It does set finite though lofty limits. It does recognize equivalence. It should be treated as an augury that genuine progress is possible. It should not be allowed to spark further weapons programs that will impede such progress toward effective arms control.

What is needed most urgently now is not a conceptual breakthrough but a decision to take advantage of the stability of the present strategic balance. It's futile to buy things we don't need in the hope that this will make the Soviet Union more amenable. The Soviets are far more apt to emulate than to capitulate. We should, instead, try a policy of restraint, while calling for matching restraint from the Soviet Union.

If the Soviet Union responds by some significant slowing of its own strategic arms buildup, we can at the end of the first six months announce additional moves.

There is, of course, a chance that the Soviet response may be lacking or inadequate. But our present lead in technology and warheads makes it possible for us to take this initiative safely. No advances the other side might make in six months or many more could alter the strategic balance to our detriment.

The chances are good, moreover, that highly advertised restraint on our part will be reciprocated. The Soviet Union, it may be said again, has only one superpower model to follow. To date, the superpower aping has meant the antithesis of restraint. Soviet moves toward antiballistic missile defense were followed by U.S. A.B.M.'s and our multiple independently targetable warheads to overcome any defensive system. Soviet MIRV's are now in development. There now are hints that we may build more massive missiles to match Soviet throw-weight.

It is time, I think, for us to present a worthier model. The strategic arms competition is a logical place to start. The steps we can take in trying to start a process of reciprocal restraint are not drastic. They would create no risk to our national security. We can be first off the treadmill. That's the only victory the arms race has to offer.

(By Pen Kemble)

Washington.—Last week, scandal-craving Washington savored what seems to be a fix: A memorandum of unidentified authorship that raised questions about President Carter's nomination of Paul C. Warnke as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency circulated through Senate offices. Mr. Warnke's supporters breathed indignation.

While furor about the supposed anonymity of the memo raged, little attention was paid to its contents. In truth, it was a wholly substantive document, based entirely on Mr. Warnke's public words and actions. It contained not a trace of suggestion that he is anything but intelligent, candid, honorable. It was first written in December, when Mr. Warnke was proposed as a possible Defense Secretary, by the staff of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. It was slightly revised when he was cited as possible arms-control chief, and given to a few Senate aides and reporters as a background paper before Jan. 1. Every person receiving it knew exactly who wrote it; it wasn't intended for further circulation. When, last week, Mr. Warnke's prospects rose, the memo was circulated by someone who received it in December. Although the memo's authors promptly and proudly came forward, a "scandal" had been launched.

Why did this obscure memorandum provoke such furious rebukes from the guardians of the public mind? Perhaps because it called attention to some obvious but little-noted facts about Mr. Warnke's views, and raised some deep questions about the course the new Administration seemed to be setting out on in the field of strategic arms.

The memo cited position papers issued by the McGovern for President campaign and endorsed by his chief defense adviser, Paul Warnke, that proposed cuts in present (1972) and projected weapons programs that went well beyond those proposed even by our Soviet adversaries in the negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

It quoted Mr. Warnke's published proposals (Foreign Policy, spring, 1975) for unilateral restraint in strategic weapons: "We can be the first off the treadmill. That's the only victory the arms race has to offer."

It cited Mr. Warnke's doubts about the very negotiating process he is proposed to oversee: "... rather than creating a climate in which restraint can be practiced, the existence of the negotiations themselves has been an occasion for acceleration of strategic arms development... Insofar as formal agreements are concerned, we may have gone as far as we can now go."

Most important, it pointed out the assumptions that underlie the strategy of exemplary unilateral restraint (or "reciprocal unilateral gestures," as a reporter described it). They are that the United States is centrally responsible for the arms race, and actions by us alone can turn it around: "Our words and our actions are admirably calculated to inspire the Soviet Union to spend its substance on military manpower and weaponry."

Mr. Warnke's philosophy, as understood by the memo's authors, is rooted in the hope that the Soviet military posture is born more of fear than of aggressive military and political designs. All respected evidence today argues against this assumption.

Under the authority of Robert S. McNamara as Defense Secretary, we began unilaterally to restrain our strategic-weapons programs. But the Russians have neglected our example, and instead have seen our restraint as their chance to

catch up with and surpass us in nuclear weaporry.

Only last week, the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified to the Senate that they now share the judgment that Soviet programs are aimed at strategic superiority, and that, if current trends continue, the Russians soon will reach that goal. suggests that the first step in persuading the Russians to join us in ending the

arms race is to let them know we will not let them win it.

One hopes President Carter and his strategic-arms-limitation-talks team will go to the Russians at once with a sweeping proposal for mutual, verifiable and balanced reductions in strategic weapons. We must make clear to them, however, that if their drive toward strategic superiority continues, we will take the necessary steps to maintain that balance of power that has prevented superpower war.

It is difficult to see how Mr. Warnke could carry out such a strategy.

But one thing is certain: The policy he is pledged to has never been through a serious public debate, and surely has no mandate from the last election. It runs counter to the campaign statements of candidate Carter, who in his decisive second debate with President Ford assured the nation that, under his Administration, America would keep up its strength, and even would retain "a defense capability second to none." This provides little warrant for Mr. Warnke's experi-

ments in unilateral restraint.

Mr. Warnke is an able advocate, and perhaps in time he will convince us. But for now, one hopes the Senate will not trifle with these crucial issues out of an understandable desire to show a spirit of cooperation toward the new Administration. A long, intense and substantive debate is in order.

CONGRESSIONAL ADVISERS AT SALT

Senator Pell. Keeping on this question of the relationship of Congress to your agency. I remember when Albert Gore succeeded Senator Humphrey as chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee, he and the ranking Republican used to go with your predecessor on the SALT talks.

Is it your intention that there be congressional advisers at these talks, or is it a question of informing them after the talks have been completed?

Mr. WARNKE. I would be prepared to do it either or both ways, Sen-

ator Pell.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

RESTORATION OF ACDA MORALE

Also, in connection with the morale in your agency, which I think has suffered in these past few years—I think Dr. Ikle has done the best job he could. I think Mr. Lehman was a dead loss and voted against him in the beginning. The result has been that within the Agency itself many of those people who believed in arms control have had to leave or have left, and the morale is at a low point, as I am sure you are aware.

What do you intend to do to bring the morale of that Agency up to the level that it should be to give you the support that is necessary

in your job?

Mr. WARNKE. I believe, Senator Pell, that really what develops morale in an agency is feeling that it is playing an important part in the overall functioning of the U.S. Government.

Now I think, given President Carter's very eloquent and very firm statements about his views on arms control, that expression by itself is going to restore morale. If we have the support of the President of the United States and the support of the Congress of the United States, then we are a very blessed agency, indeed, and I don't think morale will be any problem.

Senator Pell. I hope the deputy you choose will be one who would have the confidence of the people in the Agency and not, as in the past, where Senator Symington, who was the chairman of the subcommittee, and myself as ranking member, voted against him, and it was agreed that Mr. Lehman would not have contacts with the oversight

chairman.

That, obviously, created a very bad situation. I think the fact that you are going in with congressional approval and support should do a lot itself to help morale in the Agency.

Mr. WARNKE. I certainly hope it would, Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. Thank you. No more questions.

U.S. COMMITMENTS UNDER NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy?

Senator Percy. Mr. Warnke, the Soviet Union and other countries are cited frequently for their violations of various treaties, commitments, and agreements, but rather seldom do we soul search and engage in self-criticism by pointing out our own transgressions.

You have been concerned that the United States has not fully lived up to its commitments under the nonproliferation treaty in three dif-

ferent areas.

I wonder if you would care to comment on your views in these areas?

The first concerns transferring nuclear technology.

Mr. WARNKE. Senator Percy, first of all, let me state that I am not sufficiently familiar with the facts because I have been engaged in practicing law for a living during the past 8 years. So I cannot really give

you any concrete information as to what has been done.

All I can say is what I think ought to be done. I believe that we ought to be very, very careful about any transfers of nuclear technology because, as I stated earlier, I believe that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the direct threats that we face at the present time. And I think any transfer ought to be not only consistent with the NPT, but also ought to be subject to the strictest safeguards, hopefully enforced by a beefed up IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

Senator Percy. Putting it another way, Is it your feeling that the United States and many other provider countries have let the salesmen of nuclear materials and technology gain ground over the non-

proliferators?

Mr. WARNKE. I think that there has been inadequate attention paid to the necessity of providing very, very strict safeguards, yes.

Senator Percy. The second area that you have noted where we were not fully living up to our commitments was by providing nuclear materials to European countries under safeguards less comprehensive than those implemented by the IAEA. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. Warnke. I say to the extent that has occurred, it strikes me as being very dangerous business, indeed. It again, as you suggest, indicates a too commercial approach to a vital national security problem.

Senator Percy. Lastly, what is your view on our failure to make

substantial progress in disarmament?

Mr. Warnke. Well, of course, one of the carrots that was held out to third countries during the NPT negotiation was the idea that we and the Soviet Union would make progress toward achieving some control over our respective nuclear armaments. I've been concerned that if there is an apparent lack of progress, then this might be used as a means by some people to repudiate the NPT.

But again, that strikes me as being a very, very dangerous

development.

FAIRNESS OF UNSIGNED MEMORANDUM

Senator Percy. Concerning the 4-page unsigned memorandum that was circulated, I would like to give you an opportunity to comment as to your personal feelings about the fairness of it, whether that is a practice that you feel can be condoned, or whether you feel that points of view that you had may have been distorted intentionally, or possibly without intention but came out that way, or whether things that you said which are crucial to an understanding your point of view were just omitted, inadvertently or purposely?

Mr. Warnke. Well, Senator Percy, I dislike challenging anybody's

motives or purposes, and I will avoid it in this instance, too.

Senator Percy. Taking it at face value, would you care to comment

on whether it was a fair representation of your views?

Mr. WARNKE. It is not an accurate representation of my views. I think statements are taken out of context. I think in many instances my statements have been condensed or excerpted from several pages to look as though they were continuous.

I don't say that this was deliberate distortion because I believe that there could have been a misunderstanding on the part of the author.

I don't regard it as being a particularly good memorandum.

[General laughter.]

Senator Percy. That might be looked upon as an understatement, but I will accept that.

ACCOMPLISHING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPENDENCE

This committee is undertaking an exhaustive analysis of our Triad doctrine, the whole strategic underpinning of our defense, and we have been inquiring into defensive and offensive strategies, as well as intentions, motivations and capabilities of potential adversaries.

Your predecessor, Dr. Ikle, in the position for which you have been nominated, has testified before this committee on January 14 in those hearings and he stated that he shares President Carter's expressed hope of accomplishing a substantial reduction in dependence upon nuclear weapons as an instrument of international relations.

In this, in fact, is an accurate view of President Carter's position,

would you comment on how one goes about doing this?

Mr. WARNKE. That, of course, is a very, very broad kind of question, and a very broad hope on the part of the President of the United States.

I think we would all be happier if the prospect of nuclear war could be removed totally from our ken. I doubt if it can be in our lifetime.

What we can hope for is that we can take measures of arms control which will preserve the stability of the strategic nuclear balance and therefore eliminate any possibility that, whatever the provocation, anybody might be tempted to initiate a nuclear war.

Now I believe that that is what President Carter has in mind. He has talked, of course, about the ultimate objective of a nuclear arms-

free world.

We are so far from that at the present point that we can just regard that as being more in the nature of prayer than a practicality. But we

can at least start moving in that direction.

Senator Percy. If we can start moving in that direction, would you be a little more specific on some of the techniques that might be used which might differ from the techniques of other administrations to move us in that direction?

Mr. WARNKE. You have to start out, Senator Percy, with the fact, regrettable as it is, that progress in this field requires cooperation on the part of the Soviet Union. Obviously, we cannot do it by ourselves.

Now as I understand it, they have made some promising sounds about their willingness to move forward toward some kind of effective arms control. I think step 1 clearly is to embody the Vladivostok limits in some formal treaty. At least then we will start off with ceilings, high though they are, and we will start off with ceilings which are even on both sides. Then that can be used as a basis for subsequent reductions.

I think, however, that we cannot just do it on numbers. Numbers alone is not going to be adequate to bring about a truly stable and

enduring strategic balance.

We have also to be concerned about the size of the missiles that are included within those limits. I would certainly think that we would want to move toward limiting the size of Soviet missiles because that is what presents the specter of achieving some sort of first strike capability, or at least the capability to challenge our ICBM's-intercontinental ballistic missile—and put us at a strategic disadvantage.

It is that kind of general approach, I think, that we ought to take.

TWO IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT

Senator Percy. In Dr. Ikle's testimony he mentioned two important principles for an effective arms control agreement. These were, first, adequate provision for verification; and second, retention of the technological ability and political will to respond appropriately to violations, if they should occur, in order to preserve U.S. security.

Would you care to comment on Dr. Ikle's statement and indicate what principles would guide you in negotiating an arms control treaty?

And do you differ in any major respect from these principles mentioned by Dr. Ikle?

Mr. Warnke. I wish, Senator Percy, that I could say it as well as Dr. Lklé said it there. It seems to me that those two principles are absolutely essential in any sort of strategic arms negotiations.

We obviously have to make sure in any agreement that there is adequate provision for vertification. I think in my opening statement I commented that it is necessary for the American public to have the assurance that there is no way in which undetected violations could undermine our security.

As I say, maybe Fred Iklé said it a little better than that, but I think

the theme is consistent.

As far as the second point is concerned, that, obviously, is necessary for any success in strategic arms negotiations. They have to recognize the alternative that we have the means and the will to continue in the arms competition and to deny them any superiority. Otherwise, what would be incentive be for them to negotiate?

Those strike me as two very sound principles, indeed.

Senator Percy. Thank you very much. I am going to stop right here, as the red light indicates my time has expired. We are dealing with a major issue and I'm just going to put in a plug for a minor issue. I hope that someday, along with the other 50 States, when we come to a red light in Washington, D.C., we could turn right. It would save some fuel and energy. It's about time Washington, D.C., caught up with other State governments in this country.

I'm sure you can turn right on red in Alabama, can't you, Mr.

Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe then you'd have 51 States?

[General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I do agree with you on the right turn proposition.

Senator Griffin, do you want to ask any questions?

Senator Griffin. I think Senator Humphrey may first wish to ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. Senator Humphrey?

Senator Humphrey. First, I want to assure the Senator from Illinois that Minnesota pioneered in the right turn on red. Of course it is the only time we turned right.

[General laughter.]

PAST U.S. UNILATERAL INITIATIVES

Senator Humphrey. Let me say something about unilateral initiatives.

The late President Eisenhower took one of the first initiatives in the stopping of testing of nuclear weapons. Regrettably, that initiative on his part was violated in the summer of 1960 by the Soviet Union. But President Eisenhower did take the initiative and felt that it was a constructive one and did not impair our security.

Second, the United States took the initiative in Antarctica, of making that a completely weapons-free zone. So there have been initiatives that have been taken without jeopardizing the security of our

country. To the contrary, they may have to that security.

I felt, for example, in the instance of the MIRV's that we could have continued our research and development, but withheld any deployment as an initiative because once having MIRV as our weapon, we gain no further security. It's just a question of time as to whether the Soviets will even gain as much as we thought we had or exceed us, that's all, because they have truly a military industrial complex.

That is not often written about in their press, but that truly exists.

ACDA DIRECTOR'S RESEARCH RESPONSIBILITY

One of the areas that I would like to cover is your new role. The ACDA Director is given a very substantial amount of responsibility. Title III of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act is known as research, and I've always felt that this was the key and the heart of the act.

As a matter of fact, it was hotly debated and it carried by a single vote in the Senate, but was from time to time after that more readily ratified.

That places responsibility upon the Director to take the initiative in matters that relate to the construction and operation matters of international control for arms control and disarmament, techniques and systems of detecting, identifying, inspecting and monitoring tests.

This part, may I say most respectifully, Mr. Warnke, has been down-played because it has been inadequately funded. The budget for this Agency in the current budget is approximately \$13 million. I would like the public to know that we contemplate over \$120 billion for the Pentagon this year.

We place upon the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the role of seeking peace and reducing armaments, of providing for inspection that is safe, for methods of verification that can be guaranteed. We give them the grand sum total of \$13 million.

As the daddy of this Agency, I think the kid has been starved and I think it is time we take a good, hard look at it. Mr. Director, if you are confirmed, and I hope and pray that you shall be, I would hope that you would advance your cause by telling the President of the United States and the Director of the Budget that you are on a very lean diet, very, very lean.

Mr. WARNKE. I certainly would take an immediate look at our budget situation, Senator Humphrey, and respond appropriately. We would appreciate your support.

ACDA RESPONSIBILITY TO REPORT TO PUBLIC

Senator Humphrey. You have the responsibility to be the chief adviser to the President, to report to the President. You have a responsibility to be the chief adviser to the Congress and report to the Congress. And you have a third responsibility under the law, which has not been fulfilled, and that is to report to the public.

This is one of the few laws in which an agency in Government is instructed to report to the public. Other agencies are frequently denied the opportunity to effectively report to the public. But as the author of this act, I wanted to see that there was some public information.

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

Another matter which I call to your attention, because we may not have all the time to talk about this that we ought to have, is a new section which was added 2 years ago. Congressman Zablocki of the House of Representatives and I in the Senate, with the cooperation of our colleagues, added this section on the arms control impact information and analysis.

This is not really one of the Defense Department's favorite topics. They were not exactly singing the Hallelujah Chorus when this was

proposed. [General laughter.]

But it says:

In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear weapons, nuclear implements of war, military facilities or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for the delivery of nuclear weapons; second, any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having an estimated total cost in excess of \$250 million, or an annual cost in excess of \$50 million, the Director shall, on a continuing basis provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information in accordance with the procedures established in this Act.

The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program, as described in the subsection with respect to its impact on arms control and

disarmament policy.

What I am getting at is what you said here earlier. The Defense Department goes willy-nilly on its way making weapons systems, and then after they have let the monster out of the barrel, then the Arms Control Agency has to come along and figure out how in the world can we get that rascal back in the barrel, or how can we tame him, or can we give him some sleeping pills or something else to slow him down?

I want to make it clear that the Arms Control Agency has not ful-

filled this function.

You are going to be the new Director, my dear friend; and since I can address you now as friend, I hope it will always be that way. I would like very much for you to keep a watchful eye on this provision because I shall be a watchful oversight Member of Congress on it.

Do you have any comment ? [General laughter.]

Mr. WARNKE. I appreciate the advice, Senator Humphrey, and the warning.

Senator Humphrey. It's a friendly concern, because this is what I would call preventive medicine.

Mr. WARNKE, Yes.

Senator Humphrey. Preventive medicine. I believe it was as Dr. Kissinger said, that had he known all of the implications of the MIRV prior to its deployment, he might very well have taken a different view. This is exactly why this language is in the law.

Mr. WARNKE. Well, as I said in my opening comments, Senator Humphrey, I view the responsibility of ACDA as making the arms control perspective as one of the inputs of national security decisionmaking.

I think that the arms control impact statement requirement is one way of insuring on a functional basis that this perspective is brought to bear. I would regard it as being a very important function of the Agency.

STRENGTHENING CONTROLS OVER NUCLEAR EXPORTS

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Warnke, the other subject that is of the highest priority in the national agenda is nuclear proliferation.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. Not just strategic nuclear weaponry but the proliferation. Senators in this committee have taken a very active interest in this. Some have been leaders.

Do you have any specific ideas as to how our controls over nuclear exports could be strengthened while maintaining the United States

position as a reliable supplier?

Mr. Warnke. I have, I am sure, Senator Humphrey, some views which are far more general and far less specific that those which many members of the committee have been able to develop over the years.

I have the feeling that it is of crucial importance that we have the tightest safeguards in connection with any transfer of nuclear technology. I believe also that we ought to have a policy against any transfer of any technology which has to do with nuclear fuel reprocessing because of the possibilities that creates for the development of a nuclear weapons capability.

I feel that also, with respect to uranium enrichment, that is not the kind of technology that ought to be transferred on a national basis. I think, in addition, that the funding of the IAEA ought to be increased to a point at which they have adequate inspectors to verify

the adherence to the various safeguards which are imposed.

I think unless we take this far more seriously than we have in the past, we are going to find ourselves in a position where nuclear weapons capability falls into the hands of unstable regimes, or of subnational groups which would have the capacity to hold the whole civilized world hostage.

It is to me a very grave risk and requires the deepest and most con-

stant vigilance.

Senator Humphrey. I know that the administration has this very high on its agenda—

Mr. WARNKE, Yes.

Senator Humphrey [continuing.] And also concerns over the Persian Gulf, the proliferation of conventional weaponry in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. WARNKE, Yes.

Senator Humphrey. There has been a National Security study on it and I call it to your attention.

PENTAGON AND ACDA BUDGETS

My time is up, but I really want to put in the record the budget for the Pentagon this year, \$122,871,000,000. The budget for the Arms Control Agency, bless its little panting soul, \$13,605,000; \$13,605,000, that's what you're going to have to save the world with.

God bless you, and we'll need you. The Chairman. Senator Griffin?

MR. WARNKE'S CREDIBILITY IN DEALING WITH SOVIET UNION

Senator Griffin. Mr. Warnke, I want to be very candid with you, as I was with you this morning when you very graciously visited my office and we had a discussion, and indicate to you that although your views and positions, as publicly expressed, are far different from mine in some respects, I think that President Carter is certainly entitled to advisers and should have advisers that bring their point of view into his consideration.

What, I guess, bothers me about these two nominations is, in view of some of your past statements and positions, I am concerned about how credible you can be as a negotiator in dealing with the Soviet Union.

Now let me try to illustrate some of my concern.

You will recall in 1972 you testified before this committee concerning SALT I, which was referred to as the interim agreement, looking ahead to this agreement that may be negotiated. One of the problems, as I understand the negotiations, is the matter of the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber.

It is rumored or reported that the Soviet Union wants to put a 600-kilometer range limit, or some kind, on the submarine-borne cruise

missile.

Let me read to you from your testimony in 1972: After paying some respects to Secretary Laird, with whom you did not agree concerning some of his plans, you suggested also of the submarine-borne cruise missile, "this has a little more merit than a nuclear arrowhead shot from a crossbow."

I wonder how you are going to negotiate for us with the Russians

if that is your appraisal of the cruise missile.

Mr. Warnke. As I stated at the beginning of my comments, Senator Griffin, I cannot defend today everything I may have said in the past, and I won't try to do so. Obviously, the cruise missile technology has progressed amazingly since 1972. I believe that the Cruise Missile Program was reactivated at that time, in part because of the fact that it was not foreclosed by the interim agreement on control over offensive arms. And American technology has proven to be quite dramatic in that respect.

My feeling today about the cruise missile is that we ought to look at it from the standpoint of what the strategic balance will be when the cruise missile is developed, what it does in terms of stable deterrence.

As I understand it, at the present time we have both the air launch cruise missile, which, incidentally, I have supported consistently, and also a program which would develop either a sea-launched cruise missile or a land-launched cruise missile, or both.

We have to look at it very closely. I think it's not a decision that

ought to be reached precipitately.

Senator Griffin. Mr. Warnke, you testified against the SALT I agreement.

Is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. I did not testify against the SALT I agreement; I testified in favor of the ABM treaty limiting the ABM sites. I re-

garded that as a constructive move toward strategic stability. And I raised certain questions with respect to the interim agreement on control of offensive arms.

MR. WARNKE'S PAST CONCERNS ABOUT SALT I

Senator Griffin. Could you summarize what your concerns were then about SALT I?

Mr. WARNKE. About the interim agreement on control of offensive

arms? Yes. I was concerned about a number of things.

I was concerned, first of all, about the numerical disparity because it seemed to me that that made the agreement perceptually vulnerable. Any agreement which appears to give the Soviet Union a numerical lead is not one which is going to be very well received by our friends.

I was concerned about that. I was also concerned, of course, about the fact that in many instances it did not cover some of the programs which, it seemed to me, ought to be covered. I thought the agreement probably was reached too soon and in that respect, as well as in many

respects, was full of loopholes.

I think also I was concerned about the fact that some of the more important aspects were dealt with in the form of unilateral declarations. Now a unilateral declaration, it seems to me, is a built-in source of later recrimination and complaints because of unilateral declaration is, by definition, a statement that I am now prepared to say something that the other side will not agree with or will not say it agrees with.

Senator Griffin. Mr. Warnke, your expressed concerns about the earlier interim agreement of course put you in an interesting position as our negotiator with the Soviet Union, as well as your reappraisal

of the cruise missile.

You've said that one of your concerns about the interim agreement was the numerical disparity. You told me that in your office and then I got out your testimony and read it. I would like to read some of the testimony that you gave and have you comment on it.

You say here at one point:

Under those circumstances, the continuation of the missile numbers game is in fact a mindless exercise, that there is no purpose in either side achieving a numerical superiority which is not translatable into either any sort of military capability or any sort of political potential.

That is why, in my opinion, the ceilings that are placed in the interim agreement on both landbased and seabased missiles should not be the cause of any

concern on our part.

At another point you say this:

We should not be concerned about the existing mathematical edge-

Referring to the mathematical edge the agreement gives to the Soviet Union—

Nor should we be concerned about any attempts that the Soviet Union might make to add additional useless numbers to their already far more than adequate supply.

Then at another point in the testimony:

But I believe that a sensible construction of the interim agreement requires that we recognize that acceptance of the numerical imbalance is possible because, in fact, numbers are totally irrelevant to our security in the strategic nuclear arms field. If missile numbers were a valid measure of national strength, then the interim agreement would be improvident. But since they are without significance, there is nothing for which we need compensate.

As I understand it, you indicated that one of your major concerns at SALT would be the numerical limits.

Would you care to comment on your earlier testimony?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir, I would be happy to.

First of all, as I said earlier on we have to be concerned both with military capability and with political perceptions. Now from the standpoint of political perceptions respective numbers are of significance, and I believe that there was a degree of political vulnerability because of the numerical edge that the SALT I interim offensive arms agreement had in effect.

More than that, however, missile numbers back in 1972 were less important than they are today because the Soviet MIRV program had

not really reached its momentum.

Now at that point we had a very, very significant lead in nuclear warheads and, as former Secretary of State Kissinger said, "You

aren't hit by missile launchers; you're hit by warheads."

Now the MIRV program, as time has gone on, has reached the point at which, if you continue with the present trend, they begin to cut down on our missile warhead lead. And therefore, if they have more missile launchers and some of those missiles are of heavier throw weight, they could end up with a MIRV lead,

Accordingly, an interim agreement might have been good for a couple of years. It is endurable for 4 or 5 years. But at this point it ought to be replaced by something which sets ceilings which are

equivalent.

In other words, numbers have become more important as time has gone on because of the Soviet MIRV development.

Senator Griffin. Do I understand that in your statement this morning you said that numerical imbalance was one of your concerns?

Mr. WARNKE. It is one of my concerns today.

Senator Griffin. In 1972?

Mr. WARNKE. In 1972, I was concerned about the numerical

imbalance in political terms; yes.

Senator Griffin. And you still made this statement [indicating]? Mr. Warnke. Yes, because I said that if you look at it from the standpoint of military capability, the imbalance that existed at that time in missile launches was without military significance because we had such a significant lead both in accuracy and in numbers of nuclear warheads.

But perceptually, it obviously has been a source of concern.

MR. WARNKE'S 1972 TESTIMONY BEFORE COMMITTEE

Senator Griffin. Mr. Chairman, I think in fairness to Mr. Warnke, the testimony that he delivered before the committee in 1972 on the interim agreement ought to be reproduced in the hearings on his nomination at this point.

It is not too long.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want me to put them in the record?

Senator Griffin. Yes, because I have read some of his statements and I may not have put them in the proper context and I would like to do that.

The Charman. Without objection, that will be done. [The information referred to follows:]

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN BELATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1972

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Cooper, Javits and Percy. Senator Sparkman. Let the committee come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

I would like to welcome Mr. Paul Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Dr. Donald Brennan, Senior Member of the Professional Staff of the Hudson Institute; Dr. Stanley Hoffmann of the Department of Government at Harvard University; Mr. Jerome Kahan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Dr. Edward Teller, Associate Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory.

I understand that Mr. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary Warnke, has not arrived yet, but I assume he will be in.

This is the fifth of the committee sessions on the proposed treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems and the proposed interim agreement on offensive weaponry.

Today we will look into the strategic implications of the proposed treaty and agreement and look ahead to future steps in arms control. Beyond that, our witnesses will explore possible directions in national defense.

For many of us, the proposals offer a prospect that the arms race that has continued for more than two decades may be on the verge of a slowdown and, hopefully, a halt.

The subject at hand now is SALT I; but the Administration has already indicated that it plans to proceed in the fall with SALT II. There is also the prospect of further movement toward a comprehensive test ban. Undoubtedly, before all the talks are done, limitations discussions will move into the area of conventional armaments as well.

It has been argued that the proposed treaty and agreement should not be accepted with euphoria. Similarly, however, the proposed understandings should not be viewed with fear, for they represent an honest attempt on the part of many persons to arrive at some preliminary steps that will move this nation and the Soviet Union onto the path of sound arms control.

The agreements were achieved in an atmospher of parity. Consequently, we must ask ourselves not only whether they are good agreements for the United States, but also whether we should strive for a bargaining position other than relative parity in which each side has what is known as sufficiency.

Is there a real military need for these programs or are they primarily expensive bargaining chips? If we insist upon bargaining from a position of strength, we must ask whether we can expect the Soviet Union to do less.

I think we must ask ourselves how we can justifiably seek to bargain only from the position of advantage. How can the Soviet Union accept the obvious choice, should that course be pursued, of either accepting a position of weakness or of trying for its own position of strength?

The whole issue of arms limitation is an extremely difficult one to comprehend. Except for close students of the issues involved, many do not have an opportunity to come to grips with the implications of the move so far and future steps.

A major purpose of these hearings is the shedding of light upon the issues so that more people can understand what the United States and the Soviet Union are attempting now that the first round has been concluded.

Mr. Warnke has come in. We are very glad to have you, sir, and we will be glad to hear from you at this time.

By the way, I say to all of you we have your prepared statements and they will be printed in full in the record. You can present them as you choose.

STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. Warnke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you suggest, sir, I will count on my statement being printed in the record and I will endeavor now to highlight

some of the points that I endeavored to make.

First of all, I would like to say that I think very highly of the agreements that were reached with SALT. As a matter of fact, sometimes I think that perhaps I think more highly of these than do the administration spokesmen; but, in my opinion, the Moscow agreements can constitute a very large step toward effective control over strategic nuclear weapons.

ABM TREATY IS PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLISHMENT

The principal accomplishment, in my view, is the ABM treaty. That, to me, constitutes realistic recognition of the fact that no physical defense on any known or foreseeable technology is available against a nuclear attack of any significance

Accordingly, both sides have accepted the principle that safety resides not in physical defense but in the certainty that the attacker would be destroyed by the retaliatory strike that the other side would be able to mount.

LOOPHOLES IN INTERIM AGREEMENT

Now, in addition to the ABM treaty, the interim agreement does provide some control over offensive systems. I find the coverage at the present time disappointingly small; and what troubles me, as I point out in my statement, is the possibility that the loopholes that exist in the interim agreement may make that agreement a brake on the offensive arms race, but instead a spur to that race.

So construed, the interim agreement would be at least slightly worse than no

agreement at all.

But, entirely apart from the restriction on offensive systems, the ABM Treaty is a major accomplishment; it should serve to put the end to the inordinate expense and the very high risks of the nuclear arms race.

LOGIC INHERENT IN ABM LIMITATION

The question, however, is whether both sides will accept the logic that I find to be inherent in the ABM limitation. In all logic the ABM Treaty should eliminate any fear that the other side can achieve a first-strike capability. Because of the narrow limitations on the ABM system that either side can deploy, each is, in fact, open to nuclear attack when in a second strike. The surviving forces would be far more than sufficient totally to devastate the attackers' side.

NO PURPOSE IN ACHIEVING NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY

Under those circumstances, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cooper, that the continuation of the missile numbers game is in fact a mindless exercise, that there is no purpose in either side's achieving a numerical superiority. which is not translatable into either any sort of military capability or any sort of political potential. That is why, in my opinion, the ceilings that are placed in the interim agreement on both land-based and sea-based missiles should not be the cause of any concern on our part. They do give the Soviets an apparently large mathematical edge. They are permitted, as I read it, some 2.350 missile launchers to our 1,710, but either figure is a flagrant example of military redundancy. In the light of the abandonment of any forlorn measure of an ABM defense, either number affords more missiles than the other side affords in the way of targets.

So, accordingly, we should not be concerned about the existing mathematical edge nor should we be concerned about any attempts that the Soviet Union might make to add additional, useless numbers to their already far more than

adequate supply.

I suggest in my statement that were the Soviet Union to do this, we might perhaps feel some relief that they have not expended their funds of militarily more meaningful and potentially more mischievous purposes.

INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVIDES SOME CONTROL

Now, I believe that sensibly construed, the Interim Agreement does provide some measure of control which is useful in assuring the survivability of our landbased missile systems for the indefinite future. It does limit, in a qualitative way, the numbers of large missiles that the Soviet Union can construct. It confines them to some 313 instead of the magic number of 500 which at times has been suggested as the measure that would give the Soviets a counterforce capability against the land-based missiles.

With this limitation, it seems to me that even with the Minuteman part of our offensive triad alone, enough Minuteman missiles would survive to inflict unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union. But I believe that a sensible construction of the Interim Agreement requires that we recognize that acceptance of the numerical imbalance is possible because, in fact, numbers are totally irrelevant to our security in the strategic nuclear arms field.

If missile numbers were a valid measure of national strength, then the Interim Agreement would be improvident; but since they are without significance, there is

nothing for which we need compensate.

Accordingly, I feel that we should focus on the fact that arms control must not be allowed to become the new medium for fueling the arms race and this, in my opinion, could be the result if the Congress were to accept any one of three arguments which, as I read them, are currently being presented as justification for new strategic weapon systems.

LINKING APPROVAL TO FUNDING OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS

The first and, I think, the most flagrant of these is the argument that approval of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty should be linked to the funding of new strategic weapon systems. It has been suggested by Secretary Laird that the price for Pentagon support of the Moscow accords will be the agreement by Congress to fund the new programs for a manned, strategic bomber and for an underwater-launched missile system which includes a submarine which is more expensive than our nuclear carriers and approximately the same size as the largest Soviet surface ship.

There has also been a suggestion that a submarine-borne cruise missile should now be perfected because of the fact that this is not forbidden by the Interim

Agreement.

In my view, if the SALT agreements mean that we must now spend more money to build more strategic weapon systems and continue the offensive arms race, then the SALT agreements should not be approved by the Congress. Instead, they should be sent back to the drawing board with directions that the job be done

again and that it be done better this time.

I was gratified to see that President Nixon has asserted that the arms control agreements—the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement—should be approved on their merits. He stated in his news conference on June 22 that he would not have signed them unless he believed that standing alone they were in the interest of the United States; but, at the same time, and I feel somewhat inconsistently, he has contended that failure to approve the new offensive weapon programs would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and jeopardize the cause of world peace.

As I understand his position, it appears to be based on two arguments that differ somewhat from Secretary Laird's contention that the agreements and the

new funding for additional weapon systems must be linked.

ACCUMULATION OF ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE WEAPONS BY SOVIET UNION

The first of these is an argument which I believe is based more on military cosmetics than it is on military capability. President Nixon has emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union proposes to go ahead with programs in areas from which they are not foreclosed under the Interim Agreement. But since both countries are confined to what I regard as token ABM defenses, these new offensive systems add nothing to the Soviet ability to deter or in any way to utilize blackmail against the United States.

In my view, the Soviets have always lagged behind the United States in their appreciation of the realities of nuclear logic. Since I feel that way and since they have now begun to move in a direction which I regard as being the desirable direction, I don't think that we should substitute their judgment for our common sense when it comes to the further accumulation of offensive nuclear weapons.

We should accept, in fact, the reality that the ABM Treaty assures our deterrent for the years to come. We should not yield to the temptation to get back into a numbers race and, as far as any political disadvantage is concerned

stemming from the appearance of mathematical superiority, this can be prevented by a sound, rational explanation of our views to our own people, to our

allies and to those who might be disposed to be hostile to us.

Since the accumulation of additional offensive weapons by the Soviet Union will give them nothing that they do not now have and will challenge nothing that is important to our national security, it seems to me that we should not, by apparently attributing some military significance to any such gesture, put ourselves at a political disadvantage. This will occur if, and only if, we bad mouth our own strength.

BARGAINING CHIP ARGUMENT

The third argument that has been presented is the so-called bargaining chip argument and that to me poses perhaps the direct potential for continued arms escalation.

We were told for almost three years that we had to deploy an ABM in order to assure success at the first SALT, but as I understand the developments, the delay in reaching an ABM treaty stemmed less from Soviet reluctance to enter into an agreement on defensive systems than it did from our own insistence that a defensive treaty be linked to some measure of control over offensive weapons.

President Nixon noted in his State of the World Message last February that: The Soviet Union wished to work toward an initial agreement limited solely to antiballistic missiles. We considered that so narrow a solution would risk upsetting the strategic balance and might put a premium on the further development

of offensive weapons.

Now, if that was the risk then that is what the Interim Agreement should prevent. The Interim Agreement is good if it diminishes that risk. If, in fact, it spurs the arms race, then it is indefensible and it will spur the arms race if we continue during arms control negotiations to take the position that we must

escalate the arms race in order to accumulate further bargaining chips.

I think the experience with the ABM Treaty documents justifies this apprehension. Our decision to go ahead with the ABM deployment, while the impasse continued at Helsinki and Vienna, has just meant more expense and less control. We have continued with deployment of an unneeded ICBM antiballistic missile defense centered in North Dakota. The Soviet Union has gone ahead with its Galosh system which could not possibly defend Moscow and now, in a curious twist, both sides seem to be in a position in which they may end up with an additional ABM systems that they never seemed to want before.

The treaty permits us to deploy a command and control ABM around Washington and the Soviets are entitled to build east of the Urals a defense of ICBM missiles. But whether or not they go ahead it seems to me, sir, that the Congress

should reject any further ABM expenditures.

With the completion of the treaty it seems obvious that not even a bargainchip argument can be advanced as a reason for deploying a system that can pro-

vide no effective defense.

In my view, the reason that the Soviet Union and the United States have been able to negotiate and have been able to reach an agreement is because each side has had to recognize the other side's technical potential. Each side must recognize that it into capable of achieving any sort of meaningful advantage in the strategic weapons field unless the other side is willing to concede that advantage, and nothing in the history of the arms race indicates any such concession or any such prospect of one dropping out of the competition if the competition continues. Neither side need let the other one gain an appreciable advantage and neither side will.

So, if the bargaining-chip arguments is valid, and if it is going to be used, what it means is that the continuation of strategic arms limitation talks will lead to agreements to arm rather than agreements on arms control.

SALT AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR OWN MERITS

As President Nixon has suggested, the SALT agreements should be considered by Congress on their own considerable merits. I think that decisions on new nuclear weapon systems that are not now forbidden should be made entirely separate from the consideration of these agreements and should be made with primary emphasis on their implications for effective arms control in the future.

Any program that threatens the retaliatory capability of either side should be rejected. I refer, of course, specially to such things as antisubmarine warfare programs or anything else that might have the same impact as an antiballistic missile defense in appearing to challenge the retaliatory capability of either side.

AGREEMENTS ASSURE TIME FOR SENSIBLE SELF-RESTRAINT

In my view, the major accomplishment of the agreements signed at Moscow is to assure time for sensible self-restraint. No action that the Soviet Union can take, at least for the duration of the Interim Agreement, can threaten our deter-

rent or in any respect endanger our security.

Accordingly, I would recommend that we announce now that we are withholding any further deployment of nuclear weapons pending further negotiations. The ABM Treaty does not require that, just because it is permitted, we must go ahead and spend further billions on a useless ABM site. What the ABM Treaty does provide is that we need no more MIRVs, no new bombers, no larger submarines to enable us to penetrate a nonexist Soviet defense.

Instead of bargaining chips, I think our restraint can create the best climate for further progress in arms limitations. Our example can be well pulicized and can, and I believe would put great pressure on the Soviet Union to respond in

The agreements reached at Moscow can do much to move the world toward nuclear sanity and I would suggest that any arguments that diminish this bright promise should be taken with at least a grain of salt.

Thank you, sir.

(Mr. Warnke's prepared statement follows:

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE SALT AGREEMENTS AS ARMS CONTROL

On their own merits, the Moscow agreements can constitute a giant step toward effective control over strategic nuclear weapons. The ABM treaty is realistic recognition that no physical defense is possible against a nuclear attack of significant size. By its terms, both of the nuclear superpowers accept the proposition that security against nuclear devastation depends instead on the certainty that an attacker would himself be destroyed by a retaliatory second strike.

The accompanying Interim Agreement provides some measure of control over offensive missile systems. Though disappointingly permissive, it nonetheless can be a useful beginning toward comprehensive restriction of offensive nuclear weapons. But its utility in real arms control depends upon its explication and acceptance as a means facilitating further restraint. If, instead, its support is linked to Congressional adoption of crash programs in many of the offensive weapons areas which it does not cover, this Interim Agreement could prove to

be slightly worse than no offensive agreement at all.

Whether or not offensive weapons are restricted, the ABM treaty by itself would constitute the single greatest major accomplishment in controlling the nuclear arms race, with its inordinate expense and incalculable risks, by its adoption, each side will accept the policy that a strategic nuclear exchange, in light of the modern technology of death, spells out only the assured destruction of both. Soviet strategic planners, as quoted by advocates of an American nuclear warfighting capability, have in the past characterized the concept of mutual assured destruction by its acronym—a "MAD policy." Now, however, the SALT ABM treaty attests that, in the nightmare nuclear world, "though this be madness, yet there is method in it."

In all logic, the restriction on ABM defenses should eliminate any fear that either side may acquire a first strike capability. Thus it should ensure stability and forestall the accumulation of additional offensive weapons. Since each has abandoned any real attempt to defend itself from nuclear attack, the number of warheads that would survive even an all-out first strike would be sufficient totally to devastate the attacker's society. For example, if the Soviet Union, by striking first, could destroy all of our ICBMs and all our bombers, and even if the attack could catch and destroy most of our submarines in port, 10 surviving Poseidon submarines could aim 1,600 warheads at the Soviet Union. They would run out of targets before they ran out of missiles. In thus assuring retaliatory capability, the ABM treaty makes continuation of the missile numbers game a mindless exercise.

To the extent that the Interim Agreement actually leads toward the limitation of offensive weapons, it can be a desirable complement to the ABM treaty. But to the extent that it is used as an argument for accelerated construction and deployment of new offensive systems, it can only nullify the gains the treaty has achieved and thus disserve the cause of genuine arms limitation. It becomes an

agreement to arm-not arms control.

The ceilings put on ICBMs and SLBMs give a mathematical edge to the Soviets in both land-based and sea-based missiles. In aggregates, they are permitted about 2,350 missile launchers that can reach United States territory while we are restricted to some 1,710 that can be aimed at the Soviet Union from our ICBM silos and missile submarines. But this nuclear edge gives the Soviet Union no practical military capability that we do not have, and that we would not have with far fewer missiles entirely apart from our commanding lead in strategic bombers and deliverable warheads. Elimination of any forlorn hope of ABM defense of populations and facilities makes either ceiling figure a flagrant example of military redundancy. And even if our potential adversary should elect to pour additional resources into additional warheads, we need have no concern. Instead, we might properly feel some gratification that he has not used these funds for more meaningful and more mischievous purposes.

Sensibly construed, the Interim Agreement is of some value in assuring the survival of our land-based missile deterrent for the indefinite future. Limited to no more than 313 large missiles of SS-9 size or greater, and with no testing yet of true MIRV technology, a Soviet counterforce strike would leave enough Minutemen to obliterate the Soviet Union, even without resort to our submarine launched missiles and our nuclear bombers. It thus lengthens the lead time during which, if we are really serious about nuclear arms control, we can exercise restraint and look for reciprocal action from the Soviet Union. But pursuit of this sound policy requires an explanation of the Interim Agreement which focuses on the fact that we can accept the numerical imbalance because it is in fact totally irrelevant to our security. To suggest instead that this missile surplusage must be offset by the expenditure of additional billions on strategic offensive systems that are outside the parameters of the agreement is inconsistent and self-defeating. If missile numbers were a valid measure of national strength, the Interim Agreement would be improvident. Since they are militarily meaningless, there is nothing for which we need compensate.

We must not let arms control be converted into a new reason for escalating the arms race. This will be the ironic and tragic result if the Congress accepts any of the three current arguments used to justify new strategic weapons programs.

The first of these fallacies is that approval of the treaty and Interim Agreement must be linked with new funding of strategic weapons programs to preserve our security. Secretary Laird has told this Committee that the price for Pentagon support of the SALT accords is Congressional approval of proposed programs for a new manned strategic bomber and a new underwater-launched missile system carried by a submarine about the size of the largest Soviet surface ship and more expensive than our most modern attack carrier. Suggested also is a submarine-borne cruise missile. This has little more merit than a nuclear arrowhead shot from a cross-bow. If the SALT agreements mean that we must spend more money and buy more weapons for our security, they should not be approved by Congress. Instead they should be sent back to the drawing board with the request that the job be done again and be done better.

President Nixon has now asserted, however, that the arms limitation agreements should be approved on their merits. He assures us that he would not have signed them unless he believed that "standing alone, they were in the interest of the United States." But at the same time, in his news conference of June 22nd, he has contended that failure to approve the new offensive weapons program "would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and jeopardize the cause of world peace." His position seems to rest on two further arguments that differ somewhat from Secretary Laird's contention that the agreements and new

funding must be linked.

One of these arguments appears to be based on military cosmetics rather than military capability. It is emphasized that the Soviet Union has indicated its intention to go ahead with programs in areas not controlled by the Interim Agreement. With both countries confined to token ABM systems that can defend neither populations nor industrial plants, the only mission for more warheads would be as Winston Churchill put it, to "make the rubber bounce." The Soviets have always lagged behind us in strategic doctrine. We should not now substitute their judgment for our own common sense. Rather we should accept the fact that the ABM treaty assures our retaliatory deterrent for years to come and we should see that this fact is appreciated by our own people, by our friends, and by those who might feel disposed to be unfriendly.

Strategic nuclear forces can serve no purpose except to deter an enemy from using his. By this single sensible criterion we have more than enough and cannot tall into an inferior position unless this deterrent is threatened. With the ABM limitation, nothing that can threaten it is remotely in prospect. Whatever else the Soviet Union may do in the offensive nuclear missile area is without military meaning. It can give them a political advantage if, and only if, we ap-

pear to concede it to them by depreciating our own strength.

The "bargaining chips" argument is the third risk that arms control may be converted into arms escalation. We were told for almost three years that we had to deploy an ABM in order to assure success at SALT. But the delay in reaching an ABM agreement seems to have stemmed less from Soviet recalitrance than from our own insistence that an ABM limitation be accompanied by limitations on offensive weapons. As noted in President Nixon's State of the World message of February 9, 1972: "The Soviet Union wished to work toward an initial agreement limited solely to antiballistic missiles. We considered that so narrow a solution would risk upsetting the strategic balance, and might put a premium on the further development of offensive weapons." The Interim Agreement can be defended only if in fact it diminishes that risk, If it spurs the arms race, then it is indefensible, It will do so if new offensive nuclear weapons systems are supported as bargaining chips for further negotiations.

Our decision to deploy an ABM, while the impasse continued, has meant just more expense and less control. Experience shows that nations hoard obsolete weapons just as some wealthy men save string. We now seem condemned to continue with our unneeded ABM defense of some Minuteman missiles in North Dakota. The Soviets will probably retain their "Galosh" system that can't defend Moscow. Indeed, we may both end up with an additional mirror image ABM we never seemed to want before. The treaty permits us to deploy a "command and control" ABM around Washington. They are entitled to build, east of the Urals, and away from Soviet populated areas, an ABM defense for some of their missiles. Whether or not they engage in profligate futility, Congress should reject any further ABM expenditures. Not even a "bargaining chip" argument can be advanced now that an effective ABM limitation has been achieved.

What has led both nations to the bargaining table and what can lead to lasting and comprehensive limitations on offensive weapons is each side's recognition of the other's technical potential. The agreements, presumably, were designed to avoid the costs of converting that potential into weapons that would then be countered and nullified. Neither need—and neither will—let the other achieve a position of appreciable bargaining advantage. To continue to build additional nuclear weapons systems in order to bargain from strength will mean only that the final bargain will be the poorer. In the interim, the existence of negotiations will have been used to spur the arms race. If the "bargaining chip" argument is to prevail, it is questionable that we can continue to afford arms

control negotiations.

As President Nixon has suggested, the SALT agreements should be considered by Congress on their own considerable merits. Decisions on new nuclear weapons systems not now forbidden should be made separately and with primary emphasis on their arms control implications. Those that may threaten the Soviet retaliatory capability should be rejected as inconsistent with the SALT accords. Measures that serve, like the ABM limitation, to protect the mutual deterrent should be favorably considered. Among them are restrictions on further testing and on developments in ASW. They should have top priority in the negotiations that are to follow.

The major accomplishment of the agreements signed at Moscow is to assure time for the sensible self-restraint that can bring an end to the nuclear arms race. No action the Soviet Union can take at least for the duration of the Interim Agreement can threaten our deterrent or endanger our security. We therefore should announce now that we are withholding any further deployment of nuclear weapons pending further negotiations. The ABM treaty does not mean that, because it is not forbidden, we must spend further billions on useless ABM sites. The treaty does mean that we need no more MIRVs, no new bombers, no larger submarines to penetrate a non-existent Soviet defense.

Our restraint can, moreover, create the best climate for further progress in arms limitations. This example—which can and should be well publicized—would put pressure on the Soviets to respond in kind and would turn the nego-

tiations themselves into a medium for arms control.

The agreements reached at Moscow can do much to move the world toward nuclear sanity. Any arguments that diminish their promise should be taken with at least a grain of salt.

Senator Sparkman. Thank you very much, Mr. Warnke.

B-1 BOMBER AND TRIDENT SUBMARINE

Senator Griffin. Mr. Warnke, of course, I'm not involved in the SALT negotiations, but I do think that in view of some of the public charges or criticism, I guess, that have been made, it would be well if we got in the record your position with respect to the B-1 bomber.

It's reported that you had opposed the development and produc-

tion of the B-1 bomber.

Is that correct?

Mr. Warnke. I have expressed my concern about the B-1 bomber as not being the optimum replacement bomber, yes. In that respect, of course, similar comments have been made by President Carter.

Senator Griffin. And the Trident submarine?

Mr. WARNKE. The Trident submarine struck me as being quite questionable as the appropriate follow-on submarine because of its size and unit costs.

