# BRIEFINGS ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS



## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
## UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

BRIEFINGS BY CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE, AND AMBASSADOR PAUL C. WARNKE, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ON THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS

NOVEMBER 3 AND 29, 1977

[SECRET HEARINGS HELD ON NOVEMBER 3 AND 29, 1977; SANITIZED AND MADE PUBLIC MAY 1, 1978]



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NOTE.—Sections of these hearings have been deleted for various reasons at the request of the executive branch. Deleted material is indicated by the notation "[Deleted]."

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## FOREWORD

Late last year, the Committee on Foreign Relations heard Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and the Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in executive session on efforts to achieve a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the committee voted to ask the executive branch to sanitize the two hearings and the questions for the record for public release. This committee print is being released pursuant to that decision.

In early January, the Department and the Agency provided sanitized transcripts of Mr. Vance's and Mr. Warnke's testimony. I wrote to Mr. Vance and Mr. Warnke asking a further effort to avoid unnecessary classification.

On March 27, Secretary Vance responded and provided a final sanitized version of his transcript. Mr. Warnke responded subsequently. My January 9 letter to Secretary Vance and the letters from Mr. Vance and Mr. Warnke follow. With the exception of the deletion by the committee of a portion of the November 3 transcript, all deletions were made at the request of the executive branch.

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
*Washington, D.C., January 9, 1978.*

Hon. Cyrus R. Vance,
*Secretary of State,*
*Washington, D.C.*

Dear Mr. Secretary: As you will recall, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted on November 29 to ask the Department of State to sanitize the transcript of your November 3 testimony and answers provided for the record on the status of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The committee has just received a sanitized transcript of that hearing from the Department, together with completely classified answers for the record.

Upon review, it is clear that the materials provided, in their present form, would be unacceptable for printing. A committee print of these materials would add little, if anything, to the public understanding of SALT.

I believe it is very important that the sanitized transcript and answers for the record should include as much as possible in regard to the negotiating situation and the various limitations and controls under discussion. Given the fact that so much of this material is already on the public record, both officially and unofficially, continued insistence on the complete privacy of the negotiation would appear to be pointless and counterproductive.

Of course, legitimate security requirements must be recognized and respected, but I am convinced that if deletions are made only when absolutely necessary, the resulting committee print will be an important and useful public document. If the Congress and the American people are to have an opportunity to reach a sound and informed judgment on the SALT effort now and on a treaty later, maximum disclosure, consistent with national security requirements, is very important.

Accordingly, I ask that you determine the maximum extent to which your discussion of the current status of the SALT negotiations and the written answers to questions can be put on the public record, and that you direct your staff to work with the committee staff so that a substantially improved sanitized version of the transcript can be printed at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

John Sparkman.

The Secretary of State,
*Washington, March 27, 1978.*

Hon. John J. Sparkman,
*Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate.*

Dear Mr. Chairman: As we discussed on the telephone, I have strong reservations about the public release of those portions of my

testimony before your committee on November 3 which discuss specific U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions on SALT. I believe release of this testimony at the present time could be harmful to these extremely sensitive ongoing negotiations and would not be in our best interests.

In an effort to be responsive to the committee's request for declassification of as much of the transcript as possible, we have taken another look at the testimony. Enclosed is a copy of the galley proof of this testimony marked with what I consider necessary deletions. I appreciate your understanding of my concerns about public release of my comments on specific negotiating proposals and hope that the transcript in this form will be acceptable for publication by your committee.

Let me add how much I value the counsel which I receive from you and the other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is precisely because of my desire to maintain a free and uninhibited dialogue with the committee that I feel so strongly about public release of this testimony at this critical juncture in our negotiating process.

Sincerely,

CYRUS VANCE.

Enclosure.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
*Washington, April 6, 1978.*

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,
*Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further reference to your letter of January 11 requesting additional sanitization of my November 29 testimony before the Committee on SALT.

The galley proofs of my November 29 testimony, as it stands with the further declassification worked out between the NSC staff and the committee staff, contain the deletions I consider necessary at this time to avoid prejudice to the successful conclusion of the SALT negotiations.

As Secretary of State Vance indicated in his March 27, 1978 letter to you, the executive branch has strong reservations about the public release now of portions of testimony before your committee which discuss specific details of the U.S. and Soviet SALT negotiating positions.

I value our close working relationship with the committee on ongoing negotiations, and feel the benefit of your advice can best be preserved by a free exchange of information in confidence, when confidentiality is required.

Very truly yours,

PAUL C. WARNKE.

# BRIEFINGS ON THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1977

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building, the Honorable John Sparkman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Church, Pell, McGovern, Clark, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Case, Javits, Percy, Griffin, and Baker.

Also present: Senators Cranston, Kennedy, and Mathias.

Also present from the executive branch: Douglas Bennet, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Leslie Gelb, director, Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Kathie Smith, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State; Alan Platt, special assistant for Congressional Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Walter Slocum, SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) Task Force, Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you here today. I want to thank you for coming, especially for coming so soon. We always look forward to your giving us reports on your many and varied travels and conferences.

Proceed as you see fit.

## STATEMENT BY HON. CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary VANCE. I do have an opening statement which I would like to go to, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to have you read that, if you wish.

Secretary VANCE. First let me say that I am very happy to have the opportunity to meet with the committee again today to continue the process of consultation on SALT, which we have started at our earlier meetings.

I think that you share our view that SALT is one of the most important negotiations this country has undertaken. If SALT succeeds, we will have strengthened our national security by stabilizing the strategic arms race, by making an important start in the effort to reduce strategic arms stockpiles, and by placing constraints on the development of future weapons systems.

If SALT fails, the world will be a less safe place to live in, and by our failure we will be condemned to undertake greater defense expenditures in a fruitless effort to rectify that situation.



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The kind of SALT agreement I see developing is one that will improve our relative military position, build a still more durable and cooperative relationship, and make a major step toward the President's goal of imposing meaningful restraints and reductions on the nuclear arms race.

I want today to review briefly the highlights of our proposals which I outlined for you at our last meeting. I also then want to bring you up to date on the status of the negotiations at Geneva where a number of developments have taken place since our last session.

But I also want to use this opportunity to step back for a few moments from the complexities and details of the talks to look at what it is that we are trying to accomplish in SALT.

I am afraid that we sometimes lose sight of our broader interests as we become engrossed in the details of the talks.

I want to show you how our current proposals help us further those goals, and finally, I'd also like to reflect a bit on what I believe the consequences might be if the negotiations should fail.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Clark.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator CLARK. In view of the fact that there is a vote on and there are at this time very few members here, I wonder if it would not be wise for us to take a brief recess in order to vote.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to suggest that. Ordinarily we would stagger our voting, leaving one at a time. But I think that since we are just starting, it would be better for all of us to briefly recess and cast our votes.

Senator GRIFFIN. We could probably bring a few colleagues back with us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very good suggestion.

Mr. Secretary, please excuse us while we take a brief recess to go and vote.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, are you prepared to resume your report?

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir. I am all set.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Let the committee come back to order, please.

The Secretary was getting ready to read his statement when we had to answer the rollcall.

Mr. Secretary, we would be very happy for you to resume.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. PROPOSAL

Let me now devote a very few minutes to summarize for you the highlights of the U.S. proposal.

[Deleted.]

We are still negotiating a set of agreed principles which would govern SALT III. We see SALT II and SALT III as a continuum leading toward comprehensive reductions and constraints on destabilizing technology.

For our part, we are determined to seek greater reductions and even tighter qualitative constraints in any future talks.

That, in essence, is our proposal. There are, of course, a number of details, provisions which I would be happy to go into if you have questions after my presentation.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS

Now, let me turn to new developments.

These have happened since I last met with you.

Virtually all the remaining issues have been turned over to our delegations in Geneva.

As you know, Paul Warnke has gone to Geneva and has been trying to get agreement on the basis of our proposal. [Deleted.]

We have made significant progress, resolved a number of major issues with Gromyko, and have the outlines of a new agreement in sight.

WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH

Now let me turn to the question of what we are trying to accomplish in SALT.

It is important that we have a clear understanding of what SALT is all about, what it can and cannot realistically do.

During recent years there have been a lot of unrealistic expectations for SALT. Some have seen SALT as a way of cutting deeply into defense spending. Others have hoped that SALT could somehow eliminate all threats against our own forces.

In past years, we often heard the notion that SALT would usher in a whole new era of United States-Soviet cooperation and would help to do away with military rivalry across the board.

These hopes are legitimate goals that we should pursue. But we have to realize that they are not, in themselves, readily obtainable, given the nature of our relations with the Soviet Union as they now exist.

Political circumstances govern the limits of arms control, and I don't believe that the Soviets are ready at this point to go all the way to comprehensive disarmament schemes. We must, and will, rely on our own prudent efforts to meet our strategic objectives.

I want to tell you frankly that the choice in my view is between an agreement—a good agreement—which is within our grasp, or no agreement at all. It is against this standard that we have to measure what we have achieved, not against some ideal agreement that as a practical matter we cannot hope to conclude.

From the perspective of the United States and its allies, we have three fundamental objectives in pursuing the SALT process with the Soviets.

Any SALT agreement must, above all, preserve the security of the United States and its allies; at a minimum it should maintain and, if possible, enhance strategic stability between ourselves and the Soviets; it must and it should support and give substance to a political relationship with the Soviets which reduces tensions and controls competition.

With respect to our objective of strategic stability, I think we all agree that the destructive power of each side is far in excess of what

could rationally be required by either side to maintain strategic deterrence.

Moreover, technology threatens to produce new weapons which could destabilize this balance by giving one side the illusion of a temporary advantage. Any SALT agreement should, therefore, lower the levels of strategic forces of both sides, and should also restrain those technological improvements which threaten the balance. This has been a goal which, until this prospective agreement, has eluded us in SALT.

Any SALT agreement must be consistent with our own security, and that of our allies. This means that any agreement must leave us and our allies at least as strong relative to the Soviet Union as the situation which would exist in the absence of an agreement.

SALT cannot leave us or our allies in the position where we are vulnerable to nuclear coercion. This means, in my opinion, that in SALT we must preserve the principle of rough parity.

### POLITICAL DIMENSION IN SALT PROCESS

In addition to these fundamental objectives concerning our strategic and security relationships with the Soviets, the SALT process has an important political dimension with respect to United States-Soviet and overall East-West relations.

It would have been almost inconceivable 10 years ago to imagine the situation which we have today in which two adversaries discuss on a systematic and rational basis security interests of the utmost importance to both sides.

This central fact has created the foundations for a political relationship with the Soviets that reduces the tensions of the cold war and sets some important boundaries to our ideological, and political, and military competition. Given that we preserve and protect our essential strategic and security interests in an agreement, the fact of the ongoing SALT process, then, serves this important policy objective.

SALT is a bargaining process. Certainly we don't agree with many of the concepts set forth by the Soviets. They, too, have a different view of our proposals.

The aim of the negotiations is to reach a fair and equitable agreement, for without fairness and equity, there can be no agreement.

Up to now we have been looking at SALT from our point of view, in terms of what is in our interest. Many of these ideas were carefully incorporated in our Moscow comprehensive proposal which represented the central core of what we would like in an agreement.

Obviously the Soviets saw that proposal in a much different fashion and rejected it as an attempt to gain what they call "unilateral advantage."

We then entered into a process, as one normally does in negotiations, of seeking adjustments in the starting positions of both sides that would serve our purposes and move us toward our goals. In this process we have not abandoned the goals set forth in the Moscow proposal, and, in fact, have moved the Soviets a considerable distance toward accepting ideas in our Moscow proposals which they flatly rejected at that time.

WHAT PROPOSED AGREEMENT WOULD DO

As to the agreement, we have tried to reflect these broad concerns in a number of specific tasks for SALT. We believe our current proposals reflect those goals in a number of fundamental ways.

First and foremost, the agreement would establish equal aggregates between the sides and at lower levels than agreed to in SALT I or later at Vladivostok.

This agreement would reinforce the principle of overall strategic equivalence.

It would place overall limits on Soviet forces through 1985. It would also put important limits on Soviet MIRV'd ICBM's, precisely those forces which we see as potentially most upsetting to the strategic stability.

This agreement would require the Soviets to take down about 300 strategic delivery vehicles—actually to dismantle systems now targeted against the United States. In addition, the resultant Soviet force level would be well below our best estimate of their force level in the absence of a SALT agreement.

Our programs, in contrast, could go forward as planned. [Deleted.]

Equally important is the fact that for the first time we are trying to reach an agreement with significant qualitative constraints on offensive weapons. [Deleted.]

We have heard a great deal about what the SALT agreement taking shape would do about the potential Soviet capacity to launch a strike against our Minuteman ICBM force.

If we can achieve what we have proposed on qualitative restrictions, it would have the effect of slowing down the time by which the Soviets could hope to acquire such a capability.

We have sought to do what is possible to constrain the threat to our land-based ICBM's. We concluded that in terms of this objective, a limit on all MIRV'd ICBM's was at least as advantageous as a limit on modern large ballistic missiles, and could be more so.

More specifically, this agreement does go some way toward containing the potential threat to Minuteman in two ways. [Deleted.]

It would also place a limit on the number of ICBM's that can carry MIRV's.

In both respects, our proposal is an advance over the Vladivostok agreement, which called for no qualitative controls on ICBM's and set no separate ceiling on Soviet MIRV'd ICBM's.

But, given a determined Soviet effort to improve the accuracies of their ICBM warheads and the number of warheads that could be available to the Soviets under our proposed SALT agreement, I cannot say that the SALT II accord which is likely to emerge is going to prevent the Soviets from eventually acquiring such a capability.

This observation does not mean that the proposed agreement has failed to do its job. Even an agreement with tighter qualitative controls may not be able to accomplish this task. What we need to do is to put the Minuteman survivability issue into perspective.

For one thing, I do not put much stock in a scenario in which Soviet leaders decide to launch a strike against our land-based forces, since it is difficult to imagine how the Soviet leadership would consider that the U.S.S.R. could escape devastating retaliation, given our ability to counter with a large, effective force against their major urban targets.

Whatever the fate of our land-based forces, we would retain under the proposed SALT agreement a powerful sea-based missile force and bomber forces. And, we are keeping options open to deal with the Minuteman survivability problem, such as allowing R. & D. for mobile ICBM's.

Finally, in the absence of a SALT agreement, we would face a far more dangerous and unmanageable threat to our fixed land-based forces, since the Soviets would then be totally unrestrained from qualitative and quantitative improvements.

More generally, we have tried in our proposal to get a handle on the new technologies we now face, including mobile ICBM's and cruise missiles. [Deleted.]

Cruise missiles would be limited under the protocol, as I described it. This is an area of major Soviet concern. They have made it clear to us that from their point of view an agreement must take into account these systems.

We have proposed a way in which our planned programs could go forward in the interim, while we and our allies study the utility of these new weapons.

Our proposed cruise missile position would keep cruise missile options open for ourselves and for our allies after the protocol period.

QUESTION OF INSURING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION

We take the question of insuring adequate verification of a SALT agreement seriously. It has been the subject of intensive discussions with the Soviet Union and significant studies within the Administration.

It is important to recognize that we are moving into a realm of SALT limitations in which we cannot expect to be able to verify some of the limitations with precise accuracy.

In this situation, we need to look at verification in the context of what constitutes an adequate level of verification capability in light of our basic strategic concerns.

For example, we expect to have a very high degree of confidence in our ability to verify with precision the proposed limitations of the overall numbers of strategic Soviet systems, MIRV'd missiles, MIRV'd ICBM's, et cetera. Verification of cruise missile restrictions, on the other hand, will be more difficult.

Nevertheless, we believe that we have constructed these limitations in such a manner that they can be adequately verified. In judging this adequacy, we weigh the impact of the resultant uncertainties on our overall security against the advantages which accrue from accepting such limitations.

Thus, the key question is whether verification uncertainties for a particular limitation could be significant in endangering our security.

It is also important to recognize that great uncertainties would exist over Soviet weapons programs in the absence of a SALT agree-

ment and to assess our overall security situation under a SALT agreement in its entirety.

From these perspectives, I believe we will be in acceptable shape in the verification area.

We sometimes take for granted the contribution which the SALT agreements and the SALT process make to our intelligence collection capability.

National technical means are now accepted methods for collecting intelligence. Interference with national technical means is prohibited, as are deliberate concealment measures which impede verification.

PROPOSED SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR SALT III

As you know, we have proposed a set of principles for SALT III which would be an integral part of this agreement. In those principles we have incorporated many elements from our comprehensive proposal in an effort to obtain even greater reductions and tighter qualitative limits in a future agreement.

I think our proposal puts us on the right road for the first time. It is the first step toward reducing forces on both sides and getting an important grip on the question of future systems.

SITUATION IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT

We believe this is a good agreement, even if it cannot resolve all the uncertainties in the strategic relationship. But let us take a look at the situation which would exist in the absence of any agreement.

Instead of the [deleted] strategic nuclear delivery systems allowed under our proposal, we estimate the Soviets could field more than [deleted] in 1985, in the absence of any agreement. This is a [deleted] percent increase over the situation with a SALT agreement.

As many as [deleted] of these would probably be MIRV'd, in contrast with the [deleted] limit we have proposed. MIRV'd ICBM's, which we would limit to [deleted], could, depending on how the Soviets deployed their forces, be close to [deleted].

There is no doubt that both the number of warheads and the throw-weight would be significantly greater.

[Deleted.]

We, of course, could counter this threat, but I can assure you that it would be at great cost.

I don't think this is a situation which either you or I want to see develop. I cannot predict all the negative political consequences of a failure in SALT. Given the fact, however, that SALT is seen by both sides as a barometer of our overall relations, a failure would have serious consequences on the broader East-West relations.

I know that this view is shared by our European allies. Failure to reach a SALT agreement would be seen by many as a signal that both sides had abandoned their efforts to seek improved relations.

I am also concerned about the serious implications such an action would have on the thinking of the Soviet leadership in the future.

Finally, SALT is the prime example of a complex enterprise that drives to the very heart of our national security. It is filled with uncertainties and with dilemmas. There are no easy answers and

no quick solutions. It requires sophisticated analysis and balanced judgments.

COMMITTEE'S ROLE

This committee has played an historic role in fashioning wide bipartisan support for complex international enterprises. The administration has sought to consult closely with the Congress and with this committee to provide our views and to help answer your questions.

There is certain to be a wide public debate following any SALT agreement. I ask this committee's help in seeing that the debate deals with the reality of SALT in a balanced and realistic way. I hope that the committee will help us in explaining to the rest of the Senate and to the American people the importance of SALT to our national security.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PROSPECTS FOR WORKING OUT DIFFERENCES WITH SOVIET UNION

What do you think of the prospects for working out such differences as may exist between us and the Soviet Union?

Secretary VANCE. We have a number of difficult problems yet to resolve.

It is my judgment that we will be able to reach agreement on these remaining differences, but it will require patience and hard bargaining.

So, it is my conclusion that we will be able to reach a SALT agreement, but I cannot give you any date by which that can be achieved.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes a great deal of patience to work out such a situation as this, doesn't it?

Secretary VANCE. It does indeed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is nice to see you.

Secretary VANCE. Good morning, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I can think of a lot of questions to ask, but I know everybody wants to ask questions and we have quite a full house here now.

Senator CASE. I am going to pass now, Mr. Secretary, until I finish reading your statement, since I came in late and missed part of it.

Senator JAVITS. Are we operating under the 10-minute rule?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we are.

Senator CASE. I would like to reserve my 10 minutes, then.

Please go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will reserve it for you.

Senator McGOVERN?

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you, not only on this statement. I was very much impressed with the way you handled the Soviet initiative on the nuclear explosion matter. I thought it was a positive reaction with just the right tone.

WASHINGTON POST STORY BY MR. NITZE

I know that this is related only indirectly, but I wanted to commend you on it.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MCGOVERN. I wonder if you are familiar with the story in yesterday's Washington Post, in which Mr. Nitze claims to reveal the details of the SALT discussion?

Secretary VANCE. I am generally familiar with the matter.

I have glanced at the document which Mr. Nitze distributed. I have not yet had a chance to study it in detail.

I note that it consists of two parts, one a purported summary of facts, and second, his analysis of the facts and the conclusions which he draws with respect to the negotiations, and with respect to the results which would flow from the signing of any such agreement.

Senator MCGOVERN. I was curious as to whether he had ever discussed his concerns with you privately, Mr. Secretary, or with your associates before he went public.

Secretary VANCE. I have in the past discussed with Mr. Nitze his concerns about SALT on a number of occasions, both during the time that he was a member of the SALT delegation and in the early days and months of this administration.

I have had only one meeting in the last 3 months with Mr. Nitze, at which time we discussed basically the question of civil defense. He did not discuss with me in recent weeks the matters which are covered in the statement which he issued.

Senator MCGOVERN. I read through the transcript of his press conference. One of the representatives of the Federation of American Scientists brought it over to me.

I was personally distressed by the specific nature of the revelations. It seemed to me to be material that is clearly classified. I am interested to know whether that is the Department's view, whether material that has been marked classified may have been given to him in that form and was erroneously released in such a way that it could complicate the negotiating process.

