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INVESTIGATION OF KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

GOVERNMENT

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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

PART 5


JUNE 1, 6, AND 7, 1978

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

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INVESTIGATION OF KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

THURSDAY, JUNE 1, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Subcommittee on International Organizations begins another series of hearings for the investigation of Korean-American relations. These hearings will focus on the period from 1973 through 1976. By examining allegations of certain South Korean attempts to expand influence in the United States, the subcommittee is endeavoring to determine first whether they are true or false and further, to discover the motivations, contents, and goals in South Korea's multifaceted lobbying operation in this country.

Previous testimony before this subcommittee has shown that the Republic of Korea had plans, both written and unwritten, and engaged in extensive activities, designed to win greater influence on American policy and opinion. Previous testimony has also shown that high officials of our Government were aware of some aspects of improper activities by the South Korean Government since the beginning of this decade, but that measures taken to halt or prevent the activities were inadequate.

In these hearings, we will continue examination of some of the issues raised during previous sessions: The policies of the United States and the Republic of Korea toward each other; harassment and intimidation of Koreans living in the United States by the KCIA; attempts by the South Korean Government to influence the academic community in the United States; the activities of Tongsun Park; alleged ties between organizations headed by Rev. Sun Myung Moon and the South Korean Government; attempts to bribe American officials; what officials of the executive branch knew about improper South Korean activities and what action they took.

Before we begin taking testimony from our witnesses today, I would like to review for the record some of the sworn testimony of previous witnesses which relates to matters we will take up during these hearings.

One, Donald Ranard, on March 17, 1976, stated that during the visit to the United States of South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in 1973, "the KCIA moved forcefully to block his appearances and his appeal * * * [A]lways the KCIA was on his heels."

Two, Kim Woon Ha, on March 17, 1976, testified that in 1974 he was told by KCIA officials that "I would experience retaliation if I continued to criticize the inhuman activities of the Korean Government and to publish activities of anti-Park resisters."

Three, Lee Jai Hyon, on June 10, 1975, testified that while he was an official at the Korean Embassy, the KCIA briefed Embassy officers on a plan "to intimidate uncooperative Korean residents in the United States through their families, relatives, and close friends in Korea, * * * and to regiment Korean communities in the United States by infiltrating with frontmen or undercover agents."

Four, Gregory Henderson, on March 17, 1976, provided the subcommittee with an article from a Korean newspaper about a \$1 million grant to Harvard University by the Korean Traders Association. The article stated that one of the objectives of the grant was to "promote counteractive efforts against those who spearhead anti-Korean Government moves like Reischauer and Cohen."

Five, Donald Ranard, on March 25, 1976, informed the subcommittee that while he was the State Department's Director of Korean Affairs, he learned that the KCIA planned to promote anti-Japanese demonstrations in the United States, and that after he warned the Korean Embassy against such activities, no demonstrations took place.

Six, Chris Elkins, on September 27, 1976, testified that as a member of an organization headed by Reverend Moon, he was involved in plans for an anti-Japanese demonstration which was to have included throwing eggs at the Japanese Embassy.

Seven, Neil Salonen, on September 30, 1976, testified that as president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation, he participated in plans for a legal demonstration in September 1974, "to protest the Japanese Government's insensitivity to the feelings of the Korean people after President Park's wife was assassinated." He stated that the egging of the Japanese Embassy was only an option suggested by someone and then abandoned by the planners.

Eight, Sohn Ho Young, on November 29, 1977, stated that the subcommittee's copy of a document entitled "1976 Plan for Operations in the United States" was an authentic KCIA document, based on his experience as an officer of the KCIA in Houston and New York.

To explore these and other issues, we will begin today with a statement by a scholar of Korean-American relations. He will be followed today and during coming days with testimony from current and former U.S. Government officials, Korean-Americans, and former officials of the Korean Government.

Our first witness today is Mr. Rinn Sup Shinn, who has been a senior research scientist in Asian affairs at American University since 1969. Mr. Shinn has been coauthor of a number of editions of U.S. area handbooks for North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and the People's Republic of China. He is a frequent guest lecturer at the Foreign Service Institute, the National War College, and numerous other governmental and private institutions.

Mr. Shinn is well-known as an astute observer and analyst of Korean affairs and United States-Korean relation.

Mr. Shinn, we are delighted to have you here. Would you proceed?

STATEMENT OF RINN-SUP SHINN, SENIOR RESEARCH POLITICAL SCIENTIST, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Mr. SHINN. The purpose of this statement is to shed some light on the domestic and external situations in Korea in 1973 and 1974, and to place United States-Korean relations of the period in proper perspective. I shall attempt to do this first by outlining what the South Korean Government of President Park Chung Hee tried to achieve as the year 1973 opened.

Without equivocation, Park's first priority was to consolidate domestic stability under his impregnable rule. This was to be done through the sweeping political changes that he had initiated under martial law in October 1972. In the earlier hearings before this subcommittee on March 15, 1978, Prof. Gari Ledyard, of Columbia University discussed the circumstances surrounding these changes, known variously as the "October Revitalization Reforms," the "Yushin reforms," or the "Yushin system." Given the far-reaching consequences of the system on relations between Seoul and Washington, let me add a few words on what the October reforms were all about.

These reforms are said to be needed to cope with both unprecedented external uncertainties after 1970 and domestic situations, not to mention the delicate task of conducting a dialog with the North Korean Government of President Kim Il Sung. To be specific, South Korea wanted to achieve several interrelated, mutually reinforcing objectives. These were: A self-reliant national defense; an accelerated economic growth for modernization and for the welfare of the people; an undivided and unquestioning loyalty to the state through intensified anticommunism; and the establishment of the so-called "Korean-style democracy." Taken as a whole, these were postulated as being essential to the attainment of absolute stability under Park; needless to say, such stability was also regarded as a means of achieving each of the above objectives.

These objectives or priorities were by no means new; President Park had tried to accomplish them since the early sixties. But in late 1972, he felt justified in creating a new system of crisis management in light of major changes in his foreign policy environment. What was notable in his new approach was the cavalier manner in which "Western democracy" was declared, in effect, irrelevant to the reality of Korea. A senior government official minced no words when he declared in late October 1972 that the Yushin reforms were inevitable because "the cheap imitation * * * of Western democracy had brought on chaos, inefficiency, and disruption in our society."

I will not dwell on the merits and demerits of such an argument. For the purpose of this hearing, however, it must be emphasized that President Park's no nonsense policy of galvanizing national consensus by decree—rather than by open and direct popular elections—aroused strong mixed reactions, not the least of which was the erosion of the "special relationship" between Seoul and Washington.

The South Korean campaign to befriend the United States in recent years was aimed at counteracting the weakening of that special

relationship. To be sure, South Korea aspired to national self-help for a number of years, but there was no way it could attain that objective without the continued military and economic backing of Washington. This point became clear when Seoul embarked on a second 5-year plan in 1967.

The importance of American support took on the character of a national imperative after 1970 when South Korea was jolted by Washington's announced decision to reduce its troops in Korea. Actually, Seoul should have done something about that shock in February 1969 when it first got an inkling of the U.S. troop plan—and certainly within weeks after the announcement of the Nixon doctrine in mid-1969. A likely reason this did not happen was because of the self-serving South Korean official presumption that their country would remain one of the strategic areas that the United States would defend at any cost, and hence would be exempt from the Nixon doctrine.

In retrospect, Seoul was amply justified when it began to doubt the constancy of Washington after 1970. Why was the United States officially silent on its troop reduction plan until mid-1970, a plan about which South Korea insisted it should have been consulted? I submit that the South Korean perception of its security relationship with the United States has been shaped not so much by the substance of the 1970 reduction plan as by the manner in which the plan was presented to South Korea. Seoul made no secret of its alarm and displeasure over the way Washington handled the reduction plan. In July 1970 the United States formally proposed to hold talks with Seoul concerning the plan. This was done, however, not in Seoul as it should have been, but in Saigon where Secretary of State William Rogers and his South Korean counterpart were attending a ministerial conference of nations participating in the Vietnam war. On the following day, I might add, U.S. Ambassador William Porter called on Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon in Seoul for the same purpose. Meanwhile, the embarrassed Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Ha was publicly ridiculed as a glorified mailman.

Seoul, no doubt, should have been more alert in 1969 when it first detected the sign of smoke in Washington, but it was too lethargic to respond, being steeped in the innocence of a dependency mentality. It has since then learned a lesson not soon to be forgotten. The diplomatic rule of thumb now in Seoul is: React at the first sign of smoke in Washington, the presumption being that suspicion is the first line of defense. We get the impression, however, that America watchers in Seoul may be unduly hypersensitive to the atmospherics of Washington; it seems as though they are haunted by their perception of Washington as being inscrutable at best and conspiratorial at worst.

There is an old Korean proverb that says, "If you drown, blame yourself, not the water." Seoul has taken care to be prepared for all contingencies; namely, to make sure that it would not be shocked again and, of course, to see to it that the water in Washington would not be troublesome for South Korea.

By July 1970 government procedures for informing the President on foreign and national security matters had been streamlined and centralized. Also in July the Government dispatched a high-level, though unofficial, national assembly delegation to Washington for fact-

finding and to lobby for continued U.S. military presence without reduction at least until 1976. Upon their return, the members of the delegation publicly stressed the need for what they called "yoron kongse" or a public relations offensive aimed at the United States. Cited, too, was the need for a diplomatic posture improved in quality as well as quantity, and the need to establish channels through which South Korean church and private organizations could express their views on security issues to foreign audiences. Also mentioned was Seoul's adverse image stemming from, as they put it, "corruption and irregularities." More importantly, on the matter of U.S. troops in foreign countries, their understanding was said to be that the "tradition" of the United States was to "withdraw first and notify later."

In September 1970 President Park declared that "security diplomacy" vis-a-vis Washington would be positively strengthened. At the time he was unquestionably rankled by Vice President Spiro Agnew's disclosure the previous month that all American troops would be pulled out of Korea in 5 years or so—as soon as the South Korean armed forces were modernized. This came on the heels of other disquieting hints in Washington about that time that a substantial number of U.S. troops would be withdrawn, possibly in 2 or 3 years.

Against this backdrop, we can draw the reasonable conclusion that by October 1970 at the latest, the stage would have been set in Seoul for the launching of lobbying in Washington—presumably under the watchful eyes of the Government. As part of this effort, a so-called invitation diplomacy was soon underway and, during 1972 alone, some 50 "prominent" Americans in the political, academic, and press circles were invited to South Korea. The South Korean Government's action was quite rational under the circumstances as an instrument of diplomacy. In any case, by 1973 the need for a major public relations offensive came to be recognized in Seoul as more compelling than ever before.

What happened in those 2 years during which United States-Korean relations became strained? How did South Korea perceive and react to the events of the period and what were the consequences of its actions?

1973 was the first year of trial and error for President Park's "Korean-style democracy." In January, Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil came to Washington to meet with President Nixon. What Seoul wanted from Nixon was his endorsement of Park's Yushin system and Nixon's unqualified support for the status quo in Korea—meaning continued U.S. military and economic assistance and its military presence in Korea until 1975–76. Status quo was also uppermost in President Park's mind when, in January, he affirmed that a dialog with North Korea, which had already been underway for several months, would be conducted step by step on South Korea's terms. To make sure that there were no illusions about this the Government ordered its "unification diplomacy" stepped up. That is, national unification should be achieved by means of peacefully overpowering Communist North Korea. For all intents and purposes, the dialog with the North had been deadlocked by that time if only because South Korea's "small-steps-first" approach could not be squared with North Korea's proposal for mutual arms and force reduction. The northern overture

struck fear into the hearts of many South Koreans who mistrusted Pyongyang's intention. Developments during 1973 and 1974 caused further strains between the two sides.

Internally, Park's grip on power was tightened with methodical efficiency. In January, the already debilitated opposition New Democratic Party split, succumbing to the Government's divide-and-rule pressures. In February, the criminal procedure code was amended to do away with the habeas corpus provisions. In March, Park told the national assemblymen to rally behind his Yushin reforms and to discard the so-called foreign-made myths of democracy.

Undoubtedly, the most salient event of 1973 occurred in August when Kim Dae Jung, who narrowly lost to Park in the Presidential election of 1971, was kidnapped from Tokyo. At that time, Kim Dae Jung had continued to speak out against what he called the dictatorship and tyranny of the Park regime. The kidnaping incident had wide-ranging repercussions: Domestically, it was the catalyst to intensified opposition to Park; externally, it was the direct cause of acrimony with Japan; and for the United States, the issue was whether the South Korean Government deserved continued military aid from the U.S. Congress in light of its unusually harsh crackdown on human rights advocates and political dissenters.

The politics of dissent, which had been simmering for some time, escalated after the kidnaping, spreading to universities and to the circles of prominent intellectuals, poets, scholars, and Christian ministers and laymen. To stave off the snowballing of antigovernment campaigns, the authorities ordered universities and high schools closed, released some of the students detainees, and announced the removal of Lee Hu Rak, the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency—KCIA—all in December. In addition, KCIA agents were quietly removed from newspaper offices, church premises, and college campuses.

Dissidents did not let up, however, in their demands for a restoration of democracy, to which President Park replied that such demands were in effect, as he put it, "an invitation to the demise of democracy." In January 1974, he struck back with two emergency measures, the first of which would put behind bars for up to 15 years anyone criticizing his constitutional system. The second provided for courts-martial to handle offenders. Within days, a third decree was issued to cope with the economic pinch caused by the oil crisis of 1973. In April 1974, emergency measure No. 4 outlawed student activities connected with an allegedly pro-North Korean youth and student group. Also banned were student boycotts of classes or their participation in unauthorized rallies or activities. Violators were punishable by death, life imprisonment or over 5 years of detention.

The extremely volatile situation was exacerbated by a tragedy on August 15, 1974, when an assassin's bullet, intended for President Park, narrowly missed him but struck his wife; the first lady died a few hours later. The fact that the assassin was a legal Korean resident of Japan compounded the already aggravated relations that existed between Seoul and Tokyo because of the Kim Dae Jung incident.

Up to that point, Japan had been unhappy with what it believed was Seoul's foot-dragging in Tokyo's investigation of the case. By

November 1973, Korean-Japanese relations had calmed somewhat, but tensions were there nonetheless. Now in light of the new development, South Korea wanted Japan not only to assume moral and legal responsibility but take punitive actions against the pro-North Korean group in Japan with which the assassin was said to be connected. Diplomatic altercations nearly caused a rupture of relations, but because of U.S. mediation, fences had been mended by October 1974. Japan resumed its economic assistance that had been suspended since December 1973. By that time Japan had a substantial economic influence in Korea, accounting for 67.4 percent of total foreign investment as compared to 26.7 percent for the United States; in 1973, Japan had replaced the United States as the top buyer of Korean goods.

In late August 1974, Park lifted the first and fourth emergency decrees, but the antigovernment movement remained unabated. In October, the issue of press freedom was interjected into the movement.

Under normal circumstances, an American Presidential visit to Korea would assure an across-the-board national welcome. But in November 1974, President Ford's visit to Seoul became a focal point of confrontation between the Government and its opposition, the latter arguing that the Ford visit would have the effect of legitimizing Park's strong-arm tactics. President Ford was not unmindful of the Seoul situation and he took the occasion of his visit to express the concern of his administration and of the American people over President Park's stand on human rights.

As political tensions mounted steadily, among the first to bear the brunt of government retaliation was the *Dong-A Ilbo*, an influential, independent newspaper of some symbolic significance; before 1945, the newspaper was a voice of national anger against Japanese oppression. In December 1974, the Government forced major companies to withdraw their advertising from this newspaper. Concerned South Koreans and their foreign friends were to bear witness in anguish to the decline in vigor of a popular symbol of national conscience—the free press. Then, in the waning days of 1974, an American Methodist minister was ordered expelled for alleged involvement in internal politics.

The South Korean Government was under pressure also from the economic sector. It had had not only an economic slow-down in 1972, the first year of the third 5-year plan, but also became worried about the politically destabilizing effects of its post-1967 policy of imbalanced economic growth. Demands for equitable social services, for higher wages, and for income redistribution became major sources of urban industrial unrest. The Government met the challenge with a carrot-and-stick approach and by stepping up a so-called resources diplomacy—meaning the campaign designed to insure a stable supply of food grains, crude oil, and other raw materials; to develop markets for South Korean goods; and to induce foreign capital and technology on favorable terms.

It is sufficient to point out that the combination of effective lobbying, flexible diplomacy, hard work, wage controls, labor discipline, industrial growth, and booming exports paid off handsomely in 1973 and 1974. The 1973 GNP growth rate was 16.5 percent in real terms, an astonishing leap over the 7 percent of 1972. In 1974, the growth rate

was a modest 8.2 percent but still impressive when considering the recessionary effects of the 1973 oil crunch.

Some positive performance was, of course, crucial since it helped the Park regime to pull its chestnuts out of the fire. To be sure, the benefits of the economic miracle were not equitably shared, but their helpful effects on political stability would be undeniable—even with due allowances for built-in counterpressures. Economic success proved to be the tangible symbol of Park's effective leadership; it was Park's insurance for the safety of his incumbency.

On balance, the South Korean economic performance depended in no small measure on exports, which in turn were assured a strong competitive edge deriving from cheap labor, and the cheap labor was sustained by government restrictions on labor disputes or strikes. Stability on the labor front, and its implications regarding the human rights of low-paid factory workers, were therefore inextricably entwined with the political, economic, and security imperatives of the Yushin system.

This linkage no doubt explains President Park's Confucian disdain for foreign critics of his political management. Believing that these critics are either anti-Korean or are misinformed by bad foreign press, Park has come to conclude that most foreigners, if given a chance to visit Korea, would be able to discover an entirely new Korea, a country exactly the opposite of what the New York Times, the Washington Post and some Japanese newspapers had been saying it was.

In reflecting on United States-Korean relations in 1973 and 1974, there is no question that Park's heavyhandedness did complicate the picture. But from his perspective, the issue was decidedly more complex—and deadly serious. I do not want to dwell on the specifics because of lack of time, but it should be borne in mind that what Washington did in those years on matters of foreign aid and in general was perceived in Seoul by a government in a besieged state of mind. Of particular concern were the continued decrease in military and economic aid to Seoul against the backdrop of rising disenchantment on Capitol Hill with foreign aid generally; the pervasiveness of anti-war sentiments stemming from American frustrations over the Indochinese situation; the congressional action aimed at phasing out military grant aid and replacing it with foreign military sales credit by fiscal year 1977; and another action designed to limit the Presidential war powers. Of these developments, the reduction in military aid was regarded as especially alarming because it would delay its impact on Seoul's 5-year military modernization program which was to end in 1975.

South Korea had additional cause for concern after late 1973, when Congress sought to upgrade the human rights factor in U.S. foreign policy; their worst fear was confirmed in the following year when Congress placed a ceiling of \$145 million on all forms of military assistance to Korea—but with a proviso that an additional \$20 million could be handed over, contingent on the Presidential certification that "substantial progress" in the human rights area had been made in South Korea. The congressional measure was attacked in Seoul as interference in domestic affairs and was also said to be based on not only an inadequate understanding of South Korean realities but also a superficial assessment of the North Korean threat. Prime Minister

Kim Jong Pil stressed that his government had never infringed on the rights of anyone other than those who were involved in antistate subversive activities, and also categorically denied the opposition charges that the real reason for the Government's repression was aimed at the self-serving maintenance of the Park regime. Meanwhile, a publicity drive was unfolded in Japan and to a lesser degree in South Korea over the human rights situation in North Korea; the campaign, which had begun on a low key in the fall of 1973 in Japan, was focused on the plight of as many as 6,000 Japanese wives of Koreans who had gone to North Korea since 1959.

True to the axiom that whereas a great power disposes, a small state pleads, South Korea did plead through the vehicle of what it called total diplomacy or multifaceted diplomacy. In January 1973, President Park urged the overseas representatives of private Korean companies and even Korean residents in foreign countries to actively contribute to the national cause. In 1974, he called on "all Government officials and representatives of civil organizations assigned overseas" to work for the furtherance of national strength "with the price and a sense of responsibility that they are representing the state," and "solidly united under the leadership of the ambassadors concerned."

Judging from open South Korean sources, the Government placed as much emphasis on sending national assembly delegations to major foreign capitals as on inviting foreign parliamentary leaders, scholars, journalists, religious leaders, artists, and literary figures. The so-called parliamentary diplomacy, which got into full swing in July and August of 1973, produced mixed results at best, some even comical. In fact, a leading newspaper editorialized in Seoul that such diplomacy would be regarded as "success" if it produced what it called a no harm, no gain result. In September 1973, President Park instructed senior Government officials to be henceforth more discriminating, focusing more on "quality" than quantity. The apparent conclusion was that diplomatic lobbying was not for amateurs.

In 1974, there was a high premium placed on inviting foreign leaders, the rationale being that "one eyewitness exposure is worth more than 100 hearsays." More importantly, Seoul was vitally interested in the creation of so-called pro-Korean circles in the power alleys of Washington.

In conclusion, I wish to make three observations in connection with my presentation today: The first is that South Korea's national objectives in the 1973-74 period were basically a continuation—with some modifications—of those objectives dating back to the early sixties and will likely remain so for some time, barring, of course, any major changes in the operational environment of South Korean foreign policy. And the policies and actions deriving from these objectives will continue to be underlined by Seoul's siege mentality.

The second observation concerns the probable effects these national priorities and actions will have on the human rights dimensions of the Seoul-Washington connection. To be sure, there will be some improvements in appearance, but inner substance will remain shackled under the pervasive culture of suppressed silence. President Park's Yushin system is an accomplished fact that is probably irreversible; thus the real solution to the problem of civil and political rights in South Korea will be a long time coming. In the final analysis, the problem is inter-

locked with a more fundamental issue of inter-Korean confrontation and that being the case, it must be emphasized that a comprehensive, mutually acceptable peace settlement between South and North Korea is a precondition for the furtherance of human sanity on both sides.

The last point is that the "Koreagate" notwithstanding, the South Korean need for lobbying in Washington will remain as much for fencemending as for its core interests. Doubtless, the South Korean Government has learned valuable lessons, and we all should take an evenhanded, fair, and constructive approach to the "Koreagate" issue.

Most of all, South Korean officials would be well advised to resist the temptation of a shortsighted, "brownie point" approach in their relations with Washington and other nations, bearing in mind that their best "lobbyist" is something that neither money can buy nor Madison Avenue can conjure overnight. That best lobbyist would be an image of South Korea as a humane and democratic society.

Thank you very much.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Shinn. That was a very useful overview of United States-Korean relations over these years.

There is one point I want to raise in connection with economic progress which Korea has made, which has been impressive. Some comparisons I have seen indicate that the distributive justice in South Korea actually is better than most other countries, which startled me, because I have been aware of the low wages and the prohibition on strikes for urban workers. Nonetheless, some studies do appear to show that South Korea has more distributive equality than many other societies.

Are you familiar with those figures at all?

Mr. SHINN. I do not know about the statistics, but as a matter of generalization that is quite true. There are a number of studies done to underscore the fact that the measure of distributive justice is perhaps better in South Korea than in many other nations at the comparable stage of modernization. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that what is important here is how the people in Korea who are affected by this problem perceive it rather than what these studies say about the problem.

Based upon my own observations, I do believe that South Korea does have a serious problem, and if President Park Chung Hee were to have any trouble at all in the future, the source of destabilization would come from the industrial labor sector.

Mr. FRASER. Because they feel they are not sharing adequately in the economic growth?

Mr. SHINN. Yes, I would say so. In an affluent country or in one which is becoming affluent, there is a problem of frustrations among the have-nots, who see the conspicuous signs of affluence and conspicuous consumption by many who are at the top strata of the society. The have-nots are frustrated, feeling that they are going through the salt mine business of sweat, labor, and blood, and these guys are living like a pig off their hide, and that the situation is not fair.

It is that feeling of disenchantment that we have to be concerned with, but in a country like South Korea where the resources are poor and its economic limitations are tremendous, perhaps it would be inevitable that some distributive injustice would remain for some time,

but the Government is confident that in due time the problem will be overcome.

Mr. FRASER. You referred somewhere in your statement to the problem of corruption at one stage. What has happened with regard to that problem, which, I gather, is common to many developing countries? What could one say about it through these years?

Mr. SHINN. On the one hand, the Government has an annual anti-corruption campaign which you read about in the newspapers. You may see that XYZ number of Government officials were dismissed or brought to trial on charges of misuse of office and embezzlement. I believe that the Government has also taken some measures to prevent the flight of capital to foreign countries, and some time in 1974, in fact, the Government amended the law to make it impossible for passports to be abused; that is, to make sure that foreign travel by affluent businessmen will not be used as a vehicle for the flight of capital.

In addition, I might say President Park himself is setting a good example. He is above reproach morally in this regard. He is trying to set a good example, so that the people will emulate him. As a matter of national policy, he has exhorted Government officials to forego affluence. The Government also forbade people from engaging in excessive social entertainment, which in South Korea is sometimes abused as a vehicle of bribe-giving.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me follow the point Mr. Fraser made on the economic distribution. I have a recollection of reading that the average family income in the rural area has risen to approximately 3,000 U.S. dollars. My understanding is, or the implication there is, that the income distribution in the rural areas seems to have worked out more practically than the income distribution from industrial production success, their exports and so forth. Is there any general comment or opinion you have on that?

Mr. SHINN. According to Government analysis and figures, the traditional gap between rural and urban incomes has narrowed considerably. In fact, at one time the claim was made that the rural income surpassed on the average the income of the urban sector population. I have no way to confirm or dispute that official claim, but based upon my own observations and analysis, the people in the rural areas are no doubt encouraged in the belief that situations will improve.

In fact, with the advent of the so-called "Saemaul Undong," the New Village Movement, there are signs of substantial improvements in the area. There is an element of empathy on the part of the rural population, but I want to place this issue in perspective; to be sure, the rural income may have statistically improved substantially, but we have also to take into allowance the fact that there are many people, youngsters especially, who left the countryside for the big cities for quick riches or for the lure of urban life.

These people are concentrated in Seoul, Pusan, and other major cities, and therefore, those who are left in the farmlands are old people and women. Using that situation in the statistical computation, surely income has improved, but the statistics do not explain the situation in its totality.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Shinn, in the last two pages of your statement, you reach some general conclusions which I would like to run through with you. You point out that the national objectives in the 1973-74 period were a continuation of objectives dating back to the sixties, and then you go on to make the point, and I quote, "Policies and actions deriving from these objectives will continue to be underlined by Seoul's siege mentality."

Can you elaborate a bit on the "siege mentality" and its justification?

Mr. SHINN. The South Korean Government believes genuinely that it is under the gun, that there is a real threat from North Korea. I do not want to get into this question of threat, but based on the official South Korean perception of the situation, there is no doubt that Seoul is disturbed by what I call an insecurity syndrome. This situation, of course, is not in isolation. It does not happen in a total vacuum. This is partly a function of Seoul's perception of Washington's attitude toward South Korea.

The Government and many concerned people in Seoul feel that America would disengage from Korea eventually, and that the confrontation with the North Korean Government will continue for many, many years to come. Thus they feel it would be most inappropriate for the U.S. Government to lower its guard, so to speak, in the Korean context.

I think it is this particular factor which is at the root of the siege mentality. Another way of putting it is, it is a garrison state mentality. South Korea maintains that to be secure from all elements of uncertainties, it must be prepared, it must act on the worst possible assumptions, the worst imaginable prospects of the situation, and it must be alert and vigilant at all times. This is what I mean by siege mentality.

Mr. DERWINSKI. To what extent has the economic success stimulated greater confidence within Government circles? That is, greater confidence vis-a-vis North Korea and so forth?

Mr. SHINN. There is no question that the Government and people feel that South Korea is economically more viable, more prosperous than North Korea, and, in confrontation with the North Korean side, the South Koreans would have the decisive advantage. The empathy is there. It cannot be denied.

I believe, however, in order for this empathy to be translated into an actual code of public conduct, they must develop a positive frame of mind—the idea that they can stand on their own without having to depend on the United States militarily or economically. This posture of national self-reliance is being built up. President Park has taken substantial steps. In fact, his 5-year cultural renaissance program, which he initiated in either 1973 or 1974, was aimed at building this element of national self-confidence. The self-confidence building game is going on, and I hope it will continue, but once in a while, I have this sneaking suspicion that this national self-reliance, consciousness-building effort has taken on some anti-Western overtones.

I hope that my suspicion will be allayed sufficiently and the Government would take measures to make sure that the appearance of anti-Western thrust would be removed. However, politics among nations is not a one-way street. It is a function of two-way interactions all the time. The U.S. Government must be mindful that Korean people are

very sensitive, that they are insecure, that they are operating under this siege mentality, and that they do not like to be pushed around.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You note that the solution to the problem of civil and political rights will be a long time coming. It may be a long time before a real peace settlement is reached between North and South; is that correct?

Mr. SHINN. Yes; that is correct. Without question, the Yushin rationale was based in part upon this assumption that the conflict and confrontation with North Korea will continue. During those turbulent days of Government crackdowns on internal dissenters and human rights advocates, one of the principle arguments used by the Government was that these strong-handed measures were needed to cope with North Korean threats. The dialog between North and South Korea which got underway in 1972 is one of the unfortunate casualties of the conflict situation, and I see it as an impartial observer of the two-Korea situation, there is no way that human rights in real terms, in terms of the inner substance, can improve unless and until a peace settlement is agreed upon between North and South Korea.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you. I think your statement has been very realistic and very timely, and I commend you for your objectivity.

Mr. SHINN. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Shinn. We very much appreciate your appearance and testimony this morning. You have been very helpful to the work of the subcommittee.

We turn to our next witness, Mr. John E. Nidecker, who served as a special assistant for congressional affairs in the White House from 1969 until 1975. In the course of his work, Mr. Nidecker was in contact with various religious groups, and was involved in the White House prayer breakfasts. He also served as White House liaison for the national prayer breakfast groups, and in that capacity visited Korea in 1974.

Mr. Nidecker, we welcome your appearance here this morning. Would you raise your right hand?

[Whereupon, the witness was duly sworn.]

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Nidecker, we have some questions for you. My understanding is that the way we will proceed this morning will be in a question and answer format.

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. NIDECKER, FORMER SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENTS RICHARD NIXON AND GERALD FORD

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Nidecker, it is our understanding that you were a White House aide from May of 1969 to July of 1975. Is that right?

Mr. NIDECKER. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. Could you give us a little of your background prior to beginning work at the White House?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I was employed by two companies before I came to the White House, and the latter company was the Cities Service Co., and there I was manager of business development when I came to the White House.

Mr. FRASER. Starting with May of 1969, can you describe your positions and responsibilities as a White House aide up until 1973?

Mr. NIDECKER. In 1969, I came aboard the congressional relations staff for the White House, and handled all of the special projects concerning Members of the Congress with the White House. This involved constituent situations where they might need White House help as well as assisting the Congressmen in any way they might request. It was not done with any political party in view; it was done for everyone, and as a net result of that, I have gotten to know quite a number of the Congressmen and some of the problems they have had in their various districts, and I was able to assist in several ways.

After leaving that area of the White House, in the interim I had a serious problem with my spine. I had an operation, and when I came back from that, was moved into a new category, which was to assist with White House visitations, appearances before civic groups, to work with the various religious groups around the country who came to the White House, some seeking funds and some seeking all sorts of favors.

In general, I traveled around the country quite a bit, too.

Mr. FRASER. Your work in the second phase included liaison with youth groups as well as—

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; it did, with college as well as high school groups.

Mr. FRASER. As we understand it, your responsibilities were broadened somewhat in 1973 to include speechmaking among other things. Could you explain for us what your specific duties and responsibilities were in that regard?

Mr. NIDECKER. Most of it was pro bono publico. For example, every year the President of the United States makes a presentation of a wreath for the grave of Benjamin Franklin. That is sponsored by the Poor Richard Club, of Philadelphia. They ask for a representative to come to Philadelphia to speak on behalf of the United States.

At that time, I went into Independence Hall and made a speech about Benjamin Franklin and the relationship that the White House had with his memory. That was one area.

Another was to do preholiday speaking, for example, for Memorial Day in Illinois. I made a speech there talking about our men who had gone forth and died for the country. That was the kind of speech it was.

Mr. FRASER. I want to turn to the question of prayer breakfasts. Could you tell us about the White House prayer breakfasts and how they were organized, as well as the national prayer breakfast?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; to begin with, as you well know, there is a Senatorial and a House prayer breakfast group here on the Hill. They in turn are the sponsors of the national prayer breakfast, which began under the administration of President Eisenhower. They gathered together several hundred people at that first time, and met in late January and early February, and it became a traditional annual thing. It is sponsored by both the House and Senate prayer breakfast, and the invitation list has gone up to about 3,500 people who attend it each year.

Originally, when we went into the White House, it was considered to be the Presidential prayer breakfast, because the President always made an appearance there, but in the ultimate it was straightened out so it is now known as the national prayer breakfast. That is a sort

of parent to a gathering of prayer breakfasts all over the country, some 1,500 of them. There was none at the White House per se. So, there were four of us who gathered together and formed the White House prayer breakfast, which at that time met every week, and subsequently went to every 2 weeks, because other meetings decimated the group.

We started out with 5 people, and the final prayer breakfast I attended had some 55 people there to join in with us. There were various Members of the Congress who came to speak to this group, various clergy from around the world, and some foreign dignitaries appeared occasionally, too, to speak to this group. It was nonsectarian and not even totally Christian. There were non-Christians attending, too.

Mr. FRASER. As White House liaison with religious groups, did you arrange for Rev. Sun Myung Moon to attend the 1974 national prayer breakfast and later to meet President Nixon?

Mr. NIDECKER. No, sir, I did everything I could to prevent that meeting, and to prevent his attendance at that meeting.

Mr. FRASER. Could you tell us who did make these arrangements or how it came about that Reverend Moon did attend a meeting to be with the President?

Mr. NIDECKER. Until the day before that national prayer breakfast, I was under the impression that he would not be permitted to attend, because he had with him an entourage of people that he wanted to bring into it. I guess that afternoon someone made an arrangement. I think it was Bruce Herschensohn who made an arrangement whereby he could appear.

When they called me about it that evening, I made sure that he was far away from the dais where the other people were seated and where the President would be seated, so that there would be no demonstration of any kind on his part at that national prayer breakfast.

Mr. FRASER. Did you know whether or not Moon did meet with Nixon?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; I am not confident of any meeting that I can tell you about.

Mr. FRASER. I would like to turn to the 1973 Christmas tree lighting incident.

Mr. NIDECKER. That was a fiasco.

Mr. FRASER. Tell us what you can about that, including Dr. Joseph Kennedy's part in it.

Mr. NIDECKER. Dr. Kennedy had made an arrangement with the Department of the Interior to have a certain number of tickets issued to followers of Sun Myung Moon, and they set up an area for them over in the Ellipse which was fenced in by storm fencing. They were all to be behind this area, because the Christmas tree lighting was a quasi-religious organization as it was set up. There was a choir there, several clergy were there, seated on the dais, and the President of the United States was to press the button or assist the person who was doing that to light the Christmas tree.

Just before the Christmas tree was lit—of course, you realize the newspeople were there with cameras—there had been a preamble speech. The President was about ready to direct this young Boy Scout, I believe it was, who was going to press the button. The Moon follow-

ers pushed down the fence, and raced up, gathered around the little platform that they had there, and began yelling political things, with American flags in hand, and of course obviously to the news people it was an event, so they pictured it and talked about it. The President was livid, because they had turned what he felt was a national thing for us in a religious kind of context into a political rally, and he was wild about the interruption.

The poor guy who was in charge of the operation felt the wrath.

Mr. FRASER. Was that Dr. Kennedy, then?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; Dr. Kennedy had made those arrangements for those people to get in there. Dr. Kennedy was never associated with the White House in any way.

Mr. FRASER. Who was he?

Mr. NIDECKER. He was an associate of Sun Myung Moon, and kind of was his American representative here.

Mr. FRASER. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; I have talked to him, but I never met him.

Mr. FRASER. Did the Korean Government send an official delegation to the national prayer breakfast?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes. The first time I was involved with that delegation they sent a group of several Congressmen, and they made a request to have these men visit the White House and see the President. Since I was handling that phase of the arrangement that was being made, and to offset any approval of that one particular delegation coming in, I made arrangements to see various and sundry religious leaders of foreign countries on an hourly basis for 2 days.

Each one of these delegations had an opportunity to come to the White House, but they came to my office, not the President's office. There were photographs made of these groups, and conversations held with them, and they were excused at the end of their hour, and new people came in.

Among those people who came in that first delegation was a man who later came to see me. His name was Chin Hwan Row.

Mr. FRASER. Before we talk about Chin Hwan Row, do you remember when the Korean Government first began sending representatives to the national prayer breakfast?

Mr. NIDECKER. I think it was before the time I was involved with it. It was prior to 1969. I think they sent one or two people in the years before that. This time it was a larger delegation.

Mr. FRASER. That would be what, 1974?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; it would be 1971 or 1972 that this first delegation came.

Mr. FRASER. I see.

Was it 1974 when Reverend Moon attended?

Mr. NIDECKER. I believe so. I am not sure about that date.

Mr. FRASER. You referred to meeting Mr. Chin Hwan Row.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Who is he?

Mr. NIDECKER. He is a congressman from Korea.

Mr. FRASER. By congressman, do you mean he was a member of their national assembly?

Mr. NIDECKER. Their national assembly. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Could you describe for us the substance of your first meeting with Mr. Row?

Mr. NIDECKER. He was attempting to get to see the President, and it was just not possible for him to do so. He came with this delegation on the first instance and had hoped that they could get everyone to go in to see the President at that time. It was just not possible for them to do it, so I received them on behalf of the President.

Subsequently, he tried to get to see the President also.

Mr. FRASER. When you first met him at the national prayer breakfast, he was a part of this Korean delegation?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he was.

Mr. FRASER. Did you go to Korea in 1974?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I did.

Mr. FRASER. Prior to going to Korea, how often were you contacted by Mr. Row?

Mr. NIDECKER. He came here about twice each year. Sometimes—I am not sure just the number of times, but each time he came he called me and wanted to come in and sit down and talk with me, which he did.

Mr. FRASER. The trip you made to Korea in 1974, as I understand it, was the last week of April or the first week of May?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. What was the purpose of your going to Korea in 1974?

Mr. NIDECKER. The object of that trip was to go to the national prayer breakfast of Korea and represent the United States there officially.

Mr. FRASER. Did any other White House officials accompany you?

Mr. NIDECKER. No.

Mr. FRASER. In preparation for your trip to Korea, were you in contact with anyone at the State Department here in Washington?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I was.

Mr. FRASER. Who was that?

Mr. NIDECKER. Mr. Ranard.

Mr. FRASER. What was the subject of your discussions with Mr. Ranard?

Mr. NIDECKER. I went to see him for the reason that he was Chief of the Korea desk at the State Department, and to get a briefing from him as to what I might expect when I got there. He briefed me on several things. One of them was the possibility of the Korean Government using this trip as a showpiece for them, that an official of the American Government was going to be there.

I was under the impression my object was to go to this prayer breakfast and then come back to the United States after having seen several people there, including our own people. He asked me if I would make sure that I contacted all of the religious leaders in that country who were in Seoul, and ask them specifically what they thought of Sun Myung Moon and also to find out whether or not they were having complete freedom to do as they chose in their religious life.

He cautioned me about being a complete showpiece, so that I was pretty well aware that this might be one of the happenings that was going to take place.

Mr. FRASER. In the course of that discussion with Mr. Ranard, did the name Tongsun Park come up?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes. He told me that he thought surely that they would have me to go to the Blue House, the Presidential residence, to meet with Tongsun Park.

Mr. FRASER. While in Korea, were you again contacted by Dr. Joseph Kennedy, whom you have described as an aide to Reverend Moon?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; Dr. Kennedy called me, I believe it was on the Thursday of that week, to tell me that he had word from the White House that I was to go on Sunday to a dedication of a home for the Little Angels, Korean orphans. Well, as you might know, I was quite surprised that the White House was giving him that information without telling me, so I called back to check on it, and there was no such directive ever given to him.

Someone suggested that it might not be a bad idea if I had the time, but I had arranged to come back to the United States at the time of this dedication, so I turned him down. He subsequently called several people in the Korean Government asking them to please ask me to come to this thing, as well as to our Ambassador.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Nidecker, before we go on, let me turn back to one of your responses to make sure I understood it correctly. I asked you if in your discussion with Mr. Ranard you had discussion about Tongsun Park, and you indicated——

Mr. NIDECKER. As a matter of fact, I was about to correct that.

Mr. FRASER. OK.

Mr. NIDECKER. It wasn't Tongsun Park. It was Park Chung Hee.

Mr. FRASER. Park Chung Hee, the President?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. He said that you might be invited to the Blue House to meet the President of South Korea?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; but he said nothing to me about meeting with Tongsun Park over that.

Mr. FRASER. You do not recall his mentioning Tongsun Park?

Mr. NIDECKER. Not particularly.

Mr. FRASER. You have indicated that Dr. Kennedy, this aide to Reverend Moon, did contact our Ambassador to try to get you to visit the Little Angels while you were in Korea?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he did. He tried to get the Ambassador to be there, too, and was turned down.

Mr. FRASER. Who was our Ambassador then?

Mr. NIDECKER. Philip Habib.

Mr. FRASER. Did you meet with Mr. Habib at breakfast?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes, I did.

Mr. FRASER. And you talked about this?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; as a matter of fact, I met with Ambassador Habib on four occasions while I was there in Korea. That last one was the breakfast on Sunday morning before I was to leave, and while I was there Kennedy called the Ambassador and asked him to attend the dedication as well as having asked me to attend it.

Mr. FRASER. I must go vote. Mr. Derwinski will carry on.

Mr. DERWINSKI [presiding]. There is always a danger when Mr. Fraser leaves me in charge here. [General laughter.] Under the follow-through, first, I did not realize until today that one of your main areas

of expertise in the White House was looking into religious matters. Now I understand why you did not answer my calls when I would call for patronage assistance. [General laughter.] I am picking up where Don left off. Did you have any contact with the Little Angels while you were in Korea?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; the only time I ever had any contact with the Little Angels was on one occasion at Christmas time, and I think you recall what I did each year at Christmas at the White House. They brought this choir of Little Angels there to sing. They came in, sang one Christmas carol, and left, but since I was garbed as I was each one of the Little Angels wanted to come over and shake hands with me.

To elucidate for you, sir, I was Santa Clause at the White House for several years. [General laughter.]

Mr. DERWINSKI. Are you aware of any connection between Reverend Moon and the Little Angels?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; there is. There is definitely a connection between them, which I was not aware of until I went to Korea and found that Sun Myung Moon was the sponsor for the home for these Little Angels that was being dedicated at that time.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You became aware of that when you visited Korea?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. During your stay in Korea, it is our understanding you met with a number of religious leaders.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I did. I met with Bishop Lee of the Anglican Episcopal Church, with Madame Kim Ok Kil, who is a Methodist leader. I don't recall the name of the Presbyterian leader I met with. And ultimately I met with Cardinal Kim.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Is there anything of special substance you discussed with any of these religious leaders?

Mr. NIDECKER. Principally we talked about what their efforts were toward their Christianizing these people, A, and B, the problems they had in trying to do that job. This one man, this Presbyterian man, was the most hurt of all of the group, from what I could gather from his statements to me about being watched constantly, about having people in his office who were Government people, who were constantly observing his actions. There was some evidence of this when I went to visit with Cardinal Kim.

I had been out in an Embassy car with an Embassy driver. We arrived at the cardinal's compound and were met there at the gate by one of the agents who had been traveling around with us during the trip. He told me I had to hurry up and get this meeting with Cardinal Kim over with because there was a very important meeting which I was to attend.

While I was in with the cardinal, this man sent several messages in to tell me to hurry up and get going so he could take me to this other meeting. The cardinal and I at first had sort of a little battle going on between us about what he was going to say or what he was going to do. He was very reluctant to speak of anything at first, but afterwards he kind of opened up, and we sat and had coffee, and I think that his concern was with this agent who was outside his office. The agent kept dogging the cardinal's secretary to come and tell me to get going, but we finally had a conversation which pretty well outlined what his problems might have been.

Some of them were with groups of Roman Catholics who would gather outside the cathedral and be dispersed by the police. He is quite a fine man, and tries his level best to keep an even keel dealing with the Government on the one hand and his people on the other hand.

Some of the dissidents who belong to his See gather there occasionally and have some kind of a demonstration, which doesn't help him with his work.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Once this problem with the agent outside the door sort of eased, was it your judgment the cardinal was completely outspoken with you?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he was.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Was that true of most of the religious leaders you met with, subject to the possible nearby presence of some agent?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; One of the things that happened on that score was, I was able to go unescorted by Korean people to these various religious leaders. I went in an Embassy car. There was no escort with me personally. I am sure that they were nearby. However, I do not know that they were interfering. For example, when I met with Madame Kim Ok Kil, was quite an honor she accorded me, because it was the anniversary of the death of her mother, the first anniversary, and Koreans go into strict mourning at that time, but she invited me to lunch at her home that day, and we had our discussion over a lunch table.

There was some conversation about Moon in each one of these cases, and in each case it was not very complimentary to him.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, is it fair to say without exception they expressed some degree of doubt about his operation?

Mr. NIDECKER. His religiosity, and also whether or not this was a viable religion from the standpoint of what kind of money he was getting, and all kinds of things like that.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Let me get back to the point you made in your discussion with the cardinal. What was your opinion or impression of the degree of freedom of expression that was allowed for dissidents of various religious groups?

Mr. NIDECKER. It was not very good. The dissidents had a very difficult time. As a matter of fact, there were several kinds of accusations made against them. One was that they were financing underground newspapers at the colleges. The cardinal himself they did not seem to touch at the time I was there, but any one of his priests who spoke out was subject to being questioned, and it was not the easiest kind of questioning that they went through.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I will yield for a moment. Bob, I am not sure exactly what you want to do here. Do you want to pick up at this point?

Mr. BOETTCHER. That has been done.

Mr. DERWINSKI. There was a note for Don which I thought was intended for me. I am sorry. I will continue.

Who in the State Department—I presume it was the State Department that made all of your arrangements for your trip and your stay and so on.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes, they did, and immediately on getting into Korea I contacted the Ambassador, but I had been met at the airport by the second secretary as well as a delegation of Koreans, and there was a

lot of fanfare. They treated me as if I were the President of the United States when I came in. It was kind of ick to me.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You look more like Telly Savalas. [General laughter.]

Mr. NIDECKER. I was given the accord of an official representative of the President of the United States. When I got there, I was taken to the hotel and set up in a suite that the Korean Government had provided.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you recall who your escort officer was?

Mr. NIDECKER. His name was——

[Pause.]

Mr. DERWINSKI. Our records show it was Alan Krause.

Mr. NIDECKER. That is who it was, Alan Krause.

Mr. DERWINSKI. He was your official escort assigned by the Embassy while you were there?

Mr. NIDECKER. As a matter of fact, Alan Krause accompanied me most of the time. The official delegation that came from the Korean Government included Row Chin Hwan and Park Chong Kyu and a host of other people whose names I cannot recall.

Mr. DERWINSKI. We have testimony before this subcommittee from Mr. Krause regarding your visit and his role.¹ In your discussions with Mr. Krause, did he ever indicate that he had heard of any other Americans in Korea who have been approached in an unsophisticated manner like you had with this envelope?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; I cannot recall that we had such a discussion. It may have happened. I am not sure, but I did subsequently learn that there were other people who were there at that time ostensibly to attend this prayer breakfast, who had been approached. That I learned by hearsay later.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In the same way you had?

Mr. NIDECKER. In a very similar way. Let us put it that way. The approach was made not directly to the individuals who were of the Government, but in this case it was to a wife. I am sure you know about that one.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Right. In other words, based then on subsequent information, your experience was not unique?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; the other thing was, I was very careful in talking to Mr. Krause, that he knew of all of these gifts that were being heaped on me here and there. For example, when I arrived on the scene at that hotel, the room was a bower of flowers. That kind of thing I kept him informed of, and we kept a registry of everything given to me at that time.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You mentioned that Row Chin Hwan——

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes?

Mr. DERWINSKI [continuing]. Was one of your official escorts.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he was. As a matter of fact, he was ensconced in the same hotel.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Could you describe your contacts and relations with Row Chin Hwan during your stay in Korea?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; we traveled to various and sundry places. The first day I was there, they took me to what I was told was a center for youth. It was a huge park, and in that park they had a zoo, and a rifle range, and they had all kinds of athletic equipment available.

¹ See Investigation of Korean-American Relations, part 3, hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Nov. 29-30, 1977, pp. 40-41.

I was given the impression that this is where they were bringing youth from the cities of Seoul and Pusan to have fun during a period of vacation. There was a whole gathering of people. Many of the people who were foreigners to Korea who were coming to the prayer breakfast were gathered there. Of course, there was a great show of what great facilities they had for the young people of the country.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Is there anything else that Row was able to do for you? What general role did he play?

Mr. NIDECKER. He was sort of like an advance man, an arrangement officer, or whatever, and he had set up for me a great number of things to do. For example, the opening gun was the party. Subsequently, there were other receptions for which he made arrangements for me to attend. He also made arrangement for a motorcade that was 300 miles long, and to sit in a car for that length of time is a long time, I can assure you. It was a motorcade picked up by each provincial government's police force and carried through, and I had to meet with all of the provincial governors, the mayors of the principal cities in those provinces, and in each one of them there was a reception and dinner provision.

