UNITED STATES-TURKISH DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. J. Res. 204

TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO IMPLEMENT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY RELATIVE TO DEFENSE COOPERATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY IN ORDER TO RESIST ARMED ATTACK IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA

SEPTEMBER 15, 1976

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UNITED STATES-TURKISH DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER, 15, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room 4221, the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Sparkman (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Pell, Clark, Case, and Javits.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting today at the request of the executive branch to receive testimony on Senate Joint Resolution 204. This resolution would authorize the President to implement an agreement with the Government of the Republic of Turkey for the use of bases in that country by the Armed Forces of the United States.

[Text of S.J. Res. 204 follows:]

[S.J. Res. 204, 94th Cong., 2d sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the President to implement an Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Turkey Relative to Defense Cooperation Pursuant to Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty in Order to Resist Armed Attack in the North Atlantic Treaty Area

Whereas on March 26, 1976, there was signed an Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey Relative to Defense Cooperation Pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty (which agreement, together with a related exchange of notes dated April 7 and 13, 1976, are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the agreement"); and

Whereas the agreement provides that its entry into force is conditioned upon a further exchange of notes indicating the approval of both parties in accordance with their respective legal procedures; and

Whereas the said agreement provides for certain undertakings by the United States as part of its obligations under the said agreement; and

Whereas the entry into force of the agreement will restore to the United States the use of facilities which are important to the security of the United States and the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area; and

Whereas the President has requested the Congress to approve the agreement and to authorize the appropriation of funds necessary to its execution so that the Agreement may enter into force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves the agreement and the President is authorized to implement the provisions thereof.

SEC. 2. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated the amounts required by the said agreement for the purpose of carrying out the programs and activities as are provided for therein.

(b) Foreign assistance and military sales programs and activities carried out with funds made available pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be conducted in accordance with provisions of law generally applicable to foreign assistance and military sales programs of the United States: *Provided*, That section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not apply with respect to such programs and activities: *And provided further*, That the President is authorized, notwithstanding that section, to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles and defense services with respect to which funds were obligated or reserved under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 on or before February 5, 1975.

(c) This resolution satisfies the requirement of section 36 (b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act and section 7307 of title 10 of the United States Code with respect to the transfer pursuant to the agreement of naval vessels and other defense articles and defense services which are referred to in the United States note dated April 7, 1976.

(d) The costs of Department of Defense programs and activities to be carried out with Department of Defense funds made available pursuant to subsection (a) of this subsection include: operational, maintenance, and other costs in connection with the use of installations in Turkey by the United States pursuant to article XIII of the agreement; training (on-the-job and locally) of Turkish personnel assigned or to be assigned to the installations pursuant to article VI of the agreement; costs of implementation of communications joint use plans pursuant to article XVI of the agreement; and costs of providing access by Turkey to the United States Defense Communications Satellite System pursuant to numbered paragraph 3 of the United States note dated April 7, 1976.

SEC. 3. The authorities contained in this resolution shall become effective only upon the entry into force of the agreement and shall continue in effect only for so long as that agreement remains in force.

The CHAIRMAN. The agreement in question, known as the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, was signed on March 26, 1976 by Secretary Kissinger and the Foreign Minister of Turkey. It provides that the U.S. Government will extend agreed amounts of military and other assistance to the Government of Turkey over a period of 4 years. Turkey is a valued NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization—ally of the United States but one with which our relations have been sorely strained in recent years. We hope that in the course of this hearing we will learn what steps have been taken to repair those relations, including, hopefully, some indication of whether progress is being made on a resolution of the Cyprus issue.

The bases which Turkey has made available to the United States for the performance of common defense missions are of importance to Turkey and the United States. The executive branch has asked for today's hearing in order to explain the new arrangements which have been made to assure the continued availability of those bases.

Senator Case, do you have a statement?

Senator CASE. A very brief statement, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CASE

Senator CASE. I think this hearing is important and essential. It marks the first formal discussion by the Committee on Foreign Relations on the pending United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement. I believe we should set out the strategic and tactical considerations involved in either approving the pending agreement or in not approving it. It is in the interest of all concerned that the review process be completed as soon as possible.

The Committee on Foreign Relations has a number of important questions to ask. How important are Turkey and Greece to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization? Has the United States embargo on Turkey affected the ability of the Turks to perform their NATO role? What has been the effect of the withdrawal of Greece from NATO's integrated military command? Has this impeded NATO planning and the conduct of NATO missions and training exercises? What impact do the relations between Turkey and Greece have on the ability of the United States 6th Fleet to operate effectively in the volatile eastern Mediterranean?

If a defense cooperation agreement is not worked out with Turkey, what will Turkey's future role be in southern Europe, in the area of the Turkish straits and, most of all, in the Middle East?

During all the debates on Turkey and Cyprus, the critical strategic questions and the future of United States relations with Turkey have taken second place to other interests. There has been a tendency to assume that Turkey will stay in the Western camp regardless of diplomatic strains or arms embargos. Can we make such an assumption? Turkey is a relatively large and powerful country with a standing army of over 450,000. This military force has a highly significant role in southern Europe and in the Middle East.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, you have a statement?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PELL

Senator PELL. Thank you and I apologize for making my statement now and not waiting until after the witnesses statements. As you know, I have to leave shortly for another meeting.

I have the highest respect for my friends who are the administration witnesses, but I can think of no worse time to be contemplating further entangling the United States in base and military assistance arrangements with Turkey than now when tension between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean is mounting, when there are no signs of movement toward a Cyprus settlement, and when negotiations are also underway for a defense agreement with Greece.

Moreover, I believe the whole concept that the United States should be pressured to make a 4-year equivalent of a rent agreement with a NATO ally to help us defend that ally is wrong. It is a poor precedent to set and a dangerous path to follow. And, if followed, we can all see the logical extension under which the United States would find itself paying the equivalent of rent to other NATO allies for the American installations used for the common defense. If this becomes the attitude of NATO, if it becomes the view of our NATO allies that we should not only help to defend them, but also pay for that privilege as well, then I believe the original NATO concept has been distorted and our national interest harmed.

In any case, this committee and the Senate as a whole ought to consider the Turkish agreement only in the broader context of the situation in the Aegean, Greek-Turkish relations generally, and United States interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

To act on the Turkish agreement alone only risks souring United States-Greek relations, increasing opposition in Greece to defining a new defense relationship with the United States and NATO, and embedding the nation in Greek opinion that there is an American tilt

toward Turkey—and we hardly need more evidence of that. Greece is understandably concerned about Turkish intentions in the Aegean and the role of the United States in building up Turkish military capabilities which might be used against Greece.

Also, proceeding with the consideration of an agreement with Turkey at this time would remove any Turkish incentive to move on Cyprus by conveying the impression that the Congress has become conditioned to Turkey's intransigence and condones that country's continued use of American-supplied arms to occupy Cyprus in violation of American law.

Since the congressional embargo of military assistance to Turkey, this Congress has acted twice to restore assistance to Turkey in the hope of fostering a Cyprus settlement—once in October 1975, regarding pipeline aid and commercial sales and again this past June when $156 million in sales and military assistance program (MAP) grant aid were authorized in fiscal year 1976 and $175 million for fiscal year 1977—yet no progress has been achieved toward a Cyprus settlement. Now, despite this deplorable record of no Turkish response to conciliatory gestures by the United States and despite the situation in the Aegean, the administration proposes to increase the level of sales and grant aid to an average of $250 million annually under the 4-year agreement. This is pure Alice in Wonderland.

I am mindful of the administration's arguments about the need to conclude an agreement in order to insure the continued use of intelligence collection facilities in Turkey. My impression is, however, that while these sites add a measure of confidence to our intelligence collection efforts, this benefit does not balance the negative results that would flow from this treaty, including the precedents set, the risks involved in contributing to an arms race in the Aegean and the costs incurred in pledging $1 billion in grant aid and credits over 4 years.

I would also like to observe that the substantive inadvisability of beginning action now on the Turkish agreement is compounded by the procedural reality that the prospects of final Senate action on the Turkish agreement this year are practically nil. Early Senate consideration of this agreement is certainly in Turkey's interest, but I fail to see how United States interests are served.

All told, I believe that further consideration of the agreement with Turkey should be suspended until the administration has decided whether this is the path we wish to follow with all our NATO allies, has concluded a similar agreement with Greece and until prospects for a peaceful settlement of Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean and on Cyprus are improved. Otherwise, the United States must be prepared to accept a share of responsibility for continued threats to peace in those areas.

MOVEMENT OF U.S.-SUPPLIED MISSILES

In conclusion, I am informed that missiles, originally supplied by the United States to Turkey for NATO defense purposes, have been moved by Turkish authorities from the Turkey-Soviet border to the Turkish coast opposite the Greek islands in the Aegean. I understand these missiles are the second generation Pershing type and have been

installed in triangular shape mounds, 45 yards to a side, behind hills at various points on the Turkish coast.

Would you be kind enough to ascertain for the record whether or not this is correct or whether, in fact, any American-supplied missiles have been so moved? [See p. 20.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

WITNESSES

We are very glad to have with us today Hon. Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State, accompanied by the Ambassador to Turkey, William A. Macomber, who many years ago used to work very closely with this committee when he was stationed here in Washington.