Secretary VANCE. I have not yet had a chance to study it in enough detail to determine whether or not the factual material which he released is based solely upon what may have appeared in the newspapers, or whether it goes beyond that. I would have to do that first before I could give you an answer on that.

Senator MCGOVERN. I realize that.

Secretary VANCE. Unfortunately, Senator McGovern, there have been stories appearing in a number of newspapers which have gone into numbers involved in the SALT negotiations. I think that this has been harmful, quite frankly—very harmful. But I do not know whether he went beyond what he picked up in the newspapers and has additional information which goes beyond that.

It would require a study of his papers to determine that.

Senator MCGOVERN. At the appropriate time, could we have the benefit of your analysis on that?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator MCGOVERN. It struck me as a paradox. So much effort was expended to track down Mr. Ellsberg and to prosecute him for the

release of materials dealing with past history. Here you have a former high official of the Government, a man who certainly knows all the rules on national security, releasing information about an ongoing and extremely sensitive negotiation. On the surface, at least, it looks to me like an error in judgment.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Percy and I are both under great time constraints.

I therefore ask unanimous consent that he may precede me, but that I may be recognized after Senator Clark so that I may have the opportunity, too, to finish up as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The Chair recognizes Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Senator Javits and Mr. Chairman. I am needed for a quorum to mark up a bill, Mr. Secretary, and thus I will be very brief.

Mr. Secretary, we thank you for a very excellent statement.

I have a few questions.

SURVIVABILITY OF MINUTEMAN MISSILES

First on land-based missiles, I recently took a personal trip out West and spent a day going through the silos and talking to people out there about our Minuteman missiles. We know of concern that modernization of the Soviet land-based missile force has placed in jeopardy the survivability of our Minuteman missiles.

How long do you estimate that it will be before the Soviets have developed the ability to, say, destroy 50 percent of our Minuteman missiles and silos on a first strike? Do we have an estimate as to when they might have that capability?

Secretary VANCE. It would depend on the kind of strike that they were launching. One would have to go through very complicated calculations in order to arrive at a conclusion on that.

I would prefer, rather than trying to give you an off-the-cuff answer that might be misleading, to give you a more reflective answer for the record.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

[The information referred to is addressed in the answer to question 1 at the conclusion of this transcript.]

Senator PERCY. I asked the question because many military defense analysts have discussed this aspect and Soviet capability. It is something that we ought to keep in mind.

You said in your statement that there may be no agreement that adequately addresses this problem.

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator PERCY. Could you be more specific about the way you have addressed the problem in the proposed agreement?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

First, let me say that we have looked very carefully at the question of Minuteman survivability. As I indicated in my statement, there is a very serious problem as to what the consequences would be with respect to the land-based force of an all-out strike, no matter what we did in any SALT agreement. That is the problem that I am pointing to.

I would like to make available for the record a memorandum from Harold Brown to me on this, which summarizes his views with respect to this problem, which I think you will find both interesting and instructive on this particular point.

So, if I might, Mr. Chairman, I will make this available.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, we thank you for that.

[The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.]

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

On cruise missile, the 3-year protocol would place a range restriction of [deleted] miles on cruise missiles launched by heavy bombers, and a range of [deleted] miles on cruise missiles launched from ships or submarines.

Secretary VANCE. Excuse me, Senator Percy, but I don't believe I answered your previous question. You asked the question of what have we done to try to take care of this problem.

Senator PERCY. Yes, I did.

Secretary VANCE. When we first addressed this problem, we looked at it in terms of what could we do to try to constrain the number of so-called modern large ballistic missiles on the theory that if we could put sublimits on modern large ballistic missiles, this would help in terms of maintaining the survivability of the Minuteman force.

As we looked further into the problem and looked at the two basic areas which are involved, namely antisilo capability and the static indicators, we came to the conclusion that from an overall standpoint, on balance, it appeared that a general limit on MIRV'd ICBM's would be in the long-term interests of the United States. That is, we would be at least as well off with a sublimit on MIRV'd ICBM's as we would with a sublimit on modern large ballistic missiles. [Deleted.]

What I am saying is despite these or any other changes which we make during the period through the early 1980's, there is little that could be done that would change the situation.

Senator PERCY. I thank you for that further explanation. I had felt that the memorandum which you were inserting into the record covered your answer to that question.

Secretary VANCE. Yes; that is what it is.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES

[Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. Well, the limits which we have on cruise missiles are as follows.

[Deleted.]

Senator PERCY. In an article recently by Evans and Novak, it said that the Tomahawk cruise missiles could not penetrate Soviet defenses.

Is this actually true?

What does it mean for our new emphasis on cruise missiles as a substitute for the B–1, if it is true?

Secretary VANCE. I have discussed this with Harold Brown as recently as the day before yesterday. He said that it is not true. I believe that a press conference at which this subject was discussed was held yesterday at the Defense Department, which indicated that the conclusions drawn in that column are not correct.

Senator PERCY. Did this appear in the press this morning? I did not notice it.

Secretary VANCE. I think there was something in the press on that, yes.

Senator CRANSTON. It was in the press yesterday.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

According to other press reports, the Air Force would like to deploy about 240 B–52 bombers with cruise missiles to offset the loss of the B–1 bomber program. [Deleted.]

Could you tell us, Mr. Secretary, what our current plans are?

Secretary VANCE. Our current plans are under design. I do not think it is correct that the Defense Department has come to any conclusion that it wants 240. It is still studying what is the appropriate number.

[Deleted.] But no conclusion has yet been reached by the Defense Department on what force structure they wish in terms of heavy bombers, which would carry air launched cruise missiles.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, if Senator Pell wishes, I would be happy to yield to him.

Senator PELL. I would like to pass for the moment. Thank you.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I please have 5 minutes to ask the Secretary my questions?

The CHAIRMAN. OK, but there is a roll call on upstairs.

Senator JAVITS. I will just take 5 minutes, perhaps even less.

RESTRICTIONS ON MOBILE MISSILES

Cy, I have one question, one fundamental question, and I would like to connect it with your statement.

In your statement you say: "But given a determined Soviet effort to improve the accuracies of their ICBM warheads and the numbers of warheads that would be available to the Soviets under our proposed SALT agreement, I can't say that the SALT II accord likely to emerge is going to prevent the Soviets from eventually acquiring such a capability"—to wit, to destroy our Minutemen.

Then you go on to say——

Secretary VANCE. Not to destroy, but in effect to damage very heavily.

Senator JAVITS. Then you go on to say: "More generally, we have tried in our proposal to get a handle on the new technologies we now face, including mobile ICBM's and cruise missiles."

[Deleted.]

Now have those three restrictions been laid on top of the template, to wit, our need for new technologies to face what you recognize as a serious threat, to wit, R. & D.—Research and Development—on mobile ICBM's, and do they fit, and if so, why?

Secretary VANCE. The answer is yes, they have been laid on top of the template. The reason that those provisions have been put in the Protocol rather than in the treaty is for the very reason that you raise.

Senator JAVITS. That is, the 3-year limitation?

Secretary VANCE. The 3-year limitation, that is correct.

During these 3 years, the United States will have under the treaty and Protocol the right to test the mobile launcher capability, and thus to develop that capability, which would then put the United States on an equal footing with the Soviets, who already have that capability.

In the meantime, we could continue with development, but not testing, of the MX missile itself.

[Deleted.]

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if you will excuse us, we will run and vote and return as soon as we can.

Secretary VANCE. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. It seems that our other members may either not be returning or may be slow in getting back.

I think we had better resume.

Senator Case has a couple of questions to ask, so I will call upon him first.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. NITZE'S ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE U.S.-SOVIET VULNERABILITY

Mr. Secretary, I think we have had reference already to Paul Nitze's interview with the Baltimore Sun—I think that was the paper—of a few days ago. There is this question on which I wish you would comment rather specifically, please.

His calculations are that the proposed agreement will mean that by 1985 the Soviet Union could hit about 90 percent of the U.S. missile silos using fewer than half of its warheads, and that it is unlikely that more than 60 percent of Russia's missiles would be vulnerable to U.S. attack. Is that a fair assessment or is it not? Or, would you rather wait and answer that more fully for the record?

Secretary VANCE. I would like to answer it generally and then give you a fuller answer.

Senator CASE. In my judgment, that is not a fair assessment.

Secretary VANCE. What Mr. Nitze's analysis does in general is to compare ICBM's with ICBM's, and then to talk about SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] and SLBM's, and then about bomber forces, rather than to consider the overall mix, which is what I think one has to look at in terms of retaliatory capability and in terms of the whole concept of deterrence.

To answer that question specifically I would have to go into a detailed analysis for which I neither have here the time nor the figures. But I do want to repeat that I do not think it is a fair analysis.

I would like to submit for the record a complete counter analysis to that statement.

Senator CASE. I would appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that that be included in the record as part of the Secretary's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that is agreed to.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, would you have that state on whatever basis you regard as proper for comparison what the current ratio of their throw weight is to ours now and under the proposed agreement?

Secretary VANCE. I will.

[The report referred to was received in classified form on February 28, 1978, by the Foreign Relations Committee, sanitized and released to the public on February 29. The report and covering letter from Mr. Warnke follows:]

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
*Washington, D.C., February 23, 1978.*

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,
*Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is in response to your request of February 1 for a report on the verifiability of the proposed SALT TWO agreement as provided for in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendment of 1977.

As you know, the SALT TWO agreement is still under active negotiation. It is therefore not possible at this time to make a final assessment of the verifiability of the agreement that may emerge from these negotiations. Nevertheless, on the basis of an extensive and continuing review that has been conducted by all involved agencies in the Executive Branch, it is my judgment that the anticipated SALT TWO agreement is adequately verifiable by existing national technical means. This judgment is based on an assessment of the verifiability of the individual provisions of the agreement and of the agreement as a whole. The considerations leading to this judgment are reflected in the attached report which has been prepared and agreed to by the agencies in the Executive Branch concerned with this issue. I commend this report, which has my personal endorsement, to you for your consideration of this important issue.

Very truly yours,

PAUL C. WARNKE.

Attachment.

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*February 23, 1978.*

VERIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED SALT TWO AGREEMENT

1. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The anticipated SALT TWO agreement is adequately verifiable. This judgment is based on assessment of the verifiability of the individual provisions of the agreement and the agreement as a whole. Although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in view of U.S. programs. Any cheating on a scale large enough to alter the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. There will be areas of uncertainty, but they are not such as to permit the Soviets to produce a significant unanticipated threat to U.S. interests and those uncertainties can, in any event, be compensated for with the flexibility inherent in our own programs.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT

The proposed SALT TWO agreement has three principal elements:

A Treaty to last until 1985, embodying basically the Vladivostok Accord with some reductions below the Vladivostok ceilings;

A Protocol to last until September 1980, temporarily limiting certain aspects of cruise missiles, new types of ballistic missiles, and mobile ICBMs; and

Principles and Guidelines for SALT THREE.

The proposed Treaty includes the following major provisions:

An initial overall aggregate level of 2,400 strategic systems, to be reduced to an agreed number between 2,160 and 2,250 during the term of the Treaty.

A 1,320 sublimit on MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers and aircraft equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

A sublimit of an agreed number between 1,200 and 1,250 on MIRVed ballistic missiles.

A sublimit of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers.

The proposed Protocol includes the following provisions:

A ban on deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and on the flight testing of ICBMs from such launchers.

Limitations on the flight testing and deployment of new types of ballistic missiles.

A ban on the flight testing and deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 2,500 km, and on the deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km on sea- or land-based launchers.

The agreement is still under active negotiation. Unless otherwise stated, the verification assessment for unresolved issues addresses only the U.S. position.

### 3. VERIFICATION

Verification is the process of determining, to the extent necessary to safeguard our national security, that the other side is complying with the SALT agreement. We must have high confidence in our ability to detect Soviet noncompliance before it could significantly affect our interests. This process of judging the adequacy of verification must take into account the capabilities of existing and future intelligence collection systems and the ability of the other side to evade detection if it should attempt to do so. Equally important is the U.S. ability to respond to Soviet cheating, should it occur. The U.S. technological base, its R&D programs, and the substantial capabilities of its strategic forces provide this hedge.

This process must also assess the political and military significance of potential violations and the costs, risks, and gains to the Soviets of cheating. It also takes into account the degree to which the advantages conferred on the U.S. by a particular provision outweigh the disadvantages caused by problems of verification. In such cases, we must consider the potential gains to the U.S. of being allowed the flexibility to take certain actions, even though allowing the Soviets the same options may complicate verification. Cruise missile limitations constitute a prime example of such a situation.

Assessing the adequate verifiability of the proposed SALT agreement is most heavily based on our confidence in U.S. monitoring capabilities. Such monitoring is carried out by the intelligence community and involves data collection and assessment of what the other side is doing or not doing. For the most part, the intelligence community has performed and would continue to perform these functions even in the absence of a SALT agreement. Many of the uncertainties that are discussed below would also exist in our intelligence assessments of Soviet strategic programs without an agreement.

Monitoring tasks in SALT can be divided into three categories: (1) counting numerically limited systems, such as ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers; (2) measuring limited quantities, such as the throw weight of an ICBM; and (3) monitoring for evidence that a prohibited activity is being undertaken.

[Deleted.]

Our monitoring judgments assume the availability of present and programmed collection assets. However, these assessments are conservative in that they do not take into account the possibility of unusual or unpredictable intelligence successes or fortuitous blunders by the Soviets which could have the effect of enhancing verification.

We have had over five years experience in monitoring Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. We have demonstrated our ability to verify compliance with the SALT ONE agreements with high confidence. This experience reinforces our assessment of the capabilities of U.S. national technical means to verify compliance with SALT agreements. The United States has promptly raised with the Soviets any unusual or ambiguous activities which gave rise to U.S. concern. Consequently, the Soviets are well aware that the United States will call them into account for any questionable activities related to their strategic programs and will expect satisfactory clarification or resolution of the problems involved.

Since monitoring will always be subject to some degree of uncertainty, we must also assess the likelihood that the Soviets would cheat, taking into account the benefits that would accrue to them from such cheating, as well as the risks of their being detected. As a matter of prudence, therefore, we analyze scenarios involving altered or covert Soviet practices that could adversely affect our confidence in Soviet compliance. The following considerations are some that the Soviets must take into account before making a decision to cheat or not to cheat: (1) their uncertainty about our overall capability to monitor and analyze their activities; (2) the potential U.S. reaction to discovered cheating; and (3) the possible strategic gains from cheating.

It must be stressed that, as noted previously, the United States does not rely on trust, on Soviet intentions, or on political incentives for the Soviets to comply in assessing whether verification of a SALT agreement is adequate. Such judgments must be based most heavily on our monitoring capabilities, especially with regard to potentially significant Soviet noncompliance, and on the U.S. ability to respond in a timely manner to possible Soviet cheating.

Finally, as with all aspects of a treaty, we must decide whether particular provisions and the agreement as a whole represent a net gain for U.S. security compared to the absence of such provisions or to the no-treaty case. The projected higher levels of Soviet capability in the absence of a treaty would have to be matched or countered by expanded U.S. programs probably with no net increase in U.S. security. So long as U.S. programs that may be required to hedge against lower monitoring confidence are not unduly restricted by the treaty, some uncertainties can be accepted in an overall agreement that serves U.S. security interests.

4. VERIFIABILITY OF MAJOR LIMITATIONS

As stated previously, the verification tasks of the anticipated SALT TWO agreement can be grouped into three categories: (1) counting; (2) measuring capability; and (3) other tasks which, in general, are bans on certain types of systems and conduct. The scope of these tasks are illustrated in the attached table. Our judgment that the proposed agreement is adequately verifiable is based on an analysis of these tasks. The reasons for this judgment are reflected in the following discussion of the major verification tasks posed by the agreement.

5. OVERALL VERIFIABILITY OF AGREEMENT

In assessing the adequacy of vertification of the agreement, it is important to consider its totality and not only particular provisions.

A consideration in determining whether the agreement as a whole is adequately verifiable has been whether the Soviets could exploit the montoring uncertainties of several individual provisions, each of which is judged as adequately verifiable, in a way that would affect our national security interests. We have confidence that we can adequately verify compliance in such a context because the probability of detecting the fact of cheating increases markedly if the number of provisions being violated increases. Combined with the likelihood of detecting significant cheating on individual limitations, the ability to detect the fact of small cheating on a number of provisions enhances our monitoring confidence.

The Soviets cannot be sure of our overall capability to monitor a SALT TWO agreement. Thus, Soviet planners would be expected to make careful conservative assumptions regarding U.S. verification capabilities. For example, a slightly less than 50 percent chance of detection, which is considered "low confidence" in monitoring capability to the U.S., would probably appear as "high risk" to a Soviet planner contemplating cheating. Given U.S. R. & D. hedges and our greater industrial and technological base, the Soviets would not lightly undertake this risk and the attendant danger of U.S. abrogation.

In sum, although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in view of U.S. programs. However, any cheating on a scale large enough to affect the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. For these reasons, and others noted in this paper, we believe that the SALT II agreement, taken as a whole is adequately verifiable.

SOUNDNESS OF BEST ESTIMATES OF FORCE STRUCTURES

Senator CASE. In your statement you refer to [deleted] our best estimate.

How sound are these best estimates?

Secretary VANCE. The best estimates are projections of what force structures may be. As in any such case, they can only be estimates. I think they are good estimates. Indeed, they are the best estimates and I would not have put them in had I not believed that they were pretty good estimates.

Senator CASE. Well, I would be the last one to suggest otherwise, Mr. Secretary.

REASONS FOR CONFIDENCE IN ADEQUATE VERIFICATION

What are the reasons for your expression of confidence that adequate verification will exist for such things as how many MIRV's they put on their missiles?

Secretary VANCE. There are certain areas where we are going to have problems with respect to verification.

As I indicated, insofar as the treaty is concerned, we think that we can satisfactorily verify the items in the treaty.

The problem areas arise in those matters which are dealt with in the Protocol.

[Deleted.]

This may be one of those cases where one has to make a calculated determination whether or not, in the overall context, is it better to have a treaty with some elements not verifiable as compared to no treaty.

Now, we are preparing a full verification analysis and I think this committee should have it. We will be giving it to the Jackson committee when it is completed. I think it would be helpful for all of you to have the same kind of full analysis, which can be done on a precise basis, so that you can go into the details of this.

This is a very important subject and I know of the concern which you all properly have in it. Our analysis ought to be laid out in detail so that you can have it.

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, I know that we would all appreciate that. It would cover such matters as to whether you can really tell a tanker from a transport and just how and that kind of thing?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

[Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. Another problem that one runs into is the whole question of the number of reentry vehicles within a given warhead.

There is, however, a good deal that we can determine [deleted] and by [deleted] we will, I think, be making a major step forward.

Senator CASE. In eliminating uncertainties?

Secretary VANCE. That's right.

APPLICATION OF CRUISE MISSILE LIMITS

Senator CASE. A key question, it seems to me, is whether cruise missile limits apply to nuclear cruise missiles only or both to conventional and nuclear missiles.

What is your response?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

IMPROVING RANGE OF BACKFIRE BOMBER

Senator CASE. Are they trying to do anything else to improve the range of the Backfire bomber beyond the use of refueling?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

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Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I believe my time is up.
The CHAIRMAN. There is another vote on now, gentlemen.
Senator Glenn, do you have any questions?
Senator GLENN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION

Mr. Secretary, you and I had an extended discussion before regarding this exact subject. That is what I was going to get to when it was my turn; so I appreciate our having gotten into it already. I am glad in particular to hear that you are preparing something specifically on verification for us. I think that is the key to selling this to the American people. I really do.

Secretary VANCE. Right.

Senator GLENN. I know it is the key to selling it to me, because there are so many areas, such as those that were discussed before, that are big, grey areas. Very frankly, the whole treaty is not going to be worth the paper on which it is written unless we have some way of checking these things—or so I feel.

We cannot agree to things—well, the things you have already brought up, and I will not repeat them. It is most difficult in the qualitative area, above all, as you mentioned [deleted]. How many MIRV's can they put on the top of a booster?

In the last few years we have made progress which we had thought was unthinkable a few years ago. We had trouble even getting an atomic warhead off the ground at one time. We had one per booster. and that was considered a marvel. Now we are up to six or eight.

[Deleted], I guess, that the Russians have [deleted]—artillery shells that are nuclear now. How many of those can they put on top of a major booster, even saying that it takes two or three times that weight and size to give it the guidance system and the capability it would need to be MIRV'd? I could see that on some of their boosters we would wind with 50 or 100 MIRV capabilities one of these days as they get more of our capability for microminiaturization of controls.

It seems to me that we have to address the capability that they will have.

I am sure if you foresaw in these negotiations an unbalancing of that magnitude, it would change the whole picture of how many missiles or delivery systems we would want to agree to.

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

I think we will be able to check a great deal of this out through the testing route.

Senator GLENN. I would question that and I will tell you why.

Let's say that we have a nest of these up here. I could send one of these things up. We could put on four or five, which would agree with our previous limit. It would go out and spray those four or five out. We would observe that test. But we would not know that the nest was set for 50 or 75. So, I can see a testing program that once again is nonverifiable.

