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UGANDA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

UGANDA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION; ASSESSMENT OF
THE CURRENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND RELIGIOUS
POLICIES; AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICIES

JUNE 15, 21, 26, 1978

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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UGANDA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1978

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Clark, and Javits.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHURCH

Senator CHURCH. The hearing will please come to order.

From the days of our Revolution, Americans have believed that our country had a moral significance which transcended her military or economic power.

Unique among nations of the world, the United States was created by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles which they believed to be universally applicable. From the beginning, our Republic was to be a safe harbor for liberty. Government was to be by the consent of the governed, and individuals were guaranteed certain rights, including free press, free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion. Thus, it has been natural for Americans to feel a bond of sympathy and concern for foreign peoples who still suffer under tyranny.

In this light, I strongly commend President Carter for linking our human rights goals with the other major objectives of our foreign policy. The President has embarked upon an admirable campaign to promote basic human rights for all people, in all nations.

This policy is in line with the basic tradition and heritage of the American people.

Today we begin a series of three hearings to look into the human rights policies of Uganda and what role the United States and American companies have played in maintaining the regime of Idi Amin in power.

In many quarters, Amin has been portrayed as a buffoon, a comic characterization of a ruler. Others see him as a madman temporarily in control of Uganda.

As we will hear today, Idi Amin is no laughing matter. He is a cruel and inhuman tyrant who has brutalized his subjects since he seized power on January 25, 1971.

Dr. Thomas Melady, the last U.S. Ambassador to serve in Uganda has stated in his book:

Day after day come reports of disappearances, arrests, torture, and brutal killings carried out by members of Amin's special killer squads. The police are powerless to do anything. There is no safety in the country. No one is immune from the whims of the soldiers.

Richard H. Ullman, in an article in the April 1978 edition of "Foreign Affairs," stated:

Other governments, in Africa and elsewhere, rule by terror and reward opposition by death; Equatorial Guinea and Cambodia would belong on any list, and there are more. But the scale of murder in Uganda, its ferocious brutality, and its terrible capriciousness all place Idi Amin's Uganda in a category of its own in which the nearest analogues may be Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. Just as South Africa is unique—an entire system of political and social repression resting on racial distinctions—so Uganda is also. Each, for different reasons, deserves international condemnation.

The Ugandan economy has been virtually destroyed since Amin came to power. The commercial network and transportation systems are breaking down. Businessmen have reportedly fled the country in droves. Increasingly, the economy has become based on one commercial crop only—coffee.

Over 90 percent of Uganda's foreign exchange earnings come from the sale of coffee. In 1977, over one-third of this coffee, valued at approximately \$245 million, was imported by the United States. Because these coffee earnings are the primary source of revenue for the Ugandan Government, one must ask whether American purchases of Ugandan coffee do not inadvertently help to keep Amin in power.

Shortly after I announced that this subcommittee would hold hearings on Uganda, some coffee companies declared that they would no longer buy Ugandan coffee. While I applaud this decision, it appears that some companies are limiting their ban to the U.S. market only and will continue to buy Ugandan coffee for sales elsewhere. This raises the question of whether they are really serious about disassociating themselves from the bloody policies of Amin, or instead are merely trying to avoid the potentially embarrassing publicity that may result from congressional inquiries here in the United States.

The issue of whether or not the sale of high technology goods to Uganda and the technical training of Ugandan personnel in this country may aid Amin in his reign of terror will also be taken up on the second day of hearings.

Finally, the subcommittee will look closely at U.S. Government policies vis-a-vis Uganda. Official U.S. links with Uganda are very limited. Our Embassy in Kampala has been closed since 1973, and all AID and Peace Corps programs have been terminated.

But should more be done in the United Nations and elsewhere to bring greater international pressure to bear on Idi Amin? Or is unilateral action, such as an economic boycott of Uganda, the only way of bringing about a change in Amin's human rights policies?

It has been said that African problems deserve African solutions. There are people who feel that the internal policies of Uganda should not concern the United States. However, I feel very strongly that this Nation cannot ignore genocide, as it appears to be practiced in Uganda.

For this reason, I feel that these hearings are important and germane to central questions concerning American foreign policy today.

INTRODUCTION OF SENATOR MARK HATFIELD

We are privileged to have as our first witness this morning, Senator Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon, who has long expressed his personal concern about the regime of terror in Uganda and the possible responsibility we may bear in connection with trade relations with that country and the effect that they have in enabling Idi Amin to remain in power.

I want very much to welcome Senator Hatfield as our first witness this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK O. HATFIELD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

Senator HATFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling these hearings because I think this is a very major breakthrough in what has been pretty much an indifferent attitude and policy expressed by the institutions of our Government. I say indifferent in that we have had words, but we have had very little action.

I am reminded of former President Hoover who once observed that words without actions are the assassins of idealism.

In the rotunda of our State capital in Oregon—in Salem, Oreg.—are some rather significant words which reflect pretty much a thesis first struck by John Adams, back in about 1808. These words:

Modern adaptation, if in the soul of its citizens, will be found the likeness of the state, which, if they be unjust and tyrannical, so will it reflect their vices; but if they be lovers of righteousness, so then, will it be clean in justice and hold in freedom.

I think that illustrates my first point, which is, simply, that we have established in this Nation a very high ideal of human rights and human dignity. I think it is then rather contradictory if our policies and our actions do not fulfill those statements of ideals.

AMERICAN IDEALS AND POLICIES

Now this is a case in point. Last January, Senator Weicker and I and several others introduced a resolution calling for a boycott of Ugandan coffee. We felt that this was the very appropriate approach and technique to use, not only express our disagreement and our disdain for the obvious violation of human rights in Uganda, but we felt this was a nonviolent manner in which we could legitimately influence the future course of the Government of Uganda and its genocide policies.

Mr. Chairman, I can recall that ships left the port of Portland late in 1941, bearing scrap metal to Japan. It was well known that Japan was building a mighty armament and a mighty fleet, particularly planes and ships, and that Japan was becoming an increasing threat to the stability and peace of the Pacific. I remember those firms that were doing business with Germany—Nazi Germany—prior to the outbreak of World War II and our entrance into the war.

In many instances, when this was brought to the attention of the public, of people generally, the response from those businesses was

simply that business is business, and politics is politics, and that our relationship to Japan or our relationship to Germany, they would say, was purely economic. They said that in no way does it subscribe to, nor in that relationship do we approve of, their political policies or of their political ideology.

And yet, I wonder if we can separate those two things. I wonder if we can really make those clear lines of delineation.

THE CASE OF UGANDA

I think when we have a case like Uganda, in that this country, which once had a rather thriving and diversified economy and has gradually now been reduced to basically a one-cash-crop export—namely coffee—and when the United States of America and the companies within this country are the purchasers of one-third of that coffee, and when the United Kingdom is a purchaser of 20 percent more, and when the Netherlands and France and Japan are added in to make another 20 percent, you recognize that the Western World, which espouses the ideology of freedom and human dignity represents really the financial base, and therefore the political base, in major part, of Idi Amin. Whether any longer we can say that there is no relationship between the economic relations with that country and the political policies that that country performs and promulgates based upon that economic base, I very much doubt. I don't think we can say that.

I would come down very hard on the side that it cannot be separated any longer.

RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING UGANDA

Therefore you have a number of resolutions before you, not just the Weicker resolution, but others as well. I am not here this morning to say that one is superior to the other. Perhaps a combination of resolutions is best.

To me the significant thing is for this committee to review from testimony and witnesses that will come to you in these hearings the statements, the data, the information, and then we must ask ourselves seriously whether we can ignore this situation any longer at the same time that we raise the banner of human rights from the White House to the Capitol and throughout this country. Can we, at the same time, fail to take the action that could possibly, and probably, change the policies in Uganda?

THE BRITISH TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION

I am happy to say that a friend of mine in the British Parliament is introducing similar legislation into the British Parliament to try to bring Great Britain into the same kind of confrontation with this issue. I have a feeling that we have today, Mr. Chairman, a wonderful example of how the citizens are really kind of ahead of their Government, for in spite of the news blackout in the local village press, we find that beyond Washington the press has carried the data, the information, that has been shared on the floor of the Senate and in other councils in Washington.

We have today effectively gained a degree of momentum toward this boycott objective in that last year about \$600 million was the figure, as you indicate in your very cogent opening remarks, which I would like to applaud, \$200 million of which represented United States purchases. The boycott that has been thus far engaged in and subscribed to by the companies responding represents about a \$150 million cutoff of the \$200 million American purchase.

I say this as an example of where the citizens are perhaps ahead of the Government. Primarily through the churches of this country and other citizen groups there has been a response, a boycott, and a desire to see this coffee trade ended.

TIME FOR GOVERNMENT TO CATCH UP WITH CITIZENS

I think it is now about time that the Government catch up with the citizens. By doing so, we would be able to show that the Government is truly reflective and representative.

At this time, I would like to take note of the fact that the House of Representatives last week passed by a 366-to-0 vote relating to this Ugandan situation. It is not the resolution perhaps that many would have liked to have seen. It may have been watered down somewhat. But the fact remains that 366 to nothing was the vote in the House of Representatives.

We have a letter that we have circulated and in very short time 14 Senators have cosigned this letter, which is addressed to the President of the United States. It urges the President to take action on this front. Forty-five Members of the House of Representatives have also joined in the expression in this letter.

So, Mr. Chairman, even though I do not come with written testimony today, I want you to know, and I am sure that you do know, that this is something about which I have a deep conviction. I think it is something that increasing numbers of Americans have deep convictions on. We are looking now to this committee to articulate and to bring into focus the essence of indignation represented by these various resolutions, and more than just an expression of indignation; that is, really, a plan of action.

I have one last point.

OTHER INSTANCES OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

There are those who indicate that there are other places in the world where such atrocities are being committed. Mr. Chairman, you, in your opening remarks, indicated that there are unique circumstances in each country. I don't think we have to wait until we are willing to apply some kind of action to all of the countries of the world which practice some violation of human rights; I think we have to consider each one separately and distinctly, the unique circumstances within each country, and their particular relationships to the United States.

Cambodia is isolated from the world. We have no relationships with Cambodia. It is very difficult to even penetrate for information. I don't think we have to wait until we devise a plan for Cambodia before we

take action relating to Uganda. We didn't wait to take action in Rhodesia as it related to our expression in the boycott of Rhodesian chrome until we could find a solution to South Africa. We should not wait until we find a solution to Ethiopia.

In Ethiopia and many of these countries there are violations of human rights in which victims are caught in the crossfire of civil war. But in the case of Uganda, it is purely and simply a case of genocide, a genocide of black against black. Here is a black leader committing this kind of horrible crime against his own black citizens. I don't think we therefore have to wait until we develop a Henry IV grand design for the whole world before we take action on any single front. So, even though there are such violations—and I would condemn them all—as in South Korea, the Philippines, Iran, Chile, Brazil—I would condemn them anywhere in the world they exist—I do believe that this presents us a unique opportunity to take this specific ad hoc action. Let us take, then, action on each and every front where we can strike a blow for human rights.

THE HOUSE RESOLUTION

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Senator Hatfield. Your testimony is all the more pungent coming, as it does, from the heart rather than from the written page. I would think that for purposes of the record we ought to include the congressional resolution passed by the House of Representatives to which you made reference. I would ask that the entire resolution be included in the record.¹

But first, I think that for emphasis I should read in the resolving clause:

Resolved by the House of Representatives, That (a) The Congress strongly condemns the gross violations of human rights, and other acts which suppress freedom of political thought and violate the rights of individuals, which have been committed by Idi Amin and the Government of the Republic of Uganda, and the Congress urges the President of the United States to support, and where possible, implement measures, such as an embargo on trade with Uganda, which would effectively discourage United States support of the Government of Uganda. (b) The Congress urges the President of the United States to encourage and support international efforts to investigate and respond to conditions in the Republic of Uganda, including economic restrictions.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION

The second resolving paragraph refers to the importance of relevance, at least, of international action. I am informed that the State Department opposes the bills that are now pending before this committee upon the grounds, among other things, that unilateral action would prove ineffective; that it would be an idle gesture on our part to cut off imports of Ugandan coffee as a matter of national policy, as a matter of governmental action, because other countries would simply buy that coffee in our place, and thus, the gesture would be of no effect.

What is your response to that argument?

NO GUARANTEES

Senator HATFIELD. Again, Mr. Chairman, we do not live in a world of guarantees. I am not suggesting that action we take here is going to guarantee the overthrow of Amin.

¹ See appendix, p. 117 for House Congressional Resolution.

But I do think that it is a step we can take legitimately, with expectation of success, because it can give momentum to other countries of the Western World. As I indicated, the United Kingdom, since our introduction of this resolution, has now followed suit. I think we have to look at what other markets there might be.

Some have suggested that the Soviet Union might pick up this market. But we have to recognize that in the Soviet Union there has been a campaign by the Government against the consumption of coffee. Coffee, I am told, is selling for the equivalent of \$12 a pound in the Soviet Union.

I understand that they do not have the technology in the Soviet Union for the development of instant coffee, of which the Ugandan coffee bean is a very major component.

WORLD BANK DATA

I think also that it is important to note, according to the information which I have, that the World Bank has already indicated that there is a very definite impact which has already been felt as far as the flow of cash in Uganda, just on the basis of the success of the boycott from the United States thus far.

I think when you look at the total GNP of Uganda, you also find that coffee is of such a major consequence. About anywhere between 20 percent and 60 percent of the GNP is going for military costs today. If you take the major component of that financial base, and you have the impact of a third of that by the United States alone, if you bring it into that scale, then you can see that we are talking about a rather significant factor. We are not talking about the U.S. GNP and the impact that boycott would have, say, on the United States, as in reverse. Rather, we are talking about a small scale GNP, a single cash crop, the percentage of that GNP that is going for the military in order to sustain the political base. When you put all those factors together, I would reject that argument out of hand and on a mathematical equation base as well.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN EMBARGOES

Senator CHURCH. You have already noted that the United Nations was not adverse to imposing an embargo against the Rhodesian Government, which, of course, was a white government. The U.S. participated in that embargo.

There has been no comparable move in the United Nations to impose an embargo against the Idi Amin regime, even though on all the evidence its actions have been more bestial than any ever taken by Rhodesia. This, of course, suggests the obvious, the double standard. We ourselves have to face up to the implications of another possible double standard in the event that we were to impose a trade embargo against Uganda and then refrain from taking any comparable action against South Africa.

DOUBLE STANDARD IS THE RULE

I know that the double standard is not the exception but the rule in most cases in the foreign policy of every government. How would you

cope with the possible contradiction in American policy that might arise if we were to officially impose an embargo against Uganda and then refrain from taking any sanction of an economic kind against the Government of Rhodesia?

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the United Nations' failure to take this action I think can be analyzed—not justified but analyzed. Let's take the three major component groups within the United Nations today. Let's take the Communist group. Of course, you and I know that communism is generally exploitive rather than creative. Wherever there are inequities, ignorance and injustices there is a real breeding ground for the Communist cause. So, I think wherever there is instability in the world today which is not politically oriented to the communist world, they are not going to try to reduce it. It is to their advantage to maintain that instability.

Idi Amin is not ideologically oriented, so he is a prime target for that possible exploitation.

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

There is a second group, the Western World, which we think of as the Western Democratic World. I think these countries are so geared to the economic incentive, the economic motive, and the economic objective that they have been able to try, at least, falsely, to separate and delineate between the economics and the politics of the situation.

The third group, namely the Third World, is still so close to the era of colonialism and imperialism that they have welcomed almost to their bosoms a substitution of one kind of tyranny for another kind of tyranny; but because this is of their color or origin or culture, they have been much more tolerant than if it had been an imposed tyranny from the Western World.

Now I suppose that in trying to delineate between the kind of practices that violate human rights, it is almost like trying to discuss virtue amongst prostitutes, in that one cannot truly isolate that particular virtue or delineate that particular issue.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Let me indicate to you that you have in the situation of South Africa a regime that has practiced an abominable policy of apartheid, which violates the concept of human rights as we know it. There have been riots in which people have been killed rising out of this kind of policy. But as far as a distinct, deliberative strategy to go out and murder people, to kill people, in a form of genocide, this has not existed in South Africa. South Africa has not destroyed its own economic base, as Idi Amin has been destroying his economic base. In his case, there are primarily Sudanese soldiers constituting his army of mercenaries; it is not his own people. They are slaughtering people.

AMBASSADOR MELADY'S BOOK

We have had much evidence. Ambassador Melady, who will come before this committee, has written a very fine treatise on the situation, and he has indicated that this is genocide. He has entitled his book:

"Idi Amin Dada, Hitler in Africa," to identify more clearly the genocide character of Amin's policy.

Again, in no way do I excuse the violation of human rights in any part of the world. But I do feel that we are in a position at this time to be more effective in changing the policy of genocide, and hopefully we can change the policy of apartheid in South Africa as well.

But, Mr. Chairman, I don't think we need to hold up on one front where we hope and can expect some effective result until we can be guaranteed that we can get the results across the board.

Senator CHURCH. I agree with you, Senator. I ask these questions to make a record, because these are questions that will be raised.

Senator HATFIELD. Sure.

TRADE VERSUS HUMAN RIGHTS

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me that if we were to trade only with those countries that adhere to our standard in connection with human rights, we would trade with precious few.

On the other hand, though most governments are tyrannical in character, and authoritarian and repressive to one degree or another, there are some governments that are engaged in practices that must invite universal condemnation from all civilized people, where the persistent and systematic violation of human rights is so gross that extraordinary measures are justified.

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt at that moment, I would affirm your comment as a very profound observation and would associate myself with it.

I think we can also say this: You and I have joined in applauding the efforts that have been made to open the windows and open the relationship with mainland China because we believe that through those trade relations we can establish better understanding and hopefully bring about perhaps degree of influence. You and I know well that human rights have been violated in mainland China, but we can see trade being used as an instrument of influence there much more so than being isolated. The same is so for South Africa. We can have, hopefully, much more influence by maintaining certain open relationships.

AMIN A MADMAN

With Amin, I am convinced that we are dealing with a madman, one who is not subject to influence because I don't think he has the mental capability for such. With a body which is wracked with syphilis, which probably has reached his mind already, and with all of the other manifestations of insanity, I don't think we can hope for that kind of influence. Second, I think we have to be selective on these bases.

I have traditionally been basically against boycotts. Economic boycotts have historically in too many instances struck not against the power structure we are trying to influence, but against the very poor, the poorest of the poor, in those very countries. In this case we have to recognize that Amin's Uganda has been and is basically a subsistence agricultural economy whereby those people are still engaged in subsistence agriculture. The coffee crop has been, if anything, more

of a luxury item and a crop that has brought about the luxury of purchases and such. So, consequently, we would not be striking at the poor in that sense in this boycott proposal, as we would have and have done in the past in trying to influence a power structure.

Senator CHURCH. I think your point is well taken and is valid.

I want to tell you that I appreciate very much your coming this morning, Senator Hatfield, and your testifying as our lead witness.

Senator HATFIELD. Thank you.

STATE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT

Senator CHURCH. I hope that these hearings will have a constructive impact and that the State Department will listen. It is possible that the State Department can even learn from the kind of testimony that will be presented at this table.

Then we shall address the various bills that are pending before the committee fortified by the testimony and evidence that will be presented during the next few days.

Senator HATFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

INTRODUCTION OF MR. MICHAEL POSNER

Senator CHURCH. Our next witness is Michael Posner, counsel for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights of New York City.

Mr. Posner, I wonder if we might include your written statement in the record and if you would highlight that statement in your oral testimony.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. POSNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. POSNER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is what I was going to propose. Thank you.¹

First, I want to commend you and this committee for holding these hearings and thank you for inviting me to testify.

My involvement in the human rights effort concerning Uganda began in 1974. While working with the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, I helped to prepare their initial submissions on the Ugandan human rights situation to the United Nations.

Since that time, I have maintained ongoing contact with a number of Ugandan exiles.

While my remarks today are personal, much of the material is drawn from the reports of the International Commission of Jurists and current information provided to me by these Ugandan exiles.

I have been asked to testify generally regarding the human rights situation in Uganda and to comment on the proposed legislation being considered by this committee. In response, I will direct my attention to three principal areas: First, an analysis of the present situation in the country; second, a review of the reign of terror that has

¹ See appendix, p. 117.

affected every element of the Ugandan society in the last 7½ years; and third, some brief recommendations for congressional action.

While my statement includes detailed accounts of the killings and disappearances of prominent Ugandan citizens, what cannot be told are the circumstances of the deaths of tens of thousands of other Ugandans, many of them ordinary citizens who, since 1971, have been randomly killed by members of the Ugandan security forces.

A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN IN THE RULE OF LAW

Since the present regime came to power in 1971 there has been a complete breakdown in the rule of law. Today, every Ugandan citizen is in daily fear of his or her own safety. Government security forces virtually control the country and have assumed practically unlimited powers to kill, torture, and harass innocent civilians. In fact, all of these practices have become routine occurrences.

On another level, there has been an almost complete breakdown in the institutional structures of the society. The effectiveness of the criminal justice system, for example, has been almost completely undermined, and the role of the judiciary usurped by military tribunals.

Primary responsibility for this situation must be placed directly in the hands of President Amin. Contrary to his professed concern about human rights, it is clear that a substantial number of the killings in Uganda have been either directly on his orders or indirectly through the actions of officials he has placed in positions of authority and institutions he has created for that purpose.

REIGN OF TERROR UNCONTROLLABLE

However, it should also be pointed out that the security forces have now become so strong and the random violence so pervasive that it is unlikely that President Amin now has the power or the capacity to end this reign of terror.

In analyzing the current situation, Ugandan exiles repeatedly emphasize several points.

First, in 1978, constant violations of human rights are continuing to be a basic fact of life in Uganda. Arbitrary killings, torture, disappearances, and other gross violations continue on a regular basis. Because most of the victims are ordinary citizens, however, there is little public attention paid to their fate.

Second, there is no evidence to suggest that the present Ugandan Government has either the willingness or the capacity to control this reign of terror. To the contrary, recent changes in the Ugandan Cabinet indicate that President Amin is further consolidating his power and placing greater reliance on a few of the most malicious and violent members of the security forces.

THE AUTHORITIES

In late April of this year, a purge of the defense council resulted in the ouster of several top officials. However, among those who remain in power are Major Farouk of the State Research Bureau,

which is one of the security forces in Uganda, who was promoted, and Brig. Isaac Maliyamungu, who remains in charge of army training and operations.

If the current Ugandan Government intended to restore the rule of law in Uganda, it would not allow either of these men to remain in such key positions of authority.

Third, by their actions, President Amin and those close to him have demonstrated a continued commitment to eliminate any person or group that they perceive to be a threat to the regime.

As one Ugandan exile recently stated :

The Amin regime has no permanent allies; only a constantly shifting alliance. It will deal with resistance, real or imagined, from wherever it emerges. And resistance has emerged from right across the political, ethnic, and religious spectrums. Accordingly in every ethnic group, in every political group, and in every religious group there are to be found countless victims of the Amin regime.

THE ASSASSINATION OF JANANI LUWUM

The killing of Janani Luwum, Archbishop of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Boga-Zaire, in February 1977 illustrates this pattern. A leader of the Christian community and a member of the Acholi tribe, which the Government has always viewed with extreme suspicion, Luwum threatened Amin on several levels.

On February 5, a group of Ugandan soldiers surrounded his house and subsequently searched it for arms. Following this search, Luwum and his bishops prepared a memorandum dated February 10 criticizing the Government's search and asking for a resolution of differences between the Government and the church.

Six days later, on February 16, Archbishop Luwum and two Government ministers were arrested and brought before a meeting of 3,000 soldiers. When accused of plotting against the Government, Archbishop Luwum shook his head in denial. The troops at the meeting chanted, "Kill them, kill them today."

The next day Radio Uganda stated, "A Government spokesman has learned with regret of the death of the archbishop and the two ministers in a motor accident in Kampala yesterday."

Contrary to this official report, a number of Ugandan exiles have subsequently revealed that the archbishop and the two ministers were all killed by Ugandan security forces.

Following his death, a series of arrests and killings occurred throughout the country. The actions by Ugandan security forces were directed primarily against two tribes, the Acholi and the Langi, which have often been singled out for persecution.

Estimates of the number of people killed during this period alone vary, but it is likely that several thousand Ugandans were killed.

These killings were not isolated instances, as events of the past 18 months demonstrate.

FURTHER KILLINGS

In late February 1977, for example, the director of the Uganda National Theater was arrested by State Research officers and later killed. In September, a brother of Grace Ibingira, former Ugandan Ambassador to the United Nations, was apprehended in his home by members of the State Research Bureau.

According to one source, on November 5, President Amin personally ordered security officers to put him in chains. Three days later he was hanged.

The killings have continued in 1978. In March of this year, the president of the Uganda Industrial Court, Raphael Amooti Ssbuggwawo, was killed in front of his home. He had been active in lay activities of the Catholic Church and in recent months had been working to help prepare for celebrations of the centenary year of the Roman Catholic Church in Uganda, which were scheduled for 1979.

According to several Ugandan exiles, Mr. Ssbuggwawo was shot and killed by security forces in front of his home on or about March 3 of this year.

Even more recently, it was reported last month that Matthew Obado had been killed in an automobile accident. Obado formerly had been an Assistant Commissioner of Police and a Minister of Internal Affairs. According to one exile, Obado did not die in a car crash, but was killed by members of the State Research Bureau.

EVENTS IN UGANDA SINCE 1971

In order to fully comprehend the dimensions of these tragedies and others, it is necessary to review the events that have taken place in Uganda since 1971, which I will try to do briefly.

When Idi Amin came to power in January 1971, he pledged a caretaker administration that would implement a variety of reforms with the country. Yet, within 1 month, the Government had abolished Parliament, as well as district, municipal, and town councils. By March, all political activities were suspended. At the same time, very broad powers of arrest were granted to all of the Ugandan security forces. The grant of these powers of arrest were the first step in unleashing a system of arbitrary repression within the army.

In explaining these actions, General Amin said:

My mission is to lead the country out of a bad situation of corruption, depression, and slavery. After I rid the country of these vices, I will then organize and supervise a general election of a genuinely democratic civilian government.

What followed instead was the beginning of a series of arbitrary killings that have now continued for 7½ years.

POLICE ONE OF FIRST GROUPS AFFECTED

One of the first groups affected was the police, many of whom were killed during the months following the coup. There also began a series of mass killings in the army, aimed primarily at soldiers of two tribes, the Acholi and the Langi. These mass killings occurred throughout Uganda during the first year of the Amin regime. In one incident alone, at Mutakula Prison 13 survivors described in detail the killings of more than 500 prisoners.

THE ROBBERY SUSPECTS DECREE

In May 1972, the Government enacted the "Robbery Suspects Decree," which allowed any security officer to use "any force he may deem necessary to prevent the escape of suspected 'kondos' or armed robbers."

President Amin subsequently announced that the security forces would shoot on sight anyone they suspected of being an armed robber.

Though the decree was ultimately repealed, one former Minister described it as "one of the most sinister decrees under which individuals suspected to be participating in political activities were also to be treated" as armed robbers. He estimated that over 10,000 people were killed through this antikondo operation.

In August 1972, the President charged that Asians holding British passports were "sabotaging Uganda's economy and encouraging corruption." Several days later, he announced a formal decree revoking all entry permits for noncitizen Asians and requiring them to leave the country within 90 days. The decree was later expanded to Ugandan citizens of Asian descent and created extreme hardships.

THE 1972 INVASION OF UGANDA

On September 17, 1972, an invasion of Uganda was launched by supporters of former President Obote. The unsuccessful attack was mounted from Tanzania, where Obote and many of those loyal to him had sought refuge after the coup.

This action had several immediate effects inside Uganda. First, it reinforced President Amin's control of the country, and especially of the Armed Forces. Second, it led him to mount another major campaign aimed at eliminating his potential enemies within the country.

DISAPPEARANCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE OF UGANDA

On September 21, the Chief Justice of Uganda, Benedicto Kiwanuka, was arrested in his chambers by members of the Ugandan security forces. Kiwanuka, a leader of the Democratic Party, became the first African Chief Minister of Uganda in 1961 and Uganda's first Prime Minister after the granting of internal self-government in 1962. He had been appointed to the position of Chief Justice by President Amin in 1971.

In the weeks before he was abducted, Kiwanuka had made several rulings against the Government and was publicly criticized by Amin.

In 1974, Wanumbe Kibedi, a former Foreign Minister of Uganda, directly implicated Amin in Kiwanuka's disappearance. According to Kibedi, on the day Kiwanuka was abducted, Amin told him, "The boys have taken Kiwanuka. They had to get him from the court because he knew he was being followed. That's why the boys had taken him at the court."

Kibedi concludes, "I do not believe there are any grounds for doubting that Kiwanuka has been killed. Amin knew about the arrest, he must have ordered it, and he must know how Kiwanuka was killed."

Several other sources confirm that after his arrest, Kiwanuka was taken to Makindye Military Prison, where he was killed.

THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE

The scope of the violence during this period extended into every segment of the society. One prominent victim was Frank Kalimuzo, vice chancellor of Makerere University in Kampala and a leading figure in Uganda's academic community.

Another person killed in early 1973 was Rev. Clement Kiggundu, a leader of the Catholic community and an editor of the daily Catholic newspaper Munno.

In my testimony here today, it has been possible only to identify and describe briefly a few of the most widely reported human rights violations in Uganda since 1971. Yet, from these, several conclusions can be drawn.

First, arbitrary violence has continued in Uganda on a massive scale from 1971 to the present. In the first years, prominent Ugandans were often involved and their cases were widely reported. Yet most prominent Ugandans are now either living in exile or are dead. Accordingly, the killings that have occurred in the last few years primarily have affected ordinary citizens. Because these people are often not known outside their local communities and because the flow of information from Uganda has been curtailed so significantly, we hear relatively little about the horrors that continue in Uganda today.

But, as one Ugandan exile recently concluded :

In Uganda today, atrocities are carried out in the open and the soldiers no longer feel embarrassed about their duties of murder. The general population of Uganda likewise has learned to live with it to the extent that people see soldiers slaughter human beings almost daily and yet carry on their daily business until their turn comes.

FUTURE U.S. ACTION CONCERNING UGANDA

Given this background, I would like to express several personal thoughts about future U.S. action concerning Uganda.

First, I support the efforts initiated by Congressman Pease and others to ban trade with Uganda. Other witnesses at these hearings will discuss the nature and extent to which American companies are helping to support the current regime. But any congressional action that can reduce such support should be taken.

Second, an effort should be made to eliminate current immigration difficulties faced by Ugandan exiles. Under section 203 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, conditional entry into the United States can be granted most easily if an alien is migrating from a Communist country or certain countries in the Middle East.

In order to help the Ugandan refugees, I propose that appropriate steps be taken to add Uganda to this special category of countries under section 203 (a) (7).

A related problem involves Ugandan students living in exile in neighboring East African countries. Many of these students would like to come to the United States to continue their studies. Some have already been accepted by American colleges and universities but have been unable to come here because they cannot obtain necessary visas from the American Embassies in Nairobi or elsewhere. Efforts should be made to aid these exiled students and also to help facilitate scholarships and grants, where possible.

The rebuilding of Uganda inevitably depends on the talents and energies of these people and we should do whatever we can to help them.

Finally, as these actions are taken, we should also take steps to persuade our Western allies to make similar commitments.

It is my opinion that concerted efforts by the United States and her allies at this time can have a definite effort in helping to end the human rights tragedy in Uganda.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Posner.

You have presented the committee with an extremely well documented paper concerning a number of different assaults upon Ugandan citizens. The entire paper, as I indicated at the outset, will be included in the record. I appreciate your summarization. It is helpful to the committee.

Mr. POSNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDENT AMIN'S PLEDGE MEANINGLESS

Senator CHURCH. You stated that in 1978, constant violations of basic human rights continue to be a part of life in Uganda.

Are you saying that President Amin's pledge to turn over a new leaf in 1978 is nothing but a public relations campaign and that the situation has not improved in the last few months?

Mr. POSNER. Yes, I am.

As a matter of fact—as I indicated in my testimony—indications are that the purge and some of the changes in the Government are only a further consolidation of his power. He is in a position now where he has fewer and fewer allies to trust and he is relying only on those who have been with him and who he is sure will go with him in any situation. Those tend to be some of the most violent people in the security forces.

I ought to add that one of the problems in reviewing the situation in Uganda is, you often come out criticizing Amin personally.

While I think, as I have said, that he is personally responsible for what has gone on in the country, I think it has gone beyond him now, and, in fact, many of the atrocities are committed randomly by members of the security forces. He really has no control over that at this point.

There has really been a basic breakdown in the structure of the society which goes beyond Amin.

TECHNIQUES USED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS

Senator CHURCH. You were one of those who helped to write a report on Uganda by the International Commission of Jurists. Would you describe for us some of the techniques that were used by the Commission to gather information about the situation in Uganda?

Mr. POSNER. Sure.

Basically we relied almost entirely on first-hand accounts by Ugandans, most of them exiles living in East Africa and Europe. We contacted a number of people by letter. I personally interviewed perhaps 100 Ugandan exiles. Their stories were shocking and horrible. They certainly indicated an unbelievable lack of feeling about human life in Uganda.

The report also included some accounts we got from newspapermen in the area and other prominent officials of other East African govern-

ments. But primarily our sources were Ugandan exiles, many of whom had just left the country.

Senator CHURCH. I have a copy of your report with me today [indicating]. It is entitled "Uganda and Human Rights, Reports of the International Commission of Jurists to the United Nations."

RESPONSE TO THE REPORTS

What response was there to these reports within the United Nations?

Mr. POSNER. The record of the United Nations in this matter has been, to say the least, disappointing. The first report was submitted in 1974 and was considered first by the Commission on Human Rights in early 1975. It was deferred, and deferred again in 1976, when the International Commission of Jurists prepared a second report. Other materials have come in from Amnesty International and other groups.

This year, in March, the Commission on Human Rights finally did take some action. The problem is that we don't know what action that is because their proceedings are confidential. My sense is, though, that the kind of thing the United Nations will do is perhaps to send a mission to Uganda, perhaps to write a report, although that is unlikely. It certainly isn't a substitute for congressional action.

Senator CHURCH. But you see no possibility that the United Nations might impose economic sanctions of a kind imposed against the Rhodesian Government, do you?

Mr. POSNER. No possibility whatsoever.

