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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA

JANUARY 29, FEBRUARY 3, 4, AND 6, 1976

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[NOTE.—Sections of these hearings have been deleted at the request of the Department of Defense. Deleted material is indicated by the notation "[Deleted]."]

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ANGOLA

THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Senators Clark, Biden, Pell, McGovern, Case, Javits, and Percy.

Senator CLARK. The subcommittee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLARK

Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your willingness to come today to explain publicly the United States' involvement in the civil war in Angola. Many of us have long believed that the United States should not make a serious commitment of its resources and prestige to this conflict without a full, public debate. Your appearance today is a necessary first step in formulating an Angola policy which all Americans can understand and Congress can hopefully support.

During the course of these hearings, the committee will examine the administration's policy of providing military assistance to factions in the Angola civil war. On February 3, we will discuss with a representative of the Department of Defense the strategic importance of Angola and will hear testimony of nongovernmental experts on the impact of this conflict on U.S.-Soviet relations. On February 4, we will hear the testimony of Americans familiar with Angola and the situation there. On February 6, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs will testify on the impact of Angola on our relations with the remainder of Africa, and later through the year we will be holding hearings on other areas of Africa and other problems of Africa.

Both Houses having now overwhelmingly voted to prohibit the use of military appropriations for continued CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] activity in Angola it would be a serious mistake for the administration to continue assistance to the factions without further congressional approval. Any future approval will depend on the answers to certain fundamental questions about the administration's Angola policy we hope to address ourselves to here today.

Probably the most important question is what is at stake for the United States in Angola. There is reason to question whether the Soviet Union will gain a permanent foothold in Angola if the faction

it backs wins. African nations have demonstrated time and again that they are independent, nationalistic, and nonaligned. This has been true even of those nations which have most reason to be grateful to one of the superpowers. Just recently, Mozambique denied the Soviet Union base privileges and publicly accused it of pushing too hard, in spite of generous Soviet assistance in Mozambique's liberation struggle over the last decade. The MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] has repeatedly asserted its commitment to nonalignment, and Angola is a country wealthy enough to maintain its independence of outside donors. After 500 years of colonial rule and more than a decade of liberation struggle, it is unlikely that a new government in Angola will give up its hard-fought freedom to become a Soviet satellite. Undoubtedly, the influence on Angola of other African states experiencing the same process of economic and political development will be much stronger than the influence of either the United States or the Soviet Union.

There are no significant strategic interests of either the United States or the Soviet Union at stake in Angola. Administration representatives have repeatedly—and I believe accurately—assured us that the United States is not in Angola to protect either strategic, military, or economic interests. Nor has any case been made for this being an ideological conflict since Communist China and Communist Russia again find themselves on opposing sides.

It is most frequently argued that what is at stake for the United States in Angola is our credibility. The President has stated that if the United States does not respond to Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola "we will send a message of irresolution not only to the leaders of African nations, but to U.S. allies and friends throughout the world."

This assumption that a victory by the Soviet-backed faction would prove that the United States does not have the will to defend the world against Soviet aggression must be seriously examined, and I am sure we will do that here today. Angola has not traditionally relied on the United States for protection. In fact, while our newly found "friends in Angola" were fighting for their independence against Portuguese colonialism, the United States chose to ignore their struggle and continue economic and military assistance to Portugal. We must certainly ask whether it is wise policy to react to Soviet actions anyplace in the world, whether it involves our strategic or economic interests or not. If we follow this policy, it means that we must react even if the Soviets are themselves making a mistake—in short, it means that we are, indeed, the policeman of the world and that our policy is not an independent one, but rather a reactive one, determined by our adversary. In my judgment, the United States would be a more credible ally if we defined our own interests and did not become bogged down in conflicts of little real importance to us.

The assumption that the United States is merely reacting to a Soviet initiative in Angola is itself at least open to question. According to reports, the 40 Committee authorized \$300,000 in assistance to the FNLA [National Liberation Front of Angola] in January 1975. This is a small amount, but it is difficult to be sure that the Soviets so perceived it before their more significant escalation in March. President Mobutu, the recipient of substantial U.S. economic and military assist-

ance in recent years had been aiding the FNLA much earlier and might well have been increasing his assistance in anticipation of independence as well. I conclude that trying to determine who did what first in support of liberation movements in Angola is at least as difficult as answering which came first, the chicken or the egg.

Another essential question that this committee and Congress must try to answer before authorizing any further assistance for Angola is what it will accomplish.

The Soviet Union has already provided \$200 million in assistance and the Cubans have sent 11,000 troops. The Russians have 400 advisers, these by our own estimates. It is unlikely that these levels of assistance can be "balanced" by another \$9 million in the defense appropriation or the \$28 million more which has been requested, or even another \$50 million or \$100 million. How can more dollars offset troops and technical advisers? The President has said we will not send troops, advisers, or mercenaries. Do we really improve our credibility to escalating the conflict further only to back off later? I hope the Secretary will tell us today how the money blocked by the passage of the Tunney amendment—\$9 million—would have been used to successfully offset the Russian and Cuban forces.

We must also examine what this commitment is costing us in terms of our relations with the rest of Africa. Our identification with South Africa's intervention in Angola will not help our relations with the black African states, which regard racial domination in South Africa as the most serious problem on their continent. South Africa's intervention in the Angola conflict is regarded as an effort to assure that the government which comes to power does not challenge South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia or its internal apartheid practices. The United States cannot afford to be associated with this effort to preserve minority rule in South Africa.

The intervention of both the United States and the Soviet Union in Angola is bound to be viewed in the rest of Africa as superpowers seeking to exploit a civil war in Africa for their own advantage. President Kaunda stated at the OAU [Organization for African Unity] session last month, "Whilst these superpowers are trumpeting the end of the cold war era in their bilateral relations, they are at the same time sowing the seeds of discord in Africa." The heavy-handed methods of the Soviet Union in Angola—the use of their military might—will, in my judgment, have its own reward, just as it has throughout Africa, in country after country, and so will ours if we simply follow them.

One final point. I do hope that no one will interpret our opposition to shipping military equipment to Angola as an evidence of isolationism. Quite the contrary. We believe that much of our past problem in Africa has been the isolationist policies which this and previous administrations have followed. Had we ever shown any interest in southern Africa before, this military action might have seemed more credible. The fact is that our only serious interest in Africa has been by extension of the cold war. The Angolan intervention is, perhaps, only the best example. Africa deserves a policy.

Mr. Secretary, these questions are being raised not only by this committee, but by the overwhelming majority in both Houses of Congress who have voted against further U.S. military assistance to

Angola. Frankly, we question how successful a foreign policy can be that has neither congressional nor public support. We welcome the opportunity to examine them with you and to begin the long-overdue public discussion of the administration's Angola policy. We have been involved in the Angolan civil war for a year. You are the first public witness to testify before the Congress, certainly before the Senate, on our policy there. I think we would all agree with the goals the administration has expressed: an end to foreign intervention in Angola and an African solution to the conflict. What we are questioning is whether increased military assistance will, in fact, further these goals.

Mr. Secretary, is it credible for you to contend outside interference in Angola and Africa, while chastising the Congress for not allowing you to interfere as an outsider?

Senator Percy.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PERCY

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I would first like to simply say that Senator Pearson, who is the ranking minority member on this subcommittee, intended to be here but has been unavoidably detained in arriving at the Capitol this morning.

I think there is no question, Mr. Secretary, about the anxiety of the American people to hear what you have to say on this issue. It has been a long time since we have had a hearing with as many people trying to get in as this morning, and it is little wonder because we have had such a contradictory set of statements that have appeared in the press as to what America's involvement actually is, what the cost of involvement has been. We have had the administration deny that we are taking any direct role, and, yet, we have advertisements appearing in the Washington papers, asking for private organizations to get mercenaries and volunteers from the United States to go down to Angola.

The question is, how deep are we getting involved, officially or unofficially? This comes at a particularly important time, Mr. Secretary. I would like to say to you that I have not seen in a long time a deeper desire on the part of the Senate and members of this committee to reach an accord with the administration on foreign policy. I do not think we have ever been closer on anything. We have not had the big fight about withdrawing troops in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. We certainly have come together on the issue of executive agreements and treaties, and what was accomplished in Spain, I think, was an outstanding example of the cooperation between the executive branch and the legislative one. I hope we will overwhelmingly approve this treaty after we have heard all of the facts involved in it. Certainly, in SALT [strategic arms limitations talks] and military assistance in the Middle East, we are working very closely together.

Once again, the country is saying, is this another Vietnam? How deep are we getting? What are we getting involved in? Are we being sucked into the quicksand in Africa in a civil war? Thus, we look forward to your testimony this morning because of the desire we have to get the facts and share them with the American people, and then

see if we cannot carve out a common policy based on understanding of the same facts.

Senator CLARK. Senator Biden.

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR BIDEN

Senator BIDEN. I have no formal opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I would like to associate myself with your remarks and emphasize three points. I have not had a chance to read the Secretary's full statement, which we have before us, but I am very concerned as to whether or not we are, in fact, being involved in a conflict which we cannot win. One of the things I am curious about is even if, in fact, we adhere to the administration's request, whether or not there is any possibility under any circumstances to, in fact, be successful. I questioned after a number of so-called secret briefings by the Department and the CIA as to what our objectives are, what were they, what are they now. They have changed every time—well, not every time, but on three occasions. They have changed from what I was told our ultimate objective was in Angola. In closing, I did have a chance to read the first page of the Secretary's opening statement, and with regard to no foreshadowing of any opposition to the principle of involvement, I think the Secretary will have an opportunity at a later time to check on that. He will find that both Senator Clark and I, I believe, way back as far as April, if I am not mistaken—

Senator CLARK. July.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. July, expressed an opposition on the record, but that is nit-picking, I guess. This is not a newly found issue. I am anxious to hear, too, the Secretary with regard to all of the issues raised by the chairman, but particularly with regard to what our objective is there. Even if we agree with the Secretary that we should be involved, what would be the ultimate victory for our foreign policy objective in Angola? Even if we agree, which I happen, at this point, not to, but I am prepared to be persuaded by the Secretary.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Senator Case.

OPENING REMARKS OF NONMEMBERS OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since I am not a member of the subcommittee, I am here informally as an observer. I appreciate your invitation to attend this committee meeting. I look forward greatly to hearing the Secretary's statement.

Senator CLARK. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I, too, am not a member of this subcommittee. Thank you for your hospitality in inviting me to be here and to afford me the opportunity to hear the Secretary. I will have a few questions, perhaps, later.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. McGovern.

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, I am not a member of the subcommittee, but I want to commend you on these hearings and also for inviting some of the rest of us to sit in and observe. I appreciate that.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in any way you deem appropriate.

**STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE,
ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND WILLIAM E. SCHAUFELLE, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have a fairly lengthy statement here. I will delete some paragraphs as I go through it, but I will stand by the entire statement, except to the one clause which Senator Biden called my attention to, which I tried to delete this morning before he called my attention to it, but it had already been distributed. No; I think it is a fair point, and I think the chairman's article this morning brought home to me that that particular clause is, perhaps, more appropriately deleted from my formal statement, and I would like to request the press to do that.

I welcome this opportunity to explain the global significance of what is now happening in Angola, the events that have brought us to this point, the U.S. objectives and the major consequences which can result.

U.S.S.R. INTERNAL INTERVENTION IN AFRICA

The Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa—with nearly \$200 million of arms, and its military technicians and advisers, with 11,000 Cuban combat troops, and with substantial sea and airlift and naval cover in adjacent waters—is a matter of urgent concern.

Not only are the interests of the countries directly affected at stake, but also the interests of all nations in preserving global stability—which is the precondition for all else mankind aspires to accomplish.

