NOMINATION OF DANIEL ORRIN GRAHAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF
DANIEL ORRIN GRAHAM TO BE ADVANCED TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ON THE RETIRED LIST OF THE ARMY

AUGUST 10, 1976

(II)

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NOMINATION OF DANIEL ORRIN GRAHAM TO BE ADVANCED TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL ON THE RETIRED LIST OF THE ARMY

TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1976

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 212, Russell Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Byrd of Virginia, McIntyre, Goldwater, Nunn, Thurmond, and Bartlett.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief clerk; George H. Foster, Jr., John A. Goldsmith, Edward B. Kenney, Robert Q. Old, Francis J. Sullivan, George F. Travers, professional staff members; Roberta Ujakovich, research assistant; Jeffery Record, assistant to Senator Nunn; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Doug Racine, assistant to Senator Leahy; Ronald Lehman, assistant to Senator Scott; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Taft; and Fred Ruth, assistant to Senator Bartlett.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will refer briefly to the notice of the meeting that went out to consider the nomination of Daniel Orrin Graham to be advanced to lieutenant general on the retired list of the Army.

We have some routine, unobjected-to nominations. Also, we may have other matters which any member wants to bring up.

General Graham is present. General, if you will please take the chair marked "witness"—I am going to ask Senator Symington if he will make a brief statement and then proceed as he sees fit.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, by way of background to my concern let me first say that after the National Security Act of 1947, I was a member of the National Security Council because for a short time the secretaries of the services were also members of that Council, and then very properly were taken off, in that on the Council they had had the same position as the Secretary of Defense. During that period, I think it is fair to say that the person who had much if not the most to do with setting up the new National Security structure was Secretary Forrestal. And the first individual to head the CIA, whom I knew quite well—he came from my hometown—was Adm. Sidney Sauers. He was a very fine person.

I do not think there has ever been a more promilitary Secretary than Secretary Forrestal. But I can remember him saying if you leave describing the threat solely up to the military, there won't be

any money left for anything. And that made an impression on me at that time.

Now many years later I read about an article you wrote called "Strategic Intelligence—Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job."

I called up the then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Jim Schlesinger, and said that I see from the paper that you are bringing into the CIA a general who has just written an article which would imply that the military should run the intelligence presentation to the Congress and be the final authority; and I do not see how that fits in with your position as head of the CIA.

And Schlesinger, whom I knew, said, have you read the article? I said no, I haven't. He said, well, if you read it, I don't think you'd feel that way. So I read the article. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent of the committee to insert the article at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

[The article follows:]

[From the Army, April 1973]

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE—ESTIMATING THE THREAT: A SOLDIER'S JOB

In his landmark book, *The Soldier and the State*, Professor Samuel P. Huntington draws our attention to an extremely important and sometimes neglected fact:

"The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security, and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society . . ."

So, the reason for the existence of our armed forces is to counter threats to our security, and the function, composition and size of those forces depend on the perception of threats by the national leadership. If the military profession loses its role in describing these threats to national security, it surrenders much of its influence in decisions about military strategy, military force structure and the nature of its own armaments.

We have in the past ten years come perilously close to losing this vital role. The impact of the intelligence views of the Department of Defense was progressively weakened between 1960 and 1970, and the voice of civilian agencies in all facets of military intelligence became progressively more dominant. The military budgets carried the onus of heavy outlays for intelligence collection, but the key intelligence judgments derived from this costly effort were for the most part made in other agencies.

This situation can be too easily dismissed as the result of bureaucratic maneuvering, of "whiz kids" ignoring military advice, or of the general growth of anti-military sentiment in and out of government. The fact is that the muting of the military voice in military intelligence was largely of our own doing. Military professionals—both users and producers of intelligence—through failure to understand the strategic intelligence function, downgrading of the role of intelligence in general and sometimes abusing the intelligence process, have in the past produced the best arguments for taking the responsibility for threat description out of military hands. Now is the time to face these facts, and to take the attitude and the necessary steps to correct the situation.

One has little difficulty in arguing the need for good tactical intelligence among military professionals these days. One prime lesson learned in Vietnam was the fact that superior military force cannot be brought to bear in the absence of good intelligence. The Army has acted and is still acting vigorously to insure that good tactical intelligence will be available to commanders in all levels of warfare. However, we are concerned here with an area about which there is less agreement—strategic intelligence.

Strategic intelligence is that which is used to make strategic decisions. This fact is often lost sight of among planners and decision-makers. There is a tendency to think of intelligence gathered by Washington-controlled resources as "strategic" and that gathered by the commands as "tactical" or "operational" intelligence. This is nonsense. If intelligence is used to make tactical decisions, it is tactical intelligence; if it is used to make strategic decisions, it is strategic intelligence.

The means by which it is collected is quite beside the point. For example, in 1950, when front-line troops reported the fact that the Chinese were crossing the Yalu, it was tactical intelligence to all levels of command in Korea, but strategic intelligence to Tokyo and Washington. On the other hand, knowledge of a new surface-to-air missile in country X is strategic intelligence to national planners but it is tactical intelligence to any air unit which may operate in the area.

