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HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA

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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 3, 1977

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1. Peter A. Cook, Jr., District Attorney, St. Louis, Missouri.
2. John H. Brown, Jr., District Attorney, St. Louis, Missouri.

EXHIBITS

1. Exhibit A: The will of Peter A. Cook, Jr., dated March 25, 1911.
2. Exhibit B: The will of John H. Brown, Jr., dated March 25, 1911.
3. Exhibit C: The will of David H. Brown, Jr., dated March 25, 1911.
4. Exhibit D: The will of George H. Brown, Jr., dated March 25, 1911.
5. Exhibit E: The will of John H. Brown, Jr., dated March 25, 1911.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Other Documents in the Series

- Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership.*** March 27, 1974.⁴ (Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- International Protection of Human Rights: The Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy.*** August 1; September 13, 19, 20, 27; October 3, 4, 10, 11, 16, 18, 24, 25; November 1; December 7, 1973.⁴ (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Human Rights in Chile (Part 1).*** December 9, 1973; May 7, 23; June 11, 12, and 18, 1974.⁴ (Joint hearings by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements and the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.)
- Treatment of Israeli POW's in Syria and Their Status Under the Geneva Convention.*** February 26, 1974.⁴ (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements and the full committee.)
- Problems of Protecting Civilians Under International Law in the Middle East Conflict.*** April 4, 1974.⁴ (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Human Rights in Africa: Report by the International Commission of Jurists.*** June 13, 1974.⁴ (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Review of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.*** June 18 and 20, 1974.⁴ (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Soviet Union: Human Rights and Détente.*** July 17 and 25, 1974.⁴ (Joint hearings by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Torture and Oppression in Brazil.*** December 11, 1974.⁴ (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)
- Human Rights in South Korea and the Philippines: Implications for U.S. Policy.*** May 20, 22; June 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, 24, 1975.⁴ (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Human Rights in Chile (Part 2).*** November 19, 1974.³ (Joint hearing by the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Human Rights in South Korea: Implications for U.S. Policy.*** July 31, August 5, December 20, 1974.⁴ (Joint hearings by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.)
- Human Rights in Haiti.*** November 18, 1975.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)
- Human Rights in Chile.*** December 9, 1975.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)
- Chile: The Status of Human Rights and Its Relationship to U.S. Economic Assistance Programs.*** April 29; May 5, 1976.² (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)
- Psychiatric Abuse of Political Prisoners in the Soviet Union: Testimony by Leonid Plyushch.*** March 30, 1976.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)
- Human Rights in Indonesia and the Philippines.*** December 18 and May 3, 1976.² (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)
- Anti-Semitism and Reprisals Against Jewish Emigration in the Soviet Union.*** May 27, 1976.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

See footnotes on following page.

Human Rights in the Philippines: Report by Amnesty International. September 15, 1976.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Human Rights Issues at the Sixth Regular Session of the Organization of American States General Assembly. August 10, 1976.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union. June 24 and 30, 1976.² (Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Human Rights in Iran. August 3 and September 8, 1976.³ (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. June 8 and 9, 1976.² (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Human Rights in India. June 23, 28, and 29, and September 16 and 23, 1976.² (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Namibia: The United Nations and U.S. Policy. August 24 and 27, 1976.² (Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Human Rights in Argentina. September 28 and 29, 1976.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

Human Rights in North Korea. September 9, 1976.² (Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations.)

The Recent Presidential Elections in El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy. March 9 and 17, 1977.² (Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.)

¹ Document only available from Government Printing Office.

² Document available from Government Printing Office, or from International Relations Committee.

³ Document available from the International Relations Committee only.

⁴ Not available.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:04 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the subcommittee is holding a hearing on the human rights situation in Cambodia.

As part of the subcommittee's ongoing work on human rights situations around the world, we are here to examine the allegations of human rights violations that have taken place with the apparent consent of the present Cambodian Government.

Since the coming to power of the National United Front of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in April 1975, and the subsequent establishment of the State of Democratic Cambodia in January 1976, there have been serious reports of extensive killings in that country; forced mass relocations of the people, often under inhuman conditions; and brutal treatment of the ex-supporters of the previous government.

The United States holds no diplomatic or commercial ties with the Cambodian Government. Consequently, we have very little leverage, but still need to remain informed of developments in Cambodia.

We are happy to welcome testimony from persons who have closely followed and examined the situation in Cambodia. The witnesses are: Dr. Peter A. Poole, adjunct professor of international relations, American University; Dr. Gareth Porter, of the Institute for Policy Studies; Mr. John Barron, senior editor of Reader's Digest; and Dr. David P. Chandler, research associate of the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University.

Dr. Poole, if it is agreeable we will start with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF PETER A. POOLE, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Education:

A.B., Columbia College, N.Y.C. (History) 1956; M.A., Yale University (International Relations) 1957; Ph.D., School of International Service, American University (International Relations) 1968.

Academic positions:

1974 to present, Adjunct Professor of International Relations, American University.

1974-75, Chairman, Southeast Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute.

1972-74, Associate Professor of International Relations, George Washington University.

1969-72, Associate Professor of International Relations, Howard University.

Research positions:

1968-69, American University Center for Research in Social Systems.

1965-68, U.S. Defense Dept., Advanced Research Projects Agency, Bangkok, Thailand.

1964-65, Georgetown Research Project, Washington, D.C.

Foreign Service Officer:

1963-64, African Affairs Bureau, U.S. Dept. of State.

1960-62, American Embassy, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

1959-60, Language and area training.

Major publications:

America in World Politics, Praeger, 1975.

Indochina: Perspectives for Reconciliation, Univ. of Ohio, 1975.

The United States and Indochina from FDR to Nixon, Dryden, 1973.

The Vietnamese in Thailand, Cornell University Press, 1970.

Expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, Univ. of Ohio, 1970.

Cambodia's Quest for Survival, Amer-Asian Educational Exchange, 1969.

Recent articles:

Asian Survey (Jan. 1976), Asian Affairs (Oct. 1976), Washington Monthly (April 1971), Asia Mail (May 1977), Yearbook of International Communist Affairs (1977).

Mr. POOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Peter A. Poole, of Washington, D.C. By profession, I am a teacher and writer on U.S. foreign policy. In the early 1960's, I was a Foreign Service Officer in Cambodia. I visited the country on a faculty research grant from Howard University in 1971. For the past 2 years, I have served on the staff of Senator Charles H. Percy. However, I speak today as a private citizen, not as a representative of the Senator. And I might add that nobody has reviewed my testimony.

I would like to comment first on the current situation in Cambodia, as I perceive it through very limited sources, mainly Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports and commentaries by people who were in Cambodia near the end of the war.

Then I will respond specifically to the committee's expressed interest in the human rights situation in Cambodia and possible courses of international action.

Comparing the first and second postwar years, there are three main developments in the Cambodian political situation: First, consolidation of the regime's control over the people; second, some movement toward more predictable procedures and policies; and, third, some increased communication with the outside world.

The collective leadership of Cambodia has stated publicly that they no longer face serious internal resistance. They may continue to feel somewhat harassed by their neighbors, but they now seem to regard the danger of an outright invasion as a long-term, rather than an immediate, possibility.

The regime may now seem to the Khmer people less mysterious, though perhaps no less threatening, than it did a year ago. The names and titles of those who are supposed to be the principal leaders have been announced over the radio, as have the goals of the regime. This information has no doubt circulated and been absorbed by some of the

people. It may have helped to make the regime a bit more comprehensible to them.

However, the regime has not hesitated to use terror to enforce its will. This fact and its efforts to stamp out the ancient Khmer culture make me doubt that many of the Khmer people regard it as legitimate.

There has been a certain increase in various kinds of contact with the outside world, including: Official messages and statements, trips abroad by members of the regime to take part in international meetings, establishment of nominal diplomatic ties with many states, and some increase in foreign trade. This trade includes the purchase by Cambodia of some U.S.-made DDT to combat malaria, a very serious problem according to public statements.

I understand that Cambodia may also have shipped some rice to Laos. Cambodia's second postwar harvest may have been large enough to yield a small surplus for export, but there is no way for an outsider to know what this means in terms of the people's welfare.

None of the political tendencies I have described seems to be very strongly pronounced. For example, the regime has not moved very far toward communication with the outside world. It seems likely that the collective leadership remains firmly opposed to the kinds of openness to foreign contact that Prince Sihanouk favored in the years 1953 to 1970.

In July 1976, the Vietnam News Agency broadcast what is described as the English translation of an interview with Premier Pol Pot of Cambodia. "Pol Pot" may be a pseudonym for Saloth Sar, Secretary General of the Khmer Communist movement. Foreign Minister Ieng Sary was said to be present at the interview. He and Saloth Sar are brothers-in-law.

The interview has not been denounced as fraudulent by the Khmer regime. Thus, it may provide some insight into how Khmer leaders viewed their initial accomplishments and their postwar relations with Vietnam.

Premier Pol Pot is said to have told the Vietnam News Agency that his government made no noteworthy achievements during its first year in power, except to mobilize the people to produce enough food for domestic needs.

He said the regime initially faced a certain amount of internal resistance, which he described as United States sponsored. But he said this problem had been largely overcome.

An ambitious irrigation scheme was being built entirely by hand labor, Pol Pot said. He was also recorded as saying that "80 percent of the people's labor were exhausted by malaria." He indicated that imported medical supplies were inadequate for general needs and that locally produced medicines were ineffective. This is one of several comments that seem to mark a slight pragmatic softening of the radical line that Cambodia must be totally isolated from all foreign economic influences.

Pol Pot also said that factories were standing idle because they required imported raw materials, which were unavailable. He expressed the hope that a more sophisticated transportation system would be developed to permit shipment abroad of liquid latex.

When prompted by his Vietnamese interviewer to comment on the "fraternal friendship and militant solidarity" between the peoples of

Cambodia and Vietnam, Pol Pot was only willing to speak of "strengthening" friendly relations and solidarity. He said the relationship was "fine in the past," and "will be ever more finely developed and consolidated despite all difficulties."

The consensus among United States and foreign diplomats whom I have talked with is that both Cambodia and Vietnam regard their present relationship as unsatisfactory. By contrast, Cambodian and Thai diplomats are inclined to describe relations between the two countries as satisfactory or even good, in spite of ideological differences and occasional border clashes.

Cambodia now has ties with many countries, though only a few are allowed to open embassies in Phnom Penh, and even these are subject to severe restrictions.

In September 1976, Pol Pot delivered a long eulogy for Mao Tse-tung, who had just died. In his speech, Pol Pot linked the Chinese Communist Party and the "Cambodian revolutionary organization" as "fraternal" and "Marxist-Leninist." The Chinese ambassador replied in kind. This is the closest the Phnom Penh regime has ever come to stating publicly that they are Communist.

Two days later, Pol Pot was granted "temporary" leave from office for reasons of health, according to Radio Phnom Penh. He was replaced by Nuon Chea. The latter name is that of a Khmer figure of the anti-French resistance in the 1940's. He may still be active in Cambodian politics, or his name may have been borrowed by another member of the regime.

Premier Pol Pot's leadership may not have been "collective" enough to suit his colleagues. Chief of State Khieu Samphan, in an obvious reference to Prince Sihanouk has said that collective leaders make fewer mistakes than single leaders and avoid extreme positions. Pol Pot may have been regarded as too outspoken, but his statements have not been either retracted or repeated by his colleagues.

The Khmer regime's unwillingness to be labeled Communist is rather puzzling. They may not have wished to link an ideology they revere with the harsh measures they felt compelled to take after seizing power. If that is so, the tendency toward somewhat greater openness, which I have described, may indicate the regime's growing self-confidence.

Khmer leaders have publicly acknowledged that some class enemies were killed after the war. Refugee reports indicate that not only political crimes but also the most petty breaches of "revolutionary discipline" were punished by death.

At least initially, the regime's only instrument of political control was an army of ignorant peasant teenagers. Refugee reports also suggest that there was less killing in the second postwar year. But personal rights and freedom seem to be entirely subordinated to the goals of a ruthless collective leadership.

President Carter has expressed interest in having diplomatic relations with all established governments, including Cambodia and some 13 other potential or former adversaries. However, judging by their refusal to meet with the Woodcock mission, Cambodia's present leaders still have no wish to deal with the United States. We cannot change that attitude, but we should be willing to reestablish ties when eventually that attitude does change.

I can think of no form of direct U.S. action, apart from humanitarian acts such as approving the sale of DDT, that would alter the present situation in Cambodia for the better.

However, broad-gaged U.S. support for the development of the ASEAN states, bilaterally and through institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, could make a lot of difference in whether those countries realize their full potential. This in turn might have some effect on the long-term evolution of Cambodia.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much. If the witnesses are agreeable, we will hear statements from the panel. Then we will submit questions to the witnesses on the panel.

Since Dr. Porter is not here at this time, we will go to Mr. John Barron, senior editor of Reader's Digest. Mr. Barron.

STATEMENT OF JOHN BARRON, SENIOR EDITOR, READER'S DIGEST

John Barron grew up in Texas and attended the University of Missouri School of Journalism, from which he received bachelor and masters degrees. During the Korean War he served aboard ship in the Western Pacific, studied Russian at the Naval Intelligence School and subsequently was stationed in Berlin for two years as an intelligence officer.

Upon release from the Navy in 1957, Mr. Barron went to work for the Washington Star as a reporter. His investigative reporting in the early 1960s brought him national attention and numerous journalistic honors. These included the George Polk Award for National Reporting; the Raymond Clapper Award for the most distinguished Washington correspondent of 1964; the Washington Newspaper Guild's Grand Award of 1964; the Guild's Front Page Award for National Reporting; and an award from the American Political Science Association for "distinguished reporting of public affairs."

Mr. Barron joined the Reader's Digest in 1965 as a staff writer. He became an Associate Editor of the magazine the next year and a Senior Editor in 1971. Beginning in 1969, Mr. Barron directed a worldwide Digest research project to amass data about the Soviet KGB. The project culminated in 1974 with publication of his book "KGB: The Secret Works of Soviet Secret Agents," which became a bestseller in the United States and Western Europe.

The book earned enthusiastic acclaim from liberal and conservative critics alike. Newsweek said: "In hard, geopolitical importance, this book outranks and helps illuminate Solzhenitsyn's 'The Gulag Archipelago.'" The noted British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper in a New York Times review said: "... the book inspires confidence ... it is as accurate a general study of the KGB's secret activities as we are likely to get. It is also the work of a highly intelligent man who can analyze and explain as well as gather and narrate ... remarkable work of synthesis." The Columbia Broadcasting System called the book "a devastating masterpiece of investigative reporting."

In the fall of 1975, Mr. Barron together with Anthony Paul began another major research project preparatory to writing a book about Cambodia. The book, "Murder of a Gentle Land," will be published in May 1977 by Reader's Digest Press. A condensation from it appeared in the February 1977 issue of the Reader's Digest.

Mr. BARRON. I appreciate the invitation of the committee to share with its members all that I and my colleagues have learned about the events which have occurred in Cambodia since April 17, 1975.

In our judgment, a tragedy of terrible proportions has befallen and continues to afflict the people of that land. And I fear that, so long as democratic legislatures throughout the world remain silent about their plight, most are condemned to suffer in inhumane conditions bereft of elementary human rights.

To enable the committee better to evaluate what I must report, I will briefly outline the methodology and research that led to our findings and conclusions.

Under the sponsorship of the Reader's Digest, I and Anthony Paul, an Australian who is our far eastern editor, understood in the autumn of 1975 to write a book about what happened in the country after the war. We were extensively assisted by two experienced journalists, Ursula Naccache, an associate editor in our Paris office, and Katharine Clark, a senior reporter in our Washington office.

Between October 1975 and November 1976, we interviewed more than 300 Cambodian refugees, mainly in Thailand but also in Malaysia, France, and the United States. The men, women, and teenagers interviewed fled from different sections of Cambodia at different times during the 13 months of our initial research. They represented all socio-economic strata and all age groups, except the very young.

Only a minority could fairly be classified as having been supporters of the Lon Nol government toppled by the Communists, and some had actively opposed it. The large majority of those interviewed professed to have welcomed the Communist victory at first because they craved peace above all else.

Additionally, we studied the broadcasts of Radio Phnom Penh as published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. With the help from our Research Department in New York and our various foreign editions, we tried to read all reported about Cambodia in the foreign press.

In Asia, France, and the United States, we sought counsel and guidance from scholars specializing in Cambodian studies.

Finally, we consulted a number of intelligence agencies, American and foreign, in an effort to check our data with that which they had gathered by their own means.

In March of 1977, Anthony Paul returned to the camps along the Thai-Cambodian border searching for recently arrived refugees with first-hand information about current conditions in Cambodia.

He summarized the results of his interviews in a letter to me March 28. Although his letter was intended only for me, I think it is so revealing that I am appending a verbatim copy to this prepared statement.

Parenthetically, I think it important to emphasize that more than 20,000 Cambodians are known to have fled the country since April 17, 1975. They represent a very heterogeneous lot, and, while it is true that the initial news contained a disproportionate number of educated and wealthy, the latter refugees have been composed in large part of poor people of the peasantry.

This heterogeneous body, I submit, does provide an important means of ascertaining what has and is happening in the country.

[The letter follows:]

CHANTABURI, THAILAND, *March 28, 1977.*

Dear John—I have just returned from a 1,200-kilometer swing through Thailand's camps for Cambodian refugees—at Aranyaprathet, Trad, Kamput and Laem Sing. I had expected some evidence of slackening terror in Cambodia. It is true that fewer refugees are escaping from that country into Thailand—the present rate is about 100 a month—but the stories they bring suggest that the killings have not yet stopped. Daily, acts of unspeakable barbarism continue to be perpetrated in the name of this once-gentle country's communist revolution. As Ian Ward of the London "Daily Telegraph" recently put it, after a tour of the same camps, "At least 2 million Cambodians have probably perished by now, in the most gruesome display of man's inhumanity to man since World War Two."

Man Hom is a 27-year-old philosophy student whose studies at a Phnom Penh

pre-university school were interrupted by the city's fall to communist forces in April 1975. He was taken north by train to Preah Neth Preah, near Sisophon town, in late May or early June 1975. At the time he arrived, he remembers seeing perhaps a hundred bodies in the fields around Preah Neth Preah village.

About 300 "emigrant" families lived in the village, along with another 150 families of former inhabitants. Workers were offered two tins of rice per day for digging each day irrigation ditches one meter deep and four meters long. "No one could manage that," said Mam, "so the Khmer Rouge gave us somewhat less than two tins because we could not fulfill the norm they set."

There was no rule of law, Mam told me. The slightest form of irregular behavior was punished with summary execution, which often took especially brutal forms. In January of this year for example, a girl of about 20 years was caught reading an English-language textbook. Khmer Rouge soldiers seized her, tied her arms behind her back and led her away. Two days later, while walking along a jungle trail about one kilometer from the village, Mam caught sight of the girl, who was about 15 feet away from him. She had been buried up to the neck. She was still alive—her head and mouth were moving, but no words came. Afraid of suffering a similar fate if he helped her, Mam hurried past. Other villagers told that the girl had later died.

A crude but apparently effective system of spying operates in many villages. The Khmer Rouge often make a distinction between the former inhabitants of a village and the new arrivals, the so-called "people of the Emigration" (those Cambodians evacuated from cities, towns and villages and sent into the countryside in the days following the communist victory). Long Ly, a 29-year-old former official of the Agriculture Ministry in Thmar Puok told me that the former inhabitants of his village were ordered by the Khmer Rouge to report on the newcomers. For thus cooperating with their communist guards, these villagers were given more rice than the displaced city-folk.

Anyone willing to inform on the emigrants finds ready listeners among the Khmer Rouge, whose paranoia appears to be boundless. Thirty-one-year old Khao Thiem Ly is a former air traffic controller at Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport, who managed to conceal, until a day or so before last February, his service to the former government. The village to which he was "emigrated" in April 1975 was Prey Bhan village in the Chouk district, some 41 kilometers northwest of the port of Kampot by road. It is a small village—a population of about 360 at the moment—and of no particular importance. Yet, in the time he was there no fewer than 20 persons were executed for being "American spies," about five of these having been "uncovered" by Khmer Rouge late last year and early this year. Khao, who had managed to convince the communists that he worked for the Khmer Airline at Pochentong rather than the government, was denounced by a visitor to the village who had known him when he was a government employee. He escaped from Prey Bhan in February and took about a month to reach Thailand.

With some minor local variations, conditions at Prey Bhan were similar to all other villages from which refugees had recently escaped. The work schedule: rise at 5 a.m., work until 10:30 a.m. Begin work again at 12:30 p.m., work until 5:00 p.m. Further work on most nights, 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. No weekends or days off of any kind. One tin of rice per person per day until January, then slightly more following the introduction of a communal kitchen. Malaria and dysentery were rife—about ten people died of these diseases. Persons talking in groups of three or more; persons talking at night or moving at night from hut to hut or village to village; persons killing poultry without permission from Angka—all risked summary execution. Only former inhabitants of the Prey Bhan were permitted near the communal kitchen without Angka's specific permission. The "emigrants" were allowed there only at their allotted meal times.

One of the most heinous crimes at Prey Bhan is to carry an affliction known to the Khmer Rouge as khael chak, literally "old scurf" or "old dandruff". This is the Cambodian revolutionary's metaphor for memories of other days—the car or house or family left behind in Phnom Phen, for example. The charge "You have old dandruff" is levelled at anyone who, for whatever reason, incurs the displeasure of the communists. Says Khao, "A villager is given no more than two warnings about having 'old dandruff,' then he disappears."

To anyone familiar with what has been happening in Cambodia over the past couple of years, such stories, of course, are commonplace. Unfortunately for my own humanity, they have ceased to shock me. I confess, however, that I was shaken by an interview at Kamput, Thailand, on March 28, with Chhav Kean, a

42-year-old carpenter from the sugar factory in Kampong Kol village, in Battambang province's Sdau district.

Shortly after the communist takeover, says Chbav, the Khmer Rouge sent a large number of their men to the factory to work beside all the existing skilled labor, each Khmer Rouge learning the job of one of the former staff-members. This system prevailed until early March of this year.

Then about March 4, a group of about 40 of the former factory workers, who had earlier been taken from the mill and assigned to work in the canefields, suddenly disappeared. Their children, who came to the factory looking for them, were told they had gone away. Over the next few days, another 40 or so technicians were taken away from the factory in groups of a few at a time and failed to return.

The remaining technicians' concern for their own future was heightened by the sight of one of these men who had disappeared. He was seen to be held for a night under the Khmer Rouge chiefs but, then blindfolded in the morning and led away. His body, battered about the head and neck, was seen by Chbav at an often-used execution spot 1½ kilometers from the factory.

Now thoroughly alarmed, the remaining 40 or so workers staged a mass escape on the evening of March 8. About one day west of Kampong Kol en route to Thailand, Chbav, a well-built man and somewhat faster than his co-workers, was walking some meters ahead of the main party as they pushed their way through the jungle. He heard shouts, then sustained shooting of automatic weapons. After hiding for some time in the bushes, he managed to reach the Thai border. He believes himself therefore, to be the sole survivor of the former Kampong Kol sugar factory, whose non-communist workers appear to have been liquidated simply because they were too bourgeois for the Khmer Rouge. Of all my recent interviews, however, probably the most disturbing was that with Sek Sa Moun, the 33-year-old former driver of a gas tanker, who escaped from Phnom Svay Sor, a village in the Krakor district on Cambodia's Highway Five. This road, which was restored to reasonably good condition shortly after the war ended, links Phnom Penh with Battambang, which was the old Cambodia's second biggest city. Because the Krakor district is on such a main highway, one can make some assumptions about this community.

For example, if there is any rice in Cambodia, it must be possible to get it to Krakor. If there is any medicine in Cambodia, it must be possible to supply it to Krakor. If any community in Cambodia is in touch with the latest directives of the communist administration in Phnom Penh, it is surely Krakor. Krakor's easy access makes even more terrible the implications of refugee Sek's story. . . .

Immediately after the fall of Battambang in April 1975, Sek was one of thousands of people from that city sent to Svay Sor village, just outside Krakor town. Shortly after he arrived, Khmer Rouge told the emigrants that the population of their newly constituted community was 12,750.

Almost from the beginning, Krakor's scanty food rations began to take their toll. Bodies weakened by malnutrition became increasingly susceptible to tropical diseases. The resultant death toll was swollen, of course, by the fairly constant stream of executions—or sudden disappearances—of Cambodians who had for whatever reason offended Angka Loeu, the Khmer Rouge "Organization on High."

Sek remembers that the worst period began late in the dry season of last year—about April or May. The rate of deaths by starvation and disease began picking up. "By June or July," says Sek, "about five people a day were dying. Sometimes in one day 20 to 30 people died of disease, their bodies swollen by malnutrition." The famine and plagues were accompanied by an increase in the rate of executions. Sek estimated that, from the end of the dry season to about November of last year, about 600 must have been eliminated. The program embraced soldiers, teachers, students and anyone who knew a foreign language. The Khmer Rouge were not reticent about letting the villagers see their victims. "We often found their bodies later," says Sek. "Usually their throats had been cut."