Senator CHURCH. So, I take it that it is your conclusion that if any action is to be taken at all to attempt to kick the economic supports out from under this Ugandan regime of Idi Amin, it will have to be done by individual governments.

Mr. POSNER. That's correct. That isn't to say that groups like the International Commission of Jurists shouldn't continue to press at the United Nations. But there is a separate kind of action that we can take here.

WOULD U.S. ACTION HAVE ANY IMPACT?

Senator CHURCH. Do you think that unilateral action by the United States would have any real impact?

Mr. POSNER. I do personally, although I would say that I am certainly not an expert in the economics of Uganda and the coffee industry. I think that other people are going to testify to that.

My feeling is just that anything we can do at this stage is a step in the right direction. I think, even if we can't be 100 percent sure that the economic sanctions, for example, are going to be totally effective, it is worth a try.

Senator CHURCH. If the evidence and the testimony were to suggest that unilateral action would very likely prove to be totally ineffective, would you still favor it?

Mr. POSNER. I guess I would.

My feeling is, in talking to the Ugandan exiles in particular, that one of the things that has been most frustrating to them is that in a situation where the violations of human rights are so clear-cut, as in

Uganda, there has been so little world attention and so little consideration given to their problems. I think it is important that this Congress and any other bodies take whatever appropriate actions they can just to register our support for their suffering and to try to do something about it. I think it is symbolically very important.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Clark, do you have any questions?

Senator CLARK. Yes; just a couple of questions. I know you have other witnesses.

WHAT ARE TRADE LEVELS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND UGANDA?

Has it been established yet what the levels of trade are between the United States and Uganda?

Mr. POSNER. That is really not my expertise, sir. I think other witnesses will speak to that.

Senator CLARK. Then you are not sure what it is.

Mr. POSNER. No.

Senator CLARK. You made some comparison, I think, with the United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia and so forth. I frankly am rather sympathetic to this kind of legislation. I want to hear the remainder of the hearings to decide.

But by way of examining the effectiveness of it, in the case of Rhodesia, particularly as we passed an amendment in the Foreign Relations Committee and on the floor and in the House, we were dealing specifically with chrome, where you have some effective tests of who is violating and who isn't by technical means. It was, as Senator Church said, a universal, or at least a United Nations kind of sanction.

I gather, however, that your point is we ought to do whatever we can to at least let our feelings be known. You hope it would be as effective as possible; but even if it were not effective, it would send the right signal. Is that basically what you are saying?

Mr. POSNER. Exactly.

As I said, I think symbolically it is very important to the Ugandans themselves that we take some action.

Senator CLARK. Do you have any particular legislation that is before the committee that you would support above others, or any problems?

Mr. POSNER. No.

Senator CLARK. There is one last thing about which I wondered.

THE PROBLEMS WITH LEGISLATION

I see Congressman Pease is here and perhaps he will speak to this later. There is always the concern that if you put this in legislative form and there is a change in the government in Uganda and we would want to have a closer relationship with it if it is a government that we feel is an effective and a good government, what should you do about that then. Do you really want to go back the route of trying to repeal the legislation at some point or should there be some kind of presidential waiver in this legislation to allow for making a change?

We have hope at some future point that there will be a Ugandan Government with which we would be much happier.

Mr. POSNER. I certainly would have no problem with the presidential waiver concept. But it seems to me that when a new government did

come into Uganda, there would be overwhelming support from this government, hopefully, to try to get the country back on its feet. There is a tremendous amount of rebuilding that needs to be done.

As I said, the structures of the society, economic, political, educational, religious, have really been undercut. It is going to take a lot of commitment by this country and others to bring it back to where it was.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

Mr. POSNER. Thank you, Senator.

INTRODUCTION OF MR. ELSWORTH

Senator CLARK [presiding]. Our next witness is Whitney Elsworth, publisher, New York Review of Books, and former chairman of the board, U.S. Section of Amnesty International, New York.

Mr. Elsworth, please proceed in any way that you deem appropriate. I am sure that Senator Church will be back in just a couple of moments.

STATEMENT OF WHITNEY ELSWORTH, PUBLISHER, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, AND FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, U.S. SECTION OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Thank you, Senator. I will begin.

My name is Whitney Elsworth. I am a member of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Section of Amnesty International, a former chairman, as you said, and an Adoption Group member active in the U.S. Section's work on Uganda.

I do not come here representing myself as an expert on that country but rather as a member of a volunteer organization deeply concerned with human rights violations in countries all around the world.

Amnesty International is a worldwide movement which is independent of any government, political faction, ideology, economic interest, or religious creed. It plays a specific role within the overall spectrum of human rights work.

The activities of the organization focus strictly on prisoners. It seeks the release of men and women detained anywhere for their beliefs, color, sex, ethnic origin, language, or religion providing they have neither used nor advocated violence. These are termed prisoners of conscience.

It advocates fair and early trials for all political prisoners and works on behalf of such persons detained without charge or without trial.

It opposes the death penalty and torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of all prisoners without reservation.

Amnesty International acts on the basis of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments. Through its practical work for prisoners within its mandate, Amnesty International Participates in the wider promotion and protection of human rights in the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural spheres.

We would respectfully request, Mr. Chairman, that the written testimony which we have presented to your subcommittee could be submitted for the record.¹

Senator CHURCH [presiding]. Yes, that will be done.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Thank you.

THE CONCERNS OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

I will now try as briefly as I can to summarize some of our concerns expressed in our longer written testimony.

Amnesty International is, of course, extremely concerned about the human rights situation in Uganda. Since the military government of President Idi Amin came to power by coup d'état in 1971, a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations has developed and is still continuing.

Amnesty International's main concerns are as follows: (1) The overthrow of the rule of law; (2) the extensive practice of murder by government security officers, which often reaches proportions of massacre; (3) the institutionalized use of torture; (4) the denial of fundamental human rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and (5) the regime's constant disregard for the extreme concern expressed by international opinion and international organizations such as the United Nations, which results in the impression that gross human rights violations may be committed with impunity.

These aspects of repression in Uganda are documented in our written testimony.

EVENTS IN 1977 AND 1978

The focus is on events during 1977 and the first part of 1978. Events up to 1977 have been well documented by the International Commission of Jurists report, which you held up a moment ago.

The aim of our report is not simply to deliver another condemnation of one man at the center of this terrible structure, who has been instrumental in creating and perpetuating it; what Amnesty International considers more important is to describe the whole structure, which involves many other individuals and which penetrates all areas of Ugandan society. The effect of this structure of repression can be said, without exaggeration, to have transformed the whole society in a short period of time into a ruthless military dictatorship marked by arbitrary arrest, torture, murder, the removal of virtually all fundamental human rights, the terrorization of the population, the turning of tens of thousands of Ugandans into refugees.

There have been many condemnations of the Ugandan regime: Statements by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights; statements by the Commonwealth heads of governments, Roman Catholic Bishops of Eastern Africa, et cetera. There have been similar condemnations in the United States and demands by Congress and individuals, calling for economic sanctions against the Ugandan regime on the grounds of gross human rights violations.

The position of Amnesty International on this last issue must be made clear. AI does not take any position on the question of whether

¹ Retained in committee files.

or not governments should end aid or trade with a country where human rights are grossly violated. The only demand AI makes is that the practices documented by it should cease. It makes this demand of the offending government.

AI brings its information to the attention of all segments of international public opinion with a view to securing the widest possible articulation of its concerns. Accordingly, AI's function here today is solely to provide information on human rights in Uganda so that the whole area of debate may be conducted in full knowledge of the appalling situation prevailing there.

SPECIFIC CONCERNS OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

I will proceed briefly with our specific concerns. First is the overthrow of the rule of law.

After Uganda's military government came to power, Parliament was abolished, political parties were suspended, and Presidential rule by decree was enacted.

Constitutional safeguards against the misuse of power were reduced. A series of decrees signed by President Amin as chairman of the defense council directly conflict with the rule of law. First, the security forces have wide powers of arrest without warrant, and can detain indefinitely without charge any person suspected of subversion.

Second, the security forces have immunity from prosecution, which was made retroactive to the beginning of military rule.

Third, any security official is empowered to "use any force he may deem necessary" to arrest or prevent the escape of anyone suspected of kondo-ism, which is armed robbery, which carries the death penalty. This supports a policy of shooting to kill on mere suspicion.

Fourth, military tribunals, originally confined to judging cases within the armed forces, are empowered to try civilians accused of capital offenses, such as sedition, subversion, or treason. This removes the possibility of obtaining a fair public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.

Under the Economic Crimes Tribunal Decree of March 25, 1975, economic crimes such as overcharging, hoarding, smuggling, corruption, fraud, embezzlement, illegal currency sales, et cetera, carry a maximum death penalty and are to be judged by a military tribunal.

Next we turn to disappearances and killings by the security forces.

Since 1971, a very large number of persons in Uganda have disappeared following arrest by the security forces. A number have managed to flee the country when hearing of their imminent arrest, but the vast majority are never seen alive again. Only a very few survive the initial period of detention, and there is rarely any genuine judicial investigation of their cases leading to a court appearance.

Nearly all are tortured severely. Most torture victims either die under torture or are killed in other ways.

THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF SECURITY FORCES

The arrests are carried out by different branches of the security forces, which normally take victims to their own headquarters. The

various security agencies are as follows: The police; the army; the military police; the Public Safety Unit—this is a uniformed and plainclothes police unit, reportedly about 2,000 strong, set up in 1972 to deal with armed robbers: PSU night patrols regularly shoot on sight at suspected armed robbers and many persons have been killed by the PSU, allegedly “resisting arrest.” Last is the Bureau of State Research. This is the much feared state intelligence agency, reportedly about 3,000 strong. Its headquarters are at Nakasero, Kampala, where many people have been tortured and killed since 1976, with very few survivors.

MEANS OF EXECUTION

Persons arrested by officers of any of these security agencies are liable to summary execution by shooting or other methods, which have become common in Uganda. For example, a detainee may be ordered at gunpoint to murder other detainees by hitting them on the head with a hammer, axe, or car axle. In one version of this grotesque and common method of killing, detainees are lined up; the first man is given a hammer to kill the next man; he then in turn is killed by another man, until the whole line is killed, the last survivor being shot.

Bodies of those murdered are sometimes returned to relatives, usually in a mutilated condition, on payment of large bribes to security officers, of anywhere from \$300 to \$1,000. Many bodies are never recovered. Within the climate of fear inside Uganda, people do not readily divulge that relatives have disappeared or have found refuge in other countries. Even when refugees have reached other countries, they are usually afraid of contacting organizations, such as Amnesty International, for fears of reprisals against their relatives.

The cases known to Amnesty International are clearly a small fraction of the total number of people who have disappeared and been killed.

However, to present an overall view of the pattern of these killings, we detail in the written testimony the cases of people killed in the last 18 months for belonging to the various categories of the population which have become especially liable to arrest and death.

I will mention here a few of those categories and cases.

THOSE WHO DISAPPEAR OR ARE EXECUTED

First is politicians and civil servants. Large numbers of former parliamentarians and politicians have been killed, ranging from members of the former President Obote's cabinet to several members serving as ministers under President Amin. All members of President Amin's original cabinet have been killed or have fled to exile.

Next are religious leaders and followers. The killing of the Right Reverend Janani Luwum, as mentioned by Mr. Posner, Archbishop of the Church of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Boga-Zaire, is well known. But also there have been reports of ordinary church people being shot or arrested for contributing to the church celebrations or for wearing a badge commemorating the 1977 Church of Uganda centenary.

In October–November 1977, about 400 Christians in the Masaka region, mainly Catholics, were arbitrarily killed or arrested by soldiers.

Writers are another category. Mr. Posner mentioned the director of the Uganda National Theatre. But the subsequent director of the Uganda National theatre, Dan Kintu, was arrested together with playwright John Male and John Sebuliba. Under Secretary of the Ministry of Culture, and they were sentenced to death by secret tribunal on July 23, 1977. They had been arrested at the opening night of John Male's play, "The Empty Room," which allegedly insulted President Amin.

Foreigners are another category particularly liable to execution and arrest. Citizens of several African countries have been arrested and many of them killed, for example, from Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, Ghana, and other countries. Citizens of other nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany have also experienced arrest. Dennis Hills was reprieved and released after being sentenced to death in 1973. The case of Mrs. Dora Bloch is well known.

Three Americans, named as Richard [Sanke], George Milton Smith, and Orson Brown were reported disappeared after arrests by state research officers on August 10, 1977, in a Kampala hotel. A Ugandan nurse, Monica Nansamba, later reported that she had been forced to behold their dead bodies in Mbuya Military Hospital.

Next is killings of members of particular ethnic groups. Members of former President Obote's ethnic group, the Lango, and the adjoining Acholi have been especially subject to killings since 1971. There were several massacres of Acholi and Langi soldiers in the army in 1971 to 1973 and again in 1977.

This last numbered 7,000 by some accounts.

Such incidents of large-scale attacks on members of one particular ethnic group might seem to suggest a case for examining whether this would not amount to genocide, which is an international crime.

OTHER ARBITRARY VICTIMS

Arbitrary and random arrests and killings also take place all over the country. Many persons have been arrested and killed simply because a security official or soldier decided to possess their wife, their house, their car, their property or shop, their cattle, their coffee crop, et cetera.

Because of this destruction of the rule of law, the most serious human rights problem in Uganda is that of killings committed by or acquiesced in by government or security officials. The estimates of the numbers of people killed since 1971 vary enormously. The lower limits do not go below 50,000 and the upper limits are anywhere around 300,000 or above.

Amnesty International is unable to verify these estimates.

INSTITUTIONALIZED USE OF TORTURE

Now let us consider the institutionalized use of torture. Following arrest, victims are usually taken to one of these detention centers where torture is almost routine, especially at three of them: Naguru, the public safety unit barracks; Nakasero, the headquarters of the bureau of state research; and Makindye, the military police barracks.

Many senior officers have been personally involved in torturing, according to several former victims and eyewitnesses. Particularly the following officers' names are frequently cited in this respect: Police Commissioner M. K. Obura; Deputy Police Commissioner Ali To Willi; Colonel Malyamungu; Lt. Col. Francis Itabuka, former commanding officer of the bureau of state research; and his successor, Maj. Faruk Minawa; Colonel Taban; Major Nasur, the military governor over Kampala; Major Gala; Colonel Aziz; and many others.

We cite several personal testimonies in the document before you. Let me mention but one of these horrific accounts.

THE SITUATION AT MAKINDYE PRISON

Geoffrey Mugabi, a Ugandan, described how he had been arrested on February 7, 1977, and taken to Makindye prison where he heard the noise of prisoners being strangled and their heads smashed. "The floors were littered with loose eyes and teeth," he said, and he had been forced to load the battered bodies into trucks. On February 18 he had seen many trucks full of arrested soldiers who were then taken to the elimination cells, rooms C and D. He managed to escape and told his story to the Kenya "Daily Nation."

Let me now turn to the official Ugandan investigations into allegations of killings by security officers.

On occasion, commissions of inquiry and investigation have been appointed by President Amin to examine various allegations against the military regime.

OTHER INQUIRIES

In July 1971, Mr. Justice Jeffrey Jones, investigating the disappearance of two Americans released his report from Nairobi, where he had fled in fear of his life. He blamed army officers for their deaths and strongly criticized the noncooperation of the military authorities.

An internal government commission of inquiry was held in January 1973, into the disappearance of 85 prominent Ugandans. A further judicial commission of inquiry reported in June 1975, on 308 documented cases of disappearances after arrest.

Another inquiry investigated the fatal shooting by the public safety unit police on March 6, 1976, of a Makerere University student, Paul Sserwanga, just outside the campus. The inquiry also investigated the disappearance of a Kenyan student, Esther Chesire. The inquiry chairman, Prof. Bryan Langlands, was expelled from Uganda on July 29, 1976. Under a new chairman, the commission reported on November 12, according to Uganda Radio, and concluded that "If university rules had been followed, no one would have been shot."

In a statement by Professor Langlands to Amnesty International, the commission under his chairmanship had received evidence that Miss Chesire had not been seen since being prevented from boarding an airplane by Ugandan Government officials.

The circumstances and totally unsatisfactory outcome of these inquiries—more are detailed in the full testimony—demonstrate the need for an impartial international investigation into these and other incidents.

OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN UGANDA

Let me turn briefly to other human rights issues in Uganda which are of concern to Amnesty International. Clearly these are minor in comparison to the massive violations already described. However, the full structure would be incomplete without a brief mention of the totality of violations of the Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

I will summarize three of the many concerns.

The right to freedom of opinion and association have been completely removed in Uganda.

The right to freedom of religious belief is violated by the ban on certain religious sects.

There is no freedom of the press. The press in Uganda is totally government controlled or censored.

In conclusion, before President Amin came to power, the human rights situation in Uganda gave cause for concern. However, the scale of human rights violations changed dramatically after he came to power. Widespread arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, torture, and large-scale killing by the security forces were not isolated occurrences, but regular and systematic practices, condoned or encouraged by the Government. The rule of law was rapidly destroyed.

UGANDAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES ALL APPEALS

One of the most disturbing aspects of the situation in Uganda is the fact that the Government has repeatedly ignored expressions of international concern and appeals on behalf of political prisoners. The Ugandan Government has taken no steps to improve the human rights situation. Internal investigations have been totally ineffective.

Uganda is a member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, but at the same time the Uganda Government consistently and with apparent impunity denies the most basic human rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration.

In April 1978, President Amin announced a Uganda Human Rights Committee would be set up to "monitor all information in Uganda concerning human rights and coordinate with the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The committee would comprise officials of the Ministries of Justice, Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, and of security organizations like police, special branch, and the state research bureau."

Since the security organizations are accused of responsibility for torture and killing, and since even judges can face reprisals if they conflict with the military regime, such a committee can have no independence or impartiality.

1978 A YEAR OF PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

In January 1978, on the seventh anniversary of his regime, President Amin declared that 1978 would be a year of peace and reconciliation. He stated that there were no violations of human rights in Uganda and that such allegations were false propaganda by exiles.

Amnesty International is, however, convinced that this is not the case and that human rights violations continue. Though there have

been periods in late 1977 and 1978 when political killing has diminished in intensity, the pattern of arbitrary arrests, disappearances, tortures, killings, and violations of fundamental human rights persist unaltered. There is good reason to fear that unless international pressure about the human rights situation in Uganda increases, human rights violations of this nature and on this scale could continue in Uganda for a long time to come.

Thank you.

THE REPUTATION OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much for your testimony.

The organization you represent, Amnesty International, has won for itself a great reputation for the objectivity of its work, for the thoroughness with which it attempts to document and substantiate any charges of the violation of human rights in any given country.

If I remember correctly, your organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of its work.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. We are pleased to have your testimony and to have it backed up by an organization that has proven itself to be reliable. You have laid before the committee much evidence of a most appalling kind to substantiate the conclusions reached by your organization.

You have spoken of the wanton and widespread killings in Uganda, of the numerous disappearances of citizens and of aliens, and of the systematic torture engaged in by high officials of the regime, and of the utter denial of basic freedoms.

You have referred to all of this as a part of the structure of repression. I understand that Amnesty International has refrained from supporting given efforts of one kind or another to be taken against regimes such as this, and it confines itself to documentation and to the protest that it makes against such practices.

But, speaking as an individual, how is the structure of repression brought down by external force; that is, external measures? You and the previous witness have both suggested that the pattern of brutality has so infiltrated the entire power structure in Uganda that it may now have gone beyond the effective control of the President. If this is so, can external pressures be relied upon to change the conditions internally within Uganda?

NO OPINION ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Mr. ELSWORTH. Well, Senator, I think it is important to understand also why Amnesty International does not have an opinion on the question of economic sanctions.

We work in well over 100 countries all over the world. The conditions, as have appeared in these discussions today, in each country are unique. It is very difficult to apply one policy in one place and another in another, as has been mentioned.

The other thing which does also concern us about the use of economic sanctions—and I think this begins to answer your question—is that it is what we call a “one arrow quiver.” If you do bring economic sanc-

tions against a country such as Uganda and they are not effective—and I am now talking from Amnesty's point of view, which, as I stated in the beginning, is very much for the prisoners—then, exactly where are you?

OTHER METHODS CAN BE TRIED

I think it could be said—and I am now speaking personally—that other methods should be tried, either in place of or in conjunction with such things as economic sanctions. For instance, on February 2 the Government of Uganda sent to the U.S. Congress, through the State Department, a letter inviting a congressional mission or delegation to Uganda. Quite rightly, any decision on that was delayed because the matter was in front of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

However, it might be considered that such a mission should be discussed and perhaps proposed under certain very specific conditions to the Ugandan Government.

Now, there are obviously a great many possible disadvantages of such a mission. But there are some possible advantages, particularly if it is undertaken under very strict conditions. I could suggest some to you, which are the type of conditions that we employ in the missions which we send to different countries in the world.

U.N. ACTION VERY SLOW ON UGANDA

I think some of the profactors are that it could influence events, and since U.N. action has moved very slowly on the matter of Uganda, a vigorous and dynamic delegation from the Congress of the United States might do something if it was sufficiently determined.

There is also the possibility on the con side that President Amin would use the visit to gain respectability and reduce his isolation in the world community, or to present a false impression. Also, he may very well try to restrict the movements of such a committee.

It is certainly true that any congressional delegation would meet very few political prisoners, because most of them have been killed. The torture chambers unfortunately can be cleaned up.

But there could be some benefits from it.

CONDITIONS REQUIRED OF UGANDAN GOVERNMENT

The conditions which would have to be required of the Ugandan Government would be that such a commission would have free meetings with military regime leaders and civilian ministers, such as the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice, and without security officials present. Access to necessary government records, free meetings with law societies, university representatives, and Muslim and Christian leaders would be necessary—again, without security officials present. It should be able to collect evidence from individuals with a guarantee of secrecy and be able to collect evidence from individuals in other countries, especially Kenya, Zambia, et cetera. It should also be able to visit certain detention centers, such as the ones that I mentioned: Naguru, Makindye, and Nakasero, et cetera.

This may be something that your subcommittee might want to consider.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I am still puzzled at how any action taken externally can bring down a structure of repression that has become so ingrained that even the resignation of Idi Amin might have no impact or effect upon it.

Mr. ELSWORTH. I think that is an extremely difficult question. Certainly in the case of India, where oppression was on the increase under the emergency decrees, one there was able to see a situation which reversed itself significantly and dramatically with the defeat of the government in power.

THE SITUATION WOULD REVERSE IF THE GOVERNMENT FELL

I will talk personally for a moment. I think it would be a reasonable assumption that the situation would, as Mr. Posner indicated, reverse itself dramatically if the Government did, in fact, fall. The difficulty is how that would happen and under what conditions.

As I think both Mr. Posner and I have pointed out that to personalize it too much—in other words, simply to attach it to the person of President Amin—is perhaps unwise; it is perhaps well beyond that point.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Javits.

REMARKS BY SENATOR JAVITS

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I came because of my very profound interest in this matter. There have been some very key questions put to you by our chairman.

I have great respect for Amnesty International, and I think you serve us all in the way in which you are looking into these questions and giving us your view. It is not, of course, that you are God, but your view is very heavily based upon an effort to ascertain the facts and to come to a conclusions which is objective.

I think the question that interests me the most is what can we do about this. After all, as I understand it now, the import of coffee and the exchange of coffee for other goods—and the wrongs which were perpetrated—has been pretty well suppressed in this country by the action of the people who are engaged in it themselves.

First, would you confirm that. Is that true?

Mr. ELSWORTH. I think, Senator that you may have missed the beginning of my statement.

Senator JAVITS. Yes; I had to. I was involved in another meeting.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Of course.

NO STAND ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Amnesty International does not really take a position on the question of economic sanctions. This is one of the situations.

I do think, talking personally, that the recent announcements by various coffee companies have gone part of the way toward cutting off the flow of Ugandan coffee into this country, but by no means all the way. Some of them are still going to purchase for markets outside the United States. They have limited themselves only to U.S. markets.

Senator JAVITS. Even though your organization doesn't get into this, do you think it is a sound way to proceed; that is, as far as we're concerned? After all, the things that we can do are quite limited.

UGANDA STILL HAS CHARGE D'AFFAIRS HERE

It is a fact that they still have an Embassy here, isn't it?

Mr. ELSWORTH. I believe it is not an Embassy; it is a technicality. I think it is a—

Senator JAVITS. Charge d'affairs.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes; a charge d'affairs.

Senator JAVITS. They have an office and Ugandans are in charge of it. This represents the sovereignty of Uganda here in the United States, is that not right?

Mr. ELSWORTH. Correct.

Senator JAVITS. Now, what do you advise on that? Do you think the Congress ought to suggest to the President that he withdraw any kind of diplomatic recognition and ask that the whole kit and kaboodle be removed? If we do, what good will that do?

Mr. ELSWORTH. I think what we would say is if different and possible imaginative approaches were used for this situation, and you did not restrict yourself to just one type of approach—in other words, our Embassy in Uganda has been closed since 1972, I think; no, it is later than that. But the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition has had very little effect in this situation.

I do think that from our experience you must employ a variety of means to try, if you wish, to loosen up a desperately repressive situation. That is one reason why I suggested that the offer of inviting a congressional delegation might be something that the subcommittee would want to look into.

Senator JAVITS. In other words, whether or not it should be accepted.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Pardon me?

Senator JAVITS. Whether or not it should be accepted, whether we should send a delegation.

PRESIDENT AMIN'S INVITATION

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes. It was, I believe, tabled in March—is that correct—because the matter was before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. But there was an invitation for a U.S. congressional delegation from President Amin.

Senator JAVITS. Do you think we ought to send the congressional delegation with a regiment of marines?

Senator CHURCH. That's what I was going to say.

[General laughter.]

Mr. ELSWORTH. They would have to be careful; yes.

Senator CHURCH. I wouldn't want to be a member of such a delegation—

Senator JAVITS. What about a good-conduct guarantee?

Senator CHURCH [continuing]. After I read the documentation of the horrors going on in that country.

Senator JAVITS. But a good-conduct guarantee from President Amin might not be worth too much.

Mr. ELSWORTH. I do think it is interesting that he proposed it.

Senator JAVITS. Yes; that is interesting.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Now, you have to be careful. On October 2, 1975, at the U.N., he proposed that Amnesty International send a mission to Uganda. When we tried to take him up on that, there was no response. We renewed our request to send a mission at the time of Archbishop Luwum's arrest, and again there was no response.

AN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT

So, sometimes these things can be seen as being mainly an international public relations effort. But there may be some real substance to the letter of February 2, 1978, which might be worth looking into.

Senator JAVITS. You would explore that if you were us?

Mr. ELSWORTH. I think that Amnesty would recommend that you explore a variety of different techniques and approaches.

Senator JAVITS. Let us pick those off, then.

There would be the question of complete sanctions economically, which we might apply even bilaterally as there are operations of various companies which undertake contracts there. Is that not correct?

Mr. ELSWORTH. Right, that would be one of the options. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. Second, we might end whatever remaining diplomatic contact there is. That's correct, is it not?

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes, sir.

RELATIONS UNBROKEN BETWEEN U.S. AND UGANDA

Senator CHURCH. Diplomatic relations have not been broken between the United States and Uganda. Only our mission has been removed.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Removed—correct. Relations have not been broken.

Senator JAVITS. They have something here, so we could terminate diplomatic relations between us.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes.

There is, of course, the opposite of that, Senator, which is to reopen the mission in Kampala.

Senator JAVITS. Yes; that's right. We could go the other way and seek to reopen relations. Correct?

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. Fourth, we could take up President Amin's invitation and offer to send a congressional delegation, and we could ask what are the terms, the conditions, and the security which such a delegation would encounter.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Correct.

Senator JAVITS. Is there anything else? You said a "variety." I'd like to know what is in the total kit.

OTHER EFFORTS TO BE MADE

Mr. ELSWORTH. I do believe that some of the other tactics have clearly been used to date. In other words, I mean hearings such as this and statements by the President of the United States. I do believe that any effort which can be made to internationalize the pres-

sure on Uganda is also of help, either through work in the U.N., work through the U.N. Commission on Human Rights which has been moving on the issue, albeit very slowly. All of these techniques can be used.

It is sometimes the combination of techniques, in our experience, rather than the apparent force of any one technique, which could—and that is a very large “could”—bring success.

Senator JAVITS. Is there anything else that you can think of through third, fourth, or fifth parties? In other words, do you have any information or knowledge as to where he does whatever business he does? What countries still retain some kind of viable relations with Uganda?

OTHER COUNTRIES HAVING RELATIONS WITH UGANDA

Mr. ELSWORTH. I believe he receives his military arms, et cetera, from the U.S.S.R. and some from Libya. I believe that his petroleum comes in, in a variety of ways; but there is a general feeling that Libya would supply him with petroleum if it were cut off in any other way.

The supplies coming from the Western nations, such as the United States, Britain, et cetera, tend to be of a technical nature and also luxury items. There has been, as you know, proposals that those luxury items could in some way or other be embargoed and cut off, since they are used as a reward system for the upper echelon of the armed forces.

Senator JAVITS. From what countries do these come?

Mr. ELSWORTH. I am not sure this information is current, but they have been coming mostly from Britain and the United States on flights of Ugandan airplanes coming to these countries.

Senator JAVITS. Which then go back.

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. All of this could conceivably be cut off, is that right?

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. OK, thank you very much.

Senator CHURCH. Your last answer was yes?

Mr. ELSWORTH. Yes. Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Elsworth, for your testimony today.

INTRODUCTION OF CONGRESSMAN PEASE

Our next and last witness is Congressman Donald J. Pease of Ohio.

Congressman, we would have heard from you earlier, but we understood that you preferred to come as our last witness this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD J. PEASE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF OHIO

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes; that is true.

I wanted to be in a position to summarize some of the testimony given by others and to try to provide the committee with a balanced picture.

Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate this opportunity, and I think you are to be commended for having the compassion and the concern to convene hearings on Uganda. To the best of my knowledge, these hearings, along with those held in the House, are the first systematic review of United States-Ugandan relations since Idi Amin came to power 7 years ago. We all know what has happened in the interim.

AMIN MORE THAN AN AFRICAN PROBLEM

It is said that Idi Amin is an African problem to be dealt with by Africans. To argue this point is to ignore reality.

While there is little doubt that Amin is a source of anguish and embarrassment to black African leaders, only a few, like Nyerere and Kaunda, have repudiated him. To explain this is not easy.

Amin is a master of politics as drama. In a postcolonial era, it is understandable how his theatrics embody a certain black nationalist appeal. As recently as last summer, he received a standing ovation at the O.A.U. summit in Gabon.

More importantly, many black African leaders are hesitant to deplore the slaughter in Uganda for fear of being criticized for human rights violations themselves. The O.A.U. doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of a member nation provides an easy out for a threatening dilemma. The only hope of Africans dealing with Amin lies in their recognition of what much of the world has already concluded—that Amin is a special case, as is South Africa.

It is said that what Amin has presided over in Uganda is reprehensible to the world community, that his genocidal policies are crimes against humanity and deserving of U.N. sanctions.

UGANDA HAS ESCAPED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

Yet, Uganda has escaped international pressure like the arms embargo leveled against South Africa last fall. The U.N. has failed to come to grips with Amin's reign of terror. To expect otherwise demonstrates bad arithmetic and blind faith.

The 49-member African bloc has frustrated any discussion of Uganda.

In March 1977, the African block joined forces with other Third World and Communist countries to block an investigation of human rights violations in Uganda by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

Last December, the African bloc once again led the way in tabling the Nordic resolution censuring Uganda. Those who would have us do nothing about Uganda are content knowing that the U.N. Commission on Human Rights did act on a motion to initiate a human rights study mission to Uganda in February. The fact that the study mission is yet to get underway and that its work is to remain confidential speaks for itself.

UNITED STATES HAS POWER THROUGH COFFEE SALES

Amin has cowed the O.A.U. and the United Nations. This obscures the fact that the West, particularly the United States, has the real

power to affect events in Uganda. Amin sustains his hold on power through coffee sales to the United States and a few of our allies. Ruling out military force, it is through economic clout that we can best influence conditions in Uganda, as in the case with South Africa.

Now let me anticipate the arguments that will be offered by the State Department and the Commerce Department to justify continued U.S. commercial support for Amin's regime.

SANCTIONS TOOTHLESS WITHOUT COOPERATION

It is said that economic sanctions against Uganda would have only a symbolic effect, that recent history has demonstrated that sanctions don't work. Most of all, it is said, sanctions against Uganda would be toothless without the cooperation of other states.

Well, what about symbolic gestures? The State Department asks us to be content with resolutions of disapproval and the recall of ambassadors while the slaughter in Uganda continues. Just this week, the Carter administration refused to take a position on the Uganda resolution passed by the House.

If these gestures of the Carter administration have more than symbolic value, it is lost on me. Moreover, to dismiss a coffee boycott or a trade ban as being merely of symbolic significance fails to take into account the direct relationship between American purchases of Ugandan coffee and Amin's murderous regime.

Senator CHURCH. May I ask you a question at this point, Congressman? I think it might be easier for us to ask questions as they are suggested by your testimony.

TOKENISM OUR CURRENT POLICY

I agree with everything you have said so far. It is a bit ironic for the administration to condemn an embargo, an American embargo, against the importation of Ugandan coffee as being a symbolic gesture, when it has no policy of its own except one that is even more symbolic. Tokenism, I might suggest, has been the current policy of our Government. But partly because of your leadership, partly because of the fact that hearings have been held in the House and are now being held in the Senate, and a number of articles dealing with the bestial practices of Idi Amin have been included in the record, and it has been known to the industry that the Congress has pending before it certain bills, including your own, to deal with the cutting off of trade between the United States and Uganda, the coffee companies have themselves decided to import no more Ugandan coffee, at least directly to these United States.

What more could be accomplished by a governmental ban on the importation of Ugandan coffee than has in fact been accomplished by the decision of the coffee companies themselves to refrain from importing Ugandan coffee in the future?

THE IMPACT OF AN OFFICIAL U.S. BOYCOTT

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I would answer that perhaps in three ways.

First, one thing that I think we need to do in response to the genocide in Uganda is to disassociate ourselves in every way officially from that regime. An official boycott would do that.

Second, it is true that in response to the adoption by the House International Relations Committee of the Bonker-Pease resolution on Ugandan condemnation, even though that was not a binding resolution, four major coffee companies have announced that they will no longer import to the United States, Ugandan coffee. They include Proctor & Gamble, Nestles, Hills Brothers, and General Foods for its domestic market.