BUILDING NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

In recent years the United States has sought to help build a new international order less tied to the traditional patterns of power balances. It was the United States which took the initiative in seeking to resolve the most dangerous problems of our time by negotiation and cooperation rather than by force of arms. It was we who insisted on the historical necessity that this period required a more stable relationship between the two nations possessing the capacity to destroy civilization. We have sought—and with some successes—to build more constructive relations with the U.S.S.R. across a broad range: to contain strategic arms, to institutionalize cooperation in economic, scientific, and cultural fields, to reduce tensions in areas where our vital interests impinge on one another. We have done so in the face of some considerable domestic criticism because we have been convinced that the classical pattern of accumulating marginal advantages must be overcome and mankind must build more constructive patterns if catastrophe is to be avoided. No one has been more dedicated than the President and I to working for these principles.

But our efforts have been founded upon one fundamental reality: Peace requires a sense of security which depends upon some form of equilibrium. That equilibrium is impossible unless the United States remains both strong and determined to use its strength when

required. This is our historic responsibility, for no other nation has the capacity to act in this way. While constantly seeking opportunities for conciliation, we need to demonstrate to potential adversaries that cooperation is the only rational alternative. Any other course will encourage the trends it seeks to accommodate; a challenge not met today will tempt far more dangerous crises tomorrow.

If a continent such as Africa, only recently freed from external oppression, can be made the arena for great power ambitions, if immense quantities of arms can affect far-off events, if large expeditionary forces can be transported at will to dominate virtually helpless peoples—then all we have hoped for in building a more stable and rational international order is in jeopardy.

U.S. POLICY IN ANGOLA

The history of the postwar period should give us pause. Military aggression, direct or indirect, has frequently been successfully dealt with, but never in the absence of a local balance of forces. U.S. policy in Angola has sought to help friends achieve this balance. Angola represents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that the Soviet Union has moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of its choice. It is the first time that the United States has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted the Executive's action while it was in the process of meeting this kind of threat.

Thus, to claim that Angola is not an important country or that the United States has no important interests there begs what is for us the principal question. The objectives which the United States has sought in Angola have not been aimed at defending, or acquiring, intrinsic interests in that country. We are not opposing any particular faction, and I might add that we did move to establish immediate relations with FRELIMO [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique] in Mozambique—the chairman visited there in fact even though its purposes were not particularly friendly to the United States and even though it has received some outside support from the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, because we considered it an essentially indigenous movement. We could develop constructive relations with any Angolan Government. We have never been involved militarily in Angola. We are not so involved now. We emphatically do not seek to be militarily involved in the future.

Our objective is clear and simple: to help those African countries and those groups within Angola that would resist external aggression by providing them with needed financial support. Those who we seek to assist share our hopes for negotiated solution and for African self-determination. They played a larger role than the MPLA in striving toward Angolan independence.

Our deepest concern is for global stability. If the United States is seen to emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will be the perception of leaders around the world as they make decisions concerning their future security?

Will they feel they can proceed to develop their nations in an international climate which fosters cooperation and self-determination? How will they adjust their conduct in the context of such events?

And what conclusion will an unopposed superpower draw when the next opportunity for intervention beckons?

America's modest direct strategic and economic interests in Angola are not the central issue. The question is whether America maintains the resolve to act responsibly as a great power.

Let there be no mistake about it—the culprits in the tragedy that is now unfolding in Angola are the Soviet Union and its client state, Cuba. But I must note with some sadness that the Executive has been deprived of indispensable flexibility in formulating a foreign policy which we believe to be in our national interest. The crucial truth is that a stable relationship with the Soviet Union based on mutual restraint will be achieved only if Soviet lack of restraint carries the risk of counteraction. The consequences may well be far-reaching and substantially more painful than the course we have recommended. When one great power attempts to obtain special positions of influence based on military interventions, the other power is sooner or later bound to act to offset this advantage in some other place or manner. This will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage, only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in a major crisis, and often in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be broken—and that we want to break—if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if it is not broken now, we will face harder choices and higher costs later. In Angola we have consistently advocated a government representing all three factions. We have never opposed participation by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA. What we do oppose is the massive Soviet and Cuban intervention and their expressed aim of denying the other two groups any part in governing the country. Our overriding goal has been to assure that Africans shape their own destiny and that traditional colonialism not be replaced by a more modern version.

Since October we have consistently offered to stop all military supplies on our side, provided all other countries would do the same thing, and have made repeated proposals for an end of all foreign military intervention.

COURSE OF EVENTS IN ANGOLA

Let me briefly recount the course of events that has led us to this point, and I recognize that, in going over the events of the year or more, it is extremely difficult to give an absolutely unbiased account, and it will always be possible to find this or that individual whose perspective might be different. This is how it looks, how it looked from where I sat.

In 1961, the United States declared its support for self-determination in Portugal's African territories. At the time, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, was a leading force in the struggle for Angolan independence. Looking to the future, we sought to develop a relationship with the FNLA through providing it some financial, nonmilitary assistance. The U.S.S.R. had already established links with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA, through the Portuguese Communist Party. The MPLA began military action against the Portuguese in the mid-1960's. The National

Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, an offshoot of the FNLA, also began to fight in the late 1960's. Although these various uncoordinated insurgency efforts caused considerable difficulties for Portugal, they posed no serious military threat to the dominance of Portuguese military forces in Angola.

However, the overthrow of the Portuguese Government in April 1974, and the growing strength of the Portuguese Communist Party apparently convinced Moscow that a revolutionary situation was developing in Angola. The Soviet Union began to exploit this situation in the fall of 1974 through the shipment of arms and equipment to the MPLA. The United States at the same time received requests for support from other Angolan elements but turned them down.

The prospect of an independent Angola was clouded by the intense rivalry of the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. Concerned about the three factions' failure to end their bitter quarrel, leaders of other African countries prevailed upon them to come together with Portugal and seek agreement. This effort led to the Alvor Accord of January 1975. Under its terms a transitional coalition government was to be established and charged with preparing for a peaceful turnover of power by integrating the military forces of the three movements, writing a constitution and organizing an election to take place before independence, scheduled for November 11, 1975.

This was the moment, when Portugal was trying to organize a peaceful transition to independence, for the exercise of restraint by all outside parties, and this is why the United States did not support UNITA and had only the most modest support for FNLA. But the U.S.S.R. and Portuguese Communists decided to put the MPLA in power in Angola through stepped-up shipments of arms. With this kind of encouragement, the MPLA had little incentive to fulfill the terms of the Alvor Accord which would have prevented it from dominating any future coalition government.

It is no coincidence that major violence broke out in March 1975, when large shipments of Soviet arms began to arrive—thousands of infantry weapons, machineguns, bazookas and rockets. On March 23, the first of repeated military clashes between the MPLA and FNLA occurred. They increased in frequency in April, May and June, when deliveries of Communist arms and equipment, including mortars and armored vehicles, escalated by air and sea. In May, the MPLA forced the FNLA out of the areas north and east of Luanda and, in June, took effective control of Cabinda. On July 9, all-out civil war began when the MPLA attacked the FNLA and UNITA, driving both organizations out of Luanda, thereby ending the short-lived coalition government. By mid-July the military situation radically favored the MPLA.

As the military position of the FNLA and UNITA deteriorated, the governments of Zaire and Zambia grew more and more concerned about the implications for their own security. Those two countries turned to the United States for assistance in preventing the Soviet Union and Cuba from imposing a solution in Angola, becoming a dominant influence in south-central Africa, and threatening the stability of the area, and I want to stress that until this point, no military assistance of any kind was given by the United States to any faction in the Angolan problem.

In August, intelligence reports indicated the presence of Soviet and Cuban military advisers, trainers and troops, including the first Cuban combat troops. If statements by Cuban leaders are to be believed, a large Cuban military training program began in Angola in June, and Cuban advisers were there before then. By September, the MPLA offensive had forced UNITA out of several major central and southern Angolan cities.

In early September, the poorly equipped UNITA forces turned in desperation to South Africa for assistance against the MPLA, which was overrunning UNITA's ethnic areas in the south. South Africa responded by sending in military equipment, and some military personnel—without consultation with the United States.

The UNITA forces launched a successful counteroffensive which swept the MPLA out of the southern and most of the central part of Angola.

In October massive increases in Soviet and Cuban military assistance began to arrive. More Cuban troops were ferried to Angola. Cuba inaugurated its own airlift of troops in late October. And the MPLA declared itself the Government of Angola, in violation of the Alvor Accord.

In the hope of halting a dangerously escalating situation, the United States—using the leverage provided by our financial support which had started in August—undertook a wide range of diplomatic activity pointing toward a summit of the Organization for African Unity scheduled for January 1976.

Starting in October we made several overtures to the Soviet Union, expressing our concern over the scale and purpose of their intervention.

We offered to use our influence to bring about the cessation of foreign military assistance and to encourage an African solution if they would do the same. Their responses were evasive but not totally negative.

We began to voice our concerns and our limited objectives publicly. Beginning with a speech in Detroit on November 24 we pointed out that continuation of an interventionist policy by the Soviet Union must inevitably threaten our other relationships, and that our sole objective was an African resolution of an African problem.

I briefed the NATO foreign ministers and obtained significant understanding and support.

Throughout this period the U.S. principles for a solution to the Angolan tragedy were unambiguous and straightforward. Angola is an African problem and should be left to Africans to solve; foreign military involvement only escalates and prolongs the warfare there and should be ended; OAU efforts to promote a ceasefire should be supported; the United States pursues no unilateral interests in Angola and is exclusively concerned with seeing the people of that country live in peace and independence; Angola should be insulated from great power conflict.

Our diplomacy was effective so long as we maintained the leverage of a possible military balance. African determination to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention was becoming more and more evident. On December 9, President Ford made a formal proposal to the Soviet Government through their ambassador, proposing the end of all foreign military intervention and of the shipment of all foreign military equipment.

It appeared as if the Soviet Union had begun to take stock. The airlift was interrupted from December 9 until December 24.

By mid-December, we were hopeful that the OAU would provide a framework for eliminating the interference of outside powers by calling for an end to their intervention.

And we made clear in advance to all parties concerned including the Soviet Union and all African states that we would immediately accept such a solution.

At that point, the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. After the Senate vote to block further aid to Angola, the Cubans more than doubled their forces and Soviet military aid was resumed on an even larger scale.

As the scope of Soviet-Cuban intervention increased drastically, the cooperativeness of Soviet diplomacy declined.

The weight of Soviet aid and advisers and the massive Soviet expeditionary force began to tip the scales of battle in December. By this point most of the effective fighting for the MPLA was being done by the Cubans. It was clear that the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the MPLA hoped to achieve a decisive military victory on the eve of the Organization of African Unity's extraordinary summit conference in Addis Ababa, a few weeks ago.

Yet, notwithstanding their reverses, the FNLA/UNITA forces still controlled about 70 percent of the territory and 70 percent of the population of Angola at the time of the conference.

At the summit, 22 members of the OAU advocated recognition of the MPLA and condemnation of South Africa.

But, they were opposed, in an unusual demonstration of solidarity, by 22 other members who held out for a more balanced resolution that would include the following points: (1) an immediate cease-fire; (2) condemnation of South Africa and immediate withdrawal of South African forces; (3) withdrawal of all other foreign forces; (4) an end to the supply of arms to all factions; and (5) reconciliation of all factions with the aim of establishing a government of national unity.

The United States regarded this program as reasonable and responsive to the facts of the situation. We were prepared to accept it then and we are prepared to accept it now.

But the Soviet Union and Cuba urged MPLA supporters to refuse to accept this solution.

This, then, is a brief history of the significance of Angola and the record to date. In elaborating further the U.S. position, I want to respond directly to some of the issues raised in the current debate.

U.S. RESPONSE TO UNPRECEDENTED SOVIET POWER APPLICATION

Our principal objective has been to respond to an unprecedented application of Soviet power achieved in large part through the expeditionary force of a client state.