A lull in the killing appears to have occurred in November. By then, one assumes, it was becoming increasingly difficult to find amongst Krakor's thoroughly terrorized and cowed villagers anyone sufficiently interesting to kill.

And what was the total cost of the terror to Krakor? One evening last December, Sek was working in a field with about 70 other villagers, when the local communist cadre, a man of about 38 whom they knew only as Mit Hom (or Comrade Hom) strode out the darkness. Flanked by two armed guards and another soldier carrying a flaming torch, Hom ordered the workers to sit together, then

made a speech. The population of Krakor had been 12,750, said Hom. It was now about 6,000. There was, of course, no apology from Hom for this grim attrition. The purpose of the speech was simply to exhort his wretched charges to ever greater efforts in the ricefields. "Because the population of Krakor is half what it was," said Hom, "you must all now work twice as hard."

Needless to say, if Hom's figures are correct, if Sek has reported him accurately—and I found the refugee a highly convincing witness—Krakor's fate suggests that our earlier estimates of the death toll in Cambodia since April 1975 are underestimated—indeed, grossly underestimated.

Best,

TONY

(ANTHONY M. PAUL),

Reader's Digest Roving Editor (Asia and Pacific)

MR. BARRON. Our accumulated data, I believe, conclusively demonstrate that the following has happened in Cambodia:

Within a few hours after occupying Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, the Communists, known among Cambodians as the Khmer Rouge, ordered the capital evacuated. Within the next days, the entire population, estimated to have numbered at the time approximately 3 million, was expelled at gunpoint.

Hospitals and convalescent homes were emptied and their patients, regardless of conditions, swept away with the masses. Numerous people who protested or were perceived to be resisting the evacuation order were summarily shot.

Soon other Cambodian cities, harboring all together approximately half a million people, were similarly evacuated. And later, probably another half a million were driven from the larger villages to the territories controlled by the Government prior to April 17.

While draining the cities of all human life, the Khmer Rouge mounted a methodical assault on the physical symbols and sinews of preexisting Cambodian society and culture. Troops ransacked libraries, offices, and homes, burning books by the hundreds of thousands, along with written matter.

They smashed hospital equipment, wrecked furniture, and hurled the contents of homes into the streets to ruin. Temples were despoiled and sacked, and automobiles by the thousands were overturned and vandalized.

The purpose here, it seems to me, was to obliterate every vestige of Cambodian culture as it existed prior to April 1975.

Simultaneously, the Khmer Rouge commenced killing former military officers and civil servants of the Lon Nol government. Thousands were slaughtered in organized massacres conducted outside the cities according to the same basic pattern.

Personnel who had been induced to surrender en masse were taken, usually by truck or bus, under various guises to outlying fields, where Communist troops waited in ambush. The actual extermination was accomplished by differing means, which included artillery fire, explosions of hand grenades and land mines, machinegun and automatic rifle fire, bayoneting, stabbing, and bludgeoning.

Officers and senior civil servants who managed initially to conceal their past identity were killed whenever and wherever unmasked. In a number of cases described by eye witnesses, their families, including children and infants, were killed along with them. I should say that normally children and women are killed by being stabbed in the throat or hit in the back of the neck with hoes.

Congestion on the highways and roads out of the cities made driving almost impossible, and cars soon were confiscated anyway. Some people brought along bicycles or pushcarts on which they carried enfeebled relatives and such belongings as they were able to bundle together before their sudden evacuation. But most of the outcasts proceeded from the cities toward the bush and jungle on foot.

Soldiers guarding and goading the exiles along the lines of march frequently shot those who refused or were unable to keep pace.

On the five national highways leading out of Phnom Penh, the midday temperature in those last days of April rose above 100 degrees. Yet the nights were cold. The dry season now ending had parched the flatlands and evaporated the rice paddies, leaving behind stagnant, fetid pools and ponds increasingly fouled by bodies and excrement.

Virtually no stores of potable water, no stocks of food, no shelter had been prepared for the millions of outcasts. They slept wherever they could, often in fields and ditches. Along some stretches of the highways, trucks did haphazardly distribute small quantities of American rice brought from Phnom Penh, but most families received none.

The very young and the very old were the first to die. Adults and children alike slaked their thirst in roadside ditches. Consequently, acute dysentery racked and sapped life from bodies already weakened by hunger and fatigue.

A Cambodian physician, Dr. Vann Hay, who on April 17 was rousted from a Phnom Penh clinic along with all his patients, spent almost a month on various roads and trails before escaping to Vietnam.

Dr. Hay told us:

We must have passed the body of a child every 200 yards. Most of them died of gastrointestinal afflictions which cause complete dehydration. I had some medication with me, but most children brought to me required massive dosages and lengthy rest afterward. Neither was available.

Thinking of all the bodies I saw, plus the sick who came to see me, between 20 and 30 every day, half of whom were not going to live, I figure that between 20,000 and 30,000 people must have died the first month, just in the area described (the route along which he walked to Vietnam).

Now, some of these exiles were fortunate enough to be consigned to new settlements relatively close to the cities and thus, for them, the ordeal of the march lasted relatively a short time. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of others marched for weeks, goaded ever onward into the countryside without knowing what their ultimate destination or fate would be.

The eventual destination of most was a new settlement. Thousands of these new settlements were hewn out of the bush, scrubland, and jungle. Typically, upon arriving, a new villager family would be ordered to construct a hut out of bamboo leaves, whatever could be foraged from the jungle, and then were put into a work group normally comprised of 10 families.

The work groups labored and still do labor from 5 or 6 a.m. in the morning to the midday break and then until 5 or 6 p.m. at night. On moonlit nights, in many areas work continued from 7 to 10 p.m. And this all goes on 7 days a week.

There were in many areas a lack of agricultural implements, tools, and so much of the work had to be done by hand by people who were unaccustomed to arduous physical labor.

Every phase of life soon strictly was regimented according to dictates from Angka Loeu, the High Organization or Organization on High, in whose name Cambodia has been ruled since the Communist conquest.

Husbands and wives were forbidden to quarrel and, in some villages at least, prohibited from disciplining their own children. The children were singled out for intensive political indoctrination and were trained to be informants against their parents and elders. Extramarital sex was made punishable by death, and some couples were executed merely for planning marriage without prior authorization from Angka.

Generally, anyone violating the strictures of Angka or thought to be violating them received a warning known as a "kosang." A second transgression brought a second warning. A third transgression resulted in execution or "disappearance," which was widely believed—and, I believe, correctly—to be the same as execution. However, anyone caught trying to escape usually was shot without warning.

By late summer of 1975, food shortages reached famine level in large portions of the country. Epidemics of cholera, malaria, and dysentery incapacitated a sizable percentage of the new villagers. Given the demanding work regimen, the tropical squalor, and the almost total lack of modern medicine, the death rate inevitably was high in the settlements.

In the autumn of 1975, Angka Loeu ordered field commanders to prepare for the extermination, after the forthcoming harvest, of all former government soldiers and civil servants, regardless of rank, and their families.

I will say here that it is no longer any secret. What goes on the airwaves is frequently heard. While I am not at liberty to discuss what has been heard, I suggest that a lot of governments know that these orders were issued.

Soon word spread among Communist soldiers that former teachers, village chiefs, and students also were to be massacred. The second organized slaughter began early in 1976. Now the lowliest private, the most humble civil servant, and most innocent teachers, even foresters and public health officials, became prey.

The testimony of one Cambodian physician indicates that some intellectuals after servitude in the fields or incarceration in prison were concentrated in special villages for reeducation. However, the physician's own experiences, as well as accounts of numerous other refugees, indicates that many teachers, students, and educated people were killed simply because of their class or education.

Our most recent interviews, as well as the research of other journalists—for example, *New York Times*, May 2, 1977, page 1—suggest that mass executions have abated. But all data available to us show that individual executions, disease, hunger, and, above all, unrelenting terror continue unabated in Cambodia.

Possibly, some of the atrocities and barbarities committed against the populace in the first hours or even first days after the conquest were the result of uncontrolled excesses by individual soldiers, many of whom were very young and haggard, most of whom had been taught to hate and kill.

However, the evacuation of the cities, the methodical assault upon symbols of the past, the carefully organized massacres in different

parts of the country, the establishment of thousands of new villages, the imposition of more or less uniform work patterns, modes of behavior, and discipline, clearly reflect systematic central planning and direction.

As a consequent of this central rule by the Communist leaders who enshroud themselves under the title Angka Loeu, the people of Cambodia systematically are being denied virtually all human rights.

They do not have the basic right proclaimed by the Magna Carta to leave their land. They do not have the right to speak freely, to read, to assemble, to travel within their country, to choose their work or place of residence, to raise their children as they think best, to be tried according to due process of law, to worship.

They do not even have the right to speak favorably of their former home or way of life. They do not even have the right to love each other unless Angka Loeu approves.

And, unless the rest of the world effectively brings pressure to bear in their behalf, they have no right or grounds to expect surcease from the ubiquitous fear and terror that now envelops them.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Barron.

Our next witness is Dr. David Chandler. Dr. Chandler.

STATEMENT OF DAVID P. CHANDLER, PH. D., RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, EAST ASIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

David P. Chandler was born in New York City in 1933. He attended Harvard College (A.B. 1954), Yale University (M.A. 1968) and the University of Michigan (Ph. D. 1973).

From 1958 to 1966, he was a Foreign Service Officer, posted to Phnom Penh (1960-1962), Bogota and Cali (1963-1965) and as Director, Southeast Asian Area Studies, Foreign Service Institute (1965-1966).

Since 1972, Mr. Chandler has been a senior lecturer in history at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. He is currently on sabbatical, and is a research associate at the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University.

His books include "In Search of Southeast Asia: a Modern History" (one of six co-authors, 1971); "The Land and People of Cambodia" (1972); Cambodia Before the French: Politics in a Tributary Kingdom, 1794-1847" (1974) and Favorite Stories from Cambodia (translator, forthcoming). He expects to complete a general history of Cambodia in 1978. Mr. Chandler has also published articles dealing with history and politics of Cambodia in *Commonweal*, *Current History*, *Journal of the Siam Society*, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, and *Pacific Affairs*.

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak before the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman. My statement is quite short, because I was told it should be limited to 5 minutes. I will be happy to answer on specific points afterwards.

I should add, just before starting, that my background is very similar to Peter Poole's; we served in the Embassy at Phnom Penh together. In 1966 I went on to an academic career, and since then I have concentrated on Cambodian history.

To get some perspective on human rights in Cambodia today, we should keep three things in mind: First, the kinds of information that are available to us; second, how human rights were treated in pre-revolutionary Cambodia; and, third, what the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea, the so-called revolutionary organization, mean by "rights and freedom."

We Americans take it as a right, I suppose, to talk with anyone we like. We cannot do this with Cambodians today. The voices we hear are

those of people running the government or of those who have run away from it.

Democratic Kampuchea operates no postal service. All its publications are official and seldom reach the outside world. Visitors to the country are all guests of the government. Ordinary Cambodians aren't free to come and go. We can't talk to the people who are making the revolution or to those who are suffering from it, and they can't talk to us. The situation in Cambodia today is very difficult to judge.

It is easier to judge what Cambodians call the "old society," where human rights or freedoms were the privilege of a few. Before the revolution, Cambodians saw themselves as divided into "big people"—neak thom—and "little people"—neak touc. Haves and have-nots, masters and servants, meritorious and unworthy are other names they gave to this division.

There was very little movement from the bottom of society and very little sensitivity at the top. For most of Cambodia's history, most of the people were slaves.

To be sure, the "old society" wasn't as antagonistic or as self-aware as the revolutionary organization wants it to have been. Relationships were intermittent and disorderly. Here and there you could find kindness, loyalty, good fellowship, and rebellion. "Merit" and "power" were held to be interchangeable terms, and so, perhaps everyone did have a chance. Besides, there was usually the option of escape.

Cambodians now say that the "old society" lasted for 2,000 years. The handful of people who enjoyed what we would call rights or freedoms only did so very recently and always at the expense of people who had none.

Whether they knew it or not, they were "riding on the backs of the peasants," to use a Cambodian expression. The Cambodian language has many examples of this exploitative relationship, since the word for "I" meant "servant" and the word for "govern" meant "consume." Everyone saw themselves as dependent on someone else.

The revolution, according to its leaders, has destroyed the "old society." People are no longer servants of other people. Instead, they serve the revolution. In other words, since Cambodia today, according to its constitution, has "no rich or poor, no exploiters or exploited"—and I think Mr. Barron has explained to us why there are no exploiters—the people serve themselves.

Every day Radio Phnom Penh tells the people to "build and defend" Kampuchea, now that they have become its "masters." Property, transportation, and leadership are all collective, and, while the constitution gives people the right to "spiritual and material aspects of life," only two individual rights are mentioned: The right to work and the right to believe or disbelieve religious teachings.

The constitution doesn't give Cambodians the right to life itself. A recent broadcast from Phnom Penh, surveying the last 7 years, admits that, after liberation, the Cambodian people:

Turned their deep anger against the U.S. imperialists, the traitorous clique—that is, the Lon Nol government—and all exploiting classes which had sown * * * destruction, suffering and hardship * * * among our people for thousands of years.

In April 1975, the Americans had left, so this "deep anger" turned against those who had befriended us or who had fled to the cities from

the liberated zones. People with higher education, money, authority, even with Western-style clothes were seen as traitors.

Thousands of these people, it seems, were killed in the early days of the regime or were allowed to die. The revolutionary organization has never publicly regretted their deaths.

What drove the Cambodians to kill? Paying off old scores or imaginary ones played a part, but, to a large extent, I think, American actions are to blame.

From 1969 to 1973, after all, we dropped more than 500,000 tons of bombs on the Cambodian countryside. Nearly half of this tonnage fell in 1973, when it was stopped after pressure from the Congress; there is no indication that we planned to stop it without that pressure.

In those few months, we may have driven thousands of people out of their minds. We certainly accelerated the course of the revolution. According to several accounts, the leadership hardened its ideology and got rid of wavering factions during 1973 and 1974. By 1974 the opportunities for a negotiated peace—which had never been large—had disappeared.

We bombed Cambodia without knowing why, without taking note of the people we destroyed. We might have thought things through. Instead, we killed thousands of people who had done nothing to us, thousands of people we had never met. And, at the last moment, we walked away from our friends.

Perhaps these actions are preferable to what the Cambodians call "deep anger" and its consequence, which is murder, face to face, and in large numbers, but it is ironic, to use a colorless word, for us to accuse the Cambodians of being indifferent to life when, for so many years, Cambodian lives made so little difference to us.

In closing, it is impossible to say when and to what extent rights and freedoms, as we conceive of them, will be honored in Democratic Kampuchea. In the meantime, we should focus our attention on Cambodian refugees, here and in other countries, doing all we can to make the adjustment of living in America or in a refugee camp easier than it is.

We should do nothing, on the other hand, to encourage armed resistance. Instead, we should accept the fact, even if it might be a sad one, that Democratic Kampuchea is a sovereign, independent state, and we should formulate our policies toward it, in part, by remembering, rather than forgetting, what we have done.

Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Dr. Chandler.

I gather there is no serious disagreement with respect to what happened after the U.S. forces left and the Lon Nol government was overwhelmed. That is, there was, I gather everyone agrees, forced evacuation of Phnom Penh and other cities; there were large losses of life that occurred by direct execution as well as by the hardship involved in the mass exodus.

The three of you have no specific recommendations for the U.S. policy which you would put forward as a means of ameliorating or encouraging moderation in the regime there, as I understand it, although Mr. Barron makes the point that it is important that the international community be aware of what is happening.

Where does that leave us? Is this a matter that we simply acknowledge and that is the end of it as far as we are concerned? Or is there something more that we really can do?

Mr. POOLE. May I respond to that? I think that I said in my statement that I did not see anything direct we could do to alter the situation there for the better, apart from this business of approving humanitarian/economic links like the sale of DDT. I think possibly there are other things in that category that might come along.

I think it is very likely they would have to come along at the initiative of the Cambodian side. I think that our offering officially or even perhaps unofficially offering any form of aid to Cambodia would probably be grounds for being turned down.

I am not saying "don't try", but I am saying my hunch is, on the basis of past statements and the way they viewed the Woodcock mission, that they are very anxious to avoid any ties with us for the time being.

I also suggest in my statement that that could change, and I don't put any time limit on it. I think it could change fairly quickly. I think that events in the region, for example, if ties between the United States and Vietnam are reestablished—that will force the Cambodian leadership to review their attitude toward us. But I am not sure what that will produce, whether that will make them more or less interested in contact with us. I think quite possibly less, but I am not sure.

Certainly the way ASEAN goes, the way things develop in Thailand, and the way our relationship with ASEAN and particularly Thailand go, will profoundly influence the environment around Cambodia.

I don't think the leaders of Cambodia are stupid people. I think they will understand that the environment around them is changing, and their views will probably change over time.

I think there has been some—I tried to point out in my statement some very slight softening of their line on foreign economic relations. This is something that apparently Khieu Samphan thought about a good deal. I am not sure how influential he is on the Government's policy. But he probably thought about this a good deal as a graduate student in Paris in the 1950's. Apparently, they took a pretty hard line against foreign economic ties at the start of their period of exclusive control in Cambodia in April of 1975. I think that line has been softened a little bit.

So I think there are little currents of movement in several different directions, and I think that we ought to, as I state flatly in my paper—I think we ought to be prepared to establish normal relations with the established Government of Cambodia, as with virtually any government in the world, when that can be done.

I don't think we can force the pace.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Barron.

Mr. BARRON. I am only a journalist and have no competence in formulation of foreign policy, but, speaking as a layman, it seems to me there are a few things we might do.

I revert to a point I insinuated in my prepared statement, by saying it is my feeling that, unless we speak out, our silence lends a concurrence. And, by not taking a moral stand, by not denouncing the deaths of a very large number of people, we are, in effect, communicating to

the leadership that they can with impunity continue to do whatever they want.

Second, I would say that, while the leadership has, by every means possible, sought to isolate itself from the world, to make the country impervious to foreign influence, it still has to live in the world and is cognizant of what goes on in the rest of the world and what the attitudes of its neighbors are.

The Cambodians do maintain a relationship with the Chinese and they have some relationships, despite continuing border clashes, with the Vietnamese. It might be possible, through the Chinese and the Vietnamese, diplomatically to take some action to induce them to ameliorate this continuing extermination of the population, and extermination is now occurring not so much through execution, but by the conditions in which the people have been enslaved and by very serious shortages of food and medicine.

I would agree that any direct offer of U.S. food perhaps wouldn't be successful, although they did accept DDT, which they desperately needed. And I would think that through some international organization or some combination of states of different ideologies, we might try to get these suffering, dying people some food and medicine so they at least have a chance to live for a while.

No one knows how many people have died there. Our best and most conservative estimate was 1.2 million since April 17. If you read the account of my colleague, he now feels that is low. If you analyze the statements of Khieu Samphan, you could fairly conclude that maybe more than 1.2 million have died. French authorities and students estimate 800,000, and I think you can get a figure somewhat in excess of that from our own Government.

But this is an ongoing massive death of people. So however hard it looks for us to try, I think some effort is justified, if we can save only a few hundred thousand lives.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Chandler.

Mr. CHANDLER. Yes. The first point—I would certainly concur with what Mr. Barron said about the food and medicine. It seems to me that this is a place where we could be of some assistance. And if it isn't done directly, in the name of the United States, we could help to keep people alive.

What worries me a little about some other suggestions is that I personally feel that we are not in a good position to make moral statements about Cambodia, and this doesn't mean that what has happened since April 1975 isn't very horrifying, that the regime is not everything that people have said it was, such as the recent report in the New York Times and Mr. Barron's presentation.

I am certain that many of my friends and Peter's friends in 1960-62 have been killed, and I didn't want to give the impression in my statement that I was indifferent to this, but it seems to me that to make statements condemning the situation in Cambodia is a lot easier for us to do than to combine a policy or an ideology of remembering our own activities there with true humanitarian gestures that might be made through, as suggested, international organizations, without allowing—and this is always very hard for us in this country—without allowing a note of sanctimoniousness to creep in.

Mr. FRASER. We have a vote in progress, so, we will take about an 8-minute recess, and be right back.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will reconvene. There may be some additional votes soon, so I think perhaps we should use this chance to pursue questions.

Dr. Poole, you and Dr. Chandler were in the U.S. Embassy at Phnom Penh. How late were you there?

Mr. POOLE. I left in December 1962, which is now getting a little far back.

Mr. CHANDLER. I left at the same time. We were in language class together, so our tours of duty overlapped.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Chandler, you suggested that we lack the moral basis on which to make judgments with respect to the regime that is now in control of Cambodia on the basis of our own conduct there, which you were quite critical of. Should that be a bar to our expression of concern in perpetuity or for just—

Mr. CHANDLER. Of course not.

Mr. FRASER [continuing]. A decent interval?

Mr. CHANDLER. I would wish that statements of concern were made in a context of memory as well as a context of sanctimoniousness, and this is part of the problem, it seems to me, that statements about the regime, true as they are, seem to be made in a vacuum, as if we had nothing to do with the situation there. The same is true of statements about the apparent deterioration or troubles that have arisen in southern Vietnam, in Saigon, whereas the city of Saigon where these troubles are taking place is our own creation.

It seems to me that it is a complicated position to take, but it is one we have to take to be honest with ourselves. I don't say that we should be quiet or that we should merely admit our responsibility and then be quiet, but we shouldn't be surprised—let me put it this way. We shouldn't be surprised at the moment if this regime despises us. And we should work with that as a fact for now and hope that it will change as time goes on.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, since you are doing the speaking now, Dr. Chandler, I will start on this end rather than that end. Your testimony was very annoying to me, needless to say.

I see you are sort of backing off the statement that you made that we shouldn't make moral statements. You know, it is just unbelievable to me that you could say that, because we bombed Cambodia—you didn't say that gives them the right to eliminate all the people, but you indicated that that may be the reason that they are killing their own.

Our bombs didn't single out certain segments or certain peoples in Cambodia. Our bombs hit them all. And whether you thought it was right or I thought it was right, the military at that particular time thought it was right.

Therefore, I can accept your last paragraph down to the word "it" in the next to the last line, because that is the direction I think we should be going. I cannot accept your third to the last paragraph and in no way can I justify anything that may have happened since the end of the war, based on what we as an American people may have done, and, therefore, we should sit back and be quiet.

I suppose because the Chicago police force was corrupt, that spawned Al Capone, and, therefore, American citizens should just sit back and be perfectly quiet about that.

You know, we have made the decision and this administration has made the decision that we are going to speak out. And, if we are going to base whether we speak out or whether we don't on some of our sins in the past, there is nowhere that I know of within the country or in any country where we would be permitted to speak out, because certainly there is a sin of some nature in relationship to Americans actions or behavior in relationship to other countries.

I know you are not trying to oversimplify it and say the slaughter of 1 million or 2 million people—however many people were slaughtered—is justified, but I cannot understand how you think we should sit back and not speak out while this is going on, that we should feel very badly about doing this kind of thing, since this is the decision the administration has decided on, to be applied all over the world, and I see no difference in Cambodia than in any other place.

Dr. Poole, you suggested some of the things we could do to try to find some way to get some humanitarian aid in. I was tickled, of course, being in the orchard business, that they would request DDT. I wish I could find a way to get it back into my orchard to protect it from the Japanese beetle.

How would you—you did mention something about going the route of international organizations. Do you think the United Nations, for instance? The Red Cross?

Mr. POOLE. I am not sure that that was my statement that you are referring to. I think it might possibly—I think it might have been Mr. Barron.

Mr. GOODLING. But you did say something in your statement about that being one way—

Mr. POOLE. I think each of us made some comment that humanitarian aid, however it could be gotten there, was a good idea. I don't think that the question of methodology or how you get material to them is something that I can comment very usefully on here, nor does it seem to me to be terribly central.

It seems to me the first question is: They are probably going to have to ask for something, because I don't think that our offering it is going to cause any reaction in Phnom Penh, and, if they ask for it, then I think we can probably find a way of getting it there.

Mr. GOODLING. Then let me ask you this. Do you think our speaking out, for instance, will make them any more amenable to doing something about the plight of those people who are dying and have been murdered?

Mr. POOLE. No; I don't, sir. I think that—

Mr. GOODLING. Then, if we have nothing to offer unless they ask and if speaking out isn't going to put any pressure on them whatsoever, what is left?

Mr. POOLE. I don't think there is a great deal we can do. As I said in my statement, I don't see a lot that we can do to change the situation for the better. I think that we could conceivably worsen the situation by an overlv—

Mr. GOODLING. Then why is it right in some instances or in a lot of instances to do a lot of speaking out? You know, I get the impres-

sion that, if we speak out, that is going to bring about a change in the way they are going to treat human rights in other countries.