Secretary VANCE. But I think that one then gets to the question of what kind of targets are you trying to take out and can you have the size vehicle that is going to do the kind of job that has to be done, and will one really take the risk of using a system which is not tested. That

is a terribly big risk for anybody to take. So, all these kinds of calculations have to be woven in.

Senator Glenn. That is a big problem.

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator GLENN. I think these qualitative areas [deleted] for instance are important.

We made some changes when we got new metallurgical capabilities in our engines. The specs go up, the fuel specs go up, the range increases, and those are things that I just do not see how we can verify.

They are very vital because it changes the whole picture of what part of our country they can cover with what boosters and what they can do with their MIRV's.

It is exceedingly difficult, it seems to me, to verify those by any NTM [national technical means] that we now have.

The Backfire we have already addressed.

DETERMINING ALCM CAPABILITY

How, for instance, do we know how many of their bombers can have an ALCM capability? How do they know how many of ours can have an ALCM capability? They look the same as any other.

Secretary VANCE. First of all, in terms of systems that will carry them, namely the heavy bombers, we could designate those which will be given the capabilities and can be used to carry ALCM's.

So, that is one way.

Senator GLENN. How would we count the total, though? We count MIRV'd missiles and ALCM-equipped bombers all in the same category of 1,320.

Secretary VANCE. That's right.

Senator GLENN. How would we know which bombers are ALCM'd and which are not?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. For planes of that type, then, we would count all of them, whether they have it or not?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

VERIFICATION AND MINIATURIZATION

Senator GLENN. Back in 1974, Mr. Schlesinger estimated that the Soviets could deploy as many as 33,000 warheads on their existing missile forces if they developed smaller strategic warheads. That would have a fantastically unbalancing effect on SALT, if they went ahead and developed that miniature capability.

Secretary VANCE. On the question of miniaturization, I think that perhaps is one subject that we ought to leave until we get to the more detailed analysis of the verification problem itself. I really can add very little to what I have already said.

VERIFICATION AND THIRD STAGE ON SS-20

Senator GLENN. Another question on verification is this: if they put a third stage on the SS-20, it can become an SS-16 with that addition and a convertible launcher. Have we any way of monitoring that?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

NEWSWEEK CHART AND SENATOR DOLE'S STATEMENT

Senator GLENN. Have you made any public statement yet, or would you make a statement this morning, on your concept of the chart that was in "Newsweek," and Senator Dole's statement?

Secretary VANCE. I have not seen the chart.

Senator GLENN. The chart indicated basically that we have given in to the Russians on every one of their demands, I think.

Secretary VANCE. I have not seen that chart, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Do we have a copy here? It was in "Newsweek."

This indicated, where we had requested something and the Soviets had requested something, that the compromise position favored the Soviets about six times in a row.

Secretary VANCE. Well, as I have said, I have not seen the chart, but I can assure you that I will disagree with it. I could prepare you a chart that would look quite the contrary, indeed the opposite of that chart.

IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION VERSUS NUMBERS

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, I will use whatever time I have left to say that I think the matter of verification is more important than the matter of numbers. Everyone seems to concentrate on numbers.

When you and I were at the Armed Services Committee the other day, they were concentrating heavily on the numbers. I feel the numbers are already so high that they are virtually meaningless. We could split Russia in several ways and they could do the same thing to us. To be arguing over whether we have 2,400 or 2,250 I think is academic.

I would like to see us arguing instead about whether we have 500 or 550. Perhaps this is a step to get there and perhaps this is the greatest value that this treaty will have. But I think that far more important than those numbers, is whether we can verify what they are doing and whether they can verify what we are doing. I think that will be a greater stabilizing factor toward peace than anything else out of this whole treaty.

Secretary VANCE. I would agree that verification is of great importance.

I would also agree that we have on both sides more than enough weapons to destroy the other.

I think a very important aspect, however, of the treaty which is being negotiated is [deleted]. I think this approach, if successful would for the first time give us a handle on qualitative improvements and is of fundamental importance.

VERIFICATION OF UPGRADING OF PRESENT SYSTEMS

Senator GLENN. How do we verify upgrading of present systems?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. Can we monitor them?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]
Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]
Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
There is a roll call on and we have about 2 minutes to make it.
Senator Stone, have you voted?
Senator STONE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have already voted. I voted right, too, Mr. Chairman. [General laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. You hold forth. I will go to follow in your footsteps.
Senator GLENN. I think we owe Mr. Vance an apology for our helter-skelter operation here with our numerous recesses.
Secretary VANCE. Not at all. I understand completely.

PROHIBITION OF ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, in your presentation you stated: "National technical means"—that is NTM—"are now accepted methods for collecting intelligence. Interference with national technical means is prohibited, as are deliberate concealment measures which impede verification."
Secretary Brown announced a week or two ago that the Soviets have already or were about to perfect antisatellite weapons, that therefore in effect we were accelerating our search for the same types of systems, and that within a few years or less we would have our own systems. Isn't it logically indicated then, if in the search for verification, we have to protect these NTM's, that we try to get a limit or prohibition on antisatellite weapons on the part of the Soviets and offer in return the same slowdown or prohibition on our part?
Secretary VANCE. The answer is yes. Then I want to say why and I want to add a footnote to that.
We have been concerned from the very outset about the development of antisatellite capabilities. [Deleted.]
I do think it is of extreme importance that we preserve the capability of using satellites.
I will put as a footnote, however, that if there were any attempts to destroy satellites, at that point we would really be in a war-type situation. The important point is not so much potential elimination of this capability in advance of an attack as it is the threat of blinding us once an actual war-type situation occurred. If they started shooting down our satellites, obviously this would create a situation of tension between our people which would put us very close to war.
Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, are we convinced or persuaded that the Soviet Union is not developing a less obvious method than shooting down a satellite, which would technically interfere with or impede the work of a satellite?
Secretary VANCE. No, [deleted].
Senator STONE. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]
Senator STONE. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator STONE. Thank you. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]
Senator STONE. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]
Senator STONE. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]
Senator STONE. [Deleted.]
Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]
Senator STONE. [Deleted.]
Senator CLARK. Since no one else is here, I will ask you my questions, Mr. Secretary.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

I followed your statement as you read it word for word and I agree with those who have said that it is a very clear and a very comprehensive statement. It really lays out our philosophy and our views as well as a number of specific things. I join with the others in complimenting you on it.

I want to ask a few questions which it seems to me important to have in the record at this point.

COMPLIANCE WITH JACKSON AMENDMENT

You will recall that in 1972, when the Senate was considering the SALT I agreement, Senator Jackson and a number of others sponsored legislation which is generally referred to as the Jackson amendment. This said, and I quote, "to request the President to seek a future treaty that would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."

Mr. Secretary, does every provision of your proposal of the 8-year treaty strictly comply with the Jackson amendment?

Secretary VANCE. Yes. What we end up with is equal aggregates, but there is a right to mix. So everybody has to make his own choices as to which he wants to put his emphasis on as among the various kinds of systems. But we are essentially ending up with equal aggregates.

So my feeling is that this is met.

Senator CLARK. As I understand it, the SALT I limits restricted our forces to 710 ICBM's and SLBM's.

Secretary VANCE. Would you please repeat that, Senator?

Senator CLARK. I said that SALT I restricted our forces to 1,710 ICBM's and SLBM's while it permitted the Soviet Union 2,347 ballistic missiles. My question is will the new limits that you propose—[deleted]—require the United States to reduce its forces in any way?

Secretary VANCE. Not really, except for what are essentially mothball forces, such as B–52's, which are either on the runway with the capability to fly back to the boneyard or those which are already in the boneyard. Other than that, we will not have to reduce.

Senator CLARK. Effectively your proposal would not require the reduction of our forces.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. What about the Soviet Union?

Secretary VANCE. Let me get out my figures on that.

Our proposal would require the Soviet Union to reduce. They would have to reduce, initially, as I recall it, several hundred.

Senator CLARK. Your proposal at any rate meets the requirements of the Jackson amendment. The particular restrictions you are proposing, would not inhibit the present U.S. force levels, but would require the Soviets to cut back somewhat?

COMPARATIVE UNITED STATES-SOVIET LIMITATIONS

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Since the Soviets are apparently, or at least according to the best information that I have, not developing cruise missiles of the kind we are talking about in this case, it seems to me that it gives us a major advantage, at least under the proposal, in that we are permitted to proceed with cruise missile carriers, as I think we have determined is necessary in the absence of the B–1. Yet, while the Soviets are similarly permitted cruise missile carriers—and they have no intention of developing them—does this not in effect give us a very significant advantage in the sense of having a more versatile force?

Secretary VANCE. I think it does give us a more versatile force, and each one of the B–52's which would be included as a carrier could carry 20 air-launched cruise missiles. That gives you quite a formidable force.

Senator CLARK. Perhaps I am overstating this and correct me if I am wrong, but if we are going to count cruise carriers as MIRV's, and in view of the fact that the Soviets are not developing cruise missiles, then in effect we have a different limit than they do, don't we? We have [deleted].

Secretary VANCE. If you accept their figures.

Senator CLARK. Don't we, in effect, have a higher MIRV limit than they do? We don't in the treaty, obviously, but effectively we do.

Secretary VANCE. If they decide not to go that route.

Senator CLARK. At least for the next several years we will, anyway.

ICBM MIRV LIMIT

In the same area, the ICBM MIRV limit of [deleted] is a part of the treaty itself, as I understand it.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.] In any case, if these proposals are acceptable in the treaty, it is going to significantly cut into their development of these ICBM MIRV limits, isn't it?

Secretary VANCE. It is, indeed, and we think therefore it is going to produce greater stability in the balance of forces between ourselves and them.

Senator CLARK. In your judgment, does that limit require the Soviets to significantly reduce their projected ICBM MIRV'd vehicles?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.] I remember your description of that here last time.

My question really goes to the issue of whether they are not going to be forced with that limit to actually begin to move some into the SLBM's, where they pose us less problems in terms of ICBM vulnerability.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, that is a real possibility.

Senator CLARK. That, however, is not necessarily the case?

Secretary VANCE. Not necessarily. They have the choice. But it may well happen that they will do this.

[Deleted.]

VERIFIABILITY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

Senator CLARK. Senator Glenn got into the question of verification and I don't really want to go back to that. But by way of a general question, are you fairly confident, or are you confident, that there is no provision of the proposed treaty which would not be verifiable with relatively high confidence?

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

I have three or four other questions, but my time is up. I will save them for the next round.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AIRCRAFT AND WIDE-BODIED AIRCRAFT

Mr. Secretary, in your statement you refer to aircraft and wide-bodied aircraft. Was there a reason for that difference?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator PELL. You stated: [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator PELL. I see. Thank you.

BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT CONCERNING TREATIES

In connection with the limited test ban treaty—as you know, we have this up for action in the next session—do you think that Brezhnev's statement of yesterday or the day before has overtaken these treaties and that we should withhold action on these until you find out what he means?

Secretary VANCE. I think that the statement which he made yesterday was a constructive and major step with respect to a comprehensive test ban.

With it, we have now, I think, overcome what was a principal stumbling block between us with respect to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

There are two other items which were matters of major difference. One was accession to the treaty. Previously the Soviet position had been that they would not accede to the treaty until it was signed by the French and by the People's Republic of China. They have now indicated that they would enter into it without the signature of those other two. Of course, that is now out of the way.

[Deleted.]

So, I think we are making good progress toward a comprehensive test-ban treaty. How long it will take us, Senator Pell, to negotiate these remaining differences, I really cannot say at this point. But I think that in the not too distant future I will be able to give you an answer to that.

Senator PELL. Good. From the viewpoint of our own scheduling, with the peaceful nuclear-explosion treaty and the test-ban treaty, it would seem perhaps to be an exercise in the wasting of the committee's time, which could be better spent on something else.

Secretary VANCE. I understand that.

REQUIRED STATEMENT ON SALT PROPOSAL VERIFICATION

Senator PELL. Why was there no statement on the verification of the latest SALT proposal submitted by the executive branch as required in the 1978 authorization?

Secretary VANCE. I did not know that we had not done so.

Senator PELL. I understand that that has not been done.

Secretary VANCE. Do you know why, Les?

Mr. GELB. No, I don't.

Secretary VANCE. What about you, Walt?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir.

Secretary VANCE. I will check with ACDA. Perhaps I can find out why they have not.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

[See p. 14.]

THREE-YEAR RESTRICTION IN PROTOCOL

Senator PELL. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator PELL. Like we constantly do between the Senate and the House.

[General laughter.]

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The good, old democratic way.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I don't know what the rules are, but in view of Senator Kennedy's strong interest in the test-ban treaty, I would yield the balance of my time to him, if that is permissible.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Senator Kennedy, we are glad to have you with us.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE ON CTB

Mr. Secretary, on the CTB, I am encouraged by what you have said. I cannot help but believe that there is an extraordinary opportunity to move on that.

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As of three years ago, in the conversations which I had with Brezhnev, he felt that he was prepared at that time to sign the treaty without France or China within a given time frame. It seems to me that that is a negotiable item that ought to be easily dealt with—at least I think it would be extremely worthwhile to probe that.

Secretary VANCE. He has now moved on that. He has said that he will go forward without them.

VERIFICATION OUTSIDE PNE

Senator KENNEDY. In terms of verification, I think many of us have been very much impressed in the different meetings that we have had with some of the leading seismologists and others who have been following this who have felt very strongly outside, PNE's that verification really is not or should not be a major hurdle to a CTB. I would be happy to supply or collect—though I am sure you have it—the recent studies, and reports that have been done in that very narrow area.

Secretary VANCE. I would appreciate that.

ORDER OF TREATY CONSIDERATION

Senator KENNEDY. I know that Panama and SALT, are matters which are on track and which must be carried through. I would hope that the Department could continue working on CTB.

I understood that Mr. Warnke in any event was pursuing a comprehensive test ban treaty, wasn't he?

Secretary VANCE. Yes. We have been working on this for the last month. We have been negotiating on this. We were about to adjourn for 2 weeks for consultations with the various capitals, and then yesterday the Soviets moved [deleted].

Senator KENNEDY. But in any event that is basically on track.

Secretary VANCE. It is on track and this has very high priority.

Senator KENNEDY. Good.

Could you tell us what your timing is in terms of Senate—action on Panama, SALT, and other items?

Secretary VANCE. Insofar as our timing is concerned, we have signed the treaty. The hearings have been going forward in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I believe are virtually completed. We would therefore expect that that would be the first thing to come up next year, in terms of treaties, and would thus be the first to be addressed. Of course, one is going to have to look at it very practically in terms of where the votes are, whether or not you have the votes to bring it forward.

Apart from that, it stands at the top of the list.

Now, in terms of SALT, it depends on when we can complete the negotiations. We still have some hard nuts to crack insofar as SALT is concerned.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON MX

Finally, could you tell us what the position of the administration is on the MX? Given the direction in which you are moving in SALT, what are you going to request in terms of the MX?

Senator MATHIAS. May I sharpen that question a bit?

Senator KENNEDY. Sure.

Senator MATHIAS. Would the MX be the price, the domestic price, for SALT?

Secretary VANCE. No, it would not.

The MX option, however, is kept open in the agreement which we are negotiating in SALT.

[Deleted.]

Insofar as MX is concerned, under the schedules which we have, there are no flight tests planned during this 3-year period, so the only effect that would have would be on the Soviets.

Insofar as deployment is concerned, MX certainly is not going to be ready for deployment, if it is ever put into production, until the 1980's, and therefore that is not affected. But it would affect the Soviets, [deleted].

Now, at the end of the Protocol period, we will have the option still open to us to go forward with MX should that be under all the circumstances the course of action that our national security would require. But there is no determination at this point that that is the direction in which we ought to go. We simply don't know enough yet about what the general situation will be, what the state of development will show. Therefore there is no determination. It is not the price, as you were suggesting, Senator Mathias.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias, do you have any further questions?

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Secretary has been here for a long time and has been very patient.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

Let me just take him back to the point where he started, where he said that we ought to take a comprehensive look at the whole scene.

Certainly an assessment of Soviet intentions is part of a look at the whole scene.

In light of the Soviet tendency to expand their conventional forces as well as their strategic forces, can you draw any kind of conclusions as to the direction which they are taking?

Secretary VANCE. My belief is that insofar as strategic forces are concerned, their direction is one of maintenance of rough equality or rough partity between the two nations.

Insofar as conventional forces are concerned, we have somewhat of a mixed bag, where they certainly have superiority over the United States in terms of manpower but they have a different geographical situation than what we are faced with.

In terms of various types of equipment, we have superiority over them in terms of quality and in some cases in terms of numbers. In other cases they have superiority.

So, we have a rather mixed picture.

Further, I think that one has to take a look at the conventional situation in terms not only of what we and the Soviets have, but what we and our allies and they and their allies have. Central to this is the question of the balance in central Europe, and that is the whole

reason for the discussions we have been having on MBFR, discussions which have not been moving with much speed.

There are some indications that there may be interests on the part of the Soviets trying to move a bit in MBFR. I anticipate that this will be a subject which will come up for discussion when Brezhnev meets with Helmut Schmidt at the end of November. The allies have put on the table a new proposal with respect to the troublesome issue, and the Soviets have come back with a counterproposal, which is now being considered by the allies.

[Deleted.]

So, these are new developments in the mill at this point. There is a possibility of some movement in this area, although I don't think it is going to happen very fast.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions? Dick?

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just two questions.

LIMITATIONS ON CURRENT ICBM IMPROVEMENTS

Let us look at the Protocol for the moment. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

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Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Secretary VANCE. [Deleted.]

POSITIVE SIDE OF TREATY

In conclusion, Mr. Secretary, I heard you say, at least in your opening statement, that the positive side of this treaty—and please tell me if I am on the right track—is that it does provide equal numbers of delivery vehicles and equal aggregates in accordance with the Jackson amendment on SALT I——

Secretary VANCE. Right.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. That there is actually a reduction. of forces by the Soviets if this adopted——

Secretary VANCE. Correct.

Senator CLARK. That for the first time in any arrangement, if our proposal is adopted in the Protocol, we have some kind of real control over qualitative improvements of both existing systems and any new systems.

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

[Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. Which is the most significant.

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you have had a long siege. We appreciate it.

SUBMISSION OF TREATY

All that we have talked about this morning is provisional, isn't it?

Secretary VANCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, after there is full agreement between the two countries, will it be submitted as a treaty or an executive agreement? How will it be submitted?

Secretary VANCE. It will be submitted as a treaty. The treaty will have a Protocol attached to it which will cover these especially difficult items. The Protocol will have a 3-year life, rather than the full life of the treaty, which runs until 1985.

In addition, we are preparing as the third tier the statement of principles which will guide the negotiations in SALT III.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. We have been interrupted throughout the morning and members have not been able to stay here.

Would you be willing, Mr. Secretary, if any member wished to propound questions to you in writing to answer those for the record?

Secretary VANCE. I would be delighted, Mr. Chairman, to do so. And any time members of the committee have any questions that they wish to ask, if they get in touch with me or my staff, we would be delighted to furnish any and all information that we can, with the exception essentially of the instructions to the delegation, because I think it is inappropriate under the Constitution for us to furnish that information. But anything that we possibly can do for you, we would be delighted to do.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your lengthy discussion with us this morning and for bearing with us during our many interruptions.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you for inviting me before the committee today.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon at 12:58 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

[Secretary Vance's responses to additional questions for the record follow:]

SECRETARY VANCE'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* In regard to the problem of potential vulnerability of the Minuteman III and Titan missile forces, please provide the Executive Branch analysis of the vulnerability of the force to 1990 with the presently projected SALT Treaty and Protocol, and absent a SALT Treaty and Protocol. Please take into account such factors as available warheads, yield of warheads, and reliability of the missile force.

Answer. The Executive Branch is currently in the advanced stages of a comprehensive analysis of the Minuteman/Titan survivability issue in the light of the emerging SALT agreement. As soon as this analysis is completed the results will be immediately provided to the SFRC.

*Question 2.* Please discuss fully the factors which bear upon the survivability of penetration bombers, and penetration bombers carrying stand-off cruise missiles during the projected period of the SALT TWO Treaty and Protocol.

Answer. The initial survivability of US bombers is determined by their alert posture, degree of dispersal, the timeliness of warning of Soviet attack, and the bomber's ability to withstand the effects of nuclear detonations during their flyout. The overall impact of these factors was assessed in the OSD Bomber Modernization Study for the best estimate of the mid-to-late 1980's threat. [Deleted.]

The issue of Soviet air defense capability vis-a-vis a penetrating bomber or an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) carrying heavy bomber was extensively studied prior to the decision to recommend concellation of the B–1 program in favor of deploying ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. These efforts concluded that through the late 1980's, no significant Soviet air defense against penetrating bombers or ALCMs could be deployed. This subject was also analyzed in the OSD Bomber Modernization Study. However, to hedge against such a threat, and to further complicate the Soviet air defense problem, a mix of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and penetrating bombers will be deployed.

*Question 3.* Is there any information available which would indicate any degradation in the survivability of the Polaris/Poseidon/Trident submarine force during the projected period of the Treaty and Protocol? If so, please explain fully.

