

y4
. Ap 6/1
D 36/5/1
977-3

1011

95/14
Apr 6/1
D 36/5
977-3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS

GOVERNMENT
Storage

DOCUMENTS

EB 28 107R

FARRELL LIBRARY
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

KSU LIBRARIES
226454
454972
A11900 00617A

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman


ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
JOHN J. McFALL, California
JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut
BILL CHAPPELL, Florida
BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri

JACK EDWARDS, Alabama
J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia
JACK F. KEMP, New York

SAMUEL RALPH PRESTON, JOHN M. GARRITY, PETER J. MURPHY, Jr., DEREK J. VANDER
SCHAAP, GORDON CASEY, CHARLES W. SNODGRASS, J. DAVID WILLSON, AND JOHN G.
PLASHAL, Staff Assistants

NAVY MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICERS (TAR) REPROGRAMINGS, FISCAL YEAR 1977





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS

HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, *Chairman*

ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
JOHN J. McFALL, California
JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut
BILL CHAPPELL, Florida
BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri

JACK EDWARDS, Alabama
J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia
JACK F. KEMP, New York

SAMUEL RALPH PRESTON, JOHN M. GARRITY, PETER J. MURPHY, Jr., DEREK J. VANDER
SCHAAF, GORDON CASEY, CHARLES W. SNODGRASS, J. DAVID WILLSON, AND JOHN G.
PLASHAL, *Staff Assistants*

NAVY MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICERS (TAR) REPROGRAMINGS, FISCAL YEAR 1977



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

21-203 O

WASHINGTON : 1978

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, *Chairman*

JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi	ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida	ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts	SILVIO O. CONTE, Massachusetts
WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky	JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania	MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota
TOM STEED, Oklahoma	JACK EDWARDS, Alabama
GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois	ROBERT C. McEWEN, New York
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia	JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana
JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia	J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia
NEAL SMITH, Iowa	CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut	LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York	C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
JOHN J. McFALL, California	JACK F. KEMP, New York
EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey	WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado
CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland	RALPH S. REGULA, Ohio
SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois	CLAIR W. BURGNER, California
FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado	GEORGE M. O'BRIEN, Illinois
DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin	VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska
EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California	
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio	
GUNN MCKAY, Utah	
TOM BEVILL, Alabama	
BILL CHAPPELL, Florida	
BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri	
BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas	
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California	
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania	
BOB TRAXLER, Michigan	
ROBERT B. DUNCAN, Oregon	
JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts	
MAX BAUCUS, Montana	
CHARLES WILSON, Texas	
LINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana	
ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana	
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington	
MATTHEW F. McHUGH, New York	

KEITH F. MAINLAND, *Clerk and Staff Director*

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978**

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1977.

TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION, NAVY RESERVE (TAR)

WITNESSES

(STATEMENT OF) THE HON. W. GRAHAM CLAYTOR, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

HON. R. JAMES WOOLSEY, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

HON. EDWARD HIDALGO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS, AND LOGISTICS

REAR ADMIRAL CARL J. SEIBERLICH, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AND ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR MANPOWER

REAR ADMIRAL STANLEY S. FINE, USN, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND REPORTS, OFFICE OF THE NAVY COMPTROLLER

REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT A. HOBBS, USNR

REAR ADMIRAL B. HAYDEN CRAWFORD, USNR

REAR ADMIRAL NORMAN A. COLEMAN, USNR

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN B. JOHNSON, USNR, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

REAR ADMIRAL ALEXANDER JACKSON, USN (RET.)

CAPTAIN FRED D. CARL, USNR (RET.) PRESIDENT, NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION

REAR ADMIRAL JAMES E. FORREST, S.C., USN (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION

CAPTAIN JOHN BELL, USNR (RET.), CONSULTANT, NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION

MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER GEORGE LANGE (RET.), NAVAL ENLISTED RESERVE ASSOCIATION

MAJOR GENERAL FRANCES R. GERARD, ANG, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS)

REAR ADMIRAL ROHRER, USNR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NAVAL RESERVE

Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order.

We are discussing today a matter involving the Navy and the Naval Reserve.

I am not going to be able to be here as much this morning as I would like. Mr. Addabbo is here and I am turning the hearing over to him, and he will handle the hearing. Mr. Addabbo.

Mr. ADDABBO. (presiding) Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This morning the committee will begin a one-day hearing on the Navy's proposal to phase out active duty reserve officers in the Training and Administration of Reserve programs, TARS, with regular naval personnel.

Secretary Claytor is precluded from implementing his proposed phaseout of the TAR officer program because of language in the Fiscal Year 1978 Defense Appropriations Conference Report which states that any attempt to phase out the TAR program must receive the approval of both appropriations committees. The Secretary of the Navy has twice requested such approval via letter, once on September 21, 1977, and again on November 14, 1977. Each member of the subcommittee has been previously provided with a copy of these letters.

Unfortunately, it was necessary to postpone this hearing from last Thursday, December 1. This postponement has precluded Secretary Claytor's appearance in support of the proposal to phase out the TAR officer program. However, the Hon. Edward Hidalgo, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) will serve as the principal witness.

Also in attendance is the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Hon. James Woolsey. He will be assisted by Admiral Carl Seiberlich, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel. Admiral Seiberlich is intimately familiar with the details of the phaseout plan since he headed the study group which concluded that the TAR officer program should be terminated.

Also speaking in favor of the phaseout plan will be Rear Admirals Hobbs, Crawford and Coleman, all three of whom are currently active in the Naval Reserve. Admiral Fine, Director of Budget and Reports, who has appeared before the committee, is also present.

Speaking against the proposal will be representatives from the Naval Reserve Association, the Reserve Officers Association, the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association and Admiral Alexander Jackson, who has been associated with the TAR concept since its inception.

We now want to welcome you before the committee, Mr. Secretary. I know that you have given this matter a lot of consideration and the committee is interested in obtaining your views on the need for carrying out this proposal.

As Chairman Mahon has stated, we are constrained by activity on the floor and the time of the session, so we will ask that you submit your entire statements for the record, summarize them as briefly as possible, and then the committee will have questions.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will do so, submit our statements for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF REAR ADMIRAL CARL J. SEIBERLICH

Carl Joseph Seiberlich was born in Jenkintown, Pennsylvania, on July 4, 1921. He attended the University of Pennsylvania (1938-1941). He was appointed to the United States Merchant Marine Academy in 1941 and graduated with the Class of 1943, and commissioned Ensign in the United States Naval Reserve. He graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia in June 1959. He is a designated Naval Aviator.

Rear Admiral Seiberlich assumed his present duties as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower) and Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel on 30 June 1977. Prior to his current assignment he served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare).

He assumed command of the carrier USS HORNET on May 23, 1969. He served as Commander Primary Landing Area Recovery Group directing the recovery of the Apollo 11 and 12 astronauts and Command Modules upon completion of the first and second lunar landing missions on 24 July and 24 November 1969, respectively. In recognition of these recoveries, HORNET was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation.

Other significant positions of responsibility have included assignments in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and the Bureau of Naval Personnel; the Staff of the Chief of Naval Air Reserve, Glenview, Illinois; and the Staff of Commander, Anti-Submarine Warfare Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He has commanded Anti-Submarine Warfare Group THREE with the carrier, USS TICONDEROGA as his flagship; as well as the fleet oiler, USS SALAMONIE. Other assignments include Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 36 embarked in the carrier, USS VALLEY FORGE, where he served as operations officer and as executive officer, and command of Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 26 operating from the carrier, USS RANDOLPH. During World War II, he served on the destroyer, USS MAYO in both the Atlantic and Pacific theatres.

Medals and awards include the Legion of Merit with four Gold Stars and the Air Medal. In November 1952, he received from President Truman, in ceremonies at the White House, the Harmon International Trophy for outstanding achievement in aeronautics for the year 1951. Additionally, he has been awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation Ribbon with one Star, as well as numerous campaign, service and theatre medals.

Rear Admiral Seiberlich is married to the former Trudy Germi of Chicago, Illinois. They have three children, Eric, Heidi and Curt.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL CARL J. SEIBERLICH

Mr. Chairman and members of the Defense Subcommittee:

I am Rear Admiral Carl J. Seiberlich, Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel and Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower. The Acting Secretary of the Navy issued a precept dated 7 February 1977 which directed implementation of the new Reserve Management Personnel System. In connection with that tasking, I acted as Chairman of the Reserve Management Planning Group convened to achieve that objective. The report containing the specific recommendations forthcoming from the deliberations of that study group was reviewed and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy forwarded a copy of that report to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee on 21 September 1977. I welcome this opportunity to comment on some of the aspects of our deliberations and the interested parties whose advice and counsel we sought. Before proceeding, I would like to provide for the record views expressed by Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, at a hearing before the House Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommittee on 27 October 1977, which is relevant to the proposed Reserve Management Program. In addition, I would like to provide a copy of the executive summary of the Reserve Management Planning Group Report.

One of the major elements of the new Reserve Management Program is the direct involvement of high quality Regular and recalled Selected Reserve officers in Reserve management duties. The attendant sub-action of this endeavor is the gradual phase-out of the TAR Officer Program over a fifteen year period. This aspect of the plan has received considerable attention and has generated various comments from interested parties. I have personally briefed the leadership of the Naval Reserve Association, the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association and the Reserve Officers Association. In so doing, I found there to be misunderstanding concerning the details of the proposed plans. I am now confident that the leadership of all these organizations understands the elements of our plans and the underlying rationale.

During the course of the Reserve Management Planning Group deliberations, we received information from various associations, members of the Congress, interested individuals and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the other services. Careful attention was given to all these thoughtful considerations in structuring the final product. In particular, all possible concerns brought to our attention were carefully analyzed with provisions made to offset them. The procedures followed make me confident that the widest spectrum of interests was taken into account. We are convinced that the logic of the new Reserve Management Program is sound and that its implementation at the earliest date will enhance the readiness of the Reserve.

SUMMARY OF STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL JAMES L. HOLLOWAY III, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE ON 27 OCTOBER 1977.

I appreciate this opportunity to comment on our new Reserve Management Program. There are two matters related to the Reserve management issue which I would like to address, however, because they have surfaced as focal points for those who voice apprehension over certain features of our planned initiatives.

First, there has been criticism that no "study" was conducted prior to adopting this new conceptual approach for improving management of the Naval Reserve. A comprehensive and lengthy study was not really needed to arrive at the conclusion that major changes were needed to strengthen our Naval Reserve and bring it aboard in the Total Force. The Congress, during hearings in early 1976, had made it very clear that Navy had not moved aggressively enough to implement the Total Force concept and had mandated that we do so. I agreed with that mandate. In fact, in the Fall of 1976, and in preparation for submission of our Total Force proposal to the Congress which was requested by 1 February 1977, I proposed, in the formulation of the CNO Naval Reserve Policy Statement, to revitalize one key portion of this program by bringing Selected Reservists and Regulars closer together. The fact that the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs initiated a formal request to me to make this move was responsive to and supportive of this proposal. In my professional view the logic underlying the need for effective integration of Regular and Selected Reserve officers in Total Force management, that is, integrate those who must fight together if called upon, was a basic, fundamental, and essential precept. I therefore directed a group to develop a plan for implementing the concept. The plan, which this committee now has in hand, is the result. I consider it to be a well thought out, equitable program which will constitute a significant step in cementing Regular and Selected Reserve solidarity, bringing the Naval Reserve and Regular Navy together as a closeknit management team for the first time in many years.

The second area I wish to address deals with Regular officer assignments to the management of the Naval Reserve Program. In the past it has been alleged, and not without some justification, that Navy has too often assigned less than the top quality regular officers to help manage this program. One of the major elements of our new plan is to correct that situation. I wish to emphasize that I have personally committed the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure that only high quality Regular and Selected Reserve officers will be assigned to key billets associated with the new Reserve management system. In fact, the report submitted to this committee contains a directive which will publish this commitment to the entire Navy, if you approve the plan which we are addressing here today.

I am convinced we need to move expeditiously with implementation of our plan. It is approaching one year since we announced our intentions in this matter. I solicit your early concurrence.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study was conducted under a charter to create a new Reserve Management Personnel System by:

a. Phasing out the TAR officer program in a manner that will ensure the continuation of career and promotional opportunities for those currently on active duty.

b. Assigning Regular officers to Reserve management roles to contribute to Reserve mobilization readiness by providing fleet experience, warfare knowledge, and professional development.

c. Filling RPN funded billets with statutory tour officers at the seat of government and at headquarters responsible for Reserve affairs as required by law and in a manner precluding a corps of specialists being on continuous active duty.

The recommended plan provides for a 15 year transition from the TAR officer program to a Reserve Management Personnel System manned 90% by Regular officers and 10% by Selected Reservists recalled to active duty for specified tours of 4 years or less. The evolutionary transition period shown graphically on the following page provides preceptually directed career continuity and equitable promotional opportunity for TAR officers currently on active duty. All TAR officers will be counseled that their experience and knowledge are vital to the continuance of management stability as the new Reserve management program develops. The plan also provides for a gradual phase in of Regular officers of high potential and unrestricted professional growth and a number of recalled Reservists for specified tours in Reserve management.

Captain, commander and permanent lieutenant commander TAR officers will continue to be screened under current continuation policies and will have an opportunity to reach 30 years of commissioned service. During the TAR officer program phase out, four additional TAR flag selections are proposed for the URL community through FY 84 with future selections dependent on Secretary of the Navy analysis of the composition of selection fields. Current temporary lieutenant commander TAR officers and below and all Supply Corps and Intelligence TAR officers will continue to be screened under current continuation policies and will have the opportunity to be selected for captain and to serve two years in grade.


The plan by which Regular officers will be assigned to Reserve management billets necessitates a change to the grade tables in pending DOPMA legislation to avoid a loss of allowed strength in grades lieutenant commander through captain as the number of TAR officers diminishes and Regular officers are required to replace them. Without modification, Navy will experience a loss of 24 captains, 114 commanders and 258 lieutenant commanders allowed in inventory relative to Reserve management requirements being absorbed.

The plan recommends Reserve Program Billet grade adjustment and provides an objective system for obtaining quality officers of appropriate experience to fill individual Reserve Program Billets. An array of seven Additional Qualification Designations (AQD) was devised to identify experience requirements for Reserve Program Billets and experience attained by officers, ensign through vice admiral. An indoctrination course for Regular officers at CNAVRES headquarters is recommended. Additionally, it is recommended that curricula at the Naval War College, USNA, NROTC, OCS and NPGS include Naval Reserve and Total Force information.

The recall of statutory tour officers for tours of up to four years to fill Title 10 U.S. Code 265 billets is recommended to begin immediately for selected billets throughout the Reserve management structure, including one flag officer.

The enlisted TAR community was not included as part of the plan, however, the Group remained sensitive to the requirement that this plan have no adverse impact upon the enlisted TAR community, and this goal has been realized.

OFFICER INVENTORY FLOW



Mr. WOOLSEY. Let me just say very briefly that we very much appreciate your holding this hearing today. Secretary Claytor himself, as you know, is a Naval Reserve officer, Lieutenant Commander, with four years' command at sea in combat in World War II, and has given this a great deal of his own personal attention, and only the rescheduling caught him in the Western Pacific today, and he is unable to attend.

Our Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Ed Hidalgo, will be our principal witness, supported by Admiral Seiberlich, who was chairman of the Reserve Management Planning Group related to the implementation of this study.

Secretary Hidalgo himself, Mr. Chairman, was Air Intelligence Officer on the ENTERPRISE in World War II and has served previously as Special Assistant to Secretary Forrestal in the late 1940s, to Secretary Nitze of the Navy in the mid-1960s, and is former General Counsel of the United States Information Agency.

I would like to introduce Secretary Hidalgo.

Mr. HIDALGO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. I am not going to submit any prepared statement of my own.

I testified on October 27th before the House Armed Services Committee, the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, and my statement is in the record at that time; but what I would like is to submit Secretary of the Navy Claytor's statement for the record, if I may.

Mr. ADDABBO. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the initiatives we are proposing with regard to Naval Reserve Management. I hope you will agree that these are in the long term best interests of our Navy. Certainly your Committee has a distinguished record of support for our Navy and I very much appreciate the advice and counsel we have received from your membership with regard to the new Reserve Management Program I intend to review with you this morning.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the House and Senate Appropriations Conference Committee Report on the FY78 Defense Appropriations Bill directed me to take no implementing action on one facet of this Reserve Management Program, namely the phase-out over a fifteen year period of the Training and Administration Reserve (TAR) officer program, until I had secured each Committee's approval. I have requested your concurrence for this phase-out, and also the concurrence of the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees because of their expressed interest in the matter. I have now heard in the affirmative from the two Senate Committees involved. In addition, my Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Ed HIDALGO, appeared recently before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel to answer their questions on this subject.

I feel that the decision to increase the participation of regular officers in Reserve management, and, for the first time, assign Selected Reserve officers to policy making billets while phasing out the TAR Program for officers is clearly in the best interests of our Navy. Frankly, that is the one standard against which I try to measure all of my decisions as Secretary of the Navy.

Let me review with you the considerations which have lead up to this decision and hope that this review will clarify the need to implement the TAR officer phase-out decision now, and will also assure you of the dispassionate manner in which this administration has approached an issue originally raised by our predecessors.

The Training and Administration Reserve, or TAR, program grew out of World War II when the Navy was developing plans to reestablish its Naval Reserve. The Secretary of the Navy convened a Board which recommended that Reserve personnel on active duty be vested with the primary responsibility for Reserve Management. A legal basis for maintaining Reserve personnel on active duty for use in training and administering the Naval Reserve came in 1952 with enactment of Public Law 476. There have been many Reserve management studies over the years since then which have improved the system. A Reserve program billet structure and refinement of the TAR program procedures for application, selection, performance review, and attrition have been among the results of such studies. Few would argue that the system as it has developed over the years hasn't been adequate, but we feel that it can and should be improved in order to meet the future needs of the Total Force.

It is necessary to manage active and Reserve components in combined fashion if we are to realize a truly Total Force policy in the Navy. Involvement on the part of Regular officers in the training and management of Reservists as well as greater Selected Reserve participation in the management of the Reserve Program is necessary and, in my view, a key to the success of the Total Force.

As most of you will recall, when the Total Force study was issued in June of 1975 it concluded, among other things, that greater responsibility should be placed on active forces in order to improve training of the reserves. More significantly, it called for integration of active and reserve forces into a coherent whole. This is the direction in which we are now seeking to move. The Defense Manpower Commission report observed in April 1976 that the Navy in particular needed "to make better use" of its Selected Reserve and that "top-level management and support of Naval Reserve units" needed to be improved. The FY77 Military Procurement Authorization Report issued by the Senate Armed Services Committee was even more critical of the Navy for the "fragmented" nature of its overall manpower management. In the joint conference committee report on the FY77 Procurement Authorization Bill, Navy was put "on notice that appreciable additional increase in Navy manpower will receive unusually specific scrutiny until Navy takes steps to manage its manpower more efficiently and to demonstrate persuasively that it is doing so." The Secretary of the Navy was directed "to investigate and report to the Armed Services Committees by February 1, 1977 on the specific manpower-saving initiatives he proposes to take to achieve a more balanced Navy manpower program, including increased use of the Naval Reserve....." I read those words from the Authorization Committees as rather direct and to the point.

The House Armed Services Committee, Military Compensation Subcommittee, advised us that it believed "that the TAR (Training and Administration, Reserve) program in the Navy, while having served a useful purpose in the past, must be reexamined to ascertain whether it continues to be the most appropriate way of meeting Naval Reserve training needs. Some of the assignments given to TAR personnel could perhaps be performed by Regular personnel, thus creating additional rotation billets. The Navy should take steps to limit the use of senior grades in this program pending further congressional review." This guidance came in that Committee's report on pending DOPMA legislation in the Spring of 1976.

This background, with which I know some of you are already all too familiar, is nonetheless useful in understanding what drove the previous Navy administration to decide in late 1976 to phase out the TAR program for officers as part of a larger effort to improve Navy Reserve program management. Interested members of the House Armed Services Committee were briefed at their request on 6 January 1977 concerning the decision. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel told the outgoing Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs that a more detailed briefing on implementation plans would be expected before the Navy actually started moving people around.

The Acting Secretary of the Navy appointed a planning group on February 7, 1977 for "the purpose of critically examining the methods and devising the procedures for effecting the smooth and orderly implementation of a new Reserve management personnel system". The Chairman of that planning group was Rear Admiral Carl J. Seiberlich who is with me here today. On 26 February, just two weeks after I was sworn into office as Secretary, I promised the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee that the Navy would take "no action relative to implementation prior to full review by the necessary Congressional committees". As you can see, the future of the TAR program for officers has had my personal attention from the very beginning. Whereas the previous administration had decided to phase out the TAR program for officers and had already placed a moratorium on new TAR officer accessions, I stopped all actions with regard to the TAR proposal and placed it in limbo, if you will. I wanted my principal assistants to have a chance to thoroughly review and analyze the entire matter before deciding to proceed with or to reverse the prior decision.

I can assure you that the entire issue of the TAR officer phase out received a careful and objective review unfettered by what had transpired before we took office. In deciding to proceed, I was convinced that the phase-out was in the long term best interest of our Navy. I was most impressed with the fair and equitable procedures recommended by the Reserve Management Planning Group chaired by Admiral Seiberlich.

The thoughtful comments offered by your members, your colleagues in the Senate and those of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees were most helpful to us. The views of the various Reserve Association officials and their membership, as well as those of the many knowledgeable individual Selected Reservists and TAR officers who expressed interest or concern were carefully considered. I feel confident in saying that as a result of the high level of interest expressed, the widest spectrum of views were heard and taken into account.

I was interested to learn that the Marine Corps had never established a TAR or similar program for the administration of its Reserve component. The training and administrative force supporting our Marine Corps Reserve consists primarily of full time regular officers and enlisted personnel together with a small cadre of Selected Reservists on active duty. About 4400 Marine Corps personnel, approximately 2-1/2 percent of the active force, is presently committed in support of the Marine Corps Reserve. Duty with a Marine Corps Reserve component is considered part of the normal career pattern for regular force personnel. This concept has served the Marine Corps Reserve well and provides for the continuing introduction of modern techniques and concepts into the Reserve force while at the same time fostering a spirit of understanding and cooperation between Regulars and Reserves.

In our analysis and review process, which lasted almost six months, we were convinced that continuation of the TAR officer program would be at odds with achievement of an

integrated Total Force and our desire to see management of the Navy Reserve improved. Orderly phase out of the TAR officer program therefore becomes an important element of the overall plan. I would point out, however, that retention of the TAR enlisted program was reaffirmed during our review as compatible with the Total Force policy. We did not find it inconsistent with the phase out of the TAR officer program, but saw it instead representing the most effective utilization of manpower by providing technical expertise to the Naval Reserve as contrasted with the management and operational contributions required of officers. TAR enlisted personnel on active duty avoid some of the organizational problems inherent in other systems, and yet provide members who are readily available for mobilization with their Reserve unit should the need arise.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I provided a copy of the Reserve Management Planning Group's full report to your Committee, as I did to the Senate Appropriations Committee and to both the Armed Services Committees. In my 21 September letter to you and the other three Committee Chairmen, I gave you my personal assurance that what we propose to do will improve the quality of officers assigned to manage and supervise our Reserve forces. As a retired Naval Reserve Lieutenant Commander myself, I can understand the fears of some Reservists that these TAR billets may become sinecures for Regular officers reaching the end of their careers. I do not intend to let this occur, and as I stated in my letter to you, Mr. Chairman, I intend to screen the key assignments personally so as to make unequivocal my guidance and direction in this regard. We shall institutionalize the policies for the long term. A gradual transition to the new system is planned once we implement the phase-out. This I have insisted upon so that the replacements of TAR officers not be detrimental to the Reserve Management Program nor to the individual TAR officers concerned. Key points of the plan can be summarized as follows:

(1) The phase-out will be programmed over a 15 year period in order to prevent any diminution of career opportunity for those TAR officers presently on active duty. TAR officers in grades O-6, O-5, and permanent O-4 will continue to be screened under current continuation policies and will have the opportunity to reach 30 years' active service. Current temporary O-4 Unrestricted Line (URL) TAR and all Supply Corps TAR officers will be screened under current continuation policies and will have the opportunity to be selected to O-6 and serve two years in grade. Temporary and below O-4 officers have the option to apply for augmentation to the regular Navy. Four additional TAR flag officer selections are proposed for the URL through FY84 and flag selections beyond that point will be dependent upon analysis of the constituency of the selection fields. I can assure you that there will be no specific involuntary releases associated with the phase out plan.

(2) In order to replace TAR officers, regular officers of high potential and unrestricted professional growth will be assigned to Reserve management duties. They will be supplemented by about 160 Selected Reserve officers who will be recalled voluntarily to active duty for periods of up to four years, as

authorized by 10 USC 265. It is envisioned that final composition of the Reserve Management Program will be 90 percent Regular and 10 percent Selected Reserve. A screening system, in which, as I noted earlier, I have insisted that I play a personal role, will be utilized to ensure the participation, in key billets, of only high quality Regular and Selected Reserve officers. Additionally, a formalized training program under the auspices of the Chief of Naval Reserve will reinforce the preparation of these officers for assumption of their important duties.

(3) Directives will be promulgated which will institutionalize the procedures and plans to transition to the New Reserve Management Program. All parties to the endeavor will thus be aware of every aspect of the phase out and phase in plans as well as the need to embrace the full spirit and intent underlying the action.

(4) Costs associated with the Reserve Management Personnel System are not prohibitive. We estimate that \$270,000 per year will be required during the transition period with reduction to \$150,000 per year in the steady state (\$114,000 of which supports the formal training program under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Reserve).

Attainment of the truly homogeneous Total Force that we all seek, requires the closest direct and mutual involvement, and singleness of purpose, between our Regular and Reserve force managers. I am convinced that only in this way will we ever achieve the readiness and efficiency we desire for our Reserve Force. I assure you, Mr. Chairman, I am determined to achieve this objective and have concluded that what we propose is the best way to accomplish it.

Mr. HIDALGO. As far as I am concerned, I just have a few brief thoughts that I would like to convey, if I may.

The central issues, Mr. Chairman, are very clear and I trust our reasoning will be equally so. There are six central issues as I see them:

First, the vital reserve forces of our Navy need and deserve all the strength and stability they can get and that we can give them.

The second is that a quantum increase in the participation of regular naval officers in the day-to-day training and management of our reserves will give that strength and stability, in our very considered opinion. This would be accomplished by phasing out the Training and Administration Reserve, that is, the TAR officer program.

The third issue, the TAR enlisted program, about 8,000 strong, would not be touched. This is an extremely important point that we wish to emphasize. It is only the officer corps of some 1,100 or 1,200. Is that the correct figure, Admiral?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. About twelve hundred, yes, sir.

Mr. HIDALGO. Item 4, in order to avoid all disruption and dislocation of vested rights, actual or potential, including the promotion of officers in the TAR program, the phaseout would occur over a decidedly liberal term of 15 years.

Number 5, as the phaseout progresses and upon completion, the Reserves would be trained and manned by 90 percent regular naval officers and 10 percent reserves on active duty. When we finally come to the final numbers, I think the reserves on active duty would be in the order of 160.

And the last point, six, Mr. Chairman, the regular officers assigned to this task would be individuals with distinguished careers, actual and-potential. This is a second point we wish to emphasize just as strongly as possible.

The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have spoken clearly on their commitment in this regard. They will be top-drawer officers whose service in the reserve program will be regarded as career enhancing. This is a very significant point that I wish to emphasize.

So these are the six basic premises, Mr. Chairman, which, in our view, unequivocally support the conclusion that phaseout of the TAR program will contribute significantly to the total force structure of the Navy.

In closing, let me just share a word of history with you, if I may.

The TAR program was born after the end of World War II in 1952 when the Navy established its postwar Naval Reserve. The reason was very clear then. Like myself, there was a large pool of reserve officers with wartime experience, but those officers, I regret to say, many of them, have disappeared or are disappearing, so the circumstances have markedly changed.

The concept of a new approach to the TAR, to training and management of reserves has for several years been looked at and considered by Congress.

Next, the total force study of June 1975, and against that background, the House Armed Services Committee, Military Compensation Subcommittee, directed consideration of a TAR phaseout in its report on DOPMA in the spring of 1976.

The Under Secretary has already referred to the fact that Mr. Claytor has taken a very direct and active interest in this. I would add that when he came aboard, and the rest of us with him, the previous Secretariat had already made the decision to phase out the TAR program based upon prolonged and detailed study. Nevertheless, Mr. Claytor, recognizing the importance of the problem, directed a deep freeze on that and he asked us all to look at it de novo and to take a complete and very considered look. That went on over many, many months.

What I am saying to you, Mr. Chairman, is that this has been studied, restudied, studied and restudied, and, to me, those six premises, or conclusions, or issues that I mentioned to you are extremely clear to all of us in the Navy secretariat.

Finally, as you know, and I have already mentioned this, Mr. Chairman, the conference committee of the defense appropriations bill for FY 1978 directed that no action be taken without the approval of the two appropriations committees.

May I add that we have letters of approval now from the Senate, both the Senate Armed Services and the Senate Appropriations Committees and we have one of approval also from the House Armed Services Committee.

That concludes my remarks.

It is terribly important, Mr. Chairman, that we move ahead as soon as possible with this clear contribution to the total force structure of the Navy. Whatever questions you may have, sir.

Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you very much.

TURMOIL AND CHANGE IN THE NAVY

One of the points you have mentioned is stability. We know that with all the entire restructuring of the forces and reduction in the overall size of the Navy Reserve, both real and proposed, there has been quite a bit of turmoil. In view of the fact that you are going to phase this program out over a period of 15 years, do we have to make this change at this time, in view of the fact that you are making all the other force changes?

Mr. HIDALGO. I think the very fact, Mr. Chairman, that we have that instability—and, of course, what you are referring to is what is the correct number of the selected reserves, and no one is more bothered by this instability than we are—shall it be 100,000, shall it be 52,000, shall it be 87,000 as the Congress has disposed—the very fact that this instability exists makes it all the more important to strengthen the reserves, as I mentioned in my remarks, and we are absolutely convinced that the way to do it is get top-drawer regular officers in here, interfacing with reserves, making them more familiar with the day-to-day developments in the Navy, much more so than—wonderful men as they are—the TAR officers can possibly do.

Mr. ADDABBO. You have testified the study has been going on for many years and both studies have come to the same conclusion. Would it be not better for the sake of stability to have completed all the restructuring and then look at this question of the phase-out of the TAR program?

Mr. HIDALGO. I can only repeat, Mr. Chairman, the two things need not be separated and, in our view, should not be separated. The very fact we have this instability and uncertainty, to us, makes it important to get on with it and to get on with it right now instead of prolonging the TAR program.

Mr. ADDABBO. The question has been raised, and you have said, that this will increase readiness. Would we see the increase in readiness in the out years, 15 years? Will we see the increase in readiness within the foreseeable future?

Mr. HIDALGO. I would appreciate it if Admiral Seiberlich would address that question.

Admiral Seiberlich?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. First, sir, I would like to address the necessity of doing it now. We have received criticism from Congress and the General Accounting Office and other sources concerning the fragmentation of the management of our manpower personnel and training. As a result, we ordered a study under Vice Admiral Salzer known as the Salzer Study, to look at the overall system and make recommendations to improve it; and his committee came up with a plan to integrate the management of all naval manpower, personnel, and training functions.

Starting on the 1st of October this year in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, we have commenced the implementation of this plan which over the next year will integrate the management of regular, Reserve and civilian personnel within the Navy in a single management system.

So what has been done in the total force study and the proposed reorganization of the Reserve management is in consonance, bringing that into line with the new system that we have for managing all naval personnel.

As far as the readiness of the Reserve is concerned, this management plan is just one element. There is hardware, of course, which bears directly on readiness. There is the integration of the Reserve force into the regular fleet upon mobilization and the contribution that these regular officers will make to this capability. The main benefit resulting will be the responsibility of the regular Navy for the direct management of the Reserve and the integration of reserve units into our regular system.

I can't this morning give you a quantifiable increase in the readiness, in saying two percent a year or three percent, but we are looking forward to an improvement in Reserve management and a consequent improvement in readiness.

Mr. ADDABBO. So actually the question of doing away with the TAR program as it affects the question of readiness becomes very nebulous because there are many other factors, your restructuring and everything else, to determine whether we have a true improvement in readiness; is that correct, Admiral?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes. I think the biggest benefits will come five years from now and later. The 15-year phaseout period will find the TAR officers involved directly in the management of the Reserve and during that period there will be a gradual change-over from TAR direct management to regular direct management. We

planned this deliberately to ensure that the stability of the entire force would be maintained during this period.

Mr. ADDABBO. Again, for those who are going to be directly affected, the 15-year phaseout is good because it will let them complete their tours and have all their other benefits, but when you have a long phaseout like that and you have so many in constant movement or change, would that not possibly adversely affect readiness and stability?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, sir, it will not. As a matter of fact, one of the chief objectives of our planning group was to ensure that the readiness of the Reserve would be maintained.

I might mention—and it is an illustration—if two officers come into the Navy and serve their period in the active fleet and one becomes a TAR and the other becomes a regular, and at the end of this first tour they are both assigned to Reserve management billets, they will both have the same experience at that time to start, and our plan, of course, is to bring in the regular officers to fill the more junior billets and have them serve with the Reserve utilizing their recent fleet experience and then be able to come back for one or more subsequent tours. We would have the option, instead of drawing on basically 1,200 to 1,300 TAR officers, to be able to draw on the 37,000 unrestricted line officers in the regular Navy and use their expertise to fill the Reserve management billets to meet requirements.

I think this is one area where we will definitely improve the management capability and hence the readiness of the Reserve.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Secretary, due to the fact that all departments are working under constrained defense dollars and they are anxious to get as many dollars for their active forces, I am hoping that that did not have any play or any sway in this decision to take away the dollars from the Reserve force and give it to the active force.

Mr. HIDALGO. I guess we should never ignore economics, but I have never heard that used as an argument for the conclusion we have reached.

Mr. ADDABBO. Again, you are speaking about active force, so therefore it increased your dollars and takes away dollars from the Reserve, and this committee has always been anxious that the Reserve be fully funded and fully supported.

We would not like to see that used as a reason to take away dollars from the program.

Mr. HIDALGO. Readiness has been the reason, Mr. Chairman, and fitting it into the total force structure.

CURRENT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Mr. ADDABBO. It has been alleged that the Navy already has all the flexibility it needs in order to manage both the Navy Reserves and the TAR officers within the Reserve structure without resorting to the abolishment of the program. For example, it has been stated that the Navy has full authority to assign TAR officers from one type of billet in the Navy to another type, but that the Navy does not execute this authority. With that thought in mind, maybe you can develop some of the points in question.

What current limitations, either legal or practical, have been placed on the Navy in the management of the TAR personnel?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. As of 31 August, there were 1,874 Reserve program billets. These program billets are designated in three ways: those to be filled by regulars; those to be filled by reserve officers on active duty (other than for training) so-called "265" or RPN funded billets; those to be filled only by TARs; and billets to be filled by either TARs or regulars. There are 200 "265" billets which could be filled by recalled selected reservists and which are filled by TARs today.

There are 137 additional billets that must be filled by TARs, so there are 337 billets that must be filled by TARs. The remainder of the billets can be filled either by TARs or regulars, about 1,390 of those. We do at this time rotate those billets among regulars and reservists depending on the requirement of the billet and the availability of the personnel.

We do assign TAR officers to operational billets at sea. The majority of these officers are in the more junior grades. Currently we have three TAR captains and 16 TAR commanders serving afloat in operational billets, and we have an additional hundred or so TARs filling other USN billets in other programs.

Now the problem centers around providing the TAR officer with sufficient operational experience in the more senior grades. As the size of the Navy has been reduced, we have concurrently reduced the command opportunity of the regular officers and, of course, we get our selection base for flag from an experienced group of officers who have come through the proper command channels.

If we reduce that too far, we will hurt the opportunity, of course, for selection of the best qualified, the best fitted captains for flag, therefore reducing the readiness of the overall Navy.

Now if we cycled TAR officers into these billets as we would regulars, two things would occur: We would reduce the command opportunity of the regulars and, second, we would have to have more TAR officers brought in, in order to provide the kind of rotation that we would need, and our estimate would be the size of the TAR could grow to somewhere around 4,000 officers in order to support this kind of rotation.

The reason for this would be if the TAR were to maintain his identity as a TAR, he would have to serve primarily within the TAR or Reserve structure and that would necessitate these additional billets to keep sufficient TARs at sea.

What we are really doing under this plan is providing the recent operational experience in the more senior ranks to the Reserve program by drawing upon the 37,000 regular, unrestricted line officers we have available to come in and serve in these billets, and at the same time we would have a large base of junior officers with Reserve experience and then bring these officers back in in reduced numbers for the more senior billets.

We estimate at any given time there would be about 4.1 percent of the regular officers serving within the Reserve, but over a period of about 20 or 25 years we would expose a large number of regular officers to Reserve management, so that when they were occupying billets where, for instance, they made one or two Reserve manage-

ment decisions a year, they would have the familiarity with the Reserve and enhance their interest and thus their capability to make the decision.

So our problem of "fixing the TAR program," as some propose, which really means getting more TAR officers to sea, puts us in a position where the number of billets available would not support it, and so we therefore opted to put regular officers into the management of the Reserve program rather than attempting to expand the TAR program and then having them compete for the few command billets that we do have at sea.

Mr. HIDALGO. Mr. Chairman, that is a tremendously important point the Admiral is making, because with the shrinking end strength of the Navy, what the Admiral is saying to us is that the only way really that we are going to give the Reserves contact with the day-to-day problems, competence, the high technology of the Navy, is by mixing the Reserves with the regular officers. The more the shrinking occurs, the more important our recommendations to you are.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Secretary, it has been alleged by some that your refusal to appoint any additional TAR officers is having the effect of actually terminating the TAR program and establishing a program for managing the Navy Reserve similar to that which you have proposed here this morning.

Do you plan on continuing this approach if the congressional committees do not approve the TAR phaseout program?

Mr. HIDALGO. Should the approval not be given, Mr. Chairman, we would just have to move ahead and keep this program alive, but so far it hasn't been a matter of doing anything arbitrarily. We have simply been waiting and hoping for the approval of Congress and there was no point in having any further input of TAR officers at this stage.

Mr. ADDABBO. Have any vacant "TAR billets" been filled by active duty regular officers during the past year?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir; not vacant TAR billets but vacant Reserve program billets, yes, sir.

Mr. ADDABBO. How many TAR billets are currently vacant?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Less than 200. I will submit the exact number for the record, if I may, sir, but it is in that ballpark.

[The information follows:]

As of 31 August 1977, there were 149 (9 percent) out of a total of 1874 Reserve Program Billets which were gapped. This is on par proportionately with the number of billets gapped throughout Navy's shore establishment.

Mr. ADDABBO. How many passed over U.S. Navy regular or reserve officers have been assigned to reserve program (TAR) billets?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. If we are looking at the unrestricted line, as of 31 August 1977, there were 506 regular unrestricted line officers and lineal list USN officers assigned. Of that number, 27 have been passed over, approximately five percent.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Secretary, one of the six points you made previously is the fact that this will not affect the enlisted TAR program. If the officers' TAR program phaseout is approved by this committee, which is the last committee that you are looking for

approval, will you then start working on a study to see whether the enlisted TAR program should be eliminated?

Mr. HIDALGO. No, sir; that has been looked at and the conclusion reached is that we want to retain the Enlisted Reserve TAR program.

Is that correct, Admiral?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir. As part of our study, we examined this very carefully. We received testimony from the other services, including the Marine Corps, on their management system for enlisted reservists, and we recommended to Admiral Holloway that the most cost effective plan was to maintain the enlisted TAR Reserve; and he then put out a directive that it would be retained, in the very strongest terms, and there are no studies ongoing nor are there any plans for any studies, because we are convinced that this is the most cost effective way to do the job.

FULL-TIME TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE RESERVE AND GUARD STUDY (USE OF TECHNICIANS TO MANAGE AND OPERATE RESERVE FORCES)

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Admiral Seiberlich, if the enlisted TAR program is as cost effective as you just described it, tell the committee why the officer program is not cost effective. It would seem to me that it is considerably more cost effective than the approach used by some of the other Reserve components. Tie both of those together.

First, compare it to the enlisted TARs and then to the other reserve components.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The TAR enlisted program is primarily what I call a technician or support program. Eighty percent of all the enlisted TARs are in the aviation ratings and they are assigned to the force squadrons and the supporting units that maintain the airplanes and operate the airplanes. The remainder of the 20 percent are assigned primarily aboard surface ships as yeoman/personnelmen and similar ratings in support of the surface reserve.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. None of the enlisted TAR personnel is assigned to the 300 odd training centers?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir. Together with regulars they man the reserve centers, but the TARs are all in support area; in other words, personnelmen, yeomen and so forth. There are some other ratings but I am talking about the bulk.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. What you are saying is, they are assigned to hardware units and that makes them more cost effective? Is that what you are saying?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The 80 percent in the aviation ratings are either assigned to hardware units or at air stations or support units to support those hardware units; but they are hard-core aviation ratings, group IX ratings, and the other 20 percent support the surface reserve. Primarily, the majority of them are in the yeoman/personnelman/storekeeper/supply fields as direct support.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. And in your opinion is it that aspect that makes it cost effective as opposed to the general kind of things that the TAR officer performs?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We have two things to look at: Number one is the stability of the program. We maintain these enlisted personnel at their general locations for longer periods of time. We do not pay them reenlistment bonuses as we do regulars; therefore, the cost associated with maintaining a TAR enlisted man is considerably less than a regular. Since their sea-duty periods are very limited for the bulk of them, the retention rate among the TAR enlisted personnel is higher than we get in comparable rates with the regulars. That is what makes them more cost effective.

Now on the officer side of the house, we are really looking at the operational and tactical experience and the management experience, so we are talking about a different function being performed, and as an officer becomes more senior the background that he has is very important insofar as what he can contribute to the organization. We feel that the large base of regular officers with the diverse experience that they have being brought into the program can keep the Reserve force updated with the latest information and the latest techniques, and we can do this in consonance with the regular career.

In the case of the TAR program, we must keep the TAR officers primarily in the Reserve management billets and as they become more senior, as I mentioned before, the opportunity to go into meaningful billets in the fleet becomes less because of the reduced number of command billets that we have at sea right now.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Secretary, have you had the opportunity yet to review the Office of the Secretary of Defense study on the full-time training and administration of the Reserve?

Mr. HIDALGO. I have not personally, no, sir, but I believe that is the study—

Admiral SEIBERLICH. It is still in the draft stage.

Mr. HIDALGO. Still in the draft form and there are many people in disagreement with it, as I understand.

Mr. ADDABBO. The study I believe was brought about because this committee, as pointed out, has been concerned with the problems in the management of the Reserve components' dual compensation, dual retired pay, unionization, everything else.

Do you know if the administration is doing anything about these particular problems?

Mr. HIDALGO. May I defer to you, Admiral?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We have not been directly involved in this because our system, of course, is not a technician system. We feel that the technician system would not fit our purposes. We have to deploy people, send them to sea for training and that sort of thing, and there are a lot of complications involved in the technician program.

I might say that there has been a great deal of discussion concerning the efficiency of the Marine Reserve and how they handle the Marine Reserve. The system that we are proposing is very, very much like the system that is now currently used by the Marines to manage their Reserve force. They, of course, do not have a TAR group and they use 265 or recalled selected reservists and regulars to manage it, and our system is very much the same, with one difference: We would maintain the TAR enlisted Reserve and,

as I mentioned, that provides us with a lot of stability in those personnel who maintain aircraft and provide support functions to us.

Mr. ADDABBO. From what we understand, the OSD study group said that the major weakness of the Marine Corps program lies in not assigning Reserve management people (officers) repeatedly to Reserve jobs, as the TARs are. Is this correct?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I don't recollect that in the study, sir. I just looked at the draft and I don't remember that part of it. I do remember, however, that they did have some praise for the Reserve management system of the Marine Corps.

Mr. ADDABBO. I would ask you to look at that study because it seems that this study group was concerned that regular officers transferred through the Reserve program will be unable to provide the experience and continuity necessary to support a viable Reserve program. They raised that question, and you are now planning your program along the same lines as the Marine Corps. We do find that to be a particular problem if this would react adversely as to the Secretary's point number five, Reserves to be trained by regular officers.

One of the criticisms with the Marine Corps Reserves is that there has been a question on this training. It has also been reported that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs, Mr. Connor, has been saying that Congress should ignore the OSD study which recommends the Navy not change its TAR system because the Navy did not participate in this study.

Did the Navy actually participate in the OSD study?

Mr. HIDALGO. I don't know.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Not initially; however, we had two officers assigned to assist in the later part of the study, but we were not involved at the beginning. Mr. McCullen had made a decision previously, because we were reorganizing, that we were really not in a position to participate in the study, and then subsequently a decision was made that we would, and we did assign two officers to the study at that time.

Mr. ADDABBO. So you did partake in the study after a period of time?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ADDABBO. Before its completion?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

I would like to comment on the management of the Reserve. Right at this minute, as I mentioned, of the 1,874 Reserve management billets, there are only 337 that are earmarked to be filled by either TARs or selected Reservists, 200 for selected Reservists, and 137 for TARs. The remainder currently under the present management system are filled by either TARs or regulars, depending upon the availability of the officers.

In our study we carefully listed every Reserve management billet and we put an experience indicator on that billet, and then we determined quality cuts for the officers to fill those billets. For example, the Chief of Naval Reserve would be required to have had two previous tours in the Reserve of certain specific categories, and other billets were also identified that way, so we feel that the

criticism that might be levied concerning the capability of the more senior officers to manage the Reserve will be met, because of the structure that we have set up to ensure that the officer with the proper experience from the regular Navy is assigned to the Reserve management billet, whatever it might be.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Admiral Seiberlich, why do you have approximately 1,300 TAR officers on duty if you are only required to have 137 on duty today? What is the cause of this situation and also address yourself to why do you fill the 200 positions (section 265) which could be filled by Reservists called to active duty with TAR officers?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The decision was made at the outset of the TAR program that the primary management system for the Navy Reserve program would be with the TAR officers, so consequently a look at the total mix showed the base number of TAR officers required to manage the program, and the rotation that would be required in the various ranks in order to support it. Therefore, about 1,350 TARs or thereabouts is about the best number to provide the rotation necessary to give certain of the TAR officers the operational experience required and to bring an influx of a certain number of regulars in to replace them.

We could actually go to about 1,700 TARs and if we did that then there would be very little regular rotation involved, so that number was arrived at to support the program. Since we had Reserves on active duty, it was not felt necessary to recall selected Reservists.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. One other point I think needs clearing up in your previous testimony, and that is the question of cost effectiveness. Let's just keep it to that.

Would you say today's TAR officer program, compared to the officer technician program of, let's say, the Air Guard or the Army Guard, is more cost effective than those programs?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. In our mind, there is no doubt about it, the TAR officer program is far superior to the technician program, in our viewpoint.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. But yet you still feel that you should concentrate on making the changes in that program? You personally have no control over anything else, over the Army and Air Guard programs, but it would seem that the administration would take up the problem of these other technician programs which seem to be of more concern and more costly than this small TAR program. What is the reason for this?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I can only speak for the Navy and, of course, we have examined the program and if we are going to have a true, total force and we are going to eliminate the fragmentation of the management of that total force, we have to bring that management into one organization and that is what we are in the process of doing, and this is just a subset of the overall reorganization that is going on within the Naval personnel management system right now.

Mr. ADDABBO. I understand Secretary Woolsey has a previous commitment. He may be excused.

Mr. WOOLSEY. I appreciate the Chairman's indulgence.

Mr. HIDALGO. Just one final point I would like to make, that your question suggests: In order to bring into play the top potential regular officers into the Reserve program that we feel is absolutely essential to the total force, what we need is not this flexible mix that you were asking the Admiral about but a policy decision, which is what the Navy seeks from you, that we should go ahead with this phaseout and then be able to implement this in the manner that we have already fully discussed.

I think if we leave this mixture right now, you are never going to reach that management improvement that we so strongly urge here.

QUALITY OF RESERVE BILLET ASSIGNEES

Mr. ADDABBO. Can you fulfill the management improvement needs of Naval Reserve by assigning the best active Reserve officers, or in fact any active duty officer, into the Reserves because of the current and projected officer shortages within the regular establishment?

The TAR officer attrition which is occurring at a higher than normal rate because of the proposed phaseout and the officer shortage within the junior and mid-grade structure of the unrestricted line of the regular Navy, together raise concern as to the ability of the Navy to provide sufficient numbers of officers of adequate quality to manage the Reserve program. Will this be a problem?

Mr. HIDALGO. I am assured this is not so, but would you give the reasoning on that, Admiral, please?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We have looked at the availability of the regular officers to fill these billets over a period of years and the main problem is in the grade of lieutenant. We have a current shortage in the grade of lieutenant. Right now, for example, there are 45 gapped billets in the grade of lieutenant in the Reserve management program. We have looked at our assets and also plan to increase the augmentation of Reserve officers into the regular Navy in order to provide additional numbers.

What we will really be doing is substituting in those lower grade regular officers for TAR officers, and by drawing down, as I mentioned, on our total regular Navy assets, we can fill those Reserve billets.

Now the Reserve billets in the reserve force squadrons and in the ships and in the other combat organizations will be 100 percent filled. There will be certain Reserve billets ashore that will not be filled; for example, the athletic officer at NAS Willow Grove that we would gap and other similar billets; so the shore portion will be treated on a fair-share basis with the important billets filled.

Mr. ADDABBO. How many billets would actually be vacant after one year?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I would estimate probably about 125, but I would like to submit that exact number for the record; as at the time we looked at it we estimated it would be somewhere in that neighborhood.

[The information referred to follows:]

It is projected that approximately 114 billets will be gapped in reserve program shore billets in fiscal year 1978. This is on par proportionately with the number of gapped billets anticipated throughout Navy's shore establishment.

Mr. ADDABBO. What would actually happen to your proposal and to the Navy Reserve readiness if the Navy is not granted relief from the officer manpower levels established in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act or the current grade limitation tables if DOPMA is not passed in the near future?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. If DOPMA is not passed, of course, we will be under the same system that we are now, and the TAR billets will be filled by TARs during the phasedown period. We will, if DOPMA is not passed, have to make some adjustments in the relationship between the TAR billets and the regular billets.

If DOPMA is passed, we may require some relief, for example, 24 additional captain authorizations, because the management of the Reserve is of a higher mix insofar as seniority of the officers is concerned. We could accommodate the TAR phaseout, but without adjustments to the DOPMA grade tables, the ability to smoothly transition to new grade levels during periods of decreasing strength would be curtailed.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Admiral Seiberlich, just to follow up a little bit, assume you have a ten or 15 percent shortfall in officers across the Navy structure. Now under this new plan you plan to allocate that shortfall among all the elements of the Navy, the Atlantic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Naval Air units, et cetera, and you now give the Naval Reserve its ten or 15 percent shortfall in officers. But many Naval Reserve organizations, particularly the training centers, of which there are, I guess, 260 of them—I am not sure of the exact number—have only one officer or in some cases have two. When you look at something like Norfolk and you have a big organization—you have 500 officers or 300 officers—and you are taken ten percent of that, you maybe can get by. You still have a couple of hundred other officers to do the job. When you only have one, you go to zero.

What happens to that naval training center that gets the zero this time around while we are waiting to fill it?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Under our plan, we would not gap those billets. There are some naval training centers that have been gapped. However, it is not our plan right now to gap training centers where there is just one officer.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. But doesn't the very fact that it happens today, when you have a special management or special corps to fill these jobs, indicate that it is quite likely to happen in the future?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I would not say that it is quite likely to happen in the future, no.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman, at this point.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. McFall?

Mr. MCFALL. No questions.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Flynt?

Mr. FLYNT. Not right now.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chappell?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Seiberlich, let me express my appreciation for the very fine efforts you gentlemen have been making in this area and to express my personal appreciation for as much time as you have given me in planning the program which you have outlined before the committee.

NAVY IMPLEMENTATION STUDY

I would like to ask this question first, Admiral:

We keep referring to some studies. The study you made, if I understand our conversation, didn't deal with whether we would phase out the TARs but your study had totally to do with implementation; isn't that correct?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir. In February I received a directive from the Secretary of the Navy, the Acting Secretary of the Navy at that time, to form a study group for the purpose of recommending to him a plan to implement this reorganization of the Navy Reserve.

Mr. CHAPPELL. So when the matter came to you, the decision to phase out the TARs had already been made?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. By the previous administration, yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Therefore, the references you made to studies of which you were a part do not relate to the question of whether we ought to have the TAR program continued or discontinued, but only how it is to be implemented?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. That was the purpose of my study group, yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That was the purpose of your study and you are attempting to testify on that here this morning?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HIDALGO. May I interrupt there, Mr. Chappell?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HIDALGO. However, Mr. Claytor made it unmistakably clear to me when I came aboard—he came in February and I did in April and Mr. Rostker was there—when I arrived, my principal deputy—that the whole thing was to be looked at de novo and take a totally fresh look at whether this TAR program should be phased out or not, and with no preconception. Heavens knows I didn't have any. I never heard of the TAR program, if you will forgive me. I was a Reserve in World War II and this was after my time; but it was looked at with no prejudgments whatsoever and the conclusion reached that this was the best way to arrive at a total force structure.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Secretary, as I have told you in times past, I have great confidence in you and your decisions, and I regret that on this particular one we may have some differences, at least until further explanation, which I can understand can come forth. But I think the point still remains that Admiral Seiberlich—and he has reiterated this to me time and time again as we discussed it—said it had to do with implementation in this study and was not directed to the issue of whether TAR officers should be phased out or not. That to me, Mr. Chairman, is the issue today, whether the Navy justifies the phasing out of the TAR program or whether it does not, not

whether the implementation at this point is a good implementation. That, to me, seems to be the issue before us today. I think we would agree on that, wouldn't we, Mr. Chairman?

I think that is the thrust of what we were getting at in the previous happenings before this committee.

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Chappell, I have been sitting here listening to this, trying to understand it, and it seems to me there is a difference of opinion between the OSD study and the Navy. OSD says don't phase out the TARs and the Navy says do phase them out. Perhaps in your questioning you can bring out the differences there. I guess that is what we have been trying to do here.

Secretary Hidalgo says that he came to the conclusion de novo and never having looked at this before. What is the difference between what you say and what the OSD study says? OSD says don't do it; the Navy and you say to do it. This provides for us here a rather distinct difference of opinion that we are going to try to resolve.

If you don't mind, I will just throw that question in. I think that what you are trying to get—

Mr. CHAPPELL. Go ahead. I was going to get at it a little differently.

Mr. HIDALGO. I think I mentioned earlier that the OSD study is not a concluded study, not a unanimous study, in OSD.

Mr. John White, who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, knows of the Navy views, does not disagree with the Navy view on this. I have never heard him in any way differ with our conclusion that we present to you so strongly today, so I don't consider the OSD study comparable, inconclusive as it is and reflecting a difference of opinion, to the Navy's position which is based on months and months of study on top of the earlier studies that were made in my predecessor's time.

Mr. McFALL. I didn't intend to take over your time. You go right ahead.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I appreciate it.

I think sooner or later that cleavage has to come out, and I do believe there is some cleavage between those, and I do intend to have General Gerard testify on that point at some later time.

Mr. McFALL. Admiral, let me be sure whether you are attempting to testify here today on this program, or whether you are simply here to talk about the implementation.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I am here to, of course, answer questions concerning the implementation, but I might say that in the course of this study and detail that we went into, I feel that the implementation of this new Reserve management system will improve management of the Reserve.

DIFFERENCES IN UTILIZATION OF TAR AND REGULAR OFFICERS

Mr. McFALL. Let me come to this question: What is the difference in utilization between the TAR officer and a regular officer?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. It depends on what his grade is.

Mr. McFALL. Let's take them in two phases: Let's take lieutenant commander and below, compare the TAR in that category with the regular officer.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Basically, they are very much the same, in that they come in the Navy generally by the same source, except those who go to the Naval Academy. The experience they get in the early part of the career is identical and then at some decision point they decide to go regular or apply to go to the TAR or they may get out of the Navy and work in civilian life for several years and then decide to come back to the Navy and either apply for a regular commission or a TAR commission, and come back in.

So on the initial duties, as far as experience is concerned, these officers are very similar.

Mr. McFALL. Essentially the same and they are subject to exactly the same orders, aren't they?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. McFALL. The Navy can assign the TAR officer anywhere it wants to assign him, just like it does the regular officer; isn't that correct?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. That is correct.

Mr. McFALL. So he can be assigned within the Reserve Training Program or he can be assigned to sea duty or otherwise, can't he?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. That is correct.

Mr. McFALL. So there is nothing in your implementation that would change that. These officers would still be able to do exactly that same thing?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Are we talking about the junior TARs?

Mr. McFALL. We are talking about lieutenant commanders and below; isn't that true?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. That is correct.