I have been concerned about it because, really, the greatest security that we have with our SLBM's—our submarine launched ballistic missiles—is their relative invulnerability. If antisubmarine warfare developments continue, then a larger submarine but a smaller fleet might render us less secure than if we had more submarines and, hence, more targets for the Soviet Union to have to search out and destroy.

TRIDENT MISSILE

I have consistently supported the Trident missile, because that's what gives you the increased capability. The Trident missile, of course, initially raises the range from 2,000 miles to 4,000 miles, and I believe that the follow-on one has a range at 6,000 miles. That is a distinct increase in the deterrent efficacy of our force, and I support it. But I wonder whether we shouldn't have that missile perhaps on more platforms.

M-X MOBILE ICBM

Senator Griffin. Then, as we have tried to somehow develop our defense capability, there is the MX [Experimental Missile] mobile ICBM.

What is your position on that?

Mr. WARNKE. My position on that, Senator, would depend upon how successful we are in negotiating an arms control agreement.

Obviously, if our ICBM's were to become vulnerable over a period of time, we would have to take some step to insure their viability, and one means that would have to be explored would be the mobile missile.

Now it has certain problems, of course, in terms of verifiability if you do succeed in getting an arms control agreement. So it's a question of whether you can get the arms control agreement in time to make it unnecessary to develop the MX, and that, of course, depends upon the progress itself.

MX-1 TANK

Senator Griffin. In the area of conventional arms that we would have to rely on, if we are not going to use nuclear weapons, you have been critical of the new MX-1 tank.

Is that correct?

Mr. Warnke. Again, as I expressed in my beginning comments, I'm concerned about the growing unit cost of some of the replacement systems. Given the experience of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the obvious gains that have been made in smart bombs and smart missiles—the so-called PGM's—we ought to consider whether we perhaps should go for more and cheaper units, rather than individual units perhaps in fewer numbers but greater cost.

Senator Griffin. So you would disagree with the MX-1 tank. Mr. WARNKE. I think it's a program that ought to be examined

from the standpoint of the impact of the PGM's; yes.

16-DIVISION ARMY

Senator Griffin. And when the Army went to 16 divisions, you opposed that. You thought they should stay at 13.

Is that right?

Mr. Warnke. I questioned whether or not an adequate justification had been given for it. That's correct.

CUTBACK OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Senator Griffin. You've indicated the cutback from 7,000 to less

than 1,000 of our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Mr. WARNKE. Again, I testified that I thought that we probably ought to take a look at our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe from the standpoint of the security of the United States; yes. I think some are positioned in a fashion that ought to be reexamined.

F-14, F-15, AND F-16 PLANES

Senator Griffin. What about the F-14 plane and the F-15 plane? Mr. WARNE. I have supported the F-15 plane. I have questioned whether the F-14, again, was an appropriate replacement for the F-4. I suggested at one point we ought to explore a cheaper alternative. They have now come up with the F-18, which I support.

Senator Griffin. What about the F-16?

Mr. Warnke. The F-16, again, strikes he as being a desirable development because it moves in the direction of getting more cost-effective systems in the light of the developments of the defensive weapons.

REPRESENTATION OF GENERAL DYNAMICS BY MR. WARNKE'S LAW FIRM

Senator Griffin. I know my time is running out here, Mr. Chairman, but let me ask one more question, if I may.

Does your law firm represent General Dynamics?

Mr. WARNKE, It does. Senator Griffin, It does.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have some more questions when I get another chance.

The CHAIRMAN. We have Senator Culver with us. I would like to

invite him to ask questions, if he sees fit to do so.

Senator Culver. That is very kind of you, Mr. Chairman, but I will certainly withhold any questions that I may have until all members of the committee have had a chance to ask theirs.

I do appreciate your kindness.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to have you here.

Senator Danforth?

CONSISTENCY OF PRESIDENT'S AND MR. WARNKE'S STATEMENTS ON DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Senator Danforth. Mr. Warnke, in the famous second debate during the past campaign, then-Governor Carter stated, "when I become President, we will not only be strong in those areas"-referring to some others-"but also in defense, a defense capability second to none."

In the winter of 1974 and 1975, in a periodical entitled, "Perspectives on Defense," you said, "The claims that we must be number one, that we cannot afford to be a second-rate power, that our opportunities to negotiate effectively if the Soviets require that we negotiate from a position of superior strength, do not have the kind of appeal they

Do you believe that these two statements are inconsistent?

Mr. WARNKE. I don't believe that they are inconsistent, Senator Danforth. I believe, and I have said repeatedly, that we cannot yield superiority either in strategic or conventional arms to the Soviet

I believe, however, that if you try and be number one across the entire board, you then foreclose any chance of effective arms control negotiations because the other side will not accept that kind of

position.

We have to recognize that nobody is going to negotiate themselves into a position of inferiority if they have the means to prevent that from happening, and that, therefore, if you pursue arms control initiatives, you have to recognize that what you are really going to end up with is an agreement which is satisfactory to both sides. If the arms control agreement is not satisfactory to both sides, you are not going to have any agreement. And if you get one, it will not be viable because the side that finds that it has been out-traded, obviously will repudiate it.

Senator Danforth. Do you think that the comment about defense capability second to none should represent the position of the United

Mr. WARNKE. I do. I translate that as meaning the same as that we would not yield superiority to the Soviet Union.

NEED FOR GROUND FORCES AND NAVAL FORCES

Senator Danforth. In "Foreign Policy" in 1970-71, you said that "we need not procure ground forces for protracted land wars or naval forces for an extensive war."

Do you still agree with that position?

Mr. WARNKE. I think that in a nuclear age you have to recognize the fact that a protracted war would not remain conventional because of the fact that one side would begin to win and one side would begin to lose. And if the side that was losing felt that its vital interests were involved, then the nuclear threshold is reached.

So I think that what we ought to be prepared for, as Senator Nunn and Senator Bartlett have suggested, is to be able to respond to surprise attack in Europe. We cannot rely on the fact that we would be able to take our time to bring up to reserve because we are going to be fighting a 2- or 3-year war.

I believe that to be true.

REDUCTION IN U.S. CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY

Senator Danforth. Do you think we should have a reduction in our

conventional capabilities?

Mr. Warnke. No; I don't think that we should have a reduction in our conventional capabilities because at the present time the CIA estimates are that the Soviet Union is spending more money than we anticipated on them, and, as a consequence, we would be rash, particularly at a time when we are trying to reach arms control agreements, to cut back on our actual capability.

Senator Danforth. Is this a change in position for you?

Mr. Warnke. No; I have suggested in the past that we could reduce the defense budget, but that is not inconsistent with the position of maintining a conventional capability. It is a question of finding more effective ways to perform the desirable and necessary missions.

RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR RATHER THAN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

Senator Danforth. Is it fair to say that over the long term you would rely on nuclear defense rather than conventional defense?

Mr. WARNKE. It is not, no, because it seems to me that if you try and rely just on your nuclear capability, you get yourself back into the concept of massive retaliation, which is basically implausible. You have to be able to respond in flexible fashion.

The flexible response doctrine was developed, I think, during Mr.

McNamara's early years in the Pentagon, and I agree with it.

PLAUSABILITY OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR

Senator Danforth. You said that strategic nuclear war is implausible?

Is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. I say that the initiation of strategic nuclear war is implausible. You might blunder into it.

Senator Danforth. I am talking about defense. I am talking about us being in a defensive posture.

CUTBACKS IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

You have, as I understand it, suggested cutbacks in our conventional defense.

Mr. WARNKE. I have suggested cutbacks in the defense budget; that is correct.

Senator Danforth. And in the amount of manpower that we deploy.

Is that not correct?

Mr. WARNKE. I have suggested that we ought to take a look at that, too, because the cost of manpower is now something like 53 percent of our total defense budget.

Senator Danforth. In fact, in 1970-71 you suggested a cut in man-

power from 22 divisions to 17 divisions.

Is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. And I believe that some of those cuts have since been made.

Senator Danforth. You believe that they have been made?

Mr. WARNKE. I believe some of them have. Senator Danforth. Do you support that?

Mr. WARNKE. I, of course, don't have access to all of the data at the present time. My impression is that our conventional strength is adequate for the missions. I base that on what the Joint Chiefs have testified to the Congress, and it is what the Secretary of Defense has stated, that he believes the defensive forces of the United States are adequate to perform their missions.

I have no reason to disagree with that.

Senator Danforth. The question is what their mission is. Correct? Mr. WARNKE, Yes.

CONCEIVABILITY OF PROTRACTED LAND WAR

Senator Danforth. Do you still believe that a protracted land war is inconceivable?

Mr. WARNKE. Inconceivable may be too strong a word. I would say that it is highly unlikely because if you take a look at the least unlikely theatre, it would be Western Europe. And I think the question then is what would happen in the course of a conventional war in Europe. We have those tactical nuclear weapons there; the Soviet Union has the tactical nuclear weapons there.

I think that in the face of some sort of mass attack, that there might be the resort to use of the tactical nuclear weapons, and no one knows

what the escalation would achieve.

But the fact that weapons technology has advanced so much since World War II probably means that a replay of World War II is at least highly unlikely, if not inconceivable.

U.S. RESPONSE TO OFFENSIVE AGAINST EUROPEAN ALLY

Senator Danforth. The question I want to get at is supposing that there is an offensive against an ally of ours, against Western Europe. What kind of a response would we be in a position to make?

Mr. WARNKE. I would gather, again from the posture statements of the Secretary of Defense, that he has felt that we are in a position where we could respond with conventional force to try and deflect or defer any such attack by the Soviet Union.

Senator Danforth. For a limited period of time?

Mr. Warnke. For whatever period of time was necessary. And then, of course, you do have the possibility of a resort to tactical nuclear

weapons.

Now I cannot testify as to whether we have the conventional strength at the present time on anything other than secondhand information, but I have to rely upon the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. If we don't have that strength, then I suggest that we have been improvident during the years since I have been out of Government. [General laughter.]

MR. WARNKE'S POSITIONS DURING MARCH 9, 1976 BUDGET COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

Senator Danforth. Let me read to you some comments you made before the Budget Committee on March 9, 1976 and ask you if these still represent your positions.

You said:

I think that we ought to start off with the proposition that our national security is threatened from a military standpoint only by Soviet military power and only if that threatens our own territory or the independence of those whose independence is integral to our own. Those are Western Europe and Japan and those other countries such as Israel, where history and culture similarly have given us a distinct commitment.

Do you still agree with that?

Mr. WARNKE. I do.

Senator Danforth. Then you said:

I believe at the present time, and I know on this Mr. Nitze and I are in disagreement, that it is not necessary to make a decision to go ahead with a whole new generation of strategic nuclear missiles.

Do you still agree with that?

Mr. WARNKE. I do. That is why I say that we have to proceed and see whether arms control is feasible at this point and whether that would avoid the necessity for going ahead with such a new generation. Senator Danforth. Then you said:

The more that we do in the way of modernization of nuclear forces and the more that we do in terms of protecting the survivability of ICBM's, the more chance there is that we will end up with a situation in which no verifiable agreement can be reached.

Do you still agree with that?

Mr. WARNKE. I certainly do; yes. That is why I say it is a matter of great urgency that we explore the possibilities of arms control, because otherwise, initiatives will be taken which will make it far more difficult to get a verifiable, solid arms control agreement.

PROCEEDING WITH MOBILE MISSILES

Senator Danforth. I did not understand your answer to Senator Griffin. Do you agree that we should proceed with mobile missiles?

Mr. Warnke. At the present time?

Senator Danforth. Yes.

Mr. WARNKE. I don't think that decision has to be made at the present time.

Senator Danforth. As I understand it, your position is that it would depend upon how we go with the negotiations.

Is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator Danforth. I thank you. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey, would you care for another round?

Senator Humphrey. No; I think I have had my say. I am satisfied. The Chairman. Senator Culver, do you want to ask anything?

Senator Culver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your kindness in permitting members of the Armed Services Committee to be here and ask questions at these hearings.

COMMENDATION OF MR. WARNKE

Mr. Warnke, at the outset let me tell you how much I personally respect and appreciate the fact that you are willing to give yourself to public life and public service in this capacity for which you have been nominated.

It seems to me that being one of the few voices that has participated in this crucial debate over our national security policy, one who has spoken out forthrightly and honestly, published views, and contributed in the most useful way to an informed debate on this subject—and 1 must say I think there is only a small group of people who have the expertise and the background to make such a contribution—you should be greatly commended and not criticized for that participation.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, sir.

Senator Culver. I think it is an invaluable national service.

WHAT U.S. SECURITY DEPENDS ON

Mr. Warnke, I see that in your criticisms of certain defense expenditures over the last few years you have often used a broad interpretation of what actually constitutes true national security posture, including such factors as the state of the economy and other domestic needs.

Do you believe that our security depends on more than just defense? Mr. WARNKE. I believe that it does, Senator Culver. I think that what we have to have is the kind of allocation of priorities that recognizes the role of defense, that recognizes that there are other needs as well if we're going to have a harmonious society in which the welfare of the people of the United States is insured. We have to have a country worth protecting as well as the means to protect it.

REDUCTION OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE

Senator Culver. I recall, Mr. Warnke, I served in the Congress in the early 1970's and the late 1960's when there was considerable debate and support for reducing U.S. troops in Europe. You were an outspoken defender of our commitments there, as I recall.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct, sir.

Senator Culver. And you argue that we should not unilaterally make a substantial reduction of our troops and that a strong U.S. conventional posture in Europe was a wise investment in deterrence.

Am I correct in that recollection of your views?

Mr. WARNKE, That is correct, Senator Culver. I was concerned about what was then referred to as the Mansfield amendment because I thought that that might be something which would set back the stability of the situation in Europe. I thought that both from the political standpoint and from the standpoint of our conventional defense capability that would be a risky thing to do.

U.S. NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE CONCERNING FOREIGN ARMS SALES

Senator Culver. Now Mr. Warnke, you have also urged a more restrictive policy on foreign arms sales in general. I am talking about the conventional theater now as distinguished from the nuclear one.

As you are aware, I think many of us from Congress have been urging some serious initiatives by the U.S. Government leading toward international conference on the subject of bringing about some sort of rational restraint in the pathological competition for arms sales in the world today.

Now recognizing that this issue is necessarily and properly related to the one on standardization, of our NATO allies and our equipment procurement purchase policy in that regard, I was interested in what thoughts you have about the feasibility of such an undertaking. Admittedly, it is awesome in terms of the problems it represents, but many of us were disappointed that the NSC and Secretary Kissinger reported last October extremely pessimistically about any prospects for meaningful international controls.

I wondered what your thoughts were now on that subject and where you think ACDA could be a critical participant in developing an appropriate U.S. negotiating initiative and what prospects you see for general arms restraint in the conventional area of arms policy?

Mr. WARNKE. President Carter has announced his determination to see to it that we avoid being in the posture of arms supplier to the

I think it is extremely important that we do change our policy in that regard. I think that, just as with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology, sometimes commercial considerations have appeared to

override what I regard as being sound security policy.

Now we are at the present point the world's leading arms supplier to foreign countries. Accordingly, it is appropriate for us to take a lead in trying to bring together some sort of a conference of the other principal arms suppliers, which would, of course, have to include the Soviet Union, as well as France, the United Kingdom and probably West Germany, and see if we can't reach some kind of overall international agreements on the control of these transfers.

What is to me of major concern is the fact that the quality and sophistication of the weapons that are being transmitted at the present

time are increasingly high.

Now what that does, of course, is to exaggerate the possibilities for major conflict in some of these areas to which they are being transferred.

I think it is also shortsighted from the standpoint of preserving our own technological lead because when we transfer some of our more sophisticated systems to other countries, obviously, the security of

those systems is jeopardized.

Now I think that an international conference and some agreed-upon international restraints would be very much in our interest and in the interest of world peace.

SIZE OF U.S. ARMY

Senator Culver. I was interested in your response to Senator Danforth's questions on the size of the Army divisions and so forth. Of course, subsequent to your recommendation that we go to 17, we actually went to 13 on the recommendation and support of the Pentagon decisionmakers.

Mr. WARNKE. That was my recollection, Senator Culver.

Senator Culver. We are now back to 16 at the prompting of the Congress to convert more troop detail ratio. So we're now at 16 as opposed to 22. And the manpower costs are now 57 percent as opposed to 53 percent.

TRIDENT SUBMARINE

On the Trident sub I was interested in your response to Senator Griffin. As I recall, you were not against modernizing the strategic submarine force.

Mr. WARNKE. I was not.

Senator Culver. Rather, you questioned whether or not we should be making a premature commitment to the Trident system and whether it might be better to wait until the modernization requirements and technology were more developed.

Is his an accurate representation of your views?

Mr. Warnke. As I remember the situation at that point, Senator Culver, one of the questions was whether you could retrofit the Poseidon submarines with the so-called Trident missile. It struck me that might be the sounder course, and I advocated consideration of that as an alternative to going ahead with the Trident submarine,

which, incidentally, is built by General Dynamics.

Senator Culver. I was also interested when you talked about the relative cost effectiveness of alternative platforms big and little, that I might add that in 1974 Secretary Schlesinger and the Navy asked for funds for a Narwahl class submarine as a smaller, cheaper alternative to Trident, which could give us a cheaper and far more credible, and secure submarine strategic capability because of the fact that we would have more platforms at less cost, less vulnerable to Soviet detection and destruction.

So, then, once again, I think we see an illustration where your recommendation came in the form of an official recommendation from the Pentagon, and, unfortunately, came after large amounts of money had already been expended out to what is now looked upon as a rather unwise choice at a critical juncture in the development of that system.

COMMENDATION OF MR. WARNKE

So I appreciate very much not only your being here today and your nomination for this critically responsible position, which I enthusias-

tically endorse, but I, again, think this Nation is indeed fortunate that men of your stature, your competence and your expertise and knowledge are willing not only to subject yourself to certain forms of criticism from many people who did not have either the ability or the forthrightness to express those views and to come forward here today

and to be willing to serve in this position.

I, for one, who have followed your career during my 12 years in the Congress, have seen how oftentimes you are right, and had that wise counsel been followed at the time certain critical decisions were made, not only would the American taxpayers have been saved billions and billions of dollars, but in my judgment the security of both our conventional and strategic deterrents would be far greater today than it is.

And I want you to know that I feel we are lucky to have you. I hope that we are wise enough to keep you.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you. Thank you very much for your generous

comments, Senator Culver.

Senator Culver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hatch, would you care to ask some

questions?

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your kindness in allowing us to sit in on this committee this day and to ask a few questions.

Mr. Warnke, I have been very impressed with your intelligence, your knowledge, background and experience that you have exhibited here today. I think that you have shown yourself to be a very extremely knowledgeable and intelligent person in this area.

POLICY OF RESTRAINT

In the spring, 1975 issue of Foreign Policy, you blame the arms race and the United States, you state that:

As its only living superpower model, our words and our actions are admirably calculated to inspire the Soviet Union to spend its substance on military man-power and weaponry.

In the same article you go on to state that:

We should instead try a policy of restraint while calling for matching restraint from the Soviet Union.

The question I have is what exactly do you mean by restraint?

Mr. Warnke. Well, what I mean by restraint is that when you are in a situation in which your security does not require going ahead with some sort of a new weapons development, you announce that you are exhibiting restraint and call for a matching response from the Soviet Union. It is a way of achieving arms control by so-called reciprocal restraint.

That is what I mean.

Senator Hatch. Isn't one example of restraint the nature of our strategic budget?

Mr. WARNKE. It has been, yes.

Senator HATCH. Isn't it the truth that our strategic budget declined from 1962 through fiscal year 1976?

Mr. WARNKE. That's correct.

Senator HATCH. Isn't it true that our force levels of ICBM's and SLBM's have remained constant since 1968—that is the number of deployed ICBM's and SLBM's?

Mr. WARNKE. The number of launchers has been constant. Of course the number of nuclear warheads has been increasing quite significantly during that period of time—I think at the rate of three a day.

Senator Hatch. Do you consider the United States' modernization program for its missile forces to be larger or smaller than the Soviet

modernization program?

Mr. WARNKE. I think that the Soviets relatively have been spending more money than we have for the past several years.

At least that's what I gather from the press accounts of CIA

estimates.

Senator HATCH. Is there any evidence of restraints at all on the part

of the Soviets?

Mr. Warnke. There has not been and I don't think you're going to get it on the basis in which you just cut your defense budget and hope that they are going to cut theirs. For one thing, you wouldn't even be able to tell because of the difficulty of measuring their defense effort in comparison with ours. You would have to have very specific measures in which you call for very specific measures in response.

It has sometimes been described as having concrete measures of parallel restraint. And what I have suggested—I don't know. Senator Hatch, whether you were in the room at the time—is that since we are now headed toward negotiations with the Soviet Union, I would think that any concrete measures of parallel restraint would have to be a part of the negotiating package, rather than being in any sort of informal context.

Senator HATCH. I see. Then you would agree then that there is not much evidence of restraint on the part of the Soviets, and, in effect, they are developing new ICBM's and two new SLBM's, all within MIRV capacity and capability?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

IMPACT OF DROP IN BOMBERS ON U.S. STRATEGIC BALANCE

Senator HATCH. I understand that the U.S. Armed Forces dropped dramatically in the last 5 years.

Could you tell me how much and if it has had any impact on our strategic balance? I understand that we have dropped from 900 bomb-

ers to about 390.

Mr. Warnke. I believe that what we have done is to retire some of the B-52's, and then, of course, there was some attrition of B-52's because of their use in a tactical role in the Vietnam War. The question is whether or not you should go ahead with the B-1 as a replacement for some of these B-52's and an ultimate replacement for the entire force, or whether some other replacement bomber ought to be determined upon.

It is not my position that we ought to eliminate the manned bomber. I think we should have the manned bomber as part of our deterrent

Triad.

TRIAD SYSTEM OF DEFENSE

Senator HATCH. Then you do agree with the Triad system of defense?

Mr. WARNKE, I do.

Senator HATCH. Would we be safe if we did not have an effective

Triad system of defense?

Mr. Warnke. I think we are safer and that the deterrent is more complete with the Triad, because you've got the flexibility and accuracy of the ICBM's; you've got the relative invulnerability of the SLBM's [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile] on the nuclear submarines. And you have in addition to that the fact that the bombers give you a couple of additional advantages, which, it's been said, for example, would complicate any type of attack plans that the Soviets might have.

You also can scramble them. You can keep them on alert so that they cannot be destroyed in an attack. And in addition to that, of course, they have the fail safe features. They can be called back.

So then, I think the bomber force is a useful force to have. Senator HATCH. Do you believe that under our present structured system, that if we only had the Duad, that the Soviets could monitor and knock out a Duad system; that it would not have the effectiveness of the Triad system?

Mr. WARNKE. I think it would increase the chances that the Soviet Union might feel that a first strike could yield them an advantage; yes.

INCREASE IN SOVIET DEFENSE POSTURES AND BUDGET

Senator Hatch. Now you've indicated that the Soviet defense postures are increasing rather than decreasing.

Mr. Warnke. Again, as I gather from press reports, the CIA has

recently increased its estimates of Soviet defense spending.

Senator HATCH. And you have indicated that their budget at the present time is larger than those of the United States of America?

Mr. WARNKE. That, I gather, is an arguable position.

Senator HATCH. But you believe they are?

Mr. WARNKE. What?

Senator HATCH. I believe you said earlier that you thought they were.

Mr. WARNKE. Well, I believe that they are increasing.

Senator Hatch. Increasing. But you are not sure whether in con-

stant dollars it is more than ours?

Mr. WARNKE. I have no basis on which I could reach that conclusion. They are spending, obviously, more on strategic forces than we are. Overall, you can't really tell because it depends upon whether you cost manpower in American terms or whether you cost it in Soviet terms.

Senator Hatch. Would you agree that they are at least about

parallel?

Mr. Warnke. About as far as defense expenditures are concerned? Senator Hatch, Yes.

Mr. WARNKE. I think that they are both very massive expenditures; yes.

Senator HATCH. Is the military research development tests in engineering for the Soviet Union increasing or decreasing?

Mr. WARNKE. I would not be able to give you any answer on that, Senator Hatch.

Senator Hatch. Do you know whether our budgets are larger or smaller than theirs in that area?

Mr. WARNKE. I have no basis on which I could give you an opinion.

RESTRAINTS WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSED

Senator Hatch. Mr. Warnke, in this same "foreign policy" article, the one referred to earlier, you state that "the chances are good that highly advertised restraint on our part will be reciprocated."

What restraints would you impose? Now you have indicated that you would withdraw certain weaponry at certain times, wait 6 months, wait to see what their intentions would be and then go on from there.

Is that basically what you're talking about or do you have some specific things in mind?

Mr. WARNKE. What I was talking about basically was freezing certain aspects of weapons development and calling for a freeze on their part.

Senator Hatch. We would discontinue weaponry development in certain areas and ask them also to discontinue?

Mr. WARNKE. That's correct.

Many Senators in the United States have made such proposals in the past. It is not novel with me.

MX AND CRUISE MISSILE

Senator Hatch. I see. Now you have indicated already that you would not go ahead with the MX, if I understood you correctly. Mr. WARNKE. No. What I said is that I don't think that decision

has to be made at the present time.

Senator Hatch. What about the cruise missile?

Mr. Warnke. The cruise missile, I think, requires extensive study. I don't know what the eventual position is that I would recommend with respect to the cruise missile.

Senator HATCH. Again, you would tie that in to the actual SALT

negotiations?

Mr. WARNKE. I would tie it into the SALT negotiations and find out whether or not you could handle it in that context; yes,

B-1 BOMBER

Senator Hatch. Would you agree with me that the B-1 bomber is a supersonic bomber that presently could evade radar detection in its

strike attack capacity?

Mr. WARNKE. I am not familiar, of course, with the classified data on that. I have been concerned about the penetrability of the B-1 bomber, as compared with, perhaps, a standoff bomber with a longrange missile.

I think, again, this is something that requires study. It is my understanding it is being studied by the Department of Defense at the pres-

Senator Hatch. As I understand it, the B-1 bomber, as a manned bomber, can fly at low altitudes with supersonic speed and fly underneath the present radar detection systems of the Soviet Union, which could not be remedied for about 6 or 7 years.

Is that correct, in your judgment?

Mr. WARNKE, I don't know whether it is correct at the present time, Senator Hatch. I know that the B-1 bomber was developed because of the concern about the high flying bombers that might be vulnerable to Soviet surface-to-air missiles. The concept of the B-1 was that it would come in low on the deck at very high speeds, and that the look-down capability of Soviet radar was sufficiently limited so that the chances of it being able to penetrate were greater.

Now, whether that radar development had occurred in the time since, I am not sure. It is my understanding, however, that the B-1 is not

supersonic at low levels.

Senator Hatch. You may be right, but I have heard both ways.

Now, if that was true that the B-1 could fly subsonic or supersonic, beneath Soviet radar detection devices at the present time, would that not be an effective deterrent to Soviet world aggression, assuming that there is any possibility thereof?

Mr. Warnke. Well, it would obviously be a useful adjunct to your

nuclear deterrent under those circumstances.

Senator Hatch. Assuming that is true, would you want to do away with the B-1 bomber as part of your particular philosophy?

Mr. WARNKE. If the B-1 bomber turns out to be the optimum bomber to replace the B-52, then that is the bomber we ought to buy. Senator HATCH. What if it isn't optimum, but could do exactly what I told you it could do?

Mr. WARNKE. Then the question is, is there some way of doing that

same job more effectively at lower cost.

Senator Hatch. And if there isn't, would you stick with the B-1? Mr. WARNKE. I have already indicated, Senator Hatch, that I believe I would favor a continuation of the manned bomber, and the question is what is the best weapons system for that purpose.

Senator Hatch. I have a number of other questions in this area, but

I notice that my time is up.

Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate your courtesy in letting me ask these questions. I will wait for my next round.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Senator Schmitt?

Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy in allowing several of us newer Senators to participate.

It is very interesting. It is certainly a very important discussion. The first question I have is how do you prefer to have your name

Mr. WARNKE. The name is Warn-key.

Senator SCHMITT. I see. Two syllables, not three. All right. We've cleared that up. We had several discussions on that.

My home State of New Mexico has the unfortunate distinction of having helped herald a nuclear age which is really the basis for our whole discussion and concern here today. I certainly wish you and the President well in your efforts to start in some direction away from that age. I think that is extremely important. I think that everybody feels that deep down inside. But our progress there must be extremely cautious, as I am sure everybody recognizes.

IMPACT OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON OTHER NUCLEAR COUNTRIES

Do you trust the Government of the Soviet Union, Mr. Warnke? Mr. Warnke. The answer has to be no, Mr. Schmitt. And that's why I say if you're going to get an arms control agreement, you have to have one that does not rely on trust, but which is, in fact, solid and verifiable.

Senator SCHMITT. Do you trust the Government of France?

Mr. WARNKE. I am not really clear on how to answer that question because I'm not really sure I know what you mean. Trust them to do what?

Senator Schmitt. Well, we tend to be negotiating with the Soviet Union all the time. There happen to be severela other major powers with nuclear weapons. And some other persons might well consider that we have left some participants out of this. And I think that we have to take account in those discussions what their reactions would be to certain kinds of situations which could start the whole ball rolling in the wrong direction.

Is that not right?
Mr. WARNKE, Yes.

Senator Schmitt. The Peoples' Republic of China is certainly another question, plus some of the very small countries that may or may not have a nuclear capability now or sometime soon in the future.

Mr. WARNKE. I gather the point that you are raising. Senator, is the question of what the impact would be of some kind of strategic arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, in light of the nuclear capability of other countries.

Senator SCHMITT. Yes, sir.

Mr. Warnke. You could reach some point at which reductions might get you down to the stage at which you would have to be concerned about these other countries. Obviously, at the present time we and the Soviet Union have nuclear arsenals which so far outweigh those of any other country, that we aren't even talking about the kinds of restraints that would put these other countries in a position of anything like competitors in the nuclear field. But that stage could be reached, I grant you, theoretically.

Senator Schmitt. And even a small country can trigger something

that would be very difficult to stop.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator Schmitt. You have been out of the direct mainstream of Government activity for 8 years and, presumably, from your remarks, you have not yet been given certain classified briefings and certain types of information that might supplement your very broad and general understanding of the area.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct, Senator, yes.

Senator Schmitt. I think you would be very interested in some of those briefings.

SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD CIVIL DEFENSE CAPABILITY

One area that is of some interest and has been of some public discussion is the area of civil defense, which I don't think has been touched on today. There's some concern that the Soviet Union may be moving very rapidly to have a civil defense capability that would allow to have acceptable losses in the case of a nuclear confrontation. Whatever acceptable means, I don't know, but we must realize that Soviet history is quite a bit different from that of the United States in terms of the kinds of losses that warfare has cost on their population.

Do you have any comment to make on that area?

Mr. Warnke. Yes; I think that you have to keep a very careful eye on any civil defense efforts that are initiated by the Soviet Union. The reports that I have seen in the press would indicate that they have a

very extensive civil defense effort going at the present time.

Now with the crazy nightmare logic of nuclear arms, civil defense can be destabilizing. It can have the same kind of impact as antiballistic-missile defenses because it eliminates the other side's retaliatory capability, then, obviously, it has destabilized the strategic balance. If the Soviets are developing an effective civil defense system, it might put them in a position where they could calculate that a nuclear first strike followed by our response would not yield unacceptable damage to them. Then, obviously, the strategic balance would be destroyed.

Senator SCHMITT. So doesn't, in this case, the old argument of over-

kill start to pale?

Mr. WARNKE. It would, indeed, yes.

Senator SCHMITT. For what reason do you see that?

Mr. WARNKE. Because you would not be in a position then where you have the assured retaliatory capability that would deter them from initiating a nuclear war.

Senator SCHMITT. So numbers of warheads start to become important, in that case actually far beyond the actual number of launch plat-

forms of strategic units.

Mr. Warnke. The number of warheads would become very important. If they were able to destroy a substantial part of our ICBM force and then have a civil defense effort which would render them less than substantially vulnerable to our submarine launched ballistic missiles, then our assured retaliatory capability would be destroyed, yes.

AREAS OF RESTRAINT IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Senator Schmitt. Mr. Warnke, what is your general philosophy with respect to research, development, and tests, insofar as that activ-

ity is at the leading edge of potential technology?

The concern I have is that if we were to exercise restraint in some areas, unbeknownst to us, there may be some major strategic breakthroughs, such as a transparent ocean which, whether it was Trident, Polaris, or what, would not make much difference, such as space systems, defense systems, that would essentially in an instantaneous way eliminate our communication capability.

Do you feel that those are areas of restraint that we cannot afford

to have?

Mr. Warnke. Those are areas of restraint that I would never advocate. It seems to me that on the research side you have to maintain ongoing programs. I believe even on such things as ABM's, that the ABM treaty does not foreclose continued research into the possibilities of ABM.

I think that you have to continue with that kind of a strong research

program to avoid technological surprise by the other side.

As you've suggested, for example, we rely now very heavily on our submarines and our submarine launched ballistic missiles as giving us the retaliatory capability that deters the Soviet Union. But that depends upon there not being the kind of antisubmarine warfare techniques that would render our submarines vulnerable.

We certainly ought to continue with the scientific effort that will enable us to know what is possible, and to put us in a stage in which

we are technologically still ahead of the Soviet Union.

Senator Schmitt. Do you think we are emphasizing those areas sufficiently today?

MAKING BALANCE OF TERROR LESS SIGNIFICANT, ASSUMING ARMS CONTROL

Mr. WARNKE. I could not tell you, Senator Schmitt, because I am

not in possession of the facts.

Senator Schmitt. Assuming that there were an arms control system set up that we felt confident in, we, the American people, in particular, how would you then go about changing the balance of relationships in this world so that eventually the balance of terror, as you have referred to it, and I also often refer to it, starts to become less significant in the activities of the world?

Mr. WARNKE. That, Senator, I am afraid would require that I begin to structure an entire foreign policy, and I am not sure that my colleague, Mr. Vance, would appreciate my getting that far ahead of

him.

Senator SCHMITT. But at least you admit that that is where the problem lies, then, in long-term foreign policy.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Schmitt. If, and I think we all pray to God that you are successful in reaching viable arms control agreements that are lasting, we still haven't taken the next step, the step of the future, to put ourselves in the position 30, 40, or 50 years from now where maybe the arms control agreements themselves are no longer necessary.

Mr. WARNKE. I certainly agree with that, Senator Schmitt. I like

the picture you present of that kind of world.

At the present, as I read to the committee at the beginning of my comments, we can only regard arms control and disarmament policy as an important aspect of foreign policy and one that must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. I would not pretend that it is the entire composite of foreign policy. It is just one element. I think it has been a neglected element. I regard it as being important.

IMPORTANCE OF U.S. NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Senator SCHMITT. One final, specific question. Do you view the National Guard and the Reserves of this country as a major element in our strategic deterrent force, in its broadest sense?

Mr. WARNKE. I am not really in a position where I could give a concrete answer on that.

Senator SCHMITT. Should it be?

Mr. WARNKE. I think the National Guard and Reserves ought to be studied very carefully; I would recommend that to Secretary Brown, and thank God it's his problem and not mine.

General laughter.

IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTION OF DETERRENCE

Senator Schmitt. Mr. Warnke, I appreciate your answers and your candid approach to the questions today. I particularly appreciated your comment and I will commend it back to you that one of the most important aspects of negotiation of our defense foreign policy is the perception of deterrence: It not only has to be there, it has to be perceived as being there. And if you carry that with you to the negotiating table, I think it will stand you in good stead and please, don't forget it.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.

HUMAN RIGHTS BEHIND IRON CURTAIN

Senator Pell [presiding]. As you know, this administration and many of us are concerned with human rights behind the Iron Curtain and how they are being abused, particularly in the Soviet Union.

Do you believe that this concentration on enlarging human rights in the Soviet Union will hamper you in your progress in regard to arms control, or do you think that it can continue or go along on two

tracks?

Mr. Warnke. That raises the entire question of the sometimes repudiated theory of linkage. I like the comments that have been made by the administration spokesmen in that regard. I don't think you are going to be able to get a strategic arms agreement that is any better by ignoring human rights as an element in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. But I think the Soviet Union has to recognize that to the extent that they appear to be indifferent to issues of human rights, that that makes the negotiating climate far less auspicious and the chances of our reaching an agreement become far less.

I think that is just one of the facts of life. To the extent that the Soviet Union behaves in a fashion which is consistent with our concepts of human liberty, it advances the prospects that we can negotiate

a strategic arms agreement.

POSSIBILITY OF UNDERSTANDING WITH CHINA

Senator Pell. As you know, China is moving ahead in the nuclear weapons development field.

Do you see any possibility of any understanding with China, or do we have to wait until she, too, has achieved parity or sufficiency with us?

Mr. WARNKE. I would certainly hope that China could be brought into the dialog and could be involved in arms control agreements. Far

short of that level, I don't know what Chinese intentions are, obvi-

ously, at the present time.

I was in China at one point and raised a question as to what they had in mind in terms of strategic weapons development. The answer that I received was that they did not anticipate being a competitor on a level with the Soviet Union and the United States, that they thought something far short of that would give them a sufficient deterrent against the Soviet Union.

Whether that is still the view or whether it even reflects a genuinely

held view, of course I cannot guarantee.

But in any event, it would seem to me that we cannot adopt at this point a defeatist attitude that says that until China acquires as many weapons as we have, she is not going to participate in any kind of arms control agreements. I would think that her interests could be served by effective arms control agreements, and that as a consequence, she would regard that as being in her interests.

POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING OTHER NUCLEAR COUNTRIES INTO DIALOG

Senator Pell. Do you see the other nuclear countries that are pursuing their course independently being brought into dialog with us, or will they remain separate?

Mr. WARNKE. I would think that depends, Senator Pell, on the success that the Soviet Union and the United States have in initiating

some effective arms control agreements.

I don't think they would participate at the present stage, and I don't think it would be helpful to encourage their direct participation. I think we have problems enough in the bilateral context, and making it multilateral, given the great disparity between our nuclear strength and that of third countries, would make that kind of negotiation extraordinarily difficult. It would just complicate the process.

EFFECT OF ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Senator Pell. I know that you have thought about this question of arms control and the use of nuclear weapons more than most men and women in our country.

What is your view of the effect on the Western Hemisphere if there

were an all-out nuclear war?

Mr. WARNKE. I think the result would be a tragedy that would dwarf anything in the history of mankind.

Senator Pell. Would the Northern Hemisphere remain viable for

Mr. WARNKE. I don't think anybody could say what the circumstance would do. It would depend upon, of course, how many of the weapons were launched. It would depend upon how many of those reached their targets.

But as I say, really, the apocalyptic nature of the consequence is such

that I don't think any of us could imagine.

That's why it seems to me that when we talk about surgical first strikes or counterforce strikes, that that does not take into account the fallout consequences and the fact that any strike which was designed

to eliminate a substantial fraction of our 1,054 ICBM's, necessarily would inflict casualties of an almost unimaginable nature. And the

same with any strike that we might make in response.

Senator Pell. But if they all were used, I had heard or read somewhere that that amount of radioactivity in the hemisphere would be sufficient to make the hemisphere unviable for human life for a period of time.

Mr. WARNKE. That could well be.

U.S. CAPABILITY OF RETALIATION

Senator Pell. On a more specific nature, you are undoubtedly aware of General Keegan's interview with the New York Times, where he, with what I guess was team B in the CIA assessment studies, came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union had rendered us incapable of carrying out our assigned wartime retaliatory tasks.

Is there any truth in that view?

Mr. Warnke. I don't believe that there is. I gather from the statement that was given by the Joint Chiefs that they don't believe that

statement is correct either.

As I understand it, what they have said is that, at the present time, the Soviets do not have strategic superiority, although they are concerned about what would happen if current trends continued into the 1980's.

USE OF GENERAL COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Senator Pell. Two other specific questions. The General Committee, I think it is, on Arms Control and Disarmament, has not been used very much in the last few years.

Do you have any thoughts about using it? What are your thoughts

in regard to its purpose?

Mr. Warnke. I think it can be a useful adjunct in the arms control process. I would hope that it can be, perhaps, buttressed with, I think, more emphasis on our participation in the deliberations and perhaps the fielding of concrete initiatives that might advance the cause.

Senator Pell. How often has it met in the past year?
Mr. Warnke, I couldn't really tell you, Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. I think that, for the record, I will ask the staff to find the answer and put that answer in the record.

The information referred to follows.

MEETINGS OF GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 1976-77

February 2–3, 1976; April 1–2, 1976; July 29–30, 1976; October 14–15, 1976; and January 6, 1977.

SUBMISSION OF WEATHER MODIFICATION TREATY

Senator Pell. One final question in connection with the weather modification treaty.

When do you visualize that being sent up to the Senate for

ratification?

Mr. Warnke. I understand, Senator Pell, that no date for signature has been arranged at the present time. I am sorry not to be informed on these subjects, but as you know, I am awaiting the action of the Senate before I put myself in a position where I will know the facts and be able to provide them to the Senate.

Senator Pell. I thank you very much. That concludes my questions.

Are there any further questions?

Senator Humphrey [presiding]. You go ahead, Cliff.

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will not take very long, but, as you know, I think that we have had a little difficulty in maintaining, as a committee, our responsibilities in the field of nuclear energy.

EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

There are in that connection a few questions that I would like to ask you about that problem, relating largely to the matter of export of nuclear material.

One of the bills that was introduced in this area in the last Congress set out a number of objectives, and one of them was to establish that there be a condition for the export by any nuclear producing country to a nonnuclear weapon country of nuclear materials, to require assurances that the recipient should apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities carried out under the control of that nation.

Is that, in your judgment, a desirable objective?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, it is, Senator Case.

Senator Case. Another suggestion in this area is that an exporting country should be obliged to require assurances that no imported or indigenously developed nuclear materials, equipment, or technology be used to produce an explosive device or nuclear explosion.

I take it you would agree with that.

Mr. WARNKE. I certainly would agree with that, Senator Case; yes. Senator Case. Do you think that an exporting nuclear nation should require assurances that no nuclear materials, equipment, or technology be transferred to any other nation or group of nations without assurances that the same criteria would be observed?

Mr. WARNKE. I do.

Senator Case. Do you believe that nuclear material, equipment, or technology should be exported without assurances from recipients that adequate physical security would be maintained to protect against theft or sabotage?

Mr. WARNKE. I do, Senator Case. Whether the transfer was on purpose or inadvertent, the consequences would be equally unfortunate.

Senator Case. Do you think that there ought to be assurances that recipient nations will forgo nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment on a national basis?

Mr. WARNKE. I think that would be very desirable.

Senator Case. Do you think they should agree to return spent fuels to the nation where the enriched fuel was obtained?

Mr. WARNKE. I would think that that would be a desirable precaution; yes.

Senator Case. Do you think that there ought to be assurances that recipient nations forgo stockpilings of weapon grade material on a national basis and put any such material under international management and control and inspection?

Mr. WARNKE. If, in fact, we are going to have any kind of effective

nonproliferation policy, that would be essential.

Senator Case. I appreciate your response on all of those particulars. Would you now give us a formula for bringing it all about?

General laughter.]

Mr. WARNKE. I will do that on my next appearance, if I am fortunate enough to have a next appearance.

General laughter.

Senator Case. You do believe that this is a most desirable objective and something that is within your area of concern.

Mr. WARNKE. I certainly believe the ACDA ought to be intimately

involved in the formulation of policy in this area, yes.

Senator Case. I do have some other questions which I will ask be answered for the record, a followup of some other matters that were brought up here.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. [The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Warnke's Responses to Additional Questions of Senator Case

Question 1. In your article in the Spring, 1975, issue of "Foreign Policy," you said: "Also needed is an approach to arms limitations that will cut through the complexities of the search for strategic nuclear equivalence under the disparate circumstances of Soviet and American concerns and given the asymmetries in nuclear armament. What would be tried instead is to evoke a process of matching restraint, either in advance of formal agreement, or appreciably below the limits set by negotiated accords . . ." (page 15).

Later in the article, you suggested a moratorium on further MIRVing of

the United States land and sea-based missiles, and a hold on development of Tridents and B-1 bombers. The pause would last six months, to be reviewed in

light of what actions the Soviets might take. (page 28).

You also say in your article "our present lead in technology and warheads makes it possible to take this initiative safely. No advances the other side might take in six months or many more could alter the strategic balance to our detriment.

Do you still think this six month hold is feasible and safe in view of what you may have learned since then about the pace of weapons developments and

deployments?

Answer. I believe that the immediate effort should be concentrated on completion of a SALT TWO agreement before the expiration of the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms this October. While I believe reciprocal restraint in the deployment of strategic arms would be feasible, safe and in the interests of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the timing is not now appropriate for any attempt to iniitate such a course of action except on a mutually agreed basis.

Question 2. On the tactical side, you suggested reducing the 7,000 nuclear weapons based in Europe (page 28). How would this affect the Mutual and

Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna? Answer. The United States and its Allies have now offered in the MBFR negotiations to reduce the number of the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europeas well as some U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft and Pershing missile launchersas part of an agreement in which the East would reduce its offensive forces. I would support this sort of initiative.

Question 3. In the Winter, 1976, issue of Foreign Policy, you say "a major contribution toward peace and toward reduction of the devastation of local hostilities could be made by agreement with the Soviet Union, and preferably the other major international arms suppliers as well, on tight limits on arms transfers, particularly to the Middle East and Africa." Is this a realistic avenue to pursue? What indications are there that the Soviet Union would go along with such an

Answer. I believe that at least an attempt should be made to pursue an agreement among major conventional arms suppliers similar to the agreed guidelines of nuclear suppliers. There is no question but that this will be a very difficult objective but it would appear to be at least worth an attempt. I note that the Congress has urged the Executive Branch to support this objective in recent

Question 3a. If they do, what are the dangers the Russians might break it to the advantage of their allies, given the shorter Russian supply lines to the Middle

East and Africa and their larger stocks of equipment on hand?

Answer. As with any agreement, there is always the chance that another party might violate it at some point, but any significant violations could be quickly detected and corrective action taken. Our friends in these areas will be alert to the protection of their own interests. Their security will be served by decreasing the flow of more and more destructive weapons.

Question 3b. Even if the Soviets agree, what are the chances that France

would do so in view of its past track record?

Answer. I have no bas a for estimating the likelihood of Soviet Union or France joining in such an arrangement. Certainly, arms transfers constitute a significant portion of France's foreign exchange. But I believe we risk nothing and could gain much by making the effort.

Question 4. Do you believe the long-range cruise missile would be of value in a European conventional defense? If both sides were to deploy the conventional long-range cruise missile in Europe, which side would benefit most?

Answer. Nuclear-armed cruise missiles could contribute to our conventional defense posture in Europe by taking over the nuclear missions of some of our tactical aircraft, freeing these aircraft for conventional roles. In the future, it is possible that conventionally-armed cruise missiles could be developed for theater use. The value of conventionally-armed cruise missiles would depend on their cost and effectiveness compared to alternative weapons for the same tasks, as well as their ability to penetrate defenses, all of which cannot be confidently assessed at this time. Since the U.S. leads the Soviets in the technology for small, accurate cruise missiles, the U.S. would benefit first from the deployment of such weapons. In the longer run, if both sides were to deploy such missiles, it is not clear that one side would benefit more than the other.

Question 5. There has been dissatisfaction with the content and quality of the

arms control impact statements in the past. Will you try to make them more

substantive? How?

Answer. I believe that the Arms Control Impact Statements can be made more useful and substantive than those that have been submitted in the past. The statements should provide the Congress with a sound basis for assessing the arms control impact of new military deployments and technology as part of its consideration of the Defense authorization and Defense appropriation bills.

The Arms Control Impact Statements should discuss more than whether a weapon system is consistent with the obligations of present treaties or those under negotiation. The statement should include an assessment of the system's effect on stability, of its potential for expanding the competition in nuclear arms, and the effect on our security in the event of deployment of similar systems by the Soviets.

A statement should address how a particular weapon system affects current negotiations and whether it is consistent with the long-term U.S. goals in arms control negotiations, including the requirement for adequate verifiability. This would also include a discussion of that system's effect on the bargaining situation.

I fully agree with the desire of Congress for Arms Control Impact Statements, and will work to see that they are provided in a timely and responsive manner.

Question 6. In your testimony you enumerated a number of conditions which you believed should be applied to nuclear exports. What can be done to gain agreement among the other nuclear suppliers on these points?

Answer. In my view, we should couple such conditions with assurance to user countries of arrangements for supplies of nonsensitive nuclear fuels, and

do all we can to allay the fears of other supplier countries that imposition of these conditions would place them at a competitive disadvantage as compared with the United States.

ADEQUACY VS. CONTENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET

Senator Humphrey, Mr. Warnke, I was out of the room when my turn for questioning came up and I just returned. I'd like to take just

A question has just been brought up here about the size of our defense budget. It will always be argued as to whether or not it is

I notice that General Graham, a gentleman who was on team B of the Central Intelligence Agency's study of the national intelligence estimate, said that there was a need-and I quote him-"for a coherent and integrated strategic policy within the Pentagon, and not more money or a bigger defense budget." He was much more interested in what we're doing with that budget than how big our defense budget vis-a-vis the Soviets. It means taking, to put it simply, a much closer look at each weapons system and each branch of the service as it sends up its budget request to the Congress for funding.

This gets back to some of the discussion on the different weapons

systems. Let me tell you what I'm more concerned about.

I think that we have people spending a lot of time talking about weapons systems that are going to be obsolete before they're ready, and there are quantum leaps which Senator Schmitt referred to in his questioning. The Russians today are not looking only at the Triad, but they're looking at a Quadrad, too, the outer space and what it can do to our communications system. I mean the kind of weaponry that can be used, the particles that can disrupt the whole communications system, the use of the laser beam. We talk about the B-1 being able to be a supersonic plane flying at low altitudes. We found out in the 1973 war in the Middle East, that the best tanks that could be provided by this country were blown to bits by weapons that we didn't even know that the Syrians had which had been supplied by the Russians. We had to come on in with some of our more advanced technology at the very tail end in order to permit the Israelis to survive.

What I'm gtting at is it seems like we're spending an awful lot of time trying to figure out whether we can build a bigger tank or a bigger bomber, when the R. & D. which really ought to be going on, is really

in a quantum leap over what is now existing.

Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, again, Senator Humphrey, this is probably getting more into Secretary Brown's field than mine, but my feeling is we have to take a very careful look at this entire question of whether or not we are building obsolete systems or other systems which are not optimally designed to cope with the current kind of military

I think I would agree also with General Graham, that the debate shouldn't be just about the cost of the defense budget; it ought to be about the content. What is that we're buying for the money, and are they in fact the systems which are best adapted to perform the

missions which are the desirable missions in today's world? And I'd like to see more study done on that. I'm sure that under Dr. Brown that there will be more study done on that.

