DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BASE REALINEMENT POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND STOCKPILES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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FRIDAY, AUGUST 4, 1978

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Gary Hart (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Hart, Thurmond, and Culver.

Also present: James C. Smith, Kenneth W. Fish, Edward B. Kenney, professional staff members; Jeanie Killgore, clerical assistant; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Lew Ashley, assistant to Senator Hatfield; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; and Peter Gold, assistant to Senator Hart.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GARY HART, CHAIRMAN

Senator HART. The hearing will come to order.

I want to welcome our representatives of the Defense Department and various services here today.

A few months ago the Department of Defense announced another round of proposed base closures. These actions cause great turmoil among affected communities—lives are disrupted, businesses close, real estate speculation abounds—in many cases the situation becomes quite chaotic.

There is no question that base realinements must occur from time to time. I think the vast majority of elected representatives in both Houses of Congress understand and accept and support that. But like the movement of a giant business, the Defense Department must accommodate change. The questions that we intend to consider during these hearings today, are: How are these base realinements decided and are they handled in a manner that minimizes the impacts on all concerned?

This subcommittee has a special concern because we have oversight responsibility for base realinement legislation and because base realinement decisions have a significant impact on the military construction program.

It is my intention that today's discussions focus on policy questions.

We will hold the hearing record open for 7 days to permit the filing of additional statements of information to be considered for inclusion in the record. I would hope that the printed transcript of these hearings would provide an excellent information resource to anyone who wants to know how military base realinements really work.

Senator Thomas McIntyre and Senator John Durkin could not be here this morning. They have requested that their prepared statements be placed in the hearing record. Without objection, the prepared statements will be placed in the hearing record at this point.

[The statements follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCINTYRE

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the members of the subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to discuss with you today a matter of considerable concern to citizens of New Hampshire and, because of its potential impact on Navy programs, of great importance to the Department of Defense as well.

First of all, let me say that I applaud the efforts of the Department of Defense in attempting to find cost-effective ways to streamline our armed forces installations and at the same time not reduce the effectiveness or strength of our defense establishment. This effort is healthy for the Army, Navy and Air Force and recognizes the need of government to insure that taxpayers' dollars are being spent in the most efficient and intelligent way possible.

In a recent report to the Congress, the Government Accounting Office strongly urged the Navy to accelerate shipyard administration improvements and strongly recommended to the Congress that it not continue to pour funds into the Shipyard modernization programs until this was accomplished. The reasons were clear and made good sense. Why pay for modernization until we know that the Navy is capable of providing the kind of administrative and management support that will insure that the investment is wisely used? Why modernize until we know what our long term mobilization needs are going to be? In short, GAO was urging the Congress to make certain that Navy modernized its own internal management capabilities before more money was spent on capital improvements.

In making this recommendation GAO commended the Navy on one effort to date, the Management Information Services Improvement System which they saw as a step in the right direction, but only a first step. More technology such as that would be needed before the Navy would have the kind of information retrieval systems necessary to efficiently carry out its mission.

For several years now, the Computer Applications Support and Development Office (CASDO) has been stationed at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. This facility is an important contributor to the MIS Improvement System.

With all this as background, I would like to bring to the Committee's attention one change in base realinement that the Department of Defense proposes that would severely jeopardize, in my estimation, the capability of the Navy to carry out the recommendations of the GAO. Specifically, a move of the CASDO operation to Indian Head, Maryland, out of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, would result in more than 50% of the highly trained and skilled computer specialists leaving CASDO. The Navy admits that it would take considerable time to retrain sufficient numbers of specialists to insure that the MIS Improvement program was back to par. I do not believe that such a circumstance is consistent with the findings of GAO nor do I think such a decision would be in the interests of our Shipyard modernization program. And what this really means in the final analysis—I don't believe this is in the interests of our national defense.

We have had more than a year to study this problem. I have seen every Navy report I can get my hands on, I have talked with Navy officials and with CASDO personnel. I have not seen a convincing argument that such a move makes sense. In fact, I have seen hardly any argument at all. It appears that such a move is defended on the basis of its economies, yet Navy has never projected how much it would cost them to fall behind in the vital MIS program. And regardless of the economies, as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have a responsibility to see that our defense establishment is as strong and efficient and modern as it can be. For this reason, I do not believe that falling behind on the MIS program and perhaps our shipyard modernization program, justifies any minute savings, which to this point has appeared to me to be chimerical anyway.

For all these reasons, I hope the subcommittee will closely examine this proposal by the Navy. The case has not yet been made to me and I believe we owe it to ourselves to demand that it be made in the most convincing manner possible. I look forward to seeing the record of this committee for such an argument.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN A. DURKIN

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to discuss a matter which is of immediate concern to many working men and women in New Hampshire, and which is also of national concern because it directly affects the national security of our country.

I am referring to the proposal by the Navy to move the Computer Applications Support and Development Office (CASDO) from Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, where it functions so successfully, to Indian Head, Maryland, where it can be merged with the Central Naval Ordnance Command Management Information System (CENO). This proposal is presently under careful study within the Department of the Navy.

Let me say unequivocally, Mr. Chairman, that after having read all available reports, having talked at length with employees at CASDO, and having listened to the Navy officials make their arguments, I am convinced that not one valid justification has been offered for the proposed move. On the contrary, all the evidence points to the likelihood that the move will hurt CASDO, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the Management Information Services (MIS) Improvement System which is under the direction of CASDO. And, as the chairman well knows, any reduction in the MIS Improvement System would be a severe blow to Naval shipyards across the country.

As the committee knows, the General Accounting Office (GAO) recently raised a host of concerns about the shipyard modernization program. The Congress has wisely continued to keep our Navy shipyards on a course towards modernization. Just yesterday, the Senate passed a military construction appropriations bill, with over $16.1 million in construction moneys for Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. That total includes $1.6 million for a waterfront support facility that was added to the bill on an amendment I offered with my distinguished Senate colleague, Tom McIntyre.

Even with the modernization program that the Congress has approved, we cannot ignore the GAO recommendation that the Navy modernize its own internal managements facilities before millions more are spent on capital improvements. And that means we must focus on CASDO and the MIS Improvement System under its direction, which the GAO, after investigation, commended.

A move of CASDO at this time or at any point in the near future would harm CASDO, and would undoubtedly be a setback of the MIS Improvement System. Indications are that to move the CASDO operation would result in more than 50 percent of the very highly skilled CASDO personnel leaving the program. Obviously, to replace that many trained computer and other specialists would take considerable time and expense. The effect on the MIS Improvement System would be extremely harmful.

Before closing, I would like to make a general point about the supposed economic benefits the Navy sees in the proposed merger. I have long been a strong advocate of DOD efforts to find cost-effective ways to streamline our military operations, but I believe that every cost-effectiveness study must include long-term economic analysis as well as short-term economic considerations. And though the Navy may claim that it can demonstrate some short-term economies by moving CASDO to Indian Head, the long-term costs in terms of setbacks to the MIS Improvement System, in terms of the costs of recruiting and training personnel to replace those who might leave if the merger is effected, in terms of the costs of early retirement benefits and other rights due to employees who work at a government facility which is moved, will be substantial. Unfortunately, the Navy has not yet even tried to estimate, for instance, the costs for falling behind in the MIS program.

I am hopeful that the Navy will decide, after completing the study presently underway and after answering the numerous questions that I and Senator McIntyre, an outstanding member of the Armed Services Committee, have put to them, that moving CASDO out of Portsmouth would be a serious error. And should the Navy not make this decision, I know this subcommittee and other Members of the Senate will give the Navy recommendation the careful scrutiny

it deserves before allowing a merger which may be of serious detriment to the future of our Navy and our national defense.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to make my views known to you.

Senator HART. We are fortunate to have with us this morning Dr. John White, who is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics. Dr. White will lead off.

We will also hear, either through prepared statements or through questions and answers, from Secretary Antonia Chayes, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs and Installations; Secretary Alan Gibbs, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations, Logistics and Financial Management; Edward Hidalgo, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics.

Mr. White.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. WHITE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. ALAN J. GIBBS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; HON. EDWARD HIDALGO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS; HON. ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND INSTALLATIONS; PERRY J. FLIAKAS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING; PAUL W. JOHNSON, DEPUTY FOR INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING, ARMY; CAPT. M. J. MacDONALD, DIRECTOR INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES, NAVY; AND JOE F. MEIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INSTALLATIONS, AIR FORCE

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a brief statement I would like to read, with your permission.

Senator HART. Please go forward.

Mr. WHITE. It is a pleasure for me and my colleagues to appear here today as you indicated, to discuss and explain from our point of view how we operate the Department of Defense base realinement program.

GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Department of Defense conducts continuous and systematic surveys, studies, and reviews of all installations, activities, and properties in order to insure the most effective and efficient base structure possible within the resources made available by the Congress. A major source of economies in Defense has been, and will continue to be, the reduction of expenditures associated with maintaining and operating military installations. In order to achieve these expenditure reductions, those bases that do not contribute effectively, when compared to other similar bases, to current and long-range Defense plans, must be identified and removed from the inventory. These reviews are also required in order to keep pace with advances in weapons technology, modern military training methods, management techniques and other improvements, and to effect necessary

military activity reorganizations and realinements required by reduced availability of resources, changes in force levels, or other requirements.

As evidence of the success of this effort, between January 1969 and December 1977, we have announced over 3,500 base realinement actions worldwide which have resulted in the elimination of approximately 376,000 military and 250,000 civilian personnel positions, and reduced annual expenditure by approximately $5.5 billion.

The effort to reduce the size of the military base structure continues. Both the President and the Secretary of Defense have publicly stated that additional opportunities exist for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Defense Establishment. They directed a careful examination of the support structure, headquarters, and other overhead operations, manpower and manpower costs, and the base structure in the United States and abroad. Their objective is to insure that the military forces are fully supported in fulfilling their missions, but at the same time, lean and efficient.

In an effort to achieve this goal, the Department of Defense announced a number of candidate base realinement actions on April 26, 1978. These proposals, if fully implemented after the necessary studies have been completed, could realine, reduce, or close 85 military installations and activities in the United States. These actions, which would eliminate 14,600 military and 8,600 civilian positions and reduce annual defense costs by more than $337 million, are prudent management actions required to reduce nonessential defense expenditures. Savings could be used for higher priority needs, including increased combat effectiveness and readiness. While this appears to be a large proposal, the percentage of personnel and installations affected is relatively small when compared to the total base structure.

DOD BASE STRUCTURE

The DOD controls 5,737 separate installations and properties worldwide involving 27.7 million acres of land. The real property acquisition cost of these properties exceeds $46 billion. The current estimate of the DOD costs to operate and maintain these properties is approximately $15 billion annually. Managing such a huge establishment is not an easy task. Many opportunities for tightening the base structure exist. In this regard, we recently submitted to the Congress the requested "Domestic Base Factors Report." This report contains individual installation profile information on base operating support costs, population, training, mission, energy, and other data for all similar mission bases of the services in the United States. The report provides this data for 374 installations. Also included are a number of management indicators that enable comparisons to be made of similar mission bases. I should point out that is the first time such data has been available in one report. The report constitutes a new and valuable management tool.

BASE REVIEW OBJECTIVES

During this process of tightening the base structure, our objective will remain to identify:

1. Those single mission, high-cost installations which cannot accept additional substantial missions, which have low overall utility for the DOD over the long term, and should be closed or inactivated.

2. Those separate activities which can be realined, consolidated, reduced, or disestablished without significant impact on the overall defense missions.

3. Those activities, functions, or services of one military department which could be merged, combined, or readily assumed by other services or defense agencies.

4. Opportunities for combined service use of installations, and facilities by military activities and units.

5. Training activities which can feasibly be consolidated, realined, or merged within each service's training organizations.

6. Those bases which are obsolete due to technological advances.

REALINEMENT PROCESS

As part of the continuous review, the military departments conduct feasibility studies in order to identify candidate realinement actions for further detailed study. The detailed criteria utilized by the military departments in their selection process has been provided to the Congress previously and is contained in the hearing transcript before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, "Military Construction Appropriations for 1974," parts 1, 2, and 3. Should you desire, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to have the military departments provide that information for the record.

Senator HART. If you would, we would appreciate it.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

(A copy of the Army criteria and major considerations used to determine which bases and activities should be considered for realignment actions is included for the record as previously provided the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Military Construction Appropriations for 1974.)

CRITERIA FOR BASE REALIGNMENT ACTIONS [1]

1. *Purpose.*—The purpose of this document is to present the criteria and major considerations used within the Army to determine which bases and activities should be consolidated, reduced, realigned or closed.

2. *Background.*—

(*a*) Army missions involve the accomplishment of a wide variety of functions requiring both general and specialized accommodations. The base structure varies from administrative office space to production/rebuild plants; from troop bases with tens of thousands of acres to small complexes in urban areas. As missions and the size of the Army vary, so do the requirements for bases and facilities.

(*b*) The Army continually reviews its missions, strength and structure and, concomitantly, the base structure requirement to insure that it is in proper balance. Some requirements are relatively fixed because they support more stable missions such as military schools, research and development activities, materiel testing and specialized depot activities. These bases may experience variations in workload, however, the need for the bases, and their physical plants, is a continuing requirement. On the other hand, some Army missions are subject to large variations and may either generate additional requirements or reduce requirements for bases. Examples are training centers for basic and advanced individual training, aviation training facilities, production facilities, administrative space to support specialized activities and troop unit bases.

(*c*) The Army also reviews its missions to determine where and in what manner it can consolidate, realign and reduce resource requirements and still operate efficiently. This review may or may not result in a change in the base structure.

[1] Extracted from Hearings before the MILCON Subcommittee of the HAC on the Military Construction Appropriations for 1974, pt. 1.

(*d*) Inherent in these analyses are consideration of the following criteria (not rank-ordered):

Mission requirements
Budget/manpower constraints
Cost savings
Personnel turbulence
Civilian labor market
Facilities/housing availability
Capital investment (sunk cost)
Geographical location
Land area
Impacts on other services/agencies
Community impact
Environmental impact
Reserve components support
Mobilization and contingency requirements
Encroachment
Long-range plans

(*e*) The Army does not wish to convey that the analyses will produce clearcut advantages for proposed realignments vis-a-vis related alternatives. This is not always the case. Decisions are often charged with great emotionalism for the decision makers, the public and Congress. There are formidable realities that must be confronted. Some examples follow:

(1) *Investment in facilities.*—The decision making criteria often work at cross-purposes to one another. On the one hand, the Army is short of permanent facilities in every construction category; and, if a base is to be closed, it usually means "walking away from" some permanent facilities. On the other hand, if the missions performed at that post can be performed satisfactorily by consolidating them with missions at other posts, then substantial overhead savings could generally be realized.

(2) *One-time realignment cost.*—A factor complicating the execution of realignment actions, regardless of the long-range savings associated with the actions, is their one-time costs. These costs must be amortized within a reasonable period of time.

(3) *Emergency expansion.*—The Army often finds itself in a "crossfire" with respect to base management and pressing facilities requirements. In some cases, the urgency of the moment forces the Army to adopt courses of action which run counter to the long range (peacetime) objectives. For example, during the Vietnam war Army expended funds on aviation facilities at a number of bases, all of which will not be required by a peacetime Army.

3. *Mission requirements.*—The base structure of the Army exists to support Army missions. These missions are influenced by many factors, e.g., strategy, budget, force level, Department of Defense guidance, weapons systems, new technology, etc. As mission changes occur, an analysis of the resources, including bases, allocated to accomplish that mission is made by the Department of the Army staff agency having proponency for the mission. Existing resources are weighed against the new requirements and adjusted accordingly. It is here that those bases no longer required for accomplishment of the changed mission are most frequently identified. It is here that the economies of consolidation, realignments or reduction in scope of operations are identified. The ability of each base to meet the unique operational and training requirements of the assigned force or function is of paramount importance.

4. *Budget/manpower constraints.*—These constraints permit retention of only the minimum number of bases; demand the avoidance of costs for unnecessary personnel relocations: and militate against construction at those bases with limited land area and outmoded, old, functionally inefficient facilities requiring large investments for replacement facilities. Significant annual savings may result from the closure of such bases. Consolidation of missions on a single multi-mission base which subsequently results in a base closure generally produces significant annual savings. However, these savings are offset in some instances by additional investment at the gaining base. Additionally, one-time relocation costs become a factor. In evaluating the budget implication of base realignments it is necessary to weigh initial and annual savings against the one-time construction and movement costs of the various options. In general, large outlays in construction or equipment funds are not feasible and options which depend on such outlays are avoided unless no other viable alternative exists.

5. *Cost savings.*—The objective of the Army is to accomplish the assigned mission at the least cost. Where alternatives exist it is essential that the "least cost", both in terms of dollars and manpower, be selected. The decision maker must not be lulled into thinking that the proposed action will save an amount approximately equaling the base's operating budget and military pay if he closed the base. In cases where the mission requirement for the base is eliminated, a savings equaling the operations cost prior to phase down and closure cannot be

achieved. As the activity phases down, fewer plumbers, carpenters, supply clerks, etc., are needed and utility costs also decrease. Those savings would be realized with or without closure. In cases where the mission is not eliminated the savings at the base to be closed must be offset by the increased costs at the base (or bases) assuming the mission to determine net savings. In this connection, a base function easily overlooked is that of area support. Many bases provide support to the Reserves, ROTC, recruiting activities, air defense and a host of other Army and other Service activities in the geographical area. Although it is feasible to provide many of these services from another location, or through contract, these alternatives carry offsetting costs.

6. *Personnel turbulence.*—The adverse impact of military and civilian personnel turbulence must be given significant consideration because of both the high-cost and the adverse effect on morale.

7. *Civilian labor market.*—Many Army missions involve utilization of a highly specialized and unique civilian work force. Many of these pepole establish deep roots in the local community and are reluctant to dislocate with the transfer of the functions they perform. The lack of appropriate labor market thus becomes a factor in evaluating proposed realignment actions.

8. *Facilities/housing availability.*—Maximum utilization of existing government facilities with minimum expenditures for new facilities is the primary goal in realignment actions. This includes both mission related facilities and support facilities. The facility types that are of prime concern in base realignment actions vary dependent on the mission under consideration. For combat and combat support units, the firing ranges, vehicle maintenance space, parking area and maneuver area are of major concern in evaluating realignment proposals. Conversely, for administrative and headquarters activities, adequate administrative space is essential. For training activities, classroom and student housing are key factors. For all actions, availability of housing (bachelor and family) is a significant element. However, facility availability varies in importance and influence on base realignment actions. In some cases, mandatory requirements exist. For example, adequate firing ranges and maneuver area are an absolute requirement for combat and combat support units. Certain unique facility requirements are generated by intelligence, communications, logistical, and research and development activities. Relocation of these functions which do not have facilities available to accommodate them may not be feasible due to the cost of new facilities. Also, due to mission requirements, the required facilities must often be available prior to transfer of the function. This can often be expensive in terms of delay in savings to be realized as well as redundancy in equipment and facilities. Additionally, in considering bases for closure, the overall condition of the real property facilities at the base is an important element in the selection process. Relocation of an activity housed on a base with considerable substandard facilities—both prime mission as well as support—may be most effective even if certain facility criteria cannot be initially met. Over a period of time provision of a few additional facilities could prove economically beneficial as opposed to a large expenditure for expensive replacement facilities at the former base. An additional facility consideration is the extent of area support to other bases. For example, if a base provides hospital, housing, and other support facilities for surrounding bases, then it may not be possible to completely close the base. As a result, savings from the realignment are significantly less than at a base where all activities can be shut down and facilities declared excess.

9. *Capital investment (sunk cost).*—Realignment actions are designed to achieve the best utilization of permanent facilities at large, multimission, bases. If relocation of a function or mission requires new construction of duplicate facilities, then the cost reduction sought must be carefully weighed against movement and construction costs that result from the proposed realignment. This consideration is especially important in view of the shortage of construction funds and the large construction backlog.

Where mission changes dictate relocation of a particular function utilizing permanent facilities at a large, multi-mission base, attempts are made to backfill the vacated facilities with other compatible activities from small, single-mission, high cost bases or from leased facilities.

10. *Geographical location.*—The geographic location influences the ability of assigned forces to execute their mission. Weather, terrain, vegetation, proximity to strategic airfields, transportation networks, etc., all contribute to retention of bases which enhance operational effectiveness. In some cases certain mandatory elements may present themselves. For example, basic combat training and aviation training require good weather in order to maintain course schedules. Combat and

combat support training activities require appropriate firing ranges and maneuver area. Each type unit has its unique requirements. A geographical location which is adequate for the training of the infantryman would not necessarily be adequate for the training of tank crews.

11. *Land area.*—The need for adequate and suitable land area to support major combat units and their supporting forces is a major consideration. Bases must be capable of supporting the readiness and development of the assigned forces as envisioned in the United States strategy. This requirement often determines which bases will be retained in the active inventory. Where mission compatability can be achieved, the consolidation of activities at large, multi-mission bases, takes precedence over utilization of small, single-mission bases.

12. *Impact on other services/agencies.*—The Army provides support to many units and activities of the Department of Defense, the other Services, and other Federal agencies. Inherent in any base realignment action is consideration of the impact on these agencies. The personnel turbulence and costs associated with relocating or supporting these type activities are an integral part of any analysis conducted.

13. *Community impact.*—Civilian support resources (e.g., community housing, medical, schools, and recreational facilities) are a consideration in developing base realignment actions. Of particular importance is family housing. Areas which have residual capability to adequately house families negate the cost of providing government housing and facilitate rapid completion of the proposed action. Adequate support should exist on or off a gaining installation to avoid a realignment action being counter productive in terms of morale. Since personnel support capability on our installations is limited, the contribution of the civilian community in this area is important. Conversely, realignment actions, which reduce the Army presence in an area, seriously impact on communities, particularly those in which the major source of economic base is the military installation. When possible, realignment actions are designed to minimize the impact on local communities. Where appropriate, assistance is provided to local community leaders in their negotiations with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Department of Defense, whose function is to assist communities in re-establishment of an economic base where reduction in Defense expenditures has been severe.

14. *Environmental impact.*—All actions must be assessed to determine their impact on the environment. Base realignment options must have an initial assessment during the preliminary planning. If significant environmental impact is indicated, or the action is determined to be controversial, at either a gaining or losing base, then an environmental impact statement must be prepared.

15. *Reserve component support.*—The increased emphasis on utilization of Reserve Component forces to meet future contingency requirements must be considered. Reserve units are generally constituted in areas where there are population resources. Their readiness depends upon availability of adequate ranges and training areas. This requires that the range facilities and training areas not only be of the proper size and configuration, but also that they be within reasonable commuting distance. Readiness is adversely affected by increased commuting time and corresponding decreased training time availability. Concomitantly, personnel job satisfaction is lowered and personnel recruiting and retention rates decreased. Many of our bases, both active and inactive, are used extensively for support of these units, both for week-end training and annual summer training. The impact on these type units is an integral part of any analysis conducted.

16. *Mobilization and contingency requirements.*—The type and number of bases required are determined by the need to be capable of supporting the strategy directed by national policy, the operational and training requirements of the Army, and the retention of sufficient flexibility to support unprogramed increases in troop strengths. Coupled with this is the uncertainty as to when a base might be needed again. The costs of inactivating and reactivating a base can offset savings derived from its closure. Although we hope that we are entering upon a prolonged period of peace—a hope and expectation which is not unlike that after World War II and the Korean conflict—any decision to inactivate a base, whether it is retained in standby status for mobilization and contingency requirements, or is disposed of, is made without positive assurance that the decision—in the long term—will prove to be a good one.

17. *Encroachment.*—Urban and airspace encroachment into vital areas surrounding installations is of continuing concern. Some installations which were originally remote have attracted major population growth and, as a result,

continued operations have been threatened through urban expansion. Civilian aviation activity has served to restrict the airspace available for military operations. Encroachment, therefore, is an element in determining the future viability of an installation. Currently, programs to protect installations from encroachment are being instituted. These are comprised of efforts to obtain properties adjacent to bases so that only activities compatible with military operations will be developed in these areas. It is also possible that major weapons changes may bring about encroachment "from within." For example, ranges now adequate for artillery firing, may become too small for artillery weapons which may be introduced in the future. However, where encroachment has become a problem, its impact is considered during development of base realignment actions.

18. *Long range plans.*—Since the future forces cannot be predicted with certainty and are subject to unprogramed changes, flexibility to accommodate these changes within the base structure should be preserved when possible and economical. This entails developing reasonable assumptions on what unprogramed force changes might occur and determining how the various options could support the assumed force changes. However, flexibility is difficult to quantify and, as a result, tends to be a subjective consideration. There are some instances though which do lend themselves to objective analysis. For example, basic combat training production capability at each training center can be determined. Based on the required levels of production, the degree of flexibility (unused production capacity) within the structure can be determined and the degree that the structure can meet increases can be calculated. Similarly, workload versus capacity can be determined in a quantifiable manner for production and depot activities. Conversely, the degree of flexibility of the installation structure to meet other program changes, not the result of clearcut workloads, is difficult to determine. For example, the flexibility of the base structure to accommodate major combat units currently deployed overseas, depends on many variables. These variables include: type of unit, equipment density, mission requirements of the unit, if they are to be retained as active duty forces, or as reserve forces. Realignment alternatives are weighed in terms of their potential to meet unprogramed force changes.

Navy Base Realignment Criteria [2]

In the development of the Navy's shore establishment realignment proposals the following significant factors were considered:

1. *Force levels/mix.*—Includes the numbers and type of each ship and aircraft, their weapons systems and specialized support required.

2. *Ship homeporting/aircraft basing excess capacities.*—Includes the identity of requirements for pier spaces, anchorages, boat landings, runways, taxi strips, parking aprons, hangar spaces and ship and aircraft support.

3. *Navigational limitations.*—Includes restrictive drafts (depth of water), transit time, shipping congestion, length and breadth of channel, special navigational aids required, period of reduced visibility and seasonal weather conditions.

4. *Air space restrictions.*—Includes approach patterns, air space congestion (civilian), noise factors, civilian encroachment, periods of reduced visibility and seasonal weather conditions.

5. *Nuclear clearances.*—Includes nuclear area clearances existing by type and future clearances required.

6. *Shipyard locations and capabilities.*—Includes nuclear surface/sub-surface repair capabilities and requirements, weapons and electronic systems repair capabilities and requirements, specialized drydock requirements by number and type, civilian work force availability and general repair/design capabilities.

7. *Accessibility to operating areas.*—Includes transit time, air and surface congestion, periods of reduced visibility, seasonal weather conditions and availability of services.

8. *BEQ/BOQ requirements.*—Includes increases in base complex population entitlements, availability and desirability of private rentals and adequacy of messing requirements.

9. *Cold iron facilities.*—Includes availability of steam, water, air and electricity including nuclear ship electrical power requirements, pollution abatement and nuclear waste disposal requirements.

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[2] Extracted from Hearings before the MILCON Subcommittee of the HAC, on the Military Construction Appropriations for 1974, Part 2.)

10. *Aviation support facilities.*—Includes air frame and engine rework requirements, new and future aircraft introductions and contractor operations.

11. *Medical and supply support.*—Includes active and retired tri-service military populations, CHAMPUS/military hospital cost comparison, location of supply centers vis-a-vis force concentrations, supply control centers, usage data, and type, depth of supply requirements.

12. *Personnel support facilities.*—Includes availability and adequacy of social and recreational facilities, public transportation, and distances from quarters to facilities, commissaries and exchanges.

13. *Private and public family housing.*—Includes availability and adequacy of public quarters and public rentals/sales. Excesses and short-falls have been identified.

14. *Impact on the civilian economy.*—Includes loss of job availability, payroll reductions, housing surpluses and unemployment.

15. *Environmental impact.*—Includes decreases in solid waste, water, air and noise pollutants at losing complexes.

16. *Cost to implement.*—Includes severance pay and unused leave pay to discharged civilian employees, transportation costs for relocated employees, PCS costs for military personnel and dependents, preservation and caretaker costs, equipment transportation costs and MilCon requirements at gaining activities.

17. *Savings achievable.*—Includes eliminated military and civilian salary avoidances, overhead and maintenance costs and approved MilCon costs avoidance.

Criteria for Air Force Base Realignment Actions[3]

PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to present the major considerations and criteria used within the Air Force in developing basing programs which result in realignment actions.

BACKGROUND

The base posture of the Air Force exists to support the assigned forces. Since forces are a dynamic element, the base posture is also dynamic in its nature. As forces change, base requirements change, and as a result realignments in the base posture are required. The major considerations and criteria used to determine base realignments must insure that the action selected from the available alternatives best meets the various operational, geographic, facility, environmental and economic parameters and is the most consistent with the overall mission requirements of the Air Force. The Air Force has pursued a policy of achieving an optimum base structure to support the currently assigned and projected forces. As force levels and oversea deployments have reduced during the last thirteen years, the number of Air Foce bases has also reduced. The following table reflects the reduction in Air Force major installations since fiscal year 1960.

Major installation	Fiscal year—						
	1960	1964	1968	1970	1972	1974	1975
Conus	163	151	129	116	112	109	107
Overseas	90	65	69	62	49	45	41
Total	253	216	198	178	161	154	148

The reduction in the number of Air Force bases world-wide has been the result of a continual evaluation of the forces' base requirements. The most effective bases are selected for retention when base closure actions are initiated.

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS AND CRITERIA

In determining the effectiveness of an installation, several major considerations are germane. First is the need to provide installations which meet the various operational and training requirements of assigned forces. Second, there is the

[3] Extracted from Hearings before the MILCON Subcommittee of the HAC on the Military Construction Appropriations for 1974, Part 3.

need to provide bases to support the force deployments envisioned in the United States strategy. Third is the policy that multi-mission bases, i.e., ones at which various force types (strategic, logistical, airlift, etc.) are stationed, will be used to the maximum extent possible. Fourth, that the base posture should retain the flexibility to bed-down the force when unprogramed changes occur.

The above considerations have evolved into broad criteria which are used in the Air Force in developing and evaluating base realignment actions. These are: geographic locations; facility availability and condition; community support available for Air Force activities/population; potential to accommodate future force requirements; existing or future encroachment which might impact Air Force operations; budgeting considerations inherent in the proposed realignment action; possible adverse environmental impact; and mission degradation as a result of force turbulence.

In developing realignment actions, the major considerations and criteria have to be evaluated for each proposal in total, as opposed to each one being independent, with the goal of achieving an optimum balance. A discussion of the four major considerations and the resultant criteria is provided below.

Major considerations

Operational and training requirements.—Since the Air Force base posture exists to support the mission of the assigned forces, the ability of each base to meet the unique operational and training requirements of the assigned force is of paramount importance. Each force element, such as strategic offense, tactical fighter, strategic airlift, etc., has its own peculiarities in terms of mission and training which manifests itself in terms of airspace, range requirements, deployment and employment routes, availability of lines of communications, survivability, facility requirements, etc. The current base posture reflects a force beddown in which the forces' operational and training requirements are best supported. Realignment of forces can make alterations of the base posture necessary, however, the resulting beddown must, to the extent possible, enhance the ability of the force to meet its unique operational and training requirements. These requirements are summarized below.

Strategic offense (bombers/tankers).—Pre-launch survivability of the alert force coupled with geographic locations which allow proper bomber-tanker mating after launch and optimum entry into primary employment routes to target areas.

Strategic defense (fighter interceptors).—Peripheral coverage of the Continental United States.

Tactical fighter.—Accessibility of weapons ranges (air-to-air and air-to-air ground) plus sufficient airspace to allow for extensive operational training in flight maneuvers such as formation flying. Maximum "good weather" days to facilitate operational flight training under visual conditions.

Tactical airlift.—Accessibility to training areas for assault landing and drop zones and close proximity to Army elements which use tactical airlift support in training and during deployment.

Strategic airlift (MAC).—Accessibility to transportation networks which can carry cargo/passengers to and from the terminal complex, coupled with proximity to cargo generation areas.

Pilot training.—Availability of a large area of dedicated airspace which is required for student flight activities coupled with minimal poor weather days which could preclude visual flight activities.

Air Reserve Forces.—Potential to man assigned units.

Force deployment.—The Air Force force structure is based on the national strategy. This strategy determines potential areas in whuch forces would be used and determines which forces should be deployed forward in overseas locations and which forces would be deployed or employed from the CONUS. This strategy then serves to determine how many and what kind of bases we need overseas versus the CONUS.

Use of multimission bases.—A major expense of each installation is the resources required to "open the door". That is the basic number of people and things needed to support any assigned mission. This base operating and support force, however, does not increase in a direct proportion to a growth in assigned base missions. Addition of new missions to an existing base results in significantly less base. operating and support resources than does establishing a new base or retaining and operating a single-mission installation which is not limited by geographic or other requirements. Therefore, when missions are compatible and facilities available or obtainable, it is cost-advantageous to develop multi-mission bases. This is

particularly true when one of the missions is of a support nature such as headquarters, material depot, or research and development activity and the other is operational such as tactical fighter, strategic bomber, etc. Additionally, missions which have a relatively small number of personnel or equipment are most economically accommodated on bases which have other major missions.

An example is the stationing of ADC fighter interceptor squadrons on bases which have other major missions such as airlift or strategic offense. Although multi-mission bases are economical, the compatability of missions must be given prime consideration. Certain missions, such as pilot training, do not lend themselves to multi-mission installations. Additionally, the more missions assigned to an installation the greater the difficulty in closing the installation if a major mission at the base is reduced, since relocation of residual missions often proves impractical. In this sense, on the basis of a reduced base structure, multi-mission bases may inhibit future flexibility in restructuring the overall base posture.

Future flexibility.—Base realignment actions which result in base closures or contribute to the maximum utilization of an installation, especially Air Force bases which contain a relatively small amount of land, can result in a limiting of future flexibility to meet various programmed and non-programmed force adjustments. Although base closures and minimum base utilization are economically sound objectives, the selection of bases to be closed, should, to the extent possible, therefore, result in closure of the least flexible bases. If flexibility were the sole determinant, bases which have constraints in the nature of airspace, encroachment of civilian activities, single missions, limited real estate, poor community support facilities, poor physical facilities, etc., should logically be considered for closure prior to bases which have the potential to accommodate additional or new missions.

Criteria

Geographic location.—The geographic location of an installation influences many factors which bear on the ability of assigned forces to execute their mission. These include weather, availability of training areas, proximity to employment/deployment routes, survivability, airspace availability, transportation networks, etc. For each mission there are optimum geographic locations which provide maximum operational effectiveness. These locations, to the extent possible, should be used in selecting bases to beddown missions. In some cases certain mandatory elements may present themselves. For example, Undergraduate Pilot Training requires 216 good weather work days during each year in order to maintain the course schedule. Locations which cannot meet this weather criteria should not be considered for such a mission. Tactical fighter activities require that appropriate air-to-ground and air-to-air ranges be in close proximity (200 miles). Lack of these ranges requires that training be degraded by reduced mission time as a result of increased ferry time to and from the range. Therefore, lack of a range in close proximity to a base eliminates it from consideration as a tactical fighter base. However, other geographic factors are not as binding in developing base realignments. For example, survivability of strategic offensive forces is a prime consideration.

If submarine launched missiles are postulated to be the most critical threat, inland bases provide the greatest survivability due to the longer flight time of the missiles. However, this does not imply only inland bases should be considered for strategic offensive forces. Consideration of factors such as the inability of the runway complex to support strategic operations, lack of needed large maintenance facilities to house strategic bombers and tankers, poor quantity and quality of personnel support facilities, and lack of munitions storage capability all may negate the use of an existing inland base for a strategic force main operating base and dictate continual use of a coastal base where these facilities are available. In this case, survivability can be achieved through reposturing and dispersal of the alert force at satellite locations to achieve the needed time to safely launch the force.

Facility availability.—Maximum practical utilization of existing government facilities with minimum expenditures for new facilities should be a primary goal in realignment actions. This includes mission related facilities as well as support facilities. The facility types that are of prime concern in base realignment actions vary dependent on the mission under consideration. For example, if the unit is an operational flying activity, the runway complex (number, width, length, load bearing capacity), capacity of the aircraft parking ramp, and a maintenance complex capable of supporting the assigned aircraft (e.g., proper size docks and hangars,

sufficient communications-electronics and avionics maintenance space, etc.) are of major concern in evaluating the proposed action.

Conversely, for administrative and headquarters activities, the proper amount of administrative space is essential. For training activities, classroom and student housing are key factors. For all actions, availability of housing (bachelor and family) for any increase in population is a significant element. However, facility availability varies in importance and influence on base realignment actions. In some cases, mandatory requirements exist. For example, parallel runways are an absolute requirement for Undergraduate Pilot Training since the mix of training aircraft and number of air movements cannot be accommodated on a single runway. Bases with single runways do not meet the facility requirements for this mission and generally would not be considered as a feasible alternative in realignment of pilot training bases without construction of additional runways. Additionally, certain unique facility requirements are generated by intelligence, communications, logistical, and research and development activities; relocation to installations which do not have facilities available to accommodate these functions may not be infeasible due to the cost of new facilities. This, however, is a matter of economics. Also, due to mission requirements, these facilities must often be duplicated and in being prior to shutting down the current activity. This can often be expensive in terms of delay in savings to be realized as well as redundance in equipment and facilities. Similar circumstances exist in relocating other missions such as strategic airlift which requires large terminal complexes to receive and process cargo.

However, other facility requirements might not be less critical. Requirements for small missions may be provided with minor modification. This is particularly true if the unit's equipment consists of small aircraft or if no aircraft are assigned. Requirements for administrative space can be met in various ways such as conversion of excess space in other functional areas. Additionally, in considering bases for closure, the overall condition of the real property facilities at the base is an important element in the selection process. Often, if an activity is housed in an installation which has a great deal of substandard deteriorated facilities—both prime mission as well as support—then relocation to a base with permanent facilities may be most effective even if certain facility criteria cannot be initially met. Over a period of time provision of a few additional facilities would prove economically beneficial as opposed to providing a large number of expensive replacement facilities at the previous base. An additional facility consideration is the extent a base's facilities support other installations in the area. For example, if a base provides hospital, housing, and other support facilities for surrounding installations, then it may not be possible to completely close the base. As a result, savings from the realignment may be significantly less than at a base where all activities can be shut down and facilities declared excess.

Community support.—Civilian support resources (e.g., community housing, medical, schools, and recreational facilities) are a consideration in developing base realignment actions. When possible, base realignment actions should take maximum advantage of already developed civilian resources which can be used to support the assigned personnel. Of particular importance is family housing. Areas which have residual capability to adequately house Air Force families will negate the cost of providing government housing and facilitate rapid completion of the proposed action. Conversely, areas in which community support facilities are limited place an increasing degree of importance on the base facilities. Adequate support should exist on or off a training base to avoid a realignment action being counter productive in terms of personnel morale. Since excess personnel support capability on our installations is limited, the contribution of the civilian community in this area is very important.

Potential.—Since the future forces cannot be predicted with certainty and are subject to unprogrammed changes, flexibility to accommodate these changes within the base posture should be preserved when possible and economical. This entails developing reasonable assumptions on what unprogrammed force changes might occur and determining how the various basing options could support the assumed force changes.

However, flexibility is difficult to quantify and, as a result, tends to be a subjective consideration. There are some instances though which do lend themselves to objective analysis. For example, pilot production capacity at each Undergraduate Pilot Training base can be determined. Based on the required levels of pilot production, the degree of flexibility (unused production capacity) within the system can be determined and the degree that the system can meet increases can be calculated. As a result, the degree of flexibility in the system can be pre-

dicted and controlled. Similarly, workload versus base capacity can be determined in a quantifiable manner for other training activities and depot activities. As a result, flexibility in those areas is to some degree quantifiable. Conversely, the degree of flexibility of the base systems to meet other program changes not the result of clear cut workloads is difficult to determine. For example, the flexibility of the base system to accommodate tactical units in the CONUS currently deployed overseas depends on many variables such as type of unit, activity levels of the unit, if they are to be retained as active duty forces or as reserve forces etc. In these instances the underlying assumptions are subjective and the requirement for flexibility is also subjective. Notwithstanding the subjectivity, it is important that base realignment alternatives be weighed in terms of their potential to meet unprogramed force changes.

Encroachment.—Urban and airspace encroachment into vital areas surrounding installations is of continuing concern. The potential for midair collisions must be considered for basing programs. To the extent possible, basing actions must avoid aggrevating potential midair collision conditions. Some installations which were originally remote have attracted major population growth and, as a result, continued air operations have been threatened through urban expansion. The increased civil and private air activity has served to restrict the airspace available for military operations. Encroachment, therefore, is an element in determining the future viability of an installation and is a consideration in determining base realignment actions. Currently, programs to protect installations from encroachment are being instituted. These are comprised of efforts to obtain zoning, easements, or fee ownership of properties adjacent to bases so that only activities compatible with air operations will be developed in these areas. As a result, encroachment should be brought under control. However, where encroachment has become a major problem, its impact should be considered during development of base realignment actions.

Budget.—High-cost, single-mission installations with limited real estate and outmoded, old, functionally inefficient facilities requiring large investments for replacement facilities are prime candidates for closure. Significant annual savings result from the closure of such bases. However, the relative cost effectiveness of retaining installations is also a major factor in determining base realignments. Consolidation of missions on a single mult-mission installation which allows a base closure generally results in significant annual savings. However, these savings are offset in some instances by the required investment, particularly in facilities needed to consolidate. Additionally, one-time relocation costs are a factor. In evaluating the budget implication of base realignments it is necessary that initial and annual savings be weighted against the one-time construction and movement costs of the various options. Consideration should be given to consolidations which minimize the investment in new facilities while maximizing the annual savings. In general, large outlays in construction or equipment funds are not feasible and options which depend on such outlays should be avoided unless no other viable alternative exists.

Environment.—All actions must be assessed to determine their impact on the environment. Base realignment options must have an initial assessment during the preliminary planning. If significant environmental impact is indicated, for example at a gaining installation, as a result of the assessment, then an environmental impact statement must be filed.

Mission degradation.—Realignment actions, by their very nature, result in turbulence both in personnel and in mission output. The degree of turbulence is a consideration if the resulting mission degradation is of such a proportion as to be significant. Certain activities cannot be allowed to "stand down" and, as a result, realignments of these activities require in being capability at the new location. Also, work force composition is a consideration in that a highly specialized or unique work force of civilians may not facilitate relocation. These factors should be considered in evaluating realignment actions.

Mr. WHITE. If there are any questions regarding the details of these criteria, representatives of the military departments are present to respond.

At various times, circumstances will dictate that the results of the military services' continuing reviews be examined and a directive is issued requesting submissions of their proposals for announcement.

Although, in addition, base realinement proposals are at times submitted for announcement separately. The military departments will then submit their lists of recommended candidate realinements resulting from their in-house feasibility studies to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval prior to congressional and new media notification that detailed studies are being initiated. Our guidance is that these candidate proposals will be announced with alternatives, when appropriate. Moreover, our guidance provides that all feasible and practical alternatives will be considered. Additional alternatives, therefore, can be developed throughout the study process. Some alternatives are identified by the military services as a result of their detailed studies. Others are identified during the review. All of the alternatives so identified are analyzed, and those which are feasible and practical, including status quo, are considered as part of the detailed study process.

Once the Secretary of Defense has approved military department candidate realinement proposals for study, we prepare a detailed integrated, time-phased schedule of events for use by the military departments. This is an internal document used by the key personnel involved in the process. This schedule includes such events as congressional, State, and local officials notifications and breifings; national labor unions briefings; briefing of affected DOD personnel, local labor unions, and community leaders by local base commanders; and review and submission of information on the impact of the proposed realinement on the MILCON program.

You are also aware of our longstanding DOD policy of notifying interested Members of Congress and congressional committees of all base realinement actions affecting 200 or more military or 50 or more civilian personnel. The military departments are also encouraged to notify the Congress on adverse actions involving fewer personnel whenever they determine such notification is warranted. There are also provisions in the law with regard to this problem.

COMPLIANCE WITH 10 U.S.C. 2687

Under the provision of 10 U.S.C. 2687, the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the concerned military department must publicly announce and notify in writing the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that a military installation is a candidate for closure or realinement. Our policy is to require the cognizant military department to notify the committees. For the purposes of this statute, installations are identified as posts, camps, stations, bases, and other facilities where 500 or more direct hire permanent civilian employees are authorized to be employed. Compliance with the provisions of 10 U.S.C. is required when such realinements involve the reduction of more than 1,000 or more than 50 percent in the number of permanent civilian personnel authorized to be employed at that installation. These reductions include relocations and reductions of civilian personnel positions. They do not, however, include reductions in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.

Mr. Chairman, should you desire, I would be glad to provide our implementing guidance on 10 U.S.C. 2687 for the record.

Senator HART. Please do.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION SHEET BASE CLOSURES AND REALINEMENTS

(Attached is implementing guidance on 10 U.S.C. 2687.)

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., March 22, 1978.

Memorandum for: Assistant Secretary of the Army (IL&FM); Assistant Secretary of the Navy (MRA&L); Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (MRA&I); and Directors of the Defense Agencies.

Subject: Base realignment actions.

Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of January 14, 1977 implemented within the Department of Defense the provisons of Section 612, PL 94–431. The FY 1978 Military Construction Authorization Act includes a slightly revised version of the previous legislation and amends Chapter 159 of Title 10 United States Code by adding this legislation as a new Section 2687 (10 U.S.C. 2687), Base closures and realignments. An extract of 10 U.S.C. 2687 is attached for information and necessary action. The policy and guidance contained in the January 14, 1977 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum apply to the provision of 10 U.S.C. 2687. Also attached is additional guidance on the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687.

PERRY J. FLIAKAS,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Housing).

Attachments.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION ACT

Public Law 95–82, August 1, 1977

BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

SEC. 612. (a) Chapter 159 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by section 504 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new section as follows:

"§ 2687. Base closures and realignments

"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no action may be taken to effect or implement—

"(1) the closure of any military installation;

"(2) any realignment with respect to any military installation involving a reduction by more than one thousand, or by more than 50 percent, in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation at the time the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress under subsection (b)(1) that such installation is a candidate for closure or realignment; or

"(3) any construction, conversion, or rehabilitation at any military facility other than a military installation referred to in clause (1) or (2) (regardless of whether such facility is a military installation as defined in subsection (d)) which will or may be required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason of any closure or realignment to which clause (1) or (2) applies,

unless and until the provisions of subsection (b) are complied with.

"(b) No action described in subsection (a) with respect to the closure of, or a realignment with respect to, any military installation may be taken unless and until—

"(1) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned publicly announces, and notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives in writing, that such military installation is a candidate for closure or realignment;

"(2) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned complies with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 with respect to the proposed closure or realignment;

"(3) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives his final decision to carry out the proposed closure or realignment and a detailed justification for such decision, including statements of the estimated fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of the proposed closure or realignment; and

"(4) a period of sixty days expires following the date on which the justification referred to in clause (3) has been submitted to such committees, during which period no irrevocable action may be taken to effect or implement the decision.

"(c) This section shall not apply to the closure of a military installation, or a realignment with respect to a military installation, if the President certifies to the Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or a military emergency.

"(d) As used in this section:

"(1) 'Military installation' means any camp, post, station, base, yard, or other facility under the authority of the Department of Defense—

"(A) which is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or Guam; and

"(B) at which not less than five hundred civilian personnel are authorized to be employed.

Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.

"(2) 'Civilian personnel' means direct-hire permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

"(3) 'Realignment' includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.

"(e) Except as provided in subsection (e), this section shall apply to any closure of a military installation, and any realignment with respect to a military installation, which is first publicly announced after September 30, 1977.".

(b) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 159 of such title is amended by adding at the end there of a new item as follows:

"2687. Base closures and realignments.".

(c) Section 611 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1966 (Public Law 89–188; 10 U.S.C. 2662 note), and section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1977 (Public Law 94–431; 90 Stat. 1366), shall be inapplicable in the case of any closure of a military installation, and any realignment with respect to a military installation, which is first publicly announced after September 30, 1977.

Department of Defense Guidance on the Provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687, Base Closures and Realinements

It is important that the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687 be strictly applied within the DoD. The phrase "other facility under the authority of the Department of Defense" used in subparagraph (d)(1) shall include DoD activities located in General Services Administration (GSA) space, whether leased or owned. Similarly, the parenthetical phrase in subparagraph (a)(3) shall be deemed to include DoD activities located in GSA space, whether leased or owned.

The 60-day waiting period required by Clause (b)(4), 10 U.S.C. 2687 pertains to calendar days, regardless of whether or not Congress is in session, recess, etc. At the expiration of the 60-day waiting period, the firm policy of the Department of Defense (DOD) will be to immediately implement the decision, subject only to the enactment of a law to the contrary. Only the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary may consider waiving this requirement. Such an exception would be made only in very unusual circumstances.

All planning actions necessary to ensure the start of the implementation of the base realignment immediately at the end of the 60-day period, therefore, are to be taken. Submission of a recommendation seeking approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense for a base realignment action required to be reported under 10 U.S.C. 2687 will be accompanied by a firm schedule for issuance of the required notification to affected employees.

The statements required by subparagraph (b)(3) to be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, except for those involving the environmental consequences that are developed in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, will be developed and included as part of the Case Study and Justification Folder for each proposal. Appropriate extracts of this Folder may be used to satisfy this reporting requirement. This information will be kept separate and apart from the evaluations which may be required by the NEPA and its implementing guidelines as referred to in subparagraph (b)(2). To meet the reporting requirements of subparagraph (b)(3) regarding the environmental consequences, the documents developed in compliance with NEPA are to be provided to the Committees.

The economic analysis covering the budgetary and fiscal consequences required to be completed in accordance with prescribed procedures and formats as part of the DoD decision-making process for all base realignment proposals and recommendations, will be based entirely on DoD costs (including family housing, homeowners assistance, etc.). For contracting-out proposals these costs will reflect the latest civilian personnel cost factors of Office of Management and Budget Circular A–76. Other Federal agency costs, as appropriate, which may be required for the statement on local economic impact required by subparagraph (b)(3), will be included in a separate independent section of the overall Case Study and Justification Folder which will also include the evaluation of the local economic impact of the proposed action. Such other Federal agency significant costs will be either obtained form the cognizant agency or will be based upon best available estimates from previous experience. As indicated above, these costs will be discussed and evaluated apart form DoD costs included in the economic analysis and will not be included as part of any DoD total costs or amortization period.

The issuance of notices to affected employees of proposed reassignment or transfer to other positions, reductions to lower grade, or separation during the 60-day waiting perod required by 10 U.S.C. 2687 is not an irrevocable action and such notices may be issued, if beneficial to either the employees or the Federal Government. In essence, the minimum 60-day notification period to the employees required by DoD Manual 1400.20–1–M and the 60-day waiting period required by subject law can coincide, if necessary. All final base realignment recommendations forwarded for Deputy Secretary of Defense approval, therefore, which require reporting under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687, will also provide information as to whether notices of employment actions required by the realignment will be issued to employees at the affected installation during the 60-day waiting period required by 10 U.S.C. 2687, to include the reasons therefor; the anticipated date of issuance of the notices; the number of employees to receive such notices; the effective date of the action; and other pertinent data. If notices are approved for issuance during the 60-day waiting period required by 10 U.S.C. 2687, this information will be included in the submission to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives which advises of the final base realignment decision and provides the documents required by the legislation. However, if approval is granted and if such notices are issued, steps must be taken to ensure that no employment action required by the realignment is taken until after the 60-day waiting period has terminated.

Following are examples of actions which are not irrevocable and which can be accomplished during the 60-day waiting period under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687:

All planning actions for the base realignment in question.

Processing disposal reports for any excess property which may be involved, both within the Department of Defense and to the appropriate Congressional Committees.

Limited planned military personnel rotations without replacements.

Planning and programming for facilities requirements resulting from the base realignment in question.

Following are examples of actions which cannot be accomplished during the 60-day waiting period with regard to the activity affected by the base realignment subject to the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687, if they are required either at the losing or gaining installation as a result of the base realignment in question:

Involuntary separation of civilian personnel.

Involuntary relocation of civilian personnel.

Award of contracts for construction or alterations or the acquisition of facilities.

Expenditures for equipment and supplies.

Removal/relocation of significant items of equipment related to the realignment from the losing installation.

Installation of significant items of equipment related to the realignment at the gaining installation.

Termination or award of contracts related to the realignment for the affected activity at the losing installation.

Award of significant contracts related to the realignment for the affected activity at the gaining installation.

This guidance applies to all base realignment actions which require reporting under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687 and for which a final decision has been approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense or other cognizant Defense official since October 1, 1977 or will be approved in the future.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., January 14, 1977.

Memorandum: For Secretaries of the military departments, Director of the Defense agencies.

Subject: Implementation of section 612, Public Law 94–431.

On September 30, 1976, by the attached statement, the President signed H.R. 14846, the FY 1977 Military Construction Authorization Act, into law. The Act (PL 94–431, September 30, 1976) includes Section 612 concerning candidate base realignment proposals and subsequent decisions. An extract of Section 612 of PL 94–431 is attached for necessary implementation.

The 60-day waiting period required by Clause (D), Section 612 pertains to calendar days, regardless of whether or not Congress is in session, recess, etc. At the expiration of the 60-day waiting period, the fine policy of the DoD, as directed by the President in the attached statement, will be to immediately implement the decision, subject only to the enactment of a law to the contrary. Only the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary may consider waiving this requirement. Such an exception would only be made in very unusual circumstances.

Accordingly, all planning actions necessary to ensure the start of the implementation of the base realignment immediately at the end of the 60-day period will be taken. Submission of a recommendation seeking approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense for a base realignment action required to be reported under Section 612, will be accompanied by a firm schedule for issuance of the required notification to affected employees.

The information required by Clause (C) to be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives except for the environmental consequences, will be developed and included as part of the Case Study and Justification Folder for each proposal. Appropriate extracts of this Folder may be used to satisfy this reporting requirement. However, this information will be kept separate and apart from the evaluations which may be required by the National Enviromental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and its implementing guidelines as referred to in Clause (B) of Section 612. To meet the reporting requirements of Clause (C) regarding the environmental consequences, the documents developed in compliance with NEPA, are to be provided to the Committees. The economic analyses for all base realignment proposals and recommendations will reflect the latest civilian personnel cost factors of Office of Management and Budget Circular A–76. It should also be noted that proposals to convert direct-hire base services and operations to contract fall within the definition of base realignments. Appropriate action should be taken, therefore, to ensure that these types of realignments are included in all procedures and policies implemented for base realignments.

In addition to the above, base closure actions required to be reported by Section 613, PL 89–568 will continue to be forwarded to the Congress at the time the decision is made to close the installation. This report will be separate and apart from any Section 612 submission which may be required.

W. P. CLEMENTS.

Enclosures.

GENERAL PROVISIONS, MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1977, PUBLIC LAW 94–431, SEPTEMBER 30, 1976

BASE REALIGNMENTS

Sec. 612. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act may be used to effect or implement—

(1) the closure of any military installation;

(2) any reduction in the authorized level of civilian personnel at any military installation by more than one thousand civilian personnel or 50 per centum of the level of such personnel authorized as of March 1, 1976, or the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year in which the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress that such installation is a candidate for closure or significant reduction, whichever occurs later; or

(3) any construction, conversion, or rehabilitation at any other military installation (whether or not such installation is a military installation as defined in subsection (b)) which will or may be required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such other installation by reason of any closure or reduction to which this section applies;

unless—

(A) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress in writing that such military installation is a candidate for closure or significant reduction; and then

(B) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned complies with all terms, conditions and requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act; and then

(C) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate his final decision to close or significantly reduce such installation and a detailed justification for his decision, together with the estimated fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of the proposed closure or reduction; and then

(D) a period of at least sixty days expires following the date on which the justification referred to in clause (C) has been submitted to such committees, during which period the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned may take no irrevocable action to implement the decision.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term "military installation" means any camp, post, station, base, yard, or other facility under the authority of the Department of Defense—

(1) which is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or Guam; and

(2) at which not less than five hundred civilian personnel are authorized to be employed.

(c) For purposes of this section, the term "civilian personnel" means direct-hire permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

(d) This section shall not apply to any closure or reduction if the President certifies to Congress that such closure or reduction must be implemented for reasons of any military emergency or national security or if such closure or reduction was publicly announced prior to January 1, 1976.

DETAILED STUDY PROCESS

Mr. WHITE. After the candidate realinement actions have been announced, the detailed study process is initiated. The study develops for the candidate action and for all feasible alternatives:

1. Reasons for the proposed action.
2. Anticipated benefits to the DOD to be derived. This is in terms of net annual cost avoidance, one-time costs, and one-time cost avoidance.
3. Personnel expected to be adversely impacted.
4. Estimate of potential community impact.
5. Anticipated potential economic, unemployment, environmental, and other problems.
6. Budget impact.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

It has been longstanding policy to focus on defense costs and savings in determining the appropriate base realinement actions, and the basic

criterion is to amortize defense costs in less than 7 to 10 years, except for unusual cases. This policy has been reinforced by the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

I would be pleased, Mr. Chairman, to make the OMB correspondence pertaining to this policy available for the record. It is generally agreed that defense installations should not be operated primarily to sustain social and economic well-being of the local community.

[The information follows:]

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
Washington, D.C., June 18, 1976.

Hon. EDWARD W. BROOKE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR BROOKE: Thank you for your recent letter to Mr. Lynn seeking clarification of Department of Defense base realignment policies.

Let me point out initially that base closures and realignments are not undertaken simply as cost economies to the Federal Government. The National Security Act of 1947 stipulates that the Secretary of Defense shall take such actions as are appropriate "(including the transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of any function, power or duty) to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation, and to eliminate duplication, in the Department of Defense." The Act recognizes the Secretary's responsibility to generate continuing efficiencies within the Defense establishment and is a vital part of maintaining a modern, effective military force structure. Base closures and realignments are often necessary to permit adjustments in the functions, powers, and duties of our military forces. If, because of the overall impact upon local communities the Secretary were to retain functions or duties that are no longer needed, he would not be carrying out his basic responsibility for Defense modernization.

The approval of decisions by the military services on base realignments rests with the Secretary of Defense. He can bring to these decisions a broad perspective on National Security requirements, and he can also provide responsive assistance to the affected communities during the transition period through the Economic Adjustment Committee. We all agree that defense installations should not be operated primarily to sustain the social and economic well-being of the local community. We cannot agree, however, with the implication in your letter that the final decision on closures and realignments should rest outside the Department of Defense. Such a procedure would be inconsistent with the Secretary's responsibilities.

The question we must ask ourselves is: What is the best and most economical method of implementing the base realignments which must be made to maintain a modern, effective military establishment?

As stated in our earlier letter, there is no evidence that the costs of transition assistance programs will ever exceed the recurring annual savings from base realignment actions. Even if that were the case, however, it would not justify retaining an installation or function if it does not fit into the requirements of a modern defense posture. The two-step policy outlined in our letter of May 11, will permit full public discussion of any significant candidate action, including alternative courses of actions, prior to a final decision.

We believe this procedure is the only way to insure that the necessary, but difficult process of base realignments remains an instrument of defense policy.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL H. O'NEILL, *Acting Director.*

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., May 13, 1976.

JAMES T. LYNN,
Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. LYNN: Thank you for your response to the Massachusetts Congressional Delegation letter of April 2, 1976 concerning policy questions raised by

recent military base realignment action proposals. While we are grateful for the information contained in your letter, we do feel that the main issue raised in our letter remains unaddressed.

Permit us to restate the main theme of our concern. The recent military proposals were directed at desired cost savings. However, if an action proposed by a particular Federal Agency results in savings to that Agency's budget, but at the same time results in increased costs to the budgets of other federal agencies, should there not be a central agency with overview responsibility, such as the Office of Management and Budget, to weigh the overall affect of the contrary actions on the total Federal budget.

For example, if the annual savings realized by a military base closure are weighted against increased expenditures incurred by other agencies of such magnitude that no net savings will accrue for a period of ten years,or longer, who makes the decision as to whether the move is, in fact, economical? Should it be documented that a base closing will save the Defense Department $2 million annually, but that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, etc., will incur a one-time cost of $12 million, is the decision as to the advisability of the base closing as a cost savings measure the sole responsibility of the agency involved?

We certainly agree with you that defense installations should not be operated primarily "to sustain the social and economic well-being of the local comminity." We feel it imperative, however, that the citizens whose lives are affected by governmental decisions be assured absolutely that those decisions are reached in a responsible and equitable fashion. Our constituents must know that the present studies being conducted at Fort Devens are not merely a charade designed to rationalize a decision already made.

We strongly suggest that a methodology in which a branch of service proposes an action, conducts a study of its own proposal, analysis the data collected, and then issues a decision inherently opens itself to question and cynical disbelief. Great credibility would be added if an overview agency with a detached viewpoint was assigned a monitoring role to oversea total government expenditures in all areas.

We look forward to your early response.

Sincerely yours,

Edward W. Brooke, USS; Silvio O. Conte, MC; Joseph D. Early, MC; Paul E. Tsongas, MC; Torbert H. MacDonald, MC; John J. Moakley, MC; James A. Burke, MC; Michael S. Dukakis, Governor; Edward M. Kennedy, USS; Edward P. Boland, MC; Robert F. Drinan, MC; Michael J. Harrington, MC; Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., MC; Margaret M. Heckler, MC; Gerry E. Studds, MC; Thomas P. O'Neill III, LTG.

MAY 7, 1976.

Hon. EDWARD W. BROOKE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR BROOKE: Thank you for your recent letter regarding Department of Defense base realignment policies.

Let me first make it clear that I fully appreciate the pressures imposed by any closure or realignment of major military installations. As a result of the well-founded concerns which have been generated by previous realignment actions, the structure of Federal assistance programs to which you refer has been created. I believe that your concern and that of others in similar circumstances has done a great deal to demonstrate the need to provide transitional assistance to areas which have been placed in difficult economic circumstances.

However, I must also point out that the purpose of this assistance is to ease the transition period during which the affected community must develop new economic resources. The savings generated by the closure or realignment of the military activities no longer required are permanent in nature and will continue to accrue annually after the transition period is completed.

Despite the difficult problems of economic transition, I believe that the primary consideration governing any realignment of a defense installation must be the military requirement. Where the continued operation of any base is no longer supportable by military need, it must be considered as a candidate for closure or realignment. To do otherwise would suggest a thesis that defense installations

should be operated primarily to sustain the social and economic well-being of the local community. I know that you join me in recognizing that such a concept is incompatible with the need to maintain a modern, efficient establishment.

I fully understand your concern over the impact of Defense base realignments on your State, especially after previous realignments in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Partially as an outgrowth of your State's concerns voiced during the 1973 realignments, and partially because of the National Environmental Policy Act and recent court orders, the Department of Defense has recently changed its policy on base realignments.

The system operating in 1973 required only an internal Department of Defense determination on the installations to be realigned. Other Government agencies were notified only after formal public announcement of the decisions. As your letter mentions, coordination between the agencies was sometimes strained under this procedure. Funding these additional costs had not been adequately coordinated in advance so that other agencies might assess the impact on their budgets.

The revised base realignment process currently being used by the Department of Defense involves two steps leading to decision:

Step 1 is an internal study by the military services that establishes the military requirement for realignment, considers initial realignment concepts, and identifies preliminary alternatives. Some preliminary consideration may be made of the environmental and other implications of the candidate actions.

If a determination is made to proceed, it will be announced that the installation is a "candidate for realignment," subject to detailed study and evaluation. This identification of candidates for realignment is a major change from past policy which announced to the public only final decisions.

Step 2 involves a detailed study process to analyze the effects of closing or reducing the status of the candidate installation. This includes preparation of the necessary operational, technical, cost effectiveness and environmental reviews, assessments and studies. During this phase, if necessary, the cognizant military service will also draft an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), including dissemination to all interested parties, publication in the Federal Register, and conduct of public hearings. Comments from concerned citizens and organizations will actively be solicited by the Department of Defense. The EIS includes consideration of environmental as well as socio-economic factors. All feasible alternatives to the candidate action will also be identified and evaluated. This process will include coordination with affected Federal agencies.

The final realignment decision rests with the Secretary of Defense after consultation with other Government agencies and upon completion of any necessary studies.

I hope that the process outlined in this letter reassures you that full consideration will be made within the Administration to both Defense requirements and social concerns prior to any final decision on realignments. May I suggest that if you have any relevant data on the potential impact of any realignment that you contact Secretary Rumsfeld to insure consideration is given to your concerns.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES T. LYNN, *Director.*

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., April 2, 1976.

JAMES T. LYNN,
Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Executive Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. LYNN: Announcements made yesterday by the Department of the Army concerning "Proposed Studies of Installations and Activities and Realignment Actions" prompt us to raise policy questions. We would appreciate the benefit of your judgments on these questions. Our interest is, of course, quickened by the proposed reduction of 82 percent of the activities at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, the last remaining Army Base in New England.

On February 27th, President Ford, in responding to a letter from Senator Brooke stated, "The points you make particularly about the need for development of a careful and comprehensive economic analysis before any action is taken are absolutely correct." It is our judgment that one of the areas most in need of careful analysis is the impact on the overall Federal budget of base realignment decisions made by any particular branch of the Defense Department.

We well understand that the Department of the Army is concerned with the impact their actions will have on their own budget. We question whether there is any mechanism within the Government to measure the total economic impact of a particular action. Is there assigned responsibility for weighing the increase in one Department's expenditures caused by the actions of another Department? Is the overall budgetary cost or saving assessed, and are decisions based on such overall considerations, or is each Agency free to make its decisions based only on the impact of actions on its own budget?

For example, at the time the Department of the Navy announced it would close the Boston Naval Shipyard as an economy move we requested that the total economic impact be considered. Unfortunately, such factors were never taken into consideration. We now have available some of the actual costs borne by other government agencies as a result of the Navy's decision. The Massachusetts Base Conversion Commission and the Division of Employment Security used a tracking system to keep records of unemployment benefits paid to workers laid off at the Boston Naval Shipyard. These benefits totaled $11 million. The Department of Labor spent $3 million for retraining former shipyard employees. The Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce granted $900,000 for reuse planning. The Department of Housing and Urban Development awarded $160,000 for planning, and the New England Regional Commission awarded $100,000 for economic analysis. Grant applications presently in the pipeline at the Economic Development Administration total approximately $10 million, primarily for the modernization of Shipyard facilities. This total of over $25 million is substantially increased by the value of welfare benefits, food stamps, and other Federally funded programs. So, while the Navy might have realized some saving, the enormous additional costs borne by the total Federal budget was never factored in.

We would appreciate receiving from you a description of the methodology that will be employed in estimating non-Defense Department governmental costs resulting from DOD actions, and the decision-making mechanism to be employed in evaluating such data.

With thanks for your cooperation, we are.

Sincerely yours,

Edward W. Brooke, USS; Silvio O. Conte, MC; Joseph D. Early, MC; Paul E. Tsongas, MC; Torbert H. MacDonald, MC; John J. Moakley, MC; James A. Burke, MC; Michael S. Dukakis, Governor; Edward M. Kennedy, USS; Edward P. Boland, MC; Robert F. Drinan, MC; Michael J. Harrington, MC; Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., MC; Margaret M. Heckler, MC; Gerry E. Studds, MC; Thomas P. O'Neill III, LTG.

NEPA COMPLIANCE DURING DETAILED STUDY

Mr. WHITE. In compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969—NEPA—an environmental impact assessment is developed for each action, and if it is determined to be a major action which could significantly affect the quality of the human environment, an environmental impact statement is prepared. Where an EIS is required, a draft EIS is filed with the Environmental Protection Agency—EPA—as agent for the Council on Environmental Quality and is circulated to the public and to Federal, State, and local agencies for a minimum 45-day review and comment period. In addition, public hearing may be conducted, as appropriate in the affected communities, if the proposal is environmentally controversial. Substantive comments received from the public and the State and regional clearinghouses are evaluated and considered and the results are reflected in the final EIS which is also filed with EPA. Notice of the filing of both the draft and final EIS is noted in the Federal Register. No administrative action may be taken for 30 days following the filing of the final EIS. The final statement accompanies the proposed action through the review process so that the decisionmakers can give due consideration

to environmental factors concurrent with technical, operational, economic, and other factors, in making the final decision. For actions not requiring an EIS, our policy is to provide the Congress and the public a 30-day comment period, as noted in the Federal Register, prior to implementation of the realinement action. These public review procedures insure that no relevant factor has been overlooked during the decisionmaking process.

COMPLETION OF DETAILED STUDIES

After the detailed studies, including those required by NEPA, are completed, the Secretary of the concerned military department forwards his decision to the Secretary of Defense for approval. This action is then reviewed by the cognizant OSD staff elements and a recommendation on the issue is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. If he concurs in a decision to implement a realinement, the concerned military department must submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives the final realinement decision, and, when required by 10 U.S.C. 2687, a detailed justification for the decision, including statements of the estimated fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of the proposed realinement. After the report to Congress, there is a 60-day waiting period prescribed by 10 U.S.C. 2687 during which no irrevocable action may be taken to effect or implement the realinement. Of course, if a decision is made not to implement any base realinement as a result of the detailed studies, we also notify the Congress and the public.

DOD PLACEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

We are also, as you know, concerned with our employees in this matter and under the DOD program for stability of civilian employment, every effort is made to assist displaced employees in obtaining other acceptable employment. DOD officials work closely with the Civil Service Commission and maintain liaison with the Department of Labor, State employment offices, and private industry to help employees locate other employment. Where appropriate, they are given the opportunity to undertake retraining programs to qualify them for jobs available in the local labor markets. In most cases employees are given a 60-day advance notice of reduction in force and functional transfer rather than the 30 days required by the Civil Service Commission. Upon their request, employees will be carried in a leave period for such additional time as is necessary to provide a 90-day notice period prior to separation. Career employees who do not elect to take other Federal positions are eligible for severance pay up to 1 year based upon length of service, or for immediate retirement under one of the voluntary or involuntary retirement options.

Employees whose jobs are transferred to other locations are given the opportunity to transfer with their jobs. The Government pays for the cost of moving and transporting their families and household goods, the cost of buying and selling a home, the cost of a "house hunting" trip, and temporary quarters and subsistence expenses.

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

You are aware that the President is concerned with the adverse impact base realinements may have on local communities and recently issued Executive Order 12049 to assure that available Federal resources are coordinated and targeted to assist the affected communities. It designates the heads of 18 Federal agencies as members of the Economic Adjustment Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense. In order to improve Federal assistance and insure it is targeted to the most serious needs of affected communities, the Executive order includes a provision to assist communities that may be affected by proposed realinements. This is a significant change from previous practices where assistance was rendered only after a realinement decision had been made. In practice, it means that plans for adjustment assistance can be developed at the time of decision, if desired by local officials.

I would be pleased to make a copy of this Executive order together with the President's letter available for the record.

Senator HART. Please do.

[The information follows:]

(Attached is Executive Order 12049 and President's letter of 27 March 1978 on the subject.)

THE PRESIDENT

[3195-01]

Executive Order 12049 MARCH 27, 1978

DEFENSE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution of the United States of America, in order to provide coordinated Federal economic adjustment assistance necessitated by changes in Department of Defense activities, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Functions of the Secretary of Defense.*

(a) The Secretary shall, through the Economic Adjustment Committee, design and establish an Economic Adjustment Program to assist in the alleviation of serious economic and social impacts that result from major Defense realignments. The program shall provide for:

1. Identification of Defense-related impact problems of States, metropolitan areas, or communities that require assistance.

2. Preparation of development strategies and action plans to coordinate Federal, State and local economic adjustment efforts.

3. Strengthened and uniform economic impact analysis and analysis of community requirements for Federal economic adjustment resources, prior to base realignment action.

4. Timely and earliest possible consultation and cooperation with local, State and Federal officials concerning impact problems and coordinated interagency and intergovernmental adjustment assistance.

5. A clearinghouse service to exchange information among Federal, State and local officials involved in the resolution of community adjustment problems; e.g., previous studies, technical information, and sources of public and private financing.

6. Application of consistent policies, practices, and procedures in the administration of Federal programs that are utilized to assist Defense impact communities.

7. Encouragement of effective State and regional cooperation and concerted involvement of public interest groups and private sector organizations in Defense adjustment activities.

8. Development, with representatives of appropriate agencies, of uniform criteria for the determination of social economic impact of a particular realignment.

9. Identification and strengthening of existing agency mechanisms to better coordinate employment opportunities for displaced agency personnel.

10. Increased attractiveness to the private sector of interim usage of lands and buildings and ways of streamlining property disposal procedures to enable impacted communities to acquire base property for job-generation purposes as military activities phase down.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that sufficient resources and personnel are allocated to carry out these functions.

SEC. 2. *Economic Adjustment Committee.* (a) The Economic Adjustment Committee is hereby continued.

(b) The Committee shall be composed of the following, or a principal deputy, and such others as the President may designate:

(1) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be the Chairman of the Committee.
(2) The Secretary of Agriculture.
(3) The Secretary of Commerce.
(4) The Secretary of Energy.
(5) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
(6) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
(7) The Secretary of the Interior.
(8) The Secretary of Labor.
(9) The Secretary of Transportation.
(10) The Attorney General.
(11) The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.
(12) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
(13) The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(14) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
(15) The Director of the Community Services Administration.
(16) The Administrator of General Services.
(17) The Administrator of the Small Business Administration.
(18) The Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission.

(c) The Committee shall advise, assist, and support the Secretary of Defense's Economic Adjustment activities.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide all necessary administrative support for the Committee.

SEC. 3. *Responsibility of Executive Agencies.*

(a) The head of each agency represented on the Economic Adjustment Committee shall designate a permanent representative to: (1) serve as liaison with the Secretary of Defense's economic adjustment staff, (2) coordinate agency support and participation in assistance projects, and (3) assist in resolving community impact problems.

(b) All Executive agencies shall:

(1) Support, to the extent permitted by law, the economic adjustment assistance activities of the Secretary of Defense. Such support shall include the use and application of personnel, technical expertise, legal authorities, and available financial resources to the extent required to provide a coordinated Federal response to the needs of individual communities, States, and regions adversely affected by necessary Defense changes.

(2) Afford priority consideration to community requests for Federal technical assistance, financial resources, excess or surplus property, or other requirements that are part of a comprehensive plan used by the Economic Adjustment Committee.

SEC. 4. *Construction.* Nothing in this Order shall be construed as subjecting any function vested by law in, or assigned pursuant to law to, any agency or head thereof to the authority of any other agency or officer or as abrogating or restricting any such function in any manner.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 27, 1978.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., March 27, 1978.

Memorandum for: The Secretary of Defense; The Attorney General; The Secretary of the Interior; The Secretary of Agriculture; The Secretary of Commerce, The Secretary of Labor; The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; The Secretary of Transportation; The Secretary of Energy; The Chairman, Civil Service Commission; The Director, Community Services Administration; The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; The Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; The Adminstrator, General Services Administration; The Director, Office of Management and Budget; The Administrator, Small

Business Administration; The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This Administration has initiated a major effort to strengthen military effectiveness and to reduce unnecessary Defense expenditures. Many required changes can be implemented with minimal impact on individuals and communities. Other changes, however, will involve a requirement to close installations or eliminate jobs and these could result in a serious economic impact in some localities.

I am fully committed to a reduction in Defense costs, but the burden should not be borne solely by the citizens who happen to reside or work in an impacted area. Therefore, I am equally committed to the implementation of these changes in a manner that reflects my genuine concern for those individuals and communities that are directly affected.

I have asked Secretary Brown to continue to chair the Economic Adjustment Committee in order to assure that coordinated Federal assistance is provided to impacted communities when it is required and that increased consideration is given to social and economic impacts in the implementation of Defense realignment actions.

The Economic Adjustment Committee has helped many communities to successfully overcome the impact of Defense changes in the past. The scope and extent of possible future changes, however, impose a requirement for increased participation and priority attention by all agencies involved with the Committee. To meet this need, I have today signed an Executive Order designating you as a member of the Committee. I have also designated Jack Watson, my Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs and Secretary to the Cabinet, as a member of this Committee. Additionally, you should name a representative to work closely with the permanent Committee staff in the Office of Economic Adjustment.

My objective in issuing the order to strengthen the Committee is to assure that available Federal resources are coordinated and targeted in a manner that is responsive to the most important needs of Defense impacted communities. Priority consideration should be given to requirements for technical and financial assistance or other actions that may be required to support the Committee's projects.

You will appreciate that Defense impacts vary widely and they pose a complex challenge for the affected communities and states. They also serve as a test of the ability of the Federal departments and agencies to provide effective assistance. I therefore expect you to review your agency's support of economic adjustment assistance projects with the objective of identifying improvements, wherever possible.

Recognizing that funding and property are two Federal resources most often required to resolve local impact problems, I have asked the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to (1) review arrangements for identification of economic adjustment resources in the budgets of appropriate Federal agency programs, and (2) work with the Department of Defense and the General Services Administration to ensure that Federal property procedures are streamlined to expedite the interim use and transfer of excess base properties for job-generating purposes at prices the impacted communities can afford to pay.

In addition, I have asked the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to review the adequacy of the arrangements for the implementation of this Executive order. Your cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of OMB will enable us to implement necessary Defense changes and render more effective Federal assistance to those in need.

JIMMY CARTER.

PUBLIC INPUT

Mr. WHITE. You will note that the present base realinement procedures provide an opportunity for public input which is considered during the decisionmaking process. The process of announcing candidates for study, of complying with NEPA and of complying with 10 U.S.C. 2687, when appropriate, result in a public awareness long before a final decision is made. In earlier times, no Congressional notification or public announcement was released until a final decision had been made. Until the decision was made, the entire process was internal in nature which did not provide for Congressional or public participation.

Gentlemen, this concludes my formal statement. I would again like to thank you for your kind attention while I explained the policies and procedures of the DOD base realinement program.

I have with me today my colleagues, Assistant Secretary of Army, Gibbs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Chayes, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Hidalgo, and we would be glad to respond to any questions you may have on this subject.

Senator HART. Thank you very much. I think your statement is an excellent summary of the departmental policy on base realinements and I think provides a very good point of departure for further discussion.

You did make several offers of documents in your statement and we would welcome the submission of all those documents. They will be included in the record with any other materials that you wish we should have.

Let me ask if any representatives of the various services, the Assistant Secretaries, have prepared statements or opening remarks of any kind before we go to questions.

Mr. HIDALGO. I do not.

Mr. GIBBS. I do not.

Mr. CHAYES. No sir.

Senator HART. I want to also welcome my colleague, Senator Culver. I appreciate his attendance here this morning.

DETERMINATION OF BASE REALINEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Dr. White, on page 2 of your statement you have some very impressive statistics about realinement actions between 1969 and 1977. When you use those statistics to illustrate the success of the Department's efforts at realinement and consolidation, I am particularly impressed by the $2½ billion annual savings figure. Could you tell me how that figure was derived and how you can be as certain as you are about those numbers, and particularly the degree they demonstrate of success of the overall program?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

We have standard procedures by which we evaluate, in the cases of all of the announced decisions the various elements of savings, be they savings in operating and support costs or savings in personnel, and we have standard formats by which we calculate those savings. The services, when they do these analyses, submit them to us, as I say, in the standard format.

So, in each case these procedures have been reviewed not only within the Department but also by GAO in all controversial cases. I think these are well established procedures by which we can do this, and we can break them out for you in terms of service if you would like.

Senator HART. If you would, I think any documentation, particularly those figures, showing savings, would be helpful to us.

[The information follows:]

SUMMARY OF ANNOUNCED INSTALLATION AND ACTIVITY REALINEMENT AND CLOSURE ACTIONS (EXCLUDING SVN AND THAILAND), JANUARY 1969 THROUGH DECEMBER 1977

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Defense	Total
Actions	1,058	1,386	884	190	3,518
Positions eliminated:					
Military	104,872	150,999	118,451	2,127	376,449
Civilian	103,283	85,120	51,014	10,284	249,701
Estimated annual savings (millions)	$1,972.3	$1,666.7	$1,738.5	$114.9	$5,492.4

TRACKING SAVINGS

Senator HART. I certainly don't doubt the veracity of your statement. I think it is interesting to us how you can track the savings.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, I might add in that regard we are also currently improving that process in terms of a better specific tracking afterwards in terms of what exactly happened using a device in the Air Force which has now taken the lead on that and is experimenting with it in four bases.

We are also trying to refine and improve that process because it is obviously a critical part of the whole procedure.

Senator HART. I will continue to address questions principally to Dr. White but I would invite each of the rest of you to make your comments and observations.

I think one of the principal purposes of this hearing and our oversight action, is to depoliticize what I think in the end still continues to be unfortunately a too heavily politicized effort. The dollars are big, the impact is on local communities and economies is great and, therefore, political implications are also fairly important.

What the committee would like to do, and I am sure what you would like to do, to the degree possible, is insulate this whole process from being politicized. In that connection, Dr. White, the whole process by which bases are studied for realinement, is it just kind of a smoke screen for a decision that has already been made? Do the studies always come out the right way in the sense that they justify a preordained decision made within the Department, and that, in fact, by going through this process all that is being done is to conceal a decision which was perhaps heavily politicized at the outset.

PROCEDURES FOR PREPARATION OF BASE REALINEMENT PACKAGES

At the bottom of page 2 I notice you talk about the April 1978 candidate actions and you use the term "prudent management actions." To what degree is the study process genuine, and in that connection, do you on occasion, not decide to go forward with a realinement as a result of the study that was in fact conducted?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, if I may take a few moments, I think the best way to answer is to describe, perhaps in that specific context, what went on.

When Dr. Brown became Secretary of Defense, as I mentioned, he was concerned about the base realinement issue and he did issue guidance to the Departments to review their bases and to see whether or not there were, in fact, possible economies through realinements. Based on that review, we established a target schedule to announce publicly the results of the review. With that the services individually reviewed their various bases.

On the basis of those reviews, they submitted to the Office of the Secretary a proposed list of base realinements.

Now, I can assure you (a), there were items on that list that I would not have anticipated would have been on it. There were items on that list which I would have anticipated, and there were not items that I might have anticipated. So, speaking personally, it was a list that was developed by the Departments. It was one that we then

reviewed, but it was not a candidate list in the sense that we knew about it in advance.

We obviously looked at the list in terms of the practical aspects of it. Is it feasible? Does it make sense? Why those particular bases? In addition to that, we are particularly concerned because under this process, which has now become very lengthy for a great many reasons, the local community is held in a kind of limbo while this goes on. That is not particularly good for them or, therefore, for us. So we must be careful that proposals that are announced for study, for realinement as a result of the initial review are serious candidates. So we reviewed them for that reason as well, and then, of course, we concerned ourselves with alternatives. Once that was done we reviewed the list primarily with the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Duncan, but also with Dr. Brown. I discussed this matter with Dr. Brown, went over the books with him in terms of what the proposals were. Dr. Brown and Mr. Duncan then approved the announcement, and we proceeded by notifying the Congress and having a formal public announcement of the proposed realinements.

Now, I do not know at this stage what, in fact, will happen in terms of the results but I can assure you, and I could supply for the record from the past, situations where announcements have been made that have not gone forward in terms of formal closures,

Senator HART. As a result of the studies?

Mr. WHITE. As a result of the studies.

Senator HART. I think you understand the context of these questions.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, I do.

Senator HART. I think the American people are very familiar with the phenomenon of a heavy military presence in certain States and districts as a result of the seniority of certain people in the past and their relationship with the Department. Although I suppose to a certain degree human nature will continue what it has always been, I think what we want to do or try to do is help insulate you as much as possible from those pressures and to help in fact consolidate and realine and close facilities that don't make any economic sense.

So all of us, I think, unquestionably support the principle of saving taxpayer's dollars, even if it comes to the situation of our own States, which of course, makes it a great deal tougher to insure that that support is there. I think we have to be assured that there is not back-dooring of those decisions, and in a variety of ways.

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir, Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree more, and we do very much appreciate your support in this matter because these decisions are frankly devilishly hard just based on the pure substance, but we are trying to deal with them. They are very complex; they involve uncertainty about the future and so on. It is a very difficult process, and it is an enormous responsibility, so we do need to continually make our decisions in the most objective way we can.

Senator Hart. I have a large number of additional questions. Let me see if Senator Culver wants to ask questions at this point.

Senator CULVER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

COMMUNITY IMPACT OF REALINEMENT STUDIES

I am very pleased to note, Mr. White, the new guidelines for the Economic Adjustment Committee and the fact that they now provide this advance assistance before any actual closure or realinement takes place. Some of us have previously been concerned about this and suggested such measures to strengthen the adjustment assistance process.

I also welcome your willingness to study realinements and closures in order to give us a more cost effective defense. The one area that has been of particular concern to me, because of some direct experience with one installation, has been the practice that I detect of restudying a particular facility or operation where marginal savings, at least, are already demonstrated, cases in which it is very questionable, on the basis of previous studies, whether any savings are likely. Those repeated studies throw the community involved and everyone else into a very heavy lather sometimes unnecessarily. This is a problem that I am particularly concerned about, and I am curious whether within your own Department, your own office, you are properly sensitive to the implications of these exercises?

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir, I think we are. It is a serious problem and one to which we are very sensitive. You would like obviously to study only probable candidates, and you would like the study to be done as expeditiously, fairly and objectively as possible. Then you would like to put that to rest and to go to other things. There are two problems that concern me in what you mention.

One is the issue of having studied something in 1974 and then in 1976 and then in 1978, all separate studies. I think we are very sensitive to that because of all of the problems you raise.

The other problem, which is related to study, is that it goes on for a very long period, over 1 year, 1½ years. Some of this is due to problems with getting data, some of it is due to requests on the part of the community for delay, some of it is due to compliance with statutory requirements, and other factors. But again we are very sensitive to the problem of trying to get the studies over with as quickly as we can.

ARMY MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING TRAINING ACTIVITY

Senator CULVER. Secretary Gibbs, as you know, I am very skeptical about one particular problem area, and that is the Army proposal to transfer the Army Management Engineering Training Facility from the Rock Island Arsenal to be part of the Army Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee, Va.

This proposal has been studied and rejected three times—in 1964 when I first went to Congress, in the 1965–68 period, and in 1971–72. It has been rejected each time. Now, the last review, which was an ad hoc study group report by OSD and the Army, on February 3, 1972, concluded as follows:

Any advantage gained by relocating AMETA from Rock Island Arsenal would be offset by disadvantages associated with faculty disruption and reduced effectiveness brought about by the loss of current contact with the industrial environment.

One of the disadvantages cited in your 1977 preliminary feasibility study, the basis for the detailed study that is now underway, is, and I quote, "Disestablishment of an institution which has an excellent reputation and a lot of supporters."

In view of this history, why did you decide to study this proposal again?

Mr. GIBBS. Senator Culver, I think where you quote that there are disadvantages to the consolidation, that is probably a quote from the feasibility study in which we list all of the relative advantages and disadvantages. That study was undertaken because, as you have indicated, the Army has considered that on several occasions in the past and it has been a matter of some controversy within the DARCOM community, which is responsible for both the AMETA activity and the activity at Fort Lee. The decision to undertake a detailed study was based on the feasibility study which demonstrated that there may be, in fact, some substantial cost savings by consolidating at Fort Lee. We felt it was worth a detailed study and to get it out of the arena of the continuing debate at the feasibility study stage. For that reason we have gone forward with it.

Senator CULVER. When you talk about the general advantages and disadvantages, I would point out that compared to these acknowledged serious disadvantages, transferring this facility was estimated to eliminate only 26 positions, at an estimated annual savings of a little over half a million dollars, as part of the total DOD realinement involving reductions of 23,000 personnel and $340 million in annual costs.

Since your decision to study the AMETA transfer again, two further developments have cast more doubt on the cost effectiveness of this proposal. One is that the staff reductions at AMETA have reduced the number of positions that can be eliminated by the move from 26 down to an estimated 5 to 10, meaning much smaller personnel savings. Then, last month, on the basis of the Readiness Command's in process review of the current AMETA study, General Moore, DARCOM's Chief of Staff, reported to the Department of the Army that, and I quote, "Considering the changed circumstances, the absence of any economic gains and the notable disadvantages of this possible merger, DARCOM feels the consolidation of AMETA is not genuinely worthy of further pursuit and strongly recommends that the current realinement study be discontinued."

Secretary Gibbs, in view of these latest developments, on top of the past history, why did the Department of the Army refuse DARCOM's recommendations and order a continuation of the study?

Mr. GIBBS. We ordered a continuation and conclusion of the study because the communication you mentioned outlining the disadvantages and the apparent loss of savings is an argument to be made on the basis of a completed study, and a recommendation such as was being made by DARCOM is the kind of recommendation that ought to accompany the completed study.

Senator CULVER. You are mindful of DARCOM's conclusion that any small personnel savings would be offset by moving costs, transportation costs, and disruption to the local community, which I want to assure you would be very considerable indeed.

Mr. GIBBS. Yes.

Senator CULVER. The people affected are standing on their heads for a year every time you get involved in one of these things. When it is on the merits, a realinement study is certainly legitimate and justified. But when you get into one of these proposals and keep protracting the agony, hanging by their thumbs, and you have all of this past information, one can't help get conspiratorial about what is happening to them.

Secretary Gibbs, my experience on this committee indicates that there is an increasing need for advanced and innovative managers in the military services, and increasing numbers of top level managers. All of the AMETA studies agree that the merger proposal could lead to a loss of very valuable and unique management expertise.

Is my assumption correct that that is an important factor in making final decisions here?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes.

Senator CULVER. High level managerial requirements are increasing?

Mr. GIBBS. That is one of the factors that you have to weigh very carefully in coming to a final decision, the loss of key personnel who might not transfer in such a situation.

Senator CULVER. Would your decision take into account surveys of how many faculty members would leave the agency rather than transfer to Fort Lee? Do you factor that in?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, that is part of the detailed study.

Senator CULVER. Will you evaluate the potential costs that could result from a loss in Government expertise in management engineering, and from increased contracting out for some of the consulting work being done at AMETA?

Mr. GIBBS. The answer is yes.