Mr. McFALL. I assume you put the officers above lieutenant commander, commander and above, in a different category?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Because of the billets available for their experience, yes, sir.

Mr. McFALL. But that has only to do with the availability of billets, doesn't it?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. There are two things involved. One is the availability of billets and the other is, as far as the individual is concerned, the availability of that individual to fill Reserve management billets.

Mr. McFALL. But the point remains, even with the commander and above, the Navy can assign this officer anywhere it wants to assign him and to any kind of duty at any time; isn't that correct?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. They can; yes, sir.

Mr. McFALL. So there is no difference then in the assignability of any of the officers in the TAR program from those of the regular?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The biggest difference is in the availability of billets in which to put these officers.

Mr. McFALL. Right, and the fact that you change their designation from TAR to regular isn't going to change the number of available billets, is it?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. It is going to change the number of people available to fill those billets by being able to draw on the entire experience and strength of the regular Navy rather than a very small group of TAR officers who by necessity have primarily been involved in Reserve management rather than a broader spectrum of experiences.

Mr. McFALL. Yes, but you have made the point, those officers are still assignable, just like any other officer in the regular Navy, aren't they?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The TAR officers?

Mr. McFALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Except insofar as experience is concerned. For example, a TAR officer who had not been aboard a ship certainly couldn't command a ship.

Mr. McFALL. And if he had been assigned only to Reserve duties, he would be assigned to the same category; we agree on that.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir, but it is not our plan to maintain the regular in repeated tours with the Reserve. He would have the opportunity to continue his broad experience and bring him back into the Reserve billets as required.

Mr. McFALL. I understand that, and if you had a TAR you could do the same thing with him today if you wanted. It is simply a matter of availability?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. And experience of the officer.

Mr. McFALL. Yes, but you can give that officer any experience you want him to have?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We can if we had sufficient personnel to do it. As I mentioned earlier, to do what you are talking about, we would have to expand TAR program to somewhere around 4,000 officers.

Mr. McFALL. Well, the only thing you are telling me is the Navy can do anything it wants to with these officers and you can do the same thing with them that you can do with the regulars. There is no question about that. It is a question of what Navy leadership wants to do, and the fact that you change the designation doesn't change the number of billets or number of assignments that could be experienced by what we now call the TAR officer. It doesn't change that, does it. Do you agree with that?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir. If we followed what you said, then the TAR would look like a regular whether we changed the designation or not, because he would be kept at sea and rotated back, as we do with regulars, and he would look like a regular; and that is what we are doing with this change, we are providing regular officers with Reserve experience.

Mr. McFALL. You are trying to say then that you are not making any changes because you change the designation from a TAR to a regular?

Mr. HIDALGO. Congressman, with all respect, aren't we really dealing here with the distinction between theory and practice, not what the Navy can do. It is not what the Navy can do in a theoretical sense but what the Navy is able to do in view of the shrinking end strength of the Navy in the regular unrestricted line officer corps—37,000 is the figure—and the number of command billets that are available.

You know as well as I do that under that pressure the command billets are going to go preferentially, since there is much demand, to the regular Navy officers, so I submit to you, with all respect, that in theory we can do what you say. In practice we are unable to do it.

Mr. MCFALL. The only reason you don't do it in practice is not because you can't do it but because the Navy won't do it.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Stated again, what it really has to do with then is the number of ships and the number of assignments rather than the officers themselves.

Mr. HIDALGO. A combination of the two.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let's pursue that a bit.

Mr. HIDALGO. Ships differ in the number of officers that you can put aboard to command them.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Exactly. So that whether you phase out TAR or whether you don't, you still have the same number of assignments, same number of ships. The fact that you change the TAR officer to a regular isn't going to increase the number of ships and it isn't going to increase the number of billets. Gentlemen, common sense tells us that.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The difference will be that the high quality officers who have served in those operational experience gaining assignments will be available for assignment to the Reserve program.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let me come down to another point. You have retained the enlisted TAR program.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You retained it because it was a good program?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. And it met our requirements.

Mr. CHAPPELL. And it met your requirements; I assume in the officer billets of lieutenant commander and below there is really no reason to change any of that on the same basis; isn't that correct?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir; except the capability to provide Reserve experience to regular officers is done initially down in the lieutenant commander and below grades. In other words, the regular officers who will manage the program later on will have their first experience down in those lower grades, and the regular officers who will have corollary duties involving Reserve decisions will have also gotten their initial experience down there.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You and I discussed at length one day the advantage of having experienced management. I assume that you give management experience in the lieutenant commander and below billets, and you utilize them in the Reserve program, don't you?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You and I did a quick computation one day. Isn't it true that we found the average management experience in the current TAR program to be eight years, but that under the proposed TAR program the experience level would be less than three years? Isn't that what our computation showed?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. In direct Reserve management; however, I would submit, if I am managing a regular squadron and you send me ashore to manage a Reserve squadron, those two squadrons are virtually mirror images of each other.

PERFORMANCE OF NAVAL RESERVE AIR SQUADRONS

Mr. CHAPPELL. Exactly, and I am glad you brought that point up, because I was pleased to hear you tell me the status of the Reserve

today is A-1. You told me you couldn't tell one unit from the other in looking at them. As a matter of fact, the Reserve had won the recent competition; isn't that right?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We are talking about the air squadrons?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. That is correct.

Mr. CHAPPELL. The Reserve air squadrons are part of the Reserves, aren't they?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That speaks pretty well of the program today, doesn't it?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir. Since we reorganized the Air Reserve about four years ago, there has been a very distinct improvement in readiness and capability.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You told me that you couldn't tell one from the other; isn't that right, Admiral?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Is that still the fact?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Those Reserve squadrons are outstanding, no question about it. They demonstrated it on a number of occasions, as we discussed.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Then because we have had such good luck with this program, we want to change it, as we have changed program after program, time after time. For all the Navy experience with Naval Reserve, just about the time the Naval Reserve feels a little stable, we come along and change it again. The morale falls; we have problems with retention; we have problems with recruiting. We go right back through another cycle again.

I submit to you that is what we are doing here, without any real improvement in the program.

QUALITY OF RESERVE MANAGEMENT

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Could I pursue just one thing, sir? We feel that we will definitely improve the quality of the management in the surface Reserve by the introduction of additional officers with the fleet experience in this group.

Mr. CHAPPELL. But you could do that today, Admiral, couldn't you?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We could.

Mr. CHAPPELL. There is not a thing here that you couldn't do right now under the present setup, is there?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. But when you bring a high quality USN officer into a program that he knows he has no opportunity really to move into meaningful management billets later on in his career, he will have great apprehension. This is one of the problems.

Today the primary management billets within the Reserve are filled by the TAR officers with the regular officers in the higher ranks being assigned smaller numbers. Therefore, if you are a young officer involved in your first Reserve management experience you really will try not to come back because there is not a very viable capability for you in the reserve program. So I think the real decision in the integration of the total force is to make the regular

officer responsible for the management of the Reserve and show him that there are opportunities to progress with that as a subspecialty.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Which you could do today just by a change of policy on the part of the Navy leadership.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Except we could not make those billets now filled by the more senior TARs available.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Obviously you do not have enough ships and you are giving preference to the regular officers. Is that what you are saying?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

I might say in any selection command process the TAR officers are included in that selection process. Each year a certain number of TAR officers are selected for command assignment, but they operate at a handicap in any open selection process because of the fact that they do not have as much operational experience as those officers with whom they are competing. Therefore, many of them lose out, not because they are not of the proper quality, but because they do not possess the operational experience to compete for the billet.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let me come back to experience again, because I think in management, experience is very important. In our deductions and quick computations, we found that, for commanders and above, management experience under the new program drops from roughly eight years to less than three. We found that to be true also.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. What we are saying is that you are watering down the experience of your leadership and those who are to command the Reserve. Would you not agree it takes at least a year for a man to come into the Reserve and learn how to handle his job.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Not if he has had a previous tour in the Reserve. We have taken the more senior billets, we have coded those billets for previous Reserve experience in the study, in detail.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I am not talking about previous Reserve experience, I am talking about the first time he comes in. There has to be a first time. Would you not agree it takes about a year of on-the-job training for him to become proficient in his Reserve assignment?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Under our plan the Regular officers will have their first tour in the lieutenant and lieutenant commander billet by and large because the majority of the senior billets are coded for previous experience and you cannot get one of those jobs in the screening process without previous experience.

Right now we assign senior regular officers in the grade of captain and commander to the Reserve program without prior reserve experience and it does take about a year to get them up to speed. We want to eliminate that by the plan that we have to bring junior regular officers in, give them reserve experience, and the opportunity to grow in the program. During the transition period, the TAR officers, as they become more senior, will continue to manage as a gradual change-over to regular management is effected during the 15-year period.

On the other side of the coin, this Regular officer will bring a wealth of operational experience from the fleet in with him, which certainly counterbalances any reductions in overall time in the Reserve management billets

Mr. HIDALGO. If we were here recommending to you that we abolish the TAR program tomorrow, definitely and finally, overlooking the terrible impact that would have on the vested rights of existing officers, then your concerns would be extremely valid, but here we have a 15-year phaseout. If the Navy cannot intelligently solve the problems you are addressing and, at the same time, solve the essential problem of less ships and therefore less command billets, and the importance of giving the Reserves with their instability as to numbers greater strength by giving them the strength that the admiral talks about, we would be missing an incredible opportunity.

In those 15 years, Mr. Congressman, you just know, and we will be reporting to you and Congress constantly on this, that we are going to put Regulars in there that will have the necessary experience and build it up the way the Admiral has said.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I, of course, do not disagree with what you say, Mr. Secretary. However, I think the best way to judge the future is by the past. The record in the past has been of all kinds of changes, sometimes just for change's sake, it appears to me.

I do not care how the man gets his experience in the Reserve, he still is going to have to be there about a year for on-the-job training to get his experience. Then he has roughly two years to actually carry out officially the duties in the Reserve; whereas, the man today has eight years. Maybe eight is too much, although I am not saying it is. In any event, the program today is managed by people with extensive management experience.

Let me say right now that nobody is more in favor of the total force concept than I. But when you shake it all down, sift it all out, it appears to me that what we are really doing is changing, simply changing a title or a category. You are still going to need Reserve specialists, people with experience, if you are going to make the Reserve work as a part of the total force. I am trying to understand how this changing from the TAR designation is going to solve that problem.

You could rotate your Regular officers through the Reserve right now, as a matter of emphasis. You could do everything that you are talking about doing here right now. Of course, we think about vested interests and so forth, but I am not really concerned about that. I am interested in the total force concept, what we can do to make the Navy the strongest it can possibly be made through the use of its Regulars and its Reserve.

Mr. MCFALL. Do you want to ask more questions when we come back?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes.

Mr. MCFALL. All right. We will recess and then go vote.

[Recess.]

Mr. CHAPPELL. Gentlemen, we will come to order again. The chairman has asked me to proceed.

Mr. MCFALL. Mr. Chappell.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I had written a letter to the chairman dated December 6, 1977, and asked that Major General Francis R. Gerard of the Air National Guard have an opportunity to testify before the committee. I would like for the committee to call him and ask if he would be available to testify sometime this afternoon. I know he has a health problem, but we would like to see if we can have him available.

Mr. MCFALL. I assume that the chairman of the committee would be in favor of that. We will contact the chairman and have him do that.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I do not think there is any problem. I just mention that so Mr. Vander Schaaf might contact him.

Mr. MCFALL. We will try to get hold of him during the noon hour and see if he can come in this afternoon.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Secretary, you have stated here that the Reserve study recommended getting rid of the TAR officers. Do you know what the Salzer study recommended?

Mr. HIDALGO. Specifically on TAR?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes.

Mr. HIDALGO. I do not think they went into that.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. They did not address it.

Mr. HIDALGO. I do not think they went into it.

Mr. CHAPPELL. This in-depth Reserve study that you speak of, what in-depth study was that? Was this a written study, a written report made of the study?

Mr. HIDALGO. Dr. Rostker, my principal Deputy on Manpower Affairs, and his whole team went into this very thoroughly. There was no formal study. There was a memorandum and recommendations he made to me on the matter, and unqualifiedly they said this was the only way to implement this total force structure.

Mr. CHAPPELL. There is no study that we can refer to?

Mr. HIDALGO. No formal study was put together in that sense during my time.

Mr. CHAPPELL. In order to get the results of those findings, the only way we could do it would be to call the officers who participated in the study.

Mr. HIDALGO. Myself, sir, I am fully familiar with the reasoning and the conclusions that were reached.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I see.

Admiral Seiberlich, you mentioned you categorized all Reserve program billets by the experience required. The Bureau of Naval Personnel has been doing this since 1953 for officer assignment purposes. What is unusual about your classification of billets?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. What we have done is to evaluate the billets. There are billets involved in Reserve management that have various exposures; some are directly involved, such as the commanding officer of a Reserve activity; others where perhaps 20 percent of the time of the officers involved is Reserve management, and the other 80 percent perhaps in other types of operations.

So in order to categorize the experience gained by any officer occupying a reserve billet, we evaluated these billets as to the amount of meaningful experience they provided and coded them RA-1 through RA-7. We then specified the experience required to

fill each of the reserve billets. In this way we related the billet to the quality of the officer required for the job.

For example, of the 84 captain billets, we designated 27 of those billets as key billets to be filled by officers who have demonstrated the highest performance.

Mr. CHAPPELL. This is just good management, is it not? There is nothing unusual about that?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Good solid management.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That should, we hope, be standard with the Navy. So there is nothing unusual about that, is there?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Previously—

Mr. CHAPPELL. I hope it is not unusual.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, but the billets primarily are filled by TAR officers; previously there was not a system to designate what Reserve experience was required because it was assumed that the TAR officer had the previous requisite experience.

Mr. CHAPPELL. If the TAR phaseout is implemented, what you are really saying is that the Regular Navy would have a tighter control on the Reserve management billets. That is what you are saying, is it not?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I do not understand the term "Regular Navy." The Naval Reserve today of course is, insofar as the manpower personnel, under Chief of Naval Operations, who executes this authority through DCNO for Manpower OP-01, and the Chief of Naval Personnel for the distribution function.

Mr. CHAPPELL. So you are saying there is really no difference?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, sir, there are TAR officers involved in all these functions at this time.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I am trying to understand. We keep discussing fragmentation of the Reserves. There would be no change under the Navy proposal. I do not see where it reduces the so-called fragmentation because we have agreed there is nothing new in the Navy's proposal, nothing that cannot be done under the present circumstances.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I do not think we have agreed to that.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let's talk about money a minute.

Mr. HIDALGO. Mr. Congressman, I do not think we agree at all on that. You were kind enough to say before—

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let's pursue it. I thought we went through it before.

Mr. HIDALGO. In theory—

Mr. CHAPPELL. Do not talk about theory, because whatever the Navy wants to do, whatever its leadership wants to do, it can do.

Mr. HIDALGO. I wish that were true.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Well, the testimony before the committee has been to that effect before.

If I understand the admiral's statement, there is nothing new with these Reserve officers. There is nothing in the new plan that could not be done right now with the Reserve officer if the Navy wanted to do it right now.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Point to a law that says that you cannot.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The TAR officers operate in their own selection system and they are assigned primarily to Reserve management billets with certain other assignments to enhance their capability.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You tell me what currently exists. I am telling you what could be. It could be different today if the Navy wanted to do it. You admitted that a minute ago, did you not?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. There is a difference between what you want to do and what enhances the readiness of the organization by doing it. I would submit that would not occur if we took arbitrary action to do something that would not be in our best interest.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I have perhaps labored the point long enough.

Would this change give you better control of your money?

Mr. HIDALGO. I do not know what that means, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. CHAPPELL. It seems to me the end thrust is that you are going to have the same number of officers, whichever way you go.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. That is correct.

Mr. CHAPPELL. The program does not call for new ships, new airplanes, or new squadrons, so there is no change there. There is no change in the number of enlisted people. You have the same people, the same ships, you have the same job to do, so there is no change at all.

Mr. HIDALGO. You do not have the same people.

Mr. CHAPPELL. In essence all we are doing is really just taking the Reserve management and making it part of the so-called Regular Navy, right?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Making it part of the total force.

Mr. CHAPPELL. It is part of the total force now.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. As a separate compartment.

ROTATION OF REGULAR OFFICERS INTO RESERVE MANAGEMENT

Mr. HIDALGO. Sir, I think what we overlook in this process of your very logical analysis, I come back again to practice. Put in very simple terms, there is no way now that we can motivate Regular officers, in this "mix" system with a part of it segregated, to look at the Reserve management billet as a career-enhancing assignment. Perhaps the Admiral is going to disagree with me on that, but it is the conclusion I have come to. It is imperative to make this policy decision which we so urgently request from you, with the commitment by the Secretary of Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, that only experienced Regular officers with a career, actual and potential, of distinction will be assigned to this.

The way the Admiral has very clearly explained it, and you know the Reserve situation far better than I do, sir, it means that you are going to have interfacing with these Reserves who need that strengthening, as I said in my little opening remarks,—

Mr. CHAPPELL. And with which I concur.

Mr. HIDALGO. You are going to have men, day-to-day, with knowledge of the highest commands in the Navy all the way up the line. That is bound to strengthen the Reserve forces which are in great need of that strengthening, as you well know, with this uncertainty as to numbers and so on. There is no way you are going to get that

under the present system, because the TARs do not have these command billets. The Admiral explained that time and again.

We can talk theory all you like, but they are not going to get these command billets. The command billets are in great demand. They are naturally going to go to the Regular officers.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let's talk theory and practice again.

In theory we are going to make the Regular Navy officer love his Reserve counterpart a little better by this intermingling. With that, I hope wherever we go we are going to improve, and I commend the Secretary for it.

Mr. HIDALGO. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. What are you going to do different that you cannot do now in order to make that Regular officer want to be a part of the Reserve program?

Mr. HIDALGO. Because by precepts to selection boards it will be made abundantly clear that this will be a career-enhancing assignment to the Regular officers.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You can do it?

Mr. HIDALGO. There is no way to do it now, distinguishing between theory and practice.

Am I wrong about that, Admiral?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Correct, sir.

Basically the TAR officer Corps in managing the Reserve really have served as sort of an insulator, because the Regular officer feels "Let the TARs manage the Reserve, that is their business." He does not have the experience.

I can give you a very concrete example when the Reserve squadrons were recalled to active duty during the Berlin Wall crisis by President Kennedy; I was in the Atlantic Fleet at the time and was in charge of bringing those Reserves in.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Were you Reserve?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. A regular officer.

I was working for Vice Admiral Taylor at the time. I knew very little about the Reserve, although I did know that they operated airplanes and ships. So I got in an airplane and flew to Glenview, Illinois, and the first person I met was Captain "Bud" Otto. He and I sat down for about three hours and he brought me up to speed on the program. At that point I found that we had some great misconceptions and we also really did not understand it.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Who had the misconceptions?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The Regulars, and really did not understand how to integrate them. As a matter of fact, what we thought we were going to get and what we actually got were two different things, and we had to stop the recall process, go back to Washington and have a meeting back there to determine how we would do this. Out of that has come a lot of reorganization with the Reserve.

I think the next logical step is to complete the loop and make the management of the Reserves the responsibility totally of the Regular officers in order to eliminate this insulation.

Mr. HIDALGO. And over that 15-year period, Mr. Congressman, if we do not do it well we will deserve the greatest condemnation.

Mr. CHAPPELL. We would not think of that, Mr. Secretary. We know you are here in good faith. I am honestly trying to understand

well enough to see it from your vantage point. Having participated in the Reserves for so many years, I have serious misgivings.

I think, Mr. Chairman, I have pursued the points far enough.

Mr. MCFALL. Let me ask a question. I am not so sure that I will phrase it accurately to get the answer, but if I muddle around long enough I will.

In the Reserves, in this TAR program, you have a group of about 1400 officers?

Mr. HIDALGO. 1200, 1250, sir.

Mr. MCFALL. 1250. This Reserve management is reserved to them by law, they are going to be the top management people in this program, they are going to be Reserve managers; is that what is involved?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, sir.

Mr. MCFALL. By whatever custom, whatever is involved here.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. There is a mix involved, basically 337 billets that the Navy has decided could only be filled by TARs.

Mr. MCFALL. Those are the top management?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. They are through the whole structure. For instance, the top officer in the Naval Reserve is Vice Admiral Charbonnet, who is a Regular officer, sir.

Mr. MCFALL. As I tried to listen to the testimony and questions and answers here, I got the impression that the Navy felt that the TAR program, the top management of the TAR program was going to be reserved for TAR people, that it was not really very attractive to Regular officers because they could not rise to the top. But you tell me that the top man is a Regular officer. I did not understand that from the exchange going on between you and Mr. Chappell.

I just got the impression that what you had here was a group of people who had a preference whereby they were the ones who managed the Reserve program. You could not move your Regular officers in there interchangeably. On the other hand, the Reserve officer, in order to make a better officer, got moved out into the fleet. So in a sense you had a preference for the TAR officer, whereby he had the TAR program as his own. He also had the opportunity to go out into the fleet, but it did not work the other way, that is the Regular officer could not move into the Tar program and get that same kind of, in a sense, preference. But you tell me that is not true.

Mr. HIDALGO. Sir, I wonder if I may address it broadly and then the Admiral would fill in the spaces.

Mr. MCFALL. If you have this interchangeable moving back and forth, and you do not have a preference for the TAR program, then my presumption was that on the one hand you have non-Reserve people seeing all these billets which are reserved for the TARs, and the TARs saying "We have a good deal here, we have all this Reserve for us and we are going to keep it."

I can understand everybody trying to protect his own turf. Have I come to the wrong conclusion here?

Mr. HIDALGO. First of all, the turf protection is fully taken care of by the 15-year phaseout, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MCFALL. Do not talk about the phaseout, just talk about how it exists now, if you would.

Mr. HIDALGO. Addressing the other points you have raised, I would put it this way: First of all, as I said in my opening remarks, this is post-World War II vintage, when we had this huge pool of Reserve officers, I was one of them, only I went back to my private life, with wartime experience, actual experience in the fleet, and who were ready to go on in the Navy and they became TAR officers.

Now, even though the Admiral explains that by law, and please correct me as I go along if I go off the track, we only need to put 300-something TARs, the fact is we have 1250. As tradition has made it since 1946, this group of officers has grown into the number that I have given you. It is not a matter of the priority managers, it is simply a matter that this is what they were there for, what their lives are dedicated to, and they have done a magnificent job, let me explain that. Only the time has come to move into another phase.

Mr. McFALL. But these people are specialized in Reserve management, they do not move out into the fleet.

Mr. HIDALGO. They serve very little in the fleet. The problem is there are so few command billets, since we have less ships and so on, that the Regular officers are the ones who get those command billets, very understandably and very logically. So the TAR officer, as he is in 1977, cannot compete with the Regular officer for these shrinking command billets, or he is so immersed in the management of Reserves that that is his mission.

From the other side of it, you have the Regular officers, who, in this mix system, very frankly have not considered it career enhancing element to be put into the TAR management and get mixed up—

Mr. McFALL. Why?

Mr. HIDALGO. Because that is the Navy, Mr. Chairman. You move forward in the Navy by having command of a ship, getting operational experience.

Mr. McFALL. When I was in the Army they used to tell me, "That was the Army" and there was not any more logic in that than telling me "That is the Navy." Give me another answer.

Mr. HIDALGO. Is that a fair answer?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I think the fact is that if you take a look at the Regular officers assigned into the Reserve billets and what has happened to them as they progressed along and their opportunities to move ahead, the track record is rather bad.

Mr. McFALL. That is what led me to the conclusion that somehow or other the Regular officers did not want to go into the Reserve program because they could not get to the top. But then you said they can get to the top. The guy at the top now is a Regular officer. Now you tell me they do not want it because they cannot get to the top.

Mr. HIDALGO. The Regular ones cannot get to the top in the Navy.

Mr. McFALL. Is this just the answer—

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Actually the Regular officer brought in to manage the Reserve has generally not had any previous experience with the Reserve and is picked for the job because of his demonstrated operational experience and capabilities. The system we are

proposing will bring officers up through the Reserve system who will then compete for the flag billets that are in the Reserve.

Mr. McFALL. But if I understand you correctly, you can do that under the present law now, and that is what Mr. Chappell asked you. You can do it right now if you want to.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. But it will not work.

Mr. McFALL. Why would it not work?

Mr. HIDALGO. The truth is we have not done it since 1946.

Mr. McFALL. But you can do it?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. It is the way it has evolved, not a matter of law.

Mr. McFALL. But you can do it?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. It is impossible to change a thing sometimes within itself. You have to take a more radical step—that is the wrong word; more definite step is the right word—where you begin to eliminate the segregated group of managers who, as time has gone on, have had less and less experience in the fleet. That is where the Reserves are suffering, or will suffer in the future.

Mr. McFALL. So, by tradition, you have an elite group which serves here, who do not move out into the fleet; the Regular officer does not want to move into the management program because he does not want to get stuck in there, even though actually the law does permit you to do it?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. That is right, and you have just described in better words than anyone else, through that system you do not get a total force structure. That is why we are here recommending precisely this TAR phase-out.

Mr. McFALL. I can understand that, but I am not sure that I understand that the answer is to do away with the TAR program even on a 15-year basis. I am really sitting here as kind of a juror, because I have no interest in it one way or another.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We have to look at the problem from the other side, that is the Regular side. The basic experience of the Regular naval officer in Reserve management is extremely limited. As a matter of fact, I am the only flag officer who served in the Reserve in a lower grade and made flag.

Mr. McFALL. It could be, though, if you administered it the way you can under the present law, you could move these people in and out and tell them, "Look now, you can get up to the top," just do not get so bound in Navy tradition, change the Navy tradition here.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. What occurs is that as the TAR officers become more senior and there is the lack of operational billets, they of course predominantly form the structure at the top of the Reserve organization and the Regular officers are salted in, if I can use that term. In other words, they are in the minority and the TARs are in the majority in the higher grades.

Consequently, what will your utilization be of the TAR officer? Will you use him in a meaningful Reserve officer management billet or push him out into a billet where he cannot contribute as much as he should? What occurs is the TAR officers do the thing they are best trained in, which is in the Reserve management, and do repeated tours as they become more senior. This system has worked up until this point. But when you start to take a look at the

total force and the integration of the Reserves in the management, and a new feature that we feel is very important and that is the recall of the selected Reserve officer to participate in policy decisions, which we have not done to date because we have utilized TAR officers in that role, then you take a look at: How can I handle and assign these officers and, as a subset to that, you really have to phase the TAR officers out in order to provide the Regular officer with the capability to be in the management positions and operate the Reserve without the insulation of the TAR group.

Mr. CHAPPELL. May I conclude with one statement, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MCFALL. Yes.

Mr. CHAPPELL. It seems to me, if the Navy would like to prove the viability of their theories under real world circumstances, that they would begin by cycling their top quality Regular officers into Reserve program billets and prove that they can maintain the flow of quality officers through the Reserve program billets for an extended period of time. I believe this is true right now, Admiral, that you have a Regular Navy captain who is to take command of the new \$9 million Reserve center down at Anacostia. He has had 8-1/2 years in the Washington area and he is now on his twilight cruise.

Now, the point is you simply are not doing it. You are not carrying, apparently, your top quality people through. Here is a man that I think is strictly in point. Why was he given that particular billet at that particular time?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I will have to check on that. He must be the current commanding officer of the Naval Air Facility at Washington.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I believe you ought to check it.

Further, if the Navy really believes in the importance of the Naval Reserve, then certainly they can prove it by including appropriate material on the subject in the Blue Jackets Manual and incorporate meaningful courses in curricula at the Naval Academy, Naval War College, and other senior postgraduate schools. None of this has been done, so far as I know.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. The study recommends it, and it will be done.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That is great. I commend you on it. Let them introduce outstanding duty performance in the Reserves as a bonus point in the precepts or guidance given Regular Navy selection boards. All of these actions can be undertaken immediately, and I believe they must be if the Navy is ever going to deinstitutionalize Reserve program neglect and destigmatize the Reserve community.

What I am saying is, every one of these things can be done right now.

With that I conclude my questioning.

Mr. MCFALL. Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two questions, one of which is a follow-up on a question Mr. Chappell just made.

A principal concern with respect to the proposal to phase out the TAR program is the question of which and in what manner Regular

Navy officers will be assigned to the Reserve support billets. In a letter of September 21, 1977, the Secretary stated, and I quote:

"I recognize the importance of assigning top quality officers to these billets. I intend to screen these assignments personally as well as to promulgate unequivocal direction and guidance on this requirement. I can assure you and the Reserve community that what we propose to do will improve the quality of officers assigned to manage and supervise our Reserve forces."

This remains a sticky point in that in the past officers, just as Mr. Chappell brought out, assigned to the Reserves and to the recruiting commands were too often on their last assignment before leaving the Navy. In other words, they have been previously passed over for promotion. What is to keep this situation from reoccurring?

Mr. HIDALGO. Total commitment by the Navy to honor that statement, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. ROBINSON. The statement on the part of the Secretary which is incorporated in that letter?

Mr. HIDALGO. That is right, and the Chief of Naval Operations said the same thing when we testified together on October 27 before the House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. ROBINSON. You gentlemen have been here for a long time this morning, but you know that you are going to be followed by those that are going to be speaking in opposition to what you have been presenting to us.

Mr. HIDALGO. That is right.

FAIRNESS OF TAR OFFICER PHASEOUT PLAN

Mr. ROBINSON. Have you received any complaints from current TAR officers or others that the proposed phaseout is inequitable or unfair to them from a personal standpoint that have not been covered and that you would like to discuss with us before we allow you to step down?

Mr. HIDALGO. I have not, Mr. Congressman.

Do you know of any, Admiral.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, sir.

Mr. HIDALGO. I have not. Nothing has been brought to my attention.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FLYNT. We will recess for a few moments.

STATEMENTS OF RESERVE FLAG OFFICERS SUPPORTING TAR PHASEOUT

Mr. McFALL. The committee will come to order.

We will hear from Admiral Hobbs, Admiral Crawford, and Admiral Coleman so they will not have to come back this afternoon. They may, if they wish, but they will not have to come back.

Admiral Hobbs wrote the Chairman on September 6, requesting an opportunity to testify in support of the Navy proposal to terminate the TAR officer program. The committee staff asked the representatives of the Navy if there were other senior participating Reserve officers who also supported the proposal. Admirals

Coleman and Crawford were identified as supporting the proposal and were requested to testify.

I want to thank you gentlemen for giving us an opportunity to hear your views on this proposal. Your biographical data will be made a part of our record as well as any formal written statements you may wish to provide for the record.

[The information follows:]

RANK/NAME: RADM Norman A. Coleman

DATE OF BIRTH: 4 March 1923

DATE OF RANK: 1 August 1973

EDUCATION: Northwestern University, BS; University of Kentucky, Graduate School

OCCUPATION: President, Bennet-Shellenberger, Ltd. (Insurance Agents & Brokers), Colorado Springs, Colorado

MOB BILLET: Commander Naval Base Bremerton

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: CNAVRES Support Unit

RANK/NAME: RADM Burnett Hayden CRAWFORD, Jr.

DATE OF BIRTH: 29 June 1922

DATE OF RANK: 1 September 1971

EDUCATION: University of Michigan, BA, JD

OCCUPATION: Attorney-at-Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma

MOB BILLET: Commander, Naval Base New Orleans

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: CNAVRES Support Unit

RANK/NAME: RADM Robert A. HOBBS

DATE OF BIRTH: 21 March 1918

DATE OF RANK: 22 July 1971

EDUCATION: University of Washington, BA

OCCUPATION: Insurance Consultant, Mercer Island, Washington

MOB BILLET: Commander Naval Base Pearl Harbor

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: CNAVRES Support Unit

Mr. McFALL. We would like to have some oral statement from each one of you as you desire.

Admiral Hobbs, do you want to start first?

Admiral HOBBS. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and testify before the committee. I might say it is my first opportunity to do this as a Reserve officer and a new experience for me.

Mr. McFALL. You will get a combat ribbon or something for it.

Admiral HOBBS. I imagine I will be entitled to something.

I supported the Secretary's request for approval of the plan and I base my support on what I see as more of a structural change in the environment of our defense requirements as the impact not only on the Active forces but on the Reserve as well.

I have been a participant in the Ready Reserve for many years, both in the air program and as commander of the Naval Readiness Command, Seattle.

The change that I see which drives this request is based upon the total force concept and policy, and I certainly agree with Congressman Chappell that the primary purpose here is to have a better quality Navy in the total force context.

All of the mandates that I have heard as a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and in my exchanges at the OSD level as well as in the Navy is in the direction of providing Ready Reserve that not only is ready for mobilization, but also that is able to mobilize with the kind of rapidity and to take missions that formerly were in the Active force, until the Reserve is mobilized. So there has been a substantial change in the environment.

I concur with the Secretary's analysis of the Reserve in the past as it came out of World War II and through the years. The great changes in the last five to seven years have to do with the change in the requirements for mobilization; with the matter of the Reserve assets; the training requirements that have to be defined more carefully today than they were in the past, and as a bottom line on this, in the total force concept, in the short time, short-fuse mobilization, the user command which is the Active force has to be able to take the Ready Reserve forces and plug them in in a matter of days.

This requires a very close interface between the Active force and the Selected Reserve, and that is why this initiative is taken, and that is the reason I support it.

Mr. McFALL. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral Coleman.

Admiral COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share Admiral Hobbs' sentiments and the opportunity to be here, and we thank you for it.

The first time this issue really surfaced in any organized fashion in the Selected Reserve was approximately two years ago at a meeting in New Orleans when the Chief of Naval Operations Reserve Affairs Advisory Board, which meets with him periodically just to discuss matters of common interest to the Active Navy and Reserve, did discuss the long-term posture of the Naval Reserve and its relationship to the Navy, total force concept, which was a new phrase thrust upon us.

We—I say we, I speak of the Reserve Affairs Advisory Board—expressed the collective opinion that if in the long run this was to work, what we see now as three communities in a sense, Active Navy, the TAR Navy, the Selected Reserve Navy, needed to get closer together.

It was our view that some program to involve Active Navy more in the management of the Naval Reserves should be pursued. The logical product of that discussion, at least logical to us at the time, was that a TAR phaseout would be involved. Admiral Holloway asked us at the time if that was just one or two opinions or if everybody was involved, and to a man the senior officers present at that time endorsed it.

Mr. McFALL. That is one of the questions I have, Admiral.

Are there other senior Reservists who agree with you that the TAR officer program should be abolished? Do you believe that you represent a significant portion of the paid drill training Ready Reserve? What do you think of that?

Admiral COLEMAN. I can honestly say in the Selected Reserve flag community today, approximately 40 in number, not one of those has expressed to me any disagreement with this. I believe it is the collective—not collective but certainly the predominant view as I know it, that the flag officers Naval Reserve today support it.

Mr. McFALL. How about the others?

Admiral HOBBS. I concur.

Mr. McFALL. Is that the consensus here?

Admiral HOBBS. That is the consensus.

Mr. McFALL. Go ahead.

Admiral COLEMAN. As I see the Navy Reserve today, and of course, we are all the product of our own experiences—and mine essentially is the surface Reserve program, where we have a crying need to get the Naval Reserve—and as I see it these are primarily the enlisted personnel closer to their Active Navy counterpart.

I see this as a step in the right direction. I for one believe that it is the way to go.

Mr. McFALL. Do I get the impression from your statement that you feel that now you have a Reserve program which is run by a certain group of TAR officers, which is sort of separate from the Navy Reserve program? You have to get the attention of the Regular officers and get them involved in the Reserve program to make it work; is that what you are saying?

Admiral COLEMAN. Sir, we have certain Reserve programs heavily involved with the Active Navy. I would identify particularly the Naval Reserve Intelligence program, which is heavily involved with active duty offices, from top to bottom.

I may be wrong, but to my knowledge there is only one TAR officer assigned to the entire program. I may be wrong on that. I would be glad to be corrected, if so. It has worked quite well. It is a key element of the Naval Intelligence program today. We find that success is a result of that close cooperation.

Yes, I do believe in effect we do have an insulation between Selected Reserve and the Active Duty Navy. I do not believe it was intended this way, but it is a fact of life that the TAR officer community does in effect become an insulator between the two groups. I see that as a user.

Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Chairman, let me ask a question right at this point, if I may.

Mr. McFALL. All right.

Mr. FLYNT. I will address this to either one of the three of you, Admiral Hobbs, Admiral Coleman, Admiral Crawford.

We have heard testimony this morning and we have seen indications of it many times prior to this morning, that the Naval Reserve participation in the air arm of the Navy has been spectacular and dynamically successful. We get the impression that the participation of the Naval Reserve in the surface ships is not a successful and not as well-integrated as it is in the air arm of the Navy.

Is that a fair observation? Is it an accurate observation?

Admiral COLEMAN. Sir, it might even be an understatement.

Mr. FLYNT. All right. Why is that? Is it because of the—go ahead.

Admiral COLEMAN. I think there are several thrusts here. One of course is the force structure, how many Active duty ships or Active fleet ships, how many Naval Reserve force ships; who is assigned to them, where are they? It is a function of the numbers. We have been at 129,000 and 119,00, 106,000, 102,000; you know the numbers better than we.

As a matter of fact, permit me to interject a very sincere thank you to this particular committee for saving our hide year in and year out. We know it and appreciate it. But with the series of reorganizations, if you will, that have taken place in the last three years, our unit identification change, the location of those units change; I think as we have reduced numbers there has been a

tendency to lose units in the great bread-basket of the country which for so long provided substantial numbers of the Navy people. We seem to move toward the coasts. That might be a natural influence, certainly toward the larger cities.

I think also you find that as the Naval Reserve structure has changed, recruiting difficulties have perhaps increased; whether they run together I do not know, but I know there is a relationship. I think we have a need for strength in numbers that are meaningful, that relate to some good long-term planning; directly relate to the Active duty and which have the stability that can be worked with for a period of time to really develop the quality of mobilization readiness we need.

Mr. FLYNT. Is part of the failure of the Naval Reserve to play a more active role in the surface fleet and in the submarine fleet simply a question of numbers, that we do not have enough surface ships and enough submarines to accommodate larger numbers of Reserve personnel?

Admiral COLEMAN. I do not think it is totally related to that. I think part of it is surface ships; also, what happens in the active duty manning. Today, at least, the thought is that a ship which deploys is fully manned at that time. Our Reserve units are married to active duty units, but this marriage changes depending upon the deployment of the ship; essentially, where and how we use those individuals.

That picture changes a little bit from day to day, but we have not had a good clear opportunity for some time to develop a good hard relationship between the surface-related Reserve units and fleet ships.

Mr. FLYNT. Would it be also an accurate statement to say that one reason that Naval air service is more attractive to Naval Reserve personnel than surface fleet service is because the ability to perform in Naval air units is much easier from the standpoint of a Naval Reservist than it is to serve in either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral COLEMAN. I would defer to Admiral Hobbs on that. He has had experience on both sides.

Admiral HOBBS. Yes, I think the air program lends itself to easier manning and is a more attractive program for a number of reasons.

As you mentioned, the submarine service, there is no Reserve affiliation with the submarine service at sea; that is a policy matter.

Mr. FLYNT. Yes.

Admiral HOBBS. So we do not need to discuss that. However, ashore in the submarine forces, the Naval Reserve does supply a substantial capability in terms of support of the support forces ashore. That is in the organization, it is being done very well today.

There again it is the user command in the fleet that in my judgment needs to have close interface with this capability at all times, and therefore in the management structure the relationship between the Reserve community and the user, after mobilization, should also exist before mobilization. So that is the reason I would endorse this for that purpose.

Now in the air program, subsequent to the reorganization, fleet-equipped hardware has been placed in the Reserve, both in the

attack community and in the ASW, and at the present time the ASW-VP community is carrying a substantial portion of the Navy's ASW mission in modern aircraft, P-3s. There again it is a matter of the user command having a close interface with this.

It is a good capability, it does draw qualified crews. When they come off active duty in the fleet, they do enter into these programs. The location of the air stations from which they operate, in most cases, is demographically convenient to the potential crews and it is a very tidy and orderly program.

The surface program is more diverse in terms of the programs, more diverse in terms of the locations throughout the country, and for that reason it is much more difficult to manage the surface program than it is the air.

Mr. FLYNT. Would it be either practical or possible, excluding the submarine fleet because of a policy decision, to bring into the seagoing Navy the same Reserve participation which we find in the Naval Air Reserve?

Admiral HOBBS. There are problems endemic to the surface fleet Navy, in the sense that the number of ships have come down very substantially from what they were a few years ago. The ships have to be forward-deployed often. With the exception of the ships that are signed into the NRF program, most of the active force Navy simply is not there for the Reserves to participate in.

Mr. FLYNT. Admiral Crawford, I do not want to leave you out of this, if you want to comment.

Mr. McFALL. At this point, would you allow Admiral Crawford to make a statement so that we let him participate in such an exercise. He has not made a statement yet. We can get him to do that, and then we can continue to question.

Admiral Crawford, could you go ahead with your statement? Then we will get you into this colloquy with Mr. Flynt and get your voice added.

Admiral CRAWFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I don't want to be repetitious and there are two or three things that may be of some help to the committee and, of course, our purpose is to be of whatever assistance we can be. There are one or two things I would like to get out of this that I don't think are a part of it. I can look around the room and I see Admiral Johnny Johnson and Admiral Paul Rohrer, Captains Bud Otto, John Bell, Ed Huey, all TAR captains, and I don't want anything I say to be misinterpreted by anybody, that my support of this plan has any reflection on the outstanding duty they have performed in their billets.

There is nothing in the world wrong with the TAR officer. That is not the issue. They have performed well. They have been outstanding, but we do have a situation that I think to some extent has not been referred to here today with regard to the active people. The USNR TARs are not the same as the active people. There has never been a USNR TAR that has been Chief of Naval Operations, and probably never will be, or Chief of Naval Personnel or Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific or the Atlantic; and we in the Reserve program often find that these active officers that reach those top

positions in management are absolutely unaware of the Reserve program, do not understand it, and they are in a position where they are making decisions that affect us in the Reserve.

This is frankly my opinion. I think under this proposed plan that we are going to find over the years as these outstanding officers in the active Navy reach these top positions and have had one, two or three tours of duty with the Reserve, that they are going to be much more knowledgeable and much more equipped to make the decisions that relate to the Naval Reserve. I think that is one plus; but I don't think that is the major issue, I just think that is one plus, and I pass that on as an observation from what I have heard today.

There is no way that a TAR officer or a Reserve officer can make three stars or four stars or fill those billets, and I don't have any quarrel with that, but I think it is something that should be recognized by the committee. I think we are going to improve the active Navy knowledge and expertise with regard to Reserves under this program.

Now I am interested also in being identified as one in support of the program. I am, but to my knowledge this is the first time I have ever said so publicly. I have never been asked by Admiral Charbonnet or anybody else whether I support it or do not support it. I am somewhat surprised I was invited to attend here, because I think it is a close question. I don't think it is the greatest question that faces the Naval Reserve today. I think Congressman Flynt was pointing out too some of the things that are extremely important to us and I know this committee is very much aware of it, but that is not the reason I am here at this point.

I am here on this program. Now I believe that the time has come to make this change. I do not believe that we should look over our shoulder and see the Air Guard technician program and recognize that our program and the TARs today is much better than that and therefore we should hold fast. It is much better than that.

The Navy has been the leader in the Reserve management and I would like to see it continue to be the leader in the Reserve management. There is no way that I can visualize a one Navy policy or total one Navy concept or a total force policy without the interfacing of the Reserves and the actives, and the more interfacing there is, I think, the better our readiness is going to be, and I think the more effective our Navy as a whole is going to be. But I think it is a close question; it is a very close question but, in my opinion, gentlemen—I have taken this coming as a Reservist over many years; it is something that has been discussed over many years and it is here—I honestly say to you that if this committee doesn't vote to implement it or permit the Navy to implement it, I think it is going to happen some other time.

There is too much momentum moving in this direction. There is too much support for it and I think now is the time to do it. The one concern I want to leave with you is this—and I think my colleagues here who may testify to the contrary will agree with me on this issue; at least I know some of them will because I have talked to them—and that is, the proposed plan will work or will not work depending upon the quality of the active officers the Navy assigns to the program.

If we are going to get the short-timers and the pass-overs, and that is all, I say please don't put this in effect; but if we are going to get our share of the high quality officers, and the Reservist assignments for active officers are going to be clearly enhancing, somewhat like the Navy did in the recruiting command—there was a time when being assigned to the recruiting command was the end of the road in the Navy, but that has been turned around by assigning top quality people to it, and once you make two or three admirals in those billets it gets their attention. I think the same thing has to be done in this Reserve program.

Now what can we do—and this is what I have devoted my time to because I think this is the issue that is before us; this is the number one issue—will the Navy do it? Can the Navy do it? Well, I have asked a lot of questions about this and for the first time—and this will just take me a minute or two to conclude—for the first time, and maybe we won't have it in the future, but now we have the wholehearted support of the Chief of Naval Operations for the implementation of this plan and his commitment that the high quality officers will be assigned.

We also have the support of the Chief of Naval Personnel for the first time. We have the support of the Navy Secretariat, and you heard them here today, and you know what Secretary Claytor has said.

We have the support of the Chief of Naval Reserve. We have the total combined support of the Navy to support this and there is no question in your minds or mine that they are sincere; but bear in mind we are all aware they are not going to be here forever. Somebody is going to take their place. How about them? That has bothered me.

I don't know what more you could do than what you have, and I don't know what more anybody could do. I have read these letters. The Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee ended his statement by saying, "The committee intends to follow the implementation of this program to ensure that officers of high potential and unrestricted professional growth are assigned to Reserve management positions as stated in the Secretary's letter of September 21."

The same is true with regard to the other letters, the one from Senator Stennis. He says, "I believe that as long as the Naval Reserve is improved and highly qualified and able naval officers are assigned to this program"; and the same is true with Mr. Price, and that leaves this committee.

It is my hope that this committee would put the same condition on and that as time goes on that there be checks made to make certain that this is carried out as the successors to these people that have testified before you come on. I think if that is done there is no question in my mind but that the Navy will lead, as it has in the past, in the management of the Reserve program, thereby a greater interfacing between the active and the Reserves, which I think will result in a stronger Navy, consistent with the total force policy and more adequate readiness than we have today.

TERMINATION OF SHIP AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

Mr. FLYNT. Thank you, Admiral Crawford.

I would like to ask each of you, or all of you—one can respond or as many as wish to—would you comment on the effect of the Navy's decision which terminated the ship augmentation program?

Admiral CRAWFORD. Is this directed to me, sir?

Mr. FLYNT. Yes, sir.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I think we anticipate Naval Reserve ship augmentation with regard to the surface. I recognize the problems involved. If we are going to have 100 percent manning, theoretically we have a 100 percent—

Mr. FLYNT. Just so the record will show, when we used to have a ship augmentation program we had the surface ships manned 85 percent by regular Navy personnel with the remaining 15 percent to be supplied in case of emergency augmentation from the Reserves.

That policy has been terminated and we now have 100 percent manning. That is what I want to ask you.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I think, sir, that the 100 percent manning is certainly desirable if we can afford it, and if it is real, but even with 100 percent manning you have people in sick bay, you might even have some in the brig. I don't know what the plan is with regard to the schools. There are always some in school.

My feeling is, personally, that in the event of a national emergency we are going to need men and women to man these stations, and we are not going to have enough, no matter what the size of the Reserve is, and we need them and need them qualified, and we need them in the Selected Reserve, so they can be there on M Day. No matter what the manning is, I think we are still going to need an augmentation program.

Mr. FLYNT. Wouldn't it be a little more realistic training for Naval Reserves if such Naval Reservists anticipated being immediately called to augmentation assignment in the event of mobilization or emergency?

Admiral CRAWFORD. Yes, sir, and I think it would work the other way. I think the active forces would be much more interested in training that Naval Reservist if they knew he was going to be standing watch with them in a national emergency; but I know you are aware of the fact to get our people to the ships we need a naval airlift.

Mr. FLYNT. As to active duty training for Naval Reserves, would it be much more effective if their active duty training were with ships of the line?

Admiral CRAWFORD. Absolutely, without question, in my mind.

Mr. FLYNT. Yet that has been discontinued largely as a result of the policy decision to terminate the ship augmentation program?

Admiral CRAWFORD. To my knowledge, Mr. Flynt, there is still some training onboard ship by Naval Reservists, and I am not so sure that the decision with regard to augmentation eliminated that.

Mr. FLYNT. Isn't it much less though in quantity than it was previously?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I would think so but I would defer to the people that have the control over the active duty for training orders to answer the question.

Admiral COLEMAN. Mr. Flynt, I would like to respond to that too. A quick answer to your question is, it isn't due to the termination of the augmentation program, I would say, as a single answer. One of our great problems is the lack of transport airlift, and I know you gentlemen have been interested in this too. Again, being from the middle part of the country, I believe that hand in glove with the long-term success of mobilization, readiness of the surface Reserves is going to be Naval Reserve air transport. Without it, we don't have that opportunity.

With that facility to get to the places where the fleet ships are, which are not in deployment but are in port or at least Stateside, perhaps operational in coastal waters, then we do have that opportunity to train those people.

CURRENT NAVY AUTHORITY FOR TAR PROGRAM

Mr. McFALL. (presiding) I have some questions that I will ask quickly and then Mr. Chappell will have some questions.

Do you see the current TAR program as one of administering and training the Navy Reserve by people who are not under the full control of the active Navy? If so, why, and is there current authority to bring TAR officers under the control of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy? Is the question clear?

Admiral HOBBS. I think I understand the question.

I believe Admiral Seiberlich addressed himself to that particular point and within the provisions of the law the TAR officers and the Ready Reserve as well as the active force personnel, come under the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. McFALL. But by tradition they are kind of separate and they don't really use the full authority that they have now to alter this program. I think that is the gist of the question. Is that what is involved?

Admiral HOBBS. Admiral Seiberlich referred to the necessity of increasing the numbers that would have the specialty designator of TAR if they were to be brought into the active force. Again, the point I am making as far as my position is concerned is, it is a structural matter here of the relationship of the Select Reserve to the active force user. The Ready Reserve is a resource which is used to provide a surge capability and to carry some missions in a current status, and they, of course, would be called in the event of emergency or mobilization to report to an active force commander.

I don't think I quite understand the question in the context that I think you want me to answer it. It is not clear what you are saying.

Mr. McFALL. I think what the question is aimed at is, as part of my conversation with the previous witnesses, I think we concluded that they do have the present authority to change this program around so they can accomplish what they want without doing away with the TAR program over a 15-year period. But your answers, I think, are responsive.

Admiral COLEMAN. I think there is an innuendo that I at least perceive: What is the regular view of the TAR officer? I think this is the gut question. The TAR officer does not compete selection-wise with the regular officer and any regular officer I have been in

informal conversations with over many years looks at a TAR officer as truly not within the active, regular Navy community for that very reason. Their selection is by a different board and is part of the Reserve process, which relates supposedly closely to the Reserve.

TAR officers are part of the Naval Reserve.

Mr. MCFALL. And this is the kind of preference that perhaps some people would like to keep, a separate program that allows them this sort of freedom within the Navy, Navy within the Navy in a sense; isn't that what you are saying?

Admiral COLEMAN. It seems that way.

REGULAR OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS IN RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. MCFALL. In your opinion, how long does it take for an active Navy officer from O-3 to O-5 who is assigned to a Reserve organization for the first time to reach a point of maximum effectiveness in administering and understanding of the Navy Reserve?

Admiral COLEMAN. Sir, I think it would depend upon the assignment and the place he was located. An O-3 to O-5, if he has had a broad background in the Navy, I think he can get onboard within six to eight months.

Mr. MCFALL. Any disagreement?

Admiral HOBBS. I would say that an unrestricted line officer assigned to an unrestricted line billet in the Reserve would take the same time to become oriented if he went to a new assignment as a regular Navy.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Aren't there some other factors though that would cause the Regular officer to take more time? He has a community support problem. He has a different kind of recruiting problem. He is responsible for the recruiting. He has some management differences that are not there.

Admiral HOBBS. Could you be specific on that point?

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Yes; with respect to how he reports. He has to report, generally, decisions that would go up to a higher level than they would probably go for a similar kind of matter in the active Navy. They probably go all the way to New Orleans on some items that would probably be solved at fleet level or lower in the active Navy.

So those three items alone would seem to me to make some difference that would cause the active man to say, "I can't walk off an active ship and walk into a reserve training center and pick up the job in a short period of time."

Admiral HOBBS. If a regular officer came from the operating forces to an assignment in the management, he would be in a totally different environment. There would be a learning period, wouldn't there?

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Yes, sir.

Admiral HOBBS. I think that would also apply to a regular Navy officer going into the Reserve world. He would be in a somewhat different environment, yes, but there is an aura of mistake there which I don't think really exists. It is not a substantial difference.

Mr. McFALL. Maybe this is asking the same question in a different way: Could an active duty Navy captain who has never had any prior experience with Reserve units take command of a newly established readiness command and do a satisfactory job?

Admiral HOBBS. Yes, sir. I had a regular Navy captain assigned to me as my chief of staff for ten months who came to the Reserve from Taiwan, never had been in the Reserve before, and I couldn't have asked for a better performance.

Mr. McFALL. Thank you.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Do you know, Admiral, if the Readiness Command commander positions in the new proposal would require Reserve experience prior to being assigned that position?

Admiral HOBBS. Please restate the question.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. If you were to be assigned as a captain, regular Navy, to Commander, Readiness Command, whatever one it is, must you have had prior Reserve experience under the Navy's program?

Admiral COLEMAN. Yes.

Admiral HOBBS. It would be desirable, sir.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Then it does say that maybe he couldn't perform the job without ever having any prior experience?

Admiral HOBBS. I could not accept that categorically, no. I would like to add, parenthetically here, that in suggesting that the regular Navy officer would be qualified at any level to come into the Reserve program and grasp the program and administer his responsibilities in a competent fashion in no way reflects upon those that have administered the Reserve in the past, and everybody on both the administrative management side as the TAR suggests or in the policy level.

Again, it is not a matter of quality where I am concerned as to the incumbent, whether he be regular or Reserve, much as this policy initiative here relates to the question of the structural relationship of the Reserve to the active forces.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Well, Admiral, I know the committee considers the Readiness Commands to be a key item in addressing the problem that Mr. Flynt talked about in that the surface reserve may not be interfacing with the active surface Navy. I think it is very important that we understand those Readiness Commands and how they are going to be handled under this new proposal.

In some cases you have active Navy captains as Readiness Commanders and in some cases you have gentlemen of your rank as Readiness Command commanders.

Tell me, do those active captains who have been assigned as Readiness Commanders to date have prior Reserve experience?

Admiral HOBBS. I am not in a position to testify to that. I just don't know.

Mr. McFALL. Admiral Seiberlich, do you know?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Of course, in addition to the regular captains there are also TAR captains that fill those billets.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. You have never assigned a non-TAR officer to one of those Readiness Command commander billets?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I believe we have, but I would have to verify that for the record. We can do that, if you would like.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. I think that would be helpful.
[The information follows:]

The Naval Reserve Readiness Commands (NRRC) were established in 1973. However, they were subordinate to the District Commandants and were not assigned to full management responsibility of the surface reserve program until 1 October 1976. At that time the NRRC's replaced the Commandants as the primary field manager of the Surface Reserve program reporting directly to Chief of Naval Reserve. Since 1 October 1976 no regular officers have been assigned as Readiness Commanders. These Readiness commands have been commanded by either an inactive Reserve Flag Officer (with a TAR Captain as deputy) or a TAR Captain. Historical data is not available on officers assigned to the NRRC's prior to 1 October 1976.

Admiral HOBBS. I would like to inject another comment: Historically, in the Naval Air Reserve program—and I am not sure it obtains today—certain of the air stations were commanded by regular Navy officers who in turn were responsible for the administration of the Reserve programs there; so there is a historical precedence here in that regard.

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Chappell?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the forthright approach you gentlemen have made in answering these questions.

Let me ask whether any of you have ever been TAR officers?

Admiral HOBBS. No, sir.

Admiral COLEMAN. No, sir.

CURRENT ASSIGNMENTS OF NAVY RESERVE FLAG OFFICERS

Mr. CHAPPELL. None of you has ever been a TAR officer, so you are not trying to testify from personal knowledge of how much time it would take one to come in as a TAR and be assigned and pick up his management duties, are you? You are not trying to testify from personal experience on that?

Admiral CRAWFORD. Personal experience, sir, with regard to observing people coming into billets.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let me ask this question: The three of you, I assume, are in the same capacity as some of us. You are Reserve officers now?

Admiral COLEMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Are you on active duty?

Admiral COLEMAN. I presume so.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You presume so. You either are or you aren't?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I have been told I am on active duty.

Admiral HOBBS. Yes, sir. I am on active duty as are others in the room.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are on active duty for training now?

Admiral HOBBS. I call it temporary.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are on temporary active duty?

Admiral HOBBS. Correct.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I am just trying to understand each of your assignments now. All three of you are on temporary active duty?

Admiral HOBBS. My present assignment is adviser to the Chief of Naval Reserve.