SOVIET UNION'S TWO FRONTIERS

Senator Humphrey. When we talk of the Soviet defense budget, I think that we should keep in mind that they have 5,000 miles of frontier with the Peoples' Republic of China, which is not exactly just making cotton candy for the county fair for them to enjoy. There is a concern between these two countries, and the depth of that animosity or hostility or concern is always something we carefully measure.

But the Soviets, as an armed superpower, really have two frontiers: They have the frontier in the West with the Warsaw Pact, and they have a huge military establishment, particularly of manpower and

also of aircraft along the so-called Sino-Soviet frontier.

NECESSITY OF MUTUAL BENEFIT TO AGREEMENT

One of my colleagues asked you about trust. I was intrigued by both the question and the answer.

I remember one time De Gaulle said something like this: Nations

do not have friends; they have interests.

Every nation has an obligation to pursue what it believes to be its own interest, and we ought to start out that way. We're not running, a sort of charity bazaar here. This is a serious business. You can rest assured that the Soviets are going to try to take care of their interests as they see them.

I think it's our responsibility to take care of our interests and I think

we ought to perceive very carefully what those interests are.

Isn't it a fact that what we seek to do through negotiation is to arrive at understandings and agreements which meet our mutual interest and therefore can be trusted, because the only thing that can be trusted in these agreements is something that meets the respective interests of the parties?

You can build in alternatives to trust, as we have, for example, the satellites that monitor the nuclear explosions. Those are alternatives to trust. We use technology. But ultimately, the agreement must be

one that has a mutual benefit.

Is that not a fact?

Mr. Warnke. I believe that to be a fact, Senator Humphrey. I certainly agree that you can trust even the Soviet Union to pursue its own self-interest. And as a consequence what you have to do is convince them that their self-interest lies in having an effective, verifiable arms control agreement.

MORE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS ON OUTER SPACE

Senator Humphrey. I have one question from Dick Clark. He was unable to remain. He's conducting a hearing this afternoon on the Rhodesian issue. The question reads as follows:

"I'm very concerned with reports that the U.S.S.R. is creating the prospect of war in space with speed of light super weapons. Since last

February the Soviet Union has tested these weapons at least four times, following a pause since 1971. Some legal experts contend that the U.N.'s Outer Space Treaty of 1967 would effectively guard against hunterkiller satellite operations. But a number of experts are not so sure

and see both sides developing this capability-

"With so much riding on our space satellites, from vertification of Soviet activities to navigational aids for our military forces of vital interest to our submarines, do you see them as threatened? Do you see, in other words, our space satellites, for communication, for navigational purposes, for vertification purposes, threatened?"

And the question then is, "Should more specific negotiations be

opened on this Outer Space Treaty?"

Mr. WARNKE. If, in fact, there is any such move on the part of the Soviet Union, then that certainly is a development that we would have to look at with the gravest concern, and we certainly ought to have negotiations open to make sure that that sort of thing does not occur.

For one thing, as I understand it, it would be totally inconsistent with the provisions of SALT I, in which both sides undertook not to interfere with the other side's ability to verify what was going on. It's the sort of issue that ought to be discussed, therefore, in the standing consultative committee which has been established by SALT I. It also should be a subject of concern with respect to the Outer Space Treaty.

I would regard any such activity on the part of the Soviet Union as

being a very, very foreboding sign.

Senator Humphrey. I think we'll ask that this question be put to the Secretary of State, because I think it's a matter of such consequence in terms of the information Senator Clark has placed in my hands, that it ought to be passed on.

Senator Javits?

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS

Senator Javits. Yes; if my colleagues are all through, I would like to ask just one thing which has been raised constantly as indicating that the Soviet Union means us no good. That is civil defense. A big point has been made about the civil defense preparations. A fellow just came in to see me this afternoon and presented me with a book by somebody named Gouré, who purports to tell us how we are threatened. This indicates that they are preparing for civil defense.

Now two questions in that regard. One, do you consider that a proper subject for negotiation? And if so, in what way? And second, what does it mean vis-a-vis both the United States and Western Europe, and what does it mean with respect to the Peoples' Republic of China, which itself has, I gather, a considerable civil defense, with tunnels, underground factories, and whatnot?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, the answer to the first question, Senator Javits, is yes, I do consider this to be a subject that ought to be part of the negotiations. It obviously does involve the question of a challenge to your assured retaliatory capability. And therefore, I think I said in an answer to a previous question that it would have to be regarded in the same light as the anti-ballistic-missile defenses.

Accordingly, I think that it should be explored very thoroughly. And the implications, of course, are primarily in terms of our ability to be sure that they don't have a first-strike capability. And certain-

ly, that would be of concern to our Western European allies.

The Chinese civil defense effort, of course, is probably directed as much toward conventional attack as it is toward nuclear attack. I think that their tunnel system appears to be a sort of a massive derivative of the kind of thing they did during the Japanese occupation, And I would believe that they would consider this as being a desirable thing for them to have in the light of their hostility with the Soviet Union.

It does not threaten us, of course, because they don't have anything like the first-strike capability potential that the Soviet Union has.

Senator Javirs. Yes. Does it threaten the Soviet Union so that they would have a civil defense on account of the People's Republic of China civil defense?

Mr. WARNKE. That, of course, is one possible explanation for the Soviet civil defense effort. But that is not an adequate explanation if in fact it tends to destabilize the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We could not accept it just on the ground that even though it does challenge our retaliatory capability, that is really not what they

Senator Javits. I agree with you.

Mr. WARNKE. We would have to view it in terms of the effect, not

in terms of the motivation.

Senator Javirs. I am glad to hear that you consider that serious enough to be a proper issue between the parties.

Mr. WARNKE, I think it would have to be.

SOVIET ECONOMIC SITUATION

Senator Javirs. The other thing I wanted to ask you about, and if you have been asked, just tell me because I had to be away for Senator Clark's meeting, but I did want to ask you about the Soviet economic situation.

Brezhnev is making very important noises about the fact that this is breaking the back of the Soviet Union in money, and that they want to supply their people with the good things in life, and that, therefore, he is really genuinely interested in serious negotiations to reduce costs.

I have two questions on that. How big an issue do you think that

is? How much of a factor could it be in the motivation?

I have often referred to this as a two-man poker game in which we fix the stakes, either of us. At least it will be for a while, probably for many years.

So that is half the question. How serious is this and what can we

do about it ?

The other half of the question on the money side is, is this an element of your policy of, let's say, negotiated restraint, and, if so, again, how much of a factor, and what can be done with it as a factor?

Mr. Warnke. Well. I would certainly think that one of the motivations that the Soviet Union might have, which hopefully would lead them to favor some kind of arms control agreement would be the hope that they could reduce the cost of their defense effort.

Now how big a factor that would be I do not know at the present time, but I would hope to find that out. If, in fact, they are spending the amount of money that the CIA now concludes that they are, then obviously their defense effort is more of a burden to them than ours is to us, and we have a far stronger economy. I would certainly hope that they are feeling the pain and that this would lead them to favor some kind of effective arms control.

MONEY AS ITEM OF NEGOTIATION

Senator Javits. May I make a suggestion?

Assuming your confirmation, you'll be in an important position on this. It may be that the money equation, money, can itself be an item of negotiation, of great benefit to both countries because for us, somehow or other, it doesn't seem to come through in the defense budget. No matter what you cut out, it is still going higher, and higher, and higher. Probably that is true for them. Perhaps you'd give some attention to the finite details of how negotiation may also cut the money by having, say, two standards, you know. You reduce eight ICBM's, but you also lop off \$8 billion.

I submit that to you because it seems to me that that may be another way, and certainly one which would be tremendously attractive to

both parties.

Mr. WARNKE, Yes; it certainly would. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Javits. I hope you will be thinking about that. I don't know whether there is any feasibility to it. But you take the average American, and he knows that there are disarmament negotiations, Vladivostok and so on, but the Soviet Union is still coming on like gangbusters in terms of money spent on arms.

You will have that in mind?

Mr. WARNKE. I will certainly keep that in mind.

Senator Javirs. If there is anything that we could help with, I hope you will enlist the aid of this committee.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, Senator. I certainly would.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator Humphrey. We still have witnesses. I don't know what you are going to do from here on out, but I am going to leave in a little bit. I think it might not be too bad to give our witness a little relief. You've been sitting there for some time.

Mr. WARNKE, I am feeling very well, Senator.

Senator Humphrey. Psychologically you look good, politically you sound good, and physically, if you're all right, that will be great.

Senator Griffin. Won't there be hearings, Mr. Chairman, scheduled

for tomorrow?

Senator Humphrey. Yes; but we have Congressman Stratton here waiting to be heard. There will be hearings tomorrow at 2. I thought we ought to hear Congressman Stratton before we leave here tonight.

Can we limit our questions to 5 minutes, whatever we have left? Senator Griffin. Will there be an understanding then that if we have additional questions, we can submit them in writing?

Senator Humphrey. Absolutely. And responses will be made readily available to the person who submits the questions.

Senator Javits. And Mr. Warnke is subject to recall.

Senator Humphrey. Of course. If we want him, he will be back.

Senator Griffin. I don't know who is next. I have one or two questions.

Senator Humphrey. All right, go ahead.

CONDUCT OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Senator Griffin. Mr. Warnke, it has already been expressed here that not only the administration but the Congress, and particularly the Senate, is particularly interested and concerned about how these

SALT negotiations are to be conducted.

I would like to have you straighten out the record and tell us what the truth is. A recent column of Evans and Novak said: "President Carter's success in getting Paul Warnke to take the top Arms Control and Disarmament Agency post after Warnke turned it down"—is that correct? Did you turn it down first and then later accept it?

Mr. WARNKE. I was asked to consider taking the job, Senator, and I indicated that I thought I could not do it, but then the request was

renewed, and then I accepted.

Senator Griffin. Then the sentence continues: "Turned it down, but has raised deep suspicion among congressional Democrats that Warnke has a green light to negotiate strategic arms without Pentagon hindrance." I don't know what Pentagon hindrance means.

But do you have a green light of some kind?

Mr. WARNKE. There is no basis, in fact, for that statement.

Senator Griffin. What about an understanding?

Mr. Warnke. I have no such understanding, none whatsoever, Senator Griffin. I would be part, as I said earlier, of a team that would develop an agreed-upon administration position that would have to be accepted by the President. Part of my delegation at Geneva, of course, would be a Defense representative.

Senator Griffin. I think that is a good thing to have in the record.

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION'S POSITION ON CRUISE MISSILES

Mr. Warnke, you are on the advisory board of the Center for Defense Information.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator Griffin. In September of last year, that organization took the position that the United States should accept range limitations on cruise missiles, as I understand it. As a member of the advisory board, do you share the position they have taken? What position will you be in as a negotiator on cruise missiles, in view of this statement?

Mr. WARNKE. I have an entirely open mind on cruise missiles, Senator Griffin. I had no participation in the formulation of that particu-

lar recommendation at all.

Senator Griffin. That recommendation does not necessarily rep-

resent your personal viewpoint?

Mr. WARNKE. I have not made up my mind at the present time as to what position I would advocate.

NECESSITY OF VERIFICATION IN CRUISE MISSILE AGREEMENT

Senator Griffin. You do believe that, if there are restrictions, as far as an agreement generally is concerned, and as far as cruise missiles are

concerned, verification is going to be necessary?

Mr. Warnke. Verification would certainly have to be necessary. I think that is one of the problems involved in the cruise missile question because I do not believe that the satellites would be able to tell with any degree of reliability just what the range was of any given cruise missile.

Senator Griffin. That particularly applies in terms of some of the cruise missiles the Soviet Union has already developed and the capabilities that they have to put modern cruise missiles in launch canisters, as they have. If there were no verification, it would be very difficult to know whether they were complying with an agreement that related to these missiles.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator Griffin. Thank you very much.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

Senator Percy?

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

QUESTION OF PAUL NITZE'S TESTIMONY

The question of Paul Nitze's possible testimony came up earlier in today's session. I have just been successful in reaching Mr. Nitze who is lecturing this afternoon at the War College. He read to me the full text of his letter dated February 7 to Senator Sparkman. I believe Senator Sparkman put that letter into the record.

Paul Nitze indicated, in summary, that he would oppose the nom-

ination. He is opposed to anyone having both of these jobs.

He also is strongly in opposition, apparently, to testimony given March 9, 1976, by Mr. Warnke before the Budget Committee and the

philosophy that he believes that testimony represented.

I asked Mr. Nitze if he would wish to come in and testify, rather than just have his letter entered into the record, and he said he would be quite willing to do so if the committee wanted him to do so. He is not making a request, therefore. It is entirely a matter at the discretion of the committee.

I leave it to you, Mr. Chairman, to determine the consensus of the committee on whether he should be called as a witness.

MR. NITZE'S PERCEPTION OF MR. WARNKE'S POINT

And I would ask you, Mr. Warnke, whether you have had a chance to see that letter of February 7?

Mr. WARNKE, I have not.

Senator Percy. You have not. I will deliver a copy to you, then,

before you leave the room.

He starts out by pointing out two viewpoints after Vietnam. One view was that U.S. foreign and defense problems would continue, indeed might become more serious as a result of Vietnam, and could call for even more emphasis and greater prudence than had been devoted to them in the past.

There is a second point of view, with which he identifies you. He says, in fact, that there can be no question that you have been one of the most active vocal and persistent advocates of the second point of view.

Now, this second point of view, he describes this way:

In the contrasting view, the problems of the past had arisen largely from our own errors springing from over-emphasis on foreign policy, and particularly its defense aspects. Those taking the latter view believed our true strategic interests were limited to Western Europe, Japan and Israel: that the USSR presented our only military threat and that that threat could be deterred with forces less capable than those that had already been authorizel.

Therefore—so the argument ran—significant cuts could and should be made in a wide range of defense programs requested by the Executive Branch. It was hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to make certain parallel cuts, or at

least reciprocate by restraining the pace of its own programs.

That is a fairly complex concept and I would like to ask whether that is a true representation of your point of view, and whether you would like to comment on Mr. Nitze's perception of your point of view, which is one of the principal bases for his opposing your nomination.

You may wish to respond now in anticipation of Mr. Nitze's testi-

mony if, in fact, he is later asked to come in by the committee.

Mr. Warnke. I would have to study the letter with more attention than I can at the present time, Senator. I would disagree, of course, with the basic premise. I certainly do not believe that the problems of the past have arisen largely from our own errors springing from overemphasis on foreign policy.

I don't know where Mr. Nitze would have gotten that conception and as a consequence, since that is his premise, it seems to me that the remainder of the provisions are subject to that basic misunderstanding.

I certainly don't believe that our strategic interests are limited to Western Europe, to Japan, and to Israel. What I have suggested is that the primary military threat is the Soviet Union and that military forces ought to be optimized to deal with that particular threat.

Now, that doesn't mean that we don't have vital interests elsewhere in the world. Fortunately, in most instances, those vital interests will

not require the application of American military force,

We obviously have always had interests in the Western Hemisphere, but I am conscious at the present time of no outside military threat to Latin America and, as a consequence, if we were developing our forces with a view primarily toward that, or even significantly toward that, I would regard that as being a misdirection.

I think what I regard as a misconstruction is the distinction between our interests and those interests which have to be realized in terms of the application of military force. Military force is just one part of your overall national security policy. There are also such useful things as skillful diplomacy, the use of our economic power, the advantage that we have because of the fact that we have allies. All of those are methods by which we can implement our strategic interests.

I think, fortunately, the military threat to the United States is more limited than the military threat to the Soviet Union. It has been said, for example, that, fortunately, it is the Soviet Union, and not the United States, that finds itself surrounded by hostile Communist

countries.

Now, I think that the difference of view perhaps would be a question as to whether or not the primary protector of our national security interests and our strategic interests is our military force. I say that is one very important part of it, but it certainly is not the entire complex.

Senator Percy. The letter continues, but I understand we are under

the 5-minute rule.

Senator Humphrey. Yes; we are, because we have another witness

Senator Percy. I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the record be kept open so that immediately following the insertion of the letter of Mr. Nitze that Mr. Warnke be permitted to file a considered answer, responding to each of the points that are raised, so

the record may be clear.

Questions are raised, Mr. Warnke, as to whether you are qualified in the areas of military requirements, weapons capabilities, and strategy. Questions are raised about your negotiating ability and so forth, all of which go to the heart of your whole career. I think that you should have a full opportunity and I ask unanimous consent that the balance of my questions be incorporated in the record at this point, so they can be there for reply.

Senator HUMPHREY. The request will be granted and the response

will be placed in the appropriate place in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

MR. WARNKE'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS OF SENATOR PERCY

Question 1. Mr. Warnke, what role would you expect to play in SAL/T decision-

Answer. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides that the Director is to be the President's principal adviser on arms control and disarmament. As an adviser to the President, I would expect to play a significant role in the SALT decision-making process. Since the ACDA Director is also a statutory adviser to the National Security Council, I would participate in all deliberations of that body on SALT. Additionally, as Chairman of the SALT Delegation, I would be charged with implementing instructions of the President arrived at after interagency discussions in Washington.

Question 2. General Keegan is quoted as saying, "By every criterion used to measure strategic balance—that is, damage expectancy, throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage or technology-I am unaware of a single important category in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States. Taking each criteria in turn, has the Soviet Union achieved a significant lead in damage expectancy, throw-weight, in equivalent megatonnage or technology?

Answer. Estimating the total damage which a strategic force could inflict on the other side is extremely complex and cannot be characterized by any single measure of strategic capability. It is not clear whether the Soviets or the United States leads in this respect. Each has the capacity to devasate the other's sociey. The Soviets have a significant lead in missile throw-weight, while the U.S. has a significant lead in bomber payload. The Soviets have a small advantage over the U.S. in the equivalent megatonnage of their respective strategic forces. The U.S. presently leads the Soviets in most of the technology of strategic weapons, such as guidance, solid propollants, submarine quietness, and electronics.

Another criterion usually included in assessments of the strategic balance is the total number of independently targetable warheads, in which the U.S. has

a significant lead.

Question 3. As you know, this Committee has before it two treaties on nuclear matters—the proposed Thresho'd Test Ban Treaty and the proposed Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. What is your view on these two treaties, particularly in regard to their relationship to any comprehensive ban proposal? Secondly, what is your recommendation in regard to Senate action on these

two treaties?

Answer. In view of the administration's intention to pursue a complete ban, some may feel that these two treaties have been overtaken by events. Nevertheless, they do set some limits on nuclear explosions by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, I believe that these two bilateral agreements should be ratified by the United States at an appropriate time, making it clear that such ratification is not to stand in the way of prompt efforts toward achieving a total,

Question 4. What effect do you believe ratification of these two treaties would have upon other nations? Would ratification have any effect in regard to nu-

clear proliferation?

Answer. If perceived by other nations as part of our effort to achieve a total ban, I believe such ratification would be seen as consistent with our non-proliferation efforts. But, so long as the non-nuclear-weapon-States believe that proliferation of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons is not effectively restrained, our efforts to strengthen the regime against horizontal proliferation will be correspondingly difficult. Therefore, it is important that in going forward at an appropriate time with ratification we make clear our commitment to a total ban. Of course, ratification of these two treaties could not be expected to enhance significantly the prospects that France or China will phase out their nuclear explosion programs.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Danforth?

DIALOG BETWEEN MR. WARNKE AND MR. NITZE SUGGESTED

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, before I start my abbreviated questioning, I would like to say that I hope we do invite Mr. Nitze to come. I would hope, in fairness to Mr. Warnke, that both of them could participate in a dialog, because I take it the two of them represent two very different philosophical positions: and in answer to the specific questions today, I am not sure that Mr. Warnke's philosophical position has been sufficiently brought out.

I think we are doing something very important. I would feel much better if Mr. Nitze and Mr. Warnke were talking to each other than if Jack Danforth and Mr. Warnke were talking to each other.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Nitze is not up for confirmation and we will take this up with the chairman. I understand your point of view, but we do not generally precipitate that kind of confrontation here.

Senator Percy. Maybe the League of Women Voters would sponsor

a public debate on this subject.

General laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. I do think the chairman would want to entertain your request.

Mr. WARNKE. I would raise, in that connection, Senator Humphrey,

a couple of points.

First of all, I would not want to get into a detailed analysis of what the U.S. negotiating position ought to be-

Senator Humphrey. I wouldn't think so.

Mr. WARNKE [continuing]. In any kind of public debate. So from the standpoint of my talking to Mr. Nitze rather than my talking to Senator Danforth, I think that would be one problem.

The second objection I would have is, I am not sure I am talking to

Mr. Nitze anymore. General laughter.

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, may I start my 5 minutes now?

Senator Humphrey. We will put the old watch on you right now. Senator Danforth. I will ask you one long question. Senator Humphrey. OK, 5 minutes.

POSSIBILITY OF COUNTERVALUE NUCLEAR FORCE

Senator Danforth. My concern is that the position you are taking will put us in a position where the choice will be only one and that will be a countervalue nuclear force. That is, the position we are going to get ourselves into is that, if we are faced with a conflict with the Soviet Union, the only real response available to us will be a massive nuclear war in which urban populations will be the targets.

I believe that that is the question by Mr. Nitze in his article in "Foreign Policy" a few months ago, called Deterring Our Deterrents.

My concern is that your position, essentially, with respect to conventional weapons has been that there is no such thing as a conventional war any more; that you would rely on tactical nuclear weapons to fight what used to be a conventional war; that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war; that the Soviet Union may get themselves in a position of having the ability on a first strike with counterforce nuclear weapons to take out our ICBM's and our bombers; and that the only thing then available to us in a reaction to, say, nuclear blackmail on the part of the Soviet Union, in essence, would be that the United States would be faced with a position in which its only strike against the Soviet Union would be countervalued against the civilian population so that their retaliation would be a much greater strike against our civilian population.

That is my primary concern with your position as I understand it. And maybe I have totally mischaracterized it, but I would like

you to address yourself to it.

Mr. WARNKE. Let me say, Senator Danforth, that if that were my position, you would have every reason for concern. There is virtually no substantial element of that statement that represents my position.

I am sorry that I have apparently laid myself open to misunder-

standing.

In the first place, I do not think that any good strategic arms agreement would put you in a position where that sort of countervalue nuclear strike would be your only option. I think that would be a distinct setback to our security and to strategic stability.

I think, instead of that, what you ought to have is a strategic arms control agreement which diminishes the chances of their being any

kind of nuclear war.

Now, as far as my feeling about conventional force is concerned, contrary to believing that we ought to rely on tactical nuclear weapons, I believe we ought to study our conventional fighting capability far more closely than we have in the past. That is why I have supported consistently the maintenance of a substantial conventional military force in Europe.

If I believed only in nuclear weapons, I certainly would not feel that having 300,000 Americans in Europe was a sensible expenditure of

American funds.

I think that what we ought to have is the ability to respond commensurate with the nature of the attack. Accordingly, I think we

should have the quick reaction capability in Europe to deal with the least unlikely military contingency which would be an aggressor's attack perhaps of a limited nature for a limited objective.

I am not sure that we have our forces best prepared for that at the present time. That, to me, is a war which could very well occur under some circumstances and which would, in fact, remain conventional.

What I have suggested is that if you had a protracted conventional war, the chances of keeping that conventional would be very, very small because over a period of time the changing tides of battle would put one side or the other in a position in which it felt it was losing and it would not be prepared to lose a conventional war.

Now, that to me is a less likely scenario than the more limited conventional war that would, in fact, remain conventional. I, therefore, feel that our conventional power has to be maximized to deal with the

least unlikely military contingency.

I think that for us to have no conventional response would be just a serious dereliction of our defense responsibilities. And as I say, with respect to trying to end up with a situation in which any use of nuclear weapons would be the ultimate use of nuclear waepons, again, that would be a setback to our national security. We should make every effort to have the kind of regime in which we would have some chance at keeping a nuclear war limited.

Now, President Carter has the view that that would be a very, very difficult thing. I agree with him. But certainly, from the standpoint of any strategic arms agreement, we ought to see to it that the chances of keeping it limited would be maximized rather than eliminated.

I don't know whether that answers your concern, but I have been trying to express my difference with your statement of what you perceive to be my position.

Senator Danforth. Thank you.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Hatch?

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Are you familiar with Public Law 92-448, the Jackson amendment?

JACKSON AMENDMENT CONCERNING EQUALITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Mr. WARNKE. That is the Jackson amendment with respect to equality in intercontinental ballistic delivery systems? Yes.

Senator Hatch. Yes. In other words, the recognition by Congress that we want to maintain some sort of parity with our enemy forces.

What is your understanding of this public law and how do you plan to meet the conditions of this law in the negotiations that you will try to conduct?

Mr. WARNKE. I think really that principle was part of the stimulus for the Vladivostok Accords which do embody the principle of equality. Obviously, in negotiations, I will abide by the law of the United States.

Senator Hatch. Do you agree with that law and its purposes?

Mr. Warnke. I do; in terms of a permanent agreement. I certainly do. That is the difference I tried to explain to Senator Griffin earlier.

It is the difference between an interim agreement for a limited period of time where we have a very substantial lead in nuclear warheads, and a lasting agreement which hopefully is going to continue over a substantial period of time.

I think a lasting agreement should embody the principle of equality.

POSITION OF MINIMUM DETERRENCE

Senator HATCH. OK. You have spoken many times about the need to reach a position of minimum deterrence; in other words you want the United States and the Soviet Union to have the lowest possible nuclear arsenal. What size arsenal would you consider to be minimally appropriate?

Mr. WARNKE. I don't recall any comment I have ever made with re-

gard to trying to reach a position of minimum deterrence.

Senator HATCH. Do you have any position with regard to minimum deterrence?

Mr. WARNKE. Minimum deterrence to me means just the ability to strike back and kill a lot of Russians. I don't think that is an adequate deterrent.

I think we should have, as I have said before, not only the assured retaliatory capability but also have apparent, perceived equality of nuclear forces, as well as the ability to utilize them on less than an all-out basis. So I don't accept the doctrine of minimum deterrence.

Now, I gather that another implication of your question is how far down could we and the Soviets reduce our forces without rendering ourselves vulnerable to some third country. Well, I would like to have that problem, Senator Hatch. I would like to have it first.

I would like to be in a situation in which the forces had been cut back to a point where that became a problem. I don't see that really in the foreseeable future.

Senator Hatch. Would you cut back on our forces without a corresponding cutback by them—

Mr. WARNKE. Of course not; no.

Senator Harch [continuing]. Other than your program of cutting back for maybe 3 to 6 months and seeing if they follow suit?

Mr. WARNKE. I say that if you could initiate, in the absence of negotiations, a process of reciprocal restraint, that might be some sort of substitute for agreements.

My objective at the present time would be to reach an agreement and have nothing but agreed-upon reductions.

PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION

Senator Hatch. Turning to the problem of verification, how far can we trust the Soviets and how far would you rely on their goodwill? And in what precise areas do you think verification of Soviet arms limitation is possible and what areas are impossible? That is a lot of questions, I know.

Mr. Warnke. Well, you cannot really consider verification except in terms of a specific agreement, and since I don't know as yet the terms of the sort of agreement that we could work out, I don't know what

verification procedures would be necessary.

But I have answered previously the question as to whether or not I would take an agreement to the Congress, or present an agreement for the approval of the President of the United States that relied on just trust in the Soviet Union.

Senator Hatch. What verification procedures would you insist on

as a negotiator?

Mr. Warnke. I think you would have to have verification procedures that would assure you that they were not violating the terms of the agreement and that would require, of course, such things as noninterference with national means of detections.

That is why I would be very concerned about any efforts to inter-

fere with our satellites.

In addition, I would think that some measures of onsite inspection will become necessary when you reach the point of getting genuine

arms control.

Now, I think that the Soviet Union would have to recognize that there would have to be what they would regard as more intrusive methods than they were prepared to accept in the past. Now, whether or not they will accept those kinds of measures, I don't know; but that would be part, it seems to me, of the precondition of having any kind of effective arms control regime.

Senator Hatch. Will you conclude any agreements without some

sort of effective verification procedures?

Mr. WARNKE. I would not recommend any such agreement. I would not.

Senator HATCH. In other words, you would walk away without any

good verification?

Mr. Warnke. I think, Senator Hatch, than an agreement which is not verifiable is worse than no agreement. It is a source of instability rather than stability.

Senator Hatch. Thank you.

MAKING OF ULTIMATE AND FINAL DECISIONS

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Warnke, you have been very patient. We had a bit of an exercise here today in the processes of Government.

As much as I admire you, I have to tell you, you are not President. Yet questions have been placed to you as if you were the Commander in Chief. The President of the United States, who is designated by the Constitution as being the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and who is the chief spokesman of this Nation in matters of foreign policy and national security, will make the ultimate and final decisions that you will have to carry out.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct, of course, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. You are but his agent and you will carry out decisions made as a result of consultation by members of the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs—not just the chairman; the National Security Adviser.

All of these instruments of the Government and all of these members of Government will be working with the President to work out what is our negotiating posture and strategy. You will be involved, but

as much as I admire you, you will not be calling all of the shots. I think that needs to be clear for this record.

You will be the instrument of the agreed-upon policy of the Government of the United States. You will have opportunity to make your input. All of that is in the law.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator Humphrey. It is in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act. Indeed, I think that many of the questions have been directed as though somehow or other you were going to make all of these decisions on your own.

I can trust you, may I say, and I want to make it clear, that I would have no difficulty, as one Senator, in trusting you to make the right decisions. But having served in the executive branch, I think you are going to find out, as you did when you served in the executive branch, that there will be decisions made where you don't always gets your way. I cannot recall ever getting mine. [General laughter.]

I wasn't supposed to; I was only a Vice President. They don't have

anv authority: they just have responsibility.

Gerard Smith, who was a fine man and negotiated our SALT I was from the Atomic Energy Commission. He had a little stint in the State Department; then he was the publisher of a magazine. He didn't make all the decisions on SALT I. I know Henry Kissinger would never want me to say that, and neither would Mr. Nixon. The President of the United States, with his advisers, made those decisions, and Gerard Smith carried them out and did a good job.

Bill Foster came out of private industry. I worked very closely with Bill Foster on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. I helped him with that matter. He didn't make the decisions. In fact, I was sent to Europe to tell him some of the decisions that had already been made

for him. I know that, and I admire him greatly.

Dr. Ikle came from RAND and whatever input he had into any of these negotiations, he didn't make those decisions; he carried them out. In his instance, he was an advisor; he was not the negotiator, obviously.

I want it clear because sometimes as the record is developed we begin to think the witness before us is the alpha and the omega of all that is going to take place when, in fact, you undertook this responsibility at the encouragement of the President knowing full well that you would work under his instructions and within the framework of his policy.

Your role is significant, but I submit that it is only part of the process, which you clearly understand. I think every member of this com-

mittee should understand that.

COMMENDATION OF MR. WARNKE

I thank you for your frank and responsive answers today. You have been a remarkable witness and have had immense patience. We let you go now and wish you Godspeed.

We may have to, or will want to call you back, but I haven't the slightest doubt that you have favorably impressed every member that

has been here today.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you very much, Senator Humphrey.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you, sir. Is Congressman Stratton here?

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Would you mind coming back tomorrow, or would you prefer to testify tonight?

Mr. Stratton. Well, if I could be the first witness on tomorrow.

Senator Humphrey. You could if you were in the House, but Senator McClure will be No. 1 tomorrow. That will be out of senatorial courtesy.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, why don't I go on tonight, then? I have been

waiting for 4 hours.

Senator Humphrey. I know just what you mean. I have had two meetings I have missed this afternoon, but frankly, I think the ones that I missed weren't half as important as the one I attended.

If you want to testify, how much time do you need because I have a

choice between you and my wife?

Mr. Stratton. About 15 minutes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Mrs. Humphrey will tolerate that,

Mr. STRATTON. I have the same problem.

Senator Humphrey. Thank God for married men.

Mr. WARNKE. Am I excused, sir?

Senator Humphrey. You are indeed.

We will take a brief recess. [A brief recess was taken.]

Senator Humphrey. Congressman Stratton, you are, without a doubt, one of the most patient men that has ever graced the Halls of Congress. That has been demonstrated beyond human capacity this afternoon.

So with those introductory remarks welcoming you, would you please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL STRATTON, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Stratton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, I am not know for my patience, but having prepared carefully for my testimony, I felt duty bound to present it. My only concern is that I may be injecting a somewhat jarring note into what has been an otherwise pretty harmonious hearing, considering that it is taking place in the U.S. Senate.

But I am here, Mr. Chairman, as one who has spent 18 years as a member of the House Armed Services Committee concentrating on national security and foreign policy matters, and I am here to oppose most emphatically the nomination of Mr. Warnke as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as the chief negotiator in

the forthcoming SALT II negotiations.

My opposition is based on Mr. Warnke's published views on national security issues which, incidentally, don't jibe completely with what has been stated today; his views on the nature of the Soviet threat and on the handling of SALT negotiations. Mr. Warnke, as chief SALT negotiator, would in my judgment, be the wrong man in the wrong job at the wrong time.

Of course, the power to confirm executive nominations resides exclusively in the Senate. But in today's strategic environment, the selection of a chief SALT negotiator must be a matter of grave concern as much to every Member of the House as to every Member of the Senate. Indeed, if previous practices are adhered to, any agreement resulting from these negotiations must be approved by both the House and the Senate. Since the outlook of the chief negotiator will obviously have a major impact on the shape of whatever agreement emerges from these negotiations, as Senator Danforth pointed out earlier this afternoon, all of us in the Congress must exercise extreme caution in the person whom we approve to exercise that responsibility.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET STRATEGIC SITUATION OVER PAST FEW YEARS

To appreciate the disturbing implications of the Warnke nomination, let me review briefly the strategic situation between ourselves and the Soviets as it has been developing over the past few years. With the end of the Vietnam war, a strong antimilitary bias set in here in the Congress, as a result of which substantial cuts were made in the defense budget over a period of 4 or 5 years, culminating with a whopping \$9 billion cut in fiscal 1976. In the process, America's defense capabilities, ships at sea, men under arms, and vital research and development effort all went into a steady decline.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was continuing its policy of rapid military development on every front, fielding during that same period a number of advanced design weapons, planes, tanks, missiles, and nuclear missile submarines. Many military experts concluded that with American power steadily declining and Soviet military power steadily advancing, the Soviets had either already achieved military superiority over us or were on the verge of attaining such superiority.

And then last year, for reasons that are not entirely clear still, the Congress unexpectedly made a 180° turn and approved a defense budget for fiscal 1977 almost as substantial as the one submitted to us

by the Ford administration.

That action was a legislative landmark, because after 6 or 7 years of steady decline, America's military strength had finally begun to move upward again. Congress had been warned that if we had any interest in trying to keep up with the feverish pace of Soviet military advance, to prevent them from gaining superiority, defense spending would have to increase between 2 and 4 percent each year, discounting inflation. Even at that, we would not be moving toward superiority, only toward maintaining what Secretary Rumsfeld had called rough equivalence with the Soviets.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

So the question before us and the country in February 1977 is this: Where do we go from here? Do we continue the trend set in motion last year? Or do we go back to the old habit of hacking away at defense in the belief that it is already too big, and that the money in it would be better spent on social and welfare programs?

At the very time when America has repudiated its earlier policy of repeated defense cuts and made the conscious decision not to let the Soviets get ahead of us, it makes no sense at all for us to name as our principal representative in the most sensitive and far-reaching

negotiations of all, a man who, regardless of what hard-lined views he may now be giving to this committee and has, in fact, been presenting them this afternoon, has at each step of the way over the last 8 years, when you look at the record, repeatedly and consistently opposed every new weapon or improved military capability that we have undertaken.

MR. WARNKE'S OPPOSITION TO COMPONENTS OF U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT

In 1972, as the head of the McGovern Panel on National Security and a top defense advisor to Presidential candidate McGovern, Paul Warnke joined in opposing-not questioning, by the way, as was mentioned earlier, but opposing the MIRVing of our ballistic missiles, opposing Minuteman III, favoring dismantling of all Titan ICBM's, favoring a stop to the conversion of Polaris submarines to Poseidons, opposing the B-1, opposing the ABM, and favoring a 50-percent cut in the Army's air defense missiles. A later report of the same Mc-Govern Panel also opposed improvements in missile accuracy, opposed development of a hard-target capability, opposed the cruise missile, opposed the ABM, opposed bomber defense, opposed the AWAC's (airborne warning and control system), opposed MIRVing our Polaris/Poseidon missiles, and opposed development of the Trident submarine.

In fact, as has already been pointed out by Senator Nunn and others, over the years, whatever Mr. Warnke may be saying now as he moves from one Senate office to another, Mr. Warnke has opposed development of virtually all of the current components of our nuclear deterrent, which will in fact be the key issue in the forthcoming SALT negotiations, weapons whose destructive power, incidentally, have been primarily responsible for bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table in the first place.

In 1974, 2 years later, Mr. Warnke was still on the same track. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, he opposed the B-1. He didn't question it; he opposed it. He opposed the F-14, opposed the Navy's base at Diego Garcia, favored a 200,000 man cut in our military personnel, favored-incidentally, contrary to what he

said this afternoon—a cut in our NATO troops.

Senator Humphrey. I wish you could document that because, as one of the leaders of the fight to maintain military troops in NATO, I vigorously opposed the Mansfield amendment. I remember talking to Paul Warnke and asking him, and he told me, no way cut those troops.

Mr. Stratton. I reviewed the testimony, Mr. Chairman, before I made the statement and I would be glad to supply it to the committee. My recollection was that it was a 30,000 figure.

The information referred to follows:

HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. SENATE, 93RD CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, ON H.R. 16243

NATO FORCE REDUCTION

Chairman McClellan. Let us start with that. Overseas how many would you take away from NATO?

Mr. WARNKE. I probably would make a minor cut in NATO force.

Chairman McClellan. What is a minor cut? Mr. WARNKE. Something like 30,000.

Chairman McClellan, 30,000 from NATO. Would you demobilize these? Mr. WARNKE, I would.

Mr. McClellan. You would take them out of the service? That would be part

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct. In our report we propose that what we ought to take a look at are the support forces of NATO and actually make a 15-percent cut in total support forces.

Chairman McClellan. What do you mean by support forces?

Mr. WARNKE. Those other than those who are directly or indirectly engaged in combat.

Chairman McClellan. You would leave most of the combat forces there?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes; for the time being.

Chairman McClellan. You believe that in taking a 15-percent cut in the support forces this would leave the combat forces with adequate support? Mr. WARNKE, Yes.

KOREAN FORCE REDUCTION

Chairman McClellan. Now let us go to Korea. How many forces would you take out of Korea?

Mr. WARNKE, I would remove all the division from Korea.

Chairman McClellan. Remove all from Korea?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir.

Chairman McClellan. And demobilize them?

Mr. WARNKE. And demobilize them.

SOUTHEAST ASIA FORCE REDUCTION

Chairman McClellan. Southeast Asia, what would you take from here? Mr. WARNKE, I would certainly eliminate those forces that are being maintained in Thailand for the possibility of reintervention in Vietnam.

Chairman McClellan. And demobilize them?

Mr. WARNKE, Yes. I believe, Mr. Chairman, unless you demobilize those forces you bring home, you don't really realize much in the way of budgetary savings. Chairman McClellan. Where else now? I mentioned NATO, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Do we have forces anywhere else?

Mr. Warnke. I think at the present time we have something like 520,000 troops overseas. What I am talking about is a reduction—

Chairman McClellan. Most of those are in NATO, of course?

Mr. Warnke. About 300,000 in NATO, the others elsewhere. I believe something like 180,000 are in Asia. As our report suggests, we think that the major reductions should come from the Asian forces. I think we have learned again, as we have learned in the past, that it is not really desirable for the United States to equip itself for ground wars in Asia. I doubt that a contingency exists and I doubt that, if it did occur, use of our armed forces would be the way to respond to it.

I think also we ought to be looking toward more substantial reductions in the

NATO forces over a period of time.

Chairman McClellan. I am talking about this year. The fact is that I fully agree with you. I would take out more than the 30,000.

Mr. WARNKE. As I say, that would be as far as I was concerned the first with-

drawal. I think that timing is very important, Mr. Chairman, in this regard. Chairman McClellan. I agree with you about taking them out of NATO. I am not certain that would be well to demobilize them, I don't know. I feel that we have done our share and more over there for a long, long time. Anyway, I am just getting this information in general terms. I think you have substantially answered these questions.

Mr. Stratton. He opposed the Trident submarine, opposed improving the accuracy and yield of our nuclear missiles, favored a slowdown in the development of nuclear attack submarines, and opposed the SAM-D missile.

Last year, in 1976, it was once again the same consistent story of negativism on defense. Testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, Mr. Warnke opposed the B-1 bomber, and the Trident submarine, two of the very few efforts we have made over the past decade to upgrade and modernize our own nuclear deterrent force to offset all of the myriad improvements which the Soviets made over the same period.

REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF PROJECT ON BUDGET PRIORITIES

One of the organizations on which Mr. Warnke has been active—he was its Chairman—was the Advisory Committee of the Project on Budget Priorities. In 1974, that group issued a pamphlet entitled, "A Report to Congress: Military Policies and Budget Priorities, fiscal year 1975." The letter transmitting this report was signed by Mr. Warnke, and the pamphlet lists him as convenor of the reporting committee.

The report states as follows:

The effort to gain congressional control of the defense budget in fiscal year 1975 should, first of all, accept the view supported in this report that the world situation will not require, for the foreseeable future, constant dollar increases.

Congress, however, should go beyond merely holding the budget constant and should begin to require the Pentagon to squeeze the fat out. This efficiency program could be implemented by a 3-percent reduction in appropriations, in constant dollars, for each of the next 5 years.

In other words, while the Nation's top defense officials were telling us that we must increase the defense budget by at least 2 percent a year in constant dollars if we are to maintain even rough equivalence with an expanding Soviet military posture, Mr. Warnke was proposing to decrease that budget by 3 percent a year over a 5-year period. If that particular Warnke plan had been adopted in 1974—fortunately, it wasn't—our defense budget today would be \$28.8 billion below the one submitted to us in January by the Ford administration; in other words, a cut of \$28.8 billion, contrasted with a cut of only \$2.8 billion which is now under consideration by the Carter administration.

MR. WARNKE OUTSIDE MAINSTREAM OF CURRENT U.S. DEFENSE THINKING

Mr. Chairman, on the basis of these consistent and repeatedly espoused views, the nominee reveals himself to be clearly outside the mainstream of current American defense thinking, both in the Congress and in the country. Last December, "Opinion Research" reported that 71 percent of the American people believed our defense budget was adequate or should be increased. Only 16 percent favored cutting it. A Gallup poll taken about the same time showed 63 percent either in favor of the present budget or wanting a larger one, compared to only

27 percent favoring cuts.

The sweeping cuts which Mr. Warnke has been espousing, year after year, regardless of what was taking place in other areas of the world, prove him manifestly unqualified for the special responsibility for which he has been nominated. This kind of cut defense thinking was highly fashionable 4 or 5 years ago. Today, it is dangerously obsolete. Oh, of course, Mr. Warnke will be assuring you that he espouses an adequate defense, and he has gone beyond that today. But how odd that over the years, whenever the chips were down, he has always managed to come down, year after year, in opposition to virtually every new military development and improvement this country has put forward.

MR. WARNKE'S ABILITY TO DEFEND MAINTENANCE OF WEAPONS QUESTIONED

How could such a person possibly defend, with a straight face, across the table from all those tough, unsmiling, hardnosed, implacable Soviet negotiators that always surface at every disarmament negotiation, the maintenance of all these weapons which he has so consistently opposed, and which today, despite his opposition over the years, comprise the real strength of our nuclear arsenal which in virtually every other category is numerically inferior to the Soviets?

He just couldn't do it. The Russians would quote his own words

right back to him, and the American position, at least as far as our own

point man was concerned, would be devastated.

I might say parenthetically at this point, Mr. Chairman, that much has been made of the point that the top SALT negotiator is, after all, only going to be following the position of the President, but the fact of the matter is, he is the negotiator. He is the man who sits across the table from the Russians and certainly he is the one who is going to have to make the arguments and make the defense.

Senator Humphrey. But you would agree, would you not, Congressman, that he can only make the arguments which he is authorized to make? You don't have that flexibility. We have it in Congress. We can run all over the lot here, playing roly-poly, but you can't do

that when you are over in the executive branch.

When you get those instructions, you are going to follow those

instructions.

Mr. Stratton. I am sure that the bargaining committee in a labormanagement negotiation only does what the membership wants it to do, but obviously, they are not there every minute of the day and every minute of the discussion and our chief negotiator is the man who has to sound convincing, who has to know when to push and when to back up; and I just don't believe that a person who has had this consistent history, not just in the last couple of days, but over at least the last 8 years, could do that job.

MR. WARNKE'S ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE PRECISE AGREEMENT QUESTIONED

Certainly all of us recognize, Mr. Chairman, the importance of the upcoming SALT II negotiations and all of us-and that includes me—are hopeful that they will succeed. Obviously, there is no point in escalating the level of nuclear deterrence, so long as we can be sure of maintaining a genuine balance in our capabilities, and so long, as I have already said, as the agreement that spells out that

balance is unambiguous, verifiable, and self-enforcing.

We may have a start in achieving such a mutual balance in the SALT I agreement, a document widely hailed at the time, but in subsequent years we have come to realize that there were so many ambiguities in SALT I that we can no longer be certain it actually represents a real balance today. One of the first requirements of a SALT II agreement is that it end those ambiguities and loopholes in SALT I. The only way to provide such certainty is with a precise document obviously, carefully spelled out, with all the t's crossed and all the i's dotted.

But here again, the record, contrary to what we have heard today, shows that Paul Warnke is emphatically in no position to preside over the kind of negotiations that lead to a precise written agreement.

He gave us a very reevealing insight into his view on this particular question in an article in the spring of 1975 issue of "Foreign Policy" entitled, "Two Apes on a Treadmill." Here are Mr. Warnke's precise proposals for conducting nuclear negotiations. Now, he backed completely away from these statements before this committee in the 3 hours that I sat here, Mr. Chairman, but I suggest that they still represent his views because he had them reprinted this morning on the Op-Ed page of the New York Times.

From the questioning of this committee, I am sure that every member has read the document and I will only touch on part of the portions that I have included in my statement, but I think that we ought

to remember that this nominee said these things:

"The ongoing process seems to aggravate the problem." He is talking about arms negotiations. "Rather than creating a climate in which resrtaint can be practiced, the existence of the negotiations themselves has been an occasion for acceleration of strategic arms development."

Senator Humphrey. Of course, that is true. That happened at the time of the negotiation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union made more explosions in 30 days than they had in the previous

years.

Mr. Stratton. Well, if you will bear with me, Mr. Chairman, the following statement says this:

The question inescapably arises whether, under our current defense policies, we can afford to negotiate about arms control. If we must accept the insistence that the momentum of our strategic weapons programs must be maintained in order to bargain effectively, the talks have become too expensive a luxury. Insofar as formal agreements are concerned, we may have gone as far as we can now go.

Then he comes, of course, to his proposal that there shouldn't be any agreement at all; we should simply agree to a moratorium, for example, on MIRVing our missiles, announce that we are not going to do anything more on the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber for 6 months, and then, if the Russians have demonstrated some reciprocity—and he doesn't spell out how you tell whether that takes place or not—then we would—except by eliminating some of their older, missile-carrying submarines and a freeze on the development of the new family of ICBM's.

Then he would reduce our nuclear arsenal in Europe. "The chances

are good, moreover," he concludes,

That highly advertised restraint on our part will be reciprocated. The steps we can take in trying to start a process of reciprocal restraint are not drastic. They would create no risk in our national security.

Well, now, Mr. Chairman, these may be noble sentiments—

REDUCTION IN U.S. TACTICAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Senator Humphrey. Didn't we just reduce the number of our tactical weapons in Europe?

Mr. STRATTON. I beg your pardon?

Senator Humphrey. Didn't we just reduce the number of our tactical weapons in Europe?

Mr. Stratton. The number he lists in his article is over 7,000.

Senator HUMPHREY. But that is not the point. Didn't we just reduce them? That is what I asked.

Mr. Stratton. I don't believe so. That was a subject, Mr. Chairman, which we offered to the Soviets in the MBFR (mutual and balanced force reduction) discussions going on in Vienna, as part of a deal, and the Soviets have still not accepted that, or any other part of it.

Senator Humphrey. But we feel that we can do so without any

danger.

Mr. Stratton. I am not sure that we feel we can make any, or should make any reduction until we get something in return for it on the other side. What is the point of conducting negotiations in Vienna for mutual and balanced force reductions if we are going to go ahead and

reduce anyway?

Senator Humphrey. I think you are doing Mr. Warnke an injustice and that why I interrupt. He didn't say that we should do this on a permanent basis. He said he is opposed to unilateral disarmament. He said he would do this on the basis of what Eisenhower did, of what Kennedy did.

If there is a response, then we will continue. If not, then we go on. I feel that the record has to be accurate.

MR. WARNKE'S STATEMENT ON HOW NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED

Mr. Stratton. Mr. Chairman, I have spent a good deal of time going over the statements of Mr. Warnke on the record. He certainly didn't say that today. That is the thing that surprises me, but this is his statement on how negotiations should be conducted. He is the man who is going to go to SALT.

Is this the kind of thing that we really want to be carried out at

SALT?

Senator Humphrey. What he said was that it might be a risk well taken, to take some initiative on a unilateral basis now, pending the agreement of the opposite side. Dwight Eisenhower said that. John Kennedy said that. And both of those were pretty good men.

Mr. Stratton. Well, I have some comments on Mr. Kennedy in a

moment, Mr. Chairman.

It seems to me that what we have here is an essay in a learned journal. Maybe it wasn't even intended to be taken seriously, but as I say, Mr. Warnke has put it in the New York Times this morning, so he must still subscribe to it.

I submit to you that these proposals cannot possibly be taken as serious proposals for the conduct of our upcoming SALT negotiations. This is not a prescription for a treaty. This is a choreography for a minuet, a delightful fantasy, perhaps, but certainly not a formula for responsible statesmanship in a dangerous world.

How, for instance, under this plan do we eliminate the ambiguities that plagued us in SALT I if we are not going to have any treaty but

just mutual restraint for 6 months and see what happens?

If matching restraint is the only guideline, what happens to the weapons totals already agreed to at Vladivostok, for example? And

finally—and this is the most important of all—how can you possibly get any verification if all you have is some informal agreement that everybody is going to be mutually restrained for 6 months?

Under the Warnke plan, it would be impossible to know whether

the agreement had ever been violated.