The one thing that was the most odious of all to me was that when I was making this little pitch about praying together, because it was ostensibly for the prayer breakfast movement, each sentence that I said was translated by a gentleman who had been well into the kimchi before he got to me, and it was really grim. [General laughter.]

Mr. DERWINSKI. It is hard to tell what degree of inspiration he had.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Was there anything involved in Mr. Row's schedule with you that might have led you to believe that part of the process was intended to limit some of your contacts?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; as a matter of fact, he and two of his agents—I do not know whether they were called his staff personnel—were in a room about two doors away from where I was, and if they heard the lock click on my door, they were there. I was not supposed to be anywhere without this escort, so I finally learned how to open the door without making the lock click, and was able to get out and do something on my own, at least to walk downstairs and go into the lobby of the hotel without being followed. That was one part of it, but wherever I went in that whole period that I was there, these two men were not very far from where I was. They were making sure with whom I was making contact.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I presume one of these men was the one you mentioned when you had your visit with the cardinal.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he was waiting outside the cathedral compound.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What was Mr. Row's part in that meeting, if any?

Mr. NIDECKER. The subsequent meeting after the cardinal?

Mr. DERWINSKI. The meeting with the cardinal.

Mr. NIDECKER. None. The one man was there. That was the only one.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Then afterward you met with Park Chong Kyu?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I did.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did Mr. Row play a part in that meeting?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he sat in on that meeting.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Could you describe that meeting for us?

Mr. NIDECKER. It was kind of stupid, as far as I was concerned, that it bore such an urgency that I left the cardinal for it, because I sat and waited for a long time before this meeting took place. There was a general conversation about a proposed visit that Park Chong Kyu was going to make to the United States, and people he knew in this country. He claimed a great familiarity with several of our news people here, and that he was well known in this country. He was impressing me with his knowledge of the United States.

It really was not a meeting that had any real substance to it at all, and it was, I thought, principally designed to get me away from the cardinal.

Mr. DERWINSKI. All right. Now, at that point, were you presented with any items by Mr. Park Chong Kyu?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I was, and he made me a member of the Presidential Protective Force as a special adviser at that time. That was all very nice to be so considered, but he also talked about going to see the President, President Park Chung Hee, and apparently had set up that meeting for a subsequent time. Ultimately I did get to the Blue House, and met there with the President, but there were several other people in the party who were religious leaders. They had a system whereby the city of Los Angeles was a sister city to Seoul, Korea, and the representatives from Los Angeles were there at the same time. There was a minister who went to Korea with me whose name is Robinson, who is a minister of the Quaker church, and he was present at that meeting at the President's house.

We talked very briefly to the President. I made a joke about his golf game with somebody that afternoon, and that was about the size of the conversation I had with him. We had tea there, and then he walked on out to the garden with us. We all just stood around for a few minutes while he talked to this man from Los Angeles, and also this minister, who, I learned subsequently, had a golf game with him after I had gone home.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Let me return for a moment to your meeting with Park Chong Kyu. Did he present you with an emblem and an ID card?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he did.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you happen to have those?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I do.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Would you mind showing them to the committee at this point?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; I don't have the ID card. I do not know what happened to it, but I do have the emblem.

[Whereupon, the emblem was displayed.]

Mr. DERWINSKI. What is the inscription on it?

Mr. NIDECKER. It is done in two phases. On the righthand side it is in Korean. On the lefthand side, it is in English, and it says, "John E. Nidecker, Special Assistant, White House, Washington, D.C., In Commemoration of Your Visit to Korea and For Your Service as Advisor to The Presidential Protective Force, May 1, 1974," signed, in his handwriting, Chong Kyu Park, Director General, Presidential Protective Force, Republic of Korea.

Mr. DERWINSKI. During your stay in Korea—

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Nidecker, I think others in attendance at the hearing would be curious—if you could just hold it up and let them look at it.

[Whereupon, the emblem was displayed to the audience.]

Mr. NIDECKER. It is quite a fancy piece of jewelry.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did you ever get a plaque as nice as that for the advice you gave to Presidents here?

[General laughter.]

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. During that visit to Korea, were there any other gifts?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; there were several gifts. I received several paintings, small artifacts, but one was an arrangement which they called a wine server, which was carved out of stone, and the claim was that it was 2,400 years old. I had all of this stuff shipped back to me. I did not bring anything back with me, and as you know, any gift over the value of \$50 has to be turned over to the State Department. That was done with all of the gifts. Even some of the junk stuff I sent to the State Department. This piece was really considered very valuable. Someone from the Smithsonian looked at it, since it had been broken in transit, and they were going to make arrangements to have it repaired.

At first we thought it would be a Library item, but it was not. It had to go through the State Department, so it was sent to State, and subsequently the thing was sold, and I was advised by one of the reporters in Washington, Maxine Cheshire, that she had attended the sale where this piece was sold to a museum in Illinois for \$10,000. So, it was considered to be quite a valuable piece, but that was the highest bid they got on it, and that is why it sold for that price.

All of those gifts were turned over to State.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Could you tell us, to the best of your recollection, about the last day of your visit to Korea and any part played by Row Chin Hwan in any events?

Mr. NIDECKER. On the last day I was in Korea, I went to breakfast with Ambassador Habib. It was there that Mr. Kennedy made the call asking that I be directed to go to this dedication of the Little Angels home. Habib explained that I was tied up doing something else, and that I would not be able to do that, and that he was going to be busy and he could not do it. He was going to church, too.

I went to the Anglican Cathedral, to a Eucharist there, but by the time I got from Habib's house back to the hotel and finished my packing and got ready to take off, I was joined by Chin Hwan Row and a whole entourage of his people. They went to church with me, and the bishop asked me if I, since I was the first American of the Government who had ever been to that cathedral, would say something to his congregation, and I did. I just gave them a welcome from us, saying that we were all joined together in our firm belief in God. Then the bishop said that he had arranged a reception for me with his clergy in the house in this compound.

I went with him to this meeting with these religious people. Several priests were there, and we talked in general terms, but the whole time I was there, Row kept dogging me that we had to get going because I had to go say goodbye to the President, so it did not last very long. They took some photographs, and we just talked in general terms.

Since I am an Episcopalian, these clergy were interested in what I had to say, too, but Row kept saying, we have to go, we have to go, we have to go, so finally it worked out that we decided to leave.

There was a huge motorcade out to a country club, and I was taken to what were called the private quarters of the President of Korea, and he was out on the golf course with Park Chong Kyu. One of Park Chong Kyu's men, whom I had met in the course of my stay in Korea, came to me while I was there. I was concerned, because the time was edging on to when I should leave. I had a reservation on Japan Airlines to take off, and I kept insisting that I get going, because I wanted to make sure that I got out, because the next day I had an arrangement to be in California to talk to the Governors' prayer breakfast there.

They kept telling me, do not worry about this, do not worry about this, until ultimately Row came to me and said that they had just made arrangements to hold up the Japan Airline flight until I got there. Well, that makes you as popular as a skunk in a picnic, as you well know, when you do something dumb like that. I did not want that to happen, but it was stalled and stalled and stalled, and finally this young man came in and handed me an envelope, and on it was written, bon voyage, signed, Park Chong Kyu, and the man said, do not open it until you get on the plane, do not open it until you get on the plane, which immediately made me suspicious of the gift, whatever it was. So, I put it in my pocket.

Meanwhile, they played around and tried to get the President to come off the golf course, and he was figuring, fooley on this guy, I don't know him that well, and he decided not to come, and it finally worked out that I was so itchy about going that they got this motorcade together and we started off.

In the car in which I was riding was our man from the Embassy—

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Krause?

Mr. NIDECKER. Mr. Krause. Chin Hwan Row was in the car, too, and while we were riding in this big motorcade, with hosts of motorcycle police all over the place, clearing the way to get to the airport, I took the corner off the envelope and saw that it had money in it. Although I have been accused of saying I did not know whether it was Korean money or American money, and that is why I gave it back, that is not true. I knew it was American money, but I did not know how much it was.

I asked Krause to walk with me ahead of the group as we got in the airport, but when we got there, they had this big farewell arranged out in front of the airport, and I could not get to Krause. They kept pushing him off on the side, as they took photographs and whatnot, but as we were walking down toward the ramp, I got Krause, and I said to him, take this and look at it when you get back, and give it to the Ambassador. I do not know what is in it.

When I got back to the United States—oh, by the way, the people on that airplane were a little upset that they had been waiting there an hour for me to get there, as you might well realize. When I got back to the United States, I called Krause and asked him what was in the envelope, and when he told me, I was bowled over, to tell you the truth, because it had in it \$10,000, which was subsequently delivered to the Korean Government by our Ambassador.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did you have a further contact with Mr. Krause about this envelope?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I called him.

Mr. DERWINSKI. When you reached home?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes. When I got back into the United States, I was in San Francisco, and I called him from San Francisco, and talked to him then, and subsequently I talked to the Embassy, too, because they were shipping back all of the stuff I had collected while I was over there, and I talked to Alan Krause then.

Mr. DERWINSKI. And at that time he told you he had turned the envelope over to Mr. Habib?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; and I finally got word from Phil Habib how he handled it with their Government.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You heard it directly from Ambassador Habib as to the disposition?

Mr. NIDECKER. That is right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did you report this incident to anyone at the White House or the State Department?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; I did. I immediately notified Ranard and I also notified the National Security Council people. I talked to John Froebe about it, and I also notified Al Haig that this had happened.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER.

Mr. FRASER [presiding]. Did Mr. Row contact you again after your return to Washington?

Mr. NIDECKER. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, on two or three occasions he came back to see me. One time he came with what he considered to be personal gifts, and there were quite a number of them. There was a painting for Al Haig, a set of pearls for Al Haig's wife, pearls and earrings for Rose Mary Woods, pearls and earrings for Mrs. Nixon, pearls and earrings for my wife, perfume, and other things that he considered to be personal gifts.

What I did with those, I showed them to the people who were to receive them, and then gathered them up, placed them in a package, and had the mail department of the White House return them to him at the legislative house.

Mr. FRASER. In Seoul?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; we sent them via registered mail system to them. He came to me on several occasions after that, whenever he was in the country, and I think you may have seen some correspondence where he wanted to bring Park Chong Kyu to the United States for a long-term visit, and wanted to be sure that I would entertain him. I shied out of that at the time he came with the request first, and second, indicated that I would not be at the White House when Park Chong Kyu came. I had made up my mind by that time I did not want to see them personally ever again without someone being present, and it was a little difficult to try to do that.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Row make any further offers to you other than these gifts which you have already described that were to be given to different people in the White House?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he made an offer to assist in the campaign funds of various and sundry Congressmen and Senators, not naming any specific person, but offered to provide funds for them, and wanted me

to be the intermediary. Well, at the time the law was not so, but I thought it was, and told him it was illegal for him to make any kind of an offer like that to me or directly to any Member of the Congress. He tried to explain to me that it was not so, but I said to him, do not talk to me about it again. I do not want to know any more about this.

As soon as he left the office, I called in Don Ranard and John Froebe from National Security Council and sat down and described the incident to them immediately so that they were fully aware on the day that it happened what had happened.

Mr. FRASER. Do you remember what time this conversation took place?

Mr. NIDECKER. I have a copy of the letter that has a reference to it. You may have that letter.

Mr. FRASER. You could use that to refresh your memory.

Mr. NIDECKER. OK.

[Pause.]

Mr. NIDECKER. It was some time—It must have been on June 5, 1974, that it took place.

Mr. FRASER. June 5 was this conversation with Mr. Row?

Mr. NIDECKER. It must have been then, because the material I have here indicates that it is a report that was a memorandum to the files made by Don Ranard.

Mr. FRASER. What you have told us is that Mr. Row told you that he was willing or he was making an offer to assist in the campaigns of Members of Congress, both House and Senate?

Mr. NIDECKER. Right.

Mr. FRASER. Can you tell us more about that conversation? How was this to be handled? Who would designate the Members to get assistance?

Mr. NIDECKER. He wanted me to do that.

Mr. FRASER. He wanted you to tell him which Members?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he wanted me to tell him which Members deserved this fancy contribution of money, and I said there was no way that I would do it.

Mr. FRASER. Did he indicate amounts of money?

Mr. NIDECKER. He talked in terms of \$5,000 for Members of the House and \$10,000 to \$20,000 or even going up as high as, as I recall from this memorandum, up to \$30,000 for Members of the Senate. Apparently he thought the Senators were more powerful at that time, but they were prepared to contribute on the order of \$5,000 to \$10,000 for any candidate for election to the House, and in the order of from \$10,000 to \$20,000 for any Senator, but at one point I believe he said that he would go as high as \$30,000 for a contribution. I just could not tolerate that kind of nonsense going on in the White House, especially, and terminated the conversation as quickly and gracefully as I could at that time, and got rid of him. I never saw him after that. I made sure that I did not.

Mr. FRASER. Did he indicate where the money would be coming from?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; he said nothing about that. It was obviously not a personal gift, but he did not indicate where he was going to get this money.

Mr. FRASER. Did he indicate in what manner it might be transmitted to the Members of Congress?

Mr. NIDECKER. I think he was paying cash dollars.

Mr. FRASER. Did he indicate this was something he was prepared to do right then, or that he would do over the next few weeks or months?

Mr. NIDECKER. He did not indicate that, but I gathered from this conversation that while he was still here, he would have been able to do it.

Mr. FRASER. On that current trip to the United States?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes, I think so, that he was prepared to get hold of the funds and make contributions.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. FRASER. [Indicating.]

Mr. DERWINSKI. After this conversation involving the offer of \$30,000 for Senate and \$10,000 for congressional campaigns, did you ever hear of anyone else receiving such an offer or any group taking it up?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; I never heard anything more about it after that, nor anything subsequent to that that I personally heard. I have heard nothing like that.

Mr. DERWINSKI. During your service at the White House, did you ever hear of anyone else receiving a similar offer?

Mr. NIDECKER. No; the only person I know who had any relationship with the Korean people at all at that time in an official capacity was Bruce Herschensohn and his involvement was with Dr. Kennedy and Sun Myung Moon and their attempts to get to see the President. Those are the only people who had that kind of a relationship. The other thing—one other thing that Row Chin Hwan did, that I might tell you about, he offered to make a sizable contribution to the Anglican Cathedral in Seoul on my behalf, which I asked him not to do, first from the fact I was representing the U.S. Government, and second, my religious convictions would not allow that kind of offer. There were two or three other little amazing things that occurred which may be of interest to you.

At the national prayer breakfast in Korea, Cardinal Kim was seated as far away from the dais as they could seat him, much like I had done to Sun Myung Moon, and several of the other religious leaders were not included in the group that were with the Korean Government.

Another incident that did occur was, when we got to Pusan, there was a young man who had been an Anglican priest who was elected as the bishop of that diocese. As bishop-elect, he had not yet been consecrated. He was excluded from all the meetings held in Pusan, so he sent one of his priests to see me, and wanted to meet with me. I arranged for him to come and have breakfast with me the next morning, but we could not eat breakfast alone. We had a crowd around all the time as we talked, and subsequently, after his consecration, he came to visit me here in the United States, and I have corresponded with him since then.

Mr. DERWINSKI. He is still back in Korea?

Mr. NIDECKER. He is back there now; yes. He will be going to England in a month or so, and then on the way back from England we are

hoping we can get together in the United States, because he is planning to come here.

Mr. DERWINSKI. He is Korean?

Mr. NIDECKER. He is Korean. There is a move on the part of the structured churches to use nationals in all of these offices, and that is what has occurred there. Bishop Lee is a Korean. Bishop Choi is a Korean, and Cardinal Kim, of course, is a Korean.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Nidecker, after the \$10,000 incident you just described, the press picked this up and it was publicized widely. Did Park Chong Kyu write a letter to the editors of the Washington Post about this incident of the \$10,000?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; he did.

Mr. FRASER. I gather you have a copy of that.

Mr. NIDECKER. I have a copy of the letter, but I do not have a copy of the date it appeared in the Post.

Mr. FRASER. I think it might be worth reading the letter into the record. I think staff has a copy of that. Do you have the date?

Mr. BOETTCHER. Yes; the letter to the editor of the Washington Post is dated November 17, 1976. The letter appears under the headline, "Denies Involvement in Korean Cash Incident."

The letter reads:

The International Herald Tribune (Oct. 30-31) carried a story about me when I was in a public office in 1974.

According to The Washington Post story ("Nixon Aides Turned Down Korean Gifts," Oct. 29) which was edited in the Tribune, less-informed readers must have been misled. The reported story is not true and factual.

I was then not acquainted with John Nidecker—a White House aide of the Nixon administration, at all, though one of the local political figures asked me to meet him due to the pressure of work of public office that I held.

It was one Saturday afternoon, I recall, when Mr. Nidecker, accompanied by a U.S. Embassy staff in Seoul, visited me without any pre-arranged appointment at the Seoul Country Golf Club and inquired if they could see me, though briefly.

All Mr. Nidecker told me then at the golf club restaurant was nothing but that he wanted to acquaint himself with me. This was all that I know about Mr. Nidecker's visit to Korea and to me in 1974. Since then, I had neither chanced to see him again nor heard from him.

I should tell you and readers that I have not the slightest knowledge about the reported presence [sic] of \$10,000 to Mr. Nidecker or my personal signature on the envelope that contained the cash, according to the story.

You are assured of my full-fledged cooperation in your finding of the real story.

I could have brushed aside this story as mere absurdity, though it offends me. Nevertheless, my second thought obliged me to write you as to what happened in order to prevent the readers from being misled. Chung Kyu Park, Paris.

The editor's note below reads:

The writer is former chief of security and confidant of South Korean President, Park Chung Hee.

Mr. NIDECKER. I think the plaque explains in a little better detail my having met him prior to that time, and I never was in the restaurant of that golf club, by the by.

When the newspapers got the story, it so happened that nothing had been said to anybody outside the people who were involved, those to whom I had reported it in the White House or the State Department. I was out in Illinois in a tiny little town, and happened to be in the police station talking with the chief of police when a call came, and asked me if I would tell them whether the story was straight or not. They repeated almost verbatim what had happened at the Seoul air-

port. By the way, I tried desperately to find out how the reporter got the information. I never did find out, because it was his source and he did not want to disclose it. It was then that it came out in the newspaper, and that is what prompted this letter.

Mr. FRASER. And it was in Park's office, not at the golf course?

Mr. NIDECKER. That this plaque was presented, yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. And he was present at that time?

Mr. NIDECKER. Oh, yes.

Mr. FRASER. That was the same time that you received the ID card?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; this ID card had a photograph of me on it. It had the same thing essentially that is on this plaque, in English on one side and on the reverse it had the same thing as is on the Korean side of the plaque.

Mr. FRASER. You had actually met Park Chong Kyu prior to the presentation at the party?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; as a matter of fact, on my arrival there, I met him at the airport, and saw him on several occasions throughout the time I was there.

Mr. FRASER. How would you characterize the letter from Park Chong Kyu?

Mr. NIDECKER. It is a fabrication. It might have been nice for him to have this opportunity to say something to try to clear his own skirts, but it is totally false. The fact that I met him on Sunday is another situation, not Saturday. I did not meet him that day; as a matter of fact, I just met one of his minions, it was on a Sunday that I went to that golf club, and he did not come back, because he was playing golf with the President, and he just figured, I am not going to go meet that guy.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Nidecker, we appreciate very much your appearance before the subcommittee today. At this time, I would like to introduce into the record a set of documents which have been declassified by the State Department and which support the testimony you have given here today. These documents, we are informed by staff, represent correspondence among State Department officials and yourself regarding your trip to Korea, the envelope of cash from Park Chong Kyu, and the offers made to you by Row Chin Hwan.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Also included are two letters written by Mr. Row in 1976 following publicity of these incidents in which he denied he made such offers.

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. I understand, Mr. Nidecker, that you have reviewed these documents, and they comport entirely with your recollection of these events. Is that correct?

Mr. NIDECKER. Yes; they do, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, then, we will make these documents a part of the record.¹

Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I have no further questions.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. I have no questions.

¹ See appendixes 1A-1N, pp. 121-145.

Mr. FRASER. We really appreciate your appearance. I must say, your ability to recall these events is impressive and helpful.

Mr. NIDECKER. There are times when I get fuzzy and cannot think of some individual's name, but most of it I try to keep in my memory because of the kind of incident it was.

Mr. FRASER. Well, thank you very much.

Mr. NIDECKER. You are quite welcome, I am sure.

Mr. FRASER. Before the subcommittee proceeds with this next witness, I might simply say for the record that in an informal discussion here, Mr. Nidecker and Mr. Ranard agreed that Mr. Ranard was not notified of the \$10,000 envelope by Mr. Nidecker, but Mr. Nidecker does affirm that he did tell personnel at the White House, as he testified earlier, so the record will be corrected accordingly.

Our next witness today is Ambassador Sneider, who is a career Foreign Service officer. He has held numerous positions throughout the Far East. In 1972 and 1974, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs here in Washington. In 1974, he became the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, which is his current position.

Mr. Ambassador, we are delighted to have you with us today. Our practice has been to ask all witnesses to testify under oath, so if you would raise your right hand, please.

[Whereupon, the witness was duly sworn.]

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, my understanding of the way we propose to proceed this afternoon is that rather than your giving a prepared statement, you will respond to questions, and we will go along in that fashion.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD SNEIDER, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mr. SNEIDER. That is perfectly satisfactory, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, calling your attention now to the period 1973 to 1976, this is a rather general question. What would you describe as the priorities in U.S. policy toward South Korea during that 3- or 4-year period?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, as I saw my mission with respect to Korea, both while I was Deputy Assistant Secretary, and then as Ambassador during that period, the highest priority was accorded the deference of a renewal of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. We felt that in this area U.S. lives were very much at stake. We had over 40,000 people stationed in Korea, U.S. interests in that part of the world were very much at stake, and that the ultimate priority had to be the prevention of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

Now, this obviously did not mean, Mr. Chairman, that we did not have other priorities and other problems in Korea, but I must say this was the highest priority. With respect to other areas, clearly our dealings with Korea ranged over a number of very important issues. Among those issues were certainly efforts to increase Korea's ability to bear burdens of both defense and economic development with lessening U.S. assistance in conformance with the Nixon Guam doctrine which placed the burden of self-help increasingly on the people of Asia. We certainly emphasized this aspect of our policy.

Second, after martial law was announced and the Yushin Constitution came in, there was increasing criticism of the human rights situation in Korea. This became a matter of importance to the U.S. Government, and it was not an issue which was ignored as far as my experience will tell me.

There are many other issues, of course, dealing with such questions as trade liberalization, the handling of the nuclear energy program in Korea, which is a very sensitive matter, the problems of American citizens, and obviously, after the 1976 period, the problem of troop withdrawal became one of importance in our relations.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, on October 17, 1972, President Park announced the imposition of martial law and the need for revitalizing reforms, as he put it, in the form of a new constitution, commonly referred to as the Yushin system. Martial law was lifted on December 13, 1972, after a national referendum supporting the Yushin Constitution, which was held on November 31 of that year.

In December, President Park was installed as President under the new constitution, and the constitution itself was put in force.

Could you describe the factors, both domestic and international, which may have led President Park to declare martial law and promulgate the Yushin Constitution?

Mr. SNEIDER. Let me, if I might, make a somewhat extended statement, Mr. Chairman, because I think in this area in a sense you are dealing with conjecture, and it is a complex issue, to explain the actions of another government. It is always to some degree speculative, and I think you have to look at these actions and the subsequent actions, such as emergency decree No. 9, with some sense of the historical perspective in which the Koreans viewed their own problems.

In a sense, one might say that Korea has always had a sense of insecurity which goes back into history. It was a battleground for the Japanese and the Chinese over many, many centuries, and in light of this history and the lack of any experience with democracy of any nature until 1945, much of what happened subsequently must be viewed.

Going more directly to the martial law, the Yushin Constitution period, I think there are three main areas where one might speculate on the reasons behind these actions on the part of President Park, all of which tend to give a pattern of some uncertainty and insecurity.

The first area is the external environment, the world environment. During the cold war period, in a sense the Korean Government found the blacks and whites of the cold war period very comforting, but you had by 1972 very important changes in the international environment, the development of détente with the Soviet Union, President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China, developments in Vietnam, and Korea's own experience with the North-South dialog which had been started earlier that year.

It may be of more than some coincidence that just shortly before martial law was declared, the North-South dialog at the senior level broke off at Panmunjom. Added to that, you had increased uncertainties—this is a second range of areas—in United States-Korean relations. There were increasing doubts in Korea about the nature and degree of our commitment to Korea, and indeed our engagement in

Asia. There were those who interpreted the Guam doctrine, I think falsely, as the beginning of a major American disengagement from Asia, and certainly in Korea there is a great oversensitivity to this question, despite constant efforts to reassure them.

You also had our emphasis upon self-reliance, and with this, the Koreans felt that they could take a more independent turn in a number of areas, particularly as to how they handled their domestic politics. You had during this period the withdrawal of the 7th Division, which greatly concerned the Koreans. You had during this period the cut-back on funding for the modernization plan, which was geared in effect to compensate for the withdrawal of the 7th Division. All of this led to increasing doubts about the U.S. relationship.

At the same time, you had, as you well know, Mr. Chairman, increasing criticism of Korea within the American body politic in Congress and in the press.

The final factors, I think, a third range of factors, were clearly domestic considerations. Certainly I would say that my own feeling is that Koreans' experience with Western democracy, at least in terms of President Park and others, was such as to feel it was not entirely suitable at that stage in the development of Korea. They felt that they were bearing increasing burdens for both economic development and for their own defense, burdens which required very careful allocations of resources, and in a sense better control over the whole structure of society, and particularly their economy.

You also have in the background of decisions of this nature, and I am not sure this has entered into it, constant fears that the North Koreans might exploit domestic unrest. This is a constant theme of Kim Il Sung. There were fears that demonstrations might be misinterpreted by Kim Il Sung as a signal for attack.

You also have certain social factors. The structure of Korean society is essentially Confucian. It is built on the family, and it is built upon authoritarian lines, central authoritarian lines. You have, moreover, obviously, clearly, the ambition of those people in power to retain power, which is given in many of these situations, and you had during this period, 1973, recession, the result of increases in oil prices, and the decrease in world trade. Recession in Korean terms is a growth rate of about 7 or 8 percent, so from their view there was concern.

I might say that it was this desire to meet the problems through a more disciplined system that I suspect motivated either consciously or subconsciously the decisions relating to martial law and the Yushin Constitution.

In explaining the Yushin Constitution, President Park and his aides pointed to economic considerations, to the demonstrations and social unrest as reasons for taking these actions. Subsequently, he used the same type of rationale with respect to the first set of emergency decrees, 1 to 4.

Mr. FRASER. Would a part of that unrest have been reflected—there was a Presidential election, I think, in 1971?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Kim Dae Jung—

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; certainly. There was a Presidential election in 1971, in which President Park's margin was not substantial, and I

suspect there may have been some concern about a subsequent Presidential election under the old constitution.

Mr. FRASER. Under the Yushin Constitution, the direct election disappeared.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; it did, sir. I would like to reemphasize the point that I am dealing here in a speculative manner, trying to give the range of problems. I think there was an environment of uncertainty which was affected by external and internal factors as well as the changing nature of our own relationship with Korea, which has been more pronounced in subsequent years since I have been Ambassador.

Mr. FRASER. Was the U.S. Government informed of the proposal to impose martial law and to promulgate the Yushin Constitution before it happened?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; we were informed, oh, I would say momentarily the day before, on martial law. There was hardly room for us to react and do anything about reversing it. It was quite clear from my records, the records I have been able to find, that the same thing is true with respect to the Yushin Constitution and to the first set of emergency decrees as well as the second set.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, in general, these political structural changes were not shared with the United States until about the time they were going to happen.

Mr. SNEIDER. That is right. I think it was the view of the Korean Government that it was their decision to make in terms of internal politics of the country, and that domestic relations were their responsibility, and that while they would be glad to inform us in advance, they were not consulting with us on the nature of their political system.

Mr. FRASER. But since they really gave us no advance notice, whether that would be in the nature of a consultation or not—

Mr. SNEIDER. I do not think it was conceived of as a consultation, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Right, but even not being a consultation, the notice was very short.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What would be the reason, other than that it was viewed as their responsibility to make these decisions?

Mr. SNEIDER. Well, one would have to presume, given the history of our relationship with Korea, that the Koreans expected an adverse reaction from us. We had been from the very start in 1945 at the forefront of promoting Western-style democracy in Korea, and certainly in 1962 had placed very strong pressures on President Park to institute elections. I would have no doubt that they had no doubts in their minds what our reaction would be.

Mr. FRASER. On October 17, 1972, a statement by a State Department spokesman said with respect to the Yushin Constitution, "We were not consulted about the decision, and were, quite obviously, not associated with it." How did the U.S. Government view the promulgation of the Yushin Constitution, and were representations made to the South Korean Government about it?

Mr. SNEIDER. I might say that my memory of this is not complete in the details. Basically, we had several questions. To answer very quickly, one was, what would we do privately, and second, what would

we say publicly. The decision was made that we would not go beyond the statement that you have read to actually condemn it publicly, but to make our objections known with representations both in Seoul and in Washington, and those were made. I have a summary of that action which I was able to find in the files, and I recall being active in that role.

There was a lot of debate as to how far we could go, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Could you generally characterize the nature of the representations we made privately?

Mr. SNEIDER. I cannot really characterize them, because I do not remember them in specific detail. If my memory serves me correctly, there was no doubt as to the U.S. position on the thing. We felt that we saw no need for these actions that he had taken.

Mr. FRASER. Do you recall how the Seoul Government responded to those representations?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think that they responded to those representations as they have responded subsequently to other representations I have been involved with by saying it was a decision they felt was justified in their own terms.

Mr. FRASER. Between the beginning of 1973 and mid-1975, that would be a span of about 2½ years, President Park imposed a series of emergency decrees under the Yushin Constitution. These decrees limited public demonstrations, restricted freedom of the press, and made criticism of the constitution illegal, and outlawed criticism of the President.

In the view of the South Korean Government, what domestic and international conditions warranted these actions?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think that probably my response to your earlier question on the Yushin Constitution tends to embrace in a general way their feeling of recognition of the need in their terms for these actions. I might say that the history of that period is a history of periodic relaxation and moderation. Some months after I was assigned to Korea [1974], for example, I think virtually all of the political prisoners under EM-4 were released, and actually the emergency decrees of that time were rescinded.

Mr. FRASER. EM-4 refers to emergency decree No. 4?

Mr. SNEIDER. Emergency decrees 1 to 4. That is the original set of emergency decrees. Then you had the collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia, a situation of almost near panic in Korea, during which myself and my colleagues in Seoul spent a good deal of time trying to put these developments into perspective, but out of that came the reinstitution of these controls through emergency decree No. 9.

Mr. FRASER. Do you think the example of rigid control in North Korea by Kim Il Sung's government had anything to do with Park Chung Hee's moves to tighten control in the South?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think these are reasonable grounds of speculation. I have talked to people who were assigned to Seoul at that time, several of the senior responsible officers. They felt this was one of the very strong motivations. The Koreans felt that they were pitted against an implacable enemy who sought the destruction of the South Korean Government and its whole system, and the imposition of Communist rule over the South dedicated to this objective. They found in the

North a government which controlled their citizens as rigidly as one can find in the Communist world, and I am told people were quite concerned by the contrast between that and the relative freedom that existed in the South.

I think this is still a factor of concern.

Mr. FRASER. How did the State Department regard the emergency decrees, and what action did it take on that?

Mr. SNEIDER. Well, I think that our reactions to the emergency decrees in a general way were very consistent with the original position that we took on the martial law and the Yushin Constitution. Again, it was a combination of not associating ourselves publicly, and privately seeking relief from these measures, urging the Government in its own interests to reduce the controls.

I was going through my files the other day, and noted a telegram, for example, that I had personally drafted after I was informed about emergency decree No. 9, covering my conversation with the Foreign Minister, in which I expressed serious concerns about the failure to consult with us informally in advance, and to take into account the potential problems with the U.S. Congress and public. While recognizing that these were matters for internal decision, I felt that the necessity for the measures was not persuasively presented, and that the alliance relationship between our two countries involved some mutual obligations and mutual efforts, including a full exchange of views.

I cite this only as typical of the reaction that we had to these various measures, and obviously, during my period representations were made on these measures.

Mr. FRASER. Could you give us the approximate date of that?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; this was May 12, 1975. It was right after emergency decree No. 9.

Mr. FRASER. How did the promulgation of Yushin and the emergency decrees affect the U.S. priorities and interests in Korea, if at all?

Mr. SNEIDER. It clearly affected our priorities, not in the sense that we placed the highest priority on the domestic political situation in Korea, but we clearly had to pay more attention to it. We were under some clear obligation from Congress to do so—among other things, Mr. Chairman, your role in the hearings—we felt, I felt, and the Department felt that it was extremely important that the Korean Government and the Korean people understood the reaction of the American Congress and the American people to these actions. Much of my effort was centered about making sure there was a clear perception in Korea of American attitudes and therefore the risks that this meant to our relationship.

I might add that one of the concerns I have had as Ambassador is that I have found that, despite our long and very close relationship and the blood that we have shed with the Koreans, the problem that besets me still is the lack of mutual perception about each other. I think I may have sent you a speech in which I dealt with this problem.

I feel that particularly the changing nature of both societies made it necessary for both countries to adapt and take into account these changes.

Mr. FRASER. How did the Korean Government react to American press criticism of Yushin and the decrees?

Mr. SNEIDER. Well, the Korean Government clearly felt in their eyes these actions were justified. They felt that their critics did not understand the need for them. They felt that they should in effect try to educate the people as to why they were necessary. They were greatly concerned by this criticism, and feeling increasingly insecure because of the value they placed upon the alliance with the United States.

Their first effort was clearly to influence people to take a different view, a more sympathetic view to their internal political reforms and changes.

Mr. FRASER. I just asked how the Korean Government reacted to American press criticism. Let me shift the question slightly.

Mr. SNEIDER. I did not answer the question. I am sorry.

Mr. FRASER. My next question is very close to that. That is, how did the Korean Government react to mounting congressional criticism?

Mr. SNEIDER. I was essentially answering that question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. SNEIDER. On the press side, I might say I think they felt, and you have heard this from many sources, that they had not gotten a fair shake from the American press, that their position had not been presented.

Mr. FRASER. Did the Korean Government ask for advice in the U.S. Embassy on how best to deal with congressional criticism?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think in generalized terms, yes, and of course this is a kind of two-way street. My advice was, you had better talk to a very wide span of Americans and find out what their attitudes are, because it affects our relationship. I felt that it was not just enough to talk to the people who supported them in the United States. It was important to talk to the critics, such as yourself and others. I frankly felt that this type of mutual exposure was extremely important in gaining mutual understanding.

Mr. FRASER. Did criticism from the American academic community and from Korean-Americans escalate during the period also?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; I think it did, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Did the Korean media report on American criticism of Yushin and its decrees?

Mr. SNEIDER. If my memory serves me correctly, sir, the reporting was, I would say, erratic and not steady. It has only been in the last year or so that they have been more constant in reporting the criticism. May I consult with my colleague who was there?

[Pause.]

Mr. SNEIDER. There was a lot of implicit reporting of American criticism. There was some low-level reporting. I do not think there was any doubt in any knowledgeable Korean's mind about the criticism being voiced against them by the Congress and the press. Many people receive directly the clippings from American papers, and I made a very great effort, a constant effort, I would say, whenever an American Congressman came to Korea, such as Congressman Derwinski, to make sure that they advised the Koreans whom they met of the nature of this criticism and the concerns in the United States.

I might add that it was one of the principal functions of the Embassy as long as I was there to make sure that as many people were as fully aware as possible of this problem.

Mr. FRASER. If my recollection is right, ever since the demise of the independence of Dong-A Ilbo, press freedom has been quite restricted.

Mr. SNEIDER. I would say in the last year plus there has been an easing of the restrictions on the press, and it is measurable in such things as the reporting even of your hearings, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Is it still true that American publications in Korea are censored before they are put out for public sale?

Mr. SNEIDER. My recollection is, there has not been any censorship of media in a number of months. That is, Time and Newsweek have not been clipped. I brought this to the attention of one of the senior Korean officials in a very vivid way one day, and after that there was some easing.

Mr. FRASER. That is, prior to the recent period they were cutting out unfavorable articles?

Mr. SNEIDER. They were, yes.

Mr. FRASER. Is that true also of the Japanese press?

Mr. SNEIDER. I just could not answer that. I suspect it was, but I could not answer that question.

Mr. FRASER. In January 1973, Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil visited Washington and met with President Nixon.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Were Yushin and the emergency decrees discussed at that meeting?

Mr. SNEIDER. We have attempted to get a record of that meeting, Mr. Chairman, and I have not been able to obtain it. I have a few bits of information which I have obtained through other telegrams. One is a press telegram reporting that the Prime Minister remarked that President Nixon understood the October reforms. I have a second message which was a conversation with Mr. Kim in which he indicated—and this is inferential—the issue was raised with him.

I spoke to a number of people, so I don't know who raised it with him, but he was certainly aware when he came back and talked to this particular person. He was aware of Washington's reactions to the Yushin reforms.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know what President Nixon said to Prime Minister Kim with regard to the Yushin situation?

Mr. SNEIDER. I do not, Mr. Chairman. I have not been able to obtain the record of that proceeding.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Were there and are there different perceptions between the United States and the Republic of Korea as to the threat from the North during the period of your service there?

Mr. SNEIDER. If I could divide the answer to that into two areas, I think when you are dealing with the threat, you first of all have to deal with the question of North Korean capabilities, military capabilities, and second, the question of North Korean intentions. I would say that with respect to capabilities, there were some differences, I do not think of a very significant nature. It turned out in some areas, as we derived later intelligence, that the Koreans were more right than we were with their estimates, but there were not really significant differences.

In terms of intentions, I would say that probably the evaluation of the potential, the possibility of an attack by North Korea, was higher in the Korean minds than it is in our view, although we certainly feel that eternal vigilance is an absolute necessity on that very hostile border where almost any incident could escalate accidentally. I would think this is a natural phenomenon. The Koreans are very close to the situation. They have lived under this threat. They have suffered one invasion already. Almost every family was touched in some cruel way by the 1950 war, and their sense of the threat is logically going to be much greater than our own.

Mr. DERWINSKI. But their justification for many of the internal measures are based on the threat from the North. To what degree do we understand, and perhaps concur with, their evaluation of internal measures and the relationship to provocation or incidents from the North?

Mr. SNEIDER. I would say this. While I would not concur completely with them, and we do have differences which you have noted, one has to be concerned that Kim Il Sung might misconceive internal disorder in South Korea. We just frankly do not know enough to discard this possibility, and therefore I feel we have to take it into account.

Now, does that mean that all of the measures are necessary or not? I think that again you get into a judgment factor, and clearly the South Koreans are closer to the situation than we are, and tend to perhaps overreact, some of them do, to this threat, but we, I feel personally, cannot discard the possibility that you could have, if you had disorders in the South, a move by the North. There is some evidence that Kim Il Sung felt that he had missed the boat in 1960 during the student demonstrations, and that he was determined not to miss the boat again should the same thing occur.

Mr. DERWINSKI. The thing I have been curious about is the possible relationship to a major incident, and then some internal measures. For example, if I recall, the *Pueblo* incident was in 1968.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. And the next major incident, was it not the so-called Blue House attack?

Mr. SNEIDER. That was in the same period.

Mr. DERWINSKI. That was in the same period?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes. The next was the EC-121 shot down by the North Koreans in 1969, the spring of 1969.

Mr. DERWINSKI. The next major event was the assassination of Madame Park, and the discovery of the tunnels came after that.

Mr. SNEIDER. And in 1976, you have the incident at Panmunjom.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Taking all of these into account, has there been any pattern in adjustment of these internal measures in relationship to any one of these major incidents?

Mr. SNEIDER. I do not really see in the time factor a relationship, to be honest with you. I think that the decisions on internal policy derive not from reactions to specific incidents, but more to a generalized sense of insecurity from domestic and external factors.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Would it be fair to say that we are more conscious of these major incidents, whereas the Koreans, to use the term I think was used earlier, with their siege mentality, that they live with this

day after day, they are less concerned at the time of such an incident than we might be?

Mr. SNEIDER. It depends. I think frankly if you take the Blue House raid and the assassination of Madame Park, they were very seriously concerned, perhaps more concerned than we were; however, the Panmunjom incidents and the EC-121 and the *Pueblo* incident, we were more concerned. These are matters of degree.

What I as Ambassador have been basically concerned about are that incidents such as this have a capability for rapid escalation, and a conflict that is not intended can occur, so that we are concerned about dampening down those incidents without giving any indication of a sense of weakness to the North.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, you have mentioned that you used your position to constantly remind the Korean Government officials of the need to liberalize their domestic policy. In fact, I went through that kind of instruction and followthrough myself. To what degree did this kind of constant concern that you expressed perhaps influence their internal measures?

Mr. SNEIDER. I really cannot honestly answer that question. I think the Korean Government has taken its decisions on domestic policy largely in response to its own sense of how to run their internal affairs, that they are responding to their own sense of internal priorities rather than to external pressure. As a matter of fact, I think that pressures, particularly those exerted publicly, have tended to bring not a positive reaction but more likely a very negative reaction. I think that they feel that they have to act on internal matters in response to their own assessment of the political situation within Korea, and when they have relaxed, I think they have done it in those terms.

Clearly, they are very well aware of the criticism in the United States, and there is a very strong desire to diminish the criticism, and to try to strengthen the relationship with us. That would be a factor, but I would not consider that to be the principal factor.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Let me specifically discuss the 1974 incident, when Mrs. Park was assassinated. This provoked a special problem between South Korea and Japan. What position or role did the United States take in trying to moderate and calm that relationship between Japan and Korea?

Mr. SNEIDER. We essentially took what I would call a neutral position, putting pressures on neither side to make concessions, but urging both in the interest of the larger relationship and the security of the region to repair their relationship and resume a normal pattern of relationship. We were concerned by that, but we did not get involved in the middle of it. We accepted this as a Korean-Japanese problem, but urged both to settle the problem as quickly as possible, because a continuation of the intense differences could be a threat to the security of the area.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Was this U.S. position satisfactory to the South Korean Government?

Mr. SNEIDER. I consulted with one of my colleagues. I was in the department at the time, as a matter of fact, in transition. As he put it, no. They would have preferred us to be much more on the side of Korea, rather than taking a neutral position.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, we would like to proceed now to the subject of Korean Government lobbying and influence-peddling.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Could you begin by describing the activities you consider to be proper and those which would be improper, those which would be useful and those which would not be useful, as practiced by the Koreans?

Mr. SNEIDER. Well, I think that basically it is a practice of almost every government to try to influence another government, and to try to convince them that what they are doing is the right thing to do. Certainly our function as Foreign Service officers is to influence countries to which we are accredited, to convince them, to persuade them that our policies are the right and sound policies and this is an act of persuasion.

Now, when you go beyond that, for example, efforts to give people money, lavish gifts, it seems to me you are right there in the improper zone. There are probably some borderline cases involved here. Clearly there have been cases of what must be improper activity on the part of Koreans.

Mr. FRASER. When and how?

Mr. SNEIDER. Let me just add to the second part what is useful and constructive. I feel that a useful and constructive dialog is a two-way street, where you obtain the views of the other side and transmit those back, as well as transmitting the views of your side. In the case of Koreans. I felt they had to spread their wings a lot farther than just the few people who supported them, and try to understand that the nature of American society was changing in the sixties and seventies.

Mr. FRASER. When and how did you first become aware of improper Korean lobbying activities, and what were they?

Mr. SNEIDER. When I first took over as Deputy Assistant Secretary, I was warned to stay away from Mr. Tongsun Park in general terms, and there were reports, speculation and rumors about improper activities, and I cannot really pin this down. It was nothing really very specific, and actually, I did not really become aware of improper activities per se that were pinned down and proven until, I think it was January or February of 1976, when I was briefed on the material that had been given to the then Under Secretary.

The problem, I might add, Mr. Chairman, was that the facts were elusive. People suspected an awful lot, and I must say we have gone through those Embassy files at least 4 or 5 times to find whether we had any facts that we just missed, and we could not find any hard facts. We had suspicions but no hard facts.

Mr. FRASER. In January and February of 1976, you were then serving as Ambassador?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; I was, sir.

Mr. FRASER. What degree of priority did the State Department's East Asian Bureau and the Office of Korean Affairs afford to the improper Korean lobbying activities?

Mr. SNEIDER. Clearly, it was a matter of concern to us. I cannot give you a value judgment on what the relative priorities were. We had many policy problems during that period in relationship to the

U.N. debate, in dealings with other countries in relation to Korean policy, many problems in the security area. We had considerable problems about the Korean modernization plan and restructuring that plan to fit the amount of money that Congress was allotting to it, and so much of your priorities in a real sense are determined by the telegram you get the first of the morning.

Korea has been a very active place ever since I have been associated with it, and certainly this issue was not something that was ignored. But as Deputy Assistant Secretary I was also dealing with a lot of other countries, so that my time was shared.

Mr. FRASER. You became Deputy Assistant Secretary when?

Mr. SNEIDER. In August of 1972, as I remember. September, I guess, of 1972. I cannot remember the exact date. It was late that summer.

Mr. FRASER. Did you give any instructions to the Embassy staff regarding contacts with Tongsun Park?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; but it needed none. My predecessor had made it clear that there would be no contacts with him, and I reinforced that. I personally have never met the gentleman, and I have no intention to.

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, we will place into the record several documents from the Department concerning Tongsun Park. The documents have been declassified and authorized for public release at the request of the subcommittee. Included are an internal State Department memorandum dated January 26, 1972, a memorandum of conversation between Tongsun Park and the political counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, dated May 14, 1973, and six letters written by the U.S. Ambassador to State Department officials in 1972 to 1974.¹

Portions of the Ambassador's letters have been deleted, but the State Department has provided a summary in addition to the expurgated versions of the letters. The staff will read the summary.²

Mr. BOETTCHER [reading]:

Summary of certain letters of the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, 1972 to 1974. Between December 18, 1972, and February 27, 1974, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea wrote six letters to the Department of State concerning activities of Mr. Tongsun Park which the Ambassador believed should be brought to the attention of appropriate officials in Washington. These letters followed earlier expressions of concern communicated to the Department by the Ambassador. The letters described actions of Mr. Park interjecting himself into the visits to Korea of certain U.S. Congressional Delegations, relayed information given to the Ambassador by visiting Congressmen about Mr. Park's role in rice purchasing transactions of the Korean Government, and referred to other activities of Mr. Park.

The letters expressed the Ambassador's views concerning Mr. Park's possible relationship to the Korean Government and the view that his activities, in any event, were detrimental to the United States Government and damaging to the best interests of Korea. The letters also informed the Department that the Ambassador, since his arrival in Korea, had refused personally to have anything to do with Mr. Park and had instructed his staff neither to accept his invitations nor to receive him. The letters reflected that the Ambassador had given the same advice to visiting Congressmen who had spoken to the Ambassador concerning Mr. Park.

Mr. FRASER. The staff will now read for the record a portion of the Ambassador's letter dated August 2, 1973.³

Mr. BOETTCHER [reading]:

Earlier this week, Park returned to Korea on the same plane with [Blank]. During a breakfast with me, [Blank] asked if I would develop good relations with

¹ See appendixes 2A-2I, pp. 146-162.

² See appendix 2C, p. 151.

³ See appendix 2F, p. 157.

Tongsun Park. I replied that this was a matter on which I felt very strongly. I would do anything appropriate the Congressman asked, but in this case I must refuse to have anything to do with Mr. Park, and I would not permit any of my staff to have anything to do with him. I told [Blank] that I did not approve of the activities in which Park was engaged and I intended to stay absolutely clear of him. He was not someone I wished to deal with for many reasons which I chose not to go into with the Congressman but which I could assure him were valid.

Mr. FRASER. Would the staff now read the portion of the Ambassador's letter dated August 13, 1973?¹

Mr. BOETTCHER [reading]:

I was informed by [Blank] during his visit here in Seoul, that, to his knowledge, Park demands a kickback of \$1.00 a ton on shipments of rice to Korea. [Blank] told me this in confidence. [Blank] is here, in part, seeking to determine the future market possibilities for rice which is a major export from his district. He is obviously unhappy about past practices which have some shippers paying Mr. Park a fee for no visible service. Evidently Park, through his ties, which I have discussed in previous correspondence, is able to exercise a degree of control over purchases of rice in the United States and use that control to squeeze out a payment. [Deletion] I have reported these things consistently, and will continue to do so. I presume you are making this information available as appropriate. In accordance with my earlier suggestion, I hope you are keeping Under Secretary Porter informed. * * * Mr. Park continues to float in and out around here. As of last week, he was seen by one of my officers in the company of the ROK/CIA Washington Station Chief. At that time he complained again to one of my officers about my unwillingness to have anything to do with him when he is such a good friend of the United States. I have insisted, and will continue to insist, that no one in this Embassy have anything to do with Mr. Park. He knows this and is doing his damndest to get around me.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, was Philip Habib the Ambassador in Korea during this period?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. So he was the author of these communications?

Mr. SNEIDER. [Nods affirmatively.]

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, were you asked by the State Department to monitor a report or take action concerning improper lobbying?