It is extremely important to get this matter straight. If we don't, we will continue to have expensive bureaucratic squabbles about intelligence resources, based on spurious arguments about control echelons. Commands will jealously guard intelligence resources on the grounds of "tactical" intelligence requirements and Washington intelligence agencies will fail to see that their refined "strategic" collection systems are producing a great deal of tactical intelligence, neglecting the need for quick dissemination to the commands.

The definitional dilemma is compounded somewhat by tactical decisions that are often made in Washington. This fact of military life today means that military intelligence organizations in Washington find themselves hip-deep in the tactical intelligence business, traditionally the purview of commanders in the field. Further, there is the unfortunate tendency among intelligence producers and users to associate the term "strategic" exclusively with intercontinental nuclear-strike matters. For instance, you would find few intelligence officers in the targeting business who would not consider their product "strategic" intelligence. In fact, it is not; it is essentially tactical intelligence stored up against the contingency of executing the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan).

The general conceptual confusion between tactical and strategic intelligence is jeopardizing the commanders' control of their intelligence assets. But a more serious intelligence problem, in my view, is the danger of the military profession as a whole losing the function of defining the military threat for the national leadership. The basic problem is one of confidence in the military intelligence product within the services, the Department of Defense and the other departments of government.

The intelligence products of greatest impact in the national decision-making arena are the estimates. These contain the intelligence which most heavily influences strategic decisions. They are usually predictive in nature, pulling together basic order-of-battle, technical, doctrinal, economic and political intelligence to describe overall military postures of foreign powers. The estimates project military threats from the present out two, five and ten years. Military planners are heavily dependent on these estimates in force structuring, force development and weapons development.

It is in this area that we military professionals have been in danger of losing our shirts to civilian agencies. To put it bluntly, there is a considerable body of opinion among decision-makers, in and out of the DOD, which regards threat estimates prepared by the military as being self-serving, budget-oriented and generally inflated. This gives rise to a tendency to turn to some other source for "objective" threat assessments. The suspicion exists not only with regard to broad strategic estimates—for example, trends in the manned bomber threat—but to such detailed military estimates as the ability of the Soviet field army to sustain itself in the field under various assumed levels of combat. The trend toward independent analysis has been gathering over the past ten years and there are now analytical staffs in the civilian intelligence community paralleling those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on almost every military intelligence subject.

The responsibility for this situation to a large degree rests with the military side of the house, not with the civilian agencies. The lack of confidence in the threat estimates emanating from military intelligence agencies which caused users to request outside opinion in the early 1960s, is fully understandable. It stemmed from a series of bad overestimates, later dubbed "bomber gap," "missile gap," and "megaton gap." These and other seriously inflated estimates of less notoriety have hung like albatrosses around the necks of military intelligence officers ever since.

In its first several years of existence, DIA was plagued by the prevalent notion, even in the DOD staff, that the agency could not be counted upon for an objective threat assessment. This suspicion was reinforced by the fact that DIA did not perform well in the estimating area. The agency was harried by a combination of birth pains and the burgeoning demands for essentially tactical intelligence in support of Washington-level decisions on the Vietnam war. The estimates function simply muddled along until the Agency was reorganized in 1970 by Gen. Donald V. Bennett, USA. Meanwhile, planners and decision-makers had become accustomed to going elsewhere for their threat estimates.

At first blush, it would appear that the blame for this situation can be laid at the feet of intelligence officers—first in armed services intelligence agencies and then in DIA. But this is too simple; the military intelligence *user* must take his lumps as well. Too often the user has not been content with an objective judgment from his intelligence officer—he has wanted the answer that "supports the program." While planner pressure on intelligence estimates is not nearly as blatant or widespread as some quarters would contend, there has been enough of it to make it tough to regain full confidence in the military intelligence effort.

In the service staffs the fact that the position of the intelligence chief is a notch under the other key staff chiefs almost invites planner pressures on intelligence. It takes a pretty toughminded assistant chief of staff for intelligence to defend an estimate that runs counter to the well-laid plans of the rest of the general staff. In some ways, planner pressure is worse when it arises in the joint staff arena. Planners of all services "coordinating" an intelligence estimate are quite capable of reducing it to lowest common demoninator mush. There are still some "old hands" in intelligence who are so inured to yielding before user pressures that they automatically produce threat estimates designed to please, or at least certain not to offend. These types are getting fewer, but they still exist.

When intelligence yields to consumer pressure, it cannot remain credible. When intelligence estimates are reduced to bland judgments acceptable to all planners, it is difficult to justify the expensive outlay of resources to collect intelligence. Such inoffensive pap can be produced without evidence.

Fortunately, the somewhat dismal picture outlined above has brightened measurably over the past few years. The stature of intelligence estimates produced by the military has increased considerably and the accusations of bias have abated. Several factors account for this: DIA pulled up its socks and put proper emphasis on the estimates job; a new crop of more professional, less conformist intelligence officers is available for estimating work and, most important, there is a new appreciation of the intelligence function among our military customers.