During 1975 the Soviet Union is estimated to have contributed nearly \$200 million worth of military assistance to Angola. This equals the entire amount of all military aid from all sources to sub-Saharan Africa in 1974.

A total of at least 46 flights of Soviet heavy and medium military transports have ferried Soviet military equipment from the U.S.S.R.

to Luanda and Congo-Brazzaville, while a steady stream of Soviet and Cuban aircraft has continued to bring Cuban troops across the Atlantic. Soviet naval involvements, clearly related to the Angolan event, have continued in West African waters for several weeks.

The implications of Cuba's unprecedented and massive intervention cannot be ignored. It is a geopolitical event of considerable significance. For the first time, Cuba has sent an expeditionary force to another nation on another continent.

About 11,000 Cuban military personnel have been sent to Angola. If allowed to proceed unchecked, this blatant power play cannot but carry with it far-reaching implications—including the impact it will have on the attitudes and future conduct of the nations of this hemisphere.

Indeed, friend and foe alike cannot fail to contrast the sending of a large Cuban expeditionary force with our apparent inability to provide even indirect financial assistance.

We have been asked why we do not respond with other pressures on the Soviet Union.

The first answer is that many of the links the administration has tried to forge, such as trade and credit, which would have provided incentives for restraint and levers for penalties have been precluded by earlier congressional actions.

But above all, economic measures take too much time to affect a fast-moving situation like Angola. Any longer term impact would be of little use to those immediately threatened.

Still, we have made clear that a continuation of actions like those in Angola must threaten the entire web of Soviet-U.S. relations. In this sense both the negotiations and the overall relationship are in long-term jeopardy unless restraint is exercised. But there is no substitute for a local balance; indirect pressures can succeed only if rapid local victories are foreclosed.

The questions, then, come down to this: Do we really want the world to conclude that if the Soviet Union chooses to intervene in a massive way, and if Cuban or other troops are used as an expeditionary force, the United States will not be able to muster the unity or resolve to provide even financial assistance? Can those faced with such a threat without hope of assistance from us be expected to resist? Do we want our potential adversaries to conclude that in the event of future challenges America's internal divisions are likely to deprive us of even minimal leverage over developments of global significance?

HELPING BLACK AFRICAN FRIENDS OPPOSE SOVIET, CUBAN INTERVENTION

Our second objective is to help our friends in black Africa who oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention.

Only in recent years has Africa become free of great power rivalry; it must not once again become an arena in which the ambitions of outside powers are pursued.

We are told that we need not concern ourselves because in the final analysis and at some indefinite time in the future, African nationalism will reassert itself and drive out foreign influence.

Even if this were proven true, it still ignores the fact that governments under pressure will be forced to yield whenever a threat develops. Those who are threatened cannot afford to wait for history.

They must decide whether to resist or to adjust. Advice which coun-

sels confidence in the verdict of history is a mockery to those who are concerned for the fate of their country today. History rarely helps those who do not help themselves.

Some charge that we have acted in collusion with South Africa. That is not true. We had no foreknowledge of South Africa's intentions, and in no way cooperated with it militarily.

Nor do we view South African intervention more benevolently than we do the intervention of other outside powers. Indeed we have formally proposed that the removal of outside forces begin with those of South Africa and have asked—in vain—for an indication of how soon thereafter Soviet and Cuban forces would be withdrawn.

We are firmly convinced that, had there been no outside interference initiated by the Soviet Union, the Africans would have found their own solution. No single movement would have been strong enough to take over.

The resulting solution would have been more representative of the people of Angola than a government imposed by an outside power and representing only a minority faction.

MEANS CHOSEN TO OBTAIN POLICY OBJECTIVES

The means we have chosen have been limited and explained to Congress.

Our immediate objective was to provide leverage for diplomatic efforts to bring about what we consider a just and peaceful solution. They were not conceived unilaterally by the United States; they represented support to friends who requested our financial assistance.

We chose covert means because we wanted to keep our visibility to a minimum. We wanted the greatest possible opportunity for an African solution. We felt that overt assistance would elaborate a formal doctrine justifying great power intervention—aside from the technical issues such as in what budgetary category this aid should be given and how it could be reconciled with legislative restrictions against the transfer of U.S. arms by recipients.

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION

We chose a covert form of response, and indeed we chose to act only with the greatest reluctance. But, in doing so, we were determined to adhere to the highest standard of executive-legislative consultation. Eight congressional committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions.

We sought in these briefings to determine the wishes of the Congress. While we do not claim that every member approved our actions, we had no indication of basic opposition.

And I want to emphasize that this is open, obviously, to different interpretations. But this was our reading of the situation.

Altogether, more than two dozen Senators, about 150 Congressmen, and over 100 staff members of both Houses were informed. I am attaching to my statement a list of all the briefings carried out.

Mr. Chairman, where are we now? Many of the members of this committee have expressed their general support for our policy of easing tensions with the Soviet Union.

We, in the executive branch, are grateful for that support but this process cannot be divided into those segments which the Soviets will honor, and those which we allow them to ignore.

What the United States does when confronted with a blatant challenge like Angola can be of great significance in shaping our future relations with the Soviet Union.

A demonstration of a lack of resolve could lead the Soviets to a great miscalculation, thereby plunging us in a major confrontation which neither of us wants.

The United States must make it clear that Angola sets no precedent; this type of action will not be tolerated elsewhere. This must be demonstrated by both the Executive and the Congress in our national interest and in the interest of world peace.

To the Soviet Union and Cuba, the administration says: We will continue to make our case to the American public. We will not tolerate wanton disregard for the interests of others and for the cause of world peace.

To the American people, the administration says that the time has come to put aside self-accusation and division. Our own country's safety and the progress of mankind depend crucially upon a united and determined America. Today, as throughout 200 years, the world looks to us to stand up for what is right.

By virtue of our strength and values we are leaders in the defense of freedom: Without us there can be neither security nor progress.

To Congress the administration says: Whatever our past disagreements, let the Congress and the Executive now resolve to shape a co-operative relationship that will enable the United States to play a responsible international role.

Both branches will have to do their share in restoring the kind of nonpartisan support that has served our foreign policy so well in the past.

On the issue of Angola, the administration is now considering overt financial aid and we will soon be consulting with the Congress on this possibility.

But, whatever that decision, and whatever our past disagreement, let us work together on the issues with an appreciation of the larger interests involved, and with a sense of national responsibility.

A united America cannot be ignored by our adversaries: together we will preserve the independence of those who face the prospect of oppression. Together we can hearten the friends of liberty and promote peace everywhere.

[Secretary Kissinger's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman: I appear before you not to score debating points in an abstract contest over Executive-Legislative prerogative. What faces us is a Congressional decision of potentially grave magnitude taken after the Executive Branch had complied with all legal requirements for the kind of operation involved in Angola and after eight Congressional committees had been briefed over twenty times without foreshadowing any opposition in principle. The issue is not "victory" of one branch over another. The issue is what constitutes a victory for the national interest.

I welcome this opportunity to explain the global significance of what is now happening in Angola, the events that have brought us to this point, the United States' objectives and the major consequences which can result.

The Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa—with nearly two hundred million dollars of arms, and its military technicians and advisors, with 11,000 Cuban combat troops, and with

substantial sea and airlift and naval cover in adjacent waters—is a matter of urgent concern. Not only are the interests of the countries directly affected at stake, but also the interests of all nations in preserving global stability—which is the precondition for all else mankind aspires to accomplish.

In recent years the United States has sought to help build a new international order less tied to the traditional patterns of power balances. It was the United States which took the initiative in seeking to resolve the most dangerous problems of our time by negotiation and cooperation rather than by force of arms. It was we who saw that the historical necessity of this period required a more stable relationship between the two nations that possess the capacity to destroy civilization. We have sought—and with some successes—to build more constructive relations with the USSR across a broad range: to contain strategic arms, to institutionalize cooperation in economic, scientific and cultural fields, to reduce tensions in areas where our vital interests impinge on one another, and to avoid destabilizing confrontations in peripheral areas of the globe—such as Angola. The classical pattern of accumulating marginal advantages must be overcome and mankind must build more constructive patterns if catastrophe is to be avoided. No one has been more dedicated than the President and I to working for these principles.

But our efforts have been founded upon one fundamental reality: peace requires a sense of security and security depends upon some form of equilibrium between the great powers. And that equilibrium is impossible unless the United States remains both strong and determined to use its strength when required. This is our historic responsibility, for no other nation has the capacity to act in this way. While constantly seeking opportunities for conciliation, we need to demonstrate to potential adversaries that cooperation is the only rational alternative. Any other course will encourage the trends it seeks to accommodate; a challenge not met today will tempt far more dangerous crises tomorrow.

If a continent such as Africa, only recently freed from external oppression, can be made the arena for great power ambitions, if immense quantities of arms can affect far-off events, if large expeditionary forces can be transported at will to dominate virtually helpless peoples—then all we have hoped for in building a more stable and rational international order is in jeopardy.

The effort of the Soviet Union and Cuba to take unilateral advantage of a turbulent local situation where they have never had any historic interests is a willful, direct assault upon the recent constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations and our efforts to improve relations with Cuba. It is an attempt to take advantage of our continuing domestic division and self-torment. Those who have acted so recklessly must be made to see that their conduct is unacceptable.

The history of the postwar period should give us pause. Military aggression, direct or indirect, has frequently been successfully dealt with, but never in the absence of a local balance of forces. U.S. policy in Angola has sought to help friends achieve this balance. Angola represents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the U.S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted the Executive's action while it was in the process of meeting this kind of threat.

Thus to claim that Angola is not an important country or that the United States has no important interests there begs the principal question. The objectives which the United States has sought in Angola have not been aimed at defending, or acquiring intrinsic interests in that country. We are not opposing any particular faction. We could develop constructive relations with any Angolan government. We have never been involved militarily in Angola. We are not so involved now. We do not seek to be so involved in the future.

Our objective is clear and simple: to help those African countries and those groups within Angola that would resist external aggression by providing them with needed financial support. Those who we seek to assist are our friends; they share our hopes for negotiated solutions and for African self-determination. They played a larger role than the MPLA in striving toward Angolan independence.

But our deeper concern is for global stability. If the United States is seen to emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will be the perception of leaders around the world as they make decisions concerning their future security?

Will they feel they can proceed to develop their nations in an international climate which fosters cooperation and self-determination? How will they adjust

their conduct in the context of such events? And what conclusion will an unopposed superpower draw when the next opportunity for intervention beckons?

America's modest direct strategic and economic interests in Angola are not the central issue. The question is whether America still maintains the resolve to act responsibly as a great power—prepared to face a challenge when it arises, knowing that preventive action now may make unnecessary a more costly response later.

Let there be no mistake about it—the culprits in the tragedy that is now unfolding in Angola are the Soviet Union and its client state, Cuba.

But I must note with some sadness that by its actions, the Congress has deprived the President of indispensable flexibility in formulating a foreign policy which we believe to be in our national interest. And Congress has ignored the crucial truth is that a stable relationship with the Soviet Union based on mutual restraint will be achieved only if Soviet lack of restraint carries the risk of counteraction. The consequences may well be far-reaching and substantially more painful than the course we have recommended. When one great power attempts to obtain special positions of influence based on military interventions, the other power is sooner or later bound to act to offset this advantage in some other place or manner. This will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage, only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in a major crisis, and often in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be broken—and that we wanted to break until stopped—if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if it is not broken now we will face harder choices and higher costs in the future.

It is in this context that we have framed our goals in Angola. Simply put, we wish to see:

A ceasefire, ending the tragic bloodshed in that country;

Withdrawal of outside forces; Soviet, Cuban, and South African;

Cessation of foreign military involvement; and

Negotiations among the Angolan factions.

We are prepared to accept any solution that emerges from African efforts. And we are ready to offer economic assistance to the people of Angola when a legitimate government is established there.

