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U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

GOVERNMENT

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS' REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TO-
WARD AFRICA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SOUTHERN
AFRICA

MAY 12, 1978

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[NOTE.—Sections of this hearing have been deleted in the interest of national security. Deleted material is indicated by the notation [Deleted.].]

PREFACE

On May 12, 1978, the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held executive hearings on U.S. policy toward Africa in which Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young, and Assistant Secretary of State Dick Moose testified.

The hearing was held the day before the Katangan attack on Shaba province in Zaire. Although certain classified information has been deleted for publication, nothing was removed from the testimony that relates to that issue.

The committee feels that publication of the hearings will contribute to a better understanding of the evolution of U.S. policy toward Africa, particularly in light of subsequent controversies which arose over the Katangan attack, the role of Cuba in Africa and alleged shifts in the direction of American policy goals. The hearing also provides some background for Secretary Vance's speech on African policy delivered on June 20, 1978, in Atlantic City in which he declared that "our Africa policy has not changed. Its objectives remain forward-looking and positive."

Taken together, the May 12 hearing and the June 20 speech provide a broad picture of the continuity and challenges in American policy today.

REPORT

On the results of the investigation into the causes of the fire which occurred at the residence of the late Mr. J. H. Smith, on the 15th inst.

The investigation was conducted by the undersigned, and the results are hereunto submitted.

The fire occurred at about 10 o'clock, and the cause thereof was found to be a defective chimney, which was not properly maintained.

The undersigned has the honor to acknowledge the assistance of the fire department, and the cooperation of the neighbors, in the investigation.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

FRIDAY, MAY 12, 1978

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Hon. Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark, Sparkman, Glenn, Humphrey, and Javits.

Senator CLARK. I believe everyone is here who indicated he would attend. Some other Senators may come by.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today's hearings will focus on U.S. policy toward Africa, with particular emphasis on familiarizing the committee with the latest developments in Rhodesia and Namibia. We are also concerned with the issue of Cuban and Soviet activities and current administration thinking on the proper response to this challenge.

We would like to hear a report on the results of the President's trip to Africa last month and of your trips, Mr. Secretary, to southern Africa and to Moscow where, as I understand it, the issue of Soviet activities in Africa may have been discussed.

We welcome particularly Secretary Vance, Ambassador Young, and Assistant Secretary Dick Moose, and we hope that we can have a very frank and full discussion of the issues before us.

HEARING PROCEDURE

This committee will hold its hearing off the public record and for that purpose I would entertain a motion that we go into executive session, because of the nature of the material to be considered.

Senator GLENN. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Is there objection?

[No response.]

Senator CLARK. There being no objection, we will go into executive session.

[Whereupon, at 10:11 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene immediately in executive session.]

Senator CLARK. I believe everyone who is present is properly cleared and permitted to remain for this executive session.

Is that so, Norvill?

Mr. JONES. Everyone is cleared, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Fine.

CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES AFRICAN POLICY

I would like to say for the record something which I have said publicly many times. It should take only about 2 minutes.

I am particularly pleased and proud of the direction of American policy in Africa. I am sort of a newcomer to that subject, having come into discussions of it only during the last 2 or 3 years.

But I think I have seen enough of past policy—not just under the previous administration but under several previous administrations—to believe that it was not moving in the right direction. I think this administration, above all, is to be commended for the kind of policy it has developed. I think you have identified the aspirations of the majority of people in that continent and have not, at the same time, forgotten the minority interests there.

I want to congratulate you for the real change in direction that has occurred. If there is one area of American foreign policy that has undergone the greatest change—indeed it is the one that needed the greatest change—it is that policy which is directed to that continent. It has come a bit late, and as a result it is going to be very difficult to succeed with that policy.

One of the ironies is that even though I think you are going in the right direction, it is going to be very difficult to really pull off a peaceful transition to majority rule in areas like Rhodesia and Namibia.

At any rate, for what this is worth, as one person I think the policy is very wisely directed. I know it is coming under criticism, and it is going to come under more criticism because this is such a difficult area.

But I certainly commend you for this.

Mr. Secretary, I believe you have a statement to present. Perhaps it would be best if you do that for us and then we can proceed with our questions.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be best for me to lay out my statement and then to go to your specific questions. I will try to move rapidly.

STATEMENT OF HON. CYRUS VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. ANDREW YOUNG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HON. RICHARD M. MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Secretary VANCE. I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the African Affairs Subcommittee. I look forward to discussing with you the many critical issues which we now face in Africa.

PROGRESS IN UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

Over the past 2 years, under the previous administration as well as this, we have made significant strides in our relations with Africa.

I believe that these improved relations have resulted from a number of factors:

Our willingness to work with African nations in a spirit of cooperation and understanding;

Our active support for majority rule and racial equality in southern Africa;

Our serious efforts to deal with the many economic issues which are part of the North-South dialog and which directly affect the lives of Africans; and our genuine interest in African problems in their own terms, and not only in the context of East-West relations.

The progress we have made is of fundamental importance to the United States. Our economy is increasingly tied to the resources and markets of Africa. Our ability to deal with global issues depends on African cooperation. And the policies of African nations are the key to the peaceful resolution of African disputes which otherwise invite outside intervention.

The recent trip to Nigeria and Liberia by President Carter is a concrete example of what improved relations can mean to the United States. President Carter and Lieutenant-General Obasanjo were able to develop joint strategies on strengthening economic ties between our two nations and on the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia.

As a result of this new atmosphere in our relations with Africa, we are now able to work with Africans on issues which previously could have been difficult even to discuss. This has been evident, for example, in the field of human rights. We have told African nations that we are concerned about human rights not only in southern Africa, but throughout the continent. And Africans now accept our emphasis on minority rights because they believe we care about majority rule. We cannot claim primary credit, but there have been some real improvements in the human rights situations in a number of African nations during the past year. In the case of Uganda, we are encouraged by the increased attention being given to the human rights question there by African nations.

In talking about the gains we have made in our relations with black African governments, I do not mean to imply that we have no interest in our relations with South Africa as well. At the start of this administration we asked ourselves whether we could express our opposition to apartheid and at the same time elicit South Africa's cooperation in working for peaceful change and transition to majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia. I believe that the experience of the first year shows that we can.

CHALLENGES WHICH LIE AHEAD

Our progress should not obscure the problems we face in the coming months. Four important questions define the challenges which lie ahead.

Can we maintain and strengthen the gains made in our relations with African nations, and particularly with Nigeria and others where there has been a dramatic turnaround during the past year or two? How can we make it clear to African nations which have traditionally been our friends that we maintain a strong interest in our relations with them? And how can we avoid Africa's becoming an East/West battleground and head off growing Soviet and Cuban military intervention?

The answers to these questions depend on our policies in two important areas.

First, our ability to provide economic and military assistance will be a critical yardstick by which African states measure our willingness to respond to their problems and needs. In fiscal year 1979, the Carter administration is asking Congress for \$294 million in bilateral development aid for Africa; \$25 million for the African Development Fund; and \$45 million for security supporting assistance for nations caught in political crisis and turmoil. I cannot emphasize enough that it is our economic and social ties which lie at the heart of our relations with African countries. Our failure to respond to their economic needs would gravely damage the progress we have recently made.

At the same time we must recognize the countries threatened by the buildup of Cuban troops and Soviet arms on their borders have justifiable concern over their legitimate defense needs. Other governments are making their own efforts to help. We are anxious to do so without exacerbating regional military competition. As I said last year in a speech on Africa policy in St. Louis, we will only transfer arms to Africa in exceptional circumstances. This is still the policy of the Carter administration. But it is very important that we help threatened African states to meet their legitimate security needs. Military as well as economic assistance is a vital element in our efforts to reassure the African moderates.

In Sudan, we have therefore agreed to sell 12 F-5 fighter aircrafts and 6 C-130's, which will provide that nation with an air defense and troop transport capability against possible threats from Ethiopia and Libya.

Chad, which is faced with a serious Libyan-backed insurgency, has been made eligible to buy U.S. arms and receive third-country transfers. The problem is that Chad's economic situation is such that it cannot afford to purchase arms, and we cannot engage in a grant program. France is now providing the bulk of military assistance.

With Kenya, which faces continuing border disputes [deleted] and a difficult relationship with Uganda, we are evaluating Kenyan security requirements and will shortly provide Congress with a recommendation for increased assistance.

In Zaire, we are cooperating with European nations in providing training and basic military equipment to improve that nation's defense capabilities.

Beyond economic and military assistance, the second major concern of our policy is our commitment to help resolve disputes peacefully, whether in the Horn, or in southern Africa, or elsewhere. Only through the active pursuit of such a policy can we remove the opportunity for outside intervention.

EXAMPLE OF HORN OF AFRICA

Recent developments in the Horn are an example of the complexity and difficulties we face.

As you know, we have been anxious to improve our relations with Somalia. However, we were unwilling to do so as long as Somali forces were invading Ethiopia.

Following the withdrawal of the Somali army from the Ogaden, President Carter sent Assistant Secretary Moose to Mogadiscio for

discussions with President Siad Barre. During this trip we began our discussions to obtain assurances from Siad that he would respect the internationally recognized borders of his neighbors as a precondition for any U.S. military assistance. We have subsequently received such assurances. Mr. Moose also informed the Somali leader that any U.S. aid would be strictly limited in scope and confined to defensive items only. We also told Siad that we did not believe that active support by his government of the West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) which operates in the Ogaden would be compatible with the assurances that he had given us. We are continuing to monitor the activities of the WSLF and its relationship to Mogadiscio. We also suggested that our best contribution to Somalia could come in the way of increased development assistance and refugee aid.