Admiral COLEMAN. Are you talking precisely about our appearance here?

Mr. CHAPPELL. I am talking about your status with the Navy now. What is your status with the Reserve?

Admiral COLEMAN. I am assigned to the Chief, Naval Reserve Support Unit.

Mr. CHAPPELL. On a temporary basis?

Admiral COLEMAN. That is our Reserve unit participation, it is with the Chief of Naval Reserve Support Unit. My mobilization happened to be Commander, Naval Base, Bremerton. Some of them have had other mobilization assignments. Our appearance here is on a temporary duty basis.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I am assigned in two capacities: One, I am assigned to the Chief of Naval Support Unit in a nonpay status. I am not paid for the time I give to the Navy in that billet.

Admiral HOBBS. Nor am I.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I am also Chairman of the Navy Reserve Policy Board, and I come on temporary active duty to perform those duties two weeks in June and sometimes two weeks in February.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are on one of those two-week tours now?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I am on nonpay today.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are nonpay, but each of you has specific billets which you are performing in the Reserve now? That is what I am getting at.

Admiral CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yours is Commanding Officer—

Admiral COLEMAN. My technical billet title right now is Personal Representative of the Chief of Naval Reserve, Surface Warfare. I have an additional responsibility on an ad hoc basis as his representative to the Naval Academy Information Program.

For the present year I have been the Senior Member of the Chief of Naval Reserve Policy Board.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Admiral Hobbs, your specific—

Admiral HOBBS. My mobilization assignment is Commander, Naval Base, Pearl Harbor.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are presently not assigned?

Admiral HOBBS. I am attached to the Chief of Naval Reserve in the support unit as an adviser, nonpay, but I receive orders to active duty periodically for various purposes insofar as my functions related to the Chief of Naval Reserves.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Admiral Crawford, let me get that straight again now.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I am attached to the Chief, Naval Reserve Support Unit, in a nonpay status. I am also serving as Chairman of the Naval Reserve Policy Board.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Are any of you representing organizations that have passed resolutions on this matter? You are all here in your own individual capacities?

Admiral CRAWFORD. That is true. I think we are probably members of most all these organizations.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I understand that. I am trying to understand whether you speak for an organization that passed a resolution on this or whether you are giving us your best advice as Reserve naval officers.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I am giving my best advice as a Reserve naval officer based upon the background I have in the Navy, as a

former national president of the Reserve Officers Association, as a former director of the Naval Reserve Association, and in various other capacities over the years leading up to those positions.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I commend you on it and I think it is good for the record to show the status of you gentlemen and the experience you have had. That is commendable. I am not trying to suggest that you be defensive about it at all; I just wanted to get that out on the record.

Admiral Coleman, you state that you haven't had any flag officer disagree. Are you acquainted with Rear Admiral Albright?

Admiral COLEMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Did you talk with him?

Mr. COLEMAN. He participated in the last Naval Flag Conference in New Orleans where the entire group was briefed by Admiral Seiberlich. The matter was discussed and many of the Admirals present voiced their questions, opinions or thoughts.

As I recall, Admiral Albright said not a word.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You wouldn't be surprised if you learned though that I hold a letter which he wrote me, disagreeing with this program?

Admiral COLEMAN. No, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. So your testimony was, you simply hadn't heard anybody state their disagreement?

Admiral COLEMAN. That testimony was, to my knowledge, there was no disagreement. I thought it was a predominant view of the entire group.

Mr. CHAPPELL. As a matter of information, would any of you be interested in coming back on active duty in a flag billet?

Admiral HOBBS. Sir, I retire the 21st day of March, 1978, three and a half months from now, mandatory retirement, so the answer is impossible.

Mr. CHAPPELL. How about you?

Admiral COLEMAN. You mean in this program?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes, sir.

Admiral COLEMAN. You are talking about in this program as proposed?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Well, let's take it either way.

Admiral COLEMAN. If the need requires, yes, I am prepared to go back on active duty.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Would you be interested in coming back into this new program?

Admiral COLEMAN. Yes, sir, I think so.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Admiral Crawford, I assume your answer would be the same?

Admiral CRAWFORD. No, sir; that is not a correct assumption. I am an attorney in the general practice of law and I have two associates. If I came back on active duty for a period of two years I would go back to no law practice. If it were a national emergency, I will come back nonpay anytime. I am sure you are aware of it, but I can no longer survive jumping in and out of law practice. I will not elaborate, but I have had a somewhat similar experience to that in the past and I am reaching the age where I cannot provide for my family by moving in and out.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are looking at one who has some of that experience.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I can understand it. I would like to. I am interested, very much so, but I can't see it is feasible unless there is a national emergency.

CURRENT NAVY AUTHORITY OVER RESERVE ASSIGNMENT

Mr. CHAPPELL. I think you stated it very accurately a few minutes ago when you said what we are all interested in is a better interface. That is the name of the game, that is what all of us are interested in, that is what you are interested in, what I am interested in, what I assume the leadership of the Navy is interested in.

What bothers me is I cannot quite understand how this new program is going to give us a better interface. Would any of you disagree with the thought expressed earlier that the Navy could cause this interface to be brought about right now if it took the initiative which Admiral Crawford is concerned about in providing top-notch Regular officers by assignment to the Reserve.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I am curious if they did that. First, I do not think they would be inclined to do that without the permission of this committee, but what would happen to the TAR officers in that instance?

Mr. CHAPPELL. That is, the program you are talking about does exactly what we are talking about. You mean if they did it now?

Admiral CRAWFORD. If they put the active duty officers in the billets managing the Reserve program, the top quality ones, they would replace TAR officers at this time. What would happen to the TAR officers?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Under the law they could be assigned just like any other officers.

Admiral CRAWFORD. Then why should they not be like any other officers?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Are they not still going to be Reservists? Is not this whole program dealing with the Reservists? They are still Reserve billets, as I understand it.

Admiral CRAWFORD. As I understood your question, it would implement the program by putting the high quality—

Mr. CHAPPELL. My question was—maybe I confused you by putting it in two parts. My question was, when we talk about interfacing, do you know of anything that would prevent the Navy right now, any law, rule or policy that would prevent the Navy from interfacing with the Reserve its top-notch, top five-percent officers, as it assigns in other responsibilities?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I think it would be terribly unfair to the TAR officers to leave them as TAR officers and take their billets away from them.

Mr. CHAPPELL. My point is, there is nothing to prevent that?

Admiral CRAWFORD. Good judgment.

Admiral HOBBS. Would not the TARs have to be transferred to other assignments?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Of course. I said interface with them.

We have all agreed, is not the Chief of Naval Reserve a regular officer?

Admiral HOBBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. So he is part of the interface. Assuming he was assigned because he was in the top five percent of available persons for assignment, would that not be expected in good management?

Admiral HOBBS. Sir, I have a little trouble. Certainly again I do not think quality is basic to the issue of whether it be TARs or Regulars. I would not be sitting here today if I had not enjoyed pretty good relationships with some very top-quality TARs, many of whom are very close friends of mine. I do not consider that the issue, although I would certainly have to observe that the Navy is not run by just five or ten percent, it is the whole package that runs the Navy.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I understand. When one is chosen for command, is it not pretty much the policy to select those people who are in the top five percent?

Admiral COLEMAN. I certainly hope so.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Is that not generally the policy?

Admiral HOBBS. I do not know of any written policy to that effect.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I know that, but that is just good judgment and common sense.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I would think you would take your best qualified officers and select them for command.

Mr. CHAPPELL. What we must be saying is that under the present circumstances the best Regular Navy officers are not assigned to interface with the Reserve. Following up, what I believe you said, Admiral Crawford, is to make certain that in the future we do insist that those people who come into this program come in under career-enhancing circumstances.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I do not mean to be misunderstood on that point.

The program today is primarily managed by the TAR officers. The proposal is to replace the TAR officers with the active officers over a period of 15 years.

Mr. CHAPPELL. The total program by regular officers?

Admiral CRAWFORD. At the end of 15 years the Reserve program would be managed 90 percent, as I understand Admiral Seiberlich's testimony, by active officers and 10 percent by Reserves called back up to 4 years on active duty.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That is right, I understand that. But if there is really no difference between—and I do not know, maybe you are saying that the TAR officer today is different—there is an implication that he is inferior to his regular counterpart.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I do not mean to give that impression at all.

Admiral HOBBS. No, sir, I am definitely not implying that at all.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yet you seem to indicate that the management, that there is something wrong now with the management of the Reserve program. Are you saying that the Reserve Officer has the capacity and the ability and the only reason he cannot manage it as well as the regular is that he has not had certain sea duty assignments and so forth?

Admiral CRAWFORD. Sir, I think you have a gentleman back here, Admiral Rohrer, who has probably as much sea duty as anybody in the room. I do not think that is what we are trying to put across.

One of the inferences I wanted to suggest to the committee is, the TAR officer is not the same as an active duty officer because he can only go so far.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are talking about commander and above?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I am talking about—we have two rear Admiral TARs on active duty at this time.

Mr. CHAPPELL. And what are—

Admiral CRAWFORD. We have no vice admirals, no four-star admirals.

I think it is very important for the top management of the Navy to be knowledgeable of the Naval Reserve and by interfacing at the lower ranges they will become knowledgeable of the Naval Reserve, and I think it will be a strengthening process for the Active Navy as well as for the Reserve.

RETENTION OF ENLISTED TAR PROGRAM

Mr. CHAPPELL. Is interfacing not important in the enlisted program?

Admiral CRAWFORD. Absolutely, and I hope that nothing will happen—

Mr. CHAPPELL. Then why did the recommendation, if you know, why did it not cover the phasing out of the enlisted TARs?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I think we have an entirely different situation there. The enlisted personnel, as great as they are, are not in line to be Chief of Naval Operations or to hold the top management jobs in the Navy.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That is not really the purpose of this, to give TARs an opportunity to be Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral CRAWFORD. No, sir, I do not think it is, but it is a difference between TARs and the Active Navy officers.

Mr. CHAPPELL. The whole thrust that I have heard is that the Regular Navy does not understand the Reserves, the Reserves do not understand, as well as they might, the Regular Navy and therefore you need to interface them.

It seems to me this would be extremely important with that chief, with the others who are working with Reserves all the time, that they have that fleet experience too, with the most modern engines, modern procedures on board ship, all of these things. It seems to me if it is a matter of understanding, if that is what we are getting at, it is equally important for enlisted personnel, because they far outnumber the officers.

Admiral CRAWFORD. I think there is interfacing in several of our programs. The testimony as I understand it, my recollection, about 80 percent of those enlisted TARs are in the air program. They are interfacing constantly.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Is that not true in the officer program too?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I do not think it is 80 percent.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Pretty high, is it not?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I do not know what the figures are.

Mr. CHAPPELL. We have all agreed that the Reserve Air program is top-notch. As Admiral Seiberlich stated to me many times, you cannot tell one unit from another.

I still do not understand, if we have done such a good job there, if this program has worked so well there, why does it not work at the present time with your fleet units? Is it purely, as Mr. Flynt suggested, that the Navy has not come forth and asked that there be certain equipment available for the Reserve?

Admiral COLEMAN. As far as training of enlisted personnel, talking only now to the surface program, I think the key, in the Reserve centers around the country, predominant number of TAR enlisted personnel are clerical ratings. I can honestly say where we have fleet personnel assigned, USN petty officers assigned, they in fact do impart better training because of their knowledge. Some of these ratings are critically short. It is pretty hard to find a gunner's mate any place even in our Regular Navy, but we do have a mix in enlisted personnel assigned right now of both TAR and active duty, but again, in the Reserve centers most of the enlisted personnel who are TARs are clerical ratings. They handle the paper work.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You tell me what it is, but how do you remedy it? Is this new program going to remedy that problem?

Admiral COLEMAN. I hope so.

RESERVE READINESS REQUIREMENTS

Mr. CHAPPELL. How will it do it? That is what I do not understand. If it is not going to increase ships and training facilities, which could be increased now if that were the problem, how is this going to improve that fleet Reserve unit? How does this program alone do that? I just cannot follow that through.

Admiral HOBBS. I certainly think that the availability of hardware both in the air and surface units, and facilities, bears heavily upon what is going to be available to the Reserve for its requirements outside the active force. I think we have to have, where aircraft are concerned,—this committee knows far better than I just how easy the money comes for any program, whether it be active force or Reserve.

We are experiencing and have for some time in the Reserve, as I am sure in the active forces, insufficient hardware to meet our requirements. So therefore, we get into the question of sharing facilities, sharing training and aircraft in case of the air program; P-3s were a good example of that. But again, the ultimate user, the fleet user, in my judgment until then has responsibility for all aspects of this in the sense that the participants, the people that are in the program, have an empathy for the requirements and needs of the ultimate user, I think we are still going to always have the question raised: "Well, can they hack it if we call them to active duty?"

I think that question mark still exists because the Reserve is not in the system.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I see the point you make and I think it is a good point, but it still does not get down to giving—this program alone does not make the changes necessary to do that. Those are other changes that would have to be made and could be made now.

You know we in the Congress provided the money in fiscal year 1974 to provide ship operational trainers for ship simulation training of surface Reserve units and the Regular Navy diverted that money. Now what is going to keep them from diverting it in the future, even if this system itself exists?

Admiral COLEMAN. I do not believe—

Admiral HOBBS. That may not be totally accurate.

Admiral COLEMAN. I am not sure that statement is totally accurate.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Tell us what is inaccurate.

Admiral COLEMAN. I do not know. I commanded Naval Reserve Readiness Command in Denver at that time, one of the first ship operational trainers was to be there, and we tore down and built back and tore down and built back and it was not a shortage of funds or a redirection of the money; I think it was basic decisions by the personnel involved in making those decisions, to the best of my knowledge, between 9th Naval District and Naval Reserve Headquarters in New Orleans. It was not a matter of funding.

Mr. CHAPPELL. My information is that it was diverted. Whether it was or whether it was not, it could be done and has not been done, as you and I very well know.

MANAGEMENT OF THE RESERVES

There are some 65,000 or 70,000 officer billets in the entire Navy. The Reserve program billets number only 1800. That is between two and four percent of the whole Navy, is it not?

Admiral HOBBS. That is right.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That is what we are talking about. Is that the problem we are dealing with, two to four percent of our naval officers? That is the problem we are working with here is it not?

Do you gentlemen believe that the regular Navy, by simply interfacing, is going to cause the regular officers to fight as hard for Reserve programs as the Reserve leadership itself would fight for the programs?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I would like to answer that, if I may.

In my experience I have never seen an active Naval officer come in and take command of a Reserve activity that did not perform magnificently and did not carry out the objectives of the command.

Admiral Alex Jackson is a beautiful example of that and I am totally confident that once the active officers come into association with the Reserve and a Reserve billet, that we are going to find the same spectacular performance as we have had with the TARs. There is no question in my mind about that.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Do all of you share that same feeling?

Admiral HOBBS. I do not think there would be any change in terms of sponsorship—

Mr. CHAPPELL. What you are saying is that you are still going to have a Reserve organization and it is going to be manned by regular Navy people, with an emphasis on Reservists. That is what you are saying, is it not, that is the bottom line; is that not about right?

Admiral CRAWFORD. I think I would prefer to substitute the word "management" for "manned," because I think many of the Reserve positions will still continue to be manned by Reservists, commanding officers of the units, of the Readiness Command, but I think the management coming from full-time active duty would then come from the active officers.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I see our good friend Admiral Fine over here. He has just been sitting quietly, nobody has even asked him a question. I hate to see him left completely out.

Admiral FINE. I am sorry you said that.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I wonder if I might ask Admiral Fine a question. Would you submit to questions?

Admiral FINE. Oh, yes, sir, that is why I am here . . . to support the Navy witnesses.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Admiral, I would like to ask your personal and professional opinion, as a U.S. flag officer, how do you feel about this phaseout of the TARs? Understand, I said your personal and professional opinion.

Admiral FINE. I understand. Let me go into a little history if I might.

I relieved a TAR officer as executive officer on an active fleet destroyer, so there was interchange between Reserve officers and Regular Navy officers at that time. At the time he left he went off to another active fleet billet. I did the same thing on a destroyer as a commanding officer. I relieved a TAR officer as commanding officer on a destroyer, just before we deployed to Vietnam.

So in my contact with TAR officers at the junior commander and below level, it was my perception that they were interchanging with the active duty USN officer.

As far as the program being proposed, I think I have to agree with my colleagues here that ultimately it is going to depend on who mans it, the quality of people that man it, and their perception as to what they are going to get out of it career-wise. I do not have qualms that the many years required for experience would really make the officer better or worse. I think the ability to perform is going to be one that is going to have to come from his inherent ability to perform as a naval officer, not necessarily due either to a longer or shorter period of being with the Reserve force.

I have to come down on the side that says "I hate to see a Navy divided up" . . . that there are enough Navy communities now who are sort of at each other's throats and try to enhance their positions at the expense of another community; that the fewer of those communities we have the better; that if the Navy's dedication is such that they are quite willing to man the Reserve management with active duty officers who are really interested in doing a good job and who really recognize this is part of a career pattern, it is going to be for the good. There will be that much less division within the Navy.

How it will work I do not know. We are talking about something that 15 years from now we may say, in retrospect, this was the best decision we ever made . . . or the worst. Whether in fact the results we are predicting now will come out of it, and whether we are really going to work to make that result come true—well, if we

wave a magic wand and ignore the implementation, obviously our predictions of being better off are not going to come true.

If we work at it, try to fulfill the predictions that we are making that it will be a better program because of this, then our predictions will come true. It probably will be something that will be beneficial to the Navy in the long run, mainly because it is one less division of community, one less perception of difference within the Navy.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Then you favor the phaseout?

Admiral FINE. Yes, sir, I would.

Mr CHAPPELL. You put a lot of ifs in there.

Admiral FINE. Of course, any of these management improvements involve "ifs."

Mr. CHAPPELL. With all of those ifs—how can we rid ourselves most certainly of those ifs? All of us agree that if the Navy today puts the emphasis on the interface, it could do so; I do not see any reason why it could not do so. It is the career enhancement that is the real key, is that not it?

Admiral FINE. Put it this way: What the Navy has done now is, study it. The perception of the Navy leadership based on these studies is, that this is one direction to go to improve the interface between the Active and Reserve forces.

I look at this as a commitment of the Navy leadership to in fact make the predictions come true. In effect they are being asked to "put up or shut up." Having proposed this, having supported it, coming to Congress, asking the congressional committee to approve the change, in effect committing the Navy to back this change, there has to be the dedication to make it work.

If in fact this committee turned change down and said "Keep doing it the way you were doing it," I do not think the motivation would be there to make the management of the Reserve program work better than there would be if the committee said "Go ahead and we are going to watch you and make sure you make it work correctly." It is sort of quid pro quo; the Navy said they are going to do it, "But let us reorganize this way" . . . at the same time committing themselves to make it work better.

Mr. CHAPPELL. The TAR, as I understand him up to this point, has been a specialist in reserve matters; is that not the best way to describe him? He has been a naval officer in every other respect, but he has a specialty in Reserve matters, is that not pretty much a fair statement?

Admiral FINE. I would say at the most senior level, yes. As I understand it, for commander and below, my perception was that they were the same as I was.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I am talking about commander and above, they are essentially the same officers, plus the fact that they are now specialists in the management of the Reserve program. Would you disagree with that?

Admiral FINE. I would have to agree with that. That is obviously why they are on active duty.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Do you think this plan to do away with TAR specialists as such in the Reserve program is not going to hurt the program? Or do you think that, if by doing this regular officers enhance their own career, you would have specialization by reason

of the best-qualified people coming into management of the reserves?

Admiral FINE. I would say we broaden the specialization that way. I think the intention of what is being proposed ultimately has to be looked at from that point of view, that there would in fact at the various levels be a broadening of that specialization albeit the depth of experience may not be there.

The trade-off of the depth of experience we see in the TAR officers now would be traded off against a breadth of experience with more officers having experience in the Reserve program and recognizing it as part of their career. That is the trade-off; how much experience one needs.

I am a classic example of a specialist who got in financial management way late in his career, part of it motivated by this committee, I might add, but that is a separate issue. No question—

Mr. CHAPPELL. We recognize you as the best, too.

Admiral FINE. Whether I am or not, I ended up here. Through the rank of commander I had no financial management experience in the Department of Navy. There are a great many people in the supply corps who are specialized in financial management. If one is going to look at the depth of this experience they have, it far surpasses anything I have. There is a question though as to whether that depth of experience, but nevertheless a narrower depth or rather a narrower width, is perhaps worth counterbalancing by more of a breadth of experience across operational experience, across line functions, but with perhaps less depth in the knowledge of financial management.

The question can always be argued. Maybe a supply officer would do a better job here than a line officer. There is no way of even coming to grips with that trade-off issue.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Admiral for a very fine statement and these other gentlemen for fine statements. That is all I have.

Mr. FLYNT. I think at this point we will break for lunch, and we will reconvene at 2:00 o'clock. In the afternoon session we will take up the Reserve organizations and those who will appear in opposition to the phaseout of the TAR program.

AFTERNOON SESSION

RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED TO THE TAR PHASEOUT PROPOSAL

Mr. FLYNT. The committee will come to order.

The committee will now hear testimony from some of the reserve organizations and individuals who have expressed an interest in speaking in opposition to the Navy proposal relating to the TAR phaseout.

Included in this group are Rear Admiral John B. Johnson, USNR of the Reserve Officers Association; Captain Fred D. Carl, USNR, President of the Naval Reserve Association, Master Chief Petty Officer George Lange from the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association, Rear Admiral Alexander Johnson, United States Navy, Retired, who has been associated with the TAR program since its inception after World War II, and we have Captain Bell and Rear Admiral Forrest.

Admiral Johnson, would you please lead off this phase of the hearing? I believe it would be best if you desire to submit your statement for the printed record and then summarize it, or if you want to, deliver it in its entirety. The format will be entirely your decision.

We welcome you and your colleagues and associates to this hearing.

Without objection, your statement in its entirety will be included in the record at this point, and you may proceed in any manner that you desire.

[The information referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JOHN B. JOHNSON, USNR RET., DIRECTOR, NAVAL AFFAIRS, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE REGARDING THE TAR PROGRAM OF THE NAVAL RESERVE 7 DECEMBER 1977.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is a privilege to appear before you today to voice the concern of the 107,000 members of the Reserve Officers Association over the possible loss to Navy's Reserve Forces of the Officer TAR program. ROA's Congressional Charter compels this organization to work for a strong National Defense, and since the proposed elimination of the present Reserve management system that has been proved successful over 24 years could result in deterioration of Readiness of the Naval Reserve, we appreciate the opportunity to express our strong opposition to such action.

This subcommittee has been asked, by letter and testimony, to support a Navy plan to phase out the officer TAR program and replace it with officers from the Regular Navy and from the Inactive duty Reserve. The stated reasoning behind this proposal is that it will be a step toward improved manpower management and that it will bring the Regular and Reserve forces closer together. Before commenting on this rationale, I would like to state, briefly, the reasons that ROA supports the current officer TAR program.

1) It is well established in law, which directs assignment of Reserve officers to headquarters staffs for Reserve administration and provides authority for their retention on active duty, rotation to sea duty, and promotion security. (Title 10, US Code 265, 672, 678, 715).

2) It provides continuity in the Reserve Program. Repeated shore duty tours in Reserve Program billets produce expertise.

3) TARs understand Reservists and their peculiar problems; they are Reservists, and are working in this program because they want to.

4) It provides opportunity for better understanding of Reservists by Regular officers. Traditionally, the highest Reserve Program Staff positions are held by Regular officers who have TARs as Deputies or vice versa. Thus Regular officers are provided a continuity of expertise so that their relatively short tours of duty may be productive earlier.

5) TAR officers are extra numbers in grade—that is they do not count against grade limitations of active duty officers (Title 10, US Code 5446, 5504). Their continuation is provided for in proposed DOPMA legislation.

Mr. Chairman, you have been told that improved management would result from this program. It is our understanding that good business management begins with defining the objective, providing the manpower, training, and equipment to achieve the objective, and then assuring that the most expert managers are available to work these ingredients into a successful product. ROA believes that Reserve Forces are big business, and to us it appears prudent to retain top experienced managers rather than to rotate new, inexperienced ones through the jobs every two to four years.

We do not say that there is magic about TARs; and certainly nothing at all is wrong with capable, dedicated, interested Regular Navy or recalled inactive Reserve officers doing the job being done by TARS. The problem arises from historical evidence that many of the Regular Navy officers who have served in this program in past years have not been of the high caliber required. Those who have commanded the program have been superb; of those who have replaced TARs on Sea duty rotation, some have been splendid, but many have been what was "left over" after active Navy billets have been filled—those seeking twilight tours and others whose careers could no longer be damaged by a Reserve tour. We have been assured that this will not happen. However, recently a Regular Navy officer 8 times passed over for promotion has been assigned to be Commanding Officer of the Naval Reserve Center, Gadsden, Alabama, his home town.

Even for the very finest, however, it is nearly impossible to be suddenly thrust into the mysterious Reserve world, learn all about the problems and peculiarities of citizen-sailor administration and still be effective in less than many months—especially if the job is not considered career-enhancing.

How can you legislate or dictate quality, motivation, and understanding? The current Secretary of the Navy and his top military managers earnestly want it to work and, we believe, would honestly attempt this impossible task. But in true Navy tradition, "the watch changes" frequently.

Mr. Chairman, ROA has recently been in communication with the Readiness Regions which comprise the Naval Reserve Surface drilling program, the largest and most problem-beset portion of the Navy Selected Reserve. As might be expected, the TAR population, officer and enlisted, overwhelmingly supports retaining the officer TAR management system. But a testing of the Selected Reserves themselves has given strong evidence that the great majority want TARs retained and are fearful of both questionable quality and non-availability of Regular officers. Seeing one third of the Reserve Center Commanding Officer billets in one Readiness Region standing vacant, Reservists need strong convincing that billets which cannot now be filled by Regular Navy officers could fare much better in the difficult times ahead.

Mr. Chairman, ROA recently learned that the two very important management staffs of the Chief of Naval Reserve in New Orleans and in the Pentagon, under the new plan, will be composed nearly equally of Regular Navy officers and recalled Selected Reservists (265 officers). Where, we must ask, will be the continuity, the expertise in Reserve programming matters? Each billet will be filled by fine, carefully selected officers—but most of whom have never had a day's experience in Reserve management!

Mr. Chairman, the ROA is skeptical. Not about the phase-out program for TARs; this appears feasible and very fair. Not even about the earnest intent of the Navy Department to furnish adequate and high quality Regular and recalled Inactive officers to replace the TARs. We honor this intent. But we are skeptical of Navy's capability of detailing top notch Regular officers for a thousand Reserve billets when 150 such billets now slated to be filled by USN officers, have lain empty for a long period and when important Regular Navy billets are similarly empty. Would it not be reasonable for Navy to prove to its Reserve Forces and to the Congress that it can fulfill the modest manpower requirements of the TAR program before abandoning that program in favor of one with much higher requirements?

In conclusion, the position of ROA is that it simply does not make good sense to destroy a successful program, the envy of other Services, until some positive evidence can be presented that an improvement is guaranteed.

We therefore, Mr. Chairman, respectfully urge that the Navy's Officer TAR Program not be disestablished at this time; that in order to relieve the growing turmoil over this issue within the Reserve population they be given assurance that the TARs will remain; and that strong effort be made by the Navy Department to fill existing Regular Navy billet vacancies within the Reserve program before any further consideration is given to multiplying these vacancies by TAR elimination.

BIOGRAPHY

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN B. JOHNSON, USNR RET.

John Bell Johnson was born in Santa Ana, California and attended Hollywood High and Redlands University prior to entering the Navy in September 1941. As an Aviation Cadet, he completed flight training in Corpus Christi, Texas in 1942 and was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet aboard the aircraft carrier USS Card. He later transferred to Fighting Squadron Thirteen aboard USS Franklin and remained with that squadron in Pacific Fleet combat until November 1945. He returned to inactive

duty in 1946 and was active in the Naval Reserve. In 1948, he returned to active duty with the Reserve Training Command in Seattle, Washington. Since then, as a TAR officer, he served as Air officer on the attack Carrier USS Valley Forge in Korean operations, Training officer at Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas, Staff officer with both Air and Surface Reserve Training Commands, and in various Washington assignments in offices of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Chief of Naval Operations, and in the office of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, he served as Director of the International Staff of the Inter American Defense Board. RADM Johnson retired from the Navy on 1 January 1975 and now serves as Director of Naval Affairs, Reserve Officers Association. In addition to various campaign ribbons, he has been awarded the Legion of Merit with gold star, Distinguished Flying Cross with gold star, the Air Medal with gold star, Meritorious Service Medal, Presidential and Navy unit Commendations, and Purple Heart.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JOHN B. JOHNSON, USNR
(RET.)

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a privilege to appear before you today. I should like to, in the essence of timesaving, submit my prepared statement for the record. I would like to point up two or three things and then make a couple of comments and be ready for any questions.

It is particularly a privilege to be able to be here today to speak on behalf of retaining the TAR program. I spent 27 years as a TAR officer, both at sea and ashore, and it has been my privilege to be associated with that program which I strongly believe is the way to proceed for training and administration of the Naval Reserve.

From my prepared statement two or three excerpts I would like to point out.

One is that in view of some of the comments that were made this morning, I would like to reestablish the fact that it is law which directs the assignment of Reserve officers to headquarters staff for Reserve administration, and provides authority for their retention on active duty, rotation to sea duty and promotion security. That, of course, is in Title X, U.S.Code 265, 672, 678 and 715. It sounds a little detailed, but I think in view of some of the comments this morning regarding TARs going to sea, it might be pertinent, sir.

One point which may have been overlooked this morning which I would like to address is the fact that the utilization of TAR officers provides a continuity that we in ROA fear will be lost if Navy resorts to the system of having four year and even two year tours by regular officers and by 265 officers recalled from inactive duty.

One point was not raised this morning, and I think it is extremely important, is the fact that TARs *are* reservists. It was brought out by one of the inactive duty reserve flag officers that TARs are considered as being Reserve officers, but I think this is often misunderstood. The fact that they *are* reservists allows them to communicate with, to understand and to bring out, in my view, after 27 years in this business, the best performance of the drilling Reserve officers. They know what these fellows' actual problems are. They are not in the regular Navy and cannot be commanded to do certain things in the same fashion as regular officers.

They require different ways of management, and it is in this sort of expertise where I think the TARs are so urgently required.

Mr. Chairman, you have been told that improved management would result from Navy's proposed program. It is our understanding

that good business management begins with defining the objective, providing the manpower, training and equipment to achieve that objective, and then assuring that the most expert managers are available to put all of these things together and come out with a winning product.

ROA believes that the Reserve forces are big business, and to us it appears prudent to retain the top experienced management rather than to rotate new, inexperienced ones through the jobs every two or four years.

It was inferred, if not stated this morning, that the Reserve population, the Selected Reserve population, is in accord with this movement to remove the TARs and to replace them by regular Navy officers. ROA made a more than cursory survey recently of 16 of the readiness commands, and we can say that overwhelmingly the Selected Reserve population deplores the possibility of the TAR officers leaving, and I can say this unequivocally having checked with the readiness commands which represent the most problem-beset part of the Naval Reserve.

It is difficult, sir, when the Reserve population is told, in connection with this proposed program, or as Admiral Seiberlich mentioned this morning, that it is not planned to gap any of the reserve training center billets. Since there is only one commanding officer he must be there, and I think this is an admirable intent, but when the reservists in one readiness region alone see 10 of these commanding officer billets empty right now, it is difficult to convince them that some great magic is suddenly going to happen and these billets will be filled by top-notch regular Navy officers.

Secretary Hidalgo this morning mentioned that there is no way that we can motivate current regular officers to want to affiliate with the reserve program. This again, Mr. Chairman, is very understandable. It is not a career enhancing job.

Mr. Chappell, this morning, I thought very prudently, and certainly in beautiful fashion, pointed up the fact that right this minute the Secretary of the Navy can "make it so", as we say in the Navy. He can make these billets by edict and by performance career-enhancing billets if he wants to. He has not chosen to do this, and it is difficult again to convince the selected reservist or the TARs or the regular Navy officers that suddenly, by some magic or legerdemain, this is going to happen.

Certainly ROA does not question the intent of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Seiberlich or any of the officers involved in this plan, but as we say, "the watch changes", and it is awfully difficult to accept this as a substantial program.

In our belief, having a mix, as is proposed, at the headquarters of the Chief of Naval Reserve, Admiral Charbonnet is dangerous. It is proposed that he will have a mix of about half regular Navy officers and about half 265 officers, and it is hard for us to see where any kind of continuity can be derived from this kind of transitory mix.

Mr. Chairman, we believe and we respectfully urge that the Navy's officer program, TAR officer program, not be disestablished at this time. We believe that something is needed to relieve the growing turmoil over this issue, and it does exist within the reserve population, sir.

The requirement for stability was brought out by Secretary Hidalgo as a very necessary thing to this reserve program, which has had such strife and turmoil over size, shape and management. We believe that to add to this already overwhelming burden of turmoil and trauma, to remove the TARs and go to a brand new, untried system, virtually untried, is just too much and very dangerous.

We believe that assurance should be given to the Reserve population that this is not going to happen now. Our belief is that strong effort should be made by the Navy Department to fill the existing regular Navy billets. I have heard different numbers—Some say 150, some say 200, that have lain empty now for several months. If Navy could show that they could even fill those properly, and prove to the Reserve community that this could happen, which could be done right this minute, and which is not being done, we believe this should happen before Navy ever considers throwing out a tried and proved program for one that is right now merely a concept in our way of thinking.

That is all I have as a statement, sir. I will be very happy to try to answer any questions.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ALEXANDER JACKSON, USN
(RET.)

Mr. FLYNT. Admiral Jackson, do you want to make a statement at this time?

Admiral JACKSON. If I am permitted to do so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FLYNT. You certainly may, and then we will ask questions of all of you after each of the statements have been made.

Admiral JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I did not bring a prepared statement. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you because I think that this new plan is in error. I regret to have to do that because I am a retired Rear Admiral in the regular Navy. I am a Naval Academy graduate, and I cannot be accused of coming over here and making any self-serving statements.

I served as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Personnel from 1954 until 1959, and during this time we established the Navy Selected Reserve. We established the Naval Reserve Training Command at Omaha, and we implemented the TAR program.

We implemented the TAR program because it was essential that we do so. We were using what you might call 265 officers. We called them CAD officers at the time. We did not have enough regular officers to cover the entire spectrum of Naval Reserve requirements so Admiral Johnson here did the staff work under my policy direction and we established the TAR program in 1955, and it has served the Naval Reserves successfully now for 23 years.

There are impediments in the way of establishing this new program. If it is to be an all regular program, then young regular officers are going to have to be moved into it at an early age. I am not here to denigrate regular officers because I am one of them. They are fine people. They will do whatever you ask them to do and will try to do their best, but when you move young officers into this program, the training, administration and support of the Naval

Reserve, altogether you are moving them out of the areas in which they can best qualify for selection when they get up to the higher grades.

It is important for them to have career opportunities which will lead to their ultimate selection of flag rank. They are intelligent. They know this, and they will avoid trying to get into the program at early ages.

The Secretary of the Navy cannot act as a detailee. The Chief of Naval Operations cannot act as a detailee. The detailing officers will do it and they will be besieged by regulars to give them better jobs elsewhere in their view.

I would like to point out some other things that might happen to the regulars if this goes through and 265 officers are brought into the program to replace what are now TARs.

In the first place, 265 officers can only be brought in to serve on staffs at the seat of the government and on major staffs in the Reserve program. They are not brought in for the purpose of training and administering, recruiting and organizing the Naval Reserve program, and they are not extra numbers in grade. If you bring in 70 captains from the Naval Selected Reserve, when they come in they are no longer Selected Reservists. They are Reservists on active duty and they have to go on the lineal list and they take 90 billets away from the regulars. If you bring in 300 commanders, again the 265 officers are on the lineal list. They compete with the regular Navy, and they again stultify promotion for the regulars.

If you bring a flag officer on active duty in the 265 program, he occupies a regular Navy flag billet and thus injures the promotion opportunity for deserving captains in the regular Navy. This is how it affects the regular Navy.

Now let me tell you our experience with the 265 people and the CADs in my time. They bring them on. Why would these people be willing to come on active duty for a limited period of four years? Why would they want to leave their civilian employment where presumably they are successful, and we certainly don't want the ones that are not successful, give up their jobs, ruin their civilian careers, and come on active duty in the Navy for four years?

Well, the reason they do it is because they want to make a career of it and they spend two years trying to find out what their jobs are and then two more years trying to hang on.

They also get on the lineal list. They come up for promotion. They compete with regulars, and they cannot compete with regulars because they do not have the experience and the background, so they get passed over.

It's cruel treatment and we suffered through that, and this is the reason we established the TAR program which was a program wherein the Reserves that were used to supplement and advise and help the regular Navy run the program had careers of their own, were independent of worry over insecurity, and knew that their objective was to do a good job for the Naval Reserve program as well as a good job at sea.

I talked to the Secretary of the Navy and I talked to Dr. Rostker. I talked to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Matters, and I couldn't find out why they are doing this. All I was told was that it was a part of the total force concept.

Well, the total force concept includes TARs. They are as much a part of the total force as regulars are. They are authorized by you, the Congress, in law, Title X, U.S. Code Section 672, so why shouldn't they be included in the total force concept and do their share of training reservists. In my time I relied on those people. They have the expertise and the techniques that are needed.

Now it has also been said that they are running the program. They are not. It is the only service where they are not. The Chief of Naval Reserve is a regular Navy Vice Admiral. His two assistants down in New Orleans are regular Navy Rear Admirals, and the regular Navy are in command positions all the way through this program so the Reserves are getting acquainted with the regulars, and the regulars are getting acquainted with the Reserves.

Now I want to make the point about extra numbers in grade. These TAR officers are extra numbers in grade. They are the only ones who are. They also are in excess of the active duty strength limitation. They are the only ones who are. If they go, there is going to be a loss in the active duty force, both in numbers and in grades. The law right now won't permit the Navy to expand to offset those numbers.

Now the Secretary in his letter to you said they would have to go to DOPMA and change it. Well, a program is being offered here which does not have an adequate legislative background.

I think the Navy has the best program they can possibly have with the regulars in command, in key positions, with the TARs there to help them and to advise them, and they should make it go and stop changing.

In my view, and I am very sorry to have to say that, I think this program is an ill-advised plan. It is clothed with some deceptive rhetoric. It hasn't really been thought through and is of doubtful legislative authority. I think it should be rejected.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FLYNT. Thank you, Admiral Jackson.

Admiral Forrest?

Admiral FORREST. Captain Carl will speak first.

Captain CARL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have a summarized version of the statement I submitted to you in advance and I would like to review parts of it now and request that it be included.

Mr. FLYNT. Without objection the statement will be included in the record at this point in its entirety. We will also include his biographical sketch.

[The information referred to follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF CAPTAIN FRED D. CARL, USNR (RET.)

Captain Carl is the President of the Naval Reserve Association, elected in October 1977.

Captain Carl is a native of Washington, D.C. where he was born 16 June 1920. He received a B.A. degree from American University in 1947 and has received graduate study at George Washington University, Catholic University, Howard University, Springfield College & George Williams, College.

Listed among academic honors—

(1) Who's Who among students in American Universities and Colleges.

- (2) Recipient of the American University's "Bruce Hughes Prize," awarded in . . . recognition of meritorious service" - 1947
- (3) Pi Delta Epsilon, the national honorary journalistic fraternity
- (4) Recipient of the Interfraternity Award as the "Fraternity man who had contributed the most toward the Welfare of the American University."

Civilian Employment

Since March 1975, Executive Director Armed Services Department, National Board of YMCA's of the United States—Direct Administration of 26 Armed Services "Y" Branches in the United States.

Military Service

Enlisted in the Navy in 1942, Commissioned an Ensign, December 1943. Served on Destroyers and support ships in the Pacific Theater (Okinawa and Iwo Jima) and later in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Has participated in the Selected Reserve in many billets in the Surface Reserve and in Recruiting and Retention Programs. Captain Carl retired in June 1976.

Community Activities

- President—Organizational Services
 - Member, American University Alumni Association (Past Class President)
 - Member or past member: Board of Governors, USO; National Council of the YMCAs of the U.S.; Rotary International; Lions; Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade; and many others.
 - Delegate to 1971 White House Conference on Aging
 - Delegate to and member, Planning Committee, 1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth
- Captain Carl is married to the former Murial M. Hodges and has 2 daughters, Cheryl and Sandra both of whom are married. Captain & Mrs. Carl reside at 80 Cannon Road in Berkeley Heights, New Jersey.

STATEMENT BY CAPTAIN FRED D. CARL, US NAVAL RESERVE (RET), PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee—as the recently elected president of the Naval Reserve Association (NRA) I thank you for this opportunity to express the position of the NRA concerning the Navy proposal to eliminate the training and administration of the reserves (TAR) officer program. Although I only recently was elected as president of NRA, I have followed very closely all the events leading up to this Navy proposal concerning TARS. I might say that I agree 100% with the position taken by the previous executive board of NRA. The association was the first to go on record strongly opposing the plan to dump the TAR program (it included both officer and enlisted when first proposed). Over the past eleven months the NRA position has been affirmed three times at our executive committee meetings and, in addition, the recent annual conference affirmed our previous position. During the past eleven months, I have become increasingly convinced that the Navy Plan is not feasible and a "Try Before You Buy" approach is not only feasible but mandatory. In the light of past history, not only in the Navy but in all reserve components, we believe it would be ill-advised to make the change without retaining a back up system. Who knows what will happen to the Navy Reserve when the present leadership leaves the scene.

If the Navy proposal is allowed by the Congress it could very well set the pattern for all the other services who are watching this action very carefully. If Navy is successful in its move to replace reserve officers in the reserve program billets with regular officers, the precedent will undoubtedly set the wheels in motion to do the same thing in the Army and the Air Force Reserves. If this occurs, the safeguards so carefully considered by the Congress and codified into Title 10 U.S. code, by the recently enacted reserve Bill of rights, will largely be nullified. We are specifically addressing the congressional concept of reserve management of reservists.

Let's briefly review the Genesis and history of the TAR Program.

—Prior to World War II, back in the mid 30's, the Naval Reserve was administered by naval reservists on continuous active duty, obviously called CADS.

—The new programs to administer the Reserves with regular Navy did not work satisfactorily.

—After World War II the NR was reactivated on a much larger scope as an integral part of the regular Navy to be administered by the regular Navy.

—In 1953, (after determining that the program of regulars managing reserves was a failure) Vice Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., Chief of Naval Personnel, a very distinguished and most intelligent Naval officer, established the TAR program. In the establishing directive the following statements or provisions were made:

—Adequate personnel to implement the enlarged Naval Reserve Program could not be provided by the regular establishment.

—Congressional intent to retain reservists on active duty for this purpose (reserve administration) is evident.

—In order that the entire level of naval reserve training may reflect the latest fleet practices . . . TAR officers will be rotated periodically to tours of duty with the operating forces.

In the implementation of this rotation policy, a regular Navy officer shall, insofar as practicable, replace the TAR officer on a one for one basis . . .

—An annual review board was established to renew the performance of all TAR officers and to recommend the release of those officers not maintaining acceptable standards.

TAR directives were modified in 1957, 1959 and 1966 and appear in the current Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual. However, the original concept was left intact.

Every study through the years has resulted in the reaffirmation of the validity of the TAR program. Recent reaffirmations were made by the following Navy and OSD officials, mainly as a result of studies:

—SECDEF Laird August 1970

—Chief of Naval operations Zumwalt February 1972

—National Naval Reserve Policy Board November 1973

—Chief of Naval reserve charbonnet October 1974

—Chief of Naval Personnel Bagley November 1974

—Assistant Secretary of the Navy McCullen March 1975

—Assistant Secretary of the Navy McCullen July 1975

—Defense Manpower Commission April 1976

—Full time training and administration of selected reserve FTTA/SR October 1977

In addition to the above studies, statements and decisions, both the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve indicate that these components favor the implementation of management programs similar to the TAR program as a result of studies and experience. The defense manpower commission called for a TAR type program for managing reservists in their report. The general accounting office is commencing a study into manpower factors affecting the guard/reserve with particular interest in the stability and continuity offered by reservists on active duty.

We believe the present Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Naval Personnel are sincere in their belief that they can make the new program work but so were their predecessors convinced that the TAR program was the best method for reserve management in the Navy and the predecessors were supported by studies. When the three incumbents mentioned previously leave, one or more possibly within months, what will happen to the policy of assigning quality U.S. Navy officers in the reserve program billets? Past experience does not support dropping the present system until the proposed management system has proven more effective.

We at NRA have been unable to discover even a semblance of a study that recommended elimination of the TARs. The so called reserve management board was chartered in the Navy to look only at the best method to implement the decision to *eliminate the TARs*. They had no option available to recommend retention of that program even though we understand that if polled secretly, the board members would have voted overwhelmingly to retain the TAR officers instead of eliminating them. We also understand that the National Naval Reserve Policy Board, in June of this year recommended against moving ahead with the regulars managing reserves concept. The board members agreed that, although closer coordination of the regular and reserve Navy was desirable, they were deeply concerned that the current shortage of quality regular officers dictated against their assuming more "Career Enhancing Billets" in the reserve program.

We believe the question is whether or not the TAR program should be scuttled by the Navy so they can gain 1300-1400 more USN billets from the reserve—to which we answer—only if you want to hasten the deterioration of the reserves—all reserves. Because if Navy is authorized to implement this program, it will signal the other services, who are watching closely, that the mood in Congress has changed and that you endorse regular management of the reserves.

—We still cannot fathom why the Navy is so determined to implement the replacement of the TAR officers, when regular management has failed so completely in the Navy and other services in the past. The Navy directive that controls the TAR program directs that TARs be sent to sea and, *wherever practicable*, that USN officers replace them. It seems inconceivable that reasonable men wouldn't try such a controversial approach to reserve management before throwing away a proven

concept. (TAR) Why hasn't the Navy used the authority it presently has to try to make this theory of "Career Enhancement of Reserve Billets" work?

—Why has the Navy, in spite of assurances to you that implementation would not commence until permission had been received from the Congress, already implemented the plan by stopping TAR accessions from January 1977 until the present time? Why are multi-passed over officers still being sent to reserve program billets? Why, when the Navy has stated that there is a significant shortage of quality 0-3 to 0-5 officers, are they planning to make the situation worse? Where do you think the gapped or low priority billets are going to be?

—In Secretary Claytor's letter to Mr. Mahon he stated that he had some unfortunate experiences in World War II with passed-over Commanders and Captains. He went on to state that he intended to personally screen these assignments of regular officers to the reserve program billets to assure quality management. With deference to Mr. Claytor's intentions, we find it hard to equate SECNAV's very busy schedule with his desire to personally screen reserve program detailing. We know that since the original decision was made back in December, detailers have sent U.S. Navy water walkers to a few high visibility assignments. But we also know of many instances of U.S. Navy failed-of-selection officers being assigned to Reserve Program billets. The question is, when do these billets become important enough to assign quality U.S. Navy Officers?

—What is so important about having regulars manage reserves? Is it because there is a new definition of the total force which means the reserves are subjugated to the regulars? The West Germans and Canadians are part of the total force too, but as partners, not subservient to the U.S. Military Commanders.

We have no quarrel with the proposed program concerning the phaseout of the TARs if they are to be eliminated—it appears to be a very generous program. The problem is with the phase-in of this substitute program. It just isn't realistic.

Radm. Forrest, our Executive Director and Duty Admiral as he puts it, is a Naval Academy graduate. He is a retired, unmuzzled, U.S.N. Officer. The last three years of his 34 years of active duty were spent as the Auditor General of the Navy, an important and prestigious position in the Navy, reporting directly to the Secretary of the Navy. The Admiral has done a little surveying of his own since the decision was announced. In his private poll of USN Flag Officers, *Off the Record*, very few were for the elimination of the TAR program. Different reasons were given for their objections but none considered the decision a wise one.

In regard to the use of selected reservists in TAR billets—the survey sent out by the Reserve Management Group prefaced the question to selected reservists as to whether they would sign up for a 265 billet tour by stating "*Under the Proper Conditions Would You?*" The Answer to that question by anyone, including members of this Committee, has to be yes. Admiral Forrest, in his travels as Executive Director, has asked over 1500 selected reservists whether anyone was interested in a 265 tour under the conditions stated in the precept to the Reserve Management Board, that is—for not more than 4 years and no additional—not one selected reservist indicated his willingness to volunteer for active duty under those conditions. Admiral Forrest pointed out that no successful businessman could afford to sacrifice four of his most productive years in peacetime for an active duty stint. An 07/0-8 or senior 0-6 might well be able to do this but not the more junior officers who constitute nearly all the 265 billet requirements. This would leave the Navy with the choice of leaving the billets vacant, filling them with U.S. Navy Officers, or helping to reduce the ranks of the unemployed reserve officers. Yet the Navy claims they are going to bring in 160 selected reserve officers and should have no trouble filling these billets because of their "*scientifically designed*" survey.

—Why isn't the Navy getting rid of the TAR enlisted program too? Is it because of the heat that proposal would generate? The Administration has stated that they intend to keep the TAR enlisteds but what happens with the change of watch. If the rationale used for dumping the TAR officers is valid, then it applies equally to the enlisted. We certainly favor the retention of that outstanding program too. In fact, we recommended it be expanded in our mission study submission to OSD last year. Obviously the Naval enlisted reserve association also has problem with Navy's thinking, as they will state today.

Mr. Chairman, I guess the big test is what the subsequent CNO's Chiefs of Naval Personnel, Secretaries of the Navy would do. All the predecessors in those positions said keep the TARs, as the result of studies. The best program we have seen for improving the management of the reserves was one presented by the Chief of Naval Reserve in an October 1974 letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA). Had his recommendations been followed, we wouldn't be here today. The letter is recommended for your reading during your deliberations.

Mr. Chairman, we believe there are too many unanswered questions in the Navy plan. We believe that the retention of the TAR program is the best way to go for managing the Naval Reserve and we hope the Congress agrees with us. However, so that this controversy can be settled once and for all, NRA recommends that the present system (the current TAR program) be continued for five years to determine if the Navy can create and maintain a flow of quality regular officers, through Reserve Program billets, as is currently outlined in this program. Let's bring the U.S. Navy Quality Officers ashore into these billets and put the quality TAR officers at sea as Vadm. J.L. Holloway (Jr.) visualized it in 1953. In the meantime, commence TAR accessions again and bring the program back up to strength so that if the U.S. Navy resolve weakens, we haven't lost the ball game.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN CARL

Captain CARL. First I would like to introduce Admiral Jim Forrest, USN (Retired), who is our very capable Executive Director on my right who will have brief remarks after me, and on my left Capt. John Bell, USNR, a retired officer, a TAR, who is an unpaid consultant and member of the association who will also have some brief remarks. The three of us represent the three communities involved in today's issue, the selected Reservists, the TARs, and the Regular Navy. Since all of us are in a retired status, we are unmuzzled and can present the Naval Reserve position without being censored. I submit to you it is a little bit surprising to me that there is no active duty TAR here to testify, nor is there a drilling selected Reserve officer here to testify today. I submit to you that if they were asked to come, they would have to speak the party line.

Before I start, I strongly recommend for the committee's study the beautiful account of the whole TAR situation, with all the various impacts and ramifications presented by your colleague, Mr. Chappell, which he entered into the record this a.m. This document clearly presents the major aspects concerning the TAR controversy. As the recently elected President of the Naval Reserve Association. I thank you for this opportunity to express the position of our organization, which opposes the Navy's plan to eliminate the TAR officer program. Although I was only recently elected, I have followed very closely all the events leading up to this proposal. I submit to you that with all the turmoil that exists in the Naval Reserve today, what we did not need was this issue to cause more polarization between the Regulars and the Reserves, and we regret the fact that it has occurred. In my opinion it has added to the instability problem of the Naval Reserve.

Also, I regret, that as the new NRA president, I must appear before your committee, my first congressional committee hearing in this capacity, and oppose the Navy on an issue, but I do so because I believe it is right, and in the best interests of the Navy and the security of our nation.

I must say that I agree 100 percent with the position taken by the previous executive board of the Naval Reserve Association. The association was the first to go on record strongly opposing the plan to dump the TAR program, which at that time included both officers and enlisted.

Over the past 11 months the NRA position has been reaffirmed three times at our National Executive Committee meetings, and, in addition, reaffirmed at our national conference this past October.

During this time I have become increasingly convinced that the Navy plan is just not feasible, and the "try it before you buy it" approach is not only feasible but mandatory, in the best interests of the Navy and the Naval Reserve.

In the light of past history, not only in the Navy but in all Reserve components, we believe it would be ill advised to make the change without retaining a backup system. Frankly, I have heard nothing in the testimony thus far today to change my own personal position, which is the same as my association.

The Navy proposal, if allowed by the Congress, could very well set the pattern for all the other services who are watching this action very closely, in our opinion. If the Navy is successful in its move to replace officers in the Reserve program billets with Regular officers, the precedent will undoubtedly set the wheels in motion to do the same thing in the Army and the Air Force Reserves. If this occurs, the safeguards so carefully considered by the Congress and codified into Title 10 US. Code, by the recently enacted Reserve Bill of Rights, will largely be nullified. We are specifically addressing the congressional concept of Reserve management by Reserves.

I have listed the genesis and history of the TAR program in my formal statement, so I will not dwell on it at this point. Every study, Mr. Chairman and members, through the years has resulted in the reaffirmation of the validity of the TAR program. Yet, this morning we heard the Secretary say that the Navy's decision to phase out the officer program was based on long and detailed study. Where is the evidence of this?

On the contrary, in the CNO's recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he stated that there was no study. Later, upon questioning, Mr. Hidalgo changed his point, referring to it as an informal one, and said that a formal study had not taken place. Actually, during the last few years, studies and affirmations were made of the TAR program in 1972, 1973, 1974, in which there were two, 1975 in which there were also two, one in 1976, and the latest one, on the Full Time Training Administration of Selected Reserve (FTTA/SR), this past October.

In addition to the above studies, statements and decisions, it is our understanding that both the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve indicate that these components favor the implementation of management programs similar to the TAR program, as a result of studies and experience. Also, in its report, the Defense Manpower Commission called for a TAR-type program for managing Reservists.

We believe the present Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Naval Personnel are very sincere in their beliefs that they can make the new program work, but so were their predecessors convinced that the TAR program was the best method for Reserve management in the Navy—and their predecessors were supported by studies.

When the three incumbents leave office, one or more possibly within months, what will happen to the policy of assigning quality U.S. Navy officers in Reserve program billets? What will happen to it? Past experience does not support dropping the present system until the proposed management system has proven *more* effective.

The so-called Reserve Management Board was chartered in the Navy to look only at the best method to implement the decision to eliminate the TARs. Yet we heard today that the decision to phase out the TAR officer program was not based on a study. Actually, as we understand it, the board had no option available to recommend retention of that program, even though we understand if polled secretly the board members would have voted overwhelmingly to retain the TAR officers instead of eliminating them.

Also the board members of the National Naval Reserve Policies Board agreed, I understand, that although closer coordination of the Regular and Reserve Navy was desirable, they were deeply concerned that the current shortage of quality Regular officers dictated against their assuming more "career-enhancing billets" in the Reserve program.

We have heard no justification for this decision, and I am at a loss to believe that the Regular Navy is going to consider the types of billets that have been referred to as career enhancing. We believe the question is whether or not the TAR program should be scuttled by the Navy so they can gain 1300 or 1400 more USN billets from the Reserve—to which we answer—only if you want to hasten the deterioration of the Reserves, and all Reserves.

We just cannot fathom why the Navy is so determined to implement the replacement of TAR officers, when Management of the Reserves by Regulars has failed so completely in the Navy and other services in the past. I ask the question, Mr. Chairman, why hasn't the Navy used the authority it presently has to try to make this theory of career enhancement of Reserve billets work? Why has it not?

I ask you also, why are multi-passed-over officers still being assigned to Reserve program billets? Yet for the last year we have heard that that is not going to happen. Why, when the Navy has stated that there is a significant shortage of quality O-3 to O-5 officers, is it planning to make the situation worse?

Where do you think the gap in the low priority billets are going to be? In Secretary Claytor's letter to Mr. Mahon he stated that he had some unfortunate experiences during World War II with passed-over commanders and captains. I will not elaborate further.

We know that since the original decision was made in December 1976, detailers have sent U.S. Navy water-walkers to a few high-visibility assignments, but we also know of many instances of U.S. Navy failed-of-selection officers being assigned to Reserve program billets. I know personally that in one command, out of 11 officers, four are USNs, 75 percent of which, three of them, are multi-passovers. I also know of another situation in the Reserve where there are 22 aviator USN captains, I believe. Of that group, five have been passed over, and those five hold very key billets in the Reserve program administration and management.

The question is then, when do these billets become important enough to assign quality U.S. Navy officers? Also, with Navy's acknowledged shortfalls, where are they going to come from?

What is so important about having Regulars manage Reserves? Is it because there is a new definition of the total force, which means the Reserves are subjugated to the Regulars? The West Germans

and Canadians are part of the total force too, but as partners, not subservient to the U.S. military commanders.