How is this situation all that much different?

Mr. POOLE. I am not sure that I think speaking out will do much good here.

Mr. GOODLING. You are not an advocate of this speaking out?

Mr. POOLE. I don't think it will do much good in this case.

Mr. GOODLING. Anywhere?

Mr. POOLE. No. I don't personally prefer declaratory statements to action in many situations that I can think of and certainly not in this one.

Mr. GOODLING. I have no further questions.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, if it is OK with you, I would prefer it if we could go ahead and vote and then come back and resume the hearing. My questions may take more than a few minutes.

Mr. FRASER. We have another vote coming, so we will recess again briefly.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order. Since we last recessed, Dr. Gareth Porter has joined us. Dr. Porter has a prepared statement which we will insert in the record at this point. Then, perhaps, we could ask him to join in responding to questions.

[Dr. Porter's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARETH PORTER, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The situation in postwar Cambodia has generated an unprecedented wave of emotional—and at times even hysterical—comment in the United States and Western Europe. The closing off of Cambodia to the foreign press, making the refugees the only source of information used by the media, and the tendency of many refugees to offer the darkest possible picture of the country they fled have combined to provide a fertile ground for wild exaggeration and wholesale falsehood about the government and its policies. The result is the suggestion, now rapidly hardening into conviction, that 1 to 2 million Cambodians have been the victims of a regime led by genocidal maniacs.

This charge is based on a kernel of truth: There were undoubtedly large numbers of killings in the newly-liberated areas immediately after the war by soldiers of the victorious army, motivated by vengeance, and diseases such as cholera and malaria have taken a heavy toll. Moreover, it may well be true that summary executions have been used by local officials to punish foes of the regime as well as others who have violated regulations. But the notion that the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea adopted a policy of physically eliminating whole classes of people, of purging anyone who was connected with the Lon Nol government, or punishing the entire urban population by putting them to work in the countryside after the "death march" from the cities, is a myth fostered primarily by the authors of a Reader's Digest book which was given massive advance publicity through Time magazine and then again when the book was condensed in Readers Digest. The charge is not supported by serious documentary evidence, and it is contradicted by a number of reports from refugees themselves. A careful sifting through the available evidence suggests that this charge, like the infamous "bloodbath" in North Vietnam from 1954 to 1956 is an historical myth.

It will undoubtedly be many years before anything like an adequate picture of the situation in postwar Cambodia can be constructed from abroad. Nevertheless the analyst must intelligently assess the totality of the information available. It is my judgment that the predominant cause of death in Cambodia has been disease, complicated by heavy work schedule, and in some case, inadequate nutrition. It may be argued that, to the extent that the current government

is responsible for suffering and death, it is not primarily because of its reorganization of Cambodian society, nor its policies toward those associated with the old society, but rather its pursuit of a policy of self-reliance, which has minimized reliance on foreign assistance during a period of hardship whose fundamental causes lay in the ravages of an externally-imposed war.

Most commentaries on postwar Cambodia have attributed all the suffering and death there to the determination of its leaders to destroy the old society and recreate a radically new one according to a rigid ideological concept. But while the Khmer Communists' collectivization of economic and social life represents an ideological choice, the major decisions which have been so controversial—the dispersal of the urban population to the countryside, the organization of the entire working population into work teams and the continuation of a wartime work schedule, have been taken in the midst of a profound social crisis, during and immediately following a war which was certainly one of the most devastating to any country in history.

It should not be forgotten that the vast bulk of the countryside underwent a revolutionary transformation not during the last two years but during the five years of warfare. The conditions in which the zone controlled by the Communist-led National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) was transformed into a system of collective agriculture included very heavy bombing by the U.S. air force and the Kymer Republic air force of heavily populated areas.

That bombing disrupted old patterns of cultivation and residence and made the systematic reorganization of agriculture a requirement for the revolutionary movement's ultimate success. It also brought a degree of hardship for the people in those areas which appears to have been far greater than anything experienced since the end of the war.

Again, contrary to the popular interpretation, the evacuation of Phnom Penh and other cities, whether or not it was consistent with an ideological end relating to the elimination of Western cultural and social influences, was also certainly a rational response to the realities faced by the new government at the end of the war. As I have pointed out elsewhere,¹ in the absence of that decision to evacuate the population to the countryside, a far greater toll of human lives would have been taken by starvation and epidemics which had already begun to break out among the population of the city. The move had to be made as soon as possible to minimize the human cost of the status quo in Phnom Penh and other cities and to maximize the labor power needed to prepare the planting of crops to be harvested later in 1975 as well as to build water conservation works to increase the land which could be cultivated during the dry season.

The contribution which the Khmer leaders have made to the postwar suffering and death has been the result of its eagerness to move as rapidly as possible toward a modern economy, and its desire to do it with a minimum of assistance from outside the country. The fact that the revolutionary zone had passed through the most extreme privation during the war undoubtedly encouraged the leadership to believe that the population as a whole could endure a lesser degree of hardship in order to make a major leap forward in agricultural production in a short time. This meant demanding continuing sacrifices of the population in terms of long working hours, at a time when too many of them were weakened by illness and marginal nutrition. Moreover, they seemed to be determined at first, to refuse assistance from the international community, even for the purpose of coping with the serious outbreaks of cholera and malaria.

These policies, which seem to have been motivated by an extreme national pride in overcoming any physical obstacle by one's own efforts, had to be changed significantly within the first year, as Democratic Kampuchea eased the work schedule to protect the health of its workers and began to actively seek medicine and other goods from abroad to cope with the critical health situation, primarily malaria.

Alongside these mistaken policies which have added to the severity of the health crisis in postwar Cambodia, one must consider the regime's positive accomplishments. The most important of those is certainly the successful feeding of more than three million people most of whom had been dependent on U.S. food imports during the war and who would have suffered massive starvation had it not been for the careful preparations made by the revolutionary leaders and the organization of the rural population to produce a surplus of food even during the wartime period.

¹ See George C. Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, "Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution" (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), pp. 39-57.

Beyond these very basic gross generalizations about postwar Cambodia it is difficult to venture. The characterization of Cambodia as a prison camp in which everyone lives in fear and terror which is conveyed by most—but not all refugees—must be treated with caution since it is so easy for those who rejected the revolutionary society to project their own views on the entire Cambodian population. There is evidence to support an alternative thesis: that the majority of Cambodia's poor peasants, who were responsible, ultimately, for the victory of the NUF over the U.S.-supported government, gave the revolutionary movement strong support, accept the present government as legitimate and follow its leadership for reasons other than fear. It is hazardous to attempt to weigh the balance of opposition and support for the revolutionary regime without far more information than is now available.

There has been and will be a price paid in human lives, in hardship and suffering, and in the loss of certain values, in the revolutionary transformation of any society. Cambodia is no exception to that principle. But a fair assessment of that cost must be based on an accurate understanding of both the costs and benefits of the change, as well as on a distinction between those conditions for which it can reasonably be held responsible and those which it inherited from the war. It must also be matched by a calculation of the cost of the old society and of the violence waged to prevent that revolutionary change. Thus far, Western observers have not begun to come to grips seriously with the issues inherent in such a balancing of costs and benefits.

Over the past year a series of reports have been published suggesting not only that there were reprisals taken against former Lon Nol government personnel by individuals and groups after the war, but that the government had carried out a massive purge of all those connected with the old society, rounding them up and killing them in a systematic, planned way. The first to put forward this version of reality were the authors of Reader's Digest book, John Barron and Anthony Paul, who did extensive interviewing of Cambodian refugees in camps in Thailand.² Their conclusions, along with some of the more sensational refugee accounts, were publicized by Time magazine in the summer of 1976 and have since come to be widely accepted as fact. Along with the acceptance of the "purge" thesis, there have been various "estimates" of deaths from anonymous sources in postwar Cambodia, varying from 800,000 to 1.4 million. Again, by sheer repetition, these figures have taken on a life of their own, regardless of their origins.

This is not the first time that such a nationwide "purge" by an Indochinese Communist movement has been charged. There is a clear parallel between the Reader's Digest account of the alleged Cambodian bloodbath, and the earlier account of the alleged elimination by the North Vietnamese regime of all landlords along with many innocent peasants in a class purge. The fact that there were executions on a limited scale in North Vietnam combined with the belief that it was the intention of the revolutionary government to physically eliminate everyone in their class, produced the allegation that there was, in fact, a policy of purging everyone with ties to the old regime or the old society.³ Although the differences in the two situations are of course, enormous, the same political dynamic appears to be at work in the case of Cambodia. A close examination of all the available evidence suggests that the charge of a policy of purge of former government personnel and educated Cambodians is false.

A discussion of the use of refugee interviews as a documentary source is necessary before analyzing the evidence in more detail. Two points should be kept in mind in evaluating the use of refugee accounts by both Barron and Paul and the recently published book by Francois Ponchaud.⁴ The first is that many of the refugees, particularly those coming from the middle or upper class in the old society and those who were connected with the old regime, are strongly motivated to portray the situation in Cambodia in the worst possible light. They are therefore prone to exaggeration or even fabrication. Responsible journalists who have visited the camps and reported on their interviews have warned that their accounts cannot be taken at face value. As one Western journalist put it, "In the

² John Barron and Anthony Paul, "Murder of a Gentle Land" (Reader's Digest, 1977), condensed in Reader's Digest, February 1977.

³ For an analysis of the charge of a class purge in North Vietnam in connection with the land reform program of 1954-56, see D. Gareth Porter, "The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 5, no. 2, September 1973, pp. 2-15.

⁴ Francis Ponchaud, "Cambodge: anée zero" (Paris: Julliard, 1977).

strange subculture of refugee camps, men and women who have to justify their own decision to themselves and to foreign authorities merge fact into fantasy."⁵

Even more significant in terms of evaluating the claims of a nation-wide purge of the educated or of the former Lon Nol personnel is the comment by Francois Ponchaud, a French specialist. Writing in January 1976, he said, "Don't the passage of time and the overheated atmosphere of the refugee camps, where imagination amplifies and distorts the least rumors, invent facts or at least exaggerate their scope?"⁶ Coming from the author of the book considered to be the most credible work on postwar Cambodia, this certainly constitutes a serious disclaimer on the value of refugee accounts. Yet Ponchaud relies completely on such accounts, not only to reconstruct specific incidents, but to convey the alleged attitudes and policies of the Communist government as well.

The casual way which some of these refugees have with truth is illustrated by two different news reports of interviews with a refugee named Chou Try, a former school teacher who had worked as a medical orderly with the new government. In January 1976, he told a CBS reporter that he had witnessed the beating to death by Khmer Rouge soldiers of five students only days before his departure from Cambodia.⁷ But in October 1976, he told Patrice De Beer that he had not witnessed any executions, although he had heard "rumors" of them.⁸ (Chou Try was later chosen to be the Khmer chief of the entire refugee camp at Aranyaphrathet).

Another case of an elaborate refugee story which is known to be untrue involves the series of photographs widely published in Thailand, Europe and finally, by the Washington Post.⁹ The Post reported a Cambodian refugee story to explain the origins of the photographs, which included a scene purporting to show an execution by hoes and rifles about to take place. According to the refugee, the pictures were taken by a man pressed into service as a photographer by the Khmer Rouge soldiers, who were ordered to take photographs to prove to their superiors in Phnom Penh that the fields were being worked. The photographer tried to escape from Cambodia, according to the story, but was killed 12 miles from the border. But a cousin traveling with him thoughtfully grabbed the camera, said to contain the film with the pictures later published, and took it with him to Thailand, from which the pictures were finally taken to the United States.

The story was apparently credible enough for the Washington Post, which published the pictures as the "first visual confirmation of stories by Cambodian refugees of the harsh conditions under which Khmer Rouge rulers are holding the country." The only trouble is that the pictures are known to be fakes. When they were first published by a Thai-language newspaper in April 1976, Cambodia specialists in Bangkok pointed out several things about them which indicated they were fakes.¹⁰ And a Thai journalist working for a Japanese newspaper, elicited from the Thai counterintelligence officer in the border province of Aranyaprathet, the admission that he had posed the scenes in the photos in Thailand.¹¹ Color prints of the pictures were circulated widely among Cambodian refugees in Aranyaprathet during the spring of 1976, and the Indochina Resource Center received a set of them from a Cambodian living in Washington, D.C. It revealed the hoax, in the July 1976 issue of its newsletter after hearing the story from a Thai who spoke with the Thai journalist in question. The interesting question raised by this episode, of course, is what motivated one or more Cambodian refugees to concoct such an elaborate story about the "Khmer Rouge photographer" and his attempted escape from the country.

This does not mean that refugee accounts are always false or even grossly inaccurate. But in judging the credibility of assertion based on a refugee report, one should take into account not only the general political and emotional bias of the refugee, but other important distinctions as well: first, any interview which is arranged by camp authorities and in the camp situation should be looked upon as less reliable than one which takes place outside that context.

⁵ Martin Woollacott, *The Guardian* (London), Feb. 22, 1976. For other caveats regarding atrocity stories by Cambodian refugees, see Dan Southerland in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 4, 1976; H. D. S. Greenway, *Washington Post*, Feb. 2, 1976.

⁶ Francois Ponchaud, "Cambodge Libéré," Dossier no. 13, *Echange France-Asie* (Paris), January 1976.

⁷ CBS Evening News, Jan. 26, 1976.

⁸ *The Guardian* (London), Oct. 3, 1976.

⁹ "Forced Cambodian Labor Depicted," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 8, 1977.

¹⁰ *Bangkok Post*, Apr. 19, 1976.

¹¹ "Thais Fake Atrocity Photos," U.S./Indochina Report, July 1976.

Both the Ponchaud and Reader's Digest books, it should be noted rely heavily on interviews conducted in the camps and arranged by camp authorities.

Barron and Paul have confirmed that in each refugee camp in which they conducted interviews, "we approached the camp leader elected by the Cambodians and with his guidance compiled a list of refugees who seemed to be promising subjects."¹² The Khmer camp chief works closely with and in subordination to Thai officials who run the camps and with the Thai government-supported anti-Communist Cambodian organization carrying out harassment and intelligence operations in Cambodia. The organization has recruited freely within the camp for these paramilitary units, and its headquarters are known to be at Aranyaprathet, where one of the four major refugee camps is located.¹³

It seems fair to assume, therefore, that the chief of the camp determined who was to be interviewed on the basis of whether or not they had horror stories to tell (The same procedure was used for all visiting journalists, who were able to interview only refugees selected by the camp chief.)

Barron and Paul go on to explain that this initial selection by the Khmer camp chief was followed by a second selection, in which the refugees with whom the authors talked briefly were assessed as to "credibility, intelligence and experiences" before "deciding whether to interview at length." The fact that the authors consciously based their decision to interview on the basis of the kind of experiences which the refugee mentioned to begin with further biased the nature of the accounts which would be reported as representative. The result was that the most extreme refugee stories were passed on, while those which might have contrasted with or contradicted them were ignored.

Ponchaud also interviewed Cambodians in the camps, presumably under the "guidance" of the Khmer camp chief, and his "sample" of refugee stories is clearly unrepresentative of the population of the refugee camps, let alone of the population of Cambodia. Although by late 1975, the majority of the refugees were said to be peasants, the refugee accounts which Ponchaud cites appear to be only with educated, urbanized Cambodians. Of the 94 accounts which Ponchaud says he used in the book, not a single one is with a peasant.¹⁴ Since those educated Cambodians who had some connection with the Lon Nol government are most likely to have a strong ideological bias against the new regime, this represents remarkably skewed segment of the refugee accounts.

The second distinction which must be maintained in judging the credibility of information based on refugee interviews is whether the interviewer is able and willing to press for details, to go over important allegations, carefully probing for inconsistencies or exaggerations. If he does, the resulting interview is inherently more credible than if he does not. The importance of this distinction is illustrated by an interview by an Australian Cambodian specialist Ben Kiernan, with a Cambodian refugee in Australia in 1976.¹⁵ The refugee claimed initially that all of 3,000 to 4,000 Lon Nol soldiers had been killed by the Khmer Rouge after the takeover of Battambang. When asked if he had seen them all killed, the refugees said yes, but when asked again if he saw the killing with his own eyes, he said he only heard the shots. But when asked if he had actually gone to Thmar Kuol, where he said the killing took place, he admitted that he had gone elsewhere, and that a friend had told him that *he* had heard the shots.

Ponchaud's use of refugee accounts is particularly questionable, because most, if not all were written by the refugees themselves, and thus were not subject to any questioning at all.¹⁶ Such accounts would seem to be the least reliable kind of documentation, and Ponchaud's uncritical reliance on them is a particularly serious weakness given the general problems of exaggeration and falsification to which Ponchaud himself alluded in an early study.

The final distinction which should be kept in mind is between refugee reports about the statements or policies of the Communists and those which relate only what they experienced themselves. This is so because reporting on the *intentions* of one's foes always lends itself to greater distortion than does the reporting of an event. It requires that the refugee remember accurately the words of a cadre, that he understands their meaning, and that he is willing and able to report them accurately. This kind of report is therefore least likely to be reliable. Yet Ponchaud

¹² Reader's Digest, February 1977, p. 8.

¹³ For details, see *The Nation*, (Bangkok), May 27, 1976; *Liberation* (Paris), May 6, 1976.

¹⁴ Ponchaud, *Cambodge*: Anee Zero, p. 10.

¹⁵ Ben Kiernan, "Cambodia in the News; 1975-76", *Melbourne Journal of Politics*, vol. 8, 1975-76, pp. 9-10.

¹⁶ Ponchaud, *loc. cit.*

repeatedly cites refugee allegations about the slogans, policies and statements of the Communists uncritically, as though they were objective fact. Indeed, he goes a step further, rendering the slogans or quotations as though they were primary documents—the actual words of the Communists themselves, rather than the proximate recollections of refugees who are far removed from the actual words.¹⁷

The consequences of these methodological weaknesses must inevitably be a serious distortion of reality. Both Ponchaud's and Barron and Paul's books fail to measure up to even the minimum standards of journalism or scholarship, and their overall conclusions and general tone must be regarded as the product of overheated emotions and lack of caution. Moreover, there is enough evidence available from various sources, including material published by Ponchaud himself, to discredit the extreme thesis propounded by both books.

II

What the evidence from refugee interviews does clearly establish is that there were widespread reprisals against officers, and in some cases, against their families, in the Battambang-Siem Reap region. In particular a number of accounts tell of the killing of some 300 officers who gave themselves up in Battambang a few days after the end of the war. There is no reason to doubt that such violence took place. But there is reason to believe that was not the intention of the government or was the result of vengeance by local Communist troops and cadres.

It is clear that many cadres and soldiers of the revolutionary army were motivated to take revenge against their enemies in the days following the end of the war. One refugee, interviewed at length in Australia in 1976, recalled that cadres admitted being fired up by "controllable hatreds" and having killed "old society" people immediately after the war. The same refugee said, however, that the Angkar, or revolutionary organization, the name used for the Cambodian Communist Party, stepped in to order that such killing be stopped.¹⁸ Such orders from the revolutionary leadership were confirmed by a former Cambodian diplomat who reported that he was told by a Communist official near the Thai border in late May 1975 that local officials had explicit orders not to kill any more people of the old government.¹⁹

Ponchaud conceded, in an analysis published early in 1976, that there was no pattern of such killings in other provinces. He wrote that Battambang-Siem Reap was a region of "bloody violence more than any other," and that in other provinces, "massive purges of this type are not mentioned. . . ."²⁰

Even in Battambang, where the worst reprisals are reported to have taken place, the organized killings appear to have been limited to high officers of the Lon Nol army.²¹ One refugee who was interviewed at great length in Australia and who was in Battambang at the time the Communists took over, reported that, although high-ranking officers were shot, middle-ranking officers were separated from them and taken to a different place, while non-Commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers returned to their families three months later.²² Another refugee confirmed that non-Commissioned officers in Battambang were told they were being taken away for reeducation. He presents no evidence that they were killed except for other refugee claims that they saw bodies or talked to someone else who saw bodies along the highway which they assumed were the non-Commissioned officers from Battambang.²³ Still another refugee reported that ordinary soldiers had been taken to a "prisoner of war village," where they worked in the fields like anyone else.²⁴

¹⁷See, especially, pp. 90, 91 and 97 for egregious examples of the presentation of refugee allegations in the guise of primary documentation. It should be recalled that one of the primary methods used by Hoang Van Chi, a refugee from North Vietnam, to discredit the land reform in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a bloody class purge of all landlords, was the presentation of distorted versions of government slogans. The presentation of similar allegations about slogans used in Cambodia should be equally regarded as a distortion which is politically motivated. For a detailed analysis of this distortion of policies and slogans in North Vietnam, see Porter, "The Myth of the Bloodbath."

¹⁸David P. Chandler, with Ben Kiernan and Muy Hong Lim, "The Early Phases of Liberation in Northwestern Cambodia: Conversations with Peang Sophi," Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Working Papers, no. 10, p. 9.

¹⁹Ponchaud, "Cambodge Libéré."

²⁰Denis Grey, Associated Press dispatch, Bangkok Post, June 25, 1976.

²¹Kiernan, op. cit., p. 10.

²²Ponchaud, *Cambodge: anee zero*, p. 64.

²³Ibid.

Still other reports contradict the view that military and civilian personnel of the old regime, including officers and higher civil servants, were the object of a policy of purge. As early as June 1975, one refugee whose account Ponchaud cites, mentioned the existence of a prison camp for officers and high officials as well as rebels against the new regime, located West of Stung Treng. Ponchaud also reported that summary executions were not the rule at this camp.²⁴

Except for the accounts of killings of officers, the only evidence presented by Ponchaud to support the notion of a policy of general purge of those connected with the old society are the disappearances of various individuals from their work teams. Ponchaud reports the nearly unanimous belief of the refugees surveyed that these disappearances meant execution. But, according to Martin Woollacott's February 1976 report, those who had "been able to study the full range of evidence here in Thailand believe most of those who disappear now end up somewhere else in another labour project but that no attempt is made to dispel the notion that they may have been killed."²⁵

Significantly, the Barron and Paul book does not base its charge of a massive purge of old regime personnel and the educated on evidence from refugees. In fact, it states that in 1975 "the organized slaughter largely had been confined to the officers and senior civil servants."²⁶ The argument rests instead on alleged orders to local officials claimed by an unnamed foreign intelligence source. Barron and Paul say that a foreign intelligence agency monitoring Cambodian broadcasts overheard the communist commander in Sisophon receive radio orders to prepare, in their words, "the extermination, after the harvest, of all former government soldiers and civil servants, regardless of rank, and their families." [Emphasis in original.]²⁷

These alleged radio orders may or may not exist. Since the U.S. government refuses to make them public, it is impossible to know. Even if there were orders intercepted, one would have to know the exact wording, as well as the context, to be confident that the meaning was not either misunderstood or deliberately distorted. In any case, one U.S. official dealing with Cambodia told this writer in July 1976 that he had "never seen anything that could be regarded as orders from the Party" to carry out a general purge of former Lon Nol government personnel or any other social or political category.²⁸ A journalist who inquired with a State Department official in April 1976 was told that intelligence reports on Cambodia "contain little beyond the refugee accounts relied on by the press."²⁹

The Reader's Digest account offers no evidence that any such order was carried out. Nor does Ponchaud cite any refugee account which would support that charge. Journalists who interviewed refugees during 1976 found none who claimed to have heard about, let alone witnessed, any massive roundup of former soldiers or civil servants. Patrice De Beer, who visited the Aranyatprathet camp in late September 1976, asked the chief of the camp, Chou Try, about executions. Since Chou Try was the one who had kept track of newcomers to the camp during the previous months, when the purge should have been taking place, he would have known of any stories relating to it. But instead, he told De Beer that he thought "the number of executions has dropped."³⁰

The Reader's Digest authors also cite another alleged order in support of their argument that such a purge was ordered, but it is equally suspect as evidence. They quote a report by Francois Ponchaud that a Communist official in Mongkol Borei district declared on January 26, 1976, "Prisoners of war . . . are no longer needed, and local chiefs are free to dispose of them as they please."³¹ Apart from the fact that the quotation is a mistranslation of what Ponchaud had quoted in *Le Monde*, which falsely conveys the expectation of harsh treatment, if not death, to the "prisoners of war,"³² the authenticity of the quote is extremely dubious.

The statement which Ponchaud attributed to a Communist military officer appears to be a highly distorted rendering by a refugee, who is not identified and whose credibility as a source is therefore questionable. It includes the sentence,

²⁴ Ponchaud, "Cambodge Libéré."

²⁵ The Guardian (London), Feb. 22, 1976.

²⁶ Barron and Paul, Reader's Digest, p. 260.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Interview, Washington, D.C., July 10, 1976.

²⁹ Richard Dudman, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 25, 1976.

³⁰ The Guardian (London), Oct. 3, 1976.