Mr. SNEIDER. I was not asked specifically or given specific instructions to do so, but I did not frankly feel there was any need for me to have such instructions. It would go without saying.

Mr. FRASER. What action did you and your colleagues take in Korea and the United States on this?

Mr. SNEIDER. During what period, Mr. Chairman? While I was Ambassador to Korea?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. SNEIDER. To the extent we could, we tried to monitor this, but it was very difficult to do so. Much of what went on was outside our purview, and was deliberately kept outside of our purview.

Mr. FRASER. Were you aware of any Korean press articles reporting successes of Korean lobbyists in Washington?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think there may have been some, Mr. Chairman, but I cannot remember them specifically. This covers a long span. At one time, there was a flurry of articles about a couple of years ago—a year and a half ago—praising Mr. Tongsun Park, which I was infuriated about. I did not feel that he was really a hero in any sense to anybody.

¹ See appendix 2G, p. 158.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, let me say we thought it might be worth trying to wind this up in one sitting rather than breaking and coming back.

Mr. SNEIDER. That is perfectly agreeable to me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. If you get too hungry, you may say something.

Mr. SNEIDER. I will drink water.

Mr. FRASER. If we keep moving along, we might be able to finish by 1:30.

Mr. SNEIDER. Very good.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I think you heard what Mr. Nidecker was testifying to.

Mr. SNEIDER. I did, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I would like just to run through the Row Chin Hwan relation with Nidecker, if I could—for the record here.

Mr. SNEIDER. Right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. When and how did you first become aware of this activity by Row Chin Hwan?

Mr. SNEIDER. I was briefed on both the \$10,000 given to Nidecker, and the Row Chin Hwan problem, after I came out to Korea, by my then-Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Erickson. I was not aware of it when I was in the Department.

Mr. DERWINSKI. When did you arrive in Korea?

Mr. SNEIDER. September 1974, mid-September.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Then, subsequently—this was in a letter to Mr. Habib, who by then was Under Secretary of State, a letter on April 9, 1976—you outlined how the Embassy had tried to discourage, and I quote, "ridiculous activities of Row Chin Hwan." What did you mean by "ridiculous activities"?

Mr. SNEIDER. I have been trying to live with that word ever since I saw it again. I basically felt that Row Chin Hwan's activities were counterproductive, and in fact destructive, not only in terms of American mores and law, but in terms of Korea's own interests. I made strenuous efforts to discourage people from using Row Chin Hwan as a source of congressional contact, and I felt that—I will not go beyond that. I could, in executive session, but I would prefer not to.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In this letter, you also stated you had tried other tactics to stop his activity.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; what I tried to do was encourage sending a different type of person to see, to get a much broader view of American congressional and public opinion on Korea, and I encouraged people to see a very wide spectrum of Congressmen, because I felt that people were coming back and saying, everything is fine, which I knew was not the case.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In that same letter, you also praised the effectiveness of two other individuals. Could you comment on that?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; the reason I mentioned that was I felt that not only had they seen a different group of American congressional figures, but they came back and reported the depth of American feeling on a number of issues, and I felt that—this goes back to my earlier statement about increasing the Korean awareness of the problems faced in the United States.

Mr. DERWINSKI. We have this letter, which is unclassified, so at this point, I would like to insert it into the record, since I have been referring to it.¹

Mr. SNEIDER. Right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What was the State Department's reaction to your letter?

Mr. SNEIDER. As I remember—I am not sure whether I got a direct reaction from them or not. I did get a reaction—No, I did not get any reaction, but I presume that they felt that I was on the right track.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You heard Mr. Nidecker discuss the incident with Park Chong Kyu.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What was your relationship with Mr. Park Chong Kyu after this Nidecker incident?

Mr. SNEIDER. By the time I came out to Korea, Mr. Park was no longer head of the Presidential Protective Force. He had resigned as a consequence of the assassination of Madame Park. He took personal responsibility for it, in the tradition of Korea. I met him several times, and I would say that our contact was very slight, but it was told to me that he was a man who continued to have some influence and could be helpful in certain areas the U.S. Government was concerned about, because of his influence within the Korean society and Government.

Mr. DERWINSKI. And he, Park Chong Kyu, did visit the United States, and there was a letter you wrote. Would you care to discuss that?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes, I did write a letter, and was to some extent instrumental in that visit. I must say that this is one of those value judgments that one makes. I realized that he was connected with Mr. Nidecker. On the other hand, I felt that a person of this nature and stature had to have direct exposure to the United States to understand the problems in our country, and I feel that on net he himself acknowledged that the experience here was an eye-opening one for him.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Just as an aside—

Mr. SNEIDER. It is a value judgment. I am not sure I would do the same thing again.

Mr. DERWINSKI. This reminds me of the many stories of the travels of Nixon between 1960 and 1968—the doors that were opened and the doors that were slammed in his face. When he became President again it was interesting how he obviously first established contact with people who treated him well while he was out of authority, so I can understand the diplomatic psychology that goes into that.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; and we had very major problems in Korea, and misunderstandings. I had been told that in fact in one particular incident, in a matter of some importance to us, that Mr. Park had intervened even after he had left office, and had been very helpful.

Mr. DERWINSKI. The next subject we would like to cover with you is the issue of Korean Government harassment of Koreans living in the United States.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you have any recollection of when this was first called to your attention, and what information the State Department provided you in the episode or pattern?

¹ See appendix 2J, p. 164.

Mr. SNEIDER. By mid-1973, there were wide allegations in the press and otherwise about such harassments. The country director for Korea, Mr. Ranard, brought these to my attention, and in June of that year the Department did request the FBI to investigate these allegations, particularly those contained in a Washington Post article of June 7.

We have reports of incidents in St. Louis, as I recall, and one in San Francisco, and Washington, relating—and there were others as well.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did these incidents seem to increase over a period of years?

Mr. SNEIDER. We felt that there was an increase in these incidents, and we were very much concerned about it. In addition to the request for the FBI to look into them, I raised the question with a senior member of the Korean Embassy in June of that year, and expressed my concerns about it, and subsequently, as the record will show, the Department requested, through the Korean Ambassador, that the best interests of both countries would be served if the then station chief of the KCIA were reassigned from Washington.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Then without objection we will place in the record at this point a State Department memorandum dated August 17, 1973, entitled, "ROK CIA Activities in the United States." That deals with the subject we have just been discussing.¹

Do you have any recollection or knowledge whether or not the number of KCIA officials in the United States increased in the period from 1973 on to, say, 1976?

Mr. SNEIDER. I do not really have any recollection of it. I think there was some concern about that, but I do not recall the specifics of that.

Mr. DERWINSKI. By that, you would mean concern in the State Department?

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes; it is a matter, incidentally, I might add, Mr. Congressman, that concerned me subsequently, and which I made representations about after I became Ambassador in Korea, and it was following one very major representation by me that the KCIA came to the decision to drastically reduce the number of its personnel assigned to the United States.

The representation was made on a Friday, and I was informed by the next Monday or Tuesday that that decision had been made over the weekend.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, you had made representations first when you were here in the Department and subsequently when you arrived in Korea.

Mr. SNEIDER. The Under Secretary at that time, Mr. Porter, made the initial representations. I followed them up with the Korean Ambassador, as did the country director at that time, but afterwards I kept after him on this when I went to Korea.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you recall if the State Department regarded any particular Korean official as being responsible for the incidents and harassments in the United States?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think it goes without saying that we felt that the station chief at that time was the responsible official.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you recall his name, or do your records show that?

¹ See appendix 2K, p. 166.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes, his name was—I think it was Lee Sang Ho, also known as Yang Doo Won.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Speaking of this awareness, I presume that we are also discussing the State Department awareness of the issue of the KCIA penetrating the Korean community in the United States.

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You understood that when I was discussing that?

Mr. SNEIDER. Oh, sure.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Then without objection, at this point we should place in the record the State Department document entitled, "Request for FBI Investigation of Activities by ROK CIA in the U.S.," dated June 25, 1973.¹

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, we will place in the record two summaries of classified State Department documents. One summary is based on two documents of August 1973, describing representations made by the U.S. Government to the Korean Ambassador to Washington concerning the activities of the KCIA in the United States. The other summary is based on a November 1973, document regarding the State Department's request to the Korean Government that KCIA official Lee Sang Ho be transferred away from the United States.

We will also place in the record a copy of a State Department "Notice of Final Department of Foreign Diplomatic Officer," which states that Lee Sang Ho departed the United States on January 9, 1974.²

Mr. SNEIDER. Oh, sure.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, what effect did KCIA activities in the United States have on the attitudes of U.S. officials toward their relations with the KCIA in Korea?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think without going into details, Mr. Chairman, that they did have an effect, particularly, I think, on certain personalities involved. We still maintained a liaison with them in our own national interests.

Mr. FRASER. Was there some kind of action contemplated against the KCIA director, Lee Hu Rak?

Mr. SNEIDER. I am not aware of any. I think there was. I recall vaguely that there were some steps under consideration, but I am just not aware of this at all. It occurred before my day, or at least was not brought to my attention, or my memory is short.

Mr. FRASER. I think it would be useful at this time if the staff reads a portion from a 1973 memorandum already introduced. Perhaps staff will identify it.

Mr. BOETTCHER. It is an internal State Department memorandum dated August 17, 1973, entitled ROK CIA Activities in the United States.³

¹ See appendix 2L, p. 168.

² See appendixes 2M-2O, pp. 169-171.

³ See appendix 2K, p. 166.

We have concluded that while the present ROK CIA chief remains in Washington he will continue to be the source of contention in the Korean community and embarrassment to the U.S. Already he has so abused the terms of his assignment here that we have grounds to request his recall. We have discussed this and other possibilities with our own CIA who are also concerned about the implications of ROK CIA activity in the U.S. They are doing some careful thinking about their own relationships with Lee Hu Rak, and expect to be putting up some thoughts for action directed against him, motivated by concern for internal stability in the ROK.

Mr. FRASER. Your testimony and State Department documents indicate that the department considered the problem of harassment by the Korean Government to be a serious one. Do you think the measures taken by the State Department were adequate for dealing with the problem?

Mr. SNEIDER. That is a question of value judgment. I think over the years, from the time we were faced with this problem until 1976, and it took longer than perhaps one would like, I think they were adequate in that time frame, perhaps not in the shorter time frame, one might say.

Mr. FRASER. To your knowledge, did the harassment cease at some point?

Mr. SNEIDER. I am just not knowledgeable about that subject, Mr. Chairman. I could not say either way.

Mr. FRASER. As Ambassador in Seoul on behalf of the United States, have you made representations to the South Korean Government regarding harassment?

Mr. SNEIDER. I did, and I mentioned them previously. As a matter of fact, it was following one representation that I made on a Friday. The decision was made over the weekend and I was informed about it either Monday or Tuesday, that they would reduce the number of officials assigned to the United States drastically, and confine them to liaison activities.

Mr. FRASER. Did they subsequently reduce the number of personnel assigned to the United States?

Mr. SNEIDER. As far as I know, they did, sir.

Mr. FRASER. On Kim Dae Jung, the United States has spoken up frequently in international forums against kidnaping and terrorism. In August 1973, former South Korean Presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung was kidnaped from a Tokyo hotel, after a stay of several months in the United States. How did the U.S. Government react to the kidnaping of Kim Dae Jung?

Mr. SNEIDER. Basically, we were deeply concerned and reacted very strongly, in this case both publicly and privately. We took the view that while this was primarily a problem involving the Korean and Japanese Governments, we were keenly interested in the outcome of the investigations, and the Department spokesman said that we were relieved that he was alive and well, and we deplored illegal acts such as kidnaping, terrorism, and interference with international travel, and hoped the perpetrators would be brought to justice, and if he desired to visit the United States, he would be a welcome and respected guest, and we hoped there would be no impediments to such travel.

Mr. FRASER. The president of Harvard University was reported to have offered Kim Dae Jung a fellowship at Harvard beginning in Sep-

tember of 1973. How did the U.S. Government view this offer in light of the kidnapping, and what was done about it?

Mr. SNEIDER. Clearly, we would facilitate his travel if a visa was requested, and that was sort of a standing instruction in the Embassy. There were other steps taken which I would prefer to go into in executive session.

Mr. FRASER. Did the Department of State in 1975 come into possession of any particular information regarding Korean extralegal attempts to influence Congress, and if so, what did it do with this information?

Mr. SNEIDER. I was, of course, in Seoul at the time, Mr. Chairman. I am familiar with the record in a general sense on this count. We did come into very specific information, I believe, some time in the fall of 1975, and I think in previous hearings the record will show that we asked and got a Department of Justice investigation of this information, which led to subsequent developments, the indictment of Tongsun Park, and other steps.

The Department took the initiative as soon as it had that hard information. I was not informed of that information until the time of a chief of mission conference, in January or February, because it was so sensitive, and they did not transmit it to me in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know who the principal actors were in connection with moving ahead with the request to the Justice Department? Who was involved?

Mr. SNEIDER. The principal initiative of this from the very beginning has been former Under Secretary of State, Mr. Habib, and he was the one who took the initiative. He was the one who was informed, and then took the initiative.

Mr. FRASER. How did the Korean Government and people react to the revelations of Korean lobbying and influence buying in this country, since all of this became public in 1975?

Mr. SNEIDER. That is the kind of question I would prefer you ask the Korean Government, but my sense is that the Koreans have been deeply embarrassed and to some extent mortified by these revelations. It is, I think, for them obviously a mistake, and they wish to rectify their mistakes in their future practices.

It has been a difficult process to develop the grounds for cooperation with the Korean Government, but in recent months they have been very cooperative, particularly with respect to Mr. Tongsun Park. As you know, I have been very deeply involved in that negotiation, and I think that they have tried to cooperate within the terms of the Vienna Convention, with respect to the case of the former Ambassador, Mr. Kim Dong Jo.

Mr. FRASER. On that question of Kim Dong Jo, my understanding, and you can correct me if I am wrong, is that the Government of South Korea, or Mr. Kim Dong Jo, or together—they decided voluntarily to provide information to the House of Representatives that would not violate the Vienna Convention. In other words, the Vienna Convention forbids compulsory process for this purpose, but would not bar a voluntary action on their part. Is that right?

Mr. SNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, may I consult my counsel?

[Pause.]

Mr. SNEIDER. I am informed that I think our view is that while voluntary action is permissible under the Vienna Convention, we feel that action under pressure or threat in a sense contravenes the Vienna Convention. I think this position was more fully explained by the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Christopher, in the hearings before the committee, and I would rather not elaborate, add, or subtract from his testimony.

Mr. FRASER. If Kim Dong Jo should come voluntarily, that clearly is possible?

Mr. SNEIDER. It is not a direct contravention per se, but if it is under pressure, it could be construed as such.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I suppose——

Mr. SNEIDER. I hesitate to go much further than that, Mr. Chairman, because I am not an expert on the subject. I am the point man out in Seoul who is trying to urge the cooperation of the Korean Government within the framework of the Vienna Convention. I am not the legal expert.

Mr. FRASER. I think that is the point I was trying to make. To the extent you are able to elicit cooperation, then the Vienna Convention really does not come into force. We do not have a problem with it.

Mr. SNEIDER. Well, the position we have taken is that we ask for their cooperation within the framework of that convention. You might want to place Mr. Christopher's testimony in the record of this hearing.

Mr. FRASER. Since it is already a part of the committee records, we would not have to place it again.

The New York Times yesterday reported that there was some prospect, on a voluntary or cooperative basis, that Kim Dong Jo might come to the United States.

Mr. SNEIDER. I just have no knowledge of that, Mr. Chairman. At this stage in the game, I think anything I might say would have to be in executive session relating to the discussions on the subject.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I have just two brief points.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Returning for a moment, Ambassador, to the Korean-Japanese problems over the years——

Mr. SNEIDER. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI [continuing]. Part of the problem, as I understand it, is caused by the North Korean influence within certain segments of the Korean-Japanese community. Is that correct?

Mr. SNEIDER. It is very much correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, in recent years, have the South Koreans sort of gained the upper hand in that battle for loyalty? Or how is it, in your judgment? How is the battle going?

Mr. SNEIDER. I really could not give you an exact judgment. I would say that they have made some progress. They have had a program of visitation from members of the Chosen Soren, which is affiliated with North Korea. It has been a successful program in coping with the problem of infiltration of agents of Korean origin from Japan.

There has been enough documentation of such cases to justify that concern.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Have the South Koreans been concerned with any efforts by the North Koreans to penetrate the United States-Korean community?

Mr. SNEIDER. They have mentioned those concerns to me, and I have forwarded those back to Washington. I just do not know—I cannot justify them one way or the other.

Mr. DERWINSKI. One last point, Mr. Ambassador. In commenting on Mr. Fraser's question about the reaction of the Korean Government to all of these disclosures, would it be fair to say that this has had a sobering effect on their attitude?

Mr. SNEIDER. I think it would have more than that, Mr. Congressman. It is clear that Koreans engaged in lobbying activities which went well beyond the bounds of propriety, and I think that they realize this. They feel that perhaps other countries have done the same thing, but they realize that this is not the practice that one should proceed with in the future. I am sure it is one of these cases where people learn a lesson the hard way.

Mr. DERWINSKI. That leads me to my last question. What is the situation as you see it in the future, for United States-Korean relations, and the ability to go beyond this trying period and continue a good relationship?

Mr. SNEIDER. I personally feel as I leave Korea that the relationship with Korea is a very critical one in terms of American national interests, that Korea, while a small country, is a pivotal country in Asia and potentially globally. I am concerned by the potential explosiveness of the situation in the demilitarized zone that divides the North and South.

There has been a build-up of North Korean strength of a constant nature, giving them increased capabilities to attack the South. I do not expect an attack, but the capabilities have increased consistently since I have been Ambassador there. Any change in the situation in Korea will deeply affect our own interests, those of the Soviet Union, those of the People's Republic of China, and those of Japan, and I cannot think but that it will affect them adversely.

I feel that the deterrence of hostilities in that part of the world is a very critical question, and I hope that our relationship under my successor will improve, and I see some signs that it has been improving. We have been through a very trying period in United States-Korean relationships. There are many factors that one could trace this to, including activities such as we have discussed today. It is also a fact that Korea has become virtually a developed nation.

I leave Korea with a great sense of admiration for what the Koreans have done. They have a very heavy defense responsibility for which they have had to carry the burden increasingly, and yet they have the highest economic growth rate. The people have greatly benefited, almost universally, in Korea from this great spurt of economic development. When you consider the dual burdens, they have done quite a job there, and it has taken a good deal of the burden off of our shoulders. If it was a weak and inept government, it would be far more costly for the United States. I think that we both come out of this experience recognizing that the relationship is essential to both of our interests, and we have got to work to strengthen that relationship and repair the damage of the past.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your views. Let me add for myself that I hope that relations between the United States and Korea can remain on a sound footing. But I have to say that they make

it awfully hard, at least for some of us who have very strong feelings about the fact that people like Kim Dae Jung are still incarcerated, when his only offense seems to have been to have run against Park Chung Hee back in 1971, nearly defeating him; and when a poet like Kim Chi Ha remains, when we last heard, in solitary confinement. There has been a dismantling of the democratic system. It may be that self-interest compels us to be there, but I would like to think our close allies are those who share some values with us, and some of those seem to be missing in the case of the present leadership of South Korea. But I have great admiration for the Korean people, and I think you are right to point to their enormous economic progress and some of the social progress which has gone with that.

Mr. SNEIDER. We could discuss this at great lengths, Mr. Chairman. I think that the political progress of Korea in terms that you are talking about is the goal of Koreans, and will come.

Mr. FRASER. Let me thank you for being with us today.

The subcommittee will continue this series of hearings on Tuesday, June 6. The witness will be Kim Sang Keun, formerly an officer of the KCIA, stationed in Washington. Those hearings will be in room 2255.

Mr. Ambassador, we are particularly appreciative of your appearance today, having come all the way from Korea. You have been very helpful to us.

Mr. SNEIDER. Thank you very much. It has been a pleasure to be here.

[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene on Tuesday, June 6, 1978.]

INVESTIGATION OF KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

JUNE 6, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:40 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Donald Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. Today the Subcommittee on International Organizations continues its investigation of Korean-American relations focusing on the years 1973 to 1976.

Our witness this morning is Mr. Kim Sang Keun, a former official of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. He became an officer of the KCIA in 1961, and in October 1970, Mr. Kim was assigned to the Korean Embassy in Washington as a First Secretary. In March 1976, he was promoted to the rank of Counselor.

In November 1976, Mr. Kim decided to leave the service of the Government of the Republic of Korea and seek asylum in the United States. Since that time, he has been under the protection of the U.S. Marshals and has been cooperating with U.S. investigators.

Today, Mr. Kim will testify concerning his knowledge of the KCIA structure, its procedures, and its operations in this country. Of particular interest to this investigation are efforts by the KCIA to control the Korean community in the United States, the question of ties between Rev. Sun Myung Moon and the Government of the Republic of Korea, KCIA efforts to maintain front organizations in this country, and annual plans for KCIA clandestine operations in the United States.

Since Mr. Kim wishes to speak in Korean, we have obtained a qualified Korean interpreter, Mr. Hong Kyoon An, a U.S. citizen who has ably assisted this subcommittee in earlier hearings.

Mr. An is here in a purely official capacity implying neither support nor opposition to the statements he will interpret.

Mr. An, will you please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you swear you will faithfully and accurately interpret from Korean into English and English into Korean the questions, answers and statements you hear today to the best of your ability?

Mr. AN. I do.

Mr. FRASER. The witness has requested he not be photographed or his voice recorded during his appearance before the subcommittee.

In accordance with paragraph (m) of clause 2(k)(5) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, supplemented by rule 9B of the Rules

of Investigation of Korean-American Relations, we will comply with the witness' request.

I ask that the media cover all camera lenses and turn off all microphones and recording devices for the duration of the appearance of this witness.

I want to make clear this applies to everyone in the room. You will be in violation of the committee rule if anyone has a tape recorder with them or on them in any fashion whatsoever that is recording any of these proceedings. I want to make this clear so that everyone understands this rule.

I think perhaps then if our witness is available, we can start.

Mr. Kim, would you raise your right hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. KIM. I do.

STATEMENT OF KIM SANG KEUN, FORMER OFFICIAL, KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. HONG KYOON AN, INTERPRETER

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, would you please state your name for the record?

Mr. KIM. My name is Kim Sang Keun.

Mr. FRASER. Did you join the KCIA in July 1961, and hold a series of positions at the agency's headquarters in Seoul until February of 1970?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Would you please briefly list those positions?

Mr. KIM. In August 1961, I was assigned to the security section of the fifth bureau of the KCIA. I participated in drafting rules and regulations concerning security matters while I was in the section.

Then I was transferred to a section by the name of External Affairs Section in 1964. In that section, I was responsible for collecting and maintaining a list of the names of aliens coming into Korea. I was also responsible for maintaining a list of commercial concerns operating in Korea.

From 1966 to 1967, I worked in the office of the Director of the KCIA. My task was administrative secretary.

From the end part of 1967 to 1970, I was assigned to the Southeast Asian section of the Overseas Operations Bureau.

My job at that position was to collect and evaluate reports coming from our agents stationed in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Indonesia.

That is a brief sketch of my duties while I was at the KCIA headquarters at Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. In March 1970, were you sent to Japan with about five other KCIA officials to discover and prevent the contacting of Korean tourists visiting Expo-70 by the North Korean Residents Association in Japan?

Mr. KIM. Yes, I was.

Mr. FRASER. Were you next assigned to the Republic of Korea Embassy in Washington, D.C.?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. When did you arrive in Washington?

Mr. KIM. I arrived in the United States on October 13, 1970.

Mr. FRASER. Did you serve as First Secretary of the Korean Embassy in Washington from October of 1970 until March 31, 1976?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. And did you serve as counselor from April 1, 1976, until you left the embassy on November 25, 1976?

Mr. KIM. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Were you an official of the KCIA during the entire period of your assignment at the Embassy in Washington?

Mr. KIM. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, I have a list entitled "KCIA Officials Stationed at the Republic of Korea Embassy in Washington, D.C., from 1970 to 1976."¹

Do you have that in front of you?

Mr. KIM. Yes, I have it before me.

Mr. FRASER. I understand this list was prepared by the staff on the basis of interviews with you. Have you had a chance to go over the list with members of the subcommittee staff?

Mr. KIM. I looked through it with your staff.

Mr. FRASER. The list we are now referring to consists of three pages, is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. To the best of your recollection, does this list include all KCIA personnel stationed at the Embassy during your assignment there, and does it accurately indicate their ranks and principal areas of responsibilities?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. It appears from the list that the number of KCIA officials in Washington increased in 1975 twofold. That is, from 6 in 1974 to 12 in 1975.

Why was that? Why the increase?

Mr. KIM. I heard, and it is my view now, that during this period you referred to, KCIA was planning to intensify its activities in the United States by withdrawing many agents from other parts of the world and having the number of the staff increased in the U.S. area.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, you indicated that the reason for the increase in the number of officials was because the KCIA wanted to increase the level of activities here; is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, do you know why the decision was made to increase the level of activities here in 1975?

Mr. KIM. Since I was stationed in Washington, D.C. area, I am not sure why such plans were made in headquarters.

Mr. FRASER. Looking at the list, there are nine categories identifying the principal areas of responsibility: The executive branch, the media, the academic world, KCIA administration and procurement, the Department of Defense, the Congress, Korean agents, KCIA communications and sciences.

¹ This list was not released by the subcommittee.

Is that a correct listing of the principal areas of responsibilities shown on that list?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Although the document lists your own area of responsibility as Korean residents, and later you worked with Hancho Kim, I would like you to tell this subcommittee what you can about the other areas of responsibility. I will call attention to each category. The first one is the assignment to the executive branch.

To the best of your knowledge, what were the duties of the persons mainly responsible for the executive branch?

Mr. KIM. An agent in charge of the executive branch was to carry out the task of monitoring and evaluating and reporting all the policy matters which were being made by the executive branch and collect them and summarize them and cable them back to headquarters in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. What were the duties of the official responsible for the media?

Mr. KIM. He would induce or request the American reporters stationed in the United States to write articles favorable to Korea.

His second role was to collect articles published in the United States, particularly those of principal newspapers such as the Washington Post, to read them and to summarize them and to cable them back to headquarters in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. What were the duties of the official responsible for the academic world?

Mr. KIM. His job was to induce the American scholars and Korean scholars in this country to write and to publish articles favorable to Korea through which the American people would be favorable to Korea.

Mr. FRASER. What were the duties of the official responsible for KCIA administration and procurement?

Mr. KIM. First of all, he is to give administrative support for the agents stationed in Washington area.

For instance, he would receive and send communications and he would prepare the pouch, and so forth. As for procurement, under the instructions of the KCIA, he would procure the requirements and goods and have them forwarded to Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know what items were purchased for shipment to Seoul?

Mr. KIM. I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. FRASER. What were the duties of the official responsible for the Defense Department?

Mr. KIM. He had two roles. One was to maintain liaison with the Department of Defense. He was also to monitor and collect policy materials prepared by the Defense Department and have those policy materials sent to headquarters in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. What were the duties of the official responsible for Congress?

Mr. KIM. As I saw it, he was to maintain contact with Members of the Congress who are pro-Korea and increase the number of members taking a favorable stance on Korea.

Mr. FRASER. What were the duties of the official responsible for communications?

Mr. KIM. His job was to cable reports drafted by members of the agency stationed in Washington. He was also to receive cables from Korea, decode them, and have decoded messages distributed to the appropriate agents.

Mr. FRASER. What were the duties of the official responsible for science?

Mr. KIM. His main job was to collect the newly published books and other written materials in the field of science and have them sent to Korea.

He would also go to libraries, particularly in the Washington area, and find materials in the science field, copy them, and send them to Korea.

Mr. FRASER. As the official responsible for Korean residents, was it your duty to detect and prevent contact between North Koreans and local Korean residents?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Did you discover any attempts by North Koreans to contact Korean residents?

Mr. KIM. No, I have not. I haven't had any active case where such attempt was made by North Koreans toward the residents here.

However, from agents in charge of academia, I heard that certain invitations, which were sent by North Korea, were received by scholars living in this country.

Mr. FRASER. Did the North Koreans mail a lot of printed propaganda material to local Korean residents?

Mr. KIM. Yes; a good volume of North Korean materials was sent to the Korean residents in the United States and in particular from 1973 to 1974 period, a great volume of such propaganda materials were sent to the homes of Korean residents in this country.

Mr. FRASER. Did you collect such materials and send them to Seoul?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I did.

Mr. FRASER. After the establishment of the Yushin Constitution in 1972, was it also your responsibility to distribute public relations material about Yushin to the Korean community?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that was one of my jobs.

Mr. FRASER. Was reporting on anti-Korean Government activities among Korean residents in the area an important aspect of your responsibilities?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. What kinds of details did you report concerning anti-government demonstrations?

Mr. KIM. I reported the names of participants in a demonstration; I also reported statements and slogans which were put out during the demonstration, and I also reported the patterns of demonstrations.

Mr. FRASER. That included the names of the demonstrators?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I reported names of the participants, as many as I could learn.

Mr. FRASER. Did you gather such information through consular officials and the educational attaché who observed these demonstrations firsthand?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I coordinated with them and I reported.

Mr. FRASER. Did these officials observe demonstrations at the request of the KCIA?

Mr. KIM. Those officials were there as a part of the cooperative activity with us, not under our instruction, and they were there for that reason.

There was another reason because they had their own responsibilities to report to their respective ministry in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. Did you or other KCIA officials observe the demonstrations in person?

Mr. KIM. Yes; on one or two occasions agents observed the demonstrations from a distance.

Mr. FRASER. Why did you observe the antigovernment demonstrations only from a distance?

Mr. KIM. First of all, the KCIA agents and their activities were under certain criticism in this area, a criticism that we wanted to avoid.

We wanted to avoid further aggravating such criticism, and No. 2, I don't think it was proper for an agent to be close to the scene and be found by others.

Mr. FRASER. Did the KCIA ever have pictures taken of the demonstrators?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. By whom?

Mr. KIM. Since that particular role belonged to some other agents, I have no firsthand knowledge as to who took those pictures.

Mr. FRASER. Were they people from the Embassy or were they people hired outside the Embassy?

Mr. KIM. I heard that an American was employed for that purpose.

Mr. FRASER. Did you send the pictures to KCIA headquarters in Seoul?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Why were the pictures sent to headquarters in Seoul?

Mr. KIM. There were instructions from headquarters to take pictures of demonstration scenes.

Mr. FRASER. Did you also get information on demonstrations from news accounts?

Mr. KIM. Yes; we monitored the local Korean newspapers. By reading those articles, we sometimes could obtain the plans of such demonstrations in advance.

Mr. FRASER. Did you get information directly from Korean correspondents who had observed the demonstrations?

Mr. KIM. No; I did not.

Mr. FRASER. Did you ever ask Korean residents to gather information on demonstrations for you?

Mr. KIM. I did.

Mr. FRASER. Did they comply with your request?

Mr. KIM. Yes; some.

Mr. FRASER. Have you given the names of those Korean residents to the staff?

Mr. KIM. Staff and other agents?

Mr. FRASER. No; I meant the staff of the subcommittee.

Mr. KIM. Yes; I did.

Mr. FRASER. You have indicated to the staff that you kept a file on Korean residents, including active opponents of the Park government; is that correct?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I did.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, you have such a list attached to the papers before you, is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes; it is attached to the list.

Mr. FRASER. That list consists of 12 names?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. This list then has the names of those which you considered to be anti-Government Korean residents?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. And as far as you recall, is this the complete list of anti-Government activists which was in your files?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that's correct.

Mr. FRASER. Were some of these people U.S. citizens?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Why did you keep this file?

Mr. KIM. An order came from the KCIA headquarters on several occasions to report the personal data of those who participated in anti-Government activities and, therefore, in order to expedite my reportings of the same nature, I kept this list with a brief sketch of their backgrounds.

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, we can make this list a part of the record.

[The list follows:]

LIST OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT KOREAN RESIDENTS MAINTAINED BY KIM SANG KEUN
WHILE STATIONED AT THE KOREAN EMBASSY

Lee Sung Ho
Chang Sung Nam
Ahn Byung Kook
Channing Liem

Kim Kwang Suh
Lee Keun Pal
Chung Kee Yong
Shin Tae Shik

Kim Chae Chun
Rowe Kwang Wook
Ma Tong Sung
Kang Young Che

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, do you also have a list of KCIA officials who are stationed at consular offices in the United States and also at the South Korean observer mission at the United Nations? ¹

Mr. KIM. Yes; I have it in front of me.

Mr. FRASER. And that list, as I understand it, was prepared by the subcommittee staff based on interviews with you.

Have you had an opportunity to review that list with the staff?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I have.

Mr. FRASER. And is the list accurate?

Mr. KIM. Yes; this is correct as far as my memory goes.

Mr. FRASER. To your recollection, does this list include all KCIA officials assigned to these missions in the United States during the period of your services in Washington?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. You seem to be certain about the KCIA officials who are stationed here in Washington during your service, but how can you be equally sure you know the names of the KCIA officials who are stationed at the other missions in the United States?

Mr. KIM. Would you repeat the second part?

Mr. FRASER. The question is, how can you be certain of the identity of KCIA officials who were not assigned to Washington?

Mr. KIM. Some were colleagues with whom I had worked in Seoul headquarters, and others I had communications with frequently, such as phone calls and so forth.

¹ This list was not released by the subcommittee.

Mr. FRASER. So these are ones who became known to you as being in the United States.

Mr. KIM. Yes; that's the case. At the same time when other agents were assigned to other parts of this country, I became aware of that.

Mr. FRASER. Is it possible there were other KCIA personnel assigned outside of Washington whose names do not appear on that list?

Mr. KIM. Yes; there is such a possibility.

Mr. FRASER. It is our understanding that while the KCIA station chief at the Embassy in Washington is the most important KCIA official in the United States, under normal circumstances the other KCIA stations located at the consulates and at the U.N. mission report directly to headquarters in Seoul rather than to Washington, is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. In late 1972 and 1973, when Mr. Kim Dae Jung was in the United States, were there instructions from headquarters in Seoul that in the case of Mr. Kim Dae Jung, all activities were under the control of the station chief in Washington?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is true for a brief and specific time period.

Mr. FRASER. And that is the time period when Kim Dae Jung came to the United States?

Mr. KIM. No; it refers to part of the time Mr. Kim Dae Jung was in the country, not the entire—

Mr. FRASER. Not for the entire period he was here?

Mr. KIM. Certain part of that period.

Mr. FRASER. Was the station chief in Washington Mr. Lee Sang Ho?

Mr. KIM. That's correct.

Mr. FRASER. Who is Mr. Kim Dae Jung?

Mr. KIM. He was a candidate for Presidency once, and he also was a leader of an opposition party.

Mr. FRASER. Candidate for President and opposition leader?

Mr. AN. Party leader in South Korea.

Mr. FRASER. Why was the special arrangement made that all activities regarding Kim Dae Jung were under the control of the station chief in Washington?

Mr. KIM. Of course, Mr. Kim was in Washington and at the same time he traveled throughout the United States.

My memory is a little fuzzy, but as I remember it, because of his being in Washington and his travel within the country, to monitor his activities, there was a need to have a centralized control.

I believe there was also another reason in that the agents stationed in other parts of the United States were somewhat inexperienced and in order to remedy that situation, the station chief in Washington, D.C., was given that authority.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know whether the Korean Government was worried about what Kim Dae Jung might do while he was here?

Mr. KIM. As I saw it then, the Korean Government was very sensitive about his activities in the United States. There were allegations that Mr. Kim Dae Jung established a government in exile in the United States and such allegations, I think, were reported to Seoul.

There were also allegations that Mr. Kim Dae Jung was attempting to instigate the Korean residents living in this country.¹

¹ See p. 75.

Mr. Kim Dae Jung was also engaging in giving many speeches in the United States and thus those activities undertaken by Mr. Kim Dae Jung provoked critical sensitivity on the part of the Korean Government.

Mr. FRASER. Did the KCIA budget an extra \$5,000 for keeping track of Kim Dae Jung's activities during this period?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that's the way I remember it.

Mr. FRASER. While Kim Dae Jung was in the United States, did the KCIA officials observe and report his activities to the extent possible to headquarters in Seoul?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Sometime before May 18, 1973, did you have a telephone conversation with Vice Consul Bae Young Shik, a KCIA official stationed at the consulate in Los Angeles, regarding Kim Dae Jung's trip to the west coast?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Bae tell you there was nothing to worry about because he had people and was set to handle the situation?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is the way I remember it.

Mr. FRASER. And did Mr. Bae's attitude, as expressed through the telephone conversation, cause you to worry that he might take some extreme action?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did you report what Mr. Bae said and your fears to Lee Sang Ho, the station chief?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I reported that to him.

Mr. FRASER. How did Mr. Lee Sang Ho react when you told him that?

Mr. KIM. As I remember, he said that those people over there were not experienced.

Mr. FRASER. The people in Los Angeles?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Bae take action in San Francisco to disrupt Kim Dae Jung's speech on May 18, 1973?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Are you familiar with the details of what happened during that speech?

Mr. KIM. I got to know what happened there through a local Korean language newspaper afterward.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know if Rhee Min Hi played a role in the disruption of Kim Dae Jung's speech at the direction of the KCIA?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know the details of any other actions taken against Kim Dae Jung while he was in the United States?

Mr. KIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. Kim Dae Jung was kidnaped from a hotel in Tokyo in August of 1973. Are you aware of any discussions in the Embassy here in Washington or the KCIA about attempting to kidnap or assassinate Mr. Kim while he was in the United States?¹

Mr. KIM. There was no such discussion as far as I know.

¹ See appendix 3 for information on the whereabouts of KCIA officials stationed in Washington at the time of the kidnaping.

Mr. FRASER. In your opinion, would it have been more difficult to take such an action in the United States than in Japan?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Why?

Mr. KIM. Because the physical appearance of all those involved would not be so obvious in Japan, whereas such activities would be more noticeable because of differences of physical appearance in this country.

Mr. FRASER. I want to go back to an earlier question for a moment.

Mr. Kim, how do you know about Rhee Min Hi's role in disrupting the speech of Kim Dae Jung?

Mr. KIM. From the newspaper article of a Korean language newspaper, I learned what had happened.

Mr. FRASER. So you do not actually know that Rhee Min Hi was acting at the direction of the KCIA?

Mr. KIM. You are right, I have no firsthand knowledge of that.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, is it your understanding that the KCIA had written plans for operations in the United States for each year beginning in 1974?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. To the best of your knowledge, were these plans drawn up in the American section of the eighth bureau of KCIA headquarters in Seoul?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is the case as far as I know.

Mr. FRASER. I understand that you have informed the staff that there were three different heads of the American section starting with 1974, is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. And did each of these men serve in a post in the United States after having served as head of the American section?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, you have before you a copy of a Korean language document entitled, "1976 Plans for Operations in the United States."¹

While you were in the employ of the KCIA, did you ever see this document?

Mr. KIM. I had never seen this document before I was shown it by the staff.

Mr. FRASER. On the basis of your experience with KCIA documents, does this appear to be an authentic KCIA document?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is what I think.

Mr. FRASER. Have you seen a similar plan for any other year?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What was the year of that document and who showed it to you?

Mr. KIM. As I remember, it was the 1975 plan and Counselor Hwang Moon Young showed that plan to me.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Hwang show you the 1975 plan when he was assigned to the United States in 1975 just after completing an assignment as chief of the American section in Seoul?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

¹ See appendix 1, subcommittee's hearings on Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part 3.

Mr. FRASER. Was the structure of the 1975 plan similar to that of this 1976 plan?

Mr. KIM. Yes; they are similar to each other.

Mr. FRASER. When Mr. Hwang showed you the 1975 plan, did he let you read the whole plan or only the part dealing with Korean residents?

Mr. KIM. He showed me the section related to activities involving Korean residents.

Mr. FRASER. Why did he only show you the one section of the plan?

Mr. KIM. Since this document is extremely important, each agent was shown only the part that related to his own area of activities. And Counselor Hwang at that time was given the task in the area of Korean residents and he wanted to be briefed by me as to our information of residents.

Mr. FRASER. Was this section of the 1975 plan dealing with Korean residents which you saw similar to the corresponding section of the 1976 plan, which you have in front of you?

Mr. KIM. The structure looks alike. However, I am not really certain as to whether the contents are similar. I am not sure.

As I remember, the last page has a chart and this chart looks quite familiar, similar to the other one.

Mr. FRASER. To the 1975 plan?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I feel, I think that the two charts look similar to each other.

Mr. FRASER. According to our understanding, these annual plans were to be distributed only to the station chiefs and the part relevant to the duties of other KCIA officials would only be shown to them when necessary; is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Why do you think Mr. Hwang had a copy of the 1975 plan?

Mr. KIM. The reason was Mr. Hwang was the deputy, number two man of the Washington KCIA office and, therefore, he had a copy of this plan. And I can guess here that since Mr. Hwang was the chief of the American section prior to his coming to Washington, he might have brought a copy of this plan with him when he came to this country.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, earlier you said there had been three successive heads of the American section at KCIA headquarters in Seoul since 1974. Could you give us those three names?

Mr. KIM. In 1974, I believe it was Mr. Lee Moon Woo who was the section chief. He was then assigned to the New York consulate general's office and served there for 2 years.

Then came Mr. Hwang Moon Young. After that he served as a counselor in the Korean Embassy in Washington for about a 1-year period.

Then came Mr. Lee Young In. After serving as American section chief he was also assigned to the United States. I recall that he arrived in the United States in November 1976.

Mr. FRASER. That is Lee Young In?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, you testified before the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct that in September 1974, Yang Doo Won,

also known as Lee Sang Ho, former Washington station chief, sent you \$56,000 to give to Mr. Hahn Kwang Neun, the publisher of a newspaper called Han Kook Shin Moon; is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. You also indicated in the same testimony that on another occasion you gave money to Mr. Hahn, which was sent to you by Mr. Yang. How many times did you give such money to Mr. Hahn?

Mr. KIM. I believe it was either six or seven occasions.

Mr. FRASER. Where did Mr. Hahn publish his newspaper, the Han Kook Shin Moon?

Mr. KIM. He published it in Washington, D.C.

Mr. FRASER. How much money did you pass on to him in all?

Mr. KIM. I am unable to give you the total sum of the money I transmitted to Mr. Hahn. However, in 1973, under the plan to properly guide Korean residents, \$3,000 was to be given to Mr. Hahn each month.

Mr. FRASER. \$3,000 a month?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Was the \$56,000 the largest single payment?

Mr. KIM. Yes; as I remember it, that is the largest sum.

Mr. FRASER. What was the purpose of these payments to the publisher, Mr. Hahn?

Mr. KIM. The money was given to maintain his publication which had taken a pro-Korean Government stance.

Mr. FRASER. Is Mr. Hahn one of the Korean residents who cooperated in supplying you with information about anti-Government demonstrations?

Mr. KIM. Yes; but his reports were general in nature.

Mr. FRASER. Was supporting Mr. Hahn's newspaper part of a larger plan called "Plan To Properly Guide the Korean Residents"?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, you indicated Mr. Hahn and his newspaper were supporting President Park. Why would it be important to give support to such a newspaper?

Mr. KIM. Besides this publication, there are two Korean language newspapers published locally and these two papers had taken anti-Korean Government and anti-Park positions, and one of the two papers called the Hanmin Shinbo was published by Mr. Chung Kee Yong. There was another newspaper published by Mr. Kang Young Che under the title of Free Republic.

These two newspapers were taking an anti-Government position and spreading unfavorable influence among the Korean residents. The publication by Mr. Hahn was to counter that influence.

So the assistance was given to Hahn Kwang Neun and it was also planned that the Han Kook Shin Moon should be assisted to grow into a nationwide newspaper.

Mr. FRASER. You identified one of the newspapers, I think, in English. Could you give the Korean name for the second newspaper you mentioned that was anti-Government?

Mr. KIM. As I remember it, it was Chayun Konghwa Guk.

Mr. FRASER. And that was published by Chang Sung Nam?

Mr. KIM. The paper was published jointly by Mr. Kang Young Che, Mr. Chang Sung Nam, and Mr. Shin Day Shick.

Mr. FRASER. You have already said that \$3,000 a month was to be provided for Mr. Hahn beginning in 1973.

Was that the plan through successive years, if you know?

Mr. KIM. Under the 1973 plan, it was designed to give the paper a subsidy for the 1-year period of 1973. Mr. Hahn was advised that after 1973, it was to be self-sufficient. However, Mr. Hahn could not bring the paper up to a self-sufficient level by the end of 1973 and, therefore, the plan to subsidize that paper was extended.

Therefore, this financial support was extended beyond 1973 period while the general plan to properly guide the Korean residents was terminated by the end of 1973.

Mr. FRASER. Was 1973 the first year of the payments?

Mr. KIM. Yes; as I remember it, that was the first year.

Mr. FRASER. That was the year after the Yushin Constitution was adopted?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Was the plan drawn up in Washington or in Seoul?

Mr. KIM. It was drafted in Washington, D.C.

Mr. FRASER. Were both Ambassador Kim Dong Jo and Minister Lee Sang Ho involved in drafting this plan?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Was it sent to the Foreign Ministry in Seoul for approval?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. If it was a Foreign Ministry plan, why did Lee Sang Ho, a KCIA official, send you, another KCIA official, the money to give to Mr. Hahn instead of sending it through Foreign Ministry channels?

Mr. KIM. While Mr. Lee Sang Ho, whose real name is Yang Doo Won, was here in Washington he was a participant in drafting this plan. When it was to be implemented, Mr. Yang was in Seoul. Had the Foreign Office Ministry channel been used, the plan would have exposed too many officials of the Ministry. I believe in order to avoid that exposure, the money was provided by the Ministry to Mr. Yang and it was forwarded to me through KCIA channels.

Mr. FRASER. In your testimony before the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, you also stated that you conveyed the sum of \$400,000 which was sent to you by Mr. Yang Doo Won to Mr. Choi Che Yung, is that correct?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know what Mr. Choi did with this money?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I do.

Mr. FRASER. What did he do?

Mr. KIM. Mr. Choi deposited this money at the New York office of the Korean Exchange Bank. As I remember it, 1 year after that, Mr. Choi withdrew part of that money and he bought stock of Diplomat National Bank in Washington.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, I want to go over this once more to make sure it is clear.

The \$400,000 came from Yang Doo Won who is also known as Lee Sang Ho, who had been the station chief in Washington.

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. It went to Mr. Choi Che Yung?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. He placed the money in the Korean Exchange Bank in New York.

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. And later he used a part of that money to buy stock in the Diplomat National Bank in Washington.

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know how much of the \$400,000 was used to buy stock in the Diplomat National Bank?

Mr. KIM. I think it was \$50,000.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, perhaps you could tell us who Mr. Choi Che Yung is?

Mr. KIM. He is a businessman operating in New York.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, I understand that the question of why this \$400,000 was given to Mr. Choi Che Yung was gone into at some length before the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, is that right?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. So we won't try to go over that again today.

In the documents supporting your testimony before the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, the original letter dated July 7, 1975, from Yang Doo Won, who is also known as Lee Sang Ho, the former station chief, asked you to convey a diary to Dr. Choi Chai Chang, do you recall that letter?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I remember that.

Mr. FRASER. Is Dr. Choi Chai Chang the same person as Choi Che Yung, the one who got the \$400,000?

Mr. KIM. No; they are two different persons.

Mr. FRASER. Are they related?

Mr. KIM. They are cousins.

Mr. FRASER. What was the diary referred to that you were to convey to Dr. Choi Chai Chang?

Mr. KIM. In the context of this letter that you mentioned it referred to money.

Mr. FRASER. The diary referred to money?

Mr. KIM. Yes; the diary referred to money.

Mr. FRASER. You mean that was a code name for money?

Mr. KIM. In this letter that was to refer to the money; the diary was to refer to the money.

Mr. FRASER. To what money?

Mr. KIM. The money that was to be given to Dr. Choi Chai Chang by Yang Doo Won.

Mr. FRASER. How much money was involved?

Mr. KIM. I think it was over \$10,000.

Mr. FRASER. How physically was this money to be transferred?

Mr. KIM. The money was transmitted via pouch, diplomatic pouch, sent by the KCIA to Washington, ROK Embassy.

Mr. FRASER. How did it get from ROK Embassy to Dr. Choi Chai Chang?

Mr. KIM. I myself hand-carried it to Dr. Choi.

Mr. FRASER. Was the money in a hollowed-out book?

Mr. KIM. The money was contained in the cover of a diary made in Korea.

Mr. FRASER. And inside that book was the money?

Mr. KIM. It's a protective case of that particular diary. The money was in the case, not in the diary book.

Mr. FRASER. Did you give the money to Dr. Choi?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I did give him the money.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know why Yang Doo Won, also known as Lee Sang Ho, sent this money to Dr. Choi?

Mr. KIM. I have no knowledge of that.¹

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, I just want to go back to the purchase of Diplomat National Bank stock by Choi Che Yung.

Do you know why he used a part of that money to buy Diplomat National Bank stock?

Mr. KIM. I don't know.

Mr. FRASER. You do not know.

In the summer of 1975, did you receive a letter from Mr. Yang Doo Won, also known as Lee Sang Ho, containing a letter to be delivered to Colonel Pak Bo Hi?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did you deliver the letter to Colonel Pak?

Mr. KIM. Yes, I did.