We have consistently advocated such a government representing all three factions in Angola. We have never opposed participation by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA. What we do oppose is the massive Soviet and Cuban intervention and their expressed aim of denying the other two groups any part in governing the country. Our overriding goal has been to assure that Africans shape their own destiny and that traditional colonialism not be replaced by a more modern version.

For the U.S. to be found wanting as a credible friend, precisely at a time when moderate African states have clearly and repeatedly expressed their hope that America provide the necessary balance to the Soviet Union and Cuba, will have a major impact on those countries on the continent of Africa which resisted all pressures and stuck by their position even after the Senate cut off aid; on our allies in other parts of the world who look to us for security; on other countries that seek ties with us primarily because they see us as the guardian of international equilibrium.

THE RECORD OF EVENTS IN ANGOLA

Let me briefly recount the course of events that has led us to this point.

In 1961, the United States declared its support for self-determination in Portugal's African territories. At the time, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, was a leading force in the struggle for Angolan independence. Looking to the future, we sought to develop a relationship with the FNLA through providing it some financial, non-military assistance. The USSR had already established links with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA, through the Portuguese Communist Party. The MPLA began military action against the Portuguese in the mid-60's. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, an offshoot of the FNLA, also began to fight on a small scale in the late 1960's. Although these various uncoordinated insurgency efforts caused considerable difficulties for Portugal, they posed no serious military threat to the dominance of Portuguese military forces in Angola.

However, the overthrow of the Portuguese government in April 1974 and the growing strength of the Portuguese Communist party apparently convinced Mos-

cow that a "revolutionary situation" was developing in Angola. The Soviet Union began to exploit this situation in the fall of 1974 through shipments of some arms and equipment to the MPLA. The United States received requests for support from other Angolan elements at that same time, but turned them down.

The prospect of an independent Angola was clouded by the intense rivalry of the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA which had developed over the years. Concerned about the three factions' failure to end their bitter quarrel, leaders of other African countries prevailed upon them to come together with Portugal and seek agreement. This effort led to the Alvor Accord of January 1975. Under its terms a transitional coalition government was to be established and charged with preparing for a peaceful turnover of power by integrating the military forces of the three movements, writing a constitution and organizing an election to take place before independence, scheduled for November 11, 1975.

This was the moment, when Portugal was trying to organize a peaceful transition to independence, for the exercise of restraint by all outside parties. But the USSR and Portuguese Communists decided to put the MPLA in power in Angola through stepped-up shipments of arms. With this kind of encouragement, the MPLA had little incentive to fulfill the terms of the Alvor Accord which would have prevented it from dominating any future coalition government.

It is no coincidence that major violence broke out in March 1975 when large shipments of Soviet arms began to arrive—thousands of infantry weapons, machine guns, bazookas and rockets. On March 23 the first of repeated military clashes between the MPLA and FNLA occurred. They increased in frequency in April, May and June, when deliveries of Communist arms and equipment, including mortars and armored vehicles, escalated by air and sea. In May, the MPLA forced the FNLA out of the areas north and east of Luanda and, in June, took effective control of Cabinda. On July 8 all-out civil war began when the MPLA attacked the FNLA and UNITA, driving both organizations out of Luanda, thereby ending the short-lived coalition-government. By mid-July the military situation radically favored the MPLA.

As the military position of the FNLA and UNITA deteriorated, the Governments of Zaire and Zambia grew more and more concerned about the implications for their own security. Those two countries turned to the US for assistance in preventing the Soviet Union and Cuba from imposing a solution in Angola, becoming a dominant influence in south-central Africa, and threatening the stability of the area.

It was at this point that President Ford decided to respond to requests for help and to provide military assistance to the FNLA and UNITA forces through neighboring Black African countries.

In August, intelligence reports indicated the presence of Soviet and Cuban military advisers, trainers and troops, including the first Cuban combat troops. If statements by Cuban leaders are to be believed, a large Cuban military training program began in Angola in June, and Cuban advisors were probably there before then. By September, the MPLA offensive had forced UNITA out of several major central and southern Angolan cities. It controlled most of the coastline except for a strip in the far north, much of the south, and a wide belt running from Luanda to the Zaire border in the east.

In early September the poorly equipped UNITA forces turned in desperation to South Africa for assistance against the MPLA, which was overrunning UNITA's ethnic areas in the South. South Africa responded by sending in military equipment, and some military personnel—without consultation with the United States.

The UNITA forces launched a successful counteroffensive which swept the MPLA out of the southern and most of the central part of Angola. In the north the FNLA also made significant advances. By Independence Day—November 11—the MPLA controlled only the former colonial capital of Luanda and a narrow belt across north-central Angola.

In October massive increases in Soviet and Cuban military assistance began to arrive. More Cuban troops were ferried to Angola. Cuba inaugurated its own airlift of troops in late October. And the MPLA declared itself the Government of Angola, in violation of the Alvor Accord.

In the hope of halting a dangerously escalating situation, the United States—using the leverage provided by our financial support—undertook a wide range of diplomatic activity pointing toward a summit of the Organization for African Unity scheduled for January 1976. Starting in October we made several overtures to the Soviet Union, expressing our concern over the scale and purpose of their

intervention. We offered to use our influence to bring about the cessation of foreign military assistance and to encourage an African solution if they would do the same. Their responses were evasive but not totally negative.

We began to voice our concerns and our limited objectives publicly. Beginning with a speech in Detroit on November 24 we pointed out that continuation of an interventionist policy must inevitably threaten our other relationships, and that our sole objective was an African resolution of an African problem. The Administration undertook a new series of Congressional consultations on the extent of our help to the Angolan factions resisting Soviet and Cuban aggression. I briefed the NATO foreign ministers and obtained significant understanding and support. Our diplomatic efforts with foreign governments, especially African governments, culminated with a mission by Assistant Secretary Schaufele to five African countries and the dispatch of letters from President Ford to 32 African heads of state, as well as the Secretary General of the OAU, stating America's policy.

Throughout this period the U.S. principles for a solution to the Angolan tragedy were unambiguous and straightforward:

Angola is an African problem and should be left to Africans to solve;

Foreign military involvement only escalates and prolongs the warfare there and should be ended;

OAU efforts to promote a ceasefire should be supported;

The United States pursues no unilateral interests in Angola and is exclusively concerned with seeing the people of that country live in peace, independence and well-being; and

Angola should be insulated from great power conflict.

Our diplomacy was effective so long as we maintained the leverage of a possible military balance. African determination to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention was becoming more and more evident. On December 9, President Ford made a formal proposal to the Soviet Government through their Ambassador. Indeed, it appeared as if the Soviet Union had begun to take stock. They halted their airlift from December 9 until December 24.

By mid-December we were hopeful that the OAU would provide a framework for eliminating the interference of outside powers by calling for an end to their intervention. At that point, the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. After the Senate vote to block any further aid to Angola, the Cubans more than doubled their forces and Soviet military aid was resumed on an even larger scale. The scope of Soviet-Cuban intervention increased drastically; the cooperativeness of Soviet diplomacy declined.

The weight of Soviet aid and advisors and the massive Cuban expeditionary force began to tip the scales of battle in December. By this point most of the effective fighting for the MPLA was being done by Cubans. It was clear that the USSR, Cuba and the MPLA hoped to achieve a decisive military victory on the eve of the Organization of African Unity's extraordinary Summit Conference in Addis Ababa a few weeks ago. Yet notwithstanding their reverses, the FNLA/UNITA forces still controlled about 70 percent of the territory and 70 percent of the population of Angola at the time of the Conference. An OAU reconciliation commission, which had met earlier in 1975, took the position that none of the movements should be recognized as the Government of Angola. The commission called for a ceasefire and the formation of a government of national unity. Thus, those governments who recognized the MPLA were in violation of a decision of the OAU.

At the January OAU Summit, 22 members of the OAU advocated recognition of the MPLA and condemnation of South Africa. But they were opposed, in an unusual demonstration of solidarity, by 22 other members who held out for a more balanced resolution, one that would include the following points:

1. an immediate cease fire;
2. condemnation of South Africa and immediate withdrawal of all South African forces;
3. withdrawal of all foreign forces;
4. an end to the supply of arms to all factions; and
5. reconciliation of all factions with the aim of establishing a government of national unity.

The United States regarded this program as reasonable and responsive to the facts of the situation. But the Soviet Union and Cuba urged MPLA supporters to refuse to accept this solution. The Summit ended in impasse.

THE UNITED STATES POSITION

This then is the significance of Angola and the record to date. In elaborating further the U.S. position, I want to respond directly to some of the issues raised in the current debate.

Our principal objective has been to respond to an unprecedented application of Soviet power achieved in part through the expeditionary force of a client state.

During 1975 the Soviet Union is estimated to have contributed nearly \$200 million worth of military assistance to Angola. This equals the entire amount of all military aid from all sources to sub-Saharan Africa in 1974.

Soviet arms have included infantry weapons, machine guns, bazookas, mortars and recoilless rifles, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, light and medium tanks, truck-mounted multitube rocket launchers, helicopters and light aircraft. There are unconfirmed reports that the Soviet Union will provide the MPLA with MIG-21 aircraft to be piloted by Cubans.

A total of at least 46 flights of Soviet heavy and medium military transports have ferried Soviet military equipment from the USSR to Luanda and Congo-Brazzaville, while a steady stream of Soviet and Cuban aircraft has continued to bring Cuban troops across the Atlantic. Soviet naval involvements, clearly related to the Angolan event, have continued in West African waters for several weeks.

The implications of Cuba's unprecedented and massive intervention cannot be ignored. It is a geopolitical event of considerable significance. For the first time, Cuba has sent an expeditionary force to another nation on another continent. About 11,000 Cuban military personnel have been sent to Angola. If allowed to proceed unchecked, this blatant power play cannot but carry with it far reaching implications—including the impact it will have on the attitudes and future conduct of the nations of this hemisphere. Indeed, friend and foe alike cannot fail to contrast the sending of a large Cuban expeditionary force with our apparent inability to provide even indirect financial assistance. The failure of the United States to respond effectively will be regarded in many parts of the world as an indication of our future determination to counter similar Communist interventions.

We have been asked why we do not respond with other pressures on the Soviet Union.

The first answer is that many of the links the Administration has tried to forge, such as trade and credit, which would have provided incentives for restraint and levers for penalties have been precluded by earlier Congressional actions. But two other instruments have been suggested: Wheat sales and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A moratorium was placed on wheat sales for four months in 1975. To use this device every three months is too blunt it permanently. Above all, economic measures take too much time to affect a fast-moving situation like Angola; any longer term impact would be of little use to those immediately threatened. We should also ponder whether we want to return to the situation, now prevented by the grain agreement, in which the USSR can capriciously enter and leave the U.S. grain trade.

As for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, we have never considered these to be a favor which we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations. The fact is that limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals is an overriding global problem that must be dealt with urgently for our own sake and for the sake of world peace.

Still, we have made clear that a continuation of actions like those in Angola must threaten the entire web of Soviet-U.S. relations. In this sense both negotiations and the overall relationship are in long-term jeopardy unless restraint is exercised. But there is no substitute for a local balance; indirect pressures can succeed only if rapid local victories are foreclosed.

Have we really thought through the implications of our decisions? Do we really want the world to conclude that if the Soviet Union chooses to intervene in a massive way, and if Cuban or other troops are used as an expeditionary force, the United States will not be able to muster the unity or resolve to provide even financial assistance to those who are threatened? Can those faced with such a threat without hope of assistance from us be expected to resist? Do we want our potential adversaries to conclude that, in the event of future challenges America's internal divisions are likely to deprive us of even minimal leverage over developments of global significance?

Our second objective is to help our friends in Black Africa who oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention.

Only in recent years has Africa become free of great power rivalry; it must not once again become an arena in which the ambitions of outside forces are pursued. We have sought with our African friends to maintain a local balance of power so there can be no imposed solution that would deprive the Angolan people of the right to determine their own destiny.