PROPOSED HALT OF PROGRESS ON B-1 AND TRIDENT

Not only that but, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Warnke is seriously proposing that while all of this is going on—and this is a very serious omission in his testimony—we unilaterally halt all further progress on the two vital nuclear deterrent improvements that we have underway now, the B-1 and the Trident submarine, for a period of 6 months; and we do that without anything in writing, with no commitment from the Soviets and no quid pro quo.

Senator Humphrey. Forty-six Senators thought we ought never to start. I want to put it on the record. The Trident submarine was hotly

debated. It was either 43 or 46.

Mr. Stratton. That is right, but we do by majorities.

Senator Humphrey. I know, but I want to point out that 43 Senators were not necessarily willing to give the Soviet Union the world. We weren't contemplating that at all.

We did think that we could put the Trident missile on the Poseidon

submarine.

Mr. Stratton. I have always thought, of course, that the House is a little bit more responsible in these matters than the Senate. [General laughter.]

Senator Humphrey. I have always thought they were a little bit

more afraid of election time. [General laughter.]

Mr. Stratton. I have discussed these matters with Admiral Rickover and I don't think you could put very many of those missiles on the old submarine. They are bigger missiles. The size of the submarine, after all, is not really a very important factor in antisubmarine warfare. It is the quietness and other things.

The thing that disturbs me is that the essence of these negotiations are going to have to be some sort of bargaining, some sort of quid pro

quo and you can't do that with this procedure whatsoever.

RISK TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Who savs, by the way, that such an action would create no risk to our national security? Have the Joint Chiefs of Staff acreed that no risk would be entailed? How could we entrust our vital SALT negotiations to someone who would deal so flippantly and cavalierly with our national security until his name is submitted for confirmation to the U.S. Senate, particularly at a time when the precise degree of our relative nuclear balance with the Soviets is such a burning issue.

Certainly there was no mandate in the lest election for such Alice-

in-Wonderland treatment of our vital nuclear deterrent.

WORLD HAS NOT CHANGED

Mr. Chairman, I can appreciate the desire for a fresh, new approach in a new administration. There have been many defense critics around

Washington, going all the way back to Henry Wallace, who have felt that all our national security problems stem from the fact that we Americans have been too beastly to the Russians.

Mr. Warnke is only one of the more recent, and certainly one of the more poetic, of that breed. But though we have a new Congress and a new administration, the world itself has not really changed.

Mr. Warnke is not the first to think that all that is needed to achieve peace and security is a pure heart and infinite restraint. Harry Truman went to Potsdam talking about good old Joe Stalin and ended up with the Truman Doctrine and Korea. John Kennedy wanted a test ban treaty, but after he met Khrushchev personally in Vienna, he came back and predicted it would be a long, cold winter as indeed it proved to be, both in Cuba and Vietnam.

Lyndon Johnson tried the same thing at Glassboro, with sweet reasonableness and the impressive, as we all know, persuasiveness of Bob McNamara. But the Russians refused to budge for an ABM treaty until we finally started building an ABM of our own. We have already

tried that approach and it doesn't work.

The history of the last 32 years has amply demonstrated that in dealing with the Soviets, the path to peace and stability lies only through firmness and strength. Negotiator after negotiator has come back with that same story, and if you don't believe it, ask Paul Nitze.

I have been interested in the desire to bring Mr. Nitze before this

committee.

Senator Humphrey. Paul Nitze was a part of that Truman administration. Let me make it clear that I think the world of Paul. I think he is a fine, wonderfully competent man. He is an old friend of mine.

But Paul Nitze was involved in all of these things you are talking

about.

Mr. Stratton. Well, Paul Nitze has been also involved in these negotiations.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is right.

Mr. Stratton. And he knows—he has expanded at some length be-

fore the Senate Budget Committee-

Senator Humphrey. I mean, all of the so-called sellouts that you are talking about here, Paul was around in all of them except, I think,

Mr. Stratton. I am not suggesting any sellouts; I am suggesting that we have found that you cannot be sweet with the Russians. Mr. McNamara could not convince them at Glassboro—and he has a pretty formidable IQ-until we began to build our own ABM and then they said, OK, we quit.

SIGNAL OF INTENT TO MAINTAIN MILITARY BALANCE SUGGESTED

In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, the most important thing that Congress could do to insure world peace and stability would be to give the Soviets and the rest of the world a clear and unmistakable signal that we intend to continue to do everything that is necessary to maintain our rough military balance with them and that any agreements entered into with them, either for limiting or reducing that strength, must be mutual, unambiguous, verifiable, and self-enforcing.

The confirmation of Paul Warnke as chief nuclear arms limitation negotiator would send out the wrong signal and could well set back our progress toward a stable nuclear balance by several years.

REJECTING NOMINEE URGED

George Santayana once wrote that "those who refuse to learn from history are condemned to repeat it." By rejecting this nominee, the committee will spare us the prospect of having to repeat all of the many bitter lessons of the past 32 years.

I urge the committee to reject Mr. Warnke's nomination and urge

the Senate to do likewise.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, since the point has been brought up in the questioning, that if you have two nominations, I think that most emphatically, the SALT negotiator nomination should be rejected. Perhaps as Director of the Arms Control Agency, Mr. Warnke might be suitable but my impression was that these were going together and I think, for the reasons I have indicated, he would be a very unfortunate nominee for the SALT negotiator because the Russians will have read his words, just as we have.

Thank you very much.

[Representative Stratton's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMUEL S. STRATTON, (DEMOCRAT OF NEW YORK)

Mr. Chairman, I appear here, as one who has spent 18 years as a member of the House Armed Services Committee concentrating on national security and foreign policy questions, to oppose most emphatically the nomination of Mr. Paul Warnke as Director of Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency and chief negotiator in the forthcoming SALT II negotiations.

My opposition is based on Mr. Warnke's published views on national security issues, on the nature of the Soviet threat, and on the handling of SALT negotiations. Mr. Warnke as chief SALT negotiator would in my judgment be the wrong

man in the wrong job at the wrong time.

Of course the power to confirm executive nominations resides exclusively in the Senate. But in today's strategic environment the selection of a chief SALT negotiator must be a matter of grave concern as much to every member of the House as to every member of the Senate. Indeed, if previous practices are adhered to, any agreement resulting from these negotiations must be approved by both the House and the Senate. Since the outlook of the chief negotiator will obviously have a major impact on the shape of whatever agreement emerges from these negotiations, all of us in the Congress must exercise extreme caution in the person whom we approve to exercise that responsibility.

To appreciate the disturbing implications of the Warnke nomination, let me review briefly the strategic situation between ourselves and the Soviets as if has been developing over the past few years. With the end of the Viet Nam war a strong anti-mi'itary bias set in here in the Congress, as a result of which substantial cuts were made in the defense budget over a period of four or five years, culminating with a whopping \$9 billion cut in fiscal year 1976. In the process America's defense capabilities, ships at sea, men under arms, and vital

research and development effort all went into a steady decline.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union was continuing its policy of rapid military development on every front, fielding during that same period a number of advanced design weapons—planes, tanks, missiles, and nuclear missile submarines. Many military experts concluded that with American power steadily declining and Soviet military power steadily increasing, the Soviets had either already achieved military superiority over us or were on the verge of attaining such superiority.

And then last year, for reasons that are still not entirely clear, the Congress unexpectedly made a 180 degree turn and approved a defense budget for fiscal 1977 almost as substantial as the one submitted to us by the Ford Administration.

That action was a legislative landmark, because after six or seven years of steady decline America's military strength had finally begun to move upwards again. Congress has been warned that if we had any interest in trying to keep up with the feverish pace of Soviet military advance, defense spending would have to increase between 2 to 4 percent each year, discounting inflation. Even at that we would not be moving toward superiority, only towards maintaining what Secretary Rumsfeld had called "rough equivalence" with the Soviets.

So the question before Congress and the country in February 1977 is, Where do we go from here? Do we continue the trend set in motion last year? Or do we go back to the old habit of hacking away at defense in the belief that it's already too big, and the money in it would be better spent on social and welfare

programs?

At the very time when America has repudiated its earlier policy of repeated defense cuts and made the conscious decision not to let the Soviets get ahead of us, it makes no sense at all for us to name as our principal representative in the most sensitive and far-reaching negotiations of all, a man who, regardless of what hard-line views he may now be giving to this committee, has at each step of the way over the last 8 years repeatedly and consistently opposed every

new weapon or improved military capability we have undertaken.

In 1972, as the head of the McGovern Panel on National Security and a top defense adviser to Presidential candidate McGovern, Paul Warnke joined in opposing the MIRVing of our ballistic missiles, opposing Minuteman III, favoring dismantling of all Titan ICBMs, favoring a stop to the conversion of Polaris submarines to Poseidons, opposing the B-1, opposing the safeguard ABM, and favoring a 50 percent cut in the Army's air defense missiles. A later report of the same McGovern Panel on National Security also opposed improvements in missile accuracy, opposed development of a hard-target capability, opposed the cruise missile, opposed the ABM, opposed bomber defense, opposed the AWACs, opposed MIRVing our Polaris/Poseidon missiles, and opposed development of the Trident submarine.

In fact, as has already been pointed out by Senator Nunn and others, over the years—whatever he may be saying now as he moves from one Senate office to another—Mr. Warnke has opposed development of virtually all the current components of our nuclear deterrent, which will be the key issue in the forth-coming SAL/T negotiations—weapons whose destructive power, ironically, have been primarily responsible for bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table in

the first place.

Two years later, in 1974, Mr. Warnke was still on the same track. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee he opposed the B-1, opposed the F-14, opposed the Navy's base at Diego Garcia, favored a 200,000 man cut in our military personnel, favored a cut in our NATO troops, opposed the Trident submarine, opposed improving the accuracy and yield of our nuclear missiles, favored a slow down in the development of nuclear attack submarines,

and opposed the SAM-D missile.

Last year, in 1976, it was once again the same consistent story of negativism on defense. Testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, Mr. Warnke opposed the B-1 bomber, and opposed the Trident submarine, two of the very few efforts we have made over the past decade in upgrading and modernizing our nuclear deterrent force to offset all of the myriad improvements which

the Soviets made over the same period.

One of the organizations on which Mr. Warnke has been active—he was its chairman—was the Advisory Committee of the Project on Budget Priorities. In 1974 that group issued a pamphlet entitled "A Report to Congress: Military Policies and Budget Priorities, fi*cal year 1975." The letter transmitting this report was signed by Mr. Warnke, and the pamphlet lists him as 'convenor' of the reporting committee. The report states the following:

"The effort to gain Congressional control of the defense budget in fiscal year 1975 should, first of all, accept the view supported in this report that the world situation will not require, for the forseeable future, constant dollar increases...

"Congress however should go beyond merely holding the budget constant and should begin to require the Pentagon to squeeze the fat out . . . This efficiency program could be implemented by a 3 percent reduction in appropriations, in constant dollars, for each of the next 5 years."

In other words, while the nation's top defense officials were telling us we must increase the defense budget by at least 2 percent a year in constant dollars if we are to maintain even "rough equivalence" with an expanding Soviet military posture, Mr. Warnke was proposing to decrease that budget by 3 percent a year over a 5-year period. If that particular Warnke plan had been adopted in 1974fortunately it wasn't—our defense budget today would be \$28.8 billion below the one submitted by the Ford Administration. A cut of \$28.8 billion, in other words, constrasted with a cut of only \$2.8 billion now being considered by the Carter Administration.

Mr. Chairman, on the basis of these consistent and repeatedly espoused views, the nominee reveals himself to be clearly outside the mainstream of current American defense thinking, both in the Congress and in the country. Last December Opinion Research reported that 71 percent of the American people believed our defense budget was adequate or should be increased. Only 16 percent favored reducing it. A Gallup Poll taken about the same time showed 63 percent either in favor of the present budget or wanting a larger one, compared to only 27 percent

favoring cuts.

The sweeping cuts which Mr. Warnke has been espousing, year after year, regardless of what was taking place in other areas of the world, prove him manifestly unqualified for the special responsibility for which he has been nominated. This kind of cut-defense thinking was highly fashionable four or five years ago. Today it is dangerously obsolete. Oh, of course, Mr. Warnke will be assuring you that he espouses an "adequate defense." But how odd that over the years, whenever the chips were down, he has always managed to come down, year after year, in opposition to virtually every new military development and improvement this country has put forward.

How could such a person possibly defend, with a straight face, across the table from all those tough, unsmiling, hard-nosed, implacable Soviet negotiators that always surface at every disarmament negotiation, the maintenance of all these weapons which he has so consistently opposed, and which today, despite his persistent opposition over the years, comprise the real strength of our nuclear arsenal which in virtually every other category is numerically inferior to the

He just couldn't do it. The Russians would quote his own words right back to him—and the American position, at least as far as our own point man was con-

cerned, would be devastated.

Mr. Chairman, all of us recognize the importance of the upcoming SALT II negotiations, and all of us are hopeful they will succeed. Obviously there is no real point in escalating the level of nuclear deterrent so long as we can be sure of maintaining a genuine balance in our capabilities, and so long, as I have said, the agreement that spells out that balance is unambiguous, verifiable, and self-

We made a start in achieving such a mutual balance in the SALT I agreement, a document widely hailed at the time. But in subsequent years we have come to realize that there were so many ambiguities in SALT I that we can no longer be certain it actually represents a real balance today. One of the first requirements of a SALT II agreement is that it end those ambiguities and loopholes in SALT I. The only way to provide such certainty is with a very precise document, carefully spelled out, with all the t's crossed and all the i's dotted.

But here again, the record shows that Paul Warnke is emphatically in no position to preside over the kind of negotiations that lead to a precise written

agreement.

He gave us a very revealing insight into his view on this particular question in an article in the Spring 1975 issue of Foreign Policy, entitled, "Two Apes on a Treadmill." Here are Mr. Warnke's precise proposals for conducting nuclear negotiations, and I suggest they be taken seriously, since Mr. Warnke has just reprinted them this morning on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times:

"In trying to end this irrational arms competition, total reliance is now placed on negotiations looking toward formal agreement. . . . But the ongoing process seems to aggravate the problem. . . . Rather than creating a climate in which restraint can be practiced, the existence of the negotiations themselves has been

an occasion for acceleration of strategic arms development.

"The question inescapably arises whether, under our current defense policies, we can afford to negotiate about arms control. . . . If we must accept the insistence that the momentum of our strategic weapons programs must be maintained in order to bargain effectively, the talks have become too expensive a luxury , . . Insofar as formal agreements are concerned, we may have gone as far as we can now go. . . .

"As a start, we might inform the Soviet Union both privately and publicly that we have placed a moratorium on further MIRVing of our land- and sea-based missiles. We should also announce that a hold has been placed on development of the Trident submarine and the B-1 strategic bomber. We should advise the Soviet Union that this pause will be reviewed in six months in the light of what

action the Soviet Union takes during that period. . .

"If the Soviet Union responds by some significant slowing of its own strategic arms build-up, we can at the end of the first six months announce additional moves. . . . If reciprocal action is taken by the Soviet Union, such as the elimination of some of its older missile-carrying submarines and a freeze on the development of the new family of ICBM's, other low-risk initiatives are available to us. We can and should, for example, substantially reduce the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons now deployed in Europe. The number—over 7,000—is many times in excess of that useful in any remotely conceivable contingency.

"The chances are good, moreover, that highly advertised restraint on our part will be reciprocated. . . . The steps we can take in trying to start a process of reciprocal restraint are not drastic. They would create no risk in our national

security.'

These may be noble sentiments for an essay in a learned journal, Mr. Chairman. but I submit to you that they cannot possibly be taken as serious proposals for the conduct of our upcoming SALT negotiations. This is not a prescription for a treaty. This is a choreography for a minuet. A delightful and erudite fantasy, perhaps, but certainly not a formula for responsible statesmanship in a dangerous world. How, for instance, under this plan do we eliminate the ambiguities that plagued us in SALT I? If matching restraint is the only guideline, what happens to the weapons totals already agreed to at Vladivostok? And how do we get any verification at all? Under the Warnke plan it would be impossible to know whether the agreement had ever been violated.

Not ony that but, you realize, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Warnke is seriously proposing that we unilaterally halt all further progress on two vital nuclear deterrent improvements, the B-1 and the Trident submarine, for a period of six months—with nothing in writing, no commitment from the Soviets, no quid pro

quo at all.

Who says that such an action would create no risk to our national security? Have the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed this would entail no risk? Mr. Chairman, how can be entrust our vital SALT negotiations to someone who would deal so flippantly and cavalierly with our national security, particularly at a time when the precise degree of our relative nuclear balance with the Soviets is such a burning issue! Certainly there was no mandate in the last election for such Alice-in-Wonderland treatment of our vital nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Chairman, I can appreciate the desire for a fresh new approach in a new Administration. There have been many defense critics around Washington—going all the way back to Henry Wallace—who have felt that all our national security problems stem from the fact that we Americans have been too beastly to the Russians. Mr. Warnke is only one of the more recent, and certainly one of the more poetic, of that breed. But though we have a new Congress and a new Admin-

istration in Washington, the world itself has not really changed.

Mr. Warnke is not the first to think that all that is needed to achieve peace and security is a pure heart and infinite restraint. Harry Truman went to Potsdam talking about "good old Joe" Stalin, and ended up with the Truman Doctrine and Korea. John Kennedy wanted a test ban treaty, but after he met Khrushchev personally in Vienna he came home and predicted it would be "a long cold winter"—as indeed it proved to be, both in Cuba and Viet Nam. Lyndon Johnson tried the same thing at Glassboro, with sweet reasonableness and the persuasiveness of Bob McNamara. But the Russians refused to budge for an ABM treaty until we finally started building an ABM of our own. We've already tried that approach. It doesn't work.

The history of the last 32 years has amply demonstrated that in dealing with the Soviets the path to peace and stability lies only through firmness and strength. Negotiator after negotiator has come back with the same story. Ask

Paul Nitze.

In my judgment the most important thing that Congress could do today to insure world peace and stability would be to give the Soviets and the rest of the world a clear and unmistakable signal that we intend to continue to do whatever is necessary to maintain our rough military balance with them; and that any

agreements entered into with them either for limiting or reducing that strength must be mutual, unambiguous, verifiable, and self-enforcing.

The confirmation of Paul Warnke as chief nuclear arms limitation negotiator would send out the wrong signal and could well set our progress towards a stable

nuclear balance back several years.

George Santayana once wrote that "those who refuse to learn from history are condemned to repeat it." Mr. Chairman, by rejecting this nominee the committee will spare us the prospect of having to repeat all the many bitter lessons of the past 32 years.

I urge the committee to reject Mr. Warnke's nomination, and urge the Senate

to do likewise.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Danforth?

REPRESENTATIVE STRATTON'S VIEW OF NOMINATION BASED ON TODAY'S TESTIMONY

Senator Danforth. You were sitting here, Congressman Stratton, for 4 hours during the testimony of Mr. Warnke. Based on that testimony alone, in isolation, would his nomination pose any problems for you?

Mr. Stratton. Well, Mr. Warnke has, in some cases, qualified his views very substantially to what they appear in his writings and I think in some cases, it would be necessary to have the record in front of me, but I don't believe that a man can make this kind of major change so rapidly.

Certainly, he played down all of the points that I have made. He said, for example, that he questioned whether we ought to have a B-1 bomber. He didn't question it; he opposed it. He opposed the Trident and all of these other things, and that has been the consistent pattern.

Over the years, Mr. Warnke has been known as one who has certainly been associated with these various groups, Admiral Le Roche and others, which somehow say that they are in favor of an adequate defense, but somehow always come down against whatever it is you are trying to develop at the time.

DIFFERENCE IN TONE OF MR. WARNKE'S TESTIMONY

Senator Danforth. Is it your view that the tone of Mr. Warnke's testimony today was substantially different from the tone of his writings?

Mr. STRATTON. Absolutely.

Senator Humphrey. I want to thank you. I will give you one little caveat that has always been helpful to me. Where a man stands frequently depends on where he sits. It is one thing to be a writer of articles in the academic community and in the intellectual community; it is another thing to be in a position of responsibility and power.

I would hate to think that every professor who came to Washington and taught a course in government was to be judged by what he said in that classroom or in any particular lecture, because once you are in a position where you have all the responsibilities, you obviously think

slightly differently.

I go back to what I said earlier. Without disagreeing with the statements you have made about your views of Mr. Warnke, Mr. Warnke will be working as a member of a team, a very important member of a

team, to be sure, but he will be taking instructions. He will be follow-

ing those instructions.

His President is Mr. Carter, who happens to think that Admiral Rickover is quite a man. So it seems to me that Paul Warnke will be a very useful member of a team that needs a variety of opinions be-

cause arms control is a very complex and sensitive matter.

I think that what this article by Paul Warnke says is arms control before time runs out. He is advocating arms control. He has some doubts as to the process that has taken place in the protracted negotiations because the protracted negotiations lend themselves to what everybody knows has been happening, which we have been reading about all the time; namely, that the Soviets have been building up; namely, that we have been building up.

We have been MIRV'ing and we have been trying to find out some of the things they have been MIRV'ing. We are experimenting in esoteric types of weaponry all of the time, while we are looking forward to

hopefully getting an agreement.

What Mr. Warnke has been trying to say is that there may have to be some other approaches, but he has made it clear here for this record that he is unalterably opposed to unilateral disarmament. He believes in a strong national defense.

PROLIFERATION OF U.S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

When it comes to cutting the budget, I see that a study released just last week from the Air Force itself says that we pay \$400 million annually to aircraft manufacturers, more than we need, just to maintain a work force that isn't even needed-\$400 million. The whole appropriations request for this agency is \$13 million.

That is one of hundreds of examples you can dig out of the Defense

Department.

How many bases do we have overseas that are about as useless as an extra flea on a dog? There are all kinds of little bases around.

I passed an amendment in the Senate that called for a reduction in the Armed Forces, but none of them out of Europe, and none of them to be out of our strategic forces. Where were those 200,000 men to be found outside of Vietnam? Scattered all over. Every island you could find, or palm tree, and that is a fact.

Since World War II and Korea and Vietnam, we have proliferated our Military Establishment, and I really believe the arguments many people made against cutting the defense budget. I vote for these defense budgets. I voted for an aircraft carrier which now they all ad-

mit we really shouldn't have.

A year ago we were being told we had to have these big aircraft carriers. Now, the word comes out that we are really out of date, that we really ought to get smaller ones. Now we are saving the Soviets were smarter. They were building smaller ships and we were building

We have more tonnage in ships than they have, but they have more ships. They have larger megatonnage than we have, in terms of the

great big bombs, but ours are more accurate.

I think there is waste and I don't think it should be stated that just because you believe that there might be a little less in that defense budget you are against adequate defense, any more than when you run a police department and have half of your police force sitting around doing clerical work when they ought to be out on the beat. You come in and say, "Look, we are going to cut down on the number of blue coats we have around here, we are going to put some civilians in here to do the clerical work." I had to do that once.

I didn't cut my police department. I put it to work being a police force. Then I went out and hired some clerks to keep track of the traffic tickets, but we used to have sergeants and lieutenants and captains sitting around. We have more admirals and generals right now by two to one than we had in World War II. And who are we fighting

now? We have all kinds of them.

MR. WARNKE SUPPORTED

This is what Paul Warnke has been talking about. I don't necessarily want to subscribe to every word he said, but I will say this about Paul Warnke. As Senator Culver said, he added to the debate on national security policy and national defense policy. He is not a unilateral disarmament man. He understands the process of negotiation. If he didn't, he wouldn't be the lawyer he is, hired by some of the better firms around the country that needed somebody to represent their interests because lawyers negotiate most of the time, rather than litigate. He was hired by some of the biggest firms to negotiate for them.

I am of the mind that he will follow his instructions. If I have any perception of President Carter, he may speak softly but he is tough. I think he knows what he wants and I think he understands national defense and national security.

Here is Harold Brown. He was the man who wanted the B-1. Isn't

that right? Secretary of the Air Force?

Mr. Stratton. That is right.

Senator Humphrey. He was the man recommended for the CIA, the man responsible for the southern flank of NATO. We are not running around here sending out pacifists to take care of our needs,

Congressman Stratton.

This is a man who has demonstrated in this record today and in by his background—I knew him when he was Assistant Secretary of Defense, and I will tell you that he was a good man and a solid man. That he happens to think possibly that the B-1 bomber will be out of date before they build it may prove that he is a prophet. It may very well prove that the cruise missile may make it all look absolutely ridiculous because the cruise missile can carry every bit as much weaponry as the B-1 bomber and it can fly right close to the earth. It has all the radar equipment that will take it over the mountains and zip-zip around the country. All of that, it will deliver on target.

Maybe we don't need the B-1 bomber. That is all that Paul Warnke has been saying. He has been saying, stop, look, and listen because when they came up here and sold us the package of the Trident submarine, it was \$800 million. Do you know what it is now? You are on

the Armed Services Committee. What is the latest estimate?

Mr. Stratton. It is a billion-plus.

Senator Humphrey. Oh, that was a couple of years ago. Come on, Sam. What is the latest estimate? It is about \$1.8 billion.

Mr. Stratton. Well, it is \$1.2 billion or \$1.3 billion. Senator Humphrey. That was last year. It has gone up.

He was merely raising the question of whether we need it now. Let's take a look at the B-1. The B-52s are good until the 1980's. With the cruise missile attached to them, they might be good for another 10 years.

Mr. Stratton. Could I make just a couple of responses to you, Mr.

Chairman?

Senator Humphrey. Yes. I want to put the whole article in the record that you quoted in part by Paul Warnke. I think it is good to have the whole text.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY

Mr. Stratton. First of all, we have had a lot of discussion in the last few days about whether the Russians are superior to us or whether we are superior to them. I don't think that anybody can estimate or answer that question accurately. But one thing on which every responsible expert agrees, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is that if the Soviets continue their intensive effort to expand their capabilities as they have been doing and we continue as we have in the past, with the exception of last year, reducing our defense forces, for whatever reason it may be, they will end up superior to us.

And it may happen before we are aware of it.

I think we have a very heavy responsibility here in this Congress, and on that I am sure that you cannot get any real opposition from experts.

IMPORTANCE OF KIND OF SALT AGREEMENT WE GET

The other thing that concerns me, Mr. Chairman, is that the SALT negotiations are going to be perhaps the most important that we will ever be engaged in. I certairly would want them to succeed. But if we go into the SALT negotiations with the idea that we want an agreement without caring about what kind of agreement it is, we are going to be in trouble.

Senator Humphrey. The President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, would never do that. The Senate will never permit it, and we

must not even contemplate that.

Mr. Stratton. I am not testifying on Mr. Carter's qualifications.

Senator HUMPHREY. But he is the Commander in Chief.

Mr. Stratton. I supported him, and I supported him in my district. The point a lot of people are wondering about is why we haven't been able to get the SALT negotiations settled. The reason is that under the present arrangement, we cannot be certain that we have a balance until we decide what we are going to do with the Backfire and the cruise missile, and that is not something that just goodwill is going to accomplish. It is going to take a lot of hard negotiating.

MR. WARNKE'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS QUESTIONED

I just don't think that Paul Warnke, with his background, is going

to be able to conduct those negotiations.

Now, if he has to run out to the Western Union office and find out what the latest instruction is from the White House, that is not the way to conduct those negotiations. We ought to have somebody that understands the situation and can handle it on a day-to-day basis with the Soviet negotiators on the other side of the table.

Senator Humphrey. You are not looking at a Senator who believes in Soviet goodwill. What I believe in is our good sense. I don't believe we are going to have negotiators who will knowingly or unwittingly sell out the national security of the United States and I don't think Paul Warnke would.

Yes, Senator Danforth

ARE WE CONFIRMING NEGOTIATOR OR POLICY THRUST?

Senator Danforth. It may be that all we are doing is interviewing in Mr. Warnke a negotiator who will do nothing more than be the spokesman for the administration's policy. We are hiring him for his negotiating skills, so to speak. That may be the case.

If that is the case. I hope the administration will make that clear

and make that clear very quickly.

What I am concerned about is that we are doing more than confirming a negotiator, that we are confirming a policy thrust for the United States in arms negotiations. I think if that is the case, if Mr. Warnke is going to purport to speak for the administration, in terms of his prior writings, we should know that in advance.

It is true that the Senate has to ratify treaties. I think the worst thing that could happen would be for Mr. Warnke to negotiate a treaty and then have that treaty defeated by the Senate. So I really believe that if he is speaking the policy of the administration, we should know that and we should have a good debate before his confirmation as to the policy alternatives.

For that reason, and for the third time, I renew my request that the committee invite Mr. Nitze to come before us to state his views on Mr.

Warnke's nomination.

Senator Humphrey. That request, by the way, I have asked the staff director, Mr. Norvill Jones, to forward to the chairman. I am only serving here in place of Chairman Sparkman. I am sure that request will be given the most serious consideration.

May I say also very respectfully that this committee has always been consulted and so has the Armed Services Committee during the

process of negotiations that relate to our defense structure.

I think you are right. I believe Mr. Warnke should be more than just a negotiator. He will have a part in the overall strategy. He will

be one of a team.

I wouldn't want to have my views about Mr. Warnke be interpreted as if we are hiring a lawyer, so to speak, as our negotiator. My only point is that, once the position of the administration is taken, once the outlines of the negotiating posture and position are taken, then the entire team-it isn't just one man, as you know. You have been at these negotiations. I sat around the negotiations for the mutual balanced

force reduction. It isn't just Stanley Resor that is there. You have many people there. You have a whole roomful of people there, and you have one person who is your chief spokesman. You are going to have your military people there and you are going to have your State Department people there.

You are going to have your Central Intelligence Agency people there. You are going to have the best brains, hopefully, that this coun-

try can bring there.

But we have some differences of opinion. I might say, the SALT delegation includes the chairman, a representative of the Joint Chiefs, a representative of the Defense Secretary, a representative of State, a representative of ACDA, plus a CIA adviser. In this instance, I would not be a bit surprised, because of the high priority, that the President will place himself in a very unique position, namely, watching it with great care.

I think we ought to quit, Sam. You are a good man.

Mr. Stratton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your patience.

Senator Humphrey. Yes, sir. You are a good man, you are a good

arguer.

[Whereupon, at 6:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene on

Wednesday, February 9, 1977, at 2 p.m.]

[Mr. Warnke's responses to additional questions for the record follow:]

MR. WARNKE'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Mr. Warnke, you would be holding two jobs, which, in the last administration, were both full-time, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and negotiator for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). How would you arrange these duties so that you could do justice to both?

Answer. I would have strong capable deputies in both Washington and Geneva fully prepared to lead the Agency or the Delegation in my absence.

Question 2. What responsibilities would you expect to give your deputy director? What kind of person are you looking for to fill that part?

Answer. The Deputy Director of ACDA would have to be fully capable of heading the Agency while I am in Geneva. He would, of course, have considerable responsibilities even during my presence in Washington. He must be a good administrator knowledgeable in the major current arms control areas, such as SALT, MBFR, non-proliferation, test ban and conventional arms transfers. In addition, he should be experienced and competent in working with other interested agencies.

Question 3. What can you tell us of your plans and priorities in regard to

ACDA

Answer. It will require considerable more information and study before I can develop plans and priorities of any precise nature. I hope to make the Agency as efficient and effective as possible in carrying out its statutory mandate.

Question 4. What role do you envision for yourself and for ACDA within the

executive branch?

Answer. The ACDA Director is by statute an adviser to the National Security Council and the principal adviser to the President on arms control and disarmament policy. ACDA and its Director must take the lead in formulating and developing arms control possibilities to resolve problems of national security.

Question 5. Do you believe that ACDA should take a more active role in

informing the public on arms control issues?

Answer. The ACDA statute provides that one of the four principal functions of ACDA is to disseminate and coordinate public information concerning arms control and disarmament. In view of this statutory mandate the Agency must take as active a role as possible in informing the public on arms control matters.

Question 6. Taking all factors into consideration, do you believe that the Soviet Union is trying to achieve some sort of meaningful strategic superiority over the United States? Do you think such an effort could ever succeed, and, if so, under what circumstances?

Answer. Judgments of Soviet strategic objectives are necessarily subjective and fraught with considerable uncertainty. There may also be differences of view within the Soviet leadership. The Soviets have made a major effort to bring themselves from a position of clear inferiority to the present rough equality in strategic arms. The continuing Soviet strategic arms programs probably reflect at least a determination not to fall behind the U.S., a desire to catch up in certain areas where the U.S. still leads, a response to their perception of U.S. strategic programs, their traditional military doctrines, as well as internal political and institutional factors. The possibility must be faced that in addition at least some elements of the Soviet leadership are seeking a measurable degree of superiority over the U.S. despite the narrower Soviet economic and technological base.

I do not believe the Soviets can achieve superiority over the U.S. as long as we are determined to deny them this objective. The U.S. must take what actions are necessary to preclude any real or perceived Soviet military advantage in strategic

arms.

Question 7. How would other members of the SALT delegation be chosen? Would you expect that the delegation would include people with diverse back-

grounds and viewpoints?

Answer. It is my understanding that the other members of the SALT Delegation would be selected by the various national security agencies involved in the SALT process, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would certainly both hope and expect that the Delegation would include people with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints.

Question 8. As you know, there continue to be deep differences on our side as to the threat posed by the Soviet Backfire bomber and as to whether and how the Backfire might be handled under SALT. Do you believe these questions can be resolved in a way acceptable to both the American and Soviet sides?

Answer. The Soviet Backfire bomber is in a "gray-area" between clearly strategic and clearly tactical systems. It therefore poses difficult problems for SALT. Nevertheless, I believe that given a serious effort on both sides to resolve this problem a mutually acceptable solution can be worked out.

Question 9. Should strategic arms limitations negotiations be continued beyond any SALT II agreements? If so, what kinds of further controls upon the strategic

arms race do you consider important?

Answer. Once a SALT II agreement is completed, I expect that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will continue negotiations further to limit strategic arms. One objective of these follow-on negotiations would be to reduce the ceilings on the number of strategic offensive arms to levels well below those established in the SALT II agreement. Another objective would be to place additional qualitative limitations on strategic forces, including further limits on throw-weight and MIRVs, and possibly other qualitative measures. We could also seek additional limits on strategic defenses, including civil defense efforts. A SALT TWO agreement would be a major advance beyond the Interim Agreement, but still more comprehensive limitations will be necessary to halt and reverse the competition in strategic arms.

Question 10. In an interview in the New York Times of January 1, Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., who had just retired from his position of Air Force chief of intelligence, made some very disturbing changes. According to General Keegan. "Today, because of the civil defense measures in the U.S.S.R., I believe the United States is incapable of carrying out its assigned wartime retaliatory tasks of crippling the Soviet industrial economy, the essential civilian-military leadership, nuclear stockpiles and the basic fighting capacity of the

U.S.S.R.

(a) Do you agree that the United States is incapable of carrying out its assigned wartime retaliatory tasks? If you do not agree, do you believe that the United States capability to retaliate is threatened?

(b) What do you believe the Soviet Union is trying to achieve with its civil defense efforts? What are the implications of that effort in terms of our own

ability to deter?

Answer. I have seen no evidence that the Soviets now have a program for civil defense which is capable of denying our ability to retaliate with devastating effect against the military and economic resources of the Soviet Union.

I am not certain what the objectives ae for the Soviet civil defense effort. They could include an attempt to reduce the damage to their society should some level of nuclear conflict occur with NATO or China, and an attempt to increase the chances that the political and military leadership would survive a

nuclear conflict.

A Soviet civil defense on a scale which caused us, or the Soviet leaders, to question the effectiveness of our retaliatory capability would be inconsistent with the objectives of the ABM Treaty and inconsistent with our national security. Therefore I believe that we should monitor carefully all Soviet civil defense efforts and take any needed measures to counter them, by agreement or otherwise.

Question 11. Is it your objective to seek a ban on nuclear testing alone or to

seek a ban on all nuclear explosions?

Answer. There is no true distinction between nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions purported to be for peaceful purposes. Therefore, a complete ban on all nuclear explosions, not one limited to weapons tests alone, would be my objective.

Question 11. What would the United States and the Soviet Union gain from such a comprehensive ban? Would a comprehensive ban be in the national

security interests of the United States?

What concrete results would you expect a comprehensive ban to have upon the presently non-nuclear nations? What response would you expect from the

nuclear nations other than the United States and the Soviet Union?

Answer. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would stand to gain from a comprehensive ban, in my opinion. Both would benefit from the enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime which would flow from the comprehensive ban; it is widely recognized that such a ban would be the single most effective measure of reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Both the US and USSR would benefit from the enhanced political credibility which would be produced by such an agreement, since each has pledged in the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue

a comprehensive ban.

Moreover, in view of our awesome current stockpile, I agree with the President that the time has come to end nuclear tests. So long as we and the Soviet Union continue to test, we encourage other governments, such as France and China, to do the same. Terminating our program pursuant to a verified international

agreement is clearly in the national interest.

In addition, I believe that a further positive benefit would be the wide endorsement such a comprehensive agreement would receive from many non-nuclear weapon States, including some not presently Parties to the NPT itself. Because such an agreement would be nondiscriminatory, inherently so if it banned all nuclear explosions, many states which have not adhered to the NPT because they perceived that treaty to be discriminatory would be expected to participate.

My expectations with regard to responses from nuclear nations other than the US and USSR are varied. I would expect the UK to join with us in a total ban. I would not expect the People's Republic of China to join us immediately,

in view of its announced policies on this subject.

I would hope however that, once our good faith was demonstrated on this issue through adherence to a nondiscriminatory agreement, it might reconsider, The Government of France is, as you know, no longer conducting atmospheric explosions and conducts only underground explosions—as have we up to the present time. The French have now by their practice adhered to the principles of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I believe that they may do the same with regard to a nondiscriminatory, comprehensive ban, preferably by eventual adherence to a comprehensive ban. In addition to these nuclear-weapon States, it seems likely that India would feel great pressure from world opinion to join a total ban.

Question 12. Will the new administration take the initiative by proposing a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions? Should the United States make such a proposal to the Soviet Union alone or to all nations? Finally, do you expect to propose a moratorium until final agreement can be achieved?

Answer. While I obviously cannot commit the new administration on this point, I do expect that the United States Government will be actively discussing a comprehensive ban with many other governments during the next several months, with a view to proposing such an agreement. While circumstances may influence us to discuss such a proposal with the Soviet Union intially, I would

expect that, as the President has already stated, the final agreement would be negotiated and opened for signature on a multilateral basis.

I would expect that the new administration will carefully consider the possibility of a multi-national moratorium prior to the entry into force of an

international agreement.

Question 13. As you know, this Committee has before it two treaties on nuclear matters—the proposed Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the proposed Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. What is your view on these two treaties, particularly in regard to their relationship to any comprehensive ban proposal? Secondly, what is your recommendation in regard to Senate action on these two treaties?

Answer. In view of the administration's intention to pursue a complete ban, some may feel that these two treaties have been overtaken by events. Nevertheless, they do set some limits on nuclear explosions by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, I believe that these two bilateral agreements should be ratified by the United States at an appropriate time, making it clear that such ratification is not to stand in the way of prompt efforts toward achieving a total, multilateral

Question 14. What effect do you believe ratification of these two treaties would have upon other nations? Would ratification have an effect in regard to nuclear

proliferation?

Answer. If perceived by other nations as part of our effort to achieve a total ban, I believe such ratification would be seen as consistent with our nonproliferation efforts. But, so long as the non-nuclear-weapon States believe that proliferation of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons is not effectively restrained, our efforts to strengthen the regime against horizontal proliferation will be correspondingly difficult. Therefore, it is important that in going forward at an appropriate time with ratification we make clear our commitment to a total ban. Of course, ratification of these two treaties could not be expected to enhance significantly the prospects that France or China will phase out their nuclear explosion programs.

Question 15. As you know, the United States and six other nuclear suppliers reached limited agreement on the control of nuclear exports in late 1975 and were to review their efforts last year. Do you intend that the United States play a leading role in further negotations with other suppliers? If so, what would be

your objectives?

Answer. I would expect that the United States Government will continue to play an active leadership role in the deliberation of the now expanded nuclear suppliers group. Our objectives, I believe, should be the same as those envisaged when these discussions commenced, that is the enhancement of the nonproliferation regime through the adoption of mutual restraints on nuclear exports by each of the supplier governments involved. Through this forum, I hope that commercial rivalries can be made subservient to preserving and expanding the integrity of the non-proliferation regime.

Question 16. Dr. Fred C. Ikle, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told the Arms Control Subcommittee last year that future agreements for cooperation with other countries would include a specific ban on use of the provided supplies and materials for any explosive purpose. Will this also be your policy? Do you believe that the United States should automatically stop nuclear cooperation with any nation which explodes a nuclear device for

any purpose?

Answer. I will certainly seek to retain a requirement that all of our future agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy include a specific ban on using any supplied materials, equipment, or technology to further any nuclear explosive purpose. Moreover, I believe that our present agreements for cooperation should be conformed to this and other established international export guidelines.

With regard to sanctions against non-nuclear weapon States which hereafter explode a nuclear device, I agree that we should halt all nuclear exports to that

nation and avail ourselves of all appropriate treaty remedies.

Question 17. Do you intend to retain the present policy under which the United States will not export enrichment and reprocessing equipment, materials and technology to any non-nuclear weapons state?

Answer. Yes. I support President Ford's call of last October upon all nations to join with us in exercising "maximum restraint" in the export of this sensitive technology and facilities by avoiding such exports or commitments for a period of at least 3 years.

WARNKE NOMINATION

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1977

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Sparkman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Pell, Matsunaga, Javits, Percy, Grif-

fin, and Danforth.

Also present: Senator Culver.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

Some of the members of the committee have indicated they would be present. I understand at least two of them are chairing two other committees at the time being so I don't know how soon they will be coming in. Usually I like to wait until we have someone on the minority side here. Senator Case ordinarily is, but he is one of those tied up in another committee hearing and he cannot get away from it right now.

I think we better get started in order to complete the hearing. I hope

we can complete it today.

OPENING STATEMENT

Of course, as all of you know, this afternoon session is called of the committee for the purposes of continuing its consideration of the nomination of Paul Warnke to be an ambassador to serve as chairman of the U.S. delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—the so-called SALT talks and to be ACDA Director.

Yesterday afternoon the committee met more than 4 hours on this matter. Mr. Warnke testified and was questioned by members of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee and other Senators who were interested in the nomination. The questioning was quite extensive. In addition, the committee heard from Congressman Sam Stratton of New York who opposed the nomination.

Today we will be hearing from Senator James A. McClure of Idaho; Mr. Richard Cohen, U.S. Labor Party; Mr. Mark Lockman, Liberty Lobby; and Mr. Paul Nitze, Coalition for a Democratic Majority, ac-

companied by Mr. Penn Kemble.

It is the intention of the committee to fully air the views of people

for and people against the nomination in question.

Military might, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, the money spent to build and defend against them, and the role of weaponry in our foreign policy are vital questions, so vital that the survival of civilization as we know it may be dependent on how the nations of the world deal with those questions.

We shall start now. Our first witness is our friend and colleague,

Senator McClure from Idaho.

Senator McClure, you have a statement. Present that as you see fit—read it, discuss it, summarize it, however you wish. The statement will be printed in toto in the record regardless of how you do it.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. McCLURE, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

Senator McClure. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your going ahead without waiting further for the other members of the committee. I would share your desire that the minority party be represented ordinarily but the press of their schedules and yours and mine do make it convenient that we go ahead at this time.

I appreciate your willingness to do that.

Mr. Chairman, last week some Members of the Senate expressed grave concern about the then impending choice of Paul Warnke as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Rather than acknowledging these concerns and reconsidering the nomination, President Carter has unfortunately decided not only to proceed with this unwise decision but also to compound the error by simultaneously picking him to be chief negotiator in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Thus, if confirmed, he will accompanying Secretary of State Vance to Moscow for arms discussions on March 28.

NOMINATION OPPOSED

Instead of toughening the bargaining position of the United States with the Soviets, as President Carter promised in his campaign, I believe that the addition of Mr. Warnke to the negotiating team can only undermine any credible American posture. The numerous policy pronouncements of Mr. Warnke over the past several years indicate to me that he is singularly unqualified to serve in either of the capacities designated for him by President Carter. Thus I shall oppose his nomination; I only hope that the entire Senate shall prevail upon the

President to make another selection.

In most of the appointments that an incoming President makes I believe that he should be allowed the widest possible latitude of action. However, in the case of Paul Warnke we have quite unusual circumstances in that the President has designated him both as head of an agency and also a chief negotiator. Thus, the nomination much more directly concerns the business of the American people and their representatives in the Senate. Since any treaty that may be agreed upon with the Soviet Union will come before this body for approval, we have a solemn obligation here and now to contribute to the process of the negotiation by influencing the selection of the personnel involved. Mr. Warnke himself should certainly agree with this general principle. During the war in Indochina, he frequently alluded to the vital role that the Congress must play in foreign policy decisions involving the military forces. What he said in 1970 in support of the

McGovern/Hatfield amendment should apply equally to critical arms negotiations with the Soviet Union:

The President's powers, however, do not extend to the basic policy question of when our national objectives shall be pursued by military means.—Congressional Record, Aug. 31, 1970, p. 30491.

We clearly have not only the right but the obligation to raise here in the Senate basic policy issues involving the capacity of the United States to maintain her own security in any agreement with the Soviet Union. From the views consistently expressed by Mr. Warnke, I have no assurance that we should rely upon his judgments on any of the important strategic questions of our day.

MISCONCEPTION OF STRATEGIC BALANCE

At the central core of Mr. Warnke's disqualification for a key negotiating position is his general misconception of strategic balance; he quite simply does not believe in such a concept. He has consistently reiterated his fundamental erroneous belief in strategic superiority. In a debate with Senator Buckley in 1971, Mr. Warnke noted quite simply that "when both sides have assembled thousands of warheads, the numbers game is not worth playing." [Strategic Sufficiency, p. 21.] If he believes that the numbers game is not worth playing then how can he conscientiously participate in the SALT negotiations which involve very important numbers and not the kind of abstract conceptualizations that pervade Mr. Warnke's thinking.

ceptualizations that pervade Mr. Warnke's thinking.

Not believing that superiority matters, how can he then be expected to extract concessions from the Soviet Union in order to maintain a

relative balance of forces between the two superpowers?

How much force does the United States need to deter the Soviet Union? According to Mr. Warnke, we need virtually none at all. To quote again from the Buckley debate:

The former British defense minister, Denis Healey, has given his opinion that Britain's relatively small strategic forces in fact constitute an adequate retaliatory capacity against the Soviet Union because they include ballistic missile submarines. On reflection, I believe that he is right. [Strategic Sufficiency, p. 28.]

Apparently as far as Mr. Warnke is concerned, we ourselves could reduce our armaments to the level of the British and not suffer any

adverse consequences.

Consistent with this belief, Mr. Warnke believes that any kind of lead in the arms race becomes useless. In his statement opposing both MIRV's and the development of an American ABM system in 1971, he expresses his sympathy with the following point of view:

There appears to be a considerable agreement that nuclear superiority has become a meaningless and irrelevant criterion in designing strategic forces. [Congressional Record, July 20, 1971, p. 26294.]

In the Buckley debate he elaborated further on this notion by asserting that:

Even substantial nuclear superiority, short of nuclear monopoly, could not be a decisive factor in any political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. [Page 46.]

Unfortunately the general world view held by Mr. Warnke has little correlation with reality. He makes the consistent mistake of transposing his own values and objectives to those of the Soviet Union.

But whether Mr. Warnke or any other Americans believe in the irrelevance of superiority itself becomes irrelevant if the leaders in the Kremlin believe in the concept of superiority. In all of his various writings, Mr. Warnke rather conspicuously ignores the whole Soviet perception of what military power means. By ignoring half of the equation, one invariably comes up with the wrong solution to the problem.

Throughout Soviet literature and policy statements runs the consistent theme that the future belongs to the Socialist world and that the terms are largely dictated by the changing military balance. In

October, Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev noted that:

Whoever comes to power in Washington after the elections, it seems that the United States will have to consider the real correlation of forces in the world, which prompted American ruling circles, by a sober analysis of the situation, in recent years to commence a search for accords with the Socialist world. [As quoted in Soviet World Outlook, Nov. 15, 1976, p. 2.]

The Soviets take the role of military power quite seriously. This past summer the official Soviet journal USA asserted that "changes in the correlation of forces in the world arena" comes as a result of "changes in the military balance between the biggest states belonging to the two systems-the U.S.S.R. and the U.S." [Quoted in Soviet World Outlook, Aug. 1, 1976, p. 7.]

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORTS

By taking seriously the potential political advantages to be reaped by strategic superiority, the Soviet Union has engaged in a massive buildup in nearly all aspects of their military power. Somehow this massive Soviet investment in military hardware generally has escaped the notice of Mr. Warnke; thus one must seriously question whether he will have the capacity to prevail upon the Kremlin to limit their activities. Mr. Warnke has continued to think in terms of the mid-1960's and thus remained oblivious to developments of the past decade.

The only factual data that Mr. Warnke has marshaled for the positions he has taken in recent years deal almost exclusively with the number of warheads the United States and the U.S.S.R. possess and

the amount of money we spend on defense each year.

By simply asserting that the United States now has twice as many warheads as do the Soviets, he feels that he effectively dismisses all other considerations of strategic developments. In other words, it matters not at all to him that while the United States has frozen her ICBM force at 1,054 and SLBM force at 656 since 1967, the Soviets have expanded their own forces from 460 ICBM's and 125 SLBM's in 1967 to 1,603 and 725, respectively as of February 1976.

Obsession with the warhead figures and the American MIRVing of ICBM's and SLMB's effectively obscures the fact that the Soviet lead in delivery vehicles includes a lead of 613 to 54 in heavy (or large scale) ICBM's which means that they can carry a much larger and, hence, devastating warhead. (Figures from Library of Congress Study on "The United States/Soviet Military Balance," February

Through a conscientious program of hardening of silos, dispersal of industry, development and deployment of mobile missile launchers,

new ABM technology and a massive civil defense program, the Soviet Union clearly moves in the direction of being able to sustain an American attack with our low-yield warheads. Precisely, these kinds of issues must be exhaustively addressed in any forthcoming SALT negotiations. Yet Mr. Warnke has never even demonstrated an awareness of the problems; hence, he can hardly be expected to formulate mean-

ingful solutions to them.

Mr. Warnke's real concern with the American strategic effort, since his departure from Government in 1969, has been how to unilaterally end the arms race. Note that I am not accusing Mr. Warnke of favoring unilateral disarmament, but instead of urging the United States to abstain from the arms race with the Soviet Union. Believing that strategic superiority is meaningless, naturally Mr. Warnke has opposed nearly every new program that has been proposed in the past decade. He has participated on panels that have recommended against the development of the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, the MX missile, the cruise missile, and the MIRVing of existing weapons. In short, he has already opposed the development and deployment of nearly every system of defense that could have any meaningful bargaining power with the Soviet Union in the SALT negotiations, Also he has curiously charged that any new American program would destabilize the arms balance. Yet at the same time he ironically claims that the strategic balance is irrelevant.