But there are an equal number of companies, importers, who have not made that commitment. We have made a point of checking every importer from Uganda. There are about 14 or 15 who have decided not to buy Ugandan coffee, and an equal number who have not yet committed themselves. Indeed, General Foods, which is the largest, has chosen not to make a commitment for its foreign subsidiaries in Britain and several other European countries.

Senator JAVITS. Can you give us a table, Mr. Pease, of both groups, because, after all, that is what these hearings are all about.

Mr. PEASE. I would be happy to submit that for the record, Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you. I hope you will submit it promptly so that the press can get it too, with respect to today's hearings.

That is the name of the game.

Mr. PEASE. I have it with me today.

Senator JAVITS. Good.

I would request that that be included in our record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Below are the findings of a survey I conducted with regard to purchasing of Ugandan coffee by American coffee companies and brokers. This survey was conducted in the wake of the decision by three major coffee roasters to stop buying Ugandan coffee. It reflects those companies which have confirmed their intentions to not buy any Ugandan coffee and those companies which have chosen not to disclose their plans with regard to their own activities and their subsidiaries.

THOSE COMPANIES HAVING DECIDED TO NOT
BUY UGANDAN COFFEE

Proctor & Gamble (Folger's).
Nestles Co.
Woodhouse Drake and Carey Trading Co.
ACLI.
Van Ekris & Stoett, Inc.
J. Aron & Co., Inc.
Saks International.
Sprague & Rhodes Commodity Corp.
Hills Brothers Coffee, Inc.
Mitsui & Co., U.S.A.
Wm. L. Marshall Coffee Co.
Carl Borchsenius Co., Inc.
Gill & Duffus, Inc.
Carson M. Simon & Co.
M.J.B. Co.

NON-COMMITTAL COMPANIES

General Foods (Maxwell House).
E. R. Camilleri & Co.
Lonray, Inc.
Socomex Coffee, Inc.
G. M. Saks, Inc.
Coca Cola Co.—Food Division.
S. Jackson & Son, Inc.
George William Rueff, Inc.
P. W. Bellingall, Inc.
Hoyt Shepston & Sciaroni.
Volkart Brothers, Inc.
Bill Potts and Co.
E. A. Kahl and Co.
Loretz and Co.
Anderson-Clayton Foods.
Western States Marketing Co.

Mr. PEASE. The third reason, Mr. Chairman, is simply that this has been a promise by the coffee companies. We have no way of knowing

whether they will adhere to that promise either now, 6 months from now, or 1 year from now.

Senator CHURCH. Would you read into the record the companies that you have listed?

Senator JAVITS. In the two groups.

Mr. PEASE. Yes.

COMPANIES WHICH WILL NOT BUY UGANDAN COFFEE

Those companies who have decided not to buy Ugandan coffee are: Procter and Gamble—Folger Coffee; Nestles Co.—American division; Woodhouse Drake & Carey Trading Co.; ACLI; Van Ekris & Stoett, Inc.; J. Aron & Co., Inc.; Saks International; Sprague & Rhodes Commodity Corp.; Hills Brothers Coffee; Mitsui & Co.; William L. Marshall Coffee Co.; Carl Borchsenius Co.; Gill & Duffus, Inc.; Carson M. Simon & Co.; and the M.J.B. Co.

Senator JAVITS. What about something called ACLI?

Mr. PEASE. ACLI is the ACLI Sugar Co., which, in 1977 was the largest single importer of coffee from Uganda. It has told us that it will no longer do so.

Perhaps before I mention the noncommittal companies I should say that General Foods is sort of in the middle. It has made a commitment for domestic U.S. consumption, but not for its other countries.

The noncommittal companies are the E. R. Camilleri & Co.; the Lonray, Inc.; Socomex Coffee Co.; G. M. Saks, Inc.; Coca Cola Co.—Food Division; S. Jackson & Son, Inc.; George William Rueff, Inc.; P. W. Bellingall, Inc.; Hoyt Shepston & Sciaroni; Volkart Bros., Inc.; Bill Potts & Co.; E. A. Kahl & Co.; Loretz & Co.; Anderson-Clayton Foods; and the Western States Marketing Co.

Senator CHURCH. Hasn't Nestles also limited its ban to the domestic American market?

Mr. PEASE. I am not certain of that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. That is our information.

Mr. PEASE. Shall I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator CHURCH. Yes; would you please proceed.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Javits.

Amin's Uganda is not like Rhodesia or Cuba, and parallels should not be drawn.

Whether Amin would fall from power if he lost his coffee revenue from the West is an open question; but the impact upon him would be very severe.

AMIN DEPENDENT ON COFFEE REVENUE

Given what is known about Amin's near total dependence on coffee revenue and the scale of official murder in Uganda, the burden of proof ought to be upon those who would do nothing.

Finally, I reject the notion that our decision to impose sanctions must await a prior commitment of our allies to follow suit. That notion has the familiar ring of a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is just as much reason, if not more, to believe that a U.S. coffee boycott or a trade ban could serve as a catalyst for international action to

hasten Amin's downfall. Boycott legislation has been introduced recently in the British Parliament, by the way.

In fact, since the United States buys the lion's share of Ugandan green coffee, it is all the more appropriate for us to take the first step to bring economic pressure to bear upon conditions in Uganda.

Another argument for continuing our commercial trade with Uganda states that economic sanctions undermine the integrity of the GATT agreements. "The United States must honor its longstanding commitment to free trade," we are told.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Pease, we are in a little bit of a time bind here. Would it be satisfactory to you to wind up your testimony by 12:15?

Mr. PEASE. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you. You see, I have to go to the floor.

Senator CHURCH. Excuse me, but I have just been called to the Energy Committee on a matter which requires my presence for a vote. I'm sorry.

Senator Javits, would you please preside in my absence?

Senator JAVITS. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Any questions that Senator Javits lacks the time to ask we would hope to submit to you in written form for your answer, Congressman, so that the written testimony would be complete. I hope that would be acceptable.

Mr. PEASE. I would be happy to comply.

Senator JAVITS [presiding]. Please continue, Congressman Pease.

WOULD A COMMERCIAL BAN UNDERMINE GATT?

Mr. PEASE. At any rate, Senator, you will hear the argument that a commercial ban with Uganda would undermine the GATT agreements.

Let me say at the outset that I think unrestricted free trade is a worthy objective. However, to suggest that the GATT agreement is sacrosanct and inviolable is misleading.

Yes; it is true that adopting economic sanctions against Uganda would constitute a GATT violation. But there already exists ample precedent for the United States and other countries to act when they see fit on trade matters regardless of GATT obligations.

The Commerce and State Departments make much of our strong support for GATT's nondiscrimination clause. But, the historical record since GATT's inception in 1948 contradicts this assertion.

There is something much more basic about the free trade argument that bothers me. It is rooted in the notion that international economics and international politics are separate and distinct. I do not argue that on balance it services our national interest to try to maintain this distinction. But our fervor for free trade rhetoric sometimes deludes us into forgetting that economic and political motives are often intertwined.

FREE TRADE A PRINCIPLE OF CONVENIENCE

"Free trade" becomes a principle of convenience to be used to avoid having to make tough decisions in the most trying circumstances, such as South Africa and Uganda.

We are expected to energize an international moral consensus against Amin in a world which we know is undistinguished by moral scruples. If we leave the door open to commercial trade with Amin, we neutralize our real power over him and we render ourselves political eunuchs.

The history of the international trade in the past 30 years suggests that we have been willing to forgo our GATT obligations under certain circumstances, and, Mr. Chairman, if you wish, for the record I can insert those.¹

Mr. PEASE. I am suggesting that in the case of Uganda, there are higher principles involved than blind adherence to free trade dogma.

If we adopt sanctions against Uganda, we would be establishing a new principle in our trade policies. We will indicate that we recognize limits of decency beyond which other governments may not go in their treatment of their own citizens. We will demonstrate that in special cases the Congress will use its authority to insist upon corporate responsibility where it may be otherwise lacking. If we continue to look the other way regarding U.S. commercial support for Amin's regime, we leave the door open to the Hitlers, the Stalins, and the Amin's of the future to exploit us in the name of free trade.

Seasoned international cynics and other opponents of sanctions argue that the Soviets, the Libyans, or others may fill the void created by a coffee boycott. This is a hypothesis which I think is worth testing.

WHAT DO WE HAVE TO LOSE?

What do we have to lose?

I cannot say for certain that those countries will not buy Amin's coffee, but I think it is unlikely.

The Soviet's allegiance to Amin is not unqualified.

Finally, I come to the last major argument in opposition to economic sanctions against Uganda—the impact upon Americans still inside Uganda.

Frankly, this is the factor that concerns me the most. If anything, Amin has demonstrated that he is unpredictable. The only real leverage Amin has with us is the well-being of Americans living in Uganda. As recently as February 1977, he reminded us of their utility as political hostages.

Mr. Chairman, I contacted all of the churches which maintain missionaries in Uganda and they almost unanimously replied to me that they thought our policy in the Congress ought to be determined independent of the safety of those missionaries in Uganda because, they said, the missionaries know why they are there, they are adults, and they are determined to stay, no matter what, to help the ordinary citizens of Uganda.

Having responded to the arguments for not taking a course of action does not provide a rationale for taking a course of action. Let me set forth the main reasons why I am calling for a coffee boycott or trade ban on Uganda.

We have seen examples of cases where the State Department and the Congress have endorsed deviation from our free trade commit-

¹ See appendix, p. 118.

ments for political reasons in the past: The Cuban embargo and the Jackson-Vanik amendment in 1974. This suggests that we value some principles more highly than free trade.

WE SHOULD ACT UPON A NEW PRINCIPLE

I propose that we act upon a new principle: In special cases involving governments characterized by genocide, we as a Nation will take all steps to disassociate ourselves from those governments, including economic sanctions. Uganda is clearly a case of genocide practiced as government policy, a special situation which justifies an exceptional response.

Translated into policymaking, both the State Department and the Congress will have to make difficult judgments about when to act in special cases.

If we do this, we could provide an answer and a course of action when someone asks us: "Are American coffee companies really prepared to do business with a genocidist like Amin or Hitler if the price is right?"

An objective evaluation of United States-Ugandan commercial ties suggests that economic sanctions will hurt Amin and hasten his downfall. He is uniquely dependent upon hard currency from coffee exports to insure the loyalty of his mercenary army and thereby his survival. Mercenaries are not loyal when they are not paid. Further, we should not underestimate the psychological impact of a U.S. boycott. In Africa and in Uganda, conditions will determine whether Amin is perceived to be a ruler who has a future or a ruler without a future.

A U.S. boycott could signal that Amin's days are limited. Even if a coffee boycott did not cripple Amin's hold on power, we could take heart in knowing that our country would be using our economic leverage against rather than in support of Amin.

Many Americans believe that there is a double standard at work within our African policies. Defenders of the Vorster government in South Africa are fond of making this point. Whether the allegation has any merit or not, it is of secondary importance to the fact that its appeal would be quashed if we were to act more strongly against genocide in Uganda.

Mr. Chairman, I will try to summarize and complete my statement in just a moment.

I would like to say, in conclusion, that Mr. Godfrey Lule, Uganda's former minister of justice, who escaped last spring, put it best in a plea to the United Nations:

For the people of Uganda, there is no known behavior or code of conduct that can guarantee personal safety from unwarranted arrest, torture, and murder—fear engulfs everyone, high and low.

The absence of effective action from anywhere in the world reveals the need for some country to demonstrate that it has the means and the will to stand up against Amin's practice of internal genocide. We have the means. It remains to be seen whether we have the will.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Congressman Pease. We certainly appreciate your testimony.

I join Senator Church for thanking you for the initiative which you are taking in this matter. As you know, each of us is overwhelmed with a host of problems. It is very gratifying when a colleague makes a very special issue of something and takes it up and works at it—especially when it is as critically important as this.

We thank you very much.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Senator Javits.

CONGRESSMAN PEASE TO SUPPLY WRITTEN RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS

Senator JAVITS. Congressman Pease, I will give to you a list of questions prepared by the staff. If, as a result of looking over these questions, you believe that there is an addition or additions that you should make to your testimony, please let us have it by the end of next week, that is, the close of business a week from tomorrow.

Mr. PEASE. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman. I do have additional information which I would like to submit for the record.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you. We certainly appreciate that.

As there is no further business before the subcommittee, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene upon call of the Chair.]

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UGANDA: THE NATURE OF U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH UGANDA

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 1978

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Clark, Sarbanes, and Pearson.

Senator SARBANES [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to order.

We will resume our hearings. Congressman Pease is here with us again this morning.

Congressman, I think you have been supplied with a list of questions from the committee, is that correct?

Mr. PEASE. Yes, that is true.

Senator SARBANES. We would like to ask you to address yourself to them at this time. I can either put each question to you and you can answer it, or you can set them out yourself and respond to them, as you think would be most satisfactory to you.

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, since I do have a list of your questions, I think I can just go over them one at a time.

Senator SARBANES. Fine. Why don't you do just that. If you would set them out and address them, even combine them if that works better for you, that would be fine. Proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD J. PEASE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF OHIO

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that I do appreciate the opportunity to come back before this distinguished committee. I did present my formal statement last week. I think it is well for this committee to have on the record some answers to specific questions and I am happy to provide those answers this week.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COFFEE TO UGANDA

One question which is often asked is how important is the export of coffee to the Ugandan economy?

The answer is that it is extremely important, that because of the mismanagement by Idi Amin of the economy of Uganda, which was once flourishing, that country has become essentially a one-crop nation, that crop being coffee, and without coffee exports, there would be very little foreign exchange coming into Uganda to pay for necessary imports and to pay for Soviet arms, which are sold to Uganda on a cash basis.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to differentiate between the importance of coffee to the Ugandan economy and to the regime of Idi Amin.

As I have said, coffee is important to the economy as a whole because it is virtually the single crop that is available. But the key fact that needs to be kept in mind is that the coffee proceeds, by and large, do not go into the economy as a whole, but rather into the coffers of Idi Amin as the ruler of Uganda, and the money is used essentially for purchasing luxury goods for his mercenary army and for his State Research Bureau, the secret police, and to pay the salaries of that mercenary army to keep it loyal to him, and, as I said before, to purchase Soviet arms.

So, an interruption of coffee revenue would not cause great suffering to the Ugandan coffee farmer who, as it is, is getting very little of the proceeds from the coffee sale. An interruption of those revenues, however, would have a great effect on the regime of Idi Amin because, it is our conjecture, without handsome pay and luxury goods, the army would not long remain loyal to Idi Amin.

GROWING AND MARKETING UGANDAN COFFEE

The way that coffee is grown and marketed in Uganda needs to be understood by this committee.

Basically, the coffee growers market their coffees through their grower cooperatives or through private merchants, who then sell it, eventually, to the government-owned coffee marketing board.

The farmers usually receive minimal prices, often in the form of chits, as opposed to cash, from the government for their coffee. The chits are often not redeemed, so that the amount of money that flows to the farmers for their coffee is very small, indeed. That, I think, is a major explanation for the dropoff in coffee production over the past several years. There was less coffee grown, substantially less, last year than was grown the year before. It also accounts for a great smuggling trade in coffee where farmers, to the extent to which they are able, smuggle their coffee across the border into Kenya. At the same time as production has decreased in Uganda, the coffee exports from Kenya have increased substantially, and that is, essentially, Ugandan coffee that is smuggled across the border.

Many, many farmers have turned away from coffee, if they could, and have gone into subsistence farming because the economy of Uganda is in such a shambles. I might add that in terms of smuggling, it is done by individuals and also by a number of governmental officials, members of the army, for example, who find it quite lucrative to purchase coffee or even to confiscate coffee from the farmers and smuggle it across the border into Kenya to be sold there.

UGANDA'S OTHER SOURCES OF REVENUE

A question is what other sources of government revenue does Amin have.

The answer is that he has very few other sources of revenue, indeed. Coffee accounts for over 90 percent of the exports from Uganda. As I said before, without those coffee exports, Uganda would be hard pressed, indeed, to have any foreign exchange.

The question of what use is made by Amin of the coffee export revenues I think I have already covered.

Another question is if the United States totally stopped buying coffee from Uganda, what would be the effect on Amin's government. Would this take place if all European countries joined our efforts?

U.S. COFFEE IMPORTS

Coffee imports to the United States from Uganda account for about 33 percent of Amin's exports. We think that if the United States totally stopped buying coffee from Uganda, that would have a substantial disruptive effect on his ability to stay in power. Beyond that, however, one of our major allies and trading partners, Great Britain, accounts for another 21 percent of Uganda's coffee export. Another four of our allies—Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Japan—account for another 20 percent. So, if we are able to impose a coffee boycott and if we can get a few of our allies to follow suit, we will have effectively cut off 75 percent of Uganda's current market for coffee.

EFFECTS OF A COFFEE BOYCOTT

I do not believe that Amin could survive that kind of disruption of his coffee market.

It is conceivable that the Soviet Union or the Arab countries could try to step in and fill the gap left by the cutoff of markets in Western nations. Frankly, I doubt that that would be the case. But even if it were, at least in the case of the Soviets, it would be Soviet rubles which Idi Amin would be using to purchase Soviet arms instead of U.S. dollars, which he is currently using to purchase Soviet arms.

I have the feeling that our efforts at a boycott are partially practical and physical, and partially psychological. As I have said, cutting off the U.S. market and that of our allies would create serious practical difficulties to Amin. Beyond that, however, I believe that there is a significant psychological dimension. Amin stays in power by force, by the force of a secret police which is well paid, by the force of a mercenary army which is loyal to him because of being well paid and not out of any real loyalty to the nation of Uganda.

It is my belief that psychologically Amin will be viewed as a ruler with a future or a ruler without a future and that the effects of a coffee boycott, even one imposed only by the United States at first, could have a very serious effect on his ability to stay in power.

EFFECTS OF A BOYCOTT ON COFFEE PRICES

Another question which has been raised is the effect of a Ugandan coffee boycott on the price of coffee in the United States.

I have consulted with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and have been told by the Department that the likely effect on U.S. prices of coffee will be minimal. Although our imports of coffee represent some 33 percent of Amin's exports, they represent less than 5 percent of our imports, and other sources of coffee are readily available. Indeed, there is a bumper crop of coffee in South America this year. So, the likely impact on the United States will be very, very small.

The United Kingdom has not yet taken any official action. However, I have been in contact with some Members of the British Parliament about starting a similar move. There is some enthusiasm within the Parliament for a boycott by Britain and Members of the Parliament have introduced legislation similar to my own.

USING ECONOMIC LEVERAGE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

Another question is suggested in your testimony; that is, that there are historical precedents for our country qualifying its commitment to free trade and using economic leverage for political purposes. You ask me if I can cite some examples.

Yes, I can.

In the early 1950's, the United States dropped most favored nation status for Czechoslovakia, a clear violation of article I of the GATT agreements. Even though Czechoslovakia complained, GATT members retroactively approved the move.

Again, in the early 1950's, the Netherlands complained of U.S. violations of GATT with respect to trade barriers for dairy product imports. To the best of my knowledge, that matter remains unresolved.

In 1960, the United States unilaterally cut off trade with Cuba. While Cuba never complained to GATT, the violation occurred nevertheless. Either this decision was wrong, or some principles outweigh free trade.

Also in 1960, we were successful in persuading the OAS to approve economic sanctions against the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic for its attempted intervention in Venezuela. Certainly on other occasions we have restricted the sale of certain types of technology to Communist countries. Sometimes the Coordinating Committee within NATO has been utilized in this regard. Even the Carter administration has tacitly acknowledged that limited economic sanctions are sometimes justified. Witness the cutbacks in credits on aid to a few countries, like Uruguay, last year.

1978—THE "YEAR OF PEACE AND RECONCILIATION"

It is said that Amin has proclaimed 1978 to be the "Year of Peace and Reconciliation." It has been suggested by a few press accounts and by a few Americans who have visited Uganda in recent months that Amin may genuinely be trying to turn over a new leaf. The question is, do I think those reports are to be believed or do they represent a public relations campaign undertaken by Amin.

Mr. Chairman, I believe very much that the latter is the case. Amin has been very much aware of the moves within Congress since last fall to impose a boycott on trade with Uganda. During the five hearings that were held in the House International Relations Committee, the Ugandan Chargé d'Affairs was in the back of the room watching

every hearing. I believe that he knows how serious it would be for his ability to stay in power if a boycott were imposed and that he is maintaining or trying to maintain a somewhat lower profile.

TESTIMONY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

However, this committee had excellent testimony last week from Amnesty International which, I think, gives the lie to any intention that Amin has turned over a new leaf. It is the same Idi Amin who has been responsible for the killing of somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 of his fellow countrymen over the last 7 years. This is the same person who has sent one Ugandan citizen after another into prison to be tortured and killed.

It is my feeling, Mr. Chairman, that that is action which is beyond the pale and that we, in the United States, on the basis of genocide, must disassociate ourselves in every respect from that regime.

Another question asked concerns the welfare of Americans remaining in Uganda.

It was asked if we tried to communicate with any of these people and, if so, what reaction have we gotten.

NUMBER OF AMERICANS IN UGANDA

We have tried to communicate with them. The number of Americans in Uganda is estimated to be about 200. That includes something less than 100 people who are there as missionaries, religious missionaries, and something over 100 who are there for various commercial purposes.

The people who are there for commercial purposes are being well paid for their efforts. They presumably know what the dangers are of an unstable government such as Idi Amin's, and as a result of that, they stay, they make money, and I don't think we have to worry too much about them.

CONCERN FOR THE MISSIONARIES

However, I am concerned about the missionaries. We wrote to each one of the missionary orders last fall asking them about the situation and for their response.

They are aware that the U.S. Government has made one effort after another over the years to warn missionaries and to ask them to leave the country. They have chosen, in many cases, not to do so because they feel a religious commitment to serve the people of Uganda, and the worse conditions get in Uganda, the greater that commitment becomes.

However, virtually every one of the religious orders to which we wrote responded to us that the missionaries were aware of the dangers to themselves and they were staying despite those dangers; also, they felt that the United States should not make its foreign policy in any way based on what might happen to them.

I think that has reassured me somewhat, although I still am concerned about their future.

Mr. Chairman, those pretty well cover the questions that were raised about the coffee boycott. I would be happy to answer any additional questions that you might have.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much for a very helpful presentation. You have exerted some very strong leadership on this issue, and we are very grateful to you for it.

Senator Pearson, do you have any questions?

Senator PEARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't believe I have any questions. I congratulate the Congressman. The staff of this committee directed my attention to his efforts several months ago, and I want to commend him for his leadership and his very strong position.

There are some questions prepared by staff, but I see, however, that there is a long list of witnesses to be heard today. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we could just go ahead.

Senator SARBANES. I want to ask this question.

WHAT IS THE GAP BETWEEN THE GROWERS' PRICE AND AMIN'S PRICE
FOR COFFEE?

Do you know what the growers receive for their coffee and what Amin in turn finally gets for it? What is the gap between those two figures?

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I think I will have to supply that for the record.

My memory is that the growers receive about 14 cents a pound for coffee, I believe, which is substantially less than growers in most other nations receive. The market price of coffee, or the price at which the Ugandan Coffee Board sells it, escapes me for the moment. But I will supply that for the record.

[The following information was subsequently received for the record:]

The London Times of July 25, 1978 details that Ugandan robusta coffee for that day was selling on international markets at \$1.05 per pound.

Senator SARBANES. In any event, what the growers in Uganda receive on a comparative basis is significantly less than is generally the case for growers in other countries; is that correct?

Mr. PEASE. That is very much the case; yes.

I will get those figures for you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

POSITION OF KENYAN OFFICIALS

Senator SARBANES. Did you have a question concerning the supposed position of Kenyan officials? Did you address that? If you did, I missed it, I'm afraid.

Mr. PEASE. Yes, sir. We have heard that some Kenyan officials who have visited the United States have made the statement that we ought not to be too hard on Idi Amin.

I am somewhat skeptical of those statements, Mr. Chairman. As I have said before, there is a flourishing illegal flow of coffee going from Uganda to Kenya, and there is real evidence that a number of Kenyan officials are personally profiting from that sale. It might be in the interest of many of them to continue the present arrangement whereby the economy of Uganda continues to go down and private persons in Kenya can profit from the coffee smuggling.

Senator SARBANES. Even if they didn't profit from it personally, which, of course, is one aspect of it, Kenya profits in any event from

the smuggling that takes place. Would it not? So, as a state policy, it might well desire that that situation continue, since I take it they pay slightly above what the Ugandan grower would receive from the Uganda Coffee Board, and then, in turn, they realize the balance of the profit. Is that not the case?

Mr. PEASE. Yes; that's correct.

Senator SARBANES. Congressman, yours has been very helpful testimony. We appreciate very much your coming back over here today.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INTRODUCTION OF J. KENNETH FASICK

Senator SARBANES. Our next witness will be Mr. J. Kenneth Fasick, Director, International Division of the General Accounting Office.

Mr. Fasick, we welcome you to the committee today. If you would identify your colleagues and then proceed, we would be happy to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF J. KENNETH FASICK, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY THEODORE BECKER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND ROLLINDE PRAGER, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, GAO

Mr. FASICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On my right is Mr. Ted Becker, who is Assistant Director in our International Division. On my left is Rollinde Prager, who is a professional staff member. Both these persons were involved in our study of the coffee producing and marketing system.

We are pleased to participate in your hearings on United States-Ugandan economic ties, with the objective of providing the subcommittee with information of worldwide coffee production and marketing systems, and, to the extent possible, Uganda's role in these systems.

REPORT BY GAO

We had conducted a study and prepared a report to the Congress, "Coffee: Production and Marketing Systems," dated October 28, 1977, at the request of the chairman of the Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition of the House Committee on Agriculture.

The information in the report was based on work performed during the period March through August 1977, and related primarily to coffee production and marketing in 1976 and the early part of 1977. Our work was performed in the five largest coffee-producing countries and consequently did not include Uganda. However, some information on Uganda and other producing countries was obtained from sources in the United States.

COFFEE PRODUCED IN 53 COUNTRIES

Coffee is produced in 53 countries and territories, and is vital to the economies of many underdeveloped countries.

In 1976, its export value was more than \$8 billion, second only to petroleum in international commodity trade.

For the 1976-77 crop year, Uganda was the seventh largest producing country, having produced 2.7 million bags, each weighing 60 kilos.

In 1976, Uganda exported 2.6 million bags valued at \$298 million. This represented about 83 percent of its total exports.

Coffee marketing systems of the producing countries consist of growers, processors, brokers, or other intermediaries, domestic roasters, exporters, and either a government or quasi-government agency charged with carrying out the countries' coffee policies. Such policies may be directed toward any number of objectives, from controlling production, inventories, and exports, to allocating or maximizing government revenues and curbing inflation.

PRODUCING COUNTRIES SET MINIMAL INTERNAL PRICES

To help allocate income within the coffee sector and prices stabilize income to the growers, producing countries set minimum internal prices to growers in conjunction with export taxes and minimum export registration prices.

UGANDA'S MAIN PRODUCING AREA

In Uganda, the main coffee producing area is in the south-central part of the country around Kampala. Almost all production comes from over half a million small farms, half of which are less than 2 acres.

The Uganda Coffee Marketing Board, an official Government body, undertakes a variety of activities, including the purchase and export of coffee. Growers sell mainly to agents of the board at a guaranteed price established by the board. The board exports coffee by consignment through commercial exporters at the port of Mombasa, Kenya.

U.S. COFFEE IMPORTS

In 1976, the United States imported 19.8 million bags of coffee valued at \$2.6 billion, of which 5 percent or 941,000 bags, valued at \$106 million, reportedly came from Uganda.

The principal ports of entry for coffee in the United States are New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco. There is no duty on coffee, but it is subject to customs formalities. A customs permit to deliver and appropriate shipping documents must be presented to the Customs Service.

The coffee is also subject to inspection by the Food and Drug Administration.

The Customs Service furnishes data to the Bureau of Census which compiles and reports general imports by commodity, country of origin, and value. The country of origin is normally the country where the merchandise is grown. However, where the country of origin cannot be determined, the transactions are credited to the country of shipment. Therefore, the "origin" statistics for Uganda or, for that matter, any other country, could be overstated or understated.

Our study did not include any assessment of the potential error rate.

THE 1968 AGREEMENT

The capability to obtain precise "origin" data is further compromised by the 1976 International Coffee Agreement which differs from the 1968 agreement on the use of export quotas. The 1968 agreement had continuously operative quotas and required member countries to prohibit the entry of coffee from another member country that was not accompanied by a certificate of origin or re-export.

THE 1976 AGREEMENT

The 1976 agreement provides for export quotas when prices fall to between 63 and 77 cents a pound. As prices have been substantially above the trigger price since the inception of the agreement, export quotas have not been in effect, and consequently origin certificates are not required.

To implement a coffee tracking system designed to provide the International Coffee Organization, which administers the agreement, with statistical data, the Customs Service collects certificates of origin or import returns covering coffee entering the United States. As the procedures are voluntary on the part of importers, no shipments of coffee are delayed or denied entry if the documents are not furnished.

Buyers of green coffee operate in the spot, shipment, and futures markets. The spot market concerns trading among importers, brokers, jobbers, and roasters of coffee that has actually arrived from producing countries and is already landed and in warehouses.

The shipment market involves the purchase or sale of actual coffee for shipment from a producing country at a given time. The futures market involves the sale and purchase of contracts on the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange for the future delivery of coffee. However, under normal conditions, actual delivery against such contracts is seldom made, the main purpose of futures contracts being to effect hedges against holdings or short sales of actual coffee.

THE GREEN COFFEE ASSOCIATION

The Green Coffee Association, a trade association, performs various services, including the gathering of statistical data on the quantity of coffee arrivals.

The association compiles the statistics by exporting country and importing country. The 1976 statistics indicate that about 15 percent of the imports are for "order" or no specified purchaser. For the Atlantic and Pacific coasts ports, the statistical data shows imports from Uganda of 276,478 bags, of which 96,433 bags, or about 35 percent, were consigned to "order."

Representatives of the trade estimate that 75 percent of the coffee imported is handled by coffee merchants, while the remainder is purchased directly from producing countries by processors.

Mr. Chairman, this statement is very brief and hardly does justice to the intricacies of the international coffee marketing system. With your permission, I would like to submit for the record or for the use of the subcommittee our previously cited report to provide a more complete description of the system.

This completes my prepared statement, and we would be pleased to endeavor to answer any questions you may have.

Senator SARBANES. We would be happy to receive the previously cited report for the use of the committee and would appreciate having that made available to us for our reference.

[The information referred to is in subcommittee's files.]

THE FIVE LARGEST COFFEE PRODUCERS

Senator SARBANES. That work dealt with the five largest coffee producing countries, is that correct?

Mr. FASICK. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. It might be helpful if you would detail now for the record what those were. We would like that included in this testimony.

Mr. FASICK. Mr. Becker?

Mr. BECKER. The countries were Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador—

Senator SARBANES. Is this their order of importance for the international market?

Mr. BECKER. Well, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, and the Ivory Coast would be the five.

Senator SARBANES. You said that Uganda was seventh. Do you recall which country was sixth?

Mr. BECKER. I believe it was Indonesia.

Senator SARBANES. Do you have some order of magnitude of their production so that we can compare how Uganda ranks?

Mr. BECKER. In our report, on page 2, we have the 1977-78 production statistics, that is, the 1977-78 crop year.

Brazil was the largest, with 17,000 bags. Colombia was next with 9,300 bags.

Mr. FASICK. Those figures are for thousands of bags, so you are really talking millions.

Mr. BECKER. Of course. Those are millions of bags.

The Ivory Coast had 4,200,000 bags.

Senator SARBANES. Was that third?

Mr. BECKER. The Ivory Coast would be fourth. Mexico would be third.

El Salvador had 3 million bags.

Senator SARBANES. What was Mexico's production?

Mr. BECKER. 4.5 million bags.

Senator SARBANES. The Ivory Coast was 4.2 million?

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. And El Salvador?

Mr. BECKER. Three million bags.

Senator SARBANES. Would you please finish the list down to Uganda and perhaps to the country after Uganda? These you said are the 1977-78 production figures?

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. All right. Brazil had 17 million bags, is that correct, and is No. 1?

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Colombia is No. 2 with 9.3 million.

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Mexico is third with 4.5 million.

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. The Ivory Coast was fourth with 4.2 million.

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. El Salvador was fifth at 3 million.

Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. All right. Please go on.

Mr. BECKER. Indonesia would be sixth with 3 million bags.

Uganda would be seventh with 2.6 million bags.

Senator SARBANES. What is the next country after Uganda and what is its figure?

Mr. FASICK. It is Guatemala, which is 2,450,000 bags.

Senator SARBANES. After that does it drop off?

Mr. FASICK. Ethiopia would be next with 1.9 million; after that would be India with 1,760,000 bags. Then it drops off there, going down to the rest of the world being 790,000 bags.

Senator SARBANES. It goes below 1 million after that?

Mr. FASICK. No. There are some others with over 1 million. If you would care to hear all of those, we would cite them for you. It is hard to put them in order because we don't have them in order in our listing.

Senator SARBANES. I think what we will do, because we will not include the whole report as part of the record—that is just to be available for our reference—is to include table 1 of that report in the record.

Mr. FASICK. Yes, sir. Table 1 of page 2 of our report has those figures.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

RELIABILITY OF THE FIGURES

Mr. FASICK, I didn't altogether follow the point you were trying to make at the end. Does that run to the question of how reliable the figures are?

Mr. FASICK. Yes. It runs to how reliable the figures are and how reliable they can be because of the nature of the worldwide marketing system.

Congressman Pease was talking in terms of the shipments of all of Uganda's coffee as having to go through Kenya. There is no estimate, but it is expected that a substantial amount of Ugandan coffee is contraband or smuggled and sent across in other unofficial ways. So, once coffee is shipped from Kenya, there is no certainty that it is Kenyan coffee. It would be very difficult, we think, to be able to get a control over this type of situation.

Senator SARBANES. What do you mean "to get control?"

Mr. FASICK. To have some confidence in the credibility of the certificates of origin which would be required. Once coffee is shipped from Uganda to Kenya, there is no way to assure yourself that you can distinguish between Kenyan and Ugandan coffee.

Senator SARBANES. In the table from which you were quoting, what is the Kenyan coffee production for 1977-78?

Mr. FASICK. 1,335,000 bags.

I don't have figures of the change in those statistics; but Congressman Pease was alluding to a substantial reported increase in Kenyan coffee in the recent past.