We are very glad to have both of you and we will be glad to hear from you now, Mr. Habib.

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP C. HABIB, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY; AND ARTHUR HARTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HABIB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are also accompanied by Robert Ellsworth, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to read an opening statement which in part addresses some of the questions that have been raised and which also lays out in general terms the administration's view with regard to the matter before the committee.

I am here today to describe the importance the administration attaches to restoring a relationship of trust and confidence between the United States and Turkey, a relationship which has been beneficial to the United States and to Western security interests for almost three decades. Specifically I ask that the committee recommend approval of the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, concluded in Washington on March 26, 1976, and transmitted to the Congress by the President on June 16, 1976.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that this agreement, as well as a comparable agreement now being negotiated with Greece, are essential elements if we are to refurbish and strengthen our ties with these two close friends and allies. Both agreements replace and supplement earlier mutual defense arrangements with these countries that have proven to be in our national interests. Both are designed to promote our continuing objectives in the vital southeastern flank of NATO and the general area of the eastern Mediterranean. Both have been structured in a way that we believe reflects the needs and sensitivities of these two allies as well as our own basic national interests.

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PROVISIONS OF DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY

The defense cooperation agreement with Turkey provides the basis for a reopening of strategic U.S. facilities in Turkey and the continued operation of other U.S. and NATO installations. The new agreement flows directly from our mutual responsibilities and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. It is consistent with, but not identical to, the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey. Founded on reciprocal respect for the sovereignty of the parties, the new agreement authorizes U.S. participation in defense measures pursuant to article III of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is understood that when the agreement enters into force, activities will resume which were suspended by the Government of Turkey in July 1975, when the Turkish Government requested negotiation of a new defense cooperation agreement.

The agreement provides a mutually acceptable framework for this important security cooperation. The installations authorized by the agreement will be Turkish Armed Forces installations under Turkish command, but the agreement clearly provides for U.S. command and control authority over all U.S. Armed Forces personnel, other members of the U.S. national element at each installation, and U.S. equipment and support facilities.

The installations shall be operated jointly. In order to facilitate this objective the United States is committed to a program of technical training of Turkish personnel.

Other provisions of the agreement deal with traditional operational and administrative matters, including operation and maintenance of the installations, ceilings on levels of U.S. personnel and equipment, import, export, and in-country supply procedures, status of forces, and property questions.

NEED FOR TURKISH FACILITIES

The installations and support facilities which Turkey has made available to the United States over the past 30 years have played an important strategic role. They have provided our easternmost operating base in the NATO area for combat aircraft, as well as major airlift, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), storage, refueling, supply, training, and communications operations. U.S. intelligence collection in Turkey has allowed the monitoring of Soviet missile testing, has been a primary source of vital early warning information of Soviet missile and satellite launchings, and an important data link on explosions of Chinese and Soviet nuclear devices.

Most of this lost information cannot be duplicated by other systems and sites now available to us. The adverse effect of this intelligence loss increases rather than diminishes with the passage of time, and we do not foresee resolution of the problem by the substitution of other country sites or more sophisticated technology in the near future. In sum, we need the Turkish facilities.

HELPING TURKEY MEET NATO DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS

The agreement provides also for continued United States assistance in helping Turkey meet its important NATO defense obligations. The agreement commits the United States to furnish Turkey a total of $1 billion in grants, foreign military sales (FMS) credits and loan guarantees over a 4-year period. However, only one-fifth of this total will be grant aid. The balance, or $800 million will take the form of Federal financing bank loan guarantees, which require an appropriation of only 10 percent of the principal amount of the guaranteed loans. This level of assistance is modest, given the size of the Turkish military forces and their importance to us as key elements in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. It is also consistent with past levels of United States military assistance to Turkey. It is responsive to U.S. needs in ways and at levels which we think are acceptable to the Congress and the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I need hardly remind this committee of the crucial role of the southeastern flank of Europe in insuring the overall integrity of our common defense. Our position throughout southern Europe and the Near East is dependent on the maintenance of a system of security relationships which we have built up in the eastern Mediterranean and which have served this country well over many years. Turkey's role in this structure is of obvious importance, particularly in light of the increasingly strong Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean area. Turkey shares common borders with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, and it controls the straits. Turkey's armed force of 500,000 men is the largest of all our NATO partners and requires the Warsaw Pact to devote substantial ground and air forces to this area. Turkey borders on areas of the Middle East and Iran of increasing sensitivity to United States interests.

Turkey thus adds major strength to the Western alliance system and is a link to other important U.S. defense relationships in the area. In turn, the NATO alliance and the American partnership provide Turkey a bulwark against pressures from its Soviet neighbor, the temptations of neutralism, and a too-close association with radical forces in the Arab world. Our alliance with Turkey and our close bilateral relationship have thus served our mutual interests, and I believe it is clear to members of the committee from their own contacts with the Turkish leadership that this mutuality of interests should and can continue.

In our view, anything that undercuts these relationships will have the effect of undermining our security and vital interests throughout the Mediterranean region. Our facilities in Turkey have served our interests in many times of crisis, both in the context of NATO and in other areas of the eastern Mediterranean. They have given us mobility, in terms of both access and transit, that is not elsewhere available. Any weakening of this association could thus jeopardize, in times of real crisis, our ability to come to the assistance of our friends and allies in the Mediterranean. For inevitably a loss of access to facilities in Turkey, both those now suspended and others which

continue to function, would not be felt in Turkey alone but would impact on the utility of all our other defense arrangements in the area and on our capacity to be responsive to our commitments.

Mr. Chairman, it is for this, among many reasons, that we are concerned over Turkey's capacity to assist in the common defense. Since the imposition of the arms embargo, and even with the partial relaxation of restrictions subsequently enacted, Turkey's Armed Forces have suffered continued deterioration in their capability to fulfill important NATO responsibilities. Turkey is an active and dedicated participant in the NATO military structure. Its commitment to NATO remains public and strong. But NATO authorities are agreed that, under present U.S. restrictions Turkey's military capability to conduct sustained combat operations in support of NATO has been impaired. Although several NATO members have acted to help meet this impairment, it is clear that Turkey's ability to maintain her vital contribution to NATO will continue to depend on the flow of equipment from the United States, her major and historic supplier.

We regret that Turkey felt it necessary to suspend the operation of U.S. intelligence facilities in Turkey until new defense cooperation arrangements between us are worked out and approved. These intelligence facilities remain of great importance to the common defense and we understand the committee will hear separately from other government agencies on this matter. I think we are all agreed, however, that what we are ultimately concerned with here is not only these individual facilities in themselves but also a restoration, through the agreement which we have concluded with Turkey, of an overall political relationship of fundamental significance.

In the postwar period, Turkey has made tremendous strides forward in modernizing its economy and in moving toward an open and pluralistic society. Turkey fought with us in Korea. In 1952, with our encouragement, it joined NATO. Turkey's leadership is committed to continuation of the closest possible ties with Western Europe and the United States. These are policy directions we wish to encourage and support. The reestablishment of a close and effective security relationship will give us the means to do this.

EQUAL IMPORTANCE OF GREECE

Mr. Chairman, in empasizing the importance of this agreement with Turkey to the overall interests of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean, let me also emphasize our strong view that Greece remains equally important. We are in no sense making a choice for Turkey. We will make no choices among allies. Our security interests, and we believe those of Turkey and Greece as well, require that both countries remain committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense structure that has been served so well by Greek and Turkish participation in the past.

For that reason we seek also to update and modernize our defense arrangements with Greece. Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Bitsios of Greece agreed on a set of principles last April which is now being negotiated into an agreement between the two countries. Unlike Turkey, the Government of Greece has preferred to include all detailed arrangements for our facilities in Greece in appendixes

to the agreement itself. This has required highly technical and time-consuming discussions to assure that all points are covered to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. Several rounds of negotiations have been held and a team headed by Ambassador Kubisch is actively at work in Athens at this time.

CONTINUED IMPASSE ON CYPRUS

Mr. Chairman, at this juncture I would like to say a few words about Cyprus and its relationship to the other subjects I have just been discussing. We are keenly and indeed painfully aware of the adverse implications of the continued impasse on Cyprus and of deepening Greek-Turkish distrust over conditions in the Aegean. American interests have suffered and will continue to suffer so long as this impasse and these conditions continue. So do the basic interests of Greece and Turkey, and those of the alliance as a whole.

For 2 years the U.S. Government has been in the forefront of efforts to restore peace and stability to Cyprus. We have seized every opportunity to advance the cause of a fair and equitable settlement to this difficult problem. We have worked directly with the parties themselves. We have worked closely with U.N. Secretary General Waldheim. We have worked with our Western allies who share our firm desire that a satisfactory solution be found.

Secretary Kissinger has given special emphasis to the Cyprus problem in the numerous and frequent encounters he has had with his Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot counterparts, with U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, and in consultations with our major Western allies. In several instances, the stalled negotiating process was set into motion following such an initiative by the Secretary. Unfortunately, the history of the talks has been one of brief, inconclusive rounds followed by long recesses—during which time the position of each side seems to become more rigid and less susceptible to outside efforts at conciliation. The President's five Cyprus reports to Congress record the active efforts of the United States and other parties to convert the Cyprus situation from a series of lost opportunities into a sustained negotiating process which offers promise of a final resolution of this complex problem.