We are now at the stage where we are considering whether or not to initiate a military assistance program or increase economic aid to Somalia. We have made no firm decisions within the executive branch at this time.

We will, of course, keep the committee informed of our deliberations. Our relations with Ethiopia, though not good, have not deteriorated completely [deleted], and we would not like to see them broken off. Continued dialog with that government [deleted] is in our interest of peace and stability in that region. The recent decision by Ethiopia to receive our new Ambassador is a positive sign.

The Cuban presence in Ethiopia, which now is at the 16,000-17,000 level, is of serious concern to us. I will discuss the Soviet and Cuban roles in Africa later. But let me say now that it is still not clear whether the Cubans will play a major combat role in Eritrea similar to their operations in the Ogaden. [Deleted.]

We will continue to urge all of the parties concerned to exert diplomatic pressure on the Cubans and Soviets to make every effort toward a peaceful resolution of the dispute and withdrawal of Cuban forces.

We face no less a challenge in dealing with issues of transition to majority rule and racial equality in South Africa, Namibia, and Rhodesia.

PROBLEMS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa the basic problem we face is simply stated yet terribly complex: How best can we encourage peaceful change?

We cannot ignore apartheid and the growing crisis within South Africa. We have to make it clear that a deterioration in our bilateral relations is inevitable if progress is not made. Recent actions by the Congress clearly indicate that it shares this concern.

At the same time, we have to maintain our ability to work with the South African Government for peaceful change in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself. We have made it clear to South Africa that progress on each of the three will be recognized, and have done so with regard to Namibia. We understand the difficulties involved in change within South Africa. We are not seeking to impose a simplistic formula for South Africa's future nor to drive whites from South Africa. Rather, we have urged the South African Government to begin to take truly significant steps—such as talking with acknowledged representative black leaders—away from apartheid and toward

a system in which the full range of rights would be accorded to all inhabitants of South Africa, black and white alike.

South Africa's potential for nuclear weapons development is another reason why it is important that we try to maintain an effective working relationship with that Government. South Africa has the technical capability to produce a nuclear weapon. In recent months we have actively sought South Africa's agreement to sign the NPT. We have held technical talks with them and will again. Ambassador Gerhard Smith, who negotiates on nuclear matters, plans to go to South Africa in the near future. The details for his trip have yet to be arranged and his plans have not been made public.

Some have urged that we cease all nuclear cooperation with South Africa because of apartheid. [Deleted.] We believe that the question must be addressed in the context of the strong desirability of South Africa's adherence to the NPT and the application of safeguards with respect to the operation of all nuclear facilities in South Africa.

NAMIBIA PROBLEM

Substantial progress has been made toward resolution of the Namibia problem as a result of a year-long effort by ourselves and the other four Western Security Council members, operating as the so-called "contact group." Recent South African acceptance of the contact group proposal for a Namibian settlement was a significant breakthrough. We are now making approaches to the front line states, Nigeria, and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), urging SWAPO's prompt acceptance of the settlement proposal.

Time is critical. If we do not obtain SWAPO's acceptance of the proposal in the near future, South Africa might go ahead with independence on its own terms.

The May 4 South African raid into Angola [deleted] has set back our efforts to obtain SWAPO's agreement to the contact group proposal. Mistrust has been intensified [deleted].

A major substantive issue which remains unresolved is the status of Walvis Bay. [Deleted.]

While we consider that Walvis Bay is geographically, ethnically, culturally, and economically tied to Namibia, we have taken the position that the issue should be resolved through negotiations between post-independence Namibia and South Africa.

RHODESIA PROBLEM

This is also a crucial time in the effort to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Rhodesia problem.

The front line Presidents are now working with us to try to secure a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia that will include all parties and end the conflict. South African leaders have acknowledged the need for an internationally acceptable settlement that can bring peace.

Ian Smith has made some concessions in the internal agreement; but they do not provide for an irreversible transfer of power to majority rule. In our judgment, without broader agreement among the parties, or international acceptance, there will be neither a ceasefire nor a lifting of sanctions.

The Hove incident demonstrates the inevitable strains within the internal settlement, as African leaders seek the sharing of real power. [Deleted.]

The major question remaining is whether the internal and external nationalist parties can agree either to some power sharing during the transition, or to a neutral transition administration. The nub of the problem is that each side now seeks to dominate the transition government in a way that is unacceptable to the other and would make fair elections impossible.

But it is also clear that both sides want to keep the door open to a negotiated settlement including all the parties. The Patriotic Front had said it would attend a meeting with all parties and is willing to discuss all issues further; the Salisbury parties have not totally rejected a meeting of all parties, but say they are skeptical of its success.

We believe the Anglo-American proposals provide the best elements for a settlement that will be acceptable to both sides: A ceasefire; a U.N. peacekeeping force; U.N. observers to monitor elections and activities of the police; a neutral transition administration with powers over defense, law and order and electoral arrangement in the hands of an impartial administrator; integration of existing forces into one army that would be loyal to the elected government; and a democratic constitution with guarantees of individual rights for all, white as well as black.

It is our job to work to keep the door open to an inclusive settlement that will bring peace. If we and the British do not do so, the door may swing shut, with appalling consequences. That is why Secretary Owen and I went to meet with the parties in Salisbury and Dar es Salaam. I believe some progress was made in these meetings. We will be sending Ambassador Low and British Representative John Graham for talks with the parties to attempt to move forward a meeting of all the parties.

I do not know whether or not we will succeed. But I can tell you that if we either accept the Patriotic Front proposals—giving them predominance—or endorse the Salisbury agreements—which would give the internal parties a dominant position—we will lose our ability to work with all sides toward a settlement that can bring peace. We must maintain our neutrality among all the parties, and continue to stand for a fair solution in which ballots rather than bullets will decide finally who gets power. I cannot emphasize this point too strongly, for the stakes are very high.

If an agreement cannot be achieved, there is bound to be escalating conflict. This will have a devastating effect on surrounding countries. And increased involvement by the Soviet Union and Cuba on one side and South Africa on the other would be likely.

SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES

A discussion of the issues and problems we face in Africa would not be complete without mention of Soviet and Cuban activities. Their increasing intervention raises serious problems. It escalates the level of conflict. It jeopardizes the independence of African states. It creates concern among moderates that Soviet weapons and Cuban troops can be used to determine the outcome of any dispute on the continent.

We are making a strenuous effort to counter Cuban and Soviet intervention in the disputes of African nations.

First, we have told the Soviets and the Cubans, publicly and privately, that we view their willingness to exacerbate armed conflict in Africa as a matter of serious concern.

Second, we have pointed out to the Soviets the dangers which their activities in Africa pose for our overall relations. I conveyed this view most recently when I was in Moscow.

At the same time, we do not believe that it is in our national interest to make a negotiating linkage between reaching a good SALT agreement, which is clearly in our basic security interests, and the inevitable competition with the Soviets which will continue to take place in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. A SALT agreement should not be a reward for good behavior. It should be signed if it maintains our national interest and that of our allies and not otherwise.

Third, we will continue to take advantage of our long-term strengths in relations with Africa. These are found primarily in our substantial aid, trade, and investment ties. During the period from 1970 to 1976 the United States provided over \$2 billion in direct economic assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. In that same period the Soviets only provided \$200 million. It is clear that the Soviet Union relies almost exclusively on arms transfers and its ability to take advantage of short-run military conflicts as the basis of its African policy. This is not, I believe, a viable long-term political strategy, as the history of Soviet involvement in Africa over the past decade demonstrates.

The fact that the West alone is able and willing to help resolve the long-term economic problems of African nations through the transfer of capital and technology gives us a fundamental advantage that we must continue to maintain.

And fourth, our continued support for peaceful resolution of disputes and building closer diplomatic ties is in itself a barrier to Soviet and Cuban designs. [Deleted.]

African trust in the sincerity of our commitment to peaceful but meaningful change in southern Africa has been critical to minimizing Soviet and Cuban involvement. If we should abandon our efforts in support of peaceful change, the front line states would conclude that change can only come militarily [deleted]. If we abandon our current efforts, increasing conflict will thus tend not only to radicalize southern Africa itself, but to alter the policies of nations elsewhere in Africa that are now becoming increasingly friendly to us.

CONCLUSION

Major challenges lie ahead, in implementing our policy and in countering Soviet and Cuban intervention.

It will be necessary for us to work closely with the Congress if we are to achieve our goals. We will need your support in a variety of ways:

In providing long-term development assistance and humanitarian relief;

In giving sympathetic consideration to military assistance for countries threatened by Soviet arms and Cuban troops;

And in achieving and implementing negotiated settlements in southern Africa.

The involvement of the Foreign Relations Committee in our Africa policy is key to the greater public understanding we seek.

We need your counsel and your advice.

We also need your help in explaining to the American people the great stakes our country has in a positive approach to Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for an excellent statement. I know people always say that at the end of a presentation, but I find that this was a very clear and a very concise statement. It is the best one I have seen, certainly, presented in terms of where we are and why we are doing what we are doing.

I would like to have you consider, when you get back, the possibility of reviewing your statement and cutting out the sensitive portions. I would like to have it made public because I think it would be useful for the other Members and to the country to see such a concise statement on African policy.

Senator JAVITS. I would like to join in that comment, Mr. Chairman. I came especially to hear the Secretary. I was very gratified by his statement.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Jack.

Senator CLARK. Let us turn first to Chairman Sparkman and ask if he has any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. This is about the finest presentation I have ever seen on any subject. I think you have done a tremendous job in presenting the picture to us. At times we were telling you how you had to work with different countries and different issues, and I could not help but think of that old song "Tip-Toe Through the Tulips." [General laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Do you think perhaps you should alter that to make it "Through the Briar Patch?" [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. That would be for Brer Rabbit. It is certainly a difficult situation.