Senator SARBANES. You don't have figures for earlier years? I assumed you did because you made reference here to earlier years, didn't you?

Mr. FASICK. Yes.

INFORMATION FROM INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, the information from the International Coffee Organization shows exportable production for Kenya for the 1972-73 crop year of 1.241 million bags; for the 1973-74 crop year of 1.224 million bags; for the 1974-75 crop year of 1.151 million bags; for 1975-76 crop year of 1.204 million bags; and for 1977, 1.249 million bags.

I should point out, as we do in our report, that the exportable production figures of countries are based primarily on what the country reports to the International Coffee Organization. It is very difficult to substantiate actual production from these countries.

Senator PEARSON. If the Chair would yield, what was the purpose of that report? I am just assuming that it was requested to get some data as to production and marketing as it affects consumer prices in this country.

Was that the purpose?

Mr. FASICK. That was the original purpose of the chairman of the House subcommittee when he requested us to do the work.

In the course of assessing the impact that coffee shortages in a worldwide market system would have on prices, naturally we went into—

Senator PEARSON. You were not able to say whether or not it was price responsive to production by many conditions or whether it was price responsive to a cartel, is that correct?

Mr. FASICK. That's right, sir.

Senator PEARSON. That may be a digression, but what was the conclusion of the report?

Mr. FASICK. The report was basically informational. We didn't draw conclusions. While we didn't have recommendations we did have some conclusions—for example, the impact that a government's action could have through tax mechanisms, for instance, impacting on the price of coffee that our consumers in the United States would have to pay. I think in our report we found a relationship between the two, not a market relationship, although there was some impact by these actions of a government. That is an example of the type of observations we made.

Senator SARBANES. I will yield to you, Senator Pearson, for further questions.

Senator PEARSON. Thank you.

UNITED STATES IMPORTS 5 PERCENT OF UGANDA'S COFFEE

In your statement, you indicated that U.S. imports amount to 5 percent of Uganda's production, is that correct?

Mr. FASICK. Yes; 5 percent of the U.S. coffee imports was Ugandan coffee.

Senator PEARSON. So, if a U.S. embargo wants to go beyond the manifestation of some moral principle, how effective would it be on the Ugandan Government's policies or mechanisms in Uganda?

Senator SARBANES. We had better be sure we have the figures correctly.

Mr. BECKER. What we said was that U.S. imports consisted of 5 percent which was Ugandan coffee; but this amounts to 33 percent of Ugandan exports.

Senator PEARSON. I see. I will put to you the same question with a different preface, that of 33 percent.

THE EFFECTS OF A BOYCOTT AND WOULD OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE?

Mr. FASICK. We think that if an embargo was placed upon Ugandan coffee, it would have a disruptive effect on the coffee market. From what we can discern, however, it would be a temporary disruption, so far as Uganda goes, as it would find other outlets for its coffee, as we found other sources to replace the Ugandan coffee we had been importing—unless, as Congressman Pease was suggesting, we also get the European countries to participate in an embargo or a boycott.

Senator PEARSON. Suppose the British participate? I understand that is the only other country contemplating similar action?

Mr. FASICK. That would mean that somewhere over 50 percent of the Ugandan coffee would be subject to a boycott. That could have a more marked impact.

WHERE WOULD BURDEN OF BOYCOTT FALL?

Senator PEARSON. Within the country, where does the burden fall? Is it on the producers, on the government policymakers? Where would the disruption fall of having 50 percent of their exports of coffee cut off in an effective boycott?

What are the dynamics of the economy that one could indicate as to where the burden falls within the country?

Mr. FASICK. We are not sure that the burden, in the long term, would fall on Uganda. The nature of the coffee market is such that even if both the United States and Britain should boycott this coffee, they would turn to some other source for their robusta, the type of coffee you get from Uganda; as a consequence, possibly Uganda could fill the void created in the other markets by selling their coffee.

So, we are not exactly confident that in the long term it would have a marked economic impact on Uganda.

Did you want to elaborate on that in any way?

Mr. BECKER. Our opinion would be that it would take the complete cooperation of all importing and exporting countries to make a boycott effective.

Senator SARBANES. I want to pursue that question.

Is there something unique about the quality of Ugandan coffee that would always assure it a market; that, in effect, there would be a demand for that coffee and not a shift to other suppliers?

Mr. FASICK. We think so. The type of coffee grown in Africa, robusta, is blended with almost all coffee or is used extensively in the soluble or instant-type coffees. There is a heavy demand in the world for this type of coffee.

Senator SARBANES. You slid over from saying Uganda to saying Africa.

The question is whether Ugandan coffee has any unique qualities which would always assure its demand—not whether African coffee does, because I know that some other African countries have significant coffee production.

Mr. FASICK. Did you want to explain that, Ted?

Mr. BECKER. The robusta is about 30 percent of the world's supply. To my knowledge, there is nothing distinctive about the Ugandan robusta. It would be replaceable by any robusta, especially from the East African countries.

Senator SARBANES. At the moment, the certificates of origin are voluntary in an effort to provide the statistical data for the operation in the International Coffee Agreement, is that right?

Mr. FASICK. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. How significant a burden would result if the requirement were made mandatory rather than voluntary?

Mr. FASICK. I don't think it would be substantially burdensome. It would cause some additional paperwork and processes on the part of the importers and also the customs people. We are getting import certificates on a voluntary basis, evidently, from a substantial number of importers. To make it mandatory I do not think would increase the workload that much and it would bring some additional—what shall I say—credibility also to the statistical assessment of origins of the coffee.

HOW COULD UGANDA ADJUST TO THE SITUATION

Senator SARBANES. It is not clear to me why you say that if 55 percent, which I guess would represent the United States and the United Kingdom share, of the Ugandan coffee market were to be lost to them that they would be able to adjust to that situation.

Mr. FASICK. We are assuming that the worldwide demand will remain stable or would continue to grow, such as it is, and those countries which do not participate in the boycott would probably end up filling the void that was created by the United States and Britain getting out of the market, in order to fulfill the worldwide demand.

Let's say the United States and Britain do not buy Ugandan coffee, that we buy coffee from Kenya or the Ivory Coast. The demand placed upon those markets would absorb that supply. So, the other consumers would look to Uganda coffee to fill their needs.

Senator SARBANES. Well, why wouldn't the other suppliers expand their production in order to take advantage of the increased demand?

IT WOULD TAKE 4 TO 6 YEARS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION

Mr. FASICK. To increase production takes about 4 to 6 years—new trees have to get to a producing state. So, production cannot be increased that rapidly in the coffee-producing areas.

Senator SARBANES. Do you have any further questions, Senator Pearson?

Senator PEARSON. No, thank you.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Fasick, thank you very much.

INTRODUCTION OF MR. SEYMOUR MINDEL

Our next witness is Mr. Seymour Mindel, president, Chock Full O' Nuts, New York, N.Y.

If you would come forward, sir, we would be happy to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF SEYMOUR MINDEL, PRESIDENT, CHOCK FULL O' NUTS CORP., NEW YORK, N.Y., ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE RUDY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND MANAGER, GREEN COFFEE BUYING DIVISION

Mr. MINDEL. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I would like to introduce my associate, George Rudy, who is a senior vice president and is the manager of our green coffee buying division.

Chock Full O' Nuts Coffee Corp. buys green coffee, roasts, packs, and sells through supermarkets and other grocery outlets as well as our own restaurant chain.

THE BOYCOTT OF CHOCK FULL O' NUTS

We decided approximately 2 years ago that we would, in our own way, protest against the ruthlessness of the Ugandan regime by discontinuing the purchase of Uganda coffee. This decision was made on purely moral grounds and without pressure.

We sought no publicity, but after many of our accounts read about other companies whose position was publicized, they asked us about our status in this matter. We then sent out a release dated May 19, 1978, as follows:

Seymour Mindel, President of Chock Full O' Nuts Corp., states that Chock Full O' Nuts has not bought Uganda coffee for the past 2 years. We heartily support the boycott of coffee grown in Uganda under the present regime.

Although we took this position unilaterally and we would hope that other companies would join in this effort to bring economic pressures on Uganda, we also are aware of the problems and implications that may arise in the future with other governments of the world.

We don't believe that it should be within the province of individual companies to take this type of action on a personal basis. We don't believe that foreign policy should be determined by business interests which could be self-serving.

Foreign policy, with all of its ramifications, is the function of government which must set procedures as necessary for the national interest.

Thank you.

I would be willing to answer any questions that you may have.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, sir, for your statement.

Senator Pearson.

Senator PEARSON. I don't believe I have any questions at this time.

WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF BUSINESS?

Well, yes. Let me just ask you what you mean by the last part of your sentence, Mr. Mindel, where you say: "We are aware of the problems and implications that may arise in the future with other governments of the world." What do you mean by that?

Mr. MINDEL. I mean that if other countries are ruled by dictators whose policies we do not approve, I do not think it is the function of business itself to take the action. I think it is the function of the Government to establish the guidelines.

Senator PEARSON. You hold that view even though your company unilaterally made a decision and a judgment not to buy any coffee from Uganda?

Mr. MINDEL. Yes. Absolutely.

Senator PEARSON. I don't think I have any further questions.

But I do want to commend Mr. Mindel for his sense of responsibility in following through on a judgment that dealt with human rights and morality. I think that is too infrequently seen in the business community of this country.

Mr. MINDEL. Thank you, sir.

Senator PEARSON. I want to commend you regardless of what happens to this particular bill for the actions that your company took in this matter.

Mr. MINDEL. Thank you, sir.

Senator SARBANES. I want to join in that statement of Senator Pearson.

DID BOYCOTT HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE COMPANY?

Mr. Mindel, let me ask you this. Did the decision you made turn out to have any negative impact upon the functioning of the company or place you at any disadvantage with your competitors?

Mr. MINDEL. I don't believe that thus far it has had any impact as far as our company is concerned. We did not know that at the time we made the decision, of course.

Senator SARBANES. In other words, you anticipated then that it might possibly have some disadvantage?

Mr. MINDEL. It could have, relative to the coffee market in general.

Senator SARBANES. What was it you feared might have happened which did not happen?

Mr. MINDEL. It might have increased the prices of the coffees that we would buy instead of the Ugandan coffee because Ugandan coffee is interchangeable really with other coffees. There is nothing unique about Ugandan coffee.

IS UGANDAN COFFEE INTERCHANGEABLE?

Senator SARBANES. Is it interchangeable with other African coffees or is it just as a general proposition interchangeable?

Mr. MINDEL. It is interchangeable with other African coffees, with coffees of the robusta type. It is not interchangeable with the Central American or South American coffees.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Mindel, thank you very much for your statement.

Mr. MINDEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INTRODUCTION OF MR. KENNETH R. DUNNIVANT

Senator SARBANES. Our next witness will be Mr. Kenneth R. Dunnivant, manager, Green Coffee Buying, Folger Coffee Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. Dunnivant, we are pleased to have you before the committee today. Please proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH R. DUNNIVANT, MANAGER, GREEN COFFEE BUYING, THE FOLGER COFFEE CO., CINCINNATI, OHIO

Mr. DUNNIVANT. Mr. Chairman, my name is Kenneth Dunnivant and I am manager of the Green Coffee Buying Department of the Folger Coffee Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Procter & Gamble Co.

Folger markets two established coffee brands—Vacuum and Instant Folger's. Vacuum Folger's is sold throughout the United States while Instant Folger's is sold in an area comprising about 60 percent of the U.S. population.

To conserve time, we plan to respond directly to the questions posed by the subcommittee in the invitation to testify.

WHAT IS IMPORTANCE OF COFFEE TO UGANDA?

Question. What is the importance of coffee to the economy of Uganda?

Answer. We have no independent sources of information on this subject and rely on published information. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agriculture Circular of January 1978, lists the following percentages for Ugandan coffee as a percent of value of total Ugandan exports: in 1974, 73.3 percent; in 1975, 77.8 percent; in 1976, 85.8 percent.

MARKETING AND EXPORTING OF UGANDAN COFFEE

Question. What information do you have on the marketing and exporting of Ugandan coffee?

Answer. As far as we know, Uganda's Coffee Marketing Board is the sole sales agent for all Uganda coffee.

We understand that the Coffee Marketing Board maintains offices in New York and in London, is headquartered in Uganda, and sells coffee to coffee roasters and coffee dealers in the United States and other coffee consuming countries of the world.

THE UGANDAN COFFEE MARKETING BOARD

Question. What dealings have you had with the Ugandan Coffee Marketing Board?

Answer. Over the years, our dealings have been primarily with New York representatives of the Uganda Coffee Marketing Board. These representatives have sold Ugandan coffee to us, have handled inquiries about scheduling of shipments and have handled any necessary weight or quality adjustments on those coffee shipments.

WHY PURCHASE UGANDAN COFFEE?

Question. What are your reasons for purchasing Ugandan coffee in light of the evidence of the human rights policies of Uganda and what is the rationale behind your voluntary decision not to purchase any more Ugandan coffee?

Answer. We have previously pointed out in testimony before Congress and in correspondence with individual Members of Congress that while we abhor the reports of violations of human rights in Uganda, we believe that only our governmental leaders have both the information and the authority to make a sensitive policy decision like an embargo on imports from a foreign country.

We regarded the unanimous approval of the Uganda trade resolution by the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, which followed hearings by three subcommittees, as a considered expression of congressional foreign policy thinking. Accordingly, we suspended purchases of coffee from Uganda.

WHAT WOULD BE EFFECTS OF BOYCOTT?

Question. What effect would a total U.S. boycott have on the amount of coffee exported from Uganda?

Answer. The United States purchases about one-third of Uganda's coffee exports. Since there is a market for robusta-type coffees throughout the world, we believe that the U.S. State Department is on solid ground in its view that a boycott of Ugandan coffee by the United States alone would be unlikely to have a serious impact on Uganda.

Such a boycott would primarily cause a redistribution of Ugandan coffee to other consuming countries and the resultant void in the United States would be filled by robusta coffees produced elsewhere.

POLICIES TOWARD PURCHASE OF UGANDAN COFFEE

Question. What are the policies of your foreign subsidiaries regarding the purchase of Uganda coffee?

Answer. We have only one small subsidiary in Europe which is in the coffee business—only one small subsidiary in the coffee business outside the United States. They also have suspended purchases of coffee from Uganda.

EFFECTS OF BANNING UGANDAN COFFEE IN U.S.

Question. What would be the effect that a ban on Ugandan coffee in the United States would have upon the available supply of coffee in this country and the price of coffee in this country?

Answer. Uganda is one of many countries which grow robusta coffees. Traditionally, Uganda exports about 17 percent of the total robustas shipped to the world and only about 5 percent of all of the types of green coffee that are exported.

With our suspension of purchases from Uganda, we have been able to switch to other sources with little difficulty. We suspect that this is probably equally true for other roasters as well.

We would not anticipate that this action will have a significant effect on our business or, for that matter, on the price of our coffee to American consumers, although we recognize that no one has the ability to forecast future coffee prices with accuracy.

REACTION TO MANDATORY BAN BY U.S. GOVERNMENT

Question. What is your reaction to establishing a mandatory ban on the purchase of Ugandan coffee by the U.S. Government?

Answer. As we have said before, we believe that this is an appropriate decision for our properly constituted governmental authorities in the executive branch and in the Congress. We wish to repeat that the Folger Coffee Co. will continue to support, both in letter and in spirit, whatever official trade policy the U.S. Government adopts toward Uganda.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, sir.

Senator PEARSON.

Senator PEARSON. I don't have any questions, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR PEARSON'S CONCERNS

I don't want to appear to be argumentative or sarcastic, but I really am troubled by the expressions you make that only the Government has the information, only the Government in its wisdom can make these terribly sensitive foreign policy decisions, and that whatever we do you are going to follow along. If the House subcommittee issues a report and says no, that is not the right thing to do, why we will cut off our purchases.

That is just too inconsistent with the general disenchantment in the land and too inconsistent, really, with the rising course of objection in the business community to let us make more of our own decisions.

As I said, I really don't have a question. I am just concerned about this attitude. The extension of that kind of policy in all of your business dealings, exports and foreign relations matters, in the world of international companies has real implications, I think, for these troubled times.

You may respond to what I have said, if you wish, or not respond. I don't have a question. I just merely think that that is a position and attitude that strikes me as being rather unrealistic.

Mr. DUNNIVANT. Senator, if I may—

Senator PEARSON. Please notice that when I finished I smiled so as to indicate no intention to embarrass you or to be argumentative.

[General laughter.]

MIXED SIGNALS COMING FROM WASHINGTON

Mr. DUNNIVANT. Senator, if I may, I would simply like to submit that the mixed signals coming out of Washington on the subject of a

boycott on trade with Uganda suggest that the issue, I think, is not as clear-cut as your question or comment implies.

We understand that the State Department has consistently been recommending against an embargo on the basis of its questionable effectiveness and on the basis of possible risk to American citizens living in Uganda.

For the reasons that I outlined, we repeatedly sought governmental guidance on this matter. We regarded the unanimous approval of the Uganda trade resolution by the House Committee on International Relations as a definite indication of governmental foreign policy thinking. We took unilateral action to suspend purchases from Uganda the very day that that resolution passed the committee.

Senator PEARSON. I can sympathize with what you said. So often, when you are abroad, and you talk to our Ambassadors in other countries, they tell you that one of their greatest problems is to explain to foreign governments that when they deal with the United States, they actually have to deal with several governments, one being the State Department, one being the Congress, one being another agency or somebody else in the bureaucracy in general.

So, I can sympathize with the confusion of the mixed signals that come out. It is partly because of that that I would think there would be more individual initiative in the business community on some of these subjects than has heretofore been the case.

I thank you very much for your statement.

Senator CHURCH [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Pearson.

IN MOST CASES, TRADE OUGHT TO BE POLITICALLY COLORBLIND

I used to drink Folger's Coffee. I'm glad that you have made this decision. I gave it up because I had to go to coffee beans to be sure I wasn't getting any from Uganda. Now I am hooked on those coffee beans, I am afraid.

I am happy to learn that your company has made this decision. I think it represents the fact that individual companies in this country can affect policy, can make policy for themselves. Here you have taken what seems to me to be the right step.

I normally feel that trade ought to be politically colorblind. But there are cases, and this is one of them, where the regime has become so bestial that all civilized people ought to consider the ramifications of continuing to do business that enables such a regime to exist.

I think you have made the right decision.

Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes, thank you for presiding for me. Do you have any questions?

Senator SARBANES. No, thank you.

INTRODUCTION OF MR. ANDREW J. SCHRODER

Senator CHURCH. Our next witness is Andrew J. Schroder, the vice president of public affairs for General Foods Corp.

STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. SCHRODER, VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GENERAL FOODS CORP., WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SCHRODER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Andrew J. Schroder, and I am vice president of public affairs for General Foods Corp.

We welcome this opportunity to present our position on the question of trade with Uganda.

Earlier this year, on April 6, General Foods was invited to testify on this same subject before three subcommittees of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.¹ Because of the relevance of the material discussed on that occasion to some of the matters that I have been asked to cover here with you, I am attaching a copy of these earlier comments to this testimony being presented today.

GENERAL FOODS MEETING WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

You will note that our testimony on April 6 summarized our activities on the matter of U.S. trade with Uganda and included a description of a meeting held at our request in November 1977, with the State Department's Deputy Secretary and Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.

We have argued consistently, not that trade with Uganda be permitted to continue, but that our Government proceed to establish uniform trade policy with Uganda.

Our April testimony concluded with the following statement:

We continue to urge the State Department and/or Congress to establish uniform trade policy with Uganda. Industry's obligation is to abide by the government's decision in this complex matter. As you determine whether economic and other sanctions should be imposed against the Government of Uganda, you must determine whether such sanctions will be effective and whether such sanctions, even if effective, perhaps could cause the innocent people of Uganda to suffer even more. These determinations are beyond the competence of any business corporation. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that within our form of government the State Department and Congress are the appropriate forums to give consideration to these concerns as well as others of perhaps even greater importance of which we similarly would have no knowledge.

Therefore, this corporation stands ready to comply with our government's decision and will be glad to provide any further insights we can to assist your deliberations.

On May 16, of course, the House Committee on International Relations unanimously approved House Concurrent Resolution 612, which urged support of such measures as an embargo on trade with Uganda.

In view of this resolution, General Foods acted in accordance with the following statement released on May 17:

STATEMENT OF GENERAL FOODS

The Maxwell House and Food Service Products Divisions of General Foods Corporation ceased direct purchases of Ugandan coffee last December. Since then, General Foods actively has been seeking an expression of United States'

¹ See appendix, p. 122 for April 6, 1978 statement to the House Committee on International Relations.

policy regarding its remaining indirect trade with Uganda through importers and brokers.

No such expression of policy had been made either by the U.S. Department of State or the Congress. However, yesterday the House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations unanimously endorsed the concept of ceasing trade with Uganda.

Effective immediately, these divisions are taking the steps necessary to end all future indirect purchases of Ugandan coffee.

General Foods has always diligently avoided doing anything that might be construed as an attempt to unilaterally determine foreign policy. The company believes that business corporations have neither the right nor the required competence to make such determinations, a point of view that was expressed directly to the State Department by senior officers of the company in November 1977, and again before subcommittees of the Congress in April of this year, occasions when General Foods sought direction on this matter.

INTERPRETATION OF THE STATEMENT

Apparently, there have been some who have interpreted this statement as meaning that General Foods might still import Ugandan coffee into the United States in some other fashion, perhaps through its overseas subsidiaries.

This interpretation of our statement is totally incorrect. Our statement means that General Foods is doing everything that it can to insure that absolutely no Ugandan coffee is used in any of its coffee products sold here in the United States, whether through retail or institutional channels.

In conjunction with its release in mid-May of the statement that I just read, we advised those of our overseas subsidiaries having coffee operations of the action being taken by domestic U.S. units. Additionally, our overseas businesses were instructed as follows:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GENERAL FOODS' OVERSEAS BUSINESS

To consider contacting their local U.S. Embassy—informing the Embassy of the decision made by General Foods in the U.S. and that host country law and policy will influence each subsidiary's decision regarding trade with Uganda, and requesting the Embassy's assistance in keeping informed about changes in host country attitudes regarding this matter.

Second, to make every effort to assist their host governments in any action instituted by these governments to determine the propriety of continuing trade with Uganda.

Third, that in compliance with the spirit of House Concurrent Resolution 612, General Foods will avoid purchases of Ugandan coffee wherever possible, except where such avoidance would place its overseas businesses in a non-competitive position or be inconsistent with host country law or policy.

General Foods' international subsidiaries are engaged in the production and distribution of packaged grocery products similar to our business here in the United States. Some, but not all, of these companies roast and sell coffee products. As General Foods domestic business looks to Washington for direction with respect to matters affecting foreign policy, so each of these overseas companies must conduct their businesses in harmony with the laws and policies of their host countries.

Each of our international businesses having coffee production operations determines the extent of its green coffee requirements and,

where permitted by host country law and policy, conducts its own green coffee purchases.

ROBUSTA COFFEE USED FOR INSTANT COFFEES

Robusta coffees, including Ugandans, customarily are used to a greater extent in the production of soluble or instant coffees. The exception to this is France, where the predominant coffee business is ground coffee, where robusta coffee use nevertheless is significant, but where the General Foods subsidiary has less than 10 percent of the local ground and soluble markets.

In only four overseas countries where General Foods has soluble coffee production operations is the soluble coffee market in that particular country a major part of the country's total coffee business. In the remaining overseas countries where we have coffee operations, the consumer preference is for ground coffee products. Of these four countries with strong soluble coffee markets, General Foods' subsidiaries in all but one case have a business less than half the size of their major competitor, which is Nestle, a Swiss-based company. The single exception is Canada, where our subsidiary has a share of the soluble coffee market approximately equal to this same competitor's and where, incidentally, we have not purchased Ugandan coffee since last October.

Finally, you must realize that restrictions do apply in certain overseas countries regarding producers' purchases of green coffee.

RULES IN SPAIN AND OTHER HOST COUNTRIES

For instance, in Spain, a coffee roaster is not permitted to buy its own green coffee from trade sources or from producing countries but must buy directly from the government of that country. This means that in Spain, where General Foods has a soluble coffee production operation, we must advise the Spanish Government how much robusta coffee we will be requiring, and the Government then decides from which robusta-producing country or other trade source it will buy in order to satisfy our request.

Other examples of host country law and policy affecting purchases overseas of green coffee can be found in Mexico and European Economic Community, or EEC, countries.

In Mexico, the government insists that coffee producers buy only green coffee that is locally grown, thereby disallowing all coffee imports altogether. For EEC countries, a trade convention, the Lome agreement, concluded in 1975, establishes an association with 46 Caribbean, Pacific, and African nations, including Uganda. This Lome agreement gives favored treatment to goods imported from these associated nations, including Ugandan coffee, by permitting their free entry into EEC countries.

We cite these examples of host country law and policy to demonstrate the extent to which certain foreign governments are involved, directly or indirectly, in determining how our subsidiaries and other local coffee roasters are to acquire green coffee.

We hope this information proves helpful in understanding the nature of General Foods' overseas coffee business.

NO AMBIVALENCE

There are those who have characterized our corporate position on this subject as "ambivalent" because of perceived differences between our announced intentions here in the United States and overseas. In fact, there is no ambivalence.

General Foods will do all it can, consistent with host country law and policy and competitive necessity, to avoid purchasing Ugandan coffee wherever it has coffee operations throughout the world. That is our commitment.

Having sought guidance from our Government since last November on the question of propriety of trading with Uganda, General Foods applauds your review of this subject. We sincerely hope this effort will lead to discussions between the United States and other world governments so that the appropriateness of Ugandan trade is determined by those who have the constitutional responsibility in this area.

Thank you very much.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Schroder.

If Folger can suspend purchases of Ugandan coffee by its foreign subsidiaries, why can't General Foods do the same?

Mr. SCHRODER. Mr. Chairman, my understanding of the Folger statement was that they have operations in only one country overseas. That does not necessarily mean to imply that that is not an important business for them.

We have, on the other hand, coffee production operations in nine overseas countries. We have a much more complicated issue afoot here, in other words, than Folger would.

WOULD REFUSAL TO BUY FROM UGANDA CREATE PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE?

Senator CHURCH. Do you know of any country with which you are doing business where the refusal on your part to buy from Uganda would create a serious problem for you with the host government?

Mr. SCHRODER. We are in the process of trying to determine that right now, Mr. Chairman.

To the extent that that is not the case, to the extent that such a complication does not arise, we are one-half of the way home free on this situation, to be very frank about it.

I cited in my testimony the instance of Spain.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. I can see that that would be a case since the Spanish Government does the purchasing and you are hardly in a position to control that.

Mr. SCHRODER. Our subsidiaries overseas will be getting involved in this very issue.

Senator CHURCH. Is it the company's position, then, that to the extent the company is able to refrain from purchasing Ugandan coffee it will do so, even in its overseas operation?

Mr. SCHRODER. Yes, sir. That is exactly our position.

Senator CHURCH. Then only in cases like Spain, or possibly the Common Market countries, do you anticipate that there could be problems?

Mr. SCHRODER. That is certainly one area. I talk in my testimony about the notion of competitive necessity, Mr. Chairman.

NESTLES A MAJOR SEGMENT IN EVERY COFFEE MARKET

It is interesting that one of the large coffee marketers here in the United States who is not here with us today is Nestles. Now, Nestles is a Swiss-based company. Nestles has a major segment in every single coffee market where we compete with them overseas. They are a major factor in every single soluble market where we do business abroad. Therefore, an interesting question which our subsidiaries will also be looking intently at is the behavior that Nestles will exhibit in this situation.

Senator CHURCH. I think I can understand your situation. Your testimony has fully described the position that your company takes.

I have one final question.

GENERAL FOODS BUYING LESS OVERSEAS

Are General Foods' foreign subsidiaries now buying more Ugandan coffee—that is, has General Foods merely rerouted its Ugandan purchases to Europe and other markets?

Mr. SCHRODER. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be totally accurate to say that we are buying less overseas.

Senator CHURCH. That would be in line with what you said was your objective.

Mr. SCHRODER. Really, the objective of this recent corporate communication that we have issued to our overseas subsidiary—well, we are walking through that right now. These are some of the considerations that I have talked to you about.

For example, let's take our fiscal year 1978, which just ended this past April 1. Let's compare that with our fiscal year 1977. During the course of those two periods, for example in England, our English subsidiaries' purchases of Ugandan coffee would have been down by about two-thirds. That compares fiscal 1978 with fiscal 1977.

In France, the purchases would have been down about one-third.

The reasons for that are twofold. One, there has been some softness in the European coffee market as a result of higher retail prices. The second reason is because of the inability of Uganda to meet shipment schedules. There is nothing worse from a coffee roaster standpoint than not being able to count on your source of supply. There have been difficulties in this regard which have been of concern to our English and our French subsidiaries. That is also largely the reason why our Canadian subsidiary has bought Ugandan coffee since October.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony.

INTRODUCTION OF JOHN DAMGARD

Our next witness is John Damgard, the Washington representative of ACLI International.

Mr. Damgard, we welcome you to the committee this morning. Please proceed with your testimony as you see fit.

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. DAMGARD, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE, ACLI INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Mr. DAMGARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here today.

My statement is very brief and I would like to read it with your approval.

Senator CHURCH. Very well.

Mr. DAMGARD. ACLI Coffee Co., a division of ACLI International, Inc., is an importer and merchant of green coffee in the United States with sales offices in San Francisco, New Orleans, and New York.

Senator CHURCH. I wonder if you would please pull the microphone a little closer.

Mr. DAMGARD. Of course.

ABOUT 95 PERCENT OF ACLI SALES TO ROASTERS

Approximately 95 percent of our sales are to roasters, with the balance to other coffee merchants. Our principal business activity is merchandising green coffee in its original import package. Our role is best described as the middleman between the producers or growers and the roasters or manufacturers, in that we sell coffee desired by our clients for their individual blending requirements. Our firm has traded in coffee from virtually all of the 43 producing nations.

THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLEMAN

To further explain the activities of our company, one must understand the role of the middleman in the coffee industry.

What we offer to our clients, besides green coffee, is our services: our long-established connections in the producing areas, our worldwide communication network, our analysis of the market, our experience in traffic and shipping, and our ability to finance the product until our clients desire to take possession.

With regard to the importance of coffee to the economy of Uganda, we have been advised that Uganda's total world coffee exports represent over 70 percent of their foreign export earnings.

Uganda has been considered a major supplier for a variety of coffee known to the industry as robusta.

U.S. IMPORTS AND UGANDA'S EXPORTS

In the year 1977, the United States imported 14,807,691 bags, weighing 60 kilos each, of which approximately 3,352,000 were robusta beans.

Uganda exported to the United States 967,000 bags during 1977; therefore, Uganda coffee accounted for approximately 29 percent of the total robusta usage in the United States.

Total world exports for Uganda in 1977 equaled 2,192,000 bags, and approximately 44 percent of those were imported into the United States.

Uganda coffee is traded initially with the Uganda Coffee Marketing Board, the sole seller of Uganda coffees. The Uganda Coffee Marketing Board has offices in Kampala, Uganda; New York; and London.

The coffee is marketed by the Uganda Coffee Marketing Board to all principal work consuming nations. ACLI Coffee Co. has in the past contacted the New York office of the Uganda Coffee Marketing Board for the purpose of procuring Uganda coffee.

On November 29, 1977, the National Coffee Association, of which ACLI Coffee Co. is a member, passed a resolution requesting the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government to declare and implement a uniform national policy in the United States concerning trade with Uganda. This resolution was widely circulated.

On May 18, 1978, ACLI Coffee Co. advised the office of Senator Mark O. Hatfield that under existing world conditions we would not enter into further contracts to import coffee from Uganda into the United States.

ACLI ABHORS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

ACLI Coffee Co. wishes to state for the record that we abhor all violations of human rights wherever they may occur. Gross violations, such as have been alleged against President Idi Amin, are so abhorrent and repugnant that they simply cannot be tolerated in a civilized world.

We must respectfully point out to the committee, however, that ACLI Coffee Co. does not set foreign policy. We are simply traders.

Our voluntary decision not to import more Uganda coffee into the United States was, of course, prompted by the resolution passed on May 16, 1978, by the House of Representatives International Relations Committee and also the fact that most of the major roasters in the United States have announced that they will refrain from buying Uganda coffee.

BOYCOTT WOULD TEMPORARILY DISRUPT ROBUSTA FLOW

In our opinion, the effect of a total U.S. boycott of Uganda coffee will temporarily disrupt the normal flow of robusta coffee to the United States. Since the revolution in Angola in 1975, this type of coffee is less available to the U.S. roasters.

We therefore believe that additional market disruption will raise prices for robusta coffee immediately after an effective boycott. However, in the longer range, supply and demand will prevail, and as the rest of the world buys presumably distressed coffee from Uganda, then other types of robusta coffee should become more available. The United States then will import more from the countries not boycotted and a normal flow will result.

We therefore doubt that a U.S. boycott alone will achieve the goals intended. Other consuming nations would have to stop buying in order to substantially reduce Uganda's coffee earnings.

Although ACLI Coffee Co. has now voluntarily refrained from importing new Uganda purchases to the United States, we would greatly prefer that the Congress or the executive branch make it mandatory. The reason for this is simple. We are coffee traders and should not be placed in a position to set U.S. foreign trade policy.

Thank you very much.

I would be happy to answer questions that the committee may have.

Senator CHURCH. I can understand that as a middleman you are placed in a quandary when certain of those companies that buy from you are prepared to accept Ugandan coffee and others are not. It creates a problem that you apparently have resolved by simply making a decision on your own part not to import any more Ugandan coffee to the United States.

Mr. DAMGARD. That's correct.

ACLI BUSINESS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Senator CHURCH. Do you do business outside the United States?

Mr. DAMGARD. We have an affiliate company in London, called ACLI-Wodehouse, in which ACLI International has a financial interest, and I am not sure to what degree. It is essentially an autonomous operation, based on the fact that the time differences are such that there is really no purpose in trying to clear their policy with New York as their market hours are different.

Our problem in London, principally, as it is explained to me—and I don't pretend to be a coffee expert—is that on the London futures market, Uganda robusta is a deliverable grade of coffee. As we conduct our business, we frequently take positions, hedging positions, to cover either our purchases or our sales. Frequently that results in a delivery of coffee, and we have no control over whether it would be Ugandan coffee, Kenyan coffee, or that of any other African country.

LENGTH OF ACLI BAN ON UGANDAN COFFEE

Senator CHURCH. How long will ACLI continue its ban on Ugandan coffee in the absence of a mandatory official boycott policy?