This experience has brought home one immutable fact of the Cyprus situation. The will to achieve results in Cyprus can have no effect unless it is shared by the parties themselves. We and our allies can advance the cause no further than the two Cypriot communities themselves are willing to do. Mutual suspicion and distrust still greatly hinder the parties' ability even to test one another by entering into serious discussions of the outstanding issues. Efforts at a dialog are bogged down in procedural disagreements.

We do not intend to let our efforts flag. But it is patently evident that a long, difficult path lies ahead. Our ability to act as an effective catalyst in this process depends in great measure on the depth and strength of our relationships with the parties involved. Anything that will ameliorate that relationship—anything that will strengthen mutual confidence, will add to our ability to help the parties on a path to an equitable settlement. Conversely, anything which vitiates our

ability to so act will reduce the prospects for a reasonable conclusion of the Cyprus question.

An eventual solution will require compromise and new perspectives in the light of practical considerations and recognition that the situation which existed prior to 1974 is forever gone. The two sides must come to the realization that both must demonstrate statesmanship and flexibility if the Cypriot people are to live again in a stable and secure environment.

SITUATION IN THE AEGEAN

Let me comment similarly but briefly on the situation in the Aegean, where tension has recently received even more headlines than that in Cyprus. The Aegean problem involves deep and complex and emotional differences between Greece and Turkey, differences which we together with our allies have tried to help resolve.

On August 25 the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, cosponsored by the United States, Britain, France, and Italy. The resolution appealed to the parties to exercise utmost restraint in the present situation, to resume direct negotiations over their differences and to seek mutually acceptable solutions; and to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences.

The fact that the Security Council was able to adopt a resolution on this controversial matter by consensus represents a very constructive step by the international community. We believe it should help to move Greece and Turkey toward a peaceful solution of this complex dispute. As for the United States, we will continue, as we have in the past, to do everything in our power to urge the parties to settle this matter peacefully.

But, I must emphasize again, Mr. Chairman, what is perhaps a truism but which is also basic, and that is that we can play a helpful role—on this or the Cyprus issue—only to the degree that we have a relationship of mutual confidence with both Greece and Turkey. It is that need that our defense cooperation agreement with Turkey—and that with Greece—is designed to serve.

SUMMARY

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I would like again to emphasize the importance the administration attaches to having a strong and stable Turkey firmly committed to NATO and the West. Only with a Turkish ally of this kind can our overall Mediterranean policies be firmly anchored. And only with the passage by Congress of a United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement can Turkish-American relations be restored. We ask the support of the Congress, therefore, in dealing with the whole complex of foreign policy issues which I have outlined this morning and which have been so detrimental to our interests for the past 2 years. All of us want to preserve our friendship and security ties with both Greece and Turkey. All of us want a just and durable Cyprus settlement and a peaceful resolution of the dispute over the Aegean. We believe this process can best begin by congressional approval of the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation

Agreement, and the similar agreement with Greece. I ask your assistance in bringing this about.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. HABIB. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ellsworth is here to present briefly some of the more strategic considerations involved. He would like to put these considerations before the committee. With your permission I would ask him to present those considerations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I was going to call on Mr. Ellsworth. We are very glad to have him with us and will be glad to hear from you now.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What has happened in the eastern Mediterranean started with the summer of 1974. Since then a number of grevious wounds have been inflicted on the interests of the United States in that part of the world, not to say on the interests and relationships among the parties in the area.

Those wounds can be stitched back together, but they are going to carry a burden of scar tissue for a very long time. The longer they are delayed in getting stitched back together the worse the burden of scar tissue, and what my friend Phil Habib has been saying, in essence, is reviewing the efforts that have been made on the part of the administration to attempt, through the restoration of confidence between the United States and the parties having an interest in the area, to get that stitching begun. The background of it, though, and the part we want to focus on, is the strategic interests of the United States in that area as we see them, and I am going to mention five specific strategic interests that we have that will be served by early approval of the defense cooperation agreement.

TURKEY'S ROLE IN NATO

First is Turkey's role in NATO.

No area of the world outside the United States is more vital to our national security than NATO Europe. And Turkey plays a crucial role in insuring the overall integrity of NATO defenses.

The new dimensions of the threat to southern Europe are evident. The focus of unstable power relations has shifted in large measure from NATO's central front to its southern flank, constituted by the Mediterranean region, pivoting on its Atlantic approaches at one end and the Middle East at the other. The Soviet Union has established a strong military presence within the Mediterranean Sea and considerable political and military positions around the Mediterranean's littoral regions. In particular, it has sought to exploit opportunities presented by the Arab-Israeli conflict to destabilize the political-military equilibrium in this vast area. Thus, while our 6th Fleet continues to serve as a powerful deterrent to major aggression in the Mediterranean region, its effect and its supremacy are under challenge from the growing Soviet military presence.

The U.S. military options in the Mediterranean have been steadily narrowed in recent years. We have lost the ability to operate and base in the area as we once could. The North African littoral is no longer freely available to us.

As the Soviet Union has expanded its military presence and influence in the Mediterranean area, Turkey's strategic role on NATO's southern flank has naturally and inevitably grown in importance. Turkey has a 1,200-mile common land border and sea frontier with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Turkey controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, the only waters linking the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean. Control of these straits provides a significant constraint on the surge capability of the Soviet Navy into the Mediterranean. And as a member of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Turkey provides a land bridge with Iran, separating the Soviet Union from Iran and Syria and serving as a buffer to historic Russian aspirations to the south.

In addition to being a bulwark against easy Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a strong standing Turkish armed force—about one-half million men under arms—requires the Warsaw Pact to dedicate about 50 ground divisions, and large numbers of combat aircraft and military air transports, for operations against Greece and Turkey. Clearly, if they did not confront a viable Turkish force, a large part of these Warsaw Pact units could be made available for operations in the critical central region and severely complicate NATO's ability to defend that front without a major increase in military resources.

UNITED STATES BASES AND SUPPORT FACILITIES IN TURKEY

Second. Of course, Turkey's importance to free world security transcends its substantial contribution to NATO. Turkey has traditionally made available to the United States bases and other support facilities that play an important role in the United States strategic position in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean.

These facilities in Turkey provide our easternmost forward operating bases for combat aircraft, serve as major airlift, refueling, supply, training, and communications facilities in the eastern Mediterranean; and are important for aviation and naval petroleum storage in the same area. United States Marines participate with Turkish forces on Turkish territory in training exercises, and a considerable number of tactical and strategic United States Air Force under national command are presently planned for deployment to Turkey as NATO followup forces. These and other United States facilities in Turkey also contribute to stability in the Middle East region as a whole and constitute an important capability in the event of further conflict in that area. However, in the present ambiguous situation our overflight agreements and 6th Fleet visits are circumscribed to a degree not encountered in the past. Implementation of the defense cooperation agreement we have negotiated with Turkey should be helpful in this regard. Failure of the U.S. Congress to approve the agreement would unquestionably worsen the present limitations on our military options in dealing with contingencies, should any arise.

Without a continuing close relationship between Turkey, the United States, and NATO, the Soviets might gain Turkish overflight privileges and thus shorter air routes to support Soviet destabilizing activities in the Middle East. This would facilitate Soviet resupply operations or intervention in any possible new Middle East crisis, and constraints on Soviet naval surge capability from the Black Sea through the Turkish straits might diminish or disappear.

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES IN TURKEY

Third, I must underscore the strategic value of our intelligence facilities in Turkey, which have been closed since July 1975. From these facilities, we collect important and unique data on Soviet science and technology and on Soviet military activities in the southern U.S.S.R., Black Sea, and eastern Mediterranean areas. We have used these facilities to monitor Soviet compliance with the ABM agreement, and we need their renewed availability in maintaining Soviet compliance with the pending SALT II Agreement. Although some of the data collected could be recovered by other measures, or by virtue of expensive relocation of facilities outside of Turkey, taken in their entirety, our intelligence facilities are extremely valuable and to a significant degree irreplaceable. The United States can ill afford the loss of these assets.

ACCESS TO MIDDLE EAST OIL

Fourth, there is a clear political-economic need, during the next decade at least, to maintain a substantial presence in the eastern Mediterranean which will help insure our continuing access, and access of our allies, to the oil of the Middle East. Our presence in Turkey not only helps to restrain the potential escalation of simmering conflict in the Middle East, but it also enables us to demonstrate in the area our genuine concern for stability in the Middle East and for maintaining cordial relations with the other states of the area including the oil producing countries. Weakened United States ties with Turkey have to some extent signaled waning United States concern for stability in the area and could result in less favorable conditions of access to Middle Eastern oil.

INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY OF U.S. POWER

The fifth strategic consideration is global in context. Some have interpreted the contraction of U.S. presence and involvement in certain areas of the world as a diminution of our influence and even our will. Vietnam is one example. Our failure to take more forceful action to oppose the Soviet/Cuban adventure in Angola is another. Against this background and in the light of steadily growing Soviet ground, air, and naval capabilities, this is certainly not the time to take action that could appear to be a strategic retreat in the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, increasing doubts about the durability and reliability of American security policy in this area, and in Europe generally, would infect the entire larger process of East-West negotiations and Atlantic security. By thus weakening the credibility of our deterrent,

the peace and freedom we and our allies seek to preserve through our mutual security ties would be placed in greater jeopardy.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD TURKEY

Those, then, are the five strategic United States interests in maintaining our Turkish military ties. Because of the overriding significance of these strategic considerations, this administration has set forth a policy of full military cooperation with Turkey. This is not to say that we are blind to the difficult political and humanitarian problems that plague the Greek-Turkish relationship today. We are anxious to contribute to the peaceful resolution of these issues. Indeed, strengthening—not weakening—our ties with Turkey will place us in a better position to be helpful in this regard. Moreover, continuing strong United States defense ties with Turkey are important for the fundamental security interests of Greece as well as Turkey and, of course, of the entire Western alliance.

COST OF DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY

As to the "cost" of our new Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey, a number of points need to be made. We are not paying rent for bases, but clearly Turkey needs external assistance to sustain the quality and size of its armed forces in support of the strategic interests I have mentioned. We have agreed upon an amount of security assistance for Turkey over a 4-year period that we consider necessary to meet Turkey's requirements to maintain and modernize its armed forces. Someone must help Turkey. If we do not, Turkey will look elsewhere in its national interest and we can expect the Soviet Union to exploit any opportunities.

The 4-year security assistance package for Turkey is generally consistent with the level of our previous aid. Over the last 4 years preceding the embargo, our military grants to Turkey totaled $374.2 million; the 4-year total of grants proposed in the new package add to $200 million, only 20 percent of the $1 billion total package. The other 80 percent will consist of credits or loan guarantees, which should not result in any net expense to the United States.

SIMILAR AGREEMENT WITH GREECE

As you know, we are in the final stages of concluding a similar Defense Cooperation Agreement with Greece. We are hopeful of bringing our Greek and Turkish allies together again by stressing their respective strategic importance to one another and the Alliance through the similar provisions of our agreements with them. You will have the opportunity soon to assure yourselves that the provisions of our agreement with Greece are no less reflective of our security interests than the provisions of this agreement with Turkey. In the meantime, we should not delay any longer the full operation of our strategic activities in Turkey, since the current curtailment of more than a year has already seriously impacted upon our Nation's and our alliance's defense preparedness. If the United States gives due consideration to

the basic strategic imperatives outlined above, the value of maintaining our Turkish military ties as well as those with Greece will be clear.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. That is a very informative statement. We are delighted to have it.

QUESTION OF CONSIDERING TURKISH AND GREEK AGREEMENTS TOGETHER

As you know, suggestions have been made that we should more or less consider the Turkish base agreement along with the executive agreement proposed for Greece.

Do you suggest that they be tied together or that we deal with them separately?

Mr. HARTMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could address myself to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARTMAN. We believe that it is important to move ahead with the Turkish agreement. We are proceeding with as much dispatch as we can, as Secretary Habib said, to negotiate the Greek agreement. It is much more complex by choice of the Greek Government because they decided they wished to have the details with respect to the individual facilities included in the agreement itself. It seems to me that it adds an additional measure of tension perhaps to tie these agreements exactly together because then you at least appear, in discussing both agreements together, to be aiding in the process of approving one agreement or another. It seems to me they both ought to be considered on their merits. They will both be up here. The administration is doing what it can to complete the negotiations of the Greek agreement.

They are linked in the sense that we want to improve our security ties with both countries, but I think it is important for us in terms of our relationship with Turkey to show that the agreement that was submitted to the Congress in April is being considered and given the attention of the Congress because of the importance that we attach to restoring that relationship with Turkey.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION WE FACE

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the witnesses have done an admirable job. The fact that they have spoken in a low key and not shouted in no way detracts from the seriousness of the statements they have made. I take it it is an enormously serious situation which we face. You agree, I take it?

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir.

Mrs. ELLSWORTH. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Some of us suggested it would be good to have in addition to you distinguished witnesses General Haig here in regard to the impact on NATO and the importance to NATO of this agreement. You have been closely in touch with him, I take it, especially the Secretary?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Are you prepared to state that his view as to the seriousness of the situation is no less than the one you have expressed here today?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Absolutely.

Senator CASE. I bring this out because there are some matters in which I am fairly willing to take independent views. I am not prepared to override the views of the people whose job it is to do the professional, technical defense job. I wanted to bring out very clearly that this is the professional view and strongly held view of the Department of Defense as well as the Department of State and our military people.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. It is and my statement fully reflects the views of professional military as well as of the Department, of the Secretary himself.

DANGER OF TURKEY WAIVERING

Senator CASE. It has been suggested that there isn't any great danger of Turkey waivering in its membership in NATO or support of NATO or its friendship with the United States. For that reason, I am terribly glad we have Ambassador Macomber here with us today.

Nothing we say is a reflection on any individual in the Turkish Government or his or her desire to remain on the side of the West, but there are forces within Turkey as within Greece that we have to consider. We have to take account of the possibility of a loose Turkey, for example, subject to all kinds of pressures and enticements and inducements which may lead her away from that happy arrangement we have developed in the West. This is a matter we ought to seriously consider in all of these questions as well as the stability of the Turkish Government.

I would be very happy to have Ambassador Macomber's views because I can think of no one who can speak more authoritatively on this matter.

Mr. MACOMBER. Thank you, Senator Case. You spoke directly to very major concerns of mine. Turkey is firmly committed to NATO, wants to stay with NATO, but it is a country that is a democracy, it has various viewpoints, and the viewpoints that would like to take Turkey in a different direction have been strengthened in recent times by the embargo which has been exploited by those forces and for other reasons.

Now I believe that timing is important here. I believe that if the Congress delays acting on this agreement that it will amount to running a lottery with our security relationship out there.

Secretary Ellsworth has very cogently summarized why, if you look at the United States-Turkish partnership in a military sense and look at it as one entity that itself has an entity and key element in the strength of NATO. If you look at what they put into it and what we put into it in terms of geography, manpower, and material and so on.

Now, we have it in our hands to restore this partnership and stabilize the far end of NATO and stabilize our position in the eastern Mediterranean.

It may be that if we delay acting on this—and when I say we have it in our hands what I mean if the U.S. Government through the Congress enforces this new agreement, we can put this relationship back together again, because I have no doubt if that is done now that the Turkish Parliament would follow suit and we will be back to a very valuable relationship.

Now it may be, Senator, that if we delay that still can be done later on. I cannot tell you for sure that if you don't act now, and I recognize all of the reasons—a number have been mentioned this morning—of why delay might seem desirable, but it is possible that Congress could delay action until after the elections which realistically means until next winter, spring, or even summer, and it is possible that with the resources that Congress has made available since last June the relationship could hold together and that when Congress acted later and enforces this agreement that you could then have the enforcement in Turkey and then go back to business somewhat later on. It is possible.

But I do believe every day we delay the risks of this not becoming impossible grow. I believe it would be running a lottery with our effort to put that security partnership back together which we should not run.

I recognize the tremendous scheduling problems and work problems the Congress has at this time but I would urge in the national interest of the United States and of the free world in the eastern Mediterranean that we move forward with this agreement now.

Thank you.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Javits has importuned for intervention here because he has to go somewhere else.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I have a hearing that I have requested to confirm a high Federal official in the Labor Committee and they are waiting for me. If I could have 2 minutes?

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF GREECE

Senator JAVITS. Gentlemen, one thing I haven't heard in the discussion, and that is the relative importance of Greece. We are dealing with a fact not a theory. The fact is that Turkey used United States-supplied arms to split Cyprus in half. The fact that this was incited by the colonels who may in a sense be said to represent Greece or may not. That was a military overturn. We have to hold an even balance. We are showing our good faith in the Foreign Relations Committee by holding this hearing. We will not couple these treaties of Turkey and Greece, but we can not be absolutely heedless either of Greece's place in the NATO complex or of what brought us into this dilemma, and if internal political situations in Turkey compel that Government to be silent on the justification for at least American hesitation, we can't be silent. That is just the fact of life.

And, finally, suppose that Turkey decided it wanted to take Greece, would we still consider that Turkish alliance so precious that we would have to continue to supply her and condone any such action?

Where is the end of this? And that is what I would like to hear from you gentlemen. That is my only question.

Mr. HARTMAN. Senator, let me address the first part of your question. I think we have addressed in our statements the importance we attach to our relationship with Greece. With the announcement of the agreement with Turkey, the Government of Greece came to us and said that they wished to have a similar arrangement. We immediately negotiated the principles for such an arrangement and these were publicly announced shortly after the announcement of the Turkish agreement. We have been negotiating since that time with the Greek Government. As we explained earlier, it is a much more difficult task to complete the negotiations of that agreement because of a Greek request that we include the details with respect to each of the facilities in the agreement itself, whereas in the Turkish agreement some of those details are going to be filled in later through operating agreements that do not require an approval by Parliaments on either side.

Therefore, we do attach importance to the relationship with Greece. In fact, we do not believe unless we have good security and political and economic relationships with these two countries that we are going to be able to have an impact on improving the relationship between the two.