Mr. FRASER. Did Colonel Pak explain its contents to you?

Mr. KIM. Yes; he told me about part of what was written in the letter.

Mr. FRASER. What did he tell you?

Mr. KIM. He told me that Yang Doo Won asked him to transmit travel funds to a Japanese lady who was a member of the Unification Church.

Mr. FRASER. Did he say why the money was going to her?

Mr. KIM. He did not specify as to the reasons for the transaction.

Mr. FRASER. Did Colonel Pak give the woman's name to you?

Mr. KIM. Yes; he told me the name of the lady, but I don't remember that particular name now.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know if the envelope contained money in addition to the letter?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know what the rest of the letter said?

Mr. KIM. No, I don't.

Mr. FRASER. How long was the letter, do you recall?

Mr. KIM. I guess it was more than one or two pages, probably up to about five pages.

Mr. FRASER. Did you see the part in the letter that dealt with travel expenses?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that's correct, but I don't know whether it was to help in paying air fare or just in general travel expenses. I don't remember exactly.

Mr. FRASER. Was the part of the letter that dealt with travel expenses a long part of the letter or a short part of it?

Mr. KIM. I did not actually read the passage. Mr. Pak Bo Hi just told me about that travel expenses.

Mr. Pak Bo Hi either read me the passage of that part or he may have paraphrased as he read it.

¹ According to Choi Chai Chang, Mr. Chung Kyu Sup, a former Korean diplomat now living in the United States, told Choi in early 1975 that he had asked Yang Doo Won to send a package of money for him through the diplomatic pouch. Chung asked Choi to accept the package on his behalf if someone should bring it from the Korean Embassy. Several months later, Kim Sang Keun delivered a sealed package to Choi without comment. Choi telephoned Chung who came a few hours later and took the package away without opening it. According to Choi, they never discussed the contents of the package. Mr. Chung confirmed Mr. Choi's version of these events.

Mr. FRASER. In June or July of 1975, did Hanchu Kim tell you he was giving \$10,000 to Gen. Kang Young Hoon to support the Research Institute on Korean Affairs?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. At some time after that, did Hanchu Kim show you a receipt for \$5,000 made out to himself or his wife and signed by General Kang?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Hanchu Kim tell you why he gave money to General Kang?

Mr. KIM. According to Mr. Hanchu Kim, General Kang had appealed for certain assistance, because General Kang's Research Institute on Korean Affairs was suffering from a shortage of funds.

Mr. FRASER. Was the money that Hanchu Kim gave General Kang part of the \$600,000 which Yang Doo Won had sent to Hanchu Kim?

Mr. KIM. I can only guess that the money given to General Kang was part of the sum you have mentioned.

Mr. FRASER. Was money ever received through the diplomatic pouch at the Embassy for the Research Institute on Korean Affairs or for General Kang?

Mr. KIM. Yes; as I remember—I didn't see the actual money—but I read certain documents regarding that.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know when that happened?

Mr. KIM. I believe it was sometime in 1972.

Mr. FRASER. How much money?

Mr. KIM. I don't know.

Mr. FRASER. What was the source of that money in Korea, do you know?

Mr. KIM. I believe the money was sent from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. While you were employed by the KCIA at the Embassy in Washington, did the Korean Embassy and consulates have a blacklist of anti-Korean Government foreigners?

By blacklist, I mean a list of persons either not to be allowed to enter the Republic of Korea, or to be put under special surveillance if they were allowed to enter Korea?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Was this list divided into three categories based on the degree of unfriendliness to the Korean Government?

Mr. KIM. Yes; as I remember it.

Mr. FRASER. According to our information, those in class A should not be allowed to enter the Republic of Korea. Those in class B should be allowed to enter but their activities should be under constant surveillance; and those in class C should be persuaded to "correct their erroneous views of Korea." Is that correct?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that's the classification as I remember it.

Mr. FRASER. Was this list sent out by the foreign ministry or by the KCIA?

Mr. KIM. The KCIA Headquarters in Seoul sent this list to agents in Washington, D.C. I don't know whether the ministry sent similar lists to its own staff members in Washington; I don't know. But I was aware consular offices of the Embassy had similar lists in their files.

Mr. FRASER. When was such a list first issued?

Mr. KIM. As I remember, it was in 1974.

Mr. FRASER. Why was such a list drawn up, if you know?

Mr. KIM. No; I don't know.

Mr. FRASER. Did the list contain the names of people of various nationalities or only Americans?

Mr. KIM. It was only Americans.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know what happened when someone on the list applied for a visa to travel to South Korea?

Mr. KIM. There was no application made while I was in the office.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have an opinion as to why the list was drafted?

Mr. KIM. My personal opinion is that in the wake of the October 1972 declaration of the Yushin system and in the aftermath of the kidnaping of Kim Dae Jung from Japan, there was unfavorable publicity and statements made by various persons living in this country, and I think it was to control their coming to Korea, and for that purpose I think that list was made.

Mr. FRASER. I want to turn to another subject now.

I am going to refer your attention to plans for anti-Japanese demonstrations in September 1974, shortly after President Park's wife was assassinated.

From testimony of previous witnesses, we understand that followers of Rev. Sun Myung Moon planned to demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy in Washington on September 14, 1974, and the demonstration was called off at the last minute.

Mr. Kim, in September 1974, did the KCIA Headquarters in Seoul send an instruction to Washington to organize anti-Japanese demonstrations in the Washington area?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. How was this instruction transmitted to Washington?

Mr. KIM. As I remember it, it came by cable.

Mr. FRASER. Did you see that instruction?

Mr. KIM. Yes; I read it.

Mr. FRASER. To the best of your recollection, what did the instruction from headquarters in Seoul say?

Mr. KIM. The anti-Japanese demonstration was to be organized in order to expedite or to push the Japanese Government to be more cooperative in the investigation of the background of one Moon Sae Kwang whose bullet had killed the First Lady of Korea.

It was alleged that the Japanese Government was not giving full cooperation in the investigation of the background of Mr. Moon.

Mr. FRASER. This was the information contained in the cable from Seoul to the Embassy in Washington?

Mr. KIM. I don't remember if it was put precisely in those terms, but to judge from the overall content of the cable, such information was in there.

Mr. FRASER. What did you and the other KCIA officers in Washington do upon receiving this instruction from headquarters?

Mr. KIM. Each agent started to plan how to implement the instruction, and each one in his own field of responsibility consulted with Minister Kim Yung Hwan, the station chief.

Mr. FRASER. Was one of the ideas to use Korean residents for the demonstration which Seoul wanted?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Were you and Col. Lim Kyuil, who I understand was another KCIA official there, opposed to that idea?

Mr. KIM. Yes; in the period that we are discussing there were frequent anti-Korean Government demonstrations conducted by the residents in the Washington, D.C. area.

At that time, our task was to prevent such demonstrations from occurring.

Now, we were supposed to utilize and mobilize Korean residents to organize and carry out an anti-Japanese demonstration.

I thought that such an undertaking would only add to the confusion among the Korean community here.

Also, in the wake of Kim Dae Jung's kidnaping, the KCIA had suffered a setback and we were maintaining a low profile in this country.

For us to organize such a demonstration, I thought, would provoke further criticism by the U.S. Government.

Mr. FRASER. In my earlier question, I asked if you and Col. Lim Kyuil were opposed to this idea. What were Col. Lim Kyuil's responsibilities?

Mr. KIM. The areas he was responsible for were the U.S. Congress and the Department of Defense.

Mr. FRASER. Despite your opposition to using Korean residents for the demonstration, did you attempt to find Korean residents who would be willing to organize such a demonstration?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did any Korean resident agree to do this?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Have you identified this Korean resident to the staff?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Were you authorized to disburse money to persons who had organized such a demonstration?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did you give this Korean resident any money for the purpose of this demonstration?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. How much?

Mr. KIM. As I remember, it was \$500.

Mr. FRASER. Did the Korean resident succeed in carrying out an anti-Japanese demonstration?

Mr. KIM. No; he did not.

Instructions then came from KCIA to halt that demonstration.

Mr. FRASER. You say this Korean resident did not carry out the anti-Japanese demonstration because the KCIA canceled the plans for the demonstration?

Mr. KIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Was an attempt made to enlist the aid of a clergyman in organizing an anti-Japanese demonstration?

Mr. KIM. Yes; as I remember, it was Minister Kim Yung Hwan, the station chief, who had made efforts to enlist the clergyman for this purpose.

Mr. FRASER. Did the clergyman agree?

Mr. KIM. I learned from Minister Kim that when the request was made to the clergyman, the clergyman flatly refused and he further gave Minister Kim a 2-hour lecture why that shouldn't be done.

Mr. FRASER. You have indicated the KCIA called off the plans for the anti-Japanese demonstration. Where was that decision made, in Washington or in Seoul?

Mr. KIM. It was made in Seoul.

Mr. FRASER. When did this occur?

Mr. KIM. As to the exact date of cancellation instruction, I cannot recall exactly, but I think it was about 10 or 15 days after the first instruction to organize came.

Mr. FRASER. How did you find out about the order to cancel the demonstration?

Mr. KIM. I read the instruction to halt the demonstration.

Mr. FRASER. Was it a cable?

Mr. KIM. Yes; it was a cable.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know why KCIA Headquarters in Seoul decided to call off plans for the demonstration?

Mr. KIM. I don't know.

Mr. FRASER. What was your reaction to the order to call off the demonstration?

Mr. KIM. I was pleased and felt relieved.

Mr. FRASER. Did you discuss the order to cancel the demonstration with Colonel Lim?

Mr. KIM. Yes; very briefly; yes.

Mr. FRASER. Later, did Colonel Lim tell you that an anti-Japanese demonstration was about to take place when it had to be called off?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What did Colonel Lim tell you about this demonstration?

Mr. KIM. As I remember it, Colonel Lim told me that the Unification Church people were going by truck to carry out an anti-Japanese demonstration, and when they were in the area of the Korean Embassy, he had to go out and make a rather difficult effort to disperse them.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, members of the Unification Church were already in the trucks and in the area of the Embassy?

Mr. KIM. Yes; that was the situation as I remember.

Mr. FRASER. You were not actually present at the Embassy when the demonstration by these Unification Church members had to be called off, is that right?

Mr. KIM. I was not at the Embassy at that time.

Mr. FRASER. You learned about it afterward from Colonel Lim?

Mr. KIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Until Colonel Lim told you about the demonstration being called off, were you aware that members of the Unification Church were going to conduct an anti-Japanese demonstration?

Mr. KIM. No; I was not aware before Colonel Lim told me about that. When he told me, that was the first time I became aware that such a plan had, in fact, been made.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know who arranged for members of the Unification Church to conduct an anti-Japanese demonstration?

Mr. KIM. I don't know for sure.

Mr. FRASER. I would like to read into the record part of a declassified summary of U.S. Intelligence Agency reports—

In September of 1974, anti-Japanese demonstrations were planned in Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York on orders from Seoul. The

head of the Washington KCIA arranged with Reverend Moon's group for demonstrations in front of the Japanese Embassy and the White House.

The KCIA had used Moon and members of his Unification Church to stage rallies in the United States in support of Korean Government policies and aims, and on at least one occasion Moon received KCIA funds for that purpose.

Due to State Department objections, the planned anti-Japanese rallies had to be called off at the last minute by the KCIA chief through one of Reverend Moon's subordinates. The thousands of dollars already expended on the aborted demonstration had to be written off to good will.

Mr. Kim, do you know if Kim Yung Hwan or any other KCIA official met with Reverend Moon to discuss this demonstration?

Mr. KIM. No. I don't.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know if Kim Yung Hwan or any other KCIA official gave money to Reverend Moon or to any of the Unification Church people to fund this demonstration?

Mr. KIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. In connection with the planned anti-Japanese demonstration, I would like to read an excerpt from a speech given by Reverend Moon to his followers on September 22, 1974, 8 days after the demonstration was called off.¹

I quote:

On the 12th of September, the Korean Government did something to connect with me, and without their having done that, the world situation could have been brought into turmoil and tension again. Centering on our Madison Square Garden project, all those things took place, but without your knowing it. Some of you may have known that in Washington, D.C., I had planned to have a demonstration and have you protest before the Korean Embassy and the Japanese Embassy to arouse the attention of the people of the United States, but we had to quit that. We were stopped 30 minutes before it was due to begin. In fact, we didn't have to do the demonstration.

The full text of that speech can be found in the appendix of the printed testimony of Daniel Fefferman, an official with Rev. Sun Myung Moon, which was given before the subcommittee last July and August.

Mr. Kim, that brings us to the end of our questioning of you today. That is the end of my questioning, but Mr. Goodling has some questions. I might add before I turn to Mr. Goodling that when we are through with this witness, I have a further statement to read after the witness has been excused.

Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Just a few followup questions, Mr. Chairman, to some of the questions you asked.

First of all, you were asked about the increase of KCIA personnel in the United States in 1975. And I think your response to why this took place was that the KCIA wanted to increase activities in the United States.

And when asked, what activities, your response was, you didn't know. Do you have any personal ideas as to why the KCIA wanted to increase activities, whatever that means, in the United States in 1975?

Mr. KIM. It's my personal view and my personal view alone, that around this time, the U.S. assistance to Korea, particularly military aid, was decreasing, and I think that there were problems with the

¹ See appendix exhibit 2, p. 101, Subcommittee's hearings on the "Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part. 2."

American media and academic community in terms of their views on Korea and there were, of course, Korean residents problems, and I believe in order to remedy such situations which I think were deteriorating, I think the number of the agents was increased and our level of activity was to increase.

And at that time, my personal view of this increase in the number of agents was that it would be counterproductive. It would only create further detrimental side effects. That is my view.

Mr. GOODLING. In the area of responsibilities, one of the chairman's questions was: What were the duties of the officials responsible for the Department of Defense?

I think your response, Mr. Kim, was "to pick up policy matters to send to Korea." Could you clarify that?

Mr. KIM. First of all, he was to gather information, the published information, regarding Korea, such as U.S. Government's plans in terms of military assistance and political matters. It was to gather information of the published kind.

Second, he was to communicate with defense officials in cooperation with the military attaché attached to the Embassy in Washington and get information through official communications.

I don't think there was any sinister plot to get unpublished information from the offices of the Defense Department.

Mr. GOODLING. Who are the North Koreans that were referred to in the questioning about North Koreans' discussions and contacts with local Koreans, and I am assuming in the United States?

Who are these North Koreans? I am not asking for names.

Mr. KIM. I don't know exactly who or what was in charge of doing that in the United States, vis-a-vis Korean residents.

Some publications were forwarded to the families and homes of Koreans, but I don't know who did that.

Mr. GOODLING. You don't know who the North Koreans were, what they represented or what they are doing here in the United States?

Mr. KIM. I have no knowledge.

Mr. GOODLING. Did the Seoul Government believe any of the anti-government Korean residents that were on that list that you saw—page 4—did they believe they had North Korean connections?

Mr. KIM. No; except one, and the Embassy and the Government of Korea estimated that one person might have certain connections with North Korea.

Mr. GOODLING. If I remember correctly, you said you did not see the so-called 1976 plan, but you were familiar with the 1975 plan.

My question would be, would you say it was more of a tentative or proposed plan or one that was definitely designed to be carried out?

Mr. KIM. Since I was not involved in the process of drafting this plan, I just can't answer your question.

Mr. GOODLING. Would you think that some of the proposals in the plan would be almost impossible to carry out, particularly those dealing with FBI and CIA?

Mr. KIM. I think certain parts contained in this plan are not well thought out or are even impossible to carry out.

There is one area in terms of U.S. intelligence agency, some \$200 to work with. I don't think there was anything possible to do with that small amount of money, or any amount of money.

Of course, it's my own personal view, but I think when this plan was drafted, it was probably drafted for the sake of drafting a report, which was due at the end of each year.

Much of what was written is impossible to carry out.

Mr. GOODLING. I suppose that is an answer to the next question which I was going to ask; what was the purpose of designing such an elaborate plan?

Mr. KIM. Perhaps one of the reasons to create such a detailed plan was to increase the number of staff and give each one a more detailed and more concrete mission to carry out in terms of writing a report.

Mr. GOODLING. While serving with the KCIA, did you come to know of any successful North Korean lobbying activities in the United States?

Mr. KIM. No; none whatsoever.

Mr. GOODLING. The South Korean plan, 1976 plan, seemed to lack any sophistication in its attempt to influence U.S. opinions.

On the other hand, Hanoi was very successful in doing this without throwing around a lot of money. Do you have any idea as to why the two different approaches—one without sophistication and not succeeding, and one that didn't need to throw around money and was very successful?

Mr. KIM. I think North Korea spends far greater sums of money in terms of propaganda everywhere, whereas South Korea has not allocated sums that would be matched with North Korea activities.

For instance, North Korea has many higher priced or expensive books and materials spread all over, whereas our budget was limited and that is one of the reasons I think.

Mr. GOODLING. I was referring to Hanoi, but perhaps you are in a better position to talk about North Korea than Hanoi.

Hanoi was very successful without the spreading of money.

I have two last questions. Do you have any personal opinions as to why the \$50,000 was invested in the Diplomat National Bank?

I think your statement was that you didn't know, but do you have some kind of "gut feeling" as to why that \$50,000 was invested?

Mr. KIM. I really don't know what the purpose of buying stock from that bank was. I became aware of this purchase only afterwards, in November of 1976.

Mr. GOODLING. And the last question I have is, am I correct in assuming the majority of the Moon followers who would be a part of this planned anti-Japanese demonstration in September of 1974 in Washington were American citizens?

Mr. KIM. The impression I got from Colonel Lim when he related to me about the incidents, it consisted mostly of non-Koreans.

Had a large number of Koreans been involved, I was in a position to have known that.

Mr. GOODLING. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kim, we appreciate your testimony here today very much and your cooperation with the subcommittee.

We are able to excuse you now and thank you very much for appearing.

[The witness was excused.]

Mr. AN. Mr. Baker suggests that the term Mr. Kim used when speaking of Kim Dae Jung's activities among Korean residents, might better be translated as "put together a coalition."¹

Mr. FRASER. That is where we had the word "instigate"?

Mr. AN. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. "To put together a coalition"?

Mr. AN. I thought that "instigate" was a little too strong.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. An, for your help.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. Among the matters being considered by the subcommittee in its investigation of Korean-American relations are allegations of ties between organizations headed by Rev. Sun Myung Moon and the South Korean Government. There have been many sources for these allegations. U.S. intelligence reports from the early sixties have alleged that the Unification Church was used by high Korean officials for political purposes, and that the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, ostensibly an independent cultural organization, was actually formed to advance the interests of Reverend Moon and the Unification Church. State Department and intelligence agency documents later in the 1960's allege that certain projects of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation were subsidized and controlled by the Korean Government. The testimony and statements of persons formerly associated with the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation have tended to corroborate these allegations. Other allegations concerning Reverend Moon have come from former U.S. and Korean officials, journalists, scholars, clergymen, former Unification Church members, and various other persons who for one reason or another have had close contact with Reverend Moon or one of his organizations. The subcommittee has been attempting to learn, insofar as possible, whether there is a factual basis for these allegations, and to assess the impact of Reverend Moon's activities on the relations between the United States and South Korea. To this end we have tried to obtain cooperation and testimony from a number of persons currently associated with Reverend Moon. Information obtained from these subordinates to Reverend Moon has aided the subcommittee in evaluating some allegations, but there remain a number of unresolved questions which the subcommittee feels should be answered by Reverend Moon personally.

As I noted in my opening statement on June 1, there has been testimony before the subcommittee concerning an anti-Japanese demonstration that was to have taken place in Washington on September 14, 1974. The prior testimony showed that the planned demonstration related to a diplomatic controversy between Japan and Korea in the aftermath of the assassination of President Park's wife. It also established that members of the Freedom Leadership Foundation, an organization comprised of followers of Reverend Moon, were ready to proceed with the demonstration, and that the demonstration was called off at the last minute by Neil Salonen, president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation. The demonstration was called off less than 24 hours after a U.S. State Department official had warned the Korean Government against holding such a demonstration. The

¹ See p. 60.

U.S. Government official who gave this warning, Donald Ranard, testified that he did so after learning that the KCIA was planning to promote anti-Japanese demonstrations in the United States.

Today a former KCIA officer, Kim Sang Keun, confirmed that the KCIA did plan to organize anti-Japanese demonstrations in September 1974, and that KCIA Headquarters reversed itself later and called a halt to the planned demonstrations. Mr. Kim learned from another KCIA official that Unification Church members were about to begin the demonstration when KCIA officials, acting upon instructions from Seoul, had to tell the Unification Church members to call off the demonstration.

On September 15, 1974, one day after the demonstration was called off, Reverend Moon made a speech to his followers, which was translated by his assistant, Pak Bo Hi. Part of that speech reads as follows:

I already knew and received this inspiration concerning the forthcoming summit conference between Japan and U.S.—Prime Minister Tanaka is coming to America to meet with President Ford. The Korean problem will be discussed. Yesterday, therefore, knowing all these forthcoming events, I ordered my organization to do certain things. I told the leaders that, because of this particular action maybe the Unification Church movement will suffer a setback. But, even though we suffer a setback, we must mobilize our forces to unite behind Korea in the critical moment. We must support the position of Korea. Without your knowledge, important actions have been taken that will influence the Korea-Japan situation and Japan-U.S. situation. We are exerting pressure and influence to make this thing go in line with God. Do you know something? Today Korea is watching what Reverend Moon is doing because what Reverend Moon does will tremendously affect the cause of that nation. Not only Korea, but Japan, also is watching my actions. The United States, also has been watching what Reverend Moon is doing. I don't have to reveal all that has been happening and will happen, but I want you to know and trust me. In an invisible, but very notable way, important influence has been given.

A week later, on September 22, 1974, Reverend Moon made another speech to his followers. I have already quoted a passage from that speech in which Reverend Moon stated that the Korean Government did something to "connect" with him on September 12, and he says "we were stopped" 30 minutes before the anti-Japanese demonstration was to begin.

The implication of Reverend Moon's own words as reported in Unification Church publications is that on September 12, 1974, he was contacted by the Korean Government; that shortly afterward he ordered his organization to do certain things to support the position of Korea; that among the things he ordered his organization to do was to conduct an anti-Japanese demonstration in Washington; and that 30 minutes before the anti-Japanese demonstration was due to begin, he or his subordinate was ordered to stop. Only Reverend Moon can explain what kind of connection the Korean Government made with him on September 12; what he meant by important actions being taken to influence Korean-Japanese and Japanese-United States relations; and who instructed him or his organization to call off the September 14 demonstration. He apparently did not reveal the details of these matters even to his own followers. Reverend Moon can also respond to the statement set forth in the summary of U.S. intelligence reports¹ that on at least one occasion he received money from the KCIA in connection with rallies in the United States by Unification Church members in support of Korean Government policies and aims.

¹ See p. 72.

In order to obtain the answers to these and a number of other questions, the subcommittee had planned to call Reverend Moon as a witness in this set of hearings. Reverend Moon was invited to appear voluntarily at earlier hearings, but declined this invitation through his legal representative. On May 2, Reverend Moon's attorney was advised in writing that the subcommittee planned hearings for early June, and that Reverend Moon was a potential witness. He was requested to indicate by May 15 whether Reverend Moon would consent to an informal interview prior to any appearance before the subcommittee, and whether the attorney would accept service of a subpoena for Reverend Moon, if the subcommittee decided to take that step. In a reply dated May 12, Reverend Moon's attorney submitted a memorandum asking that the subcommittee not call Reverend Moon as a witness and reconsider its authorization of a subpoena for Reverend Moon on the grounds that it would invade his first amendment rights.¹

The subcommittee has since learned that on May 13, Reverend Moon left the United States and is now in London. We have no indication from Reverend Moon or his representatives as to whether he will return, or if so, whether he will resist service of a subpoena. Therefore, we do not know whether the timing of his departure on May 13 was in any way related to the subcommittee's expressed interest in having him as a witness at these hearings.

In addition to questions relating to the 1974 anti-Japanese demonstration, the subcommittee would like to question Reverend Moon about other clearly political activities undertaken on his behalf. For example, secret U.S. intelligence reports, summaries of which have been declassified for subcommittee use, state as follows:

In 1975, the ROK Mission in New York was again having problems with members of Reverend Moon's group. As a result, in the fall, the Ambassador in Washington instructed the KCIA Chief and one other KCIA officer to travel to New York to discuss with Reverend Moon, or available Unification Church officials, the fact that ROK Mission in New York had received a number of complaints about the lobbying for South Korea in the U.N. performed by some of Moon's followers.

The subcommittee has also investigated allegations that persons closely associated with Reverend Moon attempted to gain a controlling interest in the Diplomat National Bank. This is one of the topics about which we intend to question Reverend Moon. These are unanswered questions concerning the source of the funds for the purchase of Diplomat National Bank stock. There are also questions about the motives underlying these stock purchases, and the use of the Diplomat National Bank and other banks for questionable loan transactions which generated funds to be sent to Korea. In part these questions arise from the financial structure of Reverend Moon's worldwide organizations and businesses, in which large sums are transferred, often in cash, from one organization to another, into and out of the United States and from nonprofit entities into businesses.

On the subject of Reverend Moon's business dealings, and their relation to the Korean Government, declassified summaries of secret U.S. intelligence reports state:

By the end of 1975 the KCIA station chief in Washington was instructed by the KCIA Director in Seoul that he was to cooperate with Moon and to stop try-

¹ See appendix 4A, p. 178.

ing to destroy him because Moon was viewed as a positive factor in building ROK relations with the United States. By mid-1976, it was noted that the Unification Church's influence was seen to be growing both at home and abroad. At the same time one of Reverend Moon's companies, the Tong-il Industrial Corp., having profited technologically from close connections to the Ministry of National Defense, was recognized as becoming a key producer in the ROK defense industry.

The subcommittee is also interested in the activities of one of Reverend Moon's businesses, Tong-il Industries Corp. We understand that the Unification Church is a majority stockholder in this company, and that its president is a relative of Reverend Moon. It is widely reported that Tong-il is engaged in armament production in Korea, and that it helps produce and sell such weapons as M-16 rifles, machine-guns, and grenade launchers. However, the details of Tong-il's relationship to the Korean Government are shrouded in secrecy. Reverend Moon has claimed that he has had no ties to the Korean Government, and in recent testimony before the subcommittee, Reverend Moon's assistant, Pak Bo Hi, went so far as to state the Reverend Moon and the Unification Church have been persecuted by the Korean Government.

It is unclear, therefore, how Tong-il, which is headed by Reverend Moon, partly owned by the Unification Church, and apparently staffed and run by Reverend Moon's relatives and followers became an important armaments producer in Korea. We are especially interested in the question of whether Reverend Moon's business has been engaged in the export or attempted export of weaponry from Korea to other parts of the world.

There can be little dispute that Reverend Moon and his followers have had an impact on Korean-American relations and have influenced the attitude of many Americans toward Koreans in general. The time has come for Reverend Moon to give detailed and complete responses to the allegations that have surrounded him and his organizations since they entered this country.

The subcommittee has asked Reverend Moon, through his representatives, whether he will return to the United States and accept service of a subpoena. We are awaiting his reply.

That brings the subcommittee hearing to a conclusion for today. Tomorrow, Wednesday, June 7, we will resume our hearings at 1:30. We expect the session to run from 1:30 to 5 p.m.

The witnesses will be Song SunKeun, former editor of a Korean newspaper in San Francisco; Kang Kyung Koo, former education attaché at the Korean Embassy in Washington and one other witness to be announced tomorrow.

We will then adjourn this hearing until 1:30 tomorrow afternoon in this same room.

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

INVESTIGATION OF KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:30 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The Subcommittee on International Organizations meets this afternoon for the third time in its series of hearings for the Investigation of Korean-American Relations, focusing on the period from 1973 to 1976.

Through the testimony of today's three witnesses, the subcommittee will examine certain activities of the Korean Government and the KCIA in this country. Testimony will focus on harassment of Korean-Americans, on efforts by the Korean Government to control Korean residents association, on Korean Government front organizations in the United States, and on efforts by the Government of the Republic of Korea to counter criticism of the Park regime within the American academic community.

The first witness at today's hearing is Mr. Song Sun Keun, a San Francisco businessman, and former editor of the Korea Journal. Mr. Song has lived in the United States in the San Francisco area since 1962. His testimony will address the problem of harassment by KCIA agents because of anti-Park Chung Hee articles he printed in his newspaper.

Mr. Song, it is my understanding you have a brief opening statement.

If you will, raise your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SONG. I do.

STATEMENT OF SONG SUN KEUN, FORMER EDITOR OF THE KOREA JOURNAL, SAN FRANCISCO

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Song. We have your written statement. Why don't you proceed with it at this time?

Mr. SONG. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor and privilege to appear before this distinguished subcommittee to testify on behalf of Korean-American relations at large. I thank

you for the opportunity. I submit my whole statement for the record but I would like to read part of it now.

In the past 5 years, the KCIA has been very active in the United States. Much has been said and written about these activities, and this subcommittee, more than any other individual or organization, has been investigating them head on.

Putting rumors, allegations, and secondary sources aside, I would like to offer you primary sources based on personal experiences, knowledge, and evidence to support my testimony here today.

I will limit myself to three areas that may interest you. I would like to begin with a KCIA attempt to disrupt the speech engagement of Mr. Kim Dae Jung in San Francisco in May 1973 that was foiled; a KCIA-Moon Sun Myung connection through the Korean-American Political Association as early as 1970; and an assassination plot against me.

On May 18, 1973, Mr. Kim Dae Jung, sponsored by a group of Korean-American political science scholars, was to speak at the International Student Center in San Francisco. I understand you are going to question me about this so I won't go into detail.

Mr. FRASER. Were you going to skip part of your statement?

Mr. SONG. Do you want me to read it?

Mr. FRASER. You might go through your whole statement. It might save some questions.

Mr. Young Shik Bae, a KCIA agent who also acted as vice consul at the Korean consulate general in Los Angeles showed up with an entourage of more than 10 hoodlums from Los Angeles. Joining Vice Consul Bae were Mr. Dong Jim Kim, consul of the Korean consulate general in San Francisco and a certain Mr. Min Hi Rhee, a well known karate instructor in the San Francisco area, and several of his karate students. Their tactic to disrupt Mr. Kim's speech was at once all too obvious to the entire audience.

As Mr. Kim began his speech, these hoodlums started to interrupt and harass the speaker. There was a commotion, shouting and making ugly gestures and all. And they brought with them several bottles of tomato ketchup, dozens of raw eggs, and a movie camera.

The timely arrival of the San Francisco police, which resulted in removing Mr. Min Hi Rhee, saved the meeting from pandemonium. I was an eyewitness to the scene, and duly reported the incident in my Korean language biweekly called the Korea Journal. Here I would like to submit the article with photos and its English translation.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you. We will make that a part of your testimony.¹

Mr. SONG. What surprised me was the fact that Vice Consul Bae Young Shik led this outrage openly. Furthermore, although I didn't realize at the time but later came to learn, Mr. Yang Doo Won, alias Sang Ho Lee, Minister at the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., who was also KCIA station chief in the United States, came to San Francisco and stayed at the Hilton Hotel, where Mr. Kim Dae Jung was staying and was the prime-mover who directed that fiasco behind the scenes.

Second, I have heard that in 1970, Mr. Sang Ik Choi, a representative of Moon Sung Myung's Unification Church in the San Francisco

¹ See appendix 5A, p. 204.

area received \$25,000 from the Unification Church and set out to organize a Korean-American political group. Thus, the Korean-American Political Association (KAPA) was chartered in the State of California as a nonprofit corporation and Choi set himself up as its president. Mr. Doo Whan Kim, while consul at the Korean consulate general in San Francisco became the de facto vice president of KAPA. The express purpose of this organization was to exert its influence on American politics, local as well as national. To date, KAPA is known to have contributed \$5,000 to Gov. Jerry Brown during his 1974 gubernatorial campaign, and \$1,000 to Mayor Mosconi of San Francisco during his mayoral campaign in 1976. However, I would like to point out to you that this nonprofit U.S. corporation had an official of a foreign government as a key officer, and in addition was receiving financial support from Moon's Unification Church as early as 1970.

When Mr. Sang Ik Choi was promoted to the position of fundraising manager of the Unification Church of New York, Consul Doo Whan Kim succeeded him as KAPA's president after resigning his post at the Korean consulate general.

I gained my knowledge of KAPA while serving as a consultant to the San Francisco chapter of KAPA. I have supplied the subcommittee staff with copies of several KAPA documents, concerning the relationship between KAPA and the KCIA.

Third, in May of 1973, I began publishing a local Korean language biweekly, the Korea Journal, and also was its editor-reporter.

As the paper started to criticize various overt activities of the KCIA in the United States and the Park Chung Hee regime, a businessman who is a former KCIA agent approached me and indicated that he would help the Korea Journal to expand if its coverage were confined to local matters—in his words, if it became a “pleasant community bulletin board.” I declined the offer.

Then I received a substantial offer to purchase the Korea Journal. This offer came to me indirectly through close acquaintances of my family. I told them the paper was not for sale. At the time I was having considerable financial difficulty. I was approached for the third time again through some close friends with an offer to engage in profitable trade with Korea. It was all too obvious to me that such offers were made to divert my attention and activities away from my critical stand on Korean politics. I refused.

On separate occasions two old friends of my father, Mr. Il Kwon Chung, the Speaker of the Korean National Assembly, and Mr. Han Lim Lee, the Minister of Construction, sought out my father and tried to persuade him to change his views on the Park regime. My father is a Methodist minister, whose views on the Park regime could not be changed by these visitors.

After all these “friendly” attempts and offers were turned down, I began to receive telephone calls threatening my life. I reported these telephone calls to the local police and wrote about them in the Korea Journal. I would like to submit a 1974 San Francisco Examiner article for your reference.¹

The threatening calls backfired because I became more vocal than ever. Then Mr. Man Sung Limb, a KCIA agent at the Korean con-

¹ See appendix 5C, p. 208.

sulate general in San Francisco, came up with a plot to assassinate me. In order to save time, I would like to submit for your files copies of articles which appeared in the San Francisco Examiner, Los Angeles Times, Berkeley Barb, and the San Mateo Times that covered this plot. I am also submitting a tape recording and its transcript in translation of a personal interview with one of the witnesses who was present at the time Consul Limb discussed this plot.¹

Needless to say such KCIA harassment and threats would be illegal acts in this country even if I were not a U.S. citizen and these acts should be duly condemned.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I wish to make a comment, rather than a plea.

You have spent many valuable hours listening to testimony. Your efforts and patience deserve admiration. I sincerely hope that these hearings will not only be for the sake of the record but will also have some positive results. This Nation has a great stake in Korea. In spite of all the current difficulties in Korean-American relations on account of the influence-buying scandal, in the hearts of most Koreans and Americans there is a genuine friendship. All those Koreans and Korean-Americans who aspire to restore democracy and human rights in Korea trust in this friendship more than in any treaties. Mr. Kim Dae Jung is a democratic leader. He is also a friend of mine. I value my personal friendship with him. But I value his faith in democracy more. As democracy is the noblest ideal for government of the people, you who represent the people should understand and cherish such a man. In that spirit, he is also your friend. Then there is the poet, Kim Chi Ha, who is languishing in prison along with many other political prisoners in Korea.

I came to speak to you not only as a U.S. citizen, but also as a man who has left his native land but whose heart has never left it.

Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Song.

Mr. Song, what is your present address?

Mr. SONG. I live in Daly City, Calif.

Mr. FRASER. What is your present occupation?

Mr. SONG. I am running a printing shop in San Francisco.

Mr. FRASER. You indicated in your statement you are a U.S. citizen?

Mr. SONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. When did you become a citizen?

Mr. SONG. In 1969.

Mr. FRASER. When did you first become a critic of the Park government?

Mr. SONG. I have spoken out since October 1972.

Mr. FRASER. Is that when you first became a critic?

Mr. SONG. I was not a critic. I just spoke out critically. I wrote some articles for the Korean newspapers.

Mr. FRASER. So that you first made your opposition to the Park government publicly known after October 1972?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. How have you expressed your opposition?

¹ See appendix, 5E, p. 210.

Mr. SONG. Six months later I began to publish the Korea Journal, a local newspaper. Most of my criticisms were through my newspaper.

Mr. FRASER. You started the Korea Journal in May 1973?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Could you state your general editorial policy and the general political position which you took in your newspaper?

Mr. SONG. Yes; on the political side I criticized Park's regime because since they changed the constitution in 1972 I could not believe in Park's regime which did not run the country in a democratic way. Also, I opposed KCIA activity in the United States.

Mr. FRASER. Now, you have referred in your opening statement to the March 1973 meeting for Kim Dae Jung in San Francisco. Was this meeting set up through a request by Lee Keun Pal, secretary for Kim Dae Jung, to your father to arrange that meeting?

Mr. SONG. Yes. Mr. Lee had previously served in the San Francisco Consulate General Office.

Mr. FRASER. At that time in March 1973 was Mr. Yun Chan the consul general of the Republic of Korea?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. In San Francisco?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Was Mr. Yun a friend of your family?

Mr. SONG. We had a very friendly relationship.

Mr. FRASER. Did Consul General Yun telephone you about Kim Dae Jung's planned speech?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What did he tell you when he called you?

Mr. SONG. He called me several times but most of them were friendly. One day he told me, "Stop arranging that meeting for Mr. Kim Dae Jung". He told me that "as a consul general I order you to stop immediately making arrangements for Mr. Kim Dae Jung." He said he would not allow any meeting for Mr. Kim Dae Jung in this area.

Mr. FRASER. He wanted you to stop the arrangements?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Because he said that Mr. Kim Dae Jung was not permitted to speak in San Francisco?

Mr. SONG. Yes, the consul general said that.

Mr. FRASER. In that area?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did you question Mr. Yun's right to stop Kim Dae Jung from speaking?

Mr. SONG. I asked him, "Do you state that as consul general?" He said, yes. So I told him, "You chose to speak to the wrong person because from an official standpoint I am a citizen of the United States. You are a diplomat from a foreign country. You have no right to give me any orders. I recognize you as a consul general of my motherland, not as a Park regime consul general."

Mr. FRASER. You refused to cancel the speech?

Mr. SONG. I refused to cancel it.

Mr. FRASER. After you refused to stop Mr. Kim, did Consul Yun try to convince your father to stop it?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did your father refuse to stop the meeting?

Mr. SONG. Yes, he refused.

Mr. FRASER. Where was the meeting held?

Mr. SONG. My father's livingroom at the minister's parsonage of the San Francisco Korean United Methodist Church.

Mr. FRASER. That was the meeting for Kim Dae Jung?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did another meeting arranged by a student organization take place on May 18, 1973, at which time Kim Dae Jung spoke at the International Center in San Francisco?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Were you present at that time?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. In what capacity were you present?

Mr. SONG. As a reporter of the Korea Journal?

Mr. FRASER. Do you know who Mr. Rhee Min Hee is?

Mr. SONG. Yes. He was a friend of mine. He studied in the same high school. He was in a class ahead of me. He is a former president of Korean Residents Association of the San Francisco area.

Mr. FRASER. Yesterday in testimony before this subcommittee, Kim Sang Keun identified a Mr. Bae Young Shik, a vice consul stationed in Los Angeles, as a KCIA official. Was Mr. Bae present at the meeting at the International Center?

Mr. SONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. I understand that Mr. Rhee Min Hi was also present at that meeting.

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did he introduce you to Consul Bae Young Shik?

Mr. SONG. Yes, he introduced me to Bae Young Shik, the vice consul from Los Angeles.

Mr. FRASER. Before the meeting started had a group of men come to the International Center carrying brown paperbags?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did you recognize any of these men?

Mr. SONG. I cannot remember their names. I could recognize their faces.

Mr. FRASER. You recognized their faces?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. All of them or some of them?

Mr. SONG. Some of them.

Mr. FRASER. When you entered the International Center did you talk to one of these men?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What did he tell you?

Mr. SONG. He told me something was going to happen this evening. They had a plan to throw eggs and ketchup at Mr. Kim Dae Jung on the podium.

Mr. FRASER. Did you see those men go to the second floor balcony in the hall to throw the eggs and ketchup?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did the men actually use those items?

Mr. SONG. No; they couldn't use the eggs and ketchup because somebody reported to the building guards they had eggs and ketchup. So, the guards had taken those items before Mr. Kim came into the hall.

Mr. FRASER. The guards took the items away?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Who were these guards?

Mr. SONG. Official guards in uniform.

Mr. DERWINSKI. The official building guards? They weren't guards that you or the sponsoring group had hired? These were ushers or security people?

Mr. SONG. Anyway, on this occasion I did not observe, so I did not know exactly where they were from. Anyway, they wore uniforms with pistols and badges.

Mr. FRASER. During the speech by Kim Sang Don, the former mayor of Seoul, what did Rhee Min Hi do?

Mr. SONG. Rhee Min Hi was standing in the back of the room and he kept shouting. I cannot remember what he said but he made a big noise there, shouting several times.

Mr. FRASER. Was it enough to make it difficult for the speech to go forward?

Mr. SONG. Yes; Mr. Kim Sang Don stopped two or three times in his speech.

Mr. FRASER. What did Mr. Rhee do when Kim Dae Jung began to speak?

Mr. SONG. When Mr. Kim Dae Jung was on the stage he moved close to the stage. When Mr. Kim Dae Jung began to speak, he shouted "don't criticize President Park." Then Rhee tried to approach Mr. Kim Dae Jung. Kim Dae Jung had a personal bodyguard there at the time. About four people. They covered Mr. Kim from Mr. Rhee and they pushed Mr. Rhee back.

Mr. FRASER. Then what happened?

Mr. SONG. Then all of a sudden the whole room was filled with yelling and catcalls. I believe some of those making the disturbance were from Los Angeles. Some were Mr. Rhee's friends. I have a picture showing the scene of the interruption. This is Mr. Rhee Min Hee. This is Mr. Kim's bodyguard.

Mr. FRASER. Is that a picture taken at the time?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Who took it?

Mr. SONG. That picture was taken by a person hired by the KCIA.

Mr. FRASER. How did you get the picture?

Mr. SONG. Because the photographer was my school senior. I persuaded him to let me have the picture.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, you outmaneuvered the KCIA?

Mr. SONG. Yes; because I lived in San Francisco a long time, so all of them were my friends, schoolmates, or family friends.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, to sum the situation up, it was probably advertised in advance that Kim Dae Jung would make a speech criticizing the Government. Therefore in the audience there were progovernment and antigovernment people as well, is that right?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What you found was a mixed audience, not just people supporting the position of the speakers?

Mr. SONG. Yes; both sides were attending, including consuls, vice consuls and reporters, all kinds of people were there.

Mr. FRASER. What happened next?

Mr. SONG. Then all of a sudden more than 10 of the San Francisco police came in the room and they removed Mr. Rhee Min Hi. The newspaper has a picture showing him being removed by the police.

Mr. FRASER. The police removed Rhee Min Hi?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Then what did Bae Young Shik do?

Mr. SONG. He said he was a "diplomat of the Republic of Korea. This meeting is for Koreans and we will take care of it ourselves."

Mr. FRASER. Is this a statement he made to the police?

Mr. SONG. Yes; he took out an identification card and showed it to the police, and said "I am a diplomat of the Republic of Korea."

Mr. FRASER. After he showed the card he said to the police, "we will handle our own affairs"?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. How did the police respond to the request?

Mr. SONG. They didn't say a word. They removed Mr. Rhee Min Hi.

Mr. FRASER. During this meeting was Consul Kim Dong Jin making telephone calls from the meeting hall?

Mr. SONG. The telephones were at the right-hand side of the lobby. Consul Kim Dong Jin and some of the people I thought were Mr. Rhee's followers kept occupying the telephones. The two public telephones on the other side of the lobby were also occupied by them.

Mr. FRASER. Who was Kim Dong Jin calling, if you know?

Mr. SONG. I didn't know at the time but after the incident we newspaper reporters had a talk about this incident and one of the reporters told me Mr. Lee Sang Ho, who was Minister at the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., was in the Hilton Hotel where Mr. Kim Dae Jung was staying. Yun Chan was there, and so were several Korean officials. Probably they reported to Minister Lee on what occurred.

Mr. FRASER. You say Kim Dong Jin of the San Francisco consulate general was making telephone calls and you learned later he was calling Lee Sang Ho, who was at the Hilton, and Consul General Yun Chan?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. After the meeting did Mr. Rhee Min Hee telephone Kim Dae Jung and threaten him?

Mr. SONG. The next day I had an appointment with Mr. Kim Dae Jung at his hotel for an interview. At the time, Mr. Kim Dae Jung told me "Mr. Rhee called me and threatened me."

Mr. FRASER. What was the threat?

Mr. SONG. He didn't give any further details. He just said he had been threatened by Mr. Rhee.

Mr. FRASER. Did you publish an article in the Korea Journal blaming this incident on Korean Government officials?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Were you threatened or harassed in any way as a result of that article?

Mr. SONG. I don't know. I don't know whether I should say it was a threat or not. A few days later our community had a meeting

sponsored by Korean Airlines. Of course they invited the Korean consul general, and also invited me. At the meeting Consul General Yun, who until that time had been very friendly to me, pulled the mike back and said "Will you keep writing this way in your paper?" He was very angry.

Mr. FRASER. But nothing more than that? He made that statement to you?

Mr. SONG. Yes; nothing more than that, directly to me. My editor, Kim Dong Ok, told me he had a few harassing telephone calls from an unidentified person.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Chung Tai Bong, a San Francisco businessman, tell you in August 1974 that because of his business situation he wanted to stop advertising in your newspaper?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. But that he would continue to pay for his advertisements?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Chung later tell you that he had been pressured to withdraw his advertisements by Mr. Limb Man Sung because of the antigovernment stance of your newspaper?

Mr. SONG. At that time, Mr. Chung didn't tell me who was giving the pressure but a couple of years later, 1976, he told me he had been pressured by Consul Limb Man Sung.

Mr. FRASER. He told you a few years later?

Mr. SONG. Two years later.

Mr. FRASER. Who was putting the pressure on you?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. I think it should be noted that Limb Man Sung is identified as a KCIA official stationed in the United States on the list verified by Kim Sang Keun during yesterday's hearing.

Now, Mr. Song, did you become aware of an attempt by Limb Man Sung to stop others from advertising in your newspaper?

Mr. SONG. Several times. One incident occurred before Consul Limb came to San Francisco and Vice Consul Bae controlled both San Francisco and Los Angeles. At the time the branch manager of Korean Airlines, Lee Un Hyun, was a member of my church. At church he told me that although he had promised me that Korean Airlines would advertise in my newspaper, unfortunately he could not put the ad in my newspaper because Vice Consul Bae had ordered him not to put the ad in my newspaper.

I usually didn't practice advertising on a contractual basis. Usually it was a verbal agreement as a friend. I told him "I understand your position. I am glad to withdraw your ad." I withdrew his ad after issue No. 4.

Mr. FRASER. Did other advertisers stop advertising in the Korea Journal as a result of pressure from Limb?

Mr. SONG. Yes; Mr. Chung was pressured by Limb on several occasions. Chung asked me to withdraw his ad. He also told me as a friend he was going to pay for the advertising but not to carry the ad in the paper.

In another case someone told me Consul Limb had told him "I saw your ad in the Korea Journal." Limb didn't mention any other word, but that gave him the message.

Mr. FRASER. What advertiser was that? I did not catch the name.

Mr. SONG. He is an insurance salesman. I can't remember his name.

Mr. FRASER. During the period 1974 to 1976 did you receive several threats against your life?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. When was the first threat made?

Mr. SONG. Pardon?

Mr. FRASER. When was the first threat?

Mr. SONG. That was in 1974.

Mr. FRASER. How did you receive it?

Mr. SONG. I received it by telephone.

Mr. FRASER. Did the caller identify himself?

Mr. SONG. He identified himself as Kim Chi Soo. At first he didn't identify himself. I asked him several times "what is your name." Then he gave his name as Mr. Kim Chi Soo.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know Mr. Kim Chi Soo?

Mr. SONG. I didn't know him. He identified himself "as a reader of my paper." I took a look at my mailing list. I could not find Mr. Kim Chi Soo. I checked the Korean residents' names in the Korean residents directory. I could not find his name. I checked all the bay area telephone books but I could not find his name.

Mr. FRASER. Did you believe you recognized the voice of the person who called himself Kim Chi Soo?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Whose voice did it appear to be?

Mr. SONG. I believe it was Consul Limb Man Sung.

Mr. FRASER. What did that individual say?

Mr. SONG. He said "You oppose Park's government. You criticize Park's government. The men who criticize Park's government are communists." I am not a communist. Then he said "I am going to kill you by next Sunday." But he did not kill me fortunately.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Just to clarify that, you recognized this voice. Did you then say to the man on the phone, "I know who you are"? In other words, did you at that time confront him with the fact that you recognized his voice?

Mr. SONG. Yes; Consul Limb has a provincial accent, that of a southern province of South Korea. So, it is easy to identify his voice.

Mr. DERWINSKI. During the phone conversations with him, did you tell him that you recognized his voice?

Mr. SONG. At first I could not recognize him. But as I was about to finish the phone call, almost as I dropped the phone, I tried to identify him by asking again, "What is your name?" When I started speaking again, he hung up the phone.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Then he called again?

Mr. SONG. No.

Mr. DERWINSKI. There was only one call?

Mr. SONG. One call.