Mr. DAMGARD. Certainly as long as Mr. Amin continues to conduct his regime in the manner in which he is conducting it.

Senator CHURCH. I think that is a good answer.

I don't have any further questions.

Senator Sarbanes, do you have any questions that you would like to ask at this time?

Senator SARBANES. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Damgard. We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. DAMGARD. Thank you, Senator, very much.

INTRODUCTION OF MICHAEL J. MADIGAN

Senator CHURCH. Our next witness is Michael J. Madigan, who is now practicing law and representing the Page Airways, Inc., of Rochester, N.Y.

It is nice to see you again, Mike. I remember you from the days when you were cast in a very different role.

Mr. MADIGAN. It is a pleasure to see you again, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. I understand that you have a prepared statement that is to be submitted for the record, unless you would prefer to read it.

Mr. MADIGAN. Whatever the committee would prefer.

Senator CHURCH. Well, let's include your prepared statement in full in the record, and go directly to the questions.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MADIGAN, ATTORNEY FOR PAGE AIRWAYS, INC., ROCHESTER, N.Y.¹

Senator CHURCH. Would you please describe the various airplane-related sales and transactions Page has had with Uganda?

Mr. MADIGAN. Yes, Senator.

Basically, Page has sold two airplanes to Uganda. As described in the statement we provided this morning, in 1973, in conjunction with the Grumman Corp., Page sold a Grumman Gulfstream II aircraft to the Republic of Uganda. Later, in 1975, Page purchased a Lockheed L-100 Hercules Aircraft and resold it to the Republic of Uganda.

In addition to that, Page entered into an operating agreement which provided for the operation and maintenance of the L-100 aircraft. Page, however, has recently exercised its rights under that service contract to terminate that agreement and is in the process of withdrawing its crews from operation pursuant to that agreement. That should be done by the end of this month.

PAGE TO TERMINATE OPERATING CONTRACT WITH UGANDA

Senator CHURCH. Does this mean that the Page Co. has made a decision to sever its connections with the Ugandan Government?

Mr. MADIGAN. Page has made a decision to terminate the operating contract that it had with the Ugandan Government. Based upon that decision, it has notified them pursuant to the contract that it is terminating and is in the process of withdrawing its crews from Uganda.

Senator CHURCH. Will the Page Co., once it has withdrawn its service crews, continue to furnish other services to the Ugandan Government?

Mr. MADIGAN. As we indicated in our statement today, Mr. Chairman, the company has no present plans for any future business with Uganda.

Senator CHURCH. I see.

HAVE PLANES BEEN USED TO TRANSPORT WEAPONS?

Now, to the best of the company's knowledge, has either of the planes which it sold to the Ugandan Government, which it serviced up until now, been used to carry weapons or other military or police equipment to Uganda?

Mr. MADIGAN. To the best of the company's knowledge, they have not.

The Gulfstream II aircraft is presently operated by Ugandan crews, and both Grumman and Page were involved in training individuals to fly that aircraft. The only aircraft that Page presently provides a crew for is the L-100, and it entered into an oral understanding at the time of the operating contract that that plane would only carry civilian cargo. It has so instructed its crew over in Uganda.

¹ See appendix, p. 119 for Mr. Madigan's prepared statement.

PERSONAL SERVICES FOR IDI AMIN

Senator CHURCH. Has Page or any of its employees, including Charles Hanner, even performed other services of a commercial nature for the Government of Uganda or for Idi Amin personally?

Mr. MADIGAN. I am not sure, Senator, what the term "other services" means.

As is indicated in our statement, there is a separate company, called Wilmorite, that was in the process of building a building for Uganda in New York City. We have provided materials to your staff, as well as to subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations, which described miscellaneous other items which were sold to Uganda, such as a quantity of medical supplies, which is the largest of the other such items.

GRAIN PURCHASE FOR UGANDA

Senator CHURCH. Also grain purchases?

Mr. MADIGAN. Well, there was a grain purchase that apparently was made by Uganda Airlines. Page did not have any direct involvement with respect to that purchase. It was involved in loading the grain, once it was received, onto an aircraft and in the decision to have that grain trucked from one side of the country to another, as opposed to having an airplane fly from one place to another. But other than that, it was a purchase by Uganda and not one about which Page was consulted until the problem with respect to the mechanics of getting it on the airplane arose.

Senator CHURCH. I see.

MR. HANNER'S TITLE

Idi Amin has bestowed the title of "Honorary Consul for Uganda in the United States" upon Charles Hanner, vice president of Page Gulfstream. What had Hanner done to deserve such an honor?

Mr. MADIGAN. I am not sure, Senator. If you read the reports in the press, by our friends of the fourth estate, you would think that Hanner was some sort of James Bond figure traveling about the world. In fact, Charles Hanner is a 63-year-old employee of Page Airways, who was in semiretirement now, and who was involved in the sales of the two airplanes to Uganda and who has traveled back and forth to Uganda with respect to those sales. I think it is fair to say that Mr. Amin apparently likes Mr. Hanner. I do not know what the reasons were that caused him to bestow that title on him. That title is not one that carries any diplomatic privileges or anything like that.

Senator CHURCH. Did Charles Hanner perform any duties in connection with the title he bore, "Honorary Consul to the United States"?

Mr. MADIGAN. No; he didn't perform any duties. The things in which he was involved all had to do with the business of the company that he works for, which is Page Airways.

I believe that he had an isolated instance of having a student who was here in the United States ask him a question about a passport and matters of that nature. But he never received any payment. Con-

trary to the stories which have been written in the press, he is not a contracting agent for Uganda. He has not received any salary or money from Uganda. He is not Mr. Amin's personal representative in the United States or anything even remotely close to that.

I think it is an unfortunate case of press reports being based upon—well, I really don't know what, but the result is that they are inaccurate.

Senator CHURCH. I suppose that it isn't customary for commercial companies doing business in foreign lands to have executives so designated, is it? I suppose that is the reason that the attention of the press was attracted to this particular case.

Mr. MADIGAN. I don't really know all of the reasons for the attention it has received.

Senator CHURCH. But you would agree that it isn't a customary practice, wouldn't you?

Mr. MADIGAN. That it is or it is not?

Senator CHURCH. That is not.

Mr. MADIGAN. I don't believe I have ever heard of any similar title. Then again, I have never heard of a title similar to the one that Amin bestowed upon himself.

Senator CHURCH. Yes; that seems to be rather unique.

[General laughter.]

MR. HANNER'S AGREEMENT WITH UGANDAN GOVERNMENT

Senator CHURCH. In your response to additional questions posed by the House Committee on International Relations you stated that Mr. Hanner is an employee of Page Airways, Inc., and, as such, may agree to purchase items for the Ugandan Government under the terms of the purchase agreement between Uganda and Page. Is this a different agreement than the one previously referred to?

Mr. MADIGAN. Yes.

That really is a series of oral agreements. That response, in retrospect, certainly was inartfully phrased. The requests to obtain things like airplanes or medical supplies, in particular, were oral requests which were made. Mr. Amin apparently makes a great number of oral requests about a great number of things.

WHY DID PAGE TERMINATE ITS CONTRACT WITH UGANDA?

Senator CHURCH. Why, after so long a period, has Page decided to terminate its existing contracts with the Ugandan Government and to cease operations there?

Mr. MADIGAN. Page has decided to terminate its agreement because it had a continuing inability to exercise any control, or the control that it felt it needed, to operate the L-100 aircraft safely. For example, the Ugandan Airlines did not permit the project manager, which was originally contractually agreed to, to perform his duties, and I believe the company is concerned about the safety and control of the operation. Uganda Airlines has apparently indicated that it wants to take it over completely. It is apparently looking for pilots of its own and is in the process of doing that right now.

I think it was an evolving process since the contract was signed originally in 1975.

Senator CHURCH. The company's decision, then, rests on a concern for the safety of its employees and not upon any abhorrence of the character of the Ugandan regime nor of its practices?

Mr. MADIGAN. The company abhors the reports of atrocities in Uganda. But I don't think the company can indicate that that is the primary reason for this matter. Like other corporations that have done business over there, there is a contractual agreement with certain legal obligations and those obligations cannot just be brushed aside. It is pursuant to that contract and a clause in that contract that Page is terminating its operations.

Senator CHURCH. That would keep the company within its legal rights, would it not?

Mr. MADIGAN. We hope so.

SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT RELY ON CORPORATE VOLUNTARY ACTIONS?

Senator CHURCH. Do you feel that the U.S. Government should rely on voluntary actions of American companies to effect its human rights policies or do you think that this is a case where the Government itself should act to officially ban trade with Uganda?

Mr. MADIGAN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that Page, like other corporations which have testified, is somewhat troubled by the fact that there appears to be no clear-cut policy of the U.S. Government. Individual Members of Congress have given their views. The House has passed a resolution. As I understand it, the Carter administration, that is, President Carter and the State Department, have refused to take a position on that. I think the company feels that it would certainly be in a much better position if the U.S. Government would make a policy determination and make it clear what the guidelines are, whether companies are supposed to do business with Uganda or are not supposed to do business with Uganda. This is particularly important when you have contracts involved which are legally enforceable, no matter what the character of any signatory to the contract happens to be.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. Madigan. We appreciate it.

Mr. MADIGAN. Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Before you leave the stand, Mike, I am informed that Page has also provided answers to written questions which were submitted to them in advance. These answers will also appear in the record.¹

Mr. MADIGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

INTRODUCTION OF JOSEPH CREIGHTON

Senator CHURCH. Our last witness today is Joseph Creighton, the vice president and general counsel of the Harris Corp. of Cleveland, Ohio.

¹ See appendix, p. 120 for Page's answers to submitted questions.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CREIGHTON, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL, HARRIS CORP., CLEVELAND, OHIO, ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES V. STANTON, RAGAN & MASON, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. CREIGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have with me Mr. James V. Stanton of the law firm of Ragan & Mason, Washington, D.C.

I would like to say a little bit about Harris Corp.

We do not produce consumer goods of the sort that is generally known to the public.

Harris Corp. is engaged primarily in the manufacture and sale of electronic communication equipment and systems and printing equipment.

Annual sales for this fiscal year, which will end June 30, 1978, will exceed \$800 million.

Harris International Telecommunications, Inc., which has made sales to Uganda, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Harris Corp., which has its principal offices in Melbourne, Fla.

HARRIS CORP. EXPORTS

During the 1978 fiscal year, Harris has exported from the United States approximately \$200 million of goods and services and exports have been increasing. Harris and its subsidiaries have about 16,000 employees in this country, about one-third of whom are engaged in producing for export.

Employees overseas are for the most part engaged in installation, service, and maintenance activities related to equipment and systems produced in and exported from the United States. Thus, unlike many multinational corporations whose international activities are based primarily on overseas manufacturing plants or other installations abroad, Harris manufactures primarily in the United States and exports U.S.-made products.

HARRIS ACTIVITIES IN UGANDA

With respect to Uganda, Harris Corp.'s trade consists of export and installation under one basic contract of a basic communication system similar to that which Harris is installing in Nigeria and the Sudan. It is designed for developing nations which do not have long-distance telephone lines or microwave transmission systems of the type generally used in the Western World for telephone and telex messages, radio, and TV.

The system for Uganda consists primarily of Earth stations for satellite communications, connecting radio and television broadcasting transmitters and two-way radio equipment.

Harris was introduced to this business in Uganda as a result of successful work that it has performed on a similar system for a neighboring African country, Nigeria, which is friendly with the United States.

HARRIS' MAJOR COMPETITION IN AFRICA

Harris' major competitor for this business in Africa has been, and is, a Japanese company which is competing with Harris for similar systems not only overseas but also within the United States itself.

The communication system being produced for Uganda includes primarily Intelsat standard B type Earth stations; Harris standard Dom-sat type Earth stations; standard Harris VHF commercial television broadcast stations: HF and VHF, that is high frequency and very high frequency, radio communication equipment, both fixed site and portable; power generation and installation equipment for the systems; antenna towers; equipment shelters; and miscellaneous spare parts.

A portion of the system is already in operation. It is not complete.

HARRIS CONTRACTS IN UGANDA

The company's contracts in Uganda are with the Public Telephone Co., covering telephone usage, and with the Ministry of Information, covering television and radio broadcasting.

The contracts were entered into with approval of the U.S. Government.

Senator CHURCH. When were the contracts entered into?

Mr. CREIGHTON. In April of 1977, I believe.

Senator CHURCH. How much money is involved?

Mr. CREIGHTON. The total system—everything included, with the additions—is about \$30 million.

Senator CHURCH. Thirty million dollars?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Right.

Senator CHURCH. How long will it take to complete the contract?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Well, in countries like that you never know for sure; but it is scheduled for completion in October.

Senator CHURCH. Of this year?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Of this year. Obviously we don't know whether it could be done in that time.

Senator CHURCH. How far along are you with the contractual work at this time?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Well, we have not shipped all of the equipment for the second international so-called Intelsat Earth station, which is the international communication link. So, until it is shipped, all the rest is over there and most of it is in operation.

That is my understanding.

Senator CHURCH. The portion that has yet to be shipped you have described as being—what?

Mr. CREIGHTON. It is the Earth station designed for taking the signals from the satellite for international communications, as distinct from domestic communication within the nation of Uganda.

Senator CHURCH. This is a system that would enable the Ugandan Government to communicate with the outside world directly, isn't it?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Right. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. But the internal system which enables the Ugandan Government to communicate within the country—

Mr. CREIGHTON. From city to city.

Senator CHURCH [continuing]. From city to city, is complete, is it?
Mr. CREIGHTON. I am not sure of that, Mr. Chairman.

Generally speaking, you try to get a particular link on the air. But that doesn't mean that it is operating perfectly. It may mean several months of tuning up and doing things of that kind.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Mr. CREIGHTON. Would you like me to continue with my statement?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, would you please continue.

EQUIPMENT PROVIDED UNDER THE CONTRACTS

Mr. CREIGHTON. The system provided under these contracts is made up of standard commercial equipments of a type available equally from other sources in a variety of European nations and Japan.

QUOTE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Harris Corp. believes that its installation in Uganda will be of benefit to the general population. The benefits which accrue from this program and others like it were succinctly underscored by President Kennedy in his statement inviting, and I quote:

All nations to participate in a communications satellite system in the interest of world peace and closer brotherhood among the peoples of the world. The ultimate result will be to encourage and facilitate world trade, education, entertainment, and many kinds of professional, political, and personal discourse which are essential to healthy human relationships and international understanding.

Senator Church. That is an interesting quote from President Kennedy, but I find it difficult to apply to the conditions of life inside Uganda.

Mr. CREIGHTON. We do not believe that our equipment is related, in any way, to the activities that have been discussed before this committee and the House committee. Our equipment is in communications.

USE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO SUPPRESS AND CONTROL

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me that communications is the very essence of the means by which a government asserts control and retains control over a country.

Mr. CREIGHTON. Our corporation believes that communications is the very essence of freedom.

Senator CHURCH. But you don't find much freedom in Uganda, nor are you likely to find much freedom there so long as the present bestial regime is in power.

Your company must be aware of the activities of that regime. Our evidence shows that genocide is being practiced in Uganda. Anywhere from 50,000 to 300,000 Ugandans have been murdered by this government.

Is this a matter of no consequence to your company as long as there are profits to be made from a contract?

Mr. CREIGHTON. As the statement indicates, we believe in human rights. We do not necessarily believe that this is wholly uncomplex. We do believe that there are many parts of the U.S. Government

which doubt whether it would be desirable to terminate this type of contract with the Government of Uganda.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I can't argue the fact that the Government itself has failed to fashion a policy to deal with this terrible blood-letting in Uganda. I have a certain sympathy for companies that look for direction to the Government and fail to get it. But, I think that it is self-evident that a communications system is a modern tool indispensable to any government that seeks to maintain its control over a subjugated people. You must be fully aware of that. We can take judicial notice of that. It hardly needs to be proven.

Mr. CREIGHTON. I agree, Mr. Chairman, with what you say.

I also believe firmly that a communications system is essential to freedom. It is essential to communication of ideas and the communication between Uganda and the rest of the world probably is more positive than negative in overall impact.

I believe that the United States, the U.S. Government and people, are committed to freedom of speech and freedom of communication here and elsewhere.

Senator CHURCH. But you are not going to get it in Uganda under the present circumstances. As far as communications from the outside world are concerned, they will be filtered through the Ugandan Government, and only that which Idi Amin wishes to have shown will be shown. So that is a far cry from the free exchange of ideas.

I doubt that there will be much benefit derived by the people of Uganda from this communication system as long as it remains in the control of Idi Amin.

Mr. CREIGHTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, our company has presented its position with the statement which is on file. We have indicated that other African nations strongly believe that we should do business with the Government of Uganda. It is also clear that many in the U.S. Government feel likewise.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit the rest of our statement without reading it.

Senator CHURCH. Very well. The rest of your statement will be submitted.¹

HARRIS CORPORATION TO COMPLETE THE CONTRACT

Senator CHURCH. I take it from your testimony that your company has no compunctions about doing this business or any other business with Idi Amin?

Mr. CREIGHTON. That is not what the statement says and that is not correct, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Well, in what way is it not correct? You are going to continue the contract, are you not? You are going to complete the contract?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Mr. Chairman, we believe that it would be very detrimental to American policy generally, and not serve the interest of human rights, for us not to complete the existing contract.

Senator CHURCH. Well, just how do you think the existing contract is going to serve the cause of human rights?

¹ See appendix, p. 122 for Mr. Creighton's prepared statement.

Mr. CREIGHTON. I believe I stated, Mr. Chairman, that termination of it would not serve the interest of human rights.

Senator CHURCH. Well, it seems to me to be an assertion that has no connection with the facts.

HARRIS TRAINING OF UGANDA STUDENTS

Your company trained some 37 Ugandans in this country.

Mr. CREIGHTON. That's correct.

Senator CHURCH. We understand that three of those who were trained refused to return to Uganda. Is that true?

Mr. CREIGHTON. I believe they left during the training program and were granted asylum by the U.S. Government.

Senator CHURCH. From which Ugandan Government agencies were these students drawn?

Were any of them from the State Research Bureau?

Mr. CREIGHTON. To our knowledge, none of them was from the State Research Bureau.

Senator CHURCH. Have any of them gone to work for the bureau since receiving your company's training?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Our information is that almost all are doing the work for which they were trained. We know of none that are not.

Senator CHURCH. We understand that the three defectors that were given asylum in this country were the only three Christians in the group. Do you know whether or not that is true.

Mr. CREIGHTON. We did not inquire as to their religion and I do not know.

WHO WILL USE THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM?

Senator CHURCH. After the communication system is installed, who will be its principal users?

Mr. CREIGHTON. The two agencies that contracted for it, which is the Ministry of Information and the telephone system.

Senator CHURCH. The principal users, then, will be the Government?

Mr. CREIGHTON. Oh, yes. All communications there, as in most developing countries, are owned by the Government, although it is frequently in different ministries.

Senator CHURCH. All right. I think that is all of the questions that I have.

Mr. CREIGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. The hearing for today is adjourned.

The final hearing on the Ugandan matter will be on Monday morning.

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene upon call of the Chair.]

U.S. RELATIONS WITH UGANDA

MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1978

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:50 a.m. in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. I am sorry for the delay in starting this morning. I was late leaving the White House and unable to get here before now.

Senator WEICKER, I hope that it did not cause you any serious inconvenience.

Senator WEICKER. I will leave all those White House visits up to you, Mr. Chairman, gladly.

RELEASE OF CIA LETTER AND PALESTINIAN LIST

Senator CHURCH. In the course of the subcommittee's investigation of United States-Ugandan relations, the subcommittee received a list of individuals purported to be Palestinians to whom Ugandan passports have been issued. Some of these passports are diplomatic passports. Upon receiving the list, I asked the CIA to verify the authenticity of this list. I would like to read for the record the first part of Admiral Turner's written response to this inquiry.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of June 2, 1978, requesting Agency comments on a document listing what are purported to be Palestinians who had been issued Ugandan passports. Our comments on that document are as follows:

(a) As far as this Agency is able to determine, the document you forwarded is a copy of an authentic Ugandan Government document.

(b) According to information available to us, all of the listed passports appeared to be genuine as far as issue dates and serial numbers are concerned. Additionally, one of the individuals named is reported to have traveled on a Ugandan passport with the passport number cited in the document you provided.

This morning, the CIA has verbally confirmed the fact that at least one individual on the list is a known terrorist, a member of Al Fatah, who has been traveling on a Ugandan passport. This list and Admiral Turner's response will be put into the record and made available to the press.¹

Senator CHURCH. We will question the State Department about this, this morning.

¹ See appendix, p. 124 for released documents.

INTRODUCTION OF SENATOR LOWELL WEICKER

Senator Weicker, we are very pleased that you will be our leadoff witness this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. LOWELL P. WEICKER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Senator WEICKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee as you conclude your investigation of our commercial and political relations with Uganda. Testimony presented here during the hearings has, in effect, brought a skeleton out of the American closet. Appropriately, it is a Uganda skeleton labeled "U.S. Commercial Support for Idi Amin."

With this knowledge comes the obligation to respond in some meaningful way. My purpose this morning will be to make the case for binding legislation to end commercial relations between Uganda and the United States.

OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH UGANDA

First, I believe it would be helpful to briefly restate for the record the facts of our relationship with Uganda.

One, in Uganda, we are dealing with a genocidal mad man. Documented reports of government-directed slaughter, elimination of hundreds of prominent Ugandans, autonomous killer squads of the State Research Bureau roaming the countryside, government purges where the most ruthless are promoted, and the deaths of between 100,000 and 300,000 Ugandans, all paint the tragic picture of a ruler devoid of conscience and beyond persuasion.

Two, Uganda is a nation whose economy now runs on a single, government-controlled crop: coffee. Exports of this commodity account for at least half of her GNP and 90 percent of her government revenues. About 90 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence farming.

Three, the United States is Uganda's largest export trading partner, and also supplies her with high technology goods. In 1977, American companies purchased over one-third of Uganda's coffee exports at a price tag of \$245 million; at the same time, over \$11 million worth of technical goods were exported from the United States.

It is a sad but undeniable truth that the greatest and freest nation in the world has sustained one of its bloodiest and most brutal tyrants.

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO UGANDAN SITUATION

What has been the response of the United States to this state of affairs?

Our State Department has told Congress that we are doing all we can and should do about human rights in Uganda.

Our U.N. delegation gives us the good news that, after 7 years of Amin's terror, that the U.N. Human Rights Commission has finally decided to study the problem.

Our coffee companies and corporations, those who do business with Amin and those who do not, tell us they are floating in a foreign policy limbo, waiting for an "official government policy."

RESOLUTION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The House of Representatives has unanimously approved a resolution calling on President Carter to take some action against Amin, on which the administration refuses to take a stand.

Several major coffee companies have joined in a voluntary boycott while an equal number of importers continue to trade with Amin directly, or do so by way of foreign subsidiaries.

THE ROLE OF THE SENATE

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, the Constitution confers upon the Senate a special responsibility for the foreign relations of the United States. On this question, which bears heavily on the future of millions of Ugandans, and upon the credibility of our human rights policy around the world, we had best discharge that responsibility well.

On January 23, I introduced legislation in the Senate to establish an economic boycott against Uganda. I did so in the firm conviction that the brutality of the Amin regime demands a concrete response and that economic sanctions are the only effective tool available to us.

This legislative package, nearly identical to that sponsored by Congressman Pease, provides three policy options which we may wish to exercise: First, a ban on all imports which enter the United States from Uganda; second, a ban on all U.S. exports to Uganda; and third, an amendment to the tariff schedules to prohibit entry of Ugandan coffee.

Without question, both imports and exports must be addressed. Some improvements could be made in these bills as introduced, which we may be able to discuss at the conclusion of my statement.

There is no longer any question, Mr. Chairman, about the horror of General Amin's bloodsport regime; rather, the debate on this issue, and this legislation, boils down to a discussion of economic sanctions: whether they are a proper tool in foreign policy; whether they will work against Uganda; and whether the Ugandan people would suffer as a result.

Are sanctions a proper foreign policy tool?

THE EFFECTS OF AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT

An economic boycott such as I have proposed involves subjecting international trade to political constraints. There can be no realistic distinction, in any realm of public policy, between economic circumstances and political realities. The United States has recognized this and used economic sanctions against Cuba, Rhodesia, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and others, for a number of reasons, among them political. So the question is not whether political issues should become factors in international trade, but what issues should be factors.

Genocide, in my opinion, is such an issue. As Senator Case stated in his minority views on the last Uganda resolution passed by the Senate, there are certain prescriptive rules of behavior which apply to the rulers of all nations. Those who violate such rules jeopardize their standing in the community of nations. Uganda, because of Amin's genocidal policies, belongs outside of the fellowship of civilized nations and should thus be denied its benefits, one of which is free trade.

Will sanctions work? The State Department has opposed this legislation on the grounds that it will not be effective in improving rights in Uganda.

No one can predict with authority what would happen inside Uganda if a boycott were enacted. The symbolic value alone of an unequivocal American initiative against Amin could encourage Amin's own people to take steps against him. It could spur an international boycott just as our decision to boycott Cuba lead to similar action by members of the OAS.

Testimony by the coffee companies last Wednesday indicated that a boycott would cause a disruption in coffee markets, as buyers shifted their sources of supply. There is no telling how long this situation would take to stabilize, but without question it would mean big trouble for Amin.

AMIN'S REWARD SYSTEM

Amin's reward system, in which he trades whiskey and cars for the loyalty of his key henchmen, is a hand-to-mouth operation. Any interruption in the flow of coffee-cash and luxury goods into Uganda would create a precarious situation for Amin as long as it lasted.

By any yardstick of human welfare, the ouster of Amin would be a very positive development for the people of Uganda. Should a similar tyrant succeed Amin, sanctions could be maintained.

Would the Ugandan people suffer?

WOULD THE UGANDAN PEOPLE BEAR BRUNT OF BOYCOTT?

The argument that the people of Uganda would bear the brunt of economic sanctions is without substance. The Amin government has made no investment in the welfare of the Ugandan people. Hospitals exist in name only. Social services are nonexistent. Consumer goods are unavailable. With the destruction of a once prosperous and diversified economy, close to 90 percent of the population is now engaged in subsistence farming. Missionaries living in Uganda have made their decision to stay, whatever happens. In short, the people of Uganda, tragically, have nothing to lose.

WHAT SHOULD BE U.S. RESPONSE?

In the final analysis, Mr. Chairman, what should be our response to the tragedy in Uganda?

We all know the value, in the end, of resolution after resolution, condemning this and urging that.

We know the record of voluntary action when real sacrifice is called for.

We all know what the prospects are for United Nations-backed sanctions against Uganda.

We all know how effective current State Department policy will be in bringing about a change of heart in Kampala.

BINDING LEGISLATION REQUIRED

Mr. Chairman, can we deny that binding legislation is required—in response to the suffering of the people of Uganda; in response to the tyranny of Amin; and in response to the economic complicity of the United States in these events?

Human rights are, and always have been, the heart of our democracy at its finest hours, both at home and abroad. The commitments we have made to the dignity and value of all human life has been affirmed and defended from Yorktown to Normandy to Selma, Ala. The legislation I commend to your consideration is offered in that spirit.

AMIN'S REACTIONS

I close, Mr. Chairman, with a story about Amin told by a Ugandan exile living in the United States. Apparently Amin is provoked to great fits of laughter when he hears of the moral protestations of the Western nations who buy his coffee and sell him the luxury goods which are the staple of his regime. Amin laughs and says: "Is there less whiskey in the parlor?"

Arguments about how to justify and orchestrate economic boycotts are lost on Amin.

He understands that hard cash is more important than tough talk; that whisky in the parlor is more important than neutered sentiments of foreign governments.

Maybe we need to learn a lesson from the general.

Our words accomplish next to nothing unless we can make our actions count.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Senator.

WHAT OTHER CRITERIA SHOULD WE APPLY?

I notice in your statement that you discussed the effectiveness of an economic boycott against Uganda. Are there other criterion that we should apply in considering the use of economic sanctions in this case?

Senator WEICKER. I think that, as far as the boycott is concerned, it really can stand on its own feet, in the sense that it is the right thing to do.

I confess to you my impatience on this matter, Mr. Chairman. I know that you are supposed to be polite in the world of international diplomacy. Candidly speaking, I think this man is a nut who is not even deserving 5 minutes of our time or 5 cents of our money and, indeed, we are confronted with a unique situation in the sense of Uganda. It is not a matter of a differing political philosophy. I am not prepared to go ahead and say our form of government is that which should be emulated around the world.

But I am prepared, anytime that I see genocide, to say that we will have no part of it, regardless of whether it is effective or it is not. In this case, I think it will be very effective. In essence, that is why I plead the case for an economic boycott.

SHOULD UNITED STATES USE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ELSEWHERE?

Senator CHURCH. Do you support economic sanctions in other situations against, say, Cambodia or South Africa?

Senator WEICKER. I am rather reticent, I think, to leap at the sign of the slightest disagreement to go ahead and use our financial muscle in the sense of economic sanctions.

As is indicated in my previous answer, I think that, too often, we do that in this Nation. I think too often we confused what we deemed to be correct with what is the right thing to do in another nation.

BOYCOTT EFFECTS ON CUBA

I am not very frankly, for economic sanctions in the case, to be specific, in the case of Cuba. To my way of thinking, if you want to depose Mr. Castro, the best thing you could do is to open Cuba up to the open air, if you will, of normal and friendly relations between these two nations.

The only way that man can exist is in a closed society with economic dependence on the Soviet Union.

In the case of Cuba, you know even better than I do, of the traditional—which is very important—friendship between the Cuban people and the American people. And, I think, given the opportunity to operate, that is what is going to come out on top, with Mr. Castro and his brand of communism being on the losing end.

So I really cannot respond in a reactionary way, the traditional American way. On the whole, I do not think economic sanctions are all that effective.

But, when presented with a rather clear-cut case, that is, the case with Uganda, I would have no hesitation.

WOULD UGANDA BOYCOTT BE ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF COLONIALISM?

Senator CHURCH. It has been argued by some that a boycott of this kind, if it were opposed, would be regarded in Africa as another manifestation of colonialism—the case of a white super power imposing its judgment upon a tiny black African country.

Do you agree that an embargo might have this appearance or effect in Africa?

Senator WEICKER. I think that there are those who would argue that. On the other hand, not only do I want to make myself clear, but I think I understand and express what also has been said by my own government and my own colleagues in the Senate and the House.

We have no desire to go ahead and replace Spain or Portugal or England or France in that area of the world. Indeed, I think the Soviet Union and Cuba, in that sense, make a very great mistake in trying to take on that role.

Yet, clearly do I feel that we have a role to play. I think the role we should play is very much along the lines that I heard the chairman address, a very positive role as we assist Africa and the African nations to get on their feet by exporting, not just arms, but our tech-

nology, our knowledge, the products of peace and of a better quality of life.

But I think that it also has to be made abundantly clear that, whereas we choose that course as a matter of policy as compared to military intervention, it is also true that the matter of principle is enormously important to the establishment of any viable government anywhere in the world.

As I have said many times, in this Nation, it is the state of our spirit more so than anything else that is going to determine the state of the Union. Believe me, in no part can the state of the spirit countenance a genocide, or anything approaching it.

THE SENATE BILL

Senator CHURCH. You have a bill pending in the Senate. Do you feel any need, following these hearings, for further consideration that you may have given to the matter for a modification of that bill?

Senator WEICKER. I certainly think that a statement of origin provision, such as was the case with Rhodesian chrome legislation might be in order. I think it is a statement of purpose; a clear-cut statement of purpose included in the legislation is essential to clarify what it is we are doing and why we are doing it.

And, very frankly, I would hope that we would be joined in this effort by other nations.

But to me what is important, Mr. Chairman, is that we act. I just cannot rationalize in my mind any delay in our procedures when it involves such a huge loss of human life.

Granted, it is very far away and nobody feels the effect of it, or very few in this country. Not many who have relatives in Uganda. I can assure you that if that were the case—as it is the case with so many different ethnic groups in the United States—believe me, we would be all on a hot seat around here, and properly so.

Anything that can be done, anything. I would urge the chairman to go ahead and approve this legislation if, indeed, it is looked upon in favor at all by the chairman.

What I am really for is that we do something.

BILL BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMITTEE

Senator CHURCH. I am fully in sympathy with your view. Curiously enough, your bill has been referred to the Finance Committee by virtue of its jurisdiction over trade—and, I think, under the rules of the Senate, that is a proper reference—so we actually do not have your bill in this committee at the present time.

I am not quite sure how the committee will choose to respond to these hearings.

It may be that the committee will decide to report out a resolution similar to that passed by the House. Granted, such a resolution is not binding, as your bill would be, but it has produced quite a lot of result.

The major coffee companies have voluntarily cut off further purchase of Ugandan coffee in the wake of the House decision. I think that if we were to fortify that decision with a similar resolution on the part

of the Senate, we might effectively accomplish the goal through the voluntary acquiescence of the major coffee companies.

The resolution also urges the President to support, anywhere possible, measures to implement withholding trade with Uganda. That is an expression of desire, a sense of the Senate, a sense of the Congress resolution, but it seems to be producing the desired effect.

WILL BOYCOTT BLUR ACTION AGAINST WHITE REGIMES?

Senator WEICKER. If I may for one brief second touch upon something that has not been discussed but that I think the chairman is aware of it. Apparently one of the difficulties that we have here is that there are those who feel if we take any such vigorous action against Amin in Uganda it will blur our efforts against the white regimes, if you will, in Africa who are in power by virtue of minority rule.

I think this country is pretty clearly on record where it stands on majority and minority rule. I think it is pretty clearly on record as to how it views the color of a man's skin.

I think we are mature enough now, and the world is mature enough to understand that because we come down on the head of Amin does not mean that we are, in effect, in a different way espousing the cause of minority white governments in Africa. We are not.

I just think we ought to call the shots as we see it, and it does not make a damn bit of difference what the color of a man's skin is. Amin is wrong, dead wrong. I do not want to have this as part of an overall package to give us a certain type of an image.

Senator CHURCH. I agree with your analysis that there are occasions where governments go beyond the pale and no longer deserve, to use your expression, to remain in the brotherhood of civilized nations.

I want to commend you for the leadership you have shown in trying to do something about it.

Senator WEICKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

INTRODUCTION OF CONGRESSMAN DORNAN

Senator CHURCH. Our next witness is the Honorable Robert K. Dornan of California.