Senator CULVER. If you didn't have an in-house consulting capability and have to go the contracting-out route, do you assess the cost implications of that change?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

THIRTY-DAY PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD

Senator CULVER. The DOD policy described in Dr. White's statement is that no administrative action may be taken for 30 days, is that correct?

Mr. GIBBS. Following a final decision.

Senator CULVER. And an environmental impact statement?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

Senator CULVER. Now, if no impact statement is required, your policy is to provide for a 30-day public comment period prior to implementation of action, is that right?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir. Can I go through that for you?

Senator CULVER. Yes; if you would, please.

Mr. GIBBS. I would anticipate because the study is a small one compared to a number of others that Army is doing, that it can be completed fairly soon, that is, I believe that we can expect that study to be forwarded in August to the Department of the Army Headquarters. After we have reviewed it and the Secretary has made his recommendation, we will announce a preferred alternative.

A preferred alternative might be the consolidation or it might be status quo. Following that announcement, we will observe a 30-day

public comment period for people to make comments on that preferred alternative before a final decision is announced.

Senator CULVER. Does this mean there will really be two separate periods for public review then, the first being a 30-day comment period before the Secretary's final decision, is that correct?

Mr. GIBBS. That is right.

Senator CULVER. And the 60-day period for Congress to consider that decision and its justification?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir, during which we cannot begin any implementation, if 10 U.S.C. 2687 applies.

Senator CULVER. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to explore this AMETA proposal with you. I have a continuing and real interest in it.

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

Senator CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONTINUOUS REVIEW PROCESS

Senator HART. Let me pursue a lot of questions related to the issue of continuous review. I note, Dr. White, in your statement, I think on page 4, you talked about a continuous review process, to identify candidate realinement action. Can you tell us how this is done and I would like again any of the individual secretaries to make their own comments on this. Is this review classified? Does this mean that once an announcement of possible realinement or realinement studies has been made that efforts are then started all over again to identify another list, or how does that process work?

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, the reason I put that in there was to highlight a problem that we have, that you have just identified. While we have a formal list now for study, as you know, the Department is huge, the world changes all the time, there are variables. Therefore, within the services there are always reviews going on in terms of the movement of people, changes in technology, weapon systems, and those affect facilities requirements. So there is always going on within each Department a general staff review across the board of various actions. When we do not call for a formal review of the major sort that is represented by the April 26 announcement, the services are reviewing the utilization and requirement for all their various facilities in an effort to find economies.

Senator HART. But that is a sort of preannouncement process?

Mr. WHITE. That is correct, it is a standard management process. It is not formalized in the sense of the review that I have discussed.

Senator HART. I understand. Is it directed toward a time? Let me get to the timing. Is it directed toward a time when another list, long or short, of so-called candidates is going to be announced? Is there a cycle to this?

Mr. WHITE. No sir, not necessarily. In the current situation, for instance, we have not identified any target time for the compilation of a new candidate list or have we asked the services to anticipate such a request. So in the current situation, for instance, in addition to the studies that have been identified, it would just be standard

management action that they would be taking, not leaning toward the——

Senator HART. And so it would be incorrect for us to assume that you are on a periodic cycle that will repeat itself roughly at the same time next April, or anything like that?

Mr. WHITE. Yes; that is correct. We need not have another package next April. We do not now anticipate one although I do not want to foreclose that possibility. We may make such decisions, but we do not plan to do so at the this time.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AT CANDIDATE BASES

Senator HART. Of particular concern to this committee and the military construction phase has been the question of a facility being studied at one level or another that has been on the candidate list. What is the Department's policy or the individual services' policy toward construction at that facility, because many of these facilities, of course, have priority lists of construction, backed up for some period of time, or something comes on that needs to be built. I want to get to how you handle that.

We requested in the 2 years that I have been on this committee that the Department identify for us proposed construction projects that are at the facilities that are under study or even that are announced for possible relinement or closure. Even in spite of that warning, we got, I think, $40 million in construction project requests in this year's construction bill that bases that were either primarily or so-called alternate candidates, according to the April announcement. I wonder how that happens?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, we do attempt very carefully to watch the military construction program and to identify construction underway or planned at bases under study which it is economically feasible to terminate or defer. It is the responsibility of the individual military departments to review bases and the study list and the alternates in conjunction with their military construction programs and to take actions in those cases, where, in their judgment, the construction project should not go forward until there is a decision with respect to the study. That may be at the primary base or at an alternate base. In some cases there is construction that will continue even though a base is under study. In our own most recent——

Senator HART. What kind of cases would those be?

Mr. WHITE. For instance. pollution abatement situations, which have relatively short payoffs, which make sense environmentally, even though the base may be under study because of the time it would take to close a base even if there were a decision made to do so.

We could provide you, sir, with a complete list. Our current review indicates that there are some 26 projects currently on hold within the Department for this reason, that is, for the reason of study, with the dollar value of $68.1 million, and we would be pleased to provide for the record——

Senator HART. If you would.

[The information follows:]

BREAKDOWN OF MILCON ON HOLD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON HOLD

Fiscal year	Station	Project No.	Project	Program amount (thousands)
1976	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md	198	EM barracks	$2,935
1976	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md	243.2	Barracks modernization	2,500
1978	Fort Benning, Ga	331	Dental clinic	3,279
1973	Fort Dix, N.J	187	Cold storage warehouse	[1] 1,215
1973	Fort Dix, N.J	873.1	Barracks, modernization	3,000
1978	Fort Sam Houston, Tex	92	Brooke Army Medical Center, alterations	9,000
1978	Fort Benning, Ga	317	Barracks, trainee (1,150 man)	[2] 13,934

[1] Although OMB has not apportioned the funds to date, the Army is seeking release of the funds because the project supports activities unrelated to the training base or division stationing. It is necessary that this critical project which is related to health and welfare of Army and Air Force troops be executed immediately.

[2] Also pending results of the 1-station unit training and 2-station training test directed by the Congress and the 2d Infantry Division stationing decision.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON HOLD

[In thousands of dollars]

Project	Fiscal year	Cost
Naval Recruit Training Center, San Diego, Calif.:		
P-186 Academic instruction building modernization [1]	1979	850
Chesapeake Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.:		
P-500 Administrative Office (WNY)	1979	680
MCRD Parris Island, S.C.:		
P-219 Dining facility alteration	1978	500
P-220 Recruit barracks	1978	2,300
P-221 Applied instruction building	1978	700
P-144 Bachelor enlisted quarters	1979	4,000
NAVHOSP Quantico, Va.:		
P-052 Medical/Dental Clinic	1979	1,800
NAS Whiting Field, Fla.:		
P-154 Outlying Fields land acquisition	1974	1,400
P-174 Instrument Training Facility	1976	500
P-101 EM Dining Facility	1977	1,208

[1] Status of project: Design complete.

Department of the Air Force military construction projects on hold

	Thousands
Chanute AFB, Ill., fiscal year 1978:	
Fire fighting training facility	$626
Sewage treatment/disposal	7,400
Lowry AFB, Colo., fiscal year 1978:	
Avionics systems training facility	3,380
Energy monitoring control system	1,808
Kingsley Field, Oreg., fiscal year 1978: Add to/Alter runway special lighting facility	115
Rickenbacker AFB, Ohio, fiscal year 1977: Sewage treatment and disposal facility	503
Blytheville AFB, Ark.:	
Fiscal year 1976—Navaid-ILS	320
Fiscal year 1977—Industrial waste treatment and disposal facility	2,200
Fiscal year 1978—Weapons security improvements	1,971
Total	18,323

Senator HART. But to try to generalize about the policy involved, it is your policy to go forward with construction on bases that are candidates or so-called alternates, only where the construction will pay itself out one way or the other during the remaining life of this facility, even if it is going to be realined or closed?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.
Senator HART. In a short period of time?
Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

WHITE HOUSE ROLE IN BASE REALINEMENTS

Senator HART. Back to the timing, the whole question of issuing of the list, what role does the White House play in all of this? Let's say you get some recommendations through from the individual services, they come presumably to your office, they are scrubbed again there, a final list is put together, is it taken to the Secretary or not? What happens then, and where does the White House get into all of this?

Mr. WHITE. Again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to use the specifics of the April 26 list.

Senator HART. If you would.

Mr. WHITE. When we compiled the April 26 list, the services presented their recommendations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). My staff reviewed the input, and returned it to the services with our comments. When they were satisfied; their revised recommended list was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for review and approval. Once they approved the list and we were ready to make an announcement, we notified the White House which had known we were preparing a base realinement package. I know from my own experience that they were informed, since I talked on several occasions with Mr. Watson, Jack Watson, about this process. Jack looked at the list which the Secretary of Defense had approved. The White House was fully informed.

Senator HART. Did he or anyone else in the White House add or subtract from the list?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, they did not.

Senator HART. What would have been your reaction if they had sought to do so?

Mr. WHITE. We would have objected, except for one person in the White House, we would have objected, Mr. Chairman. We have been very concerned, and they have, too, including the President, that, in fact, this is a matter of efficiency within the Department of Defense, and these decisions have to be made on those grounds, not on political grounds.

So, as I say, we followed the process I have described until we were ready to announce the base realinement package. As a courtesy, we told the White House this is what we intend to do, and they said to go ahead.

Senator HART. Have they had any communications with you or anyone else in the Department that you know of subsequent to that announcement on any of those facilities?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, I have talked with people in the White House. I could ask my colleagues, perhaps they have, too, because they get inquiries from Members of Congress, citizen and local government groups, and so on. And we have had those kinds of conversations.

Senator HART. No; from the White House.

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, but the White House contacts us, having been contacted by Members of Congress and other interested parties. That occurs.

Senator HART. How often?

Mr. WHITE. In my own case, from memory, I would say in the current situation, three or four times.

Senator HART. What is the nature of that contact?

Mr. WHITE. Well, I can tell you one I had the other day. I had a call initially from—this is going backward—I had a call from Senator Stevenson, who wanted to know about the possibility of me and others meeting with him, members of the Illinois delegation and members of the communities affected in Illinois about base closures. I said, yes; we would do that.

He said he would like a White House representative. Either he or I suggested Mr. Kirschenbaum, who works for Mr. Watson.

I called Bruce Kirschenbaum, told him about this, and he agreed to attend.

Senator HART. Has anyone in the White House on their own initiative or on behalf of Members of Congress contacted you to have any facility taken off the list?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir.

Senator HART. Or strongly suggested that facilities be taken off?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir.

ALTERNATIVES TO CANDIDATE REALINEMENT PROPOSALS

Senator HART. As you know, one of the things that led to this hearing had to do with the whole question of alternatives. In your statement this morning, you mentioned, on page 5, the statement "our guidance is that these candidates would be announced with alternatives when appropriate." What does the phrase "when appropriate" mean, and how is that whole process handled?

Mr. WHITE. When the services present their lists, we request that they indicate at that time alternatives; that is, other bases which should reasonably be considered in the same context if there is to be an actual reduction in an activity or a consolidation of activities. So that, for instance, in cases where you have a primary base A, and you anticipate moving the activity to base B, it usually makes sense that you also ought to consider base B moving to base A.

So when we request the primary list, we also ask the services for alternatives of that sort.

Now, there are situations in which there can be just drawdowns, where there are no reasonable alternatives, but in most cases there are alternatives.

Senator HART. On the April list, there were 80-some facilities; is that correct?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, 85.

Senator HART. And how many of those on the April list were primary sites, and how many were alternates?

Mr. WHITE. We stated there would be some 85 different actions, so the number of actual bases on the list is longer than that, for just the reasons we are discussing here. I would have to provide for the record exactly——

Senator HART. There is a dangling antecedent there. The number of bases were longer than that. What do you mean?

Mr. WHITE. That is if you look at the question of realinements, you can have any one case, one action, but two bases.

Senator HART. That is what I am trying to get at. Of the 80-odd bases listed, how many were primary and how many were alternates?

Mr. WHITE. Well, the number of bases, how many bases were listed? I am sorry, I am mistaken, I thought there were more listed. Eight-five as an outside number. I would have to provide for the record exactly how many were the primaries and how many were the alternates.

[Additional information follows:]

Army listed 15 studies in the April 1978 base realignment announcement, all of which were primary candidates. One alternate, Oak Knoll Naval Medical Facility was included in the Letterman Army Medical Center announcement, but it was not listed separately. Navy listed 26 primary candidates and 6 alternates. Air Force listed 5 primary candidates and no alternates.

Senator HART. But the list was mixed?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. There were alternates on that list?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. All right, now, why were all the alternates not on the list?

Mr. WHITE. I think the services, as a result of their review put on the list all of the alternates they thought were appropriate at that time.

Senator HART. I guess I am going to have to go to the service secretaries to get an answer then, but it turns out later, as you know, there were other alternates not on the list. What I want to know is why, service by service.

Mr. WHITE. Let me refer to the service, but the reason obviously is that when they continued the study, process, alternatives turned up which weren't considered at the April 26 time period. Let me defer to the services, if I might.

Senator HART. Particularly to define what things turned up.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GIBBS. I believe the Army listed all of its alternates.

Senator HART. So you sent a list to Dr. White's office?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. Primary bases?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. And alternates to those primary bases?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. And in each case, all the primaries and all the alternates appeared on the April announcement?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir, I believe that is true.

Senator HART. Secretary Hidalgo?

Mr. HIDALGO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Captain Macdonald. I have no knowledge of any alternate we did not submit. Would you answer that?

Captain MACDONALD. I believe that we listed all of the alternates. We had about 4 of our 33 listings that were alternatives.

Senator HART. You sent those to Dr. White's office?

Captain MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. And in each case both the primaries and the alternates appeared on the April announcement?

Captain MACDONALD. That is correct.

Senator HART. Thank you, Captain.

Secretary Chayes?

ALTERNATIVE TO THE ANNOUNCED CHANUTE AFB REALINEMENT

Ms. CHAYES. Mr. Chairman, one of the ways one learns about the procedures is by making mistakes and, as you know, and we have stated publicly, the Air Force made a mistake by failing to put Lowry as an alternate in the beginning.

Senator HART. Lowry and other facilities?

Ms. CHAYES. Well, at the moment, as you know, we have determined that within the tech training area we named Chanute as a primary candidate. We did not name any alternatives.

Senator HART. Chanute? What about others, before we come back?

Ms. CHAYES. There were no appropriate alternatives to the other announcements. Most of those were because of technological or operational changes. In other words, let me just backtrack a little bit. In my view, there are two categories of base closures or realinements. The first is the result of either a sharp shift in equipment and/or military operations based on technology, because our view of the threat requires a different reaction, or because the mission that existed is no longer useful, no longer makes sense. In that category, I would put our radar sites, moving from the all Air Force Semiautomatic Ground Environment (Sage) system to the Joint Surveillance System for aircraft control in cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration.

There are no alternatives that are sensible in that kind of a change. To go back to what Dr. White said a little earlier, we will continue to produce base realinements on that basis because technology and our world view do continue to change.

The other type of base realinement or closure is where there is a general drawdown. Now, I think you are aware that major Air Force installations have been reduced since 1964 from 216 to 134. The manpower reduction has been from 1.2 million military to 824,000, and aircraft from 15,000 to 9,000 in a period of essentially 14 years.

Now, obviously, the base structure must react to that kind of drawdown. That is the situation that we have had in the technical training area and previously in the Strategic Air Command. In this situation, there are alternatives, and one then looks for the best means to consolidate or reduce.

Senator HART. But on the April list, none of the other facilities except for Chanute had alternates?

Ms. CHAYES. That is right.

I would say that that was a mistake, it probably would have been best. Originally we did name a base A and a base B as alternatives on our list. However, it was felt that we had to name actual bases. Therefore, because the study was not definitive enough and we didn't want to name five, due to the kind of internal turbulence and community disruption that that action would cause, we named the one most obvious.

Senator HART. So your original proposal to the Department was to reduce the communal and political disruption by not identifying by name the facilities but in fact indicating that there were alternates being studied, that was vetoed above the Department, above the Air Force?

Ms. CHAYES. Right. They said "no," you have to name names. Then we decided that if we are going to name names, we will name

the one most logical at that stage of the study. We would name the one that seemed to be the primary and not name the alternatives until we got through the second phase of the study in which we subject the cost figures to our economic model.

Senator HART. Well, was the resistance at the departmental level to naming alternatives?

Ms. CHAYES. No sir, the resistance was to——

Senator HART. Naming names?

Ms. CHAYES. Right. That was all that they said to us. The rest of it was an internal Air Force decision, which turned out not to be probably the wisest choice.

Senator HART. Well, I am not trying to fix blame here, as you know. All of us separately have been over the grounds here and I am not trying to pin down anyone.

I want to ask Dr. White one more question and yield to Senator Culver.

The confusion, where this Senator is concerned, of course, arose from the discussions we had off the record and not in public hearings, on where you reviewed for me the departmental intentions in this regard, and I thought did very well, and I very much appreciated that. What I think led to the concern where I was involved was the failure to indicate that any alternates, where this matter was concerned, were being studied, and I wonder if you would want to comment in hindsight about that. You are aware that alternates were being studied as far as Chanute was concerned?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir.

Senator HART. What about the A, B business?

Mr. WHITE. Well, the proposal from the Air Force, as Ms. Chayes indicated, was a general proposition, how about doing it this way? To this we said "no, that is not a good idea."

If you are going to have studies, consider alternatives, identify appropriate alternatives if there are any. If there are not, you obviously don't study alternatives. When the list was consolidated, there were items on the total list, not Air Force, some of which had alternatives and some which did not. There are still Air Force proposals which do not have alternatives. So at the time of our conversations, that was not the case, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HART. Now I am more confused than ever. According to Secretary Chayes, the proposal from the Air Force was that alternatives be listed but not by name, to prevent the kind of problems that we know occurred here.

The Department said, the Department vetoed that, not on the ground that you don't announce alternatives but you have got to name names. The Air Force then, according to Secretary Chayes, made a decision not to disturb everyone else at the one or three additional tech training facilities, and went with one name, because of the Department's insistence that names be named, not that alternatives not be left off. What happened?

Mr. WHITE. The Department's insistence was that if you have appropriate alternatives, name them; and when their list came down, they did not have alternatives named. They did not have appropriate alternatives to name.

Senator HART. I see.

Mr. WHITE. I guess I was remiss in not going back to the Air Force

saying, "Give me the justification for why you don't have alternatives for Chanute, for Goodfellow, for Rickenbacker, and so on." I did not do that.

Senator HART. Senator Culver?

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT FUNDING

Senator CULVER. Secretary White, in your judgment, is the current level of funding for this economic adjustment activity adequate? How much do you have budgeted this year and next year in terms of trying to implement those base closures, if they go through?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, we would have to submit the budget for the record, Mr. Culver, but I did review it not too long ago. If I may, let me speak to your question. We think it is adequate. We have done a great deal of work in preparation of the President's Executive order, within the Department of Defense, and with the Office of Management and Budget, the White House staff, and the other key departments.

In addition, we have had under review and are changing the organizational structure of the Office of Economic Adjustment. Specifically, we have reevaluated the personnel level and budget to assure that they have enough resources, people, and money for reuse studies and so on.

In addition to that, we have a major effort, which has been strongly endorsed by the President, to insure that money that is appropriated for the domestic agencies will be earmarked for these purposes. So I think in all of those areas we have made major changes, all in the right direction.

Senator CULVER. Do you need any more money for community studies, especially when these closure studies are going on?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, that is the budget I mentioned earlier that I had just reviewed, but I am sorry I don't have the exact number. There are several million dollars for that, and I think that is adequate. We look at this in terms of needs of each community.

Senator CULVER. It seems to me that this adjustment activity is very important if we are going to have some constructive alternatives and not just a phalanx of political opposition and resistance.

Mr. WHITE. I agree, Senator, and I do think that a major change, as I have tried to indicate in the statement, is that allowing and encouraging the communities to be involved in this process during the study without prejudice with respect to the outcome of the study rather than waiting. I think that is very important.

[Additional information follows:]

Department of Defense funds for economic adjustment studies during fiscal year 1978 and fiscal year 1979 are:

	Fiscal year—	
	1978	1979
Community economic adjustment programs [1]	$645,000	$700,000
Base reutilization [2]	3,000,000	3,500,000
Total	3,645,000	4,200,000

[1] These funds are utilized to identify specific local adjustment needs and to develop a consensus strategy and action plan that is responsive, feasible of implementation, and acceptable to concerned local, State, and Federal officials.

[2] These funds are utilized for studies to identify new civilian uses for military bases after a decision has been made that property is no longer needed for defense purposes.

In addition to the foregoing, funds are provided for economic adjustment projects through many Federal domestic agency programs; for example, the Department of Transportation normally funds studies and plans required to convert the aviation facilities at a former base for public aviation uses. EDA, in the Department of Commerce, funds studies related to business and industry development. Other agencies fund other requirements within their normal sphere of responsibility. In the aggregate, Federal domestic agencies funded community adjustment needs for plans and project implementation at approximately $90 million annually over the last five years. OMB is currently cooperating with DOD to improve procedures for the budgeting of requirements for domestic agency funds with the objective of providing financial assistance to impacted communities at the time it is needed.

BASE REALINEMENT SAVINGS

Senator CULVER. When you talk about projected savings from these realinements, I would be interested in the extent to which you have followed up on these estimates. For example, do you ever specifically follow up and determine how good you were at your crystal ball, to see whether these projected savings have in fact been realized?

Mr. WHITE. We have.

Senator CULVER. I would be interested if you have a scoreboard, how many have saved more money than anticipated, how many have saved less money than expected, and so on?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator CULVER. Not in terms of just looking over your shoulder critically.

Mr. WHITE. I understand.

Senator CULVER. As an internal management practice, do you try to get a firmer, more confident hold on how well you are doing in making these projections?

Mr. WHITE. Several months ago I asked my staff to do that, Senator Culver, and we discovered, or I discovered, that in fact we did not have an adequate device for looking retrospectively at how well we had done. Therefore, we have initiated a project that will provide us with that kind of tracking capability, audit capability, in order to determine what really happened in these actions.

The Air Force has been good enough to take the lead on this project, and we are currently experimenting with it in four recently closed bases. So we have that underway. I think it is fair to say we do not have an adequate device, but I think we will.

Senator HART. Secretary Chayes.

Ms. CHAYES. I would like to comment for a moment on your line of questioning, Senator Culver.

First of all, community planning funds, while the Executive order makes a great stride forward, there is a practical problem that we have to face. Communities under study are not willing—in my experience—to even accept planning money until a decision has been reached, because it is an admission of defeat. I don't know how to get around this. In the past, we have offered planning money to communities when it looked as if a decison was close. When there is an alternative, as a practical matter, there is not going to be acceptance of that money even if it is available.

The second thing is that in the study we are working on now, I just want to amplify what Dr. White said, we are working on two kinds of economic models. One we are very satisfied with, but the other still needs work. The first is the base cost model to determine the savings

we can safely project, so at least the analysis of mission and base operating support costs is as good as it can be.

The other one is the community impact model, and that still needs a lot of work. Based upon these models and audits of earlier closures, we are trying to find out what happens in down-to-earth economic terms; we have some in-depth studies now ongoing. We have three nearly completed in addition to the economic study that Dr. White spoke of. The objective is to find out what actually happens in a community—what is its status 10 years later. We are looking at some bases that have been closed a long time to see just what kind of resources—political, economic, and just plain get up and go—the communities developed and how and why they developed them. Our preliminary findings are that despite dire prediction there really have been some amazing recoveries. There are vital lessons to be learned there.

I would like to submit for the record just a very simple one on procedures. It is the story of Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo., prepared mostly by the lawyers. We will sibmit that as a reasonable sample of what we have learned about our own procedures in trying to refine our efforts.

Senator HART. We would like to have that.

[The information follows:]

LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT CLOSURE/REALINEMENT ACTIONS

I. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE RICHARDS-GEBAUR AFB LITIGATION

A. Written Documentation and retention of communications throughout the environmental impact analysis process is crucial to:

1. The capability to conduct interdisciplinary review of comment content and to prove that it occurred.

2. The capability of determining the submission of conflicting comments from the same source and efforts to resolve conflict.

3. The capability of proving the invitation to comment and when it occurs, to prove the absence of comment.

B. Quick Retrieval of Communications: Capability for quick retrieval of communications (evidence) is crucial to timely legal brief preparation.

1. Evidence gathering for rebuttals to plaintiffs' motions for temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions must be accomplished in extremely limited time. The purpose is to make your strong showing here, not only at a trial.

2. The Air Force Communications Listing for Environmental Impact Analysis Process (CLEIAP) system indexed and cross-referenced every letter, meeting and interview related to the Richards-Gebaur EIAP over a 24-month period. The evidence was not only there, it could quickly be found.

(*a*) A sample page of the CLEIAP is attached (attachment 1).

(*b*) A handbook for using the CLEIAP manually or with computer assistance has been developed and will be issued not later than the time of revising AFR 19–2.

C. Consultant Analytical Methodologies. In-house and contract consultants who prepare inputs and/or Background Studies for EISs must include descriptions of their analytical methodologies using laymen language.

1. Attacks on EIS technical findings centered on data sources and analytical methodologies which proved fruitless because:

(*a*) data sources were all substantiated and cross-referenced through the Air Force Environmental Reference Number (AFERN) system. The AFERN system itself was unsuccessfully attacked, as it was the structure for the EIS and all technical background studies (see attachment 2).

(*b*) methodologies were questioned by the Air Force at the outset of the EIAP and emphasis placed on using established techniques, preferably those from published professional sources.

(*c*) known conflicting methodologies and their results, from public and private agencies, were included, without exception, in the text of the final EIS and compared with Air Force consultant results.

(*d*) the attacks on methodologies were exposed by Air Force counsel (attachment 3) as being disagreements over which scientific methodology of predicting future impacts was more valid than another . . . an argument the court refused to settle, simply deciding that the Air Force had done the above three items (a, b, and c) for the decision maker which was adequate compliance with NEPA.

2. When practical, obtain the counterpart federal, state and/or local agency's (e.g. HUD for housing) concurrence with the technical analysis methodology prior to use.

(*a*) Such concurrence reduces credibility of eleventh hour disagreement from the agencies or anyone else.

(*b*) When agreement cannot be reached, formally request opposing study, include it as background study, and compare results in EIS.

D. Tracking and Managing the EIAP. Track and manage the EIAP at the deliberate speed step-by-step process it is. Such management and supporting documentation can only "prove" the process that actually took place. The "product" (final EIS) can only be as good as the good faith process which produced it. (See attachment 4, extracted from an Air Force affidavit produced to prove that a NEPA process occurred AS PLANNED FROM THE OUTSET and which the district judge characterized as "convincing.")

E. Clear Definition of Proposal "Purpose": Redirection of resources should not be characterized as "savings" since this places an internal resource management decision in the "balance sheet" domain of total federal/state/local costs and savings comparison (see attachment 5).

II. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GAO REPORTS (RICHARDS-GEBAUR & KINCHELOE)

A. Comparisons of GAO and Air Force Estimates: This comparison table (attachment 6) indicates general disagreement, since 1975, on the elements to include in cost benefit studies. The notes referenced from the table explain some of the major differences.

B. Annual Recurring Savings or Cost Avoidance:

1. Insure that estimates of reductions in family housing O & M costs do not duplicate general O & M reduction estimates.

2. Insure that all costs for operating satellite sites which remain in operation after closure are included, such as any increased dining and commissary operations, leased housing, etc.

3. Insure that full time commissary and Corps of Engineers' positions as well as part time positions for seasonal work are included in reductions. At Kincheloe, parttime help equaled 34 full time positions.

4. Insure that estimates of square footage for buildings to remain in use following realignments are fully documented and verified before they are used to determine reductions in civil engineering O & M costs.

5. At Richards-Gebaur AFB, GAO did not use BOS by contract costs as proposed by the Air Force. Instead they used in-house personnel for their study. While a freeze is on general BOS by contract, it should be remembered that this is a source of different estimates.

C. One Time Costs:

1. GAO includes all costs of work classified as repair for facilities to be used by relocated units. Note: GAO estimates for "Equipment and Facility Renovation," at Scott AFB were about three times higher than the Air Force estimates. While half of the difference was in omissions such as repair work, and new requirements identified after the Air Force estimates were prepared, the basis for the remaining differences were not explained in the GAO report.

2. Insure that O&M caretaker costs are included for the 18-month period, following closure, that the base is still maintained by the Air Force.

3. GAO declined to estimate, either at Richards-Gebaur AFB or Kincheloe AFB, the cost to the Homeowners Assistance Program, HUD foreclosure costs, or VA foreclosure costs, but looked into and interviewed officials in the agencies concerned. When local officials or citizens made conflicting estimates GAO included them in their report.

4. GAO declined to estimate the scope of Federal aid for alternative development of the area but did estimate school impact aid in the conventional way. An error was found in Air Force estimates related to school district eligibility at Richards-Gebaur AFB but was not explained in the report.

5. GAO estimated unemployment compensation using $132/week for the full 65 week eligibility.

6. GAO also calculated food stamp costs for civilian employees of $1,200 per employee, which they characterized as an annual cost but noted that eligibles would vary from 6 months to 3 years. Their estimate was made by multiplying $1,200 times the number of eligible employees (155), but they did not reveal how they determined eligibility.

D. One Time Cost Avoidance:

1. Deferment or cancellation of MCP and other appropriated construction line items no longer needed as a result of realinement/closure is an acceptable one time cost avoidance but the cancellation should occur after announcement.

2. Insure that all construction/improvement projects at gaining installations are included.

3. Use contract termination clauses as basis for determining contract termination savings costs for utility, construction and supply contracts.

E. New Area:

GAO included a chapter in the Kincheloe AFB Report entitled "Economic Impact of the Proposed Closure" which included a comparison of Air Force estimates of change in unemployment rate, housing occupancy rate and business loss drawn from the draft environmental statement with estimates contained in a "special study" by the local community. GAO claimed to have "verified" only selected input data, such as the Air Forces estimated employment figures in which they found no "discrepancies." However, it is obvious that in future actions, we can expect GAO to "verify" socio-economic portions of the environmental statements as well as cost benefit studies.

III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EIAP FOR RECENT BASE CLOSURE-REALINEMENTS

A. Description of the Proposed Action and Alternatives (DOPAA) Preparation: The DOPAA must be prepared and staffed by AF/PRPO prior to AF/PREV initiating an EIAP for production of a Negative Determination or Candidate EIS. Informal assessments or environmental reconaissance of working options can be produced by AF/PREV in early proposal development stages prior to fully definitive action and alternate proposals but since such DOPAA's are necessarily incomplete so too will the environmental analysis be incomplete and inconclusive as to whether an ND can be made or an EIS is required.

1. DOPAA's should include:

(*a*) manpower authorization reductions and *actual* personnel reductions expected, using the announcement date as baseline, not the expected implementation date.

(*b*) numbers and types of all aircraft movements including flying mission description at gaining locations.

(*c*) description of all functions to be moved and gaining location identified of all functions.

(*d*) description of any new facility construction.

(*e*) all actions which could contribute to cumulative environmental effects. (Note: New CEQ Regulation describes "cumulative impact as the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or persons undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time."

(i) recognize in environmental analysis other ongoing base personnel reductions and associated impacts.

(ii) use fiscal year quarter in which public announcement was made as baseline for describing existing environment and projecting impacts.

2. Adopt consistent procedure for number rounding and characterize the quantification as "approximate" or "about."

B. "Table Top" Developed Draft EISs: When an EIAP has identified the requirement for an EIS, then the statement development phase should go public as soon as practical. Table Top draft EISs should be abandoned as a technique, since they do not take advantage of public "scoping" to smoke out the issues early.

C. "Scoping Meetings" currently mandated in the new CEQ Regulations were successfully used at Richards-Gebaur AFB and the ATC closure actions, however, they would have saved some wasted effort if they could have been:

1. held prior to initiation of substantial consultant field work (i.e., before preparation of the Draft EIS).

2. initially and preferably conducted by uniformed Air Force personnel responsible for EIS preparation.

(*a*) private citizens, educators, local government staff, etc. do not believe they have "talked" to the Air Force until they "see the uniform."

(*b*) the Air Force can and should, however, have consultants present.

(*c*) working independently, contract consultants will "scope out" (delete) what to them is obviously insignificant, since to "chase down a blind alley" costs money.

(*d*) when local officials find that the "issue" given to civilian consultants was not pursued, they assume, sometimes correctly, that the Air Force "never even knew about it."

(*e*) the delicate handling of scoping meeting should only be done by Air Force personnel.

D. Standardize Economic Analysis Data Input. Use a standardized Air Force input when computing economic impacts.

1. Use population data as of date of public announcement. Include past trends.

2. Baseline for unemployment calculations should be most recent 12 month average.

3. Source of all statistics, multipliers etc. must be given (may reference in bibliography).

4. Plain language explanation of multipliers should be included.

5. Clearly define the economic region of influence used whether SMSA, LMA or other.

NAME AND ADDRESS — TELE. NUMBER — TEAM CODE

ZIP CODE	TEAM CODE	LAST NAME	DATE INITIATED	COMM CODE	ACTION DATE	AFERNS
					618 233-1962	CLBEL

DR JOHN ADAMS
PRESIDENT
CLERGY ASSOCIATION OF BELLEVILLE AREA
C/O UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
26 NORTH 14TH STREET
BELLEVILLE IL 62222

62225	AFSCC	BERGERO	25 SEP 75	(BR)		45 32
43201	MABATT	LAWSON	08 OCT 75	(IV)		
20330	AFPREV	SIMS	25 JUN 76	(DS)		

					-	GOAGRI

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
ATTN: COORDINATOR
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACTIVITIES
US DEPT OF AGRICULTURE
WASHINGTON DC 20250

20330	AFILE	WELCH	26 JUL 76	(RL)		

					-	NMAFT

THE AIR FORCE TIMES
475TH SCHOOL STREET SW
WASHINGTON DC 20024

64030	AFRGOI	CLARK	02 JUL 76	(NR)		
64030	AFRGOI	CLARK	06 AUG 76	(NR)		

					404 526-7224	GOFAAA

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95652	AFERL	SMITH	25 OCT 75	(IV)		
20330	AFPREV	SIMS	25 JUN 76	(DS)		

					919 483-8131	GOCUJP

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FAYETTEVILLE NC 28305

20036	MAHSG	DIAMOND	02 OCT 75	(IV)		
20330	AFPREV	SIMS	25 JUN 76	(DS)		

Figure VIII - Alphabetical Listing

NAME AND ADDRESS — TELE. NUMBER — TEAM COD

ZIP CODE	TEAM CODE	LAST NAME	DATE INITIATED	COMM CODE	ACTION DATE	AFERNS
					-	NMAFT

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62225	AFSCC	BERGERO	25 SEP 75	(BR)		45
43201	MABATT	LAWSON	08 OCT 75	(IV)		
20330	AFPREV	SIMS	25 JUN 76	(DS)		

Figure IX - ZIP Code Listing



Figure XII - CLEIAP-Indexed Administrative File

Extract from an Air Force Affidavit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division

CASE NO. 77–0468–CV–W–2

JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
v.
GENERAL DAVID C. JONES, USAF, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

(a) The plaintiffs charge that "assertions, estimates, and conclusions heavily relied on in the FES are for the most part totally without any reference to the Background Study" and that thus it is extremely difficult to review the FES. In reality, the FES is specifically constructed to facilitate tracking from the FES to the Background Studies. On page xxxiv of the FES is the Standard Air Force Environmental Reference Number (AFERN) System. The system consists of numbered sections which cover the same material in both the FES and the Background Studies that address environmental impacts. All environmental consultants analyzing more than one environmental attribute were instructed to organize their background studies in a chapter format corresponding to the environmental statement, with each chapter organized to conform with the AFERN system. Further, on page 167 of the FES the Background Studies are listed by subject matter to further facilitate their use. Thus, if an individual wished to study the detailed data on water at Scott, the AFERN system would tell him that water is section 3.2 under the grouping on "Natural Environment", and page 167 would tell him that the "Natural Environment" for Scott is in Background Study 3. In section 3.2 in that Background Study, he would find, in greater detail, the information discussed in the water (AFERN 3.2) section of the FES.

THE AFERN CODE

The Air Force Environmental Reference Number (AFERN) system permits the categorization of various environmental attributes by qualified personnel into a series of related yet distinct elements; it is a classification system designed for use in the preparation of TAB A–1 Environmental Narratives, environmental impact statements and negative determinations, and other environmental planning applications.

Prior to the preparation of the AFCS Relocation final environmental impact statement, qualified researchers analyzed public hearing transcripts and written comments for significant new information or for the possible neglect of important issues in the draft environmental impact statement, upgrading the quality of the EIS in the process. First, they sifted through the contributed materials, assigning AFERN Codes to questions or comments. (For example, a question pertaining to earth subsidence in an area heavily mined for coal in years past was assigned a 3.1.2.1 AFERN.) At the completion of this task, all identical AFERN Codes were assembled in separate folders. Next, discipline leaders examined the folders and reevaluated their particular portions of the draft environmental impact statement to determine whether or not the EIS dealt adequately with the issues raised by the commenters. If not, the section in question was researched further and rewritten. At the same time, these AFERN Codes were entered by the administrative staff on the Form B of the commenting individual or agency and processed it into the CLEIAP (Figure VII).

The entry of the AFERN Codes equips the CLEIAP to perform several services for the user. When used to characterize the contents of *all* Transactions from the onset of the EIAP, the AFERNs can provide the user with a predictive tool for uncovering the key issues associated with a proposed action as they are perceived by the public. In the long, convoluted course of an EIAP such insight can help to quickly focus research on important matters of concern to the participants.

By periodically requesting an AFERN Code count, a computer product arraying all recorded AFERNs can be made available for internal review and trend analysis. In short order, profiles of persistently expressed issues will reveal themselves. By determining such trends quickly research resources can be managed judiciously.

The AFERN Codes are also useful when it becomes necessary to trace all Transactions that may have come to surround a single environmental attribute on a particular research or procedural matter.

If, in the course of preparing staff summary sheets, backgrounders, or briefs for litigation, it becomes necessary to trace the evolution of an issue, a computer

Transaction search keyed to a specific AFERN Code will dredge up all Transactions connected with that designator. (This is not to be confused with the more narrowly located specific issue search that can be implemented through the use of Action Dates as mentioned above.)

For example, date dealing with the broad category "Earth" has a two digit AFERN Code 3.1; the subordinate discipline "Physiography," however, is coded 3.1.1. This numbering system always progresses from a two digit major category to narrower fields of specialization, as shown here:

Earth	3.1
Physiography	3.1.1
Geology	3.1.2
Bedrock geology	3.1.2.1
Surficial geology	3.1.2.2
Soils	3.1.3
Soils characteristics	3.1.3.1
Bearing strength	3.1.3.2
Erosion susceptibility	3.1.3.3

The AFERNs must be entered on Form B (Figure VII) left justified, space filled (deleting the decimal points) and must be from two to six digits in length. If more than 10 AFERN Codes must be entered, signify this in record positions 53–58 with six Xs. Though this rarely happens it will prompt the user to look elsewhere (i.e., the administrative file) for a complete listing of the AFERNs touched on by a participant. (See Figure II for such an entry.)

(It should be remembered that the CLEIAP is the administrative file reduced through encoding and the computer program to an easy-to-manipulate facsimile. A carefully maintained CLEIAP must always be backed up, however, with a carefully maintained set of documents. There is no substitute. A computer entry cannot be substituted for a document in a court of law.)

In the preparation of the AFCS Relocation CLEIAP, the AFERN Codes were entered by environmental planners only at the time that the draft environmental impact statement was circulated for comment. During this comment period, the public has available to it two major communication channels through which it can reach a decision maker's ear: the public hearing (PH) and the submission of written comments (CO).

Extract From Responses and Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Prayer for a Preliminary Injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division

CASE NO. 77–0468–CV–W–2

JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

v.

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES, USAF, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

2. The Resolution of Technical Disputes and Opposing Scientific Opinion Is Beyond the Purview of Judicial Review Under NEPA.

Throughout the affidavits submitted in support of plaintiffs' prayer for a preliminary injunction, there appears the implication that this court should undertake a de novo review of the data contained in the FES and make findings of fact with respect to the scientific methodology, interpretations, and conclusions used therein and derived therefrom. For example, the affidavit of Mr. Richard F. Davis asserts at para. 8: "Upon publication of the final EIS, there are certain conclusions reached by the Air Force which are contrary to the conclusions reached by MARC when reviewing the same information and data." Similarly, the affidavit of Mr. Donald H. Ong, while conceding that the Air Force included his, and HUD's, estimates of effects upon the housing market within the FES (FES at 65–67), nevertheless, attacks the Air Force for its refusal to adopt either his or HUD's quantification of these effects. Dr. Darwin W. Daicoff takes still another tack, when he argues that the adoption of different premises lead him to different conclusions with respect to the subjects of population trends, secondary unemployment, revenue consequences, and areas of impact analysis. However, in what amounts to the most conclusory allegation of inadequacy imaginable, Dr.

Herman D. Lujan attacks the failure of the FES to address the environment from a holistic perspective. Finally, in their first two offers of proof, plaintiffs seek to invalidate the results of an Air Force study of driving times in the Scott area by undertaking to perform a study of their own.

Despite the varying subject matter of these submissions, all share one common thread: They seek to have this court "second guess" the Air Force's experts by discrediting various methodological approaches used or scientific opinions rendered in the preparation of the FES.

In MPIRG, supra at 1302, the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected such an assertion as not being within the realm of judical review under NEPA; and in *Environmental Defense Fund* v. *Froehlke, supra* at 240, Judge Oliver was even more adamant in his refusal to entertain such issues:

It is simply unrealistic for plaintiffs in this case to assume that this or any other Court is going to make findings of fact which would attempt to resolve the conflicts between data contained and relied upon in the final EIS which may conflict with data which plaintiffs believe is more reliable.

The final EIS makes adequately clear that a conflict in economic theory does in fact exist in regard to the impact of reservoir development on the growth of per capita income of residents of counties in which reservoirs are located. The Congress and other decision makers are therefore appropriately advised of that particular conflict and, as contemplated by NEPA, will have an adequate basis upon which to take into consideration the available data to determine whether that conflict need necessarily be finally resolved, and to give that particular factor whatever weight they may deem appropriate.

The point is the NEPA does not delegate to the judicial branch of the government the duty of resolving similar conflicts which may exist in regard to much of the data which must be included in a final EIS. By its enactment of NEPA, Congress required the agency to support the conclusions stated in a final EIS by setting forth the data upon which such conclusions were based; it did not provide that some court would resolve all conflicts which may be put in focus by other data which might be presented by other parties to a district court of the United States. Congress was most interested to know whether a legitimate conflict may in fact exist within the scientific community but, by its enactment of NEPA, it did not, in our judgment, contemplate or anticipate that courts were to make choices and determine the merits of conflicting views between the two or more schools of scientific thought and to thereafter disapprove any final EIS which may rely upon data which was inconsistent with the court's finding.

See also *Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.* v. *Seaborg*, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1791).

Thus, it is manifest that plaintiffs misconstrue this court's function of review. As matters within the judgment and discretion of the Air Force, questions relating to the relative merits of competing scientific opinion are not for this court to decide. Instead, the role of this court is simply to examine the extant record to determine if known opposing views were accorded mention. As the court in *Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.* v. *Seaborg, supra* at 787, framed the issue:

[The judicial] function is only to assure that the statement sets forth the opposing scientific views and does not take the arbitrary and impermissible approach of completely omitting from the statement, and hence from the focus that the statement was intended to provide for the deciding officials, any reference whatsoever to the existence of responsible scientific opinions concerning possible adverse environmental effect.

In the instant case, there can be no doubt but that the decisionmaker was aware of these opposing viewpoints. Thus, the final decision, executed by Secretary Reed, concurred in by Secretary Stetson, and approved by Deputy Duncan, reflects cognizance of these various disputes:

There has been a continuing and spirited dialogue between the Air Force and the public since the original announcement of the relocation of AFCS on November 22, 1974, through the litigation leading to the injunction on June 19, 1975, to the filing of an FES on January 12, 1977. This dialogue has provided the opportunity for presentation of data and differing points of view. I recognize this exchange has not been totally satisfactory for all concerned but I believe it has served to reassure the public that we have considered all factors in reaching our decision.

Based on data presented from various sources and information in the public record, I believe those speaking in opposition to the AFCS relocation have consistently underrated the inherent economic vitality of the Kansas City area.

Housing is another factor causing considerable controversy and concern to the public and the Air Force. In viewing the question from the perspective of the Kansas City area, considerable effort was devoted to identifying the impact of our proposal on the local housing market in terms of decreased value, construction activity, and rental income. Various agencies including Housing and Urban Development (HUD), community groups and the Air Force consultant (Battelle-Columbus Laboratories) have estimated the possible impact and the estimates vary significantly. . . . I am not satisfied that one estimate is substantially more reliable than any other.

The local community groups have accused the program administrator, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of grossly underestimating the total payments to be made under this program. (The Corps of Engineers estimates a cost of $7 million vs. a community estimate of $43 million.) I believe the Corps of Engineers' estimation is more realistic.