Mr. DERWINSKI. So you never confronted him with the fact that he called and you thought you recognized his voice?

Mr. SONG. Yes; soon after that conversation I talked to Consul Kim of the San Francisco consulate general. He was my classmate in the university. He is a friend of my family. I told him "It is not very nice for a diplomat to threaten an American citizen."

Mr. FRASER. What did he say when you called him?

Mr. SONG. Consul Kim visited me and my father. He said, "As a friend, please don't carry that article in the paper, because Consul Limb came to the San Francisco consulate general because of me." He told me if I carried Consul Limb's name in the paper he was going to lose his position. He took the position that "as a friend I will explain everything, only drop Consul Limb's name from the paper."

Mr. FRASER. Have you received other such phone calls?

Mr. SONG. I have received them quite often but in the Korean language "I will kill you" is not as serious as in English. It is just for insulting and accusing people. I know that well enough but the reason on this occasion that I reported to the police was that I was sure it was the voice of Consul Limb and when he told me "I will kill you by Sunday," I felt that there was some kind of plan behind his telephone call. That is why I reported it.

Mr. FRASER. You called the police then?

Mr. SONG. Yes; I called the Daly City police and the FBI right after the telephone call.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know who made these other calls?

Mr. SONG. I don't know who made the other calls.

Mr. FRASER. You have already told us what was said during those calls?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. After your call to the police and the FBI, did either the police or the FBI investigate the situation? Did they follow through with an investigation?

Mr. SONG. I don't know what they did. A couple of years later, when I reported another threat to the police, they said they had previously recorded my harassment.

Mr. DERWINSKI. The San Francisco police?

Mr. SONG. The Daly City police and the San Francisco police.

Mr. FRASER. Have you also received a threat by mail?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have a copy of it?

Mr. SONG. I brought copies of most of the materials but unfortunately I didn't come with that copy. I will be glad to mail it to you as soon as I arrive in San Francisco.

Mr. FRASER. Is it a letter addressed to you?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What is in the letter?

Mr. SONG. All kinds of insulting words plus "I will kill you."

Mr. FRASER. Was it phrased or written in such a way as to be a serious threat?

Mr. SONG. In some way—it depends on how you interpret it—in some way it is insulting, maybe harassment. At the time I judged that it was not serious, so I did not report the letter to the police.

Mr. FRASER. You have the letter and will send us a copy of it?

Mr. SONG. Yes.¹

Mr. FRASER. When was the last time you received such a threat either by phone or by letter?

Mr. SONG. I believe that letter is the last one.

¹ At the time of printing the letter had not been supplied to the subcommittee.

Mr. FRASER. About when did that come?

Mr. SONG. In 1976, October 1976, something like that. I have the stamped envelope and the letter.

Mr. FRASER. I understand that you ceased publication of the Korea Journal in 1976, is that correct?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Why did you stop publishing it?

Mr. SONG. Because of the harassment of my life by the KCIA and harassment of my advertising clients. That was an open fight between the consulate general and myself. It was reported in the newspaper and television, so people became afraid to advertise in my newspaper. I had difficulty to collect advertising fees. Unfortunately I didn't make any advertising contracts with the clients. Most of them were verbal agreements, friendly agreements. So I could not push them to keep paying the fee.

Mr. DERWINSKI. At its peak what was the circulation of your newspaper?

Mr. SONG. My circulation was about 2,000.

Mr. DERWINSKI. That was during that 4-year period roughly?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Were any of your employees harassed as a result of working for your paper?

Mr. SONG. My editor was harassed.

Mr. FRASER. How did that take place?

Mr. SONG. Most of it was telephone calls. One occasion Rhee Min Hi almost punched him but friends surrounded him, so he didn't get hurt, but Rhee almost kicked him and punched him.

Mr. FRASER. I would like to ask you now some questions about the March 5, 1976, election in San Francisco for the president and vice president of the Korean Residents Association of Northern California. Do you recall who the candidates were in that election?

Mr. SONG. Pardon?

Mr. FRASER. In the election on March 5, 1976, in the Korean Residents Association, do you know who the candidates were for president and vice president?

Mr. SONG. Yes. There were two slates. One was Kim Kyung Ha and Lee Chang Jae. The other slate was Kim Yong Baik and Kim Dong Ok, who was editor of the Korea Journal.

Mr. FRASER. Did you report on that election in your newspaper?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did the Korean consulate general of San Francisco support one slate of candidates over another?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Which slate did they support?

Mr. SONG. They supported Kim Kyung Ha and Lee Chung Jae.

Mr. FRASER. Did they give them some active help, money and so on?

Mr. SONG. Yes; their campaign manager was Chung Tai Bong. He told me they had funds partly from the KCIA. He was sure of at least \$3,000 from the KCIA.

Mr. FRASER. This was told you by the candidate himself?

Mr. SONG. No; by the campaign manager.

Mr. FRASER. Are you aware of any efforts by Consul Limb Man Sung to persuade people not to vote for Kim Yong Baik and Kim Dong Ok?

Mr. SONG. Yes; Consul Limb telephoned people and advised them not to support Kim Yong Baik and Kim Dong Ok. Also on the eve of the election, he told people not to help elect Kim Yong Baik.

Mr. FRASER. Were these phone calls?

Mr. SONG. Yes; also they invited several persons to the consulate general's office, too.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Who did win the election? Did Mr. Kim Yong Baik win or lose?

Mr. SONG. First at the beginning Kim Yong Baik was the loser. The slate supported by the KCIA won by a 31-vote difference. After that, the Kim Yong Baik slate took it to court because the slate supported by the KCIA had brought in people from Monterey, Calif., which is outside of the San Francisco Bay area. The Kim Yong Baik slate claimed that it was an illegal election. They took it to court and the court ordered a reelection. After that Kim Yong Baik won.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In the reelection?

Mr. SONG. Yes; I have a report of that election campaign that I carried in the Korea Journal. This was published before the election. This is the man who has been identified as KCIA, Consul Limb Man Sung. He was the hand behind this election. In the article I gave about seven details of his involvement with the election campaign.

Mr. FRASER. We are glad to have that.

Mr. SONG. Unfortunately it is in Korean, so you may not understand it.

Mr. FRASER. Were you outside the San Francisco Consulate General on the night before the election?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Why?

Mr. SONG. Somebody told me that the consulate general's office was doing an operation overnight to help in the election. So in order to get the proof, I personally went to the consulate general's office. There I found the room of Consul Lamb was lighted and people working in the consulate general's office were going in and out.

Mr. FRASER. You went to the building and saw the light on in his office?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. You saw people going in and out?

Mr. SONG. Yes; so I started taking pictures of the scene. I took a picture of the lighted room of Consul Limb. When I flashed the light of my camera, Consul Limb came out personally.

Mr. FRASER. Approximately what time was this?

Mr. SONG. That was between 10 and 11 p.m.

Mr. FRASER. When Consul Limb saw you what did he do?

Mr. SONG. He just came out, so I said to him, "What are you doing this late? You are officially closed at 5 or 6 o'clock. How come you are working this late?" He said, "I prepared the pouch." I told him, "I don't understand. Why don't you prepare the pouch during the day?" Then I flashed my camera. He got so mad he threw his cigarette at me.

At that time I was in my car right beside the consulate general's office. A young man was in my car. He was frightened because he saw Counsel Limb throw the cigarette, so he jumped out of my car and ran away. Then Consul Limb's followers almost smashed into my car. At the time I didn't know that was Consul Limb's car. Anyway some Volkswagen almost ran into my car.

On the next day, at the election, Consul Kim of the San Francisco consulate general came to the press corner. I asked him, "Who was riding in the Volkswagen and tried to run into my car?" Consul Kim said that it was Consul Limb.

Mr. FRASER. You asked who tried to run his car into yours?

Mr. SONG. Consul Kim did not say Consul Limb tried to run into my car, he just said, "The driver told me it was Consul Limb." Later I had a witness who told me that Consul Limb personally said to him that he had tried to run into my car but that I drove away so fast, so that he couldn't make it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Was this reported to the police at all?

Mr. SONG. That one I didn't report to the police. I talked right after the event to Mr. Gannon, who is a reporter for NBC. He was at the election. I told him but he didn't take the story seriously.

Mr. FRASER. In November of 1976 did Mr. Chung Tai Bong tell you that he was aware of threats made on your life by Consul Limb Man Sung?

Mr. SONG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. How did Mr. Chung know of these threats?

Mr. SONG. He was an informer for Consul Limb at the time. He worked very closely with Consul Limb. I have a tape recording of a conversation I had with Mr. Chung about this plot. I have already given it to the staff.¹

Mr. FRASER. Could you just describe briefly what Mr. Chung told you?

Mr. SONG. On the evening of the election Mr. Limb came to the campaign office of Kim Kyung Ha. He said he wanted to see me killed. They had had such a plan before. People were brought from Los Angeles but they had stopped it. At this moment he said he had to see me killed. Then Mr. Kim Suk Ha, who is a brother of Kim Kyung Ha, said he would handle this business. Kim Suk Ha said he would bring people from Seattle to smash into my car and pretend it was a car accident. That is what they planned. That was the story.

Mr. FRASER. You said you had a tape of this conversation with Mr. Chung. How did you happen to have it recorded?

Mr. SONG. Mr. Chung's office is about a couple of blocks from my printing company. One day he came to my shop. I took him to dinner. He has lived in San Francisco a long time. He worked for me several times. He said, "Take care of yourself, they have a plot against you." It seemed very serious. I told him I wanted to make a recording of our conversation so why not go to my office and make a tape recording. Then he told me that he agreed to my taping his words.

Mr. FRASER. We have that tape and it has been transcribed and we will make it part of the record.

¹ See appendix 5E, p. 210.

Mr. Chung Tai Bong and Mr. Rhee Min Hee have submitted to the subcommittee signed statements relating to the matters that Mr. Song has testified to. Without objection, their statements will also be made a part of the record.¹

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Song, how would you characterize the level and kind of harassment in the Korean community in San Francisco recently?

Mr. SONG. Recently they don't harass like before. I don't see them using hoodlums and things like that. Instead they concentrate on community organizations. They are trying to form a veterans association of the Korean military, helping the Senior Citizens Association, helping the Korean Residents Association. That is their goal actually. Actually they plant their front people and try to use—

Mr. FRASER. State the last again.

Mr. SONG [continuing]. Use their political opponents and persecute the people who are against the Park regime. They say everything is all right, Korean economic progress is very fast and whoever is against Park is a Communist. They seem to try to make people believe rumors but they don't seem to have any active movement.

Mr. FRASER. Does this present level of activity represent a change from what it was a few years ago?

Mr. SONG. Yes; for example, in 1973 a young Korean man named Lee Chul Soo was arrested on a charge of killing a man in Chinatown, in a Chinese gang. At the time our reporter interviewed him he insisted he did not kill the man. Anyway, the police reported he was a criminal. I tried to help him but most of the Koreans did not go with me. So, I interviewed the consul general, Mr. Yun. He said "this is not a matter for the Korean consulate general office."

Mr. Yun also said that the young man had lived in the United States for more than 10 years, so that it was not a matter for the consulate general's office. As a result this case was ignored by the community, even my paper.

After the Tongsun Park case surfaced and resulted in so much criticism of the Korean Government, the consul general's office began to take an interest in Lee's case. They helped organize and fund a defense committee. They are using people who have been suspected of being KCIA informers as front men. They tell people that Lee's case is a Korean affair. They criticize our Justice Department, and lead the people to anti-Americanism. That is very difficult to prove. But to a man who has lived for a long time in the San Francisco area, it is clear that this project is not only to further human rights.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Song, we appreciate your cooperation with the committee, but I would like to clarify a few things that seem inconsistent to me. The committee at the end of its work has to reach some conclusions and the more accurate our information is, the better.

First, in your prepared statement which you read to us—if you will look at that again, please, on page 2, the bottom paragraph on page 2—quote:

I have heard that in 1970 Mr. Sang Ik Choi, a representative of Moon Sun Myung's Unification Church in the San Francisco area, received \$25,000 from the Unification Church and set out to organize a Korean-American political group.

¹ See appendixes 5F and 5G, pp. 214–218.

Then on page 3 you continue discussing that point. Your concluding observation is:

However, I would like to point out that this nonprofit U.S. corporation had an official of a foreign government as a key officer, and in addition, was receiving financial support from Moon's Unification Church as early as 1970.

I want to be sure there is nothing lost in translation. At the start of the comment you say, "You heard," which to me means that this is second-hand information. Later on you state it as a fact. Could you clarify that and tell me what evidence or what accurate information you had that this did happen?

Mr. SONG. I was one of the members of the KAPA. I was an adviser. I was a member of KAPA San Francisco chapter. At that time I heard the things I referred to from officers of KAPA. Also, before I left San Francisco to testify here I wanted to make sure, so I called and visited former General Secretary of the KAPA Kim Young Baik. I asked him, "how much money did you receive from the Unification Church?" He said "\$25,000, from Choi Sang Ik." So I asked him, "do you believe this money came from the Unification Church?" He said, "yes." Choi was handling KAPA's office when we inaugurated this organization.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What was the money to be used for? Did he tell you what the money supposedly was to be used for?

Mr. SONG. They invited many people to the inauguration convention, including Representative Richard Hanna, Dr. Chang Won Kim, who was chairman of the board of the Diplomat National Bank, and Dr. Kim's brother. There were a great many people invited to the convention. I believe they spent that money mostly for this convention. Also they rented the office at 760 Market Street, San Francisco.

As a member of the KAPA I believed that the rent was paid by the Unification Church. Also, most of the secretaries working for that office were ladies from the Unification Church. Also, most of the meetings were held at the Unification Church. All the printed materials, including the newspaper, were printed by the Unification Church Printing Co. for free.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I have a couple of general questions. Since the Berkeley area was the center of anti-Vietnam activity, and anti-United States-Vietnam policy in that period, and since the Government of the Republic of Korea was supporting our position in Vietnam and there were Korean troops in Vietnam, to what extent was the anti-Vietnam movement involved in any of the anti-Park regime movement?

Mr. SONG. I don't know about the Berkeley area. I did not study that. In the San Francisco area no Korean-Americans seem to have any connection at all with people in Berkeley. I am opposed to the Park regime, but I am quite conservative. I am more anti-communist than Park Chung Hee.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about North Korean activity, direct or indirect, among the Koreans in California? Were you aware of any activity, direct or indirect, that may have been sponsored or inspired by the North Koreans?

Mr. SONG. I don't see anything like that in the Korean community. I don't know what is going on in Berkeley. As far as I can see in the

Korean community we cannot find any one who is fighting for North Korea.

Mr. DERWINSKI. One last question. In your opinion is the feeling in the United States among the Korean-Americans more for or against the present Government of Korea?

Mr. SONG. Most of the Koreans have come to the United States in the last 5 years. During that time a lot of immigrants came from Korea. I believe if they were satisfied with the Park regime, they would have no reason to immigrate to this country. It is my understanding that vocal or not vocal, most of them disagree with the Park regime.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You feel the immigration has been the result of their political disagreement?

Mr. SONG. I believe so.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. We want to thank you very much for your testimony today, Mr. Song. It has been very informative and helpful to the subcommittee. We appreciate all the work you put into it.

Mr. SONG. Thank you. I have brought some material for the public.

Mr. FRASER. I see that. Thank you very much.

We turn now to our second witness, Mr. Kang Kyung Koo. Mr. Kang held high posts in the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Education in Korea prior to coming to the United States in the fall of 1970 as education attaché in the Embassy of Korea. Mr. Kang held that post until June of 1976 when he left the Republic of Korea Government service. Since 1976 Mr. Kang has been engaged in business in Fairfax, Va.

Mr. KANG, would you raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KANG. Yes; I do.

STATEMENT OF KANG KYUNG KOO, FORMER EDUCATION ATTACHÉ, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, would you please state your name and address.

Mr. KANG. My name is Kyung Koo Kang, 9411 Lee Highway, No. 512, Fairfax, Va.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, prior to your assignment as education attaché at the Korean Embassy what post did you hold in the Ministry of Education?

Mr. KANG. I was Chief, School Administration Section of the Ministry of Education in 1956. In 1967 I was the Chief, International Education Division of the same Ministry. Then from 1968 to 1970, before I came to the United States as an education attaché, I was a senior national supervisor for higher education.

Mr. FRASER. Senior national supervisor?

Mr. KANG. For higher education.

Mr. FRASER. Then in the fall of 1970 you were assigned to the Embassy in Washington?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Would you briefly describe your responsibilities as education attaché?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir. The primary duty and functions of the education attaché of the Embassy of Korea may be categorized in the next five items.

The first thing is to provide guidance and counseling service to Korean students studying in the United States.

Two, to provide guidance and financial or material support for the promotion of the education of Korean children with emphasis on their ethnic and cultural background.

Three, to maintain close coordination and contact with American academic institutions and individuals to promote programs or activities related to Korean studies.

Four, to promote student and scholarly exchange programs between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

Five, to monitor the trend of American education, such as philosophy and practice of school administration, problems of teachers, students and parents, as well as school finances and school financing systems, curriculum and methods of teaching, et cetera.

In addition to this, one more function was to provide information and data on education in Korea to American governmental authorities, school systems, or anyone interested in the Korean school system.

This is a brief explanation of the functions and duties of the education attaché of the Embassy.

Mr. FRASER. In 1975 and in 1976 Lee Jai Hyon, formerly the Embassy's chief cultural and information attaché, testified before this subcommittee about meetings held in the Korean Embassy in the spring of 1973. Dr. Lee stated that these meetings included discussions about plans to undertake projects to improve the image of the Republic of Korea in the United States.

Mr. Kang, as education attaché of the Embassy did you attend some of these Monday morning meetings in the Embassy?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What concerns of the Korean Government prompted these meetings?

Mr. KANG. To make it very brief, I would explain it this way. The Korean Government felt very strongly about the friendly relationship between the United States and Korea. At that time the United States was about to take a hands-off policy on the Vietnam war and then President Nixon made a rapprochement with China, which was an enemy Communist country. These policies were strongly criticized by the Embassy.

The Government, I understand, instructed all embassies overseas to reinforce their activities, to broaden their basis of diplomacy, such as the diplomacy for national security, diplomacy for economic development and so forth. I understand everyone in the Embassy was asked to take more interest in programs or activities to promote a friendly relationship not only between the United States and Korea but also between the Korean Government and Korean residents living abroad.

That was the main objective of that kind of meeting, I understand, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Was one of the concerns of the Korean Government their concern about reaction in the United States to the Yushin Constitution?

Mr. KANG. Well, it should be included in that objective.

Mr. FRASER. Who chaired the meetings?

Mr. KANG. In most cases the Ambassador chaired the meeting. Once in a while in case the Ambassador was absent from his office, for whatever reason, the Minister for Political Affairs generally presided at the meetings.

Mr. FRASER. The Ambassador at that time was Ambassador Kim Dong Jo?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did Minister Lee Sang Ho play a role in any of these meetings?

Mr. KANG. Most of the time Minister Lee Sang Ho maintained an attitude of listening to whatever the staff or other people said. On one occasion I remember he mentioned that all other Korean consulate general offices in America which he visited had a very strong influence upon Korean residents in that area. The Washington area, especially the Washington metropolitan area, had no such great influence by Embassy personnel. So he urged them to make more positive contacts with those Koreans living around this area and promote better relationship.

Mr. FRASER. Did Lee Sang Ho state at one of the meetings that Embassy personnel were not doing as much as the personnel at the consulates to improve the image of the Republic of Korea?

Mr. KANG. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. What did he mean by that when he said that the people in the Washington area were not doing as much as those out in the rest of the country?

Mr. KANG. My impression about his remark was that most of the Embassy staff came to Washington very careful in their behavior, conduct, manner, whatever. That any kind of controversial remarks sometimes stimulate more antigovernment or similar kinds of activities. That is why the Embassy personnel were very quiet and very cautious about the conduct of their business. That is why apparently Minister Lee Sang Ho was not satisfied by that kind of performance by the Embassy staff.

Mr. FRASER. Did Lee Sang Ho request proposals by each of the participants as to how each might do more to convey the actual situation in Korea and thereby quiet criticism of the Yushin system?

Mr. KANG. Yes; he did, but he did not particularly pinpoint it to quiet down the Yushin criticism. As I stated before, he wanted to expand the basis of national security diplomacy or economic diplomacy or whatever. So in general he asked Embassy staff to make such proposals.

Mr. FRASER. Did you submit a proposal for a project in the areas of your responsibility?

Mr. KANG. Yes, I did, sir.

Mr. FRASER. I think now before I ask you to describe that we will take a few minutes break until Mr. Derwinski comes back and he will pick up the question. There is a vote underway in the House. We will take about a 3-minute break until he arrives.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. DERWINSKI [presiding]. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Kang, I will continue with the same questions that Mr. Fraser had. You were discussing the proposal for a project and we would like you to describe the main points of your proposal. Will you proceed to describe the main points?

Mr. KANG. The kind of proposal I made, that I submitted to the meeting, was almost consistent with my primary functions and duties which I stated before. Specifically I would like to mention six items which I can recall. Those recollections may not be quite correct but they are, to the best of my knowledge, the following:

The objective of the proposed program was to promote a better relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea and the improvement of friendly ties and relationships between Korean residents living in the United States and the Korean Government.

Then in order to carry out this objective I proposed first to provide positive guidance and counseling service to all students studying in the United States such as distribution of a periodic newsletter or written materials or wherever, so that they can get accurate information about their home country.

Two, to expand the scholarship program for the Korean students. The reason is that many Korean students at the time, even now I believe, had tremendous difficulty in getting financial support. That is why I included the expansion of the scholarship program.

Three, to provide assistance to student groups. Korean students in the major cities in the United States formed their own student associations. But so often they requested assistance or help from the Embassy or regional consulates general. Most of the time their requests had been turned down. That is why I proposed to provide more assistance to student group activities.

Four, to provide assistance to the Korean community to boost their children's ethnic and cultural education. In Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, there are Korean schools, mainly held on the weekend. To these schools possible financial or material assistance, such as textbooks or other reference materials, could be provided. In some case these might be provided by their parents or by the Government, through free text books or other materials.

Five, to encourage and support American academic activities in connection with Korean studies; especially to provide strong support for Korean scholars who are studying Korean affairs in the United States. That is why I included this type of program in the proposal.

Finally, I proposed to provide material and information on Korean education, history, economic development, or social change, to American institutions of higher learning, namely Korean research centers or any library which would like to have this type of material.

That is the program I included in my proposal as education attaché.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you recall how much money you requested to carry out these projects?

Mr. KANG. To the best of my knowledge I proposed about \$200,000 a year.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Were any of your proposals implemented?

Mr. KANG. None of those programs has ever been implemented but a small portion, a fragment of this proposal, such as the promotion

and encouragement of Korean children's education in the United States and support of student activities.

Mr. DERWINSKI. As I understand, one of the programs that you recommended was assistance to the Korean studies programs at American universities. Did any of the subsequent grants to American universities result from your specific proposal?

Mr. KANG. None of those became a reality through my proposal or as a result of my proposal.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Were you personally involved in some of the grants to American universities by the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. Yes, I was.

Mr. FRASER. At the meetings at the Embassy was there any discussion of grants to Western Michigan University and the University of Hawaii?

Mr. KANG. While this type of project was never discussed, from what I understand, I made a report and there was some kind of debate among the staff. Generally, I simply reported on these grants or on requests made by such institutions or individuals for assistance.

Then before reporting to my home government I brought up these matters at Embassy meetings because my official channel is through the Minister for Political Affairs and the Ambassador. It is a direct chain of command. I must go through this channel. That is why I reported all these matters at Embassy meetings.

Mr. FRASER. So the answer is that there was a discussion of grants to Western Michigan University and the University of Hawaii during the 1973 meetings in the Embassy.

Mr. KANG. Let me clarify that. Do you mean, the meetings to expand the educational program, in order to give a better image of Korea in the United States as requested by Mr. Lee Sang Ho, or meetings in general?

Mr. FRASER. Earlier you had described the regular meetings that were held, chaired mostly by the Ambassador. My question was, during those meetings were there discussions of grants to Western Michigan University and the University of Hawaii?

Mr. KANG. I would categorically deny that. Those grants were not really included in that kind of special, what I would like to term special, program. But in general it was my primary responsibility to carry out such activities, so I raised them in routine meetings we had almost weekly. I don't know whether the grants were considered at that special type of meeting or at general meetings.

Anyway, I brought up this type of grant program for individual universities at Embassy meetings.

Mr. FRASER. You did bring it up?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. At the Embassy meetings?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Korean Government grants to those two universities?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What was said in the talks that you had about these grants with the Ambassador and officials of the KCIA?

Mr. KANG. As I mentioned before, Mr. Lee Sang Ho always maintained a very quiet attitude and very seldom spoke out. In most cases

the Minister for Political Affairs or the Ambassador himself responded to my reporting of such programs or proposals. The general feeling at the meeting was that if the Korean Government could possibly afford the amount of money requested, then we should provide grants in response to those two requests.

Mr. FRASER. Who in the Korean Government was mostly responsible for the decision to make a grant to the University of Hawaii?

Mr. KANG. It is a very difficult question for me to answer at this moment because the decision to give a grant to the University of Hawaii—I mean the final policy—was made in Seoul. So, it was beyond my knowledge.

I am in a very difficult position to answer. But generally the Minister of Education was responsible. The request went to the Minister of Education, who requested that an appropriation be made by the National Assembly. Finally the money came from the Minister of Education to the Embassy in Washington, D.C., and I transmitted the money to the University of Hawaii.

That is why I would say the Minister of Education was responsible for the decision.

Mr. FRASER. That is Min Kwan Sik?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. At some point after the initial grant was made to the University of Hawaii was there concern expressed at the Embassy over the trips to North Korea and solicitation of funds from the North Korean Government by Prof. Suh Dae Sook, director of the Center for Korean Studies at the University of Hawaii?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Why was the Embassy concerned about the activity of Professor Suh?

Mr. KANG. The main reason the Korean Government was concerned about Suh Dae Sook's activities was that it, even though Korea was at that time a developing country, had granted over \$1 million of money. This was indeed a great amount of money.

The money was given to the University of Hawaii to build a Center for Korean Studies. This money was not to be used for any purpose like bringing North Korean or Soviet scholars to that center and letting them stay at that university as a base for their education.

So it was my thought that any amount of money that the Korean Government donated should be spent on the original purpose. The Korean Government feared that the money might be used for some purpose other than that for which the Korean Government originally donated it.

Mr. FRASER. What was the original purpose of the grants?

Mr. KANG. To my understanding, the money was to build a bridge for cultural exchange between East and West because Hawaii is located in between the United States and Korea. Further, Korean immigrants came to Hawaii for the first time in the early part of 1900. So, when the Korean Government decided to give a grant to the University of Hawaii, I think it was the 71st anniversary of Korean immigration to Hawaii. It was in commemoration of that immigration and also, as I stated before, the Korean Government wanted to improve the friendly relations and understanding between the United States and Korea.

That is why the Korean Government decided to spend such a huge amount of money to build a Center for Korean Studies in Hawaii.

Mr. FRASER. In general did you favor a decision to make a grant to the University of Hawaii?

Mr. KANG. Personally, I objected to the proposal.

Mr. FRASER. Why did you object?

Mr. KANG. The reason I objected was that I personally visited the University of Hawaii before the grant was made. I met many people, including the president of the University of Hawaii, the interim director of the Center for Korean Studies, many other scholars—both Korean and American—and Korean students and residents that were there.

My final conclusion was that the money that the Korean Government was going to give was to build a building, similar to a Korean palace with a tile roof, a beautiful building in ancient Korean architectural style. But I thought a building was not a very important project. I felt Korean Government money should be spent for academic activities or productive activities such as publications, seminars, or more cultural and scholarship exchanges.

But the main purpose of the money from the Korean Government was to build a building. So I personally objected. I made a very negative report to the home government. But the decision was finalized and the money came to the University of Hawaii and the construction went on. I think at this moment the building is almost completed.

Mr. FRASER. Did Professor Suh ever suggest he wanted to spend any part of that grant from the Korean Government for some other purpose?

Mr. KANG. Whenever I met Dr. Suh Dae Sook here in Washington or in Hawaii, Dr. Suh strongly denied any of the money the Korean Government gave to the University of Hawaii would be spent for any other purpose. Then my question was, how can you operate this institute without having available funds? His response was "I will get a grant from the Ford Foundation or maybe HEW, for funds for academic research, or use other financial resources," which he said would be available.

"So don't worry about further funding for academic activities of the Center for Korean Studies."

Mr. FRASER. Was the criticism of the Korean Government by professors at Harvard and other universities of concern to officials in the Korean Embassy?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Which professors at Harvard were of most concern?

Mr. KANG. I will explain it this way. I think most frequently mentioned were those who wrote letters and articles in the New York Times or Washington Post. At that critical moment for the Korean Government it could have been Cohen and Gregory Henderson, but I cannot recall exactly who brought this up and what was discussed, but it was the general sense that any such—

Mr. FRASER. Was the grant to Harvard in any way linked to the criticism of the Korean Government by Harvard professors?

Mr. KANG. To my knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. FRASER. In December 1974 did you write to individuals at Harvard University stating that Ambassador Hahn Pyong Choon

had instructed you to explore ways in which the Korean Government could contribute to the Harvard fundraising campaign?¹

Mr. KANG. I do not recall exactly, but I understand I did so.

Mr. FRASER. You have a general recollection that you did so?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. What were Ambassador Hahn's concerns about the proposed grant to Harvard University?

Mr. KANG. To my recollection, it was not the Korean Government but the Korean Traders Association that decided to donate \$1 million to the Harvard East Asia program to establish a Chair in Korean studies. It was not through embassy channels or whatever. I was instructed by the home government that the Korean Traders Association might contribute a certain amount of money to Harvard University. Then I was asked to explore the situation, whether this money could really be spent for the benefit of Korea in the long run or in the short run.

I discussed this matter with Ambassador Hahn because the Ambassador was a graduate of the Harvard Law School and was very familiar with the Harvard situation. So, I talked this matter over with Ambassador Hahn. That is why I wrote a letter, probably to Jeff Coolidge of the East Asia program. That is my recollection.

Mr. FRASER. You wrote a letter to Jeff Coolidge?

Mr. KANG. Yes, that is my understanding.

Mr. FRASER. Saying what?

Mr. KANG. He was at that time a fund raiser for the East Asia program.

Mr. FRASER. Was that the letter that we referred to earlier?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Did you have any discussion with any official at Harvard or anyone associated with this fundraising campaign during which you learned they were reluctant to approach representatives of the Korean Government for financial support?

Mr. KANG. I can't quite clearly comprehend the point of your question.

Mr. FRASER. Did you have additional discussion with any official at Harvard or anybody associated with the fundraising effort?

Mr. KANG. Yes, I did.

Mr. FRASER. During which you learned that they were reluctant to approach a representative of the Korean Government for a contribution?

Mr. KANG. To my knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. FRASER. No one expressed to you some reluctance about approaching the embassy or approaching the Government in Seoul about getting money?

Mr. KANG. No, sir. The only thing I clearly remember is that Jeff Coolidge of the fundraising program was very positive about the establishment of a Korean Chair at Harvard. I asked questions of many university officials, how the money would be raised, how this money would be spent, and if the Korean Traders Association provided this amount of money, will there be any matching funds available? I raised these types of questions many times.

¹ It was subsequently learned by the subcommittee that Mr. Kang's contact with Harvard had been by telephone rather than letter. A letter from Harvard to Kang referring to the conversation is contained in appendix 6A, p. 222.

Mr. FRASER. In the December 1974 letter, you wrote that Ambassador Hahn had instructed you to explore ways in which the Korean Government could contribute. Did you ever get a response to that letter either orally or in writing?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. They never answered?

Mr. KANG. As for the government contribution, what I meant at the time was cooperation. I understood the Korean Government had no intention to give money to Harvard University, but that the Korean Traders Association had decided to donate money to Harvard.

In this case the Korean Government played a very important role because Korean law is very strict; no one in Korea can transmit \$1 million outside the country. That is why I was instructed to find out if it was wise to approve the transaction of \$1 million to Harvard University.

Mr. FRASER. What you are saying is that your letter really referred to the Korean Government's approval of a transfer of money?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. By some nongovernmental source in Korea?

Mr. KANG. Right. Without governmental approval none of the Korean money could be sent to the United States.

Mr. FRASER. When did you first hear that the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation was going to make a grant to Harvard?

Mr. KANG. I think it was either the latter part of December 1974 or very early part of January 1975, if my memory is correct.

Mr. FRASER. That was after you had written that letter?

Mr. KANG. Yes; at that time when I wrote the letter—I don't know when I wrote the letter—I had never acted on my own initiative but I was instructed to explore.

Mr. FRASER. That is right. But you wrote that letter at the direction of Ambassador Hahn?

Mr. KANG. Not Ambassador Hahn but the home government.

Mr. FRASER. At that time you had no knowledge of the Korean Traders Association?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Then why did you write a letter out of the blue asking Harvard officials if they would be interested in Korean Government approval for the transfer of money, if you had no notion that anybody was even thinking of such a transfer?

Mr. KANG. That is a very difficult question for me. I acted as I was instructed.

Mr. FRASER. Now the characterization of the letter, as I understand it, was that you were to explore ways in which the Korean Government could contribute, not just to approve the transaction.

Mr. KANG. Contribute means a direct money transaction or any other favorable means of support. That is how I would interpret it in broad terms. In the English language I sometimes mix up this word with that word. So, I might have used the wrong word in that letter, but my recollection is that the government had no intention to give funds directly to that institution.

Mr. FRASER. But you did not put that in the letter?

Mr. KANG. I do not remember exactly what happened.

Mr. FRASER. In any event, subsequently you learned that the Korean Traders Association was going to make a grant to Harvard. Was that the first time you had ever heard of the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation making an overseas grant?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. They had never done it before?

Mr. KANG. The Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation provides huge amounts of scholarships to Korean students in Korea. But I have never heard before—

Mr. FRASER. Was the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation established by the Korean Traders Association?

Mr. KANG. That is my understanding.

Mr. FRASER. What is the relationship between the Korean Traders Association and the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. I have no idea about that. One thing I can definitely tell you is that any such large organization's activities must come under the direct supervision of the Government and without Government approval no such activity or program could be carried out.

Mr. FRASER. Was the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation asked by the Korean Government to make the donation to Harvard?

Mr. KANG. I have no idea about that, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Was it necessary for them to obtain Korean Government approval for the grant?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did you go to Harvard on instructions from the Ministry of Education in 1975?

Mr. KANG. Yes; I did.

Mr. FRASER. Did you go with Mr. Yang Yoon Sae, Economic Minister of the Korean Embassy and former economic adviser to President Park Chung Hee?

Mr. KANG. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Why were you instructed to go to Harvard?

Mr. KANG. As I explained before, the Korean Government was just about to approve or disapprove the transaction of a \$1 million grant to Harvard University. The Government was interested, especially I think the Minister of Education, in how this money would be spent, what kind of program would be carried out in the future, and what was the future prospect of this Korean chairmanship.

So, I was instructed to visit Harvard University and find out the details of the program.

Mr. FRASER. We understand you wrote a report after your visit to Harvard. What did the report say and to whom was it addressed?

Mr. KANG. It was addressed to the Minister of Education and the main point of that report was that in the long run if the program is carried out, in 10 or 20 years it will bear much favorable fruit, favorable to Korea. So, my report, the main point of the report was that I favored approval of the grant to Harvard University.

Mr. FRASER. Because in the long run it would prove to be favorable to Korea?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. What did you have in mind when you said favorable to Korea?

Mr. KANG. I understood at the time that the money, \$1 million, would be put into an endowment fund. Then it would earn 6 or 7 per cent interest annually. Then this money would be used for financing one chair, I mean one faculty member for the study of Korea; some money would be spent on obtaining materials related to Korean studies.

A further portion, I don't remember exactly how much it was, but a further portion would be spent as grants to students, I mean American students, to study in Korea or in America, to further or to explore the Korean culture, history, or whatever.

Mr. FRASER. Why was Minister Yang chosen to go with you to Harvard?

Mr. KANG. I understand Minister Yang's main function was economic attaché. That was his title. The Korean Traders Association is very closely linked to Korean Government economic agencies such as the Economic Planning Board, Ministry of Finance, or whatever. So actually Minister Yang was representing this type of financial ministry in Seoul. That is why I think he had his own channels to find out about the grant.

Mr. FRASER. Was it your understanding that Minister Yang also wrote a report on the Harvard situation?

Mr. KANG. I don't think he did, sir. He probably did, but he was not in a position to tell me whether he did or not.

Mr. FRASER. You have no knowledge?

Mr. KANG. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. Did Minister Yang express any concern about criticism of the Korean Government by Professors Reischauer and Cohen?

Mr. KANG. It was not only Minister Yang's concern but everybody's concern. He mentioned that type of thing to me and to the staff in the Embassy.

Mr. FRASER. He did express that concern?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. During your conversations with professors and administrators at Harvard were these concerns expressed by either Minister Yang or you? Did you tell these professors about your concerns?

Mr. KANG. My concerns, sir?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. KANG. Well, I have no concern about those people because I didn't know anything about them.

Mr. FRASER. What about Mr. Yang? Did he say anything to Harvard administrators or faculty?

Mr. KANG. I have no recollection about that.

Mr. FRASER. Was there any understanding with Harvard that the money would not be used for courses that dealt with political topics?

Mr. KANG. Well, if I am asked to say whether it is yes or no, then I would say yes. But, as I weighed the proposal made by the East Asia program, I think it was by Jeff Coolidge, he especially mentioned Korean social and economic studies. He proposed it that way. So I understood that the money would be spent for the time being for the study of Korean social, cultural, and economic development.

Mr. FRASER. Was it your understanding that by establishing a chair in "Modern Korean Economy and Society" the Korean Government

hoped to present a favorable picture of the Government of Korea and thereby balance the criticism of Korea by Harvard professors?

Mr. KANG. I have no knowledge about that.

Mr. FRASER. You have no knowledge?

Mr. KANG. No.

Mr. FRASER. Was there any discussion with Harvard officials about the use of the grant by individuals critical of the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. I understand we raised the question how the money would be spent because we feared the money might be spent for other purposes, like for the East Asia program, that is, it might be used for Japanese or Chinese studies. Specifically, we focused on the scope of scholarship activities to be funded by this donation. The response was, as I remember, that the system of Harvard University never allows any individual to utilize certain endowment money for purposes other than the original purpose.

That is what I pointed out at that time.

Mr. FRASER. Let me go back to my question. Was there any discussion with Harvard officials about the use of the grant by individuals critical of the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. Not precisely like that. But in general, about whether this money could be used for some other purpose.

Mr. FRASER. Could you explain what you mean?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir. As I explained to you before, whether the money could be used for Japanese studies or Chinese studies or North Korean studies or whatever. We raised that question but not precisely whether the money might be used by professors who were critical of Korea. I do not recollect any such conversations or any such talks.

Mr. FRASER. In testimony before this subcommittee on June 10, 1975, Mr. Lee Jai Hyon testified that discussions at the Embassy meetings referred to earlier involved plans to "organize indirectly or to finance covertly scholastic meetings, seminars, and symposia," in part to crush criticism of the Korean Government. Were such academic meetings and conferences within your responsibility as education attaché at the Embassy?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You had no responsibility for academic meetings and conferences?

Mr. KANG. My primary function was to provide coordination and cooperation to have this type of academic conference, if I knew about them. If I didn't know about them then I had nothing to do with it. But if any Korean Government money is involved I would take a close look at it.

Mr. FRASER. Were you aware of any meetings or conferences that were funded or organized by representatives of the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. Other than through my channels at the Embassy?

Mr. FRASER. With money that came through the Embassy?

Mr. KANG. I learned that several meetings were held.

Mr. FRASER. Several meetings or conferences?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. They were paid for by the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. That was my understanding, but I have no concrete evidence to prove it because the money did not come through my official channels at the Embassy.

Mr. FRASER. Through what channels did the money come?

Mr. KANG. I have no knowledge, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Then how do you know it was paid for by the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. Well, most people think that way, but I have never had any authority to seek out the truth as to where the money came from or whatever. If it did not come through my official channels, then I guess they kept very quiet about that.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, the money was handled by the KCIA, and you sort of kept your nose out of it?

Mr. KANG. I would not say in this case it was KCIA or whatever. My understanding is that the Korean Economic Association, not only KCIA but many others, would provide funds for that purpose. I won't say it was KCIA or—

Mr. FRASER. Besides the KCIA as a conduit for money, what other channels were available to the Government?

Mr. KANG. I have no evidence or concrete knowledge about that. But my understanding is that it could be individuals or representatives who would solicit funds for certain types of academic activities. Then if it was acceptable and favorable, then I think the money would be given to those individuals. That is just my general understanding.

Mr. FRASER. In what way would the money be given to them?

Mr. KANG. It could be in the form of cash or in the form of transactions through third channels or whatever.

Mr. FRASER. Cash or through a third channel?

Mr. KANG. Yes. In any case, I don't have any concrete evidence on that.

Mr. FRASER. There was a symposium in 1973 at the Washington Hilton Hotel called Korea and the Powers in the 1970's, which was sponsored by the Institute for Asian Studies and Kyung Nam University. Do you know what the Institute of Asian Studies was?

Mr. KANG. I have very limited knowledge about that.

Mr. FRASER. What do you know about it?

Mr. KANG. That institute has perhaps several academic purposes. I think that institute also published a Korean newsletter and distributed it to Korean residents in Washington.

Mr. FRASER. Where was the institute located?

Mr. KANG. I understand it was on Pennsylvania Avenue and 17th Street, NW.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know who ran it?

Mr. KANG. I think it was headed by Hahn Kwang Neun.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know how long it functioned?

Mr. KANG. I was assigned to Washington in November 1970. I understand the organization existed even before that.

Mr. FRASER. It existed in the fall of 1970?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Have you ever been to the institute?

Mr. KANG. Quite a few times I visited, not in relation to that type of academic activity, but it was publishing a newspaper in the Washington area. So in connection with the newspaper articles or any other

effort the education attaché's office is supposed to make for the benefit of Korean residents, I personally visited his office.

Mr. FRASER. So you went there frequently?

Mr. KANG. Not frequently, but maybe I would say—I don't know how many times would be called frequently—but whenever anything came up I visited his office.

Mr. FRASER. Would you go once or twice a month?

Mr. KANG. Maybe not that frequently.

Mr. FRASER. Once a month?

Mr. KANG. It is pretty hard to figure out. Whenever I had business with him, I visited him.

Mr. FRASER. Was he the only one there?

Mr. KANG. He had his own office.

Mr. FRASER. Alone?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. He ran the institute?

Mr. KANG. Well, I have never seen anybody doing research, any library or whatever, because he never introduced me. I have no knowledge other than his office.

Mr. FRASER. Where did he get his money?

Mr. KANG. I have no knowledge whatever.

Mr. FRASER. The name of the person running the institute was Hahn Kwang Neun?

Mr. KANG. Hahn Kwang Neun.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know if he was given money by Kim Sang Keun?

Mr. KANG. I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know who Kim Sang Keun is?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. You have no knowledge that he was giving money to Hahn Kwang Neun?

Mr. KANG. About that type of activity, I have no knowledge.

Mr. FRASER. At the time of this symposium, was it announced that it was being funded by the Korean Government?

Mr. KANG. As far as the symposium is concerned, I had no knowledge of it in advance or even after.

Mr. FRASER. So you had no information one way or the other?

Mr. KANG. No, sir, most of the time American or Korean scholars when they are going to have a certain type of academic meeting, I was usually invited to attend as an observer. But at this particular meeting I received no invitation and no advance knowledge at all.

Mr. FRASER. Is that institute still functioning?

Mr. KANG. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Was it still functioning at the time you left your job?

Mr. KANG. At the time I resigned from the embassy I am sure it was still in existence.

Mr. FRASER. Two years later in 1975 another conference was held at the Key Bridge Marriott Hotel sponsored by the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of George Washington University. This subcommittee in November 1977 heard testimony from Prof. Kim Young Chin of George Washington University that Ambassador Hahn conveyed a check for \$20,000 from the Ministry of Education to the Institute of

Sino-Soviet Studies to cover a portion of the cost of the conference. Do you recall that conference?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. At the time of the conference were you aware of the funding arrangement?

Mr. KANG. I had a slight idea of who was going to fund this program. I understand that Prof. Kim Young Chin had good access to Korean Government authorities.

I thought he might be able to get any amount of money necessary for funding.

Mr. FRASER. I gather you did not receive notification of this donation by the Ministry of Education for that 1975 conference?

Mr. KANG. I received no formal or informal notification through my channels.

Mr. FRASER. Ordinarily, if the Ministry of Education provided this money, wouldn't you be notified?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Why do you think you weren't notified in this case?

Mr. KANG. Not only in this case but also in many cases, when the final donation has been made without going through the Ambassador, then most of the time the official office was not informed. That is why I never raised the question.

Mr. FRASER. I asked you earlier about what channels might be used for giving support to these conferences.

Mr. KANG. As Professor Kim testified, he should have received the money.

Mr. FRASER. Directly from the ministry or through the Ambassador?

Mr. KANG. Through the Ambassador himself.

Mr. FRASER. That would be one source. Might the money also come from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs?

Mr. KANG. There is a possibility.

Mr. FRASER. How about money from the Korean Traders Association?

Mr. KANG. That is also a possibility.

Mr. FRASER. Was it also possible for such funding to go through KCIA channels?

Mr. KANG. I don't deny the possibility but I have no knowledge about that.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Lee Jai Hyon also testified you were personally involved with a Korean grant to Western Michigan University for a conference at that university in 1972. Do you recall that conference?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Did you deliver money to Prof. Andrew Nahm of Western Michigan University for this conference?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. How much money did you deliver to Professor Nahm?

Mr. KANG. I don't recall exactly but no more than \$1,000. It could have been either \$700 or \$1,000.

Mr. FRASER. In what form and from whom did the money come?

Mr. KANG. The money was given in the form of a check from the Ambassador.

Mr. FRASER. Was that Kim Dong Jo?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. This conference was held shortly after the implementation of the Yushin Constitution. Did you have a conversation at that time with Professor Nahm about writing a letter to the New York Times?

Mr. KANG. Yes; I did.

Mr. FRASER. Was that letter to be in response to a letter in the Times by Prof. Gregory Henderson of Tufts University, which was critical of the Yushin Constitution?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What was the substance of your conversation with Professor Nahm?

Mr. KANG. On this point, I would like to clarify a few points.

Mr. FRASER. Sure.

Mr. KANG. May I have permission to clarify this point from the beginning to end pertaining to Professor Lee's statement on this particular item?

Mr. FRASER. Sure.

Mr. KANG. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate having this opportunity to clarify some of the differences between Dr. Lee's statement and the actual happening.

Dr. Lee mentioned nothing but the truth that a seminar was held at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Mich., shortly after Park's October 1972 martial law. At this meeting, Dr. Lee stated, the Embassy education attaché masterminded and paid off this operation.

However, Mr. Chairman, this meeting at Kalamazoo was the second meeting. The first meeting was held in 1970, even before I was assigned to the Embassy in 1970. This went on since 1970, the institute planned to have this meeting every 2 years. The second conference on Korea was I understand even before the October Yushin—

Mr. FRASER. Let me ask you to suspend for a few minutes. There is another vote in progress. We will pick up as soon as Mr. Derwinski comes back.

Mr. KANG. Thank you very much.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. DERWINSKI. Dr. Kang, will you continue where you left off with Mr. Fraser. I think you were explaining a conversation with Professor Nahm or you were discussing your assignment to implement understanding of the Yushin Constitution. Was that it?

Mr. KANG. In relation to a covert payment to organize an academic meeting at Western Michigan University.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Fine. Proceed at that point.

Mr. KANG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Lee mentioned that I paid off this operation. I admit that what he said, paid off, is partly true. But the real story is quite different. I sent a check in the amount of no more than \$1,000, because I have no exact recollection of it, to the Center for Korean Studies in connection with the academic meeting. This was only a small portion of the total expenses of the whole meeting. It could be one-tenth or one-eighth of the money they needed. I understand that many institutions, organizations or individuals solicit such a donation from the Embassy. That is why I understood this donation was only a token to acknowledge an academic conference relating to Korea.

The organizer of this conference publicly made acknowledgement at the conference. Mr. Chairman, it is therefore my strong conviction that the second conference was organized and undertaken by this Center for Korean Studies' own initiation. As far as I know, nothing was done by the Embassy to organize indirectly or to finance covertly this meeting at Kalamazoo, Mich., in 1972.

Dr. Lee also mentioned that as the result of this paid-off operation the education attaché boasted that the organizer of this meeting wrote a letter to the New York Times. What Dr. Lee said in this part was also true. But I don't agree with his statement as a whole. In a private conversation I expressed my personal opinion about the letter to the New York Times by Professor Henderson entitled "Rape of Democracy in Korea."

At this casual talk with Dr. Nahm he agreed with my feeling and he said he was already thinking of writing a letter to the New York Times. It could have been a month or so later after the meeting that Dr. Nahm's letter appeared in the New York Times.

But after reading his letter to the editor, I found that Dr. Nahm did not write such a favorable letter to Korea. What I remember now is that Dr. Nahm even denied the existence of democracy in Korea. I don't believe Dr. Nahm would write a letter favorable or in support of a Korean party at my simple suggestion.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, academic meetings held in Kalamazoo, Mich., were never influenced by the Korean Embassy. Dr. Lee Jai Hyon's statement pointed it out to some effect but I believe he did not express enough details to comprehend the entire situation so far as this matter is concerned.

Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to clarify my points.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, this letter that eventually appeared in the New York Times from Dr. Nahm was entirely his own statement and you didn't have any input, nor did you direct any part of it?

Mr. KANG. As I mentioned before, I handed over no more than a \$1,000 cash or check to the institute. At a previous meeting in 1970 it was not me but the Ambassador who at that time gave I think \$700 or \$1,000 to that institution. So, it is a fact that I gave him money, I gave the institution money, but I had no intention to pay off this academic meeting, sir.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now we will move on to another subject which is that of student demonstrations.

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. DERWINSKI. As part of your responsibilities were you expected to monitor student demonstrations against the Korean Government in the Washington, D.C., area?

Mr. KANG. That is correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you recall how many demonstrations occurred during the period you served as education attaché?

Mr. KANG. I cannot recall exactly how many times such demonstrations were taking place. At least 10 demonstrations were held during the period of my service at the Embassy in the 5½-year period.

Mr. FRASER. Was there anyone else at the Embassy who also monitored these demonstrations?

Mr. KANG. I understand that the consular section was generally responsible for Koreans living abroad and also I understand that Korean CIA agents were monitoring the situation.

Mr. FRASER. Did you report to the KCIA after monitoring demonstrations?

Mr. KANG. Well, the term "report" I do not agree with, but we had close coordination with KCIA agents. So whatever information we had, we had to pass the information to sections or personnel concerned, such as consular section.

Mr. FRASER. Did you take pictures of the demonstration?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Were some taken?

Mr. KANG. No.

Mr. FRASER. Was there a point during your tenure as education attaché in which these demonstrations became more frequent?

Mr. KANG. Especially after Yushin in October 1972.

Mr. FRASER. When you heard there was to be a demonstration against the Korean Government did you meet with the student leaders in private and persuade them not to hold the demonstration?

Mr. KANG. Yes, I did. But I didn't say clearly or exactly "stop demonstrating."

Mr. FRASER. But you tried to persuade them not to?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir, just to render friendly advice as a grownup or a senior person, let them know what will happen as a result and so forth. I rendered friendly advice.

Mr. FRASER. As to what could happen?

Mr. KANG. Whenever I heard information that Korean students might organize an antigovernment demonstration, then I maintained very close friendly contact with the student leaders and I met them very frequently, and advised them not to violate American law and order, and not to engage in any activities favorable to North Korea. In this way I frequently rendered advice to those students.

Mr. FRASER. Did you tell them that if they went ahead with the demonstration it might be difficult for them to find jobs later in Korea?

Mr. KANG. I probably told them so.

Mr. FRASER. Did you tell them that the FBI might be interested in the demonstrators and might be watching them if the demonstration was considered pro-Communist?

Mr. KANG. Yes, I did.

Mr. FRASER. Did you suggest that the \$1,500 annual support that the Embassy gave to the Korean Student Association might be cut off if they went ahead with the demonstration?

Mr. KANG. Yes, I did.

Mr. FRASER. Would you say that your warnings were simply friendly advice or intimidation designed to prevent the demonstrations?

Mr. KANG. It was only friendly advice. In order to prove this, I never cut off, and I never proposed to cut off, this fund even though the amount was—

Mr. FRASER. Even though you may have considered your words to be friendly advice, is it possible or even likely that the students may have perceived them as intimidation or threat?

Mr. KANG. I don't think the student leaders in the Washington area interpreted my words that way because they are highly intellectual

and they are very friendly to me. Because I make many friendly relationships with them, I do not believe they would interpret my language in that sense.

Mr. FRASER. It is possible that a few might have?

Mr. KANG. If anyone looks into that angle they might accept it that way but I don't believe—

Mr. FRASER. If you told somebody who was going to demonstrate that if they went ahead they might not be able to get a job in Korea, wouldn't that be intimidation?

Mr. KANG. Such a statement would never be a strong influence to a student because the student knows this very well.

Mr. FRASER. You mean he already knew it?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir. It is a known fact.

Mr. FRASER. Wouldn't this mean that somehow the information that they personally were taking part in the demonstrations was going to get back to Seoul, Korea?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Your words would underscore that fact, would they not?

Mr. KANG. I would say it this way, sir, Mr. Chairman. Whatever I told the students they had their freedom to interpret my language. To the best of my knowledge those students were quite experienced and quite knowledgeable about what is going on in Korea. And what the Government will do if they do not act favorably toward Korea.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, you did not have to tell them; they already knew?

Mr. KANG. Right. As a reminder, sometimes, not frequently, once in a while, I think I mentioned it that way. It was entirely up to the student to interpret my language.

Mr. FRASER. Were you ever asked by Lee Sang Ho or any other official in the Korean Embassy to do more to prevent demonstrations against the Korean Government by Korean students or others in the Korean community?

Mr. KANG. I was asked many times not only by the authorities but many Koreans living in this area, regarding "how Lee Sang Ho strongly instructed you to prevent or stop demonstrating or any type of antigovernment activity." To my surprise he never gave such a strong instruction to me. His basic attitude toward demonstrations was rather a hands-off policy. If you get in touch with those students, really try to stop them from demonstrating, then there will be another byproduct or a side effect from that type of contact.

So, he said, "just keep hands off, wait and see." To my surprise, he never gave a strong instruction or any suggestion to stop, directly or indirectly, student demonstrations.

Mr. FRASER. Why were you surprised?

Mr. KANG. I was not in a position directly under Minister Lee's chain of command. However, if I was asked to do it, then I was not in the position to refuse or reject his suggestion or instruction or whatever.

Mr. FRASER. Going back, it is clear, I gather, that insofar as possible the names of the students taking part in the demonstration were sent back to Seoul, Korea?

Mr. KANG. Once in a while they were sent back. Who the organizer was, how the demonstration took place.

Mr. FRASER. And those that took part?

Mr. KANG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, have you ever heard of the Research Institute on Korean Affairs headed by Gen. Kang Yong Hoon?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. This subcommittee has received a copy of the list of contributors to the Research Institute on Korean Affairs. I think you have a copy of that. I think on page 7 of this list is the following entry. "Mr. Kwan Sik Min, Minister of Education, Seoul, Korea, in care of Mr. Kyung Koo Kang." Is this a reference to you?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. There are two other entries, both also for \$10,000 on pages 8 and 10. Are those references also to you?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, did the Ministers of Education give you this money in order that they might make contributions through you totaling \$30,000 to the Research Institute?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. If the Ministers of Education did not give you this money, how did these transactions take place?

Mr. KANG. I beg your pardon?

Mr. FRASER. If the Ministers of Education did not give you this money where did you get it?

Mr. KANG. I do not remember exactly when it was, but one day—and maybe four or five times I think—he visited my office.

Mr. FRASER. Who did?

Mr. KANG. General Kang.

Mr. FRASER. The head of the institute?

Mr. KANG. The head of the Research Institute on Korean Affairs visited my office and asked me to make out a check in the amount of \$10,000 or maybe \$20,000, payable to the Research Institute. He tendered that same amount of money in cash to me. That is why I made a check to the institute because it brought no financial loss to me. So I took the money and I gave him a check.

Mr. FRASER. Why would you do it for General Kang?

Mr. KANG. Well, General Kang is considered a very influential person in Korea, also he was known as a Korean scholar and he was operating the Korean Research Institute, specializing in Korean affairs, so I maintained a very friendly relationship with General Kang. He brought that money and asked me to make out a check. I was not in a position to reject his demand. If that would have brought any financial loss to me I might have given a different answer, but since it brought no financial loss to me, I accepted the money.

Mr. FRASER. Was General Kang in the Government at that time?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Why do you say you were not in a position to reject it then?

Mr. KANG. As a matter of fact, it is because of a very different cultural background.

Mr. FRASER. You just felt by reason of his status and standing—

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir, because if it did not hurt me I just did whatever he asked. But if I am too inquisitive about senior people, not only about Government seniors but in any social respect, then it was considered unacceptable as good manners.

Mr. FRASER. Did he tell you where the cash came from?

Mr. KANG. He did not clearly state how he got the money but he said "I got the money from the Ministry of Education and I want this money in the form of a check." But I had no way to write that check on an official account so I gave him my personal check.

Mr. FRASER. Did you ask him why he wanted to route it through you?

Mr. KANG. As I explained to you, it didn't bring me any financial loss or whatever, so I felt I had better keep quiet and remain silent. I was brought up in Korea and I was taught that way and that is why I didn't make any inquiry into this matter.

Mr. FRASER. This subcommittee has requested and obtained copies of statements from your checking account for the months in question. These statements show deposits and checks for the amounts on the list of contributors. Without objection I will enter them in the record.¹

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, on pages 6 and 9 of the list of contributors your name appears as having made contributions of \$4,000 and \$2,000. Did you make those contributions?

Mr. KANG. No, sir. He gave me money and asked me for a check in the same amount. I did it also in the same manner.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, you wrote the checks but it was under the same arrangement?

Mr. KANG. Right. But it never brought me any financial loss.

Mr. FRASER. Could you tell the subcommittee how these entries happen to appear in the list of contributors?

Mr. KANG. The monthly statement shows the entry of those checks.

Mr. FRASER. I take it that General Kang must have listed you then as a contributor, is that correct?

Mr. KANG. He may have listed my name as a contributor. That is because I wrote a check.

Mr. FRASER. To sum it up, although you were listed as having made these contributions totaling \$36,000, either personally on or on behalf of the Ministers of Education, you actually received all the money in cash from Gen. Kang Young Hoon and simply wrote checks to the Research Institute for Korean Affairs for him, is that correct?

Mr. KANG. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Would you describe these transactions as strange or out of the ordinary?

Mr. KANG. It must be strange. As I mentioned before, I never made further inquiries where this money came from.

Mr. FRASER. Did you engage in this kind of transaction on any other occasion?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Did other officials at the Embassy engage in the same kind of transaction?

Mr. KANG. I have no knowledge.

Mr. FRASER. On June 22, 1977, Kim Hyung Wook testified before this subcommittee that the KCIA decided that the Korean Traders Association should assume the cost of financing the Research Institute

¹ See appendix 6B, p. 223.

on Korean Affairs. I would like the record to show that the list of contributors to the Research Institute indicates that complete funding for it was underwritten in January 1976 by the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation, an educational organization established by the Korean Traders Association.

Mr. Kang, according to an unclassified summary of U.S. intelligence information:

In mid-1973 the KCIA was attempting to improve its efforts abroad and make its operations among Korean nationals living abroad, particularly in the United States, more sophisticated. One of the results of this attempt was the instruction that all non-KCIA officers assigned abroad would have to take a course in intelligence work.

Mr. Kang, did you as an officer in the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., ever receive this kind of intelligence instruction while serving as educational attaché?

Mr. KANG. I have never received any such specific instruction.

Mr. FRASER. You have never had a course or instruction on intelligence work?

Mr. KANG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. To your knowledge did any other officer at the Embassy receive such a course in intelligence work?

Mr. KANG. Any officials who go outside, abroad, must take a kind of briefing session or training session at the Korean Central Intelligence Agency before their assignment. My case was exceptional because I never took that kind of session. I would say that all Government officials took that type of session.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, Lee Jai Hyon in his testimony before this subcommittee testified that at one of the meetings in the Embassy, a nine-point plan was discussed for influencing American policy or American attitudes toward Korea. Have you reviewed his testimony?

Mr. KANG. I didn't review his testimony on that part. I think that I have a copy.

Mr. FRASER. But you are familiar generally with what he said?

Mr. KANG. Yes, sir. I reviewed his remarks on the first statement when he made testimony before your committee about the covert operations, whatever. On that part, because I was very much seriously considered in that part, I looked into it, but I have never taken a look at his other testimony.

Mr. FRASER. Do you recall being present when this nine-point plan was discussed in the Embassy?

Mr. KANG. I have no recollection. I attended most of the general meetings but this could have been a special session, or I might have traveled to some other area on official duty. Then I may not have had access to the meeting. To my knowledge I cannot exactly recall what the proposal was.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, are you a U.S. citizen?

Mr. KANG. No, sir. I am still—

Mr. FRASER. A permanent resident?

Mr. KANG. No, sir. Technically I am still holding diplomatic status. I now have applied for permanent residency at the Immigration Office. I think that case will be reviewed by the Congress. It may take quite some time. So I am still a status adjustment applicant.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Kang, we very much appreciate your testimony today. In preparation for your testimony did you have occasion to

receive assistance from any personnel of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea?

Mr. KANG. Surprisingly I had no contact, formally or informally until this moment. Just yesterday I met one of the committee staff. I asked him "Is my name made public on the appearance notice?"

He said yes.

I told him surprisingly I have never had any contact whatsoever. This is entirely based on my knowledge, my experience and my belief, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, sir. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I will go back to the question Mr. Fraser asked you when he quoted from an unclassified summary of U.S. intelligence information. That was, whether you received any kind of intelligence instruction while serving as education attaché.

Let me rephrase that by asking did you receive any kind of instruction other than in your area of expertise as an education attaché?

Mr. KANG. No; nothing ever identified as instruction, particularly in connection with that type of purpose.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do you know if the North Koreans are making any attempts to influence the American academic community, directly or indirectly?

Mr. KANG. Mr. Congressman, my serious concern here in the United States as education attaché was that I thought the North Koreans could influence Korean students or Korean scholars or those who are critical to Korea. That was very much a serious concern. I tried to get as much information or data on such activities. But unfortunately I had very limited access to such activities and I couldn't gather any substantial amount of information about that.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I have only one other question, a very general question.

What do you feel is the overall attitude of the Korean-American community toward the present Government of Korea?

Mr. KANG. I would say my general view or understanding about the Korean community toward the Korean Government, is that there might be a half-half split. One is very much critical and the other very much in favor. The critical I think is due to many factors, political reasons, economic reasons, or social-cultural conflict or whatever.

Those who are favorable to the Korean Government, it might be that they have been away from the Korean Government for a long time and they have a kind of attachment because culturally they are linked to Korea. That is why they have a very strong attachment.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony today.

Mr. KANG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. We will turn now to our final witness, Mr. Lim Kee Seo, who is appearing today under subpoena to testify to his knowledge of certain financial transactions of the Research Institute on Korean Affairs. Mr. Lim has requested he not be photographed during his appearance before the subcommittee.

In accordance with paragraph (m) of clause 2(k) (5) of rule 11 of the House of Representatives, supplemented by rule 9(b) of the rules of the investigation, we will comply with Mr. Lim's request.

I will now ask that you cover all camera lenses and turn off all recording devices during Mr. Lim's appearance. That instruction on tape recording extends to everyone present in the hearing room today.

Mr. Lim, will you please state your full name for the record?

**STATEMENT OF KEE SEO LIM, FORMER ASSISTANT PRESS ATTACHE,
KOREA INFORMATION OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

Mr. LIM. Yes; Kee Seo Lim.

Mr. FRASER. It is pronounced Kee Seo Lim?

Mr. LIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Would you raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LIM. Yes; I do.

Mr. FRASER. You are a naturalized U.S. citizen, is that right?

Mr. LIM. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. What business are you currently engaged in?

Mr. LIM. A wig store.

Mr. FRASER. In Baltimore?

Mr. LIM. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. Did you serve as assistant press attaché at the Korean Information Office in Washington between 1968 and 1969?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Since 1970 have you been engaged in business in the Baltimore area?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. You are here under subpena, is that right?

Mr. LIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. While at the Korean Information Office in Washington did you meet an employee of the Korean Embassy by the name of Choi Hong Tae?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What was Mr. Choi's position at the Embassy?

Mr. LIM. He was the counselor of the Political Affairs Section.

Mr. FRASER. For the record, during yesterday's testimony Kim Sang Keun confirmed as authentic a partial list of KCIA officers stationed in the United States. Included in that list was the name of Counselor Choi Hong Tae. In March of 1973 did Mr. Choi come to your wig store in Baltimore?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. At that time was Mr. Choi still in the service of the Republic of Korea at the Embassy in Washington?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Were you aware at that time that Mr. Choi was an official of the KCIA?

Mr. LIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Choi came to your store and asked you to contribute some money to the Research Institute on Korean Affairs, is that right?

Mr. LIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. What did you tell him when he asked you to make a contribution?

Mr. LIM. He said he was trying to raise funds for the Research Institute on Korean Affairs. He asked me to contribute money. At that time I didn't have much money. He gave me a check and I wrote a check to the Research Institute on Korean Affairs.

Mr. FRASER. At that time did you know what the Research Institute on Korean Affairs was?

Mr. LIM. Not much, no.

Mr. FRASER. You had heard of it?

Mr. LIM. Yes; I had heard of it.

Mr. FRASER. But you didn't know much about it?

Mr. LIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. After you told Mr. Choi you could not afford to contribute he offered you a personal check, is that right?

Mr. LIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Then he asked you in turn to write a check to the institute?

Mr. LIM. Yes; because I did not have much money at that time.

Mr. FRASER. You did not have your own money?

Mr. LIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. How much was the check that he gave you?

Mr. LIM. \$10,000.

Mr. FRASER. How much did you write out the check for?

Mr. LIM. \$10,000.

Mr. FRASER. The check that you wrote to the institute, was that a personal check from your account?

Mr. LIM. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. Did you deliver that check to him after you wrote it?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. What did you do with Mr. Choi's check to you?

Mr. LIM. I beg your pardon. I did not understand.

Mr. FRASER. The check which Mr. Choi gave to you, what did you do with that?

Mr. LIM. I deposited it in my bank account, that is, my checking account.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Lim, earlier today a reference was made to a list of contributors to the Research Institute on Korean Affairs. This list was submitted to the Internal Revenue Service by the institute and was used as a basis of claiming tax-exempt status. Do you have a copy of that list in front of you?

Mr. LIM. Yes; I have a copy.

Mr. FRASER. If you will turn to page 5 you will see your name listed as having contributed \$10,000 to the Research Institute on Korean Affairs on March 23, 1973. Is that contribution, so far as you can tell, the same transaction that you have just described for us?

Mr. LIM. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. When you gave your check to Mr. Choi to whom did he say he would give it?

Mr. LIM. I heard that he gave the check to the Research Institute on Korean Affairs.

Mr. FRASER. Do you remember who was the head of it?

Mr. LIM. Yes. I heard his name, Kang Young Hoon.

Mr. FRASER. He said he would give the check to General Kang?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Shortly after this transaction did you receive a letter from General Kang thanking you for your contribution?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Have you ever met General Kang?

Mr. LIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. Have you ever engaged in any other transactions on behalf of Mr. Choi, General Kang, or the KCIA?

Mr. LIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. Did you deduct this transaction as a tax-exempt contribution on your personal income tax?

Mr. LIM. No.

Mr. FRASER. Did you later learn, yourself, that Mr. Choi was a member of the KCIA?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. When did you learn that?

Mr. LIM. He was under Mr. Kang Young Hoon.

Mr. FRASER. He was what?

Mr. LIM. Mr. Choi was working for Mr. Kang.

Mr. FRASER. At that time you learned he had been with the KCIA?

Mr. LIM. Yes; later.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did you serve in any capacity for the Korean Government before your 2-year assignment here as Assistant Press Officer?

Mr. LIM. Yes. I was engaged in the Korean Ministry of Information.

Mr. FRASER. That was your only service in the United States during your 2-year assignment?

Mr. LIM. That is right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Regarding the question Mr. Fraser asked you—your eventually being aware that Mr. Choi Hong Tae was a KCIA agent—did you find that out from hearsay or conversations in the Korean community, or how did that information come to you?

Mr. LIM. It was in the local Korean community papers.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Was this a sort of general knowledge?

Mr. LIM. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Lim, on behalf of the subcommittee I would like to thank you for your testimony here today. I would like to note further that this subcommittee is not aware of any evidence that would suggest any wrongdoing on your part.

Mr. LIM. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Further investigation by the subcommittee has revealed that numerous other individuals and corporations in the United States and Korea were involved in contributions similar to those of Mr. Kang Kyung Koo and Mr. Lim Kee Seo. To date the laundering of over \$130,000 by the Research Institute on Korean Affairs has been substantiated by the subcommittee staff. It is our intention to make these laundering transactions public at some point in the future during the course of the investigation.

Again, my thanks to you, and we will now recess the hearing until June 13, at which time we have invited Rev. Moon to appear. However, we are not certain that he will be here on the 13th of June.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned until Tuesday, June 13, 1978.]

APPENDIX 1

DOCUMENTS OBTAINED FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A. LETTER FROM DIRECTOR OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, DATED APRIL 18, 1974

UNCLASSIFIED

EC. 5/30/74
BR

April 18, 1974

American Ambassador
Seoul

Dear

You have received from the Admin Area a telegram explaining that a Special Assistant to the President named John Nidecker will be visiting you in late April. Just as soon as this visit was laid on I arranged to have Nidecker come in for a briefing.

Nidecker explained that he was a Philadelphian who had been connected with the President for several years, going back, I believe, before the White House period. As I got the picture, he had been connected with the President's election campaigns in one way or another as a voluntary worker. I am unclear as to what his exact field was. Subsequently, he became a Special Assistant with an office in the Executive Office Building and became involved in the National Prayer Breakfasts arrangements. He recalled for me that these had originally started as White House Prayer Breakfasts, but with congressional and outside endorsement had grown into a "National Prayer Breakfast" held annually. In addition, he mentioned that he has contact with various organizations and led me to believe that he has on occasions made trips overseas as an advance man before presidential visits.

Nidecker said his visit to Korea was on official business, representing the President.

He explained that the invitation had been extended by a Korean Assemblyman, whom he described but whose name he could not recall. I assumed it was Ro Chin Hwan. He had very little more to say about the origin of this visit than what I have reported.

My main interest was in making sure Nidecker was aware of political sensitivities in Korea at this time, and that neither his visit nor the White House connection be manipulated beyond reason. I told him specifically that, whatever his motivation was, he should realize the Koreans had their own reasons for inviting him at this time and that they would do their utmost to manipulate the trip for ulterior motivations. I discussed the situation in Korea, with some emphasis on student as well as Christian dissent, and said that I considered it important that he check in with you on arrival. I also thought that, inasmuch as his visit was quasi-religious in character, he use the opportunity as well to listen carefully to the views of the Christian community in Korea.

While I had Nidecker here in the office, I took advantage of the opportunity to urge caution by the White House staff concerning contact with Reverend Moon and his Unification Church, as well as others, including Park Tong Sun. He had nothing to say about

the latter, but had some interesting things to say about the former. In a nutshell, it boiled down to somebody on the White House staff having concluded they could make points in connection with the Unification Church support. Subsequently, apparently, someone seems to have realized what they let the President in for and I had the impression from Nidecker there would be no repeat of that identification.

I trust the above will be of some use to you. I would appreciate your sharing it with

All the best.

Sincerely,

Director for Korean Affairs

B. LETTER FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO JOHN E. NIDECKER, DATED
MAY 6, 1974

UNCLASSIFIED per E.C. 5/27/74
PK

Seoul, Korea

OFFICIAL-INTERNAL

May 6, 1974

Honorable John E. Nidecker
Special Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear John:

Enclosed you will find a copy of the letter which accompanied the return of the envelope given to you by Park Chong Kyu. The envelope contained ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.) in one hundred dollar bills. I regret that you had to be put to such an embarrassment. Your reaction to this transaction reinforces my high opinion of you as a person. I think it was best to handle it in the manner we have.

I am holding the knowledge of this attempted transaction very closely in the Embassy and do not expect that there will be any further complications.

It was a pleasure to have you here, and I look forward to seeing you again.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

Copy of
letter to Park Chong Kyu,
dated May 6, 1974.

C. LETTER FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO PARK CHONG KYU, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE FORCE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED MAY 6, 1974

Seoul, Korea

May 6, 1974

Mr. Park Chong Kyu
Director
Presidential Protective Force
Republic of Korea

Dear Mr. Park:

Before leaving Korea, Mr. John Nidecker gave this envelope, containing ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.), to an Embassy Officer. He said the envelope had come from you and he wished it returned.

Very truly yours,

American Ambassador

Enclosure.

cc: Mr. John Nidecker

*Original turned
over to
you delivery - 5.6.74*

D. LETTER FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DIRECTOR OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED MAY 7, 1974

12/12/74
Reg no 987415
UNCLASIFIED

Seoul, May 7, 1974

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

, Esquire
Director, EA/K
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear

This is to fill you in on the visit of John Nidecker from the White House. Mr. Nidecker was here as a guest of the Korean government, or more precisely the Annual Presidential Prayer Breakfast Committee. He came with Dr. _____ who by his own description is a promoter of government-sponsored prayer breakfasts at the national, province and city level throughout Asia.

The main purpose of Nidecker's visit was to represent President Nixon at the 7th Annual Presidential Prayer Breakfast on May 1 at the Grand Ballroom of the Chosun Hotel. Those present included President and Mrs. Park, Kim Chong-pil, Chong Il-kwon, Dr. Chong Il-hyong, Dr. Cha Chi-chol, Reverend Han Kyong-chik and about 500 guests including 50 foreigners.

There was a revealing muddle over Mr. Nidecker delivering a message to the Prayer Breakfast--or was it to President Park?--from President Nixon. National Assemblyman Row

Chin-hwan, who was Nidecker's guide, told him he would be called on to deliver his message just before the benediction. Nidecker wrote a pleasant five-minute speech which he closed by saying that President Nixon had instructed him to tell the Korean people "Listen to God." Row read it and told Nidecker he had hoped for something addressed to President Park personally. The local press had already reported that Nidecker came with a message from one President to the other. When Nidecker declined to invent one, he was not called on at all, the emcee merely announcing that Nidecker had brought greetings from President Nixon. Nidecker did get to deliver his talk the next day at a National Assembly Prayer Breakfast, attended by some fifty Assemblymen.

Nidecker commented privately when he first arrived that he realized his presence would be used for political purposes but said he would be cautious. He was true to his word. Nidecker avoided public statements and he stayed out of the clutches of the Campus Crusade for Christ and the Little Angels, both of which went after him. Although Row was his nominal sponsor, Presidential Protective Force director Pak Chong-kyu took over and was in fact the major ROK official involved. Pak gave a "surrealistic" picnic buffet for Nidecker and later in an obvious and crude fashion tried to influence Nidecker. For his part, Nidecker rejected Pak's solicitations with dignity.

At a luncheon I hosted, Mr. Nidecker met

Later we arranged for him to call
on these two, plus

's contribution was to give Mr. Nidecker an
unvarnished biographic sketch of Moon Myong-son and a

vivid description of what it is that attracts people to the Unification Church. She told the story of an Ehwa girl who joined the Unification Church and the church hid her from her family. Her brother then joined the church, located her and rescued her. Afterwards he described his ordeal in finding her. At breakfast with me on May 5 Nidecker related _____'s story and I took the occasion to dwell a little on the subject of Reverend Moon. His concluding comments on the Unification Church were that it was "Bad news all the way" and that he would warn the White House of Moon's background and his church's activities.

The Ministry of Defense gave Nidecker a military briefing
 our request that the USFK J-2, Captain _____ They accepted
 sit in.

1

1

Nidecker told me that he will be writing a report to the President giving the attitude of Korean Christians as well as the information he gleaned on Reverend Moon. My impression is that

Personally

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

E. MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES FROM DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED JUNE 5, 1974

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

June 5, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Korean Offer of Funds for Congressional
Election

John Nidecker, Special Assistant to the President, called me over today for a debriefing of his recent visit to Seoul. Also present were _____ of the NSC. Mr. Nidecker provided a detailed review of his activities in Seoul. He also mentioned his concern for the statements made by _____, who had accompanied him on the visit, and who without authorization publicly justified President Park's emergency measures in terms of the North Korean threat.

During the course of our discussion, Mr. Nidecker stated that he had been approached today by DRP Korean Assemblyman Row Chin Hwan, whom he had met in Korea and who was visiting the United States. Row had told Nidecker that Korean sources (I believe the reference was to the Korean Government) were prepared to contribute financially to the election. He stated they were prepared to contribute on the order of five to ten thousand dollars for any candidate for election to the House, and on the order of from ten to twenty thousand dollars for any Senator, whose name was on a list to be furnished by the White House. Mr. Nidecker had declined to become involved in such an arrangement, but wanted me to know of the proffer.

I told Mr. Nidecker that it was my intention to report this information immediately to Ambassador Habib, now in the Department on consultation, with

UNCLASSIFIEDPer GC-5/20/78
HJ

- 2 -

the recommendation that as soon as he returned to Seoul he find the best possible means to pass the word to those most responsible for this offer that it was improper and illegal, and that if the Korean authorities involved knew what was good for them they would cease such offers.

I reported this matter the same day to Ambassador Habib as indicated.

Director for Korean Affairs

Copies to:

F. LETTER FROM JOHN E. NIDECKER, THE WHITE HOUSE, TO U.S. AMBASSADOR,
SEOUL, DATED JULY 3, 1974

WASHINGTON

July 3, 1974

Dear []

Chin When Row is now in California after an extended stay in Washington. It is anticipated that he will be returning to Seoul shortly. There are some things of which you should be aware which were discussed here at the White House.

Row brought several gifts which were described as "personal" for members of the President's staff. Presentations were made to [] and me. He had other gifts which he had mentioned but never delivered. At one point he visited [] to whom he made some kind of presentation.

While he was here he asked me to extend a personal invitation to Mr. Park of the Presidential Protective Force to come to the United States in September. Row later informed me that he would be coming with Mr. Park but that he would be staying beyond the visit in order to help "the old man" in the elections. This is rather touchy as you know from your conversations with [] about his offer to assist in our electoral process.

Another idea he advanced was that he and Mr. Park would make a sizable contribution to Bishop [] of the Anglican Cathedral and that the contribution would be made in my behalf. As you must realize, I cannot accept that kind offer.

One more event which occurred was the result of a contact made with Senator [] concerning a Christian who had been jailed. It seems that Row was able to explain certain circumstances which caused the government to release her. The other contacts on Capital Hill were made to offset statements by a member of the Japanese Diet who had spoken with several members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the Korean government.

UNCLASSIFIED

In view of the foregoing information, I have written to Row declining his offers and have attached a copy of that letter so that you are aware of my correspondence with him. I discussed the letter with _____ of the National Security Council and with _____ so that they too are aware of the problem.

I am sure that you understand my position, which I must maintain in order to opt out of a potential problem. It is regrettable that I must call on you to assist in this situation, but I feel that your office is the only one that can handle it. Many thanks to you for your friendship and your kindnesses.

Sincerely,

John E. Nidecker
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable
Ambassador
U.S. Embassy
APO, San Francisco 96503

UNCLASSIFIED

G. LETTER FROM JOHN E. NIDECKER, THE WHITE HOUSE, TO ROW CHIN HWAN,
DATED JULY 3, 1974

WASHINGTON

July 3, 1974

Dear Mr. Row:

It was unfortunate that I did not have more of an opportunity to be with you during your visit due to my being out of Washington. As I explained, my duties are varied and thus take me far from here at times. Our meetings were certainly pleasant and I appreciate all you have done to make them so. Everyone is grateful to you for your kindness and all appreciate your generosity.

Insofar as the proposed visit that you and Mr. Park plan in September is concerned, I cannot predict what my assignment might be at that time. For that reason, I am unable to determine whether or not I will be able to join you both while you are here. If it should become possible that my schedule could be arranged to meet with you, I will advise you. Another regret I have is that I do not believe that I will be able to attend the ceremonies for Korean Armed Forces Day in October. This is something I would like to do but which has become impossible.

When you were here you mentioned an offer of a gift to the Anglican Cathedral in my name. First, I cannot accept the offer due to my position with our government. Secondly, my activity in the church precludes my accepting your generous offer. These are rules which I must obey and therefore ask that you do not make that contribution in my behalf.

UNCLASSIFIED

We hope that your wife will enjoy the small gift Mrs. Nidecker sent her. You might mention to her how grateful I am that she had that picture made from my photograph.

As I said before, I am sorry that we did not have more time together and I hope that we will have an opportunity in the future to visit for a longer period.

Sincerely,

John E. Nidecker
Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Chin Hwan Row
National Assembly of the
Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea

P.S. - I have attached a copy of my letter to President Park for your files.

UNCLASSIFIED

H. LETTER FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO JOHN E. NIDECKER, DATED
JULY 15, 1974

UNCLASSIFIED

Seoul, Korea

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

July 15, 1974

Mr. John E. Nidecker
Special Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear John:

Thank you very much for your letter of July 3. I greatly appreciate your keeping me informed on these matters. As you know, I also have the highest regard for the integrity with which you are dealing with what is obviously an unsavory affair.

I concur completely with your decision to have nothing to do with either promoting a visit by Mr. Park to Washington, gifts in your name to the Anglican Cathedral, or attending the October Armed Forces Day in Seoul. On the basis of the information you have provided on this occasion and as a result of your earlier contact with Mr. Row, it is apparent that

I suggest you inform General Haig of my considered judgment that it would not be wise for anyone in The White House to have anything whatsoever to do with Mr. Row. Please tell General Haig this is a

personal message from me. General Haig knows me well from the past and I believe has some reason to trust my judgment.

I am glad you are keeping fully informed of these matters, as I will also. I believe we must continue to consider that Mr. Row is

I
intend to base any dealings this Embassy may have with him on that presumption.

As you can see, I feel rather strongly about this. They are trying to use you in the most blatant fashion and do not give up even in the face of your polite but clear rejection of their overtures. It may be that you will have to be more blunt in the future.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

I. LETTER FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED JULY 15, 1974

UNCLASSIFIED ^P

Seoul, Korea

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

July 15, 1974

Esquire
Director for Korean Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear

I have been told by John Nidecker that he has discussed with you the letter he wrote to me about his dealings with Row Chin Whan. Enclosed you will find a copy of the letter I wrote to Nidecker in reply. I would suggest that from now on Mr. Row not be given even the normal courtesies that one extends to a Parliamentarian from a friendly country.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

's letter to
John E. Nidecker dated July 15, 1974.

J. MEMORANDUM FOR GEN. A. M. HAIG, JR., FROM JOHN E. NIDECKER, DATED
JULY 29, 1974

WASHINGTON

July 29, 1974

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL A. M. HAIG, JR.
FROM: JOHN E. NIDECKER

Recently, I made a trip to Korea to attend the Presidential Prayer breakfast and to represent our President there.

During the course of the visit, I was accorded the courtesies normally shown to visiting dignitaries of foreign governments. There were all manner of briefings including national defense, legislative action and an audience with President Park. Also included in the visit was a trip that covered all of the provinces where I met the Governors and the Mayors of the principal cities. At each location, there was some formal reception and either a dinner or luncheon in my honor. My escort for the trip was Mr. Park, Chong Kyu, the Director of the Presidential Protective Force.

On one occasion, I was asked to provide the names of Members of the Congress who might be favorable to the President so that their Korean friends would be able to help them with finances for their campaigns. After explaining that this was illegal and could not be done, there was no further discussion of the offer while I was in Korea. I paid no further attention to the offer and thought that it would not be pursued due to my lack of interest.

Also during my visit, I called on the leaders of the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian Churches to obtain their views

These visits were accomplished without an escort and my travel was in an Embassy car. During my visit with the Cardinal, I was contacted by a member of the Protective Force and told that a special meeting had been called and that I was to cut the visit short in order to get there on time. The meeting turned out to be one of not such great urgency. [

UNCLASSIFIED

After the meeting with the Ambassador, I attended Mass at the Anglican Cathedral and at the conclusion of the service was told that another meeting was to be held immediately before my departure. I later learned that the purpose of the meeting was to bid goodbye to the President and Mr. Park, Chong Kyu at the President's Country Club. Before my departure from that place, I was handed an envelope and told to open it after I was on the plane; that it was a message of "bon voyage" from Mr. Park. Just before I emplaned I tore off one corner of the envelope and saw that it contained money. I immediately gave it to Mr. [redacted] the Second Secretary of the Embassy and asked him to deliver it to the Ambassador. After my return to the States, I learned that it contained \$10,000.00 which [redacted] returned to Mr. Park.

Mr. Row, Chin Hwan, who had also been part of the escort in Korea, came here to visit. You may recall that he brought several "personal" gifts to some of us on the staff. During his visit, he again brought up the subject of possible assistance to Members of the Congress in their campaigns. His thought was that he would arrange to provide \$5,000.00 for House candidates and up to \$30,000.00 for Senate candidates. He also suggested that "it would be nice if he and Park, Chong Kyu would make a sizeable contribution to the Anglican Cathedral in Seoul in my behalf." He also suggested that I issue a personal invitation to Park, Chong Kyu to come to the United States in September. Mr. Row planned to accompany Park and to remain here for the purpose of becoming involved in the Congressional Campaigns.

All of the foregoing has been reported to [redacted] of the National Security Council and to [redacted] of State as well as to Ambassador [redacted]. Attached is a copy of my letter to the Ambassador which outlines the problem for him, as well as a copy of my letter to Row, Chin Hwan.

Please also note the copy of my last letter from Ambassador [redacted] in which he suggested that all of the foregoing be reported to you.

K. LETTER FROM HON. RICHARD L. SNEIDER, U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO
 PHILIP C. HABIB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED MARCH 9, 1976

UNCLASSIFIED

per E.C. 5/39/11

RZ

Seoul, Korea

March 9, 1976

The Honorable
 Philip C. Habib
 Assistant Secretary for East Asian
 and Pacific Affairs
 Department of State
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Phil:

Row Chin Hwan called on Dick Ericson March 8
 for the purpose of asking us to transmit the enclosed
 letter to you, along with copies of letters which he
 is also sending to and Mr. John E.
 Nidecker. The latter he will send by international
 mail directly to the recipients.

Best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Richard L. Sneider
 Ambassador

OFFICE OF THE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 MAR 17 1976
 E A

Enclosures:

As stated.

L. LETTER FROM ROW CHIN HWAN, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TO JOHN E. NIDECKER, DATED MARCH 8, 1976

OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

March 8, 1976

Mr. John E. Nidecker
905 16th Street, NW
Washington, D. C. 20006
U. S. A.

Dear John:

I was deeply saddened and distressed to read the Feb. 29 edition of the Washington Post, which alleged a wrongdoing to me. The paper said that I had made "a blanket offer" of money to US Congressmen, etc. etc. If, indeed, I had done this, I would have violated not only the US Code, but also the law of my own country. I have been a member of the National Assembly long enough to know not to believe everything I read in the newspapers, and I refuse to believe what you are supposed to have said concerning this matter. I write to you, because this obvious misunderstanding cannot harm our friendship of long standing.

As you know, I did meet with President Nixon and many members of the US Congress. I always considered such an opportunity a rare privilege, because I genuinely respected statesmen of the United States which is allied to the Republic of Korea in joint defense of Peace in this vital Far Eastern area. My respect for the President and the Congressmen had nothing to do with whether they were Republican or Democrat. All that mattered to me was that he was an American President or an American Congressman. Could I have really offered a bribe to someone in whose moral integrity I had full respect? And even if I had harbored such thoughts was I in a position to make such an offer? No. Certainly not.

All this must have been a misunderstanding of my natural interest in matters of elections. I did discuss matters which are properly thought of as shop-talk among members who, in spite of national differences, experience similar problems as members who are elected to parliaments. I was eager to ask questions about how these problems are met in America, and I told them of my own experiences. Beyond that, I had made no improper offers of money "blanket" or otherwise.

You know that I am no businessman. Under the Korean law, I cannot be involved in any business interests while I serve as a member of the National Assembly. My only purpose in meeting the American Congressmen was to try, in my own humble way, to explain the Korean situation so that understanding in America can strengthen the Korean-American ties that are so important to the maintenance of peace in Korea. The survival of my nation in the face of threatened Communist aggression was at stake; and I did not go to Washington to offer help. I was asking for help.

I wondered whether I should ignore this accusation in the Washington Post. But it is so serious that I had to write this letter for the purpose of clarification. Even a baseless accusation can cause a great deal of harm, and our joint effort for security will be the victim of this slanderous attack. All of this may have started with those who thought they had something to gain from my embarrassment. Then again, their intended target may have been something bigger than me. I alone am responsible for this unfortunate misunderstanding and I offer my clarification. I certainly hope this will not cause too much damage to the mutual goodwill, which is so important to our two countries.

May God, through His Grace, keep America strong. And may He always bless you and your beloved family.

With warmest personal regards, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

CHIN HWAN ROW
Member of the National Assembly

M. LETTER FROM ROW CHIN HWAN, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TO HON. PHILIP C. HABIB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED MARCH 8, 1976

SEOUL, KOREA

March 8, 1976

The Honorable Philip C. Habib
Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Room 2006
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
U. S. A.

OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MAR 17 1976
EA

Dear Sir:

I write to offer you my sincere and deep regrets for the unhappiness the Feb. 29 edition of the Washington Post must have caused you. It had carried an item which alleged that I had made "a blanket offer" of money to US Congressmen, etc. Of course, this is indeed a serious and startling accusation. If I had been guilty of such wrongdoing, I would be in violation of the criminal laws of my own country, let alone the US Code. For a brief moment upon reading the Washington Post, I wondered if I should ignore it, but in view of the gravity of the accusation and the damage it could do to the mutual goodwill which is so precious vital to the Korean-American relations, I decided to write to you. THE ACCUSATION IS NOT BASED ON FACTS.

I did meet with Congressman _____ and others. I valued those opportunities, because of my personal and genuine respect for them as American Congressmen, not as Republicans or Democrats. The distinction never entered my mind, which has always been preoccupied with the importance of US-ROK joint security efforts in the face of mounting threats to our national survival. How could I have offered a bribe to someone in whose moral rectitude and personal integrity I had full respect? And even if I had harbored such improper thoughts, was I in a position to make such an offer? No, I certainly was not in such a position. No one, individually or as a group, would have authorized me to do so.

I alone am responsible for anything that might have caused this great misunderstanding. According to the newspaper, Congressman _____ spoke of my "innocent" remarks. Indeed, I did discuss the challenges and problems we, as members elected to parliaments, faced. I was eager to learn how elections were conducted in the United States, and I was willing to discuss my own experience in my constituency.

But an offer of bribe? No. I did not go to Washington with presumptuous thoughts of giving aid; I was there to ask for help in terms of understanding for Korea. I am no businessman, and as a member of National Assembly I am prohibited by law to be linked to any business interests during my term of office. Please believe me when I say that the accusation is a baseless one in point of fact.


Now, the problem is that even a groundless accusation of this sort can do a great deal of damage to the goodwill for the Republic of Korea. Please let me know if I may do anything at all to repair the damage. I pray it is not too serious! Will you forgive me if I have made your already enormous task even heavier? I am truly sorry, indeed. My "innocent remarks" have been misrepresented and blown up to inordinate proportions. By whom? and for what end? I do not know.

I am enclosing herewith for your information copies of my letters to Congressman [] and Mr. Nidecker.

May God through his Grace keep America strong. May he bless you and your family always.

With warmest personal regards, I remain,

Sincerely yours,



CHIN HWAN ROW
Member of the National Assembly

N. LETTER FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE TO U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL,
DATED MARCH 19, 1976

March 19, 1976

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

Honorable
American Ambassador
Seoul

Dear

Thank you for your March 9 letter on National Assemblyman Row Chin Hwan's efforts to wiggle out of his problems in the U.S. Needless to say, I will not answer Row's letter.

As is aware, there was correspondence on Row's meeting with Niedecker at the time and our records essentially confirm Niedecker and 's recollection of events. For our part back here, we wish nothing to do with Assemblyman Row. While only Row and Niedecker were present at their conversation, if queried we will indicate that our records confirm that Niedecker had immediately reported the conversation in essentially the terms already reported. We have already informally told the Korean embassy this.

I realize that Row is ubiquitous in his frantic efforts to maintain his role as informal National Assembly "escort officer" for U.S. Congressmen. At the same time I think we should be very clear both to the ROKG and to the National Assembly leadership in expressing our concerns about Row, his activities, and the adverse impact they have.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

EA/K:

Appendix 2

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS OBTAINED FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A. MEMORANDUM FROM DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WINTHROP BROWN, SUB-
JECT: TONGSUN PARK, DATED JANUARY 26, 1972

TO: EA/K - [redacted] January 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Tong-sun Park

Mr. [redacted] the [redacted] in Seoul, brought a message that Ambassador Habib's already considerable concern about the activities of Tong-sun Park surrounding [redacted] recent visit to Seoul had been heightened by the following events:

Prior to [redacted] visit, the Embassy received a cable from him saying that he did not want to have any dealings with Park in connection with his visit. Shortly thereafter, the AID officer preparing the Congressman's agenda received telephone calls from a Mr. Kim and a Mr. Lee who claimed to speak for Park, who was arranging the Congressman's visit.

For several days the Embassy received no word from [redacted] about the schedule which the Embassy had proposed to him. They finally got in touch with the Congressman in Hong Kong and received a message which said that they should collaborate with Park in preparing the schedule.

This schedule in the end included two kisaeng parties given for the Congressman, plus a couple of private entertainments at Park's house.

[redacted] told the Embassy and [redacted] that there was a man named [redacted] who was running for Governor of Louisiana and who would probably win the position. [redacted] needed [redacted] support in his forthcoming election race. [redacted] told [redacted] that Park was a good person. [redacted] said that [redacted] had received

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ per E.C. 5/30/74
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at least \$50,000 in campaign funds from Park, who had also made a number of other substantial campaign contributions. mentioned a figure of a total of about \$400,000.

said that the first time he had met Park, the latter came to his office in the Capitol and spread on his desk a collection of expensive jewelry, some of which he tried to give to called in his entire staff, showed them the jewelry and told them in their presence that he would not accept any of it.

and said that he really had to play along with during his visit with President Park and went out of his way to say that Tong-sun Park was a fine person.

was accompanied during his visit to Seoul by a Louisiana rice broker named who said that he had checked on Tong-sun Park's assets and had been told that they were at least \$60 million.

I understand that the who was working for has returned to Seoul.

said it would be very helpful if Park could be identified as a lobbyist in a foreign country. This might diminish his acceptability, on the Hill at least, rather considerably.

I think these facts added to our other reservations about Park, plus report that Park had offered him \$1,000 for his campaign fund in the last election and had made similar offers to other Congressmen should be passed on to the FBI in connection with their current investigation.

Wm
 Winthrop G. Brown

B. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION FROM POLITICAL COUNSELOR, U.S. EMBASSY, SEOUL, SUBJECT: PARK TONG SUN AND THE EMBASSY IN SEOUL, DATED MAY 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

(COPY) "

SUBJECT: PARK TONG-SON AND THE EMBASSY IN SEOUL

PARTICIPANTS: Park Tong-Son
Political Counselor

PLACE AND TIME: Political Counselor's office
May 14, 1973, 1100 hours

NOTE. Park Tong-Son is a Korean national with business interests in both Seoul and Washington, D. C. He is the owner of the Georgetown Club on Wisconsin Avenue in Washington. A number of U. S. congressmen are members of the club. Park is also developing a Georgetown Club in Seoul. He has other business interests including, particularly, involvements in the purchase by Korea of U. S. rice and other agricultural products. He has been close to a number of congressmen including

He has usually appeared in Korea from Washington whenever Congressmen and others have visited the ROK and has been heavily engaged in handling of their schedules. He has worked closely with Congressman on Korean purchases of rice. Park's brother, who appears to have carefully avoided involvement in his brother's American political interests, is "Ken" Park (PARK Kuhn-Suk) President of Pan Ocean Bulk Carriers' Ltd., which is tied to Gulf Oil.

PARK Tong-Son called at his request to discuss what he described as his relationship with the Embassy. He said that National Assembly Speaker Chong Il Kwon and his brother had urged him to speak to me. (The following morning I saw Chong Il Kwon who told me that he had not suggested that to Park.)

Park said he had been disturbed for some time by an awareness that the Ambassador and others in the Embassy were against him and would not see him, apparently, he said, because of misunderstandings. He said that, as a person who went to school and lives in the U. S., he loves America and in his activities

CONFIDENTIAL.

has only tried to promote its interests as well as those of Korea. It is true that he has been active in assisting a number of congressmen, but he has become involved only because he is well known in some official circles in Washington and knows Korea well. In 1968 he saw an opportunity to divert dollar purchases of rice to the United States and worked hard as well as successfully against such people as [] who were trying to have the Korean hard currency purchases made from Japan. He had become involved with Congressman [] through Governor [] of Louisiana whom he has known extremely well since the days when the Governor was a congressman in Washington.

Park said it hurt him deeply in a personal way to be misunderstood by the Embassy when he tried so hard and wanted so much to promote U. S. interests. The most recent incident was the Ambassador's refusal to see him when he bore a gift from Sen. [] for the Ambassador. He had met Sen. [] at a dinner given by "my good friend, []". At another point, Park dropped the name of [] as someone who has consulted him about Korea in the past.

[] was also disturbed by the Embassy's attitudes. Park volunteered, however, that [] had for several years been advising him to terminate his "political" involvements in the United States.

At one point Park volunteered -- the subject had not previously come up in any way -- that he does not work for ROK CIA as some people may suspect. I made no comment.

After Park made his presentation I said that I would speak with candor and would like primarily to make three points:

1. We know [] well and favorably and, apart from their close kinship, we do not associate [] with Park Tong-Son's involvements.

2. The Embassy is very interested in the promotion of American business and American exports to Korea, and has no intention of doing anything to discourage U. S. trade and investment.