The Defense Intelligence Agency was reorganized in November, 1970. One of the key changes was the establishment of a separate directorate charged with the production of defense intelligence estimates. One of the prime reasons for this move was the fact that there was, practically speaking, no way to discover the views of the DIA director on important estimative matters. DIA views were submerged in the text of national estimates (NIE's) prepared at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and coordinated with all Washington intelligence agencies, or in the text of joint estimates which were coordinated with the service planners. The only exception to this rule was the rare dissent to a national estimate when a specific view of the DIA director was noted at the bottom of the page. DIA's institutional anonymity was, in large part, a product of the original service objections to the creation of the agency. "Running with the pack" was the one way to avoid collision with the individual services. It was bureaucratically much safer to have any substantive argument be between a service and the "intelligence community" than between a service and DIA. The trouble was that this attitude put civilian agencies in the position of final arbiters of any disagreements inside DOD on threat definition.

The new DIA directorate for estimates permitted proper attention to the estimating function. Under the old setup, the estimates job was under the directorate for production, which was also charged with answering the daily intelligence mail. The heavy demand for current intelligence on Vietnam, the Middle East and other crisis areas was too urgent and too time consuming to permit much effort on the more scholarly problem of estimates. The new directorate created an adversary process on substantive issues within DIA. The estimators, who must defend DIA views in the DOD and national intelligence arena, frequently challenge the results of analysis from the other DIA directorates. This necessary friction causes key intelligence judgments to be thoroughly scrubbed internally, ensuring that DIA won't find itself out on a limb defending a weak argument of some single analyst, a situation which prevailed all too often under the old setup.

The new crop of analysts and estimators available to both the service intelligence offices and to DIA are indispensable to a new effort to regain respectability for military threat estimates. Intelligence specialist programs within the services—and here the Army must be singled out as having the most effective program—are paying off in the form of real professionals capable of making objective assessments of the evidence on hand and defending the intelligence product among their fellow officers. On the civilian side, the new generation of analysts who have entered DIA are not afflicted with an overriding defensive attitude about service

intelligence opinions. Many of the old hands used to react with arguments about the DIA "charter," rather than counter differing intelligence views with good substantive analysis.

In the long run, however, the most telling factor in the improvement of military intelligence estimates is the increasing awareness among consumers that the only useful intelligence is objective intelligence. There was a time when the rule-of-thumb for acceptability of threat estimates among planners was "the bigger, the better." Intelligence estimates which failed to maximize enemy threats in both sum and detail were likely to draw fire as "wishful thinking." More often than not, military intelligence people came to heel under such criticism and stumped hard for the "worst-case" view. These old attitudes are waning now and simplistic demands for the scariest possible threat estimates are much less prevalent among users. Some hard lessons have been learned.

Military planners have seen some unfortunate results of inflated estimates over the past several years. With regard to Vietnam, it became painfully obvious that "worst-case" assessments of enemy capabilities by Washington estimators gave the erroneous impression that the more casualties we inflicted on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, the stronger they got. When theater intelligence tried to offset this by stressing the evidence of the telling effects of Allied operations on the enemy, the effort was branded as a lot of unwarranted, policy-oriented optimism. In February, 1968, the communists corroborated the estimate that they were in desperate straits by launching the militarily disastrous Tet offensive. That fact was overlooked by almost everyone, however, most preferring to believe the new gloomy estimates (later proved grossly overstated) that the VC although defeated near the cities, had "taken over the countryside."

Many Pentagon planners have also learned the "worst-case" estimates can be used to squelch military programs just as easily as to support them. A proposed program can be made to look like a total waste if its opponents are given free rein to postulate the size and sophistication of future threats to the system. Overestimates of future Soviet strategic missile capabilities killed the U.S. counterforce strategy at least four years before the strategy became invalidated by real Soviet capabilities.

The advent of arms limitation argreements sharply underscored some additional problems of inflated intelligence estimates. The "horse-trading" aspect of these negotiations raises the very real possibility of trading off actual friendly capabilities for enemy "capabilities" existing only on paper in our own intelligence estimates.

These examples lead to another important point that is beginning to be understood in military planner circles: Estimates of future enemy forces and hardware are by nature estimates of *intent*—not just of *capability*. The old arguments about "capability versus intent" are heard less now in DOD. It remains true that intelligence should emphasize capability n descriptions of current and near-future enemy forces. But the minute you tackle the usual problem of estimating enemy forces (or hardware) a year or so into the future, you have entered the realm of intent. For example, since World War II the Soviets have never, to our knowledge, deployed forces or fielded hardware as fast as their total capability permitted. To estimate that they would do so with regard to some weapon system or type of force in the future would make little sense. Indeed, all estimates of future Soviet forces derive from an attempt to discern what part of their total capability the Soviets *intend* to use in military programs and which programs they *intend* to emphasize. This is not a very difficult-to-fathom verity of intelligence estimating. It is remarkable how long it has taken some of our military users to wise up to it.