Answer. Currently, intelligence estimates do not credit the Soviet Union with an ASW capability that is effective against US ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Intensive US studies of a multitude of technologies and physical phenomena that might conceivably be exploited by the Soviets in an anti-SSBN effort has failed to reveal any area of promise for development of a significant Soviet anti-SSBN capability. However, it is possible that a breakthrough in ASW technology could provide the Soviets with additional capability against these submarines. The capability of this hypothetical breakthrough would then depend on mission and platform deployment.

*Question 4.* If the Soviet Union were to launch a surprise attack at this time against United States submarine forces, what is our projection as to how many submarines of the total force could be successfully detected, targeted, and destroyed. How would those figures change if there were adequate warning time to allow prudent shifts in submarine location?

Answer. Our current strategic planning for a Soviet first strike assumes that all in-port US SSBNs are destroyed, and all those at sea survive. [Deleted.] Our planning must be based on the assumption that warning time is inadequate to move any SSBNs from port. Given sufficient warning, however, the SSBN force could be further augmented by moving boats out of port.

*Question 5.* In what ways would this new Treaty and Protocol limit qualitative improvements? What would be the effect of any improvement limits upon the threat to United States forces? How would any contemplated qualitative restraints be verified?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 6.* What would be the specific effect upon our military programs of the Treaty itself?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 7.* To what extent would the three-year Protocol slow or stop any present United States programs?

Answer. As Secretary Brown said in a news conference at NATO Headquarters (December 7, 1977), "The negotiations with the Soviet Union insofar as they regard sea- and land-based cruise missiles are contained entirely in a protocol which would be expected to run for three years, during which time the U.S., and I believe the European Allies as well, would not, in fact, be in a position to deploy such missiles simply because their development has not proceeded to the point where their deployment would be feasible very much before then."

[Deleted.]

*Question 8.* What do we know about the effect of the Treaty, and the Protocol in regard to Soviet programs?

Answer. The force tables accompanying these questions provide our best estimate of the impact of the agreement on Soviet force levels as compared to the "no-agreement" situation. [Deleted.]

*Question 9.* If there were no SALT TWO Treaty and Protocol, what overall total of strategic offensive forces might the Soviet Union be expected to achieve by 1985?

Answer. The force tables accompanying these questions show the "best estimate" of Soviet force levels in the absence of a SALT agreement. The aggregate Soviet force level in this situation is estimated to be over 3,000.

*Question 10.* How many MIRVed missiles might they have by 1985?

Answer. The best estimate is that they would have about [deleted] MIRVed missiles in the absence of a SALT agreement.

*Question 11.* How many land-based MIRVed ICBMs might they have by 1985?

Answer. The best estimate is that they would have about [deleted] MIRVed ICBMs in the absence of a SALT agreement.

*Question 12.* How firm is the evidence the United States has that the Soviet Union would substantially exceed the ceilings now under discussion?

Answer. The estimates given represent the intelligence community's "best estimate" of Soviet programs in the absence of SALT. The estimate is based on intelligence information on Soviet programs currently in development, past Soviet practices, and assessments of Soviet modernization requirements.

*Question 13.* In the late 1960's, former Secretary of Defense McNamara concluded that 400 one-megaton-equivalent nuclear weapons would inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, and that United States ability to deliver that kind of devastation should be a sufficient deterrent.

a. Has thinking about what it might take to deter nuclear war changed as the composition and design of our forces has changed?

b. What is the present concept of what it would take to deter nuclear war, and would that ability be assuredly retained under the SALT TWO Treaty now taking shape?

Answer. The changes in design and composition of our strategic forces have not significantly affected perceptions of the requirements for deterring nuclear war.

The principal requirement for deterrence is that the US maintain forces which could sustain a massive Soviet first strike and survive with sufficient capability to inflict damage in a retaliatory attack which would be viewed as unacceptable by the Soviet leadership. We are confident that the retailiatory capability of current US forces in terms of damage capability [deleted] is sufficient to deter Soviet attack. The actual percentage damage to various target bases is a function of US targeting policy. However, it is clear that the emerging agreement would not have any significant impact on this capability because of the minimal impact on US strategic programs.

*Question 14.* At his March 30 press conference, the President linked strategic limits on the Soviet Backfire bomber and specific limits that would be placed on cruise missiles. The Protocol would appear to limit the range of cruise missiles, at least for the time being.

a. What assurances on the Backfire bomber do you believe would be satisfactory, and might these assurances be verified and enforced?

b. Do you believe the Soviet side is prepared to meet our legitimate requests on the Backfire bomber?

Answer. [Deleted.] The precise nature of the commitments they would undertake to satisfy us on this issue is currently under negotiation. [Deleted.] Soviet obligations regarding Backfire will be subject to the same rules regarding verification and enforcement as the agreement itself. [Deleted.]

*Question 15.* Will the range-ceiling on ALCMs carried by United States bombers be adequate to allow the missiles to hit the necessary targets while the bombers themselves remain at a safe distance?

Answer. The [deleted] ALCM range limit, which has been agreed for the period of the Protocol, will permit the US to maintain an effective strategic bomber force against current Soviet defenses and against those projected during the period of the Protocol. A very high percentage of the important targets in the Soviet Union can be covered by ALCMs launched at high altitude from outside projected 1980–81 Soviet air defenses. ALCM launch at low altitude would allow closer approach to Soviet air defenses and improved target coverage. The capability of covering the remaining targets is provided by penetrating bombers, which we intend to maintain in the overall bomber force to provide flexibility and to complement the ALCM–carrying bombers.

We intend to reevaluate ALCM range requirements for the post-Protocol period in the light of future Soviet developments in air defenses, as well as any constraints on air defenses which are negotiated in SALT THREE.

*Question 16.* Is the Soviet side willing to allow the deployment of cruise missiles on wide-bodied aircraft, such as the 747 or DC–10, as well as on heavy bombers?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 17.* Do the proposed cruise missile ceilings in the Treaty and the Protocol place any significant restrictions on United States force capabilities?

Answer. No. The impact of the ALCM range limit is described in the answer to Question 15. The SLCM/GLCM limits in the Protocol will result in at most a minor delay in currently projected IOCs as described in the answer to Question 7. There remains, of course, the issue of cruise missile range requirements in the post-Protocol period. This issue will be thoroughly analyzed in the context of following-on negotiations.

*Question 18.* What kind of problems do you envisage incorporating any cruise missile limitations in a subsequent treaty before the three-year Protocol expires?

Answer. The SALT THREE negotiations will start immediately after ratification of a SALT TWO agreement. It is impossible to predict when a SALT THREE agreement would be concluded, but it is our intention to seek such an agreement at the earliest possible date.

[Deleted.]

*Question 19.* Do you believe the ability to deploy long-range cruise missiles in Europe is of significance to the NATO Alliance? If so, will this Treaty and Protocol preserve that ability?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 20.* What importance do our Allies place upon the deployment of long-range cruise missiles in Europe?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 21.* Do you believe that there are any viable alternatives to such deployments?

Answer. The question of cruise missile deployment is related to theater nuclear force modernization and improvements in opposing Soviet forces. Possible alternatives to cruise missile deployment include additional F–111 deployments, extended-range Pershings, commitment of additional SLBM RVs to SACEUR, etc. These, as well as the arms control alternatives for cruise missiles, will be analyzed in detail within the Alliance.

*Question 22.* Many Europeans apparently see the cruise missiles as a counter to the Soviet SS–20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. If it is deployed as a counter, it is clear that, in at least the European area, an arms buildup would be chosen in lieu of arms limitation. Was any thought given to limiting cruise missiles and SS–20 mobile missiles as an alternative to a further arms buildup in NATO?

Answer. [Deleted.] no decisions on sea- and ground-launched cruise missile deployment have been taken either by the Allies or the United States. The Protocol period of SALT TWO is designed both to keep cruise missile options open and to provide the time for us and the Allies to consult on this question, including possible alternatives such as theater arms control negotiations.

*Question 23.* Was the sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs chosen with the thought that 300 or so M–X missiles might be deployed? If so, would approval of this agreement be tantamount to a decision to deploy M–X?

Answer. No. This was never a consideration. Approval of this agreement would be totally without prejudice to the issue of M–X deployment.

*Question 24.* On balance, do you believe that the Soviet Union would rather deploy or ban mobile missiles? Why?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 25.* If the two sides were to deploy large numbers of mobile missiles, would the net military advantage of that deployment be with the Soviet Union or United States?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 26.* What would this proposed Treaty and Protocol do to resolve the difficulties posed by the similarity between the Soviet strategic mobile missile, the SS–16, and the Soviet intermediate-range mobile missile, the SS–20?

Answer. [Deleted.]

# BRIEFINGS ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS

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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1977

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building, the Honorable Frank Church (presiding).

Present: Senators Church, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Case, Pearson, and Baker.

Senator CHURCH. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today the Committee on Foreign Relations will hear the Honorable Paul C. Warnke, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Chairman of the U.S. SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] delegation in his first appearance before the committee since the SALT I Agreement expired on October 3, 1977.

He completed another round of negotiations several weeks ago and he is returning to Geneva today for further negotiations on SALT military stabilization in the Indian Ocean and the comprehensive test ban.

There have been encouraging reports that SALT II can be concluded within a few weeks. I am sure that members of this committee share the desire for the successful outcome of a new agreement which applies real and comprehensive restrictions to the nuclear arms race and is in the national security interests of the United States.

We welcome you, Mr. Warnke, and we would like you to proceed with your presentation, after which there will be questions.

## STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL C. WARNKE, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND CHAIRMAN, U. S. SALT DELEGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS GRAHAM, GENERAL COUNSEL, ACDA, AND SPURGEON KEENY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ACDA

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you very much, Senator Church and members of the committee.

I do not have a prepared statement and I think that perhaps it would be most useful if I could respond to the questions which the various members of the committee have.

I would like, however, to sketch in a little background and give you a report on where we stand at the present point.



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As always, it is a pleasure for me to have the opportunity to appear before this committee.

Senator CHURCH. Excuse me, Mr. Warnke.

I believe that you had expected that this would be a closed session.

Mr. WARNKE. I did.

Senator CHURCH. Then we need to have a motion to close this meeting.

Senator CASE. I move that this session be closed, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

The motion has been made that the session be closed.

All those in favor so indicate by saying "aye."

[A chorus of ayes.]

Senator CHURCH. The committee is unanimous. This meeting is now closed.

Will all those who are not authorized to remain in an executive session of this committee please leave the room.

[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the committee went into executive session.]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Senator CHURCH. Norvill, are all persons present properly cleared for a classified session?

Mr. JONES. Everyone is cleared, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Fine, thank you.

Mr. Warnke, excuse me for interrupting you. Since everyone here is cleared, we will proceed in executive session.

Mr. WARNKE. I am glad to have the opportunity to talk with the committee before I return to Geneva and to Berne for, as Senator Church has stated, the resumption of the comprehensive test ban talks, the Indian Ocean arms limitation talks, and the continuation of the SALT talks.

I would like to give a little background to put into perspective where we are today.

BACKGROUND

As we all remember, back last March, we attempted to break the logjam that had continued for some time in SALT by making alternate proposals. One of them was a comprehensive approach, which would have included new elements consistent with our long-term goals of not only quantitative reductions, but also qualitative restrictions that would have preserved the strategic balance and prevented the development of counterforce capabilities which could render the strategic situation less stable.

At the same time we presented, as you recall, a so-called deferral package, which would have deferred everything to SALT III, except to embody the Vladivostok limits of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, 1,320 of which could be MIRV'd [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] missiles.

At that time, as you also recall, the Soviets rejected both proposals. Since then we have been endeavoring to work out a SALT II treaty that would bring us along toward the objectives of our comprehensive proposal.

We have had a considerable degree of success in that regard and we have had a number of setbacks along the way.

Up until May, about the only accomplishment that had been achieved was agreement on a negotiating framework. The negotiating framework, however, does give us a basis on which we can resolve the differences that exist between ourselves and the Soviet Union because it enables us to get in the treaty itself the fundamental limits of a quantitative nature and also provides for some reductions in the future.

VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT

This, it seems to us, is very important because of the fact that it puts into treaty form a major breakthrough which occurred in late 1974.

You will remember that in 1974, at Vladivostok, for the first time the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of equal aggregates. the interim agreement which is being tacitly observed, but which has expired technically, did not set equal aggregates. It provided for a numerical edge for the Soviet Union.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Warnke, would you please explain the reason why the Vladivostok agreement enabled the Soviet Union to secure a numerical edge?

Mr. WARNKE. The Vladivostok agreement, Senator Church, did not enable them to secure a numerical edge. They had that numerical edge; and in the interim agreement of 1972, the levels set were unequal. On ICBM's—intercontinental ballistic missile—for example, we were frozen at our 1,054, and they had approximately 1,600. As far as submarine tubes are concerned, the launchers of the submarine launched ballistic missiles, we were permitted 656 and they could build up to 950 by dismantling some of their older ICBM's.

Now we could afford to accept that numerical disparity back in 1972 because of the fact that it did not include some systems. It did not include the strategic bomber force. Also, at that time we had a very, very substantial lead in the number of nuclear warheads because our MIRV'ing program was way ahead of theirs.

But, as a basis for the future, the interim agreement is unsatisfactory. That is why Vladivostok was, I think, a signal accomplishment in that President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev were able to agree on the principle of equal aggregates [deleted].

Senator CHURCH. So the interim agreement of 1972 created the initial disparity?

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEM LIMITS

Senator CHURCH. At Vladivostok, when you agreed to the upper limits of 2,400 strategic delivery system, did those upper limits include or exclude bombers?

Mr. WARNKE. Those included bombers as well as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the intercontinental ballistic missiles.

So, it encompasses all of the strategic intercontinental systems.

Senator CHURCH. Can you explain to me then why, if that ceiling were agreed to and included all intercontinental delivery systems, the total number of Soviet missiles exceeds the 2,400 limit—or does it—today?

Mr. WARNKE. It would somewhat exceed the 2,400 limit today, but the 2,400 limit is not in effect at the present point. It was a Vladivostok understanding.

Senator CHURCH. The Vladivostok principles were never consummated in a treaty?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct, yes.

Senator CHURCH. Can you give us the actual numbers that do exist today?

Mr. WARNKE. I think that the Soviets have a total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which is about 2,500.

Senator CHURCH. That compares to what number on the American side?

Mr. WARNKE. Ours is a little under 2,100.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Senator CASE. Would you permit a question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator CHURCH. Of course.

Senator CASE. Mr. Warnke, I would like to follow up on one of the chairman's questions.

It seems to me that back in 1972 we were told that, among other things, these limits were acceptable because this was as far as we planned to go in any event with our building.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

So, as a result, when we are now talking about ceilings, we are talking about ceilings which in the first instance will require destruction of some Soviet systems without requiring us to get rid of any of our strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Mr. Graham, who is our General Counsel, informs me that we have about 2,150 at the present point. It is with some degree of uncertainty because it depends upon how many of the B–52's we count.

But we are well below the 2,400 figure.

Senator CHURCH. So if, as we have been told, the Soviet Union were to agree to this new total in this SALT agreement they would actually have to destroy a considerable number of intercontinental strategic delivery systems; that is, they will have to destroy a considerable number of missiles or bombers——

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH [continuing]. In order to come down to the agreed ceiling, while the United States will not have to destroy any of its weapons.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. Any of our missiles or bombers?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. I think that is something that really ought to be pointed out but is not getting stressed in the press at all. It needs to be very strongly emphasized.

SOVIET CONCESSION

Here the Soviet Union is making a very significant concession. If we were asked to destroy a number of our bombers and missiles, we would be very much aware of that. I don't think we are aware of the fact that the Russians apparently have decided to agree to that reduction in the size of their strategic force.

Mr. WARNKE. That is why, Senator, in my opinion, if you had a treaty which only included the Vladivostok understandings, it would still be a definite step forward toward effective arms control which would strengthen our national security. But the question is not whether we can get a good treaty; it is a question of how good can it be. Can it be significantly better than Vladivostok? In my opinion it can be and it will be.

TREATY PRINCIPLES AGREEMENT

Back in May, we were able to agree on the principle that there would be a treaty lasting through 1985, and then a Protocol to the treaty which would last through 1980. That Protocol enables us to solve some of the basic problems with regard to new weapons systems. It, for example, includes a ban on the deployment of mobile launchers. It will include a ban on some new types of ICBM's and possibly some new types of SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missile]. It would contain temporary restraints on the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles, but no ban on anything in the development process. So, what it does is to buy time.

Senator CASE. Excuse me. Is that anything now in the development process or no ban on the development of anything?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. What about the mobile missiles?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. But not research and development?

Mr. WARNKE. Research, of course, Senator Case, as you know, is a very difficult thing to ban in a treaty because you cannot verify it. Basically we have to ban things like flight testing and deployment, things that are verifiable by our national technical means.

Senator CASE. I understand that—but are we developing?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. So, it is only three years, and it could be ready then?

Senator CHURCH. That's right.

Paul, did you have a question?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

LIMITED PROTOCOL PERIOD

Is it the United States in the negotiations that seeks the limited Protocol period as opposed to a treaty period with respect to these weapons systems?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

[Deleted.]

Senator SARBANES. So, you seek a Protocol because you want to maintain some freedom of movement in 1980 with respect to those weapons systems, depending on how the situation develops, is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. To what extent is it a problem for us if we go into a Protocol, even though we distinguish it from a treaty, if at the end of the Protocol period we are under considerable pressure either to maintain that situation or not to depart from it, and a de-

parture from it would be perceived at that time as the United States, in effect, again launching or initiating the arms race?

Mr. WARNKE. I think, Senator Sarbanes, that that will not be a problem because we will have the opportunity to decide at that time whether we are better off continuing with some restraints in exchange for something that restrains Soviet developments, or whether we are better off at that point going ahead with deployment.

That would depend in considerable part on the conclusions that we reach this 3-year period.

The advantages of the Protocol are threefold. For one thing, it enables you to postpone a decision until you have thought through both the military and arms control implications of the systems that are under this temporary restriction. The second thing is it enables you to consult your allies and find out what their attitude is going to be as to whether they would prefer to have greater freedom on the part of the United States to deploy cruise missiles, or whether they feel that their interests can be better protected in some other fashion. Then, I think, third, what it does is enable you to preserve your bargaining position for SALT III. Our anticipation is that immediately after the conclusion of SALT II we will get into a SALT III negotiation. The objective would be to get more effective measures of arms control prior even to the expiration of the protocol let alone the treaty itself. We just don't really know enough at the present point as to the military and arms control implications of some types of cruise missiles to be able to make that decision today.

The same is true as far as mobile launchers of ICMB's are concerned.

[Deleted.]

Senator CHURCH. Do you mean a mobile missile?

Mr. WARNKE. A mobile missile, that is correct.

They are further along toward the development of a mobile ICBM which could be launched from a mobile launcher.

Senator CASE. What kind of missile is that?

Mr. WARNKE. It is the so-called SS–16—at least we so call it the SS–16. [Deleted.]

It has been a problem in the negotiations because of the fact that it is associated with the SS–20, which is an intermediate range ballistic missile. The SS–16 basically is the addition of a third stage to the SS–20, which gives it greater range.

Senator CHURCH. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CHURCH. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CHURCH. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CHURCH. [Deleted.]

Senator PEARSON. May I ask a question, please? Paul, were you finished?

Senator SARBANES. Yes, I was.

Senator PEARSON. Doesn't this effort to put limitations on the quantitative aspect of intercontinental missiles, strategic missiles, pull us away from the advantages of Vladivostok? You made the point that that treaty was good because it put absolute limits on everything.

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

Senator PEARSON. Now, with the 3-year Protocol and with the development of the cruise missiles and the arguments that go around about the Backfire and so forth, don't we really pull out a little bit from that certainty of real number limits set at Vladivostok, even though they were very high limits?

I am not arguing whether or not that is bad or good, but perhaps the circumstances and the issues make us do that.

Mr. WARNKE. Senator, I don't think that it pulls away from Vladivostok because the treaty itself, the treaty lasting through 1985, would set initially the Vladivostok ceilings, and then pull them down.

Senator PEARSON. Pull them down as much as you can?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

What it would do would be to set the 2,400 figure for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Senator PEARSON. Pardon me. Then in 3 years the limit would be off because no one knows what you are going to do with cruise missiles—is that it?

Mr. WARNKE. No; the limit would not be off at the end of 3 years. Those limits would remain through 1985.

Senator PEARSON. Yes; but what is included within the limits—everything?

Mr. WARNKE. Within the limits you would include the strategic nuclear delivery systems, yes.

You would include the ICBM launchers, the SLBM launchers, the heavy bombers, the heavy bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles, and you would also include mobile missiles if they were ever deployed.

Senator PEARSON. Is the Backfire in it?

Mr. WARNKE. The Backfire would be handled separately. [Deleted.]

Senator PEARSON. Is that a key issue right now?

Mr. WARNKE. That is a key issue right now. [Deleted.]

Senator PEARSON. I have next a general question.