In fact, what has happened over the last 2 years is that the American relationship has played against the improvement of relations between the two countries. It is an unfortunate fact, but people in Greece expect that there will be certain benefits from the pressures that have been put on Turkey through the embargo.

In Cyprus, the whole question of what to expect in the future has affected their desire to get down to serious negotiations that must take place if that problem is going to be solved.

TENSION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

With respect to the tension between Greece and Turkey themselves, our feeling and the feeling of all of our NATO allies is that we must through friendship with both of those parties attempt to bring them together as we did, for example, in New York during the Security Council debates, where a commitment was made that the two parties will discuss the Aegean situation. We must apply our influence on both sides in friendship and confidence if we are going to be able to help them to deal with problems which have not been created in the last few years but have existed for centuries.

U.S. POSITION SHOULD BE FRANKLY AND DIRECTLY STATED

Senator JAVITS. May the record show I have myself set up an effort at Greek-Turkish bilateral cooperation which was partially successful. I am a profound friend of both, and I emphasize both countries, so that they may understand the American dilemma, but that I do not believe, not withstanding the fact that Turkey may have tough internal political problems, and so does Greece, that the United States position should not be frankly and directly stated to anybody who will listen. There are real reasons for where we are. It is not an old figment of our imagination or expression of anybody's prejudices. I am inclined to

agree with the U.S. policy, but I do think that the record ought to be evenhandedly set forth in respect of both countries.

Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CASE. I am very much interested, Senator Javits, in what you brought out, it is desirable to have it right out in the open.

HELPFULNESS TO GREECE OF KEEPING TURKEY IN NATO

I would like to pick up from that if I may, Mr. Chairman, with this thought: that we can be more helpful to Greece if we keep Turkey in NATO and keep Turkey allied with the West——

Senator JAVITS. That is correct.

Senator CASE. Than any other possible way it seems to me in respect to the Turkish-Greek relationship, the danger to Greece from Turkey or of clashes between them. For the immediate interest of Greece, it is important that we do this.

I suggested in my earlier questioning and the Ambassador picked up the point that it is not by any means beyond the realm of possibility that a Turkey dislodge from its present happy relationship with the West could be a free agent and subject to all kinds of pressures which might bring back the history of the 18th and 19th centuries in respect to Turkey and Islamic supremacy and a raging situation would be enormously difficult to contain, especially in respect of the countries on the littoral of the Mediterranean and in the Near East in the Persian Gulf. I can't emphasize this too much and am so glad Senator Javits made it possible for me to bring this point out at this time.

Do you agree?

Mr. MACOMBER. I certainly do, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. May I say, too, that I agree and that I hope these words resound in Greece as I hope these words have resounded in Turkey.

Senator CASE. There is no question we all feel strongly for the Greek community and Greek sensibility and Greek interests and we are determined nothing we do shall in any way harm them. As the Secretary pointed out, we have all felt I think very clearly that this is a matter that fundamentally has to be resolved between those two countries and we should not be used as a pawn by either.

I suggest that what the colonels did and permitted to be done in Cyprus would have brought a reaction by Turkey even if they had no arms from the United States; is that correct?

Mr. MACOMBER. That is absolutely correct.

Senator CASE. Then it seems to me we ought to be reducing this matter, as far as our interest is concerned, to its proper terms.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

POSSIBILITY OF TURKS HAVING MOVED U.S. SUPPLIED MISSILES

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Senator Pell asked the question and asked that the record be filled in with the answer and I am prepared to respond.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to propound that question to you at Senator Pell's request. We would be very glad to hear you.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Senator Pell said a few minutes ago at the end of his testimony he was informed that Pershing missiles had been moved by Turkish authorities to the Turkish coast opposite the Greek Islands in the Aegean and asked that we ascertain for the record whether or not that was true.

The Turks do not have any Pershing missiles. The Turks do have Honest John missiles, but we have absolutely no evidence nor is there any basis for any evidence that there has been any movement of those Honest John missiles. Should there be any change in that situation, if the chairman likes I will be glad to advise the committee, but for the moment I am satisfied that that is the actual situation. They never have had any Pershing missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. On behalf of Senator Pell we would be very glad to be notified of any change in that situation. I will also call Senator Pell's attention to the answer you have given to the committee now.

Any further questions?

IMPORTANCE OF 6TH FLEET ACCESS

Senator CASE. I think we probably pretty well broadly outlined many of the details here. One area you touched on, gentlemen, particularly Secretary Ellsworth, is the matter of importance as far as the 6th Fleet goes. It would be helpful to develop that a little bit further in somewhat more detail. I wish you would go into your reference to the increasing unavailability of the north littoral of Africa, for example, and other matters of that kind.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Perhaps in order to respond fully I could prepare a historical record of access and gradual denial thereof as far as the 6th Fleet is concerned on the north littoral of the Mediterranean or south littoral of the Mediterranean, whichever. Also gradual diminishment of the 6th Fleet, port visits to Turkish ports, and increased levels of Soviet ship day activities in the eastern Mediterranean. I think perhaps in order to put together a comprehensive picture with accurate detailed facts would be useful to the committee and I can have that to you within a period of 24 hours. Suffice it to say in the meanwhile all of those trends have been quite adverse to the United States, every one of them, over recent years and, of course, particularly since the summer of 1974–75 there has been a particularly difficult situation as far as 6th Fleet access to anything in Turkey is concerned.

Has there been any at all?

Mr. MACOMBER. There have been some smaller ship visits but the larger ship visits have stopped.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much. I think, Mr. Chairman, it would be very helpful to have that for the record, as the Secretary suggests, and we can keep the record open for that.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have some other questions I would like to propound to the Secretary and ask that they be answered for the record.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes, sir.

REFERRAL OF AEGEAN DIFFICULTY TO INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The CHAIRMAN. On this question I brought up earlier about the difficulty in the Aegean, one of you said that it would be referred to the International Court of Justice; is that right?

Mr. HABIB. What happened, Mr. Chairman, was that the Security Council, in considering the issue, concluded, and in effect produced, a resolution acceptable to everyone. There was no controversy over the terms of the resolution. The parties were advised to do certain things.

First of all, they were advised by the Council to talk to each other. Put in more diplomatic language, it was recommended to them that they resume negotiations.

In addition to that the attention of the parties was called by the Security Council to the availability of judicial processes, including International Court of Justice, as a reference point if they chose.

Now, the presumption, when one recommends negotiations, is that if they are unable to resolve all the issues at least they narrow them down to some unresolved issues, which they could agree to take to the Court. In legal terms it is not necessary they agree. The Court is available. There are other judicial processes available that derive from certain treaty relationships that they have which they could use; and that is where the reference is made to judicial processes in general as well as to International Court of Justice.

Now, the case is presently before the Court. The Court has made a preliminary ruling on only one aspect of it, but it remains pending with respect to other aspects. So there is at the present time before the Court some consideration of the issues involved.

Specifically, let me see if I can't get the whole text submitted for the record. [See p. 23.]

There was a recent preliminary or initial ruling by the Court which I think would be useful for the committee to have. I don't seem to be able to put my hand on it right now. We will submit it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought I had heard in the news that some preliminary actions had been taken by the Court.

Mr. HABIB. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It had been suggested that the two countries get together and negotiate, as I recall.

Mr. HABIB. The suggestion that they get together and negotiate was a resolution of the Security Council of the U.N. and they have agreed to do so and there is presently scheduled a meeting at this time. I think there is one scheduled before the end of the month.

But in addition, I would like to submit for the record a precise account of what the Court did. I don't like to do it in just general terms.

The CHAIRMAN. I have an article here from the Christian Science Monitor of today that deals with this very thing. It is entitled "Turkey Hails World Court Ruling on Disputed Aegean Oil Rights." I will submit this article for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 15, 1976]

TURKEY HAILS WORLD COURT RULING ON DISPUTED AEGEAN OIL RIGHTS

(By Sam Cohen, Special to the Christian Science Monitor)

Istanbul.—Turkey considers that it has a green light to go ahead with oil prospecting in the Aegean Sea as a result of a ruling by the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

The world court rejected a Greek application for a temporary ban on Turkish oil surveying in disputed waters of the Aegean.

The Greek complaint focused on the current mission of the Turkish survey ship Sismick 1, which is due to end Sept. 25. But Turkish analysts say the court's decision means that Turkey will be able to continue such research in the future.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabry Caglayangil said Sept. 13 before leaving for the United States: "The decision proves how strong our legal position is. It makes clear that there is no need to stop the research of the seismic survey ship."

He expressed the hope that the court's ruling would "facilitate the start of conclusive direct talks" between Greece and Turkey. The ruling, he said, was in line with the UN Security Council resolution of Aug. 25 which called for such talks.

Mr. Caglayangil is expected to meet Greek Foreign Minister Dimitrios Bitsios in New York on Sept. 25. This meeting could mark the beginning of a dialogue on current Greek-Turkish differences.

The Turks hope that after preliminary talks the negotiations will be continued by experts. This could be followed by a summit meeting between Greek Premier Constantine Caramanlis and Turkish Premier Suleyman Demirel, they say.

However qualified observers see little prospect of bilateral talks leading to a settlement of the differences between the two NATO neighbors unless both sides show more flexibility in the negotiations.