While not all users of intelligence in DOD have learned the pitfalls of trying to make intelligence "fit the program," most have. Today there is a much improved market for objective intelligence judgments and this is a most hopeful sign in the field of military intelligence. When we get to the point where the strategic intelligence officer knows that his prime customers are going to raise the same amount of hell about overstatement as about understatement of threats, the objectivity of intelligence estimates will be almost automatic.

Objective intelligence is a goal to be devoutly pursued by the entire military profession. However, an important word of caution is in order: An objective intelligence judgment is not necessarily a valid judgment. Validity depends on the evidence available to the intelligence people and the quality of the analysis applied to that evidence. Any planner or decision-maker not convinced that there is good evidence and good analysis behind an intelligence judgment should feel perfectly free to reject it. And the intelligence officer should not get his nose out of joint if his product is not always accepted as gospel. However, the user cannot

insist that the intelligence officer recant and change his best judgment. If he does this, he corrupts the whole system.

To sum up, I think that the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence have come a long way since the "missile-gap" days. DIA has hit its stride in the production of respectable military estimates. While there will always be a legitimate reason for independent judgments from outside DOD on issues of critical importance to national decision-makers, there is no longer a need, in my judgment to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies. The best assist the Army can give to such an effort is to insist on objective strategic intelligence, cooperate with DIA in producing it, and put good officers in the strategic intelligence field.

APRIL 13, 1973.

Hon. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JIM: As you can see by the attached, I have read the article in detail; and have extracted certain statements made, hopefully not out of context.

At the end of the article as presented, he states: ". . . there is no longer a need, in my judgment, to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies."

Especially in that this article and the fact he is going to work for you have created much comment down here, I would hope we could get together soon re same.

Sincerely,

STUART SYMINGTON.

NOTE. Specifically, where does this leave the CIA, the second paragraph of the article. Stuart Symington

Senator SYMINGTON. After reading it, I wrote him a letter on April 13, 1973, which is short, and I will read it;

"Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. Dear Jim: As you can see by the attached, I have read the article in detail; and have extracted certain statements made, hopefully not out of context."

"At the end of the article as presented, he"—that is you, General—"states: '* * * there is no longer a need, in my judgment, to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies.'

"Especially in that this article and the fact he is going to work for you have created much comment down here, I would hope we could get together soon re same. Sincerely."

Then I put a postscript on it: "Specifically, where does this leave the CIA, the second paragraph." And I signed it.

At that time, Senator Stennis was out of commission, and I was acting chairman of this committee. I got a telephone call from Secretary Schlesinger saying he wanted to talk to me about it sometime, and that is all I got, because the next thing you know he had become Secretary of Defense. Shortly thereafter, you went back to the Pentagon, and, as I remember it, about that time became the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. So, inasmuch as your article is very strong that the final authority on intelligence submitted to the Government should come from the military, and inasmuch as I know, based on experience, that the reason for the Central Intelligence Agency was that Mr. Truman and Mr. Forrestal and Admiral Sauers did not believe that would be the best way to handle it, nor did any of the rest of us, I was concerned that you retired.

Some other people in high office over at the Pentagon who did not agree with some of the things you thought called me up. I think, in the interest of fairness, I should not get into that.

But I just was curious as to why you feel that in the case of intelligence we should considerably reduce the position of the Central Intelligence Agency which is a civilian agency; it was set up specifically to hold the rein on the military estimate of the threat.

I thought we ought to find out just what it is you had in your mind about the position of the Central Intelligence as against the military in estimating the threat and presenting it to the Congress.

I have been on this committee for 24 years and with one conspicuous exception, invariably the estimates of the service in question turn out to be greater than the estimates of the CIA; and to the best of my knowledge, the CIA turned out to be right.

In other words, the Army overestimated the troops; the Navy would overestimate the navy; and the Air Force would overestimate the air force.

Specifically, in my own experience in Vietnam when I went out there in 1965 and got a briefing from my good friend, General Westmoreland, I had with me one of the finest young officers in the Army who was given to me by the Army and who is now a general in the Army. I got into a discussion with the intelligence head and Westmoreland about the estimate of the Vietnamese troops, and I could not reconcile my figures with their figures.

So I finally said to my escort officer, Colonel, see if you can work this out because these figures do not add up to me. I think they overestimate the Vietnamese strength. And the young Colonel came back and said, "I have looked them over, and I think you are entirely right that they have very much overestimated the strength." And it turned out that they did very much overestimate the strength.

So, for these reasons, I have felt that if the CIA was properly handled that it was a proper and fitting brake against the estimate of a threat by the military.

Based on your article, which is really summed up in the title, and your last sentence, the title is "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job." And the last part of the article says, "While there will always be a legitimate reason for independent judgments from outside DOD on issues of critical importance to national decisionmakers, there is no longer a need, in my judgment, to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies."