He has advocated this unilateral cessation of our military program on the basis that the weapons are both unnecessary and would only lead to a new round of weapons development by the Soviet Union. But the simple fact of the matter is we have not developed any new ICBM's in over a decade; the B-52's date back to the early 1950's; and the Trident is the natural replacement for the Poseidon and

Polaris submarines.

U.S. POLICY OF RESTRAINT

Given the fact of near stagnation in the American strategic weapons program in the past decade, Mr. Warnke reveals an incredible view of the world when he contends that the current Soviet buildup derives from our initiatives. In his article in Foreign Policy last spring he argues that:

What is needed most urgently now is not a conceptual breakthrough of the stability of the present strategic balance. It's futile to buy things we don't need in the hope that this will make the Soviet Union more amenable. The Soviets are far more apt to emulate than to capitulate. We should, instead, try a policy of restraint, while calling for matching restraint from the Soviet Union. (Foreign Policy, p. 28)

We have, in fact, followed just such a policy of restraint for nearly the past decade now, and we have absolutely no evidence of any emulating reciprocity on the side of the Soviet Union. The evidence against his assumption in nonstrategic fields is just as great. While we reduced assistance to Vietnam, the Soviet bolstered theirs; while the Congress terminated assistance to Angola, the Soviets sent their Cuban gendarmes; while we refused to interfere in political processes in Portugal, the Soviets gave massive aid to their Communist allies. In neither the strategic nor diplomatic fields have the Soviets shown any evidence of following our examples of restrained activities.

Despite the complete absence of any factual substantiation, Mr. Warkne, nonetheless, concludes his Foreign Policy article by baldly arguing that:

The chances are good, moreover, that highly advertised restraint on our part will be reciprocated. The Soviet Union, it may be said again, has only one superpower model to follow. (Foreign Policy, p. 29)

REASON FOR MR. WARNKE'S CONCERN ABOUT DEFENSE SPENDING

The reason that Mr. Warnke has always been so concerned about the nature and amount of U.S. defense spending appears to be that he has other purposes in mind for the money that would allegedly be saved. Immediately after leaving Government service in 1969, Mr. Warnke contributed an article to the October issue of Washington Monthly entitled "National Security: Are We Asking the Right Questions?" In this article, he seriously asks whether the then defense budget of \$80 billion could possibly be reduced to only \$50 billion.

We need the further political judgment of whether the \$30 billion thus freed can be spent on problems of greater risk to our national security and in areas of greater benefit to the over-all quality of American life. (Quoted in Congressional Record, October 28, 1969, p. 31988)

Similarly in his position on the "Truth in Budgeting Task Force," the following year, he again took the position that the defense budget could be drastically cut. He claimed that:

A reduction of an additional \$5 in this huge defense budget would produce a fund which could substantially contribute to meeting our existing commitments in education, housing, crime control and environmental improvement. (Quoted from Congressional Record, February 26, 1970, p. 5000.)

Warnke simply ignores the fact that defense spending has fallen from over one-half of all Government spending in 1960 to less than 30 percent this year. And even within the defense budget, spending has only increased for personnel costs, or what might be termed the welfare portion of the budget. In order to avoid this unpleasant truth, Mr. Warnke frames his discussion of defense spending in terms of so-called discretionary outlays of the Federal Government. Thus, in his Foreign Policy article, he refers to OMB—Office of Management and Budget—calculations that "for the 1975 fiscal year, the defense area takes up \$57.1 billion." (Foreign Policy, p. 14.)

Later on in the same article he conjures up the seemingly impressive figure that the defense budget "consumes over 60 percent of disposable Federal income." (P. 25.) Through this kind of fiscal legerdemain Mr. Warnke reveals that his only interest is in substantially reducing military spending. Without even any prompting, Mr. Warnke has taken on an adversary role against the American military. So I seriously ask whether such a position has any relationship to the kind of man we want to attempt to negotiate limits with the Soviet Union.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McClure.

Senator McClure. I would be happy to respond to any questions if there are any.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

VALUE OF CONTINUING SALT TALKS

How much value do you attribute to the continuation of the SALT talks?

Senator McClure. How much what? The CHAIRMAN. How much value.

Senator McClure. Mr. Chairman, I would hope-

The Chairman. Do you consider them a virtual necessity? Senator McClure. Yes, I think the continuation of attempts to find ways to negotiate limits is an absolute necessity. I certainly do support that effort, but I think those efforts have to be conducted in a realistic framework. Not only that, they must be conducted in a position and in a manner which will give them the credibility that is absolutely necessary if the American people are to have confidence in their results.

TWO-HEADED POSITION

The Chairman. You made reference several times to what you might call the two-headed position which Mr. Warnke is supposed to occupy. Senator McClure. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that go beyond what our previous official in

this position did?

Senator McClure. Mr. Chairman, I think that has varied from time to time and I am not sure I could answer that, I have not traced that evolution.

The Chairman. Dr. Ikle was both negotiator and advocator, was

Senator McClure. Yes, and I think the concern that we would have, that I would have, might be severable, possibly. If he were head only of the agency that gives advice to the President, but was not also in effect the leader of negotiating or at least a major participant in the negotiating team, that is a possibility, but I think there is a danger in view of having him as a principal in the negotiating

The CHARMAN. I have listened during the time Dr. Ikle has occupied this position and I have always felt that he was both a spokes-

man for us and a negotiator at the same time.

Senator McClure. But he has not, on the other hand, exposed the ideas that Mr. Warnke has exposed with regard to what the ultimate disposition ought to be.

RANGE OF OPTIONS TO OPEN UP NEGOTIATION

The CHAIRMAN. You do feel though, don't you, that in trying to handle this very difficult situation he is entitled to feel out different positions, make suggestions that might open up some kind of a negotiation?

Senator McClure. Certainly. I think there ought to be a wide

range of options.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think he has gone beyond that?

Senator McClure. I think Mr. Warnke has already indicated what his options are. He does not espouse the idea that there should be a wide range of options. It seems to me that he himself, by his past statements, has indicated a rather narrow range of options or, to put it another way, to be prepared to indicate what the bottom line is

before he gets to the top line of the negotiation.

Mr. Chairman, I might just add that the role of the negotiator must and as of necessity will be at times conducted not in public view. Negotiations of this nature must by nature at times be concealed from the view of the American public. The American public must have confidence in whatever is said in those periods of time are not going to make concessions unilaterally that are unwarranted. I don't think that the American people could have that confidence if Mr. Warnke is the negotiator.

The CHAIRMAN. I rather feel myself that we, the American people, ought not to force him to lay out his whole plan and give his whole

play and not leave him room for real negotiation.

Senator McClure. Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with that. Whoever is the negotiator has to have some latitude but I would hope that the position that he has taken over the period of the last decade would not foreclose him from having all of the options and I think Mr. Warnke has already eliminated a number of options and done it by his own action in advance of this nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Griffin.

COMMENDATION OF SENATOR M'CLURE

Senator Griffin. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend Senator McClure for coming before the committee and giving the committee the benefit of his views on this very, very important nomination. I have not had an opportunity to be here and listen, but I want to assure him that I have a copy of his statement and I am going to read it.

Senator McClure. Thank you very much. The Chairman. Senator Matsunaga.

Senator Matsunaga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Did you by chance listen to Mr. Warnke's testimony yesterday be-

fore this committee?

Senator McClure. I was not here to listen to it. I read the press reports on it. I watched the Public Television broadcast last night, yes.

POSSIBILITY OF MR. WARNKE CHANGING

Senator Matsunaga. His primary concern was the security of our Nation and all that he intends to do if confirmed. Do you believe that a man of his stature, having been out of Government service now for about 8 years, could change his position to one which would be accept-

able to you?

Senator McClure. I suspect it is theoretically possible, but I don't want to take that chance. I would like to have somebody sitting at that negotiating table when I am not there, not listening, not seeing, not participating—that I have confidence does not have the views Mr. Warnke has expressed over a long period of time. Now maybe he has changed, and if he has I would applaud it.

Senator Matsunaga. Don't you agree that one of the prime requisites of a good negotiator is flexibility and that Mr. Warnke appears

to fulfill that qualification?

Senator McClure. No. I think he has denied himself some of the essential flexibility by positions he has already taken. He does not have the flexibility that other people would have in that position because he has already given away a part of the options.

Senator Matsunaga. May I suggest that you read the testimony he presented yesterday along with the answers to questions which he

made yesterday and then-

Senator McClure. I certainly will with a great deal of interest but again I am not sure that what he says when he is seeking confirmation bears as much weight as a decade of statements that all have a consistent pattern.

MR. WARNKE'S REJECTION OF OFFER

Senator Matsunaga. Of course you are aware he rejected the offer twice and it was only upon the urging of the Members of the Congress as well as those sincerely and deeply interested in the security of this Nation that he agreed to accept.

Senator McClure. I wish he had been more consistent in his re-

fusal. [Laughter.]

Senator Matsunaga. Perhaps he might be convinced by you. Perhaps you ought to talk to him personally. Or else he might be of such negotiating ability that he might convince you, too, because I know some of the other members who were here listening to him yesterday

went out of this room with changed views about Mr. Warnke.

Senator McClure. Well, that is entirely possible. I recognize that his performance was very skillful yesterday. I don't want to assign motives to what he did, it is just that I cannot have confidence in what he said yesterday is the attitude that he will take to the negotiating table in view of all that he has said in the past nor that even if what he said yesterday is exactly true that the Russians will take him without considering all of the past statements that he has made.

SENDING NEGOTIATOR WITH CONFIDENCE OF OPPOSITE PARTY

Senator Matsunaga. Perhaps in sending a negotiator we ought to send someone who has confidence of the opposite party, don't you believe?

Senator McClure. I think that is true. I think they probably welcome him with open arms because he is prepared to make concessions to them that they would like to have made.

Senator Matsunaga. Would they have the change then by send-

ing-

Senator McClure. It depends on whether you put a high premium on the attainment of an agreement or the content of it.

Senator Matsunaga. I can see that Senator McClure has an inflexible nature.

Thank you.

Senator McClure. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Danforth.

CONSISTENCY OF MR. WARNKE'S TESTIMONY AND WRITINGS

Senator Danforth. Senator McClure, in preparing your comments for today I gather that you read very extensively the writings of Mr. Warnke. Is that correct?

Senator McClure. I have read quite a number of articles and excerpts, yes. I would not presume to say I have read everything that

he has ever uttered or written.

Senator Danforth. Did you in reading his articles form a conclusion as to the general tone of his approach in dealing with disarmament?

Senator McClure. Yes.

Senator Danforth. You saw all or a part of his testimony yester-

day. Is that right?

Senator McClure. Yes; that is correct. Again I read the press accounts and I saw what was on that 1-hour program last night on public television.

Senator Danforth. From what you saw last night and what you read of the press accounts, were the views that he presented yesterday

before this committee consistent with his writings?

Senator McClure. There are two ways to look at that. First of all he has said all along, and I think he believes, as he said yesterday, that his positions would have to be consistent with the security requirements of the United States. That is not the argument. The argument is what are the security requirements of the United States. I don't see anything really that he said in his testimony yesterday that is inconsistent with the views that he stated before. That is what worries me on that question of what is necessary for the security of the United States.

Senator Danforth. My notes say that he indicated yesterday that he supports and has always supported a strong national defense.

Senator McClure. But again what is a strong national defense? That is the question. How strong is strong enough? And he I think ascribes to the Soviet Union view that he himself would ascribe to how strong is strong enough but their actions don't indicate that they agree with him.

Senator Danforth. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Senator McClure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOW STRONG IS STRONG ENOUGH?

The Chairman. I find it interesting in your statement—how strong is strong enough? I am sure you realize that we fuss about that all the time in the Senate.

Senator McClure. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And also as between the Executive and the Congress of the United States.

Senator McClure. That debate has raged for years.

The Chairman. I think we are all working in the best interests of the United States as we interpret them, and so it will be a pretty rugged battle, won't it? Who can say who is right and who is wrong? Only each Senator for himself and each American for himself.

Senator McClure. That is right.

The Chairman. So I don't quite follow the argument that because Mr. Warnke, for instance, defines an adequate defense in a way that does not fully comply with my belief or your belief or someone else's belief—

Senator McClure. Don't mistake me, Mr. Chairman. I am not condemning Mr. Warnke, I am just saying I don't want him to be a negotiator. He is entitled to his viewpoint.

GIVING NEGOTIATOR ROOM TO NEGOTIATE

The Chairman. Withdraw the word "condemn"; not willing to let him serve in a position where he would be free to express his own opinion.

Senator McClure. He is free to express his own opinion. I certainly don't question that and he may be right—I don't believe so, but he may be right. But that is different than putting him in a position of

responsibility for negotiations.

The Chairman. By the way, I said something a while ago about the negotiating. I am informed that Dr. Ikle did not negotiate, he did attend the sessions. I am also told that Gerard Smith, whom I recall

quite well, is the only one who was a SALT negotiator.

Now I don't know the exact date we started negotiating on the SALT. It has been a good long time now. We have heard different people express different views on it and we have heard in the Senate and throughout the Congress and in the executive department differing views on what ought to be the subject of the negotiation in connection with the SALT talks.

I think we all pretty well feel that we ought to continue to try to work out some kind of an arrangement along the line of the SALT talks. I think that we will continue that, but I don't see how we are going to have somebody to negotiate for us and tie their hands. I think

we have to give them room to negotiate.

Senator McClure. Well, again I agree that there ought to be negotiations. I am fully in support of the idea that we ought to have an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and that it ought to have an administrator and that there ought to be negotiations and that there ought to be a negotiator, but I can't reiterate too strongly that whomever we send as negotiator should not have already indicated how far he is willing to go unilaterally in areas which ought to require some reciprocity. That is not the way to attain a proper kind of balance in the arms limitations and I strongly, fervently hope that we can indeed reach an accommodation and an agreement that can have our support that will limit the proliferation of nuclear arms in particular but also deal with the other questions of relative military strength between the superpowers.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly would agree with you that whoever is negotiating for us ought not to show his entire hand before he begins.

Senator McClure. Well, if I were playing poker I would not want to show any of my cards until I was ready to show them all. I would not expect that if I were playing five-card draw with somebody that I would show him three of my cards and hold two back while he had all five of his hidden.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say that I have never played poker and I know nothing about it [laughter] but your wording sounds logical. In fact, I think I can remind you that you and I have worked pretty closely together often on both sides of the aisle.

Senator McClure. Yes, and there is no partisanship in this as far as

I am concerned. I hope there is none.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate your comment.
Any further questions of Senator McClure?

Senator Griffin.

Senator Griffin. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Danforth.

Senator Danforth. No.

Senator McClure. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here.

Next we have Mr. Richard Cohen of the U.S. Labor Party of Washington, D.C.

Come around, Mr. Cohen.

Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF RICHARD COHEN, U.S. LABOR PARTY

Mr. Cohen. I submitted a statement; however, I will deviate from that statement.

The Chairman. You may proceed as you see fit. Either read it, summarize it, discuss it or just give us your own views.

Mr. Cohen. All right.

The CHARMAN. We will print your statement in the record.

Mr. Cohen. I would like to make two interrelated points which in some way would lead myself and my party to absolutely oppose the confirmation of Paul C. Warnke to the two designated positions. Furthermore, I hope that these two interrelated points that I make will help to demonstrate that the debate on national security, on SALT and strategic questions generally which have been presented thus far is for the most part a charade—a charade being manipulated at this roint by the Trilateral Commission for the purposes of the Trilateral Commission, the purposes which are indefensible and if allowed to be executed will most probably lead in short course to early thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union.

CONTRADICTION IN MR. WARNKE'S POSITION

Now let me start, Mr. Chairman, by pointing out one extreme glaring contradiction. In the position asserted by Mr. Warnke vesterday this massive contradiction is by no means the property of Mr. Warnke alone, it is also shared by many of his so-called adversaries and here I specifically refer to the Committee on the Present Danger—Mr. Paul Nitze, Mr. James Schlesinger.

Now the central point to elaborate in getting at this contradiction was seen last week in Mr. Carter's fireside chat. Now Mr. Carter is going to unfold an energy policy before the Senate, Congress and the American people which, let alone its drastic economic effects on the surface from a pure military standpoint, will drastically curtail the capability of this country to maintain its own national security.

Now essential to that energy policy in Mr. Carter's statement was the point that he made in the terms of the energy conservation in which his program will allot for a drastic drop in energy consumption in this country by approximately 20 percent. Now that 20 percent will hit the machine tool industry, the electronics industry, the aerospace industry, the very guts of U.S. industry and particularly that industry linked to

our military capabilities.

Now this point contradicts the central point made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his military posture statement, fiscal year 1978, in which he elaborates—and here again from the strict objective military point of view—that the central capability which the Soviet Union has developed principally from the period following the Cuban missile crisis is a massive military industry complex, a massive military industrial complex which at this point produces five engineers to every one engineer produced in the United States, a complex which outstrips the United States 2 to 1 in the number of scientists and technicians produced.

Now what those scientists and technicians have been developing was elaborated from the U.S. population but immediately classified after it was elaborated by one of the leading Soviet scientists, Mr. Rudicov. It has been witnessed or at least we would suggest that it might have been

witnessed in terms of Soviet capabilities to blind satellites.

Now all of the matters relating to the Rudicov disclosures, the binding satellites, have to do with Soviet developments in areas related to the development of controlled thermonuclear power and it is exactly that element of U.S. energy production and fission and potential fission which the Carter administration has already stated it will keep out of its energy policy and devote itself to the nonsense of the

development of solar energy-a straight Naderite paragon.

Now Mr. Warnke yesterday said that he was a devotee. Suddenly he had changed his mind and is a devotee of military research and development. Now how could that possibly be the case when he is assumed to be a member of the administration which is following a course that will dismantle that capability? Similarly, members of the Committee on the Present Danger have systematically avoided that differential in Soviet and U.S. development, that particular one. As a matter of fact, Mr. Paul Nitze testifying before this committee a couple of weeks ago attacked the U.S. Labor Party distorting our position to cover up that point and similarly with Mr. Warnke yesterday.

Why? What is hinted? What is the policy?

I believe the secret understanding policy and the obvious contradiction lies in the fact that Mr. Warnke himself is a member of the Trilateral Commission. He is a board member of the Trilateral Commission. Seventy percent of Mr. Carter's Cabinet come from the ranks of the Trilateral Commission which includes only 165 citizens of the United States.

TRILATERAL COMMISSION

Now there has been a lot of talk about that Commission. What is it? What is its policy? Essential to its policy is the diversion of low

income from reinvestment in plant and equipment and the development of plant and equipment and diversion for maintaining the skilled labor force into the repayment of debt either directly or indirectly to bolster up the holdings, the power base of that force which organized the Trilateral Commission in the first place; namely, the Rockefeller family and principally in this case David Rockefeller and his retinue.

WHAT IS BEFORE US

That policy if you extrapolate it out politically in terms of what it will mean for Western Europe to pay that debt, what it will mean for the Third World to pay that debt, obviously brings up the specter of drastic political changes not only in Western Europe, in the Third World sector but within the United States itself. Those political changes were openly rejected by the Governments of West Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain on Walter Mondale's tour.

This brings up the central point of what Mr. Warnke will be used for in his two positions. Mr. Warnke is a softliner and he will shift his position according to the strategic situation. At this point the strategic situation is one in which Western Europe, the leading OPEC [Oil Producing and Exporting Countries] countries—and principally here I refer to the countries of Saudi Arabia and a vast section of the Third World—are now moving in unison through the back door to organize an alternate monetary and economic system to that which has dominated large sectors of the advanced second and third world ever since the post world.

We have two monetary systems in conflict. Mr. Warnke's purpose, for the edification of Mr. Brezhnev and others in the Soviet Union, will be to dangle the option of SALT before their eyes, to hook them on the SALT question, to paralyze them with the SALT option while under the cover other things are occurring. I just would like to bring your attention to what in fact is really occurring from the hallowed halls of the Trilateral Commission which happens to be the ad-

ministration at this point.

The Carter administration is preparing a display of political muscle and, if necessary, military force to prevent the countries of Western Europe from establishing an independent relationship with the Arab oil producing states free of the interference of the U.S. controlled, largely Rockefeller controlled multinational oil companies such as Standard Oil of New Jersey or Exxon and a number of others. A key part of the administration is to prevent at all costs the pending nationalization of the giant Aramco oil complex by the Saudi Arabian Government.

The command of this operation has been placed under the National Security Council headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski and James Schlesinger, the energy czar of the Carter regime. Brzezinski and Schlesinger are a task force comprising the Departments of State, Treasury, and energy to inject a direct U.S. Government presence into the negotiations with Aramco and Saudi Arabia. The purpose of the National Security Council task force is to block by whatever means a takeover of Aramco by the Saudi regime by reinforcing the company's position and so forth and so on. The terms of the Saudi nationaliza-

tion were regarded to have been settled December 1976 and drawn up by the oil ministers of Yamani and are now before King Khalid with the threat of U.S. military intervention and/or the other option being

using the Shah as the club.

In any event, if the Saudis do make a move to nationalize if such military intervention is exercised, we are on the edge of World War III. Now hopefully Mr. Warnke from the point of view of the Trilateral Commission can simmer the Soviets down and say, here we have a nice SALT agreement and so forth and so on.

That is what we have before us and that is why I would hope that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would reject the nomination

of Mr. Warnke.

[Mr. Cohen's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD COHEN, U.S. LABOR PARTY

Since January 20, the Trilateral Commission has been installed in nearly every important position of power in the Executive arm of the United States government. The President of the United States, the Vice President, and significant numbers of Cabinet members including the Secretary of State all sit on that supranational planning body. Europe and the Third World have universally responded in horror to find that David Rockefeller has seized the reins of power in the United States.

Now, for the edification of Mr. Brezhnev and the Soviet Politburo, Paul Warnke's nomination for director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and negotiator for SALT, is by far the best stage-managed performance put on by the Trilateral Commission. Mr. Warnke has been cleaned up and presented as a "soft-liner" who will press for arms reductions and promote détente over and above the opposition coming from the Committee on the Present Danger

and other "hawks,"

Once this display is over, the Soviet leadership is supposed to be impressed with Mr. Warnke's credentials as a friend of détente, and to take this as further proof that Averell Harriman is keeping his promise made to Brezhnev several months ago that the Administration would keep warhawks out of the government.

The cast and the plot for this farce goes as follows: Scoop Jackson is scheduled to testify before the rigged Senate Foreign Relations Committee and charge that Warnke is unreliable because he is prepared to declare unilateral arms reductions to the detriment of U.S. military strength. Jackson is to be followed by Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Rep. Samuel Stratton (D-NY) who will denounce Warnke as a person who "might give away the store" in the SALT talks. After this exhibition of division within the Democratic Party, conservatives who were being brainwashed by Buckley and the Committee on the Present Danger in seminars last week, are expected to be roped in and repeat the charges.

MR. WARNKE'S ASSOCIATION

Warnke, like almost every other Cabinet level appointee in this Administration is a member of the David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission. He sits on the Executive Board, next to the Executive Director Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has been chosen to play "hard cop" as National Security Council chief. On the same board is Cyrus Vance, who was promoted from Foreign Affairs editorial director of the New York Times to Secretary of State. Further down the Trilateral list is Lane Kirkland and David Packard, both of them executive members of the warhawk

Committee on the Present Danger.

Warnke is a protégé of Clark Clifford, his senior law partner in the Washingtonbased Wall Street law firm of Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain and Finney. Clifford is the person who wrote the Truman Doctrine which committed the United States to a policy of colonial interventions to preserve the "American Century" doctrine. He is also author of the National Security Act which created the CIA, against the initial opposition of President Truman. Under Clifford's sponsorship Warnke was brought into the Department of Defense in 1966 and rose to the position of chief of Internal Security Affairs. Under Paul Nitze, Warnke contributed to the implementation of the counter-insurgency warfare doctrine in Vietnam, to the bombing escalation, and to the extermination policy code-named "Operation Phoenix.

In 1968, Warnke was one of the Wall Street emissaries that delivered the message to Lyndon Johnson that he not run for reelection. This Wall Street coup allowed the Rockefeller to continue the war for the next seven years, and to use it for destabilization operations against the United States government through the creation of a pacifist, Naderist "left opposition."

While still at the Pentagon, Warnke was involved along with Vance, Califano, Ramsey Clark, Clifford and others in Operation Garden Plot, which for the first time in U.S. history worked out contingency scenarios for a coup d'état against

the United States government.

As an affiliate of the Center of Law and Social Policy specializing in international relations, Warnke has been involved in the sabotaging of nuclear fission in order to keep countries such as Brazil from obtaining energy independence from the Rockefeller oil cartels. He will use his new post as Arms Control and Defense Agency for carrying out this economic warfare policy under the guise of non-proliferation.

THE MAN WITHOUT A SOUL

Those who know Warnke describe him as a man without a soul. Some additional

facts about his recent history confirm this announcement as valid.

Up to 1976 Warnke was horrified over the prospect of confrontation with the USSR, and up to that time had a realistic appraisal of Soviet response to the strategy then being enunciated by Brzezinski and others. He is aware of the fact that the present danger of war comes as a result of the determination of bankrupt lower Manhattan banks to go for a show of force in order to subjugate the Third World and Europe. However, as a member of this crumbling empire, in his capacity as a highly paid errand clerk for David Rockefeller, Warnke now espouses the Trilateral policies which he knows are leading to war.

In his article "We Don't Need a Devil" in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, Warnke details the utopian perception which he will be operating from

as head of ACDA.

He proceeds from the assumption that the USSR is a second rate power and from that vantage point reviews the growing danger of war emanating from U.S. policies towards the Third World, or what he calls "the thwarted billion in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."

He turns to the "success" of the Rockefeller-engineered surrogate warfare against the Third World carried out in the Middle East, gloating with satisfaction that the USSR's political and economic influence has suffered a series of

"setbacks.

"The decline of Soviet fortunes in the area makes its presence at any recon-

vening of the Geneva Conference . . . hardly essential."

The U.S. monetarists can claim debt payment at will and impose fascist regimes in the Third World. At the North-South talks where the Third World has put debt moratoria on the agenda, "what is required," according to Warnke, ". . . is U.S. willingness to implement the promise of Kissinger's 1975 speech," that is, no debt moratorium.

The question that precedes this wishful thinking is whether or not the Soviets will be forced into a thermonuclear war under these tripwire conditions. Warnke answers no. He assumes that as long as the Soviet Arbatovs are allowed to maintain a perception that the U.S. is willing to negotiate arms limitations and other negotiating forum, thus impressing upon them that the U.S. will never do the unthinkable, then no tripwire conditions should ever arise

Warnke argues this by presenting the following bit of history:

"Whatever the reasons, the Soviet reaction was curiously pallid when in the spring of 1972 the Nixon Administration mined the harbor of Haiphong and stepped up the bombing of Hanoi just before the SALT I agreements . . . while Soviet shipping was trapped in Haiphong harbor, Nixon was welcomed to Moscow where he and Brezhnev signed the treaty limiting antiballistic missile sites as well as the interim agreement on control of offensive nuclear arms."

With these credentials it is still uncertain whether Congress will engage in the farce of certifying Warnke as a soft-liner, or expose him as the soft cop of the

Trilateral Commission.

OPERATION GARDEN PLOT

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cohen.

I have been reading your statement as you have discussed the matter. I find some things in there which it is hard for me to understand. At one point, for instance, you say:

Warnke was involved along with Vance, Califano, Ramsey Clark, Clifford, and others in Operation Garden Plot, which for the first time in U.S. history worked out contingency scenarios for a coup d'etat against the United States government.

Now do you really believe to say that?

Mr. Cohen. Well, a lot was going on at that point.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. Cohen. A lot was going on at that point. Essentially from my point of view, that coup d'etat was ultimately realized in the Watergate and President Nixon but at that time what was occurring was an attempt by those individuals named to reorganize the military intelligence toward its potential use and ultimate use within the domestic boundaries of the United States, and one of the essential developments that prior to this that Mr. Vance was involved in and Mr. Warnke was Operation Garden Plot which was a scenario developed for potential military takeover of urban areas during the ghetto riots.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Griffin.

Senator Griffin. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Matsunaga.

Senator Matsunaga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PARTY'S OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT'S NOMINATIONS

At the first hearing it was announced by the spokesman of the U.S. Labor Party that the U.S. Labor Party intends to oppose each and every nomination of the President. Is this still your policy?

Mr. Cohen. No, I don't think that accurately reflects the policy of

the U.S. Labor Party.

Senator Matsunaga. Has the party endorsed any nominee to date?

Mr. Cohen. No.

Senator Matsunaga. You are opposed to every one of them? Mr. Cohen. Well, it is hard to find one that we would support. Senator Matsunaga. 1,000 percent. [Laughter.]

DESCRIPTION OF WARNKE AS MAN WITHOUT SOUL

I find it interesting, if not entertaining, to find a statement here which you make that "Those who know Warnke describe him as a man without a soul." Can you name one of those who said that?

Mr. Cohen. Oh, I would not presume to do that, no. Apparently someone did hear that and reported it to me, but I think that after yesterday's demonstration others in the back of their mind would think that that is the case.

Senator Matsunaga. Do you know anyone who knows him by that good name?

Mr. Cohen. Personally?

Senator Matsunaga. Yes. Mr. Cohen. I don't know.

Senator Matsunaga. You are testifying before a Senate committee which has a major decision to make and you make statements such as this which I think destroys your credibility.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Danforth.

Senator Danforth. No questions, Mr. Chairman,

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your appearing.

Next is Mr. Mark Lockman, assistant legislative aide to the Liberty

Lobby, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Lockman, we are very glad to have you before us.

Did you present a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF MARK LOCKMAN, ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE AIDE, LIBERTY LOBBY

Mr. Lockman. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I did. I have made some amendments to it.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be printed in the record. You discuss it as

Mr. Lockman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Mark Lockman, assistant legislative aide for Liberty Lobby. I appreciate this opportunity appear today and present the views of Liberty Lobby's nearly 25,000 member board of policy, as well as the approximately quarter of a million readers of our weekly newspaper,

the Spotlight.

Mr. Chairman, the confirmation of Paul Warnke as chief arms control negotiator will seriously undermine the military strength and defense structure of our Nation. Although he has been highly recommended by President Carter for this important position, the Senate should keep in mind that Mr. Carter also highly recommended Theodore Sorensen to head the CIA—the most outrageous appointment since Caligula named his horse a counsel, and comparable in other

I'm certain the U.S. Senate would never confirm a peacenik to conduct arms control negotiations. If it does, we can expect to see a rapid decline of U.S. strength around the world-both in terms of

military defense as well as reputation.

As an American nationalist institution, Liberty Lobby opposes war. We believe that the best way to maintain the peace is not to meddle in the affairs of the rest of the world and to be so strong militarily that the rest of the world will only want to talk with us. Recent polls show that Americans support this position taken by Liberty Lobby. It is the responsibility of our Government—the responsibility of Congress-to uphold the wishes of the voters and taxpayers of this country. Had this country wanted a policy of disarmament, it would have elected George McGovern for President in 1972, and it would never have elected candidate Carter who campaigned for a strong national defense—unlike many of the other contenders in his own party.

MR. WARNKE'S VIEWS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Significant controversy surrounds an unsigned memo about Mr. Warnke's qualifications. The distinguished Senator from South Dakota, Mr. McGovern, was quick to label the attacks against Mr. Warnke as "McCarthyite tactics." To set the record straight, Liberty Lobby is in full accord with the summary of the unsigned memo and believes that the U.S. Senate should seriously consider its contents. The memo is nothing but a distillation of Mr. Warnke's own views. It reads:

Simply stated, it is hard to see how the American side in SALT can be effectively upheld by someone who advocates, as Warnke does, the unilateral abandonment by the United States of every weapon system which is subject to negotiation at SALT (as well as many others which are not under discussion).

We agree. Mr. Warnke's irresponsible views of national defense are much more than a commitment for arms control, as Senator Hart would have us believe. Instead, his idealistic perspective of the arms race should make any intelligent American shudder. Should we disarm at a time when the Soviets are engaged in the most massive build-up of arms in the history of mankind? Mr. Warnke may say yes, but I can assure you that the vast majority of Americans will reply with a resounding no.

Mr. Warnke apparently believes that arms talks cannot protect the interests of the United States. He expressed it clearly in a 1972 statement as follows:

Even substantial nuclear superiority, short of nuclear monopoly, could not be a decisive factor in any political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since most Americans are dedicated to the pursuit of peace, I wonder how they will react to an arms negotiator who does not believe the Nation's strength can be used as a negotiating tool. The only other purpose for arms is war. And if you don't use arms as a tool in pressuring adversary nations to arrive at peaceful solutions, the only alternative is war. But Mr. Warnke, according to public statements, is dedicated to unilateral arms reduction.

This is based on the idea that if we reduce our armaments, maybe the trusting Russians will do likewise. If we had an adequate inspection program of the Soviet military machine, this would be a plausible, realistic and honorable goal. But we don't have such an inspection program, and to advocate a disarmament plan is sheer folly.

PRESENT STATUS OF U.S. MILITARY POSTURE

And what is the present status of our military posture? Military experts offer these warnings:

We have no defense against ballistic missiles—General Daniel James, Jr., Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command.

The United States might lose as many as 100 million people in the event of a Soviet attack . . . The Soviet Union, on the other hand, might lose less than we did in World War II—Dr. Leon Goure of the Center for International Studies of the University of Miami.

Today we face a Soviet threat far greater than any other threat this Nation has ever faced in its 200 years of existence—J. William Middendorf, II, Secretary of the Navy.

"ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE POSTURE"

Mr. Warnke was a strong defender of the so-called "Alternative Defense Posture," a campaign paper of Senator McGovern's defense budget proposals, which, among other things advocated discontinuation of deployment of MIRVs, Minuteman III and other steps to upgrade U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles; cessation of converting Polaris to Poseidon submarines; halting the production of a B-1 prototype; cessation of deployment of the Safeguard system; and cutting by more than half the Army's surface-to-air missile capability and the Air Force's intercepter force.

It has never been suggested at the SALT talks that the Soviet Union take comparable steps toward disarmament. However, Mr. Warnke, as the principal national security adviser in 1972 to Mr. Mc-Govern, heartily endorsed the "Alternative Defense Posture," which can be called nothing less than outright unilateral disarmament.

MR. WARNKE'S PAST STATEMENTS

If Mr. Warnke doesn't feel compelled to account for his statements of 5 years ago, I can give you an up-date—1974. As Chairman on the Project on Budget Priorities (now called the Council on National Priorities and Resources) Mr. Warnke was promoting a formula for fiscal disarmament in a pamphlet published by the group, entitled "A Report to Congress: Military Policy and Budget Priorities, Fiscal Year 1975." The report, which proposed a yearly 3 percent cut in military expenditures over the next 5 years, would have reduced the military budget to about \$29 billion less than what President Ford proposed for fiscal year 1978.

And again, in 1975, Mr. Warnke actually blames the arms race on the United States, and didn't challenge this fact when Senator Hatch confronted him with it yesterday. It is only logical that if one blames the United States for the arms race that the United States should take the first step in disarming. Mr. Warnke even stated yesterday that we should take the first step and then take a wait and see attitude.

U.S. POLICIES WHICH FUEL SOVIET WAR MACHINE

The price of preserving freedom is an expensive one, but one that has been made very difficult by policies of the U.S. Government that fuel the war machine of the Soviet Union through easy credit and technological assistance. In fact, research scientist Antony Sutton estimated that nearly 90 percent of the Soviet technology has come from the United States and our own allies. The whole attitude of peaceful coexistence, détente and joint space ventures with the Soviets only adds to their already enormous ability to produce arms and missiles that are poised at us this very minute. There is no such thing as nonstrategic aid. For all aid—be it wheat, milk, oil, money, or bullets—adds to the war producing ability of a nation. Had our Nation not engaged in the policies of bailing out the Soviets every time they were in difficulty, we would not need to sit down and talk with them about anything.

In reality today, arms talks are necessary, but only if they can be used to insure the peace and security of the United States. To nomi-

nate a man who opposes every weapons system that we have would be like choosing a boll weevil to head the Department of Agriculture.

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear today and present

our views.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Javits, I guess you want to read that.

Senator Griffin.

Senator Griffin. I have no questions. The Chairman. Senator Danforth. Senator Danforth. No questions. Senator Javits. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We are glad to have your paper; it will be printed in full in the record as you presented it.

Mr. LOCKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Paul Nitze.

Mr. Nitze, we are glad to have you with us again.

STATEMENT OF PAUL NITZE

Mr. Nitze. Mr. Chairman, I thought if you permitted, I might begin by reading a letter which I sent to you the day before yesterday. The Chairman. Yes. I was going to suggest if you did not have a statement that you had written a letter to the committee.

Mr. NITZE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to see you.

Proceed as you see fit.

TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT CONCERNING FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTOR

Mr. Nitze. Mr. Chairman, when, some 10 years ago, it became increasingly clear that the United States has become strategically and politically overcommitted in Vietnam, two schools of thought began to emerge as to the proper future direction of our national security policy.

In one view, U.S. foreign and defense problems would continue, indeed might become more serious as a result of Vietnam, and could well call for even more emphasis and greater prudence than had been devoted to them in the past. In the contrasting view, the problems of the past had arisen largely from our own errors springing from overemphasis on foreign policy, and particularly its defense aspects.

Those taking the latter view believed our true strategic interests were limited to Western Europe, Japan and Israel; that the U.S.S.R. presented our only military threat and that that threat could be deterred with forces less capable than those that had already been authorized. Therefore—so the argument ran—significant cuts could and should be made in a wide range of defense programs requested by the executive branch. It was hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to make certain parallel cuts or at least reciprocate by restraining the pace of its own programs.

There can be no question that Mr. Paul Warnke, who has now been nominated to be both Director of ACDA and head of the U.S. SALT delegation, has been one of the most active, vocal, and persistent ad-

vocates of the second point of view.

CONTEXT FOR CONSIDERING MR. WARNKE'S NOMINATION

In the last year or so, an important debate has arisen over the current state and future trends of the defense situation of the United States and of those countries whose interests are important to us and generally parallel to our own. I believe there is now a wide consensus that the evidence indicates that the situation could become serious at some time in the future, given a continuation of current trends. There are, however, difference of opinion as to how soon this may occur.

It is in this context that I suggest the nomination of Mr. Warnke be considered. I believe that his testimony before the Senate Committee on the Budget, given on March 9, 1976, is relevant; particularly the last few pages thereof. He there makes it clear that he regards the principal deterrent protecting Europe, the Middle East, and Japan to be the probability that the United States would initiate, if necessary, the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, with the further probability that this would escalate to the nuclear destruction of everything he considers worth caring for and planning about in the United States.

He appears to advocate this policy concurrently with taking a highly cavalier attitude concerning significant cuts, not only in almost all elements of those U.S. conventional capabilities but also in those improved U.S. nuclear capabilities that might make such escalation less likely. In listening to his testimony at the time, I was reminded of Secretary John Foster Dulles and his short-lived doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation; in 1953, however, there was the critical difference that we then still had a virtual nuclear monopoly.

MR. WARNKE'S ABILITIES

I am concerned that Mr. Warnke, who has spoken with such certainty on matters of military requirements, weapons capabilities, and strategy, may nevertheless not be a qualified student or competent judge of any of these matters. It is claimed that he is a superb negotiator. I am unfamiliar with his successes in this area. I recognize that he has certain abilities as an advocate, but at least with respect to defense matters, these do not include clarity or consistency of logic. I doubt that such advocacy has much chance of success against the strategy and tactics of the highly serious and competent Soviet negotiators.

It is proper that the President's nominations be supported unless there are strong reasons for not doing so. In this instance, however, I cannot bring myself to believe that the Senate would be well advised to give its consent to Mr. Warnke's appointment.

MR. WARNKE SHOULDN'T BE APPOINTED TO EITHER POSITION

The letter included another sentence which today I would like to withdraw and that is: "his view is reinforced by the consideration that if confirmed, Mr. Warnke would serve not only as Director of ACDA, but also as head of the U.S. SALT delegation, charged with the basic and detailed negotiations with the Soviet SALT delegation at Geneva."

Then I went on to say that I do not believe that, in today's circum-

stances, it is wise to have one man doing both jobs.

The reason I would like to withdraw those two sentences is that after listening to channel 26 yesterday and Mr. Warnke's testimony before your committee yesterday I do not believe that he ought to be appointed to either position, even if he were to agree to serve in only one.

REASONS FOR MR. NITZE'S POSITION

Let me explain why I take that position. I had thought up to that time he did in fact really believe in the various positions that he took over the entire period from 1969 to 1976. I believe that the summary of his views during that period was very fairly summarized by Senator McClure earlier in this very session. I have gone over many of the things that he has written in that period. After all I have known Mr. Warnke well. He served me for a period of 7 years in the Pentagon

and I have seen him since, debated with him since.

I think I understand what he said, I followed what he said. I do not think that Senator McClure's summary of his position is in any way unfair. Neither do I think that the so-called anonymous summary that was circulated was unfair—in certain respects I don't think it is precise. I think Paul Warnke could perfectly well say that he did not advocate the unilateral phasing out of, for instance, any of the existing nuclear weapons systems; that all he advocated was the cut in almost every improvement in our nuclear capability.

I think it is clear that he was against any improvement in any of our nuclear weapons systems except for the Trident I missile. I can't think of anything else he was for. The summaries, I think, do correctly state what he has been saying for a period of 7 years.

Now, if I listened correctly to what channel 26 had to say about his testimony yesterday, it seemed to me there were things which were quite different than what he has been saying in the past. If I listened correctly, I thought he was saying that today he does not believe that it would be right for the United States to concede either the reality or the appearance of nuclear superiority to the Soviet Union. Maybe I misunderstood it, but that is what I think he said yesterday.

Senator Javits. I think you are right. I think that is what he did say. Mr. Nitze. Now, the question at issue is by what change of logic does he come to that? He certainly didn't in any way suggest that he has any strange and obscure definition of superiority. I think the ordinary English meaning of the word superiority is the opposite of inferiority and different than parity, equality, rough equivalence, words of that kind. In fact, if I listened to him correctly, he was talking about rough equivalence as being the thing he was for.

Now, has he really looked into what does constitute rough equivalence in any meaningful sense? I believe he has not. I don't believe he understands what the word means. I think he really has in the back of his mind a definition of superiority, Mr. Chairman, which is similar to the definition which was presented before this committee the other day

by Mr. Drell and concurred in by Senator McGovern.

Now, that is a very odd definition of superiority. That is a definition under which you don't have superiority unless you have the counter-

force capability to almost entirely eliminate the retaliatory forces of the other side and you have ABM capabilities sufficient to deal with any incoming strike. Goodness, we have not had that for years and

years and years.

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis we had nothing like that. We knew perfectly well that if there were a nuclear war this country would be severely damaged. However, we knew that our capabilty to destroy the Soviet military capability was much greater than theirs to destroy ours. We knew that our ability to do damage to their industry and possibly to their population was vastly greater than theirs to do that to us because of the fact that we had meaningful superiority at that time, but not by this arbitrary definition.

We then acted with confidence during the Cuban missile crisis because we were sure that the Russians would be outrageously stupid to initiate a nuclear war under those circumstances. They are not outrageously stupid. These are very serious competent people. So then

we could go forward.

Now, I hope to goodness that we are serious and competent people, too. I would hope to God we are and therefore it would seem to me that there is some reason to look at this question of superiority not by some arbitrary definition, but to look at it as to whether or not there is a possibility or a probability that every reasonable standard of evaluation could turn negative, too, unless you did something about it.

MR. WARNKE'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SALT AGREEMENT

Now, in that context I think it is important to look at and know what he is talking about concerning the SALT agreement. If I correctly understood what he was recommending, I think he was recommending a treaty designed along the lines of the Vladivostok accord which would postpone the issues of cruise missiles and the Backfire, but which would be accompanied by a ban on mobile ICBM's.

Now, I have a very great difficulty in seeing how under such an agreement it would ever be possible to deny the Soviets a war-winning nuclear capability unless we were to adopt a launch-on-warning doctrine for ICBM's. Maybe we will have to do that at some point, but I know that the Congress, and particularly the Senate, I think, correctly,

has been very leary of doing anything like that.

I do not believe that that is the stable relationship which Mr. Warnke also took a position in favor of yesterday. Now, I don't believe he understands anything about this, nor do I think he is being honest or consistent in saying what his views are. I believe his viewsat least I hoped that he was being honest when he gave his views during those 7 years from 1969 to 1977—but certainly they are different than the views that he seemed to be suggesting to his committee vesterday. And, therefore, I do not believe he ought to be confirmed for either of these two jobs.

DIFFERENCE IN MR. WARNKE'S VIEWS

Senator Griffin, Mr. Nitze, could I ask a question? The views he expressed here seem to be different from those as recently as March of 1976 before the Budget Committee of the Senate. Mr. Nitze. I had that in mind. As you remember, Senator, I also

testified before the Budget Committee on that same day.

Senator Griffin. So it is not just a matter of his views yesterday being different from views that he expressed 6 or 7 years ago, but as recently as last year. That was my conclusion, too.

Senator Danforth. Could you repeat what you said? I didn't hear

you.

Mr. Nitze. I said that I agreed with Senator Griffin because I also had been a witness before the same hearing that he was referring to which took place before the Senate Budget Committee, as I remember it, on March 9, 1976, and at that hearing I think he certainly conveyed the opinion to me—and I take it to Senator Griffin—that his views then were no different than they had been during the entire period from 1969 up to that date.

I take it that the point that Senator Griffin was making was that what he appeared to be saying yesterday was different not only from what he had been saying in 1969, 1971, 1972, 1974, and so forth and so on, but also different than what he seemed to be saying in 1976, as recently as 1976, but did I correctly summarize the last point, Senator

Griffin ?

The Chairman. Thank you again, Mr. Nitze, for coming and giving us this sort of discussion.

Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CAPACITY IN WHICH MR. NITZE APPEARS

I understand that Mr. Kemble will be testifying afterwards in connection with the memorandums so we are not going into that. As I understand it, you are here in your own capacity as a witness.

Mr. Nitze. I am here in my own capacity as an individual. I think I have paid my dues as a member of the Committee for A Democratic Majority. I have had no active connection with the Committee.

Senator Pell. I will direct some questions to Mr. Kemble on that.

POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS INCREASING ARMS RACE

I was interested in one point that Mr. Warnke made yesterday and that was the thought that perhaps the negotiations themselves can increase the arms race because it gives an incentive to each side to increase their bargaining chips whereas if we had a period without negotiations, perhaps that would discourage the arms race because you would not have the tendency to go in there with one or more bargaining chip. We had the argument some years ago on the question of MIRVing. I remember the differing views of one previous ACDA director and the one who was there recently; who felt we should hold off on that because the Soviets 6 or 8 years ago were doing the same thing and then having another bargaining chip.

What is your thought on that?

Mr. Nitze. Well, I share the view of—I don't know why we keep this confidential because he was perfectly frank about it at the time, but at any rate, we will keep it confidential, but I shared his view. Now, to create or for the United States to build programs solely for the purpose of being bargaining chips I thought to be in error. I thought the correct thing was for us to go forward with those systems which we would need in the event that we are unsuccessful in negotiating mutual restraints which would make those systems unnecessary but that it was wholly worthwhile to go forward with those systems that we would need in the absence of mutual limitations because, if we didn't get the limitations, we would need the systems and, if we did eventually get them, it would be quite appropriate and quite proper to dismantle and to abandon what we had already invested in them because we would have then gotten a mutual limitation. That is in fact the way in which we did get the ABM treaty.

I will swear that we would never have gotten an ABM treaty if the Congress had not authorized our going forward with the Safeguard system in 1969. The Congress authorized this with only one vote. If we had failed on that one vote, we would never have gotten

the ABM treaty.

Now, you can say that the ABM deployments of the Safeguard System were, in a way, a bargaining chip. I think they were, but I think you need that kind of a bargaining chip. If you have nothing you are willing to give up, what is the point of this type of negotiation?

I would think that the ideal thing would be if we were willing to give up many of the systems that we now have provided we can get really comparable action on the part of the Soviet Union.

I have suggested on other occasions that the ideal thing with respect to ICBMs would be if both sides scrapped all of their present ICBMs provided that both sides were authorized to build 5,000 fixed ICBMs on both sides, no one of which had a throw weight greater than 100 kilograms. You cannot MIRV 100 kilograms. Also, hundred kilogram warheads are small, 5,000 of them would provide much less megatonnage than existing forces. That is one gain for our side and theirs. This situation would in fact be stable.

Even perfect accuracy would not enable one side to gain from striking the other side. You cannot possibly have perfect reliability, but even if you had perfect accuracy and perfect reliability, it still would make no sense to attack the missiles of the other side. This would in

fact be wholly stable from the Soviet side and from ours.

I have discussed it with the Russians; they won't buy it. They have said that we are not going to give up the SS-18's and so on and so forth. They are not going to do that. But from my standpoint we would be well advised to consider all of our existing ICBM's as bargaining chips providing we could get the Russians to agree to something that would really decrease potential instability.

Therefore, I think all this attack that is made on bargaining chips of which Paul Warnke is one of the leading proponents—he says we should not build anything that we would then later be prepared to

scrap—is absolutely asinine. But that is what he has said.

Senator Pell. Returning to my question, do you think if there had been no SALT talks at all, perhaps we would be in a similar condition and have spent maybe less?

Mr. Nitze. I don't think so. I believe that on the Soviet side they would have gone forward with exactly the programs they have gone

forward with. I think they might not have demobilized some of the soft ICBM launchers, some of these big, old obsolescent ICBM and silo launchers. I think they tend to keep things even when they are obsolescent just to increase what they have. Under the treaty they have had to destroy some of those launchers. That I don't think they would have done except for the treaty.

Apart from that, I really don't believe they would have done anything different from what they have done. I really don't believe so.

Now, on our side I know that my recommendation would have been that we do more. I think we have fallen behind the trend. I think the last 10 years has been adverse to us in the strategic nuclear field and I would strongly urge that we should have done more than we actually have done.

I think one of the reasons that we have not done those things is the hope that we could really make progress in SALT beyond what we had been able to do. I devoted 5 years of my life to try and get these things done. It is not that we have not tried—we have tried our best.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

The CHARMAN. Mr. Griffin, anything further?

DOD RELATIONSHIP OF MR. WARNKE AND MR. NITZE

Senator Griffin. Mr. Nitze, for the record would you outline the relationship of Mr. Warnke and you in terms of service in the Defense Department? You said he at one time worked for you. What is some of the chronology there, your service and his service and the positions you held?

Mr. Nrrze. I believe he became part of the Defense Department in 1966, if my recollection is correct. At that time Mr. McNamara was Secretary and Mr. Vance was Deputy Secretary and I was Secretary of the Navy.