Secretary VANCE. I must say that Andy and Dick have been a tower of strength in helping to develop our policy and guide us. There are very many difficult problems that we have faced and which we will be facing in this area.

I just want to make clear my thanks to them for all that they have done.

Senator CLARK. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I have been reading your presentation very carefully and I have also been reading our staff summary, a review of our policy. I should confine myself to this line of questioning.

ABSENCE OF ECONOMICS AS TOOL IN APPROACH TO AFRICA

I find a singular absence of economics as a tool in the whole approach to Africa.

Here is this vast area with very real possibilities in some areas of turning the front line states into common markets. I just wonder what is the Department's thinking or planning along this line.

I would also like to draw your attention to another point as a sort of part B to this question.

You know that historically I have been related to an enterprise called the ADELA Investing Committee, which is considered by

UNSTAD—United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—and the other developing countries as a very model of the way they would like to get private enterprise assistance in development.

We have an entity in Latin America. We had one in Asia. There is one in Africa, but it is not under U.S. auspices, interestingly enough. As a matter of fact, there are two. There is one in Geneva which serves Africa, called SAFIDA, and the other in South Africa which is run by a brewer there whose names escapes me at the moment—though I think it is Bosch.

This is symptomatic of the fact that economics has taken very much of a back seat.

Anything you can say, Mr. Secretary, on this would be appreciated.

First, let me offer to help you. I would do anything in the world here that I can. That is my specialty and I will do anything in the world that I can to assist.

Secretary VANCE. Fine, thank you.

First, let me say I feel that the economic dimension of African policy is of fundamental importance. As I pointed out during my statement, our long-term strengths with Africa are to be found primarily in our substantial aid, trade, and investment ties. When we look at the fact that over the period of 1970 to 1976 we provided over \$2 billion in direct economic assistance, it indicates that we are cognizant of the importance of this.

Obviously we can do a better job and I think perhaps a more cohesive job of dealing with economic assistance problems. Let me offer you a couple of examples of the kinds of things we are working on.

One of the main thrusts of our discussion in Nigeria was on the economic side and how we could strengthen the economic relationship between our two countries. We have set up working groups in the two countries which have been working together to come up with concrete proposals on specific courses of action for our two countries to take which will assist the Nigerians in transforming their economic potential into strength and in providing a way for us, not only on the public side but on the private side, to participate in that process.

A bilateral meeting was recently held here in the United States. It involved officials from the two governments at the official level.

They discussed a series of problems which had been blocked out ahead of time for discussion. Subsequent to that, the Nigerians went out and visited with people in the private business community around the country. They have established specific contacts with those who are interested in following up on the initial contacts. It is somewhat along the lines of what you suggested with respect to the Mexican situation.

A report is now in the process of being prepared. That report will be submitted in this month, in May, to President Obasanjo and to President Carter. They will review this and will then give their blessing on those aspects of the report they believe it will be feasible and practical to move forward.

Let's take another case. Let's take the case of Zambia.

The biggest problem that Zambia has right now, I guess, is economic. We have worked with the Zambians during the negotiations with the IMF—International Monetary Fund—which were absolutely key to moving forward in that particular area. We have also agreed,

now that that seems to be set and be going into place, to work with them either in a Paris group or a London group, whichever they choose, to talk about debt rescheduling. We have indicated that all of the expertise which we have and the know-how in this area is available to them. I think that they are most appreciative and we will be working with them.

I think another area which is important is the African Development Bank and how we operate through the Bank. It is very important that we make the necessary contributions. We would welcome any suggestions that the Congress may have on how we can more effectively work with them in developing their economies.

Let me say one thing further. I think this is intertwined with the whole set of North-South issues with which we are wrestling. I think we made some progress in the debt meeting, more than quite frankly I had thought we were going to make.

The next big problem to wrestle with is going to be the question of the Common Fund. I personally am hopeful that we can come out of that with a reasonable and practical proposal. Dick Cooper has had some very good discussions at the debt meetings of UNCTAD. In addition to that, we have had a number of bilateral discussions, both in New York at the United Nations and in some of the home capitals. But I think if we can move in that area, it is going to be important.

The whole area of commodity agreements I think is also very important, particularly to a number of these countries; more can be done in that area.

Also, the question of carrying out our commitments to the international financial institutions is absolutely essential. This is one of the things that you all are going to be facing up to very soon, as is the group on the House side.

Let me just conclude by saying that I agree wholeheartedly with the importance that you put on this. We are making some progress though I am sure we can do better. Any thoughts that any of you have would be most welcome.

DEBT FORGIVENESS AND COMMON FUND

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, the chairman has been very indulgent with me and I would like to wind up my part of this as follows. I appreciate everything that you say. Bear in mind that we have cranked into our economic development this year debt forgiveness on an annual basis for the poorest, and most of those are in Africa.

Secretary VANCE. Yes; of course.

Senator JAVITS. I sponsored that myself as kind of a tribute to the memory of Hubert Humphrey, who originated that idea.

Second, and very importantly, you do an awful lot of reports and I would hate to impose another one on you. If you would like me to work on this—and I would love to—I would need some roundup from the Department of everything that is being done.

Secretary VANCE. We could pull it together for you.

Senator JAVITS. Right. Then, whether it is the U.S.-Mexico Commission idea or something else, I think we ought to do something. I think that would be very valuable in a diplomatic sense, that is, to signal our economic interest in Africa in some top-level way. I would like finally

to emphasize that the Africans are no fools. They are looking for money. Therefore a Common Fund would be very important to them because that would be real money.

I think we tend not to talk about the economic aspects of this because we are quite often accused by Africans of only being interested in those aspects. So, we kind of downplay the economic aspects in southern Africa. But they are even more significant in southern Africa than they are in west Africa.

Secretary VANCE. Andy, just let me add one thing to that.

If one takes a look at the Sudan, the possibilities in terms of agricultural development there and of the Sudan really becoming the bread basket for Africa are almost unlimited. This is an area where I think the expertise that the United States can bring to bear is of tremendous importance.

Senator JAVITS. I think the State Department has to have a reputation of having a Department which is hardheaded about money. It will defend profits; it will defend private ownership. But the virtue of Africa is that it is practically a swap. For example, you could undertake to rebuild Lagos, which still has open and running sewers—I have been there, as have you, and I have seen them—and that is a job that could keep 1 million Americans busy for 20 years.

Ambassador YOUNG. The Germans are doing it now.

AFRICAN NEED FOR WESTERN MARKETS AND INVESTMENT

Mr. MOOSE. I would like to underscore a point that both the Secretary and Andy have made about the opportunity that our economic system, not only of the United States, but that of the West, gives us to establish meaningful relations with the Africans. Take, for example, some so-called radical states, such as Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea. In every one of those instances, you will find governments that are very anxious to have American capital and American technology. They, like all of the rest of the African states, need western markets.

Lastly, it is my belief that opposition to these activities in Africa would be greatly lessened by the odor of success. From the point of view of American business, there is no better area to consider, and I think that hence it lends itself to treatment of the kind we are discussing.

Thank you very much.

Secretary VANCE. We would be delighted to do that and will put such a report together.

I think there is something that Andy would like to say.

AFRICAN TRADE POTENTIAL

Ambassador YOUNG. I have tried to get our interest in Nigeria tied down to dollars and cents. We import, I believe, about \$5.5 billion worth of oil from Nigeria and we have not been selling them but about \$700 million worth of goods. The Economic Commission that the Secretary described would really try to redress a balance-of-payments deficit on our part. It has been very hard to do business with Nigeria, in part because they have been in such disagreement with us on some other African policy issues. So, the coming together

on policy issues with the Front Line States and Nigeria really opens up the economic community of West African States, which is really about a 150-million-person market, 90 million of whom are in Nigeria.

With Guinea having bauxite deposits, Liberia and Guinea developing iron ore and rubber, there is a potential for trade there that is just beginning to open up. We are also getting about \$1 billion worth of oil from Angola. We don't talk about it very much, but Rhodesia and Namibia are probably as rich in resource deposits in uranium and diamonds, and Rhodesia agriculturally to feed all of Africa.

We can see a pronounced pragmatism on the part of all of those governments. When President Samora Machel was here last year for the General Assembly, he met with the President, and other African leaders, in New York, but he used most of the rest of his time looking around to see how he could get American investment in Mozambique. They have a new investment code there.

The same is true of Guinea. That country is anxious to attract additional American investment. Angola has been referred to as providing \$1 billion in oil imports. We have the anomaly there of Cuban troops protecting Gulf Oil because the receipts of the Gulf Oil Co. are extremely important to the government.

These governments can be very pragmatic about these things. As we are able to improve our political relationships with these governments because of the positions that we have taken on issues of overriding concern to the Africans, we will find it easier to manage the inevitable problems that will come up with these governments and as we carry forward our economic-political relationships to them.

I think that over the long term, this is our greatest asset in Africa. After the liberation struggles are over in southern Africa, the Africans are going to be left with the one overriding, grinding problem that they all have, which is economic development. We have things to offer them. We have the capital; we have the technology; we have the markets. The eastern world doesn't have it, and the Africans know it.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to have taken so long.

RHODESIAN CHROME

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I noticed your comments on the minerals, ores, and other riches in the ground. With reference to Rhodesia, you did not mention chrome. I think you remember the time when that was at the center of the fire.

Secretary VANCE. That's right; it still is.

The CHAIRMAN. I did want to mention this. My State does a tremendous amount of business with South Africa, primarily in modification of planes, and also in steel. We have great interests in Alabama on that and do a lot of trade with them.

I want to say again, Mr. Secretary, that the presentation you have given us is the finest, I think, I have ever seen. I am grateful to all of you for your efforts.