Necessarily, the aforementioned excerpts are selective; however, defendants submit that a reading of the decision in its totality reveals the permeation of such concerns throughout its text. Further, the FES is, itself, replete with references to opposing viewpoints. E.g., FES at 28–30, 78–83 (housing availability in the Scott AFB area); FES at 53 (the geographic area to be studied); FES at 54–55 (local merchants' and businessmen's estimates of impacts on economic activity); FES at 65–67 (Ong and HUD estimates of housing impacts); FES at 162–64 (Ong and Corps estimates of federal budget impacts of DOD Homeowners Assistance Program). In sum, the FES completely fulfilled its threefold purpose of providing information—to the decision-maker, to the public and to this court. *MPIRG, supra* at 1299–1300; *Cape Henry Bird Club* v. *Laird, supra* at 412.

3. Plaintiffs Have Offered No Evidence to Impeach the Good Faith Objectivity of the FES.

Over the course of the past two years, plaintiffs have carried their protests against the relocation of AFCS to the highest levels of this Nation's government. During this period, they have met personally with two Presidents, numerous Congressional leaders, and the Secretaries of the Departments of Defense and the Air Force. Yet, despite the opportunities afforded by these audiences, they have chosen not to emphasize environmental, as opposed to budgetary, arguments. No arguments presented to these leaders were sufficiently convincing to persuade them to initiate further study or revision of the FES. Furthermore, despite the fact that several of these meetings occurred after the filing of the FES but before a decision had been finalized, plaintiffs never asserted, as they do now (Offer of Proof No. 3), that the Secretariat was being duped into erroneous conclusions by the uniformed members of the Air Force. Instead, plaintiffs have awaited the institution of litigation to depict these high Cabinet officials as witless automations, mesmerized by some magical power of defendant General Jones and his subordinates. The obvious question is, "why," and the only logical answer is because plaintiffs have failed to present a convincing case through political channels and, therefore, can now hope only to obtain vindicative legal delay through the courts.

Thus, plaintiffs herein have, in fact, enjoyed opportunities even exceeding those envisioned by the courts in *Cape Henry Bird Club* v. *Laird, supra* at 412, and *Environmental Defense Fund* v. *Corps of Engineers, supra* at 297. They have carried their after-the-fact arguments through the political processes and have engaged in face-to-face discussions with members of the penultimate reaches of government. Surely, no plaintiff could hope for more.

In *Environmental Defense Fund* v. *Froehlke, supra* at 242–43, Judge Oliver had occasion to comment upon such eleventh-hour complaints by plaintiffs who had maintained continuous dialogue with the responsible agency throughout the preparation of the EIS. Therein, he noted that this dialogue had earlier caused the court to remark:

"[W]e know of no other environmental case in which the plaintiff has been granted a legal right to present his ideas and arguments in his own language at this state in the development." [348 F. Supp. at 350].

Id. at 242. However, because of plaintiffs' preoccupation with efforts to obtain blanket injunctive relief against the project, they had tended to devote only minimal attention to the administrative remedy, provided by NEPA, of fully stating their views on the draft EIS. This failure "necessarily resulted in the omission of plaintiffs' belated complaints about the final EIS from appearing in plaintiffs' own language in that document." Id at 243. Accordingly, while the court directed the Corps of Engineers to include plaintiffs' "belated" objections within

a supplemental appendix to the EIS, it refused to issue injunctive relief and, therefore, permitted the decision to stand.

Similarly, the instant case culminates a continuous dialogue between the Air Force and plaintiffs over the course of the past two years. During this time, the Air Force has repeatedly requested the plaintiffs to provide meaningful data pertinent comment, and candid opinion. In large measure, plaintiffs have been responsive to the Air Force's requests, so that the FES does reflect their concerns and ideas on the subject matter in question. As observed earlier, this dialogue has insured that the decision-maker was aware of their views at the time that he rendered his final decision. Finally, plaintiffs have been afforded numerous opportunities to repeat these same concerns to officials in the highest levels of government.

Yet, plaintiffs now attempt to taint the entire process by alleging an institutional bias on the part of the uniformed Air Force. In so doing, they fail to understand that section 102 of NEPA is predicated upon the existence of precisely such bias and, accordingly, erects those same procedural requirements of which they have taken continuous advantage. As stated by the court in *Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee* v. *Atomic Energy Commission*, 449 F. 2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971), these same requirements have been established to insure that "there is no way [the decision-maker] can fail to note the very serious arguments advanced by plaintiffs if he carefully reviews the entire environmental impact statement." See also *Environmental Defense Fund* v. *Corps of Engineers, supra* at 295. In light of this extensive participation and activity by plaintiffs, there can be no doubt but that the purpose has been attained in this instance.

In *Environmental Defense Fund* v. *Corps of Engineers, supra* at 295, the court remarked that an agency need not be "subjectively impartial" toward a proposal. Indeed, the mere existence of a proposal signifies that there must be a proponent somewhere. And, in case at bar, whether that proponent was a Captain, Colonel, and/or a General matters not; what does matter is that the evaluation of the proposal was, in fact, objective and presented both sides of the issue.

In attacking the Air Force's FES on this matter, plaintiffs offer no evidence of a biased evaluation. Instead, they assert that the document was incapable of being objective because the Chief of Staff happened to favor the proposal. To support this conclusion, they adduce evidence relating only to plans, intentions, proposals, and anticipations, none of which indicate the existence of any decision from the authoritative source on the relocation of AFCS from Richards-Gebaur to Scott AFB. However, as already observed, the defect in their theory is even more fundamental, for it rests upon the assumption that the decision-maker (both Secretary Reed and Secretary Stetson) and approving official (Deputy Secretary Duncan) would react impulsively and without considered judgment in favor of any proposal emanating from the Air Force and having General Jones' personal endorsement. Besides being totally unsupported in the context in which it is presented, this allegation defies both logic and common sense.

Extract From an Air Force Affidavit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division

Case No. 77-0468-CV-W-2

JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
v.
GENERAL DAVID C. JONES, USAF, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

3. The Environmental Impact Analysis Process (EIAP) Explained: In its most basic terms, the EIAP for the proposed relocation of AFCS consisted of two separate, although related, efforts: The development and preparation of the Draft Environmental Statement (DES) and the development and preparation of the Final Environmental Statement (FES). In an effort to assist in understanding this process, I have attached a diagram to this Affidavit (Attachment 1), which outlines the EIAP, by increasing level of detail, on Tracks A through D. Thus, major events, as well as the sequence in which they occurred, can be readily referenced and easily identified on Track D as, for example, (2–3), (4–7), etc. Moreover, Track D illustrates those instances where the Air Force sought public involvement in the EIAP by separating public and agency data gathering (above the line) from the technical and functional staff analysis (below the line). In its totality, the chart depicts the orderly, iterative, and inter-disciplinary process which, in fact occurred.

I have identified the preparation of the Draft and Final Statements as being two somewhat separate efforts. While the Final Environmental Statement grows out of the Draft Environmental Statement, it is not necessarily its Siamese twin and will be revised as much as is required to reflect any new insights gained during the public comment period. In short, the Draft Statement is no more than its name implies—a draft which can change through the provision of substantive new data and opinions during the formal public review and comment period (12–14). However, it is the most useful tool for focusing public review and comment and for providing a detailed basis for technical discussions between Air Force representatives and the public.

In the case at hand, the first phase in the development of the DES (shown as 3–4 on line D) was primarily an organizational one. This was the development of the Description of Proposed Action and Alternatives (DOPAA). The DOPAA was a document which was intended to describe the specifics of the change being proposed by the Air Force. The DOPAA listed five alternatives, including the status quo, and specifically stated that additional viable alternatives which might be discovered during the decision-making process would receive equal consideration by the Air Force. (Background Study #1) Once this document was prepared, initial data collection and technical analysis could begin.

On September 24, 1975, the Air Force undertook to make Congressional notification of the proposal by dispatching letters to 17 members of Congress who represented the affected localities. A copy of the DOPAA accompanied each letter. Similar letters, including copies of the DOPAA, were also sent to key local officials, businessmen, and members of Chambers of Commerce. In toto, 26 of such letters were sent to the Scott AFB area and 18 were sent to the Richards-Gebaur AFB area. These letters were sent to those individuals who were in a position to assist the Air Force in the gathering of data critical to environmental analysis. The letters were designed to create an awareness that data gathering would soon begin. They advised of the economic reasons for the proposed action; the need to conduct environmental studies; that within a week such studies would begin; that a range of alternative actions would be studied; that the assistance of concerned organizations and individuals was sought—particularly in the provision of data; and that the news media would be notified shortly after the delivery of the notification letters to the individual addresses.

Following the delivery of the notification letters, news releases were issued at both Scott and Richards-Gebaur. Twenty news media in the area around Scott were serviced, as well as 40 news media around Richards-Gebaur. The news release announced that the Air Force would be conducting extensive environmental studies to determine the extent of the environmental impacts associated with the proposed relocation of AFCS and further advised: That the DOPAA had been released; that the EIAP would take up to 280 days to run its course (approximately 600 days were taken before the EIAP was completed); that DES would be filed and serve as a vehicle for obtaining public comment; that socio-economic and physical factors were to be studied; that certain named firms would conduct the studies; and that the public was encouraged to provide data to the Air Force. A copy of the DOPAA was provided to representatives of each of the news media serviced.

In addition to this direct contact with community leaders, the Air Force initiated a dialogue with the area planning information clearinghouses that had been listed by the Office of Management & Budget. This contact was made in an effort to take advantage of their notification network, with the procedures for such contact having previously been arranged through memoranda of understanding. In its notification letter, dated September 25, 1975, the Air Force stated that it was soliciting their assistance to utilize their A-95 network, to insure public awareness, and, hopefully, to provide information from the communities which would be helpful to the Air Force in making a complete environmental assessment. The Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) acknowledged receipt of this letter and informed the Air Force that it was: Announcing the availability of the DOPAA in its A-95 Review Bulletin; providing a summary of the DOPAA to its review committees for comment; and inviting the Air Force to attend its committee meetings (which the Air Force subsequently did). Similar contact was made in the Scott area with the Illinois clearinghouses.

At the same time, the EIAP was specifically developed to establish the organizational and procedural structure for the complex and lengthy task that lay ahead. During this period, the members of the task force were identified. The prime task force members included representatives from the Air Force Civil

Engineering Center and the Air Force Environmental Health Labs (two of the Air Force's major technical resources for environmental planning efforts); representatives from the four major Air Force contractors: Benham-Blair-Winesett & Duke, Battelle Columbus Laboratories, Hammer, Siler, George, Associates, and Team Four, Inc.; representatives from the major commands involved: The Military Airlift Command (MAC), Air Force Communications Service (AFCS), and Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC); and, finally, representatives from the Air Staff itself: The Directorate of Manpower and Organization, Force Requirements Branch (PRMPC); the Directorate of Programs, Bases and Units Division (PRPO); and the Directorate of Engineering and Services, Environmental Planning Division (PREV). The Air Force members representing their various staff and command functions were appointed to review findings and provide continuous interaction with the technical multi-disciplinary task force members. With few exceptions, the same individual task force members from these organizations remained with the project until its completion in January 1977. (See Attachment 2 for professional vitae of principal Air Force contract consultants.) [note: Not provided with this extract.]

Following this organizational phase, members of the task force began the initial phase of data input and technical analysis. The first step was to lay the ground work for upcoming field work, since, as previously outlined, an extensive effort of public notification had already begun (Step 4–5 on the chart). Next, (5–6 on the chart), the first of many field surveys was begun. The initial survey started as a broad effort to identify good data sources and to determine areas requiring further in-depth study. Interviews began on October 1, 1975, and continued for several weeks on a personal basis, with a small percentage being conducted by telephone. Nearly 300 persons were contacted, including businessmen, clergy, educators, government officials, private citizens, and Air Force personnel in all four study areas (Richards-Gebaur, Pope, Scott, and Tinker Air Force Bases). All technical consultants of the Air Force task force were involved in interviewing.

At the same time that individual interviews and follow-ups were being conducted, task force members were also gaining a great deal of information from two public meetings requested by Jackson County officials. At a meeting of the Jackson County legislature on October 6, 1975, some 17 local officials offered information, impressions, and ideas to a representative of Battelle Columbus Laboratories. On November 4, 1975, at a second meeting, another Battelle representative met with Kansas City clergymen, news media representatives, businessmen, and government officials to learn their concerns and perceptions of likely impacts. Twenty-four individuals conveyed their thoughts to this task force member. AFCS personnel also attended a series of six meetings of various MARC review committees, including the Housing Policy Committee and the Economic Development Advisory Committee, as well as a meeting of the MARC Board of Directors. These meetings involved over 125 people and were held from October 17–28, 1975.

News releases were issued in December 1975 to keep the public abreast of the progress of the Environmental Impact Analysis Process. Some nine news media around Scott AFB and some 40 news media around Richards-Gebaur AFB were told that the Air Force and its task force team were nearing completion of their initial environmental field studies in conjunction with the preparation of the Air Force's Draft Environmental Statement. They were further advised: That interim statements of work in progress were being assembled and analyzed; that a Draft Environmental Impact Statement would be filed in February or March 1976; that public hearings would be held in areas affected, with announcements of times and locations to be made later; that comments from private and public entities and individuals would be used in preparing the Final Environmental Statement (FES); and that the FES would be filed in the May to June 1976 timeframe.

At my direction, additional data collection and analysis continued throughout the next several months, on an as-required basis, in response to specific issues which appeared to warrant more detailed study. In addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was requested to provide prediction analyses of housing market impacts which would result from the proposed action and alternatives in the Richards-Gebaur and Scott AFB areas. Overlapping slightly with this step of data collection and analysis was the step (6–7 on the chart) involving the preparation of the first "draft" of the Draft Statement. This document is known as the Candidate Environmental Statement (CES). The primary instruments used for this effort were Statements of Work in Progress

(SOWIP) which had been prepared by the various elements of the task force as they made significant progress in their data collection and analysis. These SOWIP's were also provided to the Air Staff Environmental Protection Committee (AFEPC) for their review and comment. (See Attachments 3 and 4 for a complete list of the AFEPC members; its charter; and the Air Force regulation further outlining its authority and responsibilities.) In addition, copies of the SOWIP's were sent to the Deputy County Counselor of Jackson County, Missouri; the Presiding Judge of Cass County, Missouri; the Executive Director of the Mid-America Regional Council; and the Executive Director of the Southwest Illinois Metropolitan Area Planning Commission in Collinsville, Illinois, for their comments.

As questions were raised or deficiencies identified by either the AFEPC or other members of the task force, they were forwarded to the responsible task force element for response. Eventually, three separate SOWIP's were prepared before the Candidate Environmental Statement was begun. (It was also during this period that the 6th Alternative, a new version of the proposal to move AFCS to Scott, was presented. Consequently, additional analyses of the impact of this alternative were requested from the task force members and these analyses became part of the CES.) The final SOWIP's were, in essence, the final background reports published with the Draft Environmental Statement. The CES was completed on April 21, 1976, after receipt of reports from the Kansas City and Chicago area offices of HUD.

On April 21, 1976, the review process was formalized, with the submission of the CES to the Air Staff EPC, the MAC EPC, the AFCS EPS, and the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) EPC. (Step 7–8 on the chart.) This review lasted from April 21 to about May 5, 1976.

On April 23, 1976, the CES was also informally forwarded to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Environmental Quality for his review and comment. (Step 8–9 on the chart.) (This secretariat level review was in addition to the earlier review by the secretariat level representatives on the EPC, itself.)

Following receipt of comments from the secretariat and the various EPCs, the task force members convened to begin preparation of the Draft Environmental Statement. (Step 9–10 on the chart.) On April 30, 1976, the Air Force had received the Jackson County Administrative Complaint, and, while no technical response was planned, the task force members did thoroughly study its content as "informal comments" which might prove of value in preparing the Draft Environmental Statement. Accordingly, the Administrative Complaint was included as Background Study #24 to the DEIS. This review and analysis of comments occupied the month of May 1976, with the actual writing of the DES taking place during the first three weeks of June 1976.

Initial drafts of the DES were forwarded to the Air Staff and Major Command EPCs for review and comment (Step 10–11 on the chart.) On June 17, 1976, the DES was formally forwarded to the secretariat for final policy and security review. (Step 11–12 on the chart.) On June 20, 1976, the final version of the Draft Environmental Statement was also transmitted to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Enviornmental Quality for release approval.

Approval for release concluded the development phase of the DES. In the following months, the DES would be the subject of considerable discussion and review. Out of this would come any new insights, data, and opinions which would help create the Final Environmental Statement.

The first major phase in the development of the FES was the public review and comment phase. The first step in this phase (Step 12–13 on the chart) was the filing of the DES with the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the forwarding of the document to private citizens; local, state and federal agencies; and the local and state A–95 clearinghouses for their review and comment. The DES was simultaneously filed with the CEQ and delivered by hand to a number of organizations, individuals, and governmental bodies, including officials of Jackson County on June 25, 1976. Copies of the DES were also mailed to approximately 600 individuals and organizations who had registered interest in obtaining a copy or who had been contacted earlier by the task force members. Therefore, in addition to the use of the news media, a notice in the Federal Register, the A–95 review process, and providing full sets of documents to various libraries, the direct-mail approach put copies of the DES in the hands of hundreds of concerned individuals. Throughout the summer, additional copies of the DES were provided as requested. In all probability, such a positive program of public participation has rarely been employed in environmental protection matters.

While the 25th of June marked the public release of the DES, the actual comment period itself did not begin until July 2, 1976, since this was the date that the CEQ published notice in the Federal Register of the Air Force's filing of the DES with the CEQ. (Step 13–14 on the chart.) While Air Force Regulations only call for a 45-day comment period, they also advise that careful consideration should be given to requests for extensions of up to 15 days. In this case, the Air Force received two separate requests—from Jackson County and MARC—and agreed to extend the comment period 30 days. Thus, the suggested 45-day review period, in this instance, actually lasted from July 2 to September 15, 1976, or 75 days.

To assure full public involvement, an extensive notification process was again implemented in July 1976. Forty-four news media in the area surrounding Richards-Gebaur and 24 news media in the area surrounding Scott were advised of the timetable for the upcoming public hearings. Additionally, notification letters were written to 64 businessmen, educators and government officials in the Richards-Gebaur area.

Comments were received in three ways: (1) as verbal statements or questions made at the public hearings; (2) as supplementary written statements provided for the hearing records; and (3) as letters, telegrams, petitions, etc. received throughout the comment period. During this period, 109 individuals submitted written comments to the Air Force from the St. Louis and Kansas City regions. Additionally, 156 individuals commented verbally at the public hearings. As I pointed out in my briefing at the beginning of each hearing, regardless of the mode of public input, the comments would receive the same degree of careful and thoughtful consideration. In my own review of the entire record, that promise was fulfilled and, through personal direction and observation, I am convinced that the final statement was conscientiously prepared in careful consideration of the full comment record.

Originally, three nights of public hearings were scheduled for the Kansas City area for the 19th, 20th and 21st of July. However, these hearings were rescheduled to August 30, August 31, and September 1, at the request of area officials who wished more time to study the DES. Also at their request, a full days' hearing was scheduled in downtown Kansas City so that government officials and representatives might have a more convenient opportunity to speak. The other hearings were scheduled in the evening for Grandview, Missouri, which the Air Force believed was centrally located to the portion of the metropolitan area principally affected by the proposed action. The Air Force rejected a request to hold additional hearings in Johnson County, Kansas, because there were insufficient numbers of affected personnel in any one part of the county to warrant such a hearing, and, also, because Grandview, located very near to the Johnson County border, was still relatively convenient, even to Johnson County residents.

As the hearings progressed, it became apparent that, because of the number of individuals who wished to speak, and because local officials were pressing for an extension, the Presiding Officer, an Air Force Judge, should (as he subsequently did) extend the hearings through September 2, 1976. The Presiding Officer, however, did not believe it necessary to extend the hearings beyond that date since he stated that the real idea of a public hearing is to get a broad spectrum of opinion that is representative, and not necessarily to afford an opportunity for every single individual to speak. Nevertheless, it should be noted that when the September 2 hearings were concluded, not a single person present who had requested to speak had been denied the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, during a hearing held by Jackson County, itself, on September 7, only eight people who had not already spoken at the Air Force's hearings made statements. Thus, while the public hearings were, in this instance, extended in an effort to give everyone a chance to be heard, as these hearings wore on, the issues that were raised, though often sincere expressions of opposition to the Air Force proposals, became repeats of those previously voiced and added nothing new or substantive to the process.

However, as a result of the public comment period and the information it provided to the Air Force, a number of additional steps of data collection and analysis were initiated. (Steps 13–17 on the chart.) These activities were intermingled with the all-important step of intensive comment review and response (Steps 14–15 and 16–17 on the chart).

The review of the public hearing transcripts and all other comments received by the Air Force was conducted by a special subgroup of the task force. This group organized all of the comments in a manner that would permit efficient distribution to other members of the task force who would, in trun, be responsible for preparing responses. These comments and their responses became an integral part of the information used to prepare the Final Environmental Statement.

This comment-review period began on October 12, 1976, and extended through the next two months.

The additional data-gathering and analysis steps that were taking place during this period were, in many respects, similar to the steps that preceded the development of the DES. Again, a number of interviews were conducted with businessmen, educators, and governmental officials, with the interviews followed by telephone conversations and letters. Additional meetings seeking technical discussion and comments on the DES were held in late August and early September 1976 with governmental officials, representatives of financial institutions, realtors, contractors, rental property managers and school superintendents in the Richards-Gebaur AFB area. Typical of these meetings were conferences with the City Administrators of Belton and Grandview, Missouri, to discuss impacts upon public finance. While such meetings were ordinarily attended by small numbers of people, they added substantially to the information already gathered on specific issues.

During this period, the consultants were also involved in new studies. In particular, some new economic studies were conducted by Battelle, and a Scott-area housing-availability study was carried out jointly by Team Four, Inc. and Battelle. In addition, new work was also being done, at the Air Force's request, by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Kansas City area. All of these studies, additional interviews, etc. generated an extensive body of information which expanded the depth of the analysis and became part of the Final Environmental Statement.

Although the preparation of the FES began during the comment-review period, it did not become a concentrated effort until November 29, 1976, when the task force was formally reconvened. While not as many "drafts" were prepared this time, the same iterative process that had been used to prepare the DES was again employed. On December 6, 1976, the "draft" was transmitted to the EPCs and to other task force members for their review. (Step 18–19 on the chart.) ("Hq USAF" should read "Hq AFCS".) From about the 14th to the end of December, 1976, the comments of the EPCs and others were reviewed, and the "draft" of the FES was revised as necessary. The task force then completed its final rewrites and incorporated the data contained in the last reports. In the second week of January, 1977, the secretariat reviewed the FES and provided the necessary approval for its release. (Step 19–20 on the chart.) Accordingly, after expending over $800,000 in preparation, the FES was released to the public on January 12, 1977.

The public release of the Final Environmental Statement and the filing of the FES with the Council on Environmental Quality (Step 20–21 on the chart) proceeded in much the same manner as with the Draft Environmental Statement. The FES was sent to 1162 individuals who had, at one time or another, either expressed interest in the EIAP or who had been contacted by the Air Force task force. Simultaneously, the Air Force made news releases to the 44 news media in the area around Richards-Gebaur and the 26 news media in the area surrounding Scott.

The increase over the distribution list for the DES reflects the increase in number of people whom the Air Force had contacted during the public comment period and who had provided comments, data, or, in some other way, expressed interest in the proposed action.

I am convinced that the Environmental Impact Analysis Process for the proposed relocation of AFCS was a highly conscientious and good faith effort in every respect and provided an accurate, impartial representation of potential and probable impacts. The exhaustive dissemination of information to the public, the full consideration of the views of affected individuals, the extensive research and interdisciplinary discussions, and analyses of impacts by experts in their fields were unprecedented in the preparation of an Air Force Environmental Impact Statement. As a result, the process developed and successfully executed in this case has already served as the Air Force model for Environmental Impact Statements on realinement actions which followed it.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CIRCUIT COURT FINDINGS RELATING TO THE AIR FORCE DECISION FOR THE RELOCATION OF HQ AFCS AND CLOSURE OF RICHARDS-GEBAUR AFB

The Richards-Gebaur AFB action was often characterized in the record as a cost saving measure when in fact it was an Air Force management proposal and

decision to redirect its resources to higher priority defense requirements. While this may seem to be a play on words, it appears to have become a crucial element in the Circuit Court's application of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the Air Force decision. This is in spite of the fact that the Air Force decision paper of 25 Mar 77 says:

"While giving consideration to the total Federal cost of a decision, my primary concerns are for the requirements of the Air Force and Defense."

The Air Force decision paper also says:

"I have carefully weighed the significant socio-economic effects and benefits to be gained by the Air Force." and:

"Considering all of these factors and *balancing them against the cost benefits which will accrue to the Air Force*, I have reached the decision to close Richards-Gebaur and relocate HQ AFCS to Scott AFB during the summer and early fall of 1977." (Emphasis added.)

Without specifying the weights used in the "balancing," the Air Force essentially said that it looked at the balance sheet, which showed savings of so much and compared the savings against costs in other areas of so much. Secretary Reed at the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 15 Sep 76 stated:

"* * * The move will cost money. As I mentioned when I started, it appears to me, and I look forward to the GAO comment, *we will save about 25 million a year by doing this.* It is our impression that *the total cost to the government, of all branches of the government will be amortized* in the order of one year or two by doing that." (Emphasis added.)

It is certainly implied that at some point, when the sole or principal objective is saving money, the "balancing" of "savings" and "costs" could lead the Air Force to conclude that the costs were too high, resulting in a "no action" decision. It would appear that a decision would be most vulnerable when it departed (which the Air Force decision did not) from the criteria consistently established in the record as the purpose and need for the action. If the decision achieved few or none of the consistently stated objectives of the proposal, it could surely be successfully argued, as the plaintiffs were attempting to do, that the Air Force decision was arbitrary and capricious. In the Court's "Substantative Review" it said:

"*The purpose of the Air Force is to achieve a substantial reduction in costs.* Under NEPA, indirect, as well as direct, costs and consequences of the proposed action must be considered. Moreover, under NEPA, *if the stated purpose will not be achieved by the proposed action* or if the indirect costs or consequences are so great that a decision by the agency to proceed with the proposed action can only be said to be arbitrary and capricious, then a court may nullify the decision." (Emphasis added.)

Since the Air Force established "savings" as the action objective and agreed to compare the savings against other cost impacts, *without an explicit national defense objective* in the balance, it is not surprising, in retrospect, that the Circuit Court could bring itself to say in summarizing its application of the arbitrary and capricious standard under NEPA:

"The Air Force should have given greater consideration to the economic effect of its action on the communities concerned and it should have attempted to strike a better balance between savings to the Department of Defense and the direct and indirect cost ot other governmental agencies, local units of government and private citizens."

However, though the court could not say, in this instance, that the decision was arbitrary and capricious it did say:

"Had Richards-Gebaur been located in a smaller community our decision might well have been different because the federal action would have seriously damaged the long term vitality of such a community."

It certainly appears that this statement flows from our own criteria for the balancing exercise and with a "pure" objective of savings, the OSD Office of Economic Adjustment programs could cost so much and the local economic impact could be so high as to tip the balance away from achieving the objective. The court's focus on evaluating the decision in a comparative cost-benefit way, without any factor of national defense, is clearest in its own Appendix I and II where it devised its own estimates from the record in addition to comparing the Air Force's and plaintiff's estimates.

The court also had no problem supporting the Air Force's rejection of alternatives which the Air Force found to be unacceptable from functional or operational

considerations. Only in the McDowell alternatives of 11.a, b, and where alternative savings routes were provided did the court pause and say that the analysis was not as "thorough as desired" but nevertheless adequate.

In future closures it appears to be essential that our redirection of resources should not be characterized as "savings." While we will identify costs to other federal and local agencies, the Air Force's stated purpose for an action, criteria for decisionmaking, and the final decision should not ever appear to be based solely on a balance sheet without clear national defense factors, unless, in fact, that is the sole criteria in decisionmaking.

Action officer: Lt Col W. R. Sims, AF/PREVX, Ext. 77763.

[Dollar amounts in millions]

AFCE relocation, GAO report findings, history	AF estimate for original decision according to GAO report	GAO estimate for original decision (Senator Dole) report DTD Nov. 26, 1975	AF estimate from OPS and resource study used in DEIS June 25, 1976	AF estimate according to GAO report	GAO estimate (Senator Eagleton) final report DTD Dec. 29, 1976	AF estimate from final OPS and resource study used in FEIS Jan. 12, 1977
	(1)			(2)		
Annual recurring savings	$7.56	$6.47	$24.428	$28.962	$19.595	$18.928
One-time cost	10.806	11.62	34.532	34.515	33.390	42.661
1-time cost avoidance	5.848	5.248	6.422	5.818	6.130	6.130

NOTES

According to GAO's Nov. 26, 1975, report, the differences in estimates between AF and GAO are largely attributable to GAO's use of completed planning documents, while the AF figures were made before completion of the planning documents. Also mentioned were: Annual recurring savings differences occurred because the Air Force "failed to consider increased medical costs at Scott and increased costs for leasing telecommunications equipment." 1-time costs estiimate differences occurred because the Air Force classified some work in facilities at Scott as repair which GAO classified as improvements, e.g., "removing and replacing ceilings, wiring, lighting, duct work and plumbing" (+$139,000); Air Force "did not provide for unemployment compensation for the 160 employees who lost their jobs (+$305,000); school district payments; and general use of more current data."

According to the GAO's Dec. 29, 1976, report, items previously omitted, such as unemployment compensation and telecommunications equipment were included by the Air Force's latest study, however, increased CHAMPUS costs at Scott were still not included in whatever figures the GAO was looking at when they did their study. As the differences shown in the table above indicate, there was seldom agreement on any single item. However, as can be seen in the last column, the final Air Force estimates produced a gross reconciliation.

COMMUNITY ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

Senator CULVER. You have cited a political problem with regard to getting the necessary incentives for serious good faith efforts in developing a community study. Under the political circumstances that accompany these activities, it is very understandable that you are running into that kind of problem.

Do you have any case studies where communities have a positive response that you could use as a model? Are there any success stories in which the community has decided to move early and there has been enough variety of real help that they have come out of it better?

Mr. WHITE. Yes; we do. We have a number of cases where we really have remarkable success in terms of the utilization of the facility after we leave, the health of the community and so on, and we could provide you for the record.

[The information follows:]

A summary of completed military base economic adjustment [1] projects follows:

[1] A new publication, containing case studies, is expected from the printer on 15 September 1978. A new slide presentation is also being prepared to illustrate the benefits of early adjustment or contingency planning to officials of communities where candidate realinements are under study. OEA publications have been widely distributed and are used by the staff to inform concerned local officials about the achievements of previously impacted communities.

Summary of Completed Military Base Economic Adjustment Projects 1961–1977

During the 16-year period since May 1961, economic adjustment assistance has been provided to over 200 communities throughout the nation affected by major Defense personnel cutbacks, contract terminations, and military base closure.

In March 1970, the Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) was created under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense to coordinate the resources of 20 Federal executive departments and agencies in providing assistance to the affected communities.

To measure the overall adjustment progress of communities affected by military base closures, a survey of the job generation and base re-use experience for 75 communities with completed base re-use programs (1961–1977) was conducted in February 1977. The survey measures the replacement job generation and re-use as accomplished and reported by the impacted communities themselves.

The impacts have ranged from the loss of 12,300 civilian personnel in the case of an Air Force depot and overhaul activity at Mobile, Alabama to only 15–25 civilian employees in several small communities affected by the closure of nearby aircraft control stations.

In many instances, the loss of military personnel (up to 5,600 military in the case of Amarillo, Texas) may have significantly affected the community's regional economy. Military personnel, however, are not recorded in the local employment or work force statistics. Their relocation (85,402 positions in total for the 75 community projects) represent a regional income loss but not a direct employment loss to the community. For this reason, the success of the community adjustment efforts should in large part be measured against whether the DOD civilian job loss in the community has been replaced by the new job and economic activity on the former base facility.

The attached summary of the 75 military base economic adjustment projects identifies the military and civilian job losses, the replacement civilian jobs, the principal industrial/commercial/public re-use activities, the major land re-uses, and the individual community contract involved who can furnish additional information.

In total, the following experience has been recorded by the 75 completed community adjustment situations:

New Jobs Replace DoD Civilian Losses.—A total of 78,765 civilian jobs are now located on the former Defense facilities to replace the loss of 68,800 former DoD civilian or contractor jobs. Within this total, 69,542 are new jobs, with 9,223 jobs relocated to improved facilities on the bases. Another 10,540 new civilian jobs off-base are directly attributable to the economic adjustment effort.

New Educational Opportunities.—Seven (7) four-year colleges, 26 post-secondary vocational technical institutes, and six high school vo-tech programs have been established at former bases. The re-use of the former Defense facilities for new vocational-technical education has provided a strong job-inducement contribution to the future community economic development programs.

Student Enrollments.—In total, there are 52,512 college and post-secondary students, 4,215 secondary vo-tech, and 5,309 trainees now receiving education and training at 48 former Defense bases.

Effective Civilian Re-Use.—In 72 of the 75 community cases,[2] the former Defense facilities have been effectively re-used by the impact communities for a wide range of industrial, education, aviation, commercial and public uses as described in the attached summary.

Industrial and Aviation Uses: Industrial parks have been established at 47 of the former Defense bases. Three of the former bases are excess Defense plant facilities which are now operated as private sector industrial plants. Thirty-one of the former bases are being used as municipal and general aviation airports.

In addition to the 75 completed economic adjustment projects as of February 1977, adjustment assistance was being furnished to 42 active communities in 26 states, Puerto Rico and Guam—including 21 communities affected by military base closures. Many of these base facilities (Boston, Massachusetts; Baltimore, Maryland; Burlington, New Jersey, etc.) will be conveyed or sold to the impact communities by the end of 1977. Interim civilian use was being accomplished by

[2] The re-use problems encountered in the three instances—Watertown Arsenal, Massachusetts; Steward Air Force Base at Newburgh, New York, and the Army Pictorial Center in New York City (Astoria)—as explained by footnotes in the attached summary.

the communities at 12 of the 21 available base facilities with job generation running from a very few new jobs to upwards of 5,600 civilian jobs (Quonset Point, Rhode Island).

It is important to note that the job generation and re-use information for the former military facilities does *not* reflect the entire recovery experience for all Defense impact communities assisted by the Economic Adjustment Committee and the Office of Economic Adjustment since 1961. In the case of communities affected by contract cutbacks and personnel reductions, it is often difficult to trace the actual replacement effort beyond a three to four year period, especially following a national recession such as in 1974–75. The most effective long-term adjustment measure is whether these previously impacted communities have continued to grow and are still actively implementing new job development and economic growth programs.

In the case of communities with available former base facilities, a reasonable measure of the long-term community adjustment process can be drawn between the civilian job loss at the base and the subsequent base job replacement experience. This measure is *conservative* as it excludes secondary and off-base jobs (except where there is a direct causal effect from the re-use of the base facilities or in specific EAC program grants for replacement jobs).

The role of the Economic Adjustment Committee and the Economic Adjustment Program is to help communities "help themselves." The job replacement experience and student enrollment levels reflected in the attached summary represent the actual performance as reported by the affected communities. The communities themselves are responsible for the productive reuse of the former Defense facilities and for securing new replacement job opportunities to offset the loss of the Defense base closures.

The experience of these communities demonstrates that future communities affected by Defense base closures can successfully adjust to the difficult impacts involved.

COMPLETED MILITARY BASE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROJECTS, 1961–77

[EXPLANATORY NOTES—College or vo-tech students: (C) College students or postsecondary vo-tech students; (S) Secondary high school vo-tech students; (T) Manpower development and other trainees. Land use: A, Aviation; Ag, Agriculture; C, Commercial; E, Education; F, Other Federal use; H, Health; Hi, Historic preservation; Ho, Housing; I, Industrial; M, Municipal; P, Park and recreation; R, Reserve or National Guard; S, State.]

Community and facility	Year of impact	Year of acquisition	Civilian jobs lost	Military transfers	New civilian jobs: Total jobs on base	New civilian jobs: New jobs on base	New civilian jobs: Direct off-base jobs[1]	Major firms/activities	College, vo-tech students	Land use	Community contact
Coden Ala.: Dauphin Island Air Force Station.	1971	1972	26	112	38	38	----------	University of South; Alabama (Marine environmental Science Consortium).	175(C); 165(S)	E	W. S. Pipas, executive director of development and operations, University of South Alabama, Mobile, Ala. 36688.
Mobile, Ala.: Brookley AFB and mobile air materiel area.	1965–69	1969	12,300	1,070	5,190	4,300	----------	Teledyne, Continental; International Paper; International Systems; University of South Alabama; Municipal Airport.	965(C)	A, E, F, Ho, I, M, P, R, S	David Nowlin, manager, Mobile-Aerospace Industrial Complex, Mobile, Ala. 36615.
Mobile, Ala.: Theodore Army Terminal.[2]	1965	1965	14	----------	2,075	2,075	----------	Degussa-Alabama, Inc.; Airco Inc.; Kerr-McGee; Barnett Millwork; Union Carbide; Ideal Basic Industries.	----------	I	Ted L. Hackey, Mobile, Ala., Chamber of Commerce, P.O. Box 2187, Mobile, Ala. 36601.
Thomasville, Ala.: Thomasville Air Force Station.	1970	1971	18	110	155	137	----------	Thomasville Adult Adjustment Center.	----------	H	Charles E. Wells, director, Thomasville Adult Adjustment Center, P.O. Box 309, Thomasville, Ala. 36784.
Kenai, Alaska: Wildwood Air Force Station.	1972	1974	63	380	60	35	30	Kenai Natives Association; U.S. Public Health Service; Wagner Flooring Co.; Wildwood Construction Co.[3]	50(T)	E, F, H, I, S	George Miller, executive director, Kenai Natives Association, P.O. Box 210, Kenai, Alaska 99661.
Kodiak, Alaska: Kodiak Air Force Station.	1975	1975	123	----------	[4]12	12	----------	Koniag, Inc.; Emerald Maintenance Co.	----------	I, Ho	Karl Armstrong, Koniag, Inc., P.O. Box 746, Kodiak, Alaska 99615.
Benicia, Calif.: Benicia Arsenal	1964	1965	2,321	32	3,200	3,165	----------	Exxon, Sperry Management Systems; E.T. Mag Wheels; Ace Hardware; Benicia Industries.	----------	Hi, I	Dale R. Stringfellow, President, Benicia Industries, Inc., P.O. Box 315, Benicia, Calif. 94510.
Malibu, Calif.:[5] Nike Site 78	1974	1974	----------	142	52	52	----------	Los Angeles County Fire and Paramedic Center.	----------	M, P	Capt. Horst Zimmerman, Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles, Calif. 90051.
Palmdale, Calif.:[5] Nike Site 04	1974	1976	----------	142	16	16	----------	Los Angeles County Conservation-Education Center.	39(T)	E	Charles F. Hudson, Forestry Division, County of Los Angeles, P.O. Box 3009, Terminal Annex, Los Angeles, Calif. 90051.

Rancho Palos Verdes, Calif.: [5] Nike Site 55.	1974	1974	----------	91	64	----------	City and school offices, city of Rancho Palos Verdes.	----------	E, M, P	Leonard Wood, city manager, city of Rancho Palos Verdes, 31244 Palos Verdes Drive West, Rancho Palos Verdes, Calif. 90274.
San Francisco, Calif.: Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. [6]	1973–75	1976	4,650	1951	1,618	690 ----------	Triple A Machine Shop, Inc.: University of California.	----------	I,E,F	Clifford P. LeGette, General manager, Triple A Machine Shop; Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco, Calif. 94124.
Torrance, Calif.: Torrance Annex, Long Beach Naval Supply Center.	1973	1974	50	----------	61	----------	City of Torrance Park Facilities.	----------	E,P	Edward J. Ferraro, City Manager, City of Torrance, 3031 Torrance Boulevard, Torrance, Calif. 90503.
Ventura County, Calif.: Oxnard Air Force Base.	1970	1976	293	1,215	638	517 ----------	Clifford Industries; Scintilla Co.; Gibbs Industries; Ventura County Community College; Union High School; Navy; county airport.	100(C); 800(S); 100(T)	A,E,F,I, M,P,R	Tom Volk, director of property administration, County of Ventura, 3900 Pelican Way, Oxnard, Calif. 93030.
Green Cove Springs, Fla.: Atlantic Fleet Site.	1962	1964	324	1,281	[7] 60	60 ----------	Fruehauf; Kustom Karr	----------	I,Ho	Mrs. Marjorie Long, Reynolds Industrial Park, P.O. Box 477, Green Cove Springs Fla. 32043.
Orlando, Fla.: McCoy Air Force Base.	1974	1976	395	2,812	695	131 ----------	Dawson Research; Page Airways; Florida Southern College; Valencia Community College: municipal airport.	800(C); 500(S)	A,E,I,P, R	J. F. Gillooly, project manager, Orlando Jetport Westside Development Properties, P.O. Box 19127, Orlando, Fla. 32814.
Sanford, Fla.: Sanford Naval Air Station.	1968	1969	230	646	593	410 ----------	AMF INC., BFJ Sales Inc.; Cordisco; Seminole Community College; Municipal airport.	1,400(C)	A,E,I	J. S. "Red" Cleveland, director, Sanford Airport Authority, Sanford, Fla. 32771.
Brunswick, Ga.: Glynco Naval Air Station.	1974	1976	344	1,828	470	470 ----------	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; Mech Tran Inc.; Modu Tech Co.; Municipal airport.	650(T)	A,F,Ho,I,P	Gordon Davis, executive director, Glynn Development Authority, Brunswick Golden Isles Municipal Airport, Brunswick, Ga. 31520.
Macon, Ga.: Macon Naval Ordance Plant.	1965	1965	958	10	1,500	1,500 ----------	Allied Chemical	----------	I	L. Thomas Murphy, Jr., Executive director, Forward Macon Inc., P.O. Box 207, Macon, Ga. 31202.
Decatur, Ill.: Decatur Army Signal Depot.	1962	1963	1,310	27	2,400	2,400 ----------	Firestone Tire & Rubber	----------	I	Leslie T. Allen, City Manager, City Hall, Decatur, Ill. 62525.
Forest Park, Ill.: Forest Park Naval Ordance Plant.	1971	1973	1,600	6	1,250	1,250 ----------	U.S. Postal Service bulk mail center.	----------	F	William McKenzie, village clerk, Forest Park, Ill. 60130.
Columbus, Ind.: Bakalar Air Force Base.	1970	1972	318	61	650	300 ----------	Cummins Engine; GIBCO Diagnostics; Indiana University and Purdue University; municipal airport.	1,200(C)	A,Ag,E,I	Harvey Pouchard, manager, Columbus-Bakalar Airport, Columbus, Ind. 47201.
Terre Haute, Ind.: Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center.	1966	1967	253	----------	850	835 ----------	Jadcore Inc.; Illiana Inc.; All State Vending; Ampacet; Ivy Hill Co.	----------	F,I	Duane Sorenson, director, Center for Economic Development, 311 Conference Center, Terre Haute, Ind. 47809.

See footnotes at end of table.

[EXPLANATORY NOTES—College or vo-tech students: (C) College students or postsecondary vo-tech students; (S) Secondary high school vo-tech students; (T) Manpower development and other trainees. Land use: A, Aviation; Ag, Agriculture; C, Commercial; E, Education; F, Other Federal use; H, Health; Hi, Historic preservation; Ho, Housing; I, Industrial; M, Municipal; P, Park and recreation; R, Reserve or National Guard; S, State.]

Community and facility	Year of impact	Year of acquisition	Civilian jobs lost	Military transfers	New civilian jobs: Total jobs on base	New civilian jobs: New jobs on base	New civilian jobs: Direct off-base jobs[1]	Major firms/activities	College vo-tech students	Land use	Community contact
Salina, Kans.: Schilling Air Force Base.	1965	1966	326	4,710	3,250	3,135	380	Beech Aircraft; Rickel Manfacutring; Tony's Pizza Inc.; Kansas Technical Institute; Westihghouse ; Municipal airport.	210(C); 405(S)	A,Ag,E,Ho,I	John F. Scanlan, executive vice president Salina Airport Authority, Salina, Kans. 67401.
Topeka, Kans.: Forbes Air Force Base.	1973	1976	416	3,739	1,835	610	----------	Topeka Metal Specialists; Macmillan Puplishers; state health department; municipal airport.	----------	A,I,R,S	Gary Richert, executive director, Metro Topeka Airport Authority, P.O. Box 19053, Topeka, Kans. 66619.
Lake Charles, La.:[8] Chennault Air Force Base.	1963	1964	252	3,030	150	250	----------	Sowella Tech of McNesse State University; Calcasieu Parish Vocational Technical School.	55(C)[8]; 320(S)	C,E,H,I,P	James E. Hoflspanir, Parish Planner, Lake Charles, La. 70601.
New Iberia, La.: New Iberia Naval Air Station.	1965	1966	85	1,025	300	200	----------	Gulf States Research Institute; Air Logistics Inc; Municipal airport.	600(C); 500(S)	A,C,E,I	Gaston Mestayer, executive director, Chamber of Commerce, New Iberia, La. 70560.
Bangor, Maine: Dow Air Force Base.	1968	1968	328	3,670	1,943	1,603	----------	General Electric, Anzac Electronics; Ansewin Shoe Co.; Jorkan Gerrill; University of Maine; municipal airport.	546(C)	A,E,Ho,I, M,R	Edward G. McKeon, Director of Development, city of Bangor, Bangor, Maine 04401.
Presque Isle, Maine: Presque Isle Air Force Base.	1961	1962	268	1,259	1,500	1,225	1,100	Aroostook Shoe Co., Maine Building Systems; Indian Head Plywood; Milliken-Tomlinson, Converse Rubber Co.; Potato-Services; Northern Maine Vocational Technical Institute; municipal airport.	380(C)	A,E,I,M,P	Larry E. Clark, executive director, Presque Isle Industrial Council, P.O. Box 831, Presque Isle, Maine 04769.
Chicopee, Mass.:[9] Westover Air Force Base.	1974	1977	+150	4,104	300	300	----------	Quabbin Industries; Massachusetts Municipal Electric Co.; Bruck Resins.	----------	A,E,H,I, M,P,R	Eric R. Person, director of development, Westover Industrial Air Park, Westover AFB, Chicopee, Mass. 01022.
Springfield, Mass.: Springfield Arsenal.	1968	1968	2,400	20	1,528	1,500	----------	Digital Equipment Corp.; Smith & Wesson; Milton Bradley Co.; Hano Business Forms; Springfield Technical Community College.	7,600(C)	E,Hi,I,P	Paul Greeley, executive vice president, Springfield Chamber of Commerce, 1500 Main Street, Springfield, Mass. 01115.