³¹ Francois Ponchaud, "Le Monde," Feb. 18, 1976.

³² The quotation, as attributed by Ponchaud to a "Khmer Rouge Military Commander," is as follows: "On ne plus besoin des prisonniers de guerre . . . qui sont laissés à la discrétion absolue des chefs locaux."

"To rebuild Democratic Kampuchea, a million people is sufficient." This is a sentiment which certain refugees have been eager to attribute to the revolutionary government. This is apparently to suggest that the Cambodian leadership does not care about the loss of several million people in the process of rebuilding Cambodia. But official broadcasts and statements have been hammering away at the opposite theme: that Cambodia is underpopulated and needs to increase its work force.³³ At least one refugee account which appears to be credible indicates that cadres emphasized in political meetings the importance of increasing the population.³⁴ So the quotation appears to be creation of one refugee's own imagination.³⁵

As for the notion of a purge of all educated people, alluded to without supporting documentation by Barron and Paul, it appears totally baseless. Again many refugees have attributed such an intent to the Communist regime,³⁶ but the evidence now indicates clearly that there was no such policy. Ponchaud points out that there were reports of organized reeducation camps beginning in September 1975.³⁷ One doctor who lived in a reeducation camp for intellectuals for three months told of a very elaborate indoctrination procedure, including the writing of "autobiographies" as in Vietnam.³⁸ In a longer account of the experience, the doctor indicates that the Communist officials who were in charge of the reeducation process were respectful toward them and talked of their ability to contribute to the future of Democratic Kampuchea.³⁹ His account hardly supports the popular notion that intellectuals have been viewed as "enemies" by the Communist government.

Cambodians in Paris, who were in a good position to evaluate the allegations of class purge on the basis of friends and relatives who had come out of Cambodia after the end of the war, have rejected the allegation decisively by announcing their intention to return to Kampuchea. On May 23, 1976, 126 educated Cambodians, including a number of former officers and non-Commissioned officers who were forcibly evacuated from Cambodia by their commanders and put in refugee camps in Thailand or in the U.S., denounced the "campaign of poison" which they said was being waged against Democratic Kampuchea. They said they were returning to their country that week after "mature reflection based on the knowledge of authentic facts—political, economic and social. . . ."⁴⁰

It is known that a certain number of high-ranking officials and military men, who were considered by the new government to be "war criminals," were executed soon after the war ended. But the evidence does not support the charge that the government intended to eliminate physically the former military and civilian personnel of the Lon Nol government or any other social category from the old society. The postwar bloodletting which took place was not a consequence of an ideological perversion but of the savagery of the war itself. In a recent analysis on Cambodia, Nayan Chanda quotes a diplomat who spent four years in Phnom Penh until the Communist victory, as saying, "It is important to remember that toward the end of the war, the soldiers of Lon Nol had the habit of eating the livers of their adversaries. Despite the fact that it lasted only five years, the war in Cambodia was the most savage in Indochina."⁴¹ He went on to speculate that, apart from the thirst for vengeance, the "political experience" and "lack of organization" of the Communist cadres and soldiers contributed to the incidence of reprisals.

These reprisals, deplorable as they were, do not qualify the government of Democratic Kampuchea for the title of "genocidal," or any of the other terms of abuse heaped on it. It would seem that such reprisals are not at all beyond the bounds of historical experience following internal wars, or wars involving foreign occupation. Nor should the commonly used "estimates" of 800,000 or 1.4 million dead be taken seriously as indications of the magnitude of the killing. A

³³ Chandler, et al., "The Early Phases of Liberation . . .", pp. 9-10.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ The absurdity of this alleged quotation is increased by Ponchaud's insistence that by "prisoners of war," the official meant "the population deported in 1975," that is, the population dispersed from the cities. He presents no evidence for this idea, suggesting that he was again simply accepting the word of a refugee.

³⁶ See, for example, the comments quoted from carefully-selected refugees by Daniel Southerland, *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 4, 1976.

³⁷ Ponchaud, *Cambodge : annee zero*, p. 94.

³⁸ *Le Figaro*, Feb. 11, 1977.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁴⁰ "Joint Declaration of Cambodians Before Departure for Democratic Kampuchea," with full list of 126 people and their professions. (mimeographed.)

⁴¹ Nayan Chanda, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 1977, p. 5.

European who worked as a statistician for the Lon Nol government until the end of the war and who interviewed refugees in Thailand with the help of Khmer friends has suggested that the number of killings immediately following the war may have numbered in the "hundreds or thousands"—not the hundreds of thousands charged by these anonymous sources.⁴² His estimate, based on the interviews he conducted, and not on the assumption of a particular policy by the government, is likely to be more accurate than those which assume a policy of full-scale purge.

In any case it is clear that the postwar killings in Cambodia do not begin to compare, either in numbers or in central government involvement, to the massacre which took place in Indonesia after the abortive coup of October 1965. Journalists and academic specialists speculated for years that the number of people murdered, with open encouragement by the military regime, was as high as half a million. Last July, Admiral Sudomo, Indonesia's chief of internal security, confirmed officially for the first time in a press conference, that 450,000 to 500,000 "Communists or suspected Communists" were massacred.⁴³

The conviction that Cambodia is the most bloodthirsty dictatorship since Hitler's was not deflected for an instant by that public confirmation of the truly massive bloodbath in Indonesia.

III

The major cause of suffering and death in postwar Cambodia has not been reprisals or purges, as one might expect from the publicity given to allegations to that effect, but the ravages of disease. In the wake of the massive social and economic disruption of the war, already existing medical and health problems became even more desperate. Malaria, the number one menace to the health of the population, apparently became a nationwide epidemic. Prime Minister Pol Pot admitted in an interview with Vietnam News Agency that 80 percent of the work force had been afflicted with malaria to some degree. The strain was particularly virulent, resisting traditional medicines on which the country's anti-malarial effort had depended. Pol Pot admitted, moreover, that, in spite of the construction of many hospitals and dispensaries, "the knowledge of our cadres is still low. We do not have sufficient medicines. Our traditional medicines are abundant, but the effects are not high."⁴⁴

The problem was, of course, not a new one for the Cambodians. A 1972 demographic study of Cambodia concluded that a million people were affected by malaria. Such a conclusion was reinforced by the comment by one Cambodian diplomat who said in 1975 that during the war, for every soldier who was wounded, two had been put out of action by malaria. The very enormity of the health problem during war may well have made the leadership less sensitive to the need for some change in policy to deal with the crisis which developed in 1975 and 1976. The seriousness of the situation did ultimately spur the government to seek help from a variety of sources, in spite of its emphasis on the principle of "self-reliance." In particular, in late 1975 and early 1976, Cambodian officials approached private relief organizations in Europe and the U.S. which had no previous ties to their government about possible medical assistance aimed at combatting malaria. And the Cambodian trade mission in Hong Kong contacted an American firm in 1976 and asked to purchase nearly half a million dollars worth of DDT for anti-malarial purposes.

Still, it was not until late 1976 that Democratic Kampuchea contacted UNICEF, which had declared itself ready to respond to any request for medical help, about the malaria problem. UNICEF had been expelled from Cambodia along with all other international and private agencies when the war ended, and there were apparently political reasons for the hesitation to call on that organization. The failure to move with dispatch to cope with the country's health problem inevitably added to the toll of lives lost and the extent of illness.

Most published reports have put the emphasis, however, on the responsibility of the government for inadequate nutrition and the exhaustion of workers by long working hours. There is little doubt that both nutrition and work schedule played a role in exacerbating the country's medical crisis. But the government of Democratic Kampuchea cannot be held responsible for the fact that food rations were tight in the immediate aftermath of the war. And both nutrition and work schedules appear to have ceased to be significant contributors to Cambodia's health problems.

⁴² Letter from W. J. Sampson to *The Economist*, Mar. 26, 1977.

⁴³ Washington Post, July 8, 1976.

⁴⁴ Vietnam News Agency, July 20, 1976.

A number of refugees who fled to Thailand in late 1975 reported that they had received one milk can of uncooked rice, or about 250 grams of cooked rice, per day per person, before the 1975-76 harvest.⁴⁵ This amount was substantially less than the 450 grams per person per day considered by the World Health Organization to be the minimum daily nutritional requirement. But most people apparently were able to supplement that rice ration with fish and vegetables.⁴⁶ So those people were not starving during the May-December 1975 period. As one foreign journalist observed after interviewing refugees who had come from Cambodia in late 1975 and early 1976, "None appeared to be suffering from severe malnutrition."⁴⁷ What the inadequate diet did do in many cases, was to weaken the defenses of workers against disease.

This problem of malnutrition was not universal by any means, even in the most difficult period. Another refugee who was interviewed in Australia in 1976, reported that each person in his work team south of Battambang received one condensed milk can of uncooked rice per day at the beginning but were given three cans, or 750 grams, per person per day when they were digging a canal in September and October 1975.⁴⁸ Moreover, special pains were taken to insure adequate nutrition for children, who were reported by the refugees to have eaten relatively better than adults.⁴⁹ Swedish Ambassador Kaj Bjoerk, who spent 2 weeks in Cambodia in March 1976, reported that he had seen "enormous numbers of children who looked quite healthy and quite lively."⁵⁰ Bjoerk also reported seeing no starvation.

The problem of nutrition was basically solved with the first major postwar harvest which took place from October 1975 to January 1976. After that harvest, the government announced that it had sufficient rice to provide a minimum of 500 grams of rice per day to each person, with those doing heavier work to get 700 grams per day.⁵¹ While there is no way of verifying that this standard ration was applied everywhere in Cambodia, it is significant that the camp chief Chou Try, reported that prior to his escape into Thailand in January 1976, he was getting two condensed milk cans of rice, or about 500 grams, each day, supplemented by vegetables from his own garden.⁵² He was a medical dispensary worker, and that would have been the standard ration for those doing light work.

The record of Democratic Kampuchea's food policy cannot be fairly assessed without putting it against the background of truly massive starvation during the war in the zones controlled by the old regime, as well as the great privation endured by those in the NUFK zones, particularly during the bombing. The problem of malnutrition in the cities of Cambodia was primarily a function of the influx of some 3 million refugees into Phnom Penh and a few other provincial enclaves, fleeing the war and American bombing, and of the refusal of the United States or the Government of the Khmer Republic to take responsibility for providing food for them.⁵³ For nearly 4 years, there was no significant food distribution program for the neediest population in and around the cities, and hundreds of thousands if not millions, slid into chronic malnutrition. Finally, some 450,000 registered refugees received a minimal 150 grams of rice per person per day—only one-third of the minimum daily requirements. But the more than 2 million unregistered refugees got nothing, and the unemployed as well as large numbers of workers and families of civil servants and soldiers as well went hungry.

But it was the children in the cities and refugee camps who were most seriously affected by this nutritional crisis, especially those under 6 years of age. As early as November 1973, a survey of the refugee camps around Phnom Penh revealed that a significant proportion of the children, ranging from 16 to 31 percent, were "severely malnourished." Half the children in Phnom Penh itself were considered to be "moderately malnourished" by early 1974, and large numbers were already suffering permanent damage to their physical and mental development. During the next year, the nutritional situation deteriorated disastrously, and when a study mission from the Office of the Inspector General of

⁴⁵ Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 4, 1976; Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1976.

⁴⁶ Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1976.

⁴⁷ Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 4, 1976.

⁴⁸ Chandler et al., "The Early Phases of Liberation . . .", p. 7.

⁴⁹ Le Monde, Nov. 8, 1975.

⁵⁰ Toronto Globe and Mail, Mar. 8, 1976.

⁵¹ Le Monde, Apr. 18-19, 1976.

⁵² New York Times, Jan. 21, 1976.

⁵³ For a detailed analysis of the problem of starvation in the GKR zone of control, see, Hildebrand and Porter, "Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution," pp. 19-38. All the data in these paragraphs is documented in that discussion.

Foreign Assistance visited Phnom Penh in early 1975, it concluded that children in Phnom Penh were "starving to death." By the most conservative estimate, at least 15,000 people, mostly small children, died of starvation and diseases complicated by malnutrition in the last 3 months of the war alone and the curve was rising rapidly when the war ended. The number of children who were seriously damaged by malnutrition must have been in the hundreds of thousands.

With as many as 2 million or more people from Phnom Penh moderately to severely malnourished at the end of the war, the population's vulnerability to disease was obviously far greater than it would normally have been. One of the primary reasons for the urgency of the Communist leadership in clearing Phnom Penh population and getting it to the countryside was the threat of major epidemics of cholera and plague in a city where massive overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, unsafe water supplies and lack of normal services would have been the postwar conditions.⁵⁴ If the exodus from the capital city cost the lives of hundreds or even thousands of people, it is also a hard fact that many thousands and possibly tens of thousands could have died in the chaos of postwar Phnom Penh had radical action not been taken.

Even more important, however, in assessing the food policy of the new revolutionary government is the fact that it did, in fact, ward off the mass starvation which had been forecast in no uncertain terms by Western officials and other observers. Because its policy throughout the war had been to carefully store and ration food supplies in order to simultaneously feed its own civilian population and take care of its military needs, and because it began to stock a surplus to help feed refugees from the cities long before the final offensive, the revolutionary organization was able to take care of the population from the cities not only during the trip to the countryside, but during the months between the end of the war and the first major harvest. It was able to do so in large part because of significant advances in water control and irrigation which permitted the harvesting of a dry season crop in large parts of the NUFK zone in 1974 and 1975.⁵⁵

The significance of the achievement of the revolutionary regime in nutrition becomes clear if one recalls that, even during the period before the harvest the most unfortunate workers in postwar Cambodia, who received only 250 grams of rice per day, were significantly better off than the average poor refugee or worker in Phnom Penh, who was getting substantially less than that and was unable to supplement it with any fish, fruit or vegetables. Moreover, in contrast to wartime Phnom Penh, where the children were the hardest hit by the malnutrition, postwar Democratic Kampuchea has, by all accounts, taken care that the children were least affected by tight food supplies. One is forced to conclude that the revolutionary regime has undoubtedly saved the lives of countless numbers of children which would have been lost had the U.S.-supported status quo continued for any longer in Phnom Penh. Since the U.S. policy of subordinating human needs to its interests in keeping the Lon Nol government in the war was directly responsible for thousands of deaths by starvation, there is hardly any basis for criticism of the new government on terms of nutrition in Cambodia.

The human cost of the change in power in April 1975 must, of course, take into account the fact that nutritional problems were further exacerbated by the heavy work schedule which was in effect during 1975 throughout Kampuchea. The Communist leadership, which had already radically reorganized the population to increase agricultural production during the war, undoubtedly saw an opportunity to continue what was, in effect, a wartime labor regime after the war ended not only to adequately feed the population but to gain momentum and begin the process of economic development once again.

It deployed its labor force so as to construct as many water control projects as possible in the shortest time. That meant a ten-hour workday for most workers, beginning at about 6:00 a.m. and continuing until about noon and then again from 1:00 p.m. until about 5:00 p.m.⁵⁶ In addition, they often worked additional hours under moonlight or by the light of lanterns. This might not have proven so severe under normal circumstances, but marginal nutrition and the prevalence of malaria meant that a large percentage of the workers were exhausted.

In response to what was apparently perceived as a serious health crisis, sometime early in 1976, the government changed the work schedule in order to give additional rest to the workers during the hottest part of the day. According to a broadcast in April 1976, work began at 5:00 a.m., and continued until 10:00,

⁵⁴ See *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵⁵ This point is documented in *Ibid.*, pp. 57-94.

⁵⁶ New York Times, Jan. 21, 1976.

then was suspended until 3:00 p.m. when it resumed for another three hours. During the hours of greatest heat, the workers wove baskets and repaired their tools in the shade and at lunch.⁵⁷ Khieu Samphan, in a speech marking the second anniversary of the Communist victory, noted "there are rest hours to enable workers to renew their strength."⁵⁸

Even though both insufficient food and severe working schedules exacerbated the medical situation during the first several months following the war, both those conditions were eased significantly by early 1976. And during 1976 and early 1977 the government carried out a series of anti-malarial programs, consisting primarily of spraying with DDT, and apparently acquired more medicines in the latter half of 1976.⁵⁹ By April 1977, it claimed that the problem of malaria had been reduced by comparison with previous years, "almost all of the working forces" had participated in the harvest, according to Samphan, in contrast to the previous year, when Pol Pot had emphasized how many had been unable to work because of illness. Samphan did not claim, however, that malaria is not still a serious problem.

There appears to be no way to estimate the toll of death from disease, in post-war Cambodia. But there is no reason whatever to credit the numbers put forward by observers in Bangkok of 800,000, 1 million or 1.4 million—from just over 10 percent to nearly 20 percent of the population. Such estimates are meaningless in the absence of some indication of the assumptions on which they are based. It must be noted that the same official sources who were claiming such a death toll had been saying in June 1975 that a million people were certain to die of starvation in the next year because there were simply no food stocks available in Cambodia to provide for them.⁶⁰ These anonymous officials, who were clearly hostile to the new government, had an obvious vested interest not admitting their failure to understand the capacity of the new regime to feed its people. They are therefore tainted by serious bias and should not be taken seriously.

In the longer perspective, it seems most likely that the new government will gain control over its medical problems over the next two or three years, through a combination of better nutrition and the use of the labor force, spraying programs and increased application of medicines and medical skills. From that point on, any assessment of the new Cambodia will increasingly have to balance positive accomplishments in economic development and the improvement of people's material conditions and social status against the loss of other kinds of values: traditional religious practices, traditional values associated with a more hierarchical social structures and easy-going lifestyles, and personal freedoms.

The debate over the balancing of those positive and negative features of revolutionary change in Cambodia will go on for many years. The hanger is that the old society will be portrayed in more glowing terms than it deserves—that its human cost will be minimized or ignored altogether, as has always been the case when revolutions are analyzed in a society fundamentally hostile to revolutionary change. That would be unfortunate, because the old society, however unattractive to the foreigner in its gentleness and placidity, was economically and socially backward. And like all such countries, it offered mostly hardship and misery to the poor.

This is reflected most clearly in the problem of infant mortality in Cambodia.⁶¹ The most recent study suggested that there are about 25 deaths in utero and still births per 1,000 live births, while an older study suggested 20 to 30 still births per 1,000 live births. In various studies over the years, it was found that the number of deaths of children from birth to 12 months was somewhere between 100 and 200 per 1,000 live births. Three different studies, done in 1955, 1958, and 1967, indicated between 150 and 200 deaths during the first year per 1,000 live births. Another 20 to 30 per 1,000 are thought to die between ages of 1 and 4 years. As for the women giving birth, one writer observed after studying the problem in 1958-59, "The number of deaths of women who are giving birth to an infant cannot be calculated but was striking."

⁵⁷ Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Apr. 8, 1976. Cited in Ponchaud, "Cambodge Libéré".

⁵⁸ Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Apr. 15, 1977.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ The 1 million figure was suggested by a U.S. intelligence study on Cambodia leaked by Henry Kissinger to the press. See Washington Post, June 23, 1975; Far Eastern Economic Review, July 25, 1975.

⁶¹ The data in this paragraph is taken from Jacques Migozzi, "Cambodge: Faits et Problèmes de Population" (Paris: Editions de Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1973), pp. 185-198.

Illiteracy, lack of sanitation and modern medical care in the countryside, and generally poor health, which are typical of all underdeveloped countries, are reflected in such high mortality rates for children and mothers, and in shorter life spans for adults. They take a toll in human life and in suffering which does not end in a year or two years but which goes on year after year, for generations. Yet the peculiar American angle of vision on revolutionary change is such that this human cost is hardly ever even weighed in the balance when a country is undergoing a revolution, let alone considered an appropriate subject for moral outrage.

Beyond the physical cost of the old regime in terms of life and health, there is the intangible cost of the social inequality between educated and uneducated, between wealthy and poor, which was clearly as much a reality in the old Cambodian society as it is in any other backward society. When a movement for revolutionary social change appears in such a society, it should not be surprising that there is a positive response from the poor peasant. That response may not be visible, of course, to the outside observer, who usually comes into the village only in the company of soldiers and officials of the old regime, if at all. Thus it is not surprising that virtually every journalist who has written about postwar Cambodia has assumed that the vast majority of the people were hostile to the revolutionary government from the beginning, as asserted by the refugees in Thailand. It may be difficult for such observers to understand how Communist cadres could have developed not merely relations of authority and obedience but strong bonds of affection and trust with the people during five years of war. Yet the one account of the revolutionary zone from a Khmer observer who was in a position to report objectively indicated precisely such relationships. Ith Sarin, former Inspector of Primary Education for the Lon Nol government, who spent most of 1972 as a candidate Communist party member, before returning to Phnom Penh to report on his experience, wrote the following in 1973:

"Another effective point in Khmer Rouge 'Psychological Activity' toward peasants is help during troubles. If a peasant in a phum is sick, the Khmer Rouge will often go to the house to give an injection or leave medicine even at night or during a storm. In ploughing, transplanting, harvesting, or threshing seasons, each bureau must send out its members to help. This being 'together with the people' in order to 'serve the people,' closely associating with the people, is the implementation of one of the Khmer Rouge theories in educating Khmer Rouge cadre.

"These kinds of psychological activities were really successful and deeply affected the people more than the instruction in theory did. The farming people of the base areas who knew nothing of socialist revolution quickly began to love and support the Angkar because of its sentiments of openness and friendliness."⁶²

When foreign observers discuss the costs and the benefits of the new regime in Cambodia, therefore, they must be careful not to impose on the debate assumptions about popular political attitudes, which are based on most superficial acquaintance with the experiences of Cambodian people and their revolution.

In assessing the costs of revolutionary change and the costs of the old society, it is also necessary to take into account the violence brought to bear from outside the country in order to maintain the old order. It is true that the U.S. intervention gave the critical historical impetus to the Cambodian Communist movement by its invasion of May 1970 and the consequent Vietnamese move into the interior of the country, organizing and arming local resistance groups as it did so, and by its bombing, which made the recruitment of resistance fighters so much easier. It is also true that it was the American war in Cambodia, like the French and American wars in Vietnam, which made the change from a traditional, stagnant economy and society to a tightly organized and disciplined, dynamic society so costly and painful to Cambodia.

Regardless of what mistakes have been committed by Cambodia's revolutionary leadership, or the excesses of its soldiers or cadres, the human cost of the revolutionary change is dwarfed by the magnitude of suffering and death which attended the war and its aftermath. There is no way for the U.S., as the foreign power whose resources and power alone kept the war going for five years, to deny its overall responsibility for the Cambodian tragedy. The problems of food,

⁶² Excerpt from *Regrets for the Khmer Soul*, translated by Timothy M. Carney, in Carney, "Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion," Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper, no. 106, January 1977, p. 46.

disease and large-scale internal migration have been largely the consequence of that war. It is the worst kind of historical myopia and hypocrisy to express more moral outrage at the revolutionary government for its weaknesses than at the cause of overwhelmingly greater suffering: the U.S. policy in Cambodia from 1970 to 1975.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say, first of all, that I think you are to be complimented not only for your continuing concern over the human rights issue in general, but for your willingness to hold this hearing on Cambodia in particular.

Based on the testimony we have heard today, and on reading which I have done on this issue, and on my conversations with Cambodian refugees in Aranyaprathet, and with our Cambodia watchers in Bangkok, I must say that, compared to Khieu Samphan, General Pinochet, President Park, President Suharto, and some of the other national leaders whom your committee has investigated, are candidates for the man of the year award of the American Civil Liberties Union.

[Laughter.]

Mr. SOLARZ. I find myself, in a way, appalled by what has been said here today. We sit here and we listen to this testimony and people in the audience look pretty much the same way people look at hearings on far more prosaic subjects. I think somehow maybe we have lost sight of the fact that in the course of the last 2 years or so there have been a million or more people who have been murdered in another country.

I think that this is really one of the most monstrous crimes in the history of the human race, and I think it calls for and requires a response which is appropriate to the situation.

To me, the holocaust in which 6 million Jews lost their lives at the hands of Hitler is the central existential fact not only of our time, but of human history, because it provides an indication of the depths of depravity to which the human spirit can sink.

And I might have hoped that, after Hitler, the world would have finally learned its lesson on genocide, and that holocausts would have been something of the past. Obviously, it hasn't. In its own way, the indifference of the world to the events in Cambodia is almost as appalling as what has happened there itself.

One of the things that strikes me is the disproportion between what has been happening there and the response of the world. Can anybody believe, for example, that if the Soviet Union embarked on an effort to systematically exterminate the 3 million Jews who remain in Russia, the people of our country or the rest of the world would remain silent?

It almost seems to me that there is a kind of implicit racism in our response, in the sense that they are not whites or Jews or westerners who are being murdered, but orientals. Perhaps to us, oriental life isn't worth as much as Western life.

I simply cannot believe that, if what is happening in Cambodia were happening in some of the countries of the western world, involving Jews or other groups with which we are more familiar we would talk about sending DDT to the offending nation in an effort to ameliorate the situation.