I am going to have to leave, as I had indicated earlier to the chairman, but I am glad I had the opportunity to be here.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate your coming.

FMS CREDITS TO AFRICA AND SUDAN

Before calling on Senator Glenn, I might mention that late last night in the markup, Senator Javits and I, in fact, resisted some changes in FMS credits to Africa and the Sudan. There was a movement to cut those back somewhat; and although they were not significant cuts, we thought that would be sending the wrong signal, particularly to Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Secretary VANCE. It surely would have been. I am certainly glad that you did that.

Senator CLARK. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CUBAN MOVES INTO AFRICA

Mr. Secretary, we have seen a pattern of Cuban moves, if the "Christian Science Monitor" is correct, into some 14 different nations in Africa, to varying degrees. The major efforts, of course, have been in Angola and Ethiopia.

There seems to be a whole pattern here that is extremely disturbing. First we hear that there are Russian arms going into some country. It seems we first heard about this in Angola. Then it is followed up with the Cuban troops there using those Russian arms. The same thing happened in Ethiopia later on. First we heard about arms, and then the Cubans moved in and began using those arms.

The situation that disturbs me at the moment is not in Africa per se. Now we see a move of Russian arms over into South Yemen. Is this to be followed by a Cuban move there?

These are very disturbing things. I don't know if there is anything you would want to add to what you have already said in your statement, but I think this may be a pattern. We have seen other moves around the Persian Gulf, which I know is a little off the subject of Africa. We have seen what happened in Afghanistan. We have seen an increased presence around the northern Iranian border, in Syria, in Iraq, in the horn of Africa, and now in Yemen.

To tie this back to Africa, do you see all of this as fitting any coherent picture, or am I an alarmist?

Secretary VANCE. No; I don't think that you are an alarmist. I think that the facts, in a sense, speak for themselves. The pattern has been one of military assistance by the Soviet Union in many cases followed by, in the case of conflict, the surrogates, the shock troops, or the Cubans.

Senator GLENN. How do we counter that? What can we do about this?

Secretary VANCE. Let me say that I think our leverage is not great in countering this. We have to be frank in recognizing that.

Let me tell you what we are planning to do.

First of all, we have made it very clear to the Soviets that if they really want to pursue détente, détente has to be a two-way street. They understand our position clearly on this. They are going to have to make up their own minds as to whether they consider the bilateral relationship and the improvement of the bilateral relationship between ourselves and them to be of sufficient importance that it is going to cause

some restraint on their part. I cannot predict at this point what the answer is going to be.

I think that they undoubtedly will continue to seize targets of opportunity and that we are not going to find, even if they start to exercise more restraint, a pattern across the board. But I think one may see some changes occurring in that direction.

Second, insofar as the Cubans, if I might continue on this subject, we have been working with the nonaligned to really begin to put heavy pressure on the Cuban use of forces in Africa, and particularly, zeroing in on the Eritrean situation, where they are most vulnerable. This is beginning to have an impact. [Deleted.]

I think that by working with the nonaligned interests we may be able to have some effect.

Now, why is Castro doing this?

It is awfully hard to try to delve into his mind. I think there are probably several reasons for it.

First, I think that he is being stimulated by the Soviets. This is in return for what they have been providing in the way of funding, arms, and the like.

Senator GLENN. What level is that running at now? Do we have any figure on that? I think it was roughly \$1 million a day or something like that.

Secretary VANCE. It is somewhere around that area, maybe a little bit more than that at this point, I think.

Second, I think that Castro sees himself as a leader of the Third World in terms of national liberation movements, and sees himself as an historic figure. This is part of the picture.

Third, I think quite frankly that there is a certain amount of pleasure that is taken in sort of tweaking Uncle Sam's beard when they know there is not much that we can do in response to it.

So, I think there are a combination of factors that affect us.

Now some of my colleagues may disagree and if they do, they ought to speak up and tell you so. But I think those are the factors that are affecting their course of action.

RECENT COUP IN AFGHANISTAN

There is one more point I want to make before I turn the discussion over.

The recent coup in Afghanistan is troubling. On the other hand, to jump right away on that one until we see a little bit more how that settles out I think would be a mistake. I think that we and the other Western nations have been correct in recognizing that government in terms of continuing to have relationships with them until we see how this develops. I think it is a little early to say how this will turn out. There are the conservatives who are out in the countryside and who have not yet been fully heard from, I think. We ought to watch that carefully and not jump to any precipitous conclusions.

Dick, did you want to add anything?

ACTIVITIES OF CUBANS AND RUSSIANS

Mr. MOOSE. I would just add one thing and in a way it relates to two or three of the factors which the Secretary mentioned.

The Cubans and the Russians often see opportunities to jump in and to exploit issues, and they do it rather cheaply. They sometimes are able to be more fervent in the espousal of certain issues that the Africans care about than we seem to be able to or were in the past. They can present themselves as the champions of national liberation, as the Secretary mentioned, or the champions of territorial integrity, or in the vanguard of decrying things the South Africans are doing. They have a much less complicated set of international relationships and responsibilities than we do.

We are encumbered or constrained from time to time by some of our associations and by political and economic realities. The Cubans and Russians can jump in on these issues and can make quick, cheap points. They can deliver arms and advisors in a hurry. We cannot do this anymore and I don't think we should do it anymore.

I don't think this really fools the Africans in the long term. I think some of the most interesting things we have heard in the last few weeks, which were referred to in passing fashion in the Secretary's statement, include the fact that Africans several times have said the following to us.

I remember a recent conversation with several African foreign ministers about what to do in Namibia. We were actually engaged in working with these ministers, together on a mutual problem which is really remarkable, given the suspicion that has gone on in the past. Specifically, we were talking about how to move the contact group proposals to acceptance. One of the ministers said to his colleagues, "Of course, we will have to look out for other friends, because they may try to complicate this thing."

It was quite clear that they recognized that the Russians might try to throw a monkey wrench into the Namibia settlement.

So, as long as we stay out in front of these issues of principle, which are consistent with our own, and the Africans will recognize our efforts, while they may still be tempted in their frustration to avail themselves of Cuban advisers or arms or something of this sort, in the long term they will readily recognize that the Russians are basically out to make trouble and are even less identified in a sincere way with African aspirations than we have appeared to be in the past.

Secretary VANCE. I would add one point on this about which I think we have to be realistic.

In many cases, the provision of arms by them is a very effective tool, which they have used effectively. Clearly that was the case in the relationship with Somalia, until that came unstuck, as seems to be the case after a period of time because of the heavyhanded way the Soviets deal with these countries. Clearly, it is the effective tool that is carrying them today in their relationship with the Ethiopians.

I would add one other thing to what I am saying on that.

I think that the situation in the Horn is motivated substantially also by geopolitical factors as far as the Soviets are concerned.

The strategic importance of it, I think, is clearly one of the factors.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COMING OUT OF CUBA

Senator GLENN. Do we have any decent intelligence information coming out of Cuba, enough so that we would know in advance any of these contemplated moves?

The CHAIRMAN. Before you answer that, Mr. Secretary, I ask Senator Glenn to please yield to me.

Senator GLENN. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. I walked off with your statement, Mr. Secretary. I now notice it is marked "confidential," so I am returning it to you.

Thank you very much.

Senator GLENN. I don't know, Mr. Secretary—is that a question you wish to address?

Secretary VANCE. Was the question how good is our intelligence information?

Senator GLENN. Do we know any of the moves the Cubans are making in advance? Do we know enough so that we can do something in advance about it?

Secretary VANCE. We have information, but there is nothing we can do in advance. We have reasonably good information about troop movements and the fact that they are taking place, how many people are going, where they are going. But even having that information, the question is what do you do. That is where you come up against the hard knot.

Senator GLENN. Would we know in advance if there were any contemplated move of major Cuban forces into, say, South Yemen? Would we know that?

Secretary VANCE. Yes, and we have information on that right now. There are probably about 1,200 to 1,500 people in South Yemen right now.

Senator GLENN. Actually there now?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

LINKAGE BETWEEN AFRICAN ISSUES AND SALT

Senator GLENN. Let me ask you to comment on another point.

You are well aware, Mr. Secretary, about my concerns regarding verification of SALT. I don't believe the SALT process is just SALT I, SALT II. SALT-whatever we build up to one of these days. I look at these mainly in the area of building confidence between the two countries so that we have some confidence these agreements are being honored.

That is the reason I place so much emphasis on verification. I think that treaty will literally pass here in the Senate on the basis of whether or not we can verify to a satisfactory degree, even though I know it is not 100 percent verifiable. Having said that, if it is part of a confidence-building operation we are discussing and I firmly believe that SALT is exactly that—before we get down to a meaningful number—because the numbers are really now so high as to be meaningless—it would be a major advantage to have a confidence-building operation between our countries to get on with other SALT talks and really work this down to where we really do have some arms control in the world some day.

Secretary VANCE. I agree with that.

Senator GLENN. I would follow that up by saying that if we assume confidence-building is what we are after, then to think there is no linkage between these African issues and SALT is to my mind rather wishful thinking. I think there will be linkage. If we can't trust them in one place, how on earth do we trust in another.

These things are linked, at least in my mind, and I think they are linked for most other people, too.

I agree with you in that I wish we could separate them; I wish we could keep them wholly apart.

Secretary VANCE. I think that you have to look at not only the philosophical problem but the practical problem as well. If you can get an adequately verifiable SALT agreement which does (a) reduce the number of weapons and (b) set some qualitative constraints—which is what we are trying to do—and you take a look at that, as compared to no SALT agreements and the consequences of that, then, I think, standing on its own two feet, it is in our national interest to both sign and ratify such a treaty. This is so even though you will still have problems in areas like Africa.