But as I remember it, Mr. McNamara did talk to me about the potential selection of Mr. Warnke who was a partner in the firm of Covington and Burling at which my friend Dean Acheson was the senior partner and I came to the conclusion that Paul Warnke should be hired for the position of General Counsel to the Pentagon. It was not my suggestion. I think it was somebody else's suggestion, but I know that I was consulted about it and did concur in his appointment.

Then when John McNaughton, who was taken Assistant Secretary, ISA [International Security Affairs] was killed in an unfortunate airplane accident the question arose as to who should succeed McNaughton. At that time I had succeeded Cy Vance as Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I believe it was my recommendation at that time that Paul Warnke be the person to succeed McNaughton.

I believe it is correct to say that after President Johnson had suggested to Mr. McNamara that he wanted him to become President of the World Bank and no longer be Secretary of Defense that McNamara ceased to work as hard at being Secretary of Defense as he had in the past and by and large he turned over to me the management of the Pentagon.

During that period obviously Mr. Warnke, I say, worked for me. I think he did in all essence and during the period then when Mr. Clark Clifford became Secretary I think the detailed operation of the Pentagon continued to rest in my hands because I think Mr. Clifford was properly more concerned with the Vietnamese War and particularly the political aspects of it and the relations of the Pentagon to the White House.

So in a substantial sense I think Paul did continue to be my subordinate during that period as well although-no, he was much more. I think toward the end of the period he became more and more responsive to Clark Clifford's views than to mine. You ask the history.

That, I think, is a correct statement of the history.

Senator Griffin. Obviously over a long period of time you have worked closely with him and had an opportunity to observe him and to learn at close hand his views on these and a wide variety of subjects.

Mr. NITZE. I am not asserting that the views that he expressed during the period 1969 to 1976 were the views that he held up until the spring of 1968. I think at that time his views changed radically.

Senator Griffin. I see. You have had two changes then.

Mr. NITZE. No, I think they changed in the direction of the views he held from 1969 to 1971, while still in the Pentagon in 1968.

ARGUMENT THAT POLICY MATTERS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY PRESIDENT

Senator Griffin. We heard over and over again yesterday at least several times that we didn't really have to worry about Mr. Warnke's views or at least the argument was made to that effect because after all the policy matters would be determined by the President.

I wonder how you react to that argument? Does that satisfy you and should you change your views and support Mr. Warnke in light of the fact that he is merely going to be a spokesman for the President?

Mr. NITZE. I don't believe that is the way the process works, Senator Griffin. If one looks back at the ABM treaty, certainly the delegation in Helsinki and Vienna worked entirely under instructions from the President, and the instructions from Dr. Kissinger after consulting with the President, but I believe it to be a correct statement that everything that was of importance in actually arriving at the ABM treaty was in fact developed by us in the delegation and recommended to Washington before it was approved. I know of no initiative which was useful in the ABM treaty which came from Washington. I think they all came from the delegation and then were approved by Washington.

So that it is not just a question of carrying out your orders. Certainly you carry out your orders, but it is a different thing than just carrying out orders. That is just simple, general lines of direction but really to translate what is a general line into something that is specific and that the President can then really consider as to whether

he wants to approve it or not, that is a two-way street.

It takes real work, real understanding, real imagination from below, not just guidance from above. What is more, here in the role of the head of the ACDA I know the committee in particular considers

this position of being director of ACDA to be an important position, a position which should make an input to the councils of Government and should represent a somewhat different view, from a different viewpoint, than the view that comes from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon or the Secretary of Defense's Office, State Department and CIA and others.

To be really of assistance to the President I think it has to be responsible assistance. It has to look at the overall position of the United States. What it is one would really want the President to do when looked at from the arms control viewpoint but not from some screwball, arbitrary, fictitious kind of viewpoint that is not going to

help the security of this country.

MR. WARNKE'S PERFORMANCE IN NEGOTIATING FIELD

Senator Griffin. In your letter you stated that you knew of no important success of Mr. Warnke in the negotiating field. I think that becomes an even more important statement, to me a least, realizing the long period of association and knowledge you have with Mr. Warnke's performance.

Did he serve as an international negotiator during the period with

which you are familiar?

Mr. Nitze. No. I may have forgotten, but the things that I may know of are things that happened in the 60's. This is why I said I am unaware. I maybe should have said I can't remember because they may exist, but I wanted to be precise. I am unaware of any such instances in negotiation.

Certainly you all heard him testify yesterday. He certainly has capabilities of advocacy but are these the kinds of capability of advocacy that you want? Frankly, I would not respect them myself because I believe they do not reflect consistencies or logical points

of view.

Senator Griffin. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Senator Pell [Presiding]. Mr. Danforth.

Senator Danforth. I don't know whether it is your very quiet voice or the way that the microphone system is working, but I am having difficulty hearing you, Mr. Nitze.

SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT REPRESENTED BY MR. NITZE AND MR. WARNKE

I would like at the outset to thank you for being here, and plead guilty to what could be the charge that I am the person who got you here because I think that it is very important during this confirmation procedure to consider what I take to be two alternative positions with respect to arms negotiation.

Is it fair to say that, as you have pointed out in your letter, there are two schools of thought basically in the fields of arms negotiation? Is it fair to say that Mr. Warnke represents one of the two schools and

you represent the other?

Mr. Nitze. I think it is more complex than that, but I think Mr. Warnke's position has been consistent with what I described as one school of thought and I think my position has been consistent with what I have described as another school of thought but if you try to

do it in two sentences you cannot make it elaborate enough to be fully reflective of the reality. I think there are all kinds of positions between his position and mine and beyond his position and beyond mine.

Senator Danforth. Let me state a proposition to you and ask you if you would give your reaction to it and then what the other school of

thought has been.

NUCLEAR WAR AS UNTHINKABLE

The statement is this. In the year 1977 nuclear war is unthinkable, it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would consider the possibility of nuclear war. Nuclear war is not an aspect of the political thinking

of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

Mr. Nitze. I would hope that nuclear war was unthinkable. I don't think it is. But I think the more important point is different. That is I am sure the Soviet Union does not desire a nuclear war. I think the possibility that the Soviets would hit us by surprise with a nuclear war is a very small probability or possibility indeed. I think if one looks at things in the strategic sense it is somewhat like a game of chess. You know, you don't have to move your queen in order to have the queen support a bishop and have that bishop support a check or knight and have a combination of the bishop and a knight and a rook checkmate the other side. You don't have to take the king and queen. If you get yourself in a position where you have the equivalent of still having a queen yourself and having the other side lose his queen, then I think that is comparable to being in a position of strategic nuclear superiority. Certainly the Russians look at it that way.

I am not sure that they have ever said it in these words, but I think other things they have said put together do support the evaluation of the Russian view as being that they consider the nuclear strategic relationship as being the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence

depend.

If you don't have at least equal strategic power and strategic strength, you are inhibited from doing a lot of things you might otherwise do. You are reluctant to take risks, that you otherwise would not

be reluctant to take, and properly so.

Now, you look at the question of an attack on Europe. I have heard others that say that the probability that the Soviets would attack NATO in Europe is low. Certainly that is true. But if the Soviets have superior conventional military capabilities vis-a-vis the NATO, this is again a position which is important in terms of strategy. This inhibits the Europeans from permitting us to use our forces in Europe, with respect to any situation which might be dangerous such as the Middle East, and so forth and so on.

So, if you look at the things from the strategic standpoint it makes a lot of difference. It is not just the question as to whether the Soviets want a nuclear war—of course, they don't want a nuclear war. No aggressor wants war. He would prefer to enter your country un-

opposed.

Senator Danforth. From your knowledge of Mr. Warnke's position stated over the years, do you differ with him in this respect?

Mr. Nitze. I do indeed from what he said. What he says is to look at the question just from the standpoint of our only military threat being from the U.S.S.R. And that all that really is required is less

in the way of defense capabilities than those we already have. This is certainly what he said in 1969, it is certainly what he said in 1972, it is certainly what he said in 1974. I think it is an implication of what he said in 1976. Isn't that correct, Senator Griffin? I don't believe he understands these interconnections.

ANALOGY BETWEEN MR. WARNKE'S AND MR. DULLES' POSITIONS

Senator Danforth. You in your letter draw an analogy between what you take to be Mr. Warnke's position and the massive retaliation doctrine of John Foster Dulles. Would you spell out that analogy?

Mr. Nitze. Well, in a series of questions during that hearing on March 9, he was asked, what would you recommend doing in the event that the Soviets were to move military force into the Middle East? And he said that he thought this was highly unlikely, that he thought the main problems involved were political problems.

But then he was pressed to answer, well, supposing they did do this? After all in 1973 they wrote a very stern note to the President suggesting that they did intend to move their forces unilaterally into

the Middle East so it is not an unthinkable kind of a thing.

He was asked, well, supposing they did, what do you think we should do? And he then replied, as I remember it, that under those circumstances this would be action so egregious on the part of the Soviet Union that we must resist it with military force, otherwise there would be no limit to what they would do.

Then the question, as I recollect it, was asked, "I am not sure we can usefully and effectively bring military force to bear in the Middle East?" Warnke said, "Well, I would think one would have to look at it in a global sense rather than just in a local sense and maybe the more intelligent thing to do about this would be to use military force in

Europe rather than in the Middle East."

And then he was further pressed, "Well, supposing that use of military force in Europe was ineffective and did not bring negotiations about, the Russians just continue it, what would you do then?" He said, "Under those circumstances I think the probability would be that the United States would use tactical nuclear weapons if that were necessary. I think he thought it would be unlikely that any such chain would go this far but he was pressed to look at what I would call the end of the toboggan. I don't think one ought to conduct policy without seeing what might be at the end of a course of action. Then he said, "Of course, the probability would be that this would escalate to nuclear war."

Then the question was asked, "What would happen then? Isn't it true that the Soviets are planning, if possible, to survive in such a war—have their leadership, their population at least survive, do we have a similar plan? I think his answer was that we don't have similar plans, but he was not sure. He thought there were some who were imaginative enough in the Soviet Union to have such plans but he didn't think that many would, but that in any case his residence was close to the District line and he thought that he would not survive such a thing and it was not well to plan for such a contingency.

Now, frankly, I take a different view than all this. I think it is necessary to take seriously these things to avoid the risks or minimize the risk of such escalation. I consider that the things that Paul

Warnke in the past has recommended are measures which if they had been implemented at the time would make the risk today of escalation in such a scenario greater than it is today. We have never heard him suggest anything which took this fully seriously. Maybe I have misunderstood something, but you asked me a question.

Senator Danforth. To simplify, is it your view that his position has been one of placing all or most of his eggs in the massive retali-

ation basket?

Mr. Nitze. I would not put it that way, no. What I would say is he does not think it is going to come about. He does not think that any of these other things that depend upon this relationship are really going to come about. He thinks that the domestic issues or at least what he said in the past is that the domestic issues are more important than the strategic military consideration. Otherwise he would not have recommended \$14 million budget cuts in 1974 and the cancellation of lots of programs. So we would be in a much more difficult situation than we are today if all those cuts had gone forward. I don't think he would have recommended all that if he had taken these things very seriously.

One other point and that is when he talks about his position in 1972 he opposed the SALT negotiations, the agreements that we had worked out by 1972 in no uncertain terms. He said at that time we didn't need more, we were in good shape and so forth and so on, and that the problems have only arisen now five years later. In this kind of business

you really have to look forward five years into the future.

I think somebody else before this committee has raised the question of lead time. If you don't look at the problem beyond today's problem, if you don't look at it from the standpoint of what it is apt to be five years from now, then the whole thing is ineffective. There is nothing much that the Congress can do or the Executive Branch can do that will significantly affect strategic capabilities in less than five years.

This is really what counts when one looks at whether somebody's views five years earlier look as though they make sense today. Therefore, I think it is pertinent to look at what Paul recommended five

years ago.

He said yesterday, for instance, that he thinks it is quite improper for somebody to suggest unilateral restraints at a time when negotiations are going on. We were negotiating at the time he was making opposite statements five years ago. Of course, there were negotiations involved. That did make a difference, on one of the problems that he says he disapproves of, the unilateral statements. Why did we enter into those unilateral statements? Because we could not get the Soviet negotiators to agree to any clearer language with respect to these things. Why was it that we could not get them to agree to clear language? Part of it was that the pace of Soviet deployments and of technical developments in the strategic field was much greater than our pace and therefore every month our relative situation got worse. Therefore we felt under pressure to make a deal as promptly as we could.

The Soviet Union was under no such time pressure. Public opinion in the United States and the Congress was breathing down our throats to make an agreement as fast as possible. Therefore, we did work one out. If we had delayed it from 1972 to 1973 it would have been even worse. How could you best handle things where you could not get the

Russians to agree to the specificity you wanted? The only thing you could do was to set out a series of unilateral statements that gave our

interpretation of the ambiguities.

The only thing that could possibly make them effective was action by the United States, if they violated them, to make this unprofitable to the Soviet Union. We never did those things. We never did this, in part, because Paul Warnke and those who were similarly oriented were pressing us against doing so, saying this was all nonsense. That is why the unilateral statements were of no effect.

"TWO APES OF A TREADMILL"

Senator Danforth. Are you familiar with Mr. Warnke's article on foreign policy entitled "Two Apes on a Treadmill"?

Mr. NITZE. I have read it.

Senator Danforth. Would you state your views on that on the posi-

tion which he takes in that article?

Mr. Nitze. Well, I find it hard to summarize because it is kind of an involved argument but if I were to try to summarize it as nearly as I can, I think the main point of it is that it profits neither our security nor the Soviet Union to have this continuing improvement in our relative nuclear capabilities. That this is the treadmill which he is describing and that the two countries are apes upon this treadmill. Although he does not say it quite that clearly, I think it is fair to say that he thinks that we are the leading ape, the ape that has taken most of the initial actions, although not all.

He mentions somewhere the Soviets have been the cause. After all the Soviets were the first to deploy ABMs and then we responded to that, But I think it is fair to say that he recommends that we be the first to get off the treadmill and that we make unilateral cuts, postponements, reductions in, not necessarily the forces we already have in being, but in the improvements to, or with the replacement and modernization of, those forces proposed by the executive branch.

At one point—I don't know whether it is in that article or some other article—he says that unless we get some reciprocal actions within 6 months we ought to reconsider. Maybe he does in that article, my memory is not that good. I know in other places he said that we could afford to make these cuts regardless of whether the Russians recipro-

cated. Not in that article necessarily.

Senator Danforth. I think in this article he is just suggesting a half year moratorium and then a review of the situation and the determination as to whether or not there is some reciprocal action and he uses the word—at least he did yesterday—reciprocal in describing this position.

Assuming he is taking the half-year position, would you comment

on whether or not that is a sound position?

Mr. Nitze. It all depends on the nature of the respective cuts. It is one thing if it is merely a cut in the number of launchers. I think this committee and other committees of the Senate have recommended an agreed cut in the number of launchers from 2,400 and a cut in the number of MIRVed missiles from 1,320 to some lower figure. If that reduction in the number of launchers goes beyond a certain point—there may be a reduction of a few hundred, or of a hundred or so, that you can tolerate without having any particular effect—if you go beyond

that and you do not deal with the throw weight of the missiles, I believe you increase the instability, you make the situation more unstable rather than more stable. I don't see that he mentions that in any case where he talks about reductions.

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, I know I am going longer than

usual, but I hope you will bear with me.

Let me read you the punchline of this "Apes on a Treadmill" article.

As a start we might inform the Soviet Union both privately and publicly that we have placed a moratorium on further MIRVing of our land and sea-based missiles. We should also announce that a hold has been placed on development of the Trident submarine and the B-1 strategic bomber. We should advise the Soviet Union that this pause will be reviewed in six months in the light of what

action the Soviet Union takes during that period.

If the Soviet Union responds by some significant slowing of its own strategic arms build-up, we can at the end of the first six months announce additional moves. We might, for example, scrap some of our elder missiles and our more aged B-52 strategic bombers. If reciprocal action is taken by the Soviet Union, such as the elimination of some of its older missile-carrying submarines and a freeze on the development of the new family of ICBMs, other low-risk initiatives are available to us. We can, and should, for example, substantially reduce the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons now deployed in Europe. The number—over 7.000—is many times in excess of that useful in any remotely conceivable contingency. Employment of a fraction of that number would destroy the terrain they purport to protect. A quarter or less would serve as well to bolster the deterrent efficacy of our conventional and strategic forces. And the circumstances of their deployment, in many cases, make them vulnerable to capture or sabotage. A sizable cut would improve both our security and the climate for reciprocal Soviet action.

What is your view of that proposal?

Mr. Nitze. Well, some of the actions that he proposes, for instance the slowdown in the development of the Trident submarine, B-1 bomber and so on and so forth, those all have to do with lead time. Once you make these cuts in the development program, disband your staff on the B-1 and so on and so forth, the time to crank up again, to rehire all those people, to get going again, is much longer than the period of the cut. If you cut any of these development programs for 6 months and then try to start it up again, you just have an awful time. I would think the loss in leadtime would be 2 years.

Now, I happen to believe, all the studies that I have made indicate, that we have a real problem with respect to getting our deterrent factors back to a position of stability in time and that the Trident program is one of the things that we need to develop and that the B-1

is another.

All he is suggesting that we get in respect to, in return for that, the way I read it, is some slowdown in the rate of actual deployment of their 16's, 17's, 18's, 19's, and relevant submarine-based missiles. That

is what it seems to me.

Now, I don't know whether that slowdown in deployment would actually mean a slowdown in the rate of production. The production of missiles is not controlled under any of the SALT agreements. They keep on building 17's, 18's, 19's, but just don't deploy them. Is that a fair trade? Is that going to help our security or not? I would be quite surprised if it did.

Now, with respect to 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons I tend to share his view that we don't have adequate storage places today for their

rapid deployment. To get them out from under an attack we need to address ourselves to the question of the security of the people needed to deploy them and so forth and so on. But if he thinks that there is no building up of a very serious, nonintercontinental, strategic nuclear threat to the European front, I don't know what is going on.

I would certainly include the SS-20's, and his school of thought believes that the Backfire is only for tactical or theatre purposes. Also one should look at what they are doing with some of their SS-11's. There is a tremendous nuclear nonintercontinental strategic threat building up against Europe. Now, how do you maintain some degree of deterrence of that? Maybe our present position is wrong, but even if so, I don't see the advantage of this cut without substituting something else that can help deter a Soviet local attack, it would not be wise.

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, I have more questions to ask but I don't know whether you want to go on to others and then come back or—

Senator Pell. You just completed your questions.

Senator Percy, do you have some questions?

Senator Percy. I do.

Senator Pell. Ten minute rule.

Senator Percy. All right.

First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. Nitze, for being here. You are probably the most forceful voice in your position today.

I asked you on the telephone yesterday whether you would be willing to accept an invitation from this committee to testify. I know your own deep concern and no one questions your devotion to this country or its objectives and purposes. We just have honorable men with a difference of opinion on how to approach the problem.

MR. WARNKE'S PRESENT ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL

Yesterday I read parts of your letter because it had been put in the record by the chairman, but I really felt certain sections of it should be put on the public record immediately so that Mr. Warnke

could have a chance to respond on the record.

I read certain sections of the letter which was your characterization of Mr. Warnke's attitude toward arms control. However, Mr. Warnke yesterday put on the record his statement of position and said that he was in favor of keeping nuclear parity with the Russians and not allowing them to gain in relative strategic strength. He indicated agreement with President Carter that the United States should have a force second to none.

Now, does that record statement and representation that Mr. Warnke made to this committee, in his confirmation hearing, ease your mind somewhat about his attitude and clarify his present position on

that?

Mr. Nitze. Mr. Senator, I have already addressed myself to that point and the position I took on that was to the contrary because it seems to me those positions as stated by you and which correspond, from what I understood from listening to the radio—those positions are so different than the sense that I have gotten of all the statements he has made from 1969 to 1976 that I am disturbed. In my letter I

had made a final comment saying that I was particularly disturbed because he was being suggested for two jobs concurrently. In the present circumstances I doubted if one should repeat an organizational procedure that worked well in the days of Gerard Smith. I don't think it would work well today. I now withdraw the implied suggestion that the jobs be split. My current view is that I could be against his appointment to both jobs or to either job in isolation.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR ACDA DIRECTOR

Senator Percy. I would like to ask you about the qualifications that you consider important in this job. What should we be looking for and what should the President have been looking for?

For instance, did you consider that Bill Foster had the qualifications and did he in fact serve as an able administrator of this agency? Mr. Nitze. I was all for Bill Foster, supported him in the begin-

ning. At the end I began to have differences of view.

Senator Percy. You what?

Mr. NITZE. I began to have differences of view.

Senator Percy. Did you feel that he was qualified for that position?

Mr. NITZE. I thought he was qualified for it.

Senator Percy. I know you had differences of view. Mr. Nitze. Sir, I began to have serious difficulty.

Senator Percy. How about Gerard Smith? Did you feel that he was qualified and did you feel that he served ably and well in that capacity?

Mr. NITZE. I did indeed.

Senator Percy. Both of them, I believe you know, enthusiastically support Mr. Warnke. In your letter, you said that Mr. Warnke "may nevertheless not be a qualified student or competent judge" of military requirements, weapon capability and strategy. Could you give us some idea what criteria you feel this committee should have in mind as we assess a nominee's qualifications for this post?

Mr. NITZE. Well, I would think it is important to find somebody—

let me start over again.

I am not sure that I would insist upon having somebody who is a careful student in his own right on weapons capabilities. What I really object to here is the statements that he has made from 1969 to 1976 have been made with the certainty that would only come from, or should only come from, somebody who knows what he is talking about. I think those statements are incorrect and as you look at them now, 5 years later, I think it is demonstrable that if the United States had followed those assertions we would be in worse shape than we are today. I can see somebody being in this position who is not a student but then does get a staff that does understand these things, so that the main thing that I would suggest is that a person in whose consistency and logic, as I put it, one has high confidence.

EXCLUSION OF CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE FROM SALT II AGREEMENT

Senator Percy. I would like to ask you another question unrelated to the nomination, and yet the nominee has expressed a viewpoint on it. If you were conducting these negotiations and, in view of the complexity of SALT II now, you realized the possibility of reaching agreement except upon cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber, would you feel you could in good conscience go ahead and conclude an agreement on as much as you could in SALT II and close SALT II as a chapter with cruise missiles and the Backfire excluded?

Mr. Nitze. I could indeed and I would recommend it and have recommended it. The problem involved here is a different one and that is, if I correctly understood what Mr. Warnke said he was supporting, an additional proposal and that was that one ban mobile ICBMs.

Frankly, I don't know how it is possible to maintain stability and deny the Soviets superiority without our going to a multiple launch-point system, a form of mobile system. Now, maybe there is some other way but nobody that I have heard talk about these things has come up with any other way that we can confidently do so.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITIONS ON SALT II

Senator Percy. With the indulgence of my colleagues, one last question.

Are you concerned about President Carter's positions on SALT II and are you equally concerned that the President might possibly do something that would not be in your definition of the national interest, just as you might be concerned about Mr. Warnke concluding an agreement which you would consider not to be in the national

interest?

Mr. NITZE. Yes, I do have that view. One of the reasons that I really am so concerned is that I would think it would be tragic if the executive branch negotiated an agreement, negotiated a treaty with the Soviet Union and that was then rejected by the Senate. I don't think that is just a matter of "so what". I think that the political consequences of such a course of action could be really very serious indeed. Therefore I think it is very important that the debates on these issues take place prior to the negotiations in part so that the negotiators have a real sense of what is apt to happen when they come back to the United States again. It may be that two-thirds of the Senate are prepared to ratify an agreement which would not only pass over the Backfire and the cruise missile issues which I have said I think is all right, but also would ban mobile ICBMs and thus the possibilities of a more stable relationship which I think we can only get through a multiple launch-point system of some type. The President ought to know what the prospect is before he goes into it and I don't know how he is going to get this opinion unless there is a debate such as your committee is having today.

I don't know what other occasion there is for the debate in time. I think this is the correct time. So what I am saying is addressed

in part to the man but also to the issue.

CONFIRMATION PROCESS

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I will not reach my own decision on this nomination until I have heard every bit of evidence that we can get. If I were forced to vote today, I would vote Aye on the nomination, but the longer I am in the Senate the more reverence I develop for the confirmation process—it is a remarkable process really.

People in other countries sometimes express amazement that we go through this. They wonder why the President just can't go ahead and select his Cabinet and other senior officials. But the process we are going through now confirms the value of the confirmation process.

I think this process has been enriched a great deal by your presence, Mr. Nitze. I tend to think Mr. Warnke will be a better negotiator and a better director as a result of this process than if we had all just said go all and all just said go all all go all just said go all go a

all just said go ahead, you have carte blanche.

If someone of your stature had not appeared and raised a few questions, just as I did during consideration of Mr. Bell's confirmation, I think the process would not have really operated as it should.

I am grateful for your willingness to be here and for the guts you had to write a letter which must have been a very hard letter for you

to write.

Mr. Nitze. If the Senate decides to confirm the nomination, I would propose to do everything I could to support Mr. Warnke in this role. Senator Percy. I said the same thing to Attorney General Bell and I really meant it, and I know Paul Warnke will really appreciate that because you have done a valuable—[Laughter.]

I think he will appreciate it, and I would be very surprised if he

didn't ask you for advice and counsel occasionally.

Senator Pell. Senator Griffin any more questions?

Senator Griffin. No.

Senator Pell. Senator Danforth?

SIX-MONTH MORATORIUM PROPOSAL

Senator Danforth. I guess the main example that was given in the "Two Apes on the Treadmill" article for the efficacy of the 6month moratorium proposal was the 1963 nuclear test ban moratorium which was unilateral.

Do you accept that analogy?

Mr. Nitze. I thought it was a rather truncated presentation of what happened. I might be wrong on this, but my recollection was that the initial moratorium was broken with a tremendous series of Soviet tests—we had to scramble in order to compensate for those tests and it was only after this episode that it was possible to work out the

limited test ban treaty.

Frankly, I believe that it is true to say that the person President Kennedy and Mr. McNamara put the burden on to work out the formula that finally resulted in the test ban treaty was myself. They worked very hard, finally got it through, but one can say that the moratorium was a necessary prelude but, boy, it was a hazardous looking thing while it went on and I am sure we got the worst end of that stick.

Senator Danforth. Do you know of any precedent which would tend to demonstrate that the 6-month proposal suggested in the "Two

Apes on a Treadmill" article would be successful?

Mr. Nitze. I don't know of any. My recollection is that at one time we did—I am not sure but I think that at one time we shut down the Hanford reactors and asked for a comparable reduction in Soviet production of nuclear material. It is my recollection that nothing happened. That was a long time ago and my recollection may be wrong.

Senator Danforth. In sum, what is your judgment about the 6-

month moratorium proposal?

Mr. Nitze. I think my judgment goes back to the experience we had during the 5 years I was involved in negotiating the treaty. I really did not get the feeling that the way in which their minds work is to reciprocate to things which we do which will minimize any threat to them. That is not the way their minds work.

As their minds work—it is up to them to take care of the deterrence of any attack upon them. It is up to us to take care of the deterrence of any attack upon us. We have got to make up our mind what we are going to do, they have to make up their mind what they are going to do, since the negotiations are ones in which each side trys to do the best to improve its situation. There may be things which would improve both situations, but that is minor. The main thing to do is to fight

your own battle.

They also look upon weaknesses as being just weakness and not to be respected. When you read what they say today as to the origins of detente and the origins of realism on the part of the United States, they attribute this to the dramatic improvement in the correlation of forces, in particular the change in their favor of the nuclear balance over the last 10 years, and they say this is what has brought about the desire for detente on the part of the United States and what they call realism.

Now, realism, they are perfectly clear about what that means and that means anybody opposing them should realistically weigh the correlation of forces and if it is negative to them they ought to act correspondingly and they ought not to take risks. They should accommodate to those who have superior forces. They don't quite look at it that way in reverse, they say that when the correlation of forces is against us, the Soviets, the communist party Bolshevik, then the thing to do is to throw dust in the enemy's eyes so we can reverse the correlation of forces. They are very explicit in their doctrine on how one ought to do things.

Senator Danforth. You mentioned earlier the lead time problem and the possibility of losing not 6 months in lead time but possibly

2 years in lead time in the development of new systems.

As I understand Mr. Warnke's position, he would only have a 6-month moratorium in areas where he believed we were so far ahead that little or nothing would be lost, that we have that much lead time we can afford to give it up.

Do you have any comments on that?

Mr. Nitze. Yes. It all goes to the question as to whether his judgment is correct that we have that much lead time and what he bases that judgment on? I believe at that time if he were basing it upon something which was not minimum deterrence that the thing above minimum deterrence that he talks about is really just for appearance sake. He says we need to maintain the appearance of equality; therefore, we need equal numbers.

At one point he refers to the reality of the balance but I don't think he really takes that seriously. When he is talking about equality he is really talking about the appearance of equality. When he talks about real equality, I know of nothing that he suggests that deals with real equality, what the balance really is. I don't think he really looked at

it; I don't think he studied it.

Senator Danforth. Would you describe the trend of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in recent years in strategic arms development?

Mr. Nitze. They are hard to summarize because it is a complex thing with all kinds of elements in it. What do you want to look at as being the correct index or criteria by which you judge this? In my view the normal way of looking at it is just to count various things on both sides. That is what is called looking at static indicators; how many launchers does each side have, how many RV's, what size, equivalent megatonnage, equivalent weapons, 2,000 pound of index, CMP and throw-weight. By these individual indices one can look at as to what the Russians have now, but also what they are apt to have 1 year from now, 5 years from now, 10 years from now, and what we are apt to have. You can see how those change over time. I think those trends are by and large well summarized in the Secretary of Defense's posture statement.

I have tried to give such figures in greater detail in the last article I wrote which was published in the Foreign Policy. There is another way of looking at it and that is to try to what the possible result might be in the event that the unlikely were to happen. Let's suppose that the Soviet Union launched a counterforce attack against the U.S. retaliatory systems—what would they have left and what would we have left after such a nuclear attack? I tried to do that and those com-

putations are illustrated in charts in that same article.

Then one can go beyond that. The thing we have prided ourselves upon is our greater ability to MIRV and our greater accuracy. Those characteristics are primarily useful only against hard targets, against silos, heavily defended storage facilities, or hardened command con-

trol facilities, things of that kind.

You know, that only happens if we use them in a counterforce response so the third set of charts the article deals with the assumption that the Soviet Union has launched a counterforce attack on us and we have responded, to the extent it is useful to do so, with a counterbalance attack against their remaining force. What is the balance of forces then remaining to both sides?

Obviously one can further increase the sophistication of the analysis. One ought to look further than that; that is, supposing then that at some point one side or the other began using its remaining forces in countervalue attacks against the population and industry of the other side and so forth and so on; what would be the outcome of such

attacks?

Now, what are the correct criteria there for measuring, what is important? Frankly, I think the Soviets look at these matters from the standpoint that the most important thing is who ends up with the greater military capability. In other words, who controls the battle-field? All their literature is perfectly clear on this, that there is no point in merely surviving if you have lost the war and the other side can then coerce you. There is no point in that. Military victory is more important than relative casualties or losses of industry.

If the other fellow's industry is not as badly damaged and you can carry on the war and he can't, you can progressively make him surrender or tell him he otherwise is not going to recover at all. You are in a

position to keep him from trying to do that,

So one should carry the analyses one step further than I have done. It is a difficult thing to do to see what are the indices of true merit

at the end. As far as I have been able to make the analysis, I think we do have a serious problem coming up before us and it is urgent to reverse the trends. We ought now to be doing some of the necessary things.

Mr. Rumsfeld began to do some of the things that frankly I thought were necessary but I get the impression that now the thought is to

delay some of these, slow down the MX program, et cetera.

HEDGING IN OF SALT NEGOTIATOR BY OTHERS

Senator Danforth. You touched on this point earlier but one thing came up yesterday and I have heard today people who are much more knowledgeable than I am in the case. They say, "look, the SALT negotiator is just one person in a room and he is surrounded by people from the Defense Department and others. He is not really representing his own views. He has to have his views approved by the President. Whatever treaty he negotiates will have to be ratified by the Senate. So really we should not be concerned that much about who our SALT negotiator is. He is so hedged in by others."

Do you have a comment on that?

Mr. Nitze. It was my experience that it made a great deal of difference, that Gerard Smith was a competent and able head of the delegation. Certainly there are differences of viewpoint amongst people who are members of the delegation, they come at the problem from different angles. But after having talked the whole thing out somebody has to make up his mind. Somebody has to resolve the differences. No team can operate unless there is a quarterback and the head of the delegation is in fact the quarterback.

As I said earlier, it was my view that most of the constructive work with respect to the ABM treaty came from the delegation, not down

from on high.

Now, this was not true of the Interim Agreement. That was basically negotiated by Dr. Kissinger, not by the delegation in Helsinki which is where we were at the time. Frankly, I think the Interim Agreement suffers by comparison with the ABM treaty although the ABM treaty is not perfect either.

Senator Pell. I cannot hear you.

Mr. Nitze. I said I think the Interim Agreement suffers in comparison with the ABM treaty although the ABM treaty itself is not perfect, but I think it is a much sounder document.

Senator Danforth. Those are all the questions I have, Mr.

Chairman.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Senator Culver from the Armed Services Committee is with us and he might have some questions.

Senator Culver. Thank you.

Good to see you here today, Mr. Nitze.

Mr. NITZE. Thank you.

RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN NEGOTIATING TEAM

Senator Culver. Mr. Nitze, I am having a little difficulty in determining just where and how you and Mr. Warnke differ.

You mentioned that in his capacity of arms control director, he would serve as a quarterback on a team, and you acknowledged that

you the quarterback is just part of the team, under Presidential directive, even on tactical decisions.

You mentioned Gerard Smith whom you characterized as an able and competent negotiator. Was he a competent quarterback?

Mr. NITZE. For the SALT delegation:

Senator Culver. Then I don't understand what you said with regard to Secretary of State Kissinger. Was he the coach, was he another quarterback, or was he the President of the University? What was his relationship to the SALT team?

Mr. NITZE. He was conducting negotiations at a different level at

what we called the higher level.

Senator Culver. Did that make Mr. Gerard Smith more or less criti-

cal in the shape and formulation of the agreement?

Mr. Nitze. I said earlier I thought Mr. Gerard Smith and the rest of the delegation were in fact wholly critical to the development of the ABM treaty and that everything that I can remember that really contributed to actually arriving at a sound agreement was originated by the delegation, not—

Senator Culver. What you are really saying is the quarterback of that team is at the mercy ultimately of the judgment and the wisdom, the decisions, of the President of the United States, or in this case of a Secretary of State, that they can override the judgment and recom-

mendations of the SALT negotiator?

Mr. Nitze. I agree with that entirely, but there are two points. One of them is the power to override and the other is the constructive work of coming forward with something that really would be in the interests of the United States.

Senator Culver. Those aspects of the agreement that were arrived at under Secretary of State Kissinger's direction, those agreements didn't suffer, did they, because of a lack of constructive contribution by the quarterback?

Mr. NITZE. I think they did.

Senator Culver. Are you talking about Mr. Smith?

Mr. NITZE. No. As I said earlier, the interim agreement, I think, was largely fashioned by negotiations conducted by Mr. Kissinger without the benefit of the—

PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT WITH AND SUPPORT OF MR. WARNKE

Senator Culver. Ultimately the President is going to decide these things, or the Secretary of State or someone else he wants to assert that power. The President said yesterday in regard to Mr. Warnke, and I quote:

I believe that his views are all well considered by me and I have accepted them and I believe that Mr. Warnke's proposals are sound and I have no concern about his attitude.

If the President agrees with and supports Mr. Warnke's point of view, why is it not proper that he is the President's representative in SALT?

Mr. Nitze. As I said earlier, I thought two things were properly under consideration by this committee. One was the issue of just the man, whether he is the appropriate man for the job, and I said I

thought that in connection with that there was also properly a debate about an issue and that the reason that that issue was important was that if a treaty were to be negotiated and were to come back for confirmation by the Senate and if it were denied confirmation, I think this is a political matter of the greatest importance. I think it would be really very bad for our foreign relations to have a treaty negotiated and checked by the Senate at this dangerous conjuncture of affairs. Therefore, it would seem to me worthwhile for the issue to be debated concurrently with the man. Therefore, I said that I personally welcomed this opportunity to contribute to the debate.

MR. SMITH'S AND MR. HARRIMAN'S ENDORSEMENTS

Senator Culver. You describe Gerard Smith with whom you worked closely in the SALT negotiations as an adviser, as a consultant. You described him as the competent and able head of ACDA. Are you aware of the fact that he strongly supports and endorses Paul Warnke for this position?

Mr. NITZE. I am indeed. It is not the first time we have differed

although-

Senator Culver. With his expertise, knowledge and competence, skill as a negotiator, such an enthusiastic recommendation from Gerard Smith should carry considerable weight on the qualification of this man. Isn't he almost an expert witness, perhaps with judgment that exceeds your own because of the more intimate way in which he was associated with Mr. Warnke, in more relevant capacities to this particular task?

Mr. NITZE. You could be right. I don't believe so.

Senator Culver. What do you think of Mr. Harriman as an able and competent negotiator?

Mr. Netze. He has had demonstrated success as a negotiator.

Senator Culver. Are you aware of the fact that he also enthusiastically and strongly endorses Mr. Warnke for this position, based on many years of association with his character and his ability and competence?

Mr. Nitze. Even before I heard that I knew he would be because I know Averell Harriman's views very well. I know what he thinks of

me. He thoroughly disagrees with my viewpoint.

Senator Culver. Does Mr. Smith thoroughly disagree?

Mr. NITZE. I don't think Mr. Smith does disagree with my viewpoint in any such blanket sense. I think he would disagree with certain aspects of what I have said.

UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS OF UNDERSTANDING AS NEGOTIATING PRACTICE

Senator Culver. I wonder what you think of unilateral declarations of understanding as a negotiating practice in SALT? What was your feeling on that?

Mr. Nitze. I have already dealt with that before the committee, but I would like to repeat what I said. What I said was that in the context of what the problem was in 1972 where time was running against us,

the Soviets were deploying launchers much more rapidly than we, the essence rested upon freezing numbers of launchers where they were, there should not be any more starts on ICBM holes. It was important to get that treaty fast. We were under the difficulty that the Soviets were going much faster in expanding their forces than we and also doing much more on R. & D. Also there was very strong pressure in the U.S. for an agreement. We were directed by President Nixon to get all the things worked out by May 1, so that we were under some time pressure.

Senator Culver. Mr. Nitze-

Mr. NITZE. Let me just complement my answer.

We were under time pressure. We could not get the Soviet Union to agree to the language that would have been clear and unambiguous. Therefore, in order to do the best we could we did put in these unilateral statements with the concurrence and approval of higher authority, the President and Henry Kissinger, because that was the only way in which we could reduce the ambiguity.

Now, of course, they were not enforcible except on the assumption that if the Soviet Union violated those unilateral statements we would then take action ourselves in order to compensate for their action. Now, that we never did because of the political situation which then existed

in the United States and the Soviets knew we could not.

Senator Culver. Mr. Nitze, it seems to me that what you are saying is that pressure under a political deadline set to serve the political purposes of a particular President put you under considerable pressure to reach an agreement. Nothing could be more unhealthy, unwise, more likely to lead to the kind of agreement that would be worse than no agreement at all, than to have an agreement hastily drafted for expedient political purposes, which does not in fact include certain bona fide bilateral agreements and commitments, and then subsequently to allege a violation of a "footnote on our copy of the agreement."

You are really talking about creating an atmosphere of ambiguity and mistrust which threatens the very foundations of the kind of sound, responsible bargaining and ultimate negotiation that has some prospects of enduring. Now, it seems to me if you are a lawyer—

Mr. NITZE. I am not a lawyer.

Senator Culver. I thought you were. Your son is a lawyer. I thought you were a lawyer, too. I am sorry. I absolve you from that sin. [Laughter.]

Let's say you are going to sell your home but the buyer insisted that even though you are going to sell the home, that you agree that if the pipes froze in that house and broke, you pay the damages.

Say there was a problem in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on that particular issue and that the disagreement on that important point was very frustrating. Then your mother-in-law came to town and said:

"Look here, Sonny, you better sell that house. I know this is a nagging contingency that probably ought to be mutually resolved, but we are up against a tough bargainer here. We can just put on our copy of the sales agreement, P.S. Even though buyer has not agreed—even though buyer has not agreed—it is our unilateral understanding that

in the event the pipes break and cause damage to the house, the other party will assume the responsibility and pay for the damages."

We sign and we pop the champagne corks. The mother-in-law goes home and says, great, and if she was running for elective office she would have something to boast about. That may be useful if you have a tough campaign, and you may well insist on that unilateral understanding even though the broker who is representing you, and your own lawyers, able and competent lawyers like Gerard Smith, say,

"I think, Mr. Seller, as your counsel that you are making a stupid

mistake.

"My professional responsibility is to tell you that to footnote your agreement with an 'unilateral understanding' is really stupid because what you are really saying here is that we could not effect an agreement between the two parties to this contract. You would sell your house under these circumstances and then stand back and cry when the other side refuses to comply with your unilateral understanding, which is not part of the deal."

It seems to me that one of the ironies in this whole history of détente and the SALT negotiation is that we have had competent and able negotiators who have worked very hard to reach an agreement, and then somebody comes flying in, some higher political authority, and

savs:

"What is the trouble here? What are the little things left undone? We need an agreement at home for political purposes, we are under some timetable, we are negotiating under the gun."

It seems to me that a sober, serious diplomat would say:

"I can't sign on to that. I won't accept that because it is implicitly very dangerous to any subsequent agreements because we create the danger of subsequent criticism, breakdown and charges of noncompliance and so forth."

Now, I was very impressed when Mr. Warnke said yesterday that his major criticism of the quality of that SALT agreement was the lack of sound judgment exercised by having unilateral understandings.

You know, that is Hornbook law. A first-year law student would not sign on to that, especially when you are dealing with those tough Russians. The only time you are going to get them to agree to think as you do is when it is in their self-interest to do it, when at least the language of the agreement requires them to do it.

But to sit there and write agreements and put footnotes down that even though they didn't agree to this, we sure wish they had and if they don't subscribe to what we unilaterally determine to be the size of the missile, the size of the hole or whatever other terms you want

to write down, they are bad guys.

UNILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS

It seems to me that anybody who negotiates with that degree of naivety or political expediency dictating the timing and the terms of an agreement does not do a service to the responsible prospects for mutually acceptable arms restraint, realistically arrived at, that does not have in it the seeds of its own destruction. Then we get Reader's Digest articles about the Soviets failing to comply with our unilateral understandings. Big surprise.

Mr. Warnke said if he takes this job, he is not going to sign on to

that particular type of negotiating practice.

Now, you signed on to that unilateral understanding. I wonder if you don't feel that in retrospect it has proven to have been a very unhealthy and unwise decision, resulting in a period of recrimination and misunderstandings that have brought about a feeling to the American people that you either can't trust them or they are too smart to negotiate with. This decision set the seeds for that general public attitude today.

How do you feel about unilateral understandings?

Mr. NITZE. I think your entire speech misses the point, Mr. Senator, if I might say so. I have never said that the Soviets violated any part of the agreement that they agreed to. I have never said that. I have tried to be specific as to where they have done things which were contrary to what Secretary Kissinger assured the Congress they would live up to because that goes way beyond the unilateral statements.

Senator Culver. Why do you criticize that? You assume that Sec-

retary Kissinger had a back-door corridor over there?

Mr. NITZE. I am just trying to state what I have said in the past.

May I continue?

I felt that there were three categories that ought to be kept carefully distinct. One category was where the Soviet Union did things other than what Secretary Kissinger assured the Congress was the sense of the agreement and that they would not do. Now, that had nothing to do with the Soviet violation, that has to do with a difference of what

happened and what Secretary Kissinger said happened.

Second, the second category is those things which the Soviets have done which differed from what we had said was our interpretation of ambiguities in the agreement. Now, with respect to those, I have also said that when Mr. Nixon at Moscow raised the point with Brezhnev and asked whether Mr. Brezhnev would not agree that both sides should live up to the spirit of the agreement and not contain themselves merely to what was called for by the agreement. Mr. Brezhnev made it crystal clear and was very strong about it. He said that "We will agree to live up to the letter of what we have agreed to and no more." I have said that that is what is carried out.

Therefore, a violation-not a violation, an action by the Soviet Union inconsistent with what was said in our interpretations of the ambiguity I have never said was a violation by the Soviet Union.

Now, the last category is what is it that the Soviet Union actually agreed to and have they acted contrary to the fact? Now, there I think some of the things that they have done are, you know-these are not very clear.

Senator Culver. Was that not to be anticipated? That is why you set up consultation machinery, because certain ambiguities would

Mr. NITZE. They have not all been straightened out yet.

Senator Culver. Of course not. You anticipated and expected that. Mr. NITZE. I never said they violated the agreement. I have never said that so therefore your entire attack on me is beside the point.

The other question is a different question. You said was it wise or unwise to go forward with the agreements then even though there were ambiguities.

Senator Culver. No, what I more specifically inquired is whether or not you agreed that unilateral understandings, which you signed on to and which Mr. Warnke opposes, were a responsible negotiating technique or were the seeds of the misunderstanding that makes subsequent agreements difficult?

Mr. NITZE, May I continue, Mr. Senator?

I think that under the circumstances that existed at that time it was the only course that we could follow.

Senator Culver. Why was that?

Mr. NITZE. Because we could not get an unambiguous agreement from the Soviets.

Senator Culver. Are you saying that any agreement is better than

no agreement?

Mr. Nitze. No, I am saying that I thought that those agreements with those unilateral statements was better than no agreement at that time and I still think that the ABM treaty—and I have heard no word in the Senate which would suggest that we should cancel the ABM treaty because the ABM treaty in essence still depends upon some of the unilateral statements.

The whole definition of what "tested in an ABM mode" means is in a unilateral United States statement—the Soviets have never agreed to our understanding of what testing is. That ABM treaty provision is really not very good, it can be circumvented at any time. Now, everybody around the table here I think agrees that that treaty is worthwhile. I doubt very much whether you would recommend canceling that treaty just because the guts of it depends upon a U.S. unilateral statement.

Senator Culver. Well, I certainly must say, in my judgment, that they have been probably the greatest, single problem creating an atmosphere now of mistrust and raising questions which I think undercuts the prospects for subsequent agreements, to the extent that there is a lack of popular support for the whole SALT exercise.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SIZE OF DEFENSE BUDGET

Now, I am interested in where you and Mr. Warnke differed in your views on the defense budget. Do you really feel that the size of a defense budget per se is a significant or meaningful index of the quality of either the conventional or nuclear deterrent?

Mr. Nitze. I think I have gone further than most people, Mr. Senator, in trying to analyze what the situation is with respect to a given

weapons system with all of its characteristics.

In other words, looking at the strategic balance I think I have not looked just at the costs. In fact, I emphasized all of the relevant indexes of relative capability, both static and dynamic, and I know of no one who has published comparable material which others can check—anybody can repeat the mathematics and question the logic claims, it is all duplicatable. I have asked various people to do it, including Harold Brown. So it is not fair to say that I have emphasized just the gross indicators of the size of budgets.

Now, let me make the other point. I do not believe that one can achieve defense capabilities that are comparable and that do not result in superiority for the other side with efforts that are significantly less than those of the other side. The Soviet Union is now technologically very competent. We have been arguing, with respect to certain

aspects of technology, as to who is ahead or who is behind. I still believe that we are somewhat ahead, but not enough so that we can achieve comparable results with 5 percent of our GNP and 5 percent or less of our national effort. We can easily, in the long run, match what they can do, but not without a roughly comparable effort. They are devoting 10 to 12 to 15 percent of their national effort and much more than that of their competent manpower.

I think you should look at the gross resources put into the effort. I am not suggesting that that gives you a detailed answer to any given question, but you have to look at both. I think you have to look at

both.

Senator Culver. It is not so much how much you spend, it is how

much we buy in terms of capabilities.

Mr. NITZE. I believe you know that if you start off with a budget that is half the size in real terms—we are not that much more efficientyou are going to end up with less capability.

Senator Culver. You agree you could spend \$1 billion an hour for defense but if you were not buying the right things it hardly contrib-

utes to an increased strength.

Mr. NITZE. I could not agree with you more, Mr. Culver.

Senator Culver. All right.

Mr. NITZE, I think there should be all the efficiency possible in the Defense Establishment, that is not a matter of debate. I further believe that one ought to buy only those weapon systems which do contribute. I think I have been one of the outstanding proponents in the case of our SLBMs of looking for, and paying attention to, the criteria of cost effectiveness and of trying to figure out what are the best figures of merit by which one can measure cost effectiveness and budget according to that, so I don't think that these are appropriate comments to make.

Senator Culver. I am trying to get at some of your differences. The debate on size of the budget has to be one of the most simplistic exchanges I hope the country ever experienced. I would hate to think the lack of quality has been duplicated in other major public issues.

Mr. NITZE. Again I would take exception, Mr. Senator, I do not believe that my contributions today have been simplistic. If anybody can point out somebody who has tried to answer with greater care and elaboration than I have, mention them to me.

Senator Culver. One, I think, would be Mr. Warnke.

Mr. NITZE. I would contest that judgment and I think that is a fair ground. I would contest it.

PERCEPTION OF DETERRENT CAPABILITIES

Senator Culver. In terms of the credibility of our deterrent, strategic and conventional, we are not only, of course, interested in real capabilities, but also perception of those capabilities.

Mr. NITZE. I think people grossly overestimate perception in the context of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not pay much attention to what we say, they do pay an immense amount of attention to what the real capabilities are.

Senator Culver. That is reassuring to me because, frankly, I would be concerned if they paid a lot of attention to those public leaders who

suggest that the United States lacks the will to defend its interests in the world in the post-Vietnam period. It is reassuring to me that the Soviet Union would take a good, hard, second look and not take actions based on a statement about our weakness that overestimates the Soviet threat.

Would you agree that in terms of perception that can be as destabiliz-

ing as underestimating the threat?

Mr. Nitze. Frankly, I have heard more people accuse somebody else of overestimating our worst case and so on and so forth, than I have had people that underestimate it. I think we have all agreed we should not overestimate. I don't think this accusation stands up under test.

Senator Culver. You say the Soviets don't look at our rhetoric on

this point.

Mr. NITZE. I am sure they don't.

Senator Culver. And they look at our real capabilities.

Mr. NITZE. They devote immense efforts to knowing what our real capabilities are.

Senator Pell. I am reminded we are on the 10-minute rule. So at this point I will ask Mr. Griffin if he has any questions.

Senator Griffin. I have one question.