NEW WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, VLADIOSTOK LIMITATIONS

It is the attitude of the administration and the negotiators to keep limits to the extent possible on the development of new weapons——

Mr. WARNKE. Absolutely.

Senator PEARSON [continuing]. And to maintain the theory and the purpose of the Vladivostok limits?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

It would not only keep the 2,400 limit initially, but over a period of about 3 years it would reduce that limit.

Senator PEARSON. Are you encouraged about the 2,160?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

VERIFICATION

Senator PEARSON. Now what about verification?

Mr. WARNKE. Verification in the whole, Senator, fortunately is more than adequate. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.] As far as 2,400 is concerned, [deleted], we can have absolute—well, nothing in the world is absolute, I suppose—we can have far more than adequate assurance of compliance with those provisions. Our national technical means enable us to determine how many fixed silos there are for ICBM's.

Senator PEARSON. Does that include MIRV's?

Mr. WARNKE. It does, Senator Pearson, because we have been able to get the Soviets to agree to a very, very controlled system of MIRV counting. [Deleted.] What we propose is that any missile of a type that has even been tested with a MIRV'd warhead is counted as a MIRV'd missile, regardless of whether or not it has a MIRV'd warhead on it. In other words, it is a type rule. It applies to all missiles of a type that has ever been tested or deployed with a MIRV warhead. [Deleted.]

That is a major, major step forward, and I think it really is something that gives us the kind of assurance at verification which is necessary to have confidence in an agreement. [Deleted.]

So, as far as the aggregate limits are concerned, and the sublimits, we do have the capability to verify.

Senator CHURCH. Did you explain while I was temporarily out of the room how we determine whether a silo contains a MIRV'd missile or an un-MIRV'd missile?

Mr. WARNKE. I did, Senator Church.

I explained that we have been insisting on the type rule under which any missile of a type which has ever been tested with a MIRV'd warhead counts as a MIRV'd missile; [deleted].

In other words, we know that there are no more than that certain number of launchers of MIRV'd missiles. There may be less; but nonetheless, we count the maximum number, and the Soviets have agreed to that.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Senator BAKER. I would like to follow up on that point for just a minute, Mr. Chairman.

NUMBERS, TYPES OF SOVIET MISSILES

Mr. Warnke, I am not familiar with the numbers and types of missiles which the Soviet Union has. Can you tell me how many missile systems the Soviets have that have not yet been MIRV'd and therefore would not be subject to the rule you described—of intercontinental range?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

[Deleted.]

Senator BAKER. What I am trying to find out is how many systems are not included in your rule.

[Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator BAKER. I am trying to find out how big the hole is. How many missiles do the Russians have of what types that have not yet been MIRV'd?

Mr. WARNKE. At the present time they have [deleted].

Senator BAKER. And would not be covered?

Mr. WARNKE. They would be covered by the rule when the silos are converted, [deleted].

Senator BAKER. Can you tell that?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes; we can.

Senator CASE. I cannot add up those figures.

How many MIRV'd missiles do they now have?

Mr. WARNKE. They are entitled to a total of something like 1,500.

Senator CASE. But what about MIRV'd missiles?

Mr. WARNKE. Oh, how many MIRV'd missiles do they have?

Senator CASE. Yes.

Mr. WARNKE. Approximately, at the present time, [deleted].

Senator CASE. How many do they have which are not MIRV'd?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. [Deleted.] That is their score?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator CASE. That includes the bombers?

Mr. WARNKE. That is just the MIRV'd ICBM's.

Senator CASE. Just ICBM's—that is what we are talking about?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator BAKER. But those [deleted] would not be covered by the rule unless they were converted?

Mr. WARNKE. The rule is that if it is a silo which is capable of launching a MIRV'd ICBM, then it counts against the total of MIRV'd ICBM launchers.

[Deleted.]

Now, according to our intelligence, they had planned to go up from the present total of something like [deleted] to a total of [deleted] which would have left them with something in excess of [deleted] unMIRV'd ICBM's.

As a result of the discussions we have had, they have now agreed to limit that total of MIRV'd ICBM's to [deleted] which will mean that they will have something between [deleted] solos which will continue to contain unMIRV'd ICBM's.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.

U.S. VERIFICATION RISKS

I am trying to identify the dimensions of our risk: That is, what opportunity do the Soviets have to avoid the MIRV limitations in terms of our ability to independently ascertain and verify the situation? As I perceive it, it would be [deleted] that are not now MIRV'd, and it is your contention that they would have to change the configuration of the silos before they could MIRV them, and we could detect that and that would bring them under the rule.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator BAKER. But the real risk would be if they did not have to change the configuration of the silos, wouldn't it?

Mr. WARNKE. The risk, Senator, would exist if they were able to develop a new missile that would fit into a silo for an unMIRV'd missile.

[Deleted].

[Deleted].

Senator BAKER. But that is the risk—that they would devise a missile that could be MIRV'd that would fit a silo of a 7, 9, or 11.

Mr. WARNKE. We would know that if that should occur, Senator.

Senator BAKER. How would we know?

Mr. WARNKE. We would know because of our intelligence sources. They would enable us to determine what new missiles they are developing.

Senator BAKER. That is a key and crucial point. I won't go any further.

I understand what you mean by "national technical means." But I don't understand what you mean by "our intelligence sources." Are you speaking of other than national technical means?

Mr. WARNKE. That includes primarily national technical means in this instance, because they are adequate for this purpose.

[Deleted].

[Deleted.]

Senator BAKER. Of course that debate is as old as the entire effort at strategic arms limitation, that is, what type of information do you require—on-site inspection? Do we require no verification beyond our own intelligence sources? Do we depend entirely on "national technical means?"

What you are saying is that by a combination of national technical means and other intelligence sources and without any addition, such as on-site access and inspection, we could ascertain that the Soviets have designed and deployed a missile in a 7, 9, or 11 silo that was MIRV'd. Is that it?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator BAKER. That is your evaluation?

Mr. WARNKE. That is my evaluation.

Senator BAKER. That is also the dimension of the risk, isn't it?

Mr. WARNKE. It depends upon what you mean by "risk." I don't regard it as being a reasonable risk. I don't think that that risk exists.

Senator BAKER. What I mean by "risk" is if we can tell for certain that something is MIRV'd, there is no risk; if there is any chance that we can't, there is a risk.

Mr. WARNKE. That is right. But, in order to have a MIRV'd missile that could fit in the silos that are not counted against the MIRV total, they would have to develop a new missile. The development of a new missile involves a whole variety of phenomena which are detectable by national technical means.

MIRV'D BALLISTIC MISSILES, HEAVY BOMBERS WITH LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILE

Senator CASE. What does the 1,320 figure include? Does it include everything, such as ships?

Mr. WARNKE. The 1,320 figure, Senator Case, would include just MIRV'd ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

Senator CASE. Does that include submarines and ship-launched missiles?

Mr. WARNKE. It includes the MIRV'd missiles on the submarines, yes.

Senator CASE. That is what I mean.

How many are there free within that limit for them to convert into heavy missiles, MIRV'd missiles, intercontinental missiles?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. That would give them a chance to MIRV [deleted] more than they have now.

Is that right?

Mr. WARNKE. That is approximately correct, yes.

ICBM VULNERABILITY

Senator CASE At some point, according to the press, Secretary Brown has conceded that MIRV'ing of Russian missiles that is possible under the agreement, will make our ICBM's vulnerable. What is your response to that?

Mr. WARNKE. My response to that, Senator, is that there is still the theoretical possibility that if the Soviets were to continue with a MIRVing program and with accuracy improvements, they might be able theoretically to attack our land-based ICBM's by some time in the 1980's and destroy a substantial part of them.

This agreement does not foreclose that theoretical possibility. It is a step forward toward minimizing that risk because it reduces the number of MIRV'd ICBM's and would also interfere with qualitative developments by preventing the introduction of new types of ICBM's.

By new types, our proposal includes not only entirely new missiles, but also modifications and modernizations that would give increased capability to existing ICBM's.

Senator CHURCH. And accuracy?

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

This would further reduce the risk to Minuteman and put further into the future the time at which Minuteman would become theoretically vulnerable. But it will not do the total job. That is why we want to go ahead immediately with SALT III and try to develop a more effective arms control agreement prior to the time that Minuteman would become vulnerable.

SALT III NEGOTIATIONS

Senator CASE. By the time SALT III is negotiated, if we go on our present schedules, it will be 8 or 10 years.

Mr. WARNKE. I am more optimistic than that, Senator.

Senator CASE. Let me say that I am only trying to look this over.

CRITICISM OF COMMITTEE WITH REGARD TO SALT

I must say here, to my colleagues and to anybody else who wants to listen, that I have been annoyed at suggestions that this committee is failing in its duty in some fashion with regard to SALT. The suggestion in some quarters is that it is our duty to see that whatever

the administration comes up with is approved by the Senate and that we should act as protagonists for it.

I don't accept that. Neither do I accept the idea that we should be against it.

I do think that we ought to explore it in every possible way in the greatest possible depth, but not as antagonists. We are all interested in the same result. The Constitution gives us the responsibility to do that very thing. In no sense are we supposed to act as the administration's warriors in this cause unless we have come upon that conclusion independently.

I just wanted to say that because the newspapers are obviously stimulated by people friendly to the cause of disarmament, and I think honestly so, who have attempted to belittle this committee and its way of acting. I don't think I will make any public fuss about this, but I just want everyone to know that as far as I am concerned, I am not going to change one bit in my effort to find out what the answers are before I make up my mind what to do. Then I will carry whatever torch my conclusions lead me to carry.

I get quite annoyed by this kind of thing, mostly because it is stupid. We don't get people into line by beating them over the head—at least you don't get Senators into line in that way.

Mr. WARNKE. I think, Senator Case, that you and I have discussed the constitutional role of the Senate in the past, and I have never found any disagreement between us.

Senator CASE. I don't think there is. We did have a little disagreement as to whether a temporary extension should be approved by Congress or not, that is, of the present situation. This is mostly for the record. Would it go toward setting a bad precedent rather than one based on substance?

Mr. WARNKE. Even then, I believe, Senator, that I agreed that there is no reason why Congress should not act upon it.

Senator CASE. Your own position was that, yes.

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, for the interruption.

Senator CHURCH. I think that your statement was well taken.

I would like to get back to a point which Senator Case has raised.

There has been so much argument among those who have been inclined to oppose SALT agreements in the past that somehow this agreement might theoretically put our ICBM's and our Minuteman system into some kind of jeopardy.

I would like to examine that thesis.

Anyone who wants to ask questions, please feel free to do so because there are several questions that I want to ask.

### THREAT GREATER WITHOUT AGREEMENT

First of all, if we did not have the agreement, then there would be no inhibition at all upon the Soviet Union to proceed to build as many MIRV'd missiles as she is capable of building. In other words, the theoretical threat to our Minuteman systems would be obviously greater in the absence of an agreement than in an agreement that curtails the number of MIRV'd missiles that even our own intelligence anticipates the Soviets would otherwise build. Is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator CASE. But no less.

Senator CHURCH. Right.

But if our intelligence feels that in the absence of an agreement the Russians could build more MIRV'd missiles than they agree to build under an agreement that we can verify, then clearly we have taken one step forward in reducing the possible theoretical risk to our Minuteman.

My second question is this.

PROTOCOL AGREEMENT

If under the protocol the Russians agree to build no new missiles or not to modify eixsting missiles [deleted] step that still further reduces the theoretical possibility of striking and destroying our Minutemen. Is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. My third question is this.

MINUTEMAN VULNERABILITY SCENARIO

Even a theoretical strike against our Minuteman system could be achieved only if the Soviets, having developed a sufficiently large force of sufficiently accurate missiles, would launch a strike against those missiles, and we left our missiles in their silos, even though we would have approximately 30 minutes warning of the strike?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. So, even under the most optimum circumstances of this theoretical situation, assuming they had developed the capability, they could destroy our missile force only with our acquiescence?

Mr. WARNKE. I think that is an accurate way to put it, yes.

Senator CHURCH. So, what is the big argument about?

THEORETICAL RISK SITUATIONS

Mr. WARNKE. I think, Senator Church, it is an argument that has been going now for at least the past 12 years. I know that when I was in the Department of Defense back in the late 1960's there were scenarios then that were developed which would indicate a threat to our land based ICBM force. This is no new discovery. It is not anything that has been the result of SALT.

As a matter of fact, SALT has, to some extent, reduced the theoretical risk by setting limits. A SALT II agreement along the lines that are now emerging would further limit the threat to Minuteman. But you cannot totally dissipate the scenario which does indicate that the Minuteman force could be substantially attrited by a counterforce strike. The chances of that counterforce strike would require that a Soviet planner have sufficient confidence in the reliability and the accuracy of his missiles, have sufficient confidence that he can avoid the fratricide effects of having missiles come in after other missiles have exploded, and thus interfere with the performance of the incoming missiles. And, as you point out, he should have the further assurance that the United States would sit there blandly for the 20 minutes warning that we would receive of the oncoming Soviet force and leave

our missiles in those silos. But, nonetheless, we have to concede, I think, the fact that as land-based missiles become both more deadly and more vulnerable, that does, to some extent, destabilize the strategic balance. They become more of a threat, but at the same time they become no less vulnerable.

That is what we are trying to cope with—not because that necessarily destroys our deterrent—it doesn't; but because of the fact that we will have a more stable situation if people are not able to speculate about the possible vulnerability of Minuteman.

I think that in viewing the Minuteman vulnerability scenario against the issue of SALT versus no SALT, you have to figure out what the possibilities are, what will occur if we don't have a SALT II treaty. Well, instead of having something like [deleted] or less strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, our projections are that the Soviet Union will have in excess of [deleted]. As far as MIRV'ed missiles are concerned, instead of having something like [deleted] they will have something like [deleted].

Now, whether in those circumstances it becomes more feasible for a Soviet planner to contemplate a strike which would attrite our Minuteman force as he has more missiles that he could direct toward that purpose, I don't think that even then it would be a good gamble on the part of any sane man. But nonetheless, SALT II will, in fact, reduce the theoretical risk to Minuteman. SALT III, in my view, will do more along those lines.

Senator SARBANES. But once assuming we hold it constant, though——

Mr. WARNKE. Hold it constant in what way, Senator?

Senator SARBANES. If there is no limitation, you then assume the Soviets will do X, Y, and Z.

Mr. WARNKE. Right.

Senator SARBANES. But you then assume that against the United States not doing anything. If there are no limitations and the Soviets are going to do X, Y, and Z, then I assume that we are going to do A, B, and C to counter X, Y, and Z. Therefore this comparison would not hold.

Senator CHURCH. Then the numbers would just escalate on both sides.

Senator SARBANES. Yes; so I would assume, or there would be different weapons systems or something of that sort.

I understand the point. But I don't see how writing a scenario that in effect says if we don't get the agreement the Soviets will do this, and then set that off against a U.S. posture that does nothing, gets you the proper comparison.

Mr. WARNKE. I believe that it does, Senator Sarbanes, for the short range: that there would be, in fact, be a period of time in which the Soviet forces would have expanded by about 50 percent with very little expansion on our part because of the fact that they have the ongoing programs and we don't.

Senator CASE. They do have a momentum, don't they?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes; they do.

Senator CASE. And they are using it apparently to build a whole new armory, which is not going to be markedly superior to what they have now, just to keep their men employed, isn't that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. That is what we have understood.

Senator CASE. George Kistiakowsky has the word and he states it very well. He assumes that there might be a possibility that not only our land based missiles but also the bombers that are on the ground and the submarines, except those which are cruising, are going to be vulnerable, too.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Senator CASE. Then he makes the various arguments that you have sketched out there against it. It just would not work because you could not launch an attack of that kind without getting in your own way, among other things. He says that we would know ahead of time what was going to come, and that is correct, under all possible circumstances, I gather, and could take steps to meet it, such as launching our own missiles and getting them out of the silos.

Is that correct?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator CASE. There are other steps of that sort.

I just don't know. I ask you if there is any vulnerability to the counter-argument that you and he and other proponents of this thing have put forth?

NEGOTIATION AGREEMENTS

Are we agreeing to other things that are troublesome?

Mr. WARNKE. There is certainly nothing which is under negotiation at the present time that would, in any respect whatsoever, increase the vulnerability of our strategic forces.

Senator CASE. Of our major strategic-missile forces?

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

What we are trying to do instead is to restrict the threat to it.

Now, as Senator Sarbanes has pointed out, we would not stand still if the Soviets went ahead with a 50-percent buildup, but the things that we would do would not diminish the likelihood of the vulnerability of our Minuteman force. We would be doing other things. We have, of course, done those other things in the past.

I think it is very significant to take a look at the comparison between the two strategic force postures.

The Soviet Union has something like 70 percent of its strategic forces in the land based ICBM's. Because of concerns that have existed in this country for more than a decade, we have decided to have three separate strategic forces to reduce the vulnerability argument. So, we have approximately one-third in ICBM's, one-third in submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and one-third in strategic bombers. So, the counterforce threat impacts more heavily on the Soviet Union than it does on us.

Obviously, if they went ahead with their buildup, we would go ahead with a buildup, too. There is no question about that. We would do whatever is necessary to insure that our security remains. But, in my view, the best way to preserve that security is to get an effective arms-control agreement so that you do not have the buildup which is going to increase the risks of counterforce. It is going to destabilize the present strategic balance. That is why I pointed out, Senator Sarbanes, that in the absence of a SALT agreement their forces are

projected to go up something like 50 percent, and we would have to make an appropriate response.

It still would not eliminate the vulnerability of Minuteman. The only way that could be eliminated is—well, I suppose there are alternate courses for both sides to put their strategic forces to sea and on strategic bombers, or to find some way in SALT agreements—not in this present one, but in follow-on SALT agreements—to further cut back on the counterforce potential of the MIRV'd ICBM forces on each side. That would have to be a very, very substantial reduction in order to satisfy the proponents of the Minuteman vulnerability scenario, because obviously, if you are cutting back on forces on both sides, you are not only cutting back on the attacking forces, you are cutting back on the targets.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Pearson.

Senator PEARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to change the thrust of this conversation, but I will yield if anybody wishes to follow up with the present discussion.

[No response.]

SEPARATE AGREEMENTS TO TREATY

Senator PEARSON. I was concerned about something you said a few minutes ago when we were talking about the Backfire. You said something about a separate agreement on the development and deployment of Backfire. That triggered off in my mind a concern about unilateral statements or separate agreements or the reliance upon SALT III to solve problems that could conceivably be solved in SALT II.

If you send to the Senate a treaty that you well know has some unilateral agreements, statements, and other things, you know that you have created an added problem.

Mr. WARNKE. I can see that. Senator.

Senator PEARSON. That is what I want to ask you about.

Let's get back to the Backfire. Is it the intent to leave that out and to have a separate agreement somehow or other as to the development, deployment, and range limitations of that—outside the SALT II treaty?

Mr. WARNKE. The Backfire issue, Senator, has not been resolved at the present point.

Senator PEARSON. I understand that.

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator PEARSON. But we are now accustomed and acclimated to the idea that the cruise missile and Backfire are somehow——

Senator CASE. Tied in with each other.

Senator PEARSON. Yes. That is a condition to the press and to the discussion that has been going on for a long time.

Senator CASE. Yes—we have given up certain things and are not getting anything in the others, that is the point.

Senator PEARSON. Let's forget Backfire and get back to the unilateral statements and separate agreements.

Mr. WARNKE. All right.

There are basically two kinds of unilateral statements, Senator Pearson, one of which, in my view, is an acceptable method of getting agreement and one of which is not.

I think that the problem we have had with unilateral statements in the past is that we have made statements about what the Soviets would do. That obviously is a totally unsatisfactory kind of arrangement. I think for the United States to say what the Soviet Union is not going to do is of no value. What we need are statements by the Soviet Union as to what they commit themselves not to do.

In SALT I there were some unilateral statements of the former type. There were unilateral statements to the effect that the United States regarded it as being within the spirit of the agreement that mobile ICBM's would not be deployed. The Soviet Union refused to make that statement, and as a consequence, you could not say to them, "You can't go ahead with this development because you promised not to do it; you committed yourself not to do it."

Now, a unilateral statement to the effect that the person making the statement commits himself obviously is something which is susceptible of enforcement. So, there are differences between those two kinds of unilateral statements.

Senator PEARSON. Outside the treaty provision?

Mr. WARNKE. There will probably be some things outside the treaty provision, I would think, yes. What they would be at the present point I am not sure.

Senator SARBANES. To follow up on Senator Pearson's question on the Backfire, [Deleted].

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator SARBANES. It seems to me to have three tiers. You have now a treaty and a protocol. Those are two tiers. The protocol, it seems to me, carries certain additional risks running with it. Your assumption is that at the end of the protocol period the United States would be free to do whatever it chooses to do under the circumstances. That may be. But it would seem to me that you also have to anticipate that there will be pressures at work to circumscribe, to some extent, that American freedom because we will be within the context of a protocol—I mean, we are not bound, I understand that, in the legal sense, but there would be pressures upon you.