Now I am practical enough to know that it is going to affect the ratification process for the very kinds of reasons that you are mentioning.

ABILITY OF AFRICAN INFRASTRUCTURES

Senator GLENN. Let me get back strictly to the subject of Africa.

How able are the African nations in general to absorb and make the best use of our help and to administer it? Do we need any efforts in helping educate African students and leaders to make an infrastructure that can do this?

It is always brought up that the whites have ruled Africa and split it up along geographic lines and along parallels that went right across the Masai area, across Tanzania, or Tanganyika, as it was in that time. We are living with that today. The same is true of Ethiopia and Somalia. They just cut across the area out there. The people look at themselves as an ethnic group and yet they are in two different nations. I don't know how we will ever solve that problem throughout Africa without recarving up the whole continent, which I am sure will never be done. But this is a problem.

How able are they to absorb this? Do we have the administrative infrastructure there? Can we move to a more balanced government between whites and blacks, or all black, or whatever? Do we need a major effort in that area? If we pour in a lot of money and it is ineffective, we would just be opening the area up for the Cubans or the Russians or somebody to come in and exacerbate that problem. We would then have another problem on our hands.

I know that that is a rather complicated question, Mr. Secretary, but I would appreciate your comments anyway.

Secretary VANCE. I would like to have Andy address that.

Senator GLENN. First, do you see it as a major problem?

Ambassador YOUNG. Yes; it is. But if we think of the 51 countries, there are some countries that are very well prepared. Nigeria, for instance, has sent about 10,000 students here to go to our trade schools. Their government is paying for it. There may be altogether 30,000 or 35,000 Nigerians studying in this country right now.

Much of West Africa has an educated elite. Rhodesia has many people who have left there. They had a fair educational system all along. Rhodesia could probably do things.

We have through the United Nations the Namibia Institute, which has been training Namibians. One of the reasons we are able to be

successful in the Sudan now is because back in the early 1960's from Sudan and Kenya there were planeloads of students that were brought here to study. They have had the opportunity to go back home and in the last 10 years or so they have taken over the administration of their countries.

There are other countries, such as Uganda, where you had a leadership class and it was just about all killed off. You virtually have to start over there.

The Portuguese colonies were very low in education. Angola never had a great many educated Africans, nor did Mozambique. That is one of the reasons why the Cubans have been able to last as long as they have in Angola—because there was a real educational vacuum there which somebody had to fill. Nobody could fix a phone or do the plumbing. The Angolans didn't even know how to run a fishing fleet. So, when the 300,000 Portuguese left, the country was basically abandoned with very little talent at the top.

DIFFICULTY OF MIXED CAPABILITIES OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Senator GLENN. The situation around Africa is mixed, then.

Ambassador YOUNG. Yes, it is very mixed.

The French colonies almost all have kept a nice relationship with France. They have not had the problems that the Portuguese colonies have. Gabon probably has more Frenchmen working there now than they did during their colonial times. The same thing is probably true of the Ivory Coast and of Senegal. They have very good relationships with the former colonial power.

Senator GLENN. Doesn't it make it difficult for us in setting up our programs with these countries? Countries may be side by side but with wholly different abilities. Yet they want to be treated the same by us when we send aid. They don't understand the problem really. Doesn't that make it difficult?

Secretary VANCE. Take Zaire for example. It is a perfect example. They simply do not have the people who are trained. So they are now having to bring in Westerners to run their financial institutions, to help set up the administration, to administer programs within the country, and they simply could not do it without them. So these countries with different capabilities are really side by side.

Ambassador YOUNG. Zaire had two college graduates at the time of independence.

Mr. MOOSE. Almost all of our aid programs have a significant component in them for manpower training.

But the situation is very spotty. The Africans are doing some things themselves that we can reinforce.

I met with the Secretary General of OCAM—African Community Organization In Mauritius—the other day and he was describing to me how this basically Francophone group of States have combined to cooperate in various technical areas. Over the last few years they have established a series of undergraduate institutions to train Africans in Africa in very down to earth areas of expertise. They have a school of veterinary medicine, for example. They have a school for accountants. They operate on these theories. They believe that if they train people in Africa, in their own institutions, they are more likely to stay there than if they send them away for training.

The Africans, hopefully with our assistance, can build up their ability to absorb and to use capital, public and private, at the same time that they go on with their development operations. There are going to be slipups in the thing and it is not going to work perfectly. But it is a long-term process and the investment that we can make in manpower training is one of the most valuable that we will have over the long term.

Senator GLENN. Senator Humphrey, I guess in the chairman's absence you are chairman and I am sorry I took so much time.

Senator HUMPHREY [presiding]. That's quite all right, Senator Glenn. I don't have too many questions. It is so long since Hubert and I were in Africa. I think it was about 10 or 11 years. But it was a good experience. To see that continent is to realize the differences in each of these countries. We were there only 1 or 2 days in each country, so I am sure that it was not like your trip.

But even so, you do get a feeling about the continent.

SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

There are lots of questions I can ask you and they are all important. But the one I would most like to ask concerns the capability of South Africa in nuclear matters. What is their status with that capability, if they have it? How responsible can we expect them to be?

Secretary VANCE. The capability which they have, from a technical standpoint, is such that they have the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. I don't believe any of us has any doubt about that.

Second, however, they have indicated that they do not intend to test or to manufacture nuclear weapons at this time. They have further said to us that they would be willing to consider signing the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in addition to that, to accept IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency—safeguards at their plants, provided that they could get from us two things. The first is an assurance of an adequate supply of low enriched uranium for certain of their requirements, and for certain experimental purposes, some highly enriched uranium. The second is—and this is something which we have just discussed—they are concerned, if they go ahead and sign the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards, that, despite that, should an attempt be made in the United Nations to bring sanctions against them by the black African nations based upon alleged potential for violations in the nuclear field, we would vote for such actions. They asked us what our intentions would be if they agreed first to sign the NPT and second to accept IAEA safeguards, and a motion was made to sanction them on the nuclear side. Would we vote no, they wanted to know. That is one of the questions we are wrestling with now. It is a tough question. But it is a fair question for them to ask.

Senator GLENN. Sure, it is very fair.

Secretary VANCE. They very much want to talk to us further about this. I think they are really serious about wanting to sign an NPT agreement and begin to sort of regularize that sort of relationship. To that end they have asked whether Gerry Smith could come out and talk to them and have a far-reaching discussion. I have said yes, we can handle that. I think if we don't do that, we slam the door and then there is no hope. We do know that they have the capability to go the

way we don't want them to go. So we should not slam the door on this. Gerry will be going out there, though I don't know exactly when, to carry on this discussion.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think they will be using this capability in the direction of energy and power?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Ambassador YOUNG. And medical uses, too?

Senator HUMPHREY. Medical uses, too.

Mr. MOOSE. But I think it will be above all for energy. They have a serious energy problem. They are very vulnerable to oil embargoes and they know it.

Secretary VANCE. Yes; they know it.

Senator HUMPHREY. What a boon that would be for those countries, if only they would use it discriminately.

Mr. Chairman, I see you are back. Thank you and I yield back the Chair.

Senator CLARK [presiding]. Thank you.

RESULT OF SUPPORTING INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA

I would like to begin my line of questioning by pursuing what Senator Glenn was discussing, the Cuban-Soviet end of things. Then I will get to Rhodesia and Namibia.

Is it too simplistic or is it accurate to say that if we were to support the internal settlement in Rhodesia that it would have the effect of inviting the Cubans into the Rhodesian situation?

Secretary VANCE. My own view is that if we are going to support the internal settlement, and to forget the Anglo-American plan at this point, it would result in the fighting continuing. As a result of the continuation of the fighting, the likelihood of the Cubans and the Russians coming in in a major way would be very substantially increased. That is why I feel so strongly that we must continue to try to find the way to somehow bring these people together. If we don't, I really believe there is a strong likelihood that the battle will continue. The fighting will go on not only in Rhodesia, but it will spread to the surrounding countryside. [Deleted.]

Maybe you ought to speak to this, Andy.

Ambassador YOUNG. I agree with that. Yet, I think the Cubans have been very careful in only picking what they believe are soft touches.

When they went into the Ogaden, the Somalis were already retreating. They went in with such big manpower and air cover that they probably sustained limited losses. [Deleted.]

They have been very careful to stay on the side of majority African opinion. So, in the Ogaden they were protecting territorial integrity. In Angola, they were fighting against South African intervention.

They have been very cautious about Rhodesia, however.

Secretary VANCE. Andy, let me carry that a step further.

What I can see happening in the situation is this: The fighting continues. You find attacks from Rhodesia into Zambia against the ZAPU troops. Kaunda then turns himself to the Cubans because he has nowhere else to turn. Then you would have the kind of thing Andy is talking about.

Mr. MOOSE. He would ask for antiaircraft units to begin with and then, there you go.

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE

Senator CLARK. I had a briefing from the Central Intelligence Agency the other day, and as I understood their explanation—correct me if I am wrong in this—it is that the Cubans are not much involved directly in Mozambique. But the ZANU forces are trained by Tanzanians. Although there are 600 or so Cubans in Mozambique, they are pretty strictly related to Mozambiquan forces rather than to the ZANU guerrilla forces. Is that accurate?

Secretary VANCE. That is my understanding.

Mr. MOOSE. That is about right, except that there are two or three Cuban anti-aircraft units there on the Mozambiquan border which offer protection to some extent against the Rhodesian air force. But still that is related to Mozambique security.

Senator CLARK. It is really related to both.