I never got an answer to it from Schlesinger. I wrote him and said what does this do to the CIA? The next thing I knew, he is in the Pentagon, and you are back with him in the Pentagon.

So I have expressed my apprehensions about this matter, not as a personal matter but from the standpoint of what is best for the country, and you are a very articulate gentleman. You have been making speeches, some of which I have read since you left the service. You have a lot of friends. And I just thought you might clear me up on this.

[The Nomination Reference and Report of Lt. Gen. Graham follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
November 20, 1976.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

The following-named officer to be placed on the retired list in grade indicated under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3962:

To be lieutenant general

Lt. Gen. Daniel Orrin Graham, [redacted] Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army). August 10, 1975.

Reported by Mr. Byrd of Virginia with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed.*

RÉSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF DANIEL ORRIN GRAHAM, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, [redacted]

Date and place of birth: April 13, 1925, Portland, Oreg.

Years of active commissioned service: Over 29.

Present assignment: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., since September 1974.

Military schools attended:

U.S. Military Academy.
The Infantry School, Basic and Advanced Courses.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
U.S. Army War College.

Educational degrees: U.S. Military Academy—BS Degree—Military Science and Engineering.

MAJOR PERMANENT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (LAST 10 YEARS)

Commanding Officer, 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, U.S. Army, Pacific-Hawaii, from March 1965 to June 1966.

Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., from July 1966 to June 1967.

Chief, Current Intelligence, Indications and Estimates Division, Directorate of Intelligence Production, Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, J–2, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from June 1967 to July 1968.

Military Intelligence Officer, Special Activities Group, Washington, D.C., from July 1968 to January 1970.

Assistant Director for Collection, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., from January 1970 to November 1970.

Deputy Director for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., from February 1970 to May 1973.

Chief, Production Review Group, Office, Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, Washington, D.C., from May 1973 to October 1973.

Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, Washington, D.C, from October 1973 to September 1974.

DANIEL ORRIN GRAHAM, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, [redacted]

Promotions	Dates of appointment	
	Temporary	Permanent
2d lieutenant		June 4, 1946
1st lieutenant	June 30, 1948	June 6, 1949
Captain	Jan. 4, 1951	Apr. 1, 1953
Major	Jan. 29, 1959	June 4, 1960
Lieutenant colonel	May 22, 1963	June 5, 1967
Colonel	Dec. 27, 1967	June 4, 1971
Brigadier general	Aug. 1, 1970	Oct. 15, 1973
Major general	Mar. 1, 1973	
Lieutenant general	Feb. 8, 1974	

U.S. DECORATIONS/BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal.
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Senior Parachutist Badge.
Source of commission: USMA.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL ORRIN GRAHAM, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES (BRIGADIER GENERAL, U.S. ARMY)

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir. I will do my best. Of course, I cannot match you in experience. When you were Secretary of the Air Force I was a second "John" in the Army. So you have a lot of background from personal experience, with a setup of not only the Central Intelligency Agency, but the whole military structure.

The article I think—you just read a statement and I would like to read it again, that I wrote in the article which was ". . . there will always be a legitimate reason for independent judgments from outside DOD on issues of critical importance to national decisionmakers. . ." I believed that then, and I believe that now, and I have never changed my opinion on that.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you did not finish the sentence.

General GRAHAM. Yes. Well, I will go on.

What had happened over the years is there had grown up not just a capability and a tendency at the Central Intelligence Agency to dig into those matters that the National Security Council had to make decisions on. But it got to the point where minor, ordinary, basic military order of battle was being duplicated out at the CIA, which I thought was a waste of effort or a bad duplication of effort. Let me give you an example, Senator. For instance, when I was in my first tour in the Defense Intelligence Agency and I was Director of Estimates—as a matter of fact, it was at the time when I wrote this article which was December of 1972—both the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency had a lot of people looking at the Soviet ground order of battle along the Chinese border. There were two entities out there that we picked up through various kinds of intelligence. DIA said those are not divisions, and CIA said yes, they are divisions. So you had a two-division difference in the order of battle opposite the Chinese border.

This difference of opinion was not only arrived at by an unnecessary duplication of effort; it then had to be argued out between two agencies. It became a matter of difficulty. We were trying to get an estimate into the joint arena, and so forth. To me it was just a great waste of time.

That is the kind of duplication that I was talking about. I said DIA's efforts—and I am talking here about the basic military intelligence work, does not have to be done out at the CIA as well as DIA. There is a lot of very talented, analytical capability out at the CIA, and it should not be wasted on the sort of things that I in DIA would put a second lieutenant or a GS–8 or 9 on to do the work. So I thought that there was—and I still feel—that that kind of duplication is unnecessary.