We are told that we need not concern ourselves because in the final analysis and at some indefinite date in the future, African nationalism will reassert itself and drive out foreign influence. Even were this to prove true, it still ignores the fact that governments under pressures will be forced to yield whenever a threat develops. Those who are threatened cannot afford to wait—they must decide whether to resist or to adjust. Advice which counsels patience and confidence in the verdict of history is a mockery to those who are concerned for the fate of their country today. History rarely helps those who do not help themselves.

Some charge that we have acted in collusion with South Africa. This is untrue. We had no foreknowledge of South Africa's intentions, and in no way cooperated with it militarily. Nor do we view South African intervention more benevolently than we do the intervention of other outside powers. Indeed, we have formally proposed that the removal of outside forces begin with those of South Africa and have asked—in vain—for an indication of how soon thereafter Soviet and Cuban forces would be withdrawn.

It is also claimed that because of our support for the side which later felt itself compelled to seek the aid of South Africa, we have lost influence in Black Africa. One cannot generalize so easily about the perceptions of the African people as the firm stand at Addis Ababa of 22 OAU members against OAU recognition of the MPLA should demonstrate. Behind this stand, which coincided with the U.S. position, was awareness that the MPLA represented only a minority of Angolans, and also a genuine apprehension over Soviet and Cuban, as well as South African, intervention. Indeed it is our inability to support our African friends that will cost us influence in Africa.

We are firmly convinced that, had there been no outside interference initiated by the Soviet Union, the Africans would have found their own solution. No single movement would have been strong enough to take over. The resulting solution would have been more representative of the people of Angola than a government imposed by an outside power and representing only a minority faction.

The outcome in Angola will have repercussions throughout Africa. The confidence of countries neighboring Angola—Zambia and Zaire—as well as other African countries, in the will and power of the U.S. will be severely shaken if they see that the Soviet Union and Cuba are unopposed in their attempt to impose a regime of their choice on Angola. They and others elsewhere may well adjust their policies to what they consider to be the forces of the future.

The means we have chosen have been limited and explained to Congress.

Our immediate objective was to provide leverage for diplomatic efforts to bring about a just and peaceful solution. They were not conceived unilaterally by the United States; they represented support to friends who requested our financial assistance.

We chose covert means because we wanted to keep our visibility to a minimum; we wanted the greatest possible opportunity for an African solution. We felt that overt assistance would elaborate a formal doctrine justifying great power intervention—aside from the technical issues such as in what budgetary category this aid should be given and how it could be reconciled with legislative restrictions against the transfer of U.S. arms by recipients. The Angola situation is of a type in which diplomacy without leverage is important, yet direct military confrontation would involve unnecessary risks. Thus it is precisely one of those grey areas where covert methods are crucial if we are to have any prospect of influencing certain events of potentially global importance.

We chose a covert form of response with the greatest reluctance. But in doing so, we were determined to adhere to the highest standard of Executive-Legislative consultation. Eight Congressional Committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought in these briefings to determine the wishes of Congress. While we do not claim that every member approved our actions, we had no indication of basic opposition.

Between July and December 1975, we discussed the Angolan situation on numerous occasions with members of the foreign relations committees and the appropriations committees of both Houses, and the committees of both

Houses that have CIA oversight responsibilities. The two committees investigating CIA activities—the Church Committee and the Pike Committee—were also briefed. Altogether more than two dozen Senators, about 150 Congressmen and over 100 staff members of both Houses were informed. I am attaching to my statement a list of all the briefings carried out.

Mr. Chairman: Where are we now? We are told that by providing money and arms for Angola we are duplicating the mistakes we made in Vietnam. Such an argument confuses the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars with the commitment of U.S. troops. If we accept such a gross distortion of history—if we accept the claim that we can no longer do anything to aid our friends abroad because we will inevitably do too much—then the tragedy of Vietnam will indeed be monumental.

We will have lost all ability to respond to anything less than direct and substantial challenge. And having lost that ability we will eventually discover that by failing to respond at an early stage, our ultimate response will have to be greater, and the stakes will be higher. If we do not exercise our responsibilities to maintain the international balance, if Congress and the Executive are unable to act in concert when vital national interests are affected, then world security may well be seriously undermined.

Many of the members of this committee have expressed their general support for our policy of easing tensions with the Soviet Union. We, in the Executive Branch, are grateful for that support. But this process cannot be divided into those segments which the Soviets will honor, and those which we allow them to ignore. What the United States does when confronted with a challenge like Angola can be of great significance in shaping our future relationship with the Soviet Union. A demonstration of a lack of resolve could lead the Soviets to a great miscalculation, thereby plunging us into a major confrontation which neither of us wants. Credibility determines, to a great degree, what a nation can accomplish without a resort to force. And as credibility is reduced, the eventual need to resort to force increases. And in the end, we are all the losers.

The United States must make it clear that Angola sets no precedent; this type of action will not be tolerated elsewhere. This must be demonstrated by both the Executive and the Congress—in our national interest and in the interest of world peace.

To the Soviet Union and to Cuba, the Administration says: we will continue to make our case to the American public. We will not tolerate wanton disregard for the interests of others and for the cause of world peace.

To the American people, the Administration says: the time has come to put aside self-accusation, division, and guilt. Our own country's safety and the progress of mankind depend crucially upon a united and determined America. Today, as throughout our 200 years, the world looks to us to stand up for what is right. By virtue of our strength and values we are leaders in the defense of freedom; without us there can be neither security nor progress.

To the Congress, the Administration says: whatever our past disagreements, let the Congress and the Executive now resolve to shape a cooperative relationship that will enable the United States to play a responsible international role. Both branches will have to do their share in restoring the kind of non-partisan support that has served our foreign policy so well in the past. On the issue of Angola, the Administration is now seriously considering overt financial aid and we will soon be consulting with the Congress on this possibility. But whatever that decision, let us work together, with an appreciation of the larger interests involved, and with a sense of national responsibility. A United America cannot be ignored by our adversaries; together we will preserve the independence of those who face the prospect of oppression. Together we will hearten the friends of liberty and peace everywhere.

ANGOLA

CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Following is a list of Congressional briefings which the Executive Branch conducted with committees of Congress, individual members and other Congressional staff persons between July, 1975, and the end of the year:

Senate

July 25—Two members of the Foreign Relations Committee and one staff aide briefed by the CIA.

July 30—Three members of the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

August 4—Senator Dick Clark (African Affairs Subcommittee Chairman) briefed by the CIA.

September 5—Three members of the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

September 23—Four members of the CIA Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

October 31—Six members of the Select Committee on Intelligence Operations and twenty staff aides briefed by the CIA.

November 6—Nine members of the Foreign Relations Committee and three staff aides briefed by the CIA.

December 1—Senator Clark briefed by Ingersoll, Schaufele and Mulcahy.

December 4—Ten staff members of various committees briefed by Haverkamp, Andrew and Fugit of AF Bureau.

December 8—Senator Clark briefed by Schaufele as a followup of the December 1 briefing.

December 8—Two members of the Foreign Relations Committee and one staff aide briefed by the CIA.

December 12—Four members of the CIA Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

December 16—Two members of the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

December 16—Ten members of the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance & Economic Policy of the Foreign Relations Committee and several staff aides briefed by the CIA.

December 16—Senator Strom Thurmond (Member of CIA Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee) briefed by the CIA.

House

July 25—Three members of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services Committee and one staff aide briefed by the CIA.

July 29—Thirteen members of the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

July 31—Six members of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Foreign Affairs Committee and one staff aide briefed by the CIA.

September 8—Four members of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services Committee and one staff member briefed by the CIA.

September 4—Five members of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Foreign Affairs Committee and one staff aide briefed by the CIA.

October 6—Thirteen members of the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

October 23—Eight members of the Select Committee on Intelligence and one staff aide briefed by the CIA.

November 5—Mulcahy testified before the International Resources, Food and Energy Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

November 13—Congressman Charles Diggs and nine other Congressmen plus several staff aides informally briefed by Mulcahy.

December 9—Thirteen members of the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and three staff aides briefed by the CIA.

December 9—Seven members of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Foreign Affairs Committee and one staff aide briefed by the CIA.

December 11—Six members of the Subcommittee on Military Affairs (Fasell Subcommittee) briefed by Mulcahy.

December 12—Congressman Riegle briefed by Mulcahy.

December 12—Five members of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services Committee and two staff aides briefed by the CIA.

December 15—J. Daniel O'Flaherty, staffer for Congressman Harrington, briefed by Fugit AF/C.

December 16—Representative Dale Milford (member of House Select Committee) briefed by the CIA.

December 17—Mahon Subcommittee briefed by Colby and Sisco.

December 17—Congressman John Burton and others (unknown) briefed by Mulcahy.

December 17—Mulcahy appeared before an informal group of twelve Representatives and 35 staff aides.

December 17—Congressman Legitt briefed by Colby.

December 18—Closed Session of about 100 Representatives briefed by Sisco and Mulcahy.

December 19—Members of the Black Caucus briefed by Sisco and Mulcahy.

Tom Doubleday of AF/C briefed 8 Congressional staffers in the period December 16 to December 31.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for a very detailed and concise statement.

If the committee has no objection, we will operate under the 10 minute rule.

ADMINISTRATION INTERPRETATION OF HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT

Mr. Secretary, I want to start with what is perhaps a side question. In your statement you say "Eight congressional committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought in these briefings to determine the wishes of Congress."

Is it the administration's interpretation of the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment that the wishes of Congress are determined in these consultations?

Secretary KISSINGER. The problem of how to conduct covert operations in relationship to congressional oversight is an extremely complicated one. The administration does not feel that it is legally obliged to follow all the opinions that may be expressed in these congressional briefings. But it would certainly take them seriously. When the issue of assistance to Angola first arose in June and July, we recognized that we were faced with an extremely painful set of alternatives.

Nobody in the year of the collapse of our effort in Indo-China had any possible interest in being involved again with what superficially could appear to be an analogous situation. Nobody in the year of the intelligence investigations had any excessive wish to expose this country to the sort of dispute that might ensue.

We examined the pros and cons of the sort of indirect financial assistance that we were considering providing for about 6 weeks. Then the President decided to proceed to brief the Congress meticulously. If, out of these briefings there emerged what would appear to us a determined opposition, we would reconsider our views, reconsider our policy.

While—I repeat—I do not say that every Member that was briefed expressed support, we did not have the sense that it would lead to a clash between the Congress and the Executive.

For example, Mr. Chairman, the amendment that you offered was not one which we found incompatible with our purposes. When I testified, when I briefed the Church committee in early December last year about what we were doing in Angola, I volunteered that once the additional sums that we were then attempting to reprogram, that is to say, once these \$28 million were expended, if any additional funds were required, it was my personal belief that we had come to the end of the covert phase of our action and we would then have to request additional funds in some overt manner.

And, therefore, your amendment, Mr. Chairman, was not one that I found incompatible with our policies, because either what we were then doing would lead to a negotiation, which, on the whole, I expected, or it would demonstrate that the Soviet Union and Cuba were

engaged in a degree of massive intervention that would require a widespread American public decision before we proceeded in opposing it.

So, in any event, we would have to come to the Congress whenever the \$28 million was expended, if a negotiation had not developed.

Our concern was that events in December, in the middle of an attempted effort to crystalize the negotiations, terminated abruptly something that had been developing over a period of months. Our disagreement is not with the proposition that there must be a limit beyond which covert actions cannot be made compatible with congressional oversight, it was rather with the methods that were chosen in December that were not actually the ones that you had recommended in your own amendment, which we, as you know, had not actively opposed.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, just to pursue this point on advising the committees or, more specifically to get their wishes, it is my understanding that the members of the committee who were briefed on these after the fact, or whatever the case may be, were not advised that their opinion was being sought.