Mr. MOOSE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. In the case of ZAPU and inside Zambia, I understand that they are playing an active role in training ZAPU forces—2,000 at a time, as I understand it. So there they are somewhat more directly involved.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

AFRICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. Ambassador Young, you are in daily contact with African representatives in the United Nations and you talk with a lot of the people there. How would you characterize—and I know this is hard because of the great number of African countries—but how would you characterize the African attitude toward the use of Soviet arms, training, and particularly the bringing in of Cuban troops in relation to use of the Russian arms?

Secretary Vance talked about the ambivalence of all that. Would you pick that up and discuss it a little bit, especially in terms of how the Tanzanians, the Zambians, or the Angolans, how the various people, particularly in southern Africa, view all this? What do they like about it and what don't they like about it?

Ambassador YOUNG. First of all, the French Africans are deeply concerned about the Cubans and the Russians.

Senator CLARK. Who are the French Africans?

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, they include Zaire, Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Chad, Mali, Mauritania—everybody probably but Guinea. Guinea is probably the only French African country that has had a relationship with the Soviets over a long period of time. I think they are anxious to open up avenues of contact with us, too.

I think the Nigerians, the Tanzanians and the Zambians resent the Cuban influence a little bit. They appreciate what they are doing, however. [Deleted.]

I think Nyerere and Nigeria want to be the strong influences in Africa themselves and I think they want to be genuinely nonaligned. They resent Cuba coming in and having too much to say about African affairs.

I think Angola particularly is totally dependent upon the Cubans. Senator Glenn might be interested that the Cubans and the Russians haven't been always united in Angola. When there was a recent coup

attempt against Neto, it was pretty clear from African sources that the Russians were behind that coup. Yet, the Cubans sided with Neto.

Senator GLENN. I was not aware of that at all. Has that been made public? Was it in the news at all? If so, I missed out on it. I thought that that was a hand-in-glove operation all the way between the Russians and the Cubans.

Ambassador YOUNG. No.

There is a tension in Angola between the mulattos, who are mixed Portuguese and African, and most of whom were educated in Europe—they make up the majority of the government—and the uneducated blacks, or blacks with limited education.

The mulattos, under Neto's control, have been trying to be independent of the Soviets. They visited me when I was in the Congress. They said, "Please don't do to us what you did to Cuba. Don't force us into the Russian camp. We want to keep our relations with Gulf. We want to open avenues to American business. We do intend to nationalize banks and we are going to keep our ties to the Soviets, also. But we don't want to be totally dependent on the Soviets, and we think that a good relationship with the United States particularly will help balance that out."

The Cubans have sort of supported them in their efforts to develop their own kind of nationalistic independent state. The Russians, I think, were ready to get rid of that group and to start up with another group. But it varies.

In Mozambique, I would say that in spite of the fact that they are classified by us as Communist, they say there is no Communist Party in Mozambique and that FRELIMO is an independent nationalist African party. They denied the Soviets the right to develop a naval base in Mozambique. I think that Senator Clark can take some credit for that. That was during the time of his earlier visit.

Senator Clark, I think that the contact that you had with Mozambique in those early days opened up the possibility of relationships with us. I think they are still most interested in that because they see their problems as development problems.

Public Law 480 funds have really been a salvation for that government in helping to feed people. They had a flood there and several thousand people were killed. In fact, almost a third of the land was under water for a while, former agricultural land. So, our being able to help them with emergency relief like that, even indirectly, was very important.

You know, everybody likes the Cubans because they think the Cubans keep us honest. [General laughter.]

They think if the Cubans would go home, we would lose interest. They don't hesitate to threaten you either. "Well, you know, if you don't come through, Brother Castro will help us." This is more on a joking kind of basis at the U.N., but at the same time, there is an element of truth in it.

Almost all of these people realize, however, that their long-range development interests lie with us.

U.S. ALLIES INVOLVED IN AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Let me pursue that in a different way, in terms of the Cuban and Soviet presence there.

Obviously several other countries have intervened directly or indirectly in Africa, most notably France, because of the long-term relationship with Africa. I think there are a few thousand French troops in Djibouti.

Secretary VANCE. 4,000 troops.

Senator CLARK. Yes; there are 4,000 French troops in Djibouti. Some have moved into Chad and other areas. But are any of our allies involved in the Ethiopian or Angolan conflict?

Secretary VANCE. I would answer that, if I may.

There is some assistance to UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola) [deleted] from other nations. I think it is limited in nature, but there is some support.

In Chad, the French are actually involved.

Senator CLARK. What about in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and that area?

Secretary VANCE. As far as I know, currently there is nothing substantial going on. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. Even though the Iraqis and the Syrians have close ties with the Soviets, they are helping the Eritreans against the Ethiopians?

[Secretary Vance nods affirmatively.]

Senator CLARK. That is amazing.

Secretary VANCE. That is the Arab situation between the Muslims and the Christians. That is basically a Muslim-Christian issue.

IS U.S. ROLE CONTEMPLATED?

Senator CLARK. Is there any role being contemplated by the United States for involvement in Ethiopia?

Secretary VANCE. No.

Insofar as Eritrea is concerned, as I indicated in my statement, we feel that that is a situation where there must be a negotiated solution, and we are urging that the OAU (Organization for African Unity) play a more active role in trying to bring about a negotiated solution.

QUALITY OF U.S. INFORMATION REGARDING AFRICA

Senator CLARK. You have seen all of the accusations made this past week from the new Stockwell book. I know that this is not the appropriate place to go into the truthfulness or lack of truthfulness of those allegations, but one of the points he makes which is both interesting and related to our discussions is the following. He talks about the fact that in the period he was there we were involved in a lot of different kinds of operations, but in point of fact the collection of intelligence information was not very good. He says that the quality of intelligence regarding Africa was really not very effective and not very helpful or useful.

What is your own feeling in terms of the quality of information we are getting? Is it useful and helpful? How is it in the situation we are discussing today?

Secretary VANCE. I think our information is quite good from the total range of sources that we have with respect to what is going on in Ethiopia at this point and in Eritrea. It is not, you know, absolutely fine, but it is good enough so that I think we have a fairly good feeling.

Senator CLARK. Do you feel it is the same for southern Africa?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; I do. [Deleted.]

Is there any difference of opinion?

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, we didn't have any contacts in Angola for a long time. So, there are not that many now. For instance, we don't really know what went on in the raid in southern Angola except through indirect sources.

Senator CLARK. The South African raid?

Ambassador YOUNG. Yes. [Deleted.]

One of the reasons I think we are having so many problems with reporting in Africa, especially from Salisbury, is that the reporters never get outside of Salisbury. They are restricted there. Their news accounts are censored, and yet, that never comes through in the U.S. press or on television, that these are censored news stories.

Senator CLARK. No; it doesn't. Why not?

Ambassador YOUNG. The New York Times even now and then on the bottom of a story will put "This story was censored by the Rhodesian Government." But really, every news story out of Salisbury is censored.

If a story is not censored, as was the case of an Associated Press photographer who got out pictures that were not censored, then the photographer or reporter cannot get back in.

Secretary VANCE. When Andy, David, and I were there recently, for the first time in I don't know how many years they permitted an interview with us to be shown on Rhodesian television. The first day they refused to let it be shown, but on the second day they let it be shown.

Senator GLENN. May I interrupt?

Senator CLARK. Sure.

Senator GLENN. Were news reports censored when you had American people traveling with you on your trip?

Secretary VANCE. No; not on our plane.

Ambassador YOUNG. No.

Senator CLARK. The failure to pick up the nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert is really an aerial photography question, then, rather than anything else?

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir.

DETERIORATION IN U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. You were talking in your introductory remarks about South Africa. You say: "We cannot ignore apartheid and the growing crisis within South Africa. We have to make it clear that a deterioration in our bilateral relations is inevitable if progress is not made."

In the security of this room, what specific things could be or might be considered if, as you say, progress is not made? Where would those deteriorations be?

Secretary VANCE. The economic field is the most obvious area. It could be a question of such things as cutting off all Export-Import Bank relationships, as has been suggested in the Congress here.

If that were to be done by a number of Western countries, then I think it could have a substantial effect. Of course, the ultimate weapon

is sanctions. This, however, is something which is terribly sensitive to our Western allies. It is most sensitive, of course, to the British, because of their huge investment there. But it is also a very sensitive issue to the French and, to a lesser degree, to the Germans.

The one thing that they always keep trying to put off even thinking about is the question of sanctions, although they realize that under certain circumstances that this question is going to have to be faced up to.

Senator CLARK. But you don't see anything other than the economic questions?

Secretary VANCE. Well, others have talked about the question of an oil embargo. [Deleted.]

ALLEGED RECEIPT OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Let me go to another subject now.

There is a story breaking in the papers these last 2 or 3 days that apparently is causing a number of problems inside South Africa. It concerns the Minister of Information, I believe. The Chicago Sun Times had the article which I read. They published an account of a matter which included some names of Congressmen who were alleged to have been involved in a government operation and receiving small amounts of funds, or something like that. I think one Congressman indicated he had received a \$100 personal contribution from a South African. Obviously it was not illegal at that time.

Can you throw any light on this whole issue? What is that all about?

Secretary VANCE. I would ask Dick to comment on that.

Mr. Moose. Mr. Chairman, at this point we really don't have any information on this that goes beyond what has appeared in the South African press. There was an article in the New York Times the other day by John Burns, which you saw. There is a Chicago Sun Times article, which I think picks up on the South African article. This really is developing in the South African press, and we really have not yet had any independent reporting on this.

Senator CLARK. OK. Thank you.

Senator Glenn.