I ask you the very important question: If the Naval Reserve is in such a good state of readiness, which has also been testified to you, never been better, as one put it, if this is so, then what is it that the Regulars are going to do to improve it further that TARs have not done or cannot do?

We have no quarrel with the proposed program concerning the phase-out of the TARs, *if* they are to be eliminated. It appears to be a very good program, but the problem is with the phase-in of this substitute program, which we just do not think is realistic.

Why isn't the Navy getting rid of the TAR enlisted program? If the rationale used for dumping the TAR officers is valid, then it applies equally to the enlisted, and if not now, then probably later. We certainly favor the retention of that outstanding program too. In fact, we recommended that it be further expanded, in the mission study that NRA submitted last year to the OSD.

Mr. Chairman, I guess the big test is what the subsequent CNO's, Chiefs of Naval Personnel, Secretaries of the Navy, would do. All the predecessors in their positions said keep the TARs, and they said it as a result of valid studies. The best program we have seen for improving the management of the Reserves was one presented by the Chief of Naval Reserve in an October 1974 letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Had his recommendations been followed, we would not be here today. The letter is recommended for your reading during your deliberations, sir.

Mr. Chairman, we believe there are too many unanswered questions in the Navy plan. We believe that the retention of the TAR program is the best way for managing the Naval Reserve, and we hope the Congress agrees with us. However, so that this controversy can be settled once and for all, the Naval Reserve Association recommends that the present system, that is the current TAR officer program, be continued for five years, to determine if the Navy can create and maintain a flow of quality Regular officers through Reserve program billets, as is currently called for. Let's bring the U.S. Navy quality officers ashore into these billets, and put the quality TAR officers at sea, as Vice Admiral J.L. Holloway, Jr., visualized it in 1953. In the meantime, commence TAR sessions, which we have not had all year, and bring the program back up to strength, so that if the U.S. Navy resolve weakens, we have not lost the ball game.

I would like to conclude by saying again I just have not seen any justification for the proposed elimination of the TAR officer program. The so-called advantages that have been alluded to by the proponents already exist within the present TAR officer program, if the Navy permits it to be fully implemented.

At this point I would like to call on Rear Admiral Jim Forrest. Thank, you, Mr Chairman.

Mr. FLYNT. Thank you, Captain Carl.

Admiral Forrest.

[The information referred to follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF REAR ADMIRAL JAMES E. FORREST, SC, USN (RET.)

RADM. JAMES E. FORREST, SC, USN (RET.)

Radm. Forrest, a native of Palms, California enlisted in the Navy in November 1940, serving aboard the battleships Tennessee and Wyoming and the fleet oiler Cuyama before receiving a Secretary of the Navy appointment to the Naval Academy in 1942.

He was graduated with the accelerated Class of 1946, receiving his commission 6 June, 1945.

He commanded three auxiliary motor minesweepers before transferring to the Supply Corps, in 1948.

The Admiral was selected for flag ranked in 1971. Immediately prior to becoming National Executive Director of the Naval Reserve Association in June 1975, Radm. Forrrest was Auditor General of the Navy for three years during the period July 1972 through June 1975. His former assignments have included Director and Deputy Director, Simulation and Computer Directorate, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, Navy Fleet Material Support Office, Mechanicsburg, PA; Assistant Fleet and Force Supply Officer, Pacific Fleet Service Force, and Deputy Commander, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service.

Radm. Forrest's decorations include the Legion of Merit with three gold stars in lieu of second, third, and fourth awards, and the Navy Commendation Medal.

He is past National President of the American Society of Military Comptrollers, past President of the Wessynton Homes Association and was formerly a member of the Board of Directors of the Navy Federal Credit Union.

The Admiral holds a master's degree in business administration from Stanford University and has attended the Navy Supply Corps School; Navy Postgraduate School, Monterey, California; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Executive Management Program of the University of Pittsburgh.

He is married to the former Elisibeth L. Hanson of East Lansing, Michigan. They have five children. The Admiral's hobbies are hunting, fishing, tennis and squash.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT TO NRA TESTIMONY BEFORE THE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ON DEC. 7, 1977.

I am Radm. J.E. Forrest, USN (Ret.), Executive Director of the Naval Reserve Association. I would like to make a few points based primarily on the fact that I am an USN officer having graduated from the Naval Academy. I might point out that I spent the past three years, just prior to retirement two years ago, as Auditor General of the Navy reporting directly to SECNAV through the Asst SECNAV. In that position I saw Secretaries of the Navy, Asst Secretaries of the Navy, and CNO's come and go. Each has his own personality, each has his own way of managing, and each has his own important set of goals. None of these gentlemen can vouch for what his successor will do. For example, we all know that return to bell bottom uniforms is in the offing. Navy aviator brown shoes are a thing of the past. I could go on and on. One man's set of goals is not necessarily another man's goals.

We will have approximately 7 SECNAVS, 4 CNO's and 5 Chief BuPers before the TAR program is laid to rest. There is absolutely no reason to believe that these 16 gentlemen will think the same way as our current leaders.

A few additional facts disturb me. The primary one is the fact that only a relatively few number of USN officers will ever be able to serve in a reserve billet. (Approximately 60-1 ratio of USN officers to USNR billets in Reserve Programs billets ashore). This means that only about 10% of USN officers will ever serve in a Reserve Programs billet ashore. When these officers come up for promotion with their peers, who have been at sea or in a squadron (and not in a Reserve Programs billet ashore) their promotion opportunity will be less. We have a very famous astronaut who didn't have his card punched as a Commander and Captain. He retired as a Captain. There was no place for him as an Admiral in the Navy.

There are a few questions which I can't answer but would like to talk to.

1. How can we keep the Reserve Programs billets ashore from being retirement homes? I've talked to several CO's of reserve activities recently who are on first tours of duty with reserves and it is their last. They are retiring.

2. How in the world can this TAR phase-out program be justified in view of the conclusions of the Gerard Study—a study requested by the Congress?

3. What conditions have changed which would make this program any more a success than when the regulars were managing the reserves following World War II. (Vadm. Holloway threw them out!)

4. How can we guarantee the success of a program which must depend on the goals of future leaders for a long period of time?

5. How can we expect a truly homogeneous total force, that we all seek, when for the past 32 years (and probably much longer) there has been nothing in the curriculum at the Naval Academy, concerning Naval Reserves? There is also nothing in the curriculum of the Officer Candidate School concerning Naval Reserves. How can we have a truly homogeneous total force under these conditions?

6. Why didn't we hear from any TAR Admirals today?

7. What is to keep us from having USN TARs as distinguished from USNR TARs? In other words, if an USN Officer has multiple tours of duty with reserves is he to apt to become an USN TAR? What have we gained then?

8. How do we keep outstanding USN Officers from resigning when they receive orders to Reserve Programs billets ashore—when they hear that this year 1 out of 6 Lieutenants (USN) in such billets was promoted (85% promotion opportunity overall), when they hear that only one LCDR (surface) in such billets was promoted to CDR, when they hear that not a single Commander was promoted to Captain in such billets?

9. How can we be so sure that we can get outstanding selected reservists to fill the 265 billets formerly filled by TAR officers? During my travels throughout the U.S. I was unable to find a single selected reservist who would volunteer for such active duty for a tour of duty of 4 years or less (talked to approximately 1000 selected reservists). No successful businessman can afford to sacrifice four of his most productive years in peacetime for such an active duty stint.

I'm sorry thatn I can't answer the above questions. However, they do tend to support NRA's recommendation, "Try It Before You Buy It".

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL FORREST

Admiral FORREST. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few remarks and points, in fact ask a few questions which I cannot answer. I, like Admiral Jackson, am a Naval Academy graduate, have been a Regular Navy officer for over 32 years, so I am speaking as an unmuzzled USN type officer who spent quite a bit of time in the Navy. Just prior to the time I retired, which was two years ago, I spent three years as Auditor General of the Navy, and in that position reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Of course I saw Secretaries of the Navy come and go, Assistant Secretaries of the Navy come and go, CNOs, come and go. Each one of these individuals has his own personality. He has his own way of managing. Each one has his own very important set of goals which to him, of course, are the most important goals. None of these gentlemen can vouch absolutely for his successor, as to what he will do. He cannot mention or vouch or put down on a piece of paper exactly what his successor is going to do when he leaves.

For example, right now we are in the process of, going back to bell-bottom trousers. That was a pretty hot program a few years ago. We are going back to them because somebody else had a good idea. You have been reading in the newspapers recently we are reverting back and getting more and more scientific engineering-type naval officers. We are going to be getting fewer and fewer liberal arts type naval officers. Maybe that was Rickover's idea—I am not sure, but at any rate the current thought now with the new gentlemen in power, is let's emphasize science and engineering. They will probably hear from Rickover on that subject.

Navy aviators' brown shoes, a small thing, are out. No longer do we have a brown-shoe Navy but now all black shoes. Aviators do not particularly like that. We keep hearing over and over again that this phase-out of the TAR program had the complete approval

of the prior administration by the Secretary of the Navy. Ten days prior to the time Mr. Middendorf left the Navy as Secretary of the Navy I was in his office with Captain Robin Goodenough, the former President of NRA. We had a couple of other gentlemen with us. We had Admiral Doug Mow. Remember that name; he is over in OPNAV. He sat there listening to what was going on. At that time, ten days prior to his departure, the Secretary of the Navy was unaware of the fact that this decision had been made. He did not approve of it at that moment in time. His statement for the record was, at that moment in time, to Admiral Mow, "How much time do I have to do something about this?"

The answer was "Ten days." The statement by the Secretary of the Navy was, "Why was this decision not brought up through me? Why was it made? Am I not the Secretary of the Navy?"

The answer by Admiral Doug Mow, "You are the Secretary of the Navy, and we were planning to tell you about it eventually."

You can imagine the thoughts. I cannot repeat what else was said at that moment in time.

I cannot vouch whether Mr. Middendorf did go along eventually. At that moment in time he was not going along with it. I tried to call him today just to get him to vouch for it. I was unable to get him. That Secretary of the Navy was not in on this plan.

We are going to have approximately seven Secretaries of the Navy; we are going to have four Chiefs of Naval Operations; we are going to have about five Chiefs of BuPers between now and the time the Navy proposes lay this program to rest forever. There is absolutely no reason to believe that these 16 gentlemen are going to think the same way as our current leaders.

I know for a fact Admiral Holloway, Sr., back in 1953 said, "Let us have a TAR program."

Of course, the current CNO says, "Let that TAR program go."

We know that Admiral Bagley just prior to Admiral Watkins' time said, "We are going to have a TAR program."

He had a very extensive study. We need a TAR program. The new Chief of BuPers said, "We don't need that TAR program." Admiral Watkins cannot speak for the next Chief of BuPers, and neither can the Secretary of the Navy. There is no question in my mind that these gentlemen can make this program work now. What about later? That is what we worry about. That is the big question later. We cannot tie these people down. Each person has to have his set of goals. He is going to make his name. I do not blame them but we cannot count on what their successors may think to do.

There are a few additional factors. I have talked to several selected flag officers. They are not in agreement with this plan.

Mr. FLYNT. You say selected. You mean selected Reserve?

Admiral FORREST. Selected Reserve flag officers. They are not in agreement. Of course, a team of horses could not get their names out of me, because they would be dead professionally.

A couple of other items. When we refer to the TARs, we prefer to use the word "conduit," not obstacle, not a barrier. It is a conduit. Incidentally, if you take a look at the sheer numbers game here, we have a ratio of approximately 60 to 1 Regulars to these billets. We are talking about these so-called Reserve Programs billets, Reserve

Program billets which are ashore, about a 60-to-1 ratio. When you take a look at the number of USN officers who will ever fill one of these billets, it is extremely small in terms of percentage, eight, nine or 10 percent. We heard the statement made that each command and each flag billet is extremely difficult to obtain. We heard the statement that it is very difficult to get a command, so when you finally get around to comparing two people, and one man has had three or four years with the Reserve activity, and another man has had three or four years at that same time, as executive officer of a tin can or maybe a squadron commander or maybe some other hot-shot operational job, there is no question who is going to get that promotion, all other things being equal, same fitness reports, same type, same top one to five percent.

There is no question who is going to get it. I am a USN officer speaking. I know how we think. If we can promote an officer who is executive officer of a tin can at the same time another man spent three years in Bismarck, North Dakota, the one with the tin can is going to get it. This is the problem. You can see this over and over and over again.

The so-called peer situation—and we are not talking about a dummy getting a promotion just because he has a better tour of duty; we are talking about all other things being equal—that man with that duty at sea with a squadron will make it.

We use in the Navy a slang term we all have to have our “cards punched”, go up the route a certain way. Of course, that is the point that the Navy people were trying to make today, they will try to make this part of that card punching process.

There is a rather famous astronaut not with us any longer. He was one of the very first, a very reputable and famous person. He got as far as Captain. He is no longer with us because he did not have his card punched. He didn't have that deep draft command. He is out of the Navy. It is difficult to understand why you can't promote an astronaut. There was no place at that time. Is there now?—I doubt it. He had not punched his card because he spent his time up in orbit somewhere. This is what I am concerned about.

I have some questions I can't answer. How can we keep these Reserve billets from becoming retirement homes? I recently gave a speech down at Phoenix. There was an extremely sharp captain down there who just came from Washington, one of the sharpest USN captains I have come across. He challenged me on it.

He said, “One of the primary purposes of this new phaseout of TARs and bringing the regulars in is bringing in this experience from the fleet, let it brush against the Reserves, and then we regulars will go back to the fleet and bring all this knowledge of the Reserves back.”

I said, “It sounds good. You are right. Where are you going when you leave here?” He said, “I am going to retirement.”

If you start looking around at some of these USN captains and commanders when they find they are going to get out of the Navy, Reserve billets are tremendous places. They are nice places to go. You can go out to Phoenix or to Tucson, if you want to end up there. This is what we are afraid of. How do you keep these billets from becoming retirement homes?

When I was Auditor General of the Navy for three years, I made a survey. I found that 87.5 percent of all the officers throughout the country which normally stay a period of one year or less or maybe a little bit more in their final tour and then get out. They were at their final destination, and it was a struggle to get that reversed.

I checked again the other day and found that it is back the other way again. Find your home, go out to it, stay a year, find a job, get out. This is a tough thing to fight.

How in the world can the TAR phaseout program really be justified in view of this Gerard Study which was directed by the Congress? I think General Gerard will be here this afternoon to address that question. Twenty-six people were on this committee. They spent about eight months and finally came out and said Navy, keep the TAR program. In fact, we would recommend, under certain conditions, that all services go to a TAR-type program.

I don't see how in the world you can take that study directed by Congress, and then buy something that is different. Incidentally, what conditions have changed today that makes it any different today—that would make this type of Navy proposed program successful when it failed under Admiral Holloway's father? Admiral Holloway's father came in and took a look at the regulars managing Reserves. That was in 1953 and he threw the regulars out and brought in the TAR program.

Again I ask these questions which I can't answer. What makes it different today? How have the conditions changed? I don't know.

Again, I have pointed this out already. How in the world can we have a successful program when about 86 to 90 percent depends on future people? I say 96 percent because most of our Secretaries of the Navy last about two years, 22 months; CNOs normally three or four years, and Chiefs of BUPERS, three or four years. You can add it up. Ninety percent of the success depends on future people who you are not talking to now.

I am sure if you had the prior CNO in here, he wouldn't even think about this sort of thing. The next one possibly may not.

How in the world—again, I think this was brought out before—can we have a purely homogeneous force? We talk about the Reserves and regulars. From firsthand knowledge over 32 years, we haven't had one single minute of instruction at the Naval Academy concerning Reserves. My total instruction consisted of one sentence. I said, what are those midshipmen over there with the funny looking hats? They wore a different hat than we did. The answer was they were V-8s or V-12s or something like that. That was the extent over four years of my instruction in the Naval Reserve.

Today it is exactly the same except they have no funny looking hats to look at. That is the only difference.

Do you realize right now in the Officer Candidate School there is absolutely nothing given concerning the Naval Reserve. Nothing is given. Why not? Something like that does not depend on phasing out the TARs. Something like that does not depend, I would imagine, on approval of this committee or any other committee. Why don't we do it? Why don't we bring the Reserves and regulars together if we really want to?

Now concerning this business of bringing USN people back and forth into the program or out of the program, aren't we going to eventually end up with something called a USN TAR, and is he not going to be placed in the same situation as the TARs are now, if he gets too many tours? How in the world can he compete for that small number of command billets? How in the world can he compete for selection if he has had more than one Reserve tour? Does he not lose some of that so-called firsthand fleet operational experience? That is our question, if the Navy's plan goes into effect.

How in the world do we keep outstanding officers who are assigned to a Reserve activity from resigning? To the best of my knowledge, and it was very difficult to get this information, there were six USN lieutenants just recently given Reserve assignments. One out of six was promoted—Incidentally, in the USN we watch this carefully because we don't want to go to a billet where we don't stand much chance of being promoted—Eighty-five percent of all the USN Lieutenants in the Navy were promoted. That was the promotion opportunity, and only one out of six USNs in the Reserve Program was promoted. We had an officer down in Jacksonville, just went there, a lieutenant. To the best of my knowledge he stood two out of eleven. He should have been promoted. Nothing in his record said he should not be promoted. He was not promoted.

What I am saying is in a USN Selection Board, you take a close look. A man is going to be three years out at a Reserve activity or is he going to be three years aboard ship? All other things being equal, and I think you gentlemen can understand it, you pick the man that is going to be at sea.

We can dictate for a while in the USN through a precept to a Selection Board, and say, may God help you if you pass over that Reserve officer. I will personally review that and you can do that and you can make it work. For how long? What about that next one coming in?

I keep going back to that. You can make anything work as Mr. Chappell said, but for how long? You can't control a man who comes in after you.

Talking about this promotion bit, there was one lieutenant commander in the surface end of the Reserve community who was promoted this year, one. In the whole entire Reserve community, to the best of my knowledge, there was not one single commander promoted to captain, and so this is a handicap we have ahead of us, trying to convince USN people that they should come into this program and it is going to be career enhancing. I think, Admiral Jackson, you referred to that.

One final point. We talk about bringing in some outstanding Selected Reservists from out in the field to take over these TAR billets in the headquarters command. I have traveled around the country talking about the various problems we have in front of us and the Selected Reserve problems we have with the TAR program and so forth, in general bringing the people up on what is going on in the legislation.

I would say I have asked over 1,000 Selected Reservists to raise their hand and say, "Would you volunteer to come back on a tour of duty four years or less?" and I have never yet had one single Selected

Reservist come back and say, yes, he would, raise his hand, not a one.

I think if you put this program in and we do phase out the TARs, I think within a very short period of time you will have a request coming back to you from the Navy suggesting perhaps a similar type program to the TAR.

I thank you very much.

BIOGRAPHY FOR CAPT. JOHN H. BELL, USNR (RET.)

CAPTAIN JOHN H. BELL USNR (RET.)

Captain Bell is a non pay consultant to the Naval Reserve Association.

Born in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, May 5, 1924, he attended school there and at the University of Miami, Florida. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy as a Nav Cad in December 1942 and was commissioned an Ensign on April 15, 1944 as a Naval Aviator.

Captain Bell served in Fighter, Night Fighter, Special Weapon, Helicopter and Anti-Submarine Warfare Units. He commissioned and was the first Commanding Officer of Air Anti-submarine Squadron Twenty Nine (VS-29).

He served on active duty for over 31 years, 22 of those years as a TAR officer. He was released from active duty twice and twice recalled for the Berlin crisis and Korea. Capt. Bell served as a Selected Reservist during his two years of inactive duty.

His last tours of active duty before retiring in January 1976 were as follows:

Officer in Charge—Reserve ASW Tactical School, Willow Grove, PA.

Commanding Officer—Naval Air Reserve Training Unit, Norfolk, VA.

Reserve Liaison Officer for Operations, Plan & Training—Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VA.

Acting Director Reserve Plans Programs & Budget and as the Director Reserve Readiness & Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Under the Honorable Ted Marrs and Will Hill Tankersley).

Captain Bell is married to former Margaret Mary Cogley of Sioux Falls, South Dakota and they have one married son who resides in Norfolk, VA. Captain & Mrs. Bell reside in their retirement home at Long Lane Farm located on the East River in Bohannon, Mathews County, Virginia.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN BELL

Navy has stated that they are trying to remove a barrier insulation between the regulars and Reserves which the TARs represent. More realistically we must acknowledge that there is a separation between the Reserves and regulars in peacetime. The TAR program was designed and built to bridge that gap. It was organized and improved through the years based on experience gained in Reserve management, not only in the Navy but in the other components. The detailers who are probably closer to the pulse than any office in Washington consider the TARs as a conduit between the active and inactive personnel. We should not tear down that bridge.

Navy has quoted the Defense Manpower Commission report in which the DMC stated that there was need to make better use of the Selected Reserve and to improve *top level* management and support of Naval Reserve Units. They certainly were not talking about middle management, represented by the TAR community, they were speaking of Navy support at the Secretarial and OPNAV levels. What the Navy did not quote was the DMC statement which recommended replacing the technicians with full-time active duty *guardsmen and reservists*. They did not have the slightest intention of recommending that regular personnel replace the technicians. There appears to be a need to define the basic term total force—Navy seems to have discovered a new concept all of a sudden and a cure to all their management problems with the Congress. The fall guy is the Naval Reserve once again which is always handy as a whipping boy.

Total force concept as coined by Secretary Laird in August 1970—referred to all assets available to support National Strategy and meet the threat including active,

reserve, civilian and allied. He directed a total force concept be applied to all aspects of *planning, programming, manning, equipment and employment* guard Reserve Forces (he did not say managing). He also directed the manning levels for technicians and TARs be provided by the Service Secretaries at full authorization levels. The emphasis there was on the lower peacetime sustaining costs of Reserve Forces. Three years later Secretary Schlesinger changed the term to total force policy, established the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Reserve Affairs in each service and reiterated Secretary Laird's direction to the Service Secretaries to improve the readiness of the Reserve components. It did not redefine total force. We believe the Navy should concentrate on the real meaning of total force and objectively look at an transfer missions to the Naval Reserve which the Reserves can perform, support the Reserves and stop twisting the term total force to suit their purposes. Navy will have pulled off a real coup if they sell the Congress this package. The problem with the Naval Reserve is and has been with the high level management, not with middle management represented by the TAR community.

It is very interesting that the Navy intends to *improve* Reserve readiness through the use of USN officers. It is our understanding from reading Navy literature that the Reserve hardware units i.e., air wings, ships, seabees, airlift squadrons, etc. Already equal or outperform their active duty counterparts with the present management structure and at much less cost. Are these new USN managers going to increase the readiness of the Reserve Units to a point where we don't need an active Navy except for peacetime deployments? It appears that Navy is making a very specious argument with words that flow well but cannot stand analysis.

Captain BELL. They have pretty well used up all my points, but I notice that this is December 7 and I hope it is not the beginning of another Pearl Harbor for the Reserve.

I feel very honored today because everybody is talking about me. I am a TAR, or at least I am a retired TAR. I had very little problem on sea duty. I went to sea and became a commanding officer of a fleet squadron, so I did get the Reserve expertise or the USN expertise at sea. I brought it back to the Reserve Command. After that I served on the staff at CNARESTRA, Reserve Staff, and I also went to the USN Staff after that at ComNavAirLant, so I got quite a tour in both the Reserves and the active force. I completed my active duty with a tour in OSD as the Director of Reserve Readiness and Mobilization.

About the only point I need to make now is, there appears to be a need to define the basic term "total force." The Navy seems to have discovered a new concept all of a sudden to cure their management problems with Congress. The fall guy once again is the Naval Reserve. They are always around to be used as a whipping boy.

The total force concept as coined by Secretary Laird in August of 1970 referred to all assets available to support national strategy and meet the threat, including active, reserve, civilian and allied. He directed a total force concept be applied to all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing the Guard and Reserve forces. He did not say manning. He also directed the manning levels for technicians and TARs be provided by the services Secretaries at full authorization levels. The emphasis there was on the lower peacetime sustaining cost of the Reserve forces.

Three years later, Secretary Schlesinger changed the term to "total force policy", establishing the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs in each service, and he reiterated Secretary Laird's direction to the service Secretaries to improve the readiness of the Reserve components. It did not redefine "total force."

We believe the Navy should concentrate on the real meaning of total force and objectively look at and transfer missions to the

Naval Reserve which the Reserves can perform, support the Reserves and stop twisting the term "total force" to suit their purposes. The Navy will have pulled off a real coup if they sell the Congress this package.

The problem with the Naval Reserve is, and has been, with the high level management, not with the middle management represented by the TAR community.

That is all I have to say. I think NERA has arrived.

Mr. FLYNT. Yes. Master Chief John Lange of the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association has joined us.

We welcome you, Master Chief Lange, and we will be delighted to hear from you. If you have a prepared statement, you may, if you wish, insert it in the record at this point, then you can either summarize it or whatever you see fit.

Mr. LANGE. Yes, sir. I have quite a lengthy statement. I typed it. It took me sixteen and a half minutes to say it. I am not going to go that far. I am going to eliminate the history, and I would like to read some part of our program.

Mr. FLYNT. Without objection, the entire statement will be included in the record at this point, and you may summarize it.

[The information referred to follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF MASTER CHIEF GEORGE ALBERT LANGE JR., USNR (RET)

Master Chief Lange is currently a drilling member of Naval Reserve Unit DDG 3706, Naval Reserve Center Jones Point, Alexandria, Virginia. He and his wife Helen, a retired Naval Reserve Chief Petty Officer, reside at 6935 North 26th Street, Falls Church, Virginia.

Master Chief Lange's Naval career spans a period of over 22 years, including 5 years of World War II service aboard 2 destroyer escorts and 3 cruisers. His subsequent Naval Reserve service has included affiliation with Surface Divisions, a Ship Activation Maintenance and Repair Division and his appointment as Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command for Naval Reserve Group Command 5-4(M).

He is a recent retiree from the Arlington County Fire Department after serving over 25 years and working his way up from provisional firefighter to the rank of Captain. He is active in his community serving as Adjutant/Quartermaster, District of Columbia Veteran's of Foreign Wars, an organization in which he has been an active member for over 30 years. He also serves as a member of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association (NERA), and is the organization's Veterans Service Officer.

STATEMENT OF THE NAVAL ENLISTED RESERVE ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman and member of the subcommittee, I am Master Chief Hull Technician George A. Lange, Jr., a drilling Naval reservist, past national treasurer for the Naval Reserve Association (NERA), and currently veterans affairs officer for NERA. All NERA officers serve in their positions without pay and I am here as a representative of the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association. NERA is an organization of enlisted Navy, marine corps and coast guard reservists. Our membership is primarily composed of enlisted Naval reservists and our presence here is to ask you to reverse the Department of the Navy's proposal to phase out the Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) Officer Program. We would like to impress on this committee that NERA is an enlisted organization of citizen sailors who are dedicated to a free country with a strong Navy and Naval reserve. NERA has no vested interest in the TAR Officer Program per se. However, NERA feels the proposed TAR officer phase out is only a part of a much larger issue—that issue is the survival of the Naval reserve as an effective force. NERA has been around for more than twenty years. During this time we have seen only superficial support for the Naval reserve by the regular Navy. With all due respect, we feel the high ranking officials and officers in the regular Navy are unaware of what's going on at the grass-roots level in their own house. The regular Navy can say all they want about one Navy and total force, but NERA still finds hostility and apathy toward the Naval reserve.

Phasing out the TAR officers and forcing regular officers into reserve billets will not improve this;

It will tear the Naval reserve apart. The only real strong support the Naval reserve has received over the years has been from Congress, TAR officer, TAR enlisted, inactive reservists, and a handful of regular-Navy people. A brief conceptual history of the TAR Program is presented herein to enlighten the Committee.

Prior to World War II, a very limited number of Naval Reserve Personnel on active Duty were utilized in the training and administration of the inactive Naval Reserve. There was, of course, no need for such a program during the total mobilization for World War II.

Early in 1945, the Secretary of the Navy convened a Board headed by RADM McQuiston and charged with developing the policy for reestablishing a Naval Reserve training program. The initial direction was to integrate Reserve training requirements into the regular Navy with active duty billets at the Navy Department, Reserve Headquarters and Field Activity levels. However, during the Board's deliberations, concern was expressed that the regular establishment would once again be reduced to peace-time manning levels after the War. It was concluded that the approximately 1,200 officer and 12,000 enlisted personnel needed to manage the Naval Reserve would seriously impair other regular Navy commitments. Additionally, congressional guidance at that time dictated that the Naval Reserve Program would operate under a Naval Reserve budget separate from the regular Navy. Reserve appropriations were only to be spent on Naval Reserve personnel, facilities, fuel, etc.

The McQuiston Board concluded that the post-war Naval Reserve Program should be managed primarily by Naval Reserve personnel on active duty for that purpose. Additionally, the Board recommended that the regular Navy establishment should also furnish officers for duty in Reserve billets within the Navy Department, on staffs, and as commanding officers and executive officers at Reserve field activities. Both of these recommendations were approved by the Secretary of the Navy 1 December 1945. The acronym "CAD" (continuous active duty) was coined to identify those reservists who would be retained on active duty in Reserve training billets.

During the phase in of the CAD program, differences in philosophy developed between Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (AIR) and the Chief of Naval Personnel over regular versus Reserve Management of the Naval Reserve. These were expressed to the Chief of Naval Operations in December 1946. DCNO(AIR) preferred to assign regular Navy personnel only to key Reserve billets and have all remaining billets filled by Naval Reservists on active duty.

CHNAVPERS was of the opinion that the degree of success of the Naval Reserve Program would be in direct ratio to the degree it was administered by personnel of the regular Navy, even if a reduction in other regular Navy programs were required. The matter was resolved when adequate numbers of personnel to implement the enlarged Naval Reserve Program could not be provided by the regular establishment. The CAD Program became a necessity, and was formed with a billet structure requiring 860 officer and 9,849 enlisted CADS to man twenty-one Naval Air Reserve activities.

The CAD concept of management of the Naval Air Reserve Program was retained through 1952, when the Armed Forces Reserve Act (Public Law 476-82d Congress) was enacted. BuPers instruction 1001.10 of 17 April 1953, first promulgated the provisions of that act within the Navy and provided that Naval Reserve officers on active duty in connection with the training and administration of the Naval Reserve Program, known as "CADS," would, thereafter, be referred to as "TARS." This directive cited congressional intent to retain reservists on active duty for the purpose of managing the Naval Reserve.

Initially, applications for the TAR Program were solicited from active duty Reserve officers of all grades, including CADS. After 1 July 1954, applications were considered only from Lieutenant Commanders and below, of the line and staff corps, whether on active duty or not. In recent years, only those Reserve officers of the unrestricted line, restricted line (intelligence) and supply corps have been considered for the TAR Program.

The concept of identifying and coding active duty billets involved in the training and administration of the Naval Reserve as "Reserve Program Billets" (RPB) was first raised by the 1954 Naval Reserve Evaluation Board (First Johnson LBoard). Additionally, this Board reaffirmed the TAR concept as a means of insuring stability of the Naval Reserve and recommended that SECNAV forcefully implement a policy of rotating TAR personnel to the operating forces to maintain warfare currency.

The RPB concept was again recommended by the 1956 Johnson Board. Although these recommendations were approved by SECNAV in 1954 and 1956, the RPB concept was not fully implemented until 1961.

In 1957, a new expanded TAR officer program was implemented. The primary purpose of this action was to retain, on active duty, a large number of experienced Reserve lineal list lieutenant commanders by involuntarily transferring from the lineal list to the TAR Program 442 Reserve officers. This action helped reduce a lineal list "hump" problem and filled out some 262 new Reserve training billets.

In February 1961, BuPers Notice 5320 was published which implemented the Reserve Program Billet (RPB) concept initially approved by SECNAV following the 1954 and 1956 Johnson Boards. This system provided that all active duty billets, having responsibility for the training and administration of Reserves, would be grouped under one billet structure and coded to indicate the type of officer, i.e., regular, Reserve or either, to be assigned to each billet. The initial distribution of RPB billets was 22 regular, 98 Reserve (TAR) and 1,940 either, a total of 2,060.

A year after the new TAR Officer Program was instituted (1958), the Chief of Naval Personnel conducted a study of the enlisted TAR Program, wherein it was concluded that, although the program fulfilled a requirement at its inception and had proven successful, changing conditions dictated a future course of action which would phase out the enlisted TAR Program by the gradual transition and integration of TAR enlisted personnel into the regular Navy. DCNO(AIR) did not support this plan for the Naval Air Reserve and cited the 1954 Johnson Board findings as rationale for retaining the enlisted TAR concept. CNO compromised and enacted a program to phase out the surface enlisted TAR Program while retaining the air-side personnel.

Because of manning problems, the phase out of the enlisted TAR Program was never fully completed. After a three-year period of surface enlisted TAR integration, the policy on enlisted integration was revised in January 1962, by reestablishing the surface enlisted TAR Program in the administrative ratings.

In relation to the CNO directive to terminate enlisted integration, the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) requested the thoughts of his subordinate commander, the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training (CNARESTRA), regarding the abolition of both the officer and enlisted TAR Programs and the utilization of USN personnel in all Reserve training billets.

In a letter offering supportive rationale, CNARESTRA concluded in February 1962, that Reserve training programs required the motivated interest and continuity provided by TAR specialists and that few USN officers could develop a genuine interest in a program so foreign to their career plans. Additionally, CNARESTRA was firmly convinced that employment of TAR enlisted personnel was the most efficient and economical means of supporting the Naval Air Reserve. Substitution of USN personnel was estimated to require increased allowances and inventories in order to allow for inefficiencies due to turnover of personnel, short tours of duty, lack of motivation and disciplinary problems.

The May 1962, Johnson Board addressed many items, which may be classified as fine-tuning recommendations, regarding the TAR concept of administering and training the Naval Reserve. Establishment of additional TAR flag billets, rotation of TAR and USN Aviation officers into the Fleet and the Reserve Forces, respectively, and rotation policies of enlisted aviation TAR were among the subjects studied. Concurrently, a Navy Department Report "Review of Management of the Department of the Navy," dated October 1962, addressed, among other things, the validity of the TAR Program. This report reaffirmed the overall effectiveness of the TAR Program and recommended that a status quo be maintained regarding the TAR officer structure.

In February 1975, the Chief of Naval Personnel convened a TAR officer study group comprised of regular and TAR officers to examine TAR officer personnel policies. This group was tasked to provide recommendations for improved internal management procedures in eight specific areas. These items included; captain continuation procedures, RPB updating, career pattern definitions, command screening requirements, selection/quality control policies, promotion procedures and accession of women officers. The report of the study group was reviewed on an item-by-item basis by the Chief of Naval Personnel in July 1975, and approved for implementation subject to certain restrictions placed on some of the items. Implementing actions have been underway since that time. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) was briefed on these actions in October 1975.

In December 1976, ASN(M&RA) directed the phase out of the TAR program and the transfer of the mission of training and administration of the Naval Reserve to the regular establishment. In February 1977, a planning group consisting of TAR,

regular and inactive duty officers was convened to develop the methodology for phasing out the officer portion of the program.

The history of the TAR Officer Program confirms that it is a viable program which has improved over the years to meet the demands of the Naval Reserve. NERA has also found that previous congressional testimony by Mr. McClullen, former ASN(M&RA), is not consistent with his proposal to phase out the TAR Officer Program. In addition, the Navy's decision to phase out the TAR Officer Program under the guise of the total force, is not consistent with the 21 August 1970, Secretary of Defense Memorandum, which directed full manning to authorizations of Reserve technicians and TARS in the total force.

NERA knows there is a need for a Reserve specialist, both officer enlisted, to administer a program that has 100,000 drilling reservists and over 100,000 in the active status pool. The Naval Reserve needs more than just transients passing through for short tours; we need people who are sincerely interested in the future of the Naval Reserve. We need people who know they will be returning to the Naval Reserve for future tours of duty. NERA has had the opportunity to examine the "265" Program, and we are skeptical about Navy taking aboard a large number of officers for short tours. In addition, this is in direct conflict with the Navy plan to modernize Naval Reserve management by the use of repeated Reserve tours. The 265 Program, as proposed, will cause a high rate of turnover, and NERA questions the ability of the "265" officers to be effective and speak out for the Naval Reserve. The Navy plan also places time constraints (maximum four-year tour) for the "265" Officer Program, NERA views this as a watered-down "mini TAR" Program—with the difference being that considerable influence and pressure from many sources, inside and outside the Navy, can be exercised in the selection process. NERA questions the continuity a large number of Naval Reserve officers can provide, if they are recalled to active duty for short tours. Training people and then discarding them just at the point they are becoming effective managers—cost effective?—good management practice?—NERA thinks not. In addition, Navy is recommending a system to code USN officers for repeated tours in the Reserve Program. It appears to NERA that Navy is recommending doing away with a proven program (TAR officers) and substituting an unknown and unproven quality. NERA believes the impartial TAR officer selection process which was halted in February 1977, serves the best interest of the Navy and Naval Reserve. Mr. Chairman, Navy is asking for your endorsement of a plan which has many, I repeat, many unanswered questions:

—Why was there not a complete unbiased study performed to give both the pros and cons of the TAR Officer Program?

—Why has Navy virtually ignored the OSD full-time training and administration of the Reserve and Guard Study (FFTA/SR)—which informally supports a Reserve management program such as the TAR Program for all Reserve components?

—Can this plan be practically carried out in the face of current active duty officer shortages?

—How long will it take Navy to fill the 130 Reserve Program billets that are currently vacant?

—What will happen if relief is not granted under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)?

—If relief is granted under DOPMA will every single officer assigned to a Reserve billet be *personally* screened by the Secretary of the Navy? We doubt this.

—What kind of quality cut is Navy talking about when there are not enough officers to go around now?

—How many passed-over USN officers have been assigned to Reserve Program billets?

Mr. Chairman, NERA could fill several pages with questions on this subject, but I believe we have made our point—the whole plan is suspect—Navy has already commenced implementation of the plan on a low-key scale without the committees' approval by:

1) ceasing all new TAR accession into the program for nearly ten months. This has seriously affected the Naval Reserve manning posture and is of serious concern to NERA.

2) stepped up the transfer of USN officers to Reserve billets.

If the Navy has not been totally above board with this committee, how can NERA members believe they have the Naval Reserve's best interest at heart.

NERA does not understand how DOD can even think of eliminating the officer TAR Program when at this very time other Reserve components have come under criticism for their unionized technician program and are looking to the Navy TAR Program as a possible solution to their own problems.

Mr. Chairman, the TAR Officer Program has proved to be an effective program which has served the Navy and Naval Reserve for many years, it can continue to serve effectively in the total force.

NERA supports the Navy's effort to strengthen the total force, but not at the expense of the Naval Reserve.

NERA strongly opposes the phase out to the TAR Officer Program. NERA strongly supports a mandatory revitalization of the TAR Officer Program with an annual progress report to Congress.

Now is not the time to phase out the TAR Officer Program. Now is the time to strengthen the program. The quality of TAR officers is at an all-time high. NERA's observations have concluded that the quality of TAR officers, particularly those accessed into the program within the last few years, is highly competitive with their USN counterparts due to their expertise in their warfare speciality. This expertise can be imparted to the entire Naval Reserve by maintaining the TAR Officer Program and thereby ensuring a stronger Naval Reserve.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this committee for affording me the opportunity to express the views of the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association regarding the extremely important and crucial issue here today. We stand ready to answer any questions you may have—or to provide additional information to the best of our ability.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MASTER CHIEF LANGE

Mr. LANGE. Thank you.

I am Master Chief Hull Technician George A. Lange, Jr., a drilling Naval Reservist, past national treasurer for the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association, NERA, and currently Veterans Affairs Officer for NERA.

All NERA officers serve in their positions without pay, and I am here as a representative of the Naval Enlisted Reserve Association.

NERA is an organization of enlisted Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Reservists. Our membership is primarily composed of enlisted Naval Reservists and our presence here is to ask you to reverse the Department of the Navy's proposal to phase out the Training and Administration of Reserves, TAR, officer program.

We would like to impress on this committee that NERA is an enlisted organization of citizen sailors who are dedicated to a free country with a strong Navy and Naval Reserve. NERA has no vested interest in the TAR officer program per se; however, NERA feels the proposed TAR officer phaseout is only a part of a much larger issue. That issue is the survival of the Naval Reserve as an effective force.

NERA has been around for more than 20 years. During this time we have seen only superficial support for the Naval Reserve by the regular Navy. With all due respect, we feel the high ranking officials and officers in the regular Navy are unaware of what's going on at the grass roots level in their own house. The regular Navy can say all they want about one Navy and total force, but NERA still finds hostility and apathy toward the Naval Reserve. Phasing out the TAR officers and forcing regular officers into Reserve billets will not improve this; it will tear the Naval Reserve apart.

The only real, strong support the Naval Reserve has received over the years has been from Congress, TAR officers, TAR enlisted, inactive Reservists and a handful of regular Navy people.

In December, 1976, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) directed the phaseout of the TAR program and

the transfer of the mission of training and administration of the Naval Reserve to the regular establishment. In February, 1977, a planning group, consisting of TAR, regular and inactive duty officers, was convened to develop the methodology for phasing out the officer portion of the program.

The history of the TAR officer program confirms that it is a viable program which has improved over the years to meet the demands of the Naval Reserve. NERA has also found that previous congressional testimony by Mr. McCullen, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), is not consistent with his proposal to phase out the TAR officer program.

In addition, the Navy's decision to phase out the TAR officer program under the disguise of the total force is not consistent with the 21 August 1970 Secretary of Defense Memorandum which directed full manning to authorizations of Reserve technicians and TARs in the total force.

NERA knows there is a need for a Reserve specialist, both officer and enlisted, to administer a program that has 100,000 drilling Reservists and over 100,000 in the active status pool.

The Naval Reserve needs more than just transients passing through for short tours; we need people who are sincerely interested in the future of the Naval Reserve; we need people who know they will be returning to the Naval Reserve for future tours of duty.

NERA has had the opportunity to examine the "265" program and we are skeptical about Navy taking aboard a large number of officers for short tours. In addition, this is in direct conflict with the Navy plan to modernize Naval Reserve management by the use of repeated Reserve tours.

The 265 program as proposed will cause a high rate of turnover and NERA questions the ability of the 265 officers to be effective and speak out for the Naval Reserve. The Navy plan also places time constraints—maximum four-year tour—for the 265 officer program, and NERA views this as a watered down mini-TAR program, with the difference being that considerable influence and pressure from many sources, inside and outside the Navy, can be exercised in the selection process.

NERA questions the continuity that a large number of Naval Reserve officers can provide if they are recalled to active duty for short tours. Training people and then discarding them just at the point they are becoming effective managers is cost effective, good management practice? NERA thinks not.

In addition, Navy is recommending a system to code USN officers for repeated tours in the Reserve program. It appears to NERA that Navy is recommending doing away with a proven program—TAR officers—and substituting an unknown and unproven quality. NERA believes the impartial TAR officer selection process which was halted in February, 1977, serves the best interest of the Navy and the Naval Reserve.

Mr. Chairman, Navy is asking for your endorsement of a plan which has many, I repeat, many, unanswered questions:

Why was there not a complete, unbiased study performed to give both the pros and cons of the TAR officer program?

Why has Navy virtually ignored the OSD full-time training and administration of the Reserve and the Guard study (FTTA/SR) which informally supports a Reserve management program such as the TAR program for all Reserve components?

Can this plan be practically carried out in the face of current active duty officer shortages?

How long will it take Navy to fill the 130 to 150 Reserve program billets that are currently vacant?

What will happen if relief is not granted under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, DOPMA?

If relief is granted under DOPMA, will every single officer assigned to a Reserve billet be personally screened by the Secretary of the Navy? We seriously doubt this.

What kind of quality cut is Navy talking about when there are not enough officers to go around now?

How many passed-over USN officers have been assigned to Reserve program billets?

Mr. Chairman, NERA could fill several pages with questions on this subject but I believe we have made our point—the whole plan is suspect; Navy has already commenced implementation of the plan on a low-key scale without the committees' approval by, one, ceasing all new TAR accession into the program for nearly ten months, which has seriously affected the Naval Reserve manning postured and is of serious concern to NERA; and, two, stepped up the transfer of USN officers to Reserve billets.

If the Navy has not been totally above-board with this committee, how can NERA members believe they have the Navy Reserve's best interest at heart?

NERA does not understand how DOD can even think of eliminating the officer TAR program when at this very time other Reserve components have come under criticism for their unionized technician program and are looking to the Navy TAR officer program as a possible solution to their own problems.

Mr. Chairman, the TAR officer program has proved to be an effective program which has served the Navy and the Naval Reserve for many years; it can continue to serve effectively in the total force.

NERA supports the Navy's effort to strengthen the total force but not at the expense of the Naval Reserve.

NERA strongly opposes the phaseout of the TAR officer program. NERA strongly supports a mandatory revitalization of the TAR officer program, with an annual progress report to Congress.

Now is not the time to phase out the TAR officer program. Now is the time to strengthen the program. The quality of TAR officers is at an all-time high. NERA's observations have concluded that the quality of TAR officers, particularly those accessed into the program within the last few years, is highly competitive with their USN counterparts due to their expertise in their warfare specialty. This expertise can be imparted to the entire Naval Reserve by maintaining the TAR officer program and thereby ensuring a stronger Naval Reserve.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, for affording me the opportunity to express the views of the Naval

Enlisted Reserve Association regarding the extremely important and critical issue discussed here today.

We stand ready to answer any questions you may have or to provide additional information to the best of our ability.

FAIRNESS OF 15 YEAR TAR PHASEOUT

Mr. FLYNT. Thank you, Master Chief Lange.

There will be some questions at this point by members of the committee, following which questions we will then call on General Gerard for his presentation.

In asking the questions, I think that I will direct my first questions to Admiral Johnson who may answer them or designate anyone else to answer them that he desires.

Is that satisfactory to all of you, with the understanding that nobody will be cut off if he wants to concur with the initial answer given or to give different views and different answers to the same questions. I want you to feel free to do so.

Do you in any way find the proposed phaseout of the TAR program to be unequitable or unworkable from a personnel standpoint, as opposed to its overall impact on the future of the Naval Reserve?

Admiral JOHNSON. I believe, from my observations, the proposed phaseout is quite fair to the existing TAR community. I am speaking only from that aspect, and no other. It seems to me impractical, however, inasmuch as I don't think they will ever see 15 years in the phaseout. The senior TARs are leaving rather hastily now and the junior TARs, seeing the handwriting on the bulkhead, are going out also.

I just don't think they are even going to have 15 years.

Mr. FLYNT. You are saying they won't last 15 years, in your opinion?

Admiral JOHNSON. In my opinion, it won't. As far as fairness is concerned, in my opinion it is fair. Now, there may be other exceptions.

Admiral FORREST. No; we agree.

Mr. FLYNT. Would your answer be the same about the TAR proposal if TAR officers were not now excluded from the dual compensation provisions of Federal law, or is that irrelevant?

Admiral JOHNSON. I don't know what it would change.

Mr. FLYNT. Your answer would be the same?

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Captain BELL. What you are saying is, if the TAR officer retired, then he would have to give up some of his pay, if he worked for the Government again?

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. If the same compensation requirements with respect to retired pay applied to the TAR officer program as applies to the regular Navy officer, would that cool your opposition to the proposal?

Captain BELL. No, it would not cool our opposition.

Mr. FLYNT. If DOPMA becomes law and the TAR officer program remains viable, would TAR officers then be covered by the dual compensation laws?

Captain BELL. That is up to you, I think. That is up to the Congress.

Admiral JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I think that would have to be decided by what used to be called the Civil Service and Post Office Committee.

Mr. FLYNT. What would you prefer?

Admiral JACKSON. The position of the Reserve Officers Association has always been that both regulars and reserves and reserves on active duty and on inactive duty are entitled to the retirement which they have earned and that striking out the pay of regulars is unfair to the regular.

CAREER ENHANCEMENT ASSIGNMENTS FOR TAR OFFICERS

Mr. FLYNT. Can you tell us why the Navy has not used its present authority to make career enhancement assignments available to a significant number of TAR officers?

Admiral JOHNSON. In my opinion—and I believe this has been borne out by testimony today—the numbers of career enhancing command billets at sea have dwindled appreciably. They are very small in the aviation community where for a long time TAR officers had not, in senior grades, been able to get sea duty. In the surface program they still, to the best of my understanding, have a goodly share of sea billets which are career enhancing, but in the aviation community it has not been practical from the standpoint of the career regular Navy officer; and I think this is understandable to those who are creating careers for the regular Navy. I think it is as simple as that.

Captain CARL. Mr. Chairman, this may not be related, but it seems to me if the Navy had an education program for the regular officers they would certainly have a better understanding of the capabilities of the Reserve and might therefore be more inclined to put TARs in sea billets.

Mr. FLYNT. Could you give us an estimate of how often current TAR officers are assigned to sea duty or other career broadening assignments, and how would that assignment policy compare with the assignment policy used for regular line and staff officers?

Admiral JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I think that that question can only be answered by the Chief of Personnel or his deputy. I think the number of TAR officers is so small as related to the number of regular officers that if there were a will there would be a way to find professional enhancement billets for them all.

Mr. FLYNT. Captain Bell, do you want to field that?

Captain BELL. Sir, I think as of now—I think it was in Mr. Chappell's statement, but I am not sure—somewhere around 30 percent or 35 percent of the TARs are at sea right now, and of course most of those are surface-type people. I think 40 percent of the active duty regular Navy people are at sea, so the difference in the percentage isn't too great if you look at both sides of the house.

If you look at just the Reserves and say only 30 percent of those TARs are at sea, it looks pretty bad. The problem, of course, is easier on the surface side because there are more billets for TARs to go to sea there.

In the aviation community it closes down pretty fast because the pyramid comes to a point in a hurry. I think probably for anyone above lieutenant commander on the aviation side, the USN just won't allow it; the TARs would love to go to sea. I have heard the statement also that the TARs don't want to go to sea, and I think that is a completely wrong impression. They love to go to sea, and I did. I went to sea as a TAR and the regulars thought I was crazy. I enjoyed the tour very much, especially as commanding officer.

Mr. FLYNT. Would your answer substantially be that the percentages are about the same?

Captain BELL. I think it is within ten or 15 percent, yes. There are a substantial number of TARs that are at sea right now.

Mr. FLYNT. I saw Admiral Seiberlich look at some papers back there. Admiral, would you like to comment on that?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir. I have the exact figures. As of 31 August, which I think can be representative, serving in Reserve program billets ashore there are 974 TAR officers. That includes two flag officers. Serving billets afloat, there are no flag officers, three captains, 16 commanders, 93 lieutenant commanders, 57 lieutenants and three lieutenants (junior grade), 172 in afloat billets.

Serving in billets ashore outside of the Reserve program there are 123 TAR officers. They are, for instance, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and some of those billets.

So that is the breakout as of the 31st of August.

Mr. FLYNT. The percentages do run about the same that were just given, according to my mental arithmetic. Is that correct?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, sir; I think you find a higher percentage of the regular officers at sea, mainly because of the predominant numbers of ensign, lieutenant (junior grade) and lieutenant billets who are at sea. When you look at the TAR community, it consists largely of the more senior officers due to the Reserve program management requirements. I can submit for the record the exact percentage.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Would you do that for the so-called field grades, or the O-4s and above?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. O-3s?

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Threes and above; however you have that.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, I can submit that for the record so we can make a comparison between the TARs and regular officer sea/shore percentages.

[The information referred to follows:]

As of 31 October 1977, 6534 (35 percent) of the 18815 URL surface and aviation USN officer inventory, pay grades 03 and above, were in operational sea and squadron assignments. As of 31 October 1977, 127 (11 percent) of 1117 URL surface and aviation TAR officer inventory, pay grades 03 and above, were operational sea and squadron assignments.

TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

Mr. FLYNT. Back to Admiral Johnson, what alternative programs for utilizing the Naval Reserve and enhancing the total force concept would you recommend in lieu of the phaseout of the TAR program? Do you want to supply that or field it now?

Admiral JOHNSON. Just off the cuff, I recommend none other than retaining the TAR program, which I think enhances the total force,

in that there is a better undersanding and, I think, a better reaction, from the Reserve forces to TARs: I think you get a better mix this way, and I think you get a better performance for total force in this fashion.

I also think the TAR acts as a catalyst between the Reserve forces who are often one-time-a-month performers, and the active, regular Navy. The TAR understands both sides of the house. He works as a perfect catalyst for the two forces.

As far as total force, I don't know how you can beat the program.

Captain BELL. You have, really, as I see it, three alternatives: either TAR, USN or technician. I don't know any other way you can go on it. We have discussed the TAR program now pretty well. The technician, I think, has shown its value to the Guard and has done a beautiful job there.

I think Admiral Seiberlich mentioned earlier though that the Technician program is not valid for the Navy because of sending him to sea. They are civilians and they are hard to get to sea.

The other is the USN program, and we discussed that today too, so I could only suggest that the TAR program is the best way to go.

Mr. FLYNT. Anybody else?

In recent years the Naval Reserve has received some considerable criticism from both the administration and committees of Congress. One of the criticisms has been that active force managers were not involved with or conversant with the details of Navy Reserve management and gave the Reserve only superficial support. Could the TAR phaseout proposal help resolve this problem, if it is a problem, or would it make it worse?

Admiral JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, without the advice and assistance of the TAR officers who have expertise in this direction, to eliminate them entirely and endeavor to support the Naval Reserve completely with regular Navy people who have had no contact with it is a planned input of ignorance.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. But, Admiral Jackson, the proposal was, and the earlier testimony here today was that this would get rid of this ignorance. The idea is that active officers would begin to understand what the Naval Reserve is, what its problems are, and some of that would fall off on the other officers they work with. We would get rid of some of the ignorance about the Naval Reserve.

Admiral JACKSON. Mr. Vander Schaaf, I don't think it is the responsibility of the Naval Reserve to train the regular Navy. It is the responsibility of the regular Navy, through all the support they can get, including the TARs, to train the Naval Reserve.

Captain BELL. If the argument you used, Mr. Vander Schaaf, were so, why doesn't it work now? Why don't the regulars do more than they are doing now about the Reserves? It goes back to my earlier statement about the need for education.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. I think the testimony I heard this morning—I can't really answer your question and I am trying to find answers myself—the testimony I heard this morning went like this: There is an elite, small group of officers who have dedicated their careers to the Reserves and they have effectively prevented an influx of active people into the Reserves. When an active officer is assigned to the Reserves, it wrecks his chance for promotion. He

doesn't feel like he is doing anything; he is ostracized. Those kinds of problems occur and the Navy says we get rid of those problems by eliminating that. I am not advocating one way or the other; I am trying to understand your position.

Captain BELL. My initial comment would be, I don't believe the Navy has encouraged its officers to go into the Reserves billets. It has made it hard for them to accept billets in the Reserve. The Navy has had the opportunity to assign more regular officers to the Reserve program than it has done under the present law. I think if the TAR program were eliminated, you would also eliminate what little assistance is provided now for the TARs' interpreting to the regular Navy the problems and capabilities of the Reserve, because they understand the Reserve; they understand the civilian community, which the Reserves come from too, which the regulars don't understand until after they have been in a billet for a while.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Let me try to be a little bit more specific: This committee has proposed over the years maybe five or six different functions that we felt the Naval Reserve could probably perform for the active duty, continuing even in a peacetime role, in addition to augmenting those functions in wartime. But you hear answers come back, "Well, the actives don't want to turn this over to the Naval Reserve because they are either going to mess it up or we can't count on them; they won't be called to active duty, their people aren't trained, et cetera."

It seems to me the management of the Navy is now coming to the committee and saying, "We have to avoid those problems; we have to avoid this misunderstanding by educating these active officers and giving them a chance to understand that the Reserves can perform some missions. The best way to do it is put a significant number of them in the Reserve programs for some period of their naval career."

On the surface, it sounds good. You fellows disagree with that?

Captain BELL. I think the education is the key to it, but I think it needs to start at the top. We are having problems with the top levels of the Navy. There is where the problem is. It is not with the middle management. We are doing damned well out in the field and we have the best air squadrons out there; and I would add ships, too. These old destroyers that are out there running around with Reserves aboard are doing just as well, if not better than the USN ships. I don't think that is a problem. I think if the top level Navy management would start giving some of these missions to the Reserves and start letting us do it, we would do a damned good job, and we could save a lot of money doing it.

We proposed many missions in our input last year to OSD but they were all shot down because Navy wasn't about to give any hardware to the Reserves.

Mr. ADDABBO. What missions, Captain?

Captain BELL. Lots of them. We had additional P-3 squadrons; we had additional ships; we had ASW squadrons, VS types, many, many different missions, and all of which the Reserves could do. We would have to be phased in. We can't assume them all at once, because we have been chopped up so badly lately.

Mr. ADDABBO. When you say you have been chopped up lately, under what conditions?

Captain BELL. We have been cut down from 129,000 down to 87,000, and every time there is a cut there is a reorganization, and you have people going in many directions here. It is a real morale problem with the Reserves, but they are ready to get in and get at it if somebody will give them something to do, and let them stay in one mission for a little while.