I remember raising that question upon returning from Africa early in September with Director Colby, who said much the same thing that you are saying: We really received very little opposition on this.

My question is whether the people who were being briefed were advised that their consultation was being sought. It seems to me that it leaves these people who were being briefed in a very difficult position if they are expected to give a yes or a no or some indication on every single covert activity that is presented to them or in the event that if they do not do that they can later be quoted as having said that they did not oppose it. That puts them in a difficult position if they are not previously advised that their opposition is going to make a difference.

Secretary KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, my experience with the Congress has been that the Members of the Senate and the Congress with whom I deal have not in the past shown an excessive reluctance to express a view, even if the view is not actively solicited.

Senator CLARK. I hope that is the case.

Secretary KISSINGER. But I can only speak of the one briefing in which I participated which was that of the Church committee. And their views were being actively expressed by the committee. That was well along in the course of the operation.

But the question you raise is one that, perhaps, requires further clarification in elaborating the oversight procedures.

Senator CLARK. There are other people in the Senate who could speak to that better than I.

Secretary KISSINGER. All I can say is that I always ask those who are briefing congressional committees what reaction they found and that the President and I thought that the degree of continuation of the action, at least in its early phases, was to some extent dependent on the mood we found in the Congress.

But there could have been a misunderstanding.

Senator CLARK. So, it would be well for those people who are being briefed to assume that if they do not take opposition on the occasion of the briefing, that it could be interpreted that they may be favorable to it?

Secretary KISSINGER. Or at least that they will not carry their opposition beyond a certain point.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Secretary KISSINGER. It is not just a question of being favorable, it is a question of whether one actively, by an act of Congress, terminates an action of which one has been well aware.

PRINCIPLE OF FOREIGN POLICY DEFINED

Senator CLARK. Fine. I would like to pursue with you a bit what seems to me the principle of foreign policy involved here, as you have described it in some detail in your statement.

If I may just start the question by rephrasing a statement of the President, which is very much along this same line. He said, the Senate decision is a deep tragedy for all countries' security depends on the United States. Ultimately, it will profoundly affect the security of our own country as well. How can the United States, the greatest power in the world, take the position that the Soviet Union can operate with impunity, many thousands of miles away with Cuban troops and massive amounts of military equipment, while we refuse any assistance to the majority of the local people who have asked only for military equipment to defend themselves.

You said much the same throughout your statement. Is it, therefore, the administration's position that the United States must become involved in any conflict in which the Soviet Union is seriously involved even if no important strategic interest of the United States is affected, and the country in question has not traditionally relied on the United States for protection?

I guess what I am really asking is, does the United States' security depend on our becoming involved in every conflict in which the Soviet Union is providing assistance, and, if so, are we not, in this case, allowing the Soviet Union to define American interests and, in effect, making us reactive in policy rather than determining our own?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the only way you can avoid being reactive with respect to military action is to initiate it yourself.

Senator CLARK. You do not have to act at all.

Secretary KISSINGER. But if you do not initiate the military actions yourself, then the decision will always be imposed on you in one way or another by the aggressive nation.

Now, I would make a distinction between Soviet military assistance of equipment of some kind, and a massive Soviet military operation. I think you will also appreciate that it is very difficult for a Secretary of State to state in public session what the United States will not do because that will then open up vast areas which seem open for all kinds of adventures.

I think we developed a national consensus during the period of the Vietnam War that in wars of national liberation, which have a largely local origin that the United States will not become involved simply because it prefers one group over another, and it will rely largely on the local forces to achieve their own successes. Therefore in Mozambique, for example, where the basic orientation of FRELIMO is probably not much different from the MPLA, the United States made no effort to affect the course of events, and as you know, Mr. Chair-

man, we immediately moved to establish diplomatic relations and have sought since to improve our relationships with them.

Similarly, in Angola during 1974 we had many opportunities to become involved in the support of the two factions that on the whole we prefer to the MPLA. However, we did not feel that our national interest was sufficiently involved in the struggle within Angola, as long as it was a substantially local struggle, for us to involve ourselves by giving military equipment, and, therefore, we only made a grant of \$300,000 which, at most, will get bicycles, office equipment, and aid political efforts of the FNLA within the context of the coalition government, which we were supporting as a result of the Alvor Accord. None of it went to arms.

Therefore, I do not believe that the Soviet actions of increasing the military equipment, their military support to Angola or to the MPLA were triggered by the American actions, and we gave the Soviet Union many opportunities to back off. However, when 11,000 Cuban combat troops appear, when the Soviet Union puts into one country the equivalent of all the military equipment that has been sent from all other sources to Sub-Saharan Africa, then we are no longer talking of a local struggle, and then we are talking about a situation where, if the United States were to say that it will be indifferent, it would do two things; it would tell all countries outside of a traditional orbit that if that sort of pressure appears, they have no choice except to accommodate to the Soviets, and, second, it might tell the Soviet Union that even in areas of traditional concern of American security, our ability or willingness to react might be minimal.

We believe or, rather, I believe but will never be able to prove it, that until the middle of December, the Soviet intervention was at the limit of what was sustainable by covert operation and that they would have to make in January the same decision I had already foreshadowed to the Church committee; that is to say, whether they would put everything at risk by going into the sort of massive intervention that has now developed.

Now, I regret that we were not given the opportunity to play this diplomacy to the end, to see whether the OAU could be given a constructive role, but you asked me a fundamental question. I would say that when Soviet military equipment appears on this massive a scale and is backed by substantial military forces, that are, in effect, Soviet-controlled, then we have a problem in which any President, I would think of either party, would have to ask himself what American security interests are, and I would not want to make a flat judgment based on the traditional role we have played in that country.

Senator CLARK. Thank you. I have some other questions, but my time is up. Senator Percy.

EXTENT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

Senator PERCY. Secretary Kissinger, I should like to determine in the next few minutes the extent of American involvement in Angola, the extent of the Chinese involvement and why they apparently chose to withdraw, and the reaction of Mr. Brezhnev when you confronted him with the facts. To the extent that you can reveal these publicly, we would appreciate it. Whenever you wish to do so in executive session, that is always acceptable, of course.

So far as American involvement is concerned, I would like to quote your own words. It is an "unambiguous and straightforward" policy. "Angola is an African problem and should be left to Africans to solve."

You indicated some, I thought, surprise when I mentioned advertisements for mercenaries. Here is a story from yesterday's Washington Post out of Kinshasa, by a Washington Post foreign correspondent, David Ottaway, indicating that UNITA has decided, now that South African troops are apparently being withdrawn, to attempt to replace them with European and American mercenaries. The day before there was this headline in the Washington Star saying "Wanted, Ex-GIs for Angola War, \$1,500 a month," and they reprint a classified advertisement asking for veterans and giving a telephone number. According to the article, the person doing it is Larry Mitchell, a 9-year Army veteran, with intelligence and special forces medical work in Vietnam, and when he was asked whether or not CIA money was involved, he said he would not reply. But he said he would not be surprised if it was coming from the CIA, because who else could afford something this large.

U.S. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN RECRUITING MERCENARIES

Because that is on the public record, I would like to ask you whether or not the CIA or any American Government department or agency is involved in recruiting mercenaries in any official or unofficial capacity directly or indirectly?

Secretary KISSINGER. The CIA is not involved in the recruiting of these individuals. It is, of course, possible that in a very indirect way, that is to say, that money that has been given to UNITA is then used by UNITA and not by the CIA to recruit people. We do not know exactly what the origin of these advertisements is, but there are some basic facts.

First and fundamentally, that the United States has offered repeatedly, unconditionally, to work for the removal of all foreign forces, without any conditions whatsoever. We have stated publicly that we would work for the prior removal of South African forces as long as we were given some kind of idea when the Cuban and Soviet forces would withdraw. Our basic objective is to leave the issues in Angola to the Angolans.

On the other hand, what is now developing in Angola is that almost all of the fighting for the MPLA is done by Cubans. The equipment that they have is too sophisticated to be used by the MPLA forces that are not so highly trained. Therefore, inevitably those who resist the Cuban forces will need individuals on their side that can use complicated equipment, and this produces the incentive for outsiders.

Senator PERCY. Are U.S. Government funds being used, though, directly or indirectly to recruit American mercenaries?

Secretary KISSINGER. It depends how you define indirectly. I would have to check to know how UNITA, if this is done for UNITA, is using the funds. No American funds are being used by American agencies, nor do American agencies supervise this part of the effort, but I would like to check precisely whether I can give you a better answer.

[The information referred to follows:]

EXCERPT FROM LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1976, TO SENATOR DICK CLARK FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY CONCERNING U.S. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN RECRUITMENT, TRAINING OR DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MERCENARIES INTO ANGOLA

Senator Percy asked the Secretary if the United States government is in any way involved in the recruitment, training or deployment of American mercenaries into Angola. The Secretary replied that we were not directly involved but that while he was not certain, he thought it was possible that some United States-provided funds might have been indirectly used by UNITA to recruit Americans and that he would verify this for the record. We have consulted with the Central Intelligence Agency and have been assured that no United States funds are being used directly or indirectly, to recruit, train or deploy American mercenaries and that the CIA has emphasized to both movements that it will not permit their use of any United States funds for such purposes.

Senator PERCY. I would appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I particularly asked the question as a matter of principle, Mr. Secretary, because I was startled last week when former Secretary Dean Rusk testified in answer to a question that I put to him in the Government operations area, when I asked him if he knew that while he was Secretary, what the CIA was doing that had a major impact on foreign policy. He said he thought at the time he was Secretary he did know, but he has subsequently learned he did not know things that they were undertaking that he should have known.

Do you feel today that you, in the light of everything that has transpired, that you do know and are personally acquainted with everything of a major nature affecting foreign policy that the CIA or any other intelligence unit is carrying on of a covert nature or an overt nature abroad?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would like to say first of all that all of these investigations have created a somewhat misleading impression of what is going on now. Since 1969, the number of covert operations has been reduced by at least 50 percent, and probably by more, so it is not that there are an enormous number of covert operations going on, and, of course, under present circumstances, any President would have to think extremely seriously in weighing the dangers of exposure before he undertakes any.

I also believe that there is an area between an overt diplomacy and military action which precisely as military conflicts become less likely and less possible, for which it is important to retain the capability for covert action. I am confident that I know of intelligence activities that bear on foreign policies. That does not mean that an occasional minor event might not occur, that I was not aware of but I would think that all major things bearing on foreign policy I would be familiar with.

Senator PERCY. Do you feel that the removal of your title in the White House in the National Security Council has in any way impaired your ability to get access to that information and your right to know?

Secretary KISSINGER. No; I do not believe it has. I think, incidentally, with respect to your previous question, Senator Percy, that we have asked the Justice Department to investigate the cases which you have mentioned in order to determine just who the parent organization is for this recruiting and that this investigation is now underway.

U.S. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN ANGOLA

Senator PERCY. Finally, on American involvement, can you tell us how much up until December 31 of last year the U.S. Government has

spent in Angola in that calendar year, and how much you would like to spend if you had a unilateral decision on this matter in Angola, directly or indirectly, that is through any neighboring countries how much you would like to spend if you had the unilateral power to spend it, authorize, appropriate, and spend it this year? What would be your judgment as to the right amount for us to spend in that area?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator Percy, these figures we have not stated publicly in the past, but they have been in the press so much. The amounts that had been set aside prior to December were something like \$32 million. We were asking for another \$28 million. Let me explain the strategy we were pursuing in December. In December we wanted to bring about a military balance, or to put the Soviet Union and Cuba into a position where they could overcome the equilibrium which was foreseeable from those sums, only by a level of magnitude that would clearly threaten other relationships. We were accompanying this with parallel diplomatic efforts to structure an OAU resolution that both of us could support, designed to get all foreign intervention out.