HOW FAR TO GO WITH SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA

Senator GLENN. I would like to follow up on the last question of Senator Clark. I have my own ambivalence on the matter of how far to go with sanctions on South Africa. I think there is a very powerful argument that we perhaps would hurt the most those we would want to help the most if we start down that road. In other words, the business interests, the people who have the money, the whites in South Africa who are the most intransigent in this whole problem are probably not those who will suffer that much. They may be able to get out of the country or do something to help themselves. Yet, the ones we might be putting out of a job, those who would suffer the privation of no job, no food for their families, and no hope of getting a job would be the ones who would be moved to riot or whatever. This is a real conflict in my own mind.

Once we start down that road, it seems to me that we would perhaps hurt the most those whom we were trying to help. I don't know what I think on this subject.

I want to do whatever we can to force a solution to the situation; but let's not wreck the very people we are trying to help in the process.

Secretary VANCE. Well, let me underline that this is a subject we have spent hours and hours debating among ourselves as well as with our allies and friends.

My own view on it is that you have to divide the South African problems really into two basic categories: those dealing with apartheid and those dealing with the longer range problems of political power sharing.

I think that with respect to the apartheid kind of questions, progress has to be made and has to be made rapidly. I think that there are a number of South Africans, including not only people in the business community but people in the Government, who realize that they really have to move and move more rapidly than they have been doing on that subject.

Insofar as that is concerned, I think we must really make our position continually clear, and we must press and press on it.

On the longer-range question of freedom to participate in political and economic life in the country, in the life of the country in the full sense, for us to try to set a time schedule for them is something that we could not do and really should not do.

So I would feel that we ought to deal with them differently.

Coming back to your precise question, it is true that the use of sanctions can hurt those whom we are really trying to help. That is why I think we all feel that we should try to move in other ways before coming to the [deleted] point where we have to make a decision with respect to sanctions, because of the very things that you are referring to.

Perhaps Andy and Dick would like to comment.

PULLING U.S. INVESTMENT OUT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Senator GLENN. We have had student demonstrations saying such things as "GM should not invest in South Africa," and that sort of thing. They go out and demonstrate. I have always looked upon that as being sort of counterproductive to what we really want out there.

If we did stop investment, we would be doing away with a lot of jobs for the very people we are trying to help. What do we say in a situation like that?

Ambassador YOUNG. Unofficially, if the students were not saying "pull out," GM would not then be under pressure to hire fairly in South Africa.

Senator GLENN. All right. I agree with you that it keeps the pressure on them. But what if GM really got out? Is that what we really want?

Ambassador YOUNG. No; I don't think so. I have always taken the position that it would not be good for the United States to completely divest itself out there. I feel the real hope for South Africa is through American businesses acting responsibly.

My own experience down south is that the northern businesses came south and acted more southern than the southern business until the pressure was on from up north. Then, very quickly, things changed. You know, I have never seen a boycott last more than 3 months. A boycott becomes an excuse for making people do what they want to do anyway.

You know, South Africa had an election. There are 1,611,000 white voters. Only 689,000 whites voted for the Nationalist Party. The rest of them did not vote at all, or a sprinkling of them voted for the Progressives. That to me says that the majority of white people are looking for an alternative in South Africa.

They won't assert themselves in any way as long as this system seems to be working, because they have tremendous advantages. But if it looks like this system is not working—and I think our student demonstrations and other things kind of keep reminding them of the potential of sanctions without actually applying sanctions. Even the banks who have refused to lend more money are still lending money within the money that is already there. I think I see sanctions functioning internationally very much as our Supreme Court functioned domestically in our southern situation.

The Supreme Court could not make you do something that was totally against your interests. But when it involved something that you knew had to happen anyway, everybody always said, "We don't really want to do this but the courts are making us do it," and that is the analogy that I see for sanctions in the South African situation.

EMPLOYMENT CODE FOR U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA SUGGESTED

Senator CLARK. Let me add one thing to that.

Our subcommittee did a year-long study of South African investments and loans. Whether we came to the right conclusions or not I suppose is highly debatable. You might be interested in looking at the report we issued. It concluded that American companies were basically not much different from those of other countries or from South African companies in terms of how they treated their workers and strikers. For example, not a single one from which we had any testimony had a black person supervising a white person in any capacity.

But beyond that, what we argued in that report was that we ought to devise some kind of fair employment code, that would be devised with the companies themselves and hopefully with some direction from our own Government, to set this as a standard, and that after a period of time we might consider even not giving tax credits to those who did not meet that very basic general kind of code. Again, we concluded that it was not a good idea for us, for any part of our Government, to actively encourage investment. Right now our policy is neither to encourage nor to discourage. This would not in any way forbid anybody from doing it. Anyone could invest who wanted to. But we decided against this divestment to some degree on the grounds you have described.

Secretary VANCE. May I add something to that, please?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Secretary VANCE. I met with Leon Sullivan yesterday. You know, Leon has been experimenting with the code idea. When Leon started out he had 12 companies. He came in to see me yesterday afternoon and he now has 98 companies, and the 98 include most of the major companies in the United States.

Leon originally started out with a code which was not a very tough kind of code. It had six principles, as I recall. He has begun to build on this and not only has a code but has a followup mechanism to see

what is actually happening, with periodic reports. He thinks he may get through this year a union provision to be added to the code as well.

Senator CLARK. That would be great.

Secretary VANCE. It is interesting to see how this develops.

His original code was less strong in some respects than the European code or the self-announced code which the Canadians have put into effect, but better than others and now it is gaining force and strength. The fact that the number of companies has multiplied so rapidly so recently indicates that companies believe that perhaps this is the route to follow.

COORDINATION AMONG NATIONS INVOLVED IN AFRICAN MILITARY SITUATION

Senator GLENN. To get back to the military situation, we looked at it for the other side, the Cubans and the Russians. I would like to get back to our side of the fence and find out what we are doing.

France, for instance, has been very responsive. France has been in Africa for a while. It intervened in the war in the western Sahara when French planes bombed the Polisario guerrillas in Mauritania. There are now about 2,000 French Legionnaires in Chad. In Zaire they put in Moroccan troops to repel the Shaba invasion. French assistance is being funneled to Somalia and to UNITA forces in Angola. The French and Belgians are supplying the bulk of the military assistance to Zaire. Approximately 4,000 French troops are also stationed in Djibouti.

Our U.S. response has been much more restrained, but several African countries are likely to turn to us in the future.

You mentioned in your testimony Sudan, Chad, Kenya and Zaire and then later on you mentioned Somalia also as being interested. Several African countries are likely to turn to the United States in the future with additional requests, such as Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Cameroon, Morocco, and front line states in southern Africa which are vulnerable to devastating air attacks from Rhodesia and South Africa.

This raises the question then—is there coordination between the European nations, France, Belgium, or anybody else who is involved in Africa? Are we coordinating these things?

Secretary VANCE. We know what they are doing. They keep us informed of what they are doing. But we have made it very clear that insofar as what we are concerned about, it is that we have to follow procedures under our laws and we have to make our own determinations on this. But generally, yes, we do know what they are doing. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. I don't suppose there is any one answer to this, but I wonder how much we tailor our program with what we know is going on there, with what France or other nations are doing. In other words, if the Somalis want something and they are getting a certain number of French rifles, do we then hold off and not give rifles in similar quantities when we know they are already getting rifles? How much coordination is there?

Secretary VANCE. On the question of Somalia, before the Ogaden invasion, we were considering doing something. We discussed this among the French, the Germans, the British and ourselves. We said

if we are going to do anything here, then let us do it in consultation with each other so that we don't duplicate or give them more than is necessary for their defensive needs. Then, once they invaded the Ogaden, we said that we would have no part of this thing; the situation had changed and we withdrew from any further consideration of it.

But there was consultation in advance.

With respect to Chad, the French consulted with us and said that they were going to do something about Chad. The Egyptians came to us and said that they were going to try to do something with Chad—all said could we help? We said that we could do nothing in the way of grant assistance, but if some third country could provide money, this would permit them to use the FMS route, for which we would prepare a Presidential determination. The President has signed the determination, but nobody has provided the money. Therefore we have not been able to do anything with respect to Chad.

So, there is this kind of consultation going on.

Mr. MOOSE. I might just add that with regard to Zaire, for example, we have a very small military FMS program there. We are supplying things in the area of transportation, communications and logistics support. We are aware of what the French and the Belgians are doing. They are doing other kinds of things. [Deleted.]

We are aware of what they are doing and we are not duplicating those things. We are supplementing those things in areas that we think are most acceptable to the Congress.

In the case of Kenya, we recently had a military survey team go out there. We have consulted with the British who are and will undoubtedly continue to be the major supplier to Kenya. We don't have any intention of duplicating, if we should propose a program, what they are trying to do.

SURVEYS AS TO WHAT IS REALLY NEEDED

Senator GLENN. That was going to be my next question.

Do we send our people over to survey what is really needed as opposed to people just asking for what they want?

Mr. MOOSE. Yes.

Secretary VANCE. Yes; absolutely.

Senator GLENN. That seems rather crucial.

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

DIFFERING VIEWS CONCERNING RHODESIA

Senator GLENN. I have only one other brief question and you can answer this or not, as you see fit.

The press reports here in Washington, in the Washington Post particularly, indicated that you had some different views on Rhodesia. I think you were quoted in the following way: Secretary Vance was supposed to be "alarmed that a pro-Marxist nation might emerge there," and Ambassador Young supposedly held that "the influence of African culture will greatly dilute and nullify the danger that such nations will topple into Soviet-Cuban or Chinese Communist alinement?" [General laughter.]

Gentlemen, you may comment as you see fit.

Ambassador YOUNG. I think that was when we were on the plane. I didn't talk to any of those guys about any of that stuff. In fact, I think that story came out after London.

Secretary VANCE. It did.

Ambassador YOUNG. I was just surprised at it. I don't know where it came from.

Secretary VANCE. This is what happened.