I will tell you another one that is an amusing tale of what happens when the CIA gets into nuts and bolts type military intelligence. A paper came out describing the order of battle of the Japanese Air Force, and the CIA paper noted that they had so many F–104's or 105's—I forget which; probably 104's—and that of the total number, some 32 were in Iran. Then they speculated as to why they would be in Iran. You know, maybe the Japanese were helping the Shah with his forces, and so forth. What they had done is they had picked up a report from CINCPAC that said 32 of these aircraft are in I-R-A-N, inspection and repair as necessary.

Now, it is that sort of duplication that I was talking about, Senator. I have always felt that if you are talking about something as important as the CEP, the accuracy of an SS–9 missile, that is going to make a difference as to whether you keep a Minuteman, change a Minuteman, or get rid of a Minuteman force, that is an area where the Director of Central Intelligence, the head of CIA, must have his own analytical capability to look at that. But he does not need to do order of battle on the Chinese border, nor does he have to keep track of the size of the Japanese Air Force. I think he can rely on what other people do over in the Pentagon because you cannot inflate that so that it makes any difference to your work to a Senator or anybody in the administration looking at the money side of the question.

Now, I regret that the people in Army magazine changed my title—the first time that I noticed that it said that the title of my article was "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job" is when it came out. Actually, when I sent it in it was "Estimating the Threat: Key to Military Planning." That was my title. But, selling newspapers or selling their product, they jazzed it up a bit.

As far as your reaction to the article, you may remember, Senator, that you and I and Bill Colby had lunch—or breakfast; I cannot remember whether it was lunch; I think it was lunch—out at CIA and did discuss my views on this matter. Did I want to get rid of the CIA? No. As a matter of fact, I think the CIA is an absolutely vital operation. I believe you would probably disagree with me that I think that the most important thing that it does is to handle all clandestine intelligence so that the military gets out of it—and did get out of it to a large extent—only a few piddling things does the military do in the clandestine area, and only with the cooperation or the approval of CIA these days. That is what I think is the key, entirely separate function of CIA.

As far as CIA's input to military estimates, I have worked at CIA for 3½ years total in the Office of National Estimates, and in a higher position—I actually worked for Mr. Colby about a year after Mr. Schlesinger left and went to the Department of Defense. I do not find that objectivity in analysis is the sole field of CIA. And I can understand that back when the individual services were presenting their own threat estimates. that the matter that you brought up probably did apply. Actually, it was before my time in Intelligence, really before I had any position where I could tell, one way or the other.

But once the Intelligence analysis job was combined into the Defense Intelligence Agency, a lot of that dropped by the side because there is no bigger critic of an inflated Air Force estimate than the

Army and the Navy and no bigger critic of an Army inflation than the Navy and the Air Force, and so forth. There are some built-in balances once you have them combined into the Defense Intelligence Agency. I think the record bears that out, Senator, because in the past 10 years, DIA has been underestimating the Soviet missile threat. And in the last several national intelligence estimates on the Soviet strategic threat, the only dissents you will find are dissents by DIA to a CIA position saying that CIA is too high. So it is not exactly the way it was 20 years ago when the Army, Navy, and Air Force were playing their own game.

With regard to Vietnam, I think you make an interesting point when you say that the military out there was overstating the numbers of Vietcong.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not necessarily Vietcong; North Vietnamese, too. North Vietnamese was the big number.

General GRAHAM. Well, in that situation—and I was out there for 1 year, too, in intelligence in Vietnam—the arguments we had with CIA is that CIA always said they were twice as big as what we said. So the two agencies, or the military guy and the CIA, can wind up—either one of them can be wrong. More often, they agree on things; and where they disagree, I think the record bears out that the military intelligence people have been right as often as the CIA people.

Senator SYMINGTON. I cannot agree with that. In any case, you have something in this country called civilian control. I would not want to get into a situation where you have an equal position with a civilian.

But your article, in my opinion, would give you a superior position. And also, it generated apprehension on my part. The situation in Laos was very bad. We sent some people out from the Foreign Relations Committee. They came back, and they said that the duplication in the Mediterranean of intelligence activity was the worst duplication that they ever saw anywhere at any time on any basis. They were experienced investigators, especially one. They said, in the Mediterranean you have Central Intelligence, ONI, Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, National Security Agency, as well as the DIA all operating independently. And, finally, you have, under the former Assistant Director of the CIA, the State Department intelligence. They are reading the same thing. They are doing the same work. There is no coordination. And they are wasting heaven knows how much of the taxpayers' money.

Now, it has been my experience that it would be very dangerous not to have one specific agency assigned to the overall task of intelligence in that field. Certainly, I would not want to see the Army Intelligence or the Defense Intelligence Agency be in that position.

Of course, it is not just the Army. We had very bad intelligence, if you want to use the kindest word, on the Tonkin Gulf. And we had very bad intelligence, if you want to use the kindest word, on the estimates of missilery at various times in Europe.

These are things that I know because I am on the Joint Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as this committee.

So I just felt that we ought to ask you if you felt that the military should be the final arbiter on intelligence. If you did, where does that leave the CIA? If you did not, how could you write this article? That is my point.