ROTATION OF REGULAR NAVY OFFICERS IN RESERVE ORGANIZATION

Mr. ADDABBO. You probably were all here this morning when we received the testimony from the Secretary and the Admiral. They promised that if the TAR program is phased out we will be getting regular Navy officers of the highest caliber, and the program would be working.

I heard testimony here earlier when I came in that the officers were passing through, or are passing through—that is my question, were or are—and a year and a half later they are retiring.

Is this of recent vintage or is this past history?

Admiral FORREST. Just passing through? That is going on right now. I think the testimony was if they phase out the TAR program they would eliminate that type of thing, watch it very carefully, and control it.

My point is, if I were going to run this program I would control it and I would watch it very carefully and it would work, and I am sure they can make it work as long as they are here.

I am saying once they are gone, you are through with it; you go right back to the way it was before. The same way I pointed out in my previous experience as Auditor General, the same thing is starting out all over again.

Mr. ADDABBO. We received testimony this morning that there have been several vacancies in the TAR billets, that they have been filled by regulars. Can anyone testify here as to the experience of the men who are filling these billets? Are these regular officers who are staying in, or are these officers who are taking it as a last assignment before retiring?

Admiral Forrest. I have run across a few of them recently, and I mentioned one in Phoenix who had an outstanding first period or tour of duty with the Reserves and now is on his way out.

Captain BELL. We saw the other day a list of assignments to Reserve Program Billets since the decision was made back in December a year ago. We have a list of at least ten officers who have been assigned to these billets who have been at least passed over once and some of them many, many times. So, the Navy has had the chance to implement the program in the last year and they haven't done it. They haven't shown that they are going to do it even after they get permission.

Mr. ADDABBO. The fact that an officer has been passed over doesn't mean he is not a capable officer.

Captain BELL. He is not a front runner, like they are talking about.

Mr. FLYNT. He is not a water walker?

Captain BELL. Right. He may have sunk a couple of times enroute.

As of now, they have given us a few high quality officers in certain high visibility billets, as we put in our testimony. We have also had a lot of others.

Mr. ADDABBO. I would ask you to supply this for the record—if I may, Mr. Chairman—you testified earlier this morning that several of the TAR billets have been filled by regulars.

I would like to know—and supply it for the record—the length of service these officers have before they reach retirement, how much more time they have before they retire.

Captain BELL. You want a certain date in time or since when till when?

Mr. ADDABBO. Since we started filling these billets. It is only recently, I imagine, within the last year.

Captain BELL. They have been doing that since 1953, supposedly. The basic TAR directive says you will send the TARs to sea; you will replace them with USN officers when practicable, I think the word is.

Mr. ADDABBO. Within the last five years?

Captain BELL. I will have to get that from the Navy.

[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Accurate retirement—eligible information on regular officers assigned in the past to reserve program billets is not available. However, of the 524 regular officers assigned to Reserve Program billets as of 31 October 1977, 31 will be involuntarily retired by statute upon completion of their current tours of duty.

Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral JOHNSON. May I say for the record that one of the very superb regular Navy officers that has been working in a Reserve program billet is Admiral Seiberlich, who testified here this morning. I think he probably knows more about the TAR program and the Reserve program and its capabilities than many Reserve officers. He is a superb officer, and this kind we love, but there are too few of them.

Captain BELL. He is an exception to the rule, believe me.

Mr. FLYNT. Master Chief Lange?

EFFECT OF REORGANIZATIONS ON RESERVES

Mr. LANGE. Sir, I am a consumer of the program and since 1974 I don't know which way to put on my uniform sometimes. We have been organized, reorganized, reshuffled, refined, redefined, "No, you ain't got a pay billet; yes, you've got a pay billet," this, that and the other thing.

I have to go to drill this weekend and these young sailors that I deal with are going to come to me and they say, "Chief, what the hell is going on? We read something in Navy Times that says this." I say, "Well, that is unofficial. You hear it from me and it ain't official either, but I probably know a lot more about it than some of the other people."

But it's getting to the point a TAR officer is in that Naval Reserve Center for four to five years. He has some ability. We know whom we are dealing with. A regular Navy officer is looking at a

two, two and a half, three year tour of duty. I know the Navy is looking at to save some money; let's keep these people in there, but that doesn't say they are going to do it.

There is one article in last week's Navy Times and one in this week's that are almost contradictory official studies by the Department of the Navy about the future of their regular officers.

Last year they came up short. The future three or four years down the road looks good, but I read into that thing, "Hey, these lieutenants and j.g.'s are looking at it right now. Hey, the Navy looks good to me." The civil employment market isn't worth a damn, but come three years from now when that young man is ready to make his decision, an excellent opportunity comes up. Daddy has a nice engineering job for him or the nuclear program has come up, but there isn't the stability of the Reserve officers in the community because there are rumors going down the road we are going to get reorganized again.

Of course, everybody is going to deny it, and then it will come out. This is what we need. The guy down at the end of the pike who is supposed to be under the guy that you are going to call up, as mentioned—today is December 7th and I think if my memory serves me right the majority of the Navy after Pearl Harbor was composed of Reservists, both officer and enlisted, and I think we did a hell of good job as well with our regular counterparts.

It is just that we just don't know where to stand. Every weekend we go in to drill and we go in and there is a different thinking down the road, no stability. We don't know what the heck is going on and it is hurting not only the enlisted people; it is also hurting the officers because they don't know what is going on, and in many respects it is hurting the readiness.

Some people say what can the Naval Reserve community do? All they can do is take a census of their own community. I had one two-week training duty; it was a destroyer, an older one; it had some problems. They did not have on board the capability in the ship's company to do high pressure welding on the crossconnect on a steamline. A ship can't go without that steamline being in good shape. The Reservist on board these two weeks was qualified. Fortunately, that man was on board; but there are many assets within the Reserve program that the Navy is not even aware of, and if they took a good census they would find it, but we just want some stability so we know where we stand; 52,00, 87,000, 129,00—for the last two years I have come up here and listened to this business about total strength and Admiral Charbonnet said it right in this room, "If we get reorganized one more time you are going to kill us."

I think sometimes in OMB that is what they want to do, kill us.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Chief, don't you think this is asking too much? Don't you think the regular Navy will be into all of this as soon as they get this new program in order?

Mr. LANGE. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You don't think it will solve that problem?

Mr. LANGE. The Navy has 47 out of 1,000 people deserting and now they are going to give BT's a bonus for going down in the firerooms.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Chief, I have been associated with the Naval Reserve about 30 years, commanded units, as Captain Bell knows, and I want to say that what you just said is absolutely true. You are constantly up and down. You never know where you are. If I thought for one moment this new program would solve that and would help in the slightest, I believe I would vote for it. I believe I would say it is a good thing; but I don't believe that is going to give any more stability to the situation than we have had before.

As a matter of fact, I am not so sure it isn't going to generate more instability, because you are not going to have the stabilizing effect which you now get from these TARs, who are there and who understand both sides of the program. That is what bothers me about it. Every time you have a change of command—and it is usually the regular at the top now, let's be honest about it, who is heading up that program who makes the change—you build some more instability into the program every time.

Captain BELL. I would like to add to that, the discussions that I heard in my travels are just on that subject, that what is being proposed adds to this instability problem tremendously because it is viewed as another uncertainty. They don't know what the future is. It is keeping our retention rates down.

More importantly, it is keeping us from getting competent enlisted and junior officer personnel into the Naval Reserve today.

I heard a very sharp lieutenant just recently in a discussion we had on this in one of the readiness commands say, "What is there in here for us to bring our peers into the Selected Reserves program today? We see no future."

Now we are talking about eliminating the TAR officer program which helps to give some stability.

Mr. FLYNT. Go ahead, Mr. Chappell.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I want to make it perfectly clear that I think the program which Admiral Seiberlich has offered here is a very fine program, once you get past the question of whether you need it or not. I want to commend you on that, Admiral Seiberlich, and I am in no way being critical of how you do it under your proposal once you decide it is to be done. My problem is, I haven't yet heard a good answer on why it should be done, I mean, on how it is going to improve the program.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent at this time to place my statement before the House Committee on Armed Services in the record at this point.

Mr. FLYNT. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

Statement of

The Honorable Bill Chappell

Member of the U.S. House of Representatives

Made Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel
of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. House of Representatives

--Concerning Management of Naval Reserve Programs--

MR. CHAIRMAN, first let me thank you and the Subcommittee for permitting me to submit the following statement on the issue now being considered--that is, the Navy's plan to disestablish its specialized officer corps for Training and Administration of Reserves, more familiarly known as the TARs.

I have been deeply concerned about the Navy's proposal to remodel the management structure of the Selected Naval Reserve by eliminating the TARs since first learning of it in December of last year. I have devoted considerable energy to investigating why the proposal was made and what purpose it would serve. I also have sought to become as knowledgeable as possible on the background and circumstances of the TAR issue, and I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to share my findings and conclusions with the Subcommittee.

Let me assure you at the outset that my concern is not focussed on the TARs per se. I am, rather, exceedingly interested in any and all actions that would affect the rightful and necessary role of the Naval Reserve as a component of our national defense. I believe my record speaks for itself regarding consistent support for strong and effective active forces; I would like to emphasize that my concern extends equally to Guard and Reserve forces, for they, too, are essential to our security.

In this particular issue, whether to keep or discard the TAR officer program, the bottom line is really, "Will this proposal affect our ability to maintain a Selected Naval Reserve of sufficient quality and operational readiness to meet the Navy's needs in any emergency?" Obviously, the means employed to manage the Reserve will directly impact both its quality and capability. Thus, the question deserves our most serious consideration.

Most people familiar with organizational management would agree that two principles are especially significant in determining effectiveness:

- (1) The manager has in-depth knowledge of and experiential, working familiarity with the organization; and
- (2) The career success of the manager is firmly integrated with and bound to the success of the organization itself.

It is principally in these two key areas that Navy's plan fails. It would assign officers to programs they know nothing about, and in which they have no vested interest.

My statement on the TAR issue is admittedly rather lengthy, Mr. Chairman. I believe this necessary, however, to provide sufficient detail to convince even the most dogged advocate of change that TAR elimination will do far more harm than good.

I recognize that the TAR issue is complex, and that there are numerous other details I cannot cover today. However, nowhere in my studies--including several communications with Navy--have I been able to find adequate justification for Navy's TAR disestablishment decision, nor any facts that refute my reasons for opposing it.

For the purposes of this hearing, I will confine my comments to the following major topics:

- The basis for the TAR decision--what prompted it initially?
- Purported objectives to be achieved--and why the plan cannot accomplish them.
- Why the current system is valid--including reaffirmation of Navy control over the TARs and documentation of Selected Reserve achievements under TAR management.
- How scrapping of the TAR officer program will adversely affect the personnel situation in the active force--aggravating existing shortages.

Ever since Assistant Secretary of the Navy Joseph McCullen's decision to eliminate Navy's TAR officer program came to light in late December of last year, there has been a strange reluctance on the part of senior Navy officials to discuss how and why the decision was made.

When, at Mr. McCullen's own request, he appeared before this Subcommittee last January to inform the Members about his unexpected action, the circumstances at that time soon were made quite clear. Members of the Subcommittee sought answers for two primary questions:

- What precipitated the decision?--and,
- What conditions were to be met before any implementing action was taken?

The answers from the outgoing Assistant Secretary provided no rationale or even any apparent basis for his proposed "decision." In response to Member queries, he admitted:

- No, his decision had not been prompted by eruption of new problems since his last Congressional appearance (at which time, ironically, he staunchly defended the TAR officer program as the most effective means of managing the Naval Reserve).
- No, the decision was not supported by newly revealed facts or analytical findings.
- No, the decision had not been well developed at the time of its announcement, nor were there any specific plans or details concerning its implementation (much less its impact!)

Assistant Secretary McCullen stated repeatedly that his only reason for appearing before this Subcommittee was to pay the Members the courtesy of personally informing them of his proposed action. He raised many more questions than he was able to answer. About the only substantive aspect of McCullen's appearance was a commitment for a full Navy review of the TAR issue with the House Armed Services Committee--following

completion of a "study" and development of an implementation plan.

As we all know, the Navy subsequently convened the so-called Reserve Management Planning Group to develop a plan of implementation. However, the state of affairs hasn't changed. The cart is still out in front of the horse! Senior Navy officials are even more anxious than before to explain at great length how they plan to phase out the TAR officer community, but not one of them has offered a plausible explanation of why they should phase out the TAR officer program.

I would say that the Navy's implementing plan is probably a good one--BUT THAT IS ENTIRELY BESIDE THE POINT! Where are the analyses proving that our Naval Reserve programs will benefit, be better managed and supported? Instead, we are being asked to buy a pig in a poke--to embark on a plan devoid of the inherent elements to succeed--and totally dependent upon a continuing willingness on the part of management to exert the necessary controls and make the hard decisions necessary to achieve the promised outcomes.

Another subject that has been neglected is how the existing program works--its advantages, as well as its shortcomings--and what the Navy can do to improve it if they are really serious about strengthening the Reserve. Today I intend to fill in some of these gaps.

The purpose of the Navy TAR proposal most often emphasized is "to bring the Naval Reserve closer to the Regular Navy." This closeness, it is claimed, will be achieved by placing recalled Selected Reservists and active-duty Regulars in the Naval Reserve program billets now filled by TAR officers.

The goal of bringing Regular and Selected Reserve personnel closer together is most admirable and desirable. Actually, this has been one of the important accomplishments of TAR officers down through the years--acting as catalysts to effect a mutual understanding. As every

Reservist knows, working with the operating forces, proving you can handle the job, and earning the respect of top professionals has always been the name of the game. But achieving these objectives isn't all that simple.

The career Regular Navy officer and the Naval Reservist live in distinctly different worlds. Not only are they different in terms of the applicable statutes, the policies and procedures, and their training and administration--but they are different attitudinally, and in primary life orientations and motivations.

On the one hand, the Regular Navy officer follows a fast-paced career pattern geared to varied assignments and increasing responsibilities in the Navy's operating forces. The civilian-sailor, however, has his primary focus on a civilian career or profession, his community, and his 28-days-a-month activities and associations. Regardless of his patriotism and motivation, his role as a Naval Reservist is only a relatively small part of his total existence.

The TAR officer's role and career preparation was developed deliberately and quite naturally to bridge this gap. The TAR officer is first and foremost a career-motivated Ready Reservist, with a warfare speciality. His background and experience through the first three or four commissioned grades is almost identical with his Regular Navy counterpart. Because of this, many of the junior billets in the Reserve Program can be handled equally well by Regular or TAR officers. But as the TAR progresses, his repeated tours in varied Reserve Program assignments gives him an intimate understanding of the Reserve environment and develops his expertise in Reserve Program management. Concurrently, his periodic rotation to operating force and other active-Navy assignments maintains his warfare qualification and places him in progressively higher positions in active-Navy management.

As he advances to the more responsible and policy-making positions

in Reserve Program management (including the so-called "265" billets), his rotation to operating force assignments is less and less significant. Just as the senior Regular Navy officer becomes more and more a manager and less and less directly involved in the operation of aircraft and ships--so does the senior TAR. However, the point is that with proper preparation, the TAR officer is uniquely equipped to interpret and convey the "mysteries" of the Reservist to the Regular, and vice versa. The TAR is a conduit between these two distinctive groups. When afforded a reasonable degree of cooperation by the Regular Navy, the TARs have been eminently successful in bringing together the best of the two worlds--and many are succeeding today, in spite of the unfavorable climate being created.

The more one looks at the current state of affairs and examines how the present program works, the more reasons one finds for challenging the Navy's arguments for change. As a matter of fact, virtually every benefit the Navy claims will result from phasing out TAR officers is already built into the existing system. As I suggested earlier, most of the rhetoric has been long on "how good things are going to be," and exceedingly short on advantages of the existing program and how it works. To develop these points, it is necessary to quickly review the Navy's Reserve Program Billet (RPB) structure and nomenclature.

Reserve Program Billets

Title 10 USC 678(a) provides for Reserve officer personnel on active duty to support Reserve components. Section 678(b) provides that such Reserve officers receive periodic refresher training appropriate to their qualification.

Navy RPBs Categorized by Function

As of June 30, 1977, the Navy had 1,911 officer personnel billets dedicated to the operation, management, and support of the Naval Reserve Program. Navy Reserve Program Billets are categorized by function as follows:

- 794 operating billets--ships, aircraft squadrons, afloat staffs
- 988 training and administration billets--Readiness Commands, Naval Air Reserve Units/Naval Air Stations, Reserve Centers
- 129 contributory billets--to compensate Regular Navy activities and commands for training and other support functions which Navy provides for its Reserve component.

RPB Coding

To ensure compliance with the law and appropriate personnel assignments, Navy employs the following Reserve Program Billet coding:

- "T" Billet--to be filled by a TAR officer in accordance with 10 USC 678(a)
- "E" Billet--to be filled by a TAR or Regular officer in accordance with 10 USC 678(b)
- "R" Billet--to be filled by a Regular officer, since there are no TAR officers of that specialty (e.g., Medical, Civil Engineer Corps)

Breakdown by RPB Codes

- 334 "T" Billets (TARs only)
- 1,489 "E" Billets (either TARs or Regulars)
- 88 "R" Billets (Regulars only)

Basis of the TAR Officer Community

The sum of the "T" and "E" billets, or 1,823 of the 1,911 total, establishes the basis for the Navy's TAR officer community. Currently, approximately 30 percent of the TAR officers are serving in afloat and fleet operational or staff billets, as compared to about 40 percent of Regular officers in such assignments--hardly the lopsided picture which is often described.

"265" Billets

Title 10 USC 265 provides for Reserve officers on active duty at the seat of government and at headquarters responsible for Reserve affairs. These officers are to participate in preparing and administering the policies and regulations affecting the Reserve component. While serving in a "265" billet, an officer is an additional number on the staff with which he is serving.

Navy Allocation of "265" Billets

In the fiscal year 1977/78 budgets, 200 of Navy's 331 "T" billets are designated as "265" billets. The "265" billets are allocated as follows:

- 3 in DoD (1 - ASD (M&RA); 1 - RFPB; 1 - Employer Support of Guard and Reserve)
- 2 in ASN (M&RA)
- 34 in OPNAV (3 - 0-03; 3 - OP-04; 4 - OP-05; 2 - OP-06; 1 - OP-094; 1 - OP-901; 1 - OP-064; 1 - OP-101; 1 - Inspector General; 17 - OP-09R)
- 16 in BUPERS
- 12 in Headquarters and Joint Commands (Naval Material, Systems Commands, Telecommunications Command, Intelligence Command, Comptroller, Military Sealift Command, Naval Education and Training Command, CINCLANT/PAC).
- 78 in Readiness Commands
- 55 on staff of Chief of Naval Reserve

Navy "265" Billet Reductions in FY 77

Navy has reduced its "265" billet structure in fiscal year 1977 as follows:

- 3 from OPNAV
- 1 from ASN (M&RA)
- 1 from BUPERS
- 3 from staff of Chief of Naval Reserve

As it now stands, the Navy has management control over every aspect of the TAR program. It can monitor and control TAR officer quality through accession, detailing, promotion, and retention criteria and procedures, thereby determining career patterns, experiential profiles, and performance standards. Navy can detail TARs in and out of both operating force and Reserve program billets. This not only provides for properly backgrounding TAR officers in both sides of the Navy world, but also permits the introduction of Regular officers into the Reserve environment. Positively pursued, such interchange within the combined active-duty community is healthy and can promote the needed awareness of Reserve affairs at all levels of command management--if this is truly an objective.

The Navy's TAR officer community has always been subject to the personnel plans, policies, and procedures of the Chief of Naval Personnel. If there are perceived deficiencies, Navy is both responsible and accountable for them. It has had, and has today, the means to correct them. TAR officer continuation is reviewed annually, affording a more positive and rapid means of dropping the poor performer than exists in the Regular Navy. Unlike the marginal Regular Navy officer, who is guaranteed a specified term of service once he reaches the grade of Lieutenant Commander, the TAR has no such protection behind which to hide inferior performance.

If operational or other qualifications are thought to be lacking, an officially recognized career pattern, with Selection Board criteria, would be in order. By the same token, the Navy can't shut off all opportunities for TAR officer upgrading and then condemn the community for

its poor quality. In short, the TAR officer is and will be no more and no less than the Navy wants him to be.

Advocates of the Navy plan state that a review of TAR officer records by the Navy's Bureau of Personnel shows that about 50 percent of the TARs are not "competitive" with their Regular Navy counterparts. This is supposed to suggest that the TARs are vastly inferior.

We all recognize that the TAR community would be at a disadvantage if forced to compete with the Regulars. This is not due to performance, but rather to the difference in career patterns. In other words, the competition is based on performance in a variety of jobs from which the TAR is largely excluded. Navy assignment policy thus prevents the TAR community from being competitive with their Regular Navy counterparts--when the Regular Navy career pattern is used as the standard.

It should also be acknowledged that if the Bureau of Personnel conducted a similar review of Regular officer records, based primarily on their performance in Reserve Program Billets (with special emphasis on "265" billets, from which the Regulars are excluded), far less than 50 percent of the Regulars' records would be competitive with those of their TAR counterparts.

If the Navy really wants to (1) increase the number of Regular officers in Reserve Program Billets, or (2) raise the "quality cut" to their top-notch talent--or both--they have every opportunity to do so within the existing program. There are 1,489 "E" billets to which Regulars may be assigned.

Realistically, of course, the Navy doesn't have the Regular officer assets--either quantitatively or qualitatively. Mid-grade officers are in short supply and retention goals are currently not being met.

It goes without saying that the utilization of Regular Navy officers in all Reserve Program Billets not statutorily requiring Reserve officers

would result in:

- More direct contact between the Selected Reserve and the Regular officers so assigned, and
- Additional awareness on the part of a small segment of the Regular officer corps of the organization, administration, and capabilities of the Naval Reserve.

However, as a practical matter, current and projected officer shortages within the Regular establishment--particularly in the grades of Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander, and Commander--will prevent accomplishment of the Navy's proposal over the next several years, if ever.

TAR officer accessions have been suspended for more than a full year now, and TAR officer attrition is occurring at a considerably higher rate than normal. (According to recent projections--1,201 TAR officers will be on board in December 1977, down 162 or 12 percent since December 1976.) As one would expect, the treatment accorded to the TAR officer program during the past year is prompting some of the best and the brightest to seek careers elsewhere. (However, the big drop-off hasn't occurred yet. Many TAR officers who are still a long way from retirement eligibility say they intend to hang on long enough to see what action the Congress takes.)

With the officer shortage in the junior and middle grades of the Unrestricted Line community of the Regular Navy, and the rapidly waning strength of the TAR officer community, the Navy will soon be unable to provide sufficient numbers of officers of adequate quality--TAR or Regular--to manage the Reserve program under either the existing system or the proposed plan. It is interesting to note in this connection that the 1977 National Naval Reserve Policy Board, in its report to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy of June 17, 1977, reached this same conclusion and expressed it in almost these same words.

On this point, advocates of the Navy plan are quick to point out that, according to their forecasts of what they think Navy's personnel picture will be over the next fifteen years, everything will work out fine. Based on recent and current track records, there is little reason to expect reliability in Navy's personnel projections for one or two years, let alone fifteen. But more important is what will happen next month and next year--not a nebulous vision of 1993.

In the process of evaluating important aspects of the Navy plan, I was briefed and had a "shirt-sleeves" working session with the Chairman of the Naval Reserve Planning Group, Rear Admiral Carl Seiberlich. Among other considerations, I asked him whether Navy's plan would provide the requisite level of Reserve Program management experience--particularly at the senior, policy-making levels.

We first calculated the picture for the entire billet structure. From the data in the plan, we found that officers average eight years of Reserve Program management experience under the existing program. But, they will only average three years of such experience if the Navy plan is fully implemented. This eight-to-three comparison is not wholly accurate because most Regular assignments would be for 2-year tours. Such short tours, rather than representing a level of experience, actually represent a learning period for the officer concerned. By the time he begins to understand the assignment, he is transferred. This will have a negative effect on the stability, productivity, and proficiency of the Naval Reserve.

While the comparison over all grades is unfavorable enough, it gives the Navy plan the benefit of every doubt and only hints at the truth of the matter.

When we excluded the lower grades (where all apparently agree that there is little to distinguish between the backgrounds of Regulars and

TARs) and we calculated the years of experience in the Commander and Captain jobs, we found the TARs average fourteen years now. The Regulars, on the other hand, will average, at most, only five years under the Navy's plan. At these senior responsibility levels, experience in and career identification with Reserve Program management is crucial to adequacy of performance. But this is not the worst of it, either.

The Navy plans to recall Selected Reservists for maximum active-duty tours of four years to fill 160 of the "265" billets. These recalledees would be responsible for providing Reserve Program insight and initiatives at top, policy-making levels. How realistic is this?

As brought out in the Full-Time Training and Administration (FTTA) Study recently completed by DoD, the restriction to one four-year tour has not proven successful with the other services in attracting the right kinds of talent in sufficient numbers. The "single-tour" recalledee obviously does not have the career identification, continuity, or active-Navy management experience necessary to participate fully and/or effectively in the decision-making process with Pentagon professionals. Since this aspect of the comparison is fully developed and documented elsewhere, I will not pursue it further. Suffice it to say, this is one of the more glaring of the several fatal flaws in the Navy's plan.

Before we leave the subject of the "265" billets, I am compelled to point out another disturbing provision in Navy's plan. Apparently, 160 of the 200 policy-level billets are to be filled by recalled Selected Reservists, 40 by Regulars. Identification of these Regular billets was a most interesting process. For example, in the office of the Director, Naval Reserve (OP-09R)--who is, of course, a Regular Navy Vice Admiral--the plan calls for his Rear Admiral Deputy, and the three most senior Captain billets, to be Regular Navy officers. The remainder of the organization--the lesser positions--will be staffed with recalledees.

This pattern is repeated over and over for other offices. The Regulars are to be the bosses, and the Selected Reservists are to be the "go-fers."

Another reason given for replacing Reserve managers with Regular Navy officers is "to upgrade and improve the mobilization potential and combat readiness of the Navy's Selected Reserve." However, when I questioned the Chairman of the Naval Reserve Management Planning Group, Admiral Seiberlich, he assured me that today's Selected Reserve is better prepared than ever before. As he put it, "It's almost impossible to tell the difference between a Reserve outfit and its Regular Navy counterpart."

In his prepared statement for this committee, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Naval Reserve and Logistics, Edward Hidalgo, devoted the first eight pages to the "missions and overall readiness of the Naval Reserve." In addressing the readiness posture of Reserve Force units, the Assistant Secretary cited:

- Reserve Carrier Air Wing Thirty (CVWR-30), embarked in USS RANGER during the period of November 15-19, 1976. In its Operational Readiness Evaluation, the Wing's boarding rates, safety, operationally ready aircraft, and mission performance were judged by fleet inspectors to be comparable to Regular Navy Wings.
- Reserve Carrier Air Wing Twenty (CVWR-20), in an Operational Readiness Exercise at the Naval Air Station at Fallon, Nevada, during the period of July 18-21, 1977. The Wing's overall performance was judged outstanding, its ability to conduct sustained combat operations was amply demonstrated, and its airborne performance and flight experience exceeded the fleet average.

In addition to what the Admiral and the Assistant Secretary have said, I think it's also important to recognize some other accomplishments that have taken place under the existing management system:

- Naval Reserve patrol (VP) squadrons routinely serve with distinction in the Mediterranean, where they recently scored an Anti-submarine Warfare "first" in tracking a Soviet submarine through Gibraltar. In the late 1950's and early 1960's the Reserve VP squadrons flew regular surveillance patrols on weekend drills from both coasts in place of the fleet squadrons and they operated on equal or better terms with active squadrons in countless fleet exercises.
- Reserve attack (VA) squadrons have won the Navy's Bombing Derby three straight times. Throughout the years, the Reserve VA squadrons have out-performed their Regular Navy counterparts on the instrumented bombing ranges. About every third or fourth year, a new set of Navy Department leaders--both civilian and military--are astonished to "discover" the prowess of these Reserve squadrons. When one thinks about it--it's obvious that a group of Reserve aviators who have had two, three, or more fleet tours, and have flown together for some time should be more capable than a young fleet squadron that includes many less experienced aviators and perhaps several nuggets freshly arrived from the Training Command.
- Reserve transport (VR) squadrons will soon represent the Navy's entire air transport capability within CONUS. Historically, they have routinely met or exceeded fleet squadron readiness standards. Reserve VR squadron performance has been legendary during the Berlin Airlift, through the Cuban Missile Crisis and trans-Pacific logistic flights to Vietnam. Whether on regular weekend airlifts bringing Reservists to drill, moving Navy midshipmen on summer cruises from coast to coast, or responding to a fleet

requirement, the operation of Reserve VR squadrons has been uniformly professional.

- A 31-year-old Naval Reserve Force (NRF) FRAM I destroyer was recently described by a fleet inspecting officer as "... a model for cleanliness and preservation ... commanding officers of many newer and fully manned ships could benefit from a short visit to this fine ship" (SubInServLant NORVA re: USS CORRY (DD-817) on Underway Material Inspection). NRF destroyers routinely participate in fleet exercises (such as "SOLID SHIELD") with consistently excellent performance. During the summers of 1970-73, two NRF destroyers deployed to the Mediterranean with their Reserve crews, followed by Reinforcing Units throughout the summer months. This exercise was cancelled in 1974 with the restrictions on overseas active-duty-for-training (ACDUTRA). These destroyers were acknowledged to perform as well as their active-fleet counterparts.
- Reserve SeaBee and Cargo Handling Battalion readiness is judged exceptionally high by their Regular Navy program sponsors. Only equipment and material shortages limit their full-range mission capability. Reserve SeaBees have made numerous contributions in both war and peacetime. Recent examples include two battalions initially recalled at the time of the USS PUEBLO incident; each served with distinction in Vietnam during full one-year tours with I CORPS, RVN. The SeaBees are almost legendary in restoration efforts following natural disasters. For example, in 1972, Naval Reserve SeaBees were responsible for repairing much of the damage wrought by Hurricane Agnes in Pennsylvania and Mississippi.

- Reserve staff units constitute CINCLANT's war gaming capability and stand fully qualified watches in the Navy Department (OPNAV) Operational Control (OPCON) Center; they are fully integrated, productive members of OPNAV, CINCLANT, SUBLANT, and SURFLANT staffs.

Mr. Chairman, the history of achievements and contributions made by Naval Reserve units is far more extensive than the few examples I have cited. For the record, I want to emphasize the obvious--that the many successes and the consistent quality of the Selected Navy Reserve were achieved under the existing management structure, that is, with the TAR officer program. In view of the record, and the on-going performance of today's Selected Reserve units, I am beginning to wonder what constitutes " ... attainment of maximum readiness of the Naval Reserve." Or, to put it another way, since we are being told that Regular Navy officers will bring about " ... attainment of maximum readiness of the Naval Reserve...":

- What will the Regular officers do in terms of training and administration that has not been done by the TARs?--and,
- How much better than their active-duty counterparts do Reserve units have to be?

Before I conclude my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put on record a few thoughts concerning the Total Force policy. Throughout the many discussions of the TAR decision with Navy spokesmen, we have all been deluged with frequent references to the term "Total Force." They typically use the term with great solemnity--even reverence--as though "Total Force" somehow makes their proposal not only right and necessary--but almost inevitable. So when the logic gets thin--as it quickly does--we are told that the TAR phase-out decision is a necessary avenue to the mystical "Total Force."

It is time to set the record straight. The Total Force concept was the creation of our distinguished good friend and former colleague, Melvin Laird, during his tenure as Secretary of Defense. He conceived this approach to force level and force mix planning as the best way to exploit capabilities and compensate for deficiencies, while achieving the most effective balance between:

- Active and Guard and Reserve forces,
- Our several military services, and
- U.S. forces and those of our Allies.

In simplistic terms, the Total Force approach determines whose forces and what kind can best be employed--to do the necessary job at the least cost--and thus make a maximum contribution to the most cost-effective, total force. In understanding and applying the Total Force policy, there is no conceptual or practical requirement stated or implied, that Regular Navy officers take over the peacetime management of all forces to achieve the total force objective.

To quote from Secretary Laird's words of August 21, 1970, to the Secretaries of the military departments:

"SUBJECT: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces

"The President has requested reduced expenditures during fiscal year 1970 and extension of these economies into future budgets. Within the Department of Defense, these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves. I am concerned with the readiness of Guard and Reserve units to respond to contingency requirements, and with the lack of resources that have been made available to Guard and Reserve commanders to improve Guard and Reserve readiness.

"Public Law 90-168, an outgrowth of similar Congressional concern, places responsibility with the respective Secretaries of the Military Departments for recruiting, organizing, equipping and training of Guard and Reserve Forces. I desire that the Secretaries of the Military Departments provide, in the FY 1972 and future budgets, the necessary resources to permit the appropriate balance in the development of Active, Guard and Reserve Forces.

"Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve forces."

Notice! He said nothing about who would manage the Reserve programs. And, remember, Mel Laird was well familiar with the letter and intent of the so-called Reserve Bill of Rights legislation. If he had intended Regular management of the Reserve as he defined the Total Force concept and, later, when he established the Total Force policy--he would have said so.

As a matter of fact, in that same August 21st directive to the Secretaries of the military departments, Secretary Laird made specific reference to the TARs. His list of policy objectives included an injunction to:

"Provide manning levels for technicians and training and administration reserve support personnel (TARS) equal to full authorization levels."

So with regard to "Total Force," in no way did it then--or does it now--have anything to do with matters of personnel, billet assignment, or who is to staff what. Thus, the term is specious and empty of meaning as an "explanation" for the decision to discontinue the TAR officer program, and we would be naive to accept it as an excuse, let alone as a reason. If the Navy can produce a cogent rationale for their proposal, let them do so. But let Navy also realize that those of us who have some familiarity with defense management are not deluded by the misuse of terminology.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman--following a full year of rhetoric, reasons, promises, and excuses, Navy has yet to demonstrate compelling justification for disestablishing the TAR officer program. They have not shown any real advantages to be gained by removing TARs from management of the Naval Reserve. On the contrary, and although Navy repeatedly skirts the fact, the proposal would result in disruption of Reserve

programs, degradation of quality, and damage to established readiness and capability standards throughout the Reserve.

Of equally critical concern is how full compliance with commitment under the Navy's proposal would impact on the Regular officer structure. The Regular officer detailers say they are already committed to send the top 7 percent of their officers to 40 percent of the billets in the Navy. Certainly I do not want to see assignments to Reserve Program Billets aggravate the officer shortages that already exist in air, surface, submarine, and other warfare specialties. Yet, that is exactly what will happen if the Navy proposal is adopted, and its promises kept. If the promises are not kept, then the Reserve Programs will suffer. If we reject the Navy plan, neither will be necessary.

I would be less uneasy, Mr. Chairman, if I could believe Navy's promise to send its "hard chargers" to Reserve billets. To date, their performance on this score has hardly been reassuring. Recent assignments reveal a plethora of "twilight tours," officers passed over for promotion or in need of jobs because their USN billets have been eliminated, multiple billet and designator mismatches, and temporary assignments pending opening of "better" billets. How, for example, is the assignment of ensigns--including women--fresh out of OCS going to "upgrade and improve ... combat readiness" or "bring about ... attainment of maximum readiness of the Naval Reserve"?

One would think that Navy, with their de facto TAR elimination program under scrutiny, might pursue credibility by delivering on its promise to "substitute high-quality Regular ... for TAR officers." The fact that they generally have failed to do so clearly portends what we can expect with total elimination of the TAR officer program.

If the Navy would like to prove the viability of their theories under real-world circumstances, let them begin cycling their top-quality

Regular officers into Reserve Program Billets and prove that they can maintain a flow of quality officers through RPBs for an extended period of time.

If Navy really believes in the importance of the Naval Reserve, let them also prove it by including appropriate material on the subject in the Blue Jackets Manual and incorporate meaningful courses in curricula at the Naval Academy, the Naval War College, and other senior or postgraduate schools. Let them introduce outstanding duty performance in a Reserve Program Billet as a bonus point in the precepts or guidance given Regular Navy selection boards. All of these actions can be undertaken immediately, and they must be, if the Navy is ever going to "de-institutionalize" Reserve Program neglect--and "de-stigmatize" Reserve assignments among the Regular community.

In other words, when and if Navy actions begin to fulfill the promises they have made of improving Naval Reserve management, readiness, and mission capability--then their plan might be taken seriously.

Meanwhile, let us keep the TAR officer program intact--including re-establishment of the accession process to restore the program to its prescribed strength. If the Navy neglects or is somehow unable to achieve their stated aims, we will not have lost the means to manage the Naval Reserve--and the Reserve can remain an effective and dependable element of our national defense.

BREAKDOWN OF RESERVE BILLETS

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, if I understand the law correctly, the Title X USC 678(a) provides for Reserve officer personnel on active duty to support Reserve components. Section 678(b) provides that such Reserve officers receive periodic refresher training appropriate to their qualification.

That is the law at the present time. If the Navy is not putting its regulars in close enough to the Reserve to understand it, that is the Navy's fault. If they are not giving these people the proper refresher training, then that is in disobedience of the law that is there. Whatever the fault is, if there is one, it has to fall right back on the leadership of the Navy.

I would like to take just a moment to go into the breakdown of the Reserve Program Billet code. If I understand it correctly, the total Reserve billeting is 1,911 officers Am I correct on that?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Eighteen hundred seventy-four.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I had 1,911; yours is right now and mine is 30 June?.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. As of then, it was 1,911. At that time, 754 were operating billets, 988 were training and administration billets, and 129 were contributory billets. But look at the breakdown. Of all of this structure of people who are manning the Reserve, you have 334 billets that only TARs can serve in, only TARs can fill, but that is the only part of the Reserve program that a TAR has to be used in right now. There are 1,489 E billets, which means they can be either TARs or regulars, either one. It is wide open. They do not have to be TARs. As a matter of fact, the billets are not being filled with TARs, except a part of them. There are 88 R billets, which means that only regulars can fill them.

So the thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that we come in here and we are arguing about making this tremendous change, and when you really get down to it, there are only 334 of those billets that have to be filled with TAR officers. If that doesn't give the Navy the flexibility to flow people in and out of the program, I don't know what does. I just can't understand why we think that we can't bring them in and out of the program under this kind of a structure.

With reference to the experience we just heard and my figures when we checked this, 30 percent of the TAR officers were serving afloat and 40 percent of the regular officers. That is a pretty good spread, and the Navy could change that if it wanted to.

I want to get back to something that one of you gentlemen mentioned. Perhaps that was you, Captain Carl. You were talking about the "TAR as a conduit". I agree with that. That is exactly what the TAR is; he is a conduit. One of you mentioned that. The regular Navy officers and the Naval Reservists live in totally distinct and different worlds. There is no question about that.

Am I correct on that?

Captin CARL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Admiral, you are a regular. Captain Bell, you are a Reserve TAR, and, of course, Admiral Jackson and some of the

others are regulars. Isn't that a fair statement, that the Reserve officer and the regular officer live in two totally different worlds?
Admiral JACKSON. Yes, sir.

CURRENT RESERVE PROGRAMS

Mr. CHAPPELL. How are you going to bring those two separate worlds together in an effective, total force concept unless you do something, have some kind of a conduit? The TAR program is the finest conduit I have seen to date, and it didn't come about by accident; it came about because there was a problem in the first place with management.

We brought these people in and I just want to call attention to some of the things that this program which we now want to change has done. Here is some of the information. I just want to go into this a minute:

Reserve Carrier Air Wing 30 embarked on USS RANGER during the period of November 15-19, 1976. In its Operational Readiness Evaluation, the Wing's boarding rates, safety, operationally ready aircraft, and mission performance, were judged by fleet inspectors to be comparable to regular Navy wings.

Reserve Carrier Air Wing 20 in an Operational Readiness Exercise at the Naval Air Station at Fallon, Nevada, during the period of July 18-21, 1977: the Wing's overall performance was judged outstanding, its ability to conduct sustained combat operations was amply demonstrated, and its airborne performance and flight experience exceeded the fleet average.

We are doing this with a program we have today.

Naval Reserve patrol squadrons routinely serve with distinction in the Mediterranean, where they recently scored an antisubmarine warfare "first" in tracking a Soviet submarine through Gibraltar. These fellows must be doing something right.

Reserve attack squadrons have won the Navy's Bombing Derby three straight times.

Reserve transport (VR) squadrons will soon represent the Navy's entire air transport capability within CONUS.

I would go on and on, talk about the SeaBees and some of the other forces—and those are in the statement—but I just want to bring out, in addition to what Admiral Seiberlich told me, that you could look at these Reserve squadrons and the regular Navy squadrons, and you couldn't tell the difference.

Maybe we are trying to make the Reserve unit better than the regular. If so, how much better are we supposed to make it than the regular unit? Maybe that is the question; maybe that is the question we ought to address ourselves to: How do we make the Reserve squadrons better than the regular Navy? Perhaps that is what we ought to get at.

I don't know which one of you to address this question to. Perhaps you, Admiral Jackson: The thing that, I guess, concerns all of us most—is that part that really has to do with manning at the rank of commander and above. Aren't they the ones we are really looking at in trying to do a better job in Reserve manning?

Admiral JACKSON. Yes.

MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVY RESERVES

Mr. CHAPPELL. Would you say as a senior regular Navy officer becomes more and more a manager and less and less directly involved in the operation of aircraft and ships that his actual assignment to those operational squadrons is less important? Or, stating it another way, as he goes into management more and more, isn't it less and less important that he have actual sea duty? Is that a fair thing?

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I certainly concur with that.

Admiral JACKSON. I think that is true of the regular Navy, too.

Mr. CHAPPELL. And true of the regular Navy, yes, sir, so that you have a parallel between the Reserve and the regular Navy. The higher he gets, the more and more he goes away from the day-to-day routine, the day-to-day operation, and he becomes purely managerial.

How are you going to help the program, to manage the program better, by saying, well, one of these fellows has to go out there and have the opportunity to command a ship? Is that going to help his Reserve managerial responsibilities? It might help his knowledge about certain techniques if he were going to be flying and so forth, but how does it improve his management skills?

Captain Bell, what is your comment on that?

Captain BELL. I don't think it is going to improve it at all. I think probably it improves your ego. If you are driving the ship around, that is fine; but the Reserve TAR doesn't really need to drive the ship around in order to pass his expertise on to the Reserves. Of course, if you get to drive the ship around, it helps to make flag; that is about it, but as far as passing on the information to the Reserve, you don't need that, and when you get up to that level the managerial skills are what you need. The present program accomplishes that need.

Mr. CHAPPELL. And the Navy has the complete opportunity and control of every aspect of the TAR program and can train its people any way it wants to train them?

Captain BELL. Absolutely.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Getting right down to the bottom line, we talked about the conduit. Why is this TAR essential as a conduit? What is there in these differences between the regular naval officer and the Reservist that brings about the need for this conduit?

Captain Bell, maybe you could address that.

Captain BELL. I think that the TAR officer understands these two different worlds, as it was put before, the inactive duty world and the active duty; he lives with the Selected Reserves, works with them regularly, all through his career with some time out to sea to bring his expertise back. He works with the regular Navy back and forth on these tours.

As a captain, for instance, or a senior commander, he can go to a regular Navy staff too; he doesn't have to go aboard a ship. He can go to a regular Navy staff and he works as a conduit there to get his expertise to that staff.

I was going to mention this earlier. When I went down to COMNAVAIRLANT there was a heck of a lot of ignorance of

Reserves, as you will find in most any USN staff, which I was able to somewhat overcome. I wasn't entirely successful in doing it, but at least I helped overcome some of the ignorance there.

So I think the conduit is very, very important when it comes to working between the active force or the regulars and the Reserves.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That Reservist has a civilian career?

Captain BELL. Yes.

Mr. CHAPPELL. He is a lawyer; he is a doctor, or what have you. He is specializing in that career and, as patriotic as he may be, he only wants to be actively involved, except in time of emergency, one weekend a month; isn't that right?

Captain BELL. And in a meaningful mission?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes. And to understand his motivation and to put him in proper perspective for his training—which translates into readiness—you have to have somebody who understands his background. You have to have somebody who understands what he is trying to do in his career and that he not be bound with the regular Navy. I thought that you just have to not be bound to the Navy and to the Navy discipline; isn't that right, Captain?

Captain BELL. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I believe that is why the TAR program was put in the beginning; I don't think it happened by accident. I believe it solved a problem. I think it has done a whale of a good job of solving the problem, and I think we make a serious mistake otherwise.

Captain BELL. Yes, sir. I think, too, there was a little misinformation put out this morning. The TAR program didn't start right after World War II; it started in 1953. They had a CAD program before that.

Admiral JACKSON. It started in 1955. After we learned a lot of lessons, it was enacted as part of the Reserve Forces Act of 1952.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and the other committee members, for indulging me, and these gentlemen for indulging my long statements and few questions.

Mr. FLYNT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chappell.

Admiral JACKSON. Mr. Chappell, before you give up the floor, may I make a comment?

From what I could understand, the principal reason, at least offered to me, for this proposed change was to bring the regular Navy to the Reserves and make them acquainted with the Reserves. It seems to me that all of those accomplishments you read of, about the air squadrons, about the Naval Reserve destroyer, Sixth Fleet, it seems to me that the Reserves are completely acquainted with the regular Navy, and that is the way to get them acquainted.

Mr. CHAPPELL. And if the air arm can do it, somehow or other, then the other forces can be brought into line with proper leadership under the present program?

Admiral JACKSON. Yes, sir; they go to sea two weeks out of the year; that is the way to do it.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I have no further questions.

Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Robinson?

CONSIDERATION OF TAR PHASEOUT BY OTHER COMMITTEES

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, it is obvious that we have had the whole load today, and, of course, we know that this is the fourth of the four committees before which this matter has to come before action can be taken with respect to it. I have not seen the letter from our own Committee on Armed Services with respect to its reasoning regarding the action that they took in approving. I have seen the two Senate letters and the staff has just handed me a copy of the letter from Chairman Price, which I will peruse; but I am wondering to what extent you have laid out the whole picture before these other committees as you have here today?

We have had five hours of this at the present time and I am wondering to what extent you feel that everybody else that has made a decision on this is as familiar with it as we are going to be when we get through this afternoon?

Admiral FORREST. Zero for the Senate side.

Admiral JOHNSON. Zero. We asked immediately when we heard about the possibility of Congressional action. We didn't ever get a favorable reply from the Senate side.

Captain BELL. We did discuss this with one of the Senate staffers afterward and he said he was very happy he didn't see us until after he had written the letter.

We did testify before the Subcommittee on Personnel, but on the Senate side no hearings at all.

Mr. FLYNT. Of the House Armed Services Committee?

Captain BELL. Yes. Most everyone was off on joint conference at that time.

RESERVE MANAGEMENT BOARD STUDY

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. I have just a couple of questions I would like to clear up about your testimony. Something bothers me. I think it was Captain Carl stated he knew if you took the Reserve Management Board members aside and had a secret vote on whether they would go with this phaseout of the TAR program, they would vote against the phaseout of the TAR program. How do you know that? Who have you talked to and how could all these people on this board sit there and acquiesce like that if that is what they felt the Board was doing.

Captain CARL. All I can tell you is that is what I have been told.

Admiral FORREST. We appeared in front of the board, three of us. The board was set up to determine what program, what would be the best program to replace the TARs, not should we get rid of the TARs, but how. There is the fine distinction.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Are you saying these qualified officers, line officers of the United States Navy, whoever they are, would not speak up and write back to their boss and say "Well, I have been given this task, but—"

Captain BELL. They were not given the precept.

Admiral FORREST. What do we replace it with?

Captain BELL. How do you get rid of them?

Admiral FORREST. Shoot them, fire them, electrocute them.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. It seems to me just as part of their summary recommendations, they would say this is the best way to do it, but we do not think—

Captain BELL. We suggested to the board if they have strong feelings they should do this.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Was that ever suggested or proposed, Admiral Seiberlich?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We were given the precept by the Secretary of the Navy to examine the problem and make a recommendation as to how to implement the plan, come up with a definitive plan. At the outset I got the group together and said that my main concern in this evolution was for the readiness of the Reserve and that any action taken that would derogate the interests of the Reserve I personally would be against, and that therefore anyone who felt that any of the actions of this group would derogate the readiness of the Reserve were free to issue a minority opinion in the report. I specifically queried each person when he signed his name on the face of the report, "Do you have a minority opinion to submit as part of this report?" and they said no, and I can assure you that I did not put any pressure on them.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. So then there may be a little posturing on both sides here. They are telling Navy management one story, and they are telling the Reserve associations another story?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No. You have to remember we were executing the precept as professional naval officers; the people in this group studied the execution and insured that this plan will not derogate the readiness of the Reserve.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let me interrupt and clarify one thing.

Admiral Seiberlich and I have been through this thing many times. Did I misunderstand, Admiral Seiberlich, when we first talked about this matter, did I misunderstand you when you said that you came into it given the job of implementing a phaseout of the TAR program; is that not where you started?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We started with that precept.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That you would phase it out?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. One of the conditions in the precept was that the Reserve management would be reorganized and the TAR program would be phased out as part of this.

Mr. CHAPPELL. So I really did not misunderstand the real thrust of it, did I?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. No, sir. You read the precept and it spells out the task that was laid upon the group to do.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Which was to come up with an alternative for TAR?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. A reorganization of the Reserve management system, and that was our task and that is what we performed. However, I might say we took no votes of anyone as to how they felt or did not feel. I felt that was improper.

Our task was to come up with an implementation plan that did not affect the readiness of the Reserve adversely, but which would enhance the Reserve.

Mr. FLYNT. The question that was asked was not should it be changed, but the question was, what is the alternative to what we have now?

Captain BELL. No. They gave the alternative too. They said, we are going to put the USN officers in.

Admiral FORREST. That is the point I want to make.

Again the decision had been made, it had been made by the Assistant Secretary of Navy, the decision was made, it was already made that, "We are going to get rid of the TARs, phase them out; you come up with a plan, the best one possible," which I am sure was unanimous, no question about that—

Admiral SEIBERLICH. It was.

Admiral FORREST. —by everybody there.

I make the statement I think we would be unanimous, in the feeling that we can not think of a better phaseout plan, but we think it will not work.

Mr. FLYNT. Either Admiral Forrest or Captain Carl made the statement there were Selected Reserve flag officers they knew who were opposed to the phaseout.

Captain CARL. I do.

Mr. FLYNT. One of you made the statement and one nodded as you are doing now. Why would they be unwilling to appear before this committee and voice their objections?

Captain CARL. For the same reason other military officers cannot voice freely their personal opinions today.

Captain BELL. That would be the end of their career, unless you did it in secret testimony.

Admiral FORREST. This is the policy of the Navy. After you have your turn in the barrel, you come out with one standard, as I understand in big corporations that is the approach, and I would do the same thing if I was still in. I would not come forward unless I wanted to get out real fast.

Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Chappell, do you have any further questions?

Mr. CHAPPELL. I do not.

Mr. ROBINSON. No questions.

FORMAL OFFICER TRAINING ON RESERVES

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. One other point I would like to be sure I understand right. Are we to believe if you go to the Naval ROTC or the Naval Academy or you go through an OCS program that in the syllabus or course of instruction presented, you are not going to know anything about the Navy Reserve when you get done?

Admiral FORREST. Zero.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Not even an hour about what the organization is?

Captain BELL. It might appear on an organization chart somewhere, but that is it.

Admiral FORREST. Zero.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. That is what I thought you testified to.

Captain BELL. That is correct.

Mr. FLYNT. We have been here two hours and six minutes since we resumed the afternoon session. We certainly do thank each of you for your presence and your full participation with this committee.

Mr. Robinson and I will go vote and we will be right back.

[Recess.]

Mr. FLYNT. The committee will come to order.

The committee is pleased to have as the next witness Major General Francis R. Gerard of the Air National Guard. He is the Director of the OSD Study Group Staff and a member, ex-officio, of the steering committee which put together a report on Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve.

The committee has asked General Gerard to appear before us and General Gerard has gladly stated his willingness to come.

We welcome you before the committee and you may place a statement in the record, which would be included in its entirety, and then you may summarize, quote from it or use any form and presentation you desire. We are glad to have you.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL FRANCIS R. GERARD, ANG

General GERARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I do not have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, because of the suddenness of my appearance. However, I know you have a copy of the FTTA/SR report and I would like to emphasize at the beginning that this report as of this time has not been accepted by the Department of Defense. It is a report submitted by our committee, generally accepted by the steering committee with reservations by the Navy and the United States Marine Corps. So therefore the report itself is being evaluated right now in the Department of Defense.

In regard to the subject today, I would like to read the summary of annex G which deals with the part of the hearing that you are dealing with today.

Mr. FLYNT. Is that a numbered page?

General GERARD. The page number is G-7.

Mr. FLYNT. All right.

Mr. CHAPPELL. May I ask one question?

Your report is complete from your standpoint?

General GERARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. It is only a question of whether it would be accepted by OSD, and that is all that remains, is that right?

General GERARD. That is right.

Mr. CHAPPELL. But your study is complete?

General GERARD. My study is complete and it has been basically adopted by the steering committee less the concurrence of the Navy and the Marine Corps on those aspects dealing with the TAR program and the Marine expertise.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Go ahead.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Before you begin, you said the Navy and the Marine Corps did not concur in this study?

General GERARD. That is correct.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Who in the Navy and Marine Corps and in what respect did they nonconcur?

General GERARD. I am sure it was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy did not concur in our recommendation that we retain the existing full-time forces supporting the Selected Reserve. Also, we made a recommendation that the Chief of the Naval Reserve manage the budget and set policies for the Naval Reserve.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Did the steering committee members and the ex-officio members, nonvoting as they are listed in the front here—a very impressive group with many, many years of Reserve experience and personnel management experience—did they all agree and sign off on this report and not file any objection to it?

General GERARD. Most of them signed off on the report. There are no objections filed. But I must say in order to clarify the record that many of them did not comment specifically on the Navy proposal with regard to the Navy or the Marines.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Mr. Chappell, I think it would be of help to the committee if we filed at least the staff members and the various members who worked on this report and had their names made a part of our record here.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I think it is very pertinent and without objection it shall be done.

[The information referred to follows:]

STUDY GROUP STAFF

Francis R. Gerard, MG, ANG, Director
 Robert J. Kirk, COL, USA, Deputy Director
 David H. Montplaisir, COL, USAF, Office, Secretary of Defense, Coordinator
 George L. Spuhler, COL, USAF (Ret), Consultant

ASSISTANT DIRECTORS

Marion R. Lowery, COL, ARNG, Research and Legislation
 Paul M. Hirsch, COL, USAFR, Personnel Forces Structures
 Donald J. Deyo, LTC, ARNG, Cost/Benefits Analysis
 Jackie Wilkins, LTC, USAF, Modeling/Simulation

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

FULL TIME

David G. Kirkpatrick, MAJ, USA, Personnel Forces Structures (Objective Force Plans)
 Patricia K. Brecht, CPT, USAR, Research and Legislation (Legal Research/Writer)
 Paul A. Norcio, GS-14, Personnel Forces Structures (Manpower Analyst)
 Thomas M. Stonehouse, GS-14, Personnel Forces Structures (USAFR Competitive Technician Specialist)
 Robert C. Ward, GS-14, Personnel Forces Structures (NGB Excepted Technician Specialist)
 Steve Halpin, GS-13, Personnel Forces Structures (USAR Competitive Technician Specialist)
 Dorothy B. Nicewarner, GS-13, Research and Legislation (Editor)
 Stephen P. Stine, GS-13, Personnel Forces Structures (NGB Excepted Technician Specialist)

PART TIME

James O. Wenning, CAPT, USNR, Personnel Forces Structures (USNR Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) Specialist) (August-October)
 Robert C. Cole, LTC, USMCR, Personnel Forces Structures (USMCR Specialist) (July-September)
 James Roe, LTC, USAFR, Personnel Forces Structures (Life Cycle Program Development) (July - 2 weeks)
 Edward D. Sullivan, LTC, USAFR, Research and Legislation (Research Analyst) (June - 3 weeks)
 Austin B. Campbell, MAJ, USAR, Research and Legislation (Legislative Analyst) (June-August)
 Albert R. Hasbrouck, MAJ, USAFR, Research and Legislation (Legislative Analyst) (August - 2 weeks)

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Richard P. Bergagna, CPT, USAR, Administrative Officer
 Maria E. Loya, SFC, ARNG, Secretary-Typist
 Wilfredo E. Tabin, SSG, USA, Administrative NCO
 James D. McFarland, SSgt, USAF, Secretary
 Carmine A. Petraglia, SGT, USMC, Secretary
 Marianne Romanchak, Pfc, USA, Secretary
 Debra K. Owen, YNSN, USN, Secretary

STEERING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Mr. Raymond S. Webster (Chairman)
 Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Reserve Affairs)
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)
 Deputy Assistant Secretary (Military Personnel Policy)
 Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)
 Mr. I. M. Greenberg
 Deputy Assistant Secretary (Planning & Requirements)
 Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)
 Mr. Carl W. Clewlow
 Deputy Assistant Secretary (Civilian Personnel Policy)
 Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)
 Mr. Jack R. Quetsch
 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
 Mr. William D. Clark
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Reserve Affairs)
 Mr. Robert T. Connor
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Reserve Affairs)
 Mr. George Kutche
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Reserve Affairs)
 Major General LaVern E. Weber
 Chief, National Guard Bureau
 Major General Henry Mohr
 Chief, Army Reserve
 Department of the Army
 Major General William Lyon
 Chief, Air Force Reserve
 Department of the Air Force

EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS

(NON VOTING)

Honorable Russell Murray
 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis & Evaluation)
 Major General Francis R. Gerard
 Director, Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve
 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
 Major General W. Stanford Smith, USAR
 Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)
 Rear Admiral Paul W. Rohrer
 Deputy Director, Naval Reserve
 Department of the Navy
 Major General William B. Fleming, USMC
 Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs
 Rear Admiral Thomas T. Wetmore
 Chief, Coast Guard Reserve

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Thank you, sir.