LEVELS AT WHICH WE NEGOTIATE

I wondered if you were going to sell your house, Mr. Nitze, if you would hire a lawyer or a real estate agent who said your house was

only worth half what you said you were trying to get for it.

Seriously, the point has been made that the Secretary of State, particularly when Secretary Kissinger was in office, did the negotiating at a higher level. I think it is true that Secretary Kissinger with shuttle diplomacy did engage oftentimes in functions and activities that in many administrations are left to others.

One of the things I noticed in terms of the contrast in style was that Secretary Vance, as he assumed office, made statements that left the impression at least that he believed not so much in carrying on the negotiations himself as putting responsible people in those positions and allowing them to function. I think it will take time to really know how this administration will operate, but assuming Secretary Vance does mean what he said, it is not a great deal of consolation for me to have somebody say that really our chief negotiator is not going to have much to do with the negotiations. They are going to go on at a higher level. I am not asking you a question really, I am responding to what I understood to be a point made earlier.

Mr. NITZE. I do have one comment, Mr. Senator, if you would per-

mit any.

Senator Griffin. Yes.

Mr. Nitze. And that is that I believe there are occasions where it is necessary to negotiate at those higher levels. I am not at all certain that it is right that the two delegations should handle everything. I think that the two delegations should, to the best of their ability, narrow down the points of disagreement so that the only things that are disagreed are really the important political issues.

When you get down to those important political issues, I think it probably is correct that they can only be settled at the highest level

between the President, with the advice of the Secretary of State, and

the chairman himself.

What I was worried about in the way it was done earlier was that the delegation was not informed, the head of the delegation was not informed as to what was going on at the higher level, the head of the delegation was not consulted, and his wisdom and his experience were not tapped at the time that the President, or the Secretary of State, or both, were in fact conducting the negotiations at a higher level. It has got to be a team effort. Certainly on the Soviet side it is very much a team effort.

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET LEVELS OF DEFENSE

Senator Griffin. I was here when you responded to Senator Danforth's questions about the trends. I was a little surprised that you did not talk in terms of the budget and the level of spending by the Soviet side as against the United States side because that is at least a part of the answer that many witnesses would give us and you didn't at all.

You spent your time talking about the effectiveness of various weapons systems. But I do thing in the context of this whole picture, while not most important, that the respective levels of spending over the last 10-year period in the various areas of defense by the two sides is at

least something to take note of.

The recent report by the CIA on the dollar cost comparisons of the Soviet and United States defense activities during the period 1966 to 1976 was widely referred to as of great interest. It seems to me, looking at what has been happening at least up until the change in the most recent defense budget, that what we had been doing, whether or not it has been accompanied with rhetoric, is exercising a national policy of restraint in our defense effort, a restraint to which the Soviets have not responded.

Is that a fair generalization?

Mr. Nitze. I also get into difficulty with the interpreting of a word like "restraint." I think generally "restraint" in this context is used in a different sense than just the normal Congressional debate as to what

the level of the budget should be.

My interpretation of the word "restraint" as used in this context is that you don't go forward with something not just because you don't think you can afford it in relationship to other domestic needs or that it is unwise from some cost effectiveness standpoint, but because you hope that there will be some response thereto. I think the word "restraint" in an arms competition context is generally used in this way.

Senator Griffin. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell. Senator Danforth.

URGENCY OF PRESENT SITUATION

Senator Danforth. In answer to my question about trends and developments in the United States and the Soviet Union, I think at the end of your fairly technical answer you used the word "urgent" to describe the present situation.

Could you elaborate on that?

Mr. Nitze. Well, I do believe that we run considerable dangers unless trends are reversed at some time in the 1980–85 period. If we are going to do anything in order to reverse those trends, I think we have got to be under way right now. The things that are under way right now are in fact the Trident and the Trident I missile and I was glad that Paul Warnke has always been for the Trident I missile. I think one ought to be precise about that; he has, however, been against the Trident submarines.

Senator Culver. Large submarines. Mr. Nitze. Large. Trident which is large.

I think he has been against the B-1 and I think he misspoke yesterday when he said that he thought the President also had expressed the view against the B-1. My recollection of what the President said is that one of the things he wants to do is to examine very closely as to whether or not to proceed with it, that this was still an open question in his mind, that he had not made up his mind.

Senator Culver. Would the gentleman yield?

I will give you back my time.

Senator Danforth. Fine, but could he finish his answer?

Senator Culver. I wanted to clarify for the record the position of President Carter. It may be characterized by ambiguity in the eyes of some, but he did testify publicly before the Democratic platfiorm committee that in his judgment the B-1 bomber was a wasteful and unnecessary expenditure of funds.

Mr. NITZE. I didn't realize that.

Senator Culver. That was his official testimony before the Democratic platform committee.

Mr. NITZE. As I remember it, some other place, he said he would re-

view the issue.

Senator Culver. I think it was page 35 of his statement.

Mr. Nitze. Your recollection and knowledge is much better than

Senator Griffin. But the view that you were questioning was President Carter's?

Mr. NITZE. That is what I am talking about, President Carter's

Senator Culver. This is President Carter's testimony. The President of the United States.

Mr. Nitze. I didn't realize that he appeared before the Democratic Caucus.

Senator Culver. Yes. The B-1 bomber is "an unnecessary and waste-

ful expenditure of funds."

Senator Griffin. Then I would have to interject. Which statement by Mr. Carter represents his views, because he has made other statements that indicated differently? I will say that on my own authority.

Mr. NITZE. Basically your question was, why do I feel a sense of

urgency?

Senator Danforth. Yes, sir.

Mr. Nitze. What I was trying to say was I believed that unless trends were reversed that there could be a very serious problem some time in the 1980's, and the only things I can see that would reverse this in a long-term sense would be, one, the Trident I missile and I think also the Trident II. There will be necessary improvements in

accuracy and above and beyond all, I think a mobile, multiple launch-

point basing system for the MX missile.

If you are going to do these in time to make a difference, you have to get on with it and that is why I think there should be a sense of urgency. I have also said that I don't think that these major systems are really going to come into deployment under the best of circumstances early enough and that therefore you have to examine with care temporary measures in the interim to relieve the unbalance that I see developing.

WHERE MR. WARNKE WOULD AND WOULD NOT SPEND MONEY

Senator Danforth. Senator Culver stated it is not how much is

spent on defense but what you buy for your money.

Are you sufficiently familiar with Mr. Warnke's positions on specific weapons systems to know on what he would spend less and on what he would spend more?

Mr. NITZE. I am afraid I don't know what those views are today. I have a recollection of the various things in the past he has said that

indicated what he thought we should not spend money on.

Senator Danforth. First of all, could you list for us those systems, not only strategic but tactical, nuclear and conventional, where he would spend more to the best of your knowledge and belief.

Mr. Nitze. More than we are now spending?

Senator Danforth. Yes.

Mr. Nitze. I am unaware. There may be some but I am unaware of what those are.

Senator Danforth. Could you list those systems—conventional, tac-

tical, strategic-on which he would spend less?

Mr. NITZE. Let us first of all start with the NATO European scene. I think he has said that if we had half the number of men in NATO today that we do have, or had at the time, he would think it highly unlikely that we would want to, or should, put the additional men in to bring the number back to what we then actually did have. This suggests to me that he believes we can live with a much lower manpower level in Europe than we have today.

Second, I think he has expressed himself as being against the MX-1

tank, the general tank modernization program.

I think he has expressed himself as being against the Marine Corps in its entirety, as I remember.

I think he has expressed himself as thinking we do not need 12 carrier task forces but we could do well with 9.

I think he has expressed himself as being in total opposition to the F-14 plane and its role.

Those are the things that occur to me in the conventional force field. I think he has been against, as we have said, the B-1 bomber. He has been against the Trident submarine, not the missile.

I think he has been against the accuracy improvements in missiles. I think he at one time was for abandoning all MIRVing on Minute-

man III's.

I think he was for the abandonment of, or the stopping of, the conversion program from the Polaris submarine program to the Poseidon program.

I think he has been against proceeding with the AWACS program.

That is the end of my recollection.

Senator Danforth. Do you have an opinion on the political significance in international politics, if any, if his positions had in fact been

the policy of the United States over the last 10 years?

Mr. Nitze. I think if those had been the policies of the United States over the last 10 years and if the Soviets had not reciprocated—I should think he would make the point that he would have hoped that if we had done all these actions there would have been some reciprocal action on the part of the Soviet Union which I don't believe there would have been, but that is a debatable point—if they had not and these things had been done, then rather than there being a debate today as to when in the future we may face a serious imbalance in the strategic relationships that would clearly be upon us right today.

MR. WARNKE'S SUPPORT FOR STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE

Senator Danforth. My notes indicate that yesterday Mr. Warnke stated, "I support and have always supported a strong national defense."

Do you think that is an accurate statement of what his position

has been between 1969 and 1976?

Mr. Nitze. I think it is. It illustrates two points: One of them that one can be certain that it is an accurate position by some undefined criterion, and it illustrates the other point that it is easy to make statements which are factually true against some obscure standard but convey a totally misleading impression because I think that anybody who read that statement would say that he was for a military defense posture which was strong in relationship to the actions that it might be called on to take, not that it was just absolutely strong in relation to past military capabilities or some undefined criterion.

Senator Danforth. Thank you. Senator Pell. Senator Culver.

COMMENDATION OF MR. NITZE

Senator Culver. Mr. Nitze, you, like Mr. Warnke, have been active in the public debate over Soviet military capabilities and intentions and the nature and composition of our defense budget over the years, and I wish to commend you, as I commended him, for the contribution

vou have made.

I think it is imperative to the health and the quality of that debate that people such as yourselves—able men, competent men, reasonable men—not only participate, but differ. The kinds of judgments that you are talking about, and I think you would be the first to agree, are of such a nature that reasonable people can differ with an equally strong commitment to a strong national defense and the security of this country.

Would you not agree with that? Mr. Nitze. I agree entirely with it.

ROOT OF MR. NITZE'S OPPOSITION TO MR. WARNKE

Senator Culver. I believe it is correct to say that you are an advocate of one set of judgments about these matters and that your judgments differ substantially from Mr. Warnke's judgments on some important

points. I think that perhaps the differences that have been posed in some ways overdramatize the differences between you two. But, having said that, aren't your different judgments the basic root of your opposition to Mr. Warnke's nomination?

Mr. NITZE. I think that is probably true.

Senator Culver. I was interested in your response here to Mr. Danforth on the number of different weapons systems and policy decisions where you suggest Mr. Warnke advocates a view that you differed with or found to be unwise for the strong defense of this country. Let us go through those.

TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM NATO

You talk about troop withdrawals from NATO and this has been a matter of very serious debate. President Eisenhower, I recall, and no one faults his military judgment, was the one, who talked about the minimum physical presence in the immediate postwar period and the sufficient number to be hostage as a credible trigger in the event of Soviet aggression. But I remember in the early 1970's when we had the debate on the Mansfield resolution Paul Warnke opposed it. He didn't favor at that time a major unilateral withdrawal of American troop presence in Europe.

Now, I know there were some appearances here before the Budget Committee where he talked in terms of a 30,000-man reduction and so forth. We, ourselves, in armed services are continually working on that force mix, getting rid of headquarters and other things. I think on this issue it is important to keep in mind that he has recognized the corner-

stone of our conventional deterrent is NATO.

MX-1 TANK

Now, on the MX-1 tank-Mr. NITZE. May I just interject one point?

Senator Culver. If you don't mind, I would be glad to give you

time later.

If I could, on the MX-1 tank, this is a tank not even in production yet. It is a \$1 million a copy. We are in competition with the German Leopard. There are some extremely serious questions that people are wrestling with now because of the Middle East battlefield experience. Given the vulnerability and the awesome destruction of tanks on the Middle East battlefield, a result of the sophisticated nature of the antitank weapon, where for a few hundred dollars at 3,000 yards you can knock out an asset that costs \$1 million, the questions are what are the lessons of that Middle East experience in terms of platform, in terms of size of the tank, in terms of the mix of fire power, survivability, flexibility, weight, mobility? Very serious people who are tank commanders and knowledgeable about this issue are wrestling with them right now, whether our own security would be enhanced if we had more smaller tanks of a different configuration at less price to go against that kind of increased capability of an antitank weaponry: As you know, that is a legitimate debate.

B-1 BOMBER

On the B-1 bomber, as you also are aware, people like former Secretary of Defense Clifford, whom you served under, opposed B-1 production, Maxwell Taylor opposes B-1 production, not because they have any evidence about the nature of the Soviet threat, not because they are disinterested in the security of this country, but, as I understand it, because they question the expenditure of billions of dollars to build 244 B-1s at a cost now of \$94 million each—each copy came in in 1970 at \$35 million—and their question is, is that the most cost effective contribution to our strategic deterrent?

The Air Force's own official testimony, as you know, has said that our B-52's are good into the 1980's. We are spending \$1 billion now on modernizing the B-52 fleet. They talk about eight B-1 bombers in this year's budget, \$2.2 billion, a third of the entire aircraft procure-

ment budget for the Air Force.

Now, what they are concerned about is whether or not those funds can be more effectively applied to other areas in our defense budget, on a more cost-effective basis to give us a stronger deterrent, about whether or not the Soviet air defense capability that in 8 or 10 years is going to have a magic window that keeps the B-52 out but lets the B-1 in. They also wonder about less costly alternatives, standoff bombers with a cruise missile capability.

Now, if one makes these arguments, it certainly should not be misconstrued or misunderstood that his professional judgments are somehow less sound or less informed than some others and are less interested

in the real strength of this country.

MIRVING DEVELOPMENT

I was interested when you said that Mr. Warnke was against MIRV. Secretary of State Kissinger has said that had he known the verification problems that have been introduced by MIRVing, he would have opposed that MIRVing at the time we came to that crossroads, so that we didn't introduce the problem of verification on both sides and made agreements that much more complicated and difficult.

TRIDENT SUBMARINE

On Trident, Mr. Warnke has talked about a smaller alternative to the Trident submarine. Why? So we can have more subs, more survivable, less vulnerable. The interesting thing is that the 1974 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger came in and recommended the Norwhal sub, a smaller alternative to this Trident, after we spent a lot of money, which could give us more platforms, more fire power, less vulnerable than the mix we now have in your Navy.

F-14 AIRCRAFT

I was interested that the F-14, \$20 million per aircraft, today are only ready one-third of the time because of the problems of concurrence, problems of operation and maintenance, problems from getting

the plane to the fleet before it is operationally ready. It is down 35 percent of the time. Our Navy can't even make it work because we pulled it out of R. & D. too fast and put it into the fleet. It is so sophisticated and of such high technology we cannot keep it going.

BIG AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Big aircraft carrier. We even have President Ford and Mr. Rumsfeld now coming in opposed. As soon as we got enough of these Presidential primaries out of the way we start talking sense on this defense budget item. They have knocked out the nuclear carrier, as you know, and they have come in with a major push for a smaller platform.

SAVINGS IF MR. WARNKE'S COUNSEL HAD BEEN FOLLOWED

In my judgment, if some of the wise counsel of Paul Warnke had been followed, it would have saved this Nation billions of dollars and we could have been in a stronger position today than we now are. If we don't go forward with the B-1, just 1 B-1, \$94 million, will buy 14,000 antitank missiles. One B-1, \$94 million, will buy six F-15 aircraft. It will buy 150 modern MX-1 tanks.

A lot of people say that where we are really weak is not in the strategic nuclear balance so much as it is in the conventional deterrent. Some of us would like to see less money spent on some futuristic weapon system coming online down the way and get that money into operation and maintenance and readiness, so that what we have is really credible.

QUESTION OF TWO VIEWS

So it seems to me the questions here are matters of judgment. You have talked about counterforce. I don't know how we can define that term, it is much abused. Whether you are talking about counterforce that involves the development of the first strike capability or whether you are talking about more modest, flexible options there are real questions about whether you subscribe to the notion you can have a nice, clean tit-for-tat, limited nuclear war or whether that firebreak is going to be moved into something more serious very quickly.

The President understandably has to have somebody who shares his views. He said that Mr. Warnke shares his views. He does not believe in limited nuclear war. He does not believe it is really a feasible option. He thinks that it would soon escalate. That is a judgment call.

The President has these views, so it seems to me that anyone with

contrary views could hardly be his negotiator at SALT.

This has been a long menu, and I am not unaware of the fact that it is a speech more than a question, but the record should reflect that if we do nothing in Congress but rubberstamp the latest things that the services rush up here off the drawing boards, we have done less than our constitutional duty.

I am glad that you and Mr. Warnke are in here talking about it, giving us the benefit of your spirited differences of judgment and opinion. Anyone who has the courage to speak out in public life, as you have, is going to find sometimes they are right, sometimes they are

wrong. At least they had the guts to say what they thought.

I think that is true in Mr. Warnke's case, it was true in your case, and I think the real question is, between those two views, which person does the President want to carry out a negotiation?

QUESTION OF MANPOWER IN NATO

Mr. NITZE. May I answer?

You raised, first of all, the question of manpower in NATO. I think the reason Mr. Warnke has advanced for not cutting the manpower is because of its political effect upon our allies. I think he has not advanced it from the standpoint of what is required for a reasonable deterrent posture on the part of NATO as a whole.

Now, you can argue about that; he is very sensitive to things that have to do with cosmetics, with appearances. I emphasize far more what the real capabilities are. I think that is a distinction between us.

MX-1 TANK

With respect to the MX-1 I know there is a debate about this and there certainly was a debate that I participated in within the Government on the preceding advanced modern battle tank program which turned out very badly. I don't want to express an opinion on that, but I do think that those who are responsible for this—you know, for recommending what we ought now to do in the tank field—be considered worthy of respect. They should not be just out of hand condemned as not making sense.

I don't want to take a position on the MX-1, but I would think the burden of proof would be on those who would think that the Army

is wrong.

B-1 BOMBER

Secondly, with respect to the B-1, you are quite right that many people have looked into alternatives of the B-1 as to whether they would be equally effective and at less cost. Very few people argue that we really don't need a bomber component of our defense establishment. I have looked into it and I believe with considerable care. Now, I know that others have different views, but on this one I believe that I would contest that I have looked into it more carefully and more fully.

KISSINGER REGARDING MIRVING

Now, with respect to Kissinger re MIRVing. My recollection of what he said, and I may be quite wrong in this, was that if he had foreseen the difficulties he would have in this matter that he would have considered it differently. I don't think he said he would not have gone forward.

The problem at that time when we went forward with the MIRV program was the question of what kinds of capabilities we needed in order to be able to penetrate an ABM defense and we would really be in a position so we didn't have to worry so much about the penetration

of our submarine launched missiles.

Frankly, I think that was a very real worry, that was the primary worry. Beyond that it is not true that the Soviets really made any—that they were prepared to have reciprocal negotiations verifiably not to MIRV. What they said was if we both agreed not to deploy MIRV's

but permitted them to test MIRV's that then they would agree to that, but we had to agree not to deploy or to build MIRV missiles. There is no way you could monitor that. They were not prepared for any inspection.

You earlier said that any agreement ought to be verifiable. There was no earthly way in which you could make them accept a verifiable MIRV agreement and one of the few leads we had was in fact our greater number of RV's—and this was because of our MIRV program—against their much bigger missiles, number of missiles and their much bigger throw weight. We really had very grave difficulties with this. I am not at all sure that even had we foreseen all the problems which later arose—I still don't believe we would have decided against it at the time—but I don't know. I think all Dr. Kissinger said was that he would have considered it differently.

TRIDENT AND SMALLER SUBMARINES

Now, with respect to the Trident sub and the smaller one the Norwhal there is a real question as to what it is you want to optimize. I believe that the systems analysis people in the Pentagon were wrong about the figure of merit that they thought was the right one to optimize. They thought it was the number of pounds of throw weight on station per billion dollars of 10-year cost, and on that basis clearly the Trident with the Trident II missile is way ahead in cost-effectiveness

against any other system.

I thought that the figure of merit you ought to look at was what alert, reliable, survivable, pounds of throw weight you could buy per billion dollars. Looking at the function of survivability clearly a number of inputs enters into those equations. Then you look at the Norwhal versus the Trident. For \$13 billion you buy six Tridents on station, for the Norwhal you can only buy two more—eight. This small increase in the number of aim points in no way offsets the increased capability you buy with the Trident. If you were to switch to a Norwhal it was not cost-effective even by the more sophisticated figure of merit that I had suggested.

Now, you take the F-14.

Senator Culver. You disagree with Dr. Schlesinger?

Mr. Nitze. I did and I think Schlesinger later changed his mind when I showed him all the computations. I think he changed his mind later and didn't go back to Norwhal after the Congress said he should not buy any.

Senator Pell. I think your time has expired.

Have you finished?

Mr. Nitze. Let me just summarize because I am prepared to deal with every one of the points you made.

PROGRAMS MR. WARNKE HAS BEEN AGAINST

I quite agree with your overall statement that I and no one else could be certain, that the merit of the argument is on my side on everyone of these things. I am not asserting that. What I am asserting, though, is that my response to Senator Danforth's question was I think a more or less precise response. He didn't ask me what I thought about the programs. He asked me what programs I recollected that Mr. Warnke has been against.

I omitted some that I would like to think about further. He was also against the program for the 688 attack submarines. He wanted to cut that back from five to two. It is my recollection that he said that some place or other. There was something else that now I don't remember.

The main point is you must couple all this with these very large recommended budgetary reductions. You would say to go buy something else with the money that you would save from the B-1. He was

not talking about that at all.

He was talking about reducing the budget \$30 billion at one time, by \$14 billion at another time, and so forth and so on. He was not talking about tradeoffs on the basis of cost effectiveness. Therefore, I think it is correct to say that if one had followed his recommendations we would be in a weaker position today unless the Soviets—

Senator Pell. Senator Danforth.

I remind both members of the committee that we have another wit-

ness still to follow.

Senator Danforth. I don't want to prolong this very long. I would like to ask a sort of a culveristic question—[Laughter]—and perhaps ask for a comment. It will be more of a speech, I suppose, than a question.

Senator Culver. The rules permit that.

CONGRESS' FOREIGN POLICY ROLE

Senator Danforth. I think it is quite true that the Congress of the United States is not in the position of rubber-stamping every arms request that comes from the Pentagon. I think it is also true that the Congress of the United States should not simply delegate all foreign policy responsibility and authority to the President or to the administration. That was done once upon a time in something called the Tonkin Gulf resolution in which the Senate of the United States decided that it really didn't have a role in foreign policy and it was going to leave foreign policy to the President. I think that that was a disaster.

I believe in this matter and in other matters the Senate in particular does have a role to play in the formation of foreign policy and that as a matter of fact the Constitution of the United States provides two specific ways in which our foreign policy role is to be exercised.

First in confirmation of Presidential nominees for positions relating to foreign policy and, second, with respect to ratification of treaties.

WHAT WILL BE VOTED ON

I fully agree that in this case we are foreshadowed by what our position is going to be with respect to a SALT treaty which would be negotiated by our next SALT negotiator. It would be a disaster if a treaty were negotiated and the Senate failed to ratify it.

I believe that we cannot simply blindly say, let's let the President have his way and appoint whoever he may please as our SALT negotiator and as his chief arms adviser so long as we have the power to

confirm that nomination.

I really believe that we are not simply voting for or against an individual to carry out the President's policy. I think we are going to be voting for or against a policy, for or against a particular philosophy embodied in this individual. I am a walk-on on the Foreign Relations Committee, here by temporary assignment. I am not an expert on arms control. Until this nomination I have never gone into it in great depths, but I have tried to know and to read what that man had to say and to read what you have to say.

I especially appreciate your willingness to come before this committee and present your side of the philosophical debate on which I

believe we are going to have to vote.

The Senate of the United States is going to have to make a judgment as to which of these two policies it wants, and I think Senator Culver is quite right to say that this is a judgment matter. Yes, it is, of course, and good men are presenting both sides of the argument. Mr. Nitze, isn't it true that this judgment is not without its risks; that it is not just a futile exercise or a debater's point, that on this particular judgment as to which of the two philosophies we are going to follow a great deal rests with respect to the future of our country and the future of the world.

Mr. NITZE. I agree entirely with the last part of your statement and the earlier part as well, but I take it it is the last part that you

transformed into a question.

No, I think there are risks and I think there are risks deciding it either way. There are risks if one fails to confirm; I think there are greater risks if one confirms Warnke, but I think you have correctly stated that this is an issue which the Senate must resolve in its wisdom.

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions and

appreciate Mr. Nitze's appearance.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Senator Culver.

Senator Culver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to express my appreciation to you for affording me the opportunity to appear today.

DIFFICULTY OF WORKING WITH PRESIDENT WITH DIFFERENT VIEWS

Mr. Nitze, we had an election in November and some of that election supposedly turned on debate about defense, about defense issues, about arms control, about whether or not we were going to make a serious effort to effect some restraint in arms control. There was greater emphasis, admittedly, in the national defense debate on conventional

arms and our present policy in that area.

We have a President who won the national election who is dedicated to arms control. Anyone who serves in Mr. Warnke's capacity obviously is going to have an important and critical role, but they will have to follow the guidelines of that President. It is very hard to imagine that someone with your views would be either comfortable or compatible. I don't say that disrespectfully, I just say it factually and objectionably.

You would find it very difficult to follow the goals of this President who says he does not believe in limited nuclear warfare, and wants to make a serious effort now towards arms control in hope that we can avoid necessary increases in the defense budget. If we don't reach agreement now, we are at a critical juncture in terms of followon generational improvements in the whole range of our capabilities.

The difference you have with Mr. Warnke is that you represent a different viewpoint, which I respect and am grateful for the fact that we have it expressed, but I wonder whether anybody with your views could ever be comfortable in harness with a President who has those other views? I wonder whether or not you feel you could follow his guidelines as a negotiator or whether somebody with your views could, whether that would contribute, as you said earlier, to a workable team effort.

The President nominated Mr. Warnke—he studied him, he knows him, he worked with both of you in the campaign, but he picked him and Mr. Warnke is going to have to carry out his guidelines. Don't you think it would be hard for you to work with the President?

Mr. Nitze. I would reverse it. I would think if these are really deeply held views by the President, then I can well imagine he would not want me to work with him because I have different views. I have worked with a number of Presidents who have had a number of different views. I have worked with a number of Secretaries of Defense, a number of Secretaries of State. I think all of those that I have worked for have understood that I will say as honestly as I know how what I believe to be the considerations which bear upon an issue and most people—in fact, all of them I believe—have understood this to be the case and they have also understood that if they then tell me why they disagree with my analysis that I will then work as loyally as I can to carry out what they want to have done provided I believe it to be within the President's oath of office and my oath of office to defend the Constitution.

MR. WARNKE'S APPROACH TO RESPONSIBILITIES IF UNABLE TO PREVAIL

Senator Culver. Don't you think that is the way Mr. Warnke would approach those responsibilities? If he were unable to prevail in a particular view, don't you imagine he would be a good soldier and carry out just as you would?

Mr. Nitze. The reason why I took a more serious view of this matter today than I did yesterday was because I did not get the feeling that he was prepared really to advocate persistently the viewpoints that he has expressed for 7 years. The viewpoints he expressed yesterday, at least as I listened to the radio, are different today.

Senator Culver. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Pell. Thank you very much indeed.

Thank you, Mr. Nitze for being very patient with us. We are particularly aware of all your service, all your dedication to our Nation for many years.

Mr. NITZE. Thank you.

Senator Pell. Our final witness is Mr. Penn Kemble of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority who is already at the table.

STATEMENT OF PENN KEMBLE, COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY

Mr. Kemble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief and

expeditious.

I am delighted to be able to attend these hearings to express the concerns of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority about the nomination of Paul C. Warnke as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as our chief negotiator in the strategic arms limitation talks.

As you know, the coalition prepared a four-page memorandum last December in which our staff sought to summarize Mr. Warnke's views on the issues relevant to this hearing. The impression exists that this memorandum willfully misrepresented the views that Mr. Warnke held at that time and that we have been reluctant to acknowledge our authorship of the document. I hope I can dispel that impression.

Yesterday the New York Times Op Ed page published a statement by me which explained how this memorandum came to be. Senator Pell has been kind enough to insert that statement, along with our memorandum, into the record of this hearing. I would like to just add

a word or two to that statement from the New York Times,

BACKGROUND OF COALITION

Our organization was founded in 1972 because we believed that our party had been seriously weakened by its embrace of a body of ideas which the American voters perceived to be unsound, and in some cases, even dangerous. A central element in that body of ideas, we believed, was a view that the United States was responsible in a major way for the danger of war in the world and that we should "Come Home" from a wide range of our foreign commitments and our expenditures for national defense. These proposals for a major retrenchment in our defense programs were made in two McGovern campaign documents, both of which Mr. Warnke, as leader of Senator McGovern's Panel on National Security, endorsed. They are entitled: "Alternative Defense Posture" and "Report of the McGovern Panel on National Security."

They are long, detailed documents and I do not wish to burden the record of the committee with the task of reproducing them but they are documents which propose truly staggering cuts in U.S. defense spending—cuts which had they been enacted would have perhaps spared us the current debate over whether the United States or the Soviet Union today possesses military superiority. I commend them to members and others who are interested in understanding why our concern

with Mr. Warnke's nomination is as strong as it is.

Members of our group were deeply gratified when, as demonstrated in his second campaign debate with President Ford, our candidate, Governor Carter, adopted a stance on defense issues which thoroughly rejected this sweeping opposition to American defense commitments. When Governor Carter became President-elect Carter, we even decided to follow one of his campaign proposals: We would become one of the first organizations in the history of American politics which, by

an act of will, would self-destruct. We came back from our work in various Democratic campaigns around the country and began to dismantle our office, negotiate with our creditors, and otherwise end our own existence.

But in mid-December of last year we were surprised to hear that Mr. Carter was considering the appointment of Mr. Warnke as Secretary of Defense. This shocked us back into a brief revival. Mr. Warnke has for the past 8 years been a distinguished, outspoken advocate for an approach to defense issues in general and strategic arms issues in particular, which we believe cost our party the voters' confidence in 1972, and, given all evidence from polls and elections since then, is even more dimly viewed today.

BACKGROUND OF UNSIGNED MEMORANDUM

Several of us on the CDM staff—all of us mere laymen, with no pretensions to expertise in this complicated field—sought to prepare a short summary of Mr. Warnke's writings and public actions. Mr. Warnke's name was dropped from consideration as Defense Secretary, only to be reborn in speculation about the directorship of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency.

We would have continued our work on this memorandum but the rent was due and our other commitments were at hand so we stopped work on the memorandum before it had been through our procedures for making it a formal official statement of the organization. We decided to give it to a handful of congressional aides and members of the press for their background information, and we did so—and every one of them who received it knew that we had prepared it and that it

was a background paper, not for general circulation.

Last Wednesday we were therefore surprised to learn that the Washington Post reported that an anonymous memo was circulating through Senate offices which attacked Mr. Warnke's views. The memo was referred to in the Post in an editorial Thursday as, I quote, "scurrilous" and "a smear." This is curious since the memo was given to Mr. Steve Klaidman of the Post last December by a member of our staff with a clear acknowledgement that we had prepared it. Mr. Klaidman tells me—he told me this today when I called him to confirm it—that he passed the memo on to Mr. Murray Marder of the Post with that information. It is my understanding that this is a perfectly normal way of assisting newsmen with background information.

From these descriptions—the descriptions I have just quoted—of the memo it was not immediately recognizable as our own work, and we had not circulated it since December, but when we confirmed that it was, we telephoned those papers and others to proclaim our paternity. If our response was at all slow, it was because we are no longer an active organization. We learned about the memo on Wednesday, and we notified the press that it was ours immediately. Friday morning's edition of the New York Times carried the acknowledgement, although it did appear until later in the Post.

My purpose in making this statement is to clear the record so that questions raised about Mr. Warnke's views will no longer be treated as though they are somehow indecent. I stand by the views, quotations and characterizations in our memo—with but one small exception—and I still remain convinced that Mr. Warnke's record does not recommend him for the positions to which he has been nominated. I will be happy to try, within the admitted limits of a layman's knowledge of these matters, to explain and defend our concerns. I will not be offended, however, if members of the committee follow the sensible course of accepting Mr. Paul Nitze's testimony on these matters as reflective of CDM's concerns, and far more authoritative and informed than mine could hope to be.

CHARGE THAT MR. WARNKE FAVORS UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

Let me, however, state for the record a response to one particular criticism that has been raised about a characterization we made. It is said that our memo charged Mr. Wanke with favoring unilateral disarmament.

Nowhere in our paper, of course, do we suggest that Mr. Warnke advocates the kind of unilateral disarmament sought by some pacifist groups. But we do say that in his role as a McGovern adviser and in his advocacy of defense cuts since then, he proposed certain "levels of unilateral disarmament." I am quoting that. We were persuaded that, given the long leadtime required for the development of these weapons systems, and the nature of arms negotiations—which conceive of these systems as ongoing processes, not as static items in an arsenal which one either has or does not have—our description is apt. But for this, however, we are hard pressed to understand how anything in our memo misrepresents the views that until yesterday Mr. Warnke expressed with such admirable clarity and candor—or how our memo "made statements out of context, condensed, excerpted from several pages to make them look contiguous," or anything of the kind.

It is a record which truly speaks for itself. Now we commend our

sources, all cited in our memo, to anyone who doubts this.

Thank you.

Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Kemble. We appreciate your coming forward as you did to testify.

ANONYMITY OF MEMO

As you know, I put statements in the record I think both Friday and Monday because I was really buying the anonymity of the report when I first saw it. I had asked my staff where it came from and they didn't know. I would have thought that even though this is a background memo somewhere on it in the normal custom, even if not signed, there would be a letterhead or something of that sort. Is that not your custom?

Mr. Kemble. It would have been if this were an official statement by our organization but it was a draft that we were in the process of working on. We closed the office and we had it in this form and this is how we put it out.

CORRECTNESS OF UNILATERAL RESTRAINT STATEMENT

Senator Pell. In connection with the contents you say that Warnke advocates "the unilateral abandonment by the United States of every

weapons system which is subject to negotiation at SALT (as well as many others which are not under discussion)."

Do you believe that is correct?

Mr. Kemble. If one construes every weapons system which is subject to negotiation at SALT to mean every weapons system that falls within the category of strategic arms, that is not so but if one construes that, as we did, to mean every weapon system which has been the subject of bargaining at SALT negotiations in the recent past, then the statement is accurate.

Senator Pell. In other words, your contention is that every system that was the subject of negotiations at SALT in the last few sessions the last time around was recommended for abandonment by

Mr. Warnke?

Mr. Kemble. No; perhaps not the entire system but those aspects of it which were under negotiation with all aspects of the program that Mr. Warnke had advocated that we should cut back on or cease development of.

Senator Pell. Here you refer to every weapon system subject to

negotiation.

Mr. Kemble. The aspect of it that was the subject of negotiation. Senator Pell. That is already changing the meaning of the sentence a great deal, but then to be specific here is what you are saying: that aspects of these weapons systems under negotiation were urged to be abandoned in every case by Mr. Warnke.

Mr. Kemble. That is right, cut back or abandoned or restrained in

their development.

Senator Pell. I am surprised at that, but I am not sufficiently part

of the negotiations to be aware of the truth or the nontruth.

Mr. Kemble. I think if I can call your attention to Mr. Nitze's testimony on this he made the qualification about this which I have just made but said that he thought the memo in general was sound and accurate.

Senator Pell. As you know, when we asked this question of Mr.

Warnke vesterday he flatly said it was incorrect.

Mr. Kemble. It could be construed I think if one made the effort to be incorrect, but the point is here that he is being sent into negotiations and those aspects of these weapons systems and in some cases systems themselves about which he is likely to negotiate are all matters which in the course of his advocacy over the last 7 years he has been opposed to.

COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY

Senator Pell. You referred several times in your memo to "we." How many members does the Coalition for a Democratic Majority have?

Mr. Kemble. Several thousand. Senator Pell. Several thousand.

Do they pay dues? Mr. Kemble. Yes.

Senator Pell. How much?

Mr. Kemble. They pay \$15 a year.

Senator Pell. \$15 a year. Who are its officers? Who is the chairman or president?

Mr. Kemble. We have cochairmen. They are Ben Wattenburg, Midge Decter, Byron Ruston and, until he acceded to the chairman-ship of the Agriculture Committee, Tom Foley but in December he, Congressman Tom Foley, explained to us that he felt in that position he could no longer continue as the cochairman.

Senator Pell. All right. Does this organization have sources of

income other than active dues?

Mr. Kemble. Yes. We hold fund-raising events for which we sell tickets and we receive some contributions from individuals. I should like to point out that we have never for this organization received a penny from anyone engaged in the commerce of defense. It is entirely supported by private citizens who just believe that these views are sound and need an effective lobby.

Senator Pell. How were the organization's policies decided?

Mr. Kemble. We have a board of directors and an executive committee. The organization, as I indicated in my statement, has not been active in recent months. Our purpose was to try to influence the Democratic Party's policies on this issue among others, and judging from Mr. Carter's campaign statements we felt we had succeeded and we still hope we have.

Senator Pell. I wonder if you would submit for the record so there is more of an awareness of the group a list of your board of directors

and also the number of your dues paying members.

Mr. Kemble. I would be happy to do that. Senator Pell. Thank you very much.

[The material follows:]

[As of the date of publication, the information referred to had not been supplied.]

MR. WARNKE'S POSITIONS ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Senator Pell. Now returning for a moment to the question of what weapons system Mr. Warnke advocated, I think that the ICBM's and the SLBM's were both under discussion at SALT.

Mr. Kemble. Right.

Senator Pell. But you are not saying that he urged abandonment of those systems?

Mr. Kemble. No.

Senator Pell. You are saying he urged not continuing to expand? Mr. Kemble. My understanding was it was not the system itself that was under discussion but rather the question of whether we should be MIRVed and what kind of accord could be established governing the numbers of these, the throw weight and things of that kind. On those questions where there was a margin of discussion, my understanding is that Mr. Warnke took positions that were considerably weaker, favored reductions that went beyond the margins that were under negotiation during the talks.

Senator Pell. I think that the subjects under discussion at SALT

were the launchers as well.

Mr. Kemble. Yes.

Senator Pell. I don't think he is advocating a smaller number of

launchers, is he?


Mr. Kemble. Yes; he has advocated a smaller number of launchers. He has advocated the dismantling of Titan missiles and also some cutbacks in the number of Minuteman and he has always favored the discontinuation of the Minuteman III program. I think these things are outlined in our memo. He favored discontinuation of Minuteman III and other steps to upgrade U.S. ICBM's, dismantling of all Titan ICBM's, and a number of other things.

Senator Pell. All right. I thank you very much for your testimony. This concludes the hearing. The record will remain open for additional statements on Mr. Warnke's nomination until Tuesday,

February 15.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 629 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]



APPENDIX

Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., February 7, 1977.

Hon. John J. Sparkman, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is to urge you and the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to reject the nomination of Paul Warnke

as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

As the United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1978, issued by General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clearly shows, since 1971 the Soviets have been ahead of us in operational strategic offensive delivery vehicles. In addition they are ahead of us in operational strategic offensive throw-weight at this time, and will be further ahead of us by the end of Fiscal Year 1982. As General Brown's report states, "The United States is expected to off-set partially this Soviet advantage by retaining a lead in bomber payload and by deployment of our new heavier MX ICBM in 1983."

In regard to Europe, an area most vulnerable to attack, the House Armed Services Committee was told by the Department of the Army, "Our forces in Europe are outnumbered—not grossly, but significantly—by our adversaries, and the types of weapons being amassed by the Warsaw Pact seem plainly attack-

oriented."

For decades, a Soviet conventional attack against the West has been deterred by our nuclear superiority. That advantage is rapidly being lost. From his own statements made in recent years Paul Warnke is clearly undisturbed by this situation. He would, in fact, further weaken our defense structure. In Foreign Policy magazine, Spring, 1975, Mr. Warnke wrote: "The proposition

In Foreign Policy magazine, Spring, 1975, Mr. Warnke wrote: "The proposition that we must remain ahead of the Soviet Union in most, if not all, perceivable elements of military power is the second fallacy that inflates defense spending."

An October 1976 interview with Mr. Warnke states: "The former Pentagon official advocated a significant departure from previous U.S. nuclear policy in suggesting that Washington specifically announce it has no intention of launching a strategic first strike against the Soviet Union under any circumstances." (Emphasis added.)

This interview was published in the International Bulletin (10/22/76).

For a number of years, Mr. Warnke has been a member of the Board of Advisors of the Center for Defense Information, a group that, like Warnke, has advocated unilateral cuts in defense spending. The Center for Defense Information, and its parent body the Fund for Peace have been in close contact with the World Peace Council, a Moscow directed movement which advocates the disarmament of the West as well as support for terrorist groups.

Since 1975 Mr. Warnke has been a registered agent of the Government of Algeria (Registration No. 2564—Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney). It is understood that Mr. Warnke and his firm served that government for a period of time before registering. The Government of Algeria has been a public supporter of terrorist groups including the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Black Liberation Army which was involved in murderous attacks in the United States.

Mr. Warnke has shown a lack of concern for the protection of highly classified government documents. He set in motion the chain of events that allowed Daniel Ellsberg to steal the Pentagon Papers.

On December 18, 1968, Paul Warnke, Morton H. Halperin and Leslie Gelb presented a set of the Pentagon Papers to the Rand Corporation for storage with

the understanding that at least two of them would have to approve the use of the Papers by anyone. On March 3, 1969, Gelb and Halperin authorized the release of the Papers to Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg, of course, later released them

in violation of the security classification.

On May 16, 1973, while testifying before the United States Senate, Ellsberg, before taking the oath, stated that Warnke, Halperin and Gelb were not involved in his theft of the Papers. No one had asked him the question, but he indicated that he felt the government believed that the three were involved with him. Later, after Senator Strom Thurmond insisted that he be put under oath, he did not discuss this matter.

The New York Times of June 24, 1971, quoted Mr. Warnke as saying that "In his view, none of the material published so far could endanger the national security." This was in reference to the Times publication of the Pentagon Papers which included full text copies of top secret cable traffic between the State Department and our embassies in Vietnam and the Philippines. A hostile foreign intelligence service monitoring our code transmissions could use these clear texts to aid them in breaking our codes.

We urge this committee to reject Mr. Warnke's nomination and that the text

of this letter be included in the committee's hearing record.

Sincerely,

Larry P. McDonald, Doug Barnard, Billy L. Evans, Robert Sikes, Richard Ichord, Jack Brinkley, Dawson Mathis, G. V. Montgomery, Dan Daniel, Bill Nichols.

> HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Cambridge, Mass., February 6, 1977.

Senator John Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Sparkman: Last Friday in Washington I was given a copy of an anonymous and scurrilous four-page memorandum attacking Mr. Paul Warnke. This memorandum, undated and unsigned, has apparently been circulated among Senators in an attempt to impugn the judgment and views of Mr. Warnke whose nomination by the President to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and United States representative to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks your Committee will be considering this week,

As one who has known Mr. Warnke for more than twenty-five years and has read some of what he has written on defense policy, I was shocked at the irresponsibility of those circulating the memorandum. Mr. Warnke can, and I am sure will, express his views fully before the Foreign Relations Committee. At the risk of answering charges that are not worthy of response, let me put a

few points in writing.

At the outset it should be stated that there are policy differences between Mr. Warnke and the anonymous author of the memorandum. The central position of the critic appears to rest on two propositions:

1. Security is a simple function of the numbers of weapons. (More weapons=

"superiority"=security)

2. Self-restraint in military procurement is a bad thing.

Some, particularly among those associated with the production of military hardware, contend that military weapons should be acquired without limit, and without regard for our need for them, their potential utility, their purpose or their cost. In this keeping-up-with-the-Jones' view there is only one test; to have more of everything than anybody else. It is fair to say that Mr. Warnke rejects the notion that the United States will gain either military or political advantage through acquiring large amounts of unneeded military hardware.

The anonymous critic tries to make national self-restraint irresponsible by calling it "unilateral". But the United States must always decide for itself what to do and what not to do. Necessarily it exercises some restraint at all times. Mr. Warnke has argued for a more conscious exercise of that restraint in the light of our needs and of the possible effect of our actions-either way-on the

Soviet Union.

Beyond reflecting these policy differences, the memorandum is grossly misleading. The essence of the charge against Mr. Warnke is that he advocates "unilateral disarmament" and is not worried about the Soviet Union. The memorandum goes on to allege that Mr. Warnke advocates "the unilateral abandonment by the United States of every weapon system which is subject to negotiation at SALT". This is patently false. Attached are some quotations from recent writings of Mr. Warkne that demonstrate the total invalidity of the charge.

Would you be kind enough to make this letter available to other members of the Committee who may have seen the anonymous memorandum attacking Mr. Warnke? Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

ROGER FISHER, Samuel Williston Professor of Law, Harvard University.

Attachment.

SAMPLE: PAUL WARNKE STATEMENTS

"What little we know of the Soviet power structure and what little we can see of China's internal struggles can give us no confidence that the foreign policy of either country will eschew the use of military force for the balance of this century. Russia and China have the manpower and means, and their motives are sufficiently obscure so that we must retain the military might to deter or defend against their overt aggression." (Security or Confrontation, Foreign Policy, Winter 1970–71 [with Leslie Gelb] page 9.)

And: "Our overriding objective continues to be deterrence of Soviet and Chinese attacks against us and our allies. And deterrence still requires us to maintain usable and credible counterforces which, in turn, possess the varied military capability to meet threats on the level at which they are posed." (ibid.

p. 22)

And: "If our conventional military power is to remain meaningful, it must retain the capability to deal with two plausible military threats. The 'improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation' does not shrink these two to one, but leaves them unmistakably two . . . Conventional aggression, by either or both Communist powers, cannot . . . blithely be discounted." (ibid. p. 30)

THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, Washington, D.C., February 11, 1977.

Hon. John Sparkman, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I write you as the Washington Representative of the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations. After consultation with Members of our Executive Committee, we want you and Members of your Committee as well as Members of the U.S. Senate to know of our support for Paul Warnke as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as well as his nomination to the rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service as Director of that Agency.

As indicated in the attached statement which the American Committee adopted on December 8, 1976, our Committee is "filled with hope" because "the newly elected President has indicated a proper concern with the great issues of

disarmament, peace, and human rights."

The American Committee in stressing the importance of promoting "American security and world peace" by improving relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, "urges the new Administration to turn its back on past timidities and to restore both balance and initiative to American policy in this field of American-Soviet Relations."

We believe Paul Warnke, acting in accord with the frequently expressed views of President Carter and Secretary of State Vance, is an excellent choice to head the Arms Control Agency and to take principal responsibility in conducting

SALT negotiations.

We believe the new Administration deserves a fair chance to see what it can do to conclude a SALT II agreement which will serve the national security interests of the United States. We believe President Carter deserves the chance to determine the direction of negotiations and to select his negotiators. If the Senate does not like the results it can, in accordance with our constitutional

procedures reject any treaties that may be negotiated. We recognize the important role of the Senate in the foreign relations of the U.S. We do not believe the Senate should, directly or indirectly, impose pre-conditions on the SALT negotiations.

Opponents of Mr. Warnke have expressed fears that he may be soft in his negotiating posture with the Soviet Union. There is nothing in the Warnke record to suggest such a stance. Furthermore, we are constrained to point out that the SALT negotiating team is made up of the Chairman, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a representative of the Department of State, as well as a

representative of the Arms Control Agency.

As the American Committee noted in its statement which is enclosed, we recognize "that there are realistic limits to the improvement of relations between Russia and the U.S. . . . Unilateral concessions are not a real issue. To our knowledge, no such concessions have been responsibly proposed nor do we favor

any."

We would appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, if this letter with its enclosures could be include in the record of the hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations and, if you deem it appropriate, we would like to have this letter with its enclosures inserted in the Congressional Record.

Sincerely yours,

CARL MARCY.

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Enclosure 1. December 8, 1976 Statement of the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations.

Enclosure 2. American Committee Membership List as of January 1977.

ENCLOSURE 1

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

The United States is in a period of transition, and this Committee is filled with hope. The newly elected President has indicated a proper concern with the great issues of disarmament, peace, and human rights. We are encouraged by the selection of Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State.

For the past year or two American policy towards the Soviet Union has been in the main neglected, adrift, and devoid of initiative. During the recent electoral campaign, U.S.-Soviet relations suffered from much misinformation and mis-

leading rhetoric.

The American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations, concerned only to promote American security and world peace through those relations, urges the new Administration to turn its back on past timidities and to restore both balance

and initiative to American policy in this field.

The Committee recognizes that there are realistic limits to the improvement of relations between Russia and the U.S. We recognize that the Soviet leadership will have to make a contribution no smaller than our own. Unilateral concessions are not a real issue. To our knowledge, no such concessions have been responsibly proposed, nor do we favor any. We are under no illusions about the seriousness of the differences that divide the two governments, particularly in the field of policy toward third countries and regions.

The Committee believes that despite our disagreements, the relationship can be improve in important ways. We urge the incoming Administration to take advantage, wherever possible, of all openings for progress, including outstandingly in the SALT talks. First priorities should be given to halting the suicidal proliferation of nuclear and other weapons. The security of our country, as well as of our friends and allies, must always be a prime motivation in our relations with the Soviet Union. But security in todays' world cannot be achieved by expanding armaments.

What is at stake here is the ultimate issue of international life today. We must make every effort to probe such possibilities as do exist. This will require not only discussion and negotiations, but a considerable measure of restraint, courage, and initiative on both sides. Indeed, the dangers of restraint are less than those of an all-out weapons race. We can better demand mutuality of the Soviet Union if the United States is prepared to match whatever it may ask of others,

The many misstatements and exaggerations of the recent electoral campaign should be consigned to the past and their place taken by a sober scrutiny of the real situation in Soviet-American relations. It would be idle to underestimate the seriousness of the remaining problems. But it is simply not true that the United States in recent years has given everything and received nothing in return in its relations with Russia, or that the Soviet side has never lived up to its undertakings. A number of agreements arrived at in earlier years are working to the benefit of both parties. There is no reason to despair of reaching further agreements that would also reduce international tensions. What is needed, in the first instance, is a resolute abandonment of the stale slogans and reflexes of the Cold War: a recognition that this is a new era, with different problems and possibilities; and a determination not to be governed by the compulsions of military competition-compulsions which have seldom failed to lead to war in the past, and which in terms of the weaponry of this age are pregnant with the possibility of utter catastrophe.

Beyond these measures of restraint in the development of weaponry we should pursue constructive purposes such as mutually beneficial exchanges in trade, science, and culture; preservation of our common environment; raising living standards worldwide; and promoting the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Declaration.

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The Committee will support and encourage the liberalization of emigration policies and the recognition of human freedoms, including the movement of individuals in all countries.