We had some hopes and considerable confidence, in fact, that by the end of January this process might be accomplished. This is why we thought \$28 million was enough for that purpose and why the relationship in the balance of forces to which the chairman referred in his opening statement would apply more to a protracted conflict than to what we had in mind.

Now, under present circumstances, where the Cubans have doubled their military force since the middle of December and where the Soviet Union now has taken public positions which they never took before, it would probably require a considerably larger effort and, therefore, I have stated the problem of overt assistance in a much more tenuous way. I do not think it is in our national interest to produce another confrontation between the executive and the Congress on this issue, and what we have in mind of doing is to sit down with a number of the key members of both Houses of the Congress with the figures as they appear to us, and see what they think before we make a formal request, and I am not prepared to make a formal request today.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, we have a vote on the floor. I will just put these two questions to you whenever my turn comes again.

What is China's role today, and what has caused them to bring about a change in that policy, if they have, and what was Mr. Brezhnev's response—when you put it to him as forcefully as you must have—as to the effect that it would have upon our relationship with the Soviet Union if they persisted in this policy of overt intervention in Angola?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I will answer this after the vote, or do you want me to answer it now?

Senator PERCY. We will come right back. I think it is Senator Case's turn. I will just hold those questions off until the next round.

Secretary KISSINGER. All right, I will answer it later.

Senator CLARK. We will take a very brief recess. I think one of the members of the committee will be back in a few minutes and we will begin then.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. The meeting will come to order. This is my only chance to be chairman, Mr. Secretary, so I might as well get started.

Secretary KISSINGER. I thought you said you did not have any questions.

Senator BIDEN. No, no; I said I had some observations, but a few questions if I may.

CONGRESSIONAL—EXECUTIVE CONSULTATIONS

They have asked me to continue the questioning so that we are able to let you go as quickly as we possibly can. I am fascinated by your appeal to the authority of the Congress throughout your statement, that is, by us, the failure of the Congress earlier on to take strong opposition that led the administration to assume we agreed with you. Was that the implication in the statement; that by failure for us to vocally express opposition at the beginning, you assumed acquiescence on our part to help you in moving a policy decision on your part?

Secretary KISSINGER. The problem of congressional oversight is complex because on the one hand, this field has generally been considered one of executive prerogative in which the Congress exercises a general supervision, but not necessarily approval of each individual action. And indeed, I would say as we evolve our relationship between the executive and the Congress, the interplay between the day-to-day supervision and the general policy supervision is one that requires a great deal of attention.

The fact is that our perception was that we felt we had an obligation to the national interest to begin doing what we thought was the right course; that we thought that if we met what seemed to us opposition in principle, that would lead to profound divisions, we would then have an opportunity early in the effort to assess that. Either because those who were briefed did not understand what we wanted, what we had in mind, or because they were uncharacteristically reticent, we did not get the impression that there was an opposition in principle of a magnitude that would cause the Congress simply to shut the thing off in the middle.

I did not mean to imply that every single Senator who was being briefed agreed. We knew that Senator Clark had a different view. But I would distinguish between the objections he took which were expressed in an amendment that really was quite compatible with what we thought could evolve, and a flat cutoff of future funds.

Senator BIDEN. I understand better what you are saying. I have some substantive questions—at least, I hope they are substantive. But before I proceed with them, I would like to state at one point that you gave the sequence of events regarding the congressional briefings as you saw it. I would like you to have the benefit of knowing what I saw from the other side. Maybe you could understand my concern better then.

As early as July, I believe, Mr. Ingersoll briefed the subcommittee and I think you have the date. I am not sure what the date was, but sometime in July.

Secretary KISSINGER. We have a list attached to the—

Senator BIDEN. I am informed that this particular one, July 28, was not on the list that you submitted. But, at any rate, regardless of when it was, or when they were, the first time I heard about our involvement in Angola in any manner at all, was sometime around that time. It was relatively small at that time.

The stated objectives were different than the stated objectives at subsequent meetings that we had, as were the amounts of money which were said to be intended to be put in there. My recollection is—and I do not have any notes in front of me—the amount was something under \$10 million, the first time I was briefed; and I was told then the likelihood of it going beyond that amount was just inconceivable. We just had no intention of being involved beyond that. We did not see it. We saw that as a cutoff point.

Without necessarily trying to elicit a response, from my standpoint what it looked like the first time I was told it was something which I stated then on the record an objection to, but it was something of a magnitude that did not seem to be very, very broad. And our major concern at that time expressed at the meeting was one of whether or not, in light of the CIA investigations, it was smart policy for you to conduct covert activity, and what impact that would have domestically, if that came out.

The second area of discussion was what South Africa was going to be doing. No; South Africa was not going to be any part of this. We had no knowledge at that time apparently of their interest in being involved. So we were not going to "be embarrassed" by South Africa. But that is the character in which the briefings and discussions were cast.

Then Senator Clark and I, newer members of the committee, were the only ones initially briefed about Angola. Quite frankly, speaking for myself, I was not sure and I am still not sure—I am sure it will become clear—how to handle a CIA briefing or a State Department briefing that is labeled classified when you object vehemently. I mean, what do you do? Do you walk out and say I object?

I am not sure how you go about that. I am learning but I was not sure then. And believe it or not, Mr. Secretary, I do not believe in leaks. I think that is a hell of a way to do business and I will never do that, as evidenced by a couple of reporters who asked me afterward what was said at an executive meeting and I would not tell them.

But the point being: I was at a loss myself as knowing how to handle it; and I assume that will come with experience. But from one member's viewpoint, that is how it looked: (1) There was hardly any involvement and an assurance by the executive branch that there would be no substantial increase in that involvement; (2) that there was no way it would be found out, so there would be no domestic embarrassment, or they did not see the possibility of it because of the amounts and the manner in which they were being shipped in; and (3) there was no likelihood of any embarrassment as a consequence of any association with South Africa, which some of us believe—I guess most of us believe—to have a despicable policy with regard to blacks.

At any rate, I just wanted you to have that perspective. Now, as I understand your statement, and I am going to try to summarize it and

see if I understand the thrust of what you are saying, when the point came that the U.S.S.R. and Cuba intervened on a major scale, we moved from bicycle diplomacy to arms diplomacy. Only as a consequence of their massive intervention and the losses on the part of the factions which they were not backing, did we feel that we needed to escalate our activity.

Then it seems to me that you went on to say that number one, this is a civil war, is that correct? Do we understand that?

Secretary KISSINGER. It was a civil war until the Soviet Union and Cuba escalated their roles to the point where almost all of the fighting on one side is done by the Cuban forces.

Senator BIDEN. OK.

U.S. ECONOMIC, STRATEGIC INTEREST IN ANGOLA

Also I think you said that there is no, at least, overwhelming economic or strategic interest which the United States has in Angola.

Secretary KISSINGER. There is no unilateral preferred position that the United States seeks in Angola. The United States could live with any Angolan Government that emerges out of the Angolan process.

Senator BIDEN. For example, in terms of our strategic and economic interest, if South Africa had been the one to take the role which Cuba and the Soviets have taken, we would not feel as compelled to be there, would we? Or any other country but the Soviet Union?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have to answer this in two parts. If South Africa had played that role, it would have not had the global impact that a Soviet and Cuban action had. But it would have had a very profound African impact and therefore we would certainly have opposed—and very strongly opposed—a unilateral South African intervention on the grounds that it would have undermined the moderate African governments like Zambia's if Angola were turned into a South African outpost. So we would have opposed it for different reasons. But dealing with South Africa we would have had a less international confrontation. It would have been a more manageable confrontation.

Senator BIDEN. The point I am trying to get to is that the global impact that this has, that you feel calls for at least in this situation our involvement in terms of backing militarily, not in terms of troops or advisers, but in terms of dollars, another faction. You go at great length and I think lay out very succinctly your well-known view with regard to what American interests are vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and what the free world's chances are vis-a-vis the U.S. involvement in the conflict.

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, my view with respect to the Soviet Union is a dual track. One I have always believed very strongly that we must seek to improve relations and not base our relations on traditional patterns of diplomacy because those in the past have always led to war. But I also believe that the policy of relaxation of tensions can succeed only from a position in which the security of all parties is assured, and in which neither side seeks to impose a unilateral advantage on the other. So that is a somewhat complex approach.

Senator BIDEN. I believe it is a complex approach. But ultimately, are you not describing the theory that peace is indivisible? Where in

fact, the Soviet Union is—in whatever way—causing the elimination of the state of peace or being involved in a confrontation that our security rests upon our countering their actions.

Secretary KISSINGER. I would make a distinction between the situations such as Vietnam in which there were substantial indigenous forces and indigenous organizations from a situation in which you are essentially dealing with a foreign intervention at very large and very long distances in areas in which there have been no traditional Soviet, not to speak of Cuban interests. In that respect I do believe that peace is indivisible; that is to say that if the Soviet Union perceives that it is free to project its influence by military means, unopposed, that then we will live in a world of great instability.

I am not saying that political competition will not go on. Of course it will. And we have been engaging in political competition in many areas of the world. But the whole effort of the policy of relaxation of tensions has been to limit the scope of this competition to political and perhaps to economic means until it could be turned into a more positive relationship. But if military means become again the accepted standard, then eventually all international restraints will disappear. That is my concern.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up.

I would like to pursue that in several other areas, if we can get to another round of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator CLARK [presiding]. Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, you have argued here this morning that the strategic significance of Angola is really not at issue; that is, the important question is how the U.S. response affects our credibility as a world power. Is that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would say that there is some strategic significance to Angola. And it is certainly a different world from the one that existed many years ago when one looks at the emerging string of Soviet bases or areas they can use on both sides of the African continent. But my order of priorities, the concern is the overall impact on the nature of the world in which we live if these methods are permitted to continue.

Senator MCGOVERN. Do you think our Ambassador to the U.N. might have slightly overstated the strategic significance of an MPLA victory when he said it would jeopardize freedom of the seas, and constitute a threat to Brazil?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I am trying to reduce the flow of communications to the State Department. I am trying to keep controversies to one a week. [Laughter.]

I would have put my order of priorities in terms of the impact on the world equilibrium first and the strategic impact second; although I would not deny that there is a strategic impact too.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN FORMULATING FOREIGN POLICY

Senator MCGOVERN. In your statement, Mr. Secretary, you said "I must note with some sadness that by its actions, the Congress has deprived the President of indispensable flexibility in formulating a foreign policy which we believe to be in our national interest."

I think from what you told us here today and other things that you have said to members of the Foreign Relations Committee that that is a matter of overriding concern with you, is it not?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I believe, Senator, leaving aside all of the disputes on specific policies on which serious people can differ, that the essence of foreign policy is design, timing, proportion, which requires above all continuity and some overriding conception and with all respect the Congress is better organized to take individual decisions than to emphasize those qualities. And how to reconcile those two objectives, seems to me one of our big national problems right now. I believe a strong foreign policy requires Executive authority.

Now how that is related to congressional supervision is one that we should work out together.

Senator MCGOVERN. I think the problem of your sadness over Congress depriving you of some flexibility, Mr. Secretary, is based on the fact that history did not begin with Angola.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is true.

Senator MCGOVERN. And the experience of the Congress in granting too much flexibility has been an enormous disaster in Indochina that almost destroyed the credibility of the United States. Here we really have a posture statement from you that is a carefully thought out position by the administration that the credibility of the United States as a power in the world is really what is at stake here. But I think many Members of the Congress who are reluctant to give you the flexibility that you ask for are basing that on a bitter historic experience.

Secretary KISSINGER. And I understand it. It is clear the pendulum had gone too far in the direction of Executive authority and that led to decisions that were tragic. The danger now is that the pendulum will swing too far the other way for very understandable reasons. But we will be judged not by how well we understand the causes of our actions, but whether we can develop a mode of national action that is relevant to our problem and whether we can transcend the past sufficiently to find the proper balance between the need for Executive authority and the need for congressional supervision.