General GERARD. The part, reiterating, is on page G-7. This is strictly in the record which is not accepted as of yet by DOD.

. . . The Navy's proposed change for managing its Reserve component does not appear to meet the requirement to establish a full-time support force with the necessary Reserve expertise to derive the optimum from the contributions and abilities of the reservists assigned to Selected Reserve units. The method of obtaining

this expertise is to a large extent the prerogative of the military department, [That is the Navy], consistent with the provisions of the Reserve Bill of Rights, Public Law 90-168, 1 December 1967.

Should the proposed Navy program guarantee this aspect, then it would be recommended that a reevaluation be made of the FTTA Study Group's conclusions relating to the retention of the Navy's existing full-time support force system.

In other words, what we are saying is, if the Navy new proposal to eliminate the TAR program would meet the Reserve expertise requirements, then we felt we should reevaluate our recommendation about retaining the existing program.

The Navy presently has a personnel force that is career-oriented to, and has a primary responsibility for, the training and administration of the Reserve.

I will not read the rest of it, but to summarize, the TARs have their separate promotion system and the people that sit on the promotion board, 50 percent of them are the naval reservists who are the ones being serviced by the TAR officers. So they have a direct interest in serving the Reserve community as well as marching with the regulars.

We compliment the intent of the present Navy administration to give full attention to the Naval Reserve program through their new proposal. We also feel that, consistent with some of the statements made here today, that if this was institutionalized and carried forward, ad infinitum, that it could be made to be successful if the officers assigned to the Reserve program gained that Reserve expertise, by being assigned for long enough periods. If they had repetitive assignments to the Reserve program, it could work.

It is very hard to distinguish between a TAR officer and a regular officer except for the fact of the amount of time that they do spend in the Reserve program. As a committee, [study] our primary objectives were to satisfy the combat readiness capabilities of the Reserve component; in the most cost-effective manner; with, a decent personnel management system. We felt that the retention of the TAR program was indicated by our study and, in comparing the TAR program versus the Regular Navy program, we felt the TAR program had advantages over exchanging that with regular officers.

That basically is the statement of our [study] committee.

Mr. CHAPPELL. General, would you please give us a brief background on why the FTTA/SR study was directed—

General GERARD. The study was generated by the Report of the Defense Manpower Commission of April of 1976, which stated that the operation of the Selected Reserve could be accomplished in a more cost-effective manner by replacing the technicians with full-time military people. The background to that report stated it would save up to \$270 million a year by replacing technicians with full-time military people.

In July of 1976, the House Armed Services Committee in its Report asked the Navy to review its naval management Reserve program, particularly the TARs, and see if that continued to be the most viable way to meet the Reserve needs. As a result, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense convened this study group in March of this year to study this proposal by the Defense Manpower Commission, and also to respond to the request of the House Armed Services Committee.

Our group was convened March 27, when I started on the study group. We had most of our people on board by May 2. We commenced the study with a representative from almost all of the services less the Navy and USMC. During our deliberations the House Appropriations Committee in its Report stated that up to \$353 million a year could be saved if you converted the technicians of the National Guard, Army and Air Force Reserve to a full-time military force.

This was part of our study, we determined that the approach of the Defense Manpower Commission and the House Appropriations Committee was correct insofar as they had gone, but they did not go far enough. They only dealt with direct and composite costs and did not go into the total costs.

So when we completed our study we determined that on "a trade-off, on a one-for-one basis, one military for one technician, that the Federal Government would only save \$2 million a year by converting the technicians to the full-time military status." This was because of the high cost and the difference in the retirement systems. We included all the drill pay, Title III Retirement, all the other pay that the military technician received in comparison with active duty. Then when we threw the productivity factors into the technician program, that is the 16 hours, one weekend a month that the technician also performed. And also considered some of the other productivity factors gained by stability, and also the absence of the base operating support (BOS) in the technician program, that we have a cost avoidance of over \$200 million a year by retaining the technician program versus going full-time military. We compared the seven Reserve components in our study, and in Chapter 4 we also compared the effectiveness of each of the systems.

FINDINGS OF DRAFT DOD STUDY

Mr. CHAPPELL. Did you make any specific findings or recommendations with reference to the Naval Reserve?

General GERARD. Yes, sir. Our finding was that the existing Naval Reserve structure could accomplish its wartime mission when properly supported.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I did not hear that.

General GERARD. The Naval Reserve, that all of the full-time systems could provide the combat-ready units if properly supported, and that no change should be made in any of the existing systems.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Would you expand on what you have just said and explain what your group considered in its deliberations concerning the TAR versus USN management of the Naval Reserve?

General GERARD. Yes, sir.

Table 5-2, two pages after the page V-18.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Go ahead.

General GERARD. We had a comparative rating on the full-time support forces of all the Selected Reserve units, and line 3, as it applies to the Naval Reserve, in its rating—the Tars versus the Regular United States Navy Officer program, we gave the TARs a higher rating in the area of: ease of administration of the program; the processing and eliminating unsatisfactory performers; and, com-

mand and control of the officer programs—of the Reserve program.

From this chart, the system analysis that we used was determined by the comparison of the existing TARs versus the Navy people, Regular Navy in the program, the TARs could be rated higher or more effective. However, we did not compare a TAR program being completely replaced by an active duty program. As far as this chart goes, it does show that the TAR program, as related to the Naval Reserve, is more effective.

Mr. CHAPPELL. General, do you have a personal and professional opinion concerning the Navy proposal to replace the TAR managers with Regular Navy managers?

General GERARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Would you please state that opinion?

General GERARD. Well, it is a very complex answer and it is not a simple one because, being involved in the Air Force and the Air National Guard since 1942, I have been subjected to all types of programs.

When the Air Force ran their Active Air Force Reserve program with active duty officers; and all the various phases that we have gone through; and I might be speaking with some biases from the Air National Guard standpoint because we have a very successful program which has been very strongly supported by the United States Air Force.

My greatest concern about a program is not the benefit of the full-time officers or people running the program. My concern is for those "Sunday" soldiers that we talk about; what is the best system to get the most contributions from those part-timers, to make them feel like they have had a meaningful weekend, as some people say, or just a busy weekend where they felt like they have accomplished something. What type of force, full-time force will accomplish this the best?

I felt it does not make any difference whether it is an active or part-time, in managing the program as long as that individual accomplishes or attains that expertise or state of mind where he recognizes the limitations and capabilities of the part-time soldier.

In the Air Force we have Air Force advisers assigned to each Air National Guard unit and they are generally assigned for a three-year period. In my experience I found even with the best ones, it takes them a year to a year and a half before they become familiar with the Air National Guard program, before they become familiar with the capabilities, the limitations, the time schedules, the sacrifices that our part-timers make. Then for about another year they are able to work with these people and at the end they are ready to go, but when they leave they are our best supporters. So if they were recycled through the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve program, I would say those people have Reserve expertise and are doing an outstanding job, no different than an Air National Guard or Reserve officer.

So the objective is to gain that knowledge and expertise. What is the best way to do it? Within my knowledge I would say of course it would be through the Reserve officer.

Mr CHAPPELL. Is that because you perceive the fact that the two, the regular officer and the Reserve officer, live in two different

worlds?

General GERARD. There is no question about it. They do. I am a part-time guardsman and I have been a full-time guardsman, and I have been Active Air Force, I am on active duty now. It is a different world. There are different obligations, different responsibilities, different time schedules, different family pressures, and a lack of understanding by the family as to what your commitments are as a part-timer versus when your full-time career is devoted to the military. So there is a difference.

Mr. CHAPPELL. This is the reason that you say the Reserve officer, that is, a TAR, is better prepared to bring out the best in that weekend warrior?

General GERARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Do you have an opinion as to the establishment of the Chief of Naval Reserve position as one to which Naval Selected Reserve flag is assigned by the President?

General GERARD. Well, yes, and in my personal opinion again, I just think it gives more prestige to be a presidential nominee, appointee, just a fact of life.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Did your study report on the Marine Corps Reserve management?

General GERARD. Yes, sir. We thought the Marine Corps management was very effective. It is a much smaller program, of course, and they do have some recruiting problems, but we felt that that program also should develop a little more Reserve expertise, per se. Their inspectors and instructors are very dedicated people, the Marine Corps pays a lot of attention to their Reserve program. But I think it is in a different scope than the Naval Reserve or the Air Force or the Army programs. The Marines are just a little bit different.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FLYNT. No questions.

Mr. CHAPPELL. General, you made one statement about the budget.

General GERARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. And what officers would be the prime ones responsible for it. Would you elaborate?

General GERARD. Yes.

Our recommendation was that the Chief of Naval Reserve should manage the budget for the Naval Reserve and establish the policies and that there should be a separate breakout of the costs to run the Naval Reserve, there should be a separate line item the same as the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Then it appears obvious that the carrying out of the recommended plan would move in a direction opposite from that which you in your personal professional opinion believe it ought to move?

General GERARD. In accordance with my personal opinion, also.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Is that the opinion also reached by the group?

Mr. CHAPPELL. What was the concurrence of the members of the study group?

General GERARD. They completely concurred in that statement.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Completely concurred in that statement.

General GERARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, while you were gone we did put in the record who these people are, their make-up and the background.

Mr. FLYNT. Yes. Together with any other parts that you or anyone else, Mr. Robinson, wants to put in from this report.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes.

Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Just one comment. I have not had an opportunity to study your report and of course we intend to do so since we were one of the committees that had some doubts about continuing this technician approach and expressed them in our report on this year's defense appropriation.

I found interesting your number showing it would cost \$200 million more to move in the direction of full-time military as opposed to technicians. This cost figure is diametrically opposed to some of the cost information we have been supplied by the Defense Manpower Commission, where they I believe showed something in the neighborhood—

General GERARD. \$270-370 million.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. —of 250 to \$350 million to be saved by moving in the direction of full-time support?

General GERARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. I have to see the assumptions, what you have in them, because all kinds of people can figure based upon the assumptions and come up with different numbers.

I just want to make that point clear that we are not going to leave your \$200 million figure unchallenged.

General GERARD. I had Mr. Hugh Walton, who wrote the Defense Manpower Commission part with our study group; we worked very closely with him. He endorses our methodology. As I say, they were correct as far as they went. They only used direct and composite costs, did not get into the total cost.

This is where the great difference is. In here we break it down by direct, composite and total cost so you can see the methodology. We did meet with Don Smith to explain to him the differences. It is quite a significant difference.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I would like to ask the gentleman, if it is not too much of a problem for him, to submit a biographical sketch for the record. I think it would be most helpful to us. I do not find it in here.

General GERARD. Yes, sir, I will.

Mr. FLYNT. I think that is a good suggestion.

I would also welcome the inclusion of biographical sketches of the six witnesses who appeared just before General Gerard.

[The information referred to follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR GENERAL FRANCIS R. GERARD, ANG

Major General Francis R. Gerard is the Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command [CINCSAC] for Air National Guard. General Gerard is attached to the Headquarters, New Jersey Air National Guard and his position is authorized the State of New Jersey during his tenure.

General Gerard was born July 11, 1924 in Belleville, New Jersey to Anthony and Rose [Gentile] Gerard. He graduated from Lyndhurst, N. J. High School in 1941. The following year, October 1942, he entered the U.S. Army Air Corps Aviation Cadet program; completed Advanced Flying Training at Craig Field, Alabama, and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant August 30, 1943. He was assigned to a fighter group in the U.S., and shortly transferred to the Eighth Air Force in Europe. During World War II he flew two combat tours in the P-51 Mustang, flying 420 combat hours in 91 missions, and progressed to First Lieutenant (May 1944) and to Captain (May 1945). He is an "Ace" having destroyed eight German fighters in aerial combat over Europe, four of which were shot down in a 12-minute battle over Leipzig, Germany.

Following the war, General Gerard attended Lafayette College in Easton, Pa. (1946-47); received a Certificate from New Jersey's John Marshall Law College in 1949, and passed the New Jersey Bar Examination that same year. In addition to being a Counselor at Law of New Jersey, he attended the USAF Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1955-56; National War College Defense Strategy Seminar, Fort Leslie J. McNair, 1965 & 1973; Air War College Orientation Course, AU, 1966 & 1972; completed the National Security Management Correspondence Course of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1971; attended Command & Staff Flying Safety Officers Course, University of Southern California, 1972; and the USAF Commanders Management Seminar, AU, 1972. In 1963 he also completed the New Jersey Civil Service Executive Development Course, and is a graduate of the New Jersey Department of Transportation's Executive Management Seminar.

His Post-World War II military service has been with the New Jersey Air National Guard, commencing in April 1947. He has served in positions as Fighter Group IG; Flight, Squadron, Fighter Group and Deputy Wing Commander, and as Fighter Wing Commander. He was promoted to the rank of Major in June 1950; to Lieutenant Colonel in July 1954 and to Colonel in November 1959. This period also saw the general recalled for two active duty tours: the Korean Conflict, 1951, and the Berlin Crisis in 1961. During the Korean callup he commanded a fighter squadron in the Strategic Air Command, and then the Tactical Air Command; and during the Berlin Crisis he served as the 108th Tac Ftr Wg Director of Operations (TAC). From May 1950 through August 1961 he was the Base Detachment Commander of the ANG units stationed at Newark Airport and McGuire AFB. Since 1961 General Gerard has been Director of Aeronautics in New Jersey's Department of Transportation, and is concerned with the establishment and implementation of a State Airport Development Program and of actions and programs to provide for public safety, the promotion and progress of aviation, and regulating of all airports, heliports, and fixed base operators with the State. He has been particularly active in the effort to promote the improvement and expansion of the county airport system as well as STOL ports and helistops at each key hospital in the State of New Jersey. The Aeronautics Division is vitally concerned with aeronautical education, and the implementation of the State and Regional Defense Airlift Plan as required during a national, regional or state emergency.

General Gerard was appointed as a Member of the Air Reserve Forces Policy Committee in 1973. He is the National Military Liaison Officer for AMVETS; a member of the American Association of Airport Executives [AAAE]; and is listed in Who's Who in the East. The General has also served as a member of the TAC Air Reserve Forces Policy Council; President of the National Association of State Aviation Officials [NASAO]; is Past President of the Army & Air National Guard Association of New Jersey; served three years on the Research Committee of the National Aircraft Noise Abatement Council [NANAC]; was Chairman of the Technical Advisory Committee on Airport Plans for the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, and was the National Commander's Representative on the Aeronautics and Aerospace Committee of the American Legion.

General Gerard's performance in combat and other service has earned him the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal with 11 Oak Leaf Clusters, American Campaign Medal, European-African-Middle East Campaign Medal with Six Battle Stars, National Defense Service Medal, Presidential Unit Citation, Armed Forces Reserve Medal, Air Force Longevity Service Award, Small Arms Expert, and the USAF Outstanding Unit Award. He has a Commercial Pilot's rating—single engine/multi engine, Instrument (Land), and has flown various aircraft such as the Sabreliner, C-119, DC-3, C-46, plus smaller multi engine and single engine civilian general aviation aircraft. He has flown the P-39, P-40, P-47, P-51, P-63, T-33A, F-84F, F-86H, F-105B, and currently flies the T-33 and holds a Command Pilot rating. He has over 4670 military flying hours.

General Gerard is married to the former Yolanda Mion of Lyndhurst, N.J., and they reside in Sea Girth, N.J., with two of their four children; daughters Diana and Daria. Sons, David and Donald, are both married.

Major General F. R. Gerard was promoted to his present grade on February 4, 1977.

On April 3, 1977, General Gerard was assigned as Study Director of the Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve Study Group. He is assigned to the OASD(RA). The Report is due to the Secretary of Defense on September 30, 1977.

On June 23, 1977, he was additionally assigned the duty of Director of the Minuteman Training Study by the DASD(RA). The completion of the first phase of this study is scheduled for September 30, 1977.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I personally want to thank you for coming over. I know you made a real sacrifice today. I know you have had your problems, but we are with you.

General GERARD. Thank you very much, sir.

May I add just one statement?

Mr. FLYNT. Yes.

Also, we would welcome biographical sketches from Admirals Hobbs, Crawford, and Coleman, to be included in their testimony.

General GERARD. Sir, I received a briefing from Admiral Seiberlich on this proposal. I would like to say, if I was confident that Admiral Seiberlich would remain I do not think I would have any concern with regard to any changes because I think he could make anything work. I am pleased with the attitude of the United States Navy to improve their Naval Reserve program. I mean they really do need to. I think they have recognized what has to be done.

Of course our report gives our position on it, but they should be complimented in trying to do something to improve their program.

Mr. FLYNT. Thank you.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. General Gerard, was there ever any attempt to suppress your report by the Navy or to hold it up? Maybe that is not a fair way to put the question.

General GERARD. I can answer that, that is a good question.

No, there has not been, and I think the Department of Defense should be complimented on the way they let me direct the study. You know, I came in especially to run this study. I have not been constrained in any way. They have supported me with the people, the facilities, the research, all the services have been cooperative. I am absolutely amazed and pleased.

Of course during the course of this study I was asked to direct another study. I am running the Minuteman training study at the same time and another one. At no time has anyone in the Department of Defense tried to constrain us, hide us, get us to change anything; just overall guidance which to me I think they should be complimented on.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Did you ask the new administration when they came into office, since a previous administration had made this decision and now this administration is going along with it to phase out the TAR program, to maybe defer that decision until your committee had had a chance to do its work? Did the Navy consider deferring its decision, do you know?

General GERARD. I cannot speak first-hand on that, so I would rather not answer the question, but the Navy was aware this study

was going on. That is the only thing I can say. But no action was taken to suppress our activities.

Mr. ALLEN. On the chronology of this thing, if I understood the testimony from Admiral Seiberlich this morning, the decision was made to go ahead last December. Is that correct?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. By the previous Acting Secretary of the Navy, yes, sir.

Mr. ALLEN. When was your group enacted?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. We received the precept from the Acting Secretary of the Navy on the 7th of February, and we completed our work and recommended a briefing to this committee and the House Armed Services Committee on the 13th of April. At that time Secretary Claytor wanted to review the wisdom of the discussion after receiving inputs from the various organizations that you have heard today and we then deferred the presentation until the 13th of May.

At that time the study of the wisdom of executing the plan was still in progress in the secretariat. The final decision was made by Secretary Claytor in his letter written to this and the other committees on the 21st of September.

Mr. ALLEN. When was your group activated, General?

General GERARD. Basically May 2. The personnel tasking went out to the services sometime in March.

Mr. ALLEN. As far as your group was concerned, when was the report completed?

General GERARD. September 22 it was presented to the steering committee, and October 7 is when all the comments on that were due.

Mr. ALLEN. So these two things were going on concurrently, is that correct, the decision by the Navy to proceed and the study as to alternative procedures, if that is a proper way to put it; is that correct?

General GERARD. Basically, yes.

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Basically, we started several months earlier and then the further study was conducted at the time General Gerard was in the height of his study.

Mr. ALLEN. Was it a conscious decision to go ahead, by the Navy, and implement it in the face of another ongoing study by another group?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. I would not say it was a decision in the face of; we were aware of the recommendations that General Gerard's committee had made. You would have to talk to Mr. Hidalgo concerning the decision-making process within the secretariat and how much they used the draft copy of the general's study.

Mr. ALLEN. One final question, Mr. Chairman.

If the Secretary of Defense accepts the report prepared by the general and his colleagues, what would the Navy's position then be? Would you have to recall your plan, in essence?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Well, it depends on your interpretation.

The present plan for the management of the Reserve is accomplished by reservists on full-time active duty and regular officers. Implementation of the plan that we have presented would call for the management of the Reserve by regular officer and reservists on full-time active duty. The difference is in the mix.

As of 31 August 1977, there were about 1279 TAR officers out of 1874 Reserve billets involved in the management of the program.

Mr. ALLEN. Then is it your suggestion that the Navy's plan and the suggestions put forth by the general and his group are not incompatible, you are talking only about degree?

Admiral SEIBERLICH. Yes.

Mr. ALLEN. Is that your view?

General GERARD. It could be, yes.

Mr. ALLEN. It could be.

General GERARD. It could be.

Mr. ALLEN. I do not have anything further.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Let me pursue.

Mr. FLYNT. Go ahead.

Mr. CHAPPELL. General, under what conditions could it be?

General GERARD. If they could demonstrate with the regular officers that these regular officers, before they go into the program, would have the Reserve expertise to substitute for the Navy TAR officers.

Mr. CHAPPELL. That would take a pretty good bit of doing to demonstrate that, would it not, General?

General GERARD. Yes, sir. I am not a personnel man, but I think they would have to change Navy officer personnel system.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Thank you.

General GERARD. That is personally speaking.

Mr. FLYNT. Again, thank you very much for your appearance before the committee and your participation in the committee's hearings. I would like to express to all witnesses who appeared today the thanks of the committee, and with that, such additions as anyone might want to supply for the record.

The committee stands adjourned—

Mr. CHAPPELL. I would like to ask unanimous consent to bring one witness, the Deputy Director of Naval Reserve, just for a brief statement.

Mr. FLYNT. Is he here?

Mr. CHAPPELL. He is here.

Mr. FLYNT. Certainly. I did not realize there were further witnesses.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I am asking him to come before the committee, if it is all right.

Mr. FLYNT. All right.

Thank you, General Gerard.

Admiral, would you state your name and the position in the Navy which you presently hold?

Admiral ROHRER. Yes, sir. I am Rear Admiral Paul Rohrer, Deputy Director of the Naval Reserve, Rear Admiral, lower half, and the senior TAR officer on active duty today

BIOGRAPHY OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL ROHRER, USNR

Rear Admiral Paul W. Rohrer, United States Naval Reserve, began his Naval Service in March 1943. He transferred to the NROTC Program at the University of North Carolina in 1945 and was commissioned on 10 June 1946.

Upon commissioning, he served in PC's and an LSM in several capacities while participating in the Bikini Operation. Released from active duty in June 1947, he

returned to the University of North Carolina to complete his undergraduate work. He subsequently was graduated from the School of Foreign Service and the Graduate School, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Rear Admiral Rohrer was recalled to active duty in August 1950 for Korean service and served as Commanding Officer, USS BEAUFORT (PCS-1387). After succeeding tours with NATO in Naples, Italy and the Officer Exam Department, Naval Examining Center, Great Lakes, he attended Postgraduate School in Naval Intelligence and the Japanese Language and then served as Assistant Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attache for Air, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo. Following tours in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, as Executive Officer, USS POLLUX (AKS-4), and on the staff of Commander, Destroyer Squadron FIVE, he assumed command of USS SHIELDS (DD 596), and concurrently served as Commander Reserve Destroyer Division 272. Rear Admiral Rohrer then reported for duty as Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy, Naval Reserve Training Command, Omaha, Nebraska. Succeeding tours included Commanding Officer, USS GREAT SITKIN (AE 17) and as Commander, Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-FOUR (NRF). While serving as COMDESRON 34, he concurrently served as Commanding Officer, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Support Group, Charleston, South Carolina. He subsequently served as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Naval Reserve/Commander Naval Reserve Personnel Center.

Rear Admiral Rohrer assumed his present assignment, Deputy Director, Naval Reserve in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in September 1975.

Rear Admiral Rohrer is married to the former Sarah West Taliaferro of Rapidan, Virginia, and they reside with their son John Marshall Rohrer, in Fairfax, Virginia.

Mr. CHAPPELL. What has been your background as a naval officer?

Admiral ROHRER. Well, I thought I was a naval officer until this morning, when I found out I am a TAR. I still consider myself a naval officer despite the opinions to the contrary, obviously.

I have 35 years of Naval service, 33 of them active. I have had a very fine career, five commands afloat, PG school, attache tour in a major capital, all the good things the Navy has to offer.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Admiral, how much time did you spend in the Reserve program?

Admiral ROHRER. I commanded a Naval Reserve force destroyer, I commanded a Naval Reserve force destroyer squadron, and I spent 20 months on the Omaha staff, the surface command in the old days, prior to coming to Washington about three years ago, where I relieved Captain Otto in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

If you consider those ship duties Reserve program billets, then I have a total of about eight years' service in the Reserve Program prior to my coming to Washington.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Who is your immediate superior now?

Admiral ROHRER. Vice Admiral P. S. Charbonnet, Director and Chief of the Naval Reserve.

Mr. CHAPPELL. So you are the number two man?

Admiral ROHRER. I am his Washington deputy, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You are his Washington deputy?

Admiral ROHRER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Admiral, are you acquainted with the recommendation made to phase out the TAR program?

Admiral ROHRER. Yes, sir, very.

Mr. CHAPPELL. As the Deputy Director of Naval Reserve, or in any other capacity, were you consulted and asked for your opinion on the matter?

Admiral ROHRER. No, sir. This is the first time anybody in authority has asked for my opinion. I have forced my opinion on

former Secretary McCullen, on Admiral Holloway, Admiral Charbonnet and Admiral Watkins. Admiral Seiberlich knows full well my opinions. However, I was never formally asked, no, sir.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Do you have a personal and professional opinion?

Admiral ROHRER. Yes, sir, very definitely.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Would you care to state it?

STATEMENT OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NAVAL RESERVE

Admiral ROHRER. This decision was announced a year ago. In the interim, I think I am quoting Admiral Seiberlich's testimony this morning, we currently have 200 shortages in the Reserve program billets.

I would like to interject and perhaps clear up some of the problems that surfaced today—and I wonder how the rest of the world is doing today—when we attack this relatively insignificant problem. The TAR is a Reserve on active duty involved in the training of the Reserve. The TAR program was designed by Admiral Jackson, approved by the current CNO's father, who was Chief of Naval Personnel in those days, as a mixture of regular and Reserves on active duty to run the program. Therefore TARs, only referring to those TARs as reservists on active duty is a misnomer.

Since that time of the announcement of the demise, we have had 240, 250 percent more than normal attrition in the entire TAR program, through deaths, births, normal retirements, and requests for release from active duty. We currently have—I think I am quoting Admiral Seiberlich correctly—200 vacancies in the Reserve program. He talked about 1856, or something like that, Reserve program billets. 700 of those Reserve program billets are afloat in Naval Reserve force ships and in Naval Reserve force air squadrons.

Through the Chief of Naval Personnel and Navy Policy, those billets are filled, all the afloat billets are filled—perhaps not with the right rank and rating, but those billets are filled with bodies, if not the right rank structure. Therefore, we are down to 1100 Reserve program billets, of which we have a 200-billet shortage, bodies not filling authorized billets. So we are not enjoying a 9 percent reduction in billets, we are enjoying an 18 percent reduction in billets, which is a little bit more than the fair share of the Navy's shore establishment shortages.

Based on that, it is disastrous. We cannot run the program effectively under those circumstances.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Does that same opinion relate to the proposed change? Are you saying that that program would be disastrous if it were implemented?

Admiral ROHRER. It has been in effect for a year. We have not had TAR accessions since October of 1976.

Mr. CHAPPELL. You have not had a TAR accession?

Admiral ROHRER. No, sir, not since October of 1976. Therefore, we do not have the normal input into the program to even up the output at the top end or whatever end people leave at.

I do not question the sincerity, I would like to add to the other plaudits given Admiral Seiberlich, I think he is the finest officer I

know. I am not questioning the intent of any of the officers who stood here, the Secretary, the people who stood here and said they would insure it was done.

As Captain Otto's relief in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, under my auspices we studied the TAR program because of certain criticisms leveled on the TAR program today, the lack of fleet expertise, that sort of thing. We studied the program and in April of 1975 the then Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral Charbonnet, also then the Chief of Naval Reserve and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Mr. McCullen, all sponsored and supported the continuation of the TAR program as the most cost-effective way and the most efficient way of continuing the management of the program.

I do not think it was for altruistic reasons. I think it all boils down to, and in my own personal opinion—and I tend to oversimplify all the time—the Navy is convinced that the only way to implement the total force is by regular officers running the Reserve Program; in other words, management, participatory management which is a buzz word in civilian industry today, is not what the Navy is convinced will run the Naval Reserve properly.

I think it is the opinion of the senior leadership that the only way to run the Reserve program properly is to replace the reserve officer on active duty with a regular officer.

Mr. CHAPPELL. On that specific point, what is your opinion as to what would be the result of phasing out the TAR program?

Admiral ROHRER. As General Gerard said, if he thought Admiral Seiberlich was going to run it for the next eon, no question it could be done. I do not question any of the mother-love statements about total force that have been given about this phaseout program.

We currently have in the Navy a severe shortage of warfare specialty mid-grade officers. Admiral Seiberlich recently signed out on a note talking about our lack of success in retention of officers upon the expiration of the initial obligated service just within this past month, and set goals for the next year, all of which are extremely high, all of which are probably not capable of accomplishment.

I do not know what the current shortage of warfare specialty officers is today, all communities, surface, sub-surface, air and special warfare, but it is growing. Therefore, for the Navy to be able to take on an additional 1250 billets currently filled by reserve officers on active duty, I consider an impossibility.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Then specifically on the point of phasing out TARs, you said you had an opinion and you were opposed to it. What in your opinion would be the result of phasing it out?

Admiral ROHRER. I think, given the current status, all-volunteer force, the airlines are hiring, whatever, the reduction in numbers of warfare-qualified officers on board to fill authorized Regular Navy and funded-for billets, I think it would be disastrous for the Naval Reserve program.

If I were the detailer, and I had present-day problems to settle, I know where I would send the available people and they would not be sent to the reserve program. I would do the same thing the Regular detailer is doing today.

Mr. FLYNT. Let me say I certainly did not mean to preclude you.

Admiral ROHRER. May I take just one second to correct something said this morning?

You talked about the phaseout of our fleet augmentation component. That was just a change of name. We currently have 15,000 reservists dedicated to active Navy ships. We have the manpower authorizations on the regular ships, the active fleet ships, they list current authorized strength and they have what I call the out-columns, mobilization, the first of which is the Selected Reserve column. We have people in almost every ship in the Navy—

Mr. CHAPPELL. This is Reserve personnel?

Admiral ROHRER. Yes, sir. We have Reserve personnel assigned to almost every ship in the Navy. We very definitely have a fleet augmentation component much stronger than we ever had before.

SHIP AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. What happened? What happened to the testimony we heard that we brought up the Navy to 100 percent manning of its ships at sea?

Admiral ROHRER. You know we are not up to 100 percent strength, we are not funded to 100 percent strength of Ship Manning Document (SMD) or Squadron Manning Document (SQMD).

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. I understood you were funded to 100 percent of SMD and all the ships have manning documents, you were funded 100 percent for those.

Admiral ROHRER. I am not in the bureau any more, and not an expert on the active side, but the difference between currently on-board authorized strengths and SMD, that delta is our Reserve augmentation unit.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. We do not want to get into all this now, but that differs from much of the testimony we received.

Mr. FLYNT. Thank you very much for adding that to it. Again thank you, Admiral Rohrer and all of the witnesses who appeared before the committee.

The committee stands adjourned.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1977.

**REPROGRAMMINGS 78-2 P/A, 78-3 P/A, 78-4 P/A-JOINT
INTEROPERABILITY OF TACTICAL COMMAND AND
CONTROL SYSTEMS**

WITNESSES

ARMY

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES R. MYER, DIRECTOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
COMMAND AND CONTROL DIRECTORATE, OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
COLONEL FLETCHER H. MAFFETT, CHIEF, JINTACC SYSTEM
ARCHITECTURE/ENGINEERING OFFICE, OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
MAJOR GENERAL ERNEST D. PEIXOTTO, DIRECTOR OF ARMY BUDGET,
OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL BILLIE N. THOMAS, CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS
TEAM COMMAND CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS DIVISION,
OFFICE OF DEPUTY OF STAFF FOR RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND
ACQUISITION

OSD

MR. J. CITTADINO, OFFICE DIRECTOR (COMBAT SUPPORT), DEFENSE RE-
SEARCH AND ENGINEERING, OFFICE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NAVY

LCDR. JAMES W. HEEGEMAN, HEAD, TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS SECTION, COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

AIR FORCE

COLONEL PATRICK T. MCGOWAN, CHIEF, TACTICAL COMMAND, CONTROL
AND INTEROPERABILITY DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF OPERATION AND
READINESS, HEADQUARTERS, USAF

MARINE CORPS

COLONEL ROBERT O. RITTS, HEAD, C4, SYSTEMS ACQUISITION COORDI-
NATION BRANCH, HEADQUARTERS, USMC

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order.

We are going to discuss a number of proposed reprogrammings. The House is in session in a very important meeting, but we don't convene until twelve. We are going to have to put quite a bit of the material in the record.

The first reprogramming concerns a program labeled as the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems.

Three reprogrammings are required because this is a joint program involving the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

The Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems program is a proposed successor to a previous program known as Ground and Amphibious Military Operations.

The authorization bill for fiscal year 1978 reduced this predecessor program by \$12.6 million and called upon DOD to make significant changes in the program concept.

The Appropriations Committee, of course, had to go along with the reductions in the authorization bill. The House report stated:

These reductions are required because the authorization committees reduced these programs by these amounts. While under the circumstances, the Appropriations Committee has no alternative but to agree to the reduction, the Department of Defense should understand the committee still supports very strongly the interoperability concept for communications programs. Within available funds, DOD should continue to do everything possible to promote this goal.

The purpose of today's hearing is to determine if the restructured program, as proposed in these three reprogrammings, is responsive to the concerns of Congress as expressed in the FY 1978 authorization and appropriations bills. We will also want to assure that funds can safely be diverted from other programs as proposed in the reprogramming.

The principal witness today is Major General Charles R. Myer, Director, Telecommunications, Command and Control, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army.

General Myer, you might introduce your colleagues who are accompanying you and then proceed with a summary of your statement.

A full copy of the statement will appear in the record at this point.

[The prepared statement and biography of General Myer and the reprogramming documents follow:]

CHARLES R. MYER
MAJOR GENERAL, US ARMY

Major General Charles R. Myer was born in Wellsburg, West Virginia, on 12 March 1924. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1946, commissioned a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps.

He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the United States Army War College and holds a Master of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Illinois.

In the 1960's he served as Commanding Officer of the 69th Signal Battalion and 11th Signal Group, United States Army Strategic Communications Command.

In the early 1970's he served as Commander, United States Army Strategic Communications Command, Europe and Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics United States Army Europe and Seventh Army.

Subsequently he was Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, United States Army Strategic Communications Command-South-east Asia, and Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics, United States Army, Vietnam. In August 1973 he became Commanding General, United States Army Signal School Training Center. He held that position until his present assignment as Director of Telecommunications and Command and Control, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. I am Major General Charles R. Myer. I represent the Chief of Staff, Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Agent for this program. In the language of the conference report on the Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978, it was stated that: "Both the House and Senate endorsed the goals of the Ground and Amphibious Military Operations (GAMO) Program but expressed serious reservations about the lack of a sound management structure and firm system architecture." The act deleted the Services' funds for the program and reduced the Executive Agent's funds for joint management of the program. Accordingly, the House Appropriations Committee on 21 June 1977 reported that the reductions to the GAMO Program were required because the authorization committees had reduced the program. Your report stated "While under the circumstances the Appropriations Committee has no alternative but to agree to the reduction, the Department of Defense should understand that the Committee still supports very strongly the interoperability concept of communications programs." In response to reservations and concerns of the Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense, on 2 August 1977, directed that certain actions be taken by the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to strengthen the management structure of the program. These actions were explained to the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committees in letters dated 26 September 1977 from Dr. Perry, Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

A new program management structure has been established and operational since 1 October 1977. This consists of a high-level council to provide policy guidance, to resolve issues and to insure earliest accomplishment of the program. A Program Director has been designated and has been given authority to make program decisions which will be binding on the Service participants. A Systems Engineer has been appointed and System Architecture/Engineering Office has been established. The program has been realigned to encompass achievement of Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS).

In addition, an expedited joint test schedule has been developed. It completes the program two years earlier. Achievement of this expedited program will require availability of FY 78 monies to the Departments as quickly as possible; otherwise a stoppage of work will occur with loss of time, and increased monies required to reestablish the effort in FY 79.

Reprogramming of FY 1978 monies this early in a new fiscal year is difficult but considered essential by all the Services to continue this program without interruption. It is requested that the proposed reprogramming of FY 1978 monies be approved to allow the continuation of this program on an accelerated basis as follows:

RESOURCE SUMMARY (\$000,s)

		<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Army	Tactical Programs/SINCGARS-V	11,328	8,166	- 3,162
	Remotely Piloted Vehicles/ Drones	9,611	9,511	- 100
	Reprogramed for GAMO/JINTACCS Program	1,000	4,262	+ 3,262
Navy	Tactical Programs/Marine Corps Data Systems (Advance)	4,674	4,124	- 550
	Intelligence and Communications Program/Fleet Telecommunications (Tactical)	11,417	9,717	- 1,700
	Reprogramed for GAMO/JINTACCS Program	0	2,250	+ 2,250
Air Force	Technology Base/Command,Control and Communications	51,985	49,985	- 2,000
	Reprogramed for GAMO/JINTACCS Program	0	2,000	+ 2,000

Army	\$3,262
Navy	\$2,250
Air Force	\$2,000
Total	<u>\$7,512</u>

This reprogramming action requires the approval of the Armed Services and Appropriation Committees. Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have indicated approval; the Senate Appropriations Committee will consider this action following consideration by your Committee. I am accompanied by representatives of all Services and we will be glad to address your questions.



UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

REPROGRAMMING ACTION								
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE							DOD SERIAL NUMBER	
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army 1978							FY 78-2 P/A	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER			(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)					
FY 78-2 P/A								
LINE ITEM	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM	
	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>								
<p>This action requests Congressional Committee approval of an increase in the Army's Joint Advanced Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Program. This increase is required to permit uninterrupted participation of the Army in the program to achieve Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS). This action is in line with the provisions of Senate Report No. 95-282, p. 36. This program has not been previously denied by the Congress and is of higher priority than those for which the funds were originally appropriated. This reprogramming proposal meets all of the administrative and legal requirements of the Congress.</p>								
<u>REPROGRAMMING INCREASE:</u>								
<u>FY 1978 PROGRAM:</u>								
<u>(Tactical Programs)</u>								
1. Joint Advanced Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Program								
	xx	1,300	xx	1,300	xx	+1,362	xx	2,662
<p><u>Explanation</u> - The additional funding is required to continue and accelerate the Army program in consonance with the Joint program. Army participation will continue in the development of technical design standards and to allow early compatibility and interoperability testing of tactical intelligence systems used in Joint military operations.</p>								
2. Joint Compatibility and Interoperability Program								
	xx	1,000	xx	1,000	xx	+1,900	xx	2,900
<p><u>Explanation</u> - The additional funding is required to support the executive Agent Systems Architecture/Engineering Office directed by the Secretary of Defense. Joint efforts will continue in the development of technical design standards and to allow early compatibility and interoperability testing of tactical command and control systems used in joint military operations.</p>								
TOTAL PROGRAM INCREASE						+3,262		

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

REPROGRAMMING ACTION								
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE							DOD SERIAL NUMBER	
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army 1978							FY 78-2 P/A	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER			(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)					
LINE ITEM	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM	
	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT
	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
REPROGRAMMING DECREASES:								
FY 1978 PROGRAM:								
(Tactical Programs)								
3. SINGARS-V								
	xx	11,328	xx	11,328	xx	-3,162	xx	8,166
Explanation - The reduction reflects the deletion of one of two planned contracts for slow frequency hopping techniques. A second contract for the development of fast frequency hopping techniques is maintained and will provide adequate competition base.								
4. Remotely Piloted Vehicles/Drones								
	xx	9,611	xx	9,611	xx	-100	xx	9,511
Explanation - Reduces level of effort in area of engineering changes.								
TOTAL PROGRAM DECREASES						-3,262		
The above program decreases are not planned for future reinstatement at this time.								
NET CHANGE TO PROGRAM						-0-		
REQUESTED (Signature and Date)					APPROVED (Signature and Date)			
 Jack E. Hobbs Dep Asst Secy Army (FM)					 NOV 2 1977 Deputy Secretary of Defense			

DD FORM 1 FEB 63 1415-1

CLASSIFICATION

CONTROL SYMBOL
 FD-Comp (AR) 483
 D 22668

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE		REPROGRAMMING ACTION						Page 1 of 3	
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, FY 1978/1979								DOD SERIAL NUMBER FY 78-3 P/A	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER		(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)							
LINE ITEM	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM		
	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	
			<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>						
<p>This action requests approval for reprogrammings of \$2,250 thousand in support of the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS), formerly Ground and Amphibious Military Operation (GAMO). This action requires Congressional approval prior to execution because GAMO has been designated as a program of special Congressional interest due to funding reductions in the FY 1978 Authorization and Appropriation Acts. This action represents a reprogramming of funds to programs of higher priority than those for which the funds were originally appropriated and meets all of the administrative and legal requirements of the Congress including special Congressional direction with regard to management of the JINTACCS program.</p> <p>The Conference Report on the DoD Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978, states: "Both the House and Senate endorsed the goals of the Ground Amphibious Military Operations (GAMO) Program but expressed serious reservations about the lack of a sound management structure and firm system architecture."</p> <p>The Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum of 2 August 1977, directed a significant restructuring of the GAMO program which included the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o A significant streamlining of the GAMO management organization. o Authorization for the program director (an Army General) to make program decisions binding upon participating Services and defense agencies. o Establishment of a high-level council to provide guidance, review progress, and resolve issues on Joint Tactical Command and Control and Communications interoperability Program. <p>With respect to the above direction, DDR&E on 26 September 1977 reported to the Chairman of the four appropriate Congressional subcommittees that the JINTACCS has been thoroughly reviewed and will remain a top priority matter within DoD.</p>									

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

REPROGRAMMING ACTION								
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE							Page 2 of 3	
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, FY 1978/1979							DOD SERIAL NUMBER	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER							FY 78-3 P/A	
FY 78-1 P/A							(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)	
LINE ITEM	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM	
	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
		<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>						
<u>REPROGRAMMING INCREASES</u>								
<u>FY 1978 Program</u>								
<u>Budget Activity 4: Tactical Programs</u>								
1. Joint Advanced Tactical CCCP		1,000		1,000		+1,700		2,700
Explanation: The FY 78 effort for JINTACCS consists of accomplishing the software, hardware and support tasks associated with implementing the intelligence portion of the Technical Interface Development Plan.								
2. Marine Corps Data Systems (Operational Systems)		4,114		4,114		+550		4,664
Explanation: This element provides for operational systems development related to Marine Corps data systems. Efforts are directed toward Tactical Command and Control Systems and related Systems. Funds from this program element also support Marine Corps efforts in JINTACCS. Actions have been taken to satisfy the concerns of Congress. In order to continue the Marine Corps efforts in JINTACCS, additional funds to the extent of \$550 thousand are necessary. These funds are needed to reprogram the Marine Corps Groups Intelligence System (MAGIS) to JINTACCS standards as well as meet the JINTACCS test schedule and support documentation development.								
TOTAL REPROGRAMMING INCREASES						+2,250		


UNCLASSIFIED


CLASSIFICATION

REPROGRAMMING ACTION

Page 3 of 3

APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE		REPROGRAMMING ACTION						DOD SERIAL NUMBER	
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy, FY 1978/1979								FY 78-3 P/A	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER		(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)							
FY 78-1 P/A		PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM	
LINE ITEM	a	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT
		b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>									
REPROGRAMMING DECREASES									
<u>FY 1978 Program</u>									
<u>Budget Activity 4: Tactical Program</u>									
1. Marine Corps Data Systems (Advanced)									
		4,674		4,674		-550		4,124	
<p>Explanation: This element provides for advanced development related to Marine Corps Data Systems. Efforts here under pertain to the Marine Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) concept. Funds contained in this element are programmed as required to support the test bed. The effect of decreasing this element by \$550 thousand will result in the redirection of test bed support for the Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) system which is scheduled for FY 1978 test bed evaluation. This reduced level of support is acceptable in view of the higher priority requirement for the JINTACCS program.</p>									
<u>Budget Activity 5: Intelligence and Communications Program</u>									
1. Fleet Telecommunications (Tactical)									
		11,417		11,417		-1,700		9,717	
<p>Explanation: The UHF Radio/Modem Development program is terminated in FY 1978. FY 1978 funds beyond necessary termination costs are available for redistribution.</p>									
TOTAL REPROGRAMMING DECREASES						-2,250			

REQUESTED (Signature and Date)

 OCT 17 1977
 Assistant Secretary of the Navy

APPROVED (Signature and Date)

 NOV 2 1977
 Deputy Secretary of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

Page 1 of 2 Pages

REPROGRAMMING ACTION								
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE							DOD SERIAL NUMBER	
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE FY 1978							FY 78-4 P/A	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER			(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)					
FY 78-1								
LINE ITEM	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM	
	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>								
<p>This action requires Congressional approval prior to implementation due to special interest of the Congress. This reprogramming action provides \$2.00 million of FY 78 RDT&E funding to continue critical on-going efforts within the JCS program for Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) (formerly GAMO). The RDT&E program will make use of FY 78 funds which are a fall out from restructuring of a sister program to provide for a more efficient FY 78-83 program funding profile. This RDT&E program is of a higher priority than those for which the funds were originally appropriated and meets all the administrative and legal requirements of Congress.</p>								
<p>JINTACCS is a joint interoperability program to provide improved operational effectiveness of Service (A, N, AF, & MC) tactical command and control systems planned for use in support of joint operations through the 1980s. Designated Air Force participants are elements of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), the Tactical Air Intelligence System (TAIS), E-3A, JTIDS, and COMPASS EARS. Air Force objectives are to develop interface design standards with the other Services, modify affected Air Force systems, participate in joint compatibility and interoperability testing, and demonstrate an interface capability in joint operational effectiveness demonstrations.</p>								
<p>Critical Air Force efforts planned for FY 78 include continuing joint efforts to develop a Technical Interface Design Plans-Test Edition (TIDP-TE) to be used as the compatibility and interoperability standard for design of emerging systems, analyzing the effects of the TIDP-TE on existing Air Force systems as well as those under development, specifying the required test-only modifications to be made to participating test systems, and preparing to enter joint system testing during FY 79.</p>								
<p>The FY 78 Committee Reports show that the intention of Congressional action in deleting the FY 78 RDT&E funds for the GAMO program (now JINTACCS) was to force a reorganization of the joint program to provide a stronger and more effective management structure. The Committees did, however, indicate that it would look favorably on reprogramming upon positive indication that GAMO would be reorganized. That action has been accomplished. A new high level Council for Joint Tactical Command and Control, and Communications Systems (JTC³S) has been established to oversee the program and to provide a forum for resolving issues in OSD and JCS command and control, and communications programs. The previous GAMO Management Office has become the Systems Architecture/Engineering Office for the JINTACCS program. The JINTACCS Program Director, appointed by the Army, as the executive agent for the</p>								

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

REPROGRAMMING ACTION								
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE							DOD SERIAL NUMBER	
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE FY 1978							FY 78-4 P/A	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER	(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)							
LINE ITEM	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM	
	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT	QUANTITY	AMOUNT
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>								
<p>program now has the authority to make program decisions which are binding on all Service/Agency participants. The JCS Joint Standardization Group for Tactical Command and Control, and Communications Systems (JSC/TOCCS) is being modified to provide for OSD participation.</p>								
<u>REPROGRAMMING INCREASE</u>								
<u>FY 1978 PROGRAM</u>								
<u>TACTICAL PROGRAMS</u>								
1. Ground & Amphibious Military Operations (GAMO)								
(JINTACCS)								
		0		0		+2,000		+2,000
<p>Explanation: This action provides for continuation of on going efforts in development of Technical Interface Design Plans initiated under the GAMO Program, and will allow for studies to determine the effects of identified interface incompatibilities in order that preparations may be made for compatibility and interoperability tests scheduled to begin in FY 79.</p>								
TOTAL PROGRAM INCREASE						+2,000		
<u>REPROGRAMMING DECREASES</u>								
<u>FY 1978 PROGRAM</u>								
<u>TECHNOLOGY BASE</u>								
2. Command, Control and Communications								
		51,985		51,985		-2,000		49,985
<p>Explanation: Reduces FY 78 level of effort in consonance with FY 79 and FY 80 reduced level of effort reflected in revised Air Force estimates. These funds are fall out from restructured FY 78 program which provides a more efficient FY 78-83 program funding profile.</p>								
TOTAL PROGRAM DECREASE						-2,000		
NET CHANGE TO PROGRAM						-0-		
REQUESTED (Signature and Date)			APPROVED (Signature and Date)			REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL		
<p><i>Arnold G. Baxter</i> 3 OCT 1977 Arnold G. Baxter Secretary of the Air Force Financial Management)</p>			<p><i>Clarence W. Duncan</i> NOV 2 1977 Clarence W. Duncan Deputy Secretary of Defense</p>					

General MYER. Mr. Chairman, my statement is presented for the record and I will summarize it.

The program you cited is to achieve interoperability of tactical command and control systems of the three services. By an action in 1977 on the 1978 budget, funds were taken away from the program by the Senate and the House until the services could get the program in a better management structure.

As a consequence of that, the Secretary of Defense, in August, directed restructuring of the program. A council has been established. A director has been appointed. An engineering office has been set up and a joint test facility is under construction to bring the program into balance and cause about a two-year acceleration of the previous time schedule.

As a result of that, Dr. Perry corresponded with both the Senate and the House and informed the Secretary of Defense and them of the actions the services were taking.

We feel we have a good management base now. The Senate and the House have both strongly endorsed the purpose of the program and now that our ducks are in order, I respectfully submit the reprogramming action for about \$7.5 million so we can get on with the job.

Mr. SNODGRASS. It was the authorization committees that reduced the appropriation and the Appropriations Committee had to go along with the action of the authorization committees. Have you received their approval for this proposed reprogramming?

General MYER. We have, Mr. Snodgrass. Both the committees in the House and the Senate have passed and approved the reprogramming.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Could you very quickly say the major changes you have made that responded to the criticisms of the authorization committees?

General MYER. Essentially a high level council has been established to arbitrate any differences that the services might have as we go through the implementation of the program; the establishment of a director—that happens to be myself—and an engineering office under myself as director, which we are in the process of staffing now, which will be joint service; the development of a joint test facility at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which will be manned with approximately 70 to 80 people to see that the program is carried out. Those are the highlights.

TIMETABLE FOR INTEROPERABILITY

Mr. SNODGRASS. If the Committee approves this reprogramming, when will the United States begin to achieve actual interoperability of forces in the field?

General MYER. The program is supposed to extend to about 1985. It would depend upon the various systems that the services are developing and when they are put in the field as to when we can start the testing.

We expect to have the joint test facility operable at Fort Monmouth within the next year.

We should be in the process of starting testing of the first systems that come along, in about a year and a half.

Mr. SNODGRASS. 1985 seems a very long distance in the future. This committee for many years has been urging the services to have more interoperability.

Isn't there anything the Department of Defense can do to accelerate at least some portion of this program or get some portion of the services interoperable before 1985?

General MYER. We expect to have a fair number of them interoperable before 1985, but the program itself encompasses, I would say, about 19 to 26 different systems of the services and, of course, the time frame of the program is predicated upon the fielding of those systems. As soon as one of the systems is fielded by the services then we crank it into the test facility and do the interoperability testing.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Could you provide for the record the major systems encompassed in this program and the time frame in which you think they will become interoperable so the Committee can have more feel as to the pace you are going to pursue in implementing this program in the next ten years?

General MYER. I would like to ask the systems engineer to answer that if I could, please.

Colonel MAFFETT. As General Myer indicated, we will start testing in July, 1979. We will start testing first in the functional area of intelligence for two reasons:

1. The systems are more nearly available and,
2. That is one of most importance.

Those tests will be completed in about a year and a half, in the summer of 1981. JCS is scheduling an operational demonstration in 1981 to demonstrate by a joint exercise that those things do work and we have demonstrated interoperability.

Then in the years 1981 through 1984 and 1985 maybe because we are dependent upon the joint exercise, and the availability of that joint exercise to do the demonstration, we will be involved in the balance of the test program.

We will have achieved for Air Defense the interoperability of the major systems for air defense and air control for each of the services and that was demonstrated in the past year, in the '77 year.

Everything done in the Tactical Air Control Systems/Tactical Air Defense Systems interoperability program becomes a part of what we are doing and these programs are being accomplished concurrently by the Services.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Could you elaborate for the record your statement?

[The information referred to follows:]

The Tactical Air Control Systems/Tactical Air Defense Systems, TACS/TADS joint interoperability program was established in July 1969 to achieve interoperability of the Army's AN/TSQ-73 Air Defense Command and Control System; the Navy's Naval Tactical Data System; the Navy's Airborne Tactical Data System; the Air Force's AN/TSQ-91 Command Reporting Center; and the Marine Corps' Marine Tactical Data System. Technical interface standards for these automated/computerized tactical command and control systems were developed in 1975. Joint tests were conducted in 1976 and 1977 which demonstrated that these systems are compatible and are interoperable in joint military operations. The Ground and Amphibious Military Operations (GAMO) program, now JINTACCS, was established in April 1971 to achieve compatibility and interoperability of the tactical

command and control systems to be used by the Service during the 1980's in joint military operations. The technical and operational standards developed an integral part of the TACS/TADS program become an integral part of the JINTACCS interoperability standards for joint Air Operations and will be used for configuration management of operational air control and air defense tactical command and control systems of the Services.

INTEROPERABILITY WITH NATO

Mr. SNODGRASS. Will this do anything to promote interoperability with the NATO allies?

General MYER. The JINTACCS program was not initially intended to embrace NATO. OSD has, however, earmarked \$2 million in the fiscal year 1979 budget to expand the program to encompass the NATO structure as well.

We expect to do that, predicated upon the receipt of that money in the fiscal year 1979 budget.

Mr. SNODGRASS. What is the time frame when we hope to achieve interoperability with our NATO allies?

General MYER. Colonel Maffett is going over there in January to lay the ground work for how we will do that.

Mr. SNODGRASS. It is too soon to say?

General MYER. It is at this time, yes.

Mr. SNODGRASS. But it has high priority emphasis now?

General MYER. Definitely; and I think it has to be a part of the JINTACCS program.

TRI-TAC/JINTACCS INTERFACE

Mr. SNODGRASS. The TRI-TAC program is being pursued to promote greater commonality in military communications equipment. How does the JINTACCS program relate to the TRI-TAC program, if at all?

General MYER. The TRI-TAC program items are in tactical communications and will have to be cranked into the applicability portion.

As you probably know, the first item to be fielded from the TRI-TAC program is also going to be tested in a full systems configuration at Fort Huachuca and that is started in 1979.

I would say that is the first element of the TRI-TAC architecture that would be cranked into the JINTACCS program.

Colonel MAFFETT. The two programs are separate and one program does not depend on the other.

There is within our charter the requirement that everything the JINTACCS program develops that requires communications be done in concert, in coordination with TRI-TAC.

Standards, procedures, systems and equipment which we will be using will be compatible with the TRI-TAC program.

Mr. SNODGRASS. TRI-TAC supposedly is to develop equipment which is inherently interoperable. DOD will literally be using the same pieces of communications equipment in the different services.

The purpose of the JINTACCS program, as I understand it, is to take existing equipment which was not inherently interoperable and, by various procedures, doctrine, and so forth, find ways to make it interoperable. Once TRI-TAC equipment becomes the per-

vasive equipment in the force, does the JINTACCS program become unnecessary or will there still be some need for the JINTACCS program?

General MYER. I think there will be a need probably beyond the proposed completion date of the program itself, 1985, as additional systems are fielded by the services because there will be many systems that call for interoperability that will be coming in that are outside of the TRI-TAC architecture.

Mr. SNODGRASS. For the record, if you can, elaborate upon why both the JINTACCS and a TRI-TAC program are needed concurrently.

[The information referred to follows:]

Both programs have the same objective to achieve compatibility and interoperability but are concerned with different equipment. The JINTACCS program will achieve joint compatibility and interoperability of tactical command and control systems; whereas, the TRI-TAC program will achieve joint compatibility and interoperability of tactical multichannel and switching communications equipments.

JUSTIFICATION FOR REDUCTIONS IN MAJOR PROGRAMS

Mr. SNODGRASS. I have two final questions.

What are the major program reductions that will be made in order to provide the \$7.6 million that you are going to reprogram?