3. Beyond that, I thought Mr. Park would be well advised to understand our belief that he should either identify himself openly as a lobbyist or disassociate himself from the kinds of involvement that he has had in the past with American public figures for the activities observed. I personally would not expect the Embassy's attitude toward him to change so long as he continues his operations of the kind we were both obviously talking about.

At one point Mr. Park said he realized the problem is really the antipathy of the Ambassador and that others probably do not feel the same. I told him that all of those concerned in the Embassy have the same view. , ,

He said since he was not a lobbyist, but only a friend of both Korea and the U. S., it would be inappropriate for him to register as a lobbyist. He understood also that since he remains a Korean national he could not, in any event, register as such.

As the conversation closed Mr. Park said he regretted that he didn't seem to have made his point very well and that the Embassy continues to misunderstand him. I told him I didn't think there was any misunderstanding. Commenting again as he left the office that he felt misunderstood and that he felt this was unfortunate for U. S.-Korean relations, he said that, in fact, he resented the suggestion that he was a lobbyist.

Though seemingly disturbed and displeased that he had not improved his standing with the Embassy as a result of the conversation, Park remained outwardly cordial through the time of his departure.

- - - - -

When I mentioned the matter to the following morning, not only denied that he had told Park to see me. but said also that he had strongly advised Park to terminate his "political" involvements in the United States.

POL:

C. SUMMARY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF CERTAIN LETTERS OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KOREA, 1972-1974 (NOTE: "SANITIZED" COPIES OF THE LETTERS FOLLOW IN APPENDIXES 2D-2L)

SUMMARY OF CERTAIN LETTERS OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KOREA, 1972-74

Between December 18, 1972, and February 27, 1974, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea wrote six letters to the Department of State concerning activities of Mr. Tongsun Park which the Ambassador believed should be brought to the attention of appropriate officials in Washington. These letters followed earlier expressions of concern communicated to the Department by the Ambassador. The letters described actions of Mr. Park interjecting himself into the visits to Korea of certain U.S. Congressional Delegations, relayed information given to the Ambassador by visiting Congressmen about Mr. Park's role in rice purchasing transactions of the Korean Government, and referred to other activities of Mr. Park.

The letters expressed the Ambassador's views concerning Mr. Park's possible relationship to the Korean Government and the view that his activities, in any event, were detrimental to the United States Government and damaging to the best interests of Korea. The letters also informed the Department that the Ambassador, since his arrival in Korea, had refused personally to have anything to do with Mr. Park and had instructed his staff neither to accept his invitations nor to receive him. The letters reflected that the Ambassador had given the same advice to visiting Congressmen who had spoken to the Ambassador concerning Mr. Park.

D. LETTER FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED
DECEMBER 18, 1972

UNCLASSIFIED per EC-5/10/74
[Signature]

Seoul, Korea

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

December 18, 1972

Department of State
Washington, D.C.

✓ Dear

This letter will cover certain aspects of Congressman
visit to Seoul which I believe need to be brought to
the attention of the right people.

The visit was complicated by the continuous interference
of Tong Són Park, whose name will be known to you.

Park has constantly interjected himself into the
visits of certain Codels

ever since my arrival in Korea. I
have refused to have anything to do with the man and have issued
instructions to all members of my staff neither to accept his
invitations nor to receive him.

At our first meeting after his arrival, Congressman
spoke to me about Park who had been a particular
nuisance at the airport.

He was using the Congressman's name, and those of his colleagues, freely to increase his own prestige within the Korean Government.

Congressman said Mr. Park has been intervening in rice purchasing transactions of the Korean Government by demanding a kick-back of \$2.00 a ton from the shippers in the United States. He asks this fee because he bears impressive credentials from the Korean Government stating that all rice purchases must pass through him. He then holds up rice purchases by the Korean Office of Supply until the rake-off is assured. Mr. said he was considering legislation specifically forbidding such commissions.

Mr. said his own relationship with Park began several years ago. He had been told that Park was an important person who had to be dealt with because of his influence in regard to U.S. -Korean affairs. In 1971, had sent a telegram to the Embassy protesting Park's intervention in rice purchases. I reminded the Congressman that he had also sent a letter to me in the fall of 1971 on the same subject. The Embassy had acted on both of those messages and I had made it clear to the Congressman the last time he was here that he should have nothing to do with the man whose activities were suspect to say the least.

The Congressman said he had accepted Park's hospitality on numerous occasions and had permitted him to assist in the arrangements for his visit to Seoul. He apologized for doing this without my knowledge and said that in the future he would work through the Embassy.

The Congressman said it was essential that Park terminate his present activities in United States Government-financed grain purchases. He had asked for a private session with President

Park at which he would raise the subject. He said he proposed to tell Park that the Korean Government should purchase its rice without any added-on commission and asked me if this hint would be enough to stop the activity. I told him he should be more explicit and come more to the point.

Mr. [redacted] asked if he should go ahead with his plans to seek legislation within PL 480 to put an end to activities of the sort Park was engaged in.

The subject of Tong Son Park's activities, with all sorts of innuendoes and references to unethical behaviour on his part, kept coming up again and again during Congressman [redacted] visit. Congressman [redacted] who was present on a number of occasions when Congressman [redacted] discussed the matter, also spoke to me privately about it.

Congressman [redacted] told me he raised the matter with President Park and hopes that the \$2.00 rake-off will be stopped. He said he intends to discuss this problem with AID Administrator Hannah and people in the Department of Agriculture, and is still contemplating initiating restrictive legislation.

There is a good deal more to this story -

Tong Son Park

All of this is extremely sensitive.

Sincerely,

E. LETTER FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED
JUNE 27, 1973

UNCLASSIFIED

per E.L.T. [signature]

Seoul, Korea

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

June 27, 1973

Department of State
Washington, D.C.

✓ Dear

First of all I want to thank you for your recent notes.
They have been very helpful.

This letter is to enclose a couple of old items which I
thought should be part of your files. One is an interesting
newspaper article which appeared locally about Tong Son
Park. You may not have seen it and I thought you might
find certain references amusing. This brought to mind
the fact that I had failed to send you two Memoranda for
the Files, which we had prepared some time ago, concerning
Mr. Park. You are, I know, aware of my concern about his
activities.

✓ The latest version, involving his attempt to work out deals
with the Speaker short-circuiting his Embassy, is only
one example. I am glad that you handled it as you did.

I believe you will find

a good deal of information about his previous activities in the files and what I have not contributed I am sure Bill Porter can provide.

I continue to forbid any member of this Embassy to have anything to do with Mr. Park without my express permission.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Enclosures:

1. Article from Pacific Stars & Stripes dated Sunday, June 24, 1973.
2. Memorandum for the Files, dated April 24, 1973 - Visit of Congressman
3. Memorandum for the Files, dated May 14, 1973 - Tong Son Park and the Embassy in Seoul. *6. 0001*

F. LETTER FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED
AUGUST 2, 1973

Seoul, Korea

~~OFFICIAL-INTERNAL~~

August 2, 1973

Department of State
Washington, D.C.

✓ Dear

This is a further report on matters relating to Tong Son Park's activities. You will have received my previous letter of June 27, 1973 stating my concerns about his influence-peddling.

Earlier this week, Park returned to Korea on the same plane with

During a breakfast with me, asked if I would develop good relations with Tong Son Park. I replied that this was a matter on which I felt very strongly. I would do anything appropriate the Congressman asked, but in this case I must refuse to have anything to do with Mr. Park, and I would not permit any of my staff to have anything to do with him. I told that I did not approved of the activities in which Park was engaged and I intended to stay absolutely clear of him. He was not someone I wished to deal with for many reasons which I chose not to go into with the Congressman but which I could assure him were valid.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

G. LETTER FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED
AUGUST 13, 1973

~~OFFICIAL-INTERNAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

per B.C. 5/30/78
[Signature]

August 13, 1973

Department of State
Washington, D.C.

✓ Dear

This is further information, for the record, on the activities of Tong Sen Park, about whom you have already received considerable information from me. I was informed by [redacted] during his visit here in Seoul, that, to his knowledge, Park demands a kickback of \$1.00 a ton on shipments of rice to Korea. [redacted] told me this in confidence.

[redacted] is here, in part, seeking to determine the future market possibilities for rice which is a major export from his district. He is obviously unhappy about past practices which have some shippers paying Mr. Park a fee for no visible service. Evidently Park, through his ties, which I have discussed in previous correspondence, is able to exercise a degree of control over purchases of rice in the United States and use that control to squeeze out a payment.

✓ I have reported these things consistently and will continue to do so. I presume you are making this information

available as appropriate. In accordance with my earlier suggestion, I hope you are keeping Under Secretary Porter informed.

I do not know what [redacted] intends to do about the activities in question. From what he said I gathered he does not like what is going on but at the same time does not wish to do anything to jeopardize an important market for his rice-producing constituents.

Mr. Park continues to float in and around here. As of last week, he was seen by one of my officers in the company of the ROK/CIA Washington Station Chief. At that time he complained again to one of my officers about my unwillingness to have anything to do with him when he is such a good friend of the United States. I have insisted, and will continue to insist, that no one in this Embassy have anything to do with Mr. Park. He knows this and is doing his damndest to get around me.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

H. LETTER FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 1974

UNCLASSIFIED

Seoul, Korea,

OFFICIAL INFORMATION

February 11, 1974

Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear

This is further to the memoranda which I have submitted to you in the past about the activities of Park Tong Sen. When I returned from leave, I was informed by my staff that Mr. Park was very much in evidence throughout the visit of Congressman . He was in Seoul when the congressional party arrived and seemed to be much involved in all the scheduling. According to an Embassy Officer, all expenses for the party at the hotel were to the account of Mr. Park's company.

The Embassy was not substantially involved in the visit or in the social arrangements surrounding it. Enclosed you will find a memorandum which covers the high points of the visit. I would not take the first sentence of the final paragraph too seriously as I believe it was intended for the record. However the rest of that paragraph rings true.

I suspect we will discover that Mr. Park is going to seek to continue to play a role with other congressmen visiting

Korea. We have some visits coming up that I expect him to be involved with, but I will continue to see to it that the Embassy and Embassy personnel have nothing whatever to do with anything directly connected with Mr. Park.

Sincerely, ,

Enclosure:

Copy of Memo
to The Ambassador, dated
February 4, 1974

I. LETTER FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DATED
FEBRUARY 27, 1974

UNCLASSIFIED *per [signature]*

Seoul, Korea

OFFICIAL-INFORMED

February 27, 1974

Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear

This is one more letter on the subject of Park Tong Son.
During the recent visit of

the Congressman asked me if I knew Park and
what I thought of him. Naturally I told him the truth,

remarked on Park's wide acquaintanceship
and influence in Congress. I said I was aware of this
but it made no particular difference to me in my judgment
of the man. and had given specific
orders that no member of my staff was to have anything to
do with him.

said he agreed with me completely.
He noted that Park had made attempts to get close to him
but he disliked the man and would have nothing to do with
him. I complimented the Congressman on the wisdom of his
decision.

I told _____ that Park was not adverse to taking advantage of his contacts with American leaders to inflate his own importance in his country. I mentioned the recent photograph which had appeared in Korean newspapers showing Park with _____ and _____.

When I showed it to him he was visibly disturbed and asked me for a copy of the picture, which he said he would show to _____ with an explanation of Mr. Park's activities and reputation.

I don't know whether you will be hearing any more about this, but this will serve to keep the record complete on the subject.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

J. LETTER FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, SEOUL, TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
DATED APRIL 9, 1976

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Seoul, Korea.

April 9, 1976

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

APR 20 1976

Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

E A

Dear _____:

Thank you very much for your letter of March 19 regarding Row Chin Hwan. Should you have any doubts, let me assure you that we have made it clear to one and all our concerns about Row's ridiculous activities. I have personally talked to _____

_____ among others. I might add that our efforts to discourage the Koreans from using the likes of Row date well back before the Washington Post stories. In fact, I had just about convinced _____

We have also tried another tack, namely to praise the effectiveness of the likes of _____

_____ who apparently disdain the normal Korean gift-giving tactics. That too has made an impression on the Koreans.

UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

per G.C. 5/30/78
B2

2.

In a related matter, I am disturbed by the publicity given to _____ gift of a watch to Congressman _____. While he has his faults, _____ should not be equated with Row. The watch he gave the Congressman, incidentally, cost approximately \$23. The attack on _____ has discouraged those in the Assembly and elsewhere who have been equally critical of Row and the other big gift givers. I guess there is little that one can do about such developments. We have pointed out that, unfortunately or not, every Korean Assemblyman will tend to be tarred with the Row brush in the present circumstances.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Ambassador

K. MEMORANDUM, SUBJECT: ROK CIA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, DATED
AUGUST 17, 1973

S/S

per B.C. 5/24/76
B2
August 17, 1973
POI 5-
U.S.

SECRET

TO: P

FROM: EA

ROK CIA Activities in the United States

There are a great many unanswered questions in connection with Kim Tae Chung's abduction from Japan and reemergence in Seoul.

One of the disturbing accompaniments has been growing fear among Korean residents here over ROK CIA activities in the United States. The abduction of Kim has heightened these fears and there is a widely held view that ROK CIA agents here were involved in Kim's abduction in Japan.

Whatever may be the actual case about their connection with Kim's disappearance

The New York Times August 17 recounts a number of alleged harassments of Korean residents by the CIA. Over the past several months has brought these allegations to the attention of the Embassy, including discussion with Ambassador Kim and the CIA head, Lee Sang Ho. Most recently, in June at the time of the resignation of the ROK Cultural Affairs Attache here, Lee Jai Hyun, put the ROK DCM on notice about activities of its CIA. We have also asked the FBI to investigate the activities of the CIA in the U.S.; this investigation is still in progress.

UNCLASSIFIED per E-C 5/30/78

~~SECRET~~

B2

- 2 -

Our principal concern is that ROK CIA activities in the U.S. are becoming increasingly bold. In fact, a few months ago []

We can ill afford these Korean blunders at a time when we, the ROK and other nations are engaged in garnering support for the ROK foreign policy initiative which we consider important.

We have concluded that while the present ROK CIA chief remains in Washington he will continue to be the source of contention in the Korean community and embarrassment to the U.S. Already he has so abused the terms of his assignment here that we have grounds to request his recall. We have discussed this and other possibilities with our own CIA who are also concerned about the implications of ROK CIA activity in the U.S. They are doing some careful thinking about their own relations with Lee Hu Rak, and expect to be putting up some thoughts for action directed against him, motivated by concern for internal stability in the ROK.

We intend to wait for a little longer before recommending action until we can see what the ROKG reaction is to the story on their CIA actions here and until we have further details (if there are any) on their possible involvement in the Kim abduction.

We expect to make a recommendation to you next week.

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: EA/K: []
x 22332:8/17/73
Concurrence: EA/K - []

L. MEMORANDUM FROM OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS TO OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE
LIAISON, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR FBI
INVESTIGATION OF ACTIVITIES BY ROK CIA IN THE UNITED STATES, DATED
JUNE 25, 1973

EA/K—

Request for FBI Investigation of Activities by ROK
CIA in the U.S.

As you know, I have had discussions with our SY people as well as with the FBI liaison representative regarding the activities of the Korean CIA in the U.S. as alleged in the Washington Post story of June 7.. Reports of such activities have also come to me from various Korean residents in the U.S., as well as in a couple of letters that I have received.

As I mentioned to you earlier, I believe these reports and allegations are serious enough to warrant an appropriate investigation by our FBI. I would appreciate your taking the necessary steps to set this in process.

M. SUMMARY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF TWO DOCUMENTS OF
AUGUST 1973



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C., 20520

SUMMARY OF TWO STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS OF AUGUST, 1973

In late August 1973 a senior official of the Department of State raised with the Korean Ambassador allegations regarding improper activities by the Korean CIA (KCIA) in the United States. The official stated that the U. S. Government had grave misgivings about the size and activities of the KCIA in the United States. It was the U. S. Government's position that the KCIA mission could have one and only one function -- that of liaison with the U. S. intelligence community, notably the CIA. Referring directly to the placement of KCIA representatives in some Korean consulates, the official stated that the U. S. CIA was in Washington, not in the other cities where the Korean Government had consular establishments. While the U. S. Government recognizes that the Korean Government has legitimate consular functions regarding its residents in the United States, the senior official emphasized that the KCIA has no business attempting to control activities of the Korean community and the U. S. Government cannot accept the KCIA involving itself in such functions or in any manner harassing or intimidating Korean citizens in the United States. The official noted that we did not see any reason for the KCIA to be increasing its staff in the United States and closed the subject with the conclusion that the time had come for the Republic of Korea to consider reassignment of the KCIA station chief LEE Sang-ho from Washington.

According to Department of State records, a second Department of State official also reviewed the U. S. Government position on these matters along the same lines with the Korean Ambassador shortly after the meeting noted above. On this occasion the Department official pointed out also that inappropriate or illegal activities by the KCIA in the United States are ultimately most harmful to the Republic of Korea and that any potential benefit was not worth the costs involved.

N. SUMMARY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF A DOCUMENT DATED
NOVEMBER 1973

SUMMARY OF A STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENT OF NOVEMBER, 1973

According to Department of State records, the subject of KCIA activities in the United States and the requested re-assignment of station chief Lee Sang-ho was also raised with Korean Government officials in Seoul in early November 1973. As of the second week of November, assurances had been received by the Department of State from the Korean Embassy that Mr. Lee would be definitely transferred. In order that there be no inordinate delay in this action, however, a senior Department official again took the matter up with the Korean Ambassador. Mr. Lee departed the United States shortly thereafter (date not given in this document).

O. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOTICE OF FINAL DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC OFFICER, CONCERNING LEE SANG HO, DATED JANUARY 31, 1974

NOTICE OF FINAL DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC OFFICER		Jan. 31, 1974
TO: The Secretary of State, Attention: Office of Protocol		
1. NAME (First, Middle, Last) Sang HO LEE		
2. POSITION Minister, Embassy of Korea		
3. DATE OF APPOINTMENT December 22, 1971	4. DATE OF FINAL DEPARTURE January 9, 1974	
5. DESTINATION OR NEW ADDRESS Seoul, Korea		
6. ENCLOSURES Dipl. ID Cards #15342, 15343; (D.C. Tax Exemp. Cards #E-10229, #E-10230; Va. Tax Exemp. No. 494, Md. Tax Exemp. Card#D-1862		
Mission Embassy of Korea	Signature of Chief of Mission <i>[Signature]</i>	

APPENDIX 3

LETTER TO SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF FROM MR. KIM SANG KEUN DATED
JUNE 14, 1978

A. ORIGINAL LETTER IN KOREAN

에드워드 베이커 씨 貴下

1978年 6月14日 아침에 貴下와
電話로 對話한 內容을 記述하여 回信
합니다.

1973年 여름, 駐美韓國大使館의
李相鎬 公使를 비롯하여 崔洪義
參事官 및 朴正一 書記官은 韓國
中央情報部 本部의 一時敍國命令(出張)
을 받고 서울을 訪問한바 있습니다.

제가 지금 이분들의 一時敍國命令과
關聯하여 記憶되는 것은 李相鎬 公使는
韓國 中央情報部 워싱턴地域 責任者로서

業務協議次 (워싱턴 赴任 1年6個月以上 經過)
 였으며, 崔洪泰 參事官은 美國에
 數年間 勤務했으므로 海外 長期
 勤務者에 對한 國內 教育이 名目이
 있고, 그리고 朴正一 書記官은 購買
 業務에 對한 指示受領 및 討議
 (行政處理上의 蹉跎問題 等) 였습니다.

日本에서의 金大中氏 拉置事件이
 있는 以後, 朴正一 書記官이 서울出張을
 마치고 워싱턴으로 敏任하였는데

韓國中央情報部로부터 朴正一 書記官
 에게 그가 日本을 經由하여 워싱턴에
 敏任한 理由와 그 日程을 詳細히

報告하도록 指示되었던 것입니다.

그當時 朴正一書記官이 個人用務로 日本을 經由했기 때문입니다.

周知하는바와 같이 金大中氏 拉置事件에 對하여는 美國의 主要新聞들도 大的으로 報道하였고 이와 관련하여 美國에서 勤務하던 韓國中央情報部員의 이름도 紙上에 掲載되었었습니다.

그러나 當時 나의上官이 있으며 또한 同僚이었던 이들 세사람의 서울 滯留 期間中에 지냈던 個人的인 얘기도 들었습니다만 金大中氏 拉置事件과는 全然 無關한 것으로 생각되었습니다.

여기에 저의 意見을 添加한다면,

上言已한바와 같이 過去 워싱턴에서
勤務했던 韓國 中央情報部員들이
金大中氏 拉置事件에 關聯되었다고 보지
않습니다. 다만 이 期間中에

李相鎬 公使, 崔洪養 參事官 그리고
朴正一 書記官이 다 함께 美國에 出
임으로서 言論人들과 一般의 關心을
끌게 되었고, 따라서 言論機關의 主要
記事取材 對象으로 나타났던 것으로
解釋합니다.

貴下의 健安을 빕니다.

1978年 6月14日 午後

金 相 根

B. ENGLISH TRANSLATION PREPARED BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF

Dear Mr. Baker:

I am writing an account of and replying to the content of the telephone conversation I had with you on the morning of June 14.

In the summer of 1973 Minister Lee Sang Ho, Counselor Choi Hong Tae, and Secretary Park Chung Il of the Korean Embassy in the United States received an order from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency headquarters to return to Korea temporarily and make a visit to Seoul.

What I remember now about these peoples' orders to return temporarily to Korea is that in the case of Minister Lee Sang Ho it was for the purpose of consultations about his duties as the person responsible for the KCIA in the Washington area. (He had been stationed in Washington for more than one year and six months.) In the case of Counselor Choi, because he had served for some years in the United States, the reason stated was domestic education for those who have worked abroad for a long period. In the case of Secretary Park Chung Il it was the receipt of instructions and discussion concerning procurement (problems of administrative snags, etc.).

After Mr. Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped from Japan, Secretary Park Chung Il finished his business in Seoul and returned to his duties in Washington.

There was an order from the KCIA in Seoul for Secretary Park Chung Il to report in detail the reasons for and the schedule of his trip through Japan on his way to resume his duties in Washington.

This was because at that time Secretary Park Chung Il had passed through Japan on personal business.

It is commonly known that important American newspapers reported about the kidnapping of Mr. Kim Dae Jung on a large scale, and in connection with this the names of Korean Central Intelligence Agency employees who worked in the U.S. also were published in the papers.

Although at the time I even heard private discussions of what had happened while the three people who included my superior and a colleague were in Seoul, I felt that they had absolutely no connection with the kidnapping of Mr. Kim Dae Jung.

If I might add my personal opinion here, I do not regard the KCIA employees mentioned above who used to be stationed in Washington as having any connection with the kidnapping of Mr. Kim Dae Jung. However, in my analysis, because Minister Lee Sang Ho, Counselor Choi Hong Tae and Secretary Park Chung Il were all absent from the U.S. at that time, it attracted the interest of media people and the general public. It therefore became prominent as a subject of important articles in the news media.

I wish for your good health.

The afternoon of June 14, 1978

Kim Sang Keun

APPENDIX 4

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CHARLES A. STILLMAN, ESQ., COUNSEL FOR THE REV. SUN MYUNG MOON, AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. LETTER FROM CHARLES A. STILLMAN, ESQ., TO HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND HON. DONALD M.
FRASER, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, DATED
MAY 12, 1978

LAW OFFICES OF
CHARLES A. STILLMAN

460 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
AREA CODE 212 753-7500

CHARLES A. STILLMAN
JULIAN W. FRIEDMAN

EDWARD J. PASTUCHA
COUNSEL

CABLE ADDRESS
"STILLREID"
TELEX 237894

May 12, 1978

Hon. Clement J. Zablocki
Chairman, Committee on International
Relations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Hon. Donald M. Fraser
Chairman, Subcommittee on International
Organizations
United States House of Representatives
2268 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515

Re: Rev. Sun Myung Moon

Dear Congressmen Zablocki and Fraser:

My firm represents Rev. Sun Myung Moon, whom the Subcommittee on International Organizations is considering calling as a witness in its pending investigation of Korean-American relations.

We have been requested by the Subcommittee staff to consider two questions: (1) whether we would be agreeable to an informal conference between Rev. Moon and the staff; and (2) whether, in the event the Subcommittee determines to serve a subpoena on Rev. Moon, we would accept service on his behalf.


We respectfully suggest that it is not appropriate to consider either question, and that no subpoena should be directed to Rev. Moon in light of the current state of the record of the Subcommittee's investigation. Enclosed for your consideration is a Memorandum which provides detailed support for our belief that compelling Rev. Moon to testify at this time would seriously interfere with both his own First Amendment rights and those of the numerous Americans who regard him as the spiritual leader of their chosen religion.

LAW OFFICES OF
CHARLES A. STILLMAN

Hon. Clement J. Zablocki
Hon. Donald M. Fraser
May 12, 1978
Page 2

We most respectfully urge your careful attention to the attached Memorandum, since we believe that the issues its raises are basic to our American Constitutional system.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Charles A. Stillman". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Charles" and last name "Stillman" clearly legible.

Charles A. Stillman

CAS:mc
Enc.

cc: Committee on International Relations
Howard Anderson, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF
CHARLES A. STILLMAN

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE REV. SUN MYUNG
MOON SUBMITTED TO MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

This Memorandum is respectfully submitted to the membership of the Subcommittee on International Organizations (the "Subcommittee") and the Committee on International Relations (the "Committee") by the undersigned counsel for Rev. Sun Myung Moon. We have been advised that the Subcommittee has authorized a subpoena directed to Rev. Moon in connection with the Subcommittee's pending investigation of Korean-American relations, and that it is now considering whether such a subpoena should in fact be issued.

It is the purpose of this Memorandum to demonstrate that in light of the current state of the record, compelling Rev. Moon to testify will impinge -- without any valid legislative or investigative purpose -- upon the First Amendment rights of both Rev. Moon and the members of the Church of which he is the spiritual leader. Consequently, we respectfully submit that authorization for the subpoena should be withdrawn by either the Subcommittee itself or the full Committee.

Counsel submit this Memorandum in order to place in perspective some of the important issues which we believe would be raised by the issuance of a subpoena directed to Rev. Moon.

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Foremost among those issues is the effect that the subpoena would have on the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States -- an issue which is made even more pointed by the highly controversial nature of Rev. Moon and the Unification Church.

That the Unification Church has not attained the acceptance in this country which is enjoyed by other religions cannot justify any interference with the First Amendment rights of its spiritual leader or its members. On the contrary, that is a reason to be even more protective of those rights than in the ordinary situation. As the Supreme Court has stated:

While, of course, all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these protections, they are all the more essential . . . where the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and the deterrent and 'chilling' effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of freedom of speech, expression and association is consequently the more immediate and substantial.

Gibson v. Florida Legislative Commission, 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1962). And the mere service of a Congressional subpoena -- especially on a person such as Rev. Moon -- can have the precise "chilling effect" which the Supreme Court condemned. As the Court stated in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1958):

The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify against his

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will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference. And when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disastrous.

It is important to stress that we do not claim that the First Amendment provides Rev. Moon with an absolute shield from testimony before any Congressional inquiry under any circumstances. What is clear, however, is that when an investigation intrudes into Constitutionally protected areas as basic as those at stake here, the body conducting the inquiry must show an overriding and compelling need for the testimony -- a showing that requires a real factual basis for concluding that the testimony is necessary to the accomplishment of some valid legislative purpose.

Gibson v. Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1962); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

In light of the First Amendment considerations set forth above, we submit that the Committee should seriously question whether the Subcommittee has shown a compelling need for the testimony of the Rev. Moon.* We believe that the

*It should be noted in this regard that Rev. Moon has recently testified in an inquiry by the Securities and Exchange Commission into the Diplomat National Bank. In that instance, it was undisputed that, like other shareholders in the Bank, Rev. Moon was in possession of relevant information specifically related to precise areas of legitimate inquiry. On that basis he appeared without objection.

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record is completely absent of any factual basis which justifies the disregard of the First Amendment rights of Rev. Moon and the members of the Unification Church.

At the very least, we submit that it is incumbent on the Subcommittee to demonstrate precisely what information it seeks to elicit from Rev. Moon and the relationship of such information to a valid Congressional purpose. Nor is this the first time that we have raised this issue. At the end of last year, when we first learned that the subpoena had been authorized, we requested that the Subcommittee counsel inform us of the areas of proposed inquiry to Rev. Moon. Counsel originally agreed to do so, but subsequently declined. On March 1, 1978, we wrote to the Chairman of the Subcommittee requesting the same information (a copy of that letter is annexed as Exhibit A to this Memorandum).

It was not until May 4, 1978 that we received a response (a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit B). It is respectfully submitted that with the exception of the reference to Diplomat National Bank*, the topics listed in the letter -- particularly item 4 -- are so vague and ambiguous as to be

*It is difficult to imagine what need the Subcommittee has for any testimony by Rev. Moon concerning Diplomat National Bank, since the Subcommittee is currently in the process of examining Mr. Bo Hi Pak, the individual with the greatest knowledge about this subject. Moreover, the Subcommittee could also gain access to the transcript of Rev. Moon's testimony on this subject before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Requiring him to testify again compels the conclusion that the Subcommittee's purpose is to harass, rather than learn the true facts.

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virtually meaningless. Moreover, and even more importantly, the letter does absolutely nothing to satisfy the Subcommittee's heavy burden of demonstrating both a compelling need for Rev. Moon's testimony and a strong factual basis for concluding that his testimony is essential to the performance of the Subcommittee's delegated responsibilities.

Rev. Sun Myung Moon and the Unification Church

While the controversy surrounding the Unification Church is well-known, the facts about it have not received comparable publicity. We believe that a brief outline of those facts would be helpful.

The Unification Church is an international religious movement which was founded in 1954 in Seoul, Korea by Rev. Sun Myung Moon. Today the Church counts over three million members in over 123 countries of the world. In the United States, the Church was originally organized in 1960 and is now active in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Approximately thirty-seven thousand Americans are either members of the Church or count themselves as its supporters. Of course, these numbers are in no way comparable to the membership of the major religions in the United States. But as the Supreme Court has cautioned, that is a reason to be more -- rather than less -- protective of First Amendment rights.

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The Rev. Sun Myung Moon occupies a central role both in the theology of the Unification Church and in its day-to-day operation. As the founder and spiritual leader of the Church, Rev. Moon is revered as a prophet whose teachings are sacred to those who worship within the Unification Church. Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with his theology, there can be no dispute that the members of the Unification Church sincerely believe that Rev. Moon is a messenger of God. The members of the Unification Church view everything which Rev. Moon thinks, says and does as a step toward fulfilling his religious mission. All aspects of his life are bound up with, and dominated by, his theology.

The fundamental theology of the Unification Church is set forth in the Divine Principle, a religious text which draws extensively from the Old and New Testaments. The Divine Principle also sets forth a social philosophy which stresses the importance of the family as a unit basic to society, and which proposes positive solutions to many of the moral and social problems of the day. A fundamental tenet of the Church is its steadfast opposition to communism as an atheistic and anti-religious force.

The Divine Principle treats Korea, the birthplace of Rev. Sun Myung Moon, with the same reverence as other religions hold for their respective Holy Lands. The Church's

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involvement with Korea is theological and religious, not political. Of course, the fact that a particular country or region is sacred to a religion is not unusual -- indeed, the same is true of virtually every major religion in the world. Anticommunism and the sanctity of Korea are basic dogma to the members of the Unification Church. Therefore, when members of the Church comment on these subjects, they are speaking not about political matters but about matters which affect the very essence of their religion.

We stress the above facts in order to place in context the significance of the subpoena which the Subcommittee is considering serving on Rev. Moon. We are, of course, aware that many Americans regard Rev. Moon as a charlatan. Such popular attitudes may tempt members to dismiss his appeal to this Committee without considering the important Constitutional issues. But regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Rev. Moon and his theology, and despite the temptation to dismiss him as the demagogic leader of a fringe group, we respectfully remind the Committee that thousands of American citizens look to Rev. Sun Myung Moon with complete sincerity as a holy prophet and messenger of God. All of these individuals, and Rev. Moon himself, are entitled to the absolute protections of the First Amendment in associating with the Church and in practicing their religion.

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The Subcommittee's Investigation

We do not, of course, dispute the authority of the Congress to inquire into Korean-American relations or attempts by the government of South Korea to influence the policies of the United States. However, the line must be drawn when that inquiry intrudes into the religious freedom protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, the Chairman of the Subcommittee recognized that limitation at the outset of the investigation. The Hon. Donald M. Fraser stated, on June 22, 1976, at the commencement of the Subcommittee's hearings:

Many people have contacted my office regarding this hearing and seem to have the impression that the subcommittee is investigating the Unification Church, which Sun Myung Moon heads. Let me say at the outset that this is not the case. This hearing is not concerned with the religious philosophy or practices of the Unification Church. Those are protected by the First Amendment and those rights are inviolable.

Unfortunately, however, the sentiment expressed by the Chairman at the outset appears to have become lost in the fervor of the Subcommittee's investigation.

As we understand the announced objective of the Subcommittee's investigation, it is, in the words of the Chairman, to inquire into "allegations of improper activities by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in the United States". In other subsequent statements, Chairman Fraser has

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suggested, without disclosing his basis for doing so, the existence of possible links between the KCIA and "persons or organizations affiliated with the Rev. Sun Myung Moon." However, during the recent public hearings conducted by the Subcommittee, the purely speculative nature of any such inference became clear.

On March 15, 1978, the Subcommittee released 708 pages of documents uncovered in its investigation (Subcommittee Hearings, Supplement to Part 4). Those documents included certain Central Intelligence Agency memoranda, one of which referred to the Unification Church by name, and two of which mentioned the "Tong Il Church" but presumably were intended to refer to the Unification Church. The first of these documents was a February 26, 1963 Central Intelligence Agency memorandum (Subcommittee Hearings, Supplement to Part 4, p. 458) stating that the Unification Church was organized by a former director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. The report does not disclose the source for this information, and specifically labels it as "Unevaluated" and "Tentative". The next two memoranda -- dated December 18, 1964 and January 4, 1965 (Subcommittee Hearings, Supplement to Part 4, pp. 459-460) -- simply repeat the "Unevaluated" and "Tentative" information linking the former KCIA director to the Church, and again carefully avoid disclosure of the source for this information. Any reasonable evaluation of these reports would have disclosed the true facts --

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that, as noted above, Rev. Moon founded the Unification Church in 1954, before the current government of South Korea came to power and before the KCIA was even created.

Similarly speculative and sensational charges of affiliation between the Unification Church and the Korean CIA or the Korean government were made by other witnesses in earlier Subcommittee hearings. Those charges appear to have been enthusiastically accepted by the Subcommittee staff without the slightest degree of the healthy skepticism one would normally expect from trained investigators, and without any consideration of the motives of the witnesses. However, their charges were rebutted by Neil Albert Salonen in his testimony before an executive session of the Subcommittee.

In fact, both Rev. Moon and other members of the Church have made repeated and emphatic statements -- both before the Subcommittee and in other forums -- that the Unification Church has no affiliation, either overt or covert, with the South Korean Government or any agency thereof, and that Rev. Sun Myung Moon is a religious leader who has no association or connection with any governmental agency or body.* And the absence of any link between the Church and

*These facts were emphasized again and again by Mr. Bo Hi Pak in his testimony before the Subcommittee in March and April. Moreover, Mr. Pak eloquently described the harm which the Unification Church has suffered as a result of the public's wholesale acceptance as fact of the unfounded and speculative charges linking the Church with the Korean C.I.A. While we realize that many citizens of this country -- and even many members of Congress -- may view injury to the Unification Church as a desirable result, the First Amendment was specifically intended to prevent any such tyranny of the majority.

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the Korean government is supported by another document released by the Subcommittee -- a CIA memorandum dated September 22, 1975 (Subcommittee Hearings, Supplement to Part 4, p. 474). That memorandum refers to the "problems" of the Korean Mission in New York in controlling the activities of Church members on behalf of Korea. No such problems would have existed if the Church was under the control of the Korean government. While we do not contend that the September 22, 1975 memo is dispositive, we do urge that it is entitled to at least as much weight as the memoranda referred to above on which the Subcommittee staff has focused -- memoranda the authority of which is not enhanced by the mere fact that they repeat three separate times "Unevaluated" and "Tentative" information from an undisclosed source.

Even more importantly, logical analysis supports the proposition that there is no link between the Korean government and the Unification Church. If the Korean government had set out to develop a concerted effort to influence U.S. policy by the actions of various individuals in this country, it appears that the Unification Church would be the last group chosen to help accomplish that goal. In light of the controversiality and unpopularity of Rev. Moon and the Unification Church in the United States, can it be seriously argued that the Church's support for a particular governmental policy would aid that policy in being adopted?

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On the contrary, the Church's support can be more properly viewed as the proverbial kiss of death. And this is precisely the impression conveyed by the reference, in the September 22, 1975 CIA memo (Supplement to Part 4, p. 474), to the fact that the Korean Mission was "once again having problems with . . . Moon's fanatics" and their lobbying activities.

In light of the speculative nature of the Subcommittee's "evidence" and the sanctity of the First Amendment, it is respectfully submitted that before the Subcommittee can legitimately summon Rev. Moon as a witness, it must demonstrate by direct and reliable evidence that an affiliation exists between the Unification Church and the Korean government -- an affiliation based on something more than the Church's desire to see South Korea remain a non-Communist country. We assume that this Committee, and indeed all members of Congress, share that desire. "Unevaluated" and speculative testimony and intelligence reports -- especially where demonstrably erroneous in their description of underlying facts -- simply do not and cannot satisfy the Subcommittee's burden.

In the absence of any real evidence, the Subcommittee and its investigative staff have attempted to substitute what can only be described as the crudest form of guilt by association. That guilt by association is premised on the facts that: (a) Rev. Moon and many other Unification Church leaders

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are Korean by birth; (b) members of the Church regard Korea as the fatherland of their faith; and (c) a principal religious tenet of the Church is its avowed anti-Communism. On the basis of these premises, the inference has been drawn that when members of the Unification Church exercise their Constitutional right to petition their elected representatives, they do so as agents of, and under the direction of, the Korean government.

We respectfully submit that such an inference is insulting to the serious religious purposes of Rev. Moon and the Unification Church. No one would ever seriously suggest, for example, that because of their reverence and political support for the State of Israel, and their lobbying in this country on Israel's behalf, American Jews are agents of the Israeli government. Nor would anyone challenge the right of Roman Catholics in this country to undertake vigorous political action concerning abortion and other matters perceived by them to be of religious significance. Does doing so make them agents of the Vatican? In short, the rights of Unification Church members to petition the government and to speak freely on political issues are not lost merely because their doing so is motivated by their feelings and beliefs with regard to South Korea -- feelings and beliefs which are religious in nature. Yet it is precisely such conduct by members of the Unification Church -- coupled with the fact that the country which was the

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birthplace of their spiritual leader, and which occupies a special place in their religion, happens to be a country whose government is currently in disrepute -- which underlies Rev. Moon's entire involvement in the Subcommittee's investigation.

Churches and clergymen in this country have a long-standing tradition of playing an important role in contemporary political events. One need only think of the role played by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and other religious organizations in the drive for racial equality during the nineteen-sixties; the spear-head role played by various clergymen in mobilizing opposition to the war in Vietnam; or the active stands taken by many churches and other religious organizations in support of child labor laws, low-income housing and other social legislation during the first half of this century. Did anyone ever suggest that the activities of those religious organizations and individuals could or should be subjected to scrutiny by Congress? Does the Constitution permit any different treatment of the Unification Church because of the unpopularity of both its spiritual leader and the country which occupies a special place in its theology? If the First Amendment were only intended to protect popular causes, it would be meaningless.

It should also be noted that the First Amendment intrusion here would be even greater than in the examples

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given above. What the Subcommittee now seeks is not merely the testimony of a member of a given religion -- a particular Roman Catholic or a particular Jew -- but the testimony of a religious and spiritual leader. Since Rev. Moon as an individual cannot be divorced from the religious philosophy and practices of the Unification Church, we respectfully submit that the mere act of compelling his testimony will seriously interfere with the religious freedom of all members of the Church.

A religious and spiritual leader's sole asset is his personal reputation. That reputation must necessarily suffer when he is compelled, without cause and against his will, to answer questions before a Committee or Subcommittee of Congress. Moreover, damage to Rev. Moon must inevitably attend an appearance before a Congressional Subcommittee in the light of the current adverse publicity concerning South Korea and the inevitable confusion of unrelated issues by the general public. In this regard, we note that while the Subcommittee investigation has been in progress for almost two years, the effort to subpoena Rev. Moon was not made until the peak of the anti-Korean publicity on Capitol Hill attendant upon the celebrated testimony of Tongsun Park before representatives of the Justice Department and the Ethics Committee of the House of Representatives. Whatever the motivations underlying this timing, it is clear that Rev. Moon's mere appearance in

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the wake of the Park testimony will draw even more publicity than would have attended an earlier subpoena. The attendant intrusion upon the Rev. Moon's rights of privacy and religious freedom will thus be needlessly exacerbated.

Moreover, the religious faith of individual members of the Unification Church will necessarily be affected by compelling their religious leader to testify, a governmental act which inevitably calls into question the very basis for their religious beliefs. In this regard, we note that notwithstanding his assurances at the outset of the hearings that he had no intention of infringing on the First Amendment rights of members of the Unification Church, the Chairman of the Subcommittee has apparently been actively cooperating with, and lending his prestige to, organizations whose avowed purpose is to undermine the Unification Church. We enclose as Exhibit C to this Memorandum a copy of a New York Times article of January 14, 1978 reflecting that activity.

We have also recently learned that two members of the Subcommittee staff gained entrance to the Washington premises of the Unification Church by falsely representing that they were architects who admired the structure, and that one of them, when subsequently confronted, blatantly denied his deception. How can such behavior possibly be justified? How can such behavior be squared with the Chairman's assurances that the Church is not a target of the Subcommittee's investigation? Do clandestine activities by the Korean CIA justify

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CHARLES A. STILLMAN

equally clandestine activities by Subcommittee staff members directed against American citizens exercising their freedom of religion?

We submit that the Committee should be fully as sensitive to the implications of the Subcommittee's subpoena as we are confident it would be were an attempt made to compel the leader of a more popular church to testify. At a minimum, the Subcommittee must first adduce reliable, first-hand information showing that Rev. Moon is an agent of the Korean government. Only on the basis of such information should the Committee permit the subpoena to be served. In the absence of such a factual basis for questioning him, it is respectfully submitted that the Committee should act to protect the First Amendment rights of Rev. Moon and the members of his Church in the same way that it would act to protect the rights of all other religions and their leaders.

DATED: New York, New York

May 12, 1978

Respectfully submitted,

Law Offices of Charles A.
Stillman
Attorneys for Rev. Sun Myung Moon
460 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 753-7500

March 1, 1978

Hon. Donald M. Fraser
Chairman, Subcommittee on
International Organizations
United States House of
Representatives
2268 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515

Re: Korean Investigation

Dear Congressman Fraser:

As you may recall from my prior letter to you, I represent the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. I am writing in connection with the subpoena to Reverend Moon which I am told the Subcommittee has authorized.

Howard Anderson of the Subcommittee staff called this morning and asked whether we would accept service of the subpoena on behalf of Reverend Moon. When he made that request, we told Mr. Anderson that in order to respond to his question, we would need a list of the areas into which the Subcommittee intended to inquire. This request was premised upon our great concern that given Reverend Moon's status as a religious leader, there is a serious danger that interrogation of him would violate his rights under the First Amendment.

At the end of last year, when we were first advised that the subpoena had been authorized, Mr. Anderson made a similar request that we accept service on behalf of our client. At that time, we advised Mr. Anderson -- as we did today -- that it was important for us to know the areas of inquiry. It was our understanding that he agreed to provide us with an outline of the Subcommittee's proposed interrogation of Reverend Moon, and that he would do so shortly after the New year. Today, however, when we renewed our request, Mr. Anderson declined to provide such an outline.

EXHIBIT A

Hon. Donald M. Fraser
March 1, 1978
Page 2

It is for that reason that I have taken the liberty of writing to you. I am sure that you can understand our desire to protect the First Amendment rights of our client, and I think that providing us with the outline we requested would help to accomplish that result while in no way interfering with the legitimate scope of authority of the Subcommittee. We await your reply.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles A. Stillman

CAS:mc

cc: Hon. Clement J. Zablocki
Howard Anderson, Esq.

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL

NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIDED—
NOT FOR INTERNATIONAL MAIL

SENT TO (See Reverse)		STREET AND NO. 1111 17th Ave	
P.O. STATE AND ZIP CODE P.O. Box 366 Chicago, IL 60604		POSTAGE \$1.37	
CERTIFIED FEE		€	
SPECIAL DELIVERY		€	
RESTRICTED DELIVERY		€	
SHOW TO WHOM AND DATE DELIVERED		€	
SHOW TO WHOM, DATE AND ADDRESS OF DELIVERY		€	
SHOW TO WHOM AND DATE DELIVERED WITH RESTRICTED DELIVERY		€	
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TOTAL POSTAGE AND FEES		€	
POSTMARK OR DATE		3	
CONSULT POSTMASTER FOR FEES			
OPTIONAL SERVICES			
RETURN RECEIPT SERVICES			

PS Form 3800, Apr. 1976

CHARLES A. STILLMAN

INVESTIGATION OF
KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
DONALD M. FRASER, MINN., CHAIRMAN
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, MASS. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, ILL.
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, N.Y. WILLIAM F. GOODLING, PA.
LEE N. HAMILTON, IND.
LEE J. RYAN, CALIF.
ROBERT S. BOETTCHER
SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF DIRECTOR

MAY - 4 1978
Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

May 2, 1978

Charles A. Stillman, Esq.
460 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Stillman:

This Subcommittee is giving consideration to calling the Reverend Sun Myung Moon as a witness at public hearings to be held during the first part of June. To assist the Subcommittee in deciding whether to call Rev. Moon, and to help in preparing and scheduling his testimony if he is called as a witness, we are requesting the opportunity to interview Rev. Moon informally, in the presence of counsel if he so desires. Such an interview would of course be voluntary and would be conducted by members of the Subcommittee staff. We have followed, or attempted to follow, this procedure in the case of virtually every witness who has appeared before the Subcommittee.

The following are topics which we would like to discuss with Rev. Moon:

1. His knowledge of the source of funds used to purchase stock in the Diplomat National Bank;
2. His knowledge of the circumstances surrounding a planned demonstration by the FLF at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., in September 1974;
3. Alleged political activities by the Unification Church and organizations related to it, including activities in opposition to the impeachment of President Nixon in 1973-74; and
4. The relationship between Rev. Moon, the Unification Church and related organizations and industries, including KCFF, and the South Korean Government, its agencies and officials.

EXHIBIT B

Committee on International Relations

INVESTIGATION OF KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Charles Stillman


- 2 -

May 2, 1978

I would appreciate your notifying me at your earliest convenience, but no later than May 15th, whether or not Rev. Moon will consent to such an informal interview. I would also appreciate your indicating whether you will accept service of a subpoena on behalf of Rev. Moon, in the event the Subcommittee decides to take that step.

I look forward to your response and hope that we will be able to arrange an informal meeting with Rev. Moon.

Sincerely yours,



Howard T. Anderson
Subcommittee on International
Organizations

B8

A.J.C. Weighs Religious Sects' Role

The American Jewish Congress, concerned by anguished reports from Jewish parents of young people involved in a variety of new religious groups, has started a nationwide campaign to gather information on the groups and to press for legal and legislative action against their activities.

The congress, said Naomi Levine, its executive director, has set up a "cult committee" to coordinate the campaign and has asked its local chapters in 100 cities around the country to report on investigations and legislation "dealing with cult activity in any form."

"We have always been lawyers for the Jewish community," she said, "and we want to protect the rights of parents and children from illegal action under the guise of religious proselytizing."

Mrs. Levine said that three United States Representatives had agreed to meet with A.J.C. members on Feb. 7 to discuss the problem of young people's involvement with religious groups. The three are Richard L. Ottunger, Democrat of Westchester County; Elizabeth Holtzman, Democrat of Brooklyn, and Donald M. Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota.

She said that her organization would also try to meet with the criminal justice division of the Department of Justice to present findings on "cult activity" and to get copies of the department's legal memorandums on the subject.

To get first-hand information, she said, the organization will soon sponsor meet-

ings in Washington and in New York for parents of sect members and former members to tell of their experiences. The Congress is particularly interested in getting examples of illegal activity.

"We'll spend whatever is necessary to get this information," she said.

Asked if she had any particular group in mind, she said, "The Moonie group seems to be the most troubling." Followers of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, head of the Unification Church, are often called "Moonies."

"We're trying to see if the Unification Church is paying members against the minimum wage law," she said.

Mrs. Levine said the A.J.C. was particularly interested in using the Fair Labor Standards Act, which regulates rates of pay and hours that employees can work, to start lawsuits against any of the sects that parents have complained about.

She said that the "cult committee" would investigate any religious group suspected of engaging in illegal activity, including Jews for Jesus, an evangelistic organization of Jews who have embraced Christian beliefs.

"We want to find ways to impair their activity that do not infringe on religious liberty," she said. "We pride ourselves in being very creative lawyers, and we are going to search to see if there is anything that can be done."

So far, however, the organization's lawyers have not found a good case to take up.