The American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations stands prepared to give the new Administration every possible help and support in any efforts it may make in the spirit of these considerations. In doing so, we are sure we will find our-

selves in company with a great many other Americans.

The Committee believes that improving relations in these admittedly limited areas will gradually facilitate effective cooperation between the two superpowers in dealing wih a wide range of universal life and death issues—issues that transcend ideology and are susceptible only to international solutions. Among these are environmental pollution, the population explosion, food production, developing new energy sources and controlling terrorism.

ENCLOSURE II

THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

David Apter, David Apter & Associates.

Harry Ashmore, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

William Attwood, Former Ambassador, President and Publisher, Newsday. Frederick E. Baer, President, Paper Converting Maching Co.

Charles Benton, President, Film, Inc.

Meyer Berger, M. Berger Co.

Harold J. Berman, Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

William Bernbach, Doyle Dane Bernback, Inc.

Bernard B. Blier, Executive Director, Northeastern Pennsylvania Industrial Development Commission.

George B. Bookman, Vice President, New York Botanical Gardens.

Robert J. Broadwater, Vice President, Coca-Cola Co.

Howard Brooks, Provost, the Claremont University Center.

Harrison Brown, President, International Council of Scientific Unions.

Lawrence T. Caldwell, Chairman, Political Science Dept., Occidental College.

James R. Carter, Chairman of the Board, Nashua Corporation.

Willard G. Clark, President, World-Wide Sires, Inc.

Walter Clemens, Kennan Institute Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Richard Colburn, Rolled Alloys, Inc. Randolph Compton, Kidder Peabody.

Arthur Macy Cox, Writer and Lecturer on Foreign Affairs.

Ms. E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan, Historian, Oregon Historical Society. William Davidson, Director, Institute for Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs.

Kirk Douglas.

Tilford Dudley, President, Property, Management and Maintenance.

¹ Executive committee.

Ms. Helen G. Edmonds, Distinguished Professor of History, North Carolina Central University.

Bernard T. Feld, Professor of Physics and Head, Division of Nuclear and Particle Physics, Physics Dept. MIT.

Richard C. Fenton, President, Fenton International, Inc.

Joseph Filner, President, Noblemet.

H. S. Forrest, Senior Vice President, Control Data Corp.

Jerome D. Frank, Professor of Psychiatry, John Hopkins University.

Edward L. Freers, Formerly Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and Political Adviser to Commander-in-chief of U.S. Strategic Air Command. John Kenneth Galbraith, Former Ambassador, Harvard University.

Philip S. Gillette, Associate Professor of Political Science.

Marshall I. Goldman, Chairman, Economics Dept.

Ms. Nancy D. Greene, President, Womens Institute of International Relations. Rufus K. Griscom, Attorney.

Julian N. Hartt, Dept. of Religious Studies. The Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., President, University of Notre Dame. John H. Hill, Hill and Knowlton.

Barry Hunsaker, Executive Vice President, El Paso LNG Co. Robert Hutchins, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Philip C. Jessup, Former Ambassador, Former Judge on the International

Donald M. Kendall, Chairman, Pepsico, Inc.

George Kennan, Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Institute for Advanced Studies.

George B. Kistiakowsky, Former Presidential Science Advisor, Department of Chemistry, Harvard University.

Edward Korry, Former Ambassador.

B. Larner, Vice President, C-E Lummus, Combustion Engineering, Inc. Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Director, Center for Defense

Wassily Leontief, Nobel Laureate, Dept. of Economics, N.Y. University.

Mark Lewis, 3508 Lowell St. NW., Washington, D.C.

Carl Marcy, Former Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Attorney at Law.

Eugene McCarthy.

Ms. Margaret McNamara.

Sheldon T. Mills, Former Ambassador.

Patrick Morgan, Dept. of Political Science, Washington State University.

Michael L. Nacht, Program for Science and International Affairs. Ms. Peggy Nalle, Writer, Editor.

Fred Warner Neal, Chairman, International Relations Faculty, Claremont Graduate School.

Robert Neale, Robert Neale Real Estate Co.

Nicholas Nyary, Consultant.

Ara Oztemel, President and Chairman, Satra Corp.

Hugh Patterson, Publisher, Arkansas Gazette.

Gifford Phillips.

Gerard Piel, Publisher, Scientific American.

Samuel Pisar.

George Prill, Lockheed Corp.

Paul O. Proehl, Former Vice Chancellor, UCLA, International Trade Consultant. H. M. Reed, Jr., Director, International Area Development, Eastern Bloc, International Paper Co.

Edwin O. Reischauer, Former Ambassador,

Alan E. Riedel, Senior Vice President, Administration, Cooper Industries, Inc. David Riesman, Department of Sociology. Harvard University.

Howard R. Rome, Mayo Clinic, President, World Association of Psychiatrists. Robert V. Roosa, Former Under Secretary of Treasury, Brown Bros., Harri-

Peter Rubstein, Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.

¹ Executive committee.

Harrison Salisbury, New York Times. Leonard M. Salter, Wasserman and Salter, Counsellors at Law.

Terry Sanford, President, Duke University.

Sidney H. Scheuer, Scheuer and Co.

Marvin Schacter, President, Volume Merchandise, Inc.

Stephen Schlossberg, General Coonsel, U.A.W. Robert D. Schmidt, Executive Vice President, Control Data Corp.

I. W. Scott, Jr., CRC Crose International, Inc. Richard Shipley, President, American Casein Co.

Frederick Starr, Secretary, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution Building.

Christopher E. Stowell, President, W.J.S. Inc.

Kenneth W. Thompson,1 Woodrow Wilson Dept. of Gov. and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.

Raymond L. Thurston, Former Ambassador.

Marietta Tree, Former Ambassador.

Robert C. Tucker, Department of Politics, Princeton University.

H. Peter Von Bucher, Senior Vice President, Chemtex, Inc. James J. Wadsworth, Former Ambassador.

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Thomas Watson, Jr., IBM. William Watts, President, Potomac Associates.

Jerome B. Wiesner, Former Presidential Science Advisor, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Eugene W. Wilkin, President, Wilkin Associates.

Harold Willens, Chairman, Factory Equipment Corp.

Leonard Woodcock, President, UAW, Int'l Union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America.

Jerry Wurf, International President, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO.

Herbert F. York, Former Presidential Science Advisor, Department of Physics, University of California.

Paul Ziffren, Attorney, 10889 Wilshire Blvd.

ADDITIONS TO AMERICAN COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP LIST

George W. Hoffman (1/6/77), Department of Geography, University of Texas. Bernard Brodie (1/25/77), Dept. of Political Science, UCLA.

Charles Morgan (1/25/77)

Larry Eagleburger (1/31/77), Dept. of State.

Gerald Freund, Dean (1/31/77), Humanities and Arts, Hunter College of The City University of New York.

> STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR CENTER, Stanford, Calif., February 3, 1977.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN. U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Sparkman: Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee on January 19 and testify in the very important hearings by your Committee on "National Security and Arms Control

Implications of Current U.S. Strategic Options."

I am writing to tell you how pleased I am to learn of President Carter's nomination of Paul Warnke to be Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as well as the chief SALT negotiator. During my many years of involvement in U.S. national security and strategic policy issues, I have developed a very great respect for his wisdom and balanced judgment in this area of vital problems. I sincerely hope he will be confirmed and able to assume an important leadership role in the new Administration.

Sincerely,

SIDNEY D. DRELL, Professor and Deputy Director.

¹ Executive committee.

AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION, Washington, D.C., February 9, 1977.

Hon. John Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Sparkman: There are many sound arguments against the nomination of Paul Warnke to be director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Listed below are three major reasons why the American Conservative

Union believes that Mr. Warnke's nomination should be rejected:

(1) Unilateral Disarmament—There is much that has already been widely reported about Paul Warnke's views that clearly shows he is an ardent advocate of unilateral reduction of strategic weapons. Over the past few years Mr. Warnke has repeatedly taken this position and he reiterated it again in the February 8, 1977, issue of the NEW YORK TIMES.

In the article Mr. Warnke states:

What is needed most urgently now is not a conceptual breakthrough but a decision to take advantage of the stability of the present strategic balance. It's futile to buy things we don't need in the hope that this will make the Soviet Union more amenable. The Soviets are far more apt to emulate than to capitulate. We should instead try for a policy of restraint, while calling for matching re-

straint from the Soviet Union (emphasis added).

It is clear that Mr. Warnke's views remain unchanged. He still believes in the unilateral reduction of strategic forces in the naive hope this will encourage reciprocal restraint by the Soviets. All available evidence indicates, however, the Soviets have never exhibited restraint in strategic buildup even when the United States had curbed or slowed expansion of certain strategic weapon systems. Instead, the Soviets have been buying a lot of "things" in a major effort, it would seem, to force the U.S. to "capitulate" first. In addition, if conventional force trends are consistent, U.S. conventional force reductions in recent years have in no way solicited a similar response by the Soviets. Today the Soviets hold overwhelming leads in virtually all conventional force categories: ships, tanks, tactical aircraft, troop levels, etc.

(2) The Warnke nomination undermines the Jackson Amendment—The well known Jackson Amendment which passed the Senate 56-35 on September 14, 1972, during ratification proceedings of the SALT I agreement, stipulated that essential "equivalence" must be maintained in any future arms control efforts. If Mr. Warnke is confirmed as ACDA director, the U.S. Senate will have repudiated its earlier stance that "equivalence"—which Mr. Warnke totally rejects as essential—should be maintained in any future SALT agreements. This contradiction will not go unnoticed by the Soviets and will undoubtedly encourage them to

adopt a more hardline, inflexible stance in future SALT negotiations.

(3) Advocate, Not A Technician—The function of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency requires that, above all else, its director be an able technician who can provide objective and highly competent analysis of complicated, scientific trends and aspects of strategic weapon systems, Mr. Warnke has virtually no background in this area. He is not a technician and has never produced a single article that reveals any technical expertise in nuclear strategic forces. Furthermore, he has produced very little that would suggest he has any grasp of or desire to understand the Soviets' motives and strategic doctrine. Mr. Warnke is basically an advocate, not a technician nor expert, in strategic military doctrine. As an advocate he is not qualified to be an objective fact-finder providing highly technical and unbiased information which is vital for any meaningful arms control negotiations. In addition, Mr. Warnke enthusiastically endorses the idea that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director should lead the SALT negotiations. This was once the case but was changed for good reasons: both activities require full-time attention and cannot be adequately performed simultaneously. Moreover, in light of Mr. Warnke's background he is even less qualified to be a negotiator than director of ACDA.

Summary: Given the recent evidence that the Soviets are expanding their strategic forces at an unprecedented rate; that previous efforts by the U.S. to exhibit restraint have not deterred the Soviet quest for military superiority; and that current trends will place the Soviets in an unquestioned superiority by 1980 (which many experts believe they have already achieved), it would seem that Mr. Warnke is definitely the wrong man at the wrong time to be appointed

to a position of such crucial importance as Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director. If President Carter really wants the "best", then certainly he could have done much better than nominating Mr. Warnke. The American Conservative Union hopes that the U.S. Senate will also adhere to President Carter's criteria and insist on the best by seeking someone more qualified than Paul Warnke to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Sincerely,

James C. Roberts, Executive Director.

Hon. John J. Sparkman, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: During the recent confirmation hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee on the nomination of Mr. Paul C. Warnke, our names were mentioned and linked, and some question was raised as to whether Mr. Warnke had been directly responsible to us when we were Secretary of Defense and he was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The implication of the question thus raised was that others were better placed

than we to assess Mr. Warnke's character, judgment, and abilities.

He was of course directly responsible to us during his period of service at the Pentagon, and we affirm without reservation that he is a man of impeccable character and integrity, intellectual force, and exceptional ability. He was a wise and thoughtful counselor, and he demonstrated efficiency and stamina in carrying a wide range of heavy responsibilities. In particular, the Senate should understand that the position filled by Mr. Warnke at the Pentagon is charged with advising the Secretary of Defense on the full range of political-military affairs and on the arms control problem in particular. Rarerly, if ever, therefore has a nominee for the role of U.S. arms negotiator had a better grounding in the perspectives and problems of both defense and foreign affairs.

In the same hearings, one witness alleged that the arms negotiator has great latitude in determining the substance of the negotiations. While the quality of the negotiator and his team are of course critical elements, we know from our own experience that the President, the State and Defense Departments, and all other relevant agencies are continuously involved, intimately and completely, in the formulation of arms control policy and in the negotiating process.

We believe Mr. Warnke is an ideal choice to assume these important responsibilties, and we believe the President was wise in deciding to combine the tasks of arms negotiator and disarmament agency administrator in one man, for they are closely related if not interdependent. We urge his confirmation for both positions.

Sincerely,

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA. CLARK M. CLIFFORD.

STATEMENT OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE NOMINATION OF PAUL WARNKE

The Communications Workers of America supports the nomination of Paul Warnke to serve as both the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as chief negotiator for the United States at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union.

President Carter has prudently recognized that the current period in United States-Soviet relations presents a unique opportunity to halt and reverse the mad momentum of the nuclear arms race. The Chief Executive expressed his commitment to this goal when he recently announced his support for "the complete

elimination of nuclear weapons from the Earth."

Currently the American nuclear arsenal possesses an overkill capacity capable of pulverizing the Soviet Union 25 times over. Even more disturbing, we are stockpiling hydrogen bombs at the rate of three a day. The Pentagon now maintains a nuclear arsenal equivalent to 600,000 times the single bomb which devastated Hiroshima 32 years ago.

The acceleration in the arms race gives heightened meaning to the warning of the late President John F. Kennedy who admonished that "the weapons of war

must be abolished before they abolish us."

Because of the nuclear proliferation, four scientific experts all agreed that they envisioned some form of nuclear conflagration by the year 2000 when they were recently asked whether they foresaw an atomic war in the near future.

This chilling assessment not only envisions the prospect of a nuclear confrontation between America and Russia. It also takes into account the likelihood of a nuclear war involving China, France, India or other nations which now brandish these superweapons of death and destruction. Moreover, still more countries are attempting to process plutonium so that they too can possess this most sophisticated status symbol of 20th century technological development, membership in the nuclear weapons club.

Because of our relentless participation in the escalating arms race, the United States has turned its back on many pressing domestic priorities, a development

that has been especially distressing to CWA.

While we have spent hundreds of billions of dollars to construct futuristic weapons of death and destruction, our economy has stagnated, our cities have decayed and our citizens have suffered from a policy of "benign neglect." Human

needs have been ignored while the merchants of death have prospered.

Fearing a potential, cataclysmic, first-strike nuclear attack from the Soviets, we have armed ourselves with a diversified arsenal of offensive and defensive military weapons to deter our adversary. In reality, the probability of such an attack is remote, yet because we have been mesmerized by its mere possibility, we have upset our list of values so seriously that domestic problems are now a far more serious threat than the counterfeit threat of Soviet-launched nuclear holocaust.

The time is now especially propitious for disarmament talks because the Soviet Union is also beset by divisive problems. The increasing fragmentation among the member States of the Communist commonwealth has created serious conflicts.

So varied have become the many roads to socialism that the idea of Marxist ideology as a common umbrella overhanging the diverse systems is becoming tenuous and suspect, especially with the growth of autonomous centers of Marxist interpretation in Peking, Belgrade, and Tirana. Indeed, for the immediate future, no problem looms larger for Moscow than the conduct of foreign policy inside the Communist bloc itself.

Mr. Chairman, Paul Warnke has a special sensitivity for the rare opportunity we now have to negotiate with the Soviet Union a deescalation of our mutual

nuclear deterrents.

Indeed, Mr. Warnke is eminently qualified to play a pivotal role in disarmament issues, having served as general counsel to the Department of Defense and also

as an Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs.

Contrary to the myth propagated by his opponents, Mr. Warnke is not an advocate of precipitate, unilateral American disarmament. Instead, he favors phased mutual restraint. He stands for a negotiated, balanced reduction of weapons with the U.S.S.R., not prostrate abdication of the American defense posture

Mr. Warnke is keenly aware that to reduce the balance of nuclear terror, both sides must take the first step of agreeing to reduce their weapons of terror. The nuclear arms race is a contrivance of men's will and, as such, is neither permanent

nor irreversible.

Thousands of years ago a Chinese philosopher observed that "a journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step." The nomination of Paul Warnke to serve as our Nation's chief arms control spokesman is a significant step forward toward reducing the likelihood of a suicidal nuclear holocaust as America embarks on the third century of its experience as the world's leading democracy.

APPENDIX TO PREPARED STATEMENT OF U.S. LABOR PARTY

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILITARY POSTURE

(By Lyndon H. LaRoche, Jr.)

Feb. 6, 1977-In the main, the February 1977 report of Chief of Staff General George Brown to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is newsworthy only because it appears over General Brown's signature. The exception is the report's vitally important concluding scetion on Research and Development, whose crucial point we amplify here.

Given the circumstances of the "Carter transition," one could not have expected General Brown to speak as frankly in public as he might have wished against the sort of rubbish being dragged into national "strategic estimates" by the Rockefeller crowd. President Ford had "quit the ball game" in the "third quarter," professing to thus avoid the victory which might have damaged his "good loser" standing. General Brown's report chiefly clings to the bureaucratic tradition, "touching the right bases" and that sort of thing.

Although the sensitive reader picks up a significant shading of language and emphasis here and there, until the final section the report avoids the kind of direct statement which might prompt excessive howling from Carter's "team." Until the final section of the report, General Brown "kept his nose clean.

A few opening observations on the report as a whole provide background for the specific point chiefly under consideration here.

The Strategic Balance

Until President Kennedy's (McGeorge Bundy's) 1962 "Cuba Missile Crisis" the Soviet strategic military profile tended to converge upon the "mutually assured destruction" utopian doctrine of the USA and NATO. The 1962 confrontation tilted the balance of straegic policy-thinking within the Soviet leadership away from "deterrence" toward a comitment to a thermonuclear war-winning policy. This shift brought Soviet policy back into conformity with the natural Soviet political-military outlook, for which the 1930's "Tukachevsky Plan" is broadly exemplary.

This shift in Soviet military posture goes far deeper than a formal change in policy. Present Warsaw Pact strategic capabilities are now peculiarly adapted to the commitment to thermonuclear war-winning. This approximate decade-anda-half of buildup around the shifted policy has been accomplished through the most painful allocations of productive facilities, and not without shocks within the Soviet and Warsaw Pact political leaderships.

As General Brown's report properly emphasizes, this shift in Soviet policy correlates with a double-effect development to the decided, cumulative advantage of the Warsaw Pact generally and the Soviet Union in particular. During the approximately 15 years since the Cuba Missile Crisis, the USA's Research and Development infrastructure has been in ongoing erosion and virtual collapse, while Soviet basic research has leaped ahead on the basis of a massive increase in the number of scientists and engineers. This feature of the strategic balance includes several recent demonstrations that the Soviets are qualitatively ahead of the USA in key areas of military relevant basic scientific research, an emerging gap which will probably accelerate over the period immediately ahead.

Broadly, there is no disagreement concerning those facts among most leading NATO circles. It is agreed that the Warsaw Pact is developing a thermonuclear war-winning capability. It is debated whether the Warsaw Pact has yet

developed a decisive margin of military war-winning capability.

In respect of those facts, there are two glaring omissions from General Brown's report.

General Brown asserts that the Soviets have not yet achieved a significant margin of thermonuclear war-winning capability. This feature of the report has no weight one way or the other-and is therefore an omission-in-fact. The Chief of Staff of the United States would under no imaginable circumstance announce publicly that the Soviet Union had achieved such military superiority, no matter how large such a margin were to his knowledge. (The reasons for that are obvious enough to any congressman or journalist who does not have his thumb stuck in his mouth.)

Second, although the report emphasizes categorical comparisons of principal weapons systems, it does not interrelate those elements as a coherent military capability-even though there could be no reason of "national security" for omitting such matters of extant public knowledge. In this way, the report avoids presentaiton of actual Warsaw Pact capabilities-losing the coherent image of such capabilities in a Schwaermerei of systems considered in only a fragmented

The significance of that is illustrated by the 1940 Fall of France. On paper, in terms of weapons systems considered in distinct categories, the French Army had the advantage in tanks and certain other categories. What was decisive in the Nazi victory—apart from the political war-fighting capabilities of the opposing forces—was not the weapons systems as such, but the way in which they were deployed, etc.

Exemplary is the case of the Warsaw Pact armored personnel carriers. It is necessary to add to the appropriate location in General Brown's report that these APCs are part of the training and deployment programs for mobile movement of Warsaw Pact mechanized spearhead forces across a West German terrain which

has been previously saturated with ABC warfare.

In general, weapons systems can be competently assessed only from the way in which they will be used, and within a coherent overview of the overall deployment of forces. The business of matching one weapons system against its opposite number is an inconclusive application of the Sears-Roebuck catalogue mentality. The question is, "What does such a weapons system, in its indicated usage, do to

enhance the total offensive capability of the forces as a whole?

Naturally, one doubts that the staff at the Pentagon would perpetrate such a blunder in its own private strategic studies. Nonetheless, their report to the Congress perpetrates such a blunder on the congressmen-hence, such a blunder contributes to shaping USA policy. What the report offers the Congress is a comparative study of a collection of catalogue parts, when the question before the Congress is whether these parts add up to a functioning automobile, tractor, or merely a very expensive (and dangerous) toy for overgrown Trilateraloid children.

"SALT II"

The immediate context of reference for the report is the off-again, on-again "SALT II" charade—to be precise, the "SALT II" Mutt-and-Jeff game of psychological warfare being employed in the effort to throw Moscow (and other centers) psychologically off-balance.

We are not opposing a "SALT II" agreement, but merely insisting that foolish

illusions concerning this subject ought to be exploded.

"SALT II" is not primarily a military agreement. It is a political gesture in the guise of a military weapons-systems agreement. From the Soviet standpoint, such an agreement, like the Helsinki "Basket 1" package, is no better than its bona fides—which, at this moment, would include a Carter administration pull-back of its Israeli and Ian Smith-Vorster puppets from the present headlong confrontationist course currently being escalated in both the Middle East and Africa's south and Horn regions. It is the political process of publicized ratification of a "SALT II" agreement by both parties, accompanied by certain perhaps less publicized bona fides, which would "reduce" the political tensions between the USA and the USSR.

As a military agreement per se, "SALT II" is nonsensical. The issues of "cruise missile" and "backfire bomber" are mere rhetorical sleight-of-hand diversions. Any agreement on specific weapons systems can enforce only what it purports to expressly enforce. I could place myself in either seat, meticulously honoring such an agreement, while also cheerfully and quite legally proceeding to develop a decisive margin of war-winning capabilities.

Unfortunately, "SALT II" cannot be realized under the present operational

policy commitments of the Carter administration.

The bankruptcy of Chase Manhattan Bank and related institutions can not continue to be forestalled unless both the Western Hemisphere and most of the rest of the world are placed under a fascist zero-growth deindustrialization and austerity policy. Without that concession, Chase Manhattan's bankrupt debtoverhang collapses. Hence, the Trilateral Carter administration has shown itself consciously committed to a domestic and foreign policy absolutely irreconcilable with the expressed fundamental self-interests of the other OECD nations, the Comecon (CMEA), and the developing sector. It is Soviet and CMEA political and economic cooperation with Western European and other nations which presently represents the decisive margin of resistance to Chase Manhattan's desperate policies. Hence, the Carter administration is proceeding from a conscious commitment to bluffing its way through an irrepressible global conflict.

If the Carter administration were to commit itself to a "SALT II" agreement and the indispensable bona fides that entails, such a step backwards from the present, operational confrontationist policies would mean a collapse of Chase Manhattan Bank and allied institutions. Until and unless that Carter administration elects to abandon Chase Manhattan to its much-deserved bankruptcy, that administration will tease the Soviets and others with recurring apparent moves toward "SALT II," and might effect such an agreement only if the Soviets would

relinquish the requirements of the relevant bona fides.

There is no basis to doubt that such a confrontationist policy is currently operational. The escalation of the Middle East operations of Brzezinski et al., the Carter adminisration's intervention to nullify a written protocol just previously enacted between Vorster and British representative Ivor Richard, the all-out escalation of Brzezinski's interventions into Eastern Europe, and, most significant, the Carter administraton's launching of "crisis-management" 'destabilization tactics against the U.S. population through the contrived "energy crisis," are all crucial evidence that the New York Times Jan. 20 "Potemkin Village" editorial reflects the operation policies of the administration. Any contrary estimates are simply weishful delusions.

At the moment, one of the key breaking-points on the global strategic situation is the issue of Brazilian nuclear-energy development agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany. The Brazilian government is not only preponderantly committed to this, despite massive pressure from New York and Washington, but has made this a public issue between itself and the Carter administration. At

the other end, West Germany, the issue is no less signicant.

Through Rockefeller-controlled agencies, including the Rockefeller brothers' protege Ralph Nader, the general development of nuclear power has been effectively aborted. Only two nations, the USA and the USSR (plus, possibly China) currently have operating fuel reprocessing capabilities—although Wset Germany and France are on the verge of achieving this. West Germany's agreement with Brazil coincides with West Germany's realization of reprocessing capability.

Currently, massive pressure, including some delivered via Vice-President W. F. Mondale, has been deployed against West Germany and Europe generally on the issue of the Brazilian power agreement. West Germany is nonetheless firmly committed to that contract, a point featured as a leading public joint statement of West Germany's Helmut Schmidt and France's Giscard d'Estaing during this past week. Meanwhile, every part of Rockefeller's intelligence networks, including the agent-riddled West German Communist Party, is being deployed for projected mass riots and other means in the effort to sabotage European nuclear energy programs.

If Secretary Cyrus Vance loses the fight over nuclear plants for Brazil, the \$40 billions Brazilian debt is placed in jeopardy (at least as far as lower Manhattan's perceived requirements are concerned in this matter), and the South Atlantic Treaty Organization game probably evaporates, too. Agreements on development cooperation among Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina would nullify

the Carter administration's "Second War of the Pacific" scenario.

One might therefore say that Cyrus Vance et al. behaved most stupidly in this matter of Brazil's nuclearpower policy, placing their entire Latin American strategy at risk in such a way. Actually, the unfortunate Cyrus had a Hobson's choice in the matter. Since global deindustralization and reduced energy consumption are the keynotes of his faction's fascist economic policies, he could not envisage acceptance of so significant a nation as Brazil shifting effectively to a pro-development policy while he is armtwisting Peru, Mexico, and other Latin American nations into submitting to fascist economic austerity. Mr. Vance was not stupid, but merely insane.

With Carter in the White House, the world is on a short fuse leading to a showdown. In this setting, the Carter administration's Mutt-and-Jeff games over "SALT II" are merely part of the overall psychological warfare effort to put the opposition psychologically off-balance before the actual thermonuclear

confrontation occurs.

THE PENTAGON'S PREDICAMENT

The nexus of General George Brown's problem is that his government is headed toward an actual thermonuclear war, but preparing only for a monstrous strategic bluff modeled on the 1962 missile crisis. In fact, since 1966, the logistical and other elements of fundamental war-fighting capability of the USA have deteriorated, together with the Vietnam War's erosion of the nation's political war-fighting capability. Mr. James Schlesinger's recent, weird public statements respecting the "aura of power" exemplify the essential hollowness of the administration's military strategy.

The purely military side of the question is illustrated by the 1976 ERDA flap concerning the declassification of secret Soviet research to a Livermore Laboratories audience by Soviet physicist L. Rudakov, The Soviets are qualitatively

ahead of the USA in relativistic beam and related work. The flap over the MIG-25 is a part of the same picture. Most recently, some idiot has circulated a summary of a purported CIA paper alleging that the Soviet's monkeying with the ionosphere has caused a global weather modification. That argument is absurd in its conclusion; it is the Tri-"laterization" of the Amazon basin, involving forces on a scale much larger than Soviet ionosphere experiments, which entirely accounts for the main features of the recent years' shift in global weather patterns. However, the Soviets are developing such capabilities, as well as the ability to put the entire NATO communications and related targetting system "on the fritz" with the aid of such procedures.

From the Pentagon's standpoint, the USA is losing its capability to sustain a military posture at such crucial points as electronics-aerospace and basic research and development. The Carter policy of reducing U.S. energy consumption by successive 20 per cent and 40 per cent levels will have devastating consequences from the Pentagon's standpoint, as will also Senator Ted Kennedy's

effort to liquidate the New England electronics-aerospace complex.

Although the Pentagon report avoids arrogating the decisive political side of the strategic problem to itself, generals and colonels can not help thinking about such matters. No ecommanding officer attuned to the outlook of combat troop command could. The Pentagon must view the U.S.A.'s extremely reluctant strategic allies as largely "unacceptable forces" in overall strategic planning. The zombie and mercenary forces which fascinate the "surrogate warfare" freaks of the Interpol and National Security Council cliques quickly lose their special usefulness under the political conditions of general warfare—as Vietnam, among other experiences, illustrates. Terror and forces modeled on the Canaris "Brandenburger Division" may represent a tertiary, complementary feature of war-fighting, but for serious war-fighting, "special forces" antics are strictly "bush ultra-obnoxiousness of the sort that cannot decide the outcome. Serious political mobilizations under warfare conditions deal summarily with the Mark Rudds and kindred covert operations offal. The relatively hardened allies of the Trilateral gang are a tiny minority of social forces which the rest of the population of those nations is only waiting to string up from the nearest limb of summary justice. Once general warfare shifts the pattern of deployment from exceptional actions to general mobilizations, the massive potentialities simmering below the surface of current events come into play-a contemplation which prompts any sensitive Pentagon officials to shudder at the mere mention of the word "allies,"

The political strategic problem is not that the USA is intrinsically hatable. Quite the contrary; any large out-pouring of U.S. industrial technology to the developing sector (and elsewhere) would make most of the world pro-American. The problem, from the Pentagon professional's vantage point, is that the present administration has all the policy and related earmarks of a "loser," a doomed

ancien regime.

GENERAL BROWN RADIATES A COHERENT THOUGHT

General Brown's report chooses to concentrate its main effort at the crucial

point of the Research and Development question.

The general background presentation included in that concluding portion of the report is an able and accurate summary of the comparative facts of Soviet and U.S. Research and Development capabilities over approximately the past fifteen years. This, concentrating on numbers and specializations of categories of scientists and engineers, is a direct parallel to our own earlier summary of the

Brown proposes to reverse the USA's decline by an energetic revitalization of military Research and Development programs. There are some potentially devastating fallacies-chiefly of omission-in this proposal, but his argument is

entirely sound as far as it goes,

At first glance, Brown's proposal is a politically astute approach toward saving the nation's key university and other research centers, as well as the electronics-aerospace industry generally, from the Naderite axe of Carter's deindustrialization policy. Save these vital national capabilities by placing them in effect under the nation defense budget umbrella. Thus, General Brown's co-thinkers in the Congress are offered the option of measured retreat before Carter on the economy in general while exempting key sectors from the Carter axe under the implied threat of charging Carter with virtual treason if he fails to make such

exceptions. In fact, although Brown does not explicitly charge Carter with being a filthy Tory traitor to the United States, he sets forth the facts on which some Congressman might premise such an epithet.

Brown complements this line of argument with the correct observation that a broad spectrum of now-commonplace technological advances in civilian economy originated as by-products of military Research and Development, The argument offered is sound as far as it goes, and might have been elaborated into an even

much stronger case, space permitting.

We have made a related sort of proposal to congressmen and others concerning a counter-energy policy; mobilize our forces for a concerted defense of university and other research centers, and feed our electronic-aerospace industry with the projects developed in that way, centering around fusion research. In this way we shift resources within academia away from "socially relevant basket-weaving" into basic sciences training, building up qualified cadres and working teams of scientific specialists while extending this spearheading effort into development projects conducted chiefly through the electronics and aerospace sector. Brown's report essentially proposes to accomplish such a tactic under the umbrella of national defense.

There are two problematic features of Brown's approach. The first is the implicit problem of "national security," which gets significantly in the way of the quality of research effort required. The second is a tendency toward a post hoc

ergo propter hoc evaluation of the record of military technology.

We ourselves have two specific competences to employ in dealing with the problem of "national security." First, through our collaboration with some leading physicists and related studies, we have put together a conclusive overview of the fact that the Manhattan Project succeeded despite the "national security" environment in which it operated; but for a revolt of the scientists against the pertinent ignorance of the FBI and others involved, the conditions of work for the project's success would not have been established. Free-wheeling communication among scientists is the essence of a research and educational environment for proliferation of effective scientific cadres. Second, we have come into the forefront of several areas of current theoretical work, and have demonstrated that a certain type of political campaigning among scientists, industrialists, workers, and others is indispensable to realizing the preconditions for broadly based breakthroughs in scientific knowledge. The Greshamite science and education policies of Tudor England are the most pertinent paradigm for the workings of the same principle.

We shall deal with the second of those two points after identifying the second

problematic feature of the Brown report on Research and Development.

The relative success of military technological development work is not located in the military aspect as such, but in the dirigist and centralized character of state-funded development in contrast to market-oriented projects of private capitalist firms. This is illustrated in one way by the general case of Soviet economic and military development, and in another way by the pattern of "state industry" sectors emergent in Italy, France, Britain, and so forth. Any person who has been concerned with a corporate development project recalls, with enraged frustration, why most corporate projects of that sort tend to fail. What is wanted, to supersede the problematical, post hoc ergo prompter hoc perception offered in General Brown's report, is an insight into the underlying principles common to the varied cases of successful dirigist approaches.

We shall develop that point secondly, after first developing the notion of the

"Greshamite paradigm" for development of scientific capabilities.

LESSONS OF THE NADERITE PLAGUE

Dr. Edward Teller, for some years a public opponent of our proposals concerning fusion research, late last year publicly reversed himself on this issue, elaborating absolutely cogent reasons for such a shift in policy. This incident exemplifies the broader fruits of the kind of international campaign we had conducted, especially over the preceding two and a half years, a campaign which contributed in a marginal but definite way to making 1976 the year of definite breakthroughs in plasma physics research.

If our campaign is propertly examined, it offers a conclusive refutation of previously prevailing illusions respecting the alleged nonpolitical character of basic scientific work. This point is best illustrated by placing our efforts as the direct opponent of Ralph Nader (variant spelling Nadir) and what Nader

broadly symptomizes.

Nader is a protege of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. That fact is of interest to those corporations who have incurred extra financial costs to Rockefeller-linked financial institutions as a result of Nader's sabotage of financed projects. In fact, the entire zero-growth plague is essentially a Rockefeller project. Zero Growth as such is associated with John D. Rockefeller III, and with the Rockefeller-linked Club of Rome. It is not only a fight between Rockefeller and the Catholic Church, but pits Rockefeller and allied factions against the entirety of the Non-Aligned nations, most of the OECD nations' fundamental self-interests, and the fundamental industrial and related self-interests of the United States itself. The neo-Malthusian Rockefeller brothers have demonstrated that science itself is the most fundamental of the political issues before mankind today.

This is not a new issue, only an old issue which has peaked to the dimensions of a crisis of unprecedented magnitude and intensity in the form of "energy policy." In the history of the English-speaking people, this was the issue of the fight between the Tudors and Hapsburg Fuggery (the fight that made the very word "Fuggery" and its derivative epithets among the most obscene terms in the English vocabulary.) It was the issue of the American Revolution. The Tory Rockefellers and their allies express the seven centuries continuity of antiscientific Fuggery from the days of the Bardi's rampaging thieves, Biche and Mouche, through the Hapsburgs, the Holy Alliance, and our native American Tory traitors, Aaron Burr, Martin van Buren, Andrew Jackson, August Belmont, and so forth.

Science—the fostering of creative scientific work for technological progressis a profoundly political commitment. Not petty "politics" in the sense most persons misuse that term, but real politics, the struggle over policies which determine the fate of nations and humanity generally. (Indeed, a nonpolitical person is therefore professedly a moral imbecile, just as the notion of a "value-free

university" is a depraved obscenity.)

The root of scientific thought is the conception of the entire universe as a lawful universality, and the coherent notion that deeds of act and omission are events which send ripples throughout the world to affect the universality in that way. Hence, scientific knowledge is not essentially mathematical procedures or anything of that sort. Scientific knowledge is a rigorous way of looking at the connection between one's acts and the world as a whole. Scientific knowledge is the habit of looking over the shoulder of one's own thought-processes while one is thinking, judging whether those thought processes represent a competent ordering of the way in which one's behavior can affect the world as a whole in some useful way.

This attitude becomes science as impassioned efforts to discover the lawful ordering of the connection between the universal and the individual act lead to

coherent knowledge of the lawful ordering.

Dr. Edward Teller, in explaining his shift in policy, spoke precisely as such a scientist. He spoke as a scientist not merely because of his education and so forth, but because he situated the question of policy appropriately in respect of its global

consequences.

Our campaign for fusion research had two complementary features most pertinent to the points just made. Our chief argument involved an elaboration of the theoretical overview of physics and of the notion of energy which coincided with the humanist origins of physics: the neo-platonic, negentropic conceptions emergent from the work of Roger Bacon, the Florentine Academy, and so forth. These arguments were most typically effective among strata of physicists which were distinguished by a history of creative scientific achievements; hence the argument we made found corroboration in such physicists' own psychological and related experience in creative work. "Yes, this describes the way I think when I accomplish something important," is the gist of that psychological corroboration. Our correlated arguments emphasized the universalist approach to present global problems, that the fusion breakthrough represented the main chance upon which present establishment of the future of the human species depended.

These positive elements of the campaign were complemented by a ruthless emphasis on the fact that the delay in fusion research was consistently the result of deliberate anti-scientific policies of forces centering around the Rockefeller brothers. In general, the physicists and others knew that fact better than we did, but had wishfully refused to conceptualize their relevant experiences in that

coherent way.

This political aspect of our campaign was deliberately complemented by an accompanying practical activity. Each of these physicists and others had already some accomplished or in-process significant bit of contribution to overall progress in fusion and related work. What was immediately lacking was an institutionalized set of channels for socializing that material in a political way. These sorts of contributions were generally being buried, either by de facto censorship by some relevant journals and so forth, or by being relegated to obscurity by the indifferent way in which their circulation occurred. These physicists and others had been cumulatively discouraged from sustaining the effort to propagate their contributions in the way essential to fruitful scientific work. We improvised alternative channels of communication of some of the most appropriate of these conceptions.

To balance the account, those physicists and others were immediately subjected to a massive "Cointelpro"-type harassment on account of their associations with our efforts. That experience proved to much of the physics and related scientific communities that our theses concerning Rockefeller and the political character

of science were not only valid, but could not be overlooked.

The extension of this campaign into the ranks of industrialists and working people—especially skilled workers and technicians—produced evidence of the potential for assembling a significant social force behind the cause of a broadly

based, but fusion-research-issue-centered campaign for science.

This was helped in direct and perverse ways by Soviet breakthroughs, the flap over the Rudakov case representing a kind of watershed for accelerating prelim-inary success of the overall campaign. The fact that Soviet breakthroughs forced U.S. and other physicists to consider more seriously the reality of "nonlinear effects" meant that our specific epistemological emphasis on the corrected notions of a Riemannian relativistic continuum could no longer be brushed aside. Science was obviously obliged to orient now toward fundamental breakthroughs in theoretical physics, preparing itself to overthrow Maxwellian physics, the Einstein-Weyl program, and to examine the Schrödinger issue in a new way. Contrary to the wretched Bertrand Russell, basic scientific knowledge had not come to its end at about 1927; the greatest breakthroughs in such knowledge are imminently before us-if we only mobilize ourselves appropriately to realize them.

What this experience illustrates, most fundamentally, is that the emerging new era of scientific knowledge demands a reorientation of the physicist toward greater emphasis on the self-consciously epistemological aspect of scientific thought in general. The epistemological emphasis in the works of Descartes, Riemann, and Cantor is exemplary of the mere beginning-point for the kind of

rigorous emphasis required today.

In Bardwell's recent treatment of the work of Lamb, the work of my own immediate associates took a fresh step forward in behalf of our continued concern to begin the process of shifting scientific thought from an excessive dependence upon algerbraic (hence, reductionist) forms of conscious conceptualization. Negentropic "nonlinear effects" complement the apparent elementarity of particle-forms with the conditional elementarity of the Gestalts characterizing vortices and so forth. Some most recent achievements at the Argonne labora-

tories point in the same direction.

These Gestalts, whether as particles or "non-linear structures," are of course only predicates of existence—and "existence is not a predicate." Basic research will concentrate in the immediate period ahead on synthesizing apparent anomalies under many kinds of controlled conditions, including developing coherent positron beams and what-not. The research programs will emphasize efforts to explore the relations which may be synthesized among various combinations of such particles and "anomalies" under very high energy-density conditions. The broad functions of this research program is to elaborate a broad array of evidence to the point that some crucial hypotheses can be developed concerning the transfinite existence which orders the negentropic relations among very high energy-density phenomena. As Bardwell's commentary on Lamb's work properly suggests, we shall discover many new things concerning what underlies the apparent soundness of many algerbraic formulations, but we shall accomplish this by resorting to increasing emphasis on new kinds of conscious images which supersede mathematical thinking as we now know it.

For this purpose, the epistemological program we have specified for physics will be indispensable. To this end, the sort of work done by the Labor Committees, Labor Party, and Fusion Energy Foundation thus far is only the preliminary, token expression of what must next be undertaken. The Labor Party, because it presently represents the only institutions which have so far attained an independent mastery of the epistemological method indispensable to the next qualitative phase of basic research, will thus tend to determine catalytically whether the USA succeeds in this venture at the rate which is potentially within

our immediate grasp.

Consider the folly of conducting such basic research work under the disadvantages of "national security." Although the Soviets have not yet replicated the specific epistemological competence of the Labor Party, Soviet science verges with a high degree of approximation on such competence through the tradition associated with Academician Vernadsky, notably emphasizing Vernadsky's successful preliminary grasp of the significance of Riemann (the actual Riemann, not the cheap-imitation Riemann of the Einstein-Weyl program) for extending Pasteur's program of studies into the primariness of negentropic processes. Hence "secrecy" in respect to basic research is nonsensical. It is to the extent that the kind of open basic research activity emphasized by the Labor Party and Fusion Energy Foundation are enhanced, expanded to include more numerous institutions, that the necessary, crucially oriented approach to basic research can be successfully fostered.

Hence, we are not opposed on principle to conduiting much of the research program's support through General Brown's Pentagon, and so forth; the basic research must, however, be kept away from the umbrella of "national security." Since there is every reason to order the matter in this way, and no competent reason to prevent such an arrangement, that is the way it must be done.

One further, extremely important practical consideration must be taken into account. General Brown's report emphasizes that, on the record, military research has appeared to foster much civilian technological progress. It is also a fact, on the record, that development has tended to occur through small firms rather than large ones. Informal, task-oriented teams of collaborators, sometimes of relatively short duration, are the normal optimal organization of a research project. Great intellectual efforts radiate from centers of leading influence, centers which operate as coordinating and reference points for particular project-teams, but the task oriented teams themselves best function in this sort of environment under the added stipulation of the greatest freedom in their manner of composition and dissolution. It is often the cross-fertilization accomplished in new teams through team-members from diverse other short-term projects which is most fruitful.

The type of activity typified by the recent work of the Fusion Energy Foundation represents the necessary sort of central focus needed for the overall research community. This must be complemented by great fluidity in migration of specialists among various university research centers, corporate and private research laboratories, and so forth, for collaborative shorter-term undertakings.

Otherwise, given a certain level of basic research and scientific cadre development, the final phase of technological advancement is the capacity to produce devices which reflect scientific achievement. The power of the United States was not developed by virtue of our possession of "scientific secrets," but our superior power to produce what more advanced European science discovered. Today, granting the importance of scientific cadres in Western Europe, Japan, and India, outside the U.S.A. the residence of science is the Soviet Union. We have little opportunity to parasitize science from Europe any longer; to have it, we must begin to foster basic scientific communities ourselves. It is not necessary to elaborate the rather obvious various implications of that point.

THE FLAP ABOUT "DIRIGISM"

When some key corporate executives protested angrily against the "dirigism" of the ICNEP organization, we emphatically agreed—because ICNEP was proposing fascist dirigism. Otherwise, as we emphasized during our 1976 presidential campaign, there are certain other forms of dirigism which simply cannot succeed in a capitalist economy; those, too, we rejected.

What General Brown's report proposes is, to speak plainly, dirigism. The conscience of U.S. conservatives, otherwise stoutly opposed to dirigism generally,

accepts the same dirigism for the sub-domain of our economy represented by the U.S. Defense Budget. In Western Europe, and in Brazil, the "state sector"—sometimes ingenuously termed "socialist sector"—represents a broadened application of dirigism.

The proper way for a typical American to examine this problem is to take the dirigism of Alexander Hamilton as a point of reference, the Hamiltonian con-

ception of the national bank.

The mental block against competent insight into this matter is the acceptance of the nonsense-myth of "pure, state-free, competitive capitalism." Such a form of capitalism, on the record, never existed. From the Tudor period onward, capitalist development has always occurred through the patronage of a centralized state, and has depended upon the credit and revenues of the centralized state to create the economic environment in which capitalist development of individual firms could flourish. In fact, the notion of "pure, competitive capitalism" was developed in the United States principally as a piece of Jacksonian anti-capitalist rubbish.

As Hamilton clearly and correctly understood, and as most today unfortunately do not, the centralized capitalist state's selective fiscal and monetary policies, mediated by an appropriate central banking institution, are the only instrument through which private individual capitalist firms can flourish. Every other version of this matter is pure myth and ignorant delusion. The question is not whether the state credit should be used to shape national development. The only legitimate question is what national development policy should be, and how the relationship between state banking and individual firms should be ordered.

As we have shown and emphasized in our 1976 presidential campaign materials, the most efficient state regulation of private firms in a capitalist economy is a minimal direct intervention into the internal affairs of those firms. Certain minimal and maximal standards of employment and so forth are quite sufficient, provided that the fiscal and monetary relationships between the firm and the

state are properly ordered.

State policy properly says that a certain capital-formation policy for agricultural development and a certain policy for taxing the revenues of agriculture is specified, catching the resources of individual initiative between those two points of policy. The same applies to mining, manufacturing, and transportation. The state must direct its fiscal and monetary policies to efficiently mold the economic environment to the effect of favoring the results demanded.

This principle governed the development of state sectors in Italy, France, Brazil, and so forth. The national interest demanded maintaining and developing certain industries in opposition to foreign monetary interests, miscalled

"free market forces,"

These sorts of "dirigist" policies intersect the case of military expenditures. If sufficient concentration of state funds is committed to a dedicated effort to cause certain corporations to get a job done, the job will probably be done. If this allocation of state resources is made in respect to military requirements, but if similar support for non-military productive research is not provided by those or other means, it will appear to be the case that military technology leads the way. The secret is essentially that the government tends to be more sensible of military imperatives as long as a probable adversary is in sight.

The essential problem is our tax and banking policies. We do not require vast "dirigist" bureaucracies. Quite the opposite. What we require is a ruthless tax and banking policy which distinguishes between aiding the results we desire and penalizing those (relatively speaking) we desire less. Create a relative tax-bonanza for useful forms of basic research, and for technological advancement through higher rates of per capita capital formation, and tax the hell out of speculative capital gains and so forth; use the resources of a state bank to pour credit on the most favorable terms to desired categories of activity and starve less desirable activities, meanwhile keeping financial structures pared down by tax and related methods to correspondence with real values. The results will tend to produce themselves through "private initiative."

The problem is that our fiscal and monetary policies have been at best indifferent to the distinctions between industrialist and monetarist interests, and have increasingly favored the monetarist interest at the expense of he indus-

trialist interest.

After all, it is the same corporations, the same executives, the same professional technicians, and so forth who deliver both military and civilian technology. We have moved away from the government arsenal as the main instrument of military hardware. The only difference behind Brown's post hoc ergo prompter hoc presentation of facts is the difference in the policies under which the same corporations, the same executives, and so forth are operating in respect

of the two kinds of production by the same firm.

Let us consider the case of Chrysler Corporation. Why don't we take the wraps off Chrysler's potential—get it out from under various kinds of harassment, including the Naderite varieties, and let it concentrate on a high-technology role in the auto and related fields? Why spend billions patching up automobile models which are inherently high pollutants and so forth, rather than letting the flow of capital move into developing new types of vehicles and so forth? Why not let Chrysler continue with some basic models, adding new types into its spectrum, thus feeding the overall development of the industry? Our federal tax and monetary policy should be attuned to such purposes.

This would require a drastic change in the functioning of the Congress. Instead of session devoted to ad hoc patchwork enactments, the Congress should be essentially a body which proceeds from a deliberative overview of the needs and objectives of the nation and passes annually very, very few bills, shaping fiscal, monetary, and other principal policies to give clear direction to the effective efforts of the nation. The ad hoc, helter-skelter arrangements, in which principally the Brookings Institution, the Russell Sage Foundation, Joe Rauh, and the Rockefeller Foundation proposes, and a confused Congress processes, an unwholesome mess of ad hoc legislation and an occasional, non-understood lollapalooza, is the immediate root of the problem to which General Brown's report refers. Our nation lacks any purpose, except to do in the main what pleases the Rockefeller brothers and a few others of the same ilk.

Given the circumstances of the moment, one would not be properly displeased if the Congress were to authorize the tactic which General Brown implies in the Research and Development section of his report. For the moment, we are not overly scrupulous concerning how the indispensable Research and Development effort is funded. The practical problem is of providing some method which would effectively prevent the Carter administration from interfering with the realization of the intent of Congress to this point. In line with the proposed Executive Branch reorganization I presented to the Ford White House, I would pefer basic research under the Commerce Department, coordinated with a remodeled Intelligence Department of the Executive, but matters being what they arefor the moment we must accomplish some extremely essential things by the proverbial "hook or crook."

The important thing, the reason for this report, is that the present period in the United States is one of mobilization and general preparation for what we must do once we rid ourselves of the Trilateral Administration and what it entails. Our actions during this period must also be a coherent building-process, a preparation of our outlook and programmatic views for what we must do once we get the Executive Branch into our hands, where it belongs. In the meantime, forced to expedients as we are, let us shape our expediencies as much as possible into conformity with the measures we will enact once we are in control of the

Executive Branch.

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTERAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA-UAW, Washington, D.C., February 8, 1977.

The Honorable DICK CLARK, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Dick: This letter expresses the personal support of President Woodcock and that of the UAW for Paul Warnke to head the Arms Control and Disarma-

ment Agency and to conduct the next round of the SALT talks,

Mr. Warnke is an enlightened and intelligent person of great competence and experience. He is fully conversant with the issues of arms control. While he is certainly not the advocate of unilateral disarmament his critics suggest, he is sensitive to the overriding human need for the reduction of arms expenditures and especially nuclear weapons.

We urge you to vote for his confirmation and we predict that he will serve the security of the nation and the cause of world peace with great distinction.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely.

STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG.