General MYER. In the Army area the money is coming out of the R&D money for the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINGARS).

In the Navy and the Air Force area, the major reprogramming action is coming out of the intelligence and communications program for fleet telecommunications in the tactical area.

In the Air Force there is a reduction of the technology base command control and communications program from \$51 to \$49 million roughly.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Why is it possible to make these reductions? Did the committee appropriate too much this year or are you delaying things to be reinstated later?

General MYER. I would like to address that to the Army and then perhaps call on the Air Force and the Navy witnesses for their particular portion.

In the SINGARS program, the reduction was going to take place anyway because originally there was going to be three competitors for the ECCM portion of the radio part to give us anti-jamming capabilities.

It was determined by the project manager that this was not necessary; we could have competition with two competitive contractors and therefore it was possible to make that reduction in SINGARS without being detrimental to the program itself.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Would the Navy and the Air Force comment?

Colonel McGOWAN. For the Air Force, this action will actually reduce our efforts slightly in that area and slow the start on this particular project.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Could the Navy witness indicate why it was possible for the Navy to make reductions?

LCDR. HEEGEMAN. The UHF Radio Modem Development project has been terminated by the Navy as being duplicative of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System and the residual funding has been made available for this program.

(Clerk's note: Colonel Ritts added the following information for the record:)

Colonel RITTS. Marine Corps resources to be reprogrammed to JINTACCS are to be taken from RDT&E,N Program Element 63766M - Marine Corps Data Systems Advanced. These funds are to be withdrawn from the Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems (MTACCS) project which supports the test bed effort at the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA). The MTACCS Project is currently funded at \$1,716,000 in FY 1978. The reprogramming request of \$550,000 would leave \$1,166,000 available for the MTACCS Project. Although this reprogramming action will decrease the depth of FY 1978 support for the Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) system which is entering the test bed, based on evaluation of possible sources for funds, the reduction to the MTACCS project represents the most viable alternative.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Is TRI-TAC proceeding on schedule?
[The information referred to follows:]

The TRI-TAC program is composed of individual equipment programs. Each of these programs are on schedule.

Mr. SNODGRASS. When will TRI-TAC equipment begin to be fielded with the operational forces?
[The information referred to follows:]

TRI-TAC equipment will enter the field in 1982.

Mr. SNODGRASS. What will be the effect of these reductions on other programs?

[The information referred to follows:]

The effects of Service reprogramming in fiscal year 1978 are as follows:

ARMY: Tactical Programs/SINGARS-V	No adverse effect.
ARMY: Remotely Piloted Vehicles/Drones	No adverse effect.
NAVY: Fleet Telecommunications/Tactical	No adverse effect.
NAVY: Marine Corps Data Systems/Advanced	Minor effect by delay in evaluation of Tactical Combat Operations System.
AIR FORCE: Technology Base/Command Control and Communications.	No adverse effect.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Will any of these reductions be reinstated in future years?

[The information referred to follows:]

None of the funds reprogrammed in FY 1978 for accomplishment of the JINTACCS program are required to be reinstated in future years.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, General.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1977.

REPROGRAMMING 78-7 P/A - DIVISION RESTRUCTURING
STUDY

WITNESSES

ARMY

MAJOR GENERAL ERNEST D. PEIXOTTO, DIRECTOR OF ARMY BUDGET,
OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. WRIGHT, DIRECTOR OF OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE ARMY, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
COLONEL BERNARD S. PERGERSON, REQUIREMENTS DIRECTORATE, OF-
FICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
COLONEL D. S. PHIL, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. ARMY
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MAHON. The next proposed hearing is Operation and Maintenance, Army Reprogramming No. FY '78-7, Division Restructuring Study.

The Army has submitted a reprogramming request for \$12,444,000 to be added to a base program of \$4 million for the purpose of conducting a test of various alternative mechanized armored division configurations.

This item requires prior approval of the Appropriations Committee since it was a matter addressed in conjunction with congressional action on the fiscal year 1978 budget.

We will attempt to keep the number of questions down to a minimum since we have directed the investigations staff to make a complete review of this test procedure as well as an analysis of the combat effectiveness costs and changes in readiness which are likely to result from any proposed reorganization.

We are glad to have you, General Peixotto, before the committee. We welcome you here. Since this is your first appearance, in addition to your prepared statement you might put a biographical sketch in the record at this point.

[The biography, statement and a copy of the reprogramming document follows.]

MAJOR GENERAL ERNEST D. PEIXOTTO
UNITED STATES ARMY

Ernest Dishman Peixotto was born at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 24 July 1929. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1951 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Engineers in the Regular Army. His initial assignments included Tactical Officer in the Engineer Officer Candidate School at Fort Belvoir; 307th Amphibious Support Regiment, Panama Canal Zone; 16th Armored Engineer Battalion of the First Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas; and Vicksburg Engineer District, Vicksburg, Mississippi, where he worked on flood control projects involving the Mississippi River.

After receiving a Master of Science degree at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1957, he served for two years with the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C. as Project Officer for the construction and operation of the Army's first prototype nuclear power plant designed to provide electric power for remote installations of the Armed Forces.

In June 1959 he went to Vietnam as the Engineer and Academic Advisor to the Vietnamese National Military Academy in Dalat; in 1961 he was assigned to the Research and Development Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Engineers; and in 1962 he served for two years in the Special Weapons Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army.

Following a year at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, in 1965, he was assigned as Area Engineer, Meshed, Iran, part of the U.S. Army Engineer Gulf District, where he supervised the construction of a jet air base for the Imperial Iranian Air Force. Returning from Iran in 1966, he served for two years as the Special Assistant for Plans and Policy to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D. C.

Returning to Vietnam in 1968, he served a year as the Commanding Officer, 86th Combat Engineer Battalion operating in the Mekong Delta in support of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division. Following Vietnam, he attended the National War College in 1970 where he studied national security problems and international relations. In June 1970 he was assigned as the Commander/Director of the U.S. Army's Waterways Experiment Station at Vicksburg, Mississippi, the U.S. Army's largest civil engineering research and development center. After promotion to Brigadier General in July 1973, he served as the Assistant Commandant of the U. S. Army Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

On 1 July 1974 he reported for duty as the Deputy Director of Materiel Plans and Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition. On 22 September 1975 he was appointed the Director, Materiel Plans and Programs. On 15 November 1977 he was appointed the Director of the Army Budget.

General Peixotto is married to the former Elizabeth L. Smith of Fort Pierce, Florida. They have two children, Vivian and Ernest.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

This is my first opportunity as Director of the Army Budget to appear before this Committee. It is a pleasure for me to appear and I look forward to working with the committee and your staff members as the FY 1979 budget request and other Army matters are reviewed.

The purpose of this reprogramming proposal is to seek approval for an additional \$12.4 million FY 1978 Operation and Maintenance, Army funds to continue the Division Restructuring Study (DRS) test in FY 1978. This test, initiated in Fiscal Year 1977, has been developed to generate data from simulated combat situations which will be fully evaluated in order to develop a rationale basis for recommending major changes to the organization of Army divisions in the 1980-85 time frame.

The Division Restructuring Study (DRS) was initiated in early 1976 by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to determine the optimum heavy division organization to integrate the modern weapons systems entering the inventory and to counter the new threats anticipated on the battlefield. Testing the DRS concept is an essential step for the Army prior to any consideration of change in the organization of armor and mechanized units. The driving factor of these tests is to maximize the effectiveness of the new weapons systems being introduced. The Army must examine the interaction of the new weapons systems and proposed organizational structure to see if they can be adequately supported by trained personnel and the logistics systems as well as operate with effective command, control, and communications. The Army needs this opportunity to blend new concepts for fighting on the modern battlefield through DRS testing to determine if proposed concepts will enhance the overall fighting capability of the Army's combat divisions. This is far better than adopting any doctrinal or equipment related organizational change that has not been thoroughly field tested.

As originally developed, the DRS test plan included three phases: Battalion level tests in the Fall of 1977, a division test in the Fall of 1978, and a full division field test in the Spring of 1979. The estimated cost of these tests coupled with the impact on other high priority programs such as force readiness and REFORGER, caused the Army to review and revise the test plan. The revised plan continues the battalion level phase (Phase I) and the division (minus) field test (Phase II). The full division test at Fort Irwin has been eliminated. The division (minus) test will stress two full DRS Brigades and the command post exercise to stress the full division support systems. All field testing will be conducted at Fort Hood and completed during FY 1978. The battalion tests began 16 October 1977 and will continue through 16 December 1977. Restructuring and training additional units for the division (minus) test is scheduled to begin in January 1978 with actual testing during the 4th Quarter, FY 1978. It is essential that the Army provide necessary supplies and additional equipment early in FY 1978 to allow sufficient time to train the restructured units in their new configurations. Prior to initiation of Phase II a senior level review will be completed to insure that the results of Phase I justify the continuation of the test program.

The estimated cost for Phase I and Phase II in FY 1978 is \$16.4 million. This total exceeds the \$4 million currently appropriated. The Army recognizes that \$4 million is a ceiling and we have taken necessary steps to stay within the amount until the results of this reprogramming proposal are announced. In order to accomplish this high priority effort, the Army is requesting authority to reprogram \$12.4 million from other lower priority programs within Operation and Maintenance, Army. The sources of these funds are:

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>DOLLARS IN MILLIONS</u>
Tactical Systems Support	\$ 3.3
Operating Supplies and Equipment	5.1
Camouflage Screens	2.0
Commercial & Industrial Type Activities	1.4
Second Destination Transportation	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL	\$12.4

These funds have been made available as a result of:

- a. Extending the planned issue of camouflage screens to lower priority CONUS units.
- b. Reducing free issue of repair parts to support new systems introduced into units.
- c. A realignment of funds provided for supplies and equipment and Second Destination Transportation.
- d. A congressional moratorium on commercial and industrial type activities which makes funds available from Base Operations Support.

If the reprogramming request is not approved, the Army will have to cancel the Division (minus) portion of the test. In so doing, we would lose the only current opportunity to examine modern doctrine in alternative divisional organizations designed to integrate future weapons systems. The cancellation of this test would eliminate our ability to develop sound data upon which to base decisions concerning the best way to organize units in order to maximize the effectiveness of its new equipment.

The results of DRS testing will enable the Army to determine whether to implement any or all elements of the DRS concept. Nothing has been prejudged or predetermined. Decisions to implement will be made only after addressing improvements in effectiveness, affordability, readiness, strength levels, contingency planning and supportability in the 1980's.

The following summary addresses the application and source of funds: (This request for reprogramming realigns funds within Operation and Maintenance, Army, for Division Restructuring Study Test Support.)

RESOURCE SUMMARY



	(DOLLARS)
Program 2	\$ 11,806,200
Program 3C	40,000
Program 7S	575,000
Program 8M	<u>23,100</u>
TOTAL	\$ 12,444,300

This reprogramming request requires action by the Appropriations Committees.

UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

REPROGRAMMING ACTION									
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE Operation and Maintenance, Army 2182020							ODD SERIAL NUMBER FY 78-7 P/A		
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER FY 1978 - 1 PA	(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)								
LINE ITEM a	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM		
	QUANTITY b	AMOUNT c	QUANTITY d	AMOUNT e	QUANTITY f	AMOUNT g	QUANTITY h	AMOUNT i	
			<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>						
	<p>This reprogramming action is submitted for prior approval because of Congressional interest in the Division Restructuring Study (DRS) Test. This item has not previously been denied by Congress and the DRS Test is of higher priority than those items for which funds were originally appropriated. This action meets all the administrative and legal requirements of Congress. This action will be reflected in the FY 1978 column of the FY 1979 President's Budget.</p>								
	REPROGRAMMING INCREASE FY 1978								
	GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES - MP - 2	2,594,710		2,594,710	+	11,806		2,606,516	
	INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS - MP - 3	473,562		473,562	+	40		473,602	
	CENTRAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE - MP - 7	2,537,098		2,537,098	+	575		2,537,673	
	TRAINING, MEDICAL AND OTHER		GENERAL PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES - MP - 8						
		1,970,008		1,970,008	+	23		1,970,031	
	<p>Explanation: The FY 78 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET contained \$4 million for DRS Testing. Revision and consolidation of the Test Plan has resulted in an Army initiative to complete testing in FY 78 at Fort Hood with a reduced number of test units vis-a-vis a full division level test at Fort Irwin in FY 79 as originally programed. This results in significant cost avoidance in FY 79 but does require a minimal tradeoff increase in FY 78. Testing the DRS concept is essential to the Army prior to any consideration of reorganizing our armor and mechanized units to maximize the effectiveness of the new weapons systems being introduced. It is important to examine the interaction of the division's weapons systems and organization to see if they can be supported adequately by trained personnel and logistics as well as operate with adequate command, control and communications. The Army needs the opportunity to blend the concepts for fighting on the modern battlefield through DRS testing to determine if proposed concepts will enhance the overall fighting capability of the Army's combat divisions. This is far better than</p>								

UNCLASSIFIED

REPROGRAMMING ACTION								
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE Operation and Maintenance, Army 2182020							DOD SERIAL NUMBER FY 78-7 P/A	
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER FY 1978 - 1 PA			(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)					
LINE ITEM a	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM	
	QUANTITY b	AMOUNT c	QUANTITY d	AMOUNT e	QUANTITY f	AMOUNT g	QUANTITY h	AMOUNT i
<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>								
adopting any doctrinal or equipment related organizational change that has not been thoroughly field tested.								
TOTAL PROGRAM INCREASE:					+ 12,444			
REPROGRAMMING DECREASE: FY 1978								
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES - MP - 2								
		2,594,710		2,606,516	- 11,806			2,594,710
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS - ME - 3								
		473,562		473,602	- 40			473,562
CENTRAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE - MP - 7								
		2,537,098		2,537,673	- 575			2,537,098
TRAINING, MEDICAL AND OTHER GENERAL PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES - MP - 8								
		1,970,008		1,970,031	- 23			1,970,008
Explanation: Tradeoffs have been identified within the respective OMA programs to support the DRS Test reprogramming. Program 2 Tradeoffs are Tactical Systems Support (\$ 3.3M), operating supplies and equipment (\$ 5.1M), camouflage screens (\$ 2.0M), and Commercial and Industrial Type Activities (\$ 1.4M). Tradeoffs in the other OMA Programs (3, 7 and 8) represent a realignment of priorities within programed funds in order to support the test requirements at Fort Hood.								
TOTAL PROGRAM DECREASE:					- 12,444			
NET CHANGE IN PROGRAM:					- 0 -			
REQUESTED (Signature and Date)			3 NOV 1977		APPROVED (Signature and Date)			
 Alvin J. Gibbs					 NOV 14 1977			

DD FORM 1415-1
1 Jan 75

Assistant Secretary of the Army Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Installations, Logistics and Financial Management)

CHANGE IN COST ESTIMATE

Mr. MAHON. Does this Division Restructuring Test affect Fort Hood?

General PEIXOTTO. The tests are being conducted at Fort Hood. Over the last month or so we have had a series of battalion level tests conducted at Fort Hood. The tests are being conducted with units of the First Cavalry Division. They will be involved throughout the rest of this fiscal year.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Vander Schaaf will ask some questions.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. General Peixotto, the Army has increased the amount required to run this study in 1978 from \$4 million to \$16.4 million. It seems your initial estimates were in error by a considerable degree. What is the reason for this?

General PEIXOTTO. When the fiscal year 1978 budget was prepared, we had plans to conduct a division restructuring test. However, the plans had not been finalized. Originally the test was to extend over several years.

As the decisions were made in the December-January time frame last year, it was established that there would be a three-phase test, two phases of which would be conducted in fiscal year 1978, which would call for roughly \$16 million we are requesting here today. It was a matter of timing and a submission of the budget.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Is it correct that the Army never really attempted to price out the cost of this test prior to making a decision to budget for the item.

General PEIXOTTO. No, that is not correct. As plans were made we priced it out and made some price adjustments even after we provided to you a cost estimate.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. I received some information in response to questions concerning the test provided by the Army in reviewing the '78 budget. On page 37 of the material provided by the Army on this subject last April—they are talking about the \$4 million—it says "Specific dollar requirements are being formulated. They are dependent upon analysis of restructure division tests, tables of organization and equipment.

"Things have not been finalized. Detailed cost data can be expected by August 1977."

This would indicate you started this program not having an estimate of what the test would cost since the test was funded in the FY 1978 budget.

General PEIXOTTO. The overall statement, of course, included funds not only for fiscal year '78, but into fiscal year '79.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. The question is, when you started the program you did not have a cost estimate for this. I think this answer I just read is self-evident.

Approximately a year ago you put \$4 million in the budget for the purpose of running this test. You then indicated in April that some time in August you would come up with a cost estimate to conduct the test. This is an indication you didn't really know what the test would cost when you started the program.

General PEIXOTTO. The total cost I would say has evolved during the past year. Basically the statement is correct.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Did the fact the committee informed the Army last June it intended to review your tests and your study procedures in detail using our investigative staff—did that recommendation have anything to do with increasing the scope of the test or the dollars required to conduct this test?

In other words, did you increase the scope of the tests following announcements in June by the committee that we intended to closely review this test procedure.

General PEIXOTTO. No, that was not the rationale. As the plan for this test evolved, it called for three phases.

The first phase was a battalion level test to be conducted at Fort Hood. The second also to be conducted at Fort Hood would be a division minus test and the third phase, which would be the largest portion, would be conducted with a full size division at Fort Irwin.

As the Army reviewed this, primarily for cost reasons, the cost of transporting a division to Fort Irwin and conducting the tests out there were so great that we decided we would combine Phase III with Phase II; we would conduct only Phases I and II/III and accelerate Phase II/III from fiscal year 1979 into fiscal year 1978.

That is one of the primary "drivers" for the increase in cost.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Phase II or Phase III? You dropped Phase III which was going to be in '79.

General PEIXOTTO. That is right. We have now brought that into fiscal year 1978. If the schedule goes well, we can complete the tests in September of this fiscal year.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Was cost the only consideration in dropping the Phase III portion?

General PEIXOTTO. Readiness was also a problem, a matter of taking a division out to Fort Irwin. Readiness is a consideration in the scheduling in September.

That division has to support reserve component training at Fort Hood during the summer. They also have a commitment to participate in reforge so we are integrating this test among other very high priority requirements.

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF RESTRUCTURING TEST

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. According to the test plan, the test director and the majority of the controller-evaluator personnel will be experienced combat leaders who will come from the Army's forces command. This is supposed to ensure that any data developed during the test will be objective and will be independent of TRADOC and other army sources which came up with the initial study from which you are proposing this division reorganization.

Have you given any consideration to obtaining an independent source completely outside of the Army to act as a evaluator/coordinator during this test phase?

General PEIXOTTO. No.

Let me explain some of the evaluation. While, FORSCOM and TRADOC are involved in this, we also have OTEA involved in the overview of this test. It is up to OTEA to make the evaluation of the test. OTEA is responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Army—the Commanding General reports directly to the Chief of Staff for all

testing in research, development and so on and provides a completely objective and independent appraisal.

I would also add that the Commanding General of TRADOC is personally involved in this test and he is—giving it his personal review.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. What is OTEA? Is that Operational Test Evaluation Army?

General PEIXOTTO. It is the Operation Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA).

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. It is not under DARCOM or Forces Command or another of the Army's major commands?

General PEIXOTTO. It is a separate agency established several years ago to ensure that all operational testing in the Army and tests such as this have a completely unbiased group of both professional military and civilian analysts reviewing the data and reporting directly to the Chief of Staff.

They have no pressures from commanders on them.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Would the Army object to having experienced combat Marine Corps personnel review your procedures and review this test?

General PEIXOTTO. We always work with the Marines. The tactics and operations used by the Marines are significantly different from the Army because of their missions. We would certainly share our data and knowledge with the Marines, but I don't think the Army would particularly care to have the Marines pass judgment on how the Army should be organized.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Would you support a recommendation to have a number of combat trained Marine officers review your test as it develops at Fort Hood?

General PEIXOTTO. I would be opposed to such a proposal.

REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASED PERSONNEL

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Another thing that is of interest to the Committee with regard to this reorganization is, of course, its cost. There are many possible costs that can occur, including transportation costs, shipping equipment between divisions, moving personnel around, changing the educational process for people and the kind of weapons systems they handle. A great many cost factors come into play and our investigative staff will attempt to look at all of these.

One of them that clearly stands out in this proposal, is your proposal to reduce the size of an armored tank platoon. Currently we have one lieutenant who heads up five tanks. Under this proposal you would have one lieutenant taking care of three tanks, or two lieutenants for every six tanks.

First, we increase the number of lieutenants, then the number of captains who are company commanders. That increases the number of battalions which increases the number of lieutenant colonel positions in that structure which in turn increases the number of battalion staff members who are generally captains and majors.

Do we have your assurance you are going to evaluate the personnel costs involved in this reorganization structure in reaching any final conclusions before you implement?

General PEIXOTTO. Let me assure you that the purpose of the test is to establish data upon which we can conduct analysis and review the true needs of how to integrate the modern weapons systems with the new organization in the Army.

Once we do that and develop what is perceived to be an optimum organization for the Army for the 1980s, the Army is obliged to look at the resources allocated to the Army. We have constrained of military end strength in the Army. We know pretty well what the budgets will be in the future. We will not be coming in with requirements that exceed what can be expected.

I can assure you we are not just going to come in and reorganize the Army as a fait accompli. This will be thoroughly studied by the Army staff. The matter of affordability, the equipment, the potential increases in equipment and the impact on the Authorized Acquisition Objective (AAO) will be evaluated.

The impact on the officer corps, our ability to furnish the lieutenants, and the career patterns that are involved will need to be evaluated. All these aspects must be evaluated before a decision can be made.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Offhand, do you have any estimate of the number of additional officers required for a mechanized or armored division if this proposal were adopted?

General PEIXOTTO. The restructured division, as it is being tested, would include 180 additional officers in the division.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Would there be any reductions in enlisted positions offsetting that, or would the total division strength be increased?

General PEIXOTTO. I will ask Colonel Pihl to answer that question.

Colonel PIHL. As you go to a three-tank platoon, you would eliminate from a five-tank platoon, one E-6 position in the platoon, but there is an increase of 120 officers for maneuver battalions and the field artillery in addition, with no other offset at this time.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much.

REPROGRAMMING 78-6 P/A -ADP FOR AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND

WITNESSES

AIR FORCE

MAJOR GENERAL GERALD J. POST, USAF, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR SYSTEMS AND LOGISTICS

BRIG. GENERAL GEORGE C. LYNCH, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE

COLONEL AGAMEMNON R. MOURGES, USAF, DIRECTOR, DATA AUTOMATION, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR SYSTEMS AND LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER RESOURCES

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MAHON. We will now consider a reprogramming proposal by the Department of the Air Force.

In recent years the Congress has had considerable difficulty with Air Force proposals to provide third generation automated data processing equipment and support to the Air Force Logistics Command.

The effort was previously referred to as the Advanced Logistics System. The program was terminated by the Congress in 1975. It was later determined that the Air Force had not in fact terminated all of this effort but had continued a significant portion of it under the heading of Project MAX and/or MINIMAX.

Both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees discussed the Air Force Logistics Command ADP situation in their respective reports on the FY 1978 Defense Appropriations Bill and in conference it was agreed the Department was to comply with the specific report language which appeared in the Senate Report.

Furthermore, no funds were to be spent in FY 1978 for Projects MAX or MINIMAX or any portion thereof or related thereto until the Department of Defense had specifically delineated to the Committee its overall plan for Project MAX, and the various other systems that previously were a part of ALS, interim ALS, and so on, and the Appropriations Committee had approved these plans.

Since completion of the conference report, the Air Force has terminated Project MAX and has provided the Committee with a Master Plan for further development of Logistic Management Information Systems.

Under the guidance provided in the conference reports, submission of the Master Plan and supporting documentation allowed the Air Force to submit a reprogramming action of up to \$10 million to offset the \$10 million reduction made in the original request.

According to the conference report, approval of the Master Plan was a pre-condition for approving the expenditure of additional funds.

RELATIONSHIP OF MASTER PLAN TO REPROGRAMING REQUEST

General Post, before you make your opening statement, would you please respond to a couple of questions:

What is the relationship of this reprogramming request of \$7.3 million to the Logistics Management Information System Master Plan?

General Post. There is a direct relationship between the reprogramming request and the Master Plan, to the extent that of the \$7.3 million, \$4.2 million is directly associated with initiating implementation of that Master Plan.

As a result of staffing the reprogramming through the Executive Department, through the Department of Defense and the OMB, that question was asked a number of times. We did prepare a document which highlights the elements within the \$7.3 million, the dollars associated with each, and the number of people, or manpower positions.

Mr. MAHON. Is it reasonable to expect the committee to approve the reprogramming action without also approving a go-ahead on at least the FY 1978 portion of the Master Plan?

General Post. Well, sir, inasmuch as a little more than half of the dollars that are requested in the reprogramming are associated with the Plan, one might say it would not be reasonable to ask the Committee to approve the reprogramming without approving the plan.

It is the hope of the Air Force that the Committee will approve both.

Mr. MAHON. Prior to our getting into specific questions on this reprogramming proposal, would you present your summary statement in support of the reprogramming and be sure to include in the summary statement any current information with respect to the operation of the Air Force Logistics Command Data System which may be of interest to the Committee?

I am certain you are well aware of the fact that the Air Force has been severely criticized for failing to keep the Congress informed with respect to its actions and activities related to these programs. You now have an opportunity to ensure that this situation does not recur.

General POST. Yes, I am familiar with that criticism.

My statement, which I will submit for the record—I don't want to read it because it covers some of the background information that you just covered in your opening statement.

[The statement and a copy of the reprogramming document follows:]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

I appreciate the opportunity to present for your consideration reprogramming action FY 78-6 which requests authority to transfer \$7,295,000 to the Operation and Maintenance, Air Force Appropriation for operation of vital data processing activities and systems in the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). The funds are available in the FY 1977/1979 Other Procurement Appropriation.

The Conference Committee Report on the FY 1978 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill reduced the funds requested for data automation support of the Air Force Logistics Command wholesale logistics mission from \$60,000,000 to \$50,000,000, a reduction of \$10,000,000. The Report also stated that the Committee would entertain a reprogramming action if the Air Force determined additional funds above those appropriated were required, subject to completion of certain specified actions.

The Conference Report directed submission of a report on the five major system redesigns. This report was also to include a constrained and realistic definition of mission essential, nondeferrable criteria for ADP systems at Air Force Logistics Command. The portion of the report dealing with a definition of mission-essential, nondeferrable criteria and Project MAX was delivered to the Committees on August 24, 1977. The final part of the evaluation dealing with the other four major redesigns and the AFLC Logistics Management Information System Master Plan were signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on October 21, 1977, and transmitted to the Congress. Based on requirements identified in these reports and the Master Plan, the Air Force has determined that a reprogramming of \$7,295,000 is required. Specifically, this reprogramming will permit AFLC to accomplish the following.

1. Initiate the conversion of approximately 50 percent of IBM 7080 computer data systems to the CYBER computer. As you are aware, IBM has told the Air Force it will provide maintenance support for the 7080 computers only on a parts and labor availability basis after December 21, 1979.
2. Accomplish site preparation at Headquarters, AFLC and each Air Logistics Center for installation of IBM 360/65 computers capable of emulating IBM 7080 computer data systems. AFLC plans to use these computers to process that workload which cannot be accommodated by the CYBER computers. These systems will be acquired from government surplus or competitively, with appropriate justification, from third party sources. The acquisition of the IBM 360/65 computers will assure continued operations, until replacement by a competitive acquisition, as outlined in the AFLC Logistics Management Information System Master Plan.
3. Upgrade the CYBER computer configuration at four Air Logistics Centers to accommodate the IBM 7080 data system conversions.
4. Obtain contractor support to augment the AFLC data automation work force in the conversion of the IBM 7080 computer data systems to the CYBER computer.
5. Implement high priority Data Automation Requirements (DARs) such as the Comprehensive Engine Management System and Wartime Requirements Computations.

6. Implement selected DAR's identified in Part 2, AFLC Logistics Management Information System Master Plan.

7. Make AFLC initiated emergency changes to data systems to ensure continuity of operations.

8. Implement Department of Defense and Air Force directed changes to data systems as required to permit continued AFLC day-to-day operations.

Sufficient funds to pay AFLC programmer/analyst personnel are included in this reprogramming.

Funding Sources

The \$7,295,000 is available for transfer from the Other Procurement, Air Force FY 1977/1979 Appropriation. As a result of operational limitations identified during follow-on test and evaluation, the GBU-2 program (PAVESTORM) has been terminated.

This concludes my statement. The Air Force seeks your support of this reprogramming action.

REPROGRAMMING ACTION																	
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT TITLE Operations and Maintenance, Air Force FY 1978							DOD SERIAL NUMBER FY 78-6 P/A										
APPROPRIATION SERIAL NUMBER FY 78-1			(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)														
LINE ITEM a	PROGRAM BASE REFLECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION		PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY SEC DEF		REPROGRAMMING ACTION		REVISED PROGRAM										
	QUANTITY b	AMOUNT c	QUANTITY d	AMOUNT e	QUANTITY f	AMOUNT g	QUANTITY h	AMOUNT i									
<u>PRIOR APPROVAL ACTION</u>																	
<p>This reprogramming is submitted as a prior approval since the program increase is financed by transfer authority under Section 833 of Public Law 95-111 and is therefore a matter of special interest. The reprogramming request meets the administrative and legal requirements of the Congress. These programs are of a higher priority than those for which the funds were originally appropriated and have not been denied by the Congress.</p> <p>The proposed reprogramming action to transfer \$7,295 million into the Operations and Maintenance, AF appropriation is to provide funds for the personnel, equipment rental and maintenance, and contract support necessary for the operation of vital ADP activities and systems in Air Force Logistics Command. Source of these funds is the Other Procurement, Air Force 1977/1979 appropriation. Explanation of the increase by program is provided.</p> <p>This action will be reflected in the FY 1978 column of the FY 1979 President's Budget</p> <p>REPROGRAMMING INCREASE</p> <p><u>FY 1978 Program</u></p> <p>1. Central Supply and maintenance</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;"></td> <td style="width: 15%; text-align: right;">2,887,525</td> <td style="width: 15%; text-align: right;">2,887,525</td> <td style="width: 15%; text-align: right;">+ 7,295</td> <td style="width: 25%; text-align: right;">2,894,820</td> </tr> </table> <p><u>Explanation:</u> This reprogramming action is to provide funds for the operation of vital ADP activities and systems in AFLC. Further justification is attached.</p> <p>TOTAL FY 1978 PROGRAM INCREASE</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 70%;"></td> <td style="width: 30%; text-align: right;">+ 7,295</td> </tr> </table> <p>NET CHANGE IN PROGRAM</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 70%;"></td> <td style="width: 30%; text-align: right;">+ 7,295</td> </tr> </table> <p><u>Explanation:</u> This reprogramming action requests the transfer of funds under Section 833, Public Law 95-111, DoD Appropriations Act, 1978. Transfer is from the Other Procurement, Air Force, 1977/1979 appropriation.</p>										2,887,525	2,887,525	+ 7,295	2,894,820		+ 7,295		+ 7,295
	2,887,525	2,887,525	+ 7,295	2,894,820													
	+ 7,295																
	+ 7,295																
REQUESTED (Signature and Date) <i>Arnold S. Butler</i> Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force					APPROVED (Signature and Date) NOV 15 1977 <i>W. S. Dunaway</i> Deputy Secretary of Defense												

JUSTIFICATION

The Congress reduced the funds requested for data automation support of the AFLC wholesale logistics mission from \$60.0 million to \$50.0 million, a reduction of \$10 million. It was stated that a reprogramming action would be considered subsequent to submission of the following: An acceptable definition of mission essentiality, evaluation of the five major redesigns using this definition, and submission of the AFLC Logistics Management Information System Master Plan. The AFLC Logistics Management Information System Master Plan and the final part of the evaluation dealing with the five major redesigns, including the required definition for mission essentiality, were signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on October 21, 1977 and transmitted to the Congress by OSD.

The Air Force has determined that \$7.3 million of the \$10 million reduction is required through reprogramming. This will allow AFLC to implement the Master Plan appropriately in FY 1978. Specifically, it will permit AFLC to accomplish the following:

- Initiate the conversion of approximately 50 percent of IBM 7080 computer data systems to the CYBER computer.
- Accomplish site preparation at HQ AFLC and each ALC for potential installation of IBM 360-65 computers, capable of emulating IBM 7080 computer data systems, from government surplus or competitively from third party sources with appropriate justification.
- Upgrade the CYBER computer configuration at four Air Logistics Centers to permit IBM 7080 system conversion.
- Obtain contractor support to augment the AFLC data automation workforce in the conversion of the IBM 7080 computer data systems to the CYBER computer.
- Develop high priority Data Automation Requirements such as the Comprehensive Engine Management System and Wartime Requirements Computations.
- Develop selected Data Automation Requirements identified in Part 2, AFLC Logistics Management Information System Master Plan.
- Make AFLC initiated emergency changes to data systems to ensure continuity of operations.
- Implement DOD and Air Force directed changes to data systems as required to permit continued AFLC day-to-day operations.

Sufficient funds to pay AFLC programmer/analyst personnel are included in the \$7.3 million to accomplish the above.

MASTER PLAN

General Post. I would like to say a few things about the Master Plan itself, since the statement submitted for the record deals only with the reprogramming.

The Master Plan capitalizes on some of the lessons that the Air Force has learned through attempts to implement major data systems such as the Advanced Logistics System and others. It capitalizes on them. The Master Plan is a blueprint for a very careful, highly disciplined evolutionary method to improve the logistics management systems of the Air Force Logistic Command and to provide the Command with up-to-date computers upon which to operate those systems.

With regard to communications with the Congress, we provided, upon receipt of the Master Plan from AFLC—a copy to the staff of the Committee here, while it was undergoing staffing within the Pentagon. We opened a dialogue at that time with the Committee staff and we have maintained that dialogue through the period.

As far as the opportunity to provide items that may be of interest to the committee is concerned, there are a couple of situations existing today that I think may be of some interest to the committee.

ACQUISITION OF DATA COLLECTION EQUIPMENT

General Post. The first has to do with the acquisition of some data collection equipment.

You may recall when General Buckingham submitted his report of the Depot Maintenance Management Systems Assessment Group, which he chaired, to the Committee, he noted therein that the Air Force would continue—although we would terminate Project MAX with the exception of one control subsystem, we would continue to implement the Uniform Cost Accounting System for depot maintenance directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

That implementation, in part, requires the acquisition of some equipment to collect data. That is, when a worker starts on the job he has to input into a machine to record the time he started that job, when he starts his next one, et cetera.

Mr. MAHON. General Post, you may elaborate on this for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Acquisition of the data collection equipment is currently underway. The Defense Audit Service has been reviewing implementation of Uniform Cost Accounting by the three Services. They have notified us that their review indicates that the source data collection equipment specified by the Air Force may have more capability than is required to do the job. This is being assessed by the Air Force at the present time. The second item which may be of interest to the committee concerns information we received on December 13. We were informed that during the month of November, some work had been accomplished at the Ogden Air Logistics Center using a program developed for Project MAX prior to its cancellation. A review of this situation at Ogden ALC revealed that some computer runs had been made on the labor distribution component of Project MAX. The purpose of these computer runs was, however, not associated with further development of Project MAX; rather these runs were made to establish a basis for evaluating output products from vendor supplied software associated with the data collection equipment.

Finally, in summary, the purposes of the funds in the reprogramming request are to: (1) sustain the operation of data systems currently operating on AFLC IBM 7080

computers; (2) to implement high priority and other selected data automation requirements; and (3) to make changes to data systems initiated by the Department of Defense, the Air Force, and AFLC as required for day-to-day continuity of operations. The Air Force seeks the committee's support of this reprogramming action.

Mr. MAHON. The item we have before us is somewhat controversial. We hope to complete our business this morning.

Mr. Vander Schaaf, will you proceed at this point.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. General Post, as you know, the Committee's investigative staff completed a study in September on the termination of the Advanced Logistics ADP System. The Air Force was previously provided a copy of this report. The report is a devastating indictment of Air Force incompetence in the management of its automatic data processing systems.

Since this report generally covers past history, we will not dwell on it this morning. I only want to read one quotation from the report and ask you to comment on the various portions of that quotation. This particular quotation summarizes some of the difficulties incurred by the Air Force in managing and terminating the ALS system:

"Personnel within the Secretariat failed to assume a leadership posture and to exercise vested authorities to insure Congressional directions were followed until almost 11 months had elapsed. The Air Staff, beset with internal bickering and compromised by its indulgence with AFLCs noncompliance with instructions, was neutered of any influence in carrying out Committee directions. AFLC, historically inept in ADP development, continued an unblemished record, even in the simple task of devising an intelligible plan for interim work. AFLC's absolute failure to follow Air Force Headquarters' instructions, such as recording FY 1976 expenditures—\$37 million limitation—appears to be an intolerable administration deficiency and borders on insubordination. The questionable legality of AFLC's sole-source pursuit of IBM 370/168 computers demands legal inquiry by the Air Force Inspector General."

That report is a rather devastating indictment of Air Force procedures in handling and managing ADP operations from the Headquarters level right through the Air Logistics Center level. We want some assurance this situation cannot reoccur in the Air Force again, that top management in the Air Force does in fact have control of what's going on at AFLC Headquarters with respect to how, when and where they purchase, buy and use ADP equipment.

Can you talk to that a little bit, what changes have been made in the Air Staff to assure this doesn't happen again?

General Post. Yes, I can. It is very hard to assure someone that in a large organization that things will not recur, but let me say, first, the Air Force agrees that the management of our data processing acquisitions need strengthening. We have taken a number of steps to do so. Within AFLC, for example, they have established a validation process for new data automation requirements, operated by an agency independent of the functional user that generates the requirements and independent of the data automation organization that develops and programs those requirements.

We think this is a good step.

The Air Force 300-series regulations, which govern Automatic Data Processing, have also been revised substantially to improve procedures for approving and developing automated data systems and acquiring computer hardware. The role of the Secretariat-level Automatic Data Processing Review Board, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management, is being expanded to include periodic reviews of all major ADP programs. We also have had frequent discussions with the staff of the Secretary of Defense and have established an agreement that the periodic meetings will continue. Finally, quarterly reports have been submitted to this Committee and others on the data processing activities of AFLC. We believe that these actions are sufficient to preclude situations of the type alluded to in the S&I report from developing.

Mr. MAHON. Are there questions?

Mr. ADDABBO. I would request that the words of the report be adhered to and that the Committee be appraised of all actions and that there be no circumvention of the conference report or the decisions of the Committee.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, one of the most prominent citizens of Marlow Bend, Alabama, is Ernest Fitzgerald, in my district. Mr. Rushford said the following in an article in the Washington Post, November 27th of this year. He is talking about Project MAX:

"But as Fitzgerald remarked, it has not been ended. Rather, it has been given another name. The actual-hour accounting system and spending is proceeding apace, Fitzgerald says. Fitzgerald refers to the actual hour accounting system as 'Son of MAX', explaining that 'It looks like MAX, talks like MAX, quacks like MAX; it is based on the same idea of paying for whatever actual time is spent on a job rather than setting reasonable standards for completing work.' As Fitzgerald puts it, 'The Air Force is sucking the bullet rather than biting it.'"

General Post. The system to which the article refers, the actual hours cost accounting system, is part of the Uniform Cost Accounting System for depot maintenance which I mentioned earlier, directed by the Office, Secretary of Defense. In relating it to Project MAX, the initial Project MAX did not contain such a system. Once the Uniform Cost Accounting System was directed upon all the Services, Project MAX was modified to include it.

Early in this calendar year that part was broken away from Project MAX for implementation sooner than AFLC could have brought Project MAX in. The fact that the Air Force, as well as the other Services, is working on implementation of an actual hours accounting system is true, that is accurate; but as far as being Project Max under another name, I couldn't agree with that.

Mr. EDWARDS. So you say this system was brought into Project MAX and when MAX was terminated it was broken out of MAX and continued on its way?

General Post. It was broken out in January 1977, before MAX was terminated. But the latter is correct, the Air Force is continuing to implement the Uniform Cost Accounting System. It has terminated Project MAX with the exception of one material control subsystem.

Mr. EDWARDS. Does the Air Force agree with the Defense requirement that you go to a system of cost accounting as far as your depot operations are concerned?

General POST. A system of actual hour job audit cost accounting, I believe, sir. We have had discussions recently with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on that subject, both on the accounting side and the logistics side. Last week a joint group from OSD and the Air Staff—last week or the week before—spent a week visiting Air Force Logistics Command Headquarters and three of the Air Logistics Centers. It conducted an in-depth review to answer that question, "Does depot maintenance operation in AFLC require a job type cost accounting system or does it not?"

They are about to render their report. I understand that it says that the Air Force Logistics Command requires both. That is, in certain areas it makes most management sense to have actual hour cost accounting against the job; in others it makes more sense to accumulate costs against the work center and to allocate them to each of the job orders.

Mr. EDWARDS. That is still in the process of being studied; is that what you are saying?

General POST. Yes, sir.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. General Post, because of the time constraints we will not be able to get into all these questions. I think there are a few items we ought to touch upon. I will place these questions in the record, to be answered in detail by the Air Force, so we have a historical record of what is taking place in this program, and I will discuss a few of the key proposals without discussing what data goes from what computer to where.

[The information referred to follows:]

ALLOCATION OF DOLLARS AND MANYEARS REQUESTED TO TASKS

Question. Attached to the reprogramming action is a justification statement. This justification statement lists eight tasks or areas of work which the AFLC will pursue if the \$7.3 million is provided. The committee will now take up the specific tasks in order. We would like you to tell the Committee, or provide for the record, the dollars to be allocated to each task from the \$7.3 million in the reprogramming action and from the \$50 million base already provided for AFLC ADP operations. Also provide the manyears associated with each task.

General Post. We are prepared to provide the committee with the dollars and the manpower required for each task contained in the reprogramming action. No funding in the \$50M base is provided for implementing the Master Plan. Therefore, the only reprogramming tasks for which there is some funding in the \$50M base are those associated with continuing current operations. There is approximately \$2M in the \$50M base for making directed changes to current data systems. Additionally, there is \$265 thousand dollars in the reprogramming request required to continue operation of the IBM 7080s located at AFLC Headquarters. This \$265,000 was not identified as a separate task in the reprogramming request submitted. It is, however, needed until the data systems operating on one

of the HQ AFLC IBM 7080s can be converted to the CYBER computer. Keeping this IBM 7080 running until then will preclude extensive TDY to other sites for processing; thus avoiding delays, inefficiencies, and TDY costs.

CONVERSION FROM 7080 TO CYBER COMPUTERS

Question. The first task listed is "initiate the conversion of approximately 50% of IBM 7080 computer data systems to the CYBER computer."

Since there are 15 IBM 7080s in the AFLC and only eight CDC CYBERs which are already in use, is it possible to load 50% of the 7080's program onto the CYBER system?

Col. Mourges. Yes, it is possible with the enhancement of the CYBER computers provided for in this reprogramming. The CDC CYBER is a much larger, more powerful computer than the IBM 7080. The CYBER computers have some available capacity due to the cancellation of Project MAX, which would have been hosted on them.

Question. Will this action result in the termination of operations for seven or eight IBM 7080s? If so, when?

Col. Mourges. Seven IBM 7080s will be terminated. One will be phased out in Fiscal Year 78 and two each in Fiscal Years 79 thru 81.

Question. Will there be a future cost savings as a result of converting 50% of the 7080 computer data to the CYBER computer?

Col. Mourges. Yes. We will save \$120,000 per year per 7080. This represents the contract maintenance costs. We also will have some savings in computer operations staff. The magnitude of this savings is being analyzed now. We will have to increase the operations staff on the CYBER computers to accommodate additional shifts required to process the 7080 systems. We are not sure at this point what the net operations staff savings will be.

Question. Since IBM intends to discontinue standard maintenance support for the 7080 at the end of 1979 and for the 1401 (of which AFLC has 24) at the end of 1981, what plans has the Air Force made to keep the 7080 system running?

Col. Mourges. We are purchasing available spare parts for the 7080. We plan to convert about half the 7080 programs to the CDC CYBER computers, and we are seeking IBM 360/65 computers with the ability to emulate an IBM 7080 computer.

Question. What about the 1401 system?

Col. Mourges. The IBM 1401 is used as an input/output device for the IBM 7080. As the 7080s are reduced, there will be a corresponding reduction in IBM 1401s. We will retain the displaced 1401s as a parts bank to support the 1401s that may remain in operation. We don't anticipate a serious problem here.

ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT SYSTEM

Question. There is a statement on page 16 of the Executive Summary of the Master Plan that "there is a significant probability that the current computer system will not be able to continue

minimum essential support until the capital replacement program is fully implemented, due to lack of maintenance support or saturation." What are the alternatives and where does the Air Force stand in implementing these alternatives?

Col Mourges. The "lack of maintenance support" refers to the IBM decision to cancel guaranteed maintenance support for the IBM 7080 computer in December 1979. We are approaching this problem in three ways. We are planning to convert 83 of the 123 data systems operating on the 7080s, allowing release of seven 7080 systems. We are stocking spare parts for 7080s and seeking IBM 360/65 computers which can emulate 7080 operation.

The reference to "saturation" refers to the situation with the IBM 360/40 computers which process the AFLC Base Support System. These computers are now operating at a level 20% above the manufacturers recommended load. They are saturated. The Air Force is examining some interim fixes, but the long term solution to this problem must await the AFLC capital replacement program.

SITE PREPARATION

Question. The next is to "accomplish site preparation at Headquarters AFLC and each ALC for potential installation of IBM 360-65 computers capable of emulating IBM 7080 computer data systems."

What is the cost to accomplish this and the manpower required?

Col Mourges. This will cost \$180 thousand, \$30 thousand for each site. There is no Air Force manpower required for this effort. It will be accomplished by contract.

Question. Since the IBM 360-65 alternative, if it is selected, would be replacing IBM 7080s on a less than one-for-one basis, why do you require additional site preparation?

Col Mourges. The IBM 360/65 is a different machine. While we do not intend to build new computer rooms, some modification of existing sites will be necessary.

Question. Could the request for site preparation be deferred until a decision has been reached with respect to finding available 360-65s and a decision to pursue this alternative?

Col Mourges. Funding for this site preparation could be deferred until the IBM 360/65 computers are acquired. The reason funding is requested at this time is to enable maximum flexibility in our implementation planning.

UPGRADING THE CYBER SYSTEM

Question. The next item is to "upgrade the CYBER computer configuration at four Air Logistics Centers to permit IBM 7080 system conversion."

Again provide the related manpower and cost data.

Col Mourges. The total cost of the four upgrades is \$318 thousand dollars. This will provide an enhancement to the CYBER computer memory capacity from 96 thousand bytes to 131 thousand bytes at each site. It will also enable the installation of additional tape control units. These enhancements are required to accommodate the planned conversion of IBM 7080 data systems to the CYBER

computers. There is no manpower increase related to this requirements.

Question. What four Air Logistics Centers are involved?

General Post. The four centers requiring this upgrade are located at Warner Robins, Georgia; San Antonio, Texas; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Sacramento, California.

Question. Will this upgrade meet all current ADP requirements at these four centers? In answering that question, be sure to use the "constrained" definition of mission essential requirements.

General Post. The upgrade will not meet all ADP requirements under either a constrained or unconstrained definition of the mission-essential requirements.

The reason the upgrade will not meet requirements under the constrained definition is that the Comprehensive Engine Management System (CEMS), which meets this definition, would not be placed on the CYBER computers. Although capacity exists on other current equipment to accommodate Increment 1 of CEMS, additional equipment may be required to accommodate the entire system.

The purpose of the CYBER upgrade is to provide required capacity and to make the CYBER computers compatible at all the ALCs. Although some system improvements will be made during the conversion process, the basic purpose of the CYBER enhancement is to accommodate the conversion of some IBM 7080 systems to the CYBER computers.

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Question. The next task is to "obtain contractor support to augment the AFLC data automation work force in the conversion of the IBM 7080 computer data system to the CYBER computer." Provide the appropriate cost and manpower data.

Col Mourges. The cost of this contractual support will be \$850 thousand. \$250 thousand will be used to exercise an existing contract for CDC CYBER analysts to provide technical support. These analysts will assist our in-house analysts in making optimum use of the CYBER hardware and software, for example, file structures and scheduling algorithms. This technical assistance will enable our analysts to more rapidly and efficiently convert the 7080 programs to the CYBER computers. \$450 thousand will be used to pay the contractor selected to do the entire conversion of one large data system. The remaining \$150 thousand is required to purchase conversion tools, automated conversion short-cuts, available from the contractor selected to do the one system conversion.

Question. Why is it necessary to obtain contractor support?

Col Mourges. A few commercial software houses have extensive experience and automated tools to accomplish software conversion. Our plan is to select a contractor to actually accomplish the conversion of one large data system, learn from his experience, acquire his automated tools and then convert the remainder of the data systems with in-house resources. We want to shorten our "learning curve" as much as possible.

Question. Will you obtain this contractor support from a contractor who may be interested in bidding on follow-on work for the AFLC Logistics Management Information System?

Col Mourges. We do not know who the contractor will be since we intend to fully explore the market and use a competitive procurement. The contractor selected may or may not be interested in doing follow-on work.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEW REQUIREMENTS

Question. The next task is to "develop high priority data automation requirements."

Provide the related cost and manpower data.

General Post. \$320 thousand dollars which will fund 16 man-years needed to develop or modify these automated data systems.

Question. Of the 88 requirements identified in the master plan, how many are considered to be of "high priority?"

General Post. Three of the 88 requirements fall into the high priority category because they have a direct impact on Air Force readiness. They are the Comprehensive Engine Management System which I just mentioned (12 man-years), the Wartime Requirements Computation System (one man-year), and the B-1 Diagnostic and Trend Analysis System (three man-years). Whatever the future may be for the B-1 aircraft, the diagnostic system will help us improve our failure analysis and prediction capabilities on other weapon systems.

Question. The next task is to "develop selected data automation requirements identified in part II, AFLC Logistics Management Information System Master Plan."

Provide the required financial and manpower data.

General Post. \$1.4M dollars to cover 73 man-years of effort are identified with this task.

Question. The implication is that the reprogramming provides funds which go beyond development of requirements for the high priority system and will begin requirement development for lesser priority systems. Is that correct?

General Post. Yes, sir, that is correct. As I have just indicated, the high priority category includes only those systems with direct impact on readiness. The systems identified under this task are those which would improve the efficiency of AFLC operations and/or provide economic benefits.

Question. What items will begin requirements development under this task heading?

General Post. The systems to be developed or modified will be selected from the validated requirements considering priority, resource availability, and the capability and capacity of current AFLC computers. Of the 88 system improvements identified in the Master Plan, 37 have been validated. Three of those are considered high priority as previously discussed. Of the remainder, 20 have been partially developed. We plan to continue work on these upon approval of the Master Plan subject to priority, resource, and equipment constraints. That leaves 14 validated requirements iden-

tified in the Master Plan which we plan to begin work on this fiscal year. These are: (1) Required System Capabilities Management System, (2) Support Equipment Acquisition and Control System, (3) DOD High Dollar Spare Parts Break-out Program Screening System, (4) Stock Control and Distribution System, (5) Air Munitions Storage Management System, (6) Item Management Vehicle Data System, (7) Nuclear Ordnance Logistics System, (8) DOD Activity Address Directory System, (9) LOGAIR Real Time Terminal System, (10) Mission Design Series/Project Workload Planning System, (11) Optimization of the AFLC Command Vehicle Reporting and Management System, (12) Automatic Test Equipment Software Configuration Control System, (13) Expansion of the Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Information System, and (14) Air Munitions Test Program System.

The extent of the work begun will vary among the requirements and will, in some cases, be constrained by the capability and capacity of existing computer equipment. For example, three of these systems may need additional equipment, but some work can be done on them prior to making that decision. Finally, it is probable that more requirements will be identified and validated during FY 78 and work may begin on these subject to their priority, resource availability, and the capability and capacity of current equipment.

EMERGENCY CHANGES TO DATA SYSTEMS

Question. The next task is to "make AFLC initiated emergency changes to data systems to insure continuity of operations."

Provide the appropriate manpower and dollar data as previously requested.

Col Mourges. This will require \$1.72 million to pay 86 people.

Question. It would seem that emergency changes would have to be financed from within the \$50 million base provided to the AFLC. What are these emergency changes and do you regularly budget for emergency changes?

Col Mourges. These changes are required to implement program and procedure revisions which take place each year. These occur in the areas of cataloging, supply management, weapon system configuration control, etc. These were categorized as emergency changes because if these fact of life changes are not accomplished, we rapidly get into an emergency position. While we cannot predict precisely what changes will have to be made each fiscal year, we can fairly accurately predict the level of effort required to accomplish these changes. There is \$1.2 million for this purpose within the \$50 million base provided for AFLC. We consider these changes in authorizing manpower, which, of course, is a prime driver of budget requirements. We do not, however, have a separate line in our budget entitled "emergency changes."

Question. What would be the result of not funding this particular task?

Col Mourges. If this task is not funded, AFLC will have to accomplish these changes from within the current funding of \$50 million. The resources diverted to make these changes will cause a reduction in other services and products needed by AFLC.

CHANGES REQUIRED TO CONDUCT DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS

Question. The last task listed in the justification statement is to "implement DOD and Air Force directed changes to data systems as required to permit continued AFLC day-to-day operations."

Provide the appropriate manpower and cost data.

Col Mourges. This task equates to \$1,040 million which will provide the pay of 52 people.

Question. It would seem that the basic program provided by the Congress (\$50 million) would be adequate to take care of routine day-in and day-out operations. How does the \$50 million provided for FY 1978 compare with the FY 1977 amount actually spent for routine daily operations?

Colonel Mourges. The basic \$50 million program includes about \$800 thousand for higher headquarters directed fact of life changes. The additional \$1 million in the reprogramming request will allow AFLC to accommodate these changes throughout FY 1978. The \$50 million thus far provided during FY 78 compares to \$59.3 million spent during FY 1977 for continued operation of the central logistics systems.

IMPACT OF REPROGRAMMING ON MASTER PLAN

Question. What effect would failure to approve any portion of this reprogramming have on (1) the AFLC operation in FY 1978, and (2) the implementation of the overall Logistics Management Information System master plan?

General Post. Failure to approve the reprogramming would result in stopping some AFLC data services. This would require manual work-around procedures in the functional logistics elements of AFLC with resulting inefficiencies and inability to accomplish the central logistics function completely. In addition, AFLC has estimated that without the additional financing addressed in the reprogramming action, between three hundred and six hundred data automation employees would have to be reassigned under reduction-in-force procedures to vacancies outside the data automation organization. In addition to the adverse impact on the individual employees and the general personnel turbulence associated with such an action, an extensive training program would be required. Regarding the effect on implementing the Master Plan, the work would defer such implementation. The most bothersome problem here would be the delay in assuring continued operation of the vital logistics systems resident on the IBM 7080 computers in view of tenuous support posture for the 7080. These data systems are the guts of Air Force logistics support and we must assure their continued operation. Of lesser immediate impact, but of considerable concern from the economic and/or efficiency viewpoint, would be the delay in implementing the management system improvements identified in Part 2 of the Master Plan.

Question. From what specific program line item or line items is the \$7.3 million to be obtained in the "Other Procurement, Air Force, 1977/79 appropriation?"

General Post. The \$7.3 million will be obtained from the GBU-2 (PAVESTORM) munitions program. The GBU-2 specific program line item is No. 22 in the Procurement Programs (P-1) Document.

FUNDING LIMITATION

Question. The Congressional direction on insuring termination of ALS states that "The Committee directs that expenditures for all ALS-follow-on work be strictly limited to not more than \$500,000 per month from all appropriations and including the cost of all personnel employed in support of the interim system, until the evaluation is approved by the Congress." Has the Air Force lived up to the letter of this limitation?

Colonel Mourges. The Air Force has taken a number of actions to insure that the limitation is lived up to. AFLC was told to establish a system to assure the limitation was not exceeded. The Air Force Auditor General was requested to review AFLC's control procedures for the \$500,000 per month limitation. As a result of the Auditor General's review, additional guidance was sent to AFLC. A copy of this guidance was provided to the Committee on Nov. 2, 1977.

We have received AFLC's October report on the limitation. It indicates that \$327,000 was expended for activities subject to the limitation. We expect the total for November will approximate that amount. AFLC is examining the impact of the additional guidance on the amounts identified for October and November. In order to comply with the limitation during December some data automation personnel were assigned lower priority tasks not covered by the limitation.

Question. How much are you currently spending per month for work on new or improved AFLC ADP systems?

Col Mourges. As I indicated previously, AFLC is taking those actions necessary to insure that work on new or improved AFLC standard ADP systems is held below \$500,000 per month.

Question. When will the Air Force be ready to submit "a comprehensive program action document which fully supports the master plan from the present until as far into the future as can be foreseen" as stated in Deputy Secretary Clements' letter to the Chairman dated October 21, 1977.

General Post. AFLC, using guidance provided by the Air Force, has initiated the development of the Program Action Document. We expect to submit the Program Action Document to OSD in March 1978.