Some of the justifications or explanations which we have heard for the events of the last year have been frankly, in my judgment, both

cowardly and contemptible. They are, as I see it, very much the same kind of justifications that were offered to justify the murder of the Jews by Hitler in the 1940's.

I hold no brief for what we did in Cambodia. I fully agree that we bear a measure of the responsibility for setting in motion a course of events which ultimately led to this most monstrous evil. But how anybody can suggest, by virtue of that fact, that we are morally absolved of any obligation to attempt to deal with this crime seems to me an act of moral insensitivity.

So I think we have to consider what we can do. I don't know necessarily that speaking out is the answer, although I am convinced that keeping silent is not. Clearly there are others whose credentials are less tarnished than our own who might more effectively champion this cause. The problem is that nobody has assumed the banner.

And I don't know that it absolves us of our moral responsibility to prevent a continuation of what has been happening in Cambodia simply because others haven't taken the initiative.

I would like to ask the witnesses to comment on a number of questions which I have, because I do believe we have to give some thought to the most effective potential kind of international response possible.

The first is: Can any of you explain why what happened in Cambodia actually happened? This, after all, is a relatively unprecedented historic event. Here is a revolutionary regime presumably imbued with Marxist ideology. Marx talked about the triumph of the proletariat, not the elimination of the proletariat. Even the Chinese, who come to power on the basis of what was essentially an agrarian revolution, made no effort to completely depopulate their cities and transfer the urban population to the countryside.

I wonder if you have any sense of the kind of ideological justification for what has happened in Cambodia, as presented by the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea—what they hope to accomplish—what led to the development of the kind of ideology which led them to embark on what I think is a virtually unprecedented effort to completely uproot the social and economic bases of their society, to embark on a systematic slaughter of an inordinately high percentage of their own people?

I have no doubt that the dropping of 500,000 tons of bombs may have enraged them, but we dropped infinitely more tonnage on Vietnam and, whatever the situation may be there, I don't know that they are systematically destroying their own people.

There are plenty of other countries that have suffered grievously in war which, when a new government came to power, didn't embark on what has been going on in Cambodia.

So I think it is rather simplistic to suggest that the only explanation for this is that we dropped some bombs on them, however unfortunate it was that we dropped those bombs in the first place.

I wonder if any of you could respond to that.

Mr. POOLE. I think I have some ideas in response to that. I think, first of all, that what has happened to Cambodia is a 7-year story, not a 2-year story, and I think you have more or less indicated you see that.

In that perspective, the people who are running Cambodia, whose names we still don't know for certain, inherited a society that was in ruins when they took over 2 years ago. And, as the then Cambodian

Ambassador to this country put it to a group of people at the Asia Society, talking about the *Mayaguez* incident, "those people don't have anything with which to run the country, except a bunch of teenagers with guns in their hands. What do you expect of them?"

And this is not, Mr. Congressman, a morally insensitive person, the Ambassador to this country. He was a very decent human being and he had a lot of sympathy with the problem they were faced with as leaders of that destroyed country.

Mr. FRASER. Will the gentleman yield? Is that the Ambassador who was present at the time that the government fell?

Mr. POOLE. Yes.

STATEMENT OF GARETH PORTER, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C.¹

Gareth Porter was born in Independence, Kans., on June 18, 1942. He received his B.A. from the University of Illinois in 1964, his M.A. in international relations from the University of Chicago in 1966 and his Ph. D. from Cornell University in 1976. He was correspondent and bureau chief for Dispatch News Service International in Saigon in 1971. He was then named research associate at Cornell University's International Relations of East Asia project in 1972. He was codirector of Indochina Resource Center from 1974 through 1976. He is now an associate at the Institute for Policy Studies. He is author of "A Peace Denied: the United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement" (1976) and "Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution" (with George C. Hildebrand) (1976). He is a member of the Southeast Asia Regional Council of the Association of Asian Studies.

Mr. PORTER. Congressman Solarz, could I perhaps step back one or two paces, because I must say that I cannot accept the premise of your question, which is that it is a fact that 1 million people have been murdered systematically or that the Government of Cambodia is systematically slaughtering its people.

Mr. SOLARZ. I know there are still people publishing books contesting whether 6 million Jews were killed by Hitler. I don't know whether 1 million were killed or 1.2 million were killed or 800,000 were killed. Unfortunately, nobody will ever know.

But I would suspect, in light of everything that has come out already, that it would be rather difficult for someone to sustain a proposition that hundreds of thousands of Cambodians have not been murdered by their own countrymen since the fall of the Lon Nol regime.

Now, if you care to proceed along those lines, feel perfectly free to do so, but I hope you will forgive me if I consider any such effort to be essentially contemptible.

Mr. PORTER. Well, you will excuse me for saying so. I came here on the assumption that the committee was interested in hearing views on the facts of the matter, rather than—

Mr. SOLARZ. I only speak for myself, not for my colleagues, but I must tell you that, if Professor Butz from Northwestern or wherever he teaches, who just published a book denying that 6 million Jews were killed by Hitler, were invited to testify before a congressional committee about the evidence he had uncovered, I for one would not accord his views much respect.

And, while I don't necessarily mean to compare you with Professor Butz, it seems to me there is such an ample amount of documenta-

¹ Dr. Porter's prepared statement appears on p. 19.

tion about what has been happening there, that it is beyond belief to me that anyone could seriously argue that this hasn't been going on.

At least some of the other witnesses have had the intellectual decency not to deny it, but to attempt, in a perverted kind of way, to justify it. I don't think it can be justified either, but how anybody can deny it is beyond me.

Mr. PORTER. I repeat that I am not in a position of trying to justify anything. What I attempt to do in my study of this subject is to ascertain what the facts are, and I would like to simply point out, as a basis for beginning this kind of discussion, that there are forms of documentation and there are forms of documentation. I just want to make two brief points on this matter.

One is that you have said that this, as far as you know, is an unprecedented systematic slaughter of innocents.

Mr. SOLARZ. By their own people.

Mr. PORTER. And I would remind you that it was not a few years ago that your President, President Nixon, was telling the American people in a very solemn way in public speeches that anywhere between 500,000 and 1 million people were killed by the North Vietnamese regime from 1954 to 1956.

Now, as a specialist in Southeast Asia and particularly in Indochina, more particularly in Vietnam, I made it my business to investigate very carefully the documentation on which this kind of charge was based, and I have written a monograph which, as far as I know, is the first careful attempt to reconstruct what happened in the land reform in Vietnam.

What I concluded was that the number of people who were killed during the land reform was not as President Nixon and some others have maintained over the years, 500,000 to 1 million, but rather probably 2,500 at the maximum.

Now, it is not an unprecedented phenomenon for a kernel of truth, which is that there have been executions in Cambodia, to be taken and turned into a vast exaggeration on a scale of many-fold.

What I wish to argue is that this is the case in Cambodia as well. I think there is documentation on the basis of refugee accounts which contradicts the account which Reader's Digest has published and accounts which have been given in much shorter form, much briefer form, and in much sketchier form by journalists who have interviewed Cambodian refugees in Thailand.

If you are willing, I would be interested in just presenting what that evidence is.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, let me ask you two questions first. Are you familiar with Khieu Samphan's interview with Oriana Fallaci?

Mr. PORTER. I don't think it was an interview with Oriana Fallaci. It was an interview with Familia Christiana, if you are referring to the same document I am thinking of.

Mr. SOLARZ. We are talking about the same interview. Didn't he in effect acknowledge in that interview that somewhere in the vicinity of 1 million had been killed since the war?

Mr. PORTER. No, he did not. I would like to, if I may, put into the record of this hearing the text of that interview, and I would simply point out that the context of the questions and answers which had to do with how many millions of people there were in Cambodia before

the war and how many millions of people there are today was a series of questions in which the interviewer was attempting to get Khieu Samphan to comment on the treatment of war criminals. This was a term that was used by the interviewer, not Khieu Samphan.¹

And Khieu Samphan bridled at the question and initially said that the people wanted the war criminals to be executed and "we cannot understand why you would care so much about these criminals." He was referring to the seven supertraitors who normally are mentioned in regard to the question of executions of war criminals in Cambodia.

The interviewer then returned to the subject two more times, and it was after that that the interviewer then asked the question: How many Cambodians were there at the beginning of the war? And the answer was: 7 million. I am sorry. It was the reverse. The first question was: What is the present population of Cambodia? According to the transcript, the answer was: The present population of democratic Cambodia is 5 million.

Now, I must insert parenthetically here that I find it very difficult to believe that Khieu Samphan would put forward the figure of 5 million, since the officials of the regime have repeatedly stated that the population is 7.7 million today in Cambodia.

Mr. SOLARZ. But the interview does report that he said 5 million.

Mr. PORTER. That is correct. Then the next question is: At the start of the war there were 7 million people living in Cambodia. This is the statement made by the questioner. If 1 million died in the war, what happened to the rest?

The answer, according to the account, is: It is incredible how you westerners care about what happens to war criminals.

In any case, if you want an accurate account, you must consider the number of Cambodians who left for Thailand, France, the United States, and other countries.

Now, at no point did he say that 1 million people had been killed since the end of the war or had died since the end of the war.

Mr. SOLARZ. I should have thought that if 1 million hadn't been known he would have had ample opportunity in the context of such a question to clear it up.

Let me ask you this. Do you believe that 6 million Jews were killed by the Nazis during World War II?

Mr. PORTER. I have no reason to think otherwise, although I don't know obviously what the figure was.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think that possibly that is an exaggeration, an exaggerated figure, that maybe only a couple of hundred thousand—

Mr. PORTER. I have no reason to believe that. Of course not.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think 1 million Armenians were killed by the Turks?

Mr. PORTER. I don't think that this is really relevant to the question here. I don't agree to the parallel.

Mr. SOLARZ. You were talking before about the number of people who were killed or weren't killed by the North Vietnamese, which you seemed to think was relevant, as a way of demonstrating—

Mr. PORTER. Yes, I do.

¹ Not reproduced in this volume.

Mr. SOLARZ. So far as the Armenians are concerned, do you think that figure of 1 million is accurate?

Mr. PORTER. I have no idea what the accurate figure is for Armenians. I have never studied that.

Mr. SOLARZ. And you have no idea what the accurate figure is for the number of Jews who were killed by Hitler?

Mr. PORTER. I have heard the figure of 6 million, and I have no reason to believe that that is false.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. Now, why do you have no reason to believe that that is false, but you do appear to have reason to believe that the figure used for the Cambodians is false?

Mr. PORTER. Yes. I am glad you asked that question. If I may, I would like to mention three sources of documentation on this. The first is a letter to the Economist magazine by a gentleman named W. J. Sampson who lives in Brussels. It is a rather long letter which I would also like to enter into the record of the hearing.¹

In the letter, he says that, after being in Phnom Penh the last year of the war as a statistician for the Lon Nol government, he then left the country and stayed in touch with Khmer friends and interviewed Khmer refugees in camps in Thailand.

On the basis of this information which he got from Cambodian friends and from the refugees, he said—and I quote:

We heard about the shooting of some prominent politicians and the lynching of hated bomber pilots in Phnom Penh. A European friend who cycled around Phnom Penh for many days after its fall saw and heard of no other executions. Only one refugee reported elimination of collaborators, and this at third-hand. I feel that such executions could be numbered in hundreds or thousands rather than in hundreds of thousands.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know who this fellow is?

Mr. PORTER. He is identified here in the Economist as a statistician in Phnom Penh until the end of March 1975. His job involved close contact with the government's central statistics office.

Mr. SOLARZ. That is how he is identified there. Do you know anything about him?

Mr. PORTER. No, I do not.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. So, for all you know, this fellow could be a psychotic, right? Do you know anything about the person who wrote—

Mr. PORTER. Theoretically, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. And this is in the form of a letter to the editor, right? What is your next evidence?

Mr. PORTER. The next document is an article by Ben Kiernan of Monash University in the Melbourne Journal of Politics.²

Mr. SOLARZ. Who is he? Do you know who this fellow is?

Mr. CHANDLER. He is a student of mine.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know him?

Mr. PORTER. I do not know him personally. No, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know anything about him?

Mr. PORTER. I know that he is a specialist on Cambodia.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. By the way, was he a student of yours, Dr. Chandler? Then you presumably know this fellow. Do you believe that the number of people, Dr. Chandler, who have been killed in Cambodia

¹ See appendix 1, p. 55.

² Not printed in this volume.

since the end of the war is anywhere near the number that has been estimated since that period of time, or do you think, like the gentleman who is speaking now, that this is an enormous exaggeration based on a kernel of truth?

Mr. CHANDLER. No, I don't think it is an enormous exaggeration.

Mr. SOLARZ. So presumably we are about to hear evidence from a student of yours to the effect that this is all an enormous exaggeration, but you know the student and you are convinced that, despite what we are about to hear, the fact is that an enormous number of people have been killed, leaving aside the justification for it or who is to blame. These killings have in fact taken place.

OK. Do you want to tell us what this student of Dr. Chandler's has to say?

Mr. PORTER. Yes. This student has interviewed a number of Khmer refugees in Thailand and in Australia, and he points out in this article that one gets contradictory accounts, and I simply want to mention one of these contradictions which I think bears directly on the question of whether in fact it was the policy of the—

Mr. SOLARZ. The witness will forgive me, but there is nothing that has happened in the course of human history about which there haven't been contradictory accounts. To this day there are still contradictory accounts about what happened to the Jews at the hands of Hitler and there are people who deny that. So it is interesting to hear what the contradictions are, but the mere fact that there are contradictory accounts, in and of itself, establishes nothing. Please continue.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you. I will, first of all, read the several sentences from one account, which was that—the question was: What happened to the Lon Nol soldiers when the Khmer Rouge evacuated the town of Battambang? I should state parenthetically that it is from Battambang and Siem Reap where the vast majority of the refugee accounts come from, in terms of large numbers of executions of Lon Nol military and civilian officials and intellectuals.

The answer is: They were all killed after being taken to Thmar Knol. Question: How many of them were there? Answer: About 3,000 or 4,000. Question: Did you see them all killed? Answer: Yes. Question: With your own eyes? Answer: No, I heard the shots. Question: Did you go to Thmar Puok as soon as you left Battambang? Answer: No. I went to O Prasat and a friend there told me that the soldiers had been shot at Thmar Knol. Actually, he heard the shots.

Then the author goes on to state that another refugee whom he interviewed for 5 hours in Melbourne, Australia, in early July 1976 was also in Battambang when the Khmer Rouge took the town. According to him, high-ranking officers were shot, middle-ranking officers were taken to Thmar Knol, noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers, who were the great majority, were taken to O Porng Moan, but they came back with their families 3 months later.

So the point is that, while one of these Khmer refugees testified that all of the 3,000 or 4,000 had simply been taken out and shot, the other, who had been there in Battambang as well, testified that only the high-ranking officers—

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me tell you something, Mr. Porter. I don't know anything about this student of Dr. Chandler's, whom the professor disbelieves, or anything about this anonymous letter writer—

Mr. PORTER. I don't believe Dr. Chandler said he disbelieved—

Mr. SOLARZ. Disbelieves the argument that only a handful have been killed. Let me tell you something. I have had the chance, as my good friend from Illinois knows, to travel a good deal in the course of the last 2 years as a member of this committee, and I have met a lot of our foreign service people in different posts around the world.

Absolutely one of the most impressive and most intelligent and most dedicated, and one of the best people I have met in our foreign service during that period of time, is a fellow by the name of Charles Twin- ing, who is posted to the Embassy in Bangkok, who is our Cambodia watcher in that country.

He spent a year learning Khmer, and, ever since the fall of the Lon Nol regime, he has spent virtually all of his time systematically interviewing refugees who have escaped from the country; monitoring the Cambodian radio; reading the Cambodian newspaper. I understand they have a publication which comes out once a week. He has been talking to foreign diplomats who have entered the country.

I have had the chance to talk with him twice now in the course of the last year in rather extended conversations in Bangkok. He is someone in whose judgment I personally have enormous confidence, and I can tell you that his judgment is, in effect, that these allegations concerning mass murders and continuing brutalities are absolutely correct.

You may find someone here and there who disputes it. I don't know about the other members of the committee or anybody else in the country or the world. For my part, I literally have absolutely no doubt that what is alleged to have gone on there has gone on there. I think the only relevant question before this committee is not the effort to determine whether it happened, because, outside of yourself, I don't think there are many people who doubt it, but what we can do about it.

I gather we are going to have to cast a vote, Mr. Chairman. The question I was going to ask—and maybe it could be best answered after we return—is whether there is something the international community can do about this. And I am not simply talking about passing resolutions.

Would it be helpful to have perhaps some kind of an international boycott of Cambodia? Would it make sense to consider the establishment of a kind of international police force under the authority of the United Nations?

I mean, if ever there was a situation that cried out for affirmative action, this seems to me to be the one. Maybe that is utterly impractical. I don't underestimate the political difficulties, but it seems to me that this situation calls for a lot more than ways of figuring out how to send DDT into the country so that they can deal with the malaria problem or to consider a resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and democratic Kampuchea.

Maybe ultimately nothing can be done, but I certainly think that we have a moral obligation to consider every conceivable possibility of doing something about the situation. I am not simply talking about making statements so that we can wallow in our own sense of virtue. I am talking about doing something which can bring a criminal regime to its senses and can prevent a repetition or a continuation of what has happened.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I don't know if I am going to be able to come back. I think the thrust of Steve's comments and his questions was most appropriate to our area of interest.

I just wanted to say, having perused the statements here, with all due respect to Professor Chandler, your paper instead of being entitled "Human Rights in Cambodia"—It should have been more properly entitled "Justification for Slaughter."

I was a late arrival, Mr. Chairman. I don't know if I can return. If I can, Mr. Chairman, we can take up from there.

Mr. FRASER. All right. Well, I guess the witnesses will have plenty to respond to when we come back.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will resume its hearing. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the time that the subcommittee recessed, I had asked the panel if they had any thoughts about what we might do from a very practical point of view to deal with this problem.

Are there any possibilities for international action that you can think of? Any international forums in which we might raise this question? Any specific proposals that we might encourage others to either accept or propose themselves, which might hold forth some realistic prospect of dealing with this problem, including the possibility, as I indicated, of some kind of international police action under the auspices of the United Nations?

I am not necessarily endorsing these possibilities. I just mention them as illustrations of the kinds of things which at least ought to be considered. I suppose that I really find it morally very difficult to simply throw up my hands and say that we bear part of the responsibility for having created this monstrosity and in any case what can we do about it? So let us really consider the kind of action which conceivably might bring this to an end.

Yes?

Mr. POOLE. I think that an international police force would be one of the worst possible things we could do.

I mean, if we want to save human life, I would have hoped we had learned something by now. The latest dispatches from Bangkok I have seen said they have got about 60,000 troops there and they are aiming to double that by the end of the year. And I believe that.

The second idea, of an international boycott, is absurd. The country is isolated economically, self-isolated. So what are you going to do about it in an international boycott?

I go back to my original statement that there is very little we can do to make the situation better. There is a lot that we could do, including those two ideas, that would make the situation a great deal worse. It could be worse than it is.

Mr. SOLARZ. Supposing it turns out that these mass murders are continuing? Would you take the same position?

Mr. POOLE. The best information we have is that they are not continuing.

Mr. SOLARZ. Hopefully, they are not. Supposing they were? This is a hypothetical question.

Mr. POOLE. I think it is very hard to conceive of an action that can prevent this particular type of regime from killing people in the

country. I agree that one should try and think. I have searched my mind for some kind of action. I cannot think of it.

I think that what in fact is happening is that the regime has cut itself off from most of the world. I described in my statement while you were on the phone that they have been engaged in consolidating and to some extent regularizing the regime and moving into a little more contact with the outside world. I think they are settling down a little bit. They think they are. They think they have turned a corner of some sort.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why do you think they embarked on this effort not only to systematically slaughter such a large percentage of their own people, but also to completely depopulate the cities and to utterly restructure the society?

Mr. POOLE. The cities of Cambodia are not normally cities. They are towns. They were made cities by civil war. They had no choice but to move the people back to the countryside. They could have done it better, but they had no choice except to——

Mr. SOLARZ. But they reduced the population, as I understand it, in places like Phnom Penh to far below what it was before the war.

Mr. POOLE. Yes. They obviously overdid it. They obviously did it very badly. But the general thrust of moving the people out of the city was something that practically any regime would have contemplated and done at some stage in that year, getting the people back on the land and producing rice.

Mr. SOLARZ. But they seemed to be——

Mr. POOLE. But that, however, doesn't respond to you in full, if I might just finish my answer to your question. That is ground that has been gone over a lot and you have probably read about it and I have read about it, and others have heard about it and it isn't really the salient point.

The point is: Why did they kill a lot of people? Why did they do it so brutally? And the best answer I have been able to come up with there—and I have thought about it and done some research on it—is, first off, that they took over at a time when society was in ruins, so that there were no normal means of government. This doesn't excuse them. But it is a fact. It is a background fact that is relevant to understanding what happened.

The country was in a state of social, political, and economic chaos when they took over. So there is that background fact.

The second part is that the only means they had for running the country was this, what I have described as an ignorant peasant teenage army—a rather large, very obedient army, well armed and totally flexible, totally obedient to orders. If they were told to march people down the road a couple of kilometers, the likelihood is that they would shoot the ones that didn't do it, simply because they had no orders not to.

Mr. SOLARZ. How were they able to establish that sense of total discipline in the ranks of their army?

Mr. POOLE. I don't know the answer to that question. I assume that, if you are trying to run and organize a guerrilla force and your objective is to take over the capital of the country, that they went about it in a businesslike manner.

Mr. SOLARZ. Was there any indication in any of the statements that were made by the Khmer Rouge leaders prior to the fall of the Lon Nol regime which would have indicated that, once they came to power, something approximating what actually happened was in store for the country? That they were planning to embark on a systematic effort to exterminate families who were associated with the old regime and to establish what was in essence a completely agrarian society, not simply by removing the excess population from the villages, but virtually by moving the entire population into the countryside?

Mr. POOLE. You have put your finger on a very tragic fact, tragic for everybody in this room, because everybody who was thinking about Cambodia in the spring of 1975—and Congress had to think about it and Cambodian scholars had to think about it and Cambodians living outside the country had to think about it and journalists had to think about it—was wondering about cutting off aid, and our operative assumption—and I wrote some articles saying it—was that normalcy would break out, that fraternization between the two sides in the civil war would be what everybody would be striving for.

And I think Ambassador Dean, testifying before this committee about a year ago, said he thought that that was in Long Boret's mind when he gave himself up and went back. I mean, took Lon Nol out of the country and went back and gave himself up. I am not sure if all of the Khmer elite assumed there would be reconciliation; but it was the assumption of a lot of people that peace, however it was going to be, was going to be better than this damn war. I think that is why Congress cut off aid. And at the time, I certainly felt they were right in thinking that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I remember participating in debates within our committee which I think really signalled the end of the continuing American involvement there. Once we rejected President Ford's request for additional funds, that was the end of it. It was only a matter of days before the government fell.

I think you are absolutely right. It was everybody's assumption that, whatever might happen after the war, it could not possibly be worse than a continuation of the war itself.

Mr. BARRON. Sir, I would like to respond quickly to two or three points that have arisen in the recent discussions and hence are in the record. We spoke to at least one, and I seem to recall two, Cambodian refugees who stated that, prior to the end of the war, they had been told by captured Khmer Rouge soldiers that, upon—

Mr. SOLARZ. Who said this?

Mr. BARRON. These are refugees we interviewed. They reported that they had been told prior to the end of the war, at least one of them did, that captured Khmer Rouge soldiers had stated that, at the end of the war, the cities would be emptied of all people.

Second, there is an, to me, impressive study made by Kenneth M. Quinn who was then in the State Department in Cambodia, about the regimen of life, the procedures and methods employed by the Khmer Rouge in those territories occupied long before the end of the war.

In this study, we can see precedents for much that did in fact happen. So I think there were data, there were indications of what might happen. Perhaps we didn't pay enough attention.

Mr. POOLE. I agree with that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Does the leadership of the organization, as it were, consciously identify itself as Marxist in any way, shape, manner, or form?

Mr. BARRON. Yes. This is something of an embarrassment to the Communists or Marxists, but they have. They were, many of them, recruited into the Communist movement in their student days in France.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we have any sense of what, from a Marxist point of view, their compatriots in Peking or in Moscow make of this rather un-Marxist effort to establish an agrarian society in the name of a philosopher who heralded the triumph of the urban proletariat?

Mr. PORTER. Could I just very briefly address that? I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding here of what the objectives of the present government are. I mean this has been stated over and over again in the American press, that what they are trying to do is to return to the 18th century, primitive, rural society. And this is part of the purpose, at least, of breaking up the cities and dispersing the population in the countryside.

As Dr. Poole has stated, I think one has to begin with the point that it was impossible in fact to sustain any kind of reasonable urban life on any kind of scale, given the economic situation at the end of the war, and that was in fact a reasonable policy to follow, to disperse people back to the countryside where they could both grow food and eat the food that was already stockpiled in the countryside.