In the Turkish view the Security Council's resolution and the world court's decision have proved that Greece was mistaken in turning to international forums in an attempt to win support for its case against Turkey.

Mr. HABIB. We will submit precise information.

The CHAIRMAN. Frankly that seems to me to be one of the most important things to be considered.

Mr. HABIB. That is why we had sponsored the resolution. We agree.

The CHAIRMAN. I also feel that the best way in the world to get a misunderstanding settled is to get the parties talking to each other. I am a strong believer in negotiation, and if you will prepare that information for us we would certainly appreciate it.

Mr. HABIB. We will. We will submit for the record the text of the joint resolution which did in effect call for that negotiation.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1976.

HON. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As I promised at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing Wednesday on the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, I want to bring you up to date on developments in the Aegean Sea. As you know, the question of the rights of Greece and Turkey in and under the Aegean is one of extraordinary sensitivity in both countries.

Most of the recent developments have focused on the operations of the Turkish seismic research vessel, the SISMIK I. On August 25, the United Nations Security Council was able to pass by consensus a resolution, a copy of which is

enclosed, which appealed to both parties to exercise restraint and try to reduce tension in the area. The resolution also called on both Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations in an effort to find mutually acceptable solutions. The resolution was co-sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and France. The Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Turkey will be in New York late this month for the UN General Assembly and we are hopeful that they will meet and begin a negotiating process on that occasion.

On August 10, when the Greek Government brought the Aegean case to the Security Council, it also appealed to the International Court of Justice to rule on the issues in dispute in the Aegean and also requested the Court to declare that Turkey was not entitled to undertake any exploration activity or scientific research in the disputed area. On September 11, the Court declined to ask Turkey to desist from further research in the Aegean. I am enclosing a copy of the Court's press release. The Court has, as yet, not said anything about the ultimate status of the Greek and Turkish claims, nor has it decided whether or not it will even hear the general case. Greek and Turkish governmental and press reactions to the Court's refusal to issue an interim ruling have been restrained.

Throughout this period our efforts have been directed toward bringing the parties together to negotiate their differences while urging restraint in their actions. Given the deep divisions between the parties, progress toward a solution may be extremely difficult. We will keep in mind the Committee's interest in these matters and as major developments occur will keep you informed.

Sincerely,

PHILIP C. HABIB.

Enclosures: 1. UNSC Resolution 395; 2. ICJ Press Release.

RESOLUTION 395 (1976), ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1,953RD MEETING, ON AUGUST 25, 1976

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Greece dated 10 August 1976 (S/12167),

Having heard and noted the various points made in the statements by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey,

Expressing its concern over the present tensions between Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean Sea,

Bearing in mind the principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the various provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter concerning procedures and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes,

Noting the importance of the resumption and continuance of direct negotiations between Greece and Turkey to resolve their differences,

Conscious of the need for the parties both to respect each other's international rights and obligations and to avoid any incident which might lead to the aggravation of the situation and which, consequently, might compromise their efforts towards a peaceful solution,

1. *Appeals* to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to exercise the utmost restraint in the present situation;

2. *Urges* the Governments of Greece and Turkey to do everything in their power to reduce the present tensions in the area so that the negotiating process may be facilitated;

3. *Calls on* the Governments of Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations over their differences and appeals to them to do everything within their power to ensure that these result in mutually acceptable solutions;

4. *Invites* the Governments of Greece and Turkey in this respect to continue to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences which they may identify in connexion with their present dispute.

[United Nations press release ICJ/369, Sept. 13, 1976]

WORLD COURT DECIDES NOT TO INDICATE INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

(The following is reproduced as received from the Registry of the International Court of Justice, The Hague.)

On 11 September 1976, the International Court of Justice made in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case an Order finding by 12 votes to 1 that the circumstances as they now present themselves to the Court are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of its Statute to indicate interim measures of protection.

The Court was composed as follows: President, Jiménez de Aréchaga; Vice-President, Nagendra Singh; Judges Forster, Gros, Lachs, Dillard, Morozov, Waldock, Ruda, Mosler, Elias, and Tarazi; Judge *ad hoc* Stassinopoulos. The President, the Vice-President and Judges Iachs, Morozov, Ruda, Mosler, Elias and Tarazi appended separate opinions to the Order of the Court. Judge *ad hoc* Stassinopoulos appended a dissenting opinion.

In its Order, the Court recalls that on 10 August 1976 Greece instituted proceedings against Turkey in respect of a dispute concerning the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. Greece requested the Court, *inter alia*, to declare what is the course of the boundary between the portions of the continental shelf appertaining respectively to Greece and Turkey in the area, and to declare that Turkey is not entitled to undertake any activities on the Greek continental shelf whether by exploration, exploitation, research or otherwise, without the consent of Greece.

On the same day Greece also requested the Court to indicate interim measures of protection to the effect that the Governments of both States should (a) refrain, unless with the consent of each other and pending the final judgment of the Court, from all exploration activity or any scientific research with respect to the areas in dispute; (b) refrain from taking further military measures or actions which may endanger their peaceful relations.

At public hearings on 25, 26 and 27 August 1976, the Court heard observations presented on behalf of the Government of Greece on its request for the indication of interim measures of protection. On 26 August, the Turkish Government, which had not appointed an agent and was not represented at the hearings, communicated to the Registry of the Court certain written observations in which it submitted in particular that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and suggested that the request for interim measures be dismissed and the case removed from the list.

In justification of its request for interim measures, Greece alleged: (*a*) that certain acts on the part of Turkey (the granting of petroleum exploration permits, the explorations of the vessel MTA Sismik I) constitute infringements of its exclusive sovereign rights to the exploration and exploitation of its continental shelf and that the breech of the right to a coastal State to exclusivity of knowledge of its continental shelf constitutes irreparable prejudice; (*b*) that the activities complained of would, if continued, aggravate the disputes. Turkey contended: (*a*) that these activities cannot be regarded as involving any prejudice to the existence of any rights of Greece over the disputed area and that, even if they could, there would be no reason why such prejudice could not be compensated; (*b*) that Turkey has no intention of taking the initiative in the use of force.

So far as (*a*) is concerned, the Court, viewing the matter in the context of Article 41 of its Statute, is unable to find in the alleged breech of Greece's rights such a risk of irreparable prejudice to rights in issue as might require the exercise of the power to indicate interim measures of protection. With regard to (*b*) the Court considers that it is not to be presumed that either Government will fail to heed its obligations under the United Nations Charter or fail to heed Security Council resolution 395 (1976) of 25 August 1976, wherein the two Governments were urged "to do everything in their power to reduce the present tensions in the area" and called on "to resume direct negotiations over their differences".

The Court observes that, to pronounce on the present request for interim measures, it was not called upon to decide any question of its jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and that its present decision in no way prejudges any question relating to its jurisdiction or the merits of the case. It is unable, at the present stage of the proceedings to accede to Turkey's request that the case be removed from the list, but it will be necessary to resolve as the next step the question of its jurisdiction with respect to the case. The written pleadings are first to be addressed to that question and will be filed within time limits, the fixing of which the Court has reserved for further decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. I appreciate it very much. Any further questions?

ARMS EMBARGO'S EFFECT ON GREECE AND TURKEY

Senator CASE. Very seriously, I will think of a thousand things to ask tomorrow morning after you gentlemen have disbursed. But if you don't mind I would like you to elaborate a little bit on the effect this embargo on arms to Turkey has had on the Turkish military and upon the participation of Turkey and Greece in the exercises in NATO. I think this is a very important question. It may sound a little technical, but it relates very much to capabilities and possibilities and what may turn out to be actuality.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. There are two or three things that can be said about that, Senator Case.

One thing to be said about it is that, of course, one important result of all of this was the fact that Greece felt compelled to as it were withdrawn from many of the military structures and activities of NATO. I have in mind particularly Greek participation in COMLAND [Commander Allied Land Forces] Southeast Headquarters in Izmir, Turkey. The Greek military has withdrawn from Izmir before and gone back and one can't say that that, therefore, is a permanent wound, but it is not good. That is one effect of the situation, that is to say, the Greek withdrawal of all of their military people from COMLAND Southeast Headquarters, which is a NATO headquarters commanded by a NATO commander who happens to be a U.S. Army four-star general located in Izmir.

Another effect of the overall situation has been that of course the Greeks and the Turks have refused to participate in joint NATO exercises in the eastern Mediterranean and on the southern flank with either COMLAND Southeast or CINC [Commander in Chief] South, a NATO naval command located at Naples.

Probably those things can be restored which entail a loss of training. It is a loss of joint operating experience, which is not insignificant. But probably the most important strategic effect of the embargo itself has been its effect on the readiness capability of Turkish Armed Forces.

I hesitate to get in and will not get into any detail to the extent of that loss of Turkish readiness, but I will say the Turkish Armed Forces depend for their logistics, for their maintenance, for their spare parts, to a fairly substantial extent on the continued flow of those things from the United States, and to the extent that those things, that is to say, spare parts and maintenance and logistics support have been cut off or denied them, to that extent the very capability of their national security has been eroded away. And that is serious for Turkey but it is also serious in the senses which I have already described, for the United States, our strategic interests, and for NATO as a whole.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING GREECE AND TURKEY ON RIGHT SIDE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence of me and I won't impose on it any further. In closing I want to emphasize my concern here to keep these two great countries on the right side. They have been so enormously useful and important not only in NATO but in

Western civilization generally. It is important to keep this going; it is enormously important. We want the friendship of both, we need the strength of both, and it is I think essential that we take those steps which will make it possible for the elements in both countries which want to keep their faces turned toward the civilized world to maintain positions of leadership in their respective countries. We must do everything we can for them.