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT OF 7080 COMPUTERS

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. In the executive summary of the most plan you say, "There is a significant probability that the current computer system will not be able to continue any essential support in the capital replacement program as fully implemented due to a lack of maintenance support or saturation."

What are the alternatives and where does the Air Force stand in implementing these alternatives?

General Post. If I may, I would like to ask Colonel Mourges, the Air Force Director of Data Automation, to answer that question.

Colonel MOURGES. We are doing a variety of things. Number one, the 7080s will be only supported after December 31, 1979, on a time and parts availability basis from IBM. They will not guarantee parts. To overcome that problem, I have directed a scouring of the entire United States for spare 7080s. We have gone to the third party market, through the reutilization program, the Defense Logistics Agency and many other sources. As a result of that effort, we have uncovered three 7080s which can be used as spare parts to back any 7080s that might require it.

Just as an aside, AT&T has offered to sell us two 7080s for \$1 apiece. There is technological obsolescence.

The second action we are taking, to eliminate the number of 7080s we have, is to move the applications that are on the 7080s to our CYBERs that we acquired through the ALS program. It is a well time phased effort and as a result of that we should eliminate seven of the 7080s.

Another alternative we are considering—

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. If you eliminate seven, why don't you use these seven for the spare parts for the remaining eight, rather than finding spare parts in industry?

Colonel MOURGES. The 7080s provide the mainstay of data processing. If the 7080s go down, the Command comes to a halt. It is a risk that the Air Force cannot accept and we will back up the 7080s if the cost is very reasonable.

When I can acquire 7080s at, say, \$1 apiece, I will.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. You would retain all fifteen 7080s with eight as a backup?

Colonel MOURGES. No, sir; I would use them as a backup, take them off maintenance and use them as spare parts. That is my problem.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. It appears to me you don't need to find any new ones in industry; you have 15 now; is that correct?

Colonel MOURGES. Yes, sir.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. If you are going to phase that down to seven and transfer some of the work to the CYBER computers, it would seem the ones you phase down would be available for cannibalization to support the ones you retain?

Colonel MOURGES. That is correct.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Then why go to industry for more?

Colonel MOURGES. We want to reduce the risk totally if we can, if the cost is not excessive.

General POST. Let me comment on that too, if I may.

One of the reasons we are exploring and grabbing all alternatives is that we have not yet gotten an approval to convert, for instance, some of those systems from the 7080s to the CYBER computers, and until we do that—until we have the approval, we won't be able to do that.

SITE PREPARATION

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Another thing we need comment on is the need to accomplish site preparation. It would seem, again, you are not ready for site preparation. You don't know if you are going to

use 7080s, whether you will use 360-65s to back them up or some other alternatives. I am not sure you know when you will procure new equipment. Why do you have money for site preparation in this request?

Colonel MOURGES. We are exploring all alternatives. The other alternative is the acquisition of 360-65s, through the DOD reutilization program. It would have to have the capability to emulate the 7080. Again, backing up the 7080s, we have identified one or two that may become available in 1978 or 1979.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. How much money is in here to prepare site preparation for some 360-65s that are "still up in the sky"?

Colonel MOURGES. There is \$180,000, \$30,000 per site.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. What would be wrong with deferring that \$180,000 at this time?

Colonel MOURGES. It could be deferred but as a result of the reutilization program, the 360-65s may be available at any time. I think it would be prudent if we provided site facilities to accommodate them and give maximum flexibility.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. If they become available, one would believe you could find in a \$60 million program \$180,000.

General LYNCH. Fifty million at the moment.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. With this reprogramming we are talking about closer to \$60 million; it is \$180,000 out of \$50 million. If you don't have it locked up, should the Committee provide the money is the question I am asking.

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

One other area that needs some on the record discussing is the question of contractor support. You are again requesting funds for contractor support. By the very nature of bringing a contractor in to develop these programs, he in a sense has a leg up on bidding and competing for follow-on hardware. To what degree are we going to depend upon the contractor support? That seems rather unclear from your proposal here, at least from the data package. Are you going to preclude the contractor who provides manpower support in designing some of these new systems, from bidding on the hardware?

Colonel MOURGES. There are a number of questions in that, Mr. Vander Schaaf, but I can address them.

We are speaking of \$850,000 in the reprogramming action, and there are basically three subpieces to that. As a result of the \$10 million reduction and the \$500,000 a month limitation, AFLC has eliminated all the CYBER analyst support that it had on site. This is a skill that understands the CYBER equipment from a hardware and software point of view.

We vitally need those people to provide the bridge for the AFLC program analysts who will do the conversion.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Will award of this contract preclude the contractor from bidding on the sale/conversion of the AFLC system to third generation computers at a future date?

[The information follows:]

The Master Plan is based on the principle of free and open competition among all interested and eligible contractors. While this principle will be employed for the Services contract to the Program Management Office, the Program Management

Office contract is the only contract we envision at this time which will include provisions preventing the selected contractor from bidding on software or hardware solicitations. Therefore, we do not plan to preclude the contractor selected for converting the IBM 7080 System to CYBER computers from bidding on other conversions or the hardware replacement. Further, we are keenly aware that the vendor receiving the IBM 7080 to CYBER conversion contract could structure his product in a manner which may favor his selection on other conversion or hardware replacement actions. The Air Force intends to take every possible step to minimize the risk of this occurrence to include separate, sequential procurements each carefully structured to avoid favoritism and to ensure that no contractor "locks us in," thus precluding fair competition among contractors.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. How many Air Force personnel have been trained in the CYBER computer system?

Colonel MOURGES. I will provide that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

AFLC conducted 234 CYBER classes with a total attendance of 5399 people between 1972 and 1974. Since many of these people attended multiple classes, the actual number of different individuals trained was considerably less than 5399. Unfortunately, AFLC's records do not indicate the specific number of different individuals trained during this period or the number of CYBER trained people affected by the Reduction-In-Force following the termination of the Advanced Logistics System. However, AFLC's records do show that 702 employees have been trained in the COBOL programming language and the CYBER/SCOPE operating system since mid-1976. The majority of the 702 employees work for AFLC today as programmers/analysts.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. What happened to those people?

Colonel MOURGES. There were RIF actions; people have moved about and the best way we can acquire this kind of talent is from the contractor.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Let's not talk about future years in the Master Plan but in this reprogramming you are looking to Control Data for that manpower?

Colonel MOURGES. Just \$250,000 of that.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Of the \$850,000?

Colonel MOURGES. Yes.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Where does the rest go?

Colonel MOURGES. The other element is \$450,000. As we indicated, a major factor in the AFLC Master Plan is the conversion effort. The concept is to examine a few vendors—we have not gone into contract yet. It would be a software house specializing in conversion tasks. What we would do is allow the vendor to convert one system. There are approximately 83 items to be converted. The end product would be to determine his efficiency and the tools that he uses to translate the 7080 program to the CYBER.

If those tools prove efficient after deep analysis and evaluation, the Air Force would then acquire those tools for \$150,000, which is the remaining part of the \$850,000, and use those tools in house by AFLC program analysts for the conversion effort.

Now, the second part of your question, do we plan to preclude that software house from bidding in the future on any other follow-on work. It would be primarily a specialty house and there are about two or three in the industry doing this kind of thing.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. It sounds to me like Control Data people will be doing almost the same thing as the software people.

Colonel MOURGES. No, sir; it is two different tasks. The CYBER analysts are expert in the hardware and the operating system and

they will work with the AFLC program analyst to make sure, for example, file structures are optimum, scheduling algorithms are right.

General POST. To make maximum use of the CYBER, not actually to do the conversion program.

Colonel MOURGES. It is just common practice at all design agencies to have this talent on board.

REQUIREMENTS, DOCUMENTATION AND DEVELOPING REQUIREMENTS

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. We have the question of requirements, documentation and developing requirements. There is an indication in your reprogramming you are going to use contractor personnel to develop the requirements for the systems you need.

The question is, doesn't the Air Force know what it requires? If you don't know what you require, yourself, in house, you are in trouble. He will tell you what you require and you will be back where you started many years ago.

General LYNCH. Perhaps I can address that one.

I think in a letter I signed over to you all, I included a comment that may have created the impression we are looking to contractors to define requirements. The wording was not very pure. That certainly isn't what we intend to do. The Air Force is going to define its requirements; however, there is a possibility that contractor effort is going to be needed to build the systems and things like that to satisfy and fulfill the requirements identified by the Air Force.

I think that is the key differentiation that needs to be made.

Mr. ADDABBO. Would it be more cost effective to sell the equipment rather than keep it for spare parts?

General POST. No, sir, because there isn't a market for it anymore. That is substantiated by the fact that AT&T has offered us two of them for \$1 a piece. A nice patriotic gesture, however.

COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM FOR AFLC

Mr. EDWARDS. Why is the Air Force having trouble making a final decision on the subject of cost accounting as proposed by DOD? As I understand it, the Army and Navy both have adopted the system and are moving forward with it, and you are still studying it. What is the problem with the Air Force?

General POST. I can't comment on the progress in the Army and the Navy, sir, but the problem is that there are legitimate differences of opinion, and the Government cost accounting standards recognize that difference of opinion as to how you should account for costs in a manufacturing operation or in a repair operation. That is the source of the controversy.

There are people who believe this is the right way and others who believe that is the right way. As I said, a joint visit by the OSD sponsors of the Uniform Cost Accounting Program, along with the Air Staff people—they have spent a week assessing this out in the field. I understand they agree the Air Force needs both, depending on the particular type of repair being made.

Mr. MAHON. I thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. EDWARDS. Have you ever checked with Army and Navy to see how they have handled it?

General Post. Our people have, yes, sir.

F-14 RE-ENGINEING

WITNESSES

REAR ADMIRAL S. S. FINE, USN, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND REPORTS
REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT C. MANDEVILLE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, AVIATION
PROGRAMS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
COMMANDER JOSEPH A. BRANTUAS, USN, OFFICE OF AVIATION PLANS
AND REQUIREMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Mr. MAHON. We wish to discuss Secretary Claytor's letter dated December 2, 1977, on the status of the Navy's F-14 engine and Carrier Onboard Delivery (VCX) aircraft programs.

The Congress appropriated \$15 million in Fiscal Year 1977 and an additional \$26 million in Fiscal Year 1978 for the development of a new engine for the F-14 aircraft. The Navy did not initiate the development program in Fiscal Year 1977 even though Congress provided funds for that purpose.

Furthermore, the letter dated December 2, 1977, states that development of the new engine has not been started to date and such effort, if any, would not be initiated until mid-1978.

[The information referred to follows:]



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

2 December 1977

The Honorable George H. Mahon
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The substance of this letter was provided in response to a query regarding the status of the Navy's F-14 engine and Carrier Onboard Delivery (VCX) programs from the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. In view of the interest displayed during the Congressional review of the FY 78 President's Budget, it is considered appropriate that the status of the F-14 engine and VCX programs be provided to your committee. Similar letters are being sent to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Navy witnesses, in their testimony before Congress, have identified the need for a higher thrust engine in the F-14 in order to counter the anticipated threat in the mid-1980 time frame and beyond. The problem associated with this three billion dollar engine development/procurement program is one of affordability considering priorities within fiscal constraints; therefore, no funds have been obligated to date.

As you are aware, Congress authorized and appropriated \$15 million in FY 77 to conduct a hardware demonstration that was to be used as a basis for source selection of an advanced technology engine (ATE) for the F-14. In FY 78 the Congress authorized and appropriated an additional \$26 million for the ATE although the Navy had not requested additional funding. During preparation of the FY 79 Navy Program Objectives Memorandum (POM), it became apparent that an F-14 re-engine program could not be accommodated within the fiscal guidelines provided. Therefore, the Navy has not initiated a hardware demonstration program due to its inability to identify the funding necessary for source selection and initiation of full scale development.


The questions of affordability and priorities must be answered in terms of life cycle cost tradeoffs associated with overall F-14 weapons system improvement. This matter is presently under review by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy. In this regard, I plan to initiate a funded study which will address the cost effectiveness of several potential improvements for this weapons system. The study will consider such aspects as radar system improvements and propulsion improvements as they relate to the mission of the aircraft. As a part of the study, the detailed cost of ownership of a modern advanced engine in the F-14 vis-a-vis the current engine with attendant improvements will be established in detail. The study should be

completed by mid-1978 and at that time, the Navy will be able to determine what improvements should be pursued to insure the maximum capability in the 1985-2000 time frame. In my opinion, this course of action represents the most logical and responsible approach to the problem.

The desired VCX program involves affordability and procurement priority issues similar to those of the new F-14 engine. The Navy has recently received direction from the Secretary of Defense to program and budget funds for a mixed Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) and Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) program. We are now in the process of determining the mix of COD aircraft and CH-53 helicopters that will provide the best aggregate capability within fiscal constraints. A subsequent effort will identify potential COD aircraft and the Navy will then request approval for the most cost effective system and procurement strategy. Pending completion of these actions, the \$2 million in FY 77 appropriations has not been obligated.

I hope that the above information will clarify our management efforts with regard to these programs. Your continued interest in and strong support of a viable defense capability for this country is appreciated.

Sincerely,



W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
Secretary of the Navy

Now the purpose of this hearing is to discuss the re-engining of the F-14 and I will ask members of our staff here to proceed for a moment, and any members of the committee. We are all interested in this problem as we have discussed it before.

Admiral Fine, do you have a statement.

Admiral FINE. Yes, sir, I have a statement.

Mr. MAHON. We will insert it in the record at this point.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Chairman:

It is a pleasure to appear before you to testify on the subject of re-engining the F-14. I will keep my remarks brief in the interest of saving time.

There has been testimony before Congress related to the requirement and desirability for a new F-14 engine.

It is currently estimated that the development, procurement and introduction of a new engine for the F-14 would cost approximately three billion dollars. Such an undertaking, which will impact most heavily on current and outyear Navy Programs must be considered in the context of the totality of Navy Programs within a constrained Fiscal Control. To date, we have been unable to identify this magnitude of outyear funding for the re-engining.

The Congress authorized and appropriated \$15 million in FY 1977 and an additional \$26 million in FY 1978 for a hardware demonstration to be used as a basis for source selection of an advanced technology engine. As a preliminary step to developing a re-engine program, a study of several possible alternatives for improving the F-14 weapons system has been proposed. The study will address such alternatives as a new engine to include life cycle cost trade-offs, improvements in the present TF-30 engine, and improvements to the weapon system which would provide greater stand-off capability. Furthermore, the threat through the life of the F-14 needs to be reassessed and validated. Such alternatives must be examined thoroughly in order to ensure that we would be using our funds in the most economical and effective manner possible. In short, we need to consider all factors and alternatives, know where we are going and how we are to get there before proceeding.

It is anticipated that the study will take several months to complete and will provide a cost-effective baseline for determining the improvements to be pursued.

Another matter which should be addressed is the applicability of the Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act to our actions regarding the F-14B engine. While there is no doubt that we are not proceeding as fast as the Congress and, for that matter, the Navy would like to in obligating and expending funds on the F-14B engine development, it must be emphasized that the Navy has not and, at this time, does not propose to withhold the F-14B engine funds from obligation, or expenditure, nor is any action being taken which will preclude the obligation or expenditure of such funds. In fact, in response to an inquiry from OSD in August as to our intentions for the FY 1978 funds, the Navy specifically requested that we be permitted to continue reviewing our options. The time lag in obligating the F-14B engine funds has resulted from our difficulty in determining the best approach to take with regard to accomplishment of our goals. The funds have been made available to OSD for obligation and the Navy has proceeded toward fulfilling our need and obligating the funds in an orderly fashion. Before we can choose an F-14 replacement engine we must determine what role that engine is to play in the overall weapon system. The first step in that regard is the study that has been discussed today for which about \$800,000 will be required. It is expected that, upon completion of the study, we will be in a better position to decide if and how we move forward with the program.

Based on the rationale stated above, I feel that Title X of the Congressional Budget Impoundment and Control Act should not apply. In my opinion, we must look at Title X in a reasonable manner and conclude that agencies should be given the time they need to obligate funds in an orderly manner; however, if the agency is prepared to obligate these funds in an orderly manner and it is then determined to delay the obligation of such funds, Title X would most certainly come into play.

That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to answer any questions.

Mr. CASEY. The House Appropriations Committee report for Fiscal Year 1978 specifically stated that the Department of Defense is directed to initiate development of the new engine as soon as possible. The Navy's plan, as defined in the letter, postpones development of this congressionally directed program.

Admiral FINE, would you explain why the Navy has not initiated the program and why a deferral or rescission has not been submitted for congressional consideration, particularly with reference to the Fiscal Year 1977 funding?

Admiral FINE. Let me touch on the first part of your question first, related to the "not initiated". Part of the problem is that the internal DOD, PPBS schedule is out of synchronization with the congressional action on this item. That is the simplest way to explain it. By the time Congress added the 1977 money into our budget, we had gone through our planning for 1978 and that did not include F-14 re-engining.

The funds came for Fiscal Year 1977 at a time when we had pretty well structured 1978 and the out years to the budget for 1978. It came to you representing what we intended then and what we intended in the out years. It didn't include F-14 re-engining.

The same thing happened this year. Going through our internal program process in preparation for putting the FY 1979 budget together and looking at what the outyear requirements were for all of our programs, including the requirement for when the F-14 re-engining would really be required, it became rather apparent that we just did not have the resources available, based on the fiscal guidance we received from the Secretary of Defense, to be able to program the F-14 engine into the out years. At the same time, Congress approved additional funds for 1978. So we ended up with FY 1977 funds of \$15 million, 1978 funds of \$26 million, and both appropriations without any internal Navy or DOD action and without any out-year funding anywhere in our program.

This program, as I indicated in my statement, will probably be about a \$3 billion program, as best we can project right now. Once we start a program like this, moving it requires contractor investment; it requires the Navy to do a lot of internal staffing before moving into a program of this size, either studying it or preparing for it, and to some extent our internal process never caught up.

Mr. ADDABBO. Admiral, you have been around a long time. How many programs in the Navy have started at \$5 million and ended up at \$1 billion? How many started at \$30 million and ended up at \$2 billion. Don't most of the programs that come in here start with a small development fund and suddenly we are into it and we say we can't cancel because we have spent so much money? Most of the programs start in the low millions of dollars; they don't start as a balanced new program.

Admiral FINE. We try, of course, Mr. Addabbo; we come to you, especially with the latest requirement for data sheets, to show Congress the out year impact of any programs like this.

Mr. ADDABBO. That out year impact was discussed before this committee. This committee last year appropriated \$15 million. I have seen reprogrammings on other matters come here before appropriations bills were even signed into law. Now you are telling me you have problems and have not spent funds provided last year.

Early in 1977 we had the hearings with Secretary Brown; I asked questions and many members of the committee asked questions on where we were going, and we were again looking for direction.

I think all the questions indicated that there would be additional money provided in fiscal year 1978. That was in January or February of last year. Then the debate was held on the House floor in June 1977. An amendment was offered to cut the money out and the Congress responded that the money should stay in, and we are now at the end of 1977, and we still are looking for more studies.

How many reprogramming requests have you had before this committee on other matters.

Admiral FINE. The issue is not the \$15 million or the \$26 million, the adequacy of that to get started. The problem is, once we get started, can we afford to keep going.

Mr. ADDABBO. You now have on hand \$41 million?

Admiral FINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ADDABBO. Now I understand you are asking for \$800,000 to start another study.

Admiral FINE. There has been a question on the program tradeoffs and it is one we have to look at before we start on a program of this magnitude.

Mr. ADDABBO. Congress has looked at it twice for you. Amendments have been offered; debates were held, and we said we believe that this money should be spent on this program. Secretary Brown came before this committee and said it is a \$2 billion program, way back in—I imagine it would be way back sometime in February or March when we were holding hearings. He had some ideas and questions about it, and was going to look at it.

Now the Congress looked at it. I can't understand why we need another \$800,000 study on something that the Congress has acted on twice.

This committee knows it will cost about \$3 billion. If you want this tested, you could have sent down a rescission, but you have not. Now we hear the famous last words: Another study.

Mr. PRESTON. The question is the need for a further study. If you look at the original F-14 program, both the F-14A and the B, with the advanced engine were proposed. The Navy spent several hundred millions of dollars in development of a new advanced technology engine, then stopped the program. Congress has tried to restart that effort, so it is not something that was initiated in the Congress. It was in the original F-14 program for a number of years and a lot of money has been spent, far beyond the study stage, on such an engine.

Admiral FINE. I don't think the question is one of requirements. Again, not being in the technical world or even in the aviation world, I don't think there is a question about the requirements. We have testified there is a requirement. The question comes down to whether we can afford to fulfill this particular requirement with the new engine or if there are perhaps other ways of fulfilling the requirement for the F-14's ability to fight in the out years. Is it a new engine, or a new weapons system. Even this committee addressed it as a weapons system. Is it a new missile. In other words, what

would be the best way to provide more capable performance in the out years for the F-14.

Before we pursue the re-engining we should look at all the alternatives and the study discussed would not only look at the re-engining but also at the other alternatives that perhaps would be available for the out years.

Mr. McFALL. Obviously, the Navy doesn't want to do what the Congress said to do. I gather from your last statement that it involves a study of whether or not you ought to have an F-14 at all.

Admiral FINE. No, sir.

Mr. McFALL. Then would you enlarge upon your last statement? Who makes the decision, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense? Am I right in saying you are not going to make it, somebody else has made it, and you are here representing those who make the decisions?

Admiral FINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. McFALL. You and others are trying to explain what the policy decision has been made up above. Who made the decision, the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FINE. The decision not to go ahead?

Mr. McFALL. Not to go ahead.

Admiral FINE. I would like to back off, to this extent: It is not a decision not to go ahead. As I indicated, we had a very difficult time coming to grips with what we should go for and how to proceed, again, because most of this happened outside of our own internal planning process.

Let me amplify that for a moment.

In the internal planning process within DOD, Navy has a program that must be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval, a five-year program, with fiscal constraints. Within those fiscal constraints we can come up with any sensible mixture as to what we should have in our programs.

Mr. McFALL. You have been allocated so much money and you don't see how you can fit in a new engine for the F-14?

Admiral FINE. Yes, sir. To date, we have not been able to come to grips with that problem in our internal planning system and what we are really doing now is trying to take a good look at it and say, if we want to allocate that much of the Navy's resources in the out years for that re-engining, should we do it, is it do-able within that cost? Are there other alternatives rather than re-engining to make the F-14 a more capable aircraft in the 1980s?

Mr. McFALL. Is that what the \$800,000 is for?

Admiral FINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. McFALL. How long will it take you to do that study?

Admiral FINE. Assuming we can get started in the immediate future, hopefully by early mid-summer; in other words, before the 1977 money expires.

Mr. McFALL. What are the elements of that study?

The F-14 as it now stands has a somewhat reduced capacity to operate.

Admiral FINE. I would like to have Admiral Mandeville address that.

Admiral MANDEVILLE. Obviously the new engine will give increased performance, but we have never looked really in depth at

what might be done to the TF-30, the engine presently installed in the F-14. It was not designed to live in the environment that the fighter aircraft puts it through. It wasn't built for a fighter. It was planned to be used as an interim engine until the follow-on engine was developed.

There is a possibility, certainly, that some fairly significant changes could be made that would allow the engine to gain performance and capability that we need from it and we should, I think, rightfully look at that before we press on with a very, very expensive program to re-engine.

We have studied the problem in the past but not in real depth, I should say, because it is old, old technology, and trying to make that engine last for another 20 years, maybe, is not an easy thing to do. Further, what would really be required in the engine? What should we do to it? This will be most of the technical work done in the study. Then, given that engine as it stands, or that engine in an improved state, how would better weapons that we see coming down the pike help us in the total weapons system for fighter capability in the airplane?

This type of analysis would be balanced against the new engine, whatever we might want to do if it looked feasible in the TF-30, to see what kind of tradeoffs we are getting for the dollars. It is kind of a broad-brush look across the fighting capability of the airplane. Not only the power, but the new weapon system that may be coming along.

Mr. ADDABBO. The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, was before this committee on Washington's birthday, February 22, 1977. At that time he said he was going to take a look at this again. It was a multi-billion dollar program and we had appropriated \$15 million. In May this committee, the Appropriations Committee, had put forward another \$26 million for this engine.

If there was any doubt on whether or not an engine was needed or whether or not this study was needed, if that study was ordered then, as we go into the hearings in January on the '79 budget, we would know.

But now you are telling us today that after we have gone through now almost two years of appropriations, you are now asking for an additional study which we will not get a report on until late summer, which will probably be after the '79 budget has been approved, and that budget may be forced to take additional money, so we are talking about 1980.

Whereas, if this engine is needed, as Congress says, which would give us possibly a better fighting plane, we have all this lag of time. Are we interested in the security or are we interested in showing who is in control; whether DoD is in control or whether the Congress is in control? These are the questions that you raise in our minds.

Admiral FINE. I am afraid I can't answer that last one.

Mr. ADDABBO. I know you can't. This is the response I want you to take back.

Mr. EDWARDS. I find myself torn here, Admiral, because I try to extend the prerogatives of the people's branch of government, the Congress, but the Congress is dead wrong in requiring the new

engine. I argued that on the floor a few months back. It is the greatest waste of \$3 billion I have ever seen. Everybody here knows my position on that, and so I don't quite know what my position ought to be now.

Mr. ADDABBO. Vote present.

Mr. EDWARDS. I am not sure how the Navy feels called on to ignore what the Congress has done, and yet I know, based on the earlier study of the TF-30, which in my view ought to be updated, that people who know the role of the F-14 and know the role of the F-18 and know what we are trying to do with V/STOL down the road, have got to come to but one conclusion and that is that we need not spend \$3 billion on re-engining the F-14.

I guess I come down on the side of swallowing my congressional pride and saying you ought to get this study done.

Mr. MAHON. We will suspend until we can dash up and vote and come back. Maybe you can figure out a better answer.

(Recess taken.)

Mr. MAHON. The committee will resume.

Mr. EDWARDS. I made a speech in the last question.

Admiral FINE. Let me put on the record, if I might, the answer that the Navy intends to comply with congressional intentions.

I think perhaps we are at fault in trying to comply with congressional intentions a little slower than we probably should have. I think one of the issues that hit us was the providing by the Congress of the \$41 million.

Our internal staffing has just not really focused in on the entire issue. We are addressing with this proposed \$800,000 study whether we should seriously pursue what could be a major program for the Department of the Navy.

Ultimately within the Navy we have certain wickets we have to go through. Many of them, of course, at the request of Congress over the years, require that we don't start programs that end up the way Mr. Addabbo indicated: Put your foot in the door and go running. We have tried to be a little more orderly.

While \$41 million is a large amount of money and it does allow us to initiate something, it would by no means allow us to follow through on the engine. We would have to devote additional resources to that engine and \$3 billion of resources is a rather significant level.

The problem as to whether we are or are not complying with the Budget Impoundment Control Act is one I think of intention.

If there was an intention on the part of the Navy to in fact tell Congress we do not intend doing something about the engine, then we should report to you that this money is deferred and perhaps offered up for rescission. We have not internally gotten to that point where we can say we will not do anything with the money and a portion of it will not be obligated, that we are not going to pursue the engine and that, therefore, the funds should be offered up for rescission.

Mr. EDWARDS. The Navy and the Air Force have been fighting it out at Nellis Air Force Base in AIM/VAL, ACE/VAL. There are a number of publications in aviation journals and what-not that suggest very strongly that the Navy F-14 has come off better than the Air Force F-15, with those sorry engines we keep hearing about.

I think the study we referred to in our debate that had to do with upgrading of the TF-30 were admittedly studies, as I recall, back in the early seventies, perhaps not thorough, as thorough as you are probably talking about now, but even those studies suggested that by upgrading the TF-30 you could get almost as much thrust as you could get with a new engine.

I feel that while you may not have necessarily followed especially the request of Congress as you could have, that when you get right down to it—and we are looking at a \$3 billion decision—that we really ought to know where we are going.

I am convinced that Congress doesn't know where it is going in its action where this issue came up.

I think you ought to make the study.

Mr. MAHON. We have some additional questions we would like for you to respond to in the record.

[The questions referred to follow:]

Question. Admiral Fine, has OSD allotted the fiscal year 1977 funds to the Navy, and if not, why not? What is the status of the fiscal year 1978 funds?

Admiral FINE. OSD has not released either the FY 77 or FY 78 funds. OSD feels that the requirement for the development and procurement of a high thrust advanced technology engine must first be justified in terms of effectiveness and life cycle cost savings. In response to this, the Navy has proposed to undertake such a cost-benefit analysis of the weapons system with the concurrence of OSD.

Question. By performing a funded study a portion of the fiscal year 1977 funds will presumably be used. We understand that \$800,000 has been earmarked for the funded study. If the study were made by military personnel, however, none of the fiscal year 1977 funds would be needed until after a decision were made on exactly what course of action would be taken. Time is obviously a factor, because if the Department of Defense cannot make its decisions and provide a fiscal plan that would make available the FY 1977 funds before September 30, 1978—the date the 1977 appropriation expires—the Department would not be acting in accordance with the Impoundment Act unless a rescission had been submitted. Admiral Fine, can you assure this Committee that a fiscal plan has been established that results in the fiscal year 1977 appropriation being made available and obligated before the funds expire?

Admiral FINE. No fiscal plan has been established to obligate the fiscal year 1977 appropriation before the funds expire. When the Navy study, which is not using any of the \$41 million, is completed in July 1978 and the benefits of re-engining the F-14 are assessed in light of the study results, and if a new engine is the preferred option, we will proceed to develop a plan to obligate both the FY-77 and FY-78 funds.

Question. Admiral Fine, how many studies have been made to date on potential improvements to the F-14 aircraft? How many were made, whether funded or unfunded, on the F-14 engine?

Admiral FINE. Potential improvements to the F-14 and its engine have been the subject of innumerable studies. For instance, many

engineering changes result from studies and there are now well over a thousand approved changes between the airframe and engine. Many of these are relatively minor, but even among the more significant studies there has never been one which addresses (1) the potential for improved operational effectiveness and (2) the detailed analysis of life cycle cost benefits that could be realized with a re-engining program, one of the alternatives for improvement. That is the type of study we are now proposing.

Question. The letter states that a funded study will be initiated. What is the difference between a funded and unfunded study? Who will do this study? Will the contractor be competitively selected?

Admiral FINE. An unfunded study would use headquarters personnel and support resources. A funded study would utilize headquarters management personnel to direct and oversee the analysis effort but a Navy industrially funded field activity or a contractor would perform the actual study work. In this case, we intend to fund the Naval Air Development Center, Johnsville, Pennsylvania for our study.

Question. Mr. Parker testified this year that the new engine is not required because: (1) the F-14 will be essentially out of production by the time such an engine could be available; (2) the retrofit costs associated with putting those engines in are more than we can afford; and (3) the performance that we would envision resulting from that is not all that exciting. Relative to the first point, about F-14's not being in production, the Air Force recently proposed that new engines be put on the FB-111A which has been out of production for a number of years. Does the fact that F-14 production may have been completed before a new engine is available still represent a problem?

Admiral FINE. The fact that F-14 production may be completed before a new engine is available will not represent a problem in that we would require all prospective contractors to tailor their designs such that F-14 airframe changes would be minimized. The program would require substantial retrofit effort in any case so the additional impact in the event the F-14 were out of production is not considered significant.

Question. What is the estimated cost of developing, procuring and installing new engines in the F-14? Provide a breakout for the record showing total program and procurement costs and unit costs.

Admiral FINE. Estimated costs for developing, procuring and installing new engines are as follows: (then year dollars)

	Program Costs	Engine Unit Costs
Development:	\$644.0M	N/A
Procurement:	\$2,586.0M	\$2.674M ¹
Installation:	\$52.5M	\$62.5K ²
TOTAL	\$3,282.5M	\$3.395M³

¹ Based on 967 engines which would provide installs for 420 aircraft plus spare requirements.

² Based on 420 aircraft, 125K per aircraft.

³ Based on 967 engines.

Question. What other improvements are currently being considered for application to F-14 aircraft?

Admiral FINE. We are of course making many minor changes to the F-14 to improve its readiness, safety and operational utility. We

currently have under development a major program to improve the capabilities of the F-14's Hughes AWG-9 radar. In addition, we are studying the feasibility of a CILOP (Conversion in Lieu of Procurement) program to update and enhance the utility of the F-14 aircraft in the late 1980's and 1990's. This one step major modification program would use existing technology to update the F-14 systems in the late 1980's.

CARRIER ON-BOARD DELIVERY (COD) PROGRAM

Mr. MAHON. We have some questions on the Carrier on-Board Delivery (COD) program that will be inserted into the record. Thank you very much.

Question. In fiscal year 1977 \$2.0 million was appropriated for the purpose of initiating a fully competitive development program for a new COD aircraft. The amount provided was sufficient to cover the cost of preparing, issuing, and evaluating a request for proposal for a new COD. Admiral Mandeville, according to the Secretary's letter, the Navy has not yet identified potential COD aircraft or issued an RFP. This delay occurred after the Navy testified that an urgent requirement existed for new COD aircraft and was one of the primary justifications for requesting US-3A procurement funds in fiscal year 1977. Admiral Mandeville, why has there been over a year delay?

Admiral MANDEVILLE. Mr. Chairman, \$2.0 million RDT&E was appropriated in FY-1977; however, \$170 million of procurement funds for the US-3A were deleted from the FY-1977 President's Budget. Funding of this magnitude simply cannot be identified in the budget or authorization years without exacerbating other high priority programs. The Navy cannot, in good faith, initiate contracting documents until program funding is identified. The Navy is still considering the approach to take. Subsequent to completion of the current budget review, we will inform you of the utilization of the \$2 million.

Question. Admiral Mandeville, what aircraft are being considered for use as COD's?

Admiral MANDEVILLE. Mr. Chairman, my personnel observation, based on funding constraints, is that the selected COD candidate will be a derivative or modification of an existing carrier capable aircraft, unless an existing Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) type aircraft configuration proves competitive. I do not envision extensive expenditure of development funds for a COD aircraft.

Question. Admiral Mandeville, is the US-3A aircraft still being considered?

Admiral MANDEVILLE. The prototype US-3A is deployed in a COD role and performing nicely. I am sure it will be a competitor.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1977.

ADVANCED HYDROFOIL**WITNESSES****NAVY**

**REAR ADMIRAL BRUCE KEENER III, DIRECTOR OF SHIP ACQUISITION,
SURFACE WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS**

**MR. JAMES SCHULER, PROGRAM MANAGER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS
COMMAND**

COMMANDER GEORGE J. JENKINS, JR., PROGRAM COORDINATOR

Mr. CASEY. The final item we wish to discuss today is Secretary Claytor's letter dated December 1, 1977, on the Hydrofoil Craft (Advanced) program.

The fiscal year 1978 appropriation bill provided \$500,000 for the purpose of deactivating/mothballing two RDT&E test hydrofoil ships—the 120-ton Highpoint and the 320-ton Plainview. This action was based on Navy data showing that no funding was going to be requested in fiscal year 1979 for the Hydrofoil Craft (Advanced) program. This continued use of these ships for hydrofoil research was unnecessary.

The letter, however, states that these ships are required and a RDT&E program is to be established for the purpose of developing additional missions for the NATO Patrol Hydrofoil (PHM) class of ships.

We will place the letter from Secretary Claytor and your statement in the record at this point.

[The letter and prepared statement of Admiral Keener follows:]



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

December 1, 1977

The Honorable George H. Mahon
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Joint Conference on the FY 78 Appropriations Bill reduces the Hydrofoil Craft (Advanced) line from \$2,132,000 to \$500,000.

In its report on this bill, your Committee specified that these funds were provided to deactivate/mothball HIGHPOINT (PCH-1) and PLAINVIEW (AGEH-1), the Navy's two research and development hydrofoil craft. The report also observed that the Navy planned to terminate this program in FY 78.

Subsequent to this Committee action, Congress did not act on the President's proposal to rescind the SCN funds previously appropriated for production of the five follow NATO PHMs. Accordingly, the Navy has awarded the production contract to Boeing Marine Systems.

It is most desirable to exploit and further refine the PHM technology. Furthermore, the Navy has recently initiated a program aimed at development of additional missions for the PHM class of hydrofoil ship.

In order to continue this technological support and mission development effort, it will be necessary to retain PCH-1 through FY 78 at a minimum, and to retain AGEH-1 at least through FY 83.

Subject to your concurrence, we desire to retain PCH-1 and AGEH-1 in service beyond the end of FY 78 and to use the funds appropriated in FY 78 to pursue the technological and mission development program discussed above, with continued effort in FY 79 and the outyears.

A similar letter has been sent to Acting Chairman Magnuson.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "W. Graham Claytor, Jr." in a cursive style.

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
Secretary of the Navy

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

The Joint Conference on the FY 78 Appropriations Bill reduces the Hydrofoil Craft (Advanced) line from \$2,132,000 to \$500,000.

In its report on this Bill, this Committee specified that the funds were provided to deactivate/mothball HIGH POINT (PCH-1) and PLAINVIEW (AGEH-1), the Navy's two research and development hydrofoil craft. The report also observed that the Navy planned to terminate this program in FY 78. This observation is no longer valid.

Subsequent to this Committee action, Congress did not act on the President's proposal to rescind the SCN funds previously appropriated for production of the five follow NATO PHMs. Accordingly, the Navy has awarded the production contract to Boeing Marine Systems.

USS PEGASUS (PHM-1) was commissioned as a warship last summer and is presently serving as an active asset of the United States Pacific Fleet. In her single mission area of surface attack, the ship has demonstrated, both in test and in operational use, an impressive capability. The success achieved by the blending of advanced hull technology with a formidable anti-surface armament promises that the PHM squadron will make a significant contribution to U.S. seapower.

As excellent a weapons system as is the PHM in its present configuration, there is every reason to believe that its technology can be further refined and developed, and that other missions can be developed for this class ship, including ASW, AAW and Mine Warfare.

The Navy has recently initiated an effort, through the Hydrofoil Craft (Advanced) Program, to continue the exploitation and refinement of the PHM technology and to develop additional missions for the class. Our goal is to define suitable weapon sensor suites that might be incorporated into the PHMs by the mid 1980's.

The two experimental hydrofoils, PLAINVIEW and HIGH POINT, will continue to play an extremely important role in this effort.

Because of the large amount of concurrency involved in the investigation of many different weapons suites, sensors and technological refinements, it will be necessary to retain PCH-1 through FY 78 at a minimum, and to retain AGEH-1 at least through FY 83.

We request your concurrence in retaining PCH-1 and AGEH-1 in service beyond the end of FY 78 and to use the funds appropriated in FY 78 to pursue the technological and mission development program discussed above, with continued effort in FY 79 and the outyears.

Mr. MAHON. We are talking about the hydrofoil ship which is considered by many as a boondoggle. The program has gone forward for quite a long time. Of course, the contractors support it and people with parochial interests would, of course, support it. It may be an excellent project. We wanted to discuss this whole problem with you to some extent at this time.

Mr. CASEY. The NATO PHM class of ships were designed to carry Harpoon surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles.

Admiral Keener, can the PHM perform the surface warfare mission or are there deficiencies which have resulted in the decision to develop additional mission capabilities?

Admiral KEENER. The PHM has proved thus far to be fully capable of performing the surface warfare mission and has met or exceeded all of our expectations and specifications. There has been a great deal of interest in utilizing PHMs in other mission areas, primarily ASW. Such interest was expressed by Representative Dicks in the rescission hearings held in this room in June. It is in the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the FY 1978 Authorization Bill. The desire of the Navy is—both in response to such interests and in response to our own internal interests in improving our ASW capability—to explore the possibility that the PHM might be able to perform some ASW function as well as the surface warfare function.

Mr. CASEY. In this case you ask for additional funds in the future to continue a program that congressional interest is expressed in, whereas the F-14 engine program is being slowed down.

Admiral KEENER. Yes, Mr. Casey. As you are aware, when the Navy came in for the fiscal year '78 budget, the PHM program was a subject of rescission.

It looked like we would not get PHMs. The Navy's budget was zeroed beyond fiscal year '78 and any further hydrofoil work was to be an outgrowth of the ANVCE study.

We have been overtaken by events on all fronts. The rescission was not voted. The contract was signed. We will have in 1982 a six-ship PHM squadron and, with the capital investment of something on the order of \$300 million, it seems prudent to continue to explore the technology and the mission applications which will make that investment the most useful to the taxpayers.

Mr. CASEY. One PHM class ship is operational. Five additional ships are being constructed. Are there any plans to procure additional PHM ships after the five on the contract are delivered?

Admiral KEENER. There are no current U.S. Navy plans. The matter is still under review with the Federal Republic of Germany. They have expressed their intent not to procure PHM's. However, their competitive fast patrol boat has come across some technical problems and I expect the whole matter to again come under review in the German Navy.

Mr. CASEY. There are no funds in the five-year plan at this time?

Admiral KEENER. There are none and there is no current intent to add any in the out years.

Mr. CASEY. The staff has been advised that a total of \$21 million will be requested from fiscal year 1979 through fiscal year 1983 for the hydrofoil craft program.

Would you briefly describe the major research tasks to be completed relative to identifying additional missions for the PHM?

Admiral KEENER. The \$21 million is not quite exact. The Navy's present plan is \$6.5 million, broken down into \$2.1 in '79 and \$4.4 in '80.

Both of those are contained in the current Navy basic figure. In addition to that, there is \$5 million each in '81, 2 and 3, but they are in the Navy's enhanced budget. That is, that portion of the budget which we do not expect to be funded unless a high priority need can be shown for it.

Any need for those funds would have to be the subject of separate justification on an annual basis, of course, and they are put in, frankly, to keep the line open to the out years so that if technology or mission applications show promise or require further exploration, we do have a line that is shown in the budget that we can then testify to and separately justify.

Mr. CASEY. The \$5 million in '81, 2 and 3 is above the line?

Admiral KEENER. That is correct.

Mr. CASEY. So we are talking about the funds for '79 through '80?

Admiral KEENER. Yes.

Mr. CASEY. That is an approved plan?

Admiral KEENER. That is in the Navy's current plan, yes.

Mr. CASEY. Does that include sufficient funds to look at the VDS?

Admiral KEENER. Yes. We are investigating that and the high speed towed array with the Canadians.

Mr. CASEY. Would these be completed by 1980?

Admiral KEENER. I don't believe the thin line array would be. The Canadian VDS would be.

Mr. CASEY. How about HYCANS?

Admiral KEENER. That is in design now. We have ordered production of the breadboard model. It should be delivered at the end of fiscal year '78 and start tests in '79.

Mr. CASEY. Would you expand for the record on exactly what you will do between now and 1980 and what will be completed and what will not be completed? Do that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

By the end of 1980 we will have developed the prototype and will have tested the pre-production High-Speed Collision Avoidance and Navigational System. We will be ready to proceed with acquisition of the production systems for the PHM squadron. I should point out that this system will have applicability to other high speed ships as well as to the PHM.

We will have developed a mine warfare capability in an extremely important area in which we presently have no capability at all. This capability involves a technique which requires two hydrofoils operating together. We will have completed our analyses and tests of candidate ASW suites, including VDS, other towed array systems, foil-mounted sonars, certain offboard sensors and compatible weaponry. We will be prepared to recommend, based on concurrent studies, an appropriate design for backfit to the PHMs, and the appropriate tactics for their use in an ASW role. The same will be true of AAW suites.

We will have completed concurrent work in exploitation of hydrofoil technology, including a digital autopilot system, reliability and maintainability data collection, and strut and foil load alleviation techniques. These efforts will have direct application to the PHM as well as to future hydrofoils.

Areas in which work will not be completed by the end of 1980 include: tests and analyses of more advanced ASW sensors and weaponry such as the Mark 48 torpedo, the advanced lightweight torpedo, and associated combat systems integration; development of design criteria for future hydrofoils; conceptual studies and preliminary

designs for future hydrofoils, responsive to anticipated recommendations of the ANVCE study; noise reduction efforts; and a variety of technological efforts associated with future hydrofoils; such as, optimized foil sections, reduced hydraulic power, and improved steering systems.

Mr. CASEY. If the PHM class of ships were limited to five production ships rather than the 28 that were in the original program, are there sufficient numbers of ships to justify the development of additional missions?

Admiral KEENER. If we carry out the current plan of ultimately home-porting this six ship squadron in the Mediterranean, they can provide a significant enhancement of our anti-surface warfare capability. If it proves that either the variable depth sonar, the thin line towed array or the foil-mounted sonar does have a useful ASW capability, they would also contribute to the ASW defense of the Sixth Fleet, which is considered our most serious problem. So yes, I think it does justify the investment.

Mr. CASEY. When will decision be made on whether these ships will go to the Mediterranean?

Admiral KEENER. That will depend on many factors. If Korea heats up, they would be useful in the Sea of Japan, for instance. There are a number of possible scenarios. If the world stays the way it is today, we would anticipate their being homeported in the Mediterranean.

Mr. CASEY. The staff was advised that \$6.5 million was expended from fiscal year 1972 through 1975 for the overhaul of the Plainview. Some of that may have been Operation and Maintenance money. Navy data shows that the costs associated with the Plainview are unusually high because the ship was in overhaul status for four years. The overhaul lasted for an extended period because of contractual problems and funding inadequacy.

Could you explain that situation a little bit? We didn't have very much information on it.

Admiral KEENER. I would like to ask the Program Manager, Mr. Schuler, to address that question, please.

Mr. SCHULER. There were substantial contractual problems in the overhaul of the Plainview. The original intention was to conduct an overhaul which would only address the problems that were known and, as they were investigated further, they became associated with other problems.

There was a contractual problem in getting a shipbuilder to take on the job because it was one of a kind, unique and unusual.

We finally ordered that work through a contract with the Todd Shipyard in Seattle.

At the same time that we did the overhaul, we identified technical improvements which could be demonstrated on that ship such as a welded hydraulic system and installation of a high yield tail strut and foil.

Those were incorporated in the overhaul and modification. This is considered a major modification rather than just an overhaul because it included hardware and technology which was not available at the time it was built nor even at the time when the overhaul was started. So it is really a major upgrading of the capabilities of the ship.

Mr. CASEY. Could you expand for the record on the costs and what all you did on that, why it took so long and so forth?

Mr. SCHULER. We have that information in detail.

Mr. VANDER SCHAAF. Would you also comment in the record as to why you competitively contracted that, it being one of a kind, and so forth, and why it was a good idea to go the competitive process on a one-time overhaul?

You can do that for the record.

Mr. SCHULER. Yes, I will.

[The information referred to follows:]

The original plan was to conduct the overhaul in the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Changes in their workload caused us to seek a private contractor. We advertised competitive and received only one bid from the Todd Shipyard. We awarded the contract to Todd on a Sole Source basis.

The AGEH-1 was originally designed and built as an experimental ship using FY 1962 SCN funds. After several years of testing, the ship required a major overhaul and extensive modification to cure known deficiencies, improve its reliability and incorporate new technology for full-scale test and evaluation. The majority of the work was accomplished by the Todd Shipyard in Seattle, Washington under a contract extending from May 1974 through March 1977. Todd was supported by several major subcontractors. The AGEH modification included installation of Government Furnished Material.

The total expenditure on this effort was about \$10.3M, of which about \$5.45M was provided through the Todd Contract. 72 items of work were accomplished ranging from the design, installation and test of an all-welded hydraulic system and the installation of a new tail strut/foil of FY-130 steel, to diesel engine repairs, rewiring of sensors and repair of strut retention linkages. The five major items of work accomplished during this period are as follows:

I. Install and checkout the digital autopilot and improve the automatic control system including its status, caution, warning and other pilot house indicators. \$1.0M

II. Design, procure, install, checkout and verify the performance of an all-welded hydraulic system (2000 HP capacity) to drive the Incidence Control foils and auxiliaries. \$1.6M

III. Design, construct, install and test the HY-130 steel tail strut and foil including the Yoke on which it is mounted to provide steering. \$1.3M

IV. Inspect, repair, refurbish, reassemble and test main propulsion gear boxes together with associated shafting, torque and thrust meters. \$1.0M

V. Remove, refurbish, realign, resurface, recoat and install main strut/foil assemblies. \$1.3M

Other significant items included installation of plastic salt water piping system, installation of a new firefighting system, instrumentation for this experimental platform, rewiring and piping repairs as well as replacement of the main strut/foil incidence control linkage and repair of the linkage for retracting the aft strut/foil.

Mr. CASEY. Why was the Plainview overhauled if no definitive need for the ship was planned after fiscal year 1978?

I refer to the plan that existed when the '78 budget first came up.

Admiral KEENER. Planning for the Plainview overhaul started in 1971, at which time the PHM program was in its formative years and it was heavily committed to the PHM development effort.

Mr. CASEY. How much will it cost to maintain, operate and man the Plainview and Highpoint in fiscal years 1978 and 1979?

[The information referred to follows:]

Operating and maintenance costs will amount to about one million dollars per annum; military personnel, about 600 thousand dollars per annum.

Mr. CASEY. Could the PHM that is in the fleet today be used to conduct this R&D effort? If not, why not? The point here is the PHM we have in the fleet today is an R&D development ship.

Admiral KEENER. No, sir, it is a fully commissioned U.S. Navy warship.

Mr. CASEY. But it was built with R&D funds; that is my point.

Admiral KEENER. You want that information for the record?

Mr. CASEY. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

As a commissioned warship, PHM-1 is heavily committed to Fleet operations. She has, for example, been operating underway more than 32% of the time since she completed fitting out last July, including two major fleet operations. Current planning envisions two deployments outside the continental United States within the next 15 months. Since the R&D program contemplated involves a great deal of carefully controlled well-instrumented and monitored shipboard tests, generally at test ranges, PEGASUS' contribution to fleet readiness would be severely impacted.

In general, the mission development work requires a great deal of concurrency for its accomplishment on schedule; for example, HYCANS will be installed and tested on PLAINVIEW while HIGH POINT does thin line array testing; PLAINVIEW will do RPV evaluations concurrent with Canadian VDS evaluations on HIGH POINT.

A certain amount of tactical evaluation can be accomplished using PHM-1 alone. However, the use of more than one hydrofoil craft in company, generally groups of two or three, would allow a better approximation of the way the PHM squadron as a whole will operate. It is planned to provide one or both of the R&D ships to participate in multi-PHM type exercises as required by the Fleet commander.

The final output of the mission development effort would look toward possible design changes to further enhance the combat potential of the PHM. Since the PHM is a proven design for its existing mission, we would prefer not to perturb that design until the feasibility of candidate systems can be thoroughly evaluated on other platforms. For example, it is known that the Canadian VDS will require certain modifications before installation on PHM-1. Similarly, PHM-1 hydraulics and electrical system may have to be fairly extensively modified. To go to this expense and disruptive effort before we can determine whether or not the VDS will be operationally useful, would not be cost effective, especially when the VDS can be installed on HIGH POINT with only minor interface work.

Certain mission development areas *require* at least two hydrofoils. The best example is certain types of mine warfare.

Mr. CASEY. Briefly describe the advanced naval concepts study.

Admiral KEENER. I am not competent to describe it. It is an effort to examine the technology, capabilities, utilities of a wide variety of vehicles ranging from hydrofoils, surface effect ships, wing in ground effect vehicles, sea loiter aircraft, air loiter aircraft. I am just not competent to address the status of the study.

Mr. CASEY. Then you don't know when this study will be completed?

Admiral KEENER. It is due to be completed in early calendar '78. That is my understanding.

Mr. CASEY. If I recall, the use of the Highpoint and the Plainview were tied into the results of this study.

Admiral KEENER. No, sir, I don't believe that is entirely correct. As you saw, we were zeroed after '78 in the Navy budget. Anything in the future would have to be separately justified on the basis of the ANVCE study.

Whether that would have kept the Plainview and the Highpoint in commission or whether we would have gone into another design effort, I can't prejudice. We have been overtaken by events.

Mr. CASEY. It is our understanding those two ships are going into drydock or mothballing pending the results of this study.

Admiral KEENER. They were to be laid up, that was my understanding.

Mr. CASEY. And this study is not out yet?

Admiral KEENER. No, sir. It will be in the spring, I understand.

Mr. CASEY. On the other hand, you are requesting that these ships be kept in inventory and recommending a \$21 million R&D program be set up to find additional missions for the PHM.

Admiral KEENER. I can't say we are recommending \$21 million. We are recommending \$6.5 million, for which we can clearly foresee the need and we can justify the mission development, as well as the technology development. Regarding the other \$15 million, the use of that will depend on where the first \$6.5 leads.

Mr. CASEY. Admiral Keener, is it true that you don't have enough money to buy five PHMs and that one of them isn't going to be weaponized unless additional funds are provided?

Admiral KEENER. That is correct, sir. The contract was drawn up and expected to be awarded in January of 1977. The rescission action delayed the signing of that contract until mid-October, 1977, a delay of about ten months. During that time, the escalation costs increased the price by \$13.2 million.

In order to acquire the 5 PHMs in consonance with the congressional directive—the rescission was not voted, the money had to be spent for the purpose for which it was appropriated—to purchase five PHMs. Additional money in the form of a supplemental was not available and the decision has been made and approved by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense that the last ship of the line will be an unweaponized ship. It will be built to the same standards and can be later weaponized.

Mr. CASEY. Funds for construction of a PHM support ship were deleted in fiscal year 1978.

Admiral Keener, what impact will this have on the operation of a squadron of PHMs?

[The information referred to follows:]

The primary impact is decreased flexibility and mobility. We intend to support the squadron as we do the PEGASUS; from a shore-based complex of transportable vans. We presently anticipate basing this complex and homeporting the ships in the Mediterranean to minimize the logistics effort involved in transatlantic movements. For in-theater movements, we would anticipate moving selected vans to a forward areas or embarking them on platforms of convenience, such as large auxiliaries or landing craft. This type support is less satisfactory than that which would have been provided by a dedicated support ship, but we do not expect an unduly adverse impact.

Mr. MAHON. Are there questions regarding the hydrofoil program?

If not, thank you very much, gentlemen.

INDEX

Training and Administration, Navy Reserve (TAR)	1
Career enhancement assignments for TAR officers	94
Draft DOD study, findings of	135
Enlisted TAR program, retention of	58
Fifteen year TAR phaseout, fairness of	93
Formal officer training on reserves	130
Full-Time Training and Administration of the Reserve and Guard Study ..	19
Management of the Reserves	60, 126
Management practices, current	16
Naval Reserve Air Squadrons, performance of	29
Navy authority for TAR program, current	50
Navy authority over Reserve assignment, current	56
Navy implementation study	25
Navy Reserve Flag Officers, current assignments of	53
Regular officer assignments in Reserve Organizations	51
Regular officers into Reserve Management, rotation of	35
Reorganizations on Reserves, effect of	99
Reserve billet assignees, quality of	23
Reserve billets, breakdown of	124
Reserve Management Board Study	128
Reserve management, quality of	30
Reserve organizations opposed to the TAR phaseout proposal	63
Reserve programs, current	125
Reserve readiness requirements	59
Ship augmentation program	48, 146
Statement by Chief of Naval Operations	3
Statement by Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel and Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower	2
Statement by Deputy Director of Naval Reserve	142
Statement by Director, Naval Affairs, Reserve Officers Association of the United States	64
Statement by Executive Director, Naval Reserve Association	78
Statement by Hon. Bill Chappell, Jr., before House Armed Services Committee	102
Statement by Naval Enlisted Reserve Association	86
Statement by President, Naval Reserve Association	70
Statement by Secretary of the Navy	8
Statement by Study Director of Full Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve Study Group	131
Statements of Reserve Flag Officers Supporting TAR Phaseout	41
TAR officer phaseout plan, fairness of	41
TAR phaseout by other committees, consideration of	128
Technicians to manage and operate Reserve Forces, use of	19
Total force concept	95
Turmoil and change in the Navy	14
Utilization of TAR and regular officers, differences in	26
Reprogrammings 78-2 P/A, 78-3 P/A, 78-4 P/A—Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control System	147
Interoperability with NATO	161
Introduction	147
Justification for reductions in major programs	162
Timetable for interoperability	159
TRI-TAC/JINTACCS interface	161

Reprogramming 78-7 P/A—Division Restructuring Study	164
Change in cost estimate	170
Independent evaluation of restructuring test.....	171
Introduction	164
Requirement for increased personnel	172
Reprogramming 78-6 P/A—ADP for AFLC	173
Acquisition of data collection equipment.....	180
Allocation of dollars and man-years requested to tasks	183
Alternatives to current system	184
Changes required to conduct day-to-day operations	189
Contractor support	186, 192
Conversion from 7080 to CYBER computers	184
Cost accounting system for AFLC.....	194
Development of new requirements.....	187
Emergency changes to data systems.....	188
Funding limitation	190
Impact of reprogramming on master plan	189
Introduction	173
Master Plan	180
Maintenance support of 7080 computers	190
Relationship of master plan to reprogramming request.....	174
Requirements, documentation and developing requirements	194
Site preparation.....	185, 191
Upgrading the CYBER system	185
F-14 Re-Engining	195
Carrier on-board delivery (COD) program	207
Advanced Hydrofoil	208