Mr. SOLARZ. Was it reasonable to forcibly evacuate everybody who was a patient in a hospital, regardless of how seriously they were ill or wounded, and force them to join a death march to the countryside? Was that reasonable?

Mr. PORTER. I think—I mean I have written one chapter of a book on that. It goes into that subject in some detail. We examined very carefully the medical situation in the hospitals of Phnom Penh, and I don't know if you recall the testimony which was given in the last year of the war about the medical situation in Phnom Penh, but it was beyond belief. It was literally a place of death, where the patients were brought, both soldiers and civilians.

There was not, in fact, a reasonably functioning medical system in Phnom Penh. These hospitals were places where the toilets overflowed into the hallways, where there were patients lying in the hallways.

And I do indeed think that one can argue that it was a reasonable alternative to move the patients as fast as possible to locations outside the cities where there were in fact other medical facilities, not good medical facilities, but, in the circumstances which existed in Phnom Penh at the end of the war, probably better than what existed there.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you really believe what you are saying?

Mr. PORTER. I am sorry. Maybe you could make clear what you find objectionable about that.

Mr. SOLARZ. This isn't some kind of a put-on where you are playing a role? I mean you actually believe that what you have said is true, that that characterizes—

Mr. PORTER. Congressman, did you in fact read the testimony about the medical situation in Phnom Penh at the end of the war? Do you know what I am talking about?

Mr. SOLARZ. I assume that the conditions were somewhat less acceptable than they are in the municipal hospitals in the city of New York, but that hardly persuades me that medical conditions were better in the nonexistent facilities in the countryside to which these people were sent, regardless of their condition.

There are some people who are better off lying in bed because of their condition than they are participating in a forced march without any food or water provided for them en route to their unknown destinations, and without doctors, nurses, or other medical facilities to greet them.

Mr. PORTER. Let me just add that there was one hospital in Phnom Penh that was regarded as reasonably functioning—and that is by any kind of medical standards—and that was the Kalmette Hospital which was run by the French. And that was a hospital which in fact was not turned out into the countryside. It was taken over by the Communists and they continued to run it.

So my point is that I think you are operating on a very inadequate base of information when you make statements that patients were turned out into the countryside in a death march for some strange reasons which could not be understood.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. FRASER. There has been a lot of ground covered in the questions. Do any of the witnesses want to respond further?

Mr. CHANDLER. I would like to say a couple of things, if I could. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I was told by Representative Goodling that one administration thought it right to bomb Cambodia, and now another administration thinks it right to think about human rights. God knows what the next administration is going to do.

We have got to keep one thing in mind. That is, the Cambodians had human rights while we were bombing them under Nixon, and they have got them now. And I think we would have been a lot better off thinking things through, as I said in my opening remarks.

The second point—and I am sorry if I am going to show some feelings here. I didn't come down to Washington to be told that I am cowardly and that my morals are contemptible. I didn't come here to be told that my concern for the Cambodian people was less than that of anybody else in this room.

As a matter of fact, as I said before, I am certain that nearly all of the personal friends, very close personal friends, that Peter and I had in Cambodia have been shot because of the jobs they held under the old regime, or because they didn't take the revolutionary side.

Now, let me move off that and say here that there is a background for the Khmer Rouge behavior, and this has been gone into by people who have done research in the background of their movement, and it seems to me, in disagreement with Dr. Poole, that it was not surprising that they behaved the way they did, and, in disagreement perhaps with Dr. Porter, they had a great contempt or, as they call it, a great anger for the civilization that existed in Phnom Penh when they took it over.

Now, why did they have this contempt? Well, some of them—ideologues, if you will, who have picked up their—You don't just pick up—I don't think you pick up Marxism as a disease. I am not a Marxist myself, but it seems to me many of these students in Paris

in the 1950's began to look at Cambodian society from a certain distance and saw that it was riddled with injustice. I could see this in Cambodia when I was there. All sorts of people would admit this.

And, if it was riddled with injustice, the Marxists thought, there must be a way out, through some kind of master plan, which they worked out in detail: Cambodia should stop being dependent on foreign aid, for one thing, stop being dependent on foreign markets, and that also the individual farmer should stop being dependent on money-lending Chinese merchants.

OK. These are economic problems. Also in the forests to which they went in the early 1960's, developing ideology under pressure of the war, they decided that the people who were not their friends were their enemies and that the people who were their biggest enemies of all were the United States.

Now, I am not saying that this absolves them in any way, or that it absolves us either. I agree that we should increase our moral concern, but our moral concern for Cambodia and for the Cambodian people should be connected with our realization that for the first time in our history we bombed a country that had never fired a shot at an American soldier. I think this is very different from, well, "bombs fall all over," as you suggested, that wars go on—or maybe it was Representative Goodling. After the war in that scenario, everybody shakes hands as if it had been a game.

The Cambodian war, it seems to me, was an extremely brutal war, by all, let us say, three sides: The Lon Nol government, the insurrectionists, and the Americans. And I would like to leave my statement at that, trying to inject, if I can, a few nuances into the argument this afternoon and making the injection of nuances in no way the same thing as trying to be morally indifferent to what is going on in the country.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, if I could make just one observation here, because I wouldn't want Dr. Chandler or anybody else to misunderstand my own views. I think what we did in Cambodia was contemptible. I think that, had we not launched the invasion of Cambodia, we probably wouldn't have set in motion the course of events which led to the present state of affairs in that unfortunate country.

To that extent, obviously, we do bear a significant measure of responsibility for having helped to produce this disaster.

But I also think that there is not a country in the world that isn't riddled with injustice. At the same time, I think there is no society so unjust that it can justify what has happened in Cambodia, presumably in the name of dealing with injustice.

Mr. CHANDLER. I am justifying nothing. I never used the word "justify." You put it in my mouth.

Mr. SOLARZ. If I did, then I regret it. It may well be that, by their own misguided lights, people who are responsible for what is happening in Cambodia think that they are rectifying ancient wrongs and creating conditions for a more just society in the future. I haven't had the opportunity to speak with them or to psychoanalyze them.

But one doesn't have to come to the conclusion that these people are maniacal murderers in order to come to the conclusion that what they are doing is not only profoundly wrong, but profoundly immoral, and,

simply because it may be done in the name of creating a better society—and I don't mean to suggest this is your point of view—hardly justifies it.

There are certain objective facts which I submit we are obligated to respond to. I remember an old saying that the only thing which is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.

For my own part, I think there are certain situations which are objectively so horrendous that they obligate all people of good will and decency, however sullied their own credentials may be, to attempt to do something to correct a very terrible wrong.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I did have other documentation which I wanted to present in support of the rather unpopular notion apparently that what everyone else seems to assume is automatically the truth is not in fact.

I did want to mention the fact that the book by Francois Ponchaud, which has been cited by Jean Lacouture in support of the idea that the present government is genocidal—and in fact coined the term “autogenocide”—is one that I think bears closer examination in terms of how it contrasts with the way it has been publicized here in this country. And I will not go into details, but I will simply state for the record that every single reference to Francois Ponchaud's book by Jean Lacouture in his review in the New York Review of Books, which has been cited in the New York Times, the Boston Globe, and elsewhere, is false and misleading. That is to say, it misrepresents the substance of what Ponchaud says. It presents material as an official document of the government when, in fact, it was a comment by Thai journalists, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, since ultimately the record will one day be printed of these proceedings and there may be from time to time people who attempt to establish the accuracy of what has been said here, I would hope that at this point in the record the review in the New York Review of Books be included so that we can enable those who read the record to see the review and make a judgment themselves.¹

Mr. PORTER. I would also request, however, that an analysis of that review, which includes the original documentation from the book itself, be included. I hope that would be acceptable.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have that analysis?

Mr. PORTER. I do have an analysis which I can provide for the record. Yes.²

Is that acceptable, Congressman?

Mr. SOLARZ. It is perfectly acceptable to me, but the chairman will determine that.

Mr. PORTER. The point I want to make in regard to Francois Ponchaud, the author of this book, who did a great deal of interviewing of refugees and careful sort of combing through the available documentation, is that he wrote a monograph in early 1976 in which he stated that, although there were violent repression of officers and other officials in the provinces of Battambang and Siemreap that in other provinces the refugees did not report the massive purges that they did in

¹ See appendix 2, p. 56.

² Not available at time of printing.

those provinces and that, although certain categories of people were sent, as they said, to higher authority, Angka Loeu, from which they did not return to their villages, that there were, however, prison camps for the military officers and men where executions were not taking place. That is, the reports from the refugee sources that he had were that these camps were not places where people were systematically being exterminated.

Now, I want to add one other point which I think is relevant to the question of whether in fact there was a policy of massive extermination, and that is an article from *La Figaro*, February 11, by an intellectual, a doctor from Phnom Penh who underwent a rather elaborate process of reeducation in post war Cambodia.

This is relevant for the reason that it is stated time and time again that the difference between the Vietnamese and Cambodians' postwar policies was that Vietnam did have resort to reeducation whereas the Cambodians paid no attention to that and simply exterminated.

This article has a very detailed account of the process of reeducation, and I think it is relevant to try to decide whether in fact there was an official policy for the extermination of these various classes.¹

Now just one more point, and that is, if, in fact, the Congressman feels that it is incumbent on Congress to take action legislatively in some way to deal with regimes which have undertaken massive systematic killing, slaughter, massacre, I would suggest that you might take a look at the regime in Indonesia where the regime itself has officially confirmed that they did kill 450,000 to 500,000 people in 1965. To my knowledge, there have been no regrets expressed there. To my knowledge, the U.S. Government—neither the U.S. Government nor Congress has taken any kind of action in that regard. I suggest this is an area you might usefully look into.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes. I would agree with the witness that what happened in Indonesia is a moral abomination as well. Of course, you know, that was close to a decade ago, and the murders have come to an end. I certainly think we ought to express our regrets as to what happened then, but right now we are confronted with an ongoing situation in Cambodia. From everything that I can determine, even if the killings have more or less come to an end on a massive basis, although I gather there are still some going on, it would appear to me, from what I have heard and what I have read, that the country has been turned into a kind of vast concentration camp, as it were. People are obligated to work from dawn till dusk and attend indoctrination sessions in the evening, where they are given a mere pittance to eat, where they are not permitted to go from one place to another within the country, where the kind of situation exists, in short, which is far, far worse than that which exists in many other repressive regimes around the world, with respect to which we have expressed concern in the Congress.

And I just think that what we have here might almost be *sui generis*, thereby requiring an exceptional and maybe extraordinary response on our part.

Bad as the situation may be in South Korea and in Chile, and in other parts of the world, I think here it appears to be demonstrably

¹ See appendix 3, p. 59.

worse. I don't necessarily have any answers, but I think we have to see what we can do.

I am considering introducing a resolution along these lines, and I hope that the distinguished chairman of the committee would be able to give that some thought, because obviously his judgment counts a lot not only with me, but with other members of the committee.

I would just hope that, when the history of this sad and sorry episode is ultimately written, no one will be able to say that the U.S. Congress and the American people let it pass without any official commentary or effort to do something, however modest it might have been, about it.

Mr. BARRON. Mr. Porter has cited four separate segments of evidence to substantiate his challenge of the assumption that great death has occurred in Cambodia.

Mr. PORTER. Excuse me. If I could correct that, my point was about whether there was a policy of extermination of classes.

Mr. BARRON. Policy of massacre of officers and civil servants and intellectuals and so on. Two of them I am not competent to comment on: The letter that appeared in "The Economist" and the writings of the Australian student. But I do have some particular knowledge of the work of Francois Ponchaud and of the statements by Dr. Opum Nal, to whom you refer, because we have worked intimately with them both.

Having not read the review of Ponchaud's book—I don't know whether the review of it is accurate, but I don't really think that is relevant to the question of his personal findings—Ponch assisted us extensively in our interviews in France. He compared data with us, criticized our work, and challenged in some cases our findings. We found him to be a very honest scholar, one, incidentally, who, in his way, is as critical of the policies of the United States, France, as some of the witnesses today.

However, it is the judgment of Father Ponchaud that between April 17, 1975, and January 1, 1977—or it was his initial judgment—that at least 800,000 people perished in Cambodia.

In the late spring or early summer of 1976, Ponchaud returned to the camps, made further interviews, and told us he was sure that his original estimate of 800,000 was unrealistically low.

As for his statements that in some areas people fared better than others, that there was no policy of massacre, I believe that he was referring to those areas that have long been under Khmer Rouge domination.

Our data about what happened in those areas are fragmentary, but it is logical that the rule there would be somewhat different than among the people, the 4 million or so exiles, who were regarded as enemies.

The statement of Dr. Oum Nal, far from showing that there was no policy of massacre or extermination of intellectuals or classes, actually proves just the reverse, because, he suffered a long ordeal, incarceration, and lived under barbaric conditions for a while. He swept the floors at a hospital outside of Sisophon, as I remember, the chief doctor of which was a former practical nurse who had worked under him in Phnom Penh. And the nurse, now chief doctor, befriended him, but the whole body of his testimony shows that engineers, educated people, were being singled out and oppressed and, in some cases, killed or at least they vanished.

The fact is that he did—he was the one person we could find—go to a special village for reeducation, from which he chose to flee.

The Khmer Rouge and their apologists in the West repeatedly have stated that the people had to be moved from the cities to the countryside where food had been stockpiled, medical facilities were awaiting them.

We simply, after talking to more than 300 people, with rare exceptions, could find no evidence that any provision had been made to provide these millions of people with food or medical care. Such food as was distributed would appear to have come from American stocks captured in Phnom Penh. It would have been much easier, if you wanted to disburse this food, to have done it there.

A final thing I would say regarding the deaths in Cambodia: We know that the orders were issued to execute former military personnel and civil servants, teachers and students. We know that some intellectuals were the victims of organized massacres, apparently for no reason other than their education or class.

But I submit that the greatest and most calculated number of deaths has occurred by virtue of the conditions into which these people have been consigned and enslaved. I must say that the individual executions, according to our data, do continue, but who is there left to massacre by class now?

If you look at the latest published data, you see the conditions of life are such that people are dying and will continue to die.

Mr. SOLARZ. What do you think we should do about this?

Mr. BARRON. I think we should speak out about it. I agree with you that, to do nothing, is to condone murder and to sully ourselves. But, as a practical matter, the people who most likely would be able to exercise some influence are the Chinese and, to an extent, the North Vietnamese, with whom they are fighting now and then.

And I think, as a first step, you could start there, ask them. And, second, you could challenge the United Nations to do something about it.

And, if all these data—Oh, I want to say one other thing. If the Congress has any doubt about the number of deaths there, if there is any doubt about the Cambodian regime using the figure 5 million, I would suggest that you inquire of agencies of the government, and I would suggest that they can provide you with evidence quite beyond the Khieu Samphan interview. Other Cambodian officials at approximately the same time had stated that there were 5 or 5.2 million inhabitants of Cambodia. The figure of 7.7 million mentioned by Mr. Porter, I have seen stated one time, and that was in a claim made shortly after the first anniversary of the revolution that all of the reports about massacres and starvation and death were maliciously false and the population now is 7.7 million. I don't know of anybody in the world who has ever contended that the population of Cambodia ever was that large.

Mr. PORTER. Could I respond to several of these points? First of all, with regard to this interview of Khieu Samphan, it should be stated for the record—and I will provide that interview for the hearing record—Khieu Samphan did explicitly deny in that interview that these charges of massive reprisals did in fact take place. He denied, in other words, that the policies attributed to him were in fact the case.

I want to just underline, if I understand correctly what Mr. Barron is saying—you do agree then that it is the case that the intellectuals were not in fact targeted for extermination by——

Mr. BARRON. No, I don't agree with that at all. I didn't say that.

Mr. PORTER. Perhaps you could clarify.

Mr. BARRON. I said we do not have evidence that all intellectuals have been killed. We do have evidence that a goodly number were, particularly students and teachers, some engineers. But we do not—I cannot substantiate a statement that all were killed.

Mr. PORTER. The point I want to make is that Dr. Om Now in this very long article in *La Figaro* states quite clearly that there were 637 intellectuals who were brought together, including engineers, students, teachers, and so forth, at the beginning of this period. He talks about an unknown number of them who were taken away during the midst of the indoctrination or reeducation, and it was apparent—it appeared the first time he mentioned it that they were taken away and killed. Later on, they reappear at a point where it is clear that they were taken away for special treatment, but not killed. No where in this article does he indicate that the people in his group to be reeducated—that any of them were killed. Clearly, the purpose of reeducation was not to kill.

So my point is that this certainly proves that there was not a general policy, although I am obviously in no position to say that no intellectuals were killed, nor would I argue that. But there was not a general policy of extermination of intellectuals because of their class background. It seems to me on the face of it simply untrue.

Mr. BARRON. I would have to, if I may just add this—in his interview with us, the physician mentioned pretty much what you have recounted there, but, additionally, he reported the disappearance of some colleagues at different times who never were seen again.

And I submit that disappearance in Cambodia has a pretty sinister connotation, and I would say further that he left early on, in April of 1976. The second wave of massacres, aimed against the noncommissioned officers, the enlisted personnel, the lower ranking civil servants, the teachers and students, did not begin until early 1976, until after the completion of the first harvest. And so this is certainly evidence, I would agree, that, as of April 1976, not all intellectuals had been killed and some were being reeducated but, given the orders that were issued and of which non-Communist governments are aware, by virtue of the manner in which they were issued, and given the evidence that some of them were executed—that is, people were massacred—I think we can only conclude that a goodly number of people were killed pursuant to those orders.

Mr. FRASER. Have there been any diplomatic personnel in and out of Phnom Penh in the last year who have managed to convey their impressions?

Mr. POOLE. Mr. Chairman, in the article by David Andelman yesterday in the *New York Times*, he apparently has talked to those who have gotten to Bangkok. You can't go directly from Phnom Penh to Bangkok. I think they must have been on leave in Bangkok and that sort of thing.¹

¹ See article in appendix 5, p. 67.

Whether Andelman got to Peking or Hanoi to talk to diplomatic personnel, there is now commercial air traffic between Hanoi and Phnom Penh via Saigon, and Peking and Phnom Penh, so you get two kinds of diplomatic personnel.

One kind is the type that just gets in for a quick trip to present their credentials and gets sort of an impressionistic view and possibly gets to talk to others in the diplomatic corps there—or perhaps does not even get that.

And there are those who spend substantial tours there, but again are pretty well confined in Phnom Penh.

Mr. FRASER. But, I mean, have we learned anything about their impressions?

Mr. POOLE. I think a lot of people—I think there have been a lot of impressions gained from them; yes.

Mr. BARRON. But only about Phnom Penh.

Mr. FRASER. To what effect?

Mr. POOLE. Pretty well confirming the negative side of the regime.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, the larger number of people have died?

Mr. POOLE. Yes; I don't think that that is widely disputed.

Mr. PORTER. If I may, I would just like to sort of finish that point that I started to make, which was that I don't think that there is any way that one can argue, given the evidence presented by one of the key witnesses, if you will, and given your statement that the order supposedly went out in January of 1976 to kill all intellectuals—here is this man who was in reeducation precisely at the time when the orders are to go into effect. Four months later he is released from reeducation and goes into normal civil life.

Mr. BARRON. That isn't what happened.

Mr. PORTER. He received his black costume and his scarf and was assigned to normal economic duties.

Mr. BARRON. What I meant didn't happen is that the orders for the massacres were issued in 1975. The commanders were told to prepare for them after the completion of the harvest.

At the time of the doctor's escape, he was still in the village where he was going to be presumably reeducated, and he was told his reeducation would take several years at least, according to his statements.

Mr. PORTER. He doesn't say that in here at all. In fact, he says something quite different. I would like to have the committee translate this, if you are interested in following up on this point.

But I also want to question the nature of the so-called orders which you allege are so clear cut. Ponchaud claims to have some sort of documentation in one article that he writes of the language of an order which was given to district officials in one province, Monkouberi Province, in January 1976, and he quotes from this:

To construct democratic Kampuchea while renewing everything on a new basis. Destroy everything which recalls the colonial imperialist culture, not only on the ground but also in the people. To rebuild new Kampuchea, 1 million people is sufficient. There is no more need to prisoners of war who are left to the absolute discretion of local chiefs.

Now this quotation, which Ponchaud presents as though it were an actual official text, I assume must be a reconstruction from refugee accounts.

Mr. BARRON. I know nothing about that.

Mr. PORTER. It seems to me that this is being presented as a form of documentation which I simply do not believe that Ponchaud himself has nor any refugee has, so again we are presented with a problem of misrepresentation of a kind of documentation.

I simply question whether this is in fact an accurate reconstruction of the so-called order.

Mr. CHANDLER. I would like to come in here, Mr. Chairman, if I may. I know it is getting late, but it seems to me that what I want to say would tie in with several other things that have been said. I think the problem of information is a serious one, and it worries me very much.

If nothing bad is happening in Cambodia, the regime doesn't have to let in the New York Times, but they could let in more newsmen than they do, which is just about nobody. The first newsman admitted into Cambodia, to travel around—a Romanian—went in only this year, 2 years after the liberation of Phnom Penh.

In early 1976 when diplomats visited the site of what the regime said was an American or American-induced bombing, one man, the Swedish Ambassador, tried to talk to some eye witnesses, but he was not allowed to do so. He was told by a spokesman what had happened.

We are being told what is happening, all the time. If the regime had a policy of systematic extermination of the intellectuals—and I don't have evidence that they did—it would seem to me completely unlikely, given the history of the movement, and the history of the ideology of the leaders, for them to announce this policy in any accessible form.

The regime, in other words, doesn't have much of a documentary sense. In that sense, as a gentleman here was saying in one of the recesses, we can count the number of Jews who were killed in the war because the Germans kept records of each one that they killed. The Cambodians never did. Nor, may I add, did we, when we were killing them.

Now, this doesn't mean that they don't have such a policy. I think we have to—I know the phrase "open mind" doesn't sound perhaps, you know, high toned enough, but, an open mind is what we need because we have to get information. Information is what we do not have.

People are piecing things together, it seems to me, largely to make cases, and although what is happening in Cambodia does not seem to me to be happy for the people who are there, I only wish that there could be more information. This would be the kind of thing that should be uncontroversial, but helpful, as a statement that we could make in some public forums, asking Cambodians to tell us: Why isn't there more information from your country? Instead, I notice when Ieng Sary, the Cambodian Foreign Minister, went around Southeast Asia recently, he gave very few press conferences, and answered very few questions.

Now, I don't say he must have something to hide, but it would seem to me that, if he had nothing to hide, what would be wrong with a press conference, what is wrong with a little more knowledge? If a little more knowledge would show us—and I hope it is true—that Mr. Porter is right, this would mean less people have been killed than some other people are saying, and I would be glad to have that information. Information, I think, is the crux of the issue, and the lack of it, and my own sadness, are the two notes I wish to strike.

Mr. PORTER. If I may just make one concluding statement, I do agree with Mr. Barron on one point, and that is I think the problem of illness, particularly malaria, is far more serious in suffering and death than any question of purge of classes or former Lon Nol personnel. That clearly is a serious problem in postwar Cambodia. It was a very serious problem during the war.

Cambodian officials have said that, for every person killed and wounded on their side during the war, there were two who were afflicted with malaria.

And I find it incomprehensible that Congressman Solarz would suggest in a demeaning way—would refer to the one gesture, if you can call it that, that the United States has made to postwar Cambodia, which was to sell it DDT as an antimalarial—that he should refer to that in a demeaning tone. This is the one thing, however inconsequential, that the United States has done to alleviate in some way postwar Cambodia's suffering, which I agree wholeheartedly has been serious, enormous by any standard.

And I must say that I find it difficult to understand, given the situation in postwar Cambodia, why the regime has not done more to ask for postwar assistance from international agencies who would be perfectly willing to help, although it should be added that quite early on the Cambodians did approach private organizations in this country and in Europe for this kind of antimalarial assistance.

So they were not insensitive to the problem. I think there were political reasons why they did not approach either the Soviet Union or any of its allies or international organizations, which they, for reasons which are—which were somewhat obscure, just distrust intensively.

But I do think it is more useful to focus on the concrete problem of a serious nature of illness and particularly malaria in postwar Cambodia, the lack of medicine, the lack of trained medical personnel, and to explore what could be done in that regard, if, in fact, people have a moral concern to help the Cambodian people.

Mr. FRASER. I gather all of the witnesses are prepared to see humanitarian assistance go to Cambodia.

Mr. CHANDLER. What the Cambodians call "so-called humanitarian assistance".

Mr. FRASER. Well, I must say it has been a lively discussion. I recognize, Dr. Chandler, that some of the members expressed views that obviously you didn't appreciate very much. I haven't been able to find any way to run congressional hearings in which members aren't, in effect, free to—

Mr. CHANDLER. I don't think this is the forum for that type of thing. I was only trying to get some information across, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. I understand. A number of you made references to be put in the record. We will be glad to have them and include them. If there is anything further that you want to submit, I hope you will feel free to do so. We certainly won't close the record immediately.