Congressman?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 27TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Representative DORNAN. Mr. Chairman and distinguished staff members, I have never had the honor to appear before you before. It is a pleasure to be here except for the subject matter being so tragic.

Senator CHURCH. We are pleased to have you here.

Representative DORNAN. Thank you, Senator.

If I could submit my formal statement for the record and, then, rather than read that, engage in a question and answer session with you, Senator. We would be able to elicit more of what I learned visiting 10 of the most outstanding citizens I have ever met with in much traveling

around this world—10 exiles from the torn and pathetic nation of Uganda. I met with these gentlemen in a country adjoining Uganda, and, if I may be vague on their names and the country in which I met them for the formal record, it will alleviate some diplomatic tension, because this particular country has been very accommodatiing in offering them a refuge. But because this country is also under authoritarian rule, the refugees are very sensitive about using the nation as a political base to criticize Uganda and Amin even though that criticism is tantamount to exercising a judgment on Satan himself.

CONGRESSMAN DORNAN'S TRAVELS

I worked for almost a decade as a radio talk show host and for a much longer time as a television public affairs talk show host, reporter and commentator and, in the course of my work, I had the opportunity to assign myself to all corners of this world: eight trips to Vietnam, four to Cambodia, four to Laos, three to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Bloc nations, multiple trips to the Middle East. I was able to fly on 12 food flights into Biafra and visited many western African nations and north Africa. But I had never been to the east-central area of Africa until at the end of a trip to Rhodesia and South Africa this January.

Senator CHURCH. These trips came prior to your election to Congress?

Representative DORNAN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. You are going to find it difficult to match that record as a Member of Congress.

Representative DORNAN. Well, in spite of the constant criticism about so-called junketing, there are trips, as you well know, that are not only extremely necessary, but very vital, to inform Members of Congress about what is happening in the world, and most trips do not involve shopping with accompanying wives.

MEETING WITH EXILES

On this particular visit of mine to a country adjoining Uganda, I had hoped to meet with exiles and spend maybe the better part of an hour with them. I was directed toward a mission settlement, which is trying to do something about thousands of young high school graduates who are refugees from Uganda who now find themselves in a peculiar passport situation, which is a pathetic byproduct of this reign of terror of Amin. Because when you say the word "Uganda" now, the public consciousness associates it with genocide as they do with the rule of the Khmer Rouge Communists in Cambodia, and many nations do not want citizens coming into their country on Ugandan passports. Well, then what kind of passport would these young people travel with, to continue their education and to prepare for what they call Operation Return, when that time comes when their country is, again, part of the brotherhood of nations, they hope to go back and rebuild their devastated land. They almost will be starting from scratch. There have been so many of the Langi, Akoli, and Uganda tribespeople slaughtered by Amin that he has almost totally changed the ethnic composition of the country.

So these people will be returning to their native homeland that has become a vast wasteland.

Now, that hour meeting that I had hoped to have with these 10 fine gentlemen turned into a 4 hour and 45 minute nonstop meeting and I have never heard worse nightmare stories in my lifetime, except for the Holocaust in Nazi Germany and the terror that has befallen another very gentle and small country, Cambodia.

These 10 refugees, first of all, responded to my initial questions about terrible death statistics. I asked, if we might deal with the possible hyperbole, to nail down facts on the staggering death toll. We should find out exactly what we are dealing with concerning Amin.

Is the figure of murdered humans 200,000, 300,000 or 400,000 people dead? In a nation of 11 million, it does not take complex mathematics to compute that a comparable U.S. death toll would be about 10 million to 30 million dead Americans in our Nation of 218 million people. There were several religious ministers and several former ministers of the Government of Uganda prior to Idi Amin's seizing power at the barrel of a gun. One minister said, to me, "Congressman, the figure of 300,000 killed was passed in your bicentennial year of 1976. Now it is anybody's estimate.

I asked if it is true that people are thrown to crocodiles?

They said, yes, that recent refugees report that you can see bloated bodies in the Nile River floating next to crocodiles. The crocodiles are so gorged on human flesh that they are not bothering to devour people that are thrown in the river.

They said, they used to be very proud of their national forests, as we are of Yellowstone National Park. But now their parks are graveyards. One religious minister who has a daughter in school in southern California has traveled throughout the United States extensively.

They were all, I might add, as articulate as the esteemed chairman of this committee or say, Mr. William F. Buckley. They said, that to drive through the woods now of their national forests—for those people lucky enough to have a car, and that is a very small number—they have to roll up the car windows, because the stench of human flesh so permeates the countryside.

They told me about horrible torture such as drilling holes in people's stomachs to insert what we would have called in high school "cherry bombs," that is very powerful firecracker explosives and; of saving ammunition by slamming people in the head with shovels, forcing people to stab one another simultaneously—the very same nightmare stories that come out of Cambodia.

Well, after about an hour of this tragic relating of sheer evil, I said, all right, I have had enough. I was convinced that the death figures were not hyperbole or exaggeration just to build a public relations effort against Amin.

AMIN TRAVELS BY HELICOPTER

I then asked about the possibility of overthrowing Amin. They pointed out—and I was not aware of this—that Amin travels exclusively by helicopter, which is the practice of most dictators these days

when there has been vengeance, bloodshed, and murder, extended throughout the countryside and the highways and roads and trails of the country have become unsafe. It was this way with Hitler, this is the way in South American dictatorships, and it is probably this way in Cambodia. It is certainly that way in Vietnam—the roads are unsafe for the Communist conquerors. The ambushes are reversed now.

So again how is it that Amin and his secret police travel? By helicopter. And who trains the helicopter pilots? None other than the best country on the face of the earth, the defender of liberty, the United States of America.

TRAINING OF PILOTS

U.S. Government contracts with Amin are long terminated, thank God, but Uganda pilots were trained up to the beginning of this year near Fort Worth, Tex. My own investigation leads me to believe the training was shut down out of sheer embarrassment, but only way, way after a frightful genocide had been firmly established in the consciousness of most of the informed people on the face of the Earth.

HARRIS CORP. TESTIMONY

Senator CHURCH. Congressman, may I just interrupt you there to say we had testimony from an executive of the Harris Corp., who told us of a \$30 million contract between that country and the Amin Government which is establishing a modern system of communications within Uganda, including a satellite telecommunications system to improve the country's link with the outside world. The \$30 million contract accomplishes both an internal as well as an external modern communications system for the government.

IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Now, you have been in communications. You know a great deal about radio and television communications. Would you not regard the installation of a system of that kind of great importance to the Ugandan Government in the maintenance of effective control over all parts of the country?

Representative DORNAN. Absolutely. When German war criminals were put on trial at the end of the Second World War and Admiral Canaris, who had been working for years with British intelligence, emerged in the courtroom to confront Goering and the other war criminals. Goering screamed right out in the courtroom that they were traitors when the Nazis lost control of German communications, that is when they lost the war.

Communications, commercial and police, are the most important ways you keep a grip on an oppressed people. The Minister of Propaganda in Nazi Germany, Joseph Goebbels, was the most important man to Adolf Hitler, as was his motion picture producer Mrs. Leni Reifenstahl, who created hypnotic and diabolically clever films like "Triumph of the Will."

So anything we do in the West that would benefit or aid Uganda in communications such as a satellite system for world communications,

or even sending them a walkie-talkie radio, that only increases the terror, the death, the grip of the Amin secret police on a terrorized people.

I find it hard to believe that any American corporations will continue to help Amin, particularly given the favorable experience I have had with three major American coffee companies. I cannot believe that those companies in the most sophisticated areas of electronics or helicopter training continue to help this man.

THE ROLE OF ISRAELIS

The Israelis told me Senator, that they carry a tremendous burden of guilt. And I appreciated the candor of some Israelis about this. They are, to use their own words, absolutely distraught and heartsick that they helped to bring Amin to power. They were, as you recall, the architects of the Entebbe Airport and that is why they were able to pull off that incredible raid on our Bicentennial birthday, July 4th, 1976. There is a movement in Israel right now, particularly because of their nightmare experience with Adolf Hitler, there is this move in Israel to try and undo their role in setting up the Adolf Hitler of Africa. There is a horrible irony there.

Israel sold Amin private business jets. The Aero-commander that used to be built in Oklahoma, as you know, is now built in Israel. It is called the "1123" West Wind. This is the plane that Amin allowed Israeli pilots to come to Uganda and supposedly "steal" back, but what he was doing was to calm the storm waters after the Entebbe raid, and placate the Israelis that he feared.

Anyone who would train helicopter pilots to fly this disgusting murderer around Uganda is an accomplice to mass first-degree murder. It was Stalin who said the death of one man is a tragedy but the death of millions is a statistic. I do not know why this country can't move from caring about one person like a Steve Biko—and it is proper that we should focus in on the death of one innocent person like Biko, to caring about thousands. Why do we lose completely an awareness 2 million Bikos dying in Cambodia, 2 million. What about 400,000 dead people in Uganda?

I used to think it was racism on our country's part that we do not care if blacks kill blacks, but now I see the way in which this country and the Carter administration have almost ignored the slaughter in Cambodia, so I would have to extend any racist charges, I guess, to include the oriental world. I guess it is just whatever happens to be the current fascination of the New York Times or the Washington Post or the three networks. They decide when to focus in on mass carnage and death.

CONGRESSMAN DORNAN'S CONVERSATION WITH COFFEE COMPANY PRESIDENT

Now, I had occasion to meet one of the presidents of one of our major coffee companies just by sheer coincidence in the line waiting to see a film at the Kennedy Center. I heard his name as he was being introduced to someone else. I had been corresponding with our three

major coffee companies who together import over \$360 million in any year from Uganda—that is a third of the Ugandan budget—which means we coffee drinkers pay for the secret police there and for the helicopter training and therefore the oppression itself by putting up the dollars for it through imported coffee.

I approached this coffee company president and, because he has now come around in a very positive and, courageous manner, I would choose not to identify him, and I introduced myself. He was aware of who I was, although this is my first term in Congress, because of our correspondence about Amin.

I said, "When are you going to cut off this killer?" I said, I was just a young boy during the Second World War, and I used to fantasize, as we all do, about what we would have done had we been older about the genocide of the Jews in Europe. I said, "What would you have done with Adolf Hitler? Well now you can act. Why do you not cut off the Hitler of Africa?"

He said, he could not get involved in foreign policy. But the Hitler comparison haunted him. Now the companies are worried, the three major companies: General Foods, Nestles and Proctor & Gamble, that our Government, not about the guilt of helping a Hitler, but the United States, will slap them for conspiracy and restraint of trade because they have arbitrarily and voluntarily cut off all import of coffee from Uganda. Imagine. They fear the U.S. Government because they've cut off a psychopathic killer.

I think it would be an incredible scene if our Justice Department ever moved in the direction of attacking these coffee companies. The President should be complimenting these companies.

Senate congratulations to these companies is one of the positive things that I would like to see come out of your hearings, Senator, and out of any Senate resolution, although I believe much more in a positive "bill" such as Senator Weicker's than something merely symbolic like our House Resolution—resolutions seem not to be worth the paper they are written on because they get such small press coverage in the major newspapers and on the TV networks.

REMOVING THE UGANDAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES

I also would like to see forthwith the Ugandan Chargé D'affaires—and I believe he is in this room right now—thrown out of the United States of America as a positive statement to the whole world that there is, as you put it, a point beyond the pale, when we must condemn a nation as just absolutely outside of the community of civilized nations of our world.

The United Nations disgraces itself horribly, disgustingly, by its silence over Cambodia and its silence over Uganda. Would we have allowed Adolf Hitler to keep a Joseph Goebbels in Washington, D.C. as a Chargé D'affaires of a propaganda office, prowling the halls of this building and the House office buildings and prowling the Capitol building itself, going to every meeting and every hearing on Uganda and figuring out how he can use public relations skills in this country with its extensive communications system to counter with lies every truth that is put forth?

THE ROLE OF MR. BOB ECKELS

Amin has a Judas Iscariot that works for him by the name of Bob Eckels, an English citizen, who is the chief liar and architect of a campaign, like Goebbels to deceive the world. He who creates one lie after another to cover up the massive slaughter going on in Uganda. Much like the way pathetic young neo-Nazis in their sick uniforms threaten to march through Skokie, Ill., and say that General Eisenhower made up the stories of genocide in Nazi concentration camps. Eckels uses the same "big lie" technique.

I think that our Government must immediately throw out the Ugandan Chargé D'affaires. We must back our U.S. coffee companies and congratulate them for what they have done in cutting off Amin.

USE OF PUBLICITY

We must communicate to every corner of this world, that Idi Amin is not going to get away with genocide because of his color, or because we are afraid of, as Senator Weicker put it, of appearing as though we are diffusing our aggressive public relations campaign against apartheid in South Africa.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much for your testimony. I just have one further question, Congressman, that I want to put to you, and that relates to an article that appeared in the *Journal of Commerce* on May 31st of this year, which takes note of the voluntary decision on the part of large American coffee companies to refrain from importing any more Ugandan coffee.

BANNING UGANDAN COFFEE

The article ends with this statement, and I would like your comment on it. It ends with a paragraph which reads:

But the tightness of nearby physical coffee supplies is expected to ease in the medium to longer term. Ugandan coffee, rejected by the United States, will eventually appear on European markets in greater quantity, London dealers say.

So far, European and particularly U.K. coffee buyers have shown no objections to taking Ugandan coffee at competitive prices. So the U.S. ban in Ugandan coffee is likely to result only in a slight restructuring of world coffee trade patterns rather than in a reduction of total coffee supply.

This raises, of course, the question of whether an American embargo, whether it is officially or unofficially imposed, can effectively reach the Idi Amin regime.

What comment do you have to make on that? Would this, in the end, be an idle exercise in so far as undermining the economic base of the Ugandan regime?

Representative DORNAN. Well, it might be an idle exercise except for the power of the moral statement that it would make. The Israelis took note during the oil embargo of 1973 that nations that had once been so courageous just a generation before in defending Jews changed suddenly. You recall in 1941 in Denmark, every citizen put on a Jewish star saying to the Nazis, we are all brothers to our Jewish citizens; in the Netherlands, the Dutch hid their Jews in their homes

like the heroic little Anne Frank, but in the 1970's when it came down to gasoline for autos or friendship to Israel, suddenly gasoline became more important than people.

So maybe to a jaded, materialist Europe, with all of the social problems that we see in Italy and France, maybe they will quickly grab up Ugandan coffee, genocide notwithstanding. Maybe Europe will buy the sick lies of Robert Eckels as he appears on BBC talk shows. However, the moral statement that our Nation makes is critical, particularly—and I commend President Carter for his forthrightness on human rights, if this country is to have any respect at all in what it says about human rights. We should point a finger of scorn immediately if the embargoed coffee begins to get picked up in other markets. We should point out to the world community who is buying it and who has picked up our trade, and exactly where it is being shipped.

I still cannot get over the fact that, in the United Nations, the seats for Cambodia are occupied by Ministers who are really no better than Mafia hit men. There they sit representing a government engaging in total, horrendous, unbelievable genocide. Well, the same is true with Uganda.

If Ambassador Andy Young, a minister of Christ, has any integrity left or any guts at all, he must end his pathetic silence, his obsession with only criticizing white governments, and his mental block against criticizing black governments.

One of those 10 Ugandan refugees that I met with had just come back from South Africa. He pointed out that he was against apartheid and that, he felt uncomfortable there, but he did not feel in jeopardy for his life, only his political rights. He said Uganda is a million times worse than South Africa.

One of the refugees turned to me and said, "Congressman, the disgrace of Africa is that when the Soviet Union barely peeked into the window of Africa, Great Britain and the United States put their tails between their legs and fled." He said he had graduated from Oxford, and was proud of his western education. But that all western educated blacks were being slaughtered and no one seemed to care.

A few years ago Uganda was the jewel country of Africa. One of my young refugee friends had been president of one of Uganda's universities in his early 30's. He said they were proud of their education standard, and the standard of living in Uganda, and that it has all disappeared. Then we have to watch a mass murderer, Amin, go to the Organization of African Unity and get a standing ovation from black African politicians.

I said I was glad he brought that up. That it was incomprehensible to me. How could it happen?

He said for two reasons. One, Amin makes all of the other African dictators look good—like some of the people who have been appearing lately on "Meet the Press," "Issues and Answers," and "Face the Nation." He covers their flanks. They look good by comparison.

He said, also there is an obsession among African countries not to criticize one another's internal politics because most African nations vary from Amin only by degree. We see with each passing year less democracy on the torn continent of Africa, more military dictatorship.

more rightwing extremism, more leftwing extremism, more Soviet advisers, and more Cuban troops—in 19 countries as a matter of fact.

The intellectuals of Africa are slowly being hunted down and murdered and our country is sitting here watching it happen.

Now, that is a very tough charge against us and it struck home with me. I will not forget it. I think that the first step we can make, as tiny as it may be, is to kick out of Washington D.C. Idi Amin's paid Chargé D'affaires, the front man for a mass murderer. A P.R. agent for genocide. Outrageous.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Congressman, for your testimony. It was a very eloquent statement.

Representative DORNAN. Thank you, Senator.

INTRODUCTION OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS MELADY

Senator CHURCH. Our next witness is the Honorable Thomas Patrick Melady, former United States Ambassador to Uganda and present president of the Sacred Heart University in Bridgeport, Conn.

Mr. Ambassador, we are pleased to welcome you to the hearing this morning. You speak from personal experience in Uganda and as the author of two books, "Uganda: the Asian Exiles," and "Idi Amin, Hitler in Africa." I want to welcome you.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS PATRICK MELADY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO UGANDA AND PRESIDENT, SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY, BRIDGEPORT, CONN.

Mr. MELADY. Thank you, Senator Church for the invitation to be here before this committee.¹ This day brings back certain memories, because, exactly 6 years ago today, I took the oath of office as U.S. Ambassador of Uganda, on June 26, 1972.

BACKGROUND ON UGANDA

I would like to reflect on that day for a moment, and what I now know today about Amin. I had completed approximately 21½ years of service as U.S. Ambassador to Burundi before that assignment. I came back in Washington in May for the hearings and I spent 3 or 4 weeks reading the files, being prepared for my assignment in Uganda.

Amin had taken over in Uganda in January 1971, so between January 1971 and the late spring of 1972 we had something of a record to study. At that time, they were a few things of concern.

It was apparent that Amin was a dictator, a strong authoritarian, but of course, in that regard, he was one of many. Freedom House, at that time, listed 50-some governments as being governments that were authoritarian and that did not follow a parliamentary mode of government; that did not allow civil liberties.

We also knew that Amin was a military man—about half of the dictators at that time were military men. There were several other

¹ See appendix, p. 125 for Mr. Melady's prepared statement.

facts that we knew in the spring of 1972 when I took the oath of office that were perhaps causes of concern. You might say we found it convenient not to be concerned.

DEATH OF TWO AMERICANS

One was the death of two Americans who were killed under most peculiar circumstances. We did not want to ask too many questions. One was a professor, the other a reporter. Perhaps we should have asked some more questions, because now we know that Amin was very closely involved in the death of those two Americans. We did not say much.

While the coup of 1971 was described as almost bloodless, when the facts came out by the spring of 1971, the summer of 1971, it was known that it was not bloodless. A large number of people had been killed, not so much in the days of the coup, but in the spring and the summer of 1972.

IDI AMIN IN 1972

And then, beginning in the early spring of 1972, there was a strong outburst of anti-Israeli and antisemitic statements. They should have been causes for concern. But still, in the spring of 1972 when I was nominated as the U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, there was a lingering hope that as you read Amin's background as a practical soldier, perhaps we had another anti-Communist on the scene. He also had made some statements that were supportive, in an indirect way, of South Africa.

So there was still the hope that somehow we could get on with that dictator.

By the summer, I had my instructions as the Ambassador. I would say those instructions clearly were, this man is a dictator, he is mercurial, but avoid confrontation with him.

THE AID PROGRAM

When I arrived there, we had a small aid program. We had a long tradition of helping the university. There were approximately 1,100 private Americans, mostly missionaries doing everything from standard missionary work to teaching in schools. We were buying, at that time, a lot of their coffee and our coffee people liked the mountain-type coffee bean, therefore we wanted to assure access to that coffee, and both Pan American and TWA were developing east African air service. There was competition for landing rights, and I had to make sure that we protected our interests in that regard.

I arrived therefore, and I wanted to faithfully follow my instructions in early July 1972, of somehow, "getting on" with him, but not be too close.

THE FIRST 90 DAYS

There were a series of incidents in 90 days which influenced me to change in my instructions. In summary, those incidents, which I go into some detail in the books which I will submit to the committee, were these.

No. 1, his position on Hitler. I was there when he sent his infamous telegram to Secretary-General Waldheim in which he endorsed Hitler's genocide against the Jews. He endorsed what was done by "putting the Jewish people in the soil." The first thing I had to do from a technical point of view was to find out, did he really mean that? Was that a telegram sent by an assistant? Was it an outburst of emotion?

I must say, in my first instruction—I think while our Government always does not do things quickly, I was the only Ambassador under immediate instructions to find out about that.

AMIN'S OBSESSION WITH JEWS

It took me about a week to see Amin, and I verified that he, in fact, meant that, that he had, in fact, sent that telegram. And I had further meetings with him, both officially and informally in those months of August and September and he managed to bring it up on various occasions. It was clear in his mind that the Jews were dangerous, that they were traitors and you could not trust them. He asked me once, how many Jews do you have on your staff? I had to respond in a technical way, as an Ambassador has to do to a Chief of State, that it was not appropriate. I was not allowed to go into a discussion of the religious or ethnic backgrounds of my staff people.

I am not a sociologist or a political scientist. I could never quite understand the obsession that he had at that time. I began to take note of it, and I became so concerned in September 1972, that—I believe there was a Jewish holy day in the month of September and there was no rabbi present, so an appropriate religious service was arranged by a young Peace Corps member of Jewish background. A dozen or so Americans of Jewish background and other American nationals went to the service. It came to my attention that members of the State Research Bureau had seen that service going on. I became convinced in my mind that this man was a confirmed anti-semitic and he would not hesitate in killing people of Jewish background.

EVACUATION OF JEWISH PERSONNEL

I then arranged for the evacuation of Jewish members of the staff, and there were approximately 10 or 11. I evacuated them 1 by 1. I just thought it was not safe for them to be there.

I remember that was the first time in my diplomatic experience that I had to formally lie, because I sent the appropriate messages to the State Department and somebody found out about the telegram—the Associated Press called me on the phone. I knew my phone was bugged.

He said, is it true you are evacuating the Jewish members of the staff? I said, no it was not true. I was in the process, however, of evacuating the Jewish members of the staff in September 1972.

EXPULSION OF ASIANS

At the same time—in fact, several weeks before that—we were informed that there would be an important announcement on television,

and we should look at television, which was a means of communication there in Uganda, and the famous expulsion order of the Asians was announced. The other book goes into detail on that, but in summary I was there and I can remember my wife and I looking at the television set and the official announcement that the "brown people" had been milking the economy. I could not quite believe it was going to be implemented. It was going to be 90 days. In the first announcement, all Asians would have to leave the country, and a whole litany of all their "atrocious actions" was spelled out by Amin's spokesman.

And, of course, he proceeded to do that. I can recall the Asians lining up looking for passports, going out meekly to the airport, only allowed to take the equivalent of \$100, a little suitcase. How do you know an Asian? Well, because he was brown. How were people identified? They were identified by the color of their skin, and this was a totally racist action. The Asian community was expelled, under the most horrendous conditions, in the last summer and early fall of 1972.

I discussed the expulsion of the Asians with him. I must say, again, the U.S. Government gave us a special addition to the quota and we were able to arrange for 1,000 to come to the United States. And, as on the Jewish question, as with the Asian question, I felt, in looking at the man, the nature of his eyes, there was a deep hate, deep dislike, and he did not care what harm or evil he brought.

I began to see emerging something more than a dictator, something more than an authoritarian, a tyrant, in the classical definition of a tyrant—one who enjoys seeing suffering.

There was a third occasion—

Senator CHURCH. How many Asians were expelled from Uganda as a result of the Amin order?

Mr. MELADY. Well, the original 55,000 is now believed to have been not quite 55,000. We never had exact figures. Perhaps, I understand, about 500 did remain in the country.

ARRESTS OF AMERICANS AND GERMANS

A third incident which occurred in early September, which took about a month—sometimes something would happen one day and it would take you 3 or 4 weeks to understand the implication of it—in early September—I remember it was a Sunday because I was attending Mass—my driver came to ask me and said you had better come out.

So I came out and I went to the Embassy. Amin had announced that a group of Ugandans sponsored by the Zionist and Imperialists were about ready to invade the country. In a later announcement, a military spokesman—that was always Idi Amin—announced that the Americans, the British, and I believe the Germans and the Israelis were cooperating.

Well, that began a very hectic 1 or 2 weeks. Large numbers of Americans and Germans and British were arrested. I spent a very active 2 weeks trying to get Americans out of jail.

I belonged to a Rotary Club and I managed to have a free hour to go to a Rotary luncheon, and I can recall the German Ambassador saying to me, have you heard the rumor about Benedict Kiwanuko,

and he mentioned four or five other names. There were people who had disappeared.

THE TREATMENT OF UGANDANS

By the time the September situation was over, we realized that, while the Americans, the Germans, and the Europeans had been harassed, great psychological pressure from having been placed in jail and having these charges made against them, that it was the Ugandans who had suffered, large numbers had suffered, had been tortured and had disappeared.

I am convinced, and it is pointed out in some detail in the book, that Amin deliberately took advantage of a situation and managed to arrange for the elimination of large number of professional Ugandans; all those who could possibly have been opposed to him disappeared in the period of September and October 1972.

REQUEST FOR CHANGE OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM STATE

By October 1972, given the background of these three incidents as well as accumulating information about the disappearance and the death of Ugandans, I became convinced that I ought to discuss with my superiors in the State Department a change in instructions, and I asked permission to return, which was granted, and I returned—I have forgotten the exact date, but it was time enough to vote in the elections of 1972, so therefore it was probably the the first week in November.

I began presenting to the Assistant Secretary of State a thesis that went along this line—in Amin, we have something more than a dictator, more than a military dictator, that we had a brutal tyrant who was a murderer and was engaging in selective genocide and who believed in it from the standpoint of doctrine; that we should not dignify him with the presence of a U.S. Embassy. However, we should not be haphazard, either. Therefore, we should begin quietly to arrange for the withdrawal of Americans, both official and private and then consider closing out the United States presence.

WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICANS

I would say I never received a formal document agreeing to that, but essentially there was general agreement. I returned to Uganda a week or two later in 1973 and we arranged for the systematic withdrawal of Americans. First, the Peace Corps members, around Christmastime. We never formally notified the Ugandan Government. There was some dispute in-house as to whether we should do that. I, myself, became convinced that we were dealing with a man who would not hesitate to murder and I favored not informing Amin that we were withdrawing the Peace Corps people and people from all parts of the country.

There were those who disagreed with me. My view prevailed and at Christmastime, during the holidays, we suggested to most of the Peace Corps people that they leave, and they never did return.

AID people were withdrawn in January and February, 1973.

Beginning in late February, I returned to Washington for consultation and assistance in the general plans to withdraw Americans. In

regard to private Americans—official Americans, of course, we could more or less set the procedure up. Private Americans, we had less authority over.

Before leaving, I managed to get around the country, and I did it mostly on Sunday by attending a variety of church services of the Americans. First going to the service, and then speaking to the person in charge, giving various reasons that they should consider leaving.

I returned to the United States for consultations in February. I received instructions from the Assistant Secretary to be in contact with the headquarters of all these groups, and I was in spring and early May, more or less, in 1973. Partially as a result of that, the private presence was reduced from approximately 1,100 to 200.

CLOSING OF U.S. EMBASSY

The Embassy was closed in 1973. And when that happened—I believe it was in October 1973 that the official announcement was made by the State Department. The State Department cited two reasons for doing that: the dangers to Americans there, the security of U.S. citizens; and the nature of Amin's attack's, particularly his telegrams, on U.S. foreign policy.

In a memorandum before that, I had urged the State Department to make its primary reason the fact that he was a murderer and he had engaged in torture and we would not dignify that kind of government with the presence of a U.S. diplomatic mission.

However, that suggestion was not accepted, and the State Department relied on two reasons for the closing of the Embassy—that is, lack of security for Americans and the insults to President Nixon in the telegrams that Amin had sent, mostly on the subject of Vietnam.

AFTER 1973

What happened after 1973? In private life, my wife and I began collecting all possible documentation after 1973. It is all in the book; I will not go over it. I believe, in previous testimony, the continued torture, murder; the murder of the Anglican Archbishop; the hijacking of the Air France plane and the open collusion with the hijackers indicated by General Amin.

I think it is interesting, Senator, that during that period of 1974, 1975, and 1976, that while these things were going on and—I am not a specialist in how you awaken the interest of people—there was still little interest in the subject of Idi Amin and the genocide going on in Uganda.

I am pleased to say that I was able to find that the Christian Science Monitor was interested and they published a series of articles that I wrote in two specialized journals, "World View and America." I will not bother listing the journals and prominent newspapers that felt what I had to say during that period was emotional and did not publish them in 1974, 1975 and 1976.

At the beginning of 1977, by the time the International Commission of Jurists reported that the number of dead had risen to about 400,000, things began to change, particularly following the murder of the Archbishop in January 1977.

The point where there is an interest.

CONCERNS OF AMBASSADOR MELADY

I would like to point out my concerns at this point. While it is true if I did not have a university to run, I could be over most parts of North America and Western Europe talking about the indignities of Amin's regime. It is quite different from 3 years ago.

Where is the action?

First of all, the United Nations. I speak as a former senior adviser to the U.S. delegation of the 1970 session, and as a professor who has taught the United Nations. What is the reason why the selective outrage that exists at that institution?

The United Nations, committed to the Charter of Human Rights of 1955, has not yet taken anything more than nominal cognizance of the established fact that we have torture and genocide going on. I say that with a great deal of sadness, because now that I am back home a teacher and I see the lack of credibility that some of the Americans have in the United Nations. There is a study that has it down to 29 percent of Americans believing it is a worthwhile institution. When I was a member of the mission in 1970, it was 50 percent and about 10 years, before that, it had been about 70 percent.

I think one sheer reason for lack of credibility in that great institution is that, thanks to modern media, Americans know about the genocide going on in Uganda. That was not previously true in history.

The Turks eliminated some 1 million Armenians in 1916. It took about 2 years for the world to learn something about it. But now, thanks to instant news service, we know—the average American reading the newspaper knows that there is a government, a leader, a man, committing torture and murder and he is rather articulate. He says exactly what he believes.

I think it is unfortunate that the U.S. Government has not exerted sufficient power, has not used its prestige to make as a leading item of interest an action by the United Nations.

WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE?

What else can we do? I would urge the committee only to think of those things that are legal and legitimate. We have had, recently, in my home city the case of a very nasty murder and we have resort only to our legal system. We know the dangers of doing anything outside of the legal framework.

There are things we can do which are legal, in addition to the United Nations. I join in expressing deep regret that we have allowed the charge d'affaires of Amin, the representative of a murderer, to remain here in Washington. I expressed that regret for two reasons.

First of all, he is engaging in the spying on Ugandans here. We know that the relatives of Ugandans in this country who have the courage to speak about what is going on are being subject to torture and are being killed back in Uganda because their activities are being reported on.

I am a political scientist. If somebody could tell me some good reason, some state national interest why the charge should remain here, I would understand that. No one has ever been able to tell me why we

allow this symbol of a murderer to remain here in Washington, D.C. A simple act by the Department of State—it does not even require the action of the President—would send him packing, and he ought to be sent packing. He should not remain here in our city.

TAUGHT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

I used to teach international economics, Senator, when there were not enough political science courses for me. I looked over some of my old notes and I think I would be classified as a free trade enthusiast in the courses I used to give in international economics. I did not realize, when I gave those courses in international economics that I would sometime be dealing with a situation like we have in Uganda, a unique situation where, economically, one product has turned out to be such a principal, significant source of external support. Where a country where you have two factors, one a people able to live on a subsistence diet where the land has so far produced enough food for them to live, and where a total authoritarian dictatorship is able to take one product, give something like worthless chits, or local money, and to bank the external funding.

EXTERNAL FUNDING AMOUNTS TO \$200 MILLION

We know that, in 1976, external funding amounted to over \$200 million and I believe some testimony in the past few weeks reveal what that money is for.

That money is helping sustain the government of Idi Amin, paying for his torture and the war machine.

Certainly, we as a great people, we should be able to do something about it. I would urge the committee, whether it is in a resolution form, or whatever form, to consider a total band on all imports from Uganda—although it is true that coffee is the import which produce the money—and all exports. Any kind of trade with the dictatorship of Idi Amin.

I have recently just returned from Africa a few days ago and I saw Ugandan exiles both in Rome and London. I have also seen the heads of religious orders who have people there. I have not met one of them who has said that there is any circumstance in which we should continue trading with that man, that it is quite clear, while we cannot guarantee that cutting off his income will bring him down, I support all legal activity which will end this tyranny, this horrible horrendous nightmare which the Ugandan people are going through.

In summary, I would like to think that, through the action of the committee and through the action of the House that we could get a clear, official position by the U.S. Government. My university is located in Bridgeport, where Barnum was located. Barnum said, baloney is baloney, no matter which way you cut it.

Murder is murder, no matter who does it. We have here a man committed to murder. He is carrying out murder. He never has expressed one iota of regret or repentance for what he has done. Our official position must be that he is a murderer.

OUR RESPONSIBILITIES

Second, that we should use our force and influence as a super power. The good Lord gives us, therefore, some responsibility. I, myself, have talked personally to Ambassador Young, but after all, he is the Ambassador of the United States and he is under instructions from the President and the Secretary. We should use every possible strategy, turn to some of the great African presidents—and I know them—and ask them to join with us. This horror, this nightmare, this disease. This affliction of the family of man. Great powers and small powers and blacks and whites together should get together.

That kind of leadership should come from the United States. An instruction should be given by the President to our chief delegate to the U.N.

The studies, and I think they are in the report, clearly indicate how the special income from coffee sales helps that man to pay for his mercenaries, to pay for his hardware. Amin is a moral leper and we should have nothing to do with him.

WE SHOULD EXPEL THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRS

Finally, I repeat my recommendation that the Chargé D'affaires be expelled forthwith. He is the representative of a murderer, of an international leper, and his presence here is a clear and present danger to the poor Ugandans in the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Melady.