Mr. HABIB. If I could confirm to Senator Case that we agree completely with everything he said, we will make every effort in every forum. I can assure you the Secretary himself will make every effort. We will have considerable opportunity in the forthcoming meetings that will be taking place in New York centered around the General Assembly to pursue our national interests in this regard. We agree that it is not only important to our interests but that it also serves the interests of the two parties if we play that role. So we agree completely with what you have said. You can be certain that with respect to the complex issues that are involved there will be no flagging in our effort to contribute to their solution directly as best we can.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting is supposed to be followed by an intelligence briefing in executive session over in S–116; is that the understanding?

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir, and the gentlemen are available for that.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is all, the committee stands adjourned and we will move to S–116.

[Whereupon, at 11 a.m. the committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

RESPONSES OF HON. PHILIP HABIB, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. What is the status of U.S.–Greek base negotiations? When does the Administration expect them to be concluded?

Answer. The U.S.-Greek base negotiations are in an advanced stage. The basic Defense Cooperation Agreement text and two major subsidiary documents (Command and Control, and Status of Forces) are virtually complete. Work on the four geographical appendices (Nea Makri, Iraklion, Souda Bay and Hellenikon) has progressed to a point where only a few outstanding issues remain to be negotiated. It is difficult to predict an exact time for conclusion of the negotiations, but we should be in a position to initial an agreement within the next few weeks.

Question 2. What are the major issues separating the U.S. and Greece from reaching an accord?

Answer. There are no major issues separating Greece and the United States. Rather, there are a number of relatively minor questions which must be resolved, in some cases limited to differences of wording. Certain arrangements in the intelligence and telecommunications fields have also yet to be worked out.

Question 3. If the United States concludes and ratifies a new agreement with Turkey but does not do the same with Greece, what will the Greek response be toward U.S. use of military faciilties in Greece? Toward NATO use of military facilities in Greece?

Answer. We believe agreements with both Greece and Turkey are essential to ensuring stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and in enchancing our own security relations with those countries. We do not envisage a situation where only one of the agreements would be ratified and therefore would not want to speculate on what would occur if such a situation arose.

As for NATO use of military facilities in Greece, this is a separate issue and in no way relates to the agreement now being negotiated in Athens.

Question 4. Since the signing of the "Principles to Guide Future U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation" between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Bitsios on April 15, 1976, what restrictions on U.S. use of Greek bases or facilities have been modified or lifted?

Answer. The only restriction in effect at the time of the signing of the April Principles related to U.S. air operations at Souda Bay. These restrictions dated from the Cyprus crisis of 1974, and were eased following the signing of the Principles.

Question 5. Could you comment on reports that Congressional consideration of a Turkish agreement without a Greek agreement would cause a serious anti-U.S. reaction in Greece, causing Caramanlis' pro-West initiatives to be disrupted and re-opening the old charge that the U.S. is not being even-handed and is again tilting towards the Turks?

Answer. Such reports seem to us exaggerated. The Greek Government and public are aware that the negotiation of a U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement is entering its final stages and they know that this Agreement is similar in form and content to the U.S.-Turkish agreement. Therefore, we would not expect any serious anti-U.S. reaction in Greece as a result of current Congressional consideration of the U.S.-Turkish Agreement.

Question 6. Should the United States not conclude the proposed new Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey, what will be the action of the Turkish Government regarding continued use of Turkish military facilities by the United States?

Answer. The Turkish Government has made clear that U.S. military operations ordered suspended in July 1975 cannot be resumed until the conclusion of

a new Defense Cooperation Agreement. Turkey has also indicated that remaining military activities still authorized cannot continue indefinitely without a new Agreement. Foreign Minister Caglayangil, during his visit to Washington in March, 1976, reiterated his Government's position that our closed facilities could not be reopened until the new DCA had been approved by both national legislatures and had actually entered into force. There is every indication that the Turks intend to hold to this position.

Question 7. Why did the Administration not link the Cyprus issue to the Defense Cooperation Agreement? Are there any implied understandings or agreements that are not specified in the Agreement regarding the Cyprus issue?

Answer. We fully appreciate the Committee's concern regarding the importance of a settlement on Cyprus and the inevitable linkage of that issue to U.S. defense support for Turkey. We have made the fact of this linkage very clear to the Turks. However, the Turks have refused to accept a reference to Cyprus in the DCA because of the extreme domestic political sensitivity this issue conveys for Turkey. Our insistence, therefore, on a Cyprus clause would have made impossible any form of a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey. There is no question that the Turks fully understand the controls and restrictions written into the DCA and the consequences of their use of U.S. arms and equipment in an unauthorized manner. There are no other implied understandings or agreements with the Turks regarding the Cyprus issue.

Question 8. If the Cyprus dispute is not settled in a manner reasonably acceptable to Turkey, what will be the Turkish attitude toward future participation in and relationship with NATO?

Answer. Turkey thus far has not allowed the Cyprus dispute to affect its relationship with and participation in NATO except for joint military exercises with Greece. Moreover, we do not believe that the Turks connect Cyprus with NATO in the way the question suggests. The Turks are thus most unlikely to penalize themselves or their NATO relationship because of what might occur at some future date on Cyprus.

Question 9. If neither of the proposed defense cooperation agreements (with Turkey and Greece) is approved by the United States, what will Turkey's response be regarding continued U.S. rights to military bases in Turkey?

Answer. Turkey has made clear that the U.S. cannot expect to resume suspended activities until the Turkish DCA is approved and implemented. The Turks have also indicated that we could not expect to continue presently authorized activities in Turkey indefinitely if the Turkish DCA were not approved.

Question 10. Does Turkey recognize the right of the U.S. Congress to impose conditions on the use of weapons transferred to Turkey through U.S. arms transfer program? Is Turkey willing to be bound by the restrictions of such laws?

Answer. The answer to both questions is "yes." The Turks fully understand that no U.S. military assistance or credit sales can be authorized without the approval of the Congress and recognize that Congress has full power to impose restrictions on the supply of U.S. arms and military equipment to recipient countries. Moreover, paragraph 1 of Article XIX of the DCA makes clear that assistance to Turkey shall be provided in accordance with contractual obligations and controls applicable to all recipient countries.

Question 11. What guarantees will the Government of Turkey give that it will not curtail the use by the United States of military facilities in Turkey, for domestic political reasons, if the U.S. Government concludes a new defense cooperation agreement with Turkey?

Answer. The only guarantee is the agreement itself, in which U.S. rights and obligations and Turkish rights and obligations are clearly spelled out. The DCA provides for consultation between the parties if either decides the other is not complying with the terms of the Agreement. If after 90 days of consultation agreement is not reached, either party may terminate the Agreement by giving thirty days notice in writing. U.S. defense support would cease on the effective date of termination of the Agreement (Article XXI, para. 5).

Question 12. Will the Turkish Government grant the US the right to utilize military bases to aid Israel and/or any other non-NATO state should the United States determine it is in the interests of international peace and security to do so, if a new defense cooperation agreement with Turkey is concluded?

Answer. Although Paragraph 1 of Article II of the DCA specifies that defense cooperation shall be limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty, and Paragraph 2 provides that US activities shall serve only purposes

authorized by the Government of Turkey, Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, during his visit to Washington last March, offered his Government's assurances that the limitations provided for in Article II would not preclude authorization by the Turkish Government of "other" activities on a case by case basis. This assurance is especially significant with respect to third country supply flights. In the event we faced emergencies not related to our mutual NATO obligations, we would consult with the Turks on requests for activities beyond those contemplated by the DCA.

Question 13. Does the Turkish Government need all the military assistance proposed in the new Defense Cooperation Agreement? What are Turkey's most pressing defense needs? How do Turkey's military capabilities at present compare with those of Greece?

Answer. NATO authorities have concluded that Turkey's capability to conduct sustained combat operations in support of NATO has been impaired. It seems clear from this analysis that the reestablishment of the flow of U.S. military equipment is essential if Turkey is to be able to meet its NATO responsibilities in defense of the southeastern flank.

Turkey's most urgent needs are for new aircraft, air-to-air missiles to match Warsaw Pact weaponry, anti-tank weaponry, and communications equipment to replace World War II vintage equipment.

Turkey still enjoys some numerical superiority over Greece but this numerical advantage is of necessity reduced by the required geographical dispersion of Turkish forces.

Question 14. What benefits does the Turkish Government feel it derives from a bilateral defense association with the United States? What benefits does the Turkish Government believe it should derive from such a bilateral defense association?

Answer. The Turkish Government considers its membership in NATO and its close association with the United States as making a major contribution to Turkish security interests. In Turkish eyes, the presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Turkey helps insure that Turkey will not be attacked by its adversaries and, if attacked, will be defended by all members of the Alliance.