Now, on the Backfire, we are getting, as I understand it, even to a third tier with respect to the Soviet weapon system which, in effect, I think would be perceived as placing it in an even lesser restrictive position than what was under the protocol, let alone what is under the treaty.

Mr. WARNKE. The Backfire problem has not been solved at the present point, Senator Sarbanes, and I cannot predict what the solution will be.

Let me give a little background on it.

I think there is no question in the minds of anybody who has studied the problem that the Backfire is intended to be a theater system, not an intercontinental system. So the debate rages around what kind of a strategic mission it could, in fact, perform.

There is a deep difference of opinion [deleted] as to how well it could perform a strategic mission if it were ever designed and deployed for that purpose.

Senator CASE. But that strategic means intercontinental?

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator STONE. What if the Backfires were deployed in Cuba?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, you would not have to deploy a Backfire in Cuba to strike the United States, Senator Stone. You could do it with a Badger, or a Blinder, or any of their tactical aircraft.

Senator STONE. But what if they were deployed in Cuba?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, obviously they could strike every target in the United States.

Senator CHURCH. You would have another Cuban missile crisis.

Senator STONE. You sure would.

Mr. WARNKE. But that, of course, is one difference between our situation, Senator Stone, and that of the Soviet Union. That is one of the problems that the Soviet Union has to deal with—and that is that we do have forward bases, we do have forward based systems. So, as a consequence, we have a number of bombers that are not counted in SALT which can strike Soviet targets.

Senator STONE. Because of our forward bases?

Mr. WARNKE. Because of our forward bases.

Senator STONE. And they don't have them?

Mr. WARNKE. They don't have forward bases.

SOVIET ARMS IN CUBA

Senator STONE. We are very cognizant of what they have in Cuba at all times, aren't we?

Mr. WARNKE. Pretty well so, yes, sir. Certainly we would know about the deployment of any Backfire in Cuba.

Senator STONE. Or Badgers?

Mr. WARNKE. Or Badgers or Blinders, yes.

TRANSFER OF WEAPONS OR TECHNOLOGY TO NATO

Senator CASE. This business of forward bases works both ways. Sometime this morning we will have to get into the question of the attitude of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the question of the transfers of weapons or technology to NATO and NATO countries and our own deployment of these things there at all our bases.

I think when we have answered the question of our strategic system to everybody's satisfaction, we will have to get into the NATO matter.

Senator STONE. May I just ask one question in that regard?

I read an account of our possibly offering to trade the concussion bomb weapon in all its different formations for either Backfire or something else, or mobile missiles, or conventional limitations in the Eastern Bloc.

STATUS OF NEUTRON BOMB NEGOTIATIONS

What is the status of negotiations with regard to the concussion bomb and what we are asking the Russians for if we don't deploy it in NATO?

Mr. WARNKE. I take it, Senator Stone, that by the "concussion bomb" you mean the enhanced radiation weapon?

Senator STONE. Don't we call that the concussion bomb, even though it can be fired from a long rifle or whatever?

Senator CHURCH. Are you talking about the neutron bomb, Dick?

Senator STONE. Excuse me, yes, absolutely. I mean the neutron bomb. The concussion is something else.

Mr. WARNKE. The neutron bomb does not come into the SALT negotiations at all, Senator Stone, because it is not conceivably a strategic system. I cannot imagine that under any circumstance anybody would put an enhanced radiation warhead on a strategic missile, because obviously you would want the maximum in the way of blast, and not a reduced blast.

That is strictly a weapon that would be used for tactical nuclear weapon purposes.

Senator CASE. But what about the cruise missile? This is where you would get into that.

Mr. WARNKE. That's correct.

STRATEGIC MISSILE LIMITATIONS

Senator CASE. I think we could agree on strategic missile limitations and so forth, except for these arguments we have gone over here, which I think have been pretty well answered.

You do get into a whole different area of warfare, don't you?

Mr. WARNKE. You do, Senator Case. I think this is going to be one of the very, very difficult problems for us to resolve when it comes to future SALT negotiations.

You see, we have been able, up to this point, to keep the theater nuclear systems out of SALT, and I think we have been able to make substantial progress in that regard. I am not sure how many more times we can do that.

We can get a good SALT II agreement without dealing with the question of theater nuclear forces, forward-based systems, and so forth.

Senator CASE. But there is concern that in SALT II we may so limit, hobble, or disable ourselves that we cannot deal with it adequately, isn't there?

Mr. WARNKE. That is one of the reasons why we proposed the protocol idea. I think that is one of the things that we have to keep in mind.

This is our idea, one which we got them to accept. What we wanted to have was a protocol which would hold our options open to the future, and it does. It would enable us to go ahead with our development programs, with our testing programs, and then to have the option of deployment at the end of the protocol period. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Across the board.

Mr. WARNKE. Across the board, yes.

Now, if you were to decide during the SALT III negotiations that you were prepared to trade continuing restrictions on things like cruise missiles, then the question is, what do you trade them against? I think that gets us into the entire question of theater nuclear forces. This is something that we are beginning to discuss with NATO at the present point. It will have to receive intensive consideration, that is, the entire question of grey area systems, things like the Backfire, things like the SS-20, things like our FB-111's, which are stationed in the United Kingdom.

Senator STONE. And the neutron bomb?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, even then the neutron bomb does not fit into the SALT picture; it would fit in more closely with restrictions on battlefield weapons.

Senator PEARSON. And Vienna is not active enough to check those issues down there, is it?

Mr. WARNKE. It could come up in connection with the MBFR—Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction—talks in Vienna. It has not up to the present point. The entire question as to our decision on the neutron bomb, the enhanced radiation weapon system, has not been made.

INTRODUCTION OF NEUTRON BOMB DESTABILIZING EFFECT

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me that the introduction of the neutron bomb could destabilize the nuclear balance.

Mr. WARNKE. We view the neutron bomb as being basically an answer to the Soviet tank buildup in Western Europe.

There is no question of the fact that the Soviets have improved their conventional warfighting capability in Western Europe and significantly in the case of tanks.

Now, the particular purpose for which the neutron bomb is designed is to counter a tank attack on Western Europe. I think that it does have military efficacy in that regard.

I have not found it to be anything that has ever been raised in the talks in Geneva. I think they recognize that it is a separate issue from that.

The only place it is raised in Geneva is whenever I give a press conference. Then I get more questions about the neutron bomb than I do about SALT.

I agree with you, Senator Case, that this is a very, very complicated issue and one that is going to require intensive consideration.

NEUTRON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Senator CASE. Somewhere around it has been said, Paul, that you were urging that we concede an agreement, at least for a short period, maybe a longer one, that we will not transfer this technology.

Mr. WARNKE. I saw that article, Senator Case. It has no basis in fact.

Senator CASE. I asked you about it because I wanted to clear that up and I wanted to be able to say that you had said that.

This is not under present consideration, so far as you know, by our Government—anywhere in discussions, I mean?

Mr. WARNKE. It has not been discussed with the Soviet Union, to the best of our knowledge, in any format at any point.

Obviously the Soviet Union has found it a very handy propaganda device. I think it is sort of ironic that they talk about the so-called neutron bomb as being inhumane when their SS–18 is unquestionably the most inhumane weapon that the mind of man has ever devised. It would generate far more radiation than we ever could with a 1.5 kiloton neutron warhead.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Mr. WARNKE. It is difficult, I think, in terms of relations with third countries. They have responded, I think, perhaps with unnecessary emotion to the entire concept.

Senator CASE. As far as anything being contemplated for SALT II is concerned, the treaty or the protocol, that is not involved?

Mr. WARNKE. It has never been brought up and in my opinion would be completely inappropriate for SALT discussions.

If you ever were to begin to negotiate with respect to that, you should address yourself to the threat against which the enhanced radiation weapon is directed. That is not a strategic threat. It is the threat of a widescale conventional attack on Western Europe.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

VERIFICATION RESERVATIONS

I still have very serious hangups and they are getting much worse with regard to verification.

I started out having some reservations about it. I went to Geneva in the summer and talked with our people there. We talked with Cy Vance, of course, and we had talked to you previously. At every stop along the way my concerns about verification have been getting deeper and greater instead of lessening.

I would comment on Senator Church's comment earlier about what happens in the absence of an agreement.

I think in the absence of an agreement, as Senator Church properly pointed out, the Soviets might take the opportunity to build more and to increase their stockpile with no restraints whatsoever. But in that situation, we could do the same thing, if we saw that developing.

But, if we have an agreement that is nonverifiable, to me, that is sort of the worst of both worlds, because we will live up to it, and if they don't, we have no means of verifying what they are doing. So, it seems to me that it is almost worse having a nonverifiable agreement because we are then living in a fool's paradise. We are living in a false sense of security.

Let me give a little detail on what I mean.

We are unable to distinguish now between the SS–20 and the SS–16 mobiles. They can convert without detection. We cannot really pinpoint which boosters are MIRVed and not MIRVed. We cannot tell whether the Backfire is going to be refueled or not because refueling probes can be internal.

There was an article in today's newspaper. Are the Soviets going ahead with the killer satellite and how do we verify that? We don't have any way of verifying that that I know of, as in the report in today's paper.

The most difficult area of all is qualitative upgrading. If they improve the accuracies of their systems with new guidance or new engines that give them a different range, we have absolutely no way that I am aware of of detecting that. The only thing that has even been said in counter to that is that they will have to test them and that we will observe the tests. But we don't know whether they have a brand new guidance system or whether they just lumped one in with their old guidance system with greater accuracy.

The national technical means upon which we are all supposed to be agreed regarding detection of these things, [deleted].

[Deleted.]

We have no way of checking their reload capabilities on individual silos, repeater silos, where they can fire one and have it ready to go again shortly with another one, which gives them an expanded capability.

These are examples that I can think of this morning, just off the top of my head, without really going through any documents.

LAIRD QUOTE CONCERNING SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF TREATY

On a different note, in the December issue of "Reader's Digest"—I have not yet read the article, but it is quoted in today's staff notes—Mel Laird wrote:

> The evidence is incontrovertible that the Soviet Union has repeatedly, flagrantly and indeed contemptuously violated the treaties to which we ahered."

Now I don't know exactly which ones this refers to but perhaps you may comment on this later.

The whole area of verification, of a "pig in a poke" that we are agreeing to here is an issue that I am really developing increased concern every time we talk about these things that we are not doing anything about the enhancement of verification which we have set out as an objective for SALT III? When I asked questions previously about what we were talking about or what we were proposing with regard to verification enhancement for SALT III? I drew a big blank. I got no answers on that. I will be very blunt about that.

Apparently this is a phrase that we are putting in here that we hope to work something out, but we don't really have any idea yet as to what direction we are headed in concerning verification and enhancement.

All of the items that I mentioned here, such as cruise missiles, data base, and other things that might be included, are items that really give me a lot of difficulty with regard to approving this.

We can argue about all of the high numbers which should be cut down before we really have any meaningful strategic arms limitation anyway. We can argue those balances. But if we can't verify anything any more than has been pointed out to this committee or to the other committee in the past, then it really stops me a bit as to whether or not we should be going this route.

I would appreciate your comments on Mel Laird's comment and on any of the items which I just mentioned. There are two or three specific questions that are in the staff memorandum that I would like to ask also.

Mr. WARNKE. Fine, thank you, Senator Glenn. I will respond first of all to the question about Melvin Laird's article.

I have the greatest respect for Secretary Laird, and I was his first Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. I regard him as being extraordinarily competent. In this case he is misinformed. I think that the difficulty that he cites is a difficulty with the existing arms control agreements rather than with compliance with them. The problem is that the existing agreements are just not comprehensive enough to prevent the Soviet Union from doing a number of things that we would like them not to do.

With regard, for example, to the question that he cites about their disguising the connection between a particular missile and its launcher. Well, the restrictions do not inhibit activities at test launchers. The

only restriction on test launching sites is that they cannot increase the number of silos. They have not engaged in any activity that would disguise the number of silos that they have. Again, that is an inadequacy of the agreement rather than a violation.

Senator STONE. Isn't that the question that Senator Glenn just raised about qualitative enhancement all over again?

Mr. WARNKE. How?

QUALITATIVE ENHANCEMENT VERIFICATION

Senator STONE. Because past agreements did not have the appropriate controls on qualitative enhancement of silos.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator STONE. Senator Glenn is raising this point: Are we obtaining sufficient qualitative controls on upgrading in the current proposal?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes. As you point out, Senator Stone, that is a separate question.

What I was addressing initially is the question of whether I agree with Secretary Laird that the Soviets had violated the existing agreements. They have not.

Senator STONE. Senator Glenn was using that as a precedent for his concerns about this.

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct.

Senator STONE. And you are making his point when you say that it is not that they broke a specific agreement but that we did not have a comprehensive enough agreement to prevent that which they did.

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

Senator STONE. He is saying if they will do that to us when we have gaps, aren't we letting ourselves in for it again by not covering the qualitative enhancement gap and the verification qualitative enhancement gap in the current proposal?

Mr. WARNKE. We would, in fact, be letting ourselves in for it if we were not negotiating provisions that are verifiable. I would agree with that. But I do not agree that we are negotiating provisions that are not verifiable. I think that we are negotiating provisions on which we will have a high order of confidence in their verifiability.

That does not mean that problems will not remain. It does not mean that the problems won't get more acute as you get on to even more complicated forms of arms control. But I will have no difficulty in assuring this committee that SALT II will be verifiable.

Senator GLENN. In all aspects?

Mr. WARNKE. In all aspects we will have adequate verification, yes.

VERIFICATION OF BACKFIRE CAPABILITIES

Senator GLENN. You say that Backfire is now out of this area, right?

Mr. WARNKE. Backfire will be a part of the total package, but how it will be handled has not been settled at the present time.

Senator GLENN. How do we verify whether Backfire has refueling capability?

Mr. WARNKE. You will be able to verify whether or not the refueling capability of Backfire presents a strategic threat to the United

States by a variety of means, [deleted]. One way is restricting any sort of association of tankers with Backfire.

The Soviets at the present point have a very limited and very old tanker force. One possible means is to prevent any association of tankers with Backfire, any testing of tankers with Backfire. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. You are assuming that we can detect all tankers, then?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator GLENN. That is a big order.

Mr. WARNKE. We have a high degree of confidence, Senator Glenn, in our ability at the present point to determine which aircraft are tankers and which are not.

Senator GLENN. I don't know how you can do that when planes look like transport airplanes to begin with. Unless there is some means that I am not aware of, I don't see how you can verify which is and which is not a tanker. We have planes flying around here every day which are tankers and cannot be detected, or which can have tanks put in them on short notice and become tankers. I presume the Russians could do the same thing.

Mr. WARNKE. They could.

But, as I said, at the present point we have a high degree of confidence as to which are tankers, and we would be able, in our opinion, to determine whether or not they were being used with Backfire in order to give Backfire a refueling capability.

Senator GLENN. I would contest your statement in the absence of any proof, because I don't think we have that means.

Mr. WARNKE. I cannot defend the Backfire constraints at the present point, Senator Glenn, because they have not been worked out.

Senator GLENN. Then we have no means at the moment.

Mr. WARNKE. We don't have the constraints.

Senator GLENN. OK, let's run through some more of these things.

AGREEMENT, VERIFICATION CONCERNING MIRV'ED MISSILES

What about the MIRV versus non-MIRV'd?

Mr. WARNKE. I think we have solved that problem because of the MIRV counting rules that have been agreed to.

Senator GLENN. You mean that we just agree that everything will be counted as MIRV?

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

We agree that every missile of a type which has ever been tested with a MIRV warhead is counted as a MIRV.

Senator GLENN. But you cannot detect whether or not there is a MIRV nest on top of the thing.

Mr. WARNKE. No. But if it has ever been tested as a MIRV warhead, then every missile of that type is treated as if it has a MIRV warhead, whether or not it has one.

Senator CHURCH. And every silo?

Mr. WARNKE. And every silo which has ever contained or launched a missile of a type which has ever been tested with a MIRV warhead, is counted as a launcher for a MIRV missile.

Senator GLENN. Then this would presume that every other type missile, then, would not be MIRV'd, and you would presume that

they would absolutely test it if they went to MIRV on that type warhead.

Mr. WARNKE. We know, Senator Glenn, which of their missiles are MIRV'd and which have never been tested and never equipped with warhead. We know which type of launchers are associated with MIRV'd missiles. We have been able to get them to agree that any launcher of the type associated with a MIRV'd missile will be treated as if it were a launcher of a MIRV'd missile.

Senator GLENN. But my point is what if they put MIRV's on top of missiles that are not MIRV'd at the present time.

Mr. WARNKE. We would know if they were doing that.

Senator GLENN. How?

Mr. WARNKE. They would have to design it; they would have to test it; they would have to deploy it and we could verify it.

Senator GLENN. That is where I part company with you.

I don't think they would have to test with a whole MIRV'd nest on board. They could test with a nest with a single MIRV in it. You would come out with the same results and we would not even know the thing was MIRV'd.

Mr. WARNKE. We would know, Senator Glenn, from our national technical means, whether they were doing that sort of testing.

Senator CASE. John, would you please make it clear to me just what you are talking about when you say put a MIRV on an ICBM or something?

Senator GLENN. Sure.

They have certain ICBM's that are only a single shot right now. We are saying, and they are agreeing at Geneva, that the ones that are MIRV'd now will remain MIRV'd. They have several on top of those. The ones that are single shot missiles, with just one nuclear warhead on top, will remain that way.

What I am saying is what is to prevent them from MIRVing the others and upsetting our whole balance unknown to us. The negotiators are relying on the fact that they would have to test with all the multiple warheads in there and all of them fanning out at the same time, which I question.

Senator SARBANES. Howard Baker was asking him about this.

They said that they could not MIRV in the existing silos without modifying and therefore we would be able to spot that. But they admit, as I understand it, the danger that they can develop a missile that can be put in an un-MIRV'd silo which can carry a MIRV warhead.

Isn't that correct? Isn't that the danger?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. I think that you should hear the question again before you answer, Paul.

Mr. WARNKE. As I understood the question, he asked isn't it a danger that they could develop a new missile which could be MIRV'd, or a new MIRV warhead for an existing missile.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, but one that can be put in there without requiring the substantial modifications which we would be able to detect. That is the real danger, isn't it?

Mr. WARNKE. No, because in my opinion we could detect it. In order for them to have a MIRV capability, they would at least have to test the missile with a post-boost vehicle.

Senator CASE. With a what?

Mr. WARNKE. With a post-boost vehicle. In other words, you have the initial booster which puts the missile on its way. Then you would have a post-boost vehicle which would release the MIRV's. We would be able, by our national technical means, to determine whether they were testing a missile with a post-boost vehicle. We would be able [deleted] to tell what was going on with respect to the dispensing mechanism. We would be able to tell by the reentry vehicle.

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

BAN ON ANY TYPE OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT AGREEMENT

Mr. WARNKE. That is correct, Senator Glenn, and that is why at Geneva we have insisted on a ban on any type of deliberate concealment. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. I don't see how you would ever enforce that one. [Deleted.] There is nothing to detect. We would never know that concealment is going on. [Deleted] unless we detected the actual launch itself, we would never know that the test had occurred.

We do the same thing in this country to conceal things from the Russians.

Mr. WARNKE. I realize that we do.

This is the kind of practice which would be banned by the ban on deliberate concealment. I believe that we would be able over a period of time to tell whether or not they were, in fact, breaking that ban.

There is no agreement you can write, Senator Glenn, that says nobody can violate it. But the sanction then is that if you find a violation of the agreement, obviously you are not going to continue with that agreement.

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. If it were designed to deliberately conceal data; yes.

Senator GLENN. But it is designed for that. That is the purpose of it, completely. We get pictures back from all over the world.

Senator CHURCH. Gentlemen, I am afraid that I am not quite following this exchange. I need to have this spelled out a little bit more.

You are using certain technical terms with which I am not fully acquainted.

Senator GLENN. The whole matter concerns verification and how we do it. What I am bringing up is using some of our own techniques, ones that we use in this country, and asking why can't the Russians do the same thing, and if they do, we will have no NTM [national technical means (of verification)], basically, on some of these areas.

What we do now is this. We have satellites up which take pictures all over the world. They make a package drop which parachutes down and is picked up in the air. We bring it back in, develop the pictures, and we know what is going on all over the world. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. That is the thing that I don't quite understand.

How does that work? Under what proposed provision is that?

Senator GLENN. Let me carry that one step further and then I will come back to that.

Senator CHURCH. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]

Senator STONE. And you are asking whether that is prohibited as well?

Senator SARBANES. It is prohibited. The question is how do you verify its violation. It is no answer to say that any agreement can be violated. The whole question is to what extent can we ascertain the violations when and if they occur.

Senator GLENN. And if they occur and if that is legal for them, then can they prohibit us from doing the same thing? That is vital to our whole intelligence network all over the world. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. But that would not be a missile test, Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. Let's say weapons test—that would be a violation of the agreement.

Senator CHURCH. How is that verifiable?

Mr. WARNKE. The question raised is how would we know. [Deleted.] We would know about the existence of the test. There are such things as radar observation of reentry, radar observation in midcourse. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. [Deleted.]

How do we verify something like that? I don't see how we can do it.

Senator STONE. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator STONE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. [Deleted.]