General GRAHAM. Well, I do not agree. And I think I made it clear in the article that I do not believe that the military should be the final arbiter on intelligence. As a matter of fact, when intelligence gets to the level where senior guys have to make judgments on the basis of it, it is usually a mixture, not just of military intelligence; but it is military intelligence, political intelligence, and economic intelligence. Political and economic intelligence are certainly completely outside the purview of the military, so I agree with you that the military should not be put in charge of all intelligence.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, with all sincerity and complete tolerance of the justification of your own opinion, I do not think your article bears out your position as you state it today. I may be wrong, but I read it very carefully; I had my staff go over it very carefully.

At that time, the CIA—perhaps some of it fair, and I am certain some of it most unfair—was under very heavy criticism. So it was to me sort of like kicking a dog when he is down. That I felt was most unfortunate also.

General GRAHAM. Well, sir, I do not agree—first of all, the only mention I made of CIA in the whole estimate directly was where I point out that the DIA's views early on—right after it was established—that the Director of DIA at that time was really worried about being in any position that was different from CIA, and I mentioned that. So DIA's views were submerged in CIA text.

One reason was that it was a brand new organization, and the Director then, you may recall, came over from FBI.

Senator SYMINGTON. Came over at my request to the Air Force. And for once, Mr. Hoover agreed to let one of his men go permanently. And he came in as a colonel, and then he came to me a few weeks later. He said I am not getting the information that I should in the Air Force. His name was Joseph Carroll. So I went to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and said I want this man in the line of command, and I want him made a general. And he said well, let me look into it. He came back and said we cannot do it unless we have a special order. I said I will get you any order that you want. I am sure the Congress could agree. He said we just do not want to do it. I said well, I cannot nominate a general, but I can refuse to accept any nomination if you do not do it. These are all facts. Then there will be no more generals in the Air Force as long as I am Secretary. So he came back and said all right, he would do it. Then I came over and saw Senator Saltonstall, whom I happened to know quite well, and asked him if he would handle this special legislation and told him the story. The result of it—the reason for it—was we did not have anybody in the Air Force who knew how to catch crooks, and we had just caught a crook who is a Major General. So I said in the future we ought to have somebody with this kind of training.

I had known General Carroll because he was given to me when President Truman asked me to take over the sale of surplus property. He was lent to me by Mr. Hoover at that time at the suggestion of the Attorney General. So I knew that set up quite well. Later on, immediately the Air Force felt that there was something wrong in the way that they had handled it in the past. Next thing you know, he became a brigadier general. They wanted to put a star on him.

He came to me, and he said I do not think I am known well enough around here. Perhaps some people like what I am doing. I would appreciate it if you did not give me a promotion at this time, which was putting it mildly, rather extraordinary. I said well, Joe, you are the boss. So they made him a major general. Then they made him a lieutenant general. He was so good at what we are talking about because he had had this training outside the military, that he became the head of the DIA. I will give you one more experience. He was sick.

General GRAHAM. A back problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right. And he had troubles.

One day I read in Newsweek magazine about something that was being done out in Vietnam—called our McNamara Line at one point, fairly or unfairly. I do not know about that.

Well, I had heard nothing about it, so I went to the then-chairman of this committee and asked him if he knew about it. And, he said no, he had never heard anything about it. And, I said, do you think we ought to learn something about it? He said, yes,

So, at that point we had a briefing by General Starburn, as I remember it. I think the amount of money that had been put in there, not only without the approval of the Congress but without the knowledge of the Congress, was around $1.8 billion. And later on Senator Russell called me and said this matter is coming up before Appropriations; would you like to come in? And we went in.

The acting head of the DIA was there. And he asked about this new development up there, the so-called McNamara Line with those beepers on the ground.

General GRAHAM. Electronic fence sort of thing.

Senator SYMINGTON. The acting director turned to the major general and the major general got up and said to the Appropriations Committee who was at that time—who was chairman of this committee—Senator Russell and I were there—and said to him, this is too secret a matter to be discussed before this committee even though it was in executive session, you see.

So anyway, I have been in and out of DIA and I have been in and out of CIA. I was on the CIA Committee and I just did not understand the nature of your position, and that is all, General; I have given you my story and you have given yours. Thank you very much for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, as I said in the beginning this involves a retirement motion of General Graham.

Senator Goldwater, do you have any questions or observations?

Senator GOLDWATER. I have just one question. It is more or less a personal one. Has the committee action to date impacted on you financially?

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir. It has cost me $257 a month. I can stand it, but I have three kids to put through college, and that will take care of one of them.

Senator GOLDWATER. I just wanted to point out that delays in matters like this work hardships on the individual concerned. We have a colonel on the calendar to go to brigadier, and he has been on there about 6 or 7 months. And, he will have the same kind of hardship.

I have known General Graham; I have known of his work. And, I think he is probably the best we have ever had in that particular job. I wish we could have acted on this a long time ago. And, I certainly will vote favorably for him.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know how conscientious Senator Symington is, and I am glad to hear his opinion today. General Graham has given his views to the committee. I think that is probably natural there is some rivalry between the services and there seems to be rivalry between the various intelligence-gathering agencies.