Turkey also believes it essential to have U.S. defense equipment as a means of insuring that Turkish military forces can fulfill their obligations and meet their responsibilities under the NATO alliance structure.

Question 15. Could you comment on reports that the present government in Turkey would be politically vulnerable should there be further delay in U.S. Congressional consideration of the Turkish agreement?

Answer. The present Turkish Government committed itself to a continuation of a close defense relationship with the U.S. when it entered into and concluded negotiations with us in March 1976. The delay in Congressional consideration of that agreement has naturally proven of embarrassment, and further delays will only add to the discomfort of those in Turkey associated with the agreement and the continuation of close U.S.-Turkish ties.

Question 16. How strong domestically is the Demirel Government? What kind of a base does it have in Parliament?

Answer. The Demirel Government is a four-party coalition which at present enjoys a seven-vote margin in the 450-seat Turkish Parliament. Parliamentary elections must occur in Turkey on or before October 1977.

Question 17. Could you comment on reports that the Turkish Government plans to stall on serious negotiations of the Cyprus issue until after the fall Parliamentary elections in 1977?

Answer. There is no evidence to support such a contention. The Turkish Government has repeatedly stated its willingness to cooperate in the negotiation of a just and lasting Cyprus settlement. It has not always been willing to put forward concrete proposals of its own, but it says it is ready to consider proposals tabled by others, and to encourage the Turkish-Cypriots to meet with UN Secretary General Waldheim. Such a meeting is now in progress (as of September 20) in New York.

Question 18. How does continued delay of passage of the Turkish agreement hamper the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations and adversely affect NATO operations?

Answer. So long as the Defense Cooperation Agreement remains unapproved, vital U.S. military installations will remain closed and Turkey's armed forces will be unable to adequately meet their NATO responsibilities on the southeastern flank. Over the long run, failure by the Congress to approve the agreement may force the Turkish Government to turn away from NATO and the West.

Question 19. Are the Turks aware that there is little chance the Congress will act on a Turkish agreement this session? What is the Turkish reaction to this?

Answer. The Turkish Government has been told that the Congressional schedule may be such as to preclude full consideration of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement before adjournment. The Turks have thus far confined their reaction to expressing regret and indicating their expectation that Congressional action on the Defense Cooperation Agreement will occur as early as possible in the new Congress.

Question 20. Why are the Turks so hard-line on the Cyprus issue? Is it that they no longer can contain Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader? How potent a domestic issue is the Cyprus question in Turkey?

Answer. We regret that the Turkish Government has found itself unable to show flexibility on Cyprus. The Turks have cited the fact that they are a functioning democracy, at present ruled by a coalition government with a very narrow parliamentary majority, for which the Cyprus issue, because of its great domestic political sensitivity, poses a difficult dilemma. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that progress has not been made on Cyprus because of the action or inaction of any single party to the dispute. The Greeks and the two communities on Cyprus must share some of the blame for this situation with the Turks.

It would be inappropriate for us to comment on the relationship between the Turkish Government and the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community on Cyprus, Rauf Denktash.

Question 21. Former Prime Minister Ecevit, the leader of the opposition in Turkey, has repeatedly called for a renewal of Cyprus negotiations. What are the domestic constraints on Prime Minister Demirel, given the fact that the leader of the opposition is more flexible on the Cyprus issue?

Answer. Both former Prime Minister Ecevit and Prime Minister Demirel have indicated that they are in favor of Cyprus negotiations. Each has set down a series of conditions, both procedural and substantive. It is difficult to compare these two positions, and wrong to simplify by characterizing one as being more flexible or rigid than the other.

Question 22. In your view, how much longer can the Turks wait without a base agreement before they feel forced to take action, such as permanently shutting down U.S. installations or withdrawing from military participation in NATO?

Answer. The Turkish Government has posed no deadlines for approval of the Defense Cooperation Agreement. We cannot conclude from this, however, that the Turks will be able to wait indefinitely. In continuing to delay approval of the DCA, we run the risk of encouraging those minority elements in Turkey who wish to see that country move away from NATO and the West. In essence, delay becomes a kind of gamble that, from our standpoint, is both dangerous and unnecessary. Approval by the Congress of the U.S.-Turkish Agreement will not only allow vital U.S. installations to be re-opened and restore close U.S.-Turkish ties but will reinforce Turkish participation in NATO and alignment with the West.

Question 23. Is there any prospect for a lessening of tension between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean dispute? What is US policy on this issue? Have we kept a high or low profile on this question?

Answer. The August 25 United Nations Security Council resolution and the September 11 decision by the International Court of Justice have helped create an international climate conducive to the search for a negotiated settlement of the Aegean dispute. We are hopeful that the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers will meet soon in New York for direct talks and that this will lead to a relaxation of tension and the beginning of progress toward a solution.

The United States views this dispute between two of its allies with great concern. We will do our utmost to facilitate a settlement, but we have taken no stand on the substantive issues involved and have not and will not side with one party or another in a dispute to which we are not a direct party and where the questions involved are exceedingly complex.

The United States has been actively involved in trying to bring the parties together and develop procedures through which this issue could be negotiated and adjudicated. In this endeavor we have worked closely with our Western European allies. Thus, the United States, together with France, Italy and the United Kingdom, co-sponsored the Security Council resolution on the Aegean which was adopted by consensus on August 25.

Question 24. The Greeks are willing to submit the Aegean dispute to the International Court of Justice. Why are the Turks unprepared to do so?

Answer. The Turks have not ruled out eventual resort to the International Court of Justice but believe the parties must first attempt to resolve the very complex issues through bilateral negotiations. The idea of negotiations first, and recourse to the Court later, is reflected in the UN Security Council resolution of August 25. The Foreign Minister of Turkey in his address to the Security Council on August 25 reaffirmed that his government's policy is in harmony with that resolution.

Question 25. Is it possible to link the resolution of the Cyprus dispute to the Aegean issue? Specifically, would it be realistic to expect a gesture by the Turks on the Cyprus issue if the Greeks acceded to the Turks on their continental shelf claims? Couldn't the US propose such a package deal? Is such a deal realistic?

Answer. While nothing can be absolutely ruled out, the linkage of these two extremely difficult problems to each other is more likely to obstruct than to speed the negotiating process. The Aegean issues involve Greece and Turkey, while the question of Cyprus concerns in the first instance the two communities that live on the island. The United States has not proposed a package arrangement linking these two problems, and does not believe such a proposal would be appropriate, since it would be viewed as an attempt to deal over the heads of the people and governments involved in these questions.

Question 26. What is the Administration's response to recent Greek charges that the U.S. is again tilting towards the Turks over the Aegean issue?

Answer. Secretary Kissinger has stated at a press conference on August 14, 1976: "The U.S. is not taking a position at this point. It (the Aegean) is a problem that has to be resolved between Greece and Turkey and the United States will do its utmost to facilitate our two friends to find a solution between themselves. It is not for the United States to solve it." We do not accept the charge that the U.S. tilting towards the Turks over the Aegean. Our sponsorship along with France, Italy and the United Kingdom of the August 25 UN Security Council resolution and its adoption by consensus is further evidence of our even-handed approach to this question.

Question 27. What is the status of the U.S.-sponsored bicommunal talks on Cyprus? What are the key issues to be resolved?

Answer. The Cyprus intercommunal talks, held under UN (not U.S.) sponsorship, have been in recess since February 1976. Both Cypriot communities have expressed willingness to return to the negotiating table but procedural difficulties have kept the two sides from getting together. United Nations Secretary General Waldheim has now invited the chief negotiators from the two communities to meet with him in New York. These meetings are now in progress (as of September 20) and we hope they will lead to a full-scale resumption of the intercommunal talks.

In general, the main issues to be resolved through these negotiations concern territorial and constitutional problems, i.e. where the lines between Greek and Turkish areas on Cyprus are to be drawn and a definition of the powers and functions of the Central Government.

Question 28. What is the impact of the recent September Greek-Cypriot elections on the Cyprus issue? Is Markarios stronger as a result of these elections? What is going to happen to Clerides and his party?

Answer. The Democratic Front, which was sponsored by Archbishop Makarios, won a sweeping electoral victory in this September's elections. It is too early, however, to determine what effect this victory will have on the policies of the Cyprus Government. Cypriot officials have told us, however, that the Cypriot Government is now more willing than ever to enter into negotiations, feeling that it has a firm electoral mandate, feeling that it has the support of the people of Cyprus behind it.

Glafcos Clerides and his party received some one-fourth of the popular vote in the September elections but failed to win a seat in the legislature. Clerides has vowed to continue his political activities on the island and maintain his opposition to the policies of President Markarios.

Question 29. What is the likelihood that Denktash might declare an independent Turkish federated state on Cyprus? Wouldn't this even more seriously complicate future negotiations?

Answer. Denktash has periodically talked about declaring an independent Turkish federated state but has normally tied any such declaration to an impasse or collapse of the Cyprus negotiations. While it is difficult to know what Denktash has in mind, it is clear that both the Demirel Government in Turkey as well as Bulent Ecevit, the main Turkish opposition leader, have spoken out unequivocally against a unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish-Cypriots. Moreover, the U.S. has consistently indicated its opposition to any unilateral acts by either side which would make a negotiated Cyprus settlement more difficult to achieve.

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