B. LETTER TO CHARLES A. STILLMAN, FROM HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HON. DONALD M. FRASER, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, DATED MAY 17, 1978

Washington, D.C. 20515

May 17, 1978

Mr. Charles A. Stillman
460 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Stillman,

We have reviewed your letter of May 12, 1978 with its enclosed memorandum, in which you asked that the Subcommittee on International Organizations reconsider its intention to call Rev. Sun Myung Moon as a witness in its investigation of Korean-American Relations.

The Subcommittee has decided to call Rev. Moon as one of its witnesses in hearings scheduled to begin in June. While we understand and appreciate your concern for the First Amendment rights of Rev. Moon and his followers, we are assured that the Subcommittee's questions will not go into protected areas of religious doctrine or belief, but will instead be directed to financial, business, and political activities which fall within the authorized scope of the Subcommittee's investigation. We are satisfied that there are adequate grounds to believe that, as to certain matters under investigation, Rev. Moon is the best or only available witness.

During Rev. Moon's testimony counsel will, of course, be permitted to raise objections to specific question areas and to request clarification as to the meaning or pertinency of a particular question. In addition, the Subcommittee staff remains willing to meet informally with Rev. Moon prior to the hearing in order to discuss the content of his testimony.

We continue to hope that Rev. Moon will cooperate voluntarily with this investigation. However, since it is his apparent intention not to do so, steps will be taken to serve a subpoena requiring his appearance at the hearing. In that connection we request that you either accept service for Rev. Moon, or arrange a mutually convenient time and place for service to be made.




Committee on International Relations

INVESTIGATION OF KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Mr. Stillman

Page 2

Sincerely yours,

Clement J. Zablocki
ChairmanCommittee on International
RelationsDonald M. Fraser
ChairmanSubcommittee on International
OrganizationsEdward J. Derwinski
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on International
Organizations

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KCIA 마수 빠져 교포사회 분열 위기

- 2 페이지에 계속 -



제 10대 상임이념관리위원장직은 김자 혁열씨 지 하고 있다. 그로써직책서는 또
저지 할수 있는 이야기들이 보이지 않는 일에서 저지 나오고, 보이지 않는 것
은 길이 신기어 굳어지고 있다. 보라, 여기에 스승기지는 논길의 그로돌을 금
로이 넓게 하고 있다. (사진은 삼남을발사관 주재 송남정보보원 임산신 인사

-1 폐지에서 계속-

결정사항이 있어 이인사지 못한 몇몇의 고직을 관통하여 사직국에게 교할 하고 이를 조선일보에 의뢰하느라 기사화 된 것이다. 김씨는 즉시 답답사부스를 통하여 이직을 저지함과 동시에 조선일보사를 상대로 사직부관한 유언이 이를 기사화하여 저명한 광복과 삼엄대단한 지상을 흔대 하며 조반한원리 손해 배상금수신함을 결는대 김광남국은 통사건을 심한 김광사직부관함을 담관하고 불기소사부를 의뢰하여 조선일보사에서도 모욕에 대한 책임을 크게 담포함으로서 사건은 수습된 것이다.

김광남사 측에서 예외한 조선일보사 측의 사론을 보면 그 기사가 김이나 사직부관한 것보다는 크게 상한이해에 상한은 고요하면 쉽게 담관함을 있는것이다. 즉 통 기사는 김씨가 상한고인제 부직함을 차진한것으로 되어 있고 김광이 이광남이었던 사실 내용을 유추했는데 김씨는 당시 편집 고인제 부직함이었고 가우림부주 부직이었던 김광소 책임자였다는 점을 보아도 조선일보가 김이나 소문한 기사를 다루었는가를 미루어 알수 있다.

다음에 지난 2월28일 상한 부직된 마우스 담당에서 있었던 김광사.이음복 부주 소연방도직에서 당시의 고인제 담당이었던 권명선씨가 통기사의 사론을 듣고나와 김광복사임을 상고했는데 김광복씨가 보관하고 있는 기록에 저명한 권명선씨는 통 사인단이 김씨가 편집 부직함을 유언부가 승낙한 사실소 개명직을 증명한 상문인인 것이다.

권명선씨는 현재 한국일보가 수필 작가로 내우에 있어 가능한 부직명직 중 고직함을 하는 사론을 하고 있는 것으로 알려져 있다.

셋째로, 김광사.이음복사 측이 온 통론론이 당 구원부주 김광복씨의 3촌 중 1명이 6.25사건을 참전했다는 주의를 저지르기 시작했는데 이에 대한 본 사단에서 대대 김광복사씨는 사건은 "6.25사건이 남양사와 작도됨에 대한 김광 (학도병군인 0755296)이내 나을 김광복씨 담관, 공산국적자를 신념하는 행위를 담관했던 만우국사"임을 주장하면서

"참전했다는 3촌은 6.25사건을 참전 했으므로 참고 있었"고 담하고 "이것이 나의 기억속에서도 살아있는 3촌적 이야기"가 대대적 신격을 담포고 상한에서 상대면 신격은통론을거쳐서 저지조는지 알고조도 모를 일"이라고 저명한 포럼을 저지 보았다.

이같은 가족배경적 사항까지 세세히 김광복사측의 상대측인 김광남사측에게 통치하는 다른 것은 김광 중상남부주에서 아마도 상관을 위한 자료가 될지 어가고 있는 것이 아닌가 하는 의혹이 어가여지 하고 있는 것이다.

다만김광 김광복사측을 지지할 가족 상이 있어 보이는 김광복씨를 비롯함도 김광복가 상한을담자관 주재 중상남부부원인 김광복남사측 부위 신격에 관여하지 않다는 관념을 한것이라고 신격들에게 담포 본사에게까지 전해왔다.

이것처럼, 김광복사측 신격 상고한 오씨는 본국 신격에 부위 신격에 참여하지않다는 언약을 담포하고 담포 신격자신은 본국에 신격수통을 하고있다는 사실을 담관조도 겐느라 감수조 겐을정 이라고 담관조 있다.

일곱째, 지난 3월1일 통론사론에서 저되었던 3.1일 행자 제4상문에서는 두 구의 김광씨 부위 저지 나왔는지는 통치가 분명치 않으나 다상의 남가우림 부직적 명명해들인 김광복사임을 비롯 김기상,김신환,차상담사들이 부주담할 상한에 저지 남통을 부직짓이라는 주의를 저지르기 시작했다는 것이다. 그 반감에는 김광부원인 김광복사가 있었다.

김광사.이음복부주들을 지지하는 조씨의 남에 저명한 담포에는 김광복.김광복사들이 담관했던 고요사제가 아담 김광이 저지였이라는 김광복 김광복을 조지했으나 아담신이가 또한인 상한지적에서 김광복사도 아담신이가 담관한 김광복 부직남부주들을 공격하는 김광복 조씨에 고요를 저지 남양이 김광복이라는 단면에서 저남을 김광복남부주에게 상통조도 저지조도 했다는 것"이며, 이는 김광복부원인 김광복부직남부주들을 담포 남양이인 수 있다는 저지저지를 저지하고 있다는 것이다.

중상남부주측 한민적전지 관여는 이

단 이런 상한지적한원리의 저명한 아니 가?답지는 지난 남가우 한민적관한것으로 미반적관한사단 김기상사이가 부주조담신이 저지 저남을 저지 김광복 남사임을 겐조하여 담관한 사출지관 과 광포부위 저남으로 담관해 저지"였었다는 것이 김기상사측의 주장이다.

또 김광복사측 주원인 이인사지 제

매우조씨가 인단단상에서 돌아와서 담관이 김광복인 단면에서 어조 중상남부주에서 "조출판과 문제있다"는 통론이며 통 저지저 남산통 시기로 저지 통기통을 저지저 포가저 인단이 통남통는 저 저남통해 저국을 저지관 관여가 있는것이다.



김광사.이음복부주측의 유세담에 상한인 부주를 비담할 목적으로 유세담 주원인 통론을 김광복사측의 저남에 저지 부위 놓여있었다. 신격저지하는 저 구인통저제 조를 유세 담관김광복사 김광복한원리저지에서는 담관조까지 김광사.



김광사.이음복부주측의 유세담에 상한인 이인사지관한것이다. 그는 1973년 5월 담관사내에서 있었던 김광복사측의 저지관한원리제 중상남부주들을 담포, 남통을 부지자가 담포에 반영한가 있다.

B. "A SAN FRANCISCO AFFAIR," FROM THE KOREA JOURNAL, DATED MAY 21, 1973 (KOREAN AND ENGLISH VERSIONS)

KOREA JOURNAL

5/21/73

(7)

남북 통일에는 3단계가 필요

책제를 이루어야 하겠습니
다.

사회적 면에서 본다면
연설하고 통솔한 사람이 설
교하고 계교도 설교할 수
없는 사람은 성공할 수는 없
는 사회가 되도록 하겠습
니다.

이런 면이 다수의 이익을
모호하는 길이 아니고 통치자.

사회 정의가 실현될 수 있
는 사회가 되겠습니다.

홍순근: 물로 계교도들
에게도...

김대중: 항상 조국의 일대
관심을 갖고 본국의 동포
들에게 많이 해주면, 결국
국으로 많이 하여주시기를
바랍니다.

갑자기 장내는 조만간 지역 정치의상과 선전이 거저지고
같은 장내에서 담벼락에 "미국군" "미국군" "미국군" "미국군"
하고 하여 웃이 있어지고 단수가 떨어지니 "미국군" "미국군"
7가지는 팀이란 분리가 되고, 이면회시는 계속해서
김대중시에게 계속하는 팀이—은사단에 군중과 군중들
으로 무장한 기동경찰 10여명이 들어와서 이면회시를
연행했다.

9. 포스안젤스 때 부영사는 경찰들이 이면회시를 연행하자
이를 저지시키고서 오후 6시에 시를 가—들을 나오이며
"나는 대한민국 정부군이다." "이 집회는 한국인의 집회
며 집회는 우리가 알아서 지킨다." "그 말하였으나 경찰은
아랑곳 없이 이면회시의 앞을 잡고 퍼드 "잡고 나갔다."

10. 장내의 집사가 혼란한 동안 총기를 잡수 있는 두이 "아메리
안이 주지속 인사 및 장내를 촬영하기 시작하였고 이 현장
에는 마침내서 영쪽임을 하는 방송사시사가 있어 주중을
잡았다."

11. 이순간 장전장 주변에는 3-4명의 경찰자가 있었으며 드문
새 술술자가 오자 이면회시를 때렸다. 때 부영사가 "나는
대한민국 정부군이다" 함7개 가졌다. "그 했으나 이면회시
안 잡고 가는 데였다. 이 때의 시간은 9시 4분 경각—

12. 다시 집사를 잡아 장전장이 9시 7분 무에 시작하자 장전
두 김대중시는 이런 장전 장전장이 미국에서도 있다는
것은 통탄할 일이며 한국 연평부의 장전장을 저지 고로
들에게 보일 수 있는 한 증거이기여 드디어 성공적인 장전
작가 되었다고 조르며, 육박을 "스치발고 진주처럼 발발
으로 나락 처면에 반대하던 경찰담당이 대박을 잡 수 있는
일이 아니었는가" 말했다.

김대중씨 시국강연현장스케치

1. 1973년 5월 21일 오후 7시 30분에 시작되는 김대중씨의
시국강연회는 예정시간 기 30분이 지나도 시작되지 못하고
있다가 8시 25분에 이르러서야 개최되었다.

2. 계획가 시작되던 무이 장내는 웅장한 분위기였으며 전 상
참 고관직상 이면회시, 이상 통령사관에서 올라온 배부형
사, 상참 통령사관의 김동원영사들이 마미쪽 경석들에 자리
잡고 있는 모습이 보였다.

3. 8시경 정서 불명의 몇몇 젊은이들이 제장 2층으로 수상한
매를 들고 오이는 것을 눈치챈 육인 경비원이 이들을 "다
마 올라 갔다. 얼마후 육인 경비원이 "매를 잡수마라" 들고
내려와 김대중씨에게 넘겨 주었는데 그 안에는 매를 통
연회를 방해하는데 "스치발고" (24제)가 들어 있었다.

4. 8시 25분 4명의 전장한 장년들의 도회를 받으며 김대중씨
육인 서술시장 김상문씨가 박수를 받으며 통탄—간단한
국민적벽가 있었다.

5. 담담 사죄를한 한국은계 연구회의 조영현씨가 담담적
회지를 설명하고 제관주 제장을 들어 보이며 "이같은 방법
으로 편주한 집회를 방해"하려는 사람이 있다고 증거를
을 높이 저들과 기자들의 카메라가 마미 움직였다.

6. 연설전제 연사 김상문씨가 통탄—박정권을 청토하기 시작
하자 담담장 회에 서있던 이면회시사가 고성으로 아지를 하
여 경비원이 주위를 주었다. 시간은 8시 35분.

7. 김상문씨의 강연과 함께 김대중씨의 소개가 끝나고 주
제 연사인 김대중씨가 마이크 앞에서와 이면회시사가 연단
앞으로 나와 김대중씨에게 절친 하면서 "책 국가 원수를
모욕하는가." "사슴버린 본국이 들어갈 잡았이지 책 여기
서 찬양한 고도들을 찬양하느냐." 그 하며 육박—김대중씨
의 도회를 받은 장년들이 받아서고 절고 하를 육인 담
말했다.

8. 사죄자인 조영현씨가 대중석을 향하여 "이분이 누구인지
는 모르나 민주적인 집회를 이끌며 방해물마니 치잡하기
원하시는 분은 박수를 쳐주시요." 하니 박수가 여러 나으
자 이면회시사가 "그런데 이 언설을 듣고 싶지 않은 사람
은 나를 따라 제장합니다." 그 통수—그녀나 친숙한 반응이
없고이와 이면회시사는 다시 연설식으로 다아서와 담
서있던 김대중씨가 "물마가 주십시오." 하였다. 이때 회
에서 여단 장년이 "거저적." 그 소리를 질렀다. 그러자



증거물로 제장과 제관을 들어 보이고 있다.



연단앞에서 승경을 벌이고 있는 공경



경찰에 연행되어 가는 이면회시

6/20/75

자유 공화국에서 본지 기사를 영문으로

A San Francisco Affair

The following is translated from an article entitled, "A Sketch of the Scene as Mr. Kim Dae-Jung Speaks of Current Events in Korea," which appeared in KOREA JOURNAL (May 21, 1975), published in San Francisco. The topic of the address is described as "The Three-Stage Proposal to the Reunification of Korea."

An evening with Mr. Kim Dae-Jung, 1971 Presidential Candidate of the Opposition Party, Korea, was to begin at 7:30 p.m. at International Student Center. One could feel the atmosphere of the room being tense and apprehensive. Of certain dubious characters who were seen earlier in and out of the lobby were Mr. Lee Min-Hye, the former president of Korean Society at San Francisco Area, Mr. Bee Young-Sik, Vice Consul of Korean Consulate General in Los Angeles, and Mr. Kim Dong-Jin, Consul of Korean Consulate General in San Francisco, to name a few.

Around 8 p.m. a uniformed security guard suspiciously followed a group of young Korean men with a large shopping bag going upstairs directly above the hall where the meeting was to take place. Minutes later, the same security guard returned with a bag which he evidently confiscated, and turned it over to the program director for the evening. The bag contained 10 bottles of catnip and two dozens of eggs.

At 8:25 p.m., when Mr. Kim Dae-Jung and Mr. Kim Sang-Dong, the former mayor of Seoul, accompanied by four stout young men,

entered the hall, the audience expressed their respect with loud applause.

The evening meeting was prepared under auspices of the Organization of Korean Studies in Berkeley, California, whose president, Mr. Cho Myung-Hyun, acting as the master of ceremony, began the program by exhibiting the confiscated goods and remarked, "Someone with these things tried to disrupt our orderly meeting to night." Several men representing various press corps were busy with their cameras.

As the first of two speakers for the evening, the former mayor of Seoul, Mr. Kim Sang-Dong, spoke berating the Park Chung-hee regime. Mr. Lee Min-Hye who was standing in the rear of the hall, started shouting at the speaker with vile, uncivil remarks. This behavior of Mr. Lee caused a considerable consternation, and caught a marked attention of the security guards. The time was 8:35 p.m. However, Mr. Kim Sang-Dong managed to complete his speech, and subsequently introduced Mr. Kim Dae-Jung as the main speaker for the evening. No sooner Mr. Kim Dae-Jung stepped in front of the microphone than the same Mr. Lee marched toward the speaker's platform, screaming "Why do you criticize the head of our nation? You should fight in Korea, don't stir up good compatriots here!" Those young men who accompanied Mr. Kim into the hall immediately stood up and blocked Mr. Lee's way to Mr. Kim. There was an

instant melee.

Mr. Cho, the master of ceremony, got up and said, pointing at Mr. Lee, "Whoever this man may be, he is definitely disrupting our meeting, which is being conducted in a democratic manner. Therefore, all those who are in favor of dismissing him from this room, may please clap your hands." The audience responded with loud cheers and hand clappings. Mr. Lee, in turn, also requested, "All those who don't wish to hear this speech, follow me." As no one responded, he started to approach the speaker again. Thereupon Mr. Kim told him, "Please be excused." As he stood still unmoved, someone in the audience shouted, "Get lost!" Mr. Lee, reacting instantly, rushed toward the man who told him so, pulling and rending his dress. Then as Mr. Lee tried to rush back at Mr. Kim again, ten city police officers with guns and clubs entered the room and arrested Mr. Lee. Mr. Bee Young-Sik, Vice Consul from Los Angeles, attempted to intercede by showing his identification card, saying "I am an official of Korean government. This is a Korean meeting. We will manage our own affairs." The police paid no attention to him and took Mr. Lee away. In the midst of all these happenings, someone with a motion picture camera was busy going around. Although he was unknown to most of the audience, the presence of a certain Mr. Park Hong-Sik, who is in a motion picture business in Los Angeles, caused a

discovering speculation as to the real purpose of taking pictures of the scene of this melee.

Out on the street, as the police put Mr. Lee in a patrol wagon, Mr. Bee Young-Sik tried again, "I am an official of Korean government. I want to accompany Mr. Lee to the station." But he was ignored again and left behind.

By the time an order was restored for the speaker to begin his long waited address, it was 9:07 p.m. Mr. Kim expressed a deep regret at this unfortunate incident, especially, at the very characteristic of disrupting an orderly meeting here in the United States as if it were taken place in Korea. On the other hand, Mr. Kim said half-jokingly, because "you who are in America have just witnessed the kind of politics, that is, CIA-governed politics of the Park regime, this incident tonight, however unfortunate, can prove a point I've been making all along." Should anyone, Mr. Kim continued, disagree with my view, he needs not resort to a tactic of physical disruption or terror; for democratic way is a two-way dialogue.

Postscript: Mr. Lee, who was out on bail the next day, telephoned Mr. Kim and continued to harass and threaten him, "I will fight you to the end." The Vice Consul from Los Angeles, it is known, is an agent of Korean CIA. It became quite obvious to link Mr. Lee's undertaking with Korean CIA, whose overseas agents enjoy an enormous amount of diplomatic privileges and immunities in the U.S.



C. "DEATH THREAT TO KOREAN HERE," FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER,
DATED AUGUST 24, 1974

Sat., Aug. 24, 1974 ☆ S.F. Examiner

Foe of President Park

Death threat to Korean here

By Ken Wong

The publisher of a Korean newspaper here claims he has been threatened with death because of his criticism of South Korean President Chung Hee Park.

Song Sun-keun, 36, who publishes the Korea Journal, told Daly City police and the FBI that a phone caller Tuesday told him, "You will be killed Sunday."

The caller said he was a reader of Song's paper and identified himself as "Kim Chi Soo."

The conversation was in Korean.

The caller said Song was a Communist because of his editorials against Park, but Song said he told the man:

"You don't read my paper. We are strongly against Communism, just as we are



SONG SUN-KEUN
Tells of threat

against Park's dictatorship."

There are 15,000 Koreans in the Bay Area, 4,000 of them in San Francisco.

Song said his year-old Ko-

rea Journal, with a circulation of 2,000, is a community paper with no political affiliation but "keeps an eye on Park's right-wing dictatorship in South Korea."

"We cannot stand idly by and watch Park's repression without protest," he said.

Last April he led a demonstration, mostly by students, at the Korean Consulate General Office at 3500 Clay St.

President Park, whose wife was assassinated last week, has held office since 1961, when his military coup overthrew President John Chang's government.

Park has been elected three times to four-year terms and declared martial law in 1972. Since then all newspapers, radio and television stations have been under government control.

D. "PLEAS BY 'THREATENED' KOREAN PUBLISHER SPARK TWO PROBES," FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, DATED DECEMBER 16, 1976

Page 4—S.F. EXAMINER ☆

Thurs., Dec. 16, 1976

Pleas by 'threatened' Korean publisher spark two probes

Police in San Francisco and Daly City are investigating complaints by the publisher of a Korean-language newspaper here who claims his life has been threatened many times by agents of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

Detective James Mendiara of the Daly City Police Department, confirmed that he and Lt. Roger Austin have been assigned to probe Song Sun Keun's allegations.

In letters to the police chiefs of both cities, Song, 38, a resident of Daly City, asked for an investigation into what he called a "KCIA plot to assassinate me."

"I have received death threats ever since 1974," Song's letters, dated Dec. 13, said. "I have reported these threats to Daly City police and to the FBI and still I see no progress."

Enclosed with the letters were the name of a man who Song says is a former KCIA informer who allegedly told him of the murder plot,



SONG SUN KEUN
'Target of KCIA plot'

and a translated transcript of the conversation the two men had on Nov. 18.

San Francisco patrolmen Karl Karlsson and Kenneth Davis talked

to Song in his printing office at 360 Kearny St. yesterday.

Davis confirmed that Song had disclosed the name of the witness, but said he could not reveal the name or any other specific contents of their interview with Song. Davis said the patrolmen's report would be forwarded to Deputy Police Chief Mortimer McInerney.

By late yesterday afternoon, McInerney had not seen the patrolmen's report. However, McInerney said he would definitely order an investigation after studying the report.

Song will receive whatever protection and investigation he is entitled to (by law), McInerney said.

Song, a naturalized American who has published the Korean Journal for three years, claims KCIA agents are threatening his life because he has been critical of South Korean President Park Chung Hee.

Korean officials deny that KCIA agents are stationed here.

**E. TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SONG SUN KEUN AND CHUNG TAI BONG,
DATED NOVEMBER 18, 1976**

A Translated Transcript of a Conversation between Mr. Chung Tai Bong
and Mr. Song Sun-Keun

(This conversation was held on Nov. 18, 1976 at 7:30PM in Mr. Song's office at 360 Kearny St., San Francisco, California. The conversation was tape recorded with the knowledge and consent of both parties.)

Song: Earlier(this evening) you told me that Consul Limb(Limb Man Sung, stationed at the Korean Consulate General), Mr. Kim Suk Ha and you discussed a plan to assassinate me. Other than you three, was anyone else present?

Chung: No. The discussion took place at Mr. Lee Don Woong's apartment 2 or 3 days before the March 6 election(for president of the Korean-American Association of the San Francisco Bay Area). It was in the evening of either March 3 or 4, 1976. Consul Limb, myself and Mr. Kim Suk Ha were the only persons present. (Consul Limb) told us that there had been a plan to assassinate Mr. Song Sun-keun by having him hit by a car driven by a certain man who was to come up from Los Angeles, but that the plan had been cancelled at some point. However, Mr. Kim Suk Ha, who was present there, said, "Leave this to me. I have a 'younger brother' living in Seattle who always obeys me. I will have him kill (Song) by hitting him with his car." I heard them discussing this plan. To my knowledge, there was a plan to assassinate you one or two years ago, but that plan was cancelled for some reason.

Song: You said that the man who was to come down from Seattle was a certain Mr. Cho?

Chung: Yes, it was Mr. Cho. He is a karate expert with an 8th degree black belt and I understand that he owns a karate studio in Seattle.

Song: Do you know whether there was any communication between him and Mr. Kim Suk Ha?

Chung: I understand that they have a very close relationship, like real brothers. They were in touch with each other and I know that (Cho) visited the Bay Area several times in the past. He doesn't have any brains, but he feels such a strong kinship for Mr. Kim Suk Ha--just like a blood brother--that he would even risk his life for Kim's sake.

Song: On the day before election day, (Consul Limb) intended to hit and kill me with his car when he found me taking pictures in front of the Consulate General?

Chung: Yes I remember the discussion. (Consul Limb) was going to hit and kill you, but he....(inaudible)

Song: Exactly what did (Consul Limb) say?

Chung: His exact statement was that he saw you taking pictures and sped his car toward you to hit and kill you. However, you escaped so fast that he could not hit you. (Consul Limb) told us that if he could have caught you, he would have killed you.

Song: Did Consul Limb make that statement personally?

Chung: Yes. He personally made the statement and I personally heard it.

Song: Next, are you sure that the KCIA gave \$3,000 (to Mr. Kim Kyung Ha the brother of Kim Suk Ha and a presidential candidate in the Korean-American Association election,) at the time of the election?

Chung: I heard the story from the wife of Mr. Kim Suk Ha.

Song: Kim Suk Ha's wife?

Chung: Yes.

Song: Who brought the money?

Chung: She said that Rhee Min Hi and Chun Myung Sun brought the money.

Song: Did they bring a check or cash?

Chung: As far as I know, they brought cash. However, I am not so sure. The only thing I am sure of is that they brought \$3,000. Moreover, Consul Limb said, "Don't worry about money. Go ahead and spend. We'll cover all expenses from behind." Kim Kyung Ha had begun to worry about running out of money and several days before the election started moaning about not spending money, but (Consul Limb) urged him to spend money and not worry.

Song: Did Consul Limb pay frequent visits to Mr. Kim's campaign headquarters?

Chung: He did not visit often. Instead, he called Mr. Kim Suk Ha and met him somewhere outside and talked.

Song: And on the day when he talked about assassinating me?

Chung: Yes, (Consul Limb) was at election headquarters on that day. Yes. He was there. I think that was the only day when Consul Limb visited the campaign headquarters. Usually he communicated with both Kim Kyung Ha and Kim Suk Ha on the telephone. He called them at election headquarters. On the day before the election he came to the building in front of election headquarters.

Song: Roughly when did you have that conversation when (Consul Limb) told you he had been going to hit me with his car and kill me when I was

in front of the Consulate General?

Chung: I think it was all on that same day. To my knowledge, it was the only day when he visited Mr. Lee Don Woong's apartment during the election campaign. He told all the stories that day. It was approximately 2:00 AM.

Song: Then, it was March 5 when I went there....?

Chung: Yes, it was one day before the election. Yes, it was March 5, one day before the election.

Song: Then, after I visited the place...they probably decided to execute the plan accordingly.

Chung: Yes, I think so.

Song: And was (Kim Kyung Ha) going to sue you? And the KCIA?

Chung: Yes. KCIA....

Song: What were they going to do?

Chung: What they were going to do was, they were going to arrest and detain me if I visited Korea even though I am an American citizen. Second, by levying an enormous amount of tax on my family (in Korea), they were going to force me to kneel before them. What they were saying was that they intended to use the KCIA to force me to kneel before them.

Song: Who said these things?

Chung: Mr. Kim Suk Ha personally told me on the telephone.

Song: When was it?

Chung: It was two months or a month and a half ago. It was in the middle of September.

Song: I recall because of the problem of your advertisement in my newspaper, that the question of whether I would live or die first came up in 1974.

Chung: It was 1974.

Song: Yes, Mr. Chung, at the time you didn't tell me who it was.

Chung: No, I didn't.

Song: After I heard your story (about the advertisement problem), I telephoned Consul Limb on the telephone and asked him why he was harassing those who advertised in my paper. However, I didn't mention your name to Consul Limb.

Chung: No.

Song: I simply mentioned "my advertisers." That evening you called me back and asked me why I had told Consul Limb about it.

Chung: Yes.

Song: What was that all about?

Chung: That was all true. I told you, "Do not put my advertisement in your paper anymore. Otherwise, I will cancel it." Now I trust you man to man because we have lived together in the United States for many years. I was worried that if your problems got worse and worse, my business would be hurt. Therefore, when I argued with you and cursed you, my utmost concern was to protect my business. However, what I told you before (tonight) is all true. Because of Consul Limb, I was going to terminate my advertisement in your paper. Whether it was coincidental or not, those insurance policies I sold to persons who had connections with the Korean government were all cancelled. Insurance policies which I sold to persons who had connections with the Korean Consulate General were all cancelled. So, it was true that I felt pressure. For the sake of my business, I behaved in such a fashion at that time. Now using the KCIA (the Kim brothers) are threatening me by implying that if and when I go to Korea, they will have me arrested, that they are going to destroy my family. Although I am a U.S. citizen and have no desire to go back and live in Korea, they keep threatening my life. Therefore, I am telling you the whole truth in the hope that this will make the record clear so that people will know who killed me or who killed you if anything happens.

Song: Thank you. This was taped on Nov. 18, 1976 at 7:30PM.

**F. SIGNED SWORN STATEMENT OF CHUNG TAI BONG TO SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF,
DATED MAY 25, 1978**

Statement taken at:
New York Life Insurance Company
100 Pine Street
San Francisco, California
May 25, 1978

I, Chung Tai Bong, make the following voluntary statement to Edwin H. Gragert and David P. Hauck who have identified themselves to me as representatives of the Investigation of Korean-American Relations of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the United States House of Representatives.

I presently reside at 2365 O'Farrell Street in San Francisco, California, and am presently an agent with the New York Life Insurance Company in San Francisco, California. I came to San Francisco in 1964 and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in December, 1973. During my eighteen years of residence in the Korean-American community in San Francisco I have come to know Mr. Song Sun-keun very well, having met him in 1964 shortly after my arrival in this country.

Sometime prior to 1974, I met Mr. Limb Man Sung, consul at the San Francisco Consulate of the Republic of Korea. Mr. Limb identified himself to me as an operative of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for northern California. Mr. Limb stated that one of his missions in northern California was to stop the publication of the Korea Journal, a Korean language newspaper published by Mr. Song Sun-keun. The Korea Journal was known to have an editorial position critical of the government of the Republic of Korea. Consul Limb stated that he intended to pressure advertisers to withdraw their advertisements from the Korea Journal and thereby force Song to cease publishing of the newspaper. Consul Limb asked me to withdraw my

At my city

Chung Tai Bong

Date


MAY 25, 1978

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advertisement from the Korea Journal. After talking with Consul Limb, I called Mr. Song to tell him I was withdrawing my advertisement. However, being good friends with Mr. Song, I offered to continue paying for the withdrawn advertisement nonetheless. He refused this offer and we finally agreed that the size of my advertisement would be reduced. One other company that was pressured by Consul Limb to withdraw its advertisement from the Korean Journal was Korean Airlines.

In the 1976 election for President and Vice-President of the Korean-American Residents Association of Northern California I served as campaign manager for one of the presidential candidates, Kim Kyung Ha. In this election, Mr. Kim Kyung Ha and his vice-presidential running mate, Mr. Lee Chung Jae, were supported by the Korean Consulate in San Francisco. Consul Limb stated in my presence that it was his goal to elect officers in every Korean-American Residents Association who were, in Mr. Limb's opinion, pro- Republic of Korea. I know personally that Mr. Limb called potential voters and told them not to vote for Kim Kyung Ha's opponent, Mr. Kim Yong Baik. Further, I heard from the brother of Kim Kyung Ha that the consulate in San Francisco contributed \$3,000 to Kim Kyung Ha's campaign and that Limb offered to reimburse all expenses incurred for Kim Kyung Ha's campaign from KCIA funds.

During this campaign the Consul General in San Francisco, Yun Chan, was replaced by Mr. Shin Dong Won. Consul Limb stated to me that Yun had desired to stay neutral in the campaign, so Limb arranged for Yun to be replaced by Shin who would take a more active role in the campaign. Mr. Rhee Min Hee, the outgoing president of the Korean-American Residents Association told me directly that there would be reprisals by Consul General Shin against those who


 Chung Tai Bong

Date

2/14/78

page 3

voted for Kim Yong Baik. Mr. Rhee, known to me as an informer to Consul Limb, also tried to discredit Song Sun-keun and the running mate of Kim Yong Baik by alleging that their money came from North Korean sources.

On various occasions during the period 1974-1976 I overheard plots against Mr. Song Sun-keun. In early 1976, prior to the Residents Association election I heard Consul Limb and Mr. Rhee Min Hee discuss plans to kidnap Song Sun-keun and take him back to Korea. On another occasion one man from Los Angeles discussed with Consul Limb and Mr. Rhee a plot to kill Song by running him down with a car.

The night before the election of the Korean-American Residents Association, March 4, 1976, Consul Limb came to the election headquarters of Kim Kyung Ha and told Mr. Rhee and me that he had tried to kill Song by running him down in front of the San Francisco Consulate. Consul Limb then discussed ways of stopping Song's activities. Limb stated that because of Song's activities, Limb's work in northern California had been exposed and thus hampered, so he had a very personal reason to kill Mr. Song.

: After the election I told Song to be careful because there were individuals who wanted to harm him. On November 18, 1976, I had another discussion with Song during which I told him of my knowledge of threats on his life. I agreed willingly that the conversation be tape recorded by Song. Mr. Song recorded our conversation. I have seen a transcript of that recording prepared by Song and can attest to its authenticity and accuracy.

Chung Tai Bong
Chung Tai Bong

Date May 25 1978

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I have agreed to make this statement to the Subcommittee on International Organizations in the hope that the KCIA harassment that I witnessed of Mr. Song Sun-keun will be exposed and prevented from happening again against other Koreans and Korean-Americans living in the United States.

I have read the foregoing statement consisting of four pages, each of which I have signed, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Me up my
Chung Tai Bong

Date May 25, 1978

Witnesses:

Edwin H. Gragert
Edwin H. Gragert
Investigator
Subcommittee on International
Organizations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

David P. Hauck
David P. Hauck
Research Analyst
Subcommittee on International
Organizations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

State of California
County of San Francisco

On this 25th day of May 1978 before me Yvonne B. Powers, a Notary Public, State of California duly commissioned and sworn, personally appeared EDWIN H. GRAGERT, DAVID P. HAUCK AND CHUNG TAI BONG known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

Yvonne B. Powers
Notary Public, State of California
My commission expires Aug. 15, 1981



G. SIGNED SWORN STATEMENT OF RHEE MIN HEE (IN KOREAN) TO SUBCOMMITTEE
STAFF, DATED MAY 30, 1978, WITH STAFF TRANSLATION

본인 이인희는 1971년과 1972년 제 7대 상항지역 한인회장과 1974년 및
1976년 제 9대 상항지역 한인회장을 역임한 대한 민국 국민의 한사람입니다.
본인은 1973년 5월초 상항 연합 감리교회 송정읍 목사 자택에서 열린 김대중 씨
시국 좌담회에 상항소재 "가주 한국의 소리 방송" 회장으로 참석한 바 있습니다.

상항지역 한국 언론인 초청강연인 등 간담회에참석한 본인은 연사로 출석한
전 한국 대통령 후보 김대중씨의 강연을 듣고 평소 존경해온 김씨의 연설 내용이
사실 무늬의 허창된 내용으로 일관된 점에 크게 실망한 바 있습니다.
이날 김대중씨는 10여명의 언론인들이 참석한 자리에서 (1) 자신은 공화당 정권이
암살하려 했다. (2) 신병 치료차 일본에 건너 갔다가 한국에 계엄령이 선포되어
미국으로 왔다. (3) 박정희 대통령의 독재가 계속되는 한 미국의 군사 및 경제
원조를 중단하도록 재미교포들이 미국 정부와 의회에 압력을 넣어야 된다.
(4) 한국 통일 문제에서 북한이 주장하고 있는 남북 연방제 (일명 고트 연방제)를
지지. 찬양하는 발언을 하는 등 시종 국가원수를 비방하는 반정부 발언을 했다.
이에 본인은 김씨의 발언을 듣고 그가 선량한 교포들을 선동, 재미동포를 자신의
정치 도구와 마는 것으로 보고 그의 시국 강연이 일방적으로 한국 정부를 비방
하므로써 교포사회를 분열할 우려가 있다고 판단, 동 강연회를 중지해야 한다고
견신했습니다.

1973년 5월 17일 상항시내 Oak St. 50 국제 학생 센터에서 열린 김대중씨의
시국 강연회는 1백 50여 교포가 참석했으나 이날 김씨는 동 강연회에서도 송록사
자택에서 발언한 내용과 동일한 정부 비방으로 일관되므로써 본인은 그의 거짓강연으로
선량한 교포를 우롱해서는 안된다고 생각, 동 강연회의 중지를 요구한 바 있습니다.
김씨는 이날 (1) 박정희 정권이 자신을 암살하려 했다는 사실무근의 중상선전과
함께 (2) 한국에 대한 미국의 경제원조를 즉시 중단하도록 압력을 넣을 것과 (3) 북한

May 30th 1978
OFFICIAL SEAL
MARGUERITE K. HUGHES
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Comm. Exp. 12/31/1980
Min Hee Rhee

측이 주장하는 남북 연방제를 지지. 찬동하는 한국인이면 있을수 없는 몰지각한 발언을 계속, 이의 중지를요구한 바 있습니다.

본인이 동 강연을 반대한 이유는 김씨가 (1) 국내 정치 문제를 국외로까지 끌어 내 국가 원수를 모독한 것과 (2) 한국인이자면 누구나 반대하는 남북 연방제를 찬동, 찬공산주적인 그의 정신구조를 의심했으며, (3) 신병치료차 일본에 갔다가 한국에 비상근엄령이 선포되어 귀국을 못하게 된것을 마치 한국정부가 자신을 안살 하더라도 미국에 망명을 한듯이 허위강연을 하므로써 국내 시정애 이두운 교포들을 선동하러 했던 점입니다.

이날 본인은 김씨의 강연도중 "왜 국가원수를 모독하느냐" "정치적인 싸움이 라면 본국에 돌아와 하겠이지 왜 여기까지 와서 선량한 교포들을 우롱하느냐"고 반대한 것입니다.

본인이 김씨의 강연을 막자 김씨를 추종하는 건장한 청년 5-6 명이 본인을 강연장에서 끌어내려 욕신각신 했으며 잠시후 출동한 경찰에 의해 본인은 강연장 밖으로 끌려가 경찰에 의해 즉시 귀국조치된 바 있습니다.

또한 1976년 3월 6일 상항지역 한인회장 선거에서 김경하, 김용백 두 후보가 출마, 경합을 벌였는데 본인은 김경하 후보를 지원했는데, 일부 반대 세력으로 부터 본인이 마치 한국 정부 계통으로 부터 자금을 받은 것처럼 증상.모략한 것은 심히 유감스러우며 본인의 명예를 훼손한 것입니다. 심지어 일부 반 정부계 신문에서는 본인이 한국정부와 중앙정보부가 제공하는 자금을 받았으며 KCIA 의 앞잡이라는 떠무니 없는 허위 사실을 유포, 본인과 본인의 가족, 더 나아가서는 상항 교포 사회와 한국 정부에 극도의 피해를 주고 있다는 사실을 상기해 주시기 바랍니다. 끝.

Marguerite K. Nichols
May 30th 1978
 OFFICIAL SEAL
 MARGUERITE K. NICHOLS
 NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 My Commission Expires 12-31-1980
Marguerite K. Nichols

STAFF TRANSLATION OF THE SWORN STATEMENT OF MIN HI RHEE

I, Min Hi Rhee, am a citizen of the Republic of Korea and served as President of the San Francisco area Korean Residents Association during 1971-72 and from 1974-76. In early May of 1973, I, as chairman of the "California Voice of Korea Broadcasting" of San Francisco, attended a discussion meeting on current affairs by Mr. Kim Dae Jung at the home of Reverend Song Chung Yul of the San Francisco United Methodist Church.

At the discussion meeting to which Korean media personnel were invited to participate, I listened to the speech of Mr. Kim Dae Jung, former candidate for President of Korea, who was appearing as the speaker. I was greatly disappointed that the content of the speech by Mr. Kim, someone I had come to respect, was one of consistent groundless and preposterous falsehoods. That day Mr. Kim Dae Jung, seated with over ten members of the media, stated that: (1) the Democratic Republican Party regime intended to assassinate him; (2) martial law was declared while he was in Japan, having gone there for treatment of his illness, and he came to the US; (3) Korean residents in the US should pressure the US Government and Congress to cut off American military and economic aid as long as the President Park Chung Hee dictatorship continues; and (4) on the question of Korean unification, he expressed praise and support for a north-south federation (a federation under the name of Koryo) which is advocated by North Korea and from start to finish made anti-government statements, slandering the head of state. I listened to Mr. Kim's statements and saw that they were intended to agitate the virtuous Korean residents and try to turn these residents of the US into his political tools. Judging that his (planned) speech on current affairs would criticize the Korean government and tend to divide the Korean community, I decided that the speech had to be stopped.

On May 17, 1973 about 150 Korean residents gathered at the International Student Center at 50 Oak Street in San Francisco for a speech on current affairs by Mr. Kim Dae Jung. However, since Mr. Kim's speech on this day also consistently criticized the government with statements similar to those of the speech at Reverend Song's house, I felt that he must not make fools of the virtuous Korean residents with a speech of lies and demanded that the speech be stopped. On that day Mr. Kim (1) continued his groundless slander campaign stating that the Park Chung Hee government intended to assassinate him; (2) made senseless statements one could

- 2 -

not make if one were Korean, that supported and praised both the application of pressure to immediately cut off US economic aid to Korea and (3) the north-south federation advocated by North Korea. Therefore, I demanded that the speech be stopped.

The reasons why I opposed this speech are: (1) that Kim Dae Jung defamed the Korean head of state by extending domestic political problems abroad; (2) that I was suspicious of his pro-communist mental make-up and support for the north-south federation opposed by all who could be called Koreans; and (3) that through this speech of falsehoods he tried to agitate Korean residents ignorant of the Korean domestic situation by saying that after going to Japan for medical treatment he could not return to Korea following the announcement of the emergency martial law in Korea. Feeling the Korean government intended to kill him, he came to the US.

That day during Mr. Kim's speech I raised my opposition by saying, "Why do you defame the Korean head of state?" and "If it's a political fight you should go back to Korea and do it there. Why do you come over here and agitate the virtuous Korean residents?"

As soon as I blocked Mr. Kim's speech about 5-6 strong young supporters of Mr. Kim took me from the speakers' platform and engaged me in a verbal mele. Soon after, I was taken outside the meeting hall by the police who had been called in and I was immediately sent home by the police.

In the March 6, 1976, elections for President of the San Francisco area Korean Residents Association, Mr. Kim Kyung Ha and Mr. Kim Young Baik entered the race. I supported the candidacy of Kim Hyung Ha. The slander tactic used by certain opposition forces claiming that I received money from Korean government sources is extremely deplorable and has defamed my name. Worse still, certain anti-government newspapers circulated the completely groundless lie that I accepted money offered by the Korean government and Central Intelligence Agency and that I became a KCIA agent. This has done me and my family, as well as the Korean government and community, great damage. I hope these facts will be noted. End.

(signed) Min Hi Rhee
May 30, 1978

(official seal)

(signed) Marguerite K. Nichols
Notary Public

APPENDIX 6

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE TESTIMONY OF KANG KYUNG KOO

A. LETTER TO KANG KYUNG KOO FROM MORRISON L. EDWARDS OF HARVARD, DATED DECEMBER 18, 1974

December 18, 1974

Mr. Kang Kyung-koo
Education Attaché
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
2320 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Kang:

It was indeed a pleasure to have had the opportunity to speak with you in Mr. Olney's absence in Asia.

You indicated that the Korean Government has in the past given tangible support to the Korean Studies Programs at the East-West Center in Hawaii and Western Michigan University at Kalamazoo. The generosity of the Korean Government in these instances, and in particular the long-range vision of its Ministry of Education in guiding the support of these very important programs is much to be admired and appreciated by all who have an interest not only in Korea but in the international dimensions of higher education as well.

You stated on the telephone this morning that you are under instructions from Ambassador Hahn to explore ways in which the Korean Government might contribute to the fund-raising campaign which Mr. T.J. Coolidge, Jr., is now leading on behalf of Harvard's East Asian Studies Program. This is very exciting news for us, particularly since Ambassador Hahn, in, as you pointed out, a distinguished alumnus of the Harvard Law School.

I have forwarded this encouraging information to Messrs. Coolidge and Olney in Hong Kong. I am sure that you may expect an immediate response when they return to Boston shortly after the first of the new year.

With all best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely yours,

Morrison L. Edwards

B. BANK STATEMENTS OF KANG KYUNG KOO'S CHECKING ACCOUNT

---- MR KYUNG KOO KANG
 ---- 2320 MASS AVE N W
 WASHINGTON D C

20078

CHECKS AND DEBITS		DEPOSITS AND CREDITS	DATE	BALANCE
		BALANCE FORWARD	01 25 3	7,111.74
200.00			01 25 3	6,911.74
20.27	56.39		01 26 3	
598.00			01 26 3	6,237.08
75.00	195.13		01 29 3	5,966.95
464.00			01 30 3	5,502.95
300.00	44.50	2,487.60	02 02 3	
3,322.68			02 02 3	4,323.37
4.25			02 05 3	4,319.12
46.63			02 06 3	4,272.44
50.00	218.00		02 07 3	4,004.44
44.00			02 08 3	3,960.44
56.56	454.00		02 09 3	3,449.88
104.5404	9.28		02 12 3	3,336.06
47.56			02 14 3	3,288.50
200.00	9.27		02 15 3	3,079.23
8.94			02 16 3	3,070.29
150.00	18.00		02 22 3	2,902.29
15.75	221.75		02 23 3	2,664.79

04 05 618 678

05-22-74

----- MR KYUNG KUI KANG
 ----- 2320 MASS AVE N W
 ----- WASHINGTON D C

20006

CHECKS AND DEBITS		DEPOSITS AND CREDITS	DATE	BALANCE
3.00	9.10		04 23 4	4,515.29
19.49			04 23 4	
2.1104	13.95		04 24 4	4,483.70
20.37			04 24 4	4,447.27
30.13			04 26 4	4,417.14
2.46	20.00		04 29 4	
39.00	69.92		04 29 4	
60.00			04 29 4	4,205.76
84.32			04 30 4	4,116.44
		1,775.10	05 01 4	
		7,500.10	05 01 4	15,495.54
1.75	4.00		05 02 4	
5.45	5.70		05 02 4	
39.38	10,000.00		05 02 4	5,339.26
4.60	6.00		05 06 4	
234.00			05 06 4	5,094.66
10.00	10.00		05 08 4	
154.26			05 08 4	4,920.40
8.00	10.00		05 10 4	4,902.40
17.50			05 14 4	4,884.90
10.00			05 15 4	4,874.90
5.20			05 16 4	4,869.70
17.80			05 17 4	4,851.90
6.79			05 20 4	4,845.11
5.00	12.90		05 21 4	
14.50	50.00		05 21 4	
50.00			05 21 4	4,712.71
23.94	1,000.00		05 22 4	3,688.77

04 05 618 678

ACCOUNT NUMBER

02-21-75

DATE OF THIS STATEMENT

MR KYUNG KOO KANG
2320 MASS AVE N W
WASHINGTON D C

20008

CHECKS AND DEBITS		DEPOSITS AND CREDITS	DATE	BALANCE
		BALANCE FORWARD	01 24 5	619.41
6.79	10.00		01 24 5	
35.23			01 24 5	567.39
11.61			01 27 5	555.78
109.15			01 28 5	446.63
56.04			01 29 5	390.59
29.10			01 30 5	361.49
30.75			01 31 5	330.74
241.00		1,000.00	02 05 5	1,089.74
354.65			02 10 5	735.09
10.42	83.66		02 11 5	641.01
14.50			02 12 5	626.51
10.16		10,000.00	02 14 5	10,616.35
4.40	130.00		02 18 5	10,481.95
8.00	23.00		02 19 5	
163.02	10,000.00		02 19 5	287.93
2.00			02 20 5	285.93

04 05 618 678

09-22-75

**** MR KYUNG KOO KANG
 2320 MASS AVE N W
 WASHINGTON D C

20008

CHECKS AND DEBITS		DEPOSITS AND CREDITS	DATE	BALANCE
		BALANCE FORWARD	08 22 5	244.82
30.90			09 04 5	213.92
		4,000.00	09 09 5	4,213.92
5.00	4,000.00		09 10 5	208.92
11.80			09 12 5	197.12
32.67			09 16 5	164.45
20.00			09 17 5	144.45
15.00			09 18 5	129.45

60¢.

05 018 678

4. NUMBER

12-17-12

DATE OF THIS STATEMENT

**** MR KYUNG KOJ KANG
2320 MASS AVE N W
WASHINGTON D C

20008

CHECKS AND DEBITS	DEPOSITS AND CREDITS	DATE	BALANCE
	BALANCE FORWARD	11 21 5	256.16
10,000.00	10,000.00 RT	11 21 5	256.16
	10,000.00	11 24 5	10,256.16
15.00		11 26 5	10,241.16
10,000.00		12 01 5	241.16
30.17		12 04 5	210.99
	200.00	12 08 5	410.99
264.37		12 09 5	141.62
21.98		12 10 5	119.64
23.88		12 11 5	95.76
8.00	47.98	12 16 5	39.78
	356.47	12 17 5	396.25
9.98		12 19 5	386.27
		1 1 1	
		1 1 1	
		1 1 1	
		1 1 1	