But, the problem the committee faces now is the matter of retirement for the general and whatever his views might have been in regard to the CIA or the DIA, it seems to me, does not enter into or should enter into whether he should receive the promotion which is normally accorded all officers when they retire.

And, I, like Senator Goldwater, hope the committee will act today on this matter and approve the retirement of General Graham as lieutenant general.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. Senator Bartlett was here but he had another matter.

General Graham, here is one thing that comes to my mind. It was April 1973, as I remember, and Senator Symington talked to you about it. It was a time when I was not able to attend the committee meetings. What publication was this article in?

General GRAHAM. Senator, it was in the Army magazine. I have often said this is something you get as a penalty for belonging to the Association of the U.S. Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is my point. You were on duty when this appeared?

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just what is the rule and where is the line about you gentlemen that are on duty writing articles?

General GRAHAM. Well, they have to be submitted to the Freedom of Information Office in the Department of Defense, which this was. And, actually some minor changes were made because it went up there. And, then all I have to do is to make sure that it passes DOD.

The CHAIRMAN. And, you did submit it there?

General GRAHAM. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what was your purpose in writing and publishing, or agreeing to publish the article?

General GRAHAM. Senator, my main objective was to get out to the Army and get them to send better people into the estimating business.

The Army had been tending to take their best intelligence officers and steer them into very narrow, technical fields, such as ASA, electronic interception; or in some cases they were trying to make clandestine operators out of them.

And, I was really making the case here, that the threat-estimating business is really, as I said in the first place, the key to military planning. You have to do that well. So, more Army guys get into this business; this was the intent of the article.

The CHAIRMAN. So, you felt a need and you tried to get that need presented not only to the official Army but to all Army officers and to the public. Is that right; now?

General GRAHAM. Well, it was essentially to the Army. You know, you cannot even buy this thing down at the Pentagon for some reason. You have to belong to the Association of the U.S. Army to get it.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I yield.

Senator BYRD. As I understand it, General, you were Deputy Director of the DIA, at that time, Chief of Estimates?

General GRAHAM. Yes, Senator Byrd; I was the Deputy for Estimates. I was a brigadier at the time.

Senator BYRD. And, I assume that you are rather proud of the Agency that you held the high position in.

General GRAHAM. Yes; and I wanted to get the estimators to first—as I point out in this article, many of the same things that Senator Symington was talking about, that in the past there had been some very bad work in military estimates, and a lot of that bad work had come out of the military.

But, we had to take hold of this problem and do good work. As I keep pointing out, objective intelligence estimates are what is required, not inflated ones, objective ones.

I wanted to stir up as much interest in getting good people into this military estimating game, good military men, as I possibly could.

The CHAIRMAN. You disclaim now any intention or effort on your part to try to replace any civilian agency or displace any civilian agency with control over this matter of intelligence?

General GRAHAM. Absolutely, and I am on public record in a number of other articles that I have written in defense of CIA in both the substantive field and in fields where they have been even more strongly criticized, which is in the clandestine field and covert action and so forth.

I think the Central Intelligence Agency, as I have told them many times, is the most flexible and brightest piece of this bureaucracy that I have ever run into.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you repeat that?

General GRAHAM. I think that the Central Intelligence Agency is the brightest and the most flexible piece of the Federal bureaucracy that I have run into.

The CHAIRMAN. And, your first word there in answering my question was, you said absolutely. You meant that it is; correct?

General GRAHAM. That is correct, Senator Stennis. I have never advocated that there not be a civilian chief. In the last piece I did on organization I recommended that a civilian chief of intelligence be moved up to White House level to have charge of all intelligence, CIA, DIA, NSA, and the whole business. So, I have never taken the position that we should get out from under civilian control in any way in any military matters or others.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, any other questions, gentlemen? Anything you wish to say further, now?

General GRAHAM. No, sir. I just thank you for the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; come again.

Senator BYRD. Senator Thurmond has just come in.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, excuse me. Good morning.

Senator THURMOND. Good morning.

General GRAHAM. Good morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond, this is General Graham who has been here with us this morning. He has answered some questions here by all of us in reference to his attitude to particularly the civilian control of intelligence operation, also in the field by the military and so forth.

Senator THURMOND. I believe he is up for retirement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is correct. His name is before us for retirement. Do you have any questions now?

Senator THURMOND. You have come to the end of the road. You have served your country, and now you are ready to retire. I wish you well and compliment you on your good service.

General GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will say to Senator Thurmond, Mr. Chairman, I have had nothing against you, General Graham, in any way. Meeting you has been a great pleasure. I will say that your article disturbed me greatly, and I wish that I had gotten something in writing from Secretary Schlesinger about the point that I was trying to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming in.

General GRAHAM. Thank you very much, sir.

[Whereupon, the committee proceeded to the consideration of other matters.]

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