The recommendation that you make is one that the committee will consider very seriously in our role of advising on foreign policy matters.

I personally, concur in your recommendation, and I would hope that the committee would see fit to make that same recommendation to the administration.

Mr. Ambassador, a *de facto* embargo is now taking place. Major coffee companies have joined in it since the House resolution was adopted.

And, if the other companies follow suit—the few that still import Ugandan coffee—we will have cut off the American import of Ugandan coffee, which amounts to about a third of the total Ugandan coffee trade.

IMPACT OF AN EMBARGO

What impact do you think that might have, both on the economic side and on the political side?

Mr. MELADY. I am pleased. This has been a development in the last couple of weeks. I have read about that, and I am pleased that they have, without any legislation. And I am hoping other companies will. In my own private life, I am writing to presidents and trying to do everything I can to bring it about.

I do not think that is enough; I think we have to go on record. There would be action by the American people, as represented by their government. We should make it a law. I think we should make it easy for all companies to join in and to also make sure that certain other

gimmicks are not involved in having to go to third parties and eventually coming to us, and so forth. It should be a matter of Presidential action or law, and it should be more than just *de facto*.

But I am pleased that the several large importers have agreed to this.

WHY ARE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS RELUCTANT?

Senator CHURCH. Given the European experience with genocide during the Second World War, what accounts for the reluctance of the European governments to show more concern about the genocide now being practiced by Idi Amin?

Mr. MELADY. That is something that perplexes me. My wife and I have been doing some lecturing in Europe and find lots of private groups, like here, who speak about it—can we not get action by the government? I have talked to the governmental leaders personally. The subtitle of my book, "Hitler in Africa," is a quote from a speech by Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian President, 1 year ago right now in London.

I have spoken very recently to other African heads of state.

So, while we get general agreement that he is a brutal tyrant now engaging in genocide and that people compare him to Hitler, we cannot get any kind of action.

Well, Senator, that was also true in regards to Hitler.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. I was going to comment that the same thing happened with regards to Hitler and the performance of the United States and other European countries—indeed, the performance of the governments of the world left much to be desired. There were some condemnations of Hitler but they were purely rhetorical, and I do not remember any boycotts ever being imposed. In fact, the governments would not even open their gates, including our own, to Jewish refugees.

Mr. MELADY. It has been the media and private people and organizations that seem to be calling for action. You do not seem to be getting much from governments, whether it is in England or, for example, the Netherlands, or from Germany. I hear from all.

Canada is quite active. I spoke at a university in British Columbia a few weeks ago—again, it is the professors, students, and so forth; not the Canadian Government.

WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR GOVERNMENT APATHY?

Senator CHURCH. What accounts for this? I mean, you, by your own testimony, have suggested that the Nixon administration was unwilling to accept your recommendations and, though it terminated the Embassy, it did so on other grounds, making no reference to the genocide. And now, under this administration, President Carter is sincerely concerned about human rights. I think that his many expressions on this score indicate the extent of his interest.

And yet, we are soon to hear from the official spokesman of the administration and I am told that they are coming to tell us that they do not want to do anything. They are against taking effective action.

Can you explain this?

Mr. MELADY. Well, timidity in the face of such horrendous and bestial conduct on the part of a government that should have placed itself beyond the pale of normal relations of civilized nations.

It is hard for me to find an answer. I would say that perhaps there is a desire in the establishment, the governmental establishments, to somehow maintain some connections to hope that things may improve.

I felt that way when I first went there. At first, I could not quite believe what I was seeing in July and August. Somehow, things will get better. There is some way we can get to Amin, put him in the category of just dictator, not murderer.

And I received the reports from the State Department, I wanted to make sure—the torture and the murder and so forth. One's mind revolts against it. I did not quite want to believe what was going on.

When I became finally convinced what was going on, I made the recommendations that I made, and I find now that this Government and other governments in the West oh, had the experience just with World War II and Hitler, it was reluctant to take that decisive action.

Second, people—I receive letters from people saying, why are you spending all of this time on it? Who really cares?

I am a political scientist, not a sociologist. There is very possibly a racist implication to it. I get that in some of the correspondence. Who cares? A black man is killing lots of little blacks. Of course, I cannot accept that.

It seems to be that no real lobby has developed on behalf of the Ugandan people in the United States. The Senate, the President and the State Department are under great pressure with lots of things. I have re-read several times President Carter's commitment to human rights. I think it is genuine; I have heard him speak. I have often thought that perhaps someone could spend a half hour with him that we might have some kind of action.

There is a general indifference. There is no vital interest. There is an inability to generate some kind of action.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I guess your answer is as good as any that I have been given.

Mr. MELADY. Could it be, Senator, if I might add, that maybe it is time for people to speak? And that is why this committee has made it possible for citizens to come down here to speak.

PRESIDENT CARTER CONCERNED ABOUT UGANDA

Senator CHURCH. I have spoken to the President about Uganda and he is deeply concerned about the internal conditions in Uganda. He also is worried about the American citizens, the missionaries, who remain there. I think that may be a reason why he has not made a presidential decision.

He has spoken of the number who were still there and he is worried about possible reprisals against them.

Mr. MELADY. That is a legitimate concern, but their numbers are less than 100 now, and every opportunity has been—well, I mean, every warning has been extended and they know that their lives may be imperiled. It is my understanding that they have made that choice, and those who are still there have decided to expose themselves to this risk.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I had some questions for you, but I think you have covered them very well in your testimony and made your position so very clear that it is unnecessary for me to ask these questions.

I want to thank you very much, not only for your testimony, Mr. Ambassador, but for what you have done since you have returned from Uganda to try and stir the conscience of our country and the world through your books, your lectures, your efforts.

They have not gone unnoticed. I think that largely as a result of that effort on your part and on other, like-minded people, we may get a sufficient stirring from people to elicit some response from the bureaucracy. Let us hope so.

Thank you very much.

Mr. MELADY. Thank you, Senator.

LAST WITNESSES TO APPEAR AS PANEL

Senator CHURCH. Now, we have three witnesses remaining and I am going to ask all three of them, since I think they have pretty much the same thing to say, to appear at one time as a final panel.

Mr. Meyer, the Director of the Office of Export Administration of the Bureau of Trade Regulations, Industry and Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce; the Honorable Edward Mezvinsky, the United States Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission; and William C. Harrop, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs of the Department of State.

I think that we might hear from Mr. Meyer and Mr. Harrop in that order, and then from Mr. Mezvinsky, since his testimony will have to do with the United Nations.

Mr. Meyer and Mr. Harrop will speak for the administration in regards to our continuing trade with Uganda.

STATEMENT OF RAUER H. MEYER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF TRADE REGULATIONS, INDUSTRY AND TRADE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. MEYER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased today to appear to testify for the Department of Commerce on U.S. trade policy toward Uganda.

My statement treats briefly, but I hope adequately, each of the points which the subcommittee asked us to discuss.

BACKGROUND ON UGANDA

Uganda is essentially an agricultural economy which has been declining since 1972. Historically, our trade with Uganda has involved imports of coffee and exports of various types of machinery and equipment, miscellaneous manufactured goods, food and food preparations.

In 1977, our trade consisted of exports of \$14 million and imports of \$248 million. The principal U.S. exports in 1977 were telecommunica-

tions equipment, agricultural machinery, and cereals. Coffee accounted for virtually all of the U.S. imports from Uganda.

In 1976, Ugandan imports from the United States were only 4 percent of its total imports. The bulk of Uganda's total purchases came from Kenya, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Leading purchasers of the Ugandan exports were the United States, about 33 percent; the United Kingdom, 21 percent; and France and Italy, 6 percent each.

THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND EXPORTS

The Department of Commerce controls exports under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1969 as amended. Most of the commodities and technical data that enter into normal, commercial trade are subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.

Other agencies, principally the Department of State, for arms, and the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for nuclear products, also exercise control over exports.

TWO TYPES OF LICENSES

As with other countries, exports to Uganda of commodities and technical data are controlled by Commerce under two principal types of licenses. A validated license, which is a specific, written authorization from the Department, required to be obtained prior to export; and a general license, which is general authorization, available for any transaction that meets specified conditions and for which no written application needs to be made to the Department.

For national security reasons, a validated license is required for the export to Uganda as well as to all other countries, except Canada, of items with significant military potential. These include items on the International Strategic List, developed by COCOM, an association of NATO countries minus Iceland but including Japan, and certain other items unilaterally controlled by the United States, the export of which could make a significant contribution to the military potential of countries for which exports are restricted for national security reasons.

Additionally, we have just placed exports of crime control and detection equipment under validated license control to all countries except the NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

The Department of Commerce also exercises control over the use of U.S. origin parts and components and technical data in foreign-made products. Technical data may, for the most part, be exported to Uganda under general license.

EXCEPTIONS ON GRACE

There are some exceptions, the most notable being data relating to civil aircraft, watercraft and certain nuclear items.

The export of items subject to validated license control represented 65 percent by value, of total exports to Uganda in 1977.

These involved principally telecommunications equipment. The remaining exports were made up of general license commodities.

All of these items are widely available in Western Europe and Japan.

SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT EXPORTS UNDER SPECIAL REVIEW

Senator CHURCH. In other words, 65 percent of our exports to Uganda in 1977 were subject to the special review of the Commerce Department and had to obtain a special license from that Department?

Mr. MEYER. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. And the Department gave that license, including telecommunications equipment, for the Idi Amin regime?

Mr. MEYER. That is right.

Unless there are particular foreign policy concerns, the possible diversion of any items to countries for which exports are controlled for national security reasons is the principal concern of the review of validated license applications for exports to Uganda as for most non-Communist countries.

Examples of foreign policy concerns are suppression of human rights, nuclear nonproliferation policies—

COMMERCE DEPARTMENT AND THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Senator CHURCH. Well, let's take suppression of human rights, since this is perhaps the most egregious case in the world today, with the possible exception of Cambodia.

Does the Department of Commerce exercise any judgment in this respect, or is the Department bound entirely by the decision of the State Department?

Mr. MEYER. The Department does consult the State Department. We are obligated to do so under the terms of the statute.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. I understand that. Does the State Department set down the guideline? In other words, the Department of Commerce issues the licenses and consults with the State Department.

Now, in a matter relating to the suppression of human rights or nuclear nonproliferation or international terrorism, presumably the State Department would set the guidelines for determining whether or not the license should issue. Is that a correct interpretation?

Mr. MEYER. That is correct, Senator, but we do not accept the recommendations of the Department of State uncritically. If we disagree with them, these disagreements are escalated until they are resolved.

APPROVAL BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON COMMUNICATIONS SALE

Senator CHURCH. In the question of Uganda, did you receive no instructions on the part of the State Department against issuing a license for, let's say, the telecommunications equipment by virtue of the gross suppression of human rights in Uganda?

Mr. MEYER. Excuse me 1 minute. [Pause.]

Yes, sir, we did consult the State Department on that transaction, and we did receive State's advice that it be approved.

Senator CHURCH. To approve the sale?

Mr. MEYER. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Mr. MEYER. May I comment a little bit on that?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, of course.

Mr. MEYER. The Harris Corp. was engaged in a project that involved a satellite ground station for international communications through the Intelsat system and subsidiary ground stations which would link Ugandan cities with international stations and carry internal communications. Some radio and television equipment was also associated with the project.

After a close study of the project, we concluded after consulting with the State Department that the system was essentially devoted to commercial communications. It does not have special channels for government use or code systems, and it is not tied into the Ugandan military communications system—a radio system which already exists to link the military and security units of the government.

Therefore, we concluded that to deny the project would only have denied American firms the opportunity to participate in the development of Uganda's communications network without really affecting the Ugandan Government's own security communications system.

And, had we not participated, this would not have denied this communications system to Uganda, since other foreign bidders could have easily taken over the contract and finished the project.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Senator CHURCH. This is almost always the bottom line in questions of these kinds, whether it is arms sales, whatever, the bottom line argument is, if we do not do it, someone else will. But you have explained the basis for the decision made by the Commerce Department, and I think that we could take the balance of your statement, Mr. Meyer, and incorporate it in the record because, as I read through it, it explains the law as it applies to the Commerce Department and to the question of export licenses. I think that since the Department of State must play the principal policymaking role in this field, we ought to call on Mr. Harrop to speak for the State Department.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. HARROP, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. HARROP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. I wonder, perhaps, if you could summarize, put your entire statement in the record, and summarize it.

Mr. HARROP. Yes; let me try to give the essence of my statement. Then I will be glad to answer your questions, Senator.¹

THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION

First, I would like to make clear that the United States Government deplores the massive violations of fundamental human rights in Uganda, I believe, as strongly as any of the witnesses as you have had today and in your previous two sessions.

Senator CHURCH. Why does not the State Department's recommendation for substantive action equate with the moral indignation that the Department feels?

¹ See appendix, p. 126, for Mr. Harrop's prepared statement.

Mr. HARROP. Would you like me to summarize the actions we have taken, Senator? Perhaps that would be helpful.

Senator CHURCH. All right. Anyway that you would like to proceed. But that is really the critical question. It is how is credibility given to the many statements of this administration that deal with human rights while we continue to maintain a trade that enables the Idi Amin regime to exist?

Mr. HARROP. Well, I think that I might summarize, Senator, the policy of this Government in several different areas, in the areas of aid, in the areas of export controls and visa issuance, and in our policies toward the actions of the international community.

Since 1973, we have had no American economic assistance programs toward Uganda. They have been stopped. We have, as I think you have already heard, a very strict control over exports of any U.S. equipment or goods under our export licensing regulations or under the Munitions Control Act. Anything of a military nature, anything which we believe would support in any way the human rights policies of the Ugandan Government or the repressive ability of the regime, we do not license.

THE U.S. VISA POLICY

In our visa policy, we, as of last fall—and I think that we would acknowledge that we were, perhaps, a bit slow in changing our visa regulations—we learned that there was a group of Ugandan helicopter pilots being trained in Texas. This was, I believe, referred to by Mr. Dornan earlier. At that time, we tightened our visa policies so that now any application for a visa from a Ugandan Government representative or employee or anyone who is financed by, or representing, the Ugandan Government, any application is referred back to Washington and is very carefully vetted back here to be sure that the training, or to be sure that the travel to this country is not going to be related to the repressive ability of the regime, or related to the human rights practices of the Amin regime.

Senator CHURCH. Let me ask you a question or two on that.

TERRORISTS TRAVELING UNDER UGANDAN PASSPORT

First of all, we have received verbal confirmation today that at least one international terrorist, a member of the PLO, has been traveling under a Ugandan passport.

Can you enlighten us about this, of any action being taken by the State Department to limit the use of Ugandan passport to PLO terrorists—that is, to limit the issuance of visas with Ugandan passports?

Mr. HARROP. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Do you view those visas with special care?

Mr. HARROP. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have been aware of that list for about 2 months and whenever an application for a visa is made by a Ugandan citizen, our review would very certainly apply to anyone with a Ugandan diplomatic passport.

We would check that application very carefully through all of the security files of the U.S. Government and would reject a visa to anyone on that list which you have there from Admiral Turner,

so that such an individual would not be given a visa to come to this country.

DIFFERENT TREATMENT FOR THE LIBYANS

Senator CHURCH. What I find puzzling is that the State Department is holding up \$400 million worth of private aircraft, spare parts, and maintenance to Libya because of that country's policy in giving refuge to terrorists. I think that is an appropriate action, as far as Libya is concerned, but I wonder why similar action has never been taken to Uganda, given the propensity of Idi Amin to offer similar cover and cooperation to international terrorists?

Mr. HARROP. We do not, Mr. Chairman, regard the PLO as a terrorist organization and, in fact, we do not have evidence that any of the individuals on this list have been involved in or accused of terrorist acts.

Senator CHURCH. So is your position that you have no evidence that Idi Amin has acted to protect terrorists or to offer refuge to them or to use its passports in such a way as to elicit similar action that has been taken against Libya?

Mr. HARROP. We have no evidence, sir, that the issuance of these passports has been used for terrorism, or is designed for that purpose.

Senator CHURCH. So you would not condemn the Idi Amin regime as you have condemned the Libyan regime as giving aid or assistance to the international terrorist movement?

Mr. HARROP. We condemn the Idi Amin regime very vigorously for its human rights practices, but we do not, as of now, have evidence that they are supporting international terrorism.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Mr. HARROP. I think, just to conclude the remarks I was making about the policy which we are endeavoring to carry out, it is one of disassociation of the United States from the human rights activities of the Amin regime, to make clear in public forums, and particularly in international forums, that we feel that multilateral international action is necessary to keep pressure upon this regime, to lead it to mend its ways, to improve its deplorable behavior.

We feel that, in the end, probably the way that change can best be effected is through the concerted action of the international community and we are, in fact, somewhat encouraged by signs of improvement in this direction—for instance, in the Commonwealth meeting of last year, there was a statement sharply critical of the Ugandan Government's human rights practices and for the first time, as Mr. Mezvinsky can explain, we do have, with the agreement of African governments, as well as world governments, we do have some progress in the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Senator CHURCH. Since we have withdrawn our own Ambassador and closed our Embassy in Uganda, why do we continue to permit the Ugandans to keep a Chargé in Washington?

Mr. HARROP. We feel this is useful in our own self-interest, Mr. Chairman. To be able to retain a degree of communication with this regime we think is important to our interests, and particularly to the welfare of our approximately 200 citizens remaining in Uganda. At the time of a very, very serious threat to them in the late winter, early spring of 1977, we were able to communicate back to Amin through

his representative here, and we think that that may have had some calming effect, or some influence on saving the lives of some of our people who we thought were very much threatened.

HAVE ALL AMERICANS LEFT UGANDA?

Senator CHURCH. Do you think by now that all those Americans who are going to leave Uganda had an opportunity to do so and have been warned of the danger, the risk they are assuming, by refusing to leave?

Mr. HARROP. We have gone to great lengths to warn all the people there. We have called them, we have called their parent organizations here. We have spoken with the few companies involved.

We have, through the German Embassy, which represents our interests in Kampala, we have contacted them personally. We have put out leaflets to them. And I would say that the answer is certainly yes. Surely every American there must, by now, know that we feel that it is not a safe place to live or work.

THE UGANDAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES

Senator CHURCH. That being the case, is it necessary any longer to furnish a welcome mat to the Chargé of Idi Amin in this city?

Mr. HARROP. I think I would answer that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that the fact that American citizens will not take the advice of their Government in leaving a country does not absolve the Government of responsibility for them. I think that if a real crisis, an emergency would arise; if Amin would feel that he were somehow cornered by actions of other governments and behaved in a way that he has shown himself capable of behaving in the past, of calling all Americans together in a football stadium or wherever it might be and then putting out the headlines, notices, and the challenges to other governments, I think that we might find the presence of this mission very useful to us.

I might just make one more point that we do not certainly deal with the Ugandan mission as we do with other missions of African governments here. We deal at a working level, a rather modest way of getting our business done without much of the pomp or panoply of diplomacy.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I do not find the argument very persuasive, that missionaries that have chosen to remain to assume a risk that they know exists and who, themselves, would not want that U.S. Government to use them as an excuse for not taking an officially forthright action against the moral outrage for Amin's actions, that this appeals to me as a very strong or persuasive argument.

WHAT UNITED STATES HAS DONE SO FAR

Now, we have withdrawn our Embassy. We do not give further economic aid to Idi Amin. We have tried to elicit interest on the part of other countries to condemn the genocide being practiced by this regime. That is the extent of the policy.

It seems blind to the truth that Idi Amin exists by virtue of his foreign earnings; those foreign earnings are used to retain his regime in power, to pay off his strong-arm police; to provide them with various luxuries of life that keep them loyal to him.

A third of that export earning comes from the United States each year in the form of coffee imports and yet it is the position of the State Department that nothing should be done about that continuing custom that enables Idi Amin to continue to govern.

That, I take it, is the position?

Mr. HARROP. Well, I would, if I may, rephrase that slightly, Mr. Chairman, in saying that we feel that we would wish as a government to interfere in the movement of international trade only with great reluctance when we felt that there were not only important political reasons to do so, but some possibility of efficacy or results from it, and we have reached the conclusion in this case that the world supply situation of coffee is such that, given the reluctance of other major importing governments to join in such an activity of this kind—in fact, their reluctance to put restraints upon their imports of Ugandan coffee—we believe that the difficulties to Uganda would be very minor and probably of a very transient nature and would not cause any effective—

Senator CHURCH. This argument ignores totally the moral dimensions of our responsibilities in a case of this kind, particularly on the part of an administration that, I think, is genuinely concerned about human rights.

NO INTEREST IN BOYCOTT

Moreover, has the U.S. Government ever seriously discussed, or advocated, with our European allies, for example, the possibility of invoking a coffee boycott against Uganda?

Mr. HARROP. We have had some informal conversations which have led us to conclude that our allies were not interested in this type of policy.

Senator CHURCH. Well, then, is it not time for the United States to set an example? Perhaps if we set the example, they would take the possibility more seriously. They have lived with genocide in the Hitler era. Perhaps we can prick their conscience, if we were just to assert ourselves and say that, as a matter of our own conscience, we think this is what should be done and we would be prepared to do it and we are going to do it, and we think you ought to do it also.

Do you not think that might have more impact than just informal inquiries about the possibility that they might be interested?

Mr. HARROP. I do not have the impression that the other major importing countries are interested in this sort of policy.

Senator CHURCH. I do not suppose they are, and as long as they have no leadership from us and no interest, really, on our part and a State Department that is saying that nothing like this would work anyway and why do it, I do not suppose they are going to develop any interest.

I think it is appalling. I think it is utterly inconsistent with all the pretensions about a concern on the part of the Department for human rights. I do not think it can be justified, and certainly not on the basis of the arguments that you have presented.

I wonder if we could hear from Mr. Mezvinsky, if you could tell us something about the situation at the United Nations.

Mr. MEZVINSKY. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will just submit the statement for the record and just briefly give a quick sketch.¹

Senator CHURCH. All right.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MEZVINSKY, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Basically what I want to say will relate to the actions that have been taken by the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Ambassador Young and myself and others at the U.N. have specifically spoken out about the tragic situation in Uganda. Under the Amin Government almost any imaginable kind of human right has been violated.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE U.N. ACTION

Briefly, let's take a look at the background of the U.N. action. Basically, the Human Rights Commission has had a double standard. It has talked about Chile, it has talked about South Africa, and it has talked about Israel.

This kind of selective morality is well known. We made it clear in 1977 and 1978 that this selection approach had to change and certainly this administration's position on human rights would demand such a change.

THE UNITED KINGDOM RESOLUTION

We saw that the unholy trinity, as they call it, would be such that we would look at Uganda, look at Cambodia, and look at the other countries. In 1977, the United Kingdom had a resolution; it was defeated. We strongly supported it.

Thus in 1978, for the first time, there was unprecedented action, specifically on Uganda. It was made under the confidential procedures of the Commission.

INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

Why was there the action? International concern had been aroused. The Commission had received a statement from Godfrey Lyle, the former Minister of Justice of Uganda. It said, "Uganda is one huge jail with Amin as the chief jailer," and as Lyle points out, "There is no known behavior or code of conduct that can guarantee personal safety from unwarranted arrest, torture, and murder. Fear engulfs everyone, high and low. The Ugandan people have long learned to put up with the injustices of being robbed and manhandled by Amin's Gestapo."

It is that kind of testimony that finally persuaded the Africans, I might point out, to make the change. The Africans pushed it. But, I would like to leave you with this thought. The U.N. is glacier-like, it is slow, it is frustrating. But I think the Africans see it now. I think the developing countries have responded. There has been progress. We welcome that progress, and we also realize from the African standpoint that we not only have to look at the actions the U.S. takes

¹ See appendix, p. 129, for Mr. Mezvinsky's prepared statement.

specifically on Uganda, but also whether similar actions will be taken by the U.S. on South Africa as well.

ACTIONS BY HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

I will be glad to go into the specific actions by the Commission, but those were done under a confidential procedure.

Senator CHURCH. Why was the action taken by the Commission done under confidential—under the wraps of their confidential procedures?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. The reason is this. It was brought up under a resolution that calls for it. That is No. 1.

No. 2 it is clear that, in order to have success for action, you have to have the support of other countries besides the United States.

The African's view is that it is like punishing a member of your own family. They do not like to do it in public. They will face up to it, finally, which they did in 1978, by doing it privately, and that is the reason for the action.

Senator CHURCH. All right.

This really, such confidential procedures were not invoked in the case of Rhodesia or in the case of Chile or Israel.

Mr. MEZVINSKY. No, they were not.

THE DOUBLE STANDARD

Senator CHURCH. This is a part of that double standard?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. That is correct, and we, personally, in terms of our position, Senator, were on record to have a public discussion, to have it treated in the same way that the other three countries were, but unfortunately the votes were such that it was confidential.

Senator CHURCH. Now, coming out of these confidential procedures is what kind of recommended action?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. The action taken cannot be revealed in public session, but I would be glad to do it in executive session.

Senator CHURCH. I wonder if you could supply that in a suitable form for the committee.

Mr. MEZVINSKY. I would be happy to.

Senator CHURCH. Can you say, publicly, whether an embargo is contemplated as the UN took such an action against Rhodesia—and, as you will recall, we supported it?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Excuse me?

Senator CHURCH. I said, in the case of Rhodesia, there was a boycott invoked at the United Nations, and I am just wondering whether anything of that kind is now being contemplated?

ACTION ON UGANDA STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS

Mr. MEZVINSKY. I think the action on Uganda will be done on a step-by-step process. Member states will see what the response is by the Government of Uganda, what kind of action is taken by the Commission, take a look at those recommendations before they would face up to a boycott.

Senator CHURCH. Of course, you have to work within an organization in which the Third World countries have come to control the majority

votes. I hope the United States will continue to press vigorously for suitable action at the United Nations, but I know that we cannot depend on the United Nations, given the circumstances, and the internal politics of the organization, to act as forthrightly in a case of this kind.

I will be very much surprised if the United Nations takes an action comparable to what was taken in the case of Rhodesia.

Mr. MEZVINSKY. I might say that I think those responsible Africans, in this case, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Senegal who is the Chairman of the Commission, realize that if the United States is going to face up to the situation in South Africa, the African countries are going to have to face up to the Ugandas, the Equatorial Guineas, and the Ethiopias of the world.

The reason for confidentiality is for the protection of individuals so they can make the complaints.

UNITED STATES OBLIGED TO DO RIGHT FOR THIS COUNTRY

Senator CHURCH. Well, I wish you well at the United Nations on this special human rights panel. I hope that some action will be taken that will encompass the entire membership of the United Nations.

Meanwhile, I think the United States has its own obligation to do what is right for this country. It may be that in many cases where we are dealing with governments that do ignore human rights or suppress human rights that it is sufficient simply to refrain from giving direct military assistance to the regime or in other cases, more egregious cases, to refrain from giving economic assistance.

But there are countries in this world, and Uganda is among them, where the government has gone beyond the point where normal sanctions of that kind can any longer suffice, and if this is not a case where we should consider the moral implications of continuing trade, I do not know where we would find them.

For an administration that has expressed greater interest in human rights than the previous administrations that we have known in recent years, I think it is especially incumbent that some action be taken commensurate with the size of the atrocities.

I am certainly going to do all I can to see to it that this committee begins to move in that direction and forces this issue. It is time that something be done, something that really would demonstrate that we believe what we are saying and are prepared to back it up.

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Knowing your views, Senator, I would hope that you would assist us in having the genocide treaty ratified by the Senate.

Senator CHURCH. I have tried several times, and I will try again. I am faced in the Senate, as you are faced with in the United Nations, with votes. But, as I have made the effort before, I intend to make the effort again.

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. That concludes the hearing. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

[H. CON. RES. 612, 95th Cong., 2d sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas in recent years the Government of the Republic of Uganda has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights;

Whereas the United States holds such actions to be unacceptable and has already taken certain measures to express its abhorrence of human rights conditions in Uganda;

Whereas the United Nations Human Rights Commission has agreed to and is currently preparing for study missions in order to investigate charges of violations of rights in Uganda;

Whereas the Government of the Republic of Uganda continues to earn significant amounts of foreign exchange from exports of coffee to the United States and other countries; and

Whereas repressive measures taken by the Ugandan Government have aroused deep concern among Americans and throughout the international community: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That (a) the Congress strongly condemns the gross violations of human rights, and other acts which suppress freedom of political thought and violate the rights of individuals, which have been committed by Idi Amin and the Government of the Republic of Uganda, and the Congress urges the President of the United States to support, and where possible, implement measures, such as an embargo on trade with Uganda, which would effectively discourage United States support of the Government of Uganda.

(b) The Congress urges the President of the United States to encourage and support international efforts to investigate and respond to conditions in the Republic of Uganda, including economic restrictions.

Passed the House of Representatives June 12, 1978.

Attest:

EDMUND L. HENSHAW, Jr.,
Clerk.

THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,

New York, N.Y. August 29, 1978.

Senator JOHN SPARKMAN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: On June 15th of the year, I testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy concerning human rights conditions in Uganda.

I am enclosing a brief supplemental statement concerning present United States immigration policy with regard to Ugandan refugees. If it is possible, I would like this material added to the record.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

MICHAEL POSNER,
Executive Director.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

The principal reform in this area would be a revision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, as it relates to political refugees in the United States. Section

203(a) (7) of the present act allows preferential treatment for refugees from communist, communist dominated and certain other countries in the Middle East. One alternative would be to amend this section to include Ugandans (and other groups of political refugees) who seek entry into the United States.

A preferable course would be to make major general revisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to deal properly with the unique and significant problems faced by political refugees. Several relevant legislative proposals have now been submitted to Congress including a major reform package, which has been proposed by Senator Kennedy.

At present, the I.N.S. and State Department handle requests for political asylum on a case-by-case basis, which is extremely time consuming and arbitrary. Unless there is a change in the law, it seems unlikely that either agency will be able to systematically alter their approach.

CHANGES IN EXISTING PRACTICE

Despite the limitations imposed by the Immigration and Nationality Act, several changes could be implemented to improve the Immigration and Naturalization Service's practice. First, refugees should be informed by the I.N.S. that they will not be deported and forced back to Uganda. Second, under existing practice refugees are often granted voluntary departure status. Yet, form I-210, which informs them of this status, places emphasis on their departure, stating that they are required to depart the United States by a designated date. A letter should be sent by the Immigration Naturalization Service, clearly explaining that a stay of deportation has been granted. It should also explain other relevant details about the voluntary departure process.

A related suggestion is that the I.N.S. prepare a letter to each refugee when permission to work is granted. Under current practice work permission is noted, in handwriting, on each individual's I-94 form. Employers often deny jobs to these applicants because the forms do not look official. A letter, on I.N.S. letterhead, could eliminate many of these problems by stating that an individual with voluntary departure status is not prohibited from seeking employment by the immigration laws of the United States. This letter might also state that this status is comparable to the status conferred by a green card and is subject to annual renewal. Employers or prospective employers could be instructed to contact the regional I.N.S. office for further information. A letter with this information would be extremely helpful to Ugandans who are now unnecessarily and routinely rejected for employment.

[Submitted for Appendix by Congressman Pease]¹

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much.

We also know that the Soviets and the Arabs commonly demand hard currency for arms and other supplies. And, we know further that Amin derives 90 percent of his hard currency from coffee exports.

This seems to suggest to me that there is a direct linkage between the coffee purchases and the support needed to keep Amin in power. I do not think you would dispute this. And, you have stated in your opinion the making of foreign policy should be the responsibility of the Congress and the State Department.

Do you see any reason why the Congress should not act to recognize the relationship between coffee and Amin's hold on power and take steps to stop that unfortunate chain of events?

Mr. SCHRODER. Are you directing that to me?

Mr. PEASE. You or any of your colleagues.

Mr. SCHRODER. I really cannot say again exactly what the right decision is here, Congressman, but certainly that would be among the considerations in my mind if I were in your shoes.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you.

I would like to ask your comment and perhaps the comment of your colleagues. You have stated uniformly, all four of you, that you do not feel it is up to your companies to make decisions about whether to trade with another country or not. The position that I have taken regarding our Nation's relations with Uganda is that there comes a time when the deprivation of human rights is so great that we simply need to disassociate ourselves as a nation in every way from that regime.

¹ Taken from Hearings before House International Relations Committee.

Now, you have said essentially you are passing that decision off to the State Department and to the Congress. In your dealings with other companies—and all of your corporations do deal with other companies, let's say domestically—do you apply standards that you do not do business with some companies based on their own corporate practices, that you just prefer not to do business with a company because it exploits its own workers or because it continues other practices with which you do not agree?

Mr. SCHRODER, Congressman, I do not think we as business corporations make determinations as to whom we deal with and whom we do not based solely upon our judgment of other's morality. I think, however, as I indicated in my testimony, that when, in fact, there is that kind of reported behavior regarding a trading partner, it raises a tremendous amount of sensitivity as we proceed in our trading relationship with that other party.

For business reasons therefore, there can easily be a situation where we terminate a trading relationship, again not because of a desire to impose a moral sanction, but because we concluded that their probable trading behavior is such that we simply do not want to continue to have a relationship with them.

[From the Journal of Commerce, May 31, 1978]

BOYCOTT INCREASES DEMAND FOR COFFEE—ROASTERS LOOK ELSEWHERE

LONDON—Demand for physical coffee has been boosted during the past two weeks following the U.S. boycott of Ugandan coffee.

The decision of most U.S. roasters to steer clear of Ugandan coffee at the prompting of the U.S. government has forced them to look elsewhere for supplies of the robusta coffee they need, especially for instant coffee production.

The main alternative origin for this type of coffee is West Africa, but supplies from that region have not been forthcoming of late. Although Ivory Coast and some of the smaller producers have been offering, prices of robusta coffee have been commanding a premium of up to 80 sterling over the London robusta market July futures position, which now stands at around 1,675 to 1,700 sterling.

European roasters are not willing to pay this premium, so they have turned to Indonesia for supplies, despite the fact that coffee from this origin is regarded as inferior. But, although Indonesian coffee has been considered acceptable in Europe even with its lower quality, U.S. roasters have not generally been willing to buy from that origin until the boycott.

The Ugandan coffee boycott has forced U.S. coffee buyers to turn to Indonesia for supplies of robusta coffee. This has increased competition and pushed prices higher, even though there has been no increase in demand from Europe. For example, Indonesia E.K. ones were trading at around \$119 per 50 kilograms c and f afloat and for nearby shipment. The price has now risen to about \$144 per 50 kilos.