Thank you very much. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

[From the Economist (London), Mar. 26, 1977]

LETTER TO THE EDITOR FROM W. J. SAMPSON¹

CAMBODIAN CASUALTIES

SIR—My first impression is that some of the “stark statistics” about the killing in Cambodia (February 26th) are wrong.

I worked as an economist and statistician in Phnom Penh until the end of March, 1975; my job involved close contact with the government's central statistics office. I agree with the estimate of 7m population in 1970. There seems however to be little evidence to support the figure of “1m killed during the war”. A report by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific gives 7.89m population for mid-1974; my own independent estimate for end-August, 1974, was also 7.89m. My figures took account of the following:

- (a) Natural increase.
- (b) Higher infant mortality during war.
- (c) Reported massacre of and emigration of Vietnamese after 1970, partly offset by some net Vietnamese immigration.
- (d) Other net immigration.
- (e) Armed forces deaths, both sides.
- (f) Civilian war deaths.

The size of the combatant forces on both sides was put at 100,000–150,000 by military attachés, and deaths ran at about 500 a week for both sides towards the end of the war. Civilian killings could be numbered perhaps in tens of thousands, but not more. Your figure of 1m killed during the war thus seems far too high.

In August, 1974, the population of the Greater Phnom Penh conurbation was 1.9m, including refugees, monks, soldiers and their families; other urban areas under government control had about 600,000. A further 1½m were in rural areas controlled by the government. By April, 1975, the urban population may have reached 3m and it is this number which would have been told to move to the countryside, partly because of a typhoid risk in Phnom Penh. However they did not go into the jungles. There is little jungle around Phnom Penh and Bat Dambang, the main reception areas, and there would be little point in sending people into jungle when there was so much abandoned riceland available.

After leaving Cambodia I visited refugee camps in Thailand and kept in touch with Khmers. We heard about the shooting of some prominent politicians and the lynching of hated bomber pilots in Phnom Penh. A European friend who cycled around Phnom Penh for many days after its fall saw and heard of no other executions. Only one refugee reported elimination of collaborators and this at third hand. I feel that such executions could be numbered in hundreds or thousands rather than in hundreds of thousands. There was a big death toll from sickness (our landlord is reported to have died of malaria and an ex-servant to have lost a child). Rice is reported to have been short, in spite of large black market hoards in cities, and so are medical supplies, though pharmacies had many months stock in Phnom Penh. Fish was, however, plentiful and there were plenty of vegetables available around Phnom Penh and Bat Dambang.

One cause of depopulation was emigration. Large numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese were made to walk to Vietnam, whilst other foreigners (except a few Lao) were expelled to Thailand. Many Khmer too escaped, mainly peasants and fishermen from border provinces. Few, however, escaped from Phnom Penh.

We may in time get true figures after a new census or full registration, but till then a figure of 2.2m deaths seems questionable.

Brussels

W. J. SAMPSON

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APPENDIX 2

ESSAYS FROM THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS ENTITLED "THE BLOODIEST REVOLUTION", MARCH 13, 1977, AND "CAMBODIA, CORRECTIONS", MAY 26, 1977, BY JEAN LACOUTURE¹

THE BLOODIEST REVOLUTION

(Cambodge, année zéro, by François Ponchaud. Julliard, 250 pp., 42F)

François Ponchaud is a French priest who spent ten years in Cambodia and left three weeks after the so-called "democratic" revolution took place in April, 1975. He spoke Khmer so well that he was made a member of a local committee of translators. Since being expelled with the rest of the foreigners he has made intensive efforts to find out what has happened in Cambodia, listening to the official radio, examining every available public document, compiling evidence from some hundred refugees in Thailand, Vietnam, and France.

His book *Cambodge, année zéro* is by far the best informed report to appear on the new Cambodia, the most tightly locked up country in the world, where the bloodiest revolution in history is now taking place. What Oriental despots or medieval inquisitors ever boasted of having eliminated, in a single year, one quarter of their own population? Ordinary genocide (if one can ever call it ordinary) usually has been carried out against a foreign population or an internal minority. The new masters of Phnom Penh have invented something original, auto-genocide. After Auschwitz and the Gulag, we might have thought this century had produced the ultimate in horror, but we are now seeing the suicide of a people in the name of revolution; worse: in the name of socialism.

Of course it is horrible when Pinochet tortures his prisoners, Amin strangles his enemies, and the extreme Franco-ist guerrillas massacre theirs; but what else do we expect from people whose main work is simply killing and who are ruled only by a tyrant's caprice? What has taken place in Cambodia during the last two years is of a different historical order. Here the leaders of a popular resistance movement, having defeated a regime whose corruption by *compradors* and foreign agents had reached the point of caricature, are killing people in the name of a vision of a green paradise. A group of modern intellectuals, formed by Western thought, primarily Marxist thought, claim to seek to return to a rustic Golden Age, to an ideal rural and national civilization. And proclaiming these ideals, they are systematically massacreing, isolating, and starving city and village populations whose crime was to have been born when they were, the inheritors of a century of historical contradictions during which Cambodia passed from a paternalistic feudalism, through colonization, to a kind of precapitalism manipulated by foreigners.

François Ponchaud's book not only gives shocking, detailed, and carefully authenticated testimony confirming earlier reports of mass suffering being inflicted on the Cambodians. He quotes from texts distributed in Phnom Penh itself inciting local officials to "cut down," to "gash," to "suppress" the "corrupt" elites and "carriers of germs"—and not only the guilty but "*their offspring until the last one.*" The strategy of Herod. He cites telling articles from the government newspaper, the *Prachachat*, including one of June 10, 1976, which denounced the "reeducation" methods of the Vietnamese as "too slow."

The Khmer method has no need of numerous personnel. We've overturned the basket, and with it all the fruit is contained. From now on we *will choose only the fruit that suit us perfectly*. The Vietnamese have removed only the rotten fruit, and this causes them to lose time. [Italics added]

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Perhaps Beria would not have dared to say this openly; Himmler might have done so. It is in such company that one must place this "revolution" as it imposes a return to the land, the land of the pre-Angkor period, by methods worthy of Nazi Gauleiters.

François Ponchaud's book can be read only with shame by those of us who supported the Khmer Rouge cause. It should be shaming as well to those in the Nixon administration who bombed and laid waste Cambodia, undermining Sihanouk's regime, and refused to pursue negotiations with him in Peking, making an unmitigated Khmer Rouge victory all the more likely. And it will cause distress to those of us journalists who, after the massacre of seventeen of our colleagues in April and May 1971, tried to explain these deaths as part of the hazards of covering a disorganized guerrilla war. In fact our poor comrades were assassinated—some, we now know, clubbed to death—by the valiant guerrillas of Khieu Samphan, the "socialist" Khmer who now bars foreign observers from Cambodian soil. His people remain in terrorstricken confinement, one of this regime's more rational decisions: for how could it let the outside world see its burying of a civilization in pre-history, its massacres? When men who talk of Marxism are able to say, as one quoted by Ponchaud does, that only 1.5 or 2 million young Cambodians, out of 6 million, will be enough to rebuild a pure society, one can no longer simply speak of barbarism; what barbarians have ever acted in this way? Here is only madness.

On finishing Ponchaud's book I wondered why, after the Bertrand Russell tribunal, which justly indicted US aggression, there should not be a new public tribunal to consider and denounce such crimes, committed in the name of revolution. For may not the most sinister crimes of all be those that betray the principles of socialism and assassinate human hope itself?

CAMBODIA: CORRECTIONS

Noam Chomsky has kindly called to my attention, and has circulated to some members of the press, a number of corrections of my review of François Ponchaud's *Cambodge: Année Zéro* [NYR, March 31].

First, I attributed to "texts distributed in Phnom Penh" the injunction that not only enemies of the regime but "their offspring until the last one" should be suppressed. On page seventy-three of his book, Father Ponchaud does not in fact quote this phrase from an official text but says it is a "leitmotif" of the justifications that are made for suppression. He earlier cites a number of slogans similar to the ones I quoted, which are being used to justify the current "purification." For example, "It is not enough to cut off a weed, it must be pulled up by the roots." Such slogans, he says, are used both on the government radio and in meetings. He adds that:

Several reports by witnesses [*Témoignages*] even affirm that in numerous localities the wives and children of officers have also been done away with.

Secondly, I should not have identified the newspaper *Prachachet* as a "government paper," but rather as a Thai paper, which on June 10, 1976, carried an interview with a Khmer Rouge official who said, as Ponchaud writes, that he found the revolutionary method of the Vietnamese "very slow," requiring "a lot of time to separate the good people from the counter-revolutionaries." It was the Thai reporter of this paper who drew the conclusion I quoted that the Khmers have "overturned the basket and with it all the fruit it contained, and will, from now on, choose only the fruit that suits them perfectly."

My reference to the death of "one quarter" of the population in a single year must be corrected. Ponchaud's text is as follows:

The unremitting work, the insufficient food, the deplorable sanitary conditions, the terror and summary executions permit us to imagine the nightmarish [*hallucinant*] human cost of the Khmer revolution. In 1970, the Cambodian population was estimated at 8 million people. . . . In 1975, Prince Sihanouk—here in agreement with the Americans—calculated the war dead at 600,000, to which figure must be added 600,000 wounded. On 17 April 1976, the first anniversary of the liberation, the Kampuchean authorities announced that there were 800,000 dead and 240,000 disabled veterans [*invalides de guerre*].

As for those who died during the "peace," no one can put forward a figure with exactitude; but it is certainly more than a million. At the end of 1975, official diplomatic sources estimated a figure of 800,000 dead; sources from the American Embassy, 1.2 million; and the American relief services [*services*

caritatifs] in Bangkok, 1.4 million. No one will ever know the precise number of victims but from listening to the accounts of refugees of the deaths in their respective families, the number is without doubt considerable.

Noam Chomsky, I should add, has questioned some of the figures cited by Father Ponchaud. He deeply distrusts those from U.S. sources. He finds it extremely difficult to see why deaths from malnutrition and disease should be attributed to the Khmer Rouge rather than to the Americans who devastated the countryside and forced the population into the cities. He argues, among other criticisms, that it is unlikely that the Cambodians would have reported that 800,000 were killed and 240,000 disabled by the war, and that Ponchaud may have reversed these figures.

Noam Chomsky's corrections have caused me great distress. By pointing out serious errors in citation, he calls into question not only my respect for texts and the truth, but also the cause I was trying to defend. I particularly regret the misleading attributions I mentioned above and I should have checked more accurately the figures on victims, figures deriving from sources that are, moreover, questionable. My reading of Ponchaud's book was hasty, emotionally intense, too quick in selecting polemical points. But if I must plead guilty in handling the details of my review, I would plead innocent concerning its fundamental argument.

Faced with an enterprise as monstrous as the new Cambodian government, should we see the main problem as one of deciding exactly which person uttered an inhuman phrase, and whether the regime has murdered thousands or hundreds of thousands of wretched people? Is it of crucial historical importance to know whether the victims of Dachau numbered 100,000 or 500,000? Or if Stalin had 1,000 or 10,000 Poles shot at Katyn?

I fully understand the concerns of Noam Chomsky, whose honesty and sense of freedom I admire immensely, in criticizing, with his admirable sense of exactitude, the accusations directed at the Cambodian regime. He is seeking to establish the truth and also, I would think, to combat criticism which may have the effect of serving the interests of the Nixon-Ford establishment and its allies. Such criticism may please the champions of intervention in Indochina, who were responsible for the war in Cambodia and who are guilty—as I said in my review—of initiating and prolonging the bloodbath which still afflicts that unhappy country today. However, because denunciations of Stalinism pleased Senator McCarthy, would that have been good reason for remaining silent about the Gulag?

The pseudo revolutionaries in Cambodia have locked their country away from the eyes of the world, have turned many of their people into cadavers or mere cattle; they have not only killed Lon Nol's officials but have also murdered their women and children, maintaining order with clubs and guns. I think the problem that presents itself today is that of the life of a people. And it is not only because I once argued for the victory of this very regime, and feel myself partially guilty for what is happening under it, that I believe I can say: there is a time, when a great crime is taking place, when it is better to speak out, in whatever company, than to remain silent.

APPENDIX 3

[From *Le Figaro* (Paris), Feb. 11, 1977] ¹

A DOCTOR ZHIVAGO AMONG THE KHMER ROUGE ²

At forty, Dr. Oum Nal, stomatologist from the Medical Faculty in Paris, was a deputy chief physician in the big Phnom Penh Hospital, the Preah Ket Mealea. Built at the beginning of the Protectorate, the former hospice had 500 beds but now has 1,500. However, on the last day of the war, in the morning of the 17th of April 1975, more than 2,000 sick and injured civilians, the majority of them women, children and elderly people, crowded the smallest free spaces: halls, corridors, storerooms. The previous night had been particularly murderous; rockets exploded in the overpopulated refugee districts and the injured were streaming.

At about 10 o'clock in the morning, Dr. Oum Nal, arms loaded with serum ampoules, was rushing toward the hall of reception. In a corridor, a soldier clad in black, and armed with a Chinese rifle AK 47, saw him coming and summoned him as he was passing by:

"Where are you going, comrade?"

The Red Khmer, the first to reach the hospital, was alone. He interrupted the respectful explanations of the doctor.

"Leave all this!" he said in an even tone. "From now on the Angkar ³ will attend to your injured. The American imperialists are going to bomb the city. . . . You have to take shelter outside of the city. . . ." Then he added: "Useless to burden yourself with luggage. You will be back in a night or two. . . ."

"It was a brazen lie," Oum Nal says today in telling his story. "Did we allow ourselves to be duped? We accepted these lies as a glimmer of hope in the total darkness of despair."

The doctor went out on the street and was swept away by a gigantic stream of humanity in flight. Every hundred meters, small dark soldiers direct the stream toward the north by firing into the air or into the crowd: on an individual in a uniform, on a student with too long hair or on an exhausted old man. . . . An enormous terrified herd pushed forward by some sheep dogs!

After three weeks of wandering, the doctor was stranded in one of the "new villages" in the vicinity of Phnom Basset. In reality, this was only an area of swampy jungle. Like his colleagues, Oum Nal got a plot of soil to clear up and to cultivate.

The chief of the village was a former rickshaw driver in Phnom Penh. He had recognized the chief doctor of the hospital but pretended to ignore him; otherwise he would have been obliged to kill him.

At the end of September, when the first plantings of corn, manioc and sweet potatoes were getting ripe, the inhabitants of the new villages in the region of Phnom Basset, 200,000 to 300,000 of former Phnompenhese were deported to the Sisophon province: the Fifth Region. The railway convoys were formed at the Pursat Station. The overcrowded trains made the distance of 150 kilometers in about 10 hours. At the arrival station, a welcoming committee of 14 members received and distributed the deportees throughout neighboring villages.

Dr. Oum Nal belonged to the 7th convoy, which upon its arrival in Sisophon numbered 7,560 passengers. He had travelled on the roof of the carriage. "Like in the film of Doctor Zhivago, the last film I saw in Paris in 1966. I relived his adventures."

In front of the station a Kamaphibal ⁴ of the welcoming committee, with the aid of a loudspeaker, asked the "technicians" to register on a special list. By

¹ Printed with permission from *Le Figaro* (Paris) France.

² Translated by Casimir C. Petratis, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

³ "Angkar" means organization, that is the only Party, deified and all powerful.

⁴ "Kamaphibal" official of the civilian and military organization.

'technicians' the Red Khmers understood all the intellectuals, from a University Professor to a high school graduate, from an engineer to a specialized worker, from a physician to an orderly . . . all the intellectuals who had escaped the systematic massacre of the early days.

While he was waiting in the crowd of deportees, a Red Khmer summoned Dr. Oum Nal by name, using his title.

"I was scared! . . . Then I recognized this Khmer. He was the son of my neighbor in Phnom Penh, a jeweler. He had followed the courses of nursing. I had the opportunity of attending to one of his children. He welcomed me with a certain sympathy but invited me abruptly to register immediately as a technician.

Oum Nal soon discovered that his former orderly was the chief of the local medical services. He was also a brother of a higher-ranking Angkar, corresponding to a Provincial Governor, the chief of the Fifth Region in the new regime. This man introduced me to the Committee as a civilian physician, honest and devoted to the people. One day, he invited me to have a lunch with the members of the committee. What a stroke of good luck! My first meal since April 17th! There was rice as much as I wanted . . . with salt fish and vegetables! . . .

Thanks to this high protection and his cleverness, Dr. Oum Nal succeeded in making himself accepted in the household of the committee as a permanent guest or rather like a boarding servant.

"In order to show my 'transformation' I assumed the responsibility for domestic chores in the house: dish washing, laundry, floor cleaning, fetching water, peeling vegetables. But every day I diverted a handful of dry rice in preparation for my escape."

Dr. Oum Nal lived two entire months with the revolutionary committee. The comrade, head of the medical services, used to come to consult him, secretly of course, on medical problems.

"He thus informed me of his anxiety: 90 percent of the women did not undergo menstruation and became sterile. The pills, extracted from plants, seemed ineffective to stop this strange epidemic. The causes of this nearly general irregularity were evident: nutritional deficiency, forced labor, psychic traumas, etc. But to enumerate them in this way would mean to criticize the infallibility of the Angkar, a crime punishable by the death penalty."

A FRIGHTENING PICTURE

"In the 'new villages,' set up in the jungle, the mortality rate reached then more than 50 percent, and the survivors did not fare any better. Production, the main worry of the Angkar, went down to zero . . ."

"The wife of my protector was in charge of the maternity hospital in Sisophon," says Oum Nal. "In this establishment, due to lack of care and competence, most of the newly born died by accident from puerperal fever . . . My former orderly asked me then to translate into Cambodian, always secretly, a capitalist work, a handbook on obstetrics written in French."

The technical statements of the doctor constitute a truly horrifying picture. The Cambodian people, of Khmer race, an isolated branch in Asia of the Aryan family, heir of a lofty Sanskrit civilization, are perishing from physical misery or through collective suicide.

The presence of the "former doctor" in a revolutionary committee was against the directives of the Angkar. Oum Nal was told that he could not remain any longer in Sisophon. He had to join on the spot a group of 45 technicians, architects, lawyers, physicians etc. ready for departure.

On the second of December they were taken to Preah Net Preah, a village in the midst of rice paddies about 20 kilometers from Sisophon.

The population of this region had been deported, and the houses were empty. The "technicians" settled down in this place. It was the time of harvest. They started harvesting with a sickle.

"There we followed a normal regime: ten hours of work; about 2 ounces [70 grams] of rice and a sprinkle of salt for two daily meals."

On January 5th, 1976, at midday, the village chief interrupted the work in the rice paddy and assembled the 'technicians.' "The Angkar invite you to take part in a meeting" he said. "Don't take more of your belongings than you need for spending one night outside the village."

Nobody among them had ever come back to Preah Net Preah. Prudently Dr. Oum Nal took his bag. By nightfall, they arrived in Chup, a village on the road between Seim Reap and Sisophon, famous for its pagoda.

Surrounded by barbed wire, teeming with sentries, the Chup Pagoda had been changed into a Center of Political Indoctrination or rather a center for screening intellectuals. In the courtyard, they had built two long straw huts. One of them was used as a dormitory and defectory for the probationers. The second one was a study hall with wooden benches, a blackboard, a platform, and a rare luxury, a microphone for the speaker.

"We were 397 probationers," stated Dr. Oum Nal, "nearly all from Phnom Penh." The training started at 7 o'clock in the morning with a heavy breakfast: rice soup as much as one liked and fried fish, served by revolutionary girls with revolutionary songs and music.

"Enough to impress the people who were dying from famine for the last nine months. . . . Then after a short recreation, we were invited to come to the class hall."

Another surprise was that the Chief of the Fifth Region, the powerful Provincial Governor, came in a car in person, escorted by armed jeeps. He inaugurated the session with a speech: "The Angkar is happy to receive you here. The Angkar needs you. . . . Today we begin a new era of happiness. Our country has overcome difficulties, the heritage of the imperialist super-traitors. Their regime has become stable. Kampuchea has been given a democratic constitution, which will be read to you. As a counterpart of its goodness to you, Angkar asks you only to be loyal, sincere and straightforward . . ."

After a lavish lunch, they were given a sheet of paper each with a ball point for every group of ten. A Kamphibal asked them to write their autobiography, and in the name of the Angkar, who knows everything, they were encouraged to be frank and confident.

"This was once more a lie, a fiendish trap. Nevertheless, some amongst us spoke 'frankly' of their desires and longings, which could be summarized in three points:

- (1) reunification of dispersed families;
- (2) freedom of worship; and
- (3) opening of the universities.

On that evening, the Angkar staged a joyful, artistic and revolutionary party for the probationers. The following morning at dawn, the imprudent young people, who had expressed their sincere longing were herded in the courtyard. The soldiers tied their hands to their backs and put them on the truck.

The day was identical with the preceding day spent in writing their autobiography. Oum Nal took great care to present the same version. In the last chapter—desiderata—he wrote: "I wish to pass my life producing rice and to devote my strength to the Angkar."

"The fifth day, May 10th in the morning, at the beginning of the meeting" he relates "the Kamphibal called out a list of 45 names, among them mine. They asked to get out, to take our belongings and to stand, two by two. Armed soldiers surrounded us . . . After an agonizing wait, a truck, escorted by an armed jeep, stopped in the courtyard. They told us to take a seat and the convoy left . . . towards the West."

Late in the afternoon, the truck stopped in a street of Battambang. The city was deserted, with here and there an armed sentry in front of a house or on a cross road. The escorting chief stepped onto the vehicle and said: "Brethren, comrades! Those whose names I will call, the Angkar invites to return to Phnom Penh."

DEPARTED FOREVER

"We were terrified" say Oum Nal. "This formula 'invited to return to Phnom Penh' had been used to take towards a place of massacre all those who will not change: the military, government employees, intellectuals . . ."

Twelve names were called, and the persons stepped down from the truck. The other were taken to the Central Jail in Battambang. It was abandoned since April 17, 1975. The first work of the new inmates was to restore it: "In Kampuchea there are no prisons any more" declared their guard to them.

In fact, the regime of the detainees did not differ from the normal schedules: for everyone: 10 hours of daily work, and the regulation ration of 70 grams [about two ounces] of rice with a sprinkle of salt.

"On January 20, another group of technicians' joined us" says Oum Nal. "We recognized some of those who in Chup had been taken away the first day for having replied 'sincerely' to the chapter [paragraph] wishes and aspirations." They were unbelievably emaciated, filthy and covered with rags. They still had their hands tied to their back and the ropes cutting into their flesh caused purulent sores. They told us that they had been shut in a house in Battambang for fifteen

days, all in the same room, their feet attached to a central log, without being able to move, wallowing in their excrements. . . ."

Other groups used to come periodically but did not remain for a long time. The procedure of departure was always the same. Without advance notice, they were assembled in the courtyard. The soldiers ransacked their belongings, took them outside one after the other, every 5 to 10 minutes. There the soldiers stripped them, bound their hands and feet and loaded them onto trucks where they were also attached to rails. . . . Then the truck went away, and they had never been seen again.

"Out of the first group, thirty of us remained" said Oum Nal. "Three more times the Khmers asked us to write our autobiographies. . . . We knew the trap. Nevertheless, each time one of us got caught. One of my friends, a physician from Phnom Penh, admitted in the end that he had been mobilized for some months as a medical officer. He disappeared the following morning. . . ."

On March 1976, the 30 surviving from Oum Nal's group were called in turn. . . .

"This time we were not invited to go back to Phnom Penh. We got on a truck in an orderly fashion with our belongings, which took us a few kilometers from there, to the Wat Kandal pagoda, changed into a kind of detention and reeducation camp. The regime was that of the Red Khmers: three substantial meals daily. A courteous and well-educated Kamaphibal was in charge of completing our education. We understood that this was our last and most difficult test. . . ."

The well-educated Kamaphibal, by some strange exception, expounded political themes to them. On the domestic level, the policy of the Angkar aimed at fostering peaceful relations with all its neighbours and peace-loving nations. . . . But as the objective of Soviet imperialism was to dominate and to exploit the Third World to its advantage, the U.S.S.R. was not regarded as a friend; China helped Kampuchea without preconditions. She was a sister-nation. The aggressive imperialism of Vietnam was a constant danger. . . .

"On April 4th," tells Oum Nal "we were given a new pack: pants, a black jacket with a red-white checkered krama (the traditional Cambodian scarf), constituting the uniform of the Red Khmers. At the end of the evening meal, we were served a sweet sticky rice pudding, a thing not to be forgotten . . . the only desert in a year! And then speeches, revolutionary songs.

The following morning, I assembled my group of 'technicians' for the last time. About thirty of us survived out of 397 intellectuals who, three months earlier, undertook this probationary period of screening.