Watertown, Mass.:[10] Watertown Arsenal.	1967	1968	2,306	17	----------	----------	----------	[10]	----------	P,I	Mrs. Maureen K. Oates, vice chairman, Watertown Conservation Commission, 145 Russell Avenue, Watertown, Mass. 02172.
Wadena, Minn.: Wadena Air Force Station.	1971	1973	15	130	15	15	----------	Wadena Multicounty Health Center.	----------	H	Kenneth Tomlinson, executive director, Wadena Multicounty Health Center, Wadena, Minn. 56482.
Greenville, Miss.: Greenville Air Force Base.	1965	1966	242	2,048	197	61	----------	Acme Screw Co.; Transland Aircraft; Delta Junior College manpower training; municipal airport.	240(T)	A, E, F, I, M, P	John A. Brame, airport manager, Greenville International Airport, Greenville, Miss. 38701.
Neosho, Mo.: Camp Crowder and Air Force Plant 65.	1970	1968–75	1,200	----------	2,224	1,814	655	Lazy Boy Chair Co.; Talbot Wire; Neosho Products; Honeybear Foods;[3] Smith Brothers; Moark Production; Crowder College; municipal airport.	1,500(C); 100(T).	A, E, I, P	John C. Wright, Jr., executive vice president, Neosho Chamber of Commerce, Neosho, Mo. 64850.
Conrad, Mont.: Antiballistic Missile Sites.	1972	1975	[11] 153	20	108	108	186	Cascade Coach; Inter-Continental Truck Body; Horizon Lodge ; ABM Waterline.	----------	Ag, I, M	Robert C. Arnot, Jr., president, Pondera County Economic Development Corp., Conrad, Mont. 59425.
Lewistown, Mont.: Lewistown Air Force Station.	1971	1974	27	163	35	35	----------	Montana Institute of the Bible.	225(C)	E	William Spoja, county attorney, Lewistown, Mont. 59457.
Hastings, Nebr.: Hastings Naval Ammunition Depot.	1966	1967	240	10	706	706	----------	Ebko Industries; Fleming Manufacturing Co.; Hastings Pork; Leverage Tools; Good Samaritan Retirement Center; Central Nebraska Vocational Technical School.	4,800(C)	Ag, E, H, Ho, I	Robert Siegel, executive vice president, Chamber of Commerce, Hastings, Nebr. 68901.
Lincoln, Nebr.: Lincoln Air Force Base.	1966	1966	396	4,000	818	818	750	Addressograph-Mulitgraph Co.; Goodyear Tire, McKee Bros. Ltd.; Brunswick; Tri-Con Ind.; Kawasaki;[3] Lincoln Carpet; Bauer Candy, ISCO Instruments; Summit Foods; municipal airport.	----------	A, Ho, I, M	Rolland Harr, executive director, Lincoln Airport Authority, Lincoln, Nebr. 68501.
Omaha, Nebr.: Fort Omaha	1975	1976	49	56	90	30	----------	Metropolitan Technical College.	1,690(C)	E	H. L. McCoy, assistant to the president, Metropolitan Technical College, Omaha, Nebr. 68137.
Sidney, Nebr.: Sioux Army Depot	1967	1967	585	2	210	210	175	Agriculture Experiment Station; Plains Inc.; Sidney Manufacturing Co.; Western Nebraska Technical College; Ep-Ro Manufacturing;[3] ICI-Midwest.	400(C)	Ag, E, Ho, I, M, S	Jack H. Lowe, director, Panhandle Growth, Inc., Sidney, Nebr. 69162.
Reno, Nev.: Stead Air Force Base	1966	1969	519	2,542	950	800	----------	Learjet; J. C. Penney District Center;[12] University of Nevada; municipal airport.	200(C)	A, E, Ho, I, M	Robert L. Mandeville, Director of Airports, city of Reno, Reno, Nev. 89507.

See footnotes at end of table.

COMPLETED MILITARY BASE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROJECTS, 1961–77—Continued

[EXPLANATORY NOTES—College or vo-tech students: (C) College students or postsecondary vo-tech students; (S) Secondary high school vo-tech students; (T) Manpower development and other trainees. Land use: A, Aviation; Ag, Agriculture; C, Commercial; E, Education; F, Other Federal use; H, Health; Hi, Historic preservation; Ho, Housing; I, Industrial; M, Municipal; P, Park and recreation; R, Reserve or National Guard; S, State.]

Community and facility	Year of impact	Year of acquisition	Civilian jobs lost	Military transfers	New civilian jobs: Total jobs on base	New civilian jobs: New jobs on base	New civilian jobs: Direct off-base jobs[1]	Major firms/activities	College vo-tech students	Land use	Community contact
Manchester, N.H.: Grenier Air Force Base.	1966	1966–75	138	320	3,300	2,000	----------	Sanders Associates; Disogrin Industries; Scovill Aerosol, Edison Electrics; Moore Business Forms; Municipal airport.	----------	A, I, R	E. Mike Goodwin, airport manager, Manchester Airport Authority, Manchester, N.H. 03103.
Lumberton, N.J.:[5] Nike Site 25	1974	1976	94	----------	45	10	----------	Lumberton Township Municipal offices.	----------	E, M	Ronald J. Joyce, Mayor, Lumberton Township, 22 Estate Road, Mount Holly, N.J. 08060.
Metuchen, N.J.: Raritan Arsenal	1964	1964–65	2,610	8	4,450	4,450	----------	RCA, American Hospital Supply; R. H. Macy; Schwinn Bicycles; GSA Depot; Continental Can; Middlesex Community College.	6,000(C)	C, E, F, I, P	Howard Pointer, president, Summit Associates, Raritan Center, Metuchen, N.J. 08840.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Camp Kilmer.	1963	1965	578	426	1,626	1,626	----------	Livingston College Campus of Rutgers University; American Can; Spaulding, Mattell Toys; Job Corps.	3,756(C); 300(T)	E, I	William Wright, Jr., Director of physical and capital planning, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.
Roswell, N. Mex.: Walker Air Force Base.	1967	1967	379	4,900	1,110	1,110	665	Greyhound; Levi Straus;[3] Longhorn Manufacturing; Kennedy Engineering; Glover Packing;[3] Eastern New Mexico University; Municipal airport.	1,950(C)	A, E, H, Ho, I	Rod Starkey, executive vice president, Roswell Chamber of Development and Commerce, P.O. Box 70, Roswell, N. Mex. 88201.
Newburgh, N.Y.: Stewart Air Force Base.	1969	1971	1,011	2,700	150	150	----------	New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority;[13] General aviation airport.	----------	A	Malcolm Sargent, chairman, Stewart Redevelopment Task Force, c/o Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 256 Broadway, Newburg, N.Y. 12550.
New York City, N.Y.: Army Pictorial Center.	1970	1972	388	64	----------	----------	----------	[14]	----------	----------	Glenn Ralston, senior planner, New York Department of City Planning, 2927 41st Avenue, Long Island City, N.Y. 11101.
New York City, N.Y.: St. Albans Naval Hospital.	1974	1974	386	517	646	646	----------	Veterans' Administration Hospital.	----------	H, P	George Persons, director, Veterans' Administration Hospital, 800 Polly Place, Queens, N.Y. 11209.

Schnectady and Voorhesville, N.Y.: Army and General Depot.	1966	1967	1,484	35	1,800	1,800	----------	Mowawk Tires; General Electric; J. C. Kline Inc.; Rayco; Distribution Unlimited; Agway Feeds; Chrysler Car Distribution.	----------	I	Francisco Galesi, chairman of the board, Northeastern Industrial Park Inc., P.O Box 98, Guilderland Center, N.Y. 12085.
Bellefontaine, Ohio: Bellefontaine Air Force Station.	1969	1970	27	136	100	100	----------	Ohio Hi-Point Joint Vocational School.	600(S)	E	John C. Richard, superintendent, Ohio Hi-Point Joint Vocational School, RFD-2, Bellefontaine, Ohio 43311.
Port Clinton, Ohio: Erie Army Depot.	1966	1967	1,885	35	800	800	----------	Uni-Royal Industrial Park----------		I	Howard Ostling, manager, Erie Industrial Park, Port Clinton, Ohio 43452.
Toledo, Ohio: Rossford Arsenal----	1963	1965	1,654	52	4,000	3,640	3,000	Hunt Foods; Ace Hardware; IAM Corporation; National Canvas; Chrysler Motors [3]; Michael J. Owens Junior College; Penta County Vocational School.	4,120(C)	E,I	James Fangman, assistant to the president, Willis Day Industrial Park, P.O. Box 676, Toledo, Ohio.
Wilmington, Ohio: Clinton County Air Force Base.	1971	1973	613	66	720	660	170	Ferno Washington, Inc.; Overseas National Airways; International Paper [3]; Laurel Oaks Vocational School; general aviation airport.	500(C); 840(S)	A,E,I,R	Thomas Hunter, editor, Wilmington News-Journal, Wilmington, Ohio 45177.
Burns Flat, Okla.: Clinton-Sherman Air Force Base.	1969–70	1970	391	1,700	480	480	----------	Elco Metal Products; Southwestern Rail Products; Fontaine Trucking; Western Oklahoma Vocational-Technical Center; municipal airport.	1,000(C)	A,E,Ho,I,P	Alvin Hamm, executive director, Midwest Oklahoma Development Authority, Burns Flat, Okla. 73624.
Corvallis, Oreg.: Adair Air Force Station.	1969	1973	180	864	74	74	----------	Oregon-Southwest Washington Laborers Training Trust; Chicano Indian Study Center.	1,630(T)	E,H,Ho	Ronald L. Anderson, director of training services, Oregon-Southwest Washington Laborers Training Trust, 1008 N.E. Multnomah Street, Portland, Oreg. 97232.
Harrisburg, Pa.: Olmsted AFB and Middletown Air Material Area.	1965–68	1968	10,050	1,250	3,010	2,600	----------	Fruehauf; Todco Door Co.; Steelco; United Piece Dye; Pennsylvania State-Capitol Campus; municipal airport.	2,500(C)	A,E,Ho,I,P,R,S	Matthew M. Douglas, executive vice president, Harrisburg Area Chamber of Commerce, 114 Walnut Street, Harrisburg, Pa. 17101.
Lancaster Pa.: Marietta Air Force Station.	1967	1968	750	----------	2,000	2,000	----------	Armstrong Cork Co----------		I	Gerald Malloy, executive director, Lancaster County Development Corp., 30 West Orange, Lancaster, Pa. 17603.
Phoenixville, Pa.: Valley Forge Army Hospital.	1973–74	1976	845	546	40	1782	----------	Northeast Bible College; local school and park activities.	500(C)	E,P	Daniel Baer, president, Valley Forge Use Study Committee, P.O. Box 29, Phoenixville, Pa. 19460.
York, Pa.: York Naval Ordnance Plant.	1964	1964	1,092	13	1,359	1,359	----------	AMF, Inc----------		I	John J. Bell, executive director, York County Development Corp., Chamber of Commerce Building, East Market Street, York, Pa. 17401.

See footnotes at end of table.

COMPLETED MILITARY BASE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROJECTS, 1961–77—Continued

[EXPLANATORY NOTES—College or vo-tech students: (C) College students or postsecondary vo-tech students; (S) Secondary high school vo-tech students; (T) Manpower development and other trainees. Land use: A, Aviation; Ag, Agriculture; C, Commercial; E, Education; F, Other Federal use; H, Health; Hi, Historic preservation; Ho, Housing; I, Industrial; M, Municipal; P, Park and recreation; R, Reserve or National Guard; S, State.]

Community and facility	Year of impact	Year of acquisition	Civilian jobs lost	Military transfers	New civilian jobs			Major firms/activities	College vo-tech students	Land use	Commununity contact
					Total jobs on base	New jobs on base	Direct off-base jobs[1]				
Greenville, S.C.: Donaldson Air Force Base.	1963	1964	672	4,100	3,500	3,500	3,000	E-Systems Inc.; Woolworth Distribution Center; Union Carbide; 3-M Co.; Norwich Pharmaceutical; Michelin;[3] Donaldson Area Vocational Education Center, General Aviation.	606(C)	A,C,E,I,P	Charles L. Sanders, general manager, Donaldson Center Greenville, S.C. 29605.
Edgemont, S. Dak.: Black Hills Army Depot.	1967	1968	512	12	80	80	42	FHT Feeders; Cheyenne Feeders; Kustom Kraft Corp.[3]	----------	Ag,Ho,I	Ruben Wailes, manager, Black Hills Industrial Freeport, Edgemont, S. Dak. 57735.
Smyrna, Tenn.: Sewart Air Force Base.	1969	1971	470	4,050	1,940	1,910	----------	International Drug; Better Built Aluminum; Hy-Tec Corp.; Capital International Airways; Ferro Corp.; Carrier Corp.; Comprehensive Rehabilitation Center; municipal airport.	400(C)	A,E,H,Ho,I,R.S.	Sam Ridley, mayor, town of Smyrna, Smyrna, Tenn. 37167.
Amarillo, Tex.: Amarillo Air Force Base.	1968	1969	1,571	5,600	2,265	2,192	----------	Bell Helicopter; Levi Strauss; Tasco Engineering; Texas State Technical Institute; municipal airport.	2,000(C)	A,E,Ho,I,P,R.	John Stiff, city manager, city of Amarillo, Amarillo, Tex. 79101.
Harlingen, Tex.: Harlingen Air Force Base.	1962	1963–64	720	3,100	1,400	1,400	----------	Levi Strauss; Tex-Steel; Cooper Air Motive; Marine Military Academy; Texas State Technical Institute.	900(C)	A,C,E,Ho,I,M.	David Allex, manager, Chamber of Commerce, Harlingen, Tex. 78550.
Laredo, Tex.: Laredo Air Force Base.	1973	1975	700	1,998	1,305	610	----------	Julian Noa Inc.; Tracor-Radcon; International Diversified; municipal airport.	----------	A,E,H,Ho,I,M,S.	Gail R. Peck, director of airports, Laredo International Airport, Laredo, Tex. 78041.
Mineral Wells, Tex.: Fort Wolters	1974	[16] 1975–77	1,219	692	1,008	1,008	387	Optron, Inc.; Kay Industries; Ford Manufacturing; Northridge Oil; Illinois Tool;[3] J-Mack, Bartec;[3] Chemical Dynamics;[3] Weatherford College; general aviation airport.	300(C)	A,E,H,Ho,I,M,P,R,S.	Ellis White, mayor, city of Mineral Wells, P.O. Box 339, Mineral Wells, Tex. 76067.
San Marcos, Tex.: Camp Gary	1963	1965	30	1	250	250	----------	Texas Educational Foundation; Job Corps School; municipal airport.	2,000(T)	A,E	Jim Bough, city manager, city of San Marcos, San Marcos, Tex. 78666.
Sherman-Denison, Tex.: Perrin Air Force Base.	1971	1972	600	1,930	617	617	----------	Texas Instrument; Hitchcock, Ind.; Grayson County College; municipal airport.	1,000(C)	A,E,H,Ho,I	Jerry Chapman, executive director, Texoma Regional Planning Commission, 1000 Arnold Boulevard, Denison, Tex. 75020.

Sweetwater, Tex.: Sweetwater Air Force Station.	1971	1971	25	100	73	73	----------	Texas State Institute--------	240(C)	E	Bill Pevehouse, general manager, Rolling Plains Campus, Texas State Technical Institute, Sweetwater, Tex. 79556.
Waco, Tex.: James Connally Air Force Base.	1966	1966	833	2,980	657	657	----------	James Connally Technical Institute; municipal airport.	2,900(C)	A, E	Ted Talbott, vice president, James Connally Technical Institute, Waco, Tex. 76703.
Saltville, Va.:[16] Air Force Hydrazine Plant 80 and Olin Chemical Complex.	1971–73	1971–76	880	----------	153	153	----------	Pyott-Boone Corp.; Greer Steel; Carbonic Industries.	----------	I	Leo Branham, chairman, Saltville Industrial Development Authority, Saltville, Va. 24370.
Kitsap Country, Wash.:[17] Nike Site 92.	1974	1976	----------	131	5	----------		North Kitsap Vo-Tech and school uses.	40(S)	E	Robert Minnitti, superintendent, North Kitsap School District, Poulsbo, Wash. 98370.
Moses Lake, Wash.: Larson Air Force Base.	1966	1966	388	3,440	[18] 886	[18] 886	----------	Continental Can; Japan Airlines; King Mushroom; Saga Foods; Port of Moses Lake; Big Bend Community College; Columbia Basin Job Corps; municipal airport.	1,000(C); 200(T)	Ag, A, C, E, Ho, I, M, P	Clyde W. Owen, executive manager, Grant County Airport, Moses Lake, Wash. 98837.
Madison, Wis.: Truax field------	1968	1968	378	1,265	810	710	----------	Wisconsin Research Foundation; Dairy Equipment Co.; State Department of Transportation; municipal airport.	----------	A, C, I,M	Peter Drahn, deputy director, Dane County Airport Authority, Madison Wis. 53701
Total civilians and military----------			68, 800	85, 402	78, 765	69, 542	10, 540		52, 512(C); 4,215(S); 5,309(T)	----------	

[1] Jobs directly related to the reuse of the base property or to key community/EAC actions (including grants). Does not include secondary employment impact.
[2] Property declared excess (March 1965) to assist in offsetting Brookley AFB impact.
[3] Off-base firms.
[4] Reuse awaiting final approval of Outer Continental Shelf oil leases for the Gulf of Alaska (scheduled for November 1977). The site will be leased with a planned employment level of 200–400 persons.
[5] Reuse program for facilities was an element in larger area economic adjustment program.
[6] Economic adjustment program involved long-term outlease of shipyard by the Navy for civilian re-use.
[7] Significant job loss since 1974 (500 jobs).
[8] Lake Charles released airport and acquired the property outright in 1976. Sowella (Southwestern Louisiana Tech) is now undertaking a $4,500,000 expansion program which will increase enrollment on-base to 1,000 full-time and 1,600 part-time students.
[9] The realinement at Westover AFB resulted in the loss of 4,400 military and a net gain of 150 civilians with the Air Force Reserve, which retained the airfield. The community has acquired approximately ⅓ the excess base property (February 1977). A new $140,000,000 generating station is under construction; a new regional Vo-Tech school (800 students) will open in 1977–78; and the Westover Metropolitan Development Corp. is attracting new prospects to the remaining base properties which are awaiting sale to the community corporation.
[10] Watertown did not accept an offer for a national firm headquarters. After purchase by the town, the arsenal facilities have been salvaged in part and have remained unused.
[11] Does not include temporary construction jobs.
[12] J. C. Penney Western Regional Distribution Center is now under construction. The center will employ upward of 1,500 persons.
[13] The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) acquired Stewart and 9,000 adjacent acres for a fourth international jetport serving New York City. MTA was blocked in its efforts by a major environmental controversy.
[14] The former Army Pictorial Center was transferred to LaGuardia Community College for a new branch campus. The facility was returned to the Federal Government for disposal in 1976 due to the New York City financial situation. New York City is now endeavoring to acquire the facility under a historic preservation conveyance for further motion picture and TV production use under the auspices of the Astoria Motion Picture and TV Foundation.
[15] Portions of property still awaiting sale/conveyance to the community.
[16] Closure of private-sector chemical complex (Olin Corp.) with small (7 acres) Air Force plant resulted in OEA/EAC involvement. Job losses were not direct DOD jobs but are still reflected in job loss totals.
[17] Property made available to assist in meeting school build-up from new Trident submarine support site.
[18] Does not include 360 part-time jobs.

Senator HART. I wonder how well you are prepared to use that as a public relations tool, as an additional carrot, an incentive to the community, when they are in a situation like this and in meeting with the community leaders——

Senator CULVER. To help the community think of it in a little more positive, constructive manner?

Mr. WHITE. We do try to do that when we meet with them to describe to them some of our recent——

Senator CULVER. Do you have a film or anything like that? We have films on everything else.

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, we don't have, not to my knowledge, we do not.

COST OF REALINEMENT STUDIES

Senator CULVER. I have one last question, Mr. Chairman, back to my discussions with you earlier, Mr. Gibbs, I don't mean to minimize the agonizing complexity of what you are involved in, and I know small realinements can add up to big savings—if they are the appropriate choices—but I hope these small realinement studies with all attendant man days and paperwork do not end up costing more than the potential savings that might be realized. I could probably find a case study or two that would bear out more specifically what I am talking about. Are you sensitive to that possibility, too?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

Senator CULVER. It is not hard to gin up our Government paper mill, we have a lot of people that are working at it. I don't mean to minimize how competent and dedicated our analysts are. I just hope we assign them to studies which hold out a realistic promise of cost effective results, and not to studies that in and of themselves are more expensive than the costs we are supposedly trying to save.

Mr. GIBBS. I am sensitive to that and I am quite sure that when we look at all of the realinement actions that we have underway the savings would far exceed the total of any of the costs of the studies.

Senator CULVER. You can understand our concern when we hear of studies where in fact this isn't the case.

Mr. GIBBS. I understand.

Senator CULVER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HART. Senator Thurmond.

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING BASES

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to question Dr. White and the Service secretaries relative to the proposed base realinement study. I am not convinced the Army's training base should be reduced at all, and it is inconceivable to me that the most cost efficient training base in the Army—Fort Jackson, S.C.—should be a candidate for any base closure. The same applies to the Parris Island Marine depot near Beaufort, S.C. where the training facilities are modern, the acreage ample, and the cost efficiency rate excellent.

In fact, in the Army's base realignment announcement for the entire Nation it was estimated that if all 29 installations affected would be closed the annual savings of $129 million would be achieved.

Yet only a year ago the Army apparently rejected a study which showed it would be about $70 million cheaper to place the new one station unit training for infantry at Fort Jackson as opposed to Fort Benning, Ga. How can the Army justify taking such a course? That is what I understand they are considering. So I would say to the Army that big money could be saved immediately by placing this new training program at the most cost efficient base, Fort Jackson.

Mr. Chairman, of course these decisions rest primarily with the executive branch. Further, I have been impressed with the ability of Dr. White, Secretary Gibbs and Secretary Hidalgo and also Secretary Chayes, who is better looking than the rest of you. I do wish to take every opportunity, however, to make them aware of the benefits offered by training facilities in my State and encourage them to follow the more economical route in all these matters, which is the guidance I would trust President Carter and Secretary Brown have also given them.

Mr. Chairman, I have learned a great deal about the base realinement issues because two large installations in my State are involved. Closure of Fort Jackson would have an annual impact in revenue losses around $488 million, according to the Chamber of Commerce of Columbia. This involves 20 percent of the economy of that city. At Parris Island the impact on the nearby community of Beaufort would be very harsh as nearly 50 percent of the economy is tied to Parris Island. The impacts of these closures are most severe in small States such as mine where the military installation is a key fact in the local economy.

As to the importance of the facilities themselves, these facts have already been documented for the Defense Department and separate agencies. The size of both Fort Jackson and Parris Island give them a capability far greater than any of the facilities they are competing with in the realinement study. This should be a key factor as when the base is reduced it must be done in a way to allow an immediate surge or mobilization capacity in the event of a sudden national emergency.

The staff to student ratio at both bases is among the most efficient in the Defense Department. In addition, the lower living costs enable the military to get the same services for less cost. Further, the fuel savings from good weather and loss of training days is a big money saving factor. Still another critical point is that in the last 10 years tens of millions in new construction has been spent at both these facilities. They can both operate for many years in the future with minor new construction costs.

I would urge the leadership in the Pentagon and the White House to follow strictly a base realinement policy based upon cost savings and not political considerations. The taxpayer wants a strong defense, not one tailored to political pressures which fail to follow the most cost efficient route.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to propound some questions for Dr. White, Secretary Gibbs, Secretary Chayes and Secretary Hidalgo, if it is desired I do so at this point or later.

Senator HART. Why don't you go forward with a couple of questions for a couple of minutes and then I will go. We will just follow the 10 minute rule.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

SCHEDULE FOR BASE REALINEMENT STUDIES

Senator THURMOND. Dr. White, can you provide for the committee a schedule as to when various decisions will be made public on the base realinement study and on what criteria or baseline the decisions will be based?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, earlier during the hearings, we did indicate the criteria are in the record elsewhere and we will submit them and we will also submit the schedule.

Senator THURMOND. When will the Second Division relocation study decision be announced?

Mr. WHITE. I don't know at this time, Senator Thurmond. A final date for announcement has not been selected.

Senator THURMOND. What units are to be withdrawn from Korea for relocation in the United States and when?

Mr. WHITE. That schedule has not been determined yet. That is my understanding anyway. I am not intimately involved in the unit withdrawals, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Have recent actions in the Congress caused any changes in those plans?

Mr. WHITE. Not to my knowledge, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. You are familiar, I believe, with the resolution urging the President not to remove units over there at this time, I presume?

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir. I just want to underline, sir, that the question of movement schedule and the units is not an area over which I have any cognizance, so I am not the right person from the Secretary's office to answer the question.

Senator THURMOND. Of course the training base discussions would be based upon those actions?

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir.

Senator THURMOND. Bringing units back?

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir.

ARMY TRAINING BASES

Senator THURMOND. Dr. White, when the Army portion of the base realinement proposal was presented to DOD, did it include Fort Jackson as a candidate for announcement in the base closure study?

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir.

Senator THURMOND. Are you sure of that?

Mr. WHITE. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Was that at the direction of the Defense Department or did that originate with the Army?

Mr. WHITE. Originated in the Army, as I recall.

Mr. GIBBS. Yes sir, it did originate in the Army, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Was Fort Jackson added at the DOD level?

Mr. WHITE. No sir.

Senator THURMOND. Are all Army training bases possible candidates for realinement?

Mr. GIBBS. If I may, Senator, I would like to answer that question.

Senator THURMOND. If not, why did you put the most efficient base on the list?

Mr. GIBBS. We have underway a nearly concluded study which we announced in April which was a look at all of the training bases in the Army, a study which is trying to answer the question over the long run what is the most efficient structure for our training bases and what in fact our training workloads are going to be, so in that sense, we have been reviewing all of the installations.

We announced in April three specific candidates: Fort Jackson, Fort Dix, and Fort Bliss.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. White, the Army has been attempting to close Fort Dix since 1971. Why do you think it has not been closed although it has been on the list for years?

Mr. WHITE. I don't know, Senator. I have never in my tenure here had any opportunity to review proposals for Fort Dix other than the current studies, so I am sorry, I don't know the answer.

Senator THURMOND. In the last few years Dix has developed huge maintenance costs, because needed repairs were delayed on the grounds it may close. New construction at Dix has also been held to a minimum. Despite this it has been kept open. In recent months as training loads have decreased, cuts have been made throughout the training base to keep Dix open. Do you concur in this inefficient management approach?

Mr. WHITE. Sir, I don't know the specifics of which you speak. The problem and the reason we are doing the base realinement actions is because we do have inefficiencies. We have too many bases and too many facilities and we would like to correct that. I think that is what this process is all about.

Senator THURMOND. I believe my 10 minutes are up and I will be back in a few minutes. Thank you very much.

Senator HART. Thank you, Senator.

BASE REALINEMENT STUDIES

Let me ask the panel, and again I invite other Secretaries to comment themselves on the study process, and particularly the cost factors involved.

To what degree in these studies do you consider all the costs to the Federal Government of a realinement or consolidation, or is that cost factor merely limited to consideration of defense-related costs?

Mr. WHITE. If I might begin, Mr. Chairman. We do consider all costs, that is, we attempt to consider all costs. We do consider paramount our own costs and cost savings, but in every case we look at the economic impact on that community and the costs that will be incurred by that community as a result of any action that we may take.

Senator HART. Any other comments on that in terms of your own services?

Ms. CHAYES. Yes.

Senator HART. Secretary Chayes.

Ms. CHAYES. The problem is that we have to rely on other agencies to supply the costs. For example, educational costs and housing costs. It is to our great interest to be extremely precise and we in the Air Force give it a very high priority since we have to defend our own analysis. That is why we are developing the base cost and community economic impact models with great care.

This is not, however, the highest priority of the outside agencies. They do it in a sense of service which has caused me to give it a lot of thought. I think that now there is a move through the White House to get some kind of uniform way to cost these items. I don't feel that costs have been as reliable outside the Defense Department as they have been inside. Of course, the predictions are spongy in any place.

NONDEFENSE COSTS OF BASE REALINEMENTS

Senator HART. Can you think of or give me an instance where a base was closed that did not involve a sort of cost determination, that is to say, where the saving decision was based on these other related items, economics, housing, education, and not merely what finally sifted out as the least cost or the greatest cost savings to the Department?

Ms. CHAYES. No sir, I can't.

Mr. HIDALGO. I can't give you one.

Mr. WHITE. We have situations in the national capital region where we do make moves and do have proposals now in the current package which are not cost effective, because of the directions from the Congress with respect to reducing our presence here, but that is not really what you are speaking of.

Senator HART. No, what I am looking for is an instance in any of the services where you have decided that you will keep one base open because of the nondefense related costs, which would be greater even though the defense related costs would be less. Would you go back and scrub your records? What I am after is pretty obvious.

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir.

Senator HART. Even though we give lip service to all of related costs, Secretary Chayes has testified to the difficulty of getting the data and making it applicable, and I understand that. Nonetheless, the Department says that it gives weight to these other costs. What I am looking for is a situation where that weight prevailed.

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir.

Senator HART. I know it is difficult to come up with that off the top of your head, so if you go back in the period of time we have the record open, and see if you can find an instance where in fact those related costs prevailed.

[The information follows:]

To date there have not been any announced base realinement proposals which have not been implemented based solely on the fact that the non-Defense related costs were greater than Defense savings. However, there have been a number of previously announced based realinement proposals for study, which after the studies were completed, were not implemented. The reasons for not implementing these proposals vary, hinge generally on Defense related reasons but include consideration of community and personnel impacts.

I have touched briefly on timing question. Do any of you have an instance or any additional information to what Dr. White has already provided about how the decision is made, the timing decisions are made, and also can we expect any announcements on the current package, the current April list, let's say, by the end of this year?

Mr. WHITE. The answer to your second question I think is yes, Mr. Chairman that is, perhaps what we ought to do is submit for the

record the anticipated dates of decisions where we are close enough to know them, and it certainly ought to be by the end of the year.

Senator HART. If you would, it would be helpful.

[The information follows:]

The anticipated decision dates for the Army studies announced in April 1978 are as follows:

Study:	*Decision announcement*
Fort Bliss, Tex	Jan. 30, 1979.
Fort Dix, N. J	Do.
Fort Jackson, S.C	Do.
Fort Douglas, Utah	Dec. 29, 1978.
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah	Oct. 30, 1978.
Applied Technology Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Va	Nov. 30, 1978.
Theater Communications Security Logistics Support Center-Pacific, Fort Kamehameha, Hawaii	Oct. 17, 1978.
Logistics Systems Support Activity, Letterkenny Army Depot, Pa	Dec. 29, 1978.
Letterman Army Medical Center, Calif	Apr. 30, 1979.
Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Va	Jan. 30, 1979.
Military Traffic Management Command, Bailey's Crossroads, Va	Oct. 30, 1978.
Fort Monroe, Va	May 30, 1979.
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif	Apr. 30, 1979.
Army Management Engineering Training Agency, Rock Island Arsenal, Ill	Nov. 30, 1978.
Fort Sheridan, Ill	Mar. 26, 1979.

SER Action:	*Navy decision date*
	Decision date
Navy RTC:	
San Diego, Great Lakes	April 1979.
USMC Recruit Depot:	
San Diego, Parris Island	February 1979.
Supply Consolidation:	
Alameda, Oakland; NAS North Island, San Diego; NAS, Norfolk	October 1978.
Hospitals:	
Port Hueneme	October 1978.
New Orleans	August 1978.
Annapolis	October 1978.
Quantico	October 1978.
Whidbey Island	October 1978.
Philadelphia	October 1978.
Key West	November 1978.
Long Beach	March 1979.
CASDO/CENO	Completed.
Naval Air Facility, Detroit	December 1978.
NARDET: Various NARDETS	October 1978.
Relocation out of Washington:	
CHESDIV	October 1978.
Navy Recruit Command	October 1978.
Navy Exhibit	October 1978.
Audit Service	October 1978.
MSC	October 1978.

Air Force decision schedule	
Chanute AFB, Ill	June 1979.
Goodfellow AFB, Tex	April 1979.
Los Angeles AFS, Calif	July 1979.
Kingsley Field, Oreg	April 1979.
Loring AFB, Maine	Winter, 1978.
Rickenbacker AFB, Ohio	April 1979.

Senator HART. Again this goes to the fundamental premise of how political decisions are. Do they relate to elections one way or the other? What, as candidly as possible you could, tell us what role the election time has on the timing of your announcements one way or the other.

[Additional information follows:]

The development and timing of the April 1978 base realinement announcement was based entirely on the need to move ahead with tightening the DoD base structure in order to realize the DoD savings as early as possible.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12049

Senator HART. Let me return a minute to the line of questioning, Senator Culver again directed a question to each or all of you on the question of economic adjustment. We had some discussion of this, as you know, in our hearings before the Military Construction Committee last spring, and I had some personal reservations about the new Executive order at that time. Is that Executive order having its intended impact, can you tell us?

Mr. WHITE. I think it is. It is a little too early to tell for sure but we certainly think that it is. We have a number of things happening as a result of it. As I indicated, we have reviewed and are changing some of the activities within the office itself. We have increased participation from OMB and the White House. We have better cooperation than we had before in the current actions from the other departments, much better interest, participation, and cooperation. And we are getting the word out to the community, and I think successfully. I get a list every week of how we are doing with respect to the communities that are participating in this program.

So I think we are really doing much better than we were before.

Senator HART. You are getting better cooperation from the other Federal agencies?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, we are. The day of the announcement we had a very large meeting, chaired by Mr. Duncan, where all the departments were represented. Mr. Watson was there as well, and spoke. I don't remember the number exactly, but there were five or six Under Secretaries of domestic departments in that meeting, as well as other senior people from all the agencies. So we are getting much better cooperation.

Senator HART. How many times since that Executive order was issued has the Economic Adjustment Committee met?

Mr. WHITE. I think that is the only formal meeting of the committee. I would have to get for the record how many times the working group has met. What we did was identify the key people in the departments to do the work and that is ongoing.

Senator HART. Let us know——

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator HART [continuing]. How often that group has gotten together.

[The information follows:]

The Economic Adjustment Committee, which includes the Secretaries of 16 Federal agencies, the Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Relations, with the Secretary of Defense as chairman, met on April 26, 1978 to review the Economic Adjustment Program, current and anticipated future community assistance projects and the arrangements for interagency support. As an out-

growth of this meeting, each of the member agencies has designated a principal representative to serve as liaison to OEA to (1) coordinate agency support, (2) participate in assistance projects, and (3) assist in resolving community impact problems.

Subsequently, there have been ten meetings of EAC agency representatives for the purpose of improving interagency coordination and assistance procedures, and for arranging assistance to individual communities. Community assistance activities are managed on a project basis and concerned Federal agency representatives work on these projects as a team. Thus, at any given time there are from 30 to 40 Federal interagency teams cooperating on community projects throughout the country.

MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS

Senator HART. On the issue of mobilization, to what degree do mobilization requirements figure in your decisions on closings? Are you closing bases that would have to be reacquired or reopened in a mobilization?

Mr. WHITE. We shouldn't be disposing of them; no, sir. We do consider mobilization requirements when we look at the base structure and when base realinement decisions are made. In fact, as you may know, some are inactivated and retained in standby for just that purpose. In the interim, they are used for Reserve component training, especially during the summer.

Senator HART. What does standby involve; what do you do?

Mr. WHITE. Normally, it involves an inactive base where minimum maintenance is performed, which will allow activation on very short notice, if required.

Senator HART. In each case of each of the services across the board, Department-wide you calculate in the mobilization requirements?

Mr. WHITE. Yes.

Senator HART. You do have backup, fallback facilities for that purpose?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman; we do.

COST OF REALINEMENT STUDIES

Senator HART. On the question of the realinement studies themselves, what do they cost? Have you done any calculations on how much it would cost to study realinement for the purpose of saving money? Are we spending an awful lot of money? Does it cost us more to study than we are saving?

Mr. WHITE. I don't have any numbers on studies, Mr. Chairman. It is a lot of work, there is no question about that. EIS's alone are very expensive. We generally do those by contract. We know what those costs are. Most of the studies are done by the staff in the Department of Defense. An enormous amount of money is involved, but I do not know the exact cost. For the most part, the accomplishment of these studies is part of the staff's normal function. It is a matter of priority of effort.

Senator HART. Is there any way to calculate staff-hours and that?

Mr. WHITE. It would be very, very hard, Mr. Chairman. I don't know how to do it. We could have a look at it on a case study basis and maybe we could give you a feel for it.

Senator HART. That would be helpful. I don't want to create additional cost.

Mr. WHITE. Study.

Senator HART. How much it costs to study. But I think if you can do it off the back of an envelope, or however, on a case study basis, it would be helpful to us.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. It might even be helpful in your own calculations.

[The information follows:]

It is very difficult to generalize as to the costs of DoD base realinement studies. Each study is different and involves many different variables of varying size, scope and extent, and could include in some cases court directed actions. The DoD does not keep track of the manhours of in-house effort spent in these studies since this is part of a staff's normal function and merely involves a shift of priorities. Accordingly, costs for this effort are not maintained. Contract costs for environmental studies are available, but these represent only a portion of the total cost and are, therefore, not very meaningful indicators. However, one recent large and very controversial base realinement for which costs were accumulated, as an exception, approached a million dollars in cost. We consider the cost of this study to be unusual. The cost of these studies must also be put into the proper perspective in that it is a one time expenditure whereas the savings which may result from the study are realized each and every year after implementation. At best, the cost of the study will affect only the amortization period of the proposal and then only to a small degree in our opinion.

Senator HART. You don't have an idea of how many people in the Department are involved in the base realinement study process?

Mr. WHITE. No sir, but at various times it is extensive because you have to consider so many different elements and at so many different echelons in the Department, but I do not know.

Senator HART. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ARMY MANPOWER LEVELS

Dr. White, the Army training base realinement is postulated to a large extent upon lower manning levels, lower attrition rates, and better retention. Last year, Congress went through a tough fight on Army manpower levels, finally approving 787,000 and rejecting a much lower figure for fiscal year 1978. Despite this, someone directed the Army during the past year to reduce its size to the low level rejected by Congress. Can you account for this deviation from congressional guidance?

Mr. WHITE. When you say the lower level, lower level for 1979 program, Senator?

Senator THURMOND. 1978.

Mr. WHITE. You mean the number provided by Congress? We then directed them in 1978 to a lower number?

Senator THURMOND. We approved 787,000 and rejected a much lower figure for 1978, but despite this someone directed the Army during the past year to reduce its size to the lower level rejected by Congress. I am wondering how and why that was done and who did it?

Mr. WHITE. I am sorry, sir, I would have to provide that for the record.

Senator THURMOND. Would you provide that for the record?

Mr. WHITE. Yes sir.

[The information follows:]

It has been the managerial practice in the Department to review the current year as well as the program year during the annual budget preparation process.

This allows management to capitalize on the latest information, trends and policies that have occurred or have been developed subsequent to the authorization process. This is not a new procedure. The following table shows the results of this type of review for Army end strength beginning in FY 1973. In each case, the revised plan has been approved by the Secretary of Defense.

ACTIVE ARMY MANPOWER AT END FISCAL YEARS, 1973-78

[In thousands of dollars]

	Request, President's budget	Congressional authorization	Revised plan[1]
Fiscal years:			
1973	841.2	828.9	824.8
1974	803.8	785.0	781.6
1975	785.0	785.0	785.0
1976	785.0	782.0	782.0
TQ	793.0	790.0	790.0
1977	790.0	789.0	789.0
1978	790.0	787.0	774.2

[1] "Current year" column of the next year's President's budget.

The table shows that the end strength of the Army has been revised three times beginning in 1973. During the same period, the end strengths of the other Services were revised the following number of times: Navy—7; Marine Corps—3; and Air Force—5.

Four factors make the overall reduction in Army end strength possible while, at the same time, increasing the force structure. First, the Army will need fewer recruits to man its force because the average time served is increasing. Second, new soldiers will spend less time, on the average, in training as an increased proportion of them attend one-station unit training, a course that replaces recruit and initial skill training with a single course. Third, the Army is increasing the efficiency of its training establishment, thus increasing the ratio of students to staff. Finally, the Army is improving the management of assignments and can therefore reduce transient manpower authorizations formerly needed to cover people who are between assignments.

VALUE OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF MANPOWER REQUESTS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. White, what value do you attach to the congressional review of manpower requests and what effort do you feel should be made to accommodate them?

Mr. WHITE. We attach a great deal of value to those requests and, as you know, we spend a good deal of time with the Members of Congress discussing our program and why the manpower numbers are what they are. We do weight them very heavily in terms of our subsequent decisions, but at the same time, we have lots of actors to consider, including paramountly budget constraints. Sometimes we come up with different numbers.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. White, was there any congressional consultation about this action and, if so, with whom?

Mr. WHITE. I would have to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Meetings with key congressional staff personnel were held by Service and DoD personnel early this calendar year to explain our programs. As always, we were prepared to provide any information requested by the Congress to promote a full understanding of what we were doing.

I think it is also important to note that from a management point of view we consider the active strength authorized by Congress for each Service to be a ceiling not to be exceeded. We feel it would be imprudent to not introduce efficiencies whenever appropriate. Some of these efficiencies will inevitably result in end strength reductions.

ARMY TRAINING LEVELS

Senator THURMOND. Dr. White, what authority does the Army or DOD have to reduce the Army's training base strength below the level mandated by the Congress?

Mr. WHITE. Sir, I don't know really other than the obligation to run the Department of the Army in the most efficient way. There are a great many dynamics, as you well know, that take place here. Reenlistment rates, attrition rates, accession rates. These all interact and change over any given year.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. White, would you agree that if DOD follows this policy then the work Congress does in acting on the manpower requests is really a waste of time?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, I don't think so. We value the guidance that we get from the Congress. There are just a great many factors.

Senator THURMOND. Is it guidance or is it law that the Congress enacts?

Mr. WHITE. In some cases one and other cases the other.

Senator THURMOND. Is the Department looking upon what the Congress does as guidance? We don't guide, we enact law.

Mr. WHITE. If it is law we follow it, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Well, it was law. That is the reason I want to know who directed these cuts to be made.

Dr. White, I understand in the current budget for fiscal year 1979 the Army requested 8,000 more personnel than finally was requested in the budget. Why was the Army training cut once again?

Mr. WHITE. The Army training cut in 1979 was an attempt on our part to balance the programs within the overall defense budget in the context of the other services as well as the Army, and in the context of the dynamics of the Army manpower base, which again includes the nature of the force reenlistment rates, their attrition rates and so on.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. White, what annual training levels does DOD predict for the Army during the early eighties?

Mr. WHITE. I would have to provide that for the record, but it is lower than had been the case in recent years, Senator, and closer to the 1979 level.

[The information follows:]

Army training loads (the daily average number of Army students and trainees enrolled in formal school training courses) are shown in the following table for fiscal years 1977–1981:

	Actual, fiscal year 1977	Estimated, fiscal years—			
		1978	1979	1980	1981
Active Army	77,649	69,079	67,843	69,616	68,311
Army National Guard	12,459	16,471	16,793	14,102	13,897
Army Reserve	6,198	6,238	5,959	6,816	6,852
Total Army	96,306	91,788	85,595	90,534	89,060

Senator THURMOND. And to what extent does that differ from the training input in the past few years?