Senator STONE. [Deleted.]

Mr. WARNKE. That would be a possibility.

Senator CASE. But you still couldn't detect when they didn't. You could have the words in the treaty, but you could not detect the violation, isn't that right?

Senator CHURCH. As I understand it, as long as you detected that a test missile has been launched [deleted].

Senator GLENN. Here is what leads me into this.

When we were in Geneva in the summertime [deleted].

I now get back to my original point of how do we verify something that vital?

Senator STONE. How would we? Do you have an idea?

Senator GLENN. I do not have any idea. That is the reason I am so concerned about that point.

Mr. WARNKE. Let me, if I may, respond with regard to this entire question in terms of the agreement that we are now negotiating. [Deleted.] But what we are talking about at this stage is how do we verify whether or not a missile has been tested as a MIRV'd missile? [Deleted.]

That is why I say that as you get on with more complex SALT agreements, your verification problems are going to increase. But, for the SALT II agreement, which is currently taking place, we do have, in my opinion, adequate verification and sufficient confidence in our ability to verify. [Deleted.]

A lot of this would have to be determined in the Standing Consultative Commission, [SCC] just as it has been in the past, where we have found practices which, in our opinion, constituted at least

arguably violations of the agreement. We have raised that question in the SCC and I think that it has worked out quite satisfactorily.

DETECTING CONCEALMENT

Senator GLENN. We have a prohibition against deliberate concealment also in ground installations. How do we detect concealment there? If it is good enough, we don't detect it.

Mr. WARNKE. Again, I think you have to look at the agreement that you are verifying.

Senator GLENN. But how do you verify that there has been no concealment on the ground, because if they are good at it, we won't know it?

Mr. WARNKE. Our experience, Senator Glenn, has been that we have been able to determine when they are using camouflage practices and when they are trying to hide those. Again, regarding Secretary Laird's article, I think one of the conspicuous things about that article is it shows how good we are at finding out what is going on. This article points out some very, very subtle practices. They do not happen to constitute a violation of the existing agreements, but we certainly have known that they have been trying to conceal things. I think we will be able to in the future, too.

We have to look at it in terms of what is the agreement itself? What are we verifying?

Senator STONE. Excuse me, but may I ask a question, please?

ONSITE VERIFICATION

Have you explored onsite verification? Have we negotiated for that?

Mr. WARNKE. We have talked about that primarily in connection with the comprehensive test ban, Senator Stone.

Senator STONE. Wouldn't that answer all of these questions, or almost all of them?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, it would not answer all of them, but it would be a useful adjunct, and that is one of the things we are holding open for SALT III. [Deleted.]

But, as I said, we can verify the numbers of silos. We can verify the MIRV counting rule.

Senator CHURCH. I think that human experience would suggest that only as a spirit of confidence begins to develop between the United States and the Soviet Union are you going to be able to establish such precise identifications as on-site inspection. I think this comes with progress; it can't come all at once.

I have another question to present to the committee.

* * * * * * *

[The committee turned to other business.]

Senator CHURCH. Very well. Now that we have concluded the business of the resolution, are there further questions for Mr. Warnke?

Mr. WARNKE. Mr. Chairman, first may I comment further briefly on Senator Glenn's questions?

Senator CHURCH. Of course.

Mr. WARNKE. I was saying that with regard to testing of missiles with MIRV's, [deleted]. So really, although I recognize the complications that exist, Senator Glenn, with respect to some of these questions [deleted], to me they are not of significant importance in connection with the SALT II agreement.

Where we would run into problems would be if you had a very, very comprehensive ban on any qualitative changes. That would be difficult to verify because they obviously could make qualitative changes, and [deleted].

BAN ON UPGRADING QUALITY

Senator CASE. There is no ban at all on upgrading quality, is there?

Senator GLENN. That was the next point I was going to bring up. You have beat me to my next point, Cliff.

Mr. WARNKE. What we are trying to get, Senator Case, is a ban on new types of ICBM's [deleted].

Senator GLENN. How can you tell?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Oh, you could do that?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

We could tell, of course, whether or not there are new RV's [reentry vehicle]. In that connection, I am sure that Senator Glenn is familiar with the data that has recently come to our attention with respect to [deleted].

Senator CASE. How does that work?

Mr. WARNKE. That is a reentry vehicle and the method by which that reentry vehicle is released affects its accuracy.

Previously, [deleted] the reentry vehicles were not released in the fashion of [deleted]. But it indicates our ability to monitor that sort of change.

Now there are limits, obviously; software changes we could not tell, and some hardware changes unquestionably would be difficult to detect. But that is something which we are still endeavoring to negotiate.

Senator GLENN. [Deleted].

VERIFIABILITY OF AGREEMENT

Mr. WARNKE. But there are other phenomena which are observable under those circumstances, as I understand it. In this connection, of course, obviously my agency does not have any independent intelligence expertise. We have to rely on the inteligence community generally. Therefore I am sure that the committee will want to question the members of the intelligence community. I am assured by them that the agreement that we are currenty negotiating is, in fact, adequately verifiable.

I have been asked by the chairman, Senator Sparkman, to submit a report on the verifiability of this agreement, as it is now taking shape. That report is under preparation and I hope to be able to submit it within the very near future. I am sure that will raise certain questions. I hope it will answer certain questions.

Senator CHURCH. I think it would be wise to arrange for a special meeting with the Director of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and other specialists in this field.

Senator CASE. After we get the report.

Senator CHURCH. Then we could further pursue with those best able to answer them the most technical questions.

Senator GLENN. Let me follow this up with one more specific question and then I have a general question.

FAST RELOAD CAPABILITY ON SILO VERIFICATION

How can you verify or not verify a fast reload capability on a silo, if they develop one?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

We are able, with an adequate degree of confidence, to tell about the deployment of missiles at ICBM launch sites.

Senator CASE. Does that mean that you cannot have a spare?

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

Senator CASE. Not even one?

Mr. WARNKE. Not even one—at the site, that is.

Senator GLENN. In an underground operation, how can you possibly verify that?

I am thinking of our own proposal here for mobile launchers for underground silos 15 miles long or however long you want to make them. We have no way of knowing, no way of verifying, nor can they verify on us, whether there is one in there on a track that can pop up anywhere over a 20-mile length, or whether there are 50 in there.

How can we verify that?

Mr. WARNKE. [Deleted.]

They don't have trenches at the present point in which they have multiple launch pads; they have silos that are capable of holding just one ICBM, so that is a verifiable element at the present point.

As far as rapid reload capability is concerned, again, they would have to put in new types of facilities, and that would be a violation of the agreement.

Senator CHURCH. Is that verifiable?

Mr. WARNKE. Not any silo can be reloaded, and the addition of the new facilities would be verifiable.

TIMING OF SILO LOADING, RELOADING

Senator CASE. How long does it take to load those things now?

Mr. WARNKE. I think it is about a day.

Senator CASE. To make all the hookups?

Mr. WARNKE. That's right.

Mr. KEENE. It might be more difficult after they fire the first one.

Mr. GRAHAM. Rapid reload can mean about an hour or two.

Senator GLENN. All sorts of things could be developed, and we have had some proposals in this country to develop things like that, such as a faster relaunch capability which does not take a day or two to come up the pad after a launch.

There is a whole different area here of the verification problem as looked at by the Soviets and our problem in this country. I think that has not been addressed.

When we started out at Geneva, they proposed, to begin with, that we would go by national technical means, NTM, and that would be it. Even though I understand that we asked for more to begin with, they were adamant on that subject, and so we agreed to it. The negotiations have proceeded on that basis ever since.

Now there is a tremendous difference in their verification problem as opposed to ours. As we pointed out to Semenov, their negotiator in Geneva, all they would really need to ascertain or verify about 95 percent of the things here is a subscription to Aviation Week and the Congressional Record. They would then have a good portion of their verification problems taken care of.

We told them jokingly that if they would just give us a daily copy of the Presidium proceedings, we would apprepciate it. Semenov got a big kick out of that.

This points up the difference in our problems. I am not making light of this. It points up the difference in problems in a closed society and in an open society.

I don't know how, without their giving us onsite inspection, as Senator Stone mentioned, which I am sure they are not going to do, we will ever come up with adequate verification.

VERIFICATION ENHANCEMENT

Are there any things that we think right now will really provide better enhancement of verification in the future moving toward SALT III?

Mr. WARNKE. As far as SALT is concerned, we are working on that problem, not only in Geneva, but also here. We are trying to find out what it is that we would be able to do to supplement the present national technical means.

We have talked with them about the possibility of cooperative means.

As you know, Senator Glenn, onsite inspection is not a panacea by any means. It has certain distinct limitations itself. It would not be very effective, for example, as a supplement for the verification on the SALT II. I think, as I have already indicated, that we have adequate verifiability for SALT II.

In SALT III, if we get further qualitative controls, then some sort of cooperative means would, in fact, be useful. We have talked with them about onsite inspection in connection with the comprehensive test ban talks, and they have agreed with the principle.

We are endeavoring, with the next round of talks, to work out the criteria for that. I would hope that that would be a useful precedent for SALT III and that we would be able to carry over those into SALT.

On SALT II, as I said, I am assured by the intelligence community that we have adequate verifiability and I believe it.

Senator GLENN. Let me ask one other question and then I will be finished, Mr. Chairman.

KILLER SATELLITE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT, VERIFICATION

What are your comments about the article in today's paper on the killer satellite? A development like that would obviously upset the whole strategic balance, wouldn't it? How is a development like that prevented in SALT II, and are there any verification means that we have or that we are using now which can verify that they are or are not developing such a system? If they are, that would upset the whole balance because it would mean that they could destroy anything we have coming in. It would mean that everything basically achieved in SALT II is destroyed with that development.

Mr. WARNKE. I would agree, Senator Glenn, that if, in fact, both sides deployed and used antisatellite devices, then you could forget about SALT agreements. But there are a couple of answers to it.

The first one is that as far as the concept of some kind of particle beam is concerned, [deleted]. We do know that they have tested certain types of antisatellite weapons and we are endeavoring now to set up a negotiation with them that would ban any type of antisatellite weapon development and deployment.

In connection with SALT, the way we handled it is that that obviously would be a violation of any SALT agreement, and we would promptly have to repudiate the agreement.

ANTISATELLITE WEAPON CAPABILITY AGAINST ICBM'S

Senator GLENN. As far as you know, what they have used so far as an antisatellite weapon, would that also apply against ICBM's?

Mr. WARNKE. To the best of my knowledge, they would not have any kind of an anti-ICBM capability.

Senator GLENN. Unless they went into something like this?

Mr. WARNKE. I believe that Secretary Brown addressed the question of the so-called particle beam device back some 4 or 5 months ago. The President did, too. [Deleted.] But they do have other types of antisatellite devices which they have, in fact, already tested. Those tests have sometimes been successful and sometimes they have been unsuccessful.

It is potentially a very destabilizing development and has to be stopped. That is why we are endeavoring to get a negotiation going that would, in fact, stop that.

Senator CHURCH. If they have developed and tested these antisatellite missiles, some successfully, what then is to prevent them from stockpiling a sufficient number of such missiles so that if they were ever to decide upon a preemptive strike, they could knock out our surveillance system first?

Mr. WARNKE. The tests, of course, are very obvious. Therefore we have been able to keep track of any tests up to this point.

The tests up to this point have been very limited and [deleted].

As far as their taking a chance on trying antisatellite activity is concerned, that obviously would be the clearest indication of an attempt at a preemptive strike. It would clearly violate the SALT agreement. It would violate it in two respects.

Senator CHURCH. It would put us all on a Red Alert.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, that is right. It would put us immediately on the kind of alert we would have if there were any sort of mass evacuation of Soviet cities. I think that as a consequence that would be tantamount to an announcement of an intent to launch a strike. If we were caught at that point by surprise, it would be a reflection on our commonsense. But, antisatellite activity is barred in SALT II. It would constitute interference with national technical means, which is prohibited. It would constitute an attempt at deliberate concealment, which is prohibited.

Certainly I would agree with Senator Glenn that we ought to see if we can stop the development of any kind of effective antisatellite missile.

VERIFICATION ISSUE

Senator GLENN. I would hope that the study you are preparing on this subject is made as complete as possible. I honestly believe—and I have said this every time we get into one of these meetings—that approval or disapproval of SALT is going to revolve around the verification matter. It will in my own mind.

I must admit that I am up in the air about where I am going to come down—for or against SALT. I think it will be determined by what I finally resolve in my own mind about just how verifiable the agreement is.

I am fully aware, Paul, that we are not going to get a 100 percent verifiable treaty. There just is no such thing and I am aware of that. I am not trying to shoot for unattainable perfection. But the things that I mentioned here this morning are of real concern to me. I hope we are not buying something that we will live up to and that they may or may not choose to live up to, and that we will be left with them building and us not building—having agreed to the treaty. This would be the worst of both worlds and is my major concern.

Mr. Chairman, I fear that I have taken more than my share of the time. Thank you for your forbearance.

Senator CHURCH. I think your questions have been excellent and I think the emphasis on detection is well placed.

Mr. WARNKE. There certainly is no difference of view between us, Senator Glenn.

I agree with you on the pivotal importance of verifiability. I hope you will be satisfied.

The full report on verifiability, obviously, will have to come from CIA and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). We have been asked to provide our opinion with regard to verifiability, and we will do so.

Senator CHURCH. I only hope that we will all keep in mind as we examine the case for verifiability what the alternative may be. This is not to suggest that we ever commit ourselves to get into the kind of trap that Senator Glenn has described. But, on the other hand, if we don't get further agreements, then it is open sesame to the development of any number of weapons that will be designed to be unverifiable.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, I think that is correct.

May I make just one more comment, Mr. Chairman, on this entire question of verifiability?

Senator CHURCH. Please.

Mr. WARNKE. Senator Glenn has said, of course correctly, that no agreement could be 100 percent verifiable. I think we sometimes tend to look at verification just from the standpoint of the person who is worried about the other side cheating. We also have to look at it from the standpoint of the potential cheater.

What kind of a chance could a potential cheater afford to take? Suppose you have an agreement which is 80 percent verifiable, so that there were 8 chances out of 10 that he would be caught. He certainly could not afford to take that sort of chance.

I think we ought to aim for something in that order of likelihood. But we have to recognize again, from the standpoint of the potential cheater, what risk is he running.

There are some types of provisions that would be so difficult to verify that he would not be running any sort of risk to take the chance.

Senator GLENN. That's right.

Mr. WARNKE. I think those are the ones that we have to isolate.

I don't believe that testing a missile with MIRV's is that difficult to verify, and although there might be a theoretical possibility that he could get away with it [deleted]. I don't believe under the circumstances that the Soviet Union could afford to take that chance.

Senator GLENN. I hope those are all spelled out in your report.

Mr. WARNKE. We will do the best we can, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Warnke.

I have one further request by the committee, and that is that you and your staff be prepared to answer any written questions for the record that may be submitted to you.

Mr. WARNKE. We would be happy to do so.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

ACDA RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* Would you comment in detail on the points raised by former Secretary of Defense Laird in his December article in Reader's Digest?

Answer.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
*Washington, D.C.*

Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
*Chairman,*
*Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know there has been a great deal of interest in recent months over the question of the Soviet record of compliance with the provisions of the SALT I agreements. I understand that members of your Committee have expressed concern, most recently in the course of hearings to approve the Ambassadorial nomination of Robert Buchheim, the U.S. Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva.

The issue of Soviet compliance, although important in its own right, takes on an increased urgency at a time when we are nearing completion of a new SALT II agreement.

I am enclosing a copy of a statement prepared by the Administration which deals with the broad range of issues raised by both sides regarding compliance with the first SALT agreements. In addition the statement addresses a number of charges which have been raised in the press but which in fact were not the subject of discussion between the two sides.

I hope that this statement will lay to rest many of the concerns of members of your Committee and will serve to answer the questions raised by members of the Committee.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

CYRUS VANCE.

Enclosure as stated.

COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT ONE AGREEMENTS

*I. Introduction*

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief account of the background, discussion, and status of those questions related to compliance with the SALT agreements of 1972—the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms—which have been raised by the United States and the USSR. It also provides a brief discussion of matters which have been mentioned in the press but which have not been raised with the USSR.

*II. General*

Even before talks with the USSR on the subject of strategic arms limitation began, the United States established, in the framework of the National Security Council system, an interagency group known as the Verification Panel to study questions concerning SALT, with special attention to matters of verification of compliance with the provisions of possible agreements. During the preliminary talks in November and December of 1969, the United States proposed, and the USSR agreed, to create a special standing body to deal with questions of implementation of agreements which might be concluded, including questions which might arise concerning compliance. This reflected early recognition and agreement that such matters would require special attention in connection with any agreement as complex as one limiting the strategic weapons of the Untied States and the USSR.

Article XIII of the ABM Treaty of May 26, 1972 provides for a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to, among other things, "consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous." Article VI of the Interim Agreement provides that the Parties use the SCC in a similar manner in connection with that Agreement. In December 1972, during the first session of SALT TWO, the SCC was formally established.

Since the conclusion of the 1972 SALT agreements, procedures have been established within the U.S. government for monitoring Soviet performance and for dealing with matters related to compliance. All intelligence information is carefully analyzed in the context of the provisions of those agreements, and recommendations on questions which arise are developed by interagency intelligence and policy-advisory groups within the NSC system. Currently, these are an Intelligence Community Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations and the Standing Consultative Commission Working Group of the NSC Special Coordination Committee. Should analysis of intelligence information indicate that there could be a question concerning compliance, this latter group reviews and analyzes the available information and provides recommendations. The President decides whether a particular question or issue is to be raised with the USSR based on the study and recommendations of the Working Group and, if necessary, the department and agency principals who comprise the Special Coordination Committee or the NSC itself. After discussion of any question is opened with the USSR in the Standing Consultative Commission, the positions and actions taken by the U.S. representatives are also guided in the same manner.

*III. Questions Raised By the U.S.*

A. *Launch control facilities (special-purpose silos)*.—Article I of the Interim Agreement states: "The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972."

In 1973, the United States determined that additional silos of a different design were under construction at a number of launch sites. If these had been intended to contain ICBM launchers, they would have constituted a violation of Article I of the Interim Agreement. When the United States raised its concern over this construction with the Soviet side, the USSR responded that the silos were, in fact, hardened facilities built for launch control purposes. As discussions proceeded and additional intelligence become available, the United States concluded that the silos were built to serve a launch control function.

In early 1977, following further discussions during 1975 and 1976 and a review of our intelligence on this subject, the US decided to close discussion of this matter on the basis that the silos in question are currently used as launch control facilities. We will, of course, continue to watch for any activity which might warrant reopening of this matter.

B. *Concealment measures.*—Article V of the Interim Agreement and Article XII of the ABM Treaty provide that each Party shall not ". . . interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party. . ." nor ". . . use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions . . ." of the Agreement or the Treaty. Both articles provided that the latter obligation ". . . shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."

The United States has closely monitored Soviet concealment practices both before and after conclusion of the 1972 SALT agreements. During 1974, the extent of those concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs increased substantially. None of them prevented U.S. verification of compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement, but there was concern that they could impede verification in the future if the pattern of concealment measures were permitted to continue to expand.

The United States stated this concern and discussed it with the Soviet side. In early 1975, careful analysis of intelligence information on activities in the USSR led the United States to conclude that there no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern of concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs. We continue to monitor Soviet activity in this area closely.

C. *Modern large ballistic missiles (SS–19 issue).*—Article 11 of the Interim Agreement states: "The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBM's of types deployed after that time." This provision was sought by the United States as part of an effort to place limits on Soviet heavy ICBM's (SS–9 and follow-ons). We did not, however, obtain agreement on a quantitative definition of a heavy ICBM which would constrain increases in the size of Soviet light ICBM's (SS–11 and follow-ons). Thus, the U.S. side stated on the final day of SALT ONE negotiations:

"The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The United States proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

The U.S.S.R. Delegation maintained the position throughout SALT ONE that an agreed definition of heavy ICBMs was not essential to the understanding reached by the sides in the Interim Agreement on the subject of heavy ICBM's and made clear that they did not agree with the U.S. statement quoted above. When deployment of the SS–19 missile began, its size, though not a violation of the Interim Agreement provisions noted above, caused the United States to raise the issue with the Soviets in early 1975. Our purpose was to emphasize the importance the U.S. attached to the distinction made in the Interim Agreement between "light" and "heavy" ICBMs, as well as the continuing importance of that distinction in the context of the SALT TWO agreement under negotiation at the time. Following some discussion in the SCC, further discussions of this question in that forum were deferred because it was under active consideration in the SALT TWO negotiations.

Since that time, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Delegations have agreed in the draft text of the SALT TWO agreements on a clear demarcation, in terms of missile launch-weight and throw-weight, between light and heavy ICBM's.

D. *Possible testing of an air defense system (SA–5) radar in an ABM mode.*—Article VI of the ABM Treaty states: "To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode."