I was asked a question as I walked out of the meeting—I think you remember this, Andy—after our meetings with the Executive Council of the Rhodesian Front in Salisbury. They said, "What do you have to say, Mr. Vance, about what your friend, Mr. Robert Mugabe, has just said about a Marxist state?" I said, "He never said that to me. If he had said it to me, I would have totally disagreed with him."

That is about it.

[Ambassador Young nods affirmatively.]

Senator CLARK. Mrs. Humphrey, do you have any further questions?

DIRECTION OF CUBAN-SOVIET EFFORTS

Senator HUMPHREY. I only have one question and it is a personal one. The others probably know the answer to it.

This concerns the little map attached to our staff memorandum. It looks as though there is a trend of making a circle around part of Africa; that is, a Cuban-Soviet circle. Is that purposeful? Is it a little dangerous? As you did say, that is where the easiest countries are.

Secretary VANCE. I'm sorry, but I don't think I quite have your question.

Senator HUMPHREY. It looks like they are sort of encircling the outskirts of Africa. Are they coming into countries that have the most oil? Is there any consistent direction they seem to be taking in there in their efforts?

Secretary VANCE. Other than the Ethiopian-Somalian situation, which I think is clearly one which has geopolitical overtones because of its relationship with the oil situation, the others are more basic targets of opportunity in the Third World than really having any consistent plan.

I know that some foreign leaders disagree with that. Some feel that it is a broader plan. They feel that they have a plan to sweep in a broad band across from Angola to Ethiopia up to the Straits of Bab-el Mandeb. They feel that the Soviets have designs with respect to South Yemen. They see the other edge of the pincer coming down to Afghanistan and eventually through Pakistan.

So, there are some who have a much more schematic theory of this than at least I have been able to establish from the hard evidence. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. Would you please run through that route again?

Secretary VANCE. First of all, they see pincers around Iran, and the pincers come down through Iraq, helping to radicalize the Middle East, which will take the Soviets through the Red Sea. The other side of the pincers comes down through Afghanistan and Pakistan [deleted].

Then they may see another, broader sweep. They may see it related both to the Persian Gulf and to the Red Sea. They see it coming

through South Yemen across eventually to Ethiopia and Somalia, which may give the Soviets control over the Straits of Bab-el Mandeb, which of course is key to the oil routes going through the canal.

They also envisage a band extended from the west coast across Africa, from Angola through Zaire, eventually through Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia. It would streak all the way across. That is the basic theory.

Senator GLENN. That is quite a lineup.

Because of interest on the committee I have been watching the Russian general interest down in this warm water area. They have had a historical interest in it. Truman helped toss them out of Iran after World War II. But these increasing moves to Syria, Iraq, and now the Horn of Africa, and the increased Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, are too obvious to me to overlook.

Secretary VANCE. Let me comment on that.

On the oil thing, one can make the argument that the Soviets, toward the end of the 1980's, may have some problems in meeting their oil requirements, and therefore there is some grand design looking to that period of time down the end of the road. One can spell out a theory at least on that.

That, to me, however, is quite different than this band running across Africa.

Ambassador YOUNG. The other thing about Africa that I think we tend to forget is that Angola is twice the size of Texas. Sudan is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi, and has only 18 million people. [Deleted.]

The Cubans really don't have as much control of Angola as they would like. The Banguela Railroad, which runs right across the middle, they would like very much to open, and they have not been able to keep that railroad open for the last 2 years. Their operation in Ethiopia has gotten a lot of publicity. But I don't know what advantage they have gained from running the Somalis out of 1,000 miles of sand. I don't know what is in it for them. There are no natural resources that I know about in that sand. It is of emotional value to Siad Barre and to Ethiopia. But I don't know whether the Ogaden is of any strategic value by itself.

Now, if it is a part of conquering both Somalia and Ethiopia, and taking charge of the whole Horn, that is one thing. But I can't see the sense in their fighting over the Ogaden and Eritrea. They may see the sense in it, though.

SOVIET INTEREST IN AREA

Senator CLARK. If I could add to that, I have never been quite certain if the interest was in the sea lanes or in protecting the oil the Soviets want to protect.

John, I guess this is as much your question as mine. I am not at all certain that they are better off now than they were before they switched sides. I mean now they don't have the base at Berbera and direct access to the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia does not give them any access to the oil lanes.

I am only talking about that one point. I am not talking about the influence in the area. On the one point of the sea lanes, the Soviets

are now in a much more difficult position than they were a couple of years ago, having lost Berbera, having lost so much. They are worse off in the Horn in the sense of interrupting trade than they were before this all started—or so I would think.

Am I wrong on that?

Secretary VANCE. No; I don't think you are wrong on that. One has to envisage a broader scheme where eventually they get back into Somalia again and the whole thing is put together in a big package linked across with South Yemen.

I am not sure that it is that carefully laid out. I think it is more a target-of-opportunity kind of thing.

Mr. MOOSE. Of 14 countries in Africa where there are Cuban personnel, 5 are ex-Portuguese colonies. The particular history of the independence movement in the Portuguese colonies accounts for over one-third of the 14 countries. That is clearly attributable, I think, not really to a design, but to the way that particular decolonization process happened to fall out.

Out of the nine that remain, there are a number where the numbers of Cubans—although they are crosshatched on the map there—are minimal. [Deleted.]

Ambassador YOUNG. I have been in Tanzania half a dozen times. I met with everybody in every aspect of life out there. I have never yet seen a Cuban.

But yet, they are marked on the map.

CUBANS FUNCTIONING IN CIVILIAN AREAS

Senator HUMPHREY. Are there Cubans in the civilian areas of business, or in other civilian areas?

Ambassador YOUNG. I understand that there are a lot of Cuban doctors in the ex-Portuguese colonies, and technicians; but they are not business people. They are more or less functioning like our AID or our Peace Corps personnel in the nonmilitary capacities.

Senator CLARK. Gentlemen, we have kept you for a long, long time, and this has been a very useful discussion.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one brief question?

Senator CLARK. Sure.

ARE CHINESE DOING ANYTHING?

Senator GLENN. Are the Chinese doing anything?

Secretary VANCE. Not much. [Deleted.]

Ambassador YOUNG. They build good railroads.

Secretary VANCE. They built a good railroad. You know, they keep urging us to do more. They keep saying such things as why don't you get in there, why don't you send troops in, why don't you send arms in, so on and so forth.

They are giving some support. They have been giving some support to the Somalis. They have given some support in Mozambique and in some of the other countries. But it is really not very much.

Senator GLENN. Andy's mentioning the railroad jogged my memory on that.

When I was in Tanzania for about 6 weeks some years ago, they were just completing that. We did a bit of filming there. It followed the old Stanley trail when he went to look for Livingston in Tanganyika. That was quite an experience. They were just finishing up the railroad and there was a lot of Chinese influence there at that time. There was a lot of stuff in the papers and a lot of talk about it.

I guess they apparently gave up on that and folded up their tents and went back home after they completed a beautiful railroad to Zambia.

Ambassador YOUNG. That railroad is basically hauling Western goods in and out. It is hauling natural resources out of Zambia and is hauling our trade in. They are probably still around, but they don't seem to be influencing the politics.

Senator GLENN. Let me associate myself with the remarks of the chairman. I think today's presentation has been excellent.

SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

Secretary VANCE. Before we stop, may I just say a word or two about Namibia? I think we are at a crossroads in Namibia and do want to say something about that situation.

As I indicated in my opening remarks, I think we have made some real progress over the last year by what the contact group did in bringing it to the point where the South Africans finally came on board. We were down to the final question of whether we bring SWAPO [Southwest Africa Peoples Organization] into it.

In my judgment, there was one serious issue and that issue was Walvis Bay.

I think that there is a solution to the Walvis Bay question.

The other issue which I think has become a real live issue now is the question of where the troops are stationed because of the raid that took place. I think it really was not a serious issue until that took place.

We can't let this thing fall apart at this juncture. The only way I see to try to put this last piece in place is to get the frontline states to call a meeting, to get SWAPO there, to get the contact group there and see if we can't take care of these final two pieces which are necessary. If we can do that and get a breakthrough on Namibia, this can have, I think, an immense effect, not only in proving that something can be done in a lot of the really sore spots, but it will also have a positive effect in the Rhodesian situation as well.

We were talking about when is it possible to have this frontline-called meeting. It looks now like it can't be done within 3 to 4 weeks because everybody is traveling now. Kaunda is coming here, Machel is out of the country, and so forth.

But I think we have to continue to press on this and to hold this meeting and to try our darndest to put this last piece of the puzzle into place. If we do, then I think that that kind of success can have a major impact, not only in that particular country, but on the whole kinds of things such as Cuban perception and all of the other kinds of things we have been talking about.

Senator GLENN. May I make one other comment?

Senator CLARK. Of course.

Senator GLENN. I am not a member of the subcommittee, but I would suggest that the subcommittee go on record to upgrade the maps of the

Foreign Relations Committee. The one I am now using is clearly outdated. This is a particular hindrance where Africa is concerned.

[General laughter.]

Senator CLARK. You are quite right.

COMMENDATION OF POLICY DIRECTION AND WITNESSES

Gentlemen, again we thank you very much. I would like to reiterate what I said at the outset about the direction of policy. We are very much impressed by it.

I think the degree of expertise and detail you went into today is very encouraging in terms of taking the kind of interest you have in this important continent.

I remember asking the Secretary of State not too long ago about Mr. Mugabe, and he had never heard of Mr. Mugabe. So I think the kind of expertise and deep involvement you have in Africa now reflects the kind of interest that the administration is taking, and we are very proud of that.

Thank you all very much for coming. We greatly appreciate your appearance here today.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]