Mr. WHITE. Well, as I indicated, sir, I think it will be lower.

Senator THURMOND. Do you visualize this is sufficient to close one base or two bases, and when will you determine what reductions can be made?

Mr. WHITE. I do not have the schedule. Perhaps Mr. Gibbs does, on the decisions whith respect to the bases. Do you know the projected dates?

Mr. GIBBS. The projected dates for the Dix, Jackson, Bliss studies are after the first of the year.

ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions for Secretary Gibbs now.

Mr. Secretary, I will proceed with those. Secretary Gibbs, are you aware of an Army study issued late in 1976 which found it was far more cost effective to place the new one station unit training at Fort Jackson rather than Fort Benning?

Mr. GIBBS. I have been informed or that although I have not seen the study, Senator.

Senator THURMOD. You haven't seen that study? Mr. Gibbs, would you mind having that study brought to your attention and would you please read it?

Mr. GIBBS. I will.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, this study found that there would be one time cost of about $70 million more to place this training at Benning instead of Jackson. In addition, it found an annual recurring cost of about $4½ million if Benning was selected over Jackson.

If this study were valid today, would you support taking advantage of these savings?

Mr. GIBBS. Senator, I don't know whether the study would be valid today and I am not aware of the numbers that you are speaking about. As I understand, the Army's decision at that time to locate one station unit training at Fort Benning, it was done because the Infantry school is located at Fort Benning and there are a lot of desirable features of having one station unit training at the home of the Infantry.

Senator THURMOND. That shouldn't override the question of cost though, should it? Aren't you trying to save all you can now? Is the President trying to close bases and cut down and save in an effort to approach a balanced budget?

Mr GIBBS. We always are very cost conscious, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, a recent study conducted by the commanding general at Fort Jackson showed the cost of placing one station unit training there would be only about $3.7 million. This includes $1.7 million for a track maintenance facility and $2 million for range construction and renovation. Are you aware of this study?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes; I am aware of the study and I believe that that is being conducted as a part of the overall study of the location of the Second Infantry Division.

As you know, one of the candidates for receiving the Second Infantry Division upon its return is Fort Benning. Should Fort Benning be selected, then one station unit training would have to be relocated and Fort Jackson is the candidate for that. So the study you spoke of, I believe, is being conducted as part of that.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the present plan of the Army is to place one station unit training at Fort Benning mainly on the basis that the training should be at the professional home of the Infantry. What value do you give to the professional home concept?

Mr. GIBBS. I think there is a lot of value attached to the professional home concept. We have gone to that on a number of occasions and at a number of locations.

Senator THURMOND. How high a cost savings do you feel should be surrendered to follow through on this concept?

Mr. GIBBS. That is not a question I can answer in the abstract, Senator. The colocation——

Senator THURMOND. I believe this study showed there would be savings of $70 million. In addition, recurring costs of about $4½ million, if Benning were selected over Jackson.

Mr. GIBBS. Senator——

Senator THURMOND. In other words, how much are you willing to surrender in order to carry out that concept? If not $71 suppose it is $100 million?

Mr. GIBBS. Again, not having seen that study that you referred to, which goes back several years, it is just not a question I can answer either in the abstract or in the context of that study. Cost is an important factor, but the mission capabilities and the effectiveness that one gets by collocating training for infantrymen with the professional school where a lot of concepts and doctrine are developed and can be tested out, has to be given some weight. It is hard to put a dollar value on that kind of thing.

Senator THURMOND. I believe my time is up. I will be back in a few minutes.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE USING BASE REALINEMENT SAVINGS

Senator HART. Thank you, Senator.

I just have two questions. One has to do with mitigation. There are proposals beginning to emerge, which I would like each of you to respond to, that assert the amount of the savings or the savings to be realized from a consolidation realinement be earmarked for a period of time, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, for economic assistance to the locality affected. And, particularly directed toward possible use, reuse or revitalization of the excess capacity which that facility may represent, some other peacetime or civilian purpose.

What would be your thoughts on that, the point being that the Department would realize its cost savings several years later but for a period of time, to get over the worst initial effects, that if $1 million were saved at installation x by closure, that $1 million would go back to that community for economic adjustment and assistance and perhaps reworking of the facility if it was the kind of facility that could be used for some other purpose.

Mr. WHITE. I don't see any logical link between cost savings for a reduction of a facility and the needs of the community that is surrounding that facility. It seems to me that the needs of the community surrounding the facility ought to be addressed based objectively on those needs. That is what the economic adjustment process is intended to do. The community ought to get what support it requires, rather

than some arbitrary fraction of the defense savings, depending on the needs of the community. It seems to me that is the way to do economic adjustment, not to tie it artifically to some number which doesn't have any direct linkage to the problem.

Senator HART. Do any of the Secretaries wish to comment on that proposal?

Ms. CHAYES. I agree with John, it seems to me also there is a lot of tinkering with the process, if you can put it that way, that perhaps one way to approach all of this might be to think about comprehensive legislation that leads toward procedures, and criteria that really deals with the question of economic adjustments. I guess my concern is that overall there isn't enough money at the right time in the other agencies to deal with the needs, that the highest priority of the other agencies is not economic adjustment. It is just my own thought, that a comprehensive bit of legislation might deal with that problem, namely, the earmarking of funds to facilitate economic adjustment. I have nothing further to add to what Dr. White has said, I think he is correct. But you also talked about depoliticization and confidence; comprehensive legislation of some sort might in fact deal with all these questions in a logical, coherent framework.

Senator HART. Does the earmarking of that money, which is really what we are talking about, is it not an attempt to be arbitrary here? It is an attempt to make sure that the funds available are definable and locatable, whether they are too much or too little, at least you know where the pot is from which the assistance is going to come.

I don't think this is necessarily politicization, and I take it that is not what you are suggesting by your last remark?

Ms. CHAYES. No; I was going back to your earlier comments about the need to depoliticize the whole base closure process and the concerns that have been expressed that the process was not coherent and logical and so on. I just said it may be that an alternative would be to deal in some comprehensive piece of legislation with all of these issues, including the earmarking of the necessary funds.

POSSIBLE REVISION OF BASE REALINEMENT POLICY

Senator HART. I want to ask each of you, the Secretaries particularly, one open ended final question for myself, and that is, if you could start from scratch and design the ideal base realinement policy, what would you change, what would you do differently from the way it is being done today?

Secretary Gibbs?

Mr. GIBBS. That is an interesting question. I think I would respond in two ways. First, I think that the process that we follow is a pretty good one. It is a very open process. In general, I like this process.

One of the things that disturbs me is the very openness of it, and that is to say, because we are required to make public announcements about our studies, and because they are often large and time consuming, we end up keeping communities and our own people hanging, if you will, for quite sometime.

I don't think on balance, though, that it would be wise to change the public announcement policy or the public nature of those studies, but it is a concern and if we could figure out some way or other of either

doing these things faster or announcing the study when we are a little farther along, so as to not disrupt the community as much as it does, I think that might be a helpful change.

Senator HART. You don't have any solution to the problem we were discussing earlier with regard to Lowry about how you study a thing to find out you are not going to close it in a way that doesn't frighten everyone while you are doing that study? Is there a way of doing that except doing it in secret, which would problably be unacceptable to Congress?

Mr. GIBBS. I don't think there is a way to do it except in secret and these kinds of things are never secret. Even though we don't make a public announcement until we have done a feasibility study, during the stage when within the Pentagon we are doing feasibility studies, the mere process of collecting information means that you have to ask questions of local commanders at installations. The mere questioning begins all the speculation and lots of rumors get started well before any public announcement is made. I don't think there is a cure for it.

Seantor HART. Secretary Hidalgo, what do you think?

Secretary HIDALGO. Mr. Chairman, I would only make this brief comment. I couldn't agree more with what Secretary Gibbs has said about the impossibility of keeping any of these things on a closed basis and I don't see any possible advantage would even come near outweighing the disadvantages. For the rest, although I hardly consider myself a base closure expert, I have been around the business world a good deal and I would say that the approach that is being taken is tremendously businesslike, it is a thorny question at best, and I think it is being improved in a very systematic objective way. I just subscribe to it as being the best possible solution. I don't know of any improvement, offhand that I would find. Should I go along and have any thoughts, I would certainly communicate them to you.

Senator HART. Please do.

Secretary Chayes?

Ms. CHAYES. Well, I also think our approach is sound. I think it is important that we have had a chance here to state what the criteria are and to make Congress aware of those criteria. We may expect Congress to hold us accountable to those criteria.

As I said before, I think that we need the appropriation of the economic adjustment fund in a timely manner so a community will be able to recover quickly. I don't know how this is to be accomplished, whether through a coherent legislative framework or otherwise. In light of the concerns of the committee we ought to be taking a longer range look at our basing structure and to make publicly available anticipated changes just as we do in our force structure. Again I don't know how quite to accomplish this, but this is something that Secretary Stetson has requested of us and we intend to do it. I think you should be asking us for this framework and prodding us until you are satisfied that we do have a logical, consistent framework for base closure. I think we are getting very close to that.

Senator HART. I would invite you or any of our colleagues to communicate your feelings on that specific issue by letter or personal visit, as you so desire, because it is an interesting suggestion, a long range framework based approach to this. It might be something later we would want to hold some hearings on, just that issue, after people have formulated their thoughts a little more, but it certainly makes sense to me.

Any other thoughts, Dr. White?

Mr. WHITE. Other than the standard ones, I think we do need to continue and we need to continue to solicit your help in being objective. I think this is the most important thing in the process.

The second point I would make is that we need to continue to ask your help in terms of being timely and open, but this means moving on with the activity. The biggest problem in that regard that I see, Mr. Chairman, is that too many of the proposals which I see for change simply add time to the process and do not provide us with any more information or wisdom or anything else, in terms of help. I would rather see the help in that regard come at the end in terms of assisting the impact affected communities.

The hardest part of this whole process, speaking personally, and I know I speak for my colleagues, is what happens to people. You put people out of their jobs and disrupt their lives. So it is very hard. So we need a lot of help in that regard.

The final thing I would say, which I think is less practical than those two, is we are getting to the situation in many of these cases where nothing is acceptable except hard numbers. We are limited in the Defense Department in terms of management actions which will increase our efficiency unless we can demonstrate to the Congress specific hard number savings, and with many management actions that is often very difficult. I think we pay a cost in efficiency for that emphasis.

OBJECTIVITY OF BASE REALINEMENTS

Senator HART. Well, on the question of objectivity, that should be the primary criterion of the Department on an issue of this sort, it must be, not by our favoritism or politics, I think each of us including myself has an obligation to do everything we can to point out the benefits of certain facilities in our States and districts, the impact of closure of those facilities on the economy, and lives of the people, and also to do anything we can to mitigate that, and I would yield to no one in my concern for that.

I think we make a mistake in the Congress when any of us try to become realinement experts and get into the detailed decisionmaking process and try to make our own views the substitute of those who have the professional responsibilities for doing that. There is a much greater, I think, willingness of those of us in the Congress to intervene and to meddle if we are sure that no one is meddling on the other side. I think it is a necessity to create this objectivity. We want to know that all of us are playing with the same deck and understand the same rules. It is when I think others don't agree with those of us who feel that way that it puts us in the bad spot and we are then under great pressure to start doing some of the same political tricks as some of our colleagues.

Senator Thurmond?

PROFESSIONAL HOME CONCEPTS

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gibbs, speaking of the professional home concept, I observe that the professional home concept is not implemented in the engineering branch, as the professional home is at Fort Belvoir,

Va., and training is at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. Do you plan to consolidate these two programs?

Mr. GIBBS. We don't have any current plans to do so, although we did look in the last realinement package at the possibility of doing it. We conducted a feasibility study on that question but we decided not to go forward with a detailed study, primarily because the feasibility study demonstrated that the costs appeared to be excessive.

Over the long run the Army would very much like to consolidate its engineering training at one installation and we will probably look at that again down the road to see whether or not it could be justified on the basis of costs. As an ideal, we would like to have the professional home concept applied to the engineering community.

Senator THURMOND. It would cost considerable money to do that, wouldn't it?

Mr. GIBBS. At this time it would.

Senator THURMOND. Just like it costs considerable money to establish at Benning the training that now goes on at Fort Jackson, wouldn't it?

Mr. GIBBS. Again, I believe you are referring to a study you mentioned before, which I have not seen.

Senator THURMOND. Be sure and see that study now.

Mr. GIBBS. I am going to.

Senator THURMOND. Where it costs $70 million more to do it at Benning rather than Fort Jackson.

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

ANNUAL ARMY TRAINING PROJECTIONS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I believe the study also found that the current training base should include Fort Dix and Fort Jackson if the annual input to training remains 200,000 or higher. What are the projections for the input in the next 5 years?

Mr. GIBBS. Senator, I will have to supply that for the record, I don't have the figures with me.

[The information follows:]

The Army study done in 1976 concluded that Fort Dix should be retained if male non-prior-service input to training remains above 200,000 annually. Input projections for the next five years are as follows:

Fiscal years:	
1978	178, 558
1979	180, 831
1980	195, 007
1981	187, 000
1982	187, 000

Data Source: Fiscal year 1979 MMTR.

At the time this study was completed, women were given initial entry training (IET) primarily at Fort Jackson and Fort McClellan. This is no longer the case as women are given IET at other Army Training Centers too. The total input projected for all males and females, non-prior service, active and reserve components is as follows:

Fiscal years:	
1978	212, 157
1979	213, 469
1980	232, 616
1981	227, 000
1982	227, 000

Data Source: Fiscal year 1979 MMTR.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, turning to the base realinement study. How did you project personnel input levels on the decision to reduce the training base? The study I referred to was projected on input levels between 200,000 and 230,000 annually.

Mr. GIBBS. I will submit figures for the record. I believe the figures will show that the annual training loads will be less than those figures quoted from several years ago.

[The information follows:]

No, the current realinement study and the study analysis to which you refer are not related. The realinement study has been initiated to determine cost savings the Army might expect if the present training base structure is consolidated. The actual training inputs expected in the next few years are used as the workload requirement in this study. However, the FY 1976 Resource Analysis was done to validate the concepts of one-station-training (OST), one-station-unit-training (OSUT) and the professional home as useful and cost effective. Hypothetical training inputs were used and OST/OSUT were compared from a resource viewpoint with basic training (BT) and advanced individual training (AIT) modes of handling this workload. The only installation considered for realinement was Fort Dix and this analysis found that Dix should be retained only if the annual input remained above 200,000 for male non-prior service input to training. Today male non-prior service input is less than 181,000 annually and other assumptions in this study analysis are equally questionable.

ARMY TRAINING BASE

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in considering the base realinement for the training facilities, has this 1976 study of the Army I have cited been evaluated?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes; it was. In this exercise we began the study anew; that is, we took a look at what our training requirements are going to be over the next several years.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, when this study was made, Fort Jackson was nearly full of trainees. To keep Fort Dix going the Army has been drawing down at Jackson and other bases so now a cost study on one station unit training would be even more favorable to Jackson. Do you plan such a study and could not such a study develop a case for sizable cost savings to the Army?

Mr. GIBBS. We are looking at one station unit training at Fort Jackson, as I indicated before, in connection with the study of the location of the 2d Infantry Division.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the Army, I presume, should locate its training programs in the most cost efficient way. I presume that you would agree with that thought?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes; I would.

ARMY PERSONNEL ATTRITION

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I believe one reason for the perceived belief less training facilities will be needed is the Army view that there will be lower personnel losses or lower attrition in the future.

What are your attrition projections for fiscal year 1979 and what were they in 1978 and what do you project for 1980 and 1981 and 1985?

Mr. GIBBS. Senator, I will have to supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

ATTRITION

Inasmuch as your question is in the context of the interrelationship between Army personnel losses and trainee input to the training base, my answer will address total annual losses rather than be restricted to attrition losses alone. (We normally reserve the terminology "attrition losses" for those losses, irrespective of specific cause, which occur prior to the soldier completing his/her current term of enlistment.)

The larger total loss figure is important because, in order to maintain strength, each soldier who is lost from the Army must be replaced and, in turn, be trained. Total losses include attrition (either adverse or non-adverse) losses, ETS separations, nondisability retirements, and dropped from military control (DFMC), offset by returned to military control (RTMC), and are projected to occur in the numbers shown in the following chart:

ANNUAL ARMY LOSSES (MALE AND FEMALE)[1] FISCAL YEAR 1979 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

[In thousands]

	Fiscal years—			
	1978	1979	1980	1981
Attrition	74.49	70.91	72.98	72.54
ETS separation	74.11	86.50	90.76	84.13
Nondiscriminatory retirement	6.42	6.66	7.69	7.54
DFMC less RTMC	.54	.46	.48	.49
Total losses	155.56	164.53	171.91	164.70

[1] Note that the losses are those projected to occur during a specific fiscal year and are distinct from the losses associated with a fiscal year's "cohort" which extend over a 3-year period.

Senator HART. Excuse me just 1 minute, Senator Thurmond. Unfortunately, I have another commitment, and I would like to excuse myself and turn the Chair over to you to conclude the hearings, if you would, and offer my thanks to our witnesses this morning for some excellent information, I think extremely helpful to us, particularly the suggestion about how to handle these matters in the future, and I appreciate the effort that you made.

We all have some questions for the record. We would appreciate your cooperation there.

Thank you, Senator.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the General Accounting Office recently found that attrition goals had not even been set for females in the Army. These rates are traditionally higher than for males. Would this not be important since you are depending on a greater number of females?

Mr. GIBBS. I am not aware, Senator, of the problem you are speaking to.

Mr. WHITE. Senator, if I may, we have not historically looked at the attrition rates for females in the military services because of the size. We are now in the process of examining the attrition rates for females, and yes, it is an important factor in terms of the future.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the GAO also advises attrition rates for Navy and Air Force are increasing, while DOD is predicting lower attrition rates for the Army. The Army Training Commands are advising the Congress they will go up. This information was contained in a 1979 military manpower training report given us in March of this year. Would you comment on that point?

Mr. GIBBS. Senator, I am just not aware of the GAO report, and so it comes somewhat as a surprise to me. I am not sure that I can comment on it.

Senator THURMOND. Would you want to look into that report and then answer the question for the record?

Mr. GIBBS. I would be glad to.

[The information follows:]

ATTRITION PROJECTIONS

Attrition rates for females have been traditionally higher than those for males when the comparison is made between the same educational levels and mental categories. Because of the higher percentage of high school diploma graduates and generally higher mental category mix among females, however, the overall attrition rate for females is within 1–2 percent of the overall rate for males. You are correct that because of our projected increase in female accessions, their attrition rates will become more significant to us. However, attrition goals should not be established for female personnel at this time. With the need for increased female accessions, we may be required to accept lower mental categories to meet objectives, and we have no loss experience with lower female mental categories. Moreover, we do not know the effect of attrition of women moving into non-traditional military occupational specialties. Until more experience with increased female force levels is gained, it will be difficult to accurately forecast attrition and set reasonable attrition goals.

With respect to Army cohort attrition rates, our projections show a downward trend through FY 80, as indicated by the attached chart. About half of the downward trend can be attributed to the increase in the percentage of high school diploma graduates in the force and the lower attrition rates associated with them. The balance of the overall downward trend can be attributed to a real change in the attrition behavior noted in recent accessions to the Army.

3-YR ANNUAL COHORT ATTRITION LOSSES AS A PERCENT OF ACCESSIONS

[Fiscal years]

Sex: Education level	Year of entry					
	1974	1975	1976 [1]	1977 [1]	1978 [1]	1979 and 1980 [1]
Male: HSDG [2]	26	27	28	25	24	23
Male: NHSDG [3]	51	50	49	47	46	41
Male: All	39	37	38	35	32	30
Female: HSDG [2]	38	36	40	37	37	38
Female: NHSDG [3]	58	58	55	52	52	(4)
Female: All	40	39	42	40	37	38
All: All	39	38	38	35	33	31

[1] Forecasts.
[2] High school diploma graduates.
[3] Non-high school diploma graduates (to include GED holders).
[4] Army does not plan any NHSDG female accessions after end fiscal year 1978.

GAO REPORT

Senator THURMOND. I ask unanimous consent to have placed in the record at this point a letter on this subject which GAO addressed to Senator Harry Byrd. Without objection, that will be done.

[The letter follows:]

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,
Washington, D.C., June 8, 1978.

B–146890

Hon. HARRY F. BYRD,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: This is an interim response to your March 23, 1978, request that we undertake a study of the costs associated with first-term attrition

and the low rate of reenlistments in the armed forces. As you stated, a high rate of attrition is costly because greater numbers of individuals must be recruited and trained than would otherwise be necessary.

As requested by your staff, we are providing several observations based on limited work to date. We held discussions with and obtained data from officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) and service headquarters levels.

DOD and the Services have taken some actions to more effectively manage attrition. At the present time, however, three elements in their efforts appear to need strengthening. They are:

Attrition goals covering the full first-term enlistment period,
Coordinated programs designed to achieve those goals, and
Effective monitoring and evaluation systems.

ATTRITION GOALS

DOD has promulgated attrition goals which cover only part of the first-term enlistment period for male recruits. The goals established in 1975 and 1976 generally covered the 30-month period following recruit and initial skill training. DOD officials told us that setting these goals was not the most effective way to manage attrition since the services could control the attrition rates by increasing training attrition not subject to goals in hopes of lowering the rates during the subsequent period. Consequently, in 1977, DOD issued new goals which covered the entire first three years of the enlistment period. However, with the exception of the Army most enlistments today are for four or more years. In addition, attrition goals have not been established for females who historically have a higher attrition rate and for other reasons than males. This is an important factor because female personnel are becoming an increasingly larger proportion of the enlisted force:

COORDINATED PROGRAMS

In view of the importance of this issue to both National defense and the individuals involved, we would encourage greater coordination between DOD and the Services, between service headquarters and individual commands, and among the Services in order to effectively manage their programs and achieve their goals. For example, while Defense officials testified that actions were being taken which they expected to result in reduced attrition, the Training Commands advised the Congress that increased recruit training attrition was planned for fiscal year 1979 in the Navy and Air Force. The Military Manpower Training Report sent to Congress in March 1978 stated that the Navy expects a 12 percent attrition rate for recruit training in 1979 compared to 10 percent for 1978. Likewise, the report shows that Air Force expects attrition to be 7.7 percent for 1979, compared to 7.3 percent for 1978.

MONITORING AND EVALUATING

A critical element of a coordinated program is an effective system for monitoring and evaluating services' actions and accomplishments. DOD is planning, but has not as yet begun, to monitor Services' attrition program results for the new attrition goals. Currently among the Services only the Marine Corps has an operational and effective data collection and monitoring system.

We are particularly impressed with Marine Corps efforts to monitor attrition and evaluate actions designed to achieve the DOD goals. For example, monthly sub-goals were established for the first six months during which a third of the total attrition usually occurs. Marine Corps officials, who monitored the actual attrition experienced thus far in fiscal year 1978, found that the sub-goals have been significantly exceeded. As a result, headquarters officials are meeting with training officials to determine causes for the higher rates and what further actions can be taken to achieve the goals.

As discussed with your staff, we are performing a comprehensive study of attrition costs and actions by DOD and the services to manage in ways to reduce attrition. We expect to have our final report available by next March.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. KRIEGER, *Director.*

QUALITY OF BASIC TRAINING

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the recent study by Congressman Beard of Tennessee found that the average trainee was not as well

prepared as in the past years. This was attributed to the constant cuts in training base personnel. Do you feel this problem can be corrected despite a smaller ratio of training support people to trainees?

Mr. WHITE. May I answer that, Senator?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, I think it can be, and we have to recognize that what Mr. Beard did was go to the field. A member of his staff went to the field and asked people subjectively in a large number of situations, a large number of levels, what they thought. Then they compiled these comments into a report. That is useful, but they did not do an analysis of the training base or of the training requirement.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, is it not a fact that the generally low level of high school training characteristic of the All-Volunteer Force has tended to require more training effort rather than less?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, I don't think that is the case. We have a situation now, principally with respect to the Army but across the board, where, generally, high school diploma education of our troops is as high or higher than during the draft. The problem that we have, sir, has to do with a problem in the society, with reference to the literacy of people who come into service and so on.

Senator THURMOND. So you don't feel that training support should be increased rather than decreased?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, I do not.

FACTORS AFFECTING TRAINING BASE REQUIREMENTS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in weighing the three factors which affect the need for training base realinement, what percentage factors would you give to each—lower attrition, reduced input, and better retention? Either one of you may answer.

Mr. WHITE. Sir, I am sorry, I don't think I can answer the question quite that way. What we attempt to do through the reenlistment increase is obviously to change the structure of the force. That changes our training requirement.

With respect to the attrition rates in the first term, that tends to change the accession requirment and therefore, the emphasis in all of these feeds back into our overall accession rate. So they all have to be thought of at once in terms of coming out with a final accession rate.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I also understand the Training Doctrine Command has advised higher headquarters if the training cuts continue they will be forced to go to on-the-job training in certain skills. Are you aware of this unprecedented step being forced on the field commands by these constant training reductions?

Mr. GIBBS. In general I would have to say that I am aware of TRADOC's concerns with respect to changes in the training program. It does not necessarily follow there is going to be any diminution of the skill levels of the people who enter the active force. I think historically a lot of people who have gone through training in the Army have entered their job assignments with the expectation that their training continues on the job.

MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINING BASES

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, which of the three Army training bases under study has the capability to handle mobilization in the short period as estimated we might have in the future emergency?

Mr. GIBBS. All three training bases would have some mobilization capability. I can't give you a precise answer. That is one of the things that has to be answered in the case study.

Senator THURMOND. Management of personnel is one of the most diffiult jobs in the military. I urge that you consider the points that I have raised and I would appreciate hearing from you as to any findings or conclusions that you might reach.

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Now, I believe you said that the Army would consider all bases, whether they are on the list or not, for closure; is that correct?

Mr. GIBBS. We have been looking at all of our training installations, not just the three that have been listed for detailed study, and we have been looking at them in the context of what our long-range training needs are, what our mobilization requirements are, what our workload requirements are going to be over the next 5 to 10 years. That is really a way of our doing some planning to make sure that we in fact have an efficient training base able to accommodate both our long-term needs and our mobilization requirements.

SELECTION OF TRAINING BASES FOR REALINEMENT STUDY

Senator THURMOND. I just wondered, since you are considering all bases instead of just those three, why you singled out those three for public attention?

Mr. GIBBS. Why? Fort Bliss was selected because it has a very small basic-training mission and, as you know, it has other missions there, and because of the reduced training load there was a clear indication that looking to eliminate just basic training, nothing else, at Fort Bliss, would be appropriate for study.

Fort Jackson and Fort Dix were selected because they are training centers, they are not located with any professional schools. The advanced training they do, in addition to their basic combat training, in the area of combat service support, that is a school for cooks, a school for wheeled vehicle mechanics—is the kind of training that can be more easily moved to other installations than, for example, artillery training or training for tankers.

Senator THURMOND. Of course, you are familiar with the fact that Fort Jackson has many new and modern facilities?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, I am.

Senator THURMOND. And a new reception center, a 1,000 man barracks complex, a new hospital, theaters, dental clinics, a new PX, family housing, new instructional facilities.

About $100 million has been spent there in the last 10 years. About $180 million approximately in the last 15 years. Only $28 million spent at Dix, and Dix has been on the closure list since 1973.

Are you familiar with the fact that the weather permits more training days at Fort Jackson and results in lower-fuel costs. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. GIBBS. Those are all considerations, sir, that will be taken into account in the study.

Senator THURMOND. Are you familiar with the fact that the wage board employees realize $3,000 more annually at Dix, than at Jackson, which would be quite a savings?

Mr. GIBBS. No, I am not familiar with the exact figure but I am not surprised by the wage differential.

Senator THURMOND. Are you familiar with the fact that Fort Jackson has 53,000 acres versus 31,000 at Dix and we can expand to mobilize without opening a new base?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes sir.

Senator THURMOND. Are you familiar with the fact that the reception station at Fort Jackson serves Jackson and a number of other bases and it would cost $25 million to replace, and that these trainees would be required to go somewhere else?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, there would have to be different arrangements made. But again all of the things that you are now asking me about are all relevant questions and important ones and are all factors that are being considered in that study.

Senator THURMOND. Are you familiar with the fact that if Jackson closed you would have to put the new facilities there in a caretaker status and build identical facilities at some other site?

Mr. GIBBS. The first part of your question would be true; if we closed the Army training center there, we would not utilize all of those facilities. There would be some activities that we would maintain at Fort Jackson, but a large number of facilities would be put in caretaker status. It is not clear, and the study will have to answer this question, whether or not there would be any additional construction requirements at any other installation. An awful lot of this depends on what the workload is going to be and how that workload would be distributed among the existing training installations.

Senator THURMOND. Are you familiar with the fact that Fort Jackson's efficiency is twice, I repeat, twice that of the average of the other Army training bases and that if all the Army training bases were as efficient as Fort Jackson, a savings of $187 million alone could be made?

Mr. GIBBS. Well, I don't believe that you can make that kind of savings. A reason for that is I believe the efficiency factor that you are speaking to has to do with the ratio of students to faculty. I think you have to understand that if you compare Fort Jackson with other bases you are really not making an apples to apples comparison. That is, there are a higher number of faculty members, if you will, at other installations primarily because they have professional schools there and primarily because there are a number of people there who are included in that ratio who are not a part of the actual training operation but are charged with the responsibility of writing training documents and doctrine. So it is not clear that we could ever achieve a reduction in the faculty-student ratio across the board that would equal what you have at Fort Jackson.

Senator THURMOND. Well, there is no question that the Army's own records show that it is the most efficient Army base we have.

Mr. GIBBS. Yes, but I think you have to interpret some of those. However, I am not here to say that Fort Jackson is inefficient.

Senator THURMOND. You can interpret things any way you want but that is what the records show, don't they?

Thank you very much.

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, sir.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS BASE REALINEMENT CANDIDATES

Senator THURMOND. I have a few questions here for Secretary Hidalgo.

Mr. Secretary, would you explain for the committee what directives you received from higher headquarters which led to your recommendations on the current base realinement finding in the Marine Corps?

Mr. HILDALGO. Sir, this was the product of a general look in accordance with all the testimony that has been given today at our recruit training centers and we are looking to studies that are underway, looking for the Navy side to Great Lakes and San Diego, and on the Marine side they look, you know, Senator, at Parris Island and Pendleton and San Diego, and we are just taking a good hard look to see what if anything, should be done as the studies move forward.

The estimated date for the four way study of four alternatives to the Marine Corps, sir, we estimate will be concluded sometime in February.

Senator THURMOND. The bells have rung for a vote. Maybe we can finish it in the next ten minutes.

Mr. Secretary, how did you go about selecting the bases for inclusion in the realinement study?

Mr. HIDALGO. Are you referring to the recruit training ones, sir, or the total package of the Navy?

Senator THURMOND. Well, I am just wondering how you went about selecting the bases like Parris Island, which is included in that study. Parris Island is up for consideration now for closure.

Mr. HIDALGO. In the same manner, sir, that Dr. White has described of how we went about——

Senator THURMOND. If you would like to put both in the record, it would be all right.

Mr. HIDALGO. All right, we will do that.

[The information follows:]

In response to a Secretary of the Navy requirement to give broadest consideration to alternatives for base consolidations and realignments, the Marine Corps submitted a list of candidates. From this list, the Secretary of the Navy determined that the Marine Corps should make a detailed study of the realignment of recruit training functions.

Senator THURMOND. Were the recommendations you made to DOD followed? Were bases added or subtracted by DOD?

Mr. HIDALGO. No, sir, I think our suggestion and our proposals were accepted by OSD/DOD.

Senator THURMOND. Completely?

Mr. HIDALGO. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Did you recommend a study of the Parris Island Marine Depot for possible closure?

Mr. HIDALGO. I am sorry, would you repeat that?

Senator THURMOND. Did you recommend a study of the Parris Island Marine Depot for possible closure?

Mr. HIDALGO. I did not personally, sir, but this was part of the overall Navy package which involves 33 installations or activities as one of the candidates for study, that was all.

Senator THURMOND. Who did recommend it?

Mr. HIDALGO. Secretary Claytor was dealing with this. I was occupied, I think, with some other things at the time when the original idea came forward, but then I was fully informed and consulted about it.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, are you giving your personal attention to evaluating which bases remain and which bases should be reduced or closed?

Mr. HIDALGO. I am and I shall continue to do so.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, from the standpoint of cost savings, would it be wise for the Marines to close their only recruit training depot on the east coast and be forced to ship all new enlistees from the very heavily populated Northeast all the way to the west coast?

Mr. HIDALGO. Well, sir, that certainly is one of the main factors that will be an essential part of ths study that is underway.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, would you describe the current practice of transporting recruits from San Diego Depot to Pendleton for weapon training as inefficient or high cost to conduct Marine recruit training?

Mr. HIDALGO. The details of this I would like to submit for the record.

[The information follows:]

Weapons training is an integral part of the training of a Marine Corps recruit. The rifle ranges at Camp Pendleton are the only ones available to train the recruits at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. The only differential cost associated with weapons training at Camp Pendleton is the cost of transportation which is $56,000 per year. This is considered to be a reasonable expenditure in light of the training benefits received.

Senator THURMOND. When do you expect the Marine portion of the study to be completed?

Mr. HIDALGO. As I mentioned, Senator, we now estimate February.

Senator THURMOND. When will there be a public announcement made on this?

Mr. HIDALGO. You know the whole procedure, of course. Dr. White has explained what we do upon completion of the study and the various processes we go through, so I can't give you an exact date on that.

Senator THURMOND. I think we are going to have to stop now and go and vote. I think we have covered most of the points.

I want to take this opportunity to thank all of you fine people for coming here today and giving us the benefit of your testimony. We appreciate your presence.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. HIDALGO. Thank you.

[Subsequent to the hearing additional questions were submitted by Senator Hart to the witnesses to be answered for the hearing record. The questions, with answers supplied, follow:]

BASE FACTORS REPORT

Question. I'm interested in the Base Factors Report that you mention on page 3. Can you actually rank bases with similar missions according to some criteria? Can you compare between Services?

Answer. The Domestic Base Factors does rank each installation for each of the 80 column data sets within a similar category. However, care must be taken when making comparisons of a workload indicator for several reasons. First is the fact that the report is new and until we can assure more consistent interpretation of various definitions involved, some distortion of data will exist. The second reason is that such comparisons should only be made with full knowledge of the particular situation at the installations being compared to ensure that reasonable equals are being compared. In addition, comparison of one factor of several installations is insufficient to result in any meaningful conclusions. Instead, a number of the factors displayed in the report must be considered before any conclusions can be drawn. A better solution and one which we are attempting to develop combines a number of the more important factors into an installation profile. Hopefully, with such an approach the comparison of installations with similar missions will be facilitated. In this regard, we have asked the Military Departments to evaluate the report. One of the results of this evaluation will be that the Services will be in a position to explain sizable variations between installations. With regard to comparisons of installations with similar missions between Services, as stated in the Report, we do not believe that this will be possible to great extent due to the different organizations, methods, and procedures used by the Services in operating their bases.

Question. You mention that this report will be a valuable management tool How are you using it and what uses do you plan for it?

Answer. The Domestic Base Factors Report contains timely base, population, energy and other important data. In addition, the management indicators contained in the reports can be useful in identifying trends and in raising questions about comparative installation management, utilization, and operating costs with regard to both individual and groups of similar mission bases. These can be used to assist in identifying areas where further efforts may be required to improve the overall management of the base structure; allocate base operating support resources; increase utilization; reduce overhead and support costs and personnel; and initiate other appropriate management actions. The data used to compile the reports requires further refinement in order to be more consistent but this will be an evolutionary process and should not detract the Services from making full use of the current reports.

Question. Will it be used to plan your military construction? Will you avoid investment at high cost bases?

Answer. No, it will not be used to plan military construction, at least at this stage. However, it will identify for further study and corrective action high cost bases. Corrective action can consist of improved management practices, increased utilization, closure or consolidation or other management improvements.

Question. Can you develop candidate base realignments from this report?

Answer. Not directly. However, as stated previously, the management indicators will help to identify areas for study which may develop into base realignment candidates.

CURRENT LAW

Question. Let me turn for a moment to 10 USC 2687. For the current round of base realignments, did you all submit the required notice to the Congress?

Answer. Attached for the record are copies of the notices submitted to the Congress by the Military Departments:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D.C., April 25, 1978.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the provisions of Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, the Department of the Army hereby notifies you

that the following installations and activities are candidates for closure or realignment:

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.
U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia.
Fort Monroe, Virginia.
Presidio of San Francisco, California.
Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

The above actions will undergo detailed study following which you will be notified of the Army's final decisions and provided detailed justifications for such decisions.

Attached are realignment fact sheets which provide further details.

Sincerely,

CLIFFORD L. ALEXANDER, JR.

[Five Inclosures.]

REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET.—US ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UTAH

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

Dugway Proving Ground consists of about 841,000 acres and is located in a sparcely populated area 87 miles southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah. Established in 1942 at the outbreak of World War II, Dugway Proving Ground has the unique capability within the Department of Defense for open air and large chamber testing of chemical warfare and biological defense systems and performs tests for all Services. However, open-air testing of lethal chemical and biological agents has been restricted by public law since 1969.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

A detailed realignment study will be initiated involving the possible consolidation of base operations and support activities of Dugway Proving Ground with those of nearby Tooele Army Depot and the disestablishment of Dugway Proving Ground as a separate command. Dugway Proving Ground would be made a satellite activity of Tooele Army Depot. Dugway Proving Ground's unique capability for testing chemical warfare/biological defense systems would be retained under the operational control of the US Army Test and Evaluation Command.

REASONS FOR THE ACTION

The Department of the Army has a need to reduce non-essential support structure, headquarters, other overhead operations, manpower costs and base structure. As part of the continuing program for determining where economies of manpower improvements can be realized, a preliminary evaluation indicated that Dugway Proving Ground warrants further review for possible realignment. Therefore, Dugway Proving Ground has been selected as a candidate for formal study for possible realignment.

IMPACT OF THE ACTION

The current authorized strength of Dugway Proving Ground is 252 military and 618 civilian positions. This action could affect up to 87 military and 331 civilian positions. Approximately 52 military and 174 civilian positions would be transferred to Tooele Army Depot and 35 military and 157 civilian positions would be eliminated. Of the positions transferred to Tooele Army Depot, it is estimated that 42 military and 151 civilian positions would remain with duty station at Dugway Proving Ground. Annual savings could amount to $4.1 million.

REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET.—US ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER ALEXANDRIA, VA.

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

The US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) was established in January 1973 under the general staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters Department of the Army (DA DCSPER). MILPERCEN was formed by consolidating management functions of officer personnel from the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), enlisted personnel from DA DCSPER, information systems and computer support from Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM), and other functions from The Adjutant General (TAG).

MILPERCEN is located mainly in the Hoffman Building in Alexandria, Virginia, and the following separate activities:

1. Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN.
2. Enlistment Eligibility Activity at St. Louis, MO.
3. Personnel Assistance Points in airports at Charleston, SC; McGuire AFB, NJ; Travis AFB, CA; Seattle, WA; and J F Kennedy International Airport, NY.

The mission of MILPERCEN is to execute and recommend Army military personnel policies, systems and programs and to develop and support procedures applicable to military personnel management.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

A detailed realignment study will be initiated involving the possible move of the Military Personnel Center and those activities which must be collocated with it to Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN. MILPERCEN would be collocated with the US Army Finance and Accounting Center. New administrative storage facilities would be built to accommodate those finance records which must be moved in order to make room for MILPERCEN. Leased space currently occupied by MILPERCEN in the National Capital Region (NCR) would be returned to the General Services Administration.

REASONS FOR THE ACTION

The Department of the Army has a need to reduce non-essential support structure, headquarters, other overhead operations, manpower costs and base structure. As part of a continuing program for determining where economies or manpower improvements can be realized and as part of a continuing requirement for reducing the military presence in the National Capital Region, a preliminary evaluation indicated that MILPERCEN warrants further review for possible realignment. Therefore, MILPERCEN has has been selected as a candidate for formal study for possible realignment.

IMPACT OF THE ACTION

The current authorized strength of MILPERCEN is 980 military and 1935 civilian positions all of which would be transferred to Fort Benjamin Harrison by this action.

REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET.—FORT MONROE, VA.

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

Fort Monroe has figured in the history of America for 371 years, including the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, Korea and the Vietnam conflicts. Fort Monroe is the oldest and perhaps the most historic Army installation in the United States. It was first established in 1607, completed in 1611, destroyed and virtually abandoned from 1612 to 1727, then rebuilt when Spain declared war on England. Initial plans for the present Fort Monroe were formulated after the War of 1812 when the need for strong coastal defenses at the tip of the peninsula, formed by the junction of the James and York Rivers and Chesapeake Bay, became evident. Built from plans drawn up by General Simon Bernard, Staff Engineer for Napoleon Bonaparte, the installation was formally titled Fort Monroe in 1832 in honor of President Monroe, during whose term construction was approved and started. Designated as the first Artillery school in 1824, it remained the "Home of Artillery" until 1907 when it was designated as the Coast Artillery School. The school was transferred in 1942 and the Fort housed the Headquarters Ground Field Forces until 1955 when the Field Forces were reorganized and the Headquarters redesignated Continental Army Command. In 1973 the Army reorganized and Fort Monroe now houses the Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The mission of Fort Monroe is to perform administrative and logistical functions necessary to operate the post and to support assigned and tenant units both on and off the installation.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

A detailed realignment study will be initiated involving the possible closure of Fort Monroe, Virginia except for the facilities occupied by the Navy Surface

Weapons Center and the 72d Tactical Control Flight, US Air Force. The primary study alternative will consider the displacement of tenant activities located at Fort Monroe to Fort Eustis, Virginia, located approximately 20 miles to the north, in new facilities to be constructed. The displacement of the headquarters to Langley Field, VA, Fort Knox, KY, and other possible locations will also be reviewed.

REASONS FOR THE ACTION

The Department of the Army has a need to reduce non-essential support structure, headquarters, other overhead operations, manpower costs and base structure. As part of the continuing program for determining where economies or manpower improvements can be realized, particularly in utilization of multimission installations, a preliminary evaluation indicated that Fort Monroe warrants further review for possible realignment. Therefore, Fort Monroe has been selected as a candidate for formal study for possible closure.

IMPACT OF THE ACTION

The current authorized strength of Fort Monroe is 1271 military and 1614 civilian positions, all of which could be affected by this action. Approximately 1040 military and 1321 civilian positions could be relocated to other Army installations and 231 military and 293 civilian positions could be eliminated. Annual savings could amount to $10.2 million.

REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET.—THE PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO AND FORT BAKER, CALIF.

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

The Presidio of San Francisco consists of approximately 1750 acres and is located on San Francisco Bay at the foot of the Golden Gate Bridge.

The Presidio has been a military post since 1776 when it was established by the Spanish. It came under Mexican control in 1822 and the United States took possession in 1846. The Presidio expanded during the period 1860 and 1908 with the establishment of Fort Point, Alcatraz, Angel Island, Point Jose and the Harbor Defense Forts of Baker, Barry and Miley. During the War with Spain, Letterman General Hospital was constructed and the Presidio became headquarters for the military administration of outlying possessions as well as the major training and assembly center for troops bound for the Philippines. The Presidio became a training center for officers and a demobilization center during World War I. In the years between wars, Headquarters, Ninth Corps and the 30th Infantry were established at the Presidio. During World War II the Western Defense Command Headquarters directed the successful operations on Attu and Kiska from the Fort and Letterman General Hospital became the largest debarkation medical center in the United States. The Presidio was officially designated a Registered National Historic Landmark in 1963. Currently, the Presidio is the home of the Headquarters Sixth United States Army and Letterman Army Medical Center.

The mission of the Presidio is to perform administrative and logistical functions necessary to operate the post and to support assigned and tenant units both on and off the installation to include Reserve Components.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

A detailed realignment study will be initiated involving the possible closure of Fort Baker and the reduction of the Presidio of San Francisco to the minimum essential required to support the residual activities. The family housing and several small activities will be retained. The study will consider the displacement of tenant activities at the Presidio to other installations both in and outside the Bay Area. The activities considered for displacement would be relocated to US Naval Station, Treasure Island, CA; Fort Ord, CA; Fort Lewis, WA and Fort McCoy, WI.

REASONS FOR THE ACTION

The Department of the Army has a need to reduce non-essential support structure, headquarters, other overhead operations, manpower costs and base structure. As part of the continuing program for determining where economies or manpower improvements can be realized, a preliminary evaluation indicated

that the Presidio and Fort Baker warrant further review. Therefore, these installations have been selected as candidates for formal study for possible realignment.

IMPACT OF THE ACTION

The current authorized strength of the Presidio of San Francisco and Fort Baker is 3010 military and 2879 civilian positions. This action could affect up to 1599 military and 1888 civilian positions. Approximately 1524 military and 1358 civilian positions would be relocated to other Army installations and 75 military and 530 civilian positions would be eliminated. Annual savings could amount to $10.8 million.

REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET.—LETTERMAN ARMY MEDICAL CENTER, PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

Letterman Army Medical Center traces its origin as a general hospital to December 1898 when Headquarters of the Army General Orders created the Army's first general hospital. The "old" hospital, now known as the Annex, is no longer in use as an active treatment facility. From its start as a 400 bed hospital, Letterman has responded to war requirements throughout its history. In 1911 the US Army General Hospital, Presidio was renamed in honor of a Civil War surgeon, Major Jonathan Letterman, a pioneer in medical evacuation techniques whose principles of organization stand today. The present Letterman Army Medical Center, completed in February 1969 as a 550 bed hospital, has the mission of providing general hospital type care, dental and veterinary care and environmental health services for authorized personnel. Letterman provides medical and dental support at other locations in the central California area through local health clinics, and also serves as the destination hospital for patients referred from the southern half of the Pacific Seaboard.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

A detailed realignment study will be initiated involving the possible closure of Letterman Army Medical Center and the reduction of the facility to an outpatient clinic operation as required. The mission of the center would be transferred to the Oakland Navy Regional Medical Center upon completion of military construction projects required to upgrade and seismicproof that Navy facility. Approximately 663 medical spaces would be transferred to the Navy Center at Oakland and Travis Air Force Base to absorb increased workload as a result of the action. Other alternatives will be included in this study.

REASON FOR THE ACTION

The Department of the Army has a need to reduce non-essential support structure, headquarters, other overhead operations, manpower costs, and base structure. As part of the continuing program for determining where economies or manpower improvements can be realized, a preliminary evaluation indicated that Letterman Army Medical Center warrants further review for possible realignment. The requirement for extensive construction to seismicproof both Letterman Army Medical Center and the Oakland Navy Regional Medical Center and the under-utilization of both of those hospitals as well as David Grant Hospital at nearby Travis Air Force Base have resulted in the selection of Letterman as a candidate for formal study for possible closure. This study will be independent of the Presidio of San Francisco study.

IMPACT OF THE ACTION

The current staffing of the center includes 750 military personnel, 800 civilians, 248 students and 49 contractor personnel. The action could impact on all 1847 personnel. Approximately 363 military and 300 civilian positions would be relocated to the other medical facilities along with the 248 students; 387 military and 500 civilian positions would be eliminated. Annual savings could amount to $11.4 million.

REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET.—FORT SHERIDAN, ILL.

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

Fort Sheridan consists of about 700 acres and is located on the shore of Lake Michigan about 25 miles north of Chicago, Illinois.

Acquired in 1886, Camp Highwood was officially renamed Fort Sheridan on 27 February 1888. During World War I Fort Sheridan served as a training center for men entering the Army from Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. World War II saw Fort Sheridan function as a Recruit Reception Center and Separation Center. On 11 June 1946 Fifth US Army was established in the former Chicago Beach Hotel. In 1966 it was relocated to Fort Sheridan where it remained until 1971 when Fourth and Fifth US Armies were merged and the Headquarters moved to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In 1973 Fort Sheridan became the home of both the Headquarters US Army Recruiting Command and the Headquarters US Army Readiness Region V.

The mission of Fort Sheridan is to perform administrative and logistical functions necessary to operate the post and to support assigned and tenant units both on and off the installation. Fort Sheridan also provides administrative and logistical support for all Reserve Components located in Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and Wisconsin.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

A detailed realignment study will be initiated involving the possible closure of Fort Sheridan, Illinois, with the exception of the Army Reserve Center, which would be retained. The study will consider the displacement of tenant activities located at Fort Sheridan to other installations with some units being relocated to facilities within the Chicago area and with the area support missions of Fort Sheridan being transferred to other installations within the region. The activities considered for displacement would be relocated to Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN; Fort McCoy, WI; and other installations.

REASONS FOR THE ACTION

The Department of the Army has a need to reduce non-essential support structure, headquarters, other overhead operations, manpower costs and base structure. As part of the continuing program for determining where economies or manpower improvements can be realized, a preliminary evaluation indicated that Fort Sheridan warrants further review for possible realignment. Therefore, Fort Sheridan has been selected as a candidate for formal study for possible closure.

IMPACT OF THE ACTION

The current authorized strength at Fort Sheridan is 1190 military and 1410 civilian positions. This action could affect up to 1188 military and 1365 civilian positions. Approximately 864 military and 879 civilian positions could be relocated to other Army installations and 324 military and 486 civilian positions could be eliminated. Annual savings could amount to $15.3 million.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., July 7, 1978.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the provisions of Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, the Department of the Navy hereby notifies you that the following activities are candidates for closure or realignment:

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina

33-208—78——8

These studies and any subsequent actions will follow the requirements of applicable legislation.

Attached are information sheets which provide further details.

Sincerely,

EVERETT PYATT,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Logistics).

Attachments.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NAVAL AIR STATION, KEY WEST, FLA.

INFORMATION SHEET

The Department of the Navy has a need to reduce nonessential overhead support personnel and costs connected with its base structure. As part of this program, preliminary evaluation indicates that the Naval Air Station (NAS), Key West should be reviewed to determine the feasibility of placing it in a caretaker status by October 1979.

The primary mission of NAS Key West is to support operations of aviation activities and units of the Operating Forces. This review would consider disestablishing aviation support units and eliminating all base support services provided. Approximately 1,279 military and 551 civilian positions could be affected by this action. Of this number, 501 civilian positions could be eliminated.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, SAN DIEGO, CALIF.

INFORMATION SHEET

The Department of the Navy has a need to reduce nonessential overhead support personnel and costs connected with its bsae structure. As a part of this program, preliminary evaluation indicates that the Marine Corps Recruit Training Depots at San Diego, CA., and at Parris Island, S.C., should be reviewed for possible realignment.

The mission of Marine Corps Recruit Depots is to provide recruit training for Marine Corps enlisted personnel, as well as specialized training for enlisted Marines assigned as recruiters, recruit drill instructors, members of ships' detachments, and to the drum and bugle corps and personnel administration fields.

The following alternative realignments will be studied:

(1) Relocation of San Diego to Parris Island, with resulting increase in size and function at Parris Island MCRD.

(2) Relocation of San Diego to Camp Pendleton, CA., without change at Parris Island.

(3) Relocation of both San Diego and Parris Island to a single location at Camp Pendleton.

Jobs affected by any relocation of San Diego MCRD to Camp Pendleton or Parris Island total 7844, including 1900 military, 277 civilians and an average daily load of 5667 recruits and students.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND, S.C.

INFORMATION SHEET

The Department of the Navy has a need to reduce nonessential overhead support personnel and costs connected with its base structure. As a part of this program, preliminary evaluation indicates that the Marine Corps Recruit Training Depots at San Diego, CA., and Parris Island, S.C. should be reviewed for possible realignment.

The mission of Marine Corps Recruit Depots is to provide recruit training for Marine Corps enlisted personnel, as well as specialized training for enlisted Marines assigned as recruiters, recruit drill instructors, members of ships' detachments, and to the drum and bugle corps and personnel administration fields.

The following alternative realignments will be studied:

(1) Relocation of San Diego to Parris Island, with resulting increase in size and function at Parris Island MCRD.

(2) Relocation of San Diego to Camp Pendleton, CA., without change at Parris Island.

(3) Relocation of both San Diego and Parris Island to a single location at Camp Pendleton.

Jobs affected by any relocation of Parris Island MCRD to Camp Pendleton total 8263, including 2148 military, 548 civilians and an average daily load of 5567 recruits and students. Relocation of San Diego to Parris Island would result in approximately doubling the daily load of recruits, with some increase in military and civilian employment.

Department of Defense Placement Assistance Program for Employees Affected by Reduction in Force

Under the Department of Defense Program for Stability of Civilian Employment, every effort will be made to assist displaced employees obtain other acceptable employment.

All adversely affected career and career-conditional employees who desire placement assistance will be registered in a Defense-wide computerized Priority Placement Program. Registrants in this Program will be afforded priority placement rights to vacancies arising throughout the Department for which they are qualified and available. Also, the help of other Federal Departments and Agencies will be solicited and registrants in the Priority Placement Program will be made available for placement consideration in vacancies in these organizations. In most cases, 60-day advance notice of reduction in force and functional transfer will be given to employees rather than the minimum 30-day notice required by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Upon their request, employees will be carried in a leave status for such additional time as is necessary to provide a 90-day notice period prior to separation for reduction in force or for failure to accompany their function when it is moved outside the commuting area.

Defense officials have been working closely with the Civil Service Commission to seek out and provide job opportunities to affected employees. Eligible career employees desiring placement assistance will be registered in the Civil Service Commission's Displaced Employee Program for referral and consideration by other Federal Departments and Agencies.

Close liaison is being maintained with the Department of Labor, State Employment Offices, and private industry to help employees desiring placement assistance or retraining for positions in the private sector.

Where displaced employees are required to relocate in order to continue their Federal employment, their transportation and moving expenses will be paid.

In those cases where employees suffer downgrading, their salaries will be protected to the maximum extent provided by law and regulation.

Employees selected for other job opportunities will be promptly released in accordance with their desires and those of the gaining employers.

Career employees who do not elect to take other Federal positions will be eligible either for severance pay up to one year, based upon length of Federal service, or for immediate retirement under one of the voluntary or involuntary retirement options.

Rights and Benefits of Civilian Employees Affected by Base Closures, Reductions and Consolidations

PLACEMENT ASSISTANCE

All career employees will be given maximum assistance in continuing their careers as employees of the Federal government through reassignment to other positions in the Department of Defense or other Federal agancies. In addition, in cooperation with the Department of Labor and State employment services, assistance will be given to employees in locating positions in private industry. Where appropriate, they will be given the opportunity to undertake retraining programs to qualify them for jobs available in their local labor markets.

Employees whose jobs are transferred to other locations will be given the opportunity to transfer with their jobs. The costs of transporting them, their families, and households to new locations will be borne by the government. Among the costs that will be paid are moving and transportation of household effects, the costs of buying and selling a home, the costs of a "house hunting" trip to the new location, and temporary quarters subsistence expenses.

Employees whose jobs are eliminated will be given priority rights to other vacant positions in the DoD and in other Federal agencies. They also will be given assistance in locating jobs in private industry if they so desire.

The Department of Defense Program for Stability of Civilian Employment and Priority Placement Program provide the principal mechanisms for placing affected employees elsewhere in the DoD. Through the Priority Placement Program, the skills of displaced employees are matched with vacant positions as they occur at other activities throughout the Defense Department at which the employees are willing to work. The job match is accomplished through a computerized referral system, and if the new job involves a move to another location, the costs of moving the employee and his household are borne by the government. If the new job is at a lower grade level, the employee's pay is saved to the maximum extent permitted by law.

Employees also are registered in the Civil Service Commission's Displaced Employee Program and through this means are given priority consideration for vacancies in other Federal agencies. The State Employment services provide placement and retraining assistance for employees desiring jobs in private industry.

BENEFITS OF EMPLOYEES WHO ARE SEPARATED

A career employee who is separated by reduction in force in most circumstances is entitled by law to either an immediate retirement annuity or salary for each year of service after 10 years; and an age adjustment allowance of 10% of the total basic severance allowance for each year by which the employee's age exceeds 40.

Example: An employee 45 years of age with 15 years of creditable service with weekly pay prior to separation of $100 is entitled to severance pay of $3,000, prorated over 30 weeks.

OTHER BENEFITS

Life insurance.—Employees separated on an immediate annuity continue to receive their regular life insurance coverage (which equals their current salary, plus $2,000) free of charge. The coverage continues at its present level until age 65 when it starts reducing at the rate of 2 percent a month until it reaches 25 percent of the original value. Employees who are retiring on an immediate annuity have the option, within 31 days, to convert to another life insurance plan, without medical examination, for which they pay the full cost.

Health insurance.—Most employees separated on an immediate annuity meet the eligibility requirements to continue in the same health insurance plan by which they were covered as active employees. In such cases, the government continues to pay a portion of the cost (about 60 percent). Employees separated who are not eligible for an immediate annuity or who do not meet the minimum service requirements for continuation of their health insurance program receive a 31-day temporary extension of coverage during which time they may convert to a non-group contract without evidence of insurability by the carrier of the plan in which they are enrolled. Employees converting to such plans pay the full cost.

Leave.—Employees separated receive a lump sum payment for their accumulated annual leave. Unused leave generally may accumulate to a total of 30 days. For those who retire on an immediate annuity, the number of days of sick leave accumulated is credited toward the computation of their years of service for a retirement annuity. If an employee is physically incapacitated at the time of his proposed separation, his separation date is extended until he recovers or his sick leave is exhausted, whichever comes first.

Deferred annuities and retirement contribution refunds.—If an employee is separated before attaining eligibility for an immediate annuity, he may elect to have his deductions refunded or leave the money in the retirement fund. If the money is left in the fund and he has a minimum of 5 years of creditable service, he will be entitled to a deferred annuity at age 62.

March 1978.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION SHEET.—NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND DOD BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACTIONS

BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), to encourage harmony between the people and their environment and thereby stimulate the health and welfare of all. As a trustee of the human environment, the Department of Defense has established a policy to demonstrate leadership in carrying out its mission of national security in a manner consistent with national environmental policies. Accordingly, we are continually adjusting and refining

our administrative practices to minimize or avoid adverse environmental consequences.

REQUIREMENTS

NEPA and its implementing guidelines *require* federal agencies, "to build into their decision-making process, beginning at the earliest possible point, an appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects of proposed actions in order that adverse environmental effects may be avoided or minimized and environmental quality previously lost may be restored." Consequently, no candidate base closure or realignment action announced for study will be introduced into the DoD final decision-making process until an "appropriate and careful consideration" is given to its environmental consequences.

NEPA PROCESS.—ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA)

The first step in the NEPA process is to assess the environmental impact of the candidate action concurrent with the preliminary evaluation of the technical, operational, economic and other factors necessary to determine the desirability of implementing the candidate base realignment action. This environmental impact assessment (EIA) normally takes from one to three months to complete since it requires an interdisciplinary approach to ensure all relevant factors have been considered. Upon completion of the assessment a determination is made as to whether or not the candidate action is a major action which could significantly affect the quality of the human environment. Should this be a negative determination, a final decision to implement the action may be made. This negative determination will accompany the candidate action through each step of the decision-making process.

Department of Defense Information Sheet

BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

The military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1978, Public Law 95–82, added a new section 2687 to title 10 of the US Code. That section specifies certain procedures to be followed for certain base closures and realignments. These procedures include a requirement for the Department of Defense to inform the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives with regard to certain base closure and realignment proposals. A copy of 10 U.S.C. 2687 is attached.

Attachment—10 U.S.C. 2687.

General Provisions, Military Construction Authorization Act, Public Law 95–82, August 1, 1977

BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

Sec. 612. (a) Chapter 159 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by section 504 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new section as follows:

"§ 2687. Base closures and realignments

"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no action may be taken to effect or implement—

"(1) the closure of any military installation;

"(2) any realignment with respect to any military installation involving a reduction by more than one thousand, or by more than 50 percent, in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation at the time the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress under subsection (b)(1) that such installation is a candidate for closure or realignment; or

"(3) any construction, conversion, or rehabilitation at any military facility other that a military installation referred to in clause (1) or (2) (regardless of whether such facility is a military installation as defined in subsection (d)) which will or may be required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason of any closure or realignment to which clause (1) or (2) applies, unless and until the provisions of subsection (b) are complied with:

"(b) No action described in subsection (a) with respect to the closure of, or a realignment with respect to any military installation may be taken unless and until—

"(1) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned publicly announces, and notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives in writing that such military installation is a candidate for closure or realignment;

"(2) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned complies with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 with respect to the proposed closure or realignment;

"(3) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives his final decision to carry out the proposed closure or realignment and a detailed justification for such decision, including statements of the estimated fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of the proposed closure or realignment; and

"(4) a period of sixty days expires following the date on which the justification referred to in clause (3) has been submitted to such committees, during which period no irrevocable action may be taken to effect or implement the decision.

"(c) This section shall not apply to the closure of a military installation, or a realignment with respect to a military installation, if the President certifies to the Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or a military emergency.

"(d) As used in this section:

"(1) 'Military installation' means any camp, post, station, base, yard, or other facility under the authority of the Department of Defense—

"(A) which is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or Guam; and

"(B) at which not less than five hundred civilian personnel are authorized to be employed.

Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.

"(2) 'Civilian personnel' means direct-hire permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

"(3) 'Realignment' includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.

"(e) Except as provided in subsection (c), this section shall apply to any closure of a military installation, and any realignment with respect to a military installation, which is first publicly announced after September 30, 1977.".

(b) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 159 of such title is amended by adding at the end thereof a new item as follows:

"2687. Base closures and realignments.".

(c) Section 611 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1966 (Public Law 89–188; 10 U.S.C. 2662 note), and section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1977 (Public Law 94–431; 90 Stat. 1366), shall be inapplicable in the case of any closure of a military installation, and any realignment with respect to a military installation, which is first publicly announced after September 30, 1977.

Department of Defense Fact Sheet

COMMUNITY ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

The President's Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) is charged with helping communities and individuals that may be affected by changes in Defense programs. Assistance is provided to help communities reduce their dependence on Defense activities and to make necessary adjustments when program changes cause serious impacts. EAC membership includes 18 Executive agencies under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense.

Upon request, the EAC will assist local leaders to (1) identify the adverse effects of proposed or actual program changes, (2) examine feasible alternative courses of adjustment action, (3) develop a consensus strategy and plan of action to alleviate the impact, and (4) assure that federal resources are coordinated and targeted in a manner that is responsive to the most important needs of the impacted area. The Economic Adjustment objective is to utilize a combination of federal, state and local public and private-sector talents and resources in a cooperative effort to generate new jobs and for other related developments that will minimize local economic problems.

Requests for economic adjustment planning and project assistance may be addressed to: Chairman, Economic Adjustment Committee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Attention: Director of Economic Adjustment, Room 3E772, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301.

[From the Federal Register, vol. 43, No. 61—Wednesday, March 29, 1978]

THE PRESIDENT

[3195–01]

Executive Order 12049

March 27, 1978

Defense Economic Adjustment Programs

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution of the United States of America, in order to provide coordinated Federal economic adjustment assistance necessitated by changes in Department of Defense activities, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Functions of the Secretary of Defense.*

(a) The Secretary shall, through the Economic Adjustment Committee, design and establish an Economic Adjustment Program to assist in the alleviation of serious economic and social impacts that result from major Defense realignments. The program shall provide for:

1. Identification of Defense-related impact problems of States, metropolitan areas, or communities that require assistance.

2. Preparation of development strategies and action plans to coordinate Federal, State and local economic adjustment efforts.

3. Strengthened and uniform economic impact analysis and analysis of community requirements for Federal economic adjustment resources, prior to base realignment action.

4. Timely and earliest possible consultation and cooperation with local, State and Federal officials concerning impact problems and coordinated interagency and intergovernmental adjustment assistance.

5. A clearinghouse service to exchange information among Federal, State and local officials involved in the resolution of community adjustment problems; e.g., previous studies, technical information, and sources of public and private financing.

6. Application of consistent policies, practices, and procedures in the administration of Federal programs that are utilized to assist Defense impact communities.

7. Encouragement of effective State and regional cooperation and concerted involvement of public interest groups and private sector organizations in Defense adjustment activities.

8. Development, with representatives of appropriate agencies, of uniform criteria for the determination of social economic impact of a particular realignment.

9. Identification and strengthening of existing agency mechanisms to better coordinate employment opportunities for displaced agency personnel.

10. Increased attractiveness to the private sector of interim usage of lands and buildings and ways of streamlining property disposal procedures to enable impacted communities to acquire base property for job-generation purposes as military activities phase down.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that sufficient resources and personnel are allocated to carry out these functions.

SEC. 2. *Economic Adjustment Committee.* (a) The Economic Adjustment Committee is hereby continued.

(b) The Committee shall be composed of the following, or a principal deputy, and such others as the President may designate:

(1) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be the Chairman of the Committee.
(2) The Secretary of Agriculture.
(3) The Secretary of Commerce.
(4) The Secretary of Energy.
(5) The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
(6) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
(7) The Secretary of the Interior.
(8) The Secretary of Labor.
(9) The Secretary of Transportation.
(10) The Attorney General.
(11) The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.
(12) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(13) The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(14) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
(15) The Director of the Community Services Administration.
(16) The Administrator of General Services.
(17) The Administrator of the Small Business Administration.
(18) The Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission.

(c) The Committee shall advise, assist, and support the Secretary of Defense's Economic Adjustment activities.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide all necessary administrative support for the Committee.

SEC. 3. *Responsibility of Executive Agencies.*

(a) The head of each agency represented on the Economic Adjustment Committee shall designate a permanent representative to: (1) serve as liaison with the Secretary of Defense's economic adjustment staff, (2) coordinate agency support and participation in assistance projects, and (3) assist in resolving community impact problems.

(b) All Executive agencies shall:

(1) Support, to the extent permitted by law, the economic adjustment assistance activities of the Secretary of Defense. Such support shall include the use and application of personnel, technical expertise, legal authorities, and available financial resources to the extent required to provide a coordinated Federal response to the needs of individual communities, States, and regions adversely affected by necessary Defense changes.

(2) Afford priority consideration to community requests for Federal technical assistance, financial resources, excess or surplus property, or other requirements that are part of a comprehensive plan used by the Economic Adjustment Committee.

SEC. 4. *Construction.* Nothing in this Order shall be construed as subjecting any function vested by law in, or assigned pursuant to law to, any agency or head thereof to the authority of any other agency or officer or as abrogating or restricting any such function in any manner.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 27, 1978.

[FR Doc. 78-8497 Filed 3-28-78; 1:15 pm]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., April 26, 1978.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is to inform you and other interested Members of Congress of programmed actions affecting Air Force installations and activities.

As part of the continuing effort to manage military resources more efficiently, we plan to consolidate, reduce and realign various Air Force installations and activities throughout the United States. Information sheets identifying specific implementing or study actions, locations, and National Environmental Policy Act considerations are attached.

Career and career-conditional civilian personnel affected by these actions will receive the full advantage of the Defense Program for Stability of Civilian Employment. A fact sheet explaining this program is attached.

In addition, the Office of Economic Adjustment within the Department of Defense is prepared to assist, upon request, the local community leadership where adverse economic impact will occur as a result of the attached actions. Also attached is a fact sheet explaining the Department's Economic Adjustment program.

If you desire additional details, please let us know.

Sincerely,

CHARLES C. BLANTON,
Major General, USAF, Director, Legislative Liaison.

Attachments.
This letter sent to Committee List No. 2.

DELEGATION LIST

Alabama

Senator John Sparkman (D), Senator James B. Allen (D), and Representative Jack Edwards (R), Dauphin Island AFS.

California

Senator Alan Cranston (D), Senator S. I. Hayakawa (R), and Representative Leon E. Panetta (D), Cambria AFS/Almaden AFS.
Representative John L. Burton (D), Mill Valley AFS.
Representative Clair W. Burgener (R), Mt. Laguna AFS.
Representative Don H. Clausen (R), Klamath AFS.
Representative Robert K. Dornan (R), Los Angeles AFS.
Representative Charles H. Wilson (D), Los Angeles AFS.
Representative Glenn M. Anderson (D), San Pedro Hill AFS.
Representative Shirley N. Pettis (R), Norton AFB.
Representative George E. Brown, Jr. (R), Norton AFB.
Representative William M. Ketchum (R), Edwards AFB.
Representative Robert J. Lagomarsino (R), Vandenberg AFB.

Colorado

Senator Floyd K. Haskell (D), Senator Gary W. Hart (D), and Representative Patricia Schroeder (D), Lowry AFB.

Florida

Senator Lawton Chiles (D), Senator Richard Stone (D), and Representative Louis Frey, Jr. (R), Patrick AFB.
Representative Bill Chappell, Jr. (D), Jacksonville AFS.
Representative Robert L. F. Sikes (D), Tyndall AFB.
Representative Dante B. Fascell (D), Richmond AFS/Key West NAS.
Representative Sam M. Gibbons (D), MacDill AFB.

Georgia

Senator Herman E. Talmadge (D), Senator Sam Nunn (D), and Representative Bo Ginn (D), Savannah AFS.
Representative John J. Flynt, Jr. (D), Savannah AFS.

Illinois

Senator Charles H. Percy (R), Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III (D), and Representative Edward R. Madigan (R), Chanute AFB.

Maine

Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D), Senator William D. Hathaway (D), and Representative William S. Cohen (R), Bucks Harbor AFS/Caswell AFS/Charleston AFS.

Maryland

Senator Charles McC. Mathias (R), Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D), and Representative Marjorie S. Holt (R), Fort Meade.

Michigan

Senator Robert P. Griffin (R), Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D), and Representative Philip E. Ruppe (R), Calumet AFS/Sault Ste. Marie AFS.
Representative Guy Vander Jagt (R), Empire AFS.

Minnesota

Senator Wendell R. Anderson (D), Senator Muriel Humphrey (D), and Representative Arlan Stangeland (R), Baudette AFS.
Representative James L. Oberstar (D), Finland AFS.

Mississippi

Senator John C. Stennis (D), Senator James O. Eastland (D), and Representative Trent Lott (R), Keesler AFB.

Montana

Senator John Melcher (D), Senator Paul Hatfield (D), and Representative Ron Marlenee (R), Malmstrom AFB/Havre AFS/Opheim AFS.
Representative Max Baucus (D), Kalispell AFS.

New York

Senator Jacob K. Javits (R), Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D), and Representative John J. LaFalce (D), Lockport AFS.

Representative Otis G. Pike (D), Montauk AFS.
Representative Robert C. McEwen (R), Watertown AFS.

North Carolina

Senator Jesse A. Helms (R), Senator Robert Morgan (D), and Representative L. H. Fountain (D), Roanoke Rapids AFS.

North Dakota

Senator Milton R. Young (R), Senator Quentin N. Burdick (D), and Representative Mark Andrews (R), Minot AFS, Fortuna AFS.

Ohio

Senator John Glenn (D), Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (D), and Representative Samuel L. Devine (R), Rickenbacker AFB.
Representative Chalmers P. Wylie (R), Rickenbacker AFB.

Oregon

Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R), Senator Robert W. Packwood (R), and Representative Les AuCoin (D), Mount Hebo AFS.
Representative Al Ullman (D), Kingsley Field/Keno AFS.
Representative James Weaver (D), North Bend AFS.

South Carolina

Senator Strom Thurmond (R), Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D), and Representative Mendel J. Davis (D), North Charleston AFS.

Texas

Senator John Tower (R), Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D), and Representative Robert Krueger (D), Goodfellow AFB.
Representative Abraham Kazen, Jr. (D), Randolph FB.
Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D), Lackland AFB.
Representative Jack E. Hightower (D), Sheppard AFB.

Vermont

Senator Robert T. Stafford (R), Senator Patrick Leahy (D), and Representative James M. Jeffords (R), St. Albans AFS.

Virginia

Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (I), Senator William L. Scott (R), and Representative Paul S. Trible, Jr. (R), Cape Charles AFS.

Washington

Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D), Senator Henry M. Jackson (D), and Representative Lloyd Meeds (D), Blaine AFS.
Representative Thomas S. Foley (D), Mica Peak AFS.

Committee List No. 2

April 1978

SENATE

Chairmen	*Ranking Minority Members*
Hon. John C. Stennis, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, room 212.	Hon. John Tower, U.S. Senate, room 142.
Hon. Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, room 1243.	Hon. Milton R. Young, U.S. Senate room 5205.
Hon. Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, room 3306.	Hon. Charles H. Percy, U.S. Senate room 4321.
Hon. Gary Hart, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction Authorization, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, room 254.	Hon. Strom Thurmond, U.S. Senate, room 209.
Hon. Walter D. Huddleston, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, room 3327.	Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senate, room 260.
Hon. Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman, Committee on Budget, U.S. Senate, room 208, Carroll Arms.	Hon. Henry Bellmon, U.S. Senate room 125.

HOUSE

Chairmen	*Ranking Minority Members*
Hon. Melvin Price, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, room 2120.	Hon. Bob Wilson, House of Representatives, room 2307.
Hon. George H. Mahon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, room H–218	Hon. Elford A. Cederberg, House of Representatives, room 2306.
Hon. George H. Mahon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, room H–144.	Hon. Jack Edwards, House of Representatives, room 2439.
Hon. Gunn McKay, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, room E–300.	Hon. Robert C. McEwen, House of Representatives, room 2210.
Hon. Lucien N. Nedzi, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, room 2418.	Hon. G. Wm. Whitehurst, House of Representatives, room 442.
Hon. Robert N. C. Nix, Chairman, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, room 309.	Hon. Edward J. Derwinski, House of Representatives, room 1401.
Hon. Robert N. Giaimo,* Chairman, Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, room 2207.	Hon. Delbert L. Latta, House of Representatives, room 2309.

*Copy to: Mr. Russell Hale, National Security Task Force, Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, room 214, Annex.

AIR FORCE

(Information sheets on individual installation and activity realinement proposals in the United States)

INDEX OF INFORMATION SHEETS

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

REALINEMENT FACT SHEET—JOINT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Background and mission

The current Air Defense radar network is the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system. The system was designed and deployed in the 1950s to counter the Soviet bomber threat as then perceived. The SAGE System was to perform the peacetime air sovereignty mission and a bomber defense mission. At this time, SAGE consists of two segments: a network of 56 radars (49 USAF and 7 Federal Aviation Administration) around the periphery of the United States plus six CONUS Region Control Centers (RCCs). The SAGE system employs 1950s vintage vacuum tube technology, and has become expensive and difficult to maintain. As a result the Air Force is transitioning to the Joint Surveillance System (JSS) for peacetime air sovereignty.

Nature of action

The JSS will incorporate radar inputs from Long Range Radars (LRR) operated by the Department of Defense and the FAA. Many existing LRRSs will be transferred to the FAA which will operate and maintain the surveillance radar portion with approximately 20 people. Fewer than 10 USAF personnel will be assigned to these sites to operate the height finder radars as FAA does not have a requirement for height information from these sensors. Some existing Air Force LRRs are incorporated in the system covering areas in which FAA does not need reporting and will continue to be operated and maintained solely by the Air Force. Still other radars will no longer be required.

Reason for the action

The JSS is being implemented for two significant reasons. First, to fully comply with a 1954 Executive order which tasked the Air Force and FAA to combine their separate, dedicated radar coverage. Second, to replace the aging SAGE network with technically up to date hardware which will enable the air sovereignty mission to be performed more efficiently and cost effectively. As the system is implemented, the E–3A AWACS will be employed to augment its capability in times of increased international tension.

Impact of the action

There are over 40 sites affected in FY 79 and 80 by the implementation of the JSS. Each of these sites is relatively small, with less than 200 personnel. A breakout of the personnel affected, in the aggregate, does not adequately portray the comparatively minor personnel effects at each of the sites. In total, approximately 3200 military and 700 civilian manpower authorizations will be avoided between Fiscal Year 79 (beginning October 1, 1978) and disposal of the real property at the sites estimated for Fiscal Year 83. There may be some personnel turbulence, but the effect at each site will be comparatively minor. The manpower resources made available by these actions will be used to improve our worldwide combat readiness.

The total one-time cost for implementation of the Joint Surveillance System is $31.7 million with a total estimated annual cost avoidance of $56.8 million.

The majority of the assessments for the individual sites are complete; the remainder are being finalized and should be complete in the fall of 1978. A listing of the locations to be affected during 1979 and 1980 is attached.

The following Air Force sites are programmed to be impacted by implementation of the JSS. The manpower impact is approximate and expressed as military personnel (MIL), civilian (CIV), and total (TOT):

Location	Action effective by—	USAF personnel— Reduced			Remaining		
		Military	Civilian	Total	Military	Civilian	Total
Dauphine Island AFS, Dauphin Island, Ala. (site to be inactivated)	Summer 1980	7	----	7	----	----	----
Almaden AFS, Twin Creek, Calif. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1980	100	20	120	----	----	----
Cambria AFS, Cambria, Calif. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1980	90	25	115	----	----	----
Mill Valley AFS, Mill Valley, Calif. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Spring 1980	143	30	173	7	----	7
Mount Laguna AFS, Mount Laguna, Calif. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Fall 1980	133	30	163	7	----	7
Klamath AFS, Requa, Calif. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Winter 1979	93	25	118	7	----	7
San Pedro Hill AFS, Los Angeles, Calif. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Fall 1980	18	5	23	7	----	7
Jacksonville AFS, Orange Park, Fla. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1980	60	10	70	----	----	----
Key West NAS, Key West, Fla. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA; USAF action impact).	Winter 1979	33	1	34	7	----	7
MacDill AFB Tampa, Fla. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA at FAA site).	Summer 1980	55	5	60	5,045	855	5,900
Patrick AFB, Cocoa Beach, Fla. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Winter 1979	25	----	25	3,175	950	4,125
Richmond AFS, Perrine, Fla. (Air Force contract radar transferred to FAA).	Summer 1980	−22	−1	−23	7	----	7
Tyndall AFB, Panama City, Fla. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Winter 1979	20	----	20	3,180	950	4,130
Savannah AFS, Savannah, Ga. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1980	70	10	80	----	----	----

Location	Action effective by—	USAF personnel— Reduced			Remaining		
		Military	Civilian	Total	Military	Civilian	Total
Finland AFS, Finland, Minn. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA at Nashwauk).	Spring 1980	93	25	118	7	--	7
Havre AFS, Havre, Mont. (site to be inactivated).	Fall 1979	95	25	120	--	--	--
Kalispell AFS, Lakeside, Mont. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Winter 1979	23	--	23	7	--	7
Malmstrom AFB, Great Falls, Mont. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Winter 1979	20	--	20	4,630	620	5,250
Opheim AFS, Opheim, Mont. (site to be inactivated).	Fall 1979	90	25	115	--	--	--
Lockport AFS, Lockport, N.Y. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1979	95	25	120	--	--	--
Montauk AFS, Montauk, N.Y. (site to be inactivated).	Spring 1980	110	30	140	--	--	--
Watertown AFS, Watertown, N.Y. (site to be inactivated).	Fall 1979	97	22	119	--	--	--
Bucks Harbor AFS, Bucks Harbor, Maine (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Spring 1979	53	10	63	7	--	7
Caswell AFS, Caswell, Maine (site to be inactivated).	Fall 1980	80	20	100	--	--	--
Charleston AFS, Charleston, Maine (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1979	160	20	180	--	--	--
Fort George Meade, Laurel, Md. (radar site to be inactivated).	Summer 1980	50	3	53	--	--	--
Calumet AFS, Central, Mich. (site to be inactivated).	Winter 1979	105	25	130	--	--	--
Empire AFS, Empire, Mich. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Spring 1980	28	10	38	7	--	7
Sault Ste Marie AFS, Sault Ste Marie, Mich. (site to be inactivated).	Winter 1979	100	20	120	--	--	--
Baudette AFS, Baudette, Minn. (site to be inactivated).	Winter 1979	100	30	130	7	--	--
Roanoke Rapids AFS, Roanoke Rapids, N.C. (site to be inactivated).	Fall 1978	85	15	100	--	--	--
Finley AFS, Finley, N. Dak. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA at another location; site to be inactivated).	Fall 1979	83	30	113	7	--	7
Fortuna AFS, Fortuna, N. Dak. (radar to be inactivated).	Fall 1979	110	25	135	--	--	--
Minot AFS, Minot, N. Dak. (site to be inactivated).	Fall 1979	90	20	110	--	--	--
Keno AFS, Keno, Oreg. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Spring 1979	See announcement for Kingsley Field.					
Mount Hebo AFS, Hebo, Oreg. (site to be inactivated).	Spring 1979	160	30	190	--	--	--
North Bend AFS, North Bend, Oreg. (site to be inactivated).	Winter 1979	90	30	120	--	--	--
North Charleston AFS, North Charleston, S.C. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1980	100	15	115	--	--	--
Cape Charles AFS, Kiptopeke, Va. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1980	80	25	105	--	--	--
Blaine AFS, Blaine, Wash. (site to be inactivated).	Spring 1979	100	25	125	--	--	--
Mica Peak AFS, Mica, Wash. (Air Force radar transferred to FAA).	Summer 1979	35	10	45	--	--	--
Saint Albans AFS, Saint Albans, Vt. (site to be inactivated).	Summer 1979	90	20	110	--	--	--

LOS ANGELES AFS, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Information sheet

The Department of the Air Force desires to improve the management of resources devoted to the national space effort. Currently, the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) through the Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) at the Los Angeles AFS, California, conducts the majority of the Air Force research and development effort associated with space systems. Air Force and contractor employees from Aerospace, Inc., work together in conducting research and managing procurement and production. This study may result in a reorganization of SAMSO, relocation of activities and the closure of Los Angeles AFS. The study will consider the relocation of essential activities to Vandenberg, Norton, and Edwards AFB's, California. The actual numbers of personnel to be relocated to each location will be determined as a part of the study.

Los Angeles AFS is a small single-mission installation with limited expansion capability. The base has been subjected to urban encroachment for some time

and has few of the amenities associated with military life such as a major medical facility, sufficient base housing, and morale and welfare facilities. The relatively high cost of living in the Los Angeles area exacerbates this lack of normal amenities. Preliminary reviews conducted by the Air Force indicate management advantages can be gained if SAMSO activities are relocated. There may also be some economies realized through a reduced requirement for about 175 Air Force military and civilian personnel and approximately 400 contractor support personnel. However, further study is required prior to making any decision on this proposal. The Air Force will be conducting detailed evaluations of the operational, resource, environmental, and socioeconomic impacts of this proposal. The decision will be made only after all aspects of the proposal are examined.

An environmental assessment will be prepared to determine the extent of the impact on the biophysical environment of the Los Angeles AFS area and the areas gaining activities if the proposal were implemented. The assessment will be used to determine the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). These evaluations and assessments will begin immediately and should be complete later this year.

If an environmental impact statement is not required, it will be announced and the assessment and other evaluations will be used to make a decision on this proposal. Should an EIS be required, it will be prepared and processed in accordance with established procedures. The final EIS will then be used in the decision process. If the final decision is to implement this proposal to close Los Angeles AFS, a report to the Congress under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2678, will be made. This report will include an analysis of local economic impact.

Currently there are approximately 5,700 Air Force military, Air Force civilian and contractor personnel at Los Angeles AFS. The Air Force is sensitive to the uncertainty that this proposed closure could cause within the local military and civilian communities. Therefore, we will proceed quickly with our evaluations in order to reach an early decision.

CHANUTE AFB, RANTOUL, ILL.

Information sheet

The Department of the Air Force perceives a requirement to reduce the number of bases dedicated to technical training. This requirement is brought about by a decreasing Air Force population and changes in training concepts. These changes in training concepts include the use of programed learning techniques and training programs concentrated to fit the needs of an individual assignment rather than all aspects of a broad career area.

A preliminary review of the Air Force technical training base structure has led to the proposal to close Chanute AFB, Rantoul, IL and relocate its training missions to other technical training centers. Chanute AFB, among the training centers within the Air Force, is the sole single mission base and could possibly be closed with comparatively limited disruption of activities. Keesler AFB, MS and Sheppard AFB, TX each support flying activities in addition to technical training centers. Keesler AFB supports active and Reserve Force weather reconnaissance missions and an Airborne Command and Control Squadron; Sheppard AFB hosts a flying training wing for non-US student pilots. Activities at Lackland AFB, TX include the basic military training center of the Air Force, a major USAF Regional Hospital, Wilford Hall, and a technical training center. Lowry AFB, CO, hosts the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center and the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center in addition to a technical training center. Lowry also provides some support for Buckley Air National Guard Base, CO.

The proposal would relocate technical training instructors and students from Chanute AFB to the other technical training centers. The relocation of activities would be phased so as to minimize interruption in training courses. Preliminary studies indicate that the closure of Chanute AFB or any other training center would require a significant outlay of funds for construction of dormitories and training facilities. However, this outlay could be amortized in a few years by the cost avoidances that could be realized through the total closure of Chanute. These preliminary studies indicate that as many as 2,000 Department of the Air Force personnel positions, contract operations requiring approximately 450 employees and $43M annually could eventually be avoided. The same studies Indicate that approximately 2,800 military and 1,350 DAF civilian employee positions could be affected by this proposal, with approximately 1,600 military and 550 civilian positions relocated to other installations.

The detailed studies necessary to address all aspects of this proposal will begin immediately. The Air Force will evaluate the operational impact of the proposed action as well as the costs which could be incurred and avoided. The Air Force will assess the socioeconomic impact and the bio-physical environmental impact in the Chanute area and in the areas which would receive functions realigned from Chanute. These evaluations should be complete in 90 to 120 days. Upon completion of the environmental assessment a determination will be made and announced as to the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). If an EIS is not required, a decision will be made and announced based on the evaluations and assessments. Should an EIS be required, it will be prepared and processed in accordance with established procedures. The final EIS will then be used in the decision process. If the final decision is to implement this proposal, a report to the Congress under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687, will be made. This report will include an analysis of the local economic impact.

This proposed closure, if implemented, is expected to take several years to complete.

The requirement to phase the relocation to minimize the disruption of training and the planning, programing, funding and construction of facilities could require implementation extending into the 1980's. We recognize that a long implementation period may generate some uncertainty in the civilian and military communities. However, depending on the decision, delayed implementation can provide the community lead time to adjust to any economic impacts. The Air Force is sensitive to these concerns and will announce its decision as soon as possible.

RICKENBACKER AFB, COLUMBUS, OHIO

Information sheet

The Department of the Air Force has a continuing requirement to align its basing structure with its force posture. In satisfying this requirement, the Air Force often makes reductions and realignments of major installations. Accordingly, the Air Force will study all aspects of a proposal to withdraw active forces from Rickenbacker AFB and close excess facilities.

The Air Force will study the relocation of Strategic Air Command (SAC) forces from Rickenbacker AFB and close all facilities not required for the Air Reserve Force (ARF) activities. Currently, the 301st Air Refueling Wing with 15 KC–135 air refueling aircraft is the host unit at Rickenbacker. The SAC unit supports an Air National Guard (ANG) Air Refueling Group equipped with 8 KC–135s, an ANG Tactical Fighter Wing with 18 A–7Ds as well as an Air Force Reserve Tactical Airlift Wing with 32 C–123s. In terms of assigned assets, the number of aircraft assigned to the ARF units far outnumber the 15 KC–135s of SAC's 301 Air Refueling Wing.

The mission of the SAC KC–135 units is to provide air refueling support for SAC B–52s, and for other aircraft assigned to Tactical Air Command, Military Airlift Command and the Air Reserve Force. The KC–135 ANG unit at Rickenbacker has a similar mission. It appears that the overall management of our air refueling assets can be enhanced by dissolving the SAC unit at Rickenbacker AFB and assigning the aircraft to other existing KC–135 units. A contributing factor leading to the study of the relocation of KC–135s from Rickenbacker is an Air Force program begun in 1974. This program will eventually transfer 128 KC–135 tankers from SAC to sixteen ARF units. The transfer of tankers has, in some cases, resulted in reduced base loading at SAC installations thereby making facilities available for this realignment.

The ANG and AFR units currently assigned to Rickenbacker are not proposed for relocation. The Air Force plans to retain those units at Rickenbacker in their assigned missions.

As a part of the study relative to relocating the SAC force, the Air Force will examine the feasibility of performing the remaining base operating support functions by contract rather than by use of Air Force military and civilian personnel as is the current practice. The decision on this aspect of the proposal is dependent on the relative economic advantages of withdrawing the active forces and on on passage by Congress of amendments to the provisions of the FY DOD Authorization and Appropriations Acts relating to contracting out of base support functions.

Preliminary studies conducted to date indicate the proposal to relocate SAC forces and convert BOS to contract could reduce the population at Rickenbacker by approximately 1,800 military and 450 civilian personnel; approximately 400

military and 15 civilians of those positions would be transferred. Personnel remaining at Rickenbacker would number approximately 120 active duty military personnel, 760 AF civilian personnel including ARF technicians and approximately 3,300 ANG and AFR military personnel. The base operating support contract, if implemented, would offer employment opportunity for an estimated 200–250 additional civilian personnel. If the base operating support is not done by contract, a similar number of civil service employees will be required. The realignment of forces from Rickenbacker AFB would result in cost avoidances estimated at more than $24 million annually.

In future months, the Air Force will study all aspects of this proposal. These studies will include an operational evaluation, an evaluation of the impact on the Air Force resources and an assessment of the socioeconomic impact and the environmental impact of this proposal. The studies will begin in the immediate future and should be completed in 90–120 days.

Upon completion of the environmental assessment, a determination will be made and announced concerning the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement. Preliminary indications are that no significant impact on the biophysical environment of the Columbus, Ohio, area would result from this proposed action at Rickenbacker AFB. However, the impact on the locations which may receive missions from Rickenbacker has not been fully assessed. If an EIS is not required, a decision on the proposed actions will be made and announced based on the evaluations and assessments. Should an EIS be required, it will be prepared and processed in accordance with established procedures. The final EIS will then be used in the decision process.

The Air Force is sensitive to the uncertainty such realignment proposals could generate within the military and civilian communities at our installations. Therefore, we will proceed as rapidly as possible with our studies and we will make every effort to reach an early decision. If this proposal is implemented, the realignment of forces may take place during calendar year 1979.