On April 7, 1972, the United States made a statement to clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode." We noted, with respect to radars, that we would consider a radar to be so tested if, for example, it makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. We added that radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

During 1973 and 1974, U.S. observation of Soviet tests of ballistics missiles led us to believe that a radar associated with the SA–5 surface-to-air missile system had been used to track strategic ballistic missiles during flight.

A question of importance in relation to this activity was whether it represented an effort to upgrade the SA–5 system for an ABM role. The Soviets could have been using the radar in a range instrumentation role to obtain precision tracking; on the other hand, the activity could have been part of an effort to upgrade the SA–5 system for an ABM role, or to collect data for use in developing ABM systems or a new dual SAM/ABM system. Although much more testing and testing significantly different in form, would be needed before the Soviets could achieve an ABM capability for the SA–5, the observed activity was, nevertheless, ambiguous with respect to the constraints of Article VI of the ABM Treaty and the related U.S.-stated interpretation of "testing in an ABM mode." If the activity was designed to upgrade the SA–5 system, it would have been only the first step in such an effort. Extensive and observable modifications to other components of the system would have been necessary, but these have not occurred.

The United States raised this issue based on the indications that an SA–5 radar may have been tracking ballistic missiles during the reentry portion of their flight trajectory into an ABM test range.

The Soviets maintained that no Soviet air defense radar had been tested in an ABM mode. They also noted that the use of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited by the ABM Treaty.

A short time later, we observed that the radar activity of concern during Soviet ballistic missile tests had ceased.

The U.S. has continued to monitor Soviet activities carefully for any indications that such possible testing activity might be resumed.

E. *Soviet reporting of dismantling of excess ABM test launchers.*—Each side is limited under the ABM Treaty to no more than 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. During 1972, soon after the ABM Treaty was signed, the Soviets dismantled several excess launchers at the Soviet ABM test range.

On July 3, 1974, the agreed procedures, worked out in the SCC, for dismantling excess ABM test launchers entered into force. After the detailed procedures entered into effect, the USSR provided notification in the SCC that the excess ABM launchers at the Soviet test range had been dismantled in accordance with the provisions of the agreed procedures. Our own information was that several of the launchers had not, in fact, been dismantled in complete accordance with those detailed procedures.

Even though the launchers were deactivated prior to entry into force of the procedures, and their reactivation would be of no strategic significance, the United States raised the matter as a case of inaccurate notification or reporting to make known our expectation that in the future care would be taken to ensure that notification, as well as dismantling or destruction, was in strict accordance with the agreed procedures.

F. *Soviet ABM radar on Kamchatka Peninsula.*—Article IV of the IBM Treaty states: "The limitations provided for in Article III [on deployment] shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. . . ." In October, 1975, a new radar was installed at the Kamchatka impact area of the Soviet ICBM test range. Since Article IV exempts from the limitations of Article III only those ABM components used for development or testing at current or additionally agreed ranges, location of this radar, which the United States identified as an ABM radar, on the Kamchatka peninsula could have constituted establishment of a new Soviet ABM test range.

This situation, however, was made ambiguous by two facts: (1) just prior to the conclusion of the SALT negotiations in 1972, the U.S. provided to the Soviet Delegation a list of United States and Soviet ABM test ranges which did not include the Kamchatka impact area. The Soviet side neither confirmed nor denied the accuracy or completeness of the U.S. listing, and indicated that use of national technical means assured against misunderstanding of Article IV; and (2) the presence of an older type ABM radar could be viewed as having established the Kamchatka impact area as an ABM test range at the time the ABM Treaty was signed.

Though the location of a new ABM radar on Kamchatka was not strategically significant, it was decided that this matter should be raised with the Soviet side in order to set the record straight.

We brought the situation to the attention of the Soviet side. The U.S.S.R. indicated that a range with a radar instrumentation complex existed in the Kamchatka Peninsula on the date of signature of the ABM Treaty and that they would be prepared to consider the Kamchatka range a current test range within the meaning of Article IV of the ABM Treaty. The United States continued the exchange to establish that Kamchatka is an ABM test range, that Sary Shagan and Kamchatka are the only ABM test ranges in the U.S.S.R. and that Article IV of the ABM Treaty requires agreement concerning the establishment of additional test ranges.

The Soviet side has acknowledged that Kamchatka is an ABM test range and that it and Sary Shagan are the only ABM test ranges in the U.S.S.R. On the third point, discussions are continuing on how properly to satisfy the need for discussing and agreeing upon the establishment of an ABM test range. Agreement appears near on this matter.

G. *Soviet dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers.*—Under the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto of May 26, 1972, the USSR was permitted to have no more than 950 SLBM launchers and 62 modern, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. In addition, it was provided that Soviet SLBM launchers in excess of 740 might become operational only as replacements for older ICBM and SLBM launchers, which would be dismantled or destroyed under agreed procedures. Such procedures were developed in the SCC, and became effective on July 3, 1974. The procedures include detailed requirements for the dismantling or destruction action to be accomplished, their timing, and notification about them to the other Party.

By early 1976, the Soviets had developed a requirement to dismantle 51 replaced launchers. It soon became apparent to the United States that the Soviets would probably not complete all the required dismantling actions on all of the launchers on time. Therefore, the United States decided to raise this question with the Soviets, but before we could do so, the notification concerning dismantling or destruction provided by the Soviet side in the SCC acknowledged that the dismantling of 41 older ICBM launchers had not been completed in the required time period. The Soviet side explained the situation and predicted that all the dismantling actions would be completed by June 1, 1976 and agreed to the U.S. demand that no more submarines with replacement SLBM launchers begin sea trials before such completion. Both conditions were meet. Since that time, although we have observed some minor procedural discrepancies at a number of those deactivated launch sites and at others as the replacement process continued, all the launchers have been in a condition that satisfied the essential substantive requirements, which are that they cannot be used to launch missiles, and cannot be reactivated in a short time. As necessary, we have pursued the question of complete and precise accomplishment of the detailed requirements of the agreed procedures.

H. *Concealment at test range.*—Provisions of the Interim Agreement pertinent to this discussion are:

Article V.3: "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. . . ."

Agreed Statement concerning launcher dimensions: ". . . in the process of modernization and replacement, the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased."

Agreed Statement concerning test and training launchers: " . . . there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs . . . construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training."

In early 1977, we observed the use of a large net covering over an ICBM test launcher undergoing conversion at a test range in the USSR.

There was agreement in the United States that this subject could be appropriate for discussion in SALT in the context of the ongoing discussions on the subject of deliberate concealment measures in connection with a SALT TWO agreement. The subject was initially raised in this context.

In addition, we also expressed our view that the use of a covering over an ICBM silo launcher concealed activities from national technical means of verification and could impede verification of compliance with provisions of the Interim Agreement, specifically, the provision which dealt with increases in dimensions of ICBM silo launchers as recorded in the Agreed Statement quoted above. The United States took the position that a covering which conceals activities at an ICBM silo from national technical means of verification could reduce the confidence and trust

which are important to mutual efforts to establish and maintain strategic arms limitations.

It has been the Soviet postion that the provisions of the Interim Agreement were not applicable to the activity in question. Nevertheless, they subsequently removed the net covering.

*IV. Questions raised by the USSR*

A. *Shelters over Minuteman silos.*—Paragraph 3 of Article V of the Interim Agreement states: "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."

The United States used shelters which were either 300 or 700 square feet in size over Minuteman ICBM silos to provide environmental protection during initial construction as well as modernization, from 1962 through 1972. Beginning in 1973, in connection with modernization and silo-hardening work, prefabricated shelters of about 2700 square feet were used. From four to twelve of these shelters were in place over silos at any given time, for from 10 days to four weeks depending upon the severity of the weather.

The Soviets raised this subject, taking the position that the activity was inconsistent with Article V of the Interim Agreement since it could be classified as deliberate concealment, and that, therefore, it should cease. The United States, based on the nature of the shelters and their use strictly for environmental purposes, not for concealment, believed that their use was consistent with Article V.

In early 1977, the United States decided to modify the use of environmental shelters over Minuteman ICBM silos based on explicit confirmation of the common view shared by us and the Soviets that neither side should use shelters over ICBM silos that impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. Our use of shelters has recently been modified by reducing their size almost 50 percent in recognition of that understanding.

B. *Atlas and Titan-I launchers.*—The Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms, as noted above, provides detailed procedures for dismantling ICBM launchers and associated facilities, one principle of which is that reactivation of dismantled launchers should take substantially more time than construction of a new one.

There are 177 former launchers for the obsolete Atlas and Titan-I ICBM systems at various locations across the continental United States. All thest launchers were deactivated by the end of 1966.

The Soviet side apparently perceived an ambiguity with respect to the status and condition of these launchers, based on the amount of dismantling which had been done and its effect on their possible reactivation time. They raised this issue in early 1975.

The United States view was that these launchers were obsolete and deactivated prior to the Interim Agreement and were not subject to that Agreement or to the accompanying procedures for dismantling or destruction. However, we did provide some information on their condition illustrating that they could not be reactivated easily or quickly. The discussion on this question ceased in mid-1975.

C. *Radar on Shemya Island.*—Article III of the ABM Treaty states: "Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except . . . within one ABM deployment area . . . centered on the Party's national capital . . . and within one deployment area . . . containing ICBM silo launchers. . . ."

In 1973, the United States began construction of a new phased-array radar on Shemya Island, Alaska, at the western end of the Aleutian Island chain. This radar is to be used for national technical means of verification, space track, and early warning.

The Soviets raised a question in 1975, suggesting that the radar was an ABM radar, which would not be permitted at this location.

The United States side discussed this matter with the Soviets and as a result, we believe, eliminated any concern about possible inconsistency with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The radar became operational in early 1977.

D. *Privacy of SCC proceedings.*—Paragraph 8 of the Regulations of the SCC states: "The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners."

Prior to the special SCC session held in early 1975 to discuss certain questions related to compliance, several articles appeared in various U.S. publications with wide circulation. These articles speculated about the possibility of certain Soviet "violations" of the SALT agreements which would be discussed, and tended to draw the conclusion that there were violations, based on what was purported to be accurate intelligence information.

The Soviets have expressed to us their concern about the importance of confidentiality in the work of the SCC, and about the publication of such items. They were apparently particularly concerned about press items that may appear to have official U.S. Government sanction.

We have discussed with the Soviets the usefulness of maintaining the privacy of our negotiations and discussions and limiting speculation in the public media on SCC proceedings, as well as the need to keep the public adequately informed.

E. *Dismantling or destruction of the ABM radar under construction at Malmstrom AFB.*—When the ABM Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972, the United States had ABM defenses under construction in two deployment areas for the defense of ICBMs. Since the ABM Treaty permitted each Party only one such ABM system deployment area, the United States immediately halted the construction, which was in the early stages, at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. Specific procedures for the dismantling or destruction of the ABM facilities under construction at Malmstrom were negotiated as part of the Protocol on Procedures for ABM Systems and Their Components, signed on July 3, 1974.

Dismantling of the ABM facilities under construction at Malmstrom was completed by May 1, 1974.

In late 1974, we notified the U.S.S.R. in the SCC that dismantling activities at the Malmstrom site had been completed. Somewhat later, the Soviet side raised a question about one detailed aspect of the dismantling which they apparently felt had not been carried out in full accord with the agreed procedures.

We reviewed with the Soviet side the actions taken by the United States to dismantle the Malmstrom site, and also showed them some photographs of the before and after conditions there. The question was apparently resolved on the basis of that discussion.

*V. Other Questions and Charges*

The process of monitoring Soviet activity and analyzing the information obtained in order to decide whether any particular matter needs to be raised with the Soviet side has been described above. Activities not raised with the U.S.S.R. as ambiguous or of possible concern have also been examined by the United States. In those cases, analysis of the available intelligence information showed that they did not warrant discussion or categorization as inconsistent with the agreements. Generally, it has been the practice to avoid public discussions of these matters.

From time to time, articles have appeared in U.S. periodicals and newspapers, alleging Soviet violations of the provisions of the SALT ONE agreements. As indicated earlier, these reports or commentaries have been generally speculative, and have concluded or implied that violations or "cheating" by the Soviets had taken place.

Among the subjects most recently or frequently mentioned are those listed below.

A. *"Blinding" of U.S. satellites.*—Soviet use of something like laser energy to "blind" certain U.S. satellites could be an activity inconsistent with the obligations in Article XII of the ABM Treaty and Article V of the Interim Agreement "not to interfere with" or "use deliberate concealment measures" which impede verification, by national technical means, of compliance with the provisions of those agreements. In 1975, information relevant to possible incidents of that nature was thoroughly analyzed, and it was determined that no questionable Soviet activity was involved and that our monitoring capabilities had not been affected by these events. The analysis indicated that the events had resulted from several large fires caused by breaks along natural gas pipelines in the U.S.S.R. Later, following several reports in the U.S. press alleging Soviet violations, and in response to questions about those reports, the U.S. press was informed of those facts by several U.S. officials.

B. *Mobile ABM.*—From time to time, it has been stated that the U.S.S.R. in contravention of Article V of the ABM Treaty, has developed, tested, or deployed a mobile ABM system, or a mobile ABM radar, one of the three components of a mobile ABM system.

The U.S.S.R. does not have a mobile ABM system or complonents for such a system. Since 1971, the Soviets have installed at ABM test ranges several radars associated with an ABM system currently in development. One of the types of radars associated with this system can be erected in a matter of months, rather than requiring years to build as has been the case for ABM radars both sides have deployed in the past. Another type could be emplaced on prepared concrete foundations. This new system and its components can be installed more rapidly than previous ABM systems, but they are clearly not mobile in the sense of being able to be moved about readily or hidden. A single complete operational site would take about half a year to construct. A nationwide ABM system based on this new system under development would take a matter of years to build.

C. *ABM testing of air defense missiles.*—Article VI of the Treaty specifically prohibits the testing in an ABM mode of missiles which are not ABM interceptor missiles, or giving them ABM capabilities (see Secton III,D above). Our close monitoring of activities in this field have not indcated that ABM tests or any tests against strategic ballistic missiles have been conducted with an air defense missile; specifically, we have not observed any such tests of the SA-5 air defense system missile, the one occasionally mentioned in this connection in the open press.

D. *Mobile ICBM's.*—The development and testing of a mobile ICBM is not prohibited by the Interim Agreement, but the U.S. stated SALT ONE that we would consider deployment of such systems to be inconsistent with the objectives of the agreement. We do not believe the Soviets have deployed an ICBM in a mobile mode.

The possibility that the Soviet SS-20, which is a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile system, has been given or could be given ICBM range capabilities has been discussed in the press. The SS-20 is being deployed to replace older medium and intermediate-range missiles. It is judged to be capable of reaching the Aleutian Islands and western Alaska from its present and likely deployment areas in the eastern USSR; however, it cannot reach the contiguous 48 states from any of its likely deployment areas in the Soviet Union. While the range capability of any missile system, including the SS-20, can be extended by reducing the total weight of its payload or adding another propulsion stage, there is no evidence that the Soviets have made any such modifications to the SS-20. We have confidence that we would detect the necessary intercontinental-range testing of such a modified system.

E. *Denial of test information.*—It has been reported in some articles on SALT that the Soviets have violated the Interim Agreement by encoding missile-test telemetry, and that such activity is contrary to the provisions of Article V of the Interim Agreement which were noted in Section V.A. above. Such activity would be inconsistent with those provisions of the Interim Agreement if it impeded verification of compliance with agreement provisions; it has not been considered to have done so. In the SALT TWO negotiations, we have treated this subject in considerable detail, since such activity could affect verification of compliance with certain provisions of the agreement.

F. *ASAT.*—It has been alleged that Soviet development of an anti-satellite system is a violation of the obligation not to interfere with national technical means of verification of compliance with SALT provisions. Since development of such systems is not prohibited, this program does not call into question Soviet compliance with existing agreements. The actual use of an ASAT system against U.S. national technical means is prohibited but this has not occurred.

*Question 2.* Would you provide a complete list of issues related to compliance raised in the Standing Consultative Commission, and a full explanation in each instance as to the resolution?

Answer. The United States has raised a number of questions concerning situations and Soviet activities which appeared ambiguous and to ensure there is mutual understanding of SALT agreement provisions. These questions involved ICBM launch control facilities, concealment measures, the location and use of ABM and air defense radars, the definition of a heavy ICBM, and dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers. All of these questions are the subject matter of a paper which is under preparation in the SALT Working Group of the NSC Special Coordination Committee. It will contain a thorough discussion of the background of each of the matters raised by either side as well as the discussions and the current status or outcome. All the questions raised have been dealt with satisfactorily. Of course, all the relevant situations and activities continue to be carefully monitored, as are all Soviet activities related to the SALT

agreements, and it is the clearly-established prerogative of either side to reopen and discuss further any previously-discussed matter, or to open any new question, at any time the situation warrants it.

*Question 3.* [Deleted.]

*Question 4.* [Deleted.]

*Question 5.* (a). What methods might be used to test a MIRV bus without giving away the fact that the missile under test had a MIRVed capability?

*Question 5.* (b). How certain would the United States be of detecting such an effort through national technical means?

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 6.* (a) Is it correct that MRVs are not counted under the proposed SALT ceilings, and MIRVs are?

(b) How can a MRV test be told from a MIRV test?

(c) Is the difference between a MRV and MIRV fully understood and agreed to by the two sides?

Answer. (a) [Deleted.]

(b) [Deleted.]

(c) [Deleted.]

*Question 7.* How would you characterize the difference in verification problems faced by the United States and Soviet Union?

Answer. The difference between United States and Soviet ability to verify compliance with the SALT TWO agreement derives from the difference between the open U.S. society and the closed Soviet society. The United States must rely almost exclusively on national technical means for data on verification; the Soviets, by contrast, use national technical means to supplement information related to verification which they obtain from other (largely public) sources. The greater U.S. dependence on national technical means makes the United States more vulnerable to interference with or deliberate concealment from these means. For this reason, the United States has insisted on strict provisions against interference or concealment as well as on other provisions such as the MIRV counting rules, that improve our ability to verify compliance by national technical means. We believe that these provisions ensure adequate vertification of the agreement by the United States. They also increase the risks to the Soviets of the detection of clandestine activities. On balance, therefore, we believe that U.S. verification problems will be manageable, although we recognize that they will be greater than those faced by the Soviet Union.

*Question 8.* How specific is our understanding to date with the Soviet Union as to what would be covered in SALT THREE?

Answer. The Delegations in Geneva are working out a "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms."

[Deleted.]

*Question 9.* Clearly SALT is beginning to encroach upon theater nuclear weapons considerations, particularly as they apply to NATO. How should that problem be handled in SALT THREE? How should our Allies be part of the process?

Answer. Throughout the SALT TWO negotiations we have consulted intensively with our Allies. The SALT Delegation has frequently consulted with the North Atlantic Council at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. These consultations have involved detailed discussion of the current status of the SALT negotiations and candid exchanges among the participants. In addition there have been frequent bilateral consultations both in European captals and in Washington to discuss in detail SALT issues of interest to our Allies. We have taken into consideration Allied concerns on all matters related to SALT, and the Allies have expressed their appreciation for these efforts.

There has been no decision made on the scope of SALT THREE, but SALT THREE may well involve systems of Allied interest to a greater extent than SALT TWO. If this is the case, it will most certainly lead to even closer consultation with the Allies.

Senator CASE. May I say something off the record, please?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator CHURCH. Are there any more questions of Mr. Warnke?

Senator GLENN. Yes; I have one.

I understand that the State Department would like for us to move to declassify as much of this meeting and the November 3 meeting as possible.

Would it be in order to ask ACDA to go through the committee hearing record for November 3 and for today's meeting with the idea of declassifiying these meetings in their entirety, or as much as it is possible to do? If it is in order, I would so move.

Senator CHURCH. Such a motion would be in order, if it could be made.

Senator CASE. We could always ask them to do it, but they would have to agree.

What do you think?

Senator CHURCH. I think it would be salutary to do it.

Senator CASE. We did have a somewhat informal colloquy on several occasions and that might be looked at by our staff.

Mr. JONES [committee staff]. It does take formal action by the committee to do this.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Warnke, first of all, from the standpoint of the administration, does the administration have any objection to the release of a sanitized version after you have passed upon it?

Mr. WARNKE. We have no disagreement, certainly in principle, Senator Church. The one concern that I would have is that we have been quite forthright about the progress of the negotiations and the positions of both sides. I would want to avoid anything that would lead the other side to feel that we were violating some sort of confidentiality.

Senator CHURCH. You would have the opportunity to review the text and to make such changes as you think are necessary to protect our negotiating position.

But I think getting this information to the public would be helpful. All that I see in the press are criticisms of the defects and the weaknesses. There is no inhibition on those who are opposed to the treaties.

Senator CASE. I know it is a big job to look these over and edit them before they are made public, but I think it would be worth it.

Mr. WARNKE. I agree with that, Senator Case, and we will certainly do our best.

Senator CHURCH. All right. Then with that understanding we will put the question.

Is there objection?

[No response.]

Senator CHURCH. Would all those in favor so indicate by saying aye.

[A chorus of ayes.]

Senator CHURCH. There being no objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Warnke, thank you very much for your appearance before this committee this morning. We thank your colleagues for their participation also.

This committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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