But the tightness of nearby physical coffee supplies is expected to ease in the medium to longer term. Ugandan coffee rejected by the U.S. will eventually appear on European markets in greater quantity, London dealers say. So far European, and particularly U.K., coffee buyers have shown no objection to taking Ugandan coffee at competitive prices, so the U.S. ban on Ugandan coffee is likely to result only in a slight restructuring of world coffee trade patterns rather than in a reduction of total coffee supplies.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MADIGAN, ATTORNEY FOR PAGE AIRWAYS, INC., ROCHESTER, N.Y.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. My name is Michael J. Madigan and I am a member of the Washington law firm of Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld. We are outside legal counsel to Page Airways, Inc. and several of its individual officers and directors. I am appearing here today, as attorney for Page, in response to the request of the subcommittee that Page provide a representative at today's hearing.

Page understands the purpose of today's hearing to be part of the subcommittees' review of Uganda/United States relations since President Idi Amin came to power in Uganda in 1971. Page understands this review to be for the purpose of the subcommittees' consideration of whether economic sanctions should be applied against Uganda.

Page Airways, Inc. is a small company headquartered in Rochester, New York. Page has been, for a number of years, engaged in the sale and re-sale of airplanes. Page's business has also included land-base operations in several cities in the United States. These base operations provide service and maintenance for various private aircraft.

Page, in the past years, has participated in the sales of aircraft to Uganda. In 1973, in conjunction with the Grumman Corporation, Page sold a Grumman Gulfstream II aircraft to the Republic of Uganda. In 1975, Page purchased a Lockheed L-100-30 Hercules aircraft and re-sold it to the Republic of Uganda. In addition, Page entered into an operating agreement which provided for the operation and maintenance of the L-100 aircraft. Page has, however, exercised its rights under this service contract to terminate that agreement and to withdraw its crews in accordance with the terms of the contract.

In past years, Page has also sold Uganda ground support equipment, maintenance services, spare parts, pilot training and other miscellaneous items. The most significant of such miscellaneous items was a quantity of medical supplies which Page sold to Uganda. The approximate value of these medical supplies, and this is only approximate, is in the area of \$650,000.

A separate company, Willmorite, Inc., whose chairman of the board, James P. Willmot, is also the chairman of the board of Page Airways, is presently constructing a building for the Republic of Uganda in New York City. Except as outlined above and elaborated upon in material Page has provided to your staff, Page has no other present business with Uganda.

Page has also provided information on these subjects to subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations and, by letter of June 5, 1978, has provided copies of that material to your staff.

Page is cognizant of a number of pending legislative proposals relating to the imposition of economic sanctions against Uganda. Such measures are pending both here in the Senate, as well as in the House of Representatives. We note, however, that thus far our Government has not formulated a policy with regard to such sanctions. For example, neither President Carter nor the State Department has taken a position on the Uganda resolution passed by the House of Representatives. Notwithstanding this lack of clear governmental policy, however, Page can assure this subcommittee that Page and all of its employees will abide faithfully by the dictates of any policy which is formulated and announced by the United States Government.

There has been sentiment voiced here in Congress that American companies should, despite the lack of clear governmental policy, voluntarily stop doing business with Uganda. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that Page has terminated its operating contract in Uganda and has no present plans for additional future business in Uganda.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, as you know, there is presently pending litigation in which Page and several individual employees are involved. Some of the issues in that litigation relate to sales to Uganda described previously. We are defending those allegations and will demonstrate, when the case goes to trial, that they have no merit. Our defense however, will be presented in a court of law, not in the press or anywhere else. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to commend the responsible manner in which your staff has prepared for today's hearing. Page has made available to them the information requested and your staff has agreed that this public hearing will not touch upon the issues involved in that litigation. As an attorney I cannot compromise, in any fashion, the rights of my clients in that very important litigation. Within those parameters I will be happy to respond to questions.

RESPONSE OF PAGE AIRWAYS, INC., TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE

Question. 1. What was the exact title bestowed upon Charles E. Hanner (Hanner) by Idi Amin (Amin)?

Answer. Honorary Consul for Uganda in the United States.

Question. 2. Did Amin, any agent of him, or any employee of the Ugandan Government give or offer Hanner or Page Airways, Inc. (Page) anything of value, including but not limited to monetary compensation, or any preferential right, including but not limited to access to goods or services? If so, state the form of consideration received, the reasons for its receipt, the dates of receipt, the provider of the consideration, and any intermediaries between the provider and Amin, any agent of him, or any employee of the Ugandan Government.

Answer. No significant items (for example, Amin once gave a small stuffed animal head to Mr. Wilmot), to the best of the recollection of Page employees. It is unclear, what "preferential right, including but not limited to access to goods or services" means.

Question 3. Has Amin, any agent of him, or any employee of the Ugandan Government requested or authorized Hanner or Page to perform or obtain any services or buy any goods? If so, state the date and nature of each such request or authorization and provide all transcripts, memoranda of conversation or press accounts regarding such request or authorization.

Answer. In November and December of 1975, Hanner was requested to procure medical supplies by the Ministry of Health of Uganda. Page obtained the medical supplies, arranged for shipment to Uganda and billed the Government of Uganda. A number of small miscellaneous items also were purchased and billed by Page to Uganda. Amin also made requests relating to the possible purchase by Uganda of certain aircraft and ultimately did purchase the G-11 and L-100 airplanes.

Question 4. Was Hanner or Page ever authorized by Amin, any agent of him or any employee of the Ugandan Government to make contracts? If so, state the date and nature of each such authorization and provide all transcripts, memoranda of conversation or press accounts regarding such authorization.

Answer. No.

Question 5. Was Hanner or Page ever given by Amin, any agent of him or any employee of the Ugandan Government access or authority to disburse any monies? If so, state the amount and location of such money, and the date and nature of such access or authority.

Answer. The crew of the L-100 is always given cash by Uganda Airlines prior to each flight to cover expenses, such as fuel, landing fees, hotel bills, etc. The crew does not have credit cards and therefore pays cash for these various items. After each trip the cash disbursed is accounted for to officials of Uganda Airlines.

Question 6. Was such money ever used or disbursed by Hanner or Page? If so, state the amount, the time and the purpose of each such use or disbursement.

Answer. These monies were handled as stated above and Page does not possess any records recording these monies since the Avjet employees account for this cash to Uganda Airlines, not to Page. These monies cover the cost of operating the L-100 aircraft.

Question 7. State the departure date from the United States, the return date and the date of all intermediate stopovers of all trips of Hanner or James P. Wilmot, of which one of the stopovers was a location in Uganda. For each such trip, state the purpose of each stopover.

Answer. It is not possible at this time to provide a comprehensive listing of each and every trip to Uganda and each and every stopover, since it would require the review of an extensive volume of records. Moreover, it is not even clear that such records exist for all stopovers, etc. Page estimates, however, that over a five-year period Mr. Hanner probably made in excess of twenty-five trips to Uganda. James P. Wilmot has never been to Uganda.

Question 8. Provide a true copy of any "Purchase Agreement", including all amendments, to which Page and Amin, any agent of him or the Ugandan Government are parties. Provide all documents that discuss any such agreement.

Answer. There is no formal "Purchase Agreement" between Page and Uganda, other than the contracts provided for Subcommittee staff review in response to question 10 and the contracts for the sale of the G-11 and L-100 aircraft, which have also been provided to Subcommittee staff for review. The reference to "Purchase Agreement" in the response of Page Gulfstream to the inquiry of Congressman Pease refers to oral requests for items such as medical supplies, etc., which were sold by Page to Uganda. The response was, in retrospect, inartfully phrased and "Purchase Agreement" should not have been capitalized so as to imply the existence of a specific written agreement.

Question 9. State the date and nature of each activity performed by Hanner or Page (a) pursuant to any such purchase agreement or (b) on behalf of, affecting Amin, any agent of him, or the Ugandan Government.

Answer. (a) See answer to Q. 8. (b) Other than the sales of the G-11 and L-100 aircraft, the Avjet Air Services International, Inc. operating contract for the L-100, the Wilmore/Uganda House project, and the purchase of medical supplies, spare parts and other miscellaneous items described herein and in the response to the House Subcommittees, neither Page nor Mr. Hanner has performed activities on behalf of Amin. It is unclear what activities may "affect" Amin. For example, Hanner has spoken to and tried to be helpful to Ugandans in

the United States but has never engaged in any activities other than those described above for which he has received payment, nor has he ever functioned as a contracting agent in the United States for Uganda.

Question 10. Provide a true copy of any contract, including all amendments, by which Page provides pilots or other aircraft-related personnel to Amin, any agent of him or the Ugandan Government.

Answer. Provided to Subcommittee staff for review.

Question 11. Provide all documents that discuss any cargo carried on any aircraft of Amin, any agent of him, or the Ugandan Government, for which Page provides pilots or other personnel.

Answer. Page does not possess itineraries of the airplane or its cargo manifests.

Question 12. State the relationship of Page or Hanner to Zimex or Hannes Ziegler.

Answer. Hannes Ziegler acted as agent or representative with respect to the sale of the Gulfstream II to Uganda. Ziegler first notified Page that Uganda might be interested in purchasing a G-II airplane. Zimex is the corporate name for Ziegler's company, which is engaged in varied activities in Africa. For example, Ziegler has sold two 707 airplanes to Uganda (sales in which Page had no involvement).

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH CREIGHTON, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL, HARRIS CORP, CLEVELAND, OHIO

Mr. Chairman, I am Joseph Creighton, vice president-general counsel of Harris Corporation. I have with me James V. Stanton of the law firm of Ragan & Mason, Washington, D.C. We are appearing on behalf of Harris Corporation pursuant to your subcommittee's request with respect to the subject of commercial relations between the United States and the Government of Uganda.

Harris Corporation is engaged primarily in the manufacture and sale of electronic communication equipment and systems and printing equipment. Annual sales for this fiscal year which will end June 30, 1978, will exceed \$800 million. Harris International Telecommunications, Inc., which has made sales to Uganda, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Harris Corporation, which has its principal offices in Melbourne, Florida.

During the 1978 fiscal year, Harris has exported from the United States approximately \$200 million of goods and services and exports have been increasing. Harris and its subsidiaries have about 16,000 employees in this country, about one-third of whom are engaged in producing for export. Employees overseas are for the most part engaged in installation, service and maintenance activities related to equipment and systems produced in and exported from the United States. Thus, unlike many multinational corporations whose international activities are based primarily on overseas manufacturing plants or other installations abroad, Harris manufactures primarily in the United States, and exports U.S.-made products.

With respect to Uganda, Harris Corporation's trade consists of export and installation of a basic communication system similar to that which Harris is installing in Nigeria and the Sudan. It is designed for developing nations which do not have long-distance telephone lines or microwave transmission systems of the type generally used in the Western World for telephone and Telex messages, radio and TV. The system for Uganda consists primarily of Earth stations for satellite communications, connecting radio and television broadcasting transmitters and two-way radio equipment.

Harris was introduced to this business in Uganda as a result of successful work that it has performed on a similar system for a neighboring African government—Nigeria—which is friendly with the United States. Harris' major competitor for this business in Africa has been and is a Japanese company which is competing with Harris for similar systems not only overseas but also within the United States itself.

The communication system being produced for Uganda includes primarily Intelsat standard B type Earth stations; Harris standard Domsat type Earth stations; standard Harris VHF commercial television broadcast stations; HF and VHF radio communication equipment both fixed site and portable; power generation and installation equipment; antenna towers; equipment shelters; and miscellaneous spare parts. A portion of the system is already in operation.

The company's contracts in Uganda are with the Public Telephone Company, covering telephone usage, and with the Ministry of Information, covering television and radio broadcasting. The contracts were entered into with approval of the U.S. Government. The system provided under these contracts is made up of standard commercial equipments of a type available equally from other sources in a variety of European nations and Japan.

Harris Corporation believes that its installation in Uganda will be of benefit to the general population. The benefits which accrue from this program and others like it were succinctly underscored by President Kennedy in his statement inviting "all nations to participate in a communications satellite system in the interest of world peace and closer brotherhood among the peoples of the world. The ultimate result will be to encourage and facilitate world trade, education, entertainment, and many kinds of professional, political, and personal discourse which are essential to healthy human relationships and international understanding." Harris contracts are wholly consistent with the spirit of that statement. Harris is in the business of selling U.S.-made equipment to be used for linking all parts of the globe through a worldwide communications system, including domestic communications in developing nations which do not have and cannot afford the type of cable and microwave transmission systems which interconnect almost all communities, large and small, in the United States and Europe. A modern satellite and ground communication system, with proper care and maintenance, is intended to provide the recipient countries with total telecommunication capability in order to meet the communication needs of their country. We believe progress depends upon good communications.

Care and maintenance of the system being installed in Uganda is dependent upon adequate training of local personnel to operate the equipment once the American technicians leave. Accordingly, Harris Corporation contracted to provide operational training in the United States for the system under contract to Uganda. During the period from approximately June 23 to November 5, 1977, a total of 37 students came into this country for training at our facilities in Melbourne, Florida, where most of the contract was performed, and at our other plants at Rochester, New York and Quincy, Illinois.

Approximately 20 persons are employed by Harris Corporation in Uganda in connection with the "Turnkey" installation of the system, training and maintenance. These people in Uganda are primarily technicians who remain there only for the purposes and the period which their work requires. There are no permanent Harris offices or other facilities there, and none are planned except for normal training, continuing maintenance programs and provision of spare parts.

Harris Corporation has been asked to report what effect termination of trade with Uganda would have and what policy should be pursued by the United States, with regard to Uganda. As to the effect on Harris and American business of a termination of trade of Uganda, such an action would obviously eliminate Uganda as an export market for U.S. goods. Less obvious, however, may be the broader implications which such an action could have for American trade. If, for example, the termination of trade were to necessitate an interruption of Harris' existing contract, or prevent a U.S. contractor from supplying spare parts and maintenance to keep the system operating, this could seriously prejudice Harris and the credibility of other American enterprises in all of Central Africa by calling into question the reliability of American companies as suppliers. Thus, Uganda cannot be viewed in isolation.

With respect to future U.S. policy, Harris Corporation, of course, believes firmly in human rights. The company, however, has no expertise in the field of international relations which peculiarly qualify it to render an opinion on this issue. The factors to be considered are many and complex, as evidenced by the fact that neither the executive nor legislative branches of the U.S. Government has yet determined whether a boycott of Uganda applicable to non-military products would serve the cause of human rights. Given the apparent difference of opinion between informed and responsible officials within both branches of our government on this issue, Harris believes its policy in accepting or refusing to do business with foreign nations at peace with this country should be to conform to U.S. Government policy.

As indicated above, our contracts with Uganda were entered into pursuant to export licenses granted by our government. The U.S. Government has been actively encouraging exports of U.S.-made goods. We believe that sincere and honest efforts by American manufacturers and their employees to do just that—export U.S. products—should not be condemned on an after-the-fact basis.

As noted at the outset, Harris' present dealings in Uganda were encouraged by another African nation. To date the company has received no criticism from neighboring African states concerning this business. In light of this, it is reasonable to expect that any decision which would call an abrupt halt to the existing contractual relations of Harris, or any other American company, will likely have significant repercussions, diplomatic as well as commercial, beyond the borders of that single country.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., June 17, 1978.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of June 2, 1978, requesting Agency comments on a document listing what are purported to be Palestinians who had been issued Ugandan passports. Our comments on that document are as follows:

(a) As far as this Agency is able to determine, the document you forwarded is a copy of an authentic Ugandan Government document.

(b) According to information available to us, all of the listed passports appeared to be genuine as far as issue dates and serial numbers are concerned. Additionally, one of the individuals named is reported to have traveled on a Ugandan passport with the passport number cited in the document you provided. We have no other information on the use of Ugandan passports; however, as you know, Palestinians are considered "stateless persons" by many North African and Middle Eastern countries and are often issued passports from those countries as a matter of convenience to enable them to travel freely, without necessarily revealing that they are Palestinians.

(c) Ugandans would not normally become members of the P.L.O. inasmuch as that organization is primarily Palestinian in composition.

(d) With regard to your question on whether Ugandans who received training in the U.S. in the last five years were members of the P.L.O., this question could be more appropriately addressed by one or more of the U.S. Government agencies that deal with aliens and the internal security of the U.S.

I hope that the above information will be useful to you.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER.

JUNE 2, 1978.

Adm. STANSFIELD TURNER,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR ADMIRAL TURNER: The Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy is currently looking into U.S. relations with Uganda. Subcommittee staff have received a copy of a document listing what are purported to be Palestinians who were issued Ugandan passports, including diplomatic passports (see enclosure).

I would greatly appreciate it if the Central Intelligence Agency could verify the authenticity of this document. Also, I would like to know if any of the people listed are known to be members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization or any other radical Palestinian group; if any of the named individuals carry or have carried Ugandan passports; and if the Government of Uganda has ever issued passports to members of the P.L.O. or any terrorist group. Finally, I would appreciate it if you could inform me if any of the Ugandans who have received training in the United States in the last five years were members of the P.L.O.

Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Foreign Economic Policy.

Enclosure.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA,
PASSPORT OFFICE,
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
Kampala, Uganda, February 6, 1978.

The PERMANENT SECRETARY,
Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Kampala

LIST OF UGANDA PASSPORTS ISSUED TO PALESTINIANS

Please find attached herewith an up-to-date list of Uganda Passports issued to Palestinians for your information and record purpose.

A. R. H. GINGTHO,
(For Principal Passport Officer).

Names	Type of TD	Number	Date of issue
1. Fayez Mohamed Aman	Ordinary	KL 42729	Feb. 20, 1976
2. Awni HJazi Issac	Diplomatic	D 788	Do.
3. Ahmad Mahmood Abu Harthiya	do	D 787	Do.
4. Osama Musa Ali	do	D 786	Do.
5. Ahmad Abdullah Omran	do	D 785	Do.
6. Mohamad Assad el-Shaer	Ordinary	KL 42731	Do.
7. Abdul Fattah Mahmood Aburous	Diplomatic	D 783	Do.
8. Faye Saleh el-Banwasawi	Ordinary	KL 42732	Do.
9. Faisal Mahmood Habbash	do	KL 45243	Jan. 14, 1977
10. Khaled Mohammad el-Shekh	Diplomatic	D 780	Do.
11. Ali el-Shaer	C.I.	13437	¹ Feb. 10, 1976
12. Mohamed Kamal	Ordinary	KL 42730	Feb. 20, 1976
13. Sharif Jaaf Bin Mohammad	do	KL 45244	Jan. 14, 1977
14. Salman Mahmoud Haleb	do	KL 46000	Jan. 15, 1977
15. Maged Yousef Abu Sharar	do	KL 45999	Aug. 15, 1977
16. Yafeh el-Bast	do	KL 45998	Do.
17. Faisal el-Bast	do	KL 45997	Do.
18. Jamela Mohamed Hanea	do	KL 45996	Do.
19. Mohamed Saad Hanea	do	KL 45995	Do.
20. Fouad Bittar	Diplomatic	D 931	Oct. 13, 1977
21. Marwan Halabi	do	D 932	Do.
22. Mohammad Juma Abdullah	Ordinary	KL 46498	Do.
23. Kamal Mohammad Agha	do	KL 46499	Do.
24. Nawal Husni el-Hirfi	do	KL 46575	Oct. 26, 1977
25. Jamal Said el-Khalil	Diplomatic	D 943	Nov. 25, 1977
26. Zuhair Ibrahim Almanasreh	do	D 944	Do.
27. Yousuf Abu-Hantash	do	D 950	Jan. 14, 1978

¹ One way valid for Zaire.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS PATRICK MELADY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO UGANDA AND PRESIDENT, SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY, BRIDGEPORT, CONN.¹

My name is Thomas Patrick Melady and I am President of Sacred Heart University where I am also Professor of Political Science. From 1969 to May 1972, I was U.S. Ambassador to Burundi and from June 1972 to September 1973 I was the last U.S. Ambassador to Uganda and I hope that will remain so as long as Amin is in power.

The two books, coauthored by my wife and me, "Uganda: The Asian Exiles" and "Idi Amin Dada: Hitler In Africa" document the 7-year record of torture and death that Amin has orchestrated in Uganda. I am submitting them to the committee for further documentation.

Here in this statement I wish to simply focus on the challenge that Amin presents to U.S. foreign policy.

Idi Amin Dada is responsible for the torture and death of at least 200,000 Ugandans. He believes in genocide and is practicing it against his own people. There are many dictators in the world and various types of civil liberties that we believe in are being violated in many countries. But the situation in Uganda is a horrendous nightmare. This chief of state has endorsed Hitler's tactics of torture, murder, and genocide.

Modern communications makes it possible for the people of the world to know the horror now going on in Uganda. There is no responsible group that denies the horror is taking place.

¹ Dr. Melady, President of Sacred Heart University, was the last U.S. Ambassador to Uganda (1972-73). Before that he served as U.S. Ambassador to Burundi and senior adviser to U.S. Delegation to the U.N. He is the author of 10 books on international affairs, including "Uganda: The Asian Exiles" and "Idi Amin Dada: Hitler In Africa." Ten Universities, the Vatican and four governments have honored him for his work on Third World Affairs.

Much has been said but very little is being done to help end the horror. I am here to urge that the U.S. Government undertake all legal means to help bring an end to the Amin regime.

The absence of any concrete action to end the Amin nightmare is a scandal. First of all, let us look at the United Nations. This organization is committed to the struggle for human rights in South Africa and Rhodesia. Israel has even been condemned by the U.N.!

But, the U.N. is practicing selective outrage and this is one of the main reasons for the growing indifference of the world organization. I must raise the question of why President Carter, who in his inaugural address, eloquently dedicated U.S. foreign policy to human rights, has not instructed Ambassador Young to aggressively push for decisive U.N. action. We contribute 25 percent of the general U.N. budget. Why has not the U.S. Government informed the U.N. that it will place in escrow our annual assessment until some action is taken on the Ugandan horror?

In addition to utilizing the power of the U.N. we can pursue some national actions. It is a gross national scandal that Americans buying Amin's coffee are financing his torture and murder machine. It is also a further scandal that American citizens are assisting the modern Hitler by selling him supplies.

Some tell me that it does not make any great difference in world affairs whether or not Amin stays in power. I urge that we face the moral challenge. We should take all just and moral steps to end the holocaust now taking place in Uganda.

Idi Amin Dada is the modern Hitler. History is repeating itself. We should have learned from our experience with Hitler and the Nazis. Brutal tyrants never change; they only continue to murder!

American policy on Amin should be clear and decisive. Let us take all legitimate steps to end the regime of terror.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. HARROP, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to discuss U.S. policy towards Uganda. I would like to review briefly the essential elements of our Uganda policy, and then I will be pleased to respond to your questions.

First, let me reaffirm that the United States Government deplores the record of massive violations of fundamental human rights in Uganda. This record of violations has been thoroughly documented by well-respected organizations. There can be no dispute that the record is shameful. We have and intend to continue to make clear our opposition to and abhorrence of such flagrant disregard of fundamental human rights. I believe that this position reflects the sentiment of the Congress as well as the basic values of the American people. While there may be occasional differences as to how this should best be reflected in government action, there is no debate over the premise that human rights conditions in Uganda are of profound concern to the United States, its government and its people.

This Administration has unequivocally condemned the record of human rights abuses in Uganda, speaking out firmly in appropriate forums. I would like to refer you to some examples of such statements.

In particular, I would refer you to Secretary Vance's speech to the NAACP in July, 1977 in which he applauded the British Commonwealth's condemnation of Ugandan human rights violations. In April of this year, Mr. Mezvinsky cited Uganda in speaking to the UN's Social Committee of the Economic and Social Council. President Carter, shortly after assuming office, said in the wake of the killing of the Anglican Bishop of Uganda that "the actions (in Uganda) have disgusted the entire civilized world."

I believe there is a virtual consensus in this country deploring the human rights situation in Uganda. In the public discussion on this subject, however, there has at times seemed to be some confusion as to the appropriate objectives the United States should be pursuing. This is an important question.

What should be the objective of our policy toward Uganda? Should it be to demonstrate our concern and our opposition to violations of human rights? Should it be to bring pressure to bear on the Ugandan Government to improve human rights conditions? Should it be to punish the Ugandan Government for its record of human rights violations? Or should it perhaps be to encourage the replacement of the present Ugandan Government by a regime that will respect fundamental human rights? All of these possible objectives have been mentioned.

In its actions vis-a-vis Uganda, this administration has consistently pursued the first two objectives: to demonstrate our concern over human rights violations

by moving to preclude any activity which would contribute to such violations, and to work together with other concerned governments to bring pressure to bear on the Ugandan Government to improve the human rights situation. The administration does not believe it is appropriate for the United States to attempt to bring about the overthrow of foreign governments, and does not endorse measures designed to this end. As for punitive measures, we believe that any such measures which might be applied should be directed toward inducing improvements in the human rights situation. We would not favor indiscriminate punitive measures which would detract from our ability to influence the situation in a positive direction.

In pursuit of our objectives our approach can be simply stated as follows: It is our policy consciously to distance the United States from human rights violations in Uganda by denying Uganda U.S. products and facilities which would directly contribute to continued violations, while actively encouraging more concerted attention to this situation and appropriate actions by the international community as a whole. We believe that this is the most effective approach available to the United States.

The major specific elements of our policy toward Uganda are as follows:

We maintain no representation in Uganda. We closed our Embassy in Kampala and withdrew all American staff in late 1973 due to persistent internal security problems in the country, increasing operating difficulties for American programs and personnel, and repeated public threats against Embassy officials and other Americans in the country. Since that time, American interests in Uganda have been represented by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Under present circumstances, we have no reason to consider the re-establishment of a U.S. presence in Kampala, nor would we do so unless our overall relationship with Uganda were to improve considerably. A prerequisite for this would be a marked improvement in human rights conditions.

The Ugandan Government has continued to maintain a small Embassy in Washington, currently headed by a Second Secretary as Charge d'Affaires. In keeping with the nature of our relations, the Department maintains only such working level contacts with the Embassy as is necessary to conduct official business and to maintain a communication link to the safety and welfare of the remaining American residents in Uganda. No higher level of representation would be necessary or appropriate at present.

When we withdrew our Embassy from Kampala in 1973 in concern over unsettled conditions and threats against Americans that affected our official programs and personnel, we also advised private American residents of Uganda to depart. This guidance remains in effect and has been periodically repeated to all our citizens. In addition, we have issued travel advisories cautioning American travelers against visiting Uganda—whether for business, pleasure or any other purpose. Nevertheless, we have no authority to prevent Americans from traveling to Uganda or to require Americans resident in Uganda to leave, and some 200 Americans still reside there. (Approximately one-half of these are missionaries; the remainder include contract technicians, students, dependents of Ugandans and others). The continued presence of these Americans in Uganda, and our concern and responsibility for them, is a factor which we must consider in our decisions regarding that country.

We deny bilateral U.S. assistance to Uganda, in accordance both with executive branch policy and with recent legislation. Moreover, U.S. representatives to international development banks are under instructions to oppose and vote against loans to Uganda. Again, we would not consider the re-establishment of an assistance relationship with Uganda in the absence of a fundamental improvement in human rights conditions.

Although private commercial trade with Uganda has continued, U.S. Government programs promoting trade and investments are withheld from Uganda. Neither Eximbank nor OPIC have been active in Uganda since 1973. Uganda's exports have not been made eligible for general tariff preferences ("GSP"), and there are no plans to do so.

Further, we do not license exports to Uganda of items on the munitions list; we believe such exports would be manifestly incompatible with our human rights policy. We review all individually licensed exports to Uganda from the human rights perspective, and in cooperation with the Department of Commerce deny exports which would in our estimation contribute directly to continued human rights violations. As an example, we would not approve the sale of helicopters or other such equipment to the Uganda security establishment.

In response to the discovery last fall that Ugandan police personnel were in this country for commercial helicopter training (without the Department's

advance knowledge), we instituted a new procedure under which visa applications by officially-connected Ugandans and other representatives of Uganda must be referred to the Department for review. This procedure enables us to prevent travel by Ugandans to the United States which would be incompatible with our human rights interests.

Overall, then, our bilateral relations with Uganda are limited and carefully controlled, most specifically with respect to matters affecting fundamental human rights.

In the multilateral context, the United States has actively worked for and consistently supported efforts to focus international attention and build a consensus behind constructive actions on human rights in Uganda. We strongly supported proposals at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting in March of 1977 for a full examination of Uganda's human rights problems, in the hope that such attention would lead to improvement of conditions within Uganda. Similarly, we welcomed and encouraged the introduction of a resolution on the subject by the Nordic states in the UN General Assembly's Third Committee in December, and the informal agreement which resulted from this discussion that the issue would be again introduced in the 1978 session of the Human Rights Commission. We are pleased that consideration of this question at the March session of the Commission led to positive action being taken against Uganda for the first time. We have clearly expressed our desire that the Ugandan Government cooperate with the Commission's efforts.

Finally, it is our policy to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees from Uganda, both through contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and through special assistance (such as in education) where particular needs are identified.

Ugandan refugees do not presently qualify for the special refugee immigrant visas made available under the Immigration and Nationality Act to refugees from communist countries and certain countries of the Middle East. The Department endorses proposals that have been made in the Congress to eliminate these geographical restrictions, which would ameliorate the situation for Ugandan refugees as well as other African refugees. In addition, the Attorney General has the authority to grant parole in this country in extraordinary individual cases such as the reunification of families. Several Ugandans have been the beneficiaries of this procedure. In the meantime, we have taken special steps to facilitate the entry into the United States of Ugandan refugee students who have been granted admission to American universities. And finally, the Department has informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service that, as a general rule, under the present circumstances no Ugandan now in the United States who does not wish to return to Uganda should be deported to that country.

Now let me address those proposed measures which we do not support, specifically the imposition of a unilateral trade embargo against Uganda. As a general matter the U.S. Government is reluctant to take measures to interfere with trade unless the actions themselves appear likely to effectively advance important interests.

Specifically, we do not believe that an embargo would be effective either as an economic punitive measure, or as a means of improving the human rights situation. In the case of Cambodia, for example, where we have no political or economic relations, we have no leverage to attempt to restrain the massive human rights abuses practiced in that nation. We do not believe it would be useful to put Uganda in that category at this time. Virtually the only Ugandan product which enters the U.S. market is coffee. Given the present high world price of coffee in the world markets, Ugandan coffee now sold to the United States would readily find other markets. There appears to be little interest on the part of other coffee consuming countries in supporting a coffee embargo or other economic restrictions against Uganda at this time. Therefore there is little prospect that a unilateral U.S. embargo would elicit effective participation or support elsewhere.

With reference to U.S. exports, the United States is not a unique source for any commodity of major significance to Uganda. In 1976 our exports to Uganda totalled only \$6.3 million, over half of which was food products. In 1977 that figure rose to \$14.2 million as a result primarily of the sale of communications and electronic equipment. I believe that by any reasonable standard this level and composition of exports could not be construed as maintaining the existing government in power.

The recent announcements by the major U.S. firms which have been importers of Ugandan coffee that they are voluntarily suspending purchases of this coffee demonstrates the depth of domestic concern and will provide a direct test of the effectiveness of a U.S. boycott. Regardless of its effect on Uganda, this action by American processors and importers can be expected to lead a marked decline in the overall level of United States-Ugandan trade, given the overwhelming predominance of coffee in this trade in recent years. The decision by these U.S. firms to impose a voluntary boycott of Ugandan coffee appears to have been directly influenced by the clear expressions of Congressional concern over the Ugandan human rights situation, including the recent adoption by the House of Concurrent Resolution 612. Although we were not asked for our position on this resolution, the Department did not oppose its adoption.

While we do not support a government-imposed embargo against Uganda, we recognize that American firms must make their business decisions in light of all the relevant factors involved, among which would be human rights considerations. We have continually stressed, to the Ugandan Government that the U.S. interest in human rights reflects a widespread and deep concern on the subject within American society as a whole. This action by private American firms vis-a-vis Uganda clearly shows the growing importance of this subject across the board in America's foreign relations, and provides a timely demonstration that, in the private sector as well as in official relations, countries which ignore the fundamental human rights of their own citizens cannot expect to continue "business as usual" with the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY EDWARD M. MEZVINSKY, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss with your committee the efforts we are pursuing in the United States to address the human rights problems in Uganda.

I think that too often we have overlooked the impact that multilateral organizations can have on difficult international problems—particularly on problems which resist the efforts of one nation acting alone. One specific benefit of the UN's active role in human rights deliberations is that it provides important forums for nations to speak out about human rights abuse. Ambassador Andrew Young and I have gone on record on many occasions in strongly condemning the actions of the Ugandan Government, just as in the United Nations we have spoken out about human rights problems in Cambodia, the Soviet Union, Chile, South Africa, Argentina, and Cuba.

Let me briefly provide some background to the action on Uganda. In March 1977, the United States supported a British proposal to establish a working group to examine the human rights situation in Uganda. Although the resolution was then defeated, we continued to speak out and to encourage other countries in the UN to carefully examine the human rights machinery in general, as well as to focus specifically on the tactics of dealing with Uganda. At the General Assembly last fall, the Nordic countries, with our support, secured informal assurances that the issue of human rights violations in Uganda would be considered during the Human Rights Commission meeting this spring. Based on evidence submitted on the human rights situation in Uganda, the Commission, in confidential session, took unprecedented action against Uganda.

It is clear that progress is coming about not simply because of pushing by the United States but because of the increased concern and activism of other nations, particularly those in the developing world. Countries such as India, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, and Colombia took the lead in pressing for more across the board consideration of human rights violations. The Africans pushed for concrete action on Uganda. They assured passage of a resolution calling for creation of a regional human rights commission in Africa—an issue which we hope will be discussed further at the upcoming OAU summit meeting. And the Chairman of the Commission—the Chief Justice of Senegal—provided outstanding leadership.

There are hopeful signs for continued action on Uganda in the future and we intend to continue addressing this issue at the General Assembly this fall and in future sessions of the Commission on Human Rights. Certainly international pressure on Uganda should be and will be increased, and we intend to keep Uganda at the top of the UN human rights agenda.

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the conclusions reached.

The second part of the report deals with the financial aspects of the work. It gives a detailed account of the income and expenditure of the organization and shows how the work has been financed. It also gives a statement of the assets and liabilities of the organization.

The third part of the report deals with the administrative aspects of the work. It gives a detailed account of the organization of the work and the methods used to carry it out. It also gives a statement of the personnel employed and the work done by each of them.

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