A life as a beast of burden!

A truck discharged Dr. Oum Nal with half of his group in the village of Poy Sam Rong, 21 kilometers West of Battambang . . . about 80 kilometers, as a crow flies, from Thailand. This village, a kind of elementary cell of Cambodian collectivism. It numbered then 560 families (with 1,000 organized into 4 regiments, that is, 12 battalions divided into three working teams according to age and physical stamina.)

The kitchen was communal and the meals taken together, where the children had their meals an hour before the adults. It was possible to eat as much rice as you wanted but prohibited to take anything away. The working day started at 6 o'clock in the morning, announced by a gong.

The children above five years of age rose an hour later and were responsible for certain chores, as, for instance, collecting manure.

There were no schools! The old men from the third task group had to teach revolutionary legends, songs, and dances. There was no weekly rest day and no days off for feasts.

"A life of a beast of burden," the doctor said. Even the Kamaphibals, who guided the regiments, were bored to death, as could be seen!

We worked under the command of the gong: work in the fields, meals from the racks, sleeping in the stables. It was dangerous to speak because of the 'watchmen' or spies! We knew nothing of the remaining universe, or even of the neighboring village. We even ignored the date of the calendar. We were surprised when we were told that the 15th, 16th, and 17th of April would be devoted to the celebration of the anniversary of victory . . . the beginning of the era of happiness!

I decided to use this occasion for my escape. I left the village on April 16th at 7 o'clock in the evening."

Dr Oum Nal walked for 22 days, across the jungle most of the time, when one day Thaiandese peasants picked him up exhausted at the border. . .

Today, if the sores that were eating into his skin have healed, if his attacks of malaria and dysentery are less common, his eyes—several months after his return to France—are still reflecting an infinite sadness.

APPENDIX 4

[From Commonweal, Apr. 1, 1977]

TRANSFORMATION IN CAMBODIA¹

(By David P. Chandler²)

THE MOST RADICALLY ALTERED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD

"Two thousand years of Cambodian history have virtually ended."

—Phnom Penh Radio, January 1976

In a little less than two years, i.e., since the liberation of Phnom Penh and Battambang in April 1975, the former Buddhist kingdom of Cambodia, which had weathered two thousand years of recorded history, a century of French control, six years of American bombing and perhaps five centuries (c. 800-1400) of grandeur, has transformed itself into what seems to be the most radically altered country in the world.

The transformation affects every aspect of Cambodian life. The country is no longer a kingdom, and Buddhism is no longer the state religion. The regime—which calls itself Democratic Kampuchea, but is known to most of its people as *angkar*, "the organization"—has moved millions of people out of towns and cities onto rural work-sites, in a process aimed at increasing agricultural production, fostering self-reliance, and destroying what it calls the "old society." Money is no longer used. Shops, schools and monasteries are closed. Transportation and property have been collectivized. There is no postal service. Western medicines are not prescribed, and the Cambodian language has been overhauled to root out foreign words. The population, officially a blend of "workers, peasants, and the revolutionary army," dresses in the black cotton pyjamas traditionally worn, at work, by poor Cambodian peasants. Gambling, drinking, polygamy and extra-marital sex, are frowned upon, or worse; people who had called each other, in the past, "Sir", "Brother" and "Uncle"—to name only three Cambodian "pronouns"—must now address each other as "friend."

Political leadership has been collectivized, too, in contrast to the personalized rule of Prince Sihanouk (1941-1970) and the befuddled dictatorship of Field Marshal Lon Nol, whose Khmer Republic (1970-1975) was called (by Nixon) a "model of the Nixon Doctrine," the "old society," is seen as foreign, unequal, exploitative and corrupt. Its habits, hierarchies and economic relations have been swept aside.

What has taken their place? Is the revolution a "Cambodian" one? What are its roots, ideology, tactics and plans?

Nearly all the information we have comes from refugees or from officials of the regime. Cambodians who are happy with the revolution are inside Cambodia, but there is no way of hearing their opinions. Refugees, on the other hand, have by definition run away. Another problem with their testimony is that so many of them have escaped from northwest Cambodia, where radical politics before liberation were weak, rural class differences especially pronounced, and agricultural production higher than elsewhere in the country. For these reasons, the liberating forces there seem to have been especially vengeful and undisciplined. Stories about harsh conditions and atrocities come largely from this part of the country. But information on this point is ambiguous. The lack of refugees from other regions could mean that conditions there are better than in the northwest, or merely that the Thai border is too far away to reach on foot. Other refugees have gone to Vietnam; Cambodian officials told a Swedish diplomat early in 1976

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² David P. Chandler, presently on sabbatical from Monash University in Australia, is working on a general history of Cambodia at the East Asian Research Center at Harvard.

that these included the entire Vietnamese population of Cambodia—perhaps 150,000 people—but unlike refugees in Thailand, they are inaccessible to outsiders.

Peasants have been “outside history” for many years. Cambodian records compiled before the arrival of the French in 1863 were written by and for the literate elite, and must reflect their scale of values. This means that we know very little, in quantitative or political terms, about the mass of Cambodian society, many of whom, for most of their history, appear to have been slaves of one sort or another. The frequency of locally-led rebellions in the nineteenth century—against the Thai, the Vietnamese, the French and local officials—suggests that Cambodian peasants were not as peaceable as their own mythology, reinforced by the French, would lead us to believe. To understand their picture of the world, we should remember that for the first thousand years or so of the Christian era, Cambodians were heavily influenced by India, which gave them an alphabet, a court language, art-styles, two religions (Hinduism and Buddhism) and a fairly rigid, if often haphazard, sense of social hierarchies. In isolated villages—especially after the abandonment of Cambodia’s great capital, at Angkor, in the fifteenth century—Cambodian peasant-slaves, harassed at will by people in authority, developed little sense of community or strength. The word for “to govern” an area was the same as the word “to consume.” As in India, language and behavior were oriented toward differences in status. The hope of reincarnation in Buddhism was to improve ones place; conversely, power, however ruthlessly applied, was taken as proof of meritorious behavior—in another life.

EFFECT ON THE PEASANTS

How did this legacy affect peasants in the colonial era? The French were not drawn to this kind of question, preferring to reconstruct Cambodia’s ancient temples, nurture a small elite, and modernize the economy to provide surpluses of rice and rubber. Scholars know little of what actually went on. Did old elites break down, persist, or reappear? What happened to rural attitudes towards authority and success? Did families grow more or less cohesive? What were the effects of monetization, schooling and printed books? I put these questions to show how shaky our knowledge of Cambodian rural history often is. The same is true of the early independence period (1953–1970), the so-called “Sihanouk years.” The Prince himself occupies the foreground, obscuring such important things as Cambodia’s population boom, poorly planned mass education, the “revolution of rising expectations” and the effects on daily life of the Vietnamese civil war. To understand why so many Cambodians chose revolution in the 1970s, we need to know more about patterns of land ownership, malnutrition and indebtedness in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the growth of personal fortunes, and corruption, among the Phnom Penh elite; U.S. bombing patterns, after 1969; and the ideology of Cambodia’s students, including those who went abroad.

The ideology of Democratic Kampuchea draws its strength and wording from Marxism, especially as acted out in China, without formally acknowledging the debt. Many leaders of the régime have Marxist pasts, some going back to the 1940s, when several thousand Cambodians—especially among those living in southern Vietnam—cast their lot with the Communist-led Viet Minh. After the Geneva Conference of 1954, when France withdrew from Indochina, an estimated 2,000 of these men and women chose to go to North Vietnam rather than live under Sihanouk or Ngo Dinh Diem. Leftists who stayed in Cambodia and formed a People’s Party were ruthlessly suppressed by Sihanouk and his police. Others went underground, especially in the mountainous southwest. Meanwhile, in the 1950s and 1960s, a younger generation of Marxists, made up for the most part of Cambodians trained abroad or by French Marxists teaching in Cambodia, came of age and challenged Sihanouk’s “Buddhist Socialist” regime. These “young intellectuals,” or “Khmer Rouge,” as Sihanouk called them, included many men who became leaders in Democratic Kampuchea—Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, Son Sen and Ieng Sary, to name only four.

In the late 1960s, these two strands of Cambodian radicalism—old Viet Minh and young intellectuals—merged. At the height of the Vietnam war, many intellectuals fled to remote parts of the kingdom—including ones noted in the early 1950s for Viet Minh activity—to escape Sihanouk’s police and to revolutionize their countrymen along Maoist lines. The northeastern parts of the kingdom, already a base and corridor for Vietnamese liberation forces, were liberated by the Cambodians fairly early, probably with Vietnamese help. By 1971—after Sihanouk had been toppled by a rightist coup—the Khmer Rouge occupied roughly two-thirds of Cambodia’s territory, and controlled perhaps half its popu-

lation. The youngest and poorest segments of society, it seems, responded enthusiastically to the revolution. Those who disliked it fled, if they could, to government zones, swelling the population of Phnom Penh to some three million people. Others were "re-educated," or killed. American bombing—one of Dr. Kissinger's "bargaining chips"—and the violence of the civil war forced everyone in the kingdom to take sides.

In 1973, after the Paris Agreements, Vietnamese influence over the Khmer Rouge diminished. This development reduced Prince Sihanouk's freedom to maneuver, as head of an ostensibly pro-Chinese government-in-exile, and allowed the Khmer Rouge to replace pro-Sihanouk cadres with their own people as they accelerated their experiments, on Cambodian soil, with Maoist ideas of revolution. So-called "co-operative farms" (*sakakar*) were introduced in 1973. Other features of life in liberated zones included all-night political and cultural rallies, called *miting*, after the English word, in both Cambodian and Vietnamese; systematic puritanism affecting dress, hair-styles and sexual behavior; the abolition of money, badges of rank and private property; and a stress on collective leadership, ownership and self-reliance. Foreign models were played down to make the revolution seem a Cambodian one without roots in the "old society." In some areas, the process of liberation went on for several years; in others, especially those liberated late in the war, it was violent and brief.

The first months of peace in Battambang, for example, were harsh. After years of propaganda from their leaders and pummeling from U.S. and Lon Nol aircraft, Khmer Rouge soldiers, filled with what one of them called "uncontrolled hatred" took apart a pair of T-28 aircraft with their bare hands, and "would have eaten them, if possible, according to a witness. At the same time, people who held authority under Lon Nol began to disappear for "study." A morbid jingle declared that "*Khmaer krohom somlap, min del prap*" ("the Khmer Rouge kill, but never explain"). By mid-summer, however, the killings stopped, and the transformation of Cambodian rural society, in the northwest, began in earnest.

By this time, the people of Battambang and Phnom Penh—perhaps two and a half million of them—had been moved into the countryside by the revolutionary army, organized into work-teams and ordered to produce their own food. The work-teams were made up of groups of 10, 30, 100, 300 and 900 people, led at each level, except the lowest, by three workers placed in charge of "work" (the tasks at hand), "politics" (culture and morale) and "economics" (food and tools). This structure, modeled on a military one, proved to be an effective instrument of Khmer Rouge control. Hours were long and food was scarce, although the "organization" made a point of feeding work-teams better than they fed "unproductive" people.

What was revolutionary about the process, in Cambodian terms, was the value placed on manual labor almost as an end in itself. In the "old society" peasants placed a premium on individual freedom, and on leisure of an unsupervised kind. To make up for this they are now told that they own the land and factories where they work, and even the revolution itself. Collective self-reliance or autarky, as preached by the regime, contrasts sharply with what might be called the slave mentality that suffused pre-revolutionary Cambodia and made it so "peaceful" and "charming" to the elite and to most outsiders—for perhaps two thousand years. A refugee from Battambang recalls a Khmer Rouge making this point at a *miting* in dramatic terms. The speech went something like this:

In the old days, the big people told us we had independence. What kind of independence was that? What had we built? Well, *they* built an independence monument. Where did they build it? In the capital. Who saw the thing? The big people's children. Did country people see it? No, they didn't; they saw only photos. The big people's children went in and out of Cambodia, going here and there, and then they came back, to control our kind of people. What do we do, now, in contrast to all this? We don't build monuments like that. Instead, by raising embankments and digging irrigation canals, the children of Cambodia build their own independence monuments, ones that they can see, and their children, too . . .

The theme of self-reliance is stressed in Cambodia's constitution, promulgated in January of last year, and derives in part from the dissertation that one of Cambodia's leaders, Khieu Samphan, wrote in France in 1959. The phrase is sometimes known as autarky, and Khieu Samphan used this word in his address to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations held in Colombo last year. In cultural and economic terms, the word has been attacked by T. S. Eliot, used by Stalin, and defended by Mussolini. In the Cambodian case, in 1976, autarky makes sense, both in terms of recent experience—American intervention, and what is seen as the

Western-induced corruption of previous regimes—and in terms of Cambodia's long history of conflict with Vietnam. Cambodians are urged daily by their radio, and four times in the constitution, to "build and defend" their country against unspecified enemies. What was wrong with the "old society," these broadcasts suggest, was exploitation (literally, in Cambodian, "riding and stomping") and outsiders. Words that suggest foreign influence—such as "Communist," "socialist" or "Marxist," to name only three—do not appear in the constitution; French words are no longer used in Cambodian conversation; and the constitution condemns "so-called humanitarian" aid. Autarky is the keynote of Cambodia's ideology today, and certainly explains changing "Cambodia," in English ("Cambodge" in French) to "Kampuchea," reflecting local pronunciation, as if Argentina had changed the "g" in its name to an "h."

Self-reliance also explains turning away from Cambodia's past to make a society where there are "no rich and no poor, no exploiters and no exploited," and where, in the words of the constitution, people are free to "have no religious beliefs." Instead, everyone is at work, "happily" building dams, canals and embankments to provide water for two or even three rice crops a year—an achievement unequaled since the days of Angkor. Can the regime recapture the grandeur of Angkor without duplicating the slavery (and by implication, the elite) that made Angkor what it was? Is the price for liberation, in human terms, too high? Surely, as a friend of mine has written, we Americans with our squalid record in Cambodia should be "cautiously optimistic" about the new regime, "or else shut up." At the same time, I might feel less cautious and more optimistic if I were able to hear the voices of people I knew in the Cambodian countryside fourteen years ago, telling me about the revolution in their own words.

APPENDIX 5

[From the New York Times, May 2, 1977]

REFUGEES DEPICT GRIM CAMBODIA BESET BY HUNGER¹

(By David A. Andelman)

BANGKOK, Thailand, May 1—Two years after the Communist victory, Cambodia is pictured by refugees arriving here as a desolate country, beset by crop failures and disintegrating irrigation systems.

A sense of aimlessness and drift, they say, seems to pervade the land. Similar reports are given by defectors from the Cambodian Army, by the few diplomats who have visited the country, by agricultural experts and intelligence sources.

But the evidence is fragmentary. Most of the refugees and defectors are from the western third of Cambodia, the part of the country that adjoins Thailand. No one is allowed in to tour the land and make independent observations.

Nevertheless, a general picture emerges from interviews of spreading hunger and disease and of the destruction of Cambodia's old ways by the victorious Communists. The victors began the process two years ago with the mass evacuation of cities and capped it late last year with the enforced collectivization of farms into village-wide cooperatives.

The purges that took hundreds of thousands of lives in the aftermath of the Communist capture of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, have apparently ended for the most part, according to the informants. But the new system is said to function largely through fear, with the leadership making itself felt at local levels through what is described as "the organization."

According to army defectors and to intelligence reports, there has been a sudden increase in the Cambodian armed forces recently, with enforced recruiting and the assignment of troops to civilian work not performed adequately by local farm workers.

There are reports that cities have begun to grow again to some degree, and Phnom Penh and Battambang, the one-time principal center of a major rice-growing area, are mentioned in particular. Diplomats said that the central market in Phnom Penh has begun functioning again with some vegetables and meat available occasionally. But, they added, there is still no money anywhere. Payment seems to be by chit or through credits.

FOOD PROBLEM IN VILLAGES

The informants agree that the greatest change has taken place in the Cambodian villages and that the principal problem there is food.

Western intelligence reports say that the 1976 rice crop may have been only half as large as the one the year before and that that one was not particularly good. Refugees from western Cambodia say that the 1976 crop was anywhere from 30 to 50 percent below that of 1975.

In most villages, they say, people are eating only two meals a day, instead of the customary three, and their food consists of a thin rice gruel, sometimes with a banana leaf floating in it.

Among those describing the farmer's experience under Communist rule was Gaji Mahamath, 29 years old, a Moslem who lived most of his life in and around the northwestern village of Ampil until he left for Thailand the last week in March. He and his family have always been rice farmers, and in a good year, he said, his village of about 100 families produced 1,500 sacks of rice.

AUTHORITIES TAKE SHARE

In 1975, the first harvest after the Communist takeover, the crop was nearly as good—almost 1,200 sacks. Last fall, though, the village produced only 800

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sacks. The refugee said that the authorities took 600 sacks in 1975 and 300 last year.

Tap Krean, a 35-year-old refugee from Reamsenal in western Cambodia, said that when the Communists "first came into our village, they told us that now our land was ours that we would no longer have to pay a rent to any landlord or money lender." He had always paid about 10 percent of his rice harvest—about 20 sacks—each year to his landlord, and while he did not regard that as unbearable, he rather liked the new Communist philosophy of no rent until they took away his land.

"We still worked very hard the first year," he said. But then, he said, the Communists "took away half our harvest, and we found that no matter how hard we worked, we still got only our two bowls of rice gruel each day."

"So while usually we paid attention when we plowed, not to skip any space, to plow neat rows close together, last year no one paid any attention," he said. "We plowed like that, this space, that space. And there was nothing to kill the weeds and the dikes broke."

PATTERN OF CONTROL

There seemed in general to be a broad pattern of Communist actions in many agricultural regions. According to the refugees, six party representatives would generally be assigned to each village, and the families would be called together periodically for lectures on self-reliance, vigilance and above all hard work.

In many villages the refugees said, the people were then divided into different work details. Some went to the fields to plow, while others, particularly in villages along roads, were ordered to destroy all the old houses and build new ones hundreds of yards farther back into the jungles.

In the fields, the Communists were said to have ordered the farmers to begin knocking down the small dikes that separate one rice paddy from the next and that gave the Southeast Asian countryside its checkerboard pattern. The refugees pointed out that the Communists correctly perceived the dikes as denoting land ownership and that they stressed that now all land was owned in common.

The peasants made no objection, the refugees said, and soon broad open spaces appeared surrounded only by large, permanent dikes—each area covering several acres of land.

ONE END FLOODED, OTHER DRY

But what the peasants had not told the Communists, two refugees said, was that the smaller dikes performed a purpose other than denoting land ownership: they held in the water as well, compensating for slight irregularities in the land. With the fields opened, the refugees said, the rains at times flooded one end five or six feet deep, leaving the other end nearly dry.

Rice stalks reportedly grew tall and thin in the deep water, producing only a few small kernels of rice at the top or dying as they were submerged by the water. At the other end of the same fields, the refugees noted, rice dried and withered at the height of the rainy season.

Some workers were sent quickly to some fields when village Communist leaders realized the large dikes were breaking apart. Farmers reported constant patching, filling and rebuilding at the height of the rains. By last fall, the refugees said, nothing in their area seemed to work.

In many villages, workers were said to be prostrate from exhaustion or disease, particularly malaria, cholera and dysentery. In July 1976, Pol Pot, the Cambodian Prime Minister, told the Vietnam press agency that more than 80 percent of the Cambodian population had been weakened by malaria, and that figure is increasing.

Virtually no refugee arrives now in Thailand without one form or another of a degenerative illness. Some villages, refugees said, had as many as 200 to 400 workers unable to go to the fields because of illness.

As a result, the refugees reported, acreage being harvested dropped, and by the end of the last harvest season much of last year's rice crop in some areas was either rotting in permanently flooded fields or, in the drier areas, withering for lack of retained water. Other crops were also having severe difficulties.

Citing the huge population shifts, one agricultural economist in Bangkok with exclusive experience in Cambodia, said: "People were working land they were not familiar with, using techniques imposed from the outside with no motivation for new initiative on their part."

Then, referring to the plans for a self-sufficient pastoral society, the economist said: "The Communists were so bent on working toward their long-visualized

theoretical structure that they ignored the structure of Cambodian village and agricultural life that's worked for hundreds of years."

SYSTEM TAKES HOLD

By early this year, the system the Communists installed had reportedly taken hold throughout the country. In each collectivized village, generally composed of 200 to 400 families, there is said to be a top rank of three Communist civilians, nearly all outsiders, headed by one chief, and three lower personnel. The six members of the leadership tend to live apart from the rest of the villagers in their own compounds or on occasion in separate houses.

Nearly every refugee reported that his Communist leaders lived better than everyone else. The leaders, the refugees said, are allowed to keep their own pigs and chickens, grow small vegetable gardens or take the pigs and chickens of other villagers for their own use.

The refugees said that villagers were constantly kept in line by references to "angka," the all-powerful "organization" that was said to oversee every aspect of life. If one did not follow the revolutionary precepts, the refugees added, representatives of "the organization" would come and the person would disappear.

This happened less often as the months wore on. But the fear was constantly there.

STATIONED IN CAMPS

Soldiers who had defected from the Communists said that no armed troops were ever stationed in villages or towns but rather in camps, containing as many as 1,000 men. The defectors said the camps were placed in jungle areas accessible to a dozen or more villages with networks of runners or couriers who could be used to call for help. On a moment's notice, 50, 100 or more men could and often were mobilized, the defectors reported.

According to both defectors and intelligence reports, there seems to be a conscious effort to expand substantially the size of the Cambodian armed forces from the 50,000 or 60,000 men at the end of the war two years ago to perhaps double that number by the end of this year.

To do this, local commanders are said to be impressing villagers into service, expanding small units to 300 men the strength known as a small battalion, and small battalions to the 1,000-man great battalion, or regiment.

Defectors told of being issued a rifle and 120 bullets for patrol work in the forests, then being required to return all the shells or account for each one expended. Several defectors told of seeing M-79 grenades and B-40 rockets in storage, but none had ever used one in field exercises, which take place with increasing regularity.

INFORMATION ON CAPITAL MEAGER

Information on what is happening in Phnom Penh is sketchy at best. Diplomats who have visited or are stationed now in the city believe that only a handful of the ministries are still functioning there and with limited staffs. These, they say, are perhaps only the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Agriculture and Defense.

There are nine nations with missions in Cambodia—China, North Korea, Albania, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Egypt.

The identity of the national leadership is the subject of scores of rumors. Diplomats noted that messages of congratulation on the second anniversary of the Communist takeover were addressed in order to Khieu Samphan, chairman of the State Presidium, Nuon Chea, chairman of the People's Representative Assembly and Prime Minister Pol Pot. Many believe that Pol Pot is a revolutionary pseudonym for Saloth Sar.

Saloth Sar was identified by defectors during the war years as secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cambodia. He has not been mentioned at all since the fall of Phnom Penh two years ago.

A "SECOND LEADERSHIP"

The Cuban Ambassador has told friends that there is a shadowy "second leadership" that no Westerner has ever met or will ever see and that is responsible for the most draconian measures of control.

Some analysts believe that the Communist Party structure itself, which has never been mentioned by any official Communist publication and which may be headed by Saloth Sar, may be "the organization."

Some foreign advisers have reportedly begun to appear in the big cities. Chinese technicians have been seen in both Phnom Penh and Battambang, though confined to compounds at the airport.

Relations with neighboring Vietnam are almost as sour as those with the United States. Cambodia curtly rejected an American request to allow a trip to Phnom Penh by the mission that visited Vietnam and Laos earlier this year to inquire about Americans still listed as missing in the Vietnam war.

There are continuing reports of clashes along the Vietnam-Cambodia border and large numbers of refugees have reportedly fled into Vietnam, particularly through the eastern Cambodian area known as the Parrot's Beak. Cambodian refugees arriving by boat at Lam Saeng in Thailand said that some 3,000 Cambodians had fled to Phu Quoc, an island off the Cambodian coast that is controlled by Vietnam.

All have been welcomed by the Vietnamese, the refugees arriving in Thailand said, and each family has been given more than two acres of land to farm if they are farmers, or a boat if they are fishermen.

This drain of refugees continues despite the minefields and armed Communist patrols along all of Cambodia's borders. Nearly 25,000 have fled to Thailand since the fall of Phnom Penh—more than 6,000 then going on to France and nearly 5,000 to the United States. Thousands more have fled to Vietnam.

What all of this has done to Cambodia's population is still only a matter for speculation. The last real census was taken in the mid-1960's, and at the war's end Western estimates put the population at about 7 million, though how many died in the fighting from 1970 to 1975 may never be known.

Asked why he had fled to Thailand even though he knew a crowded refugee camp here would probably be his final destination, Tap Krea said:

"If I stay there, I die anyway—a few weeks, a few months, from my malaria, or the organization, or that rice gruel, who knows. At least here, I have no future, but I have my three bowls of rice a day."