KINGSLEY FIELD, KLAMATH FALLS, OREG.

Information sheet

The Department of the Air Force has a program to utilize the radar capabilities of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the USAF. This program, entitled the Joint Surveillance System, (JSS) would result in the transfer of some USAF radar activities to the FAA and the inactivation of some USAF radar sites. The radar site at Keno AFS, OR, and the support activities at Kingsley Field, Klamath Falls, OR, are affected by this program. The Air Force intends to inactivate the radar squadron at Keno AFS. The site itself would be retained for future use by the Federal government as a part of the JSS. The Air Force, therefore, proposes to withdraw active units from Kingsley Field.

Air Force activities at Kingsley Field support Keno AFS and a day-to-day air defense alert commitment. Aircraft provided by the F–106 Fighter Interceptor Squadron at McChord AFB, Washington, rotate to Kingsley Field on a regular basis to provide air defense alert. With the inactivation of the radar squadron at Keno AFS, there would be no longer be a requirement for the support functions performed at Kingsley Field.

The requirement for peacetime air defense alert at Kingsley appears limited. The detachment responded on only two occasions during 1976–1977 to intercept and identify aircraft which had come under air defense surveillance. It does not appear, therefore, a mission essential that we provide an alert capability from Kingsley Field. Air defense fighter interceptor coverage for the area could be provided by the existing Air National Guard alert force at Portland IAP, OR.

Preliminary studies conducted to date indicate the elimination of Air Force activities at Kingsley could generate cost avoidance estimated at almost $10 million annually and reduce the requirement for 475 military and civilian personnel.

The Air Force may retain some real property interests at Kingsley Field to provide a dispersal base for fighter interceptor aircraft if necessary during periods of heightened defense conditious. The remainder of the Air Force real property, however, could be excessed and disposed of through normal GSA procedures after inactivation of Air Force activities. The Air National Guard activity at Kingsley, a tactical air control flight, will remain.

The Air Force will be conducting evaluations of the operational, resource, environmental and socioeconomic impacts of this proposal. The Air Force expects to begin these evaluations immediately and should complete the preliminary

assessments by the summer of 1978. Upon completion of the environmental assessment a determination will be made and announced as to the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

If an EIS is not required, a decision will be made and announced based on the evaluations and assessments. Should an EIS be required, it will be prepared and processed in accordance with established procedures. The final EIS will then be used in the decision process.

GOODFELLOW AFB, SAN ANGELO, TEX.

Information sheet

The Department of the Air Force perceives a requirement to improve the management of the cryptologic training program, reduce overhead and support activities and reduce costs associated with the training base structure. Preliminary evaluations indicate that Goodfellow AFB, Texas, should be reviewed as a candidate for possible closure, with missions relocated to other installations.

The primary mission of Goodfellow is technical and operational training for applied cryptologic sciences for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in certain common skills. The current authorized permaant party strength is approximately 1,000 military and 325 civilian positions. The normal student load is about 700.

This installation has been selected for study because it is a small single-mission base with a relatively high per capita operating cost; therefore, it appears that considerable annual cost reductions could be realized if this action were to be implemented.

The Air Force will evaluate the operational impact of the proposed action, the costs that could be incurred and avoided and the potential socioeconomic and biophysical environmental impacts. Preliminary reviews indicate approximately 375 military and 225 civilian personnel positions and $14 million annually could be avoided by the closure of Goodfellow AFB.

The required evaluations will begin immediately and will identify potential sites for the relocated training activities. Under the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its implementing guidelines, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) will be prepared to evaluate the biophysical environmental impact of the closure of Goodfellow AFB. This assessment and the other evaluations are expected to take from one to three months to complete. Upon completion, a determination will be made and announced as to whether or not an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required.

If an EIS is not required, a decision on the proposal will be made and announced based on the evaluations and assessments. Should an EIS be required, it will be prepared and processed in accordance with established procedures. The final EIS will then be used in the decision process.

The Air Force is sensitive to the uncertainty that this proposed closure could generate within the military and civilian communities. Therefore, we will proceed as rapidly as possible with our studies and we will make every effort to reach an early decision.

Question. Why was your notice not submitted until much later than your public announcement?

Answer. The Air Force position is that the notice was submitted prior to the public announcement, not later. The Navy position is that the long time period between public announcement and availability of the studies themselves did not necessitate earlier submittal.

Question. In the military construction authorization bill for FY–79, there was an amendment to 10 USC 2687 to reduce the threshold of applicability from 500 civilians to 300 civilians. You did *not* oppose that amendment in your conference reclama letter. Why?

Answer. We determined that the impact of the amendment would be a minimal increase in reporting requirements. Of the 374 installations contained in the Domestic Base Factors Report, 247 have an authorized personnel level of 500 or more. Reducing the level to 300, adds only 44 more installations.

Question. There is also a training base realignment provision in the FY–79 Defense Procurement Authorization Bill which went unopposed by the Defense Department. What will be the impact of this provision and why did you not oppose it?

Answer. A. Our original viewpoint on the impact of the provision, strictly from an installation management viewpoint, was that it would have a minimal overall

effect since section 602, H.R. 10929 and Report No. 95–1118 placed no new restrictions on DoD in addition to those imposed by 10 USC 2687. Further, while it would require duplicative reporting, this would place an additional administrative workload on DoD and would be somewhat objectionable. It would not place an intolerable burden on DoD.

B. Through an administrative oversight DoD opposition to section 602, H.R. 10929, from a training management viewpoint, was not provided to the Congress. However, we have reevaluated section 602, in light of currently available information and now strongly oppose it for the following reasons:

"It involves the Congress, whether intended or not, into the micromanagement of the training base and, therefore, infringes on the prerogatives of the Executive Branch.

"It does require an increase in administrative requirements that are duplicative of reports already made available to the Congress under the provisions of 10 USC 2687 and, therefore, places an additional strain on limited DoD resources."

We made our thoughts on section 602 known to various staff members of both the House and Senate but unfortunately, official action was too late. We regret this oversight and intend to oppose this section strongly at the next opportunity.

MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS

Question. Do you have plans for mobilization that include the necessary bases? Perhaps Secretary Gibbs you might discuss, for instance, Army training bases—which you are studying cutting back—do we have enough bases to do mobilization training?

Respondent. Current Army plans consider all bases that will be required. With regard to training installations, the Army projects that there will be sufficient bases available if mobilization becomes necessary.

ALTERNATIVES

(Exchange of correspondence with Senator Hart attached.)

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., June 23, 1978.

Hon. HAROLD BROWN,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I'm deeply disturbed to learn that the Air Force has decided to defer the construction of the avionics training facility authorized for Lowry Air Force Base in the Fiscal Year 1978 Military Construction Act at a cost of $3,380,000. I'm disturbed at learning of this deferral from the press rather than from Defense Department or Air Force officials. However, I'm much more disturbed that this action appears to be a political accommodation to the Illinois Congressional delegation which has been understandably vocal in their concern over the publicly announced study of the closure of Chanute Air Force Base.

As Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Construction, having to deal with base realignment legislation and policy, I've emphasized in hearings and in private meetings with Defense officials that I support efforts by the Defense Department to achieve management efficiencies and economies through base realignments, consolidations and closures—if they can be justified—however, these actions are painful and efforts to mitigate adverse impacts are a must. I've also emphasized that realignment studies should be as objective and as factual as possible—without regard to politics.

Apparently politics dictated the recent Air Force decision to defer the Lowry project. Lowry Air Force Base has never been identified as a "candidate" or even an "alternative" for realignment by the Air Force. No mention was made in the April 26, 1978, Air Force announcement that construction activities would be curtailed or suspended at Lowry. It is my understanding that this decision was made only last week as a result of Congressional intervention.

As a Senator from Colorado, I must, of course, be concerned that Lowry Air Force Base does not become a political pawn. As Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee that has jurisdiction over these matters, this action evokes broader concerns with Defense Department base realignment policy and procedures. I have appended a list of questions on this subject which I would appreciate have your office address expeditiously.

Since serious policy issues are raised by this development, it may be necessary to defer Senate Floor action on the Fiscal Year 1979 Military Construction Act until these questions are clarified or until subcommittee hearings are conducted to determine whether amendments to base realignment law (10 U.S.C. 2687) are warranted.

Sincerely,

GARY HART,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Military Construction and Stockpiles.

Attachment.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON BASE REALINEMENTS

1. When and why was the decision made to defer the construction of the avionics training facility at Lowry Air Force Base?
2. Was the Defense Department consulted on this decision?
3. Is this decision part of a Defense Department policy to defer construction at all bases that are either "candidates" for realignment or have missions similar to "candidate" bases?
   a. If no, why not?
   b. If yes, provide a list of all other bases affected by this policy and indicate the specific deferrals that may be affected at such bases.
4. If it is not Defense Department policy to defer construction at "candidate" bases and bases with similar missions, perhaps it should be. Provide a list of all bases that are currently "candidates" for realignment and all bases that have similar missions (e.g., Chanute, Lowry, Keesler, Sheppard, and Lackland; San Diego, Great Lakes, and Orlando, etc.). For each base indicate construction projects that are pending (authorized but not completed, include those only partially completed) indicating the status of each project.
5. Despite assurances from Defense officials during hearings that the Fiscal Year 1979 Military Construction Authorization request contained no construction projects at bases that were identified as "candidates" for realignment in the recent announcements, the Senate Armed Services Committee identified and "conditionally authorized" over $40 million for such projects. What is Defense Department policy with respect to requesting authorization for construction projects at "candidate" bases?
6. The action at Lowry suggests that the Committee should perhaps examine projects at bases whose missions are similar to "candidate" bases with a view toward either eliminating projects contingent on final realignment decisions and revalidation of project requirements. Provide a list of such bases showing projects authorized for each of these bases as included in the FY–79 Military Construction Authorization Bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

ASSISTANT SECETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., July 12, 1978.

Hon. GARY HART,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction and Stockpiles, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your letter to Secretary Brown regarding the Air Force decision to defer construction of an avionics training facility at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado.

We regret that your first notice of the action to defer construction of the Lowry project was from the press. As you may know, we have a long-standing procedure that the Military Services assure that Congressional delegations are informed of any action substantially affecting their states or districts. In this instance, failure to provide prior notification of the deferral was an oversight. We sincerely regret any embarrassment which may have resulted.

I assure you that political pressure or consideration was not in any way a factor in the determination to defer construction of the avionics training facility at Lowry. Rather, that decision reflects a long-standing procedure within the Department of Defense to closely review and monitor military construction at bases (1) either planned or currently under review for possible realignment of missions or closure, or (2) which could reasonably be considered as alternatives to the prime base candidate. These management procedures are designed to insure that construction funds are not needlessly expended.

Each project is reviewed on a case-by-case basis and in many instances such reviews do not result in deferral or cancellation of planned construction. Fre-

quently, it can be determined that the need for the proposed work is not affected by a planned or on-going study and thus is required regardless of the outcome. However, in the case of the Lowry training facility, the Air Force has not completed the detailed analysis of its technical training centers and, therefore, could not clearly make such a determination. Accordingly, the Air Force took the only prudent management decision practicable under the circumstances and withheld execution of the project pending conclusion of the study which should be forthcoming shortly.

With respect to the list of detailed questions which was appended to your letter, we have prepared replies and they are enclosed herewith. If you have any questions, please let us know. We would be pleased to meet with you or your staff on this matter if you desire.

Sincerely,

JOHN P. WHITE,
Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Enclosures.

1. Question. When and why was the decision made to defer the construction of the avionics training facility at Lowry Air Force Base?

Answer. The decision within the Headquarters, United States Air Force, to defer the construction of the avionics training facility at Lowry Air Force Base was made in early June. Within the Department of Defense, it is a long-standing management practice to closely monitor the military construction program to insure that no construction funds are needlessly expended at bases (1) undergoing review for possible closure or major realignment, or (2) those which could be reasonably considered as alternatives to the prime base candidate.

2. Question. Was the Defense Department consulted on this decision?

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense was not consulted specifically on the decision to defer the avionics training facility. However, it was clearly understood that the Air Force would exercise the long-standing DoD management practice with respect to additional capital investments on a base under study for closure, as outlined above.

3. Question. Is this decision part of a Defense Department policy to defer construction at all bases that are either "candidates" for realignment or have missions similar to "candidate" bases?

(a) If no, why not?

(b) If yes, provide a list of all other bases affected by this policy and indicate the specific deferrals that may be affected at such bases.

Answer. It is not Department of Defense policy to unequivocally defer all construction at bases that are either candidates for realignment or have missions similar to candidate bases. The proposed project must be screened with respect to the final configuration or mission of the realigned installation. Projects that are not compatible with possible final realignment action are held in abeyance. Projects that cannot conceivably be affected by the realignment action (to include Health/Safety projects) are allowed to continue though they receive close scrutiny. Construction at similar locations is not deferred unless there is a direct relationship between the proposed realignment and the similar installation. Any adjustments are made in accordance with established procedures.

4. Question. If it is not Defense Department policy to defer construction at "candidate" bases and bases with similar missions, perhaps it should be. Provide a list of all bases that are currently "candidates" for realignment and all bases that have similar missions (e.g., Chanute, Lowry, Keesler, Sheppard, and Lackland; San Diego, Great Lakes, and Orlando, etc.). For each base indicate construction projects that are pending (authorized but not completed, include those only partially completed) indicating the status of each project.

Answer. Tab A, Army; tab B, Navy; and tab C, Air Force.

TAB A—DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

1. The following locations are presently being considered by the Department of the Army for possible realignment action.

(a) Training base realignment considerations:

(1) Ft. Benning, Ga.
(2) Ft. Bliss, Tex.
(3) Ft. Dix, N.J.
(4) Ft. Gordon, Ga.

(5) Ft. Jackson, S.C.
(6) Ft. Knox, Ky.
(7) Ft. McClellan, Ala.
(8) Ft. Sill, Okla.
(9) Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.

(b) Medical center realinement considerations:
(1) Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (AMC), Colo.
(2) Brooke AMC, Tex.
(3) Dwight David Eisenhower AMC, Ga.
(4) Walter Reed AMC, D.C.
(5) Tripler AMC, Hawaii.
(6) Madigan AMC, Wash.
(7) William Beaumont AMC, Tex.
(8) Letterman AMC, Calif.

(c) Other realinement considerations:
(1) Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
(2) Arlington Hall Station, Va.
(3) Ft. Eustis, Va.
(4) Ft. Douglas, Utah.
(5) Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.
(6) Ft. Hamilton, N.Y.
(7) Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.
(8) Letterkenny Army Depot, Pa.
(9) Ft. MacArthur, Calif.
(10) Ft. Monroe, Va.
(11) Corpus Christi Army Depot, Tex.
(12) New Cumberland Army Depot, Pa.
(13) Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
(14) Rock Island Arsenal, Ill.
(15) Ft. Sheridan, Ill.
(16) Ft. Wadsworth, N.Y.
(17) Vint Hill Farms Station, Va.
(18) Ft. Totten, N.Y.
(19) Redstone Arsenal, Ala.

2. The projects which are pending at the proposed realignment locations are as follows:

(A) TRAINING BASE REALINEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Fiscal year	Project	CWE (thousands)	Date
	(1) Ft. Benning, Ga.		
Design (award):			
1977	Building improvements	$969	July 1978.
1977	Energy conservation system	1,628	September 1978.
1977	Upgrade domestic waste treatment	4,030	Do.
1978	EM barracks complex	13,934	September 1978 (holding).
1978	Dental clinic	3,279	September 1978.
	Construction (completion):		
1975	Upgrade hospital	5,214	December 1979.
1976	EM barracks complex	18,342	August 1978.
1976	Building improvements—Energy	483	July 1978.
1977	Lindsay Creek Parkway	3,689	May 1979.
1978	BCT training facility	3,264	December 1978.
	(2) Ft. Bliss, Tex.		
1978	Design (award): Insulate buildings	557	September 1978.
	Construction (completion):		
1978	Water storage tanks	262	October 1978.
1978	Hot water heaters	79	February 1979.
	(3) Ft. Dix, N.J.		
	Design (award):		
1973	Cold storage warehouse	1,215	On DA hold.
1973	Barracks modernization	5,670	Design completed.
1971	Construction (completion): Improve sewage facility	3,005	August 1978.
	(4) Ft. Gordon, Ga.		
1977	Construction (completion): Regional dental activity	1,583	March 1979.
	(5) Ft. Jackson, S.C.		
	Design (award):		
1976	Building weatherproofing	357	September 1978.
1978	Water pollution control	366	July 1978.
	Construction (completion):		
1976	EM barracks complex	10,003	December 1978.
1976	Storm drainage	254	September 1978.

(A) TRAINING BASE REALINEMENT CONSIDERATIONS—Continued

Fiscal year	Project	CWE (thousands)	Date
	(6) Ft. Knox, Ky.		
	Design (award):		
1977	Insulate/improve heating/cooling, phase II	1,666	August 1978.
1977	Modify heating plant, phase II	1,747	December 1978.
1976	Upgrade sewage system, phase II	4,316	December 1979.
	Construction (completion):		
1976	Add/alter Ireland Army Hospital	34,820	August 1980.
1977	Upgrade sewage system	2,938	December 1978.
1976	Sanitary sewer cleaning, phase II	186	July 1978.
1977	Industrial waste treatment	1,960	November 1979.
1977	Improve heating/cooling phase I	1,068	August 1978.
1977	Modify heating plants, phase I	893	December 1978.
1977	Dining facility modernization	2,047	February 1979.
	(7) Ft. McClellan, Ala.		
1974	Design (award): Boiler expansion, phase IV	1,300	August 1978.
	Construction (completion):		
1976	Addition to Noble Army Hospital	9,608	September 1979.
1976	Boiler plant modernization	708	November 1978
1976	EM barracks complex	14,443	Do.
1976	Heating controls/insulation	397	Do.
1977	Heating control system (ECIP)	1,880	January 1980.
	(8) Ft. Sill, Okla.		
1977	Design (award): Industrial waste treatment	782	September 1978.
	Construction (completion):		
1976	Barracks complex trainee	12,570	March 1979.
1976	Building heating system	1,649	January 1979.
	(9) Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.		
	Design (award):		
1977	Heating plant improvement	2,800	November 1978.
1977	Insulation/storm windows	645	July 1978.
	Construction (completion):		
1974	EM barracks complex	44,840	October 1978.
1975	Electrical/mechanical upgrade hospital	4,142	August 1978.
1975	EW barracks	1,599	October 1978.
1975	Sewage treatment plant	2,001	July 1979.
1975	Water pollution control	146	Do.
1976	Range improvements	526	December 1978.
1976	Range parking area	158	Do.
1976	Sewage treatment improvment	9,144	July 1978.
1977	Fuel conversion	1,371	October 1978.
1977	Heating system automation/surveillance controls	4,236	February 1979.

(B) MEDICAL CENTER REALINEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

	(1) Fitzsimons AMC, Colo.		
1977	Construction (completion): Upgrade sewage plant	$516	August 1978.
	(2) Brooke AMC, Tex.		
1978	Design (award): Alter Brooke AMC	9,000	Design held.
	(3) Dwight David Eisenhower AMC, Ga.—None.		
	(4) Walter Reed AMC, D.C.		
1978	Design (award): Fuel oil storage/emergency generator	2,089	September 1978.
	Construction (completion):		
1972	Hospital	140,000	June 1978.
1977	Research support facility	660	August 1978.
	(5) Tripler AMC, Hawaii.—None.		
	(6) Madigan AMC, Wash.—None.		
	(7) William Beaumont AMC, Tex.		
1977	Design (award): Hospital electrical/mechanical upgrade	3,856	August 1978.
	(8) Letterman AMC, Calif.—None.		

(C) OTHER REALINEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

	(1) Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.		
	Design (award):		
1974	EM barracks	$4,652	February 1979.[1]
1974	EM barracks, phase II	6,329	March 1979.[1]
1978	Chemical storage security	6,738	September 1978.
1978	Energy control system, phase II	800	Do.
	Construction (completion):		
1974	Relocation of electrical lines for EM barracks	18	July 1978.
1976	Research facility	6,500	August 1978.
1977	Install storm sashes	692	July 1978.
1978	Energy control system, phase I	800	October 1979.
	(2) Arlington Hall Station, Va.—None.		
	(3) Ft. Eustis, Va.		
	Construction (completion):		
1976	Dining facility modernization	930	October 1978.
1977	Energy control system	1,517	February 1979.

See footnotes at end of table.

(C) OTHER REALINEMENT CONSIDERATIONS—Continued

Fiscal year	Project	CWE (thousands)	Date
1977	Insulation and storm windows	783	October 1978.
	(4) Ft. Douglas, Utah—None.		
	(5) Dugway Proving Ground, Utah—None.		
	(6) Ft. Hamilton, N.Y.—None.		
	(7) Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.—None.		
	(8) Letterkenny Army Depot, Pa.		
	Construction (completion):		
1977	Vehicle rebuild facility	3,226	November 1979.
1977	Insulate permanent buildings, phase I	1,062	February 1979.
1977	Insulate permanent buildings, phase IIa	952	August 1978.
1977	Insulate permanent buildings, phase IIb	923	Do.
	(9) Ft. MacArthur, Calif.—None.		
	(10) Ft. Monroe, Va.		
1976	Design (award): Water pollution control, phase II	649	September 1978.
	(11) Corpus Christi Army Depot, Tex.		
	Design (award):		
1978	Heat treatment	2,693	July 1978.
1978	Industrial waste, phase II	836	Do.
	Construction (completion):		
1978	Jet fuel test facility	927	December 1978.
1978	Flammable storage and POL	328	August 1978.
1978	Industrial waste, phase I	651	November 1978.
1976	Supply operations and storage building, phase II	988	January 1979.
	(12) New Cumberland Army Depot, Pa.—None.		
	(13) Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.		
1978	Design (award): Heat recovery	132	On hold. Not scheduled.
	(14) Rock Island Arsenal, Ill.		
1978	Design (award): Replace Moline bridge	9,100	August 1978.
	(15) Ft. Sheridan, Ill.—None.		
	(16) Ft. Wadsworth, N.Y.—None.		
	(17) Vint Hill Farm Station, Va.		
1977	Design (award): Sewage treatment plant	960	September 1978.[2]
	(18) Ft. Totten, N.Y.—None.		
	(19) Redstone Arsenal, Ala.		
1977	Construction (completion): Sediment and disposal facility	1,368	April 1979.

[1] These were DA hold until Fall of 1977—barracks modernization will be awarded subject to availability of funds after award of EM barracks.
[2] On DA hold until June 1978, when it was released for award.

[Cost in thousands of dollars]

Installation and project	Cost	Status (percent)
NAVY		
Current candidates for realinement:		
RTC San Diego, Calif. (none)		(1)
RTC Great Lakes, Ill. (none)		(1)
Bases with similar missions: RTC Orlando, Fla. (none)		(1)
MARINE CORPS		
Current candidates for realinement:		
MCRD Parris Island, S.C.:		
Modern family housing	2,418	10
Boiler plant modernization	80	15
Sanitation sewer collection system	570	2
Dining facility alteration	500	0
Recruit barracks	2,300	0
Applied instruction building	700	0
MCRD San Diego, Calif.: Steam and conduction system	1,200	0
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: Headquarters Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C. (none).		
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: Navy Recruit Command, Washington, D.C. (none).		
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: Navy Exhibit Center, Washington, D.C. (none).		
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: Headquarters Navy Audit Service, Washington, D.C. (none).		
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: NSA Long Beach, Calif. (none)		(2)
Bases with similar missions: NS San Diego, Calif.:		
P–087 berthing improvement	400	4
P–142 pier utilities	8,166	4
Current candidates for realinement: NAS (NARF) Alameda, Calif.:[3] P–745 energy monitor and control system.	1,191	0
Bases with similar missions: NSC Oakland, Calif.[3] (none).		

See footnotes at end of table.

Installation and project	Cost	Status (percent)
MARINE CORPS—Continued		
Current candidates for realinement:		
NARF Norfolk, Va.:[3] P–292 insulation and storm windows	390	0
NAS Norfolk, Va.:		
P–089 insulation and storm windows	100	25
P–158 heating, ventilation and air-conditioning	700	5
P–269 AUW shops and weapons storage magazine	950	10
P–363 runway extension	10,300	2
P–442 air freight terminal	2,950	0
Bases with similar missions: NSC Norfolk, Va.:[3]		
P–867 POL pipeline	4,990	25
P–163 lighting system	1,200	0
Current candidates for realinement:		
NARF North Island, Calif.[3] (none).		
NAS North Island, Calif.:		
P–366 oily waste collection and reclamation	3,600	56
P–373 industrial waste collection	2,171	80
P–379 steam and condensate system	5,949	13
P–388 oil spill prevention	1,500	0
P–391 steam and condensate system	4,500	0
P–446 classified item	7,251	0
P–996 smoke abatement—Crash fire	250	0
Bases with similar missions: NSC San Diego, Calif.[3] (None).		
Current candidates for realinement: Naval Regional Medical Center, Philadelphia, Pa.[4] (none).		
Bases with similar missions: National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md.:[4] P–052 National Naval Medical Center modernization	100,000	54
Current candidates for realinement: Naval hospital, Quantico, Va.[5] (none).		
Bases with similar missions: National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md.;[5] P–052 National Naval Medical Center modernization	100,000	54
Current candidates for realinement: Naval hospital, Whidbey Island, Wash.[6] (none).		
Bases with similar missions: Naval Regional Medical Center, Bremerton, Wash.:[6]		
P–033 hospital complex	29,959	73
P–004 BEQ	1,450	0
Current candidates for realinement: Naval hospital, Port Hueneme, Calif.[7] (none).		
Bases with similar missions: Naval hospital, Long Beach, Calif.[7] (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: Naval hospital, Key West, Fla.[8] (none).		
Bases with similar missions:		
Naval Regional Medical Center, Jacksonville, Fla. (none).		
Naval Aerospace Regional Medical Center, Pensacola, Fla. (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: Naval hospital. Annapolis, Md.[9] (none).		
Bases with similar missions: National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md.[9] (none).		
Current candidate for realinement: Naval Regional Medical Center, New Orleans, La.[10] (none).		
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: NAS Keywest, Fla.:[11]		
Dispensary/dental clinic	975	97
Incinerator	1,648	0
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
Current candidates for realinement: Support and Development Office, (CASDO), Portsmouth, N.H.[12] (none).		
Bases with similar missions: Central Naval Ordnance Management Information Systems Office (CENO), Indian Head, Md.[12] (none).		
Current candidates for realinement:		
NAS Whiting Field, Fla.:[13]		
P–174 training facility	500	[15] 0
P–154 outlying fields including land acquisition	1,400	38
EM dining facility	1,208	0
NAS Corpus Christi, Tex.:[13] P–231 boiler replacement	5,430	[15] 5
Bases with similar missions: (none).		
NAVAL RESERVE		
Current candidates for realinement:		
Naval Air Facility (NAF) Detroit, Mich.:		
P–031 aircraft maintenance hangar	4,356	20
P–032 intermediate maintenance facility	2,136	20
Naval Air Reserve Detachment (NARDET), Lakehurst, N.J. (none).		
Naval Air Reserve Detachment (NARDET), Miami, Fla. (none).		
Naval Air Reserve Detachment (NARDET), Denver, Colo. (none).		
Naval Air Reserve Detachment (NARDET), Olathe, Kans. (none).		
Naval Air Reserve Detachment (NARDET), New York, N.Y. (none).		
Naval Air Reserve Detachment (NARDET), Niagara Falls, N.Y. (none).		
Naval Air Reserve Detachment (NARDET), Seattle, Wash. (none).		
Activities with Similar Missions		
(a) To NAF Detroit, Mich.:		
Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas, Tex.:		
P–245 intermediate maintenance facility	2,693	45
P–265 F–4 trainer facility	1,740	[14] 100
P–246 aircraft maintenance hangar alterations	1,278	[14] 100
P–263 building modernization	116	[14] 100

See footnotes at end of table.

Installation and project	Cost	Status (percent)
Naval Air Station (NAS), New Orleans, La.:		
P–290 aircraft rinse facility	210	100
P–249 warehouse mez	134	85
P–261 oil spill prevention facility	403	80
P–258 aircraft maintenance hangar alterations	1,684	45
P–196 refueling vehicle maintenance facility	197	[14] 95
Naval Air Station (NAS), Willow Grove, Pa.:		
P–130 avionics engine shop	1,670	45
P–076 aircraft parking apron	1,754	30
P–151 supply building	428	25
P–119 aircraft noise suppressor	282	[14] 100
P–131 aircraft maintenance hangar alterations	996	[14] 45
Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview, Ill.:		
P–982 aircraft control tower	1,585	32
P–298 building modernization	224	5
P–078 P–3 DIFAR trainer	70	[14] 100
P–966 oil water separator	79	[14] 95
P–989 secure steam nonheat season	297	[14] 45
Naval Air Station (NAS), South Weymouth, Mass.:		
P–035 bachelor enlisted quarters	1,194	5
P–103 aircraft approach lighting	285	[14] 45
P–126 intermediate maintenance facility	2,712	[14] 40
P–131 aviation training building alterations	520	[14] 30
Naval Air Station (NAS), Atlanta, Ga.:		
P–288 load shedding cycling equipment	78	50
P–281 fuel vapor emission control	262	25
P–284 ordnance complex	244	2
P–291 ground support equipment shop expenditures	143	[14] 100
P–289 building modernization	115	[14] 30
Naval Air Facility (NAF), Washington, D.C.: [15]		
P–001 aircraft power check pad/with sound suppressor	147	[14] 100
Bases with Similar Missions		
(b) To NARDET Lakehurst, N.J. (Flying NARDET status):		
Naval Air Detachment (NARDET), Miramar, Calif.: P–149 administrative training building	1,783	25
Naval Air Detachment (NARDET), Moffett Field, Calif.: P–128 training building addition	510	([16])
Naval Air Detachment (NARDET), Patuxent River, Md. (none).		
(c) To other (nonflying) NARDETS:		
Naval Air Detachment (NARDET), Columbus, Ohio (none).		
Naval Air Detachment (NARDET), Twin Cities, Minn. (none).		
Naval Air Detachment, Albuquerque, N. Mex. (none).		
Naval Air Detachment (NARDET), Lemoore, Calif. (none).		

[1] There is collocated with each of the recruit training centers a service school's command which is not the subject for realignment actions. There are projects included in the fiscal year 1979 Milcon program for the service school's command, Orlando.

[2] The proposed action would reopen NSA Long Beach as an active homeport for surface ships. The action is intended to relieve port conjestion at NS San Diego and avoid costly future pier construction at this location. The action will not affect projects for NS San Diego requested in the fiscal year 1979 Milcon program.

[3] There are 5 naval supply centers (NSC) and 6 naval air rework facilities (NARF) within the continental United States. The situation wherein a NSC and a NARF are in sufficiently close proximity for consolidation of common supply functions exists at only 3 locations which are all addressed in the Apr. 26, 1978 realignment action.

[4] If disestablishment of NRMC Philadelphia occurs, active duty military inpatient care would be provided at NNMC Bethesda. Emergency care would be provided at the nearest hospital. Other beneficiaries would be referred to Veterans' Administration facilities or Champus.

[5] Should NH Quantico be discontinued, active duty military inpatient care would be provided principally at NNMC Bethesda with some at Fort Belvoir Army Hospital. Emergency care would be provided at the nearest hospital. Other beneficiaries would receive inpatient care at NNMC Bethesda, Fort Belvoir AH or be referred to Champus.

[6] If disestablishment of NH Whidbey occurs, active duty military inpatient care would be provided at NRMC Bremerton. Other beneficiaries would be referred to Champus or Madigan Army Hospital. Emergency care would be provided at the nearest hospital.

[7] If disestablishment of NH Port Hueneme occurs, active duty military inpatient care would be provided at NH Long Beach or possibly Veterans' Administration facilities. Emergency care would be provided at the nearest hospital. Other beneficiaries would be sent to either NH Long Beach, Veterans' Administration facilities or referred to Champus.

[8] If disestablishment of NH Key West occurs, active duty military inpatient care would be provided primarily at NRMC Jacksonville with some provided at NARMC Pensacola. Emergency care would be provided at the nearest hopsital. Other beneficiaries would be returned to Champus.

[9] If disestablishment of NH Annapolis occurs, active duty military inpatient care would be provided at NNMC Bethesda. Emergency care would be provided at the nearest hospital. Other beneficiaries would be sent to NNMC Bethesda or referred to Champus.

[10] If disestablishment of NRMC New Orleans occurs active duty military inpatient care would be provided at Public Health Service facilities. Emergency care would be provided at the nearest civilian hospital. Other beneficiaries would be referred to Public Health Service facilities (primarily) and Champus.

[11] Mission under review at NAS Keywest is support of A–5 reconnaissance aircraft. All Navy A–5 aircraft have heretofore been based at Keywest. The A–5 mission is the primary role of this base, other Navy operations here being in support of the A–5's. Upon phase out of all A–5's from Navy inventory, to occur by fiscal year 1980, plan is to assist reconnaissance mission to F–14 aircraft to be based at NAS Oceana on NAS Miramar.

[12] These activities are tenant commands with computer related primary functions. CASDO is located at the Portsmouth NSY, N.H. and CENO at NOS Indian Head, Md. Because of their size, functional nature and tenant status these commands have only minimal Milcon requirements.

[13] Although there are many more NAS's throughout the Navy, NAS Whiting Field and NAS Corpus Christi are the only 2 involved in basic propeller flight training.

[14] Design.

[15] In transition to becoming a Naval Reserve activity.

[16] Design complete.

TAB C.—DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Installation and project	Cost (thousands)	Status
Air Force current candidates for realinement:		
Chanute AFB, Ill.:		
Composite airmen dorm (75 MCP)	$6,267	99-percent complete.
Air pollution abatement (78 MCP)	626	Design complete.
Sewage treatment/disposal (78 MCP)	7,400	Do.
Construct commissary (NAF)	2,500	Do.
Los Angeles AFS, Calif.: None.		
Kingsley Field, Oreg.: Add to and alter runway special lighting	115	Do.
Goodfellow AFB, Tex.: Dispensary/dental clinic (75 MCP)	4,590	99-percent complete.
Rickenbacker AFB, Ohio:		
Sewage treatment/disposal facility (77 MCP)	503	Design complete.
Sewage regional connect (79 MCP)	946	40-percent design.
Air Force bases with similar missions:		
Chanute AFB, Ill.: Each Air Force technical training center is somewhat different and supports different missions. However, the Air Force bases supporting technical training in addition to Chanute are:		
Keesler AFB, Miss.:		
Composite medical facility (76 MCP)	43,140	59-percent complete.
Energy conservation (77 MCP)	1,350	37-percent complete.
Control tower (78 MCP)	642	Design complete.
Repair facility housing (75 MCP)	2,886	99-percent complete.
Improve/repair family housing (77 MCP)	2,378	42-percent complete.
Lackland AFB, Tex.:		
Add/alter composite medical facility (76 MCP)	97,550	26-percent complete.
Energy conservation (76 MCP)	1,466	83-percent complete.
Dental clinic (78 MCP)	4,700	Design complete.
Improve/repair wherry housing (76 MCP)	3,197	94-percent complete.
Lowry AFB, Colo.:		
Composite airmen dormitory (72 MCP)	4,779	99-percent complete.
Avionics training facility (78 MCP)	3,380	Design complete.
Energy monitor/control (78 MCP)	1,808	95-percent complete.
Sheppard AFB, Tex.: Cold storage facility (78 MCP)	980	Awarded April 1978.
Goodfellow AFB, Tex.: No other Air Force base has a cryptologic training mission.		
Rickenbacker AFB, Ohio: No other Strategic Air Command installation supports the combination of an Active Force squadron of KC–135's and such a significant number (4 squadrons) of Reserve Forces units.		
Los Angeles AFS, Calif.: No other Air Force Systems Command installation supports a similar space development and acquisition mission.		
Kingsley Field, Oreg.: No other Aerospace Defense Command base supports a similar air defense mission.		

5. Question. Despite assurances from Defense officials during hearings that the Fiscal Year 1979 Military Construction Authorization request contained no construction projects at bases that were identified as "candidates" for realignment in the recent announcements, the Senate Armed Services Committee identified and "conditionally authorized" over $40 million for such projects. What is Defense Department policy with respect to requesting authorization for construction projects at "candidate" bases?

Answer. Basically, it is Department of Defense policy to maintain to the maximum extent, a very conservative approach when requesting authorization for projects at bases which are either candidates for realignment or alternatives to these candidates. In most instances, as noted in the response to Question 1, requests would not be made for construction authorization at installations under consideration for realignment, reduction or closure. However, there are exceptional circumstances involving compliance with on-going national programs such as energy conservation or pollution abatement which justify continuation of certain related projects at candidate bases regardless of the outcome of realignment studies. Such cases, some of which were included in the Fiscal Year 1979 Military Construction Program, receive very thorough examination before being placed under contract.

6. Question. The action at Lowry suggests that the Committee should perhaps examine projects at bases whose missions are similar to "candidate" bases with a view toward either eliminating projects contingent on final realignment decisions and revalidation of project requirements. Provide a list of such bases showing projects authorized for each of these bases as included in the FY 1979 Military Construction Authorization Bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Answer. tab A, Army; tab B, Navy; and tab C, Air Force.

TAB A—DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

A. Training base locations ($000).
(1) Ft. Benning, Ga.
(a) Energy Control System—$1,528.

(b) Small Arms Maintenance Facility—$3,645.
(2) Ft. Bliss, Tex.
(a) Patriot Training Facility Alterations—$1,644.
(b) Dental Clinic—$1,905.
(c) Regional Sewage Treatment Plant—$1,209.
(3) Ft. Dix, N.J.—None.
(4) Ft. Gordon, Ga.
(a) Energy Control System—$2,201.
(b) Heat Recovery System—$1,906.
(5) Ft. Jackson, S.C.
(a) Energy Control System—$3,300.
(b) High Pressure Sodium Lights—$234.
(6) Ft. Knox, Ky.
(a) Armor Crew Interaction Simulator—$924.
(b) Tank Training Facility—$3,474.
(c) Cold Storage Plant Renovation—$1,002.
(d) Dental Clinic—$2,272.
(e) Central Vehicle Wash Facility—$4,724.
(f) Energy Control System—$2,054.
(g) Infrared Gas Spot Heaters—$401.
(h) Aircraft Control Tower—$702.
(7) Ft. McClellan, Ala.—None.
(8) Ft. Sill, Okla.
(a) Tactical Equipment Shop—$1,673.
(b) Dental Clinic—$1,970.
(c) Barracks Complex, Trainee—$17,300.
(d) Chapel—$845.
(e) Insulation/Set Back Controls—$3,109.
(9) Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.
(a) Fuel Oil Storage—$2,437.
(b) Training Facility Improvements—$3,118.
(c) Storm Windows and Insulation—$6,124.
(d) Medical Supply Warehouse—$2,477.
B. Medical Center Locations ($000)
(1) Fitzsimmons AMC, Colo. Energy Control System—$1,436.
(2) Brooke AMC, Tex.—None.
(3) Dwight David Eisenhower AMC, Ga.—None.
(4) Walter Reed AMC, D.C. Medical Administration and Support Facility—$3,524.
(5) Tripler AMC, Hawaii—None.
(6) Madigan AMC, Wash. Surgical and OB Ward Addition—$3,307.
(7) William Beaumont AMC, Tex.—None.
(8) Letterman AMC, Calif. Energy Control System—$368.

TAB B.—DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Current candidate for realinement	Bases with similar missions	Fiscal year 1979 projects
RTC San Diego, Calif.; RTC Great Lakes, Ill.	RTC Orlando, Fla.	None.
Headquarters Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C.	None	Do.
Navy Recruit Command, Washington, D.C.	do	Do.
Navy Exhibit Center, Washington, D.C.	do	Do.
Headquarters Navy Audit Service, Washington, D.C.	do	Do.
NSA Long Beach, Calif.	NS San Diego, Calif.	P–143 pier; P–144 pier improvement; P–200 quaywall repairs.
MCRD Parris Island, S.C.	None	None.
MCRD San Diego, Calif.	do	Do.
NAS (NARF) Alameda, Calif.	NSC Oakland, Calif.	P–046 oil spill prevention; P–053 dust removal; P–059 egress improvements.
NAS (NARF) Norfolk, Va.	NSC Norfolk, Va.	P–163 lighting system; P–843 cold storage warehouse; P–993 oil spill prevention.
NAS (NARF) North Island, Calif.	NSC San Diego, Calif.	P–014 general warehouse; P–029 oil spill prevention; P–005 POL pipeline.
NRMC Philadelphia, Pa.; NH Quantico, Va.; NH Annapolis, Md.	NNMC Bethesda, Md.	P–052C NNMC modernization.
NH Whidbey Island, Wash.	NRMC Bremerton, Wash.	None.
NH Port Hueneme, Calif.	NH Long Beach, Calif.	Do.
NH Key West, Fla.	NRMC Jacksonville, Fla.	Do.
NRMC New Orleans, La.	None	Do.
NAS Key West, Fla.	do	Do.
NAS Whiting Field, Fla.; NAS Corpus Christi, Tex.	do	Do.

TAB C.—DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

(thousands of dollars)

Current candidate for realinement	Bases with similar missions	Fiscal year 1979 MCP project
Chanute AFB, Ill	Keesler AFB, Miss	Improve/Repairs to Family Housing, $2,744.
	Lackland AFB, Tex	Bachelor enlisted quarters, $4,700.
	Lowry AFB, Colo	Family housing energy conservation, $164.

ALTERNATIVES

Question. Are the other Air Force technical training bases (Sheppard, Lackland, and Keesler) also alternatives to the Chanute action?

Answer. No. The analysis performed as a first phase of the Chanute AFB study process identified Lowry as an alternative and eliminated Sheppard AFB, Lackland AFB, and Keesler AFB from further consideration.

Question. Mr. Hidalgo, you announced the potential closure of one of the Navy's basic training centers (either San Diego or Great Lakes). I understand that you have 3 such basic training centers. Why wasn't the third base (Orlando, Florida) also an "alternative" base?

Answer. The facilities at RTC Orlando are the most modern available at any recruit training center. In light of their condition and the maximum potential for expansion in the even of mobilization, Orlando was not considered to be a likely alternative for closure. If the initial conditions which determined the choice of primary and alternate candidates are not confirmed during the more extensive studies underway at this time, then a revision of candidates would result. Judging these matters on a case by case basis the possibility for closure of Orlando appeared too remote to be addressed at this time.

Question. Mr. Gibbs, let me ask you the same question. Why did you single out Forts Jackson and Dix for study rather than including all of your training bases as "alternatives?"

Respondent. The Army decision to study the possible closure of either Fort Dix or Fort Jackson training centers was based upon feasibility studies which suggested that the closure of one of these two installations might be a source of substantial savings and consolidation of an overstructured training base. Also, these two installations were realignment candidates as they are single training mission posts conducting initial entry training only. Detailed realignment studies for Fort Dix and Fort Jackson are now being conducted to determine specifically what savings would result from closure. Concurrently, the Army initiated a long range review of the entire training base to determine the most cost effective structure for 1984 and beyond. When completed, the findings of this study may well have an impact on Army decisions related to the Fort Dix and Fort Jackson realignment studies.

ONGOING CONSTRUCTION POLICY

Question. At many of the bases that are either primary or alternative candidates, there is ongoing construction—some under contract, some in need process of being put under contract. What is your policy regarding this construction?

Answer. At all bases that are either candidates for realignment or have missions similar to candidate bases, proposed construction projects are screened by the Services with respect to the final configuration or mission of the realigned installation. Projects that are not compatible with possible final realignment action are held in abeyance. Projects that cannot conceivably be affected by the realignment action are allowed to continue though they receive close scrutiny. Construction at similar locations is not deferred unless there is a direct relationship between the proposed realignment and the similar installation. Projects already under construction are reviewed to determine the economic feasibility of termination of construction. If the review results in an affirmative determination, the project is then screened as discussed above for proposed projects.

Question. Let me get specific again on Lowry. Your response to my letter says that you did not decide to defer the contract on the avionics facility until June. As I understand it, you put the contract out for bids on May 24, 1978, after the public announcement on Chanute in April, 1978—so as late as May 24, 1978, you apparently intended to keep Lowry open. What occurred to make you change your mind and consider Lowry as an alternative to Chanute?

Answer. As stated earlier, the first phase of the Chanute AFB study process was an analysis of the Air Force technical training base structure. This analysis indicated that closure of the technical training center at Lowry should be studied along with the Chanute proposal.

Question. I have mentioned my concern over the possibility of programing new construction at bases that may be closed or significantly reduced. What procedures do you have to preclude programing projects at bases that may be closed?

Answer. Basically, it is Department of Defense policy to maintain to the maximum extent, a very conservative approach when requesting authorization for projects at bases which are either candidates for realignment or alternatives to these candidates. In most instances, requests would not be made for construction authorization at installations under consideration for realignment, reduction or closure. However, there are exceptional circumstances involving compliance with ongoing national programs such as energy conservation or pollution abatement which justify continuation of certain related projects at candidate bases regardless of the outcome of realignment studies. Such cases, some of which were included in the Fiscal Year 1979 Military Construction Program, receive very thorough examination before apportionment and before being placed under contract.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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