I am not arguing for a return to the situation that you have described. But I am also extremely concerned about the tendencies that have, however understandably, developed over the course of recent years as a result of the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and its aftermath. And I think it is a major national problem to find the proper balance between Executive authority and congressional supervision in the period in which we live.

CONFLICTING STATEMENTS CONCERNING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Senator MCGOVERN. I think, Mr. Secretary, it is not simply a matter of finding a proper balance on procedure. It is also a question of judgment as to what the foreign policy of the United States ought to be.

Secretary KISSINGER. Certainly.

Senator MCGOVERN. You said a while ago, although it is not in your prepared statement and I hope I am not misquoting you, that you feel that our country has now reached a consensus that we should not be involved in so-called wars of liberation that are basically of

an indigenous quality. I think that you were drawing that as a central lesson from Vietnam; that it is, in retrospect, a mistake for us to have been so heavily involved there.

How do you square that with the fact that as recently as a year ago you and the President were here before the Congress pleading for another billion dollars in arms to try to determine the outcome of that indigenous struggle in Southeast Asia? Or that as recently as this week, the last Ambassador out there says it is the fault of Congress that Saigon fell. He was your representative in Saigon; the last man to leave there. Yet he is testifying before the Congress that had it not been for the Vietnam Resources Center influencing the Congress, that we would probably be still standing out there for the cause of freedom in Saigon.

How do you square that with the conclusion that you give us today, that we have learned our lesson in Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Last year we had two problems: One was that the military actions that were then taking place in South Vietnam involved—I forget the figures now—either 18 out of 20 of the North Vietnamese divisions—I know that all except 2 of the existing North Vietnamese divisions were sent into the South in total violation of the Paris accords that we had signed in 1973 with North Vietnam that many other countries had endorsed. So what we were facing there was, if not outside aggression, at least the total violation of an armistice agreement that had been internationally recognized. Second, the decisions that we made, we faced last year at that time, involved also how the United States would conduct itself in what we generally recognize as probably the final phase of a national tragedy, and how the United States should bring this tragedy to an end.

And the real difference at the time was between those who believed that we should make every effort to give ourselves the maximum opportunity to evacuate the largest number of Vietnamese and to evacuate the Americans there under conditions of maximum safety, or whether we should simply terminate all of the assistance. I believe that—I think in the briefings that I gave at the time in executive session to many congressional committees—I made clear that we had few illusions about the probable outcome of the military operations that were then going on, and that we were then rather concerned about another matter.

Now, with respect to assessing who is to blame and at what phase of that operation, I do not feel that that is an exercise in which we should now engage. One can always find individual decisions which have caused particular events, but it is the overall effort that has to be judged.

Senator MCGOVERN. My time is up, Mr. Secretary. I am not interested in trying to make any individual assessment of blame either. I believe in amnesty for all concerned in that miserable war. I do think, however, that we have to understand that the reluctance of Congress to provide a free hand in Angola or elsewhere is related to history and that this is not something that is going to be cured overnight.

Secretary KISSINGER. And a free hand is not what is needed anyway: But a greater degree of confidence in long-range purposes must be established over a period of time.

Senator CLARK. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think these are very important hearings. I would like to pick up where Senator McGovern was discussing basic questions with you. I do think, if I may say so before getting into that, most of your statement—and it is a very broad statement and a very comprehensive one—is pretty much threshing old straw. Your complaint—you had told Congress as much as they needed to know on many occasions, and the fact that you regarded your disclosures in effect as stopping them from complaining because they did not complain at the time, your feelings that if we had not intervened in December you could have carried it out successfully—we accept or understand how you feel about this.

We happen to disagree. That is all. I do not want to get into threshing that old straw again. I do want to get to the point of our purposes and yours of some rather basic questions. First of all, I will leave aside the technical matter of supervision and oversight. That is being dealt with in other areas. This committee is deeply interested in having an input and we will I am sure. But that is not before us at the meeting today. What is before us is this question of your belief about the need for the President to have flexibility. This is very basic.

I would like to put out the possibility that in this country that is not what we are supposed to have. That is the difference between the United States of America and everything that has gone before it. I am not sure that I would say this, but I think it needs to be admitted as a hypothesis in our thinking and in our efforts to get together. That hypothesis has several consequences. One is that you should never get into an active opposition to a foreign country without doing it in the open. It does not always have to be an act of war and therefore does not always have to have congressional approval under the Constitution.

But anything that involves money, I think, should be done in the open.

I am not yielding to the Russians' constant probing to find the weak spots. I think we ought to answer that in an open way. The flexibility of the kind that you discuss, which implies the ability of the administration to deal with covert activity, just telling a few Members of Congress, getting approval, I think all that is fine, but that does not answer the question. The real question is whether the American people are going to be involved in responses of a serious nature. I think that is a very basic question.

We have to meet it here. I think it is involved. I wish you would comment on this because I do think that in this country we have a different kind of animal from the kind of governmental and sovereign state, and an operation in the world than ever went before it, and this is really what is, in a sense, involved here. Are the people going to continue to do what the founding fathers—and I do not apologize for using that quaint, old expression—thought that this country was all about.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, if you look at American history, I think you will find that in the field of foreign policy the President, since the days of the founding fathers, has exercised really unusual discretion, from the Monroe Doctrine to many of the—

Senator CASE. But, you see, that was openly stated. The world got it. The people got it. They could support it, or they could object to it at the time.

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes, but it was proclaimed before it was ratified by the Congress. It was stated as an American policy.

Senator CASE. Yes, stated, but stated openly, and this is what I am driving at.

Secretary KISSINGER. Let me differentiate the question of Executive discretion from the question of covert operations, which I will get to separately.

I believe an amount of Executive discretion is essential in the sense that somebody has to speak for the United States and when one conducts diplomacy, the expectation of other countries that the President or the Secretary of State, or whoever is designated to speak for the United States, can, in fact, deliver on the promises or the threats is essential for the role that the United States has set for itself.

Now, a wise President or Secretary of State will make certain to get the congressional approval and the public support that he can muster, and, therefore, the idea that foreign policy can be designed in total secrecy and carried out without anybody's knowledge is one that is incompatible with our tradition, and I think if we look over the actions of either Presidents or Secretaries of State, a great effort is devoted to, maybe not enough, to gaining congressional and public support for policies.

Now, there are areas of policy which are peculiar to the modern period, express in the area of covert operations, which present peculiar difficulties because when publicly avowed, they can either lead to extreme complexities or become totally unmanageable. Yet, they occur in an area where, first, our opponents are active and, second, one that has become, because of the particular aspects of the modern period, especially vulnerable.

We have not yet found a good solution for the handling of covert operations. The committees that were briefed were not selected by the administration. They were established by the Congress last year. It was not the administration which selected whom to brief on Angola. It was the Congress which had established these particular procedures to which we adhere.

Now, that, I admit, presents problems which we have to consider. On the basic problem of public support and congressional support for foreign policy, I believe that on these main purposes of foreign policy, the fundamental objective, the fundamental commitment, there has to be total disclosure. On the day-to-day tactics, a certain amount of confidentiality is necessary until at least a point of potential decision is reached, at which, again, the processes of the Congress and of the public must operate.

So, it is very hard to draw any absolute distinction, but all democracies in history have had the problem of how to reconcile their democratic procedures with the need for authority, especially in the field of foreign policy, and it is one to which there is no easy answer.

Senator CASE. I understand that, of course, but I did not want to get too deeply into detail, even in questions as to what the next step is, which we will be very glad to get your recommendation on. Your only

new point was that you might consider recommending overt assistance. That has not become a recommendation at this point, so I did not question you about it.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think the chairman will confirm that I was asked to explain the reasons for our Angolan policy, and that I responded.

Senator CASE. Oh, yes; I agree. I think it has been most helpful to have you here and also to give us a chance to explain to you what we think it looks like from our side, and I emphasize that we are of the same opinion still as to the wisdom of the action the Senate took, and just one other point before I go to vote.

I do not feel that the policy is necessary, but that the situation was not the same in July as it was later in December.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator CASE. And that a failure to make overt objection, particularly when we are under the restriction of secrecy to what was proposed in July, I never felt, and do not still feel that it stopped us from objecting in December, when we all knew what the situation was. That is all.

Secretary KISSINGER. Let me make clear. I am not saying that Members of the Congress who failed to object at earlier periods had no right to object in December. That is not my concern. My concern is that at a time when we were in the middle of a diplomatic operation, which we believed would take another 6 weeks to complete, whether another means could have been found, or whether enough time could have been given to complete this regardless of whether Members of Congress had previously expressed their view, but, in any event, this is now in the past and not a great deal is gained by going over it. But I agree, for example, that Senator Biden's account of what we presented in July is essentially what our perception of it was in July, and that the magnitude of the Soviet effort and the lengths to which the Soviet Union was prepared to go were not clear to us until later in October, so that therefore we did not agree.

Senator CASE. And that led to deterioration on the other side, too.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Sorry, I have to run off now.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, I understand that Senator Pell and Senator Javits have not asked questions yet, and that they are on their way. I do not know if you can stay.

Secretary KISSINGER. I can stay another 20 minutes or so.

Senator BIDEN. They're on their way. They should be here shortly. If I could pursue the line of questioning that I have followed before until they arrive, with regard to the destabilizing effect of Angola dominated by an MPLA, dominated by the Soviet Union—

Secretary KISSINGER. May I make a distinction here, Senator?

Senator BIDEN. Yes, please.

Secretary KISSINGER. It is not that the United States cannot survive in an Angola dominated by the MPLA and even an MPLA dominated by the Soviet Union, it is rather the principle that is established that the Soviet Union has, in effect, imposed with 11,000 Cuban troops a government in such a country, and that, as a result, other countries

threatened with the potentiality or the actuality of similar intervention might adjust their policies to it. That concerns us the most.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. I will yield to Senator Pell.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

Mr. Secretary, I think Senator McGovern mentioned the past is obviously prologue to the future. I repeat that past statement, and I asked the Library of Congress to look into the record of Soviet intervention abroad since World War II. These are figures that you know better than I, but there have been 20 nations throughout the world where the Soviets have, rather than succeeded, failed, to either maintain or to expand their influence. In Africa alone, you have the events that took place, and I will read a list: Zaire, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Mali, Egypt, and the Sudan, all areas where the Soviets had a reasonably dominant influence at one point, and all areas where they were pushed back.

It would seem to me that in this case where we all agree there is no strategic or immense American national interest involved, that if the Soviets did move into Angola, did succeed in having a dominant role, did bleed themselves dry in their efforts to do this and in other parts of the world, that the force of African nationalism is such that in a very few years the Soviets would find that the result would be that Angola would be added to that list of African nations in which they have been pushed out.

Why is this not, looking ahead into the future—and you, I know, are much more of an historian than I am—in all probability the scenario that will develop if we just sit back and let the Soviets hang themselves?

Secretary KISSINGER. First of all, going through your list of countries, in Zaire, the Soviet Union was not pushed out without some efforts by the United States. In Egypt, it was at least the surrounding policy of the United States that had some effect on Egyptian perceptions of the utility of sole reliance on the Soviet Union. In the other countries you mentioned we are talking about Soviet diplomatic influence that had been achieved through economic aid, in some cases through military aid, but through normal exercises of state-to-state relationships, and while we were not happy with it this was not a matter which we would feel would require the active opposition of the United States.

What we face, however, in Angola—and, if, as I have said before, the MPLA had come to power in Angola the way that FRELIMO came to power in Mozambique, it, again, would not have provoked any significant American response. What concerns us in Angola is that we are facing 11,000 combat troops in a country like Angola. That is a massive force. That is a larger force than the entire MPLA possessed at this time last year. I think in December 1974 they had 4,000; in March they went up to 10,000, and there are more Cubans there now than the entire MPLA had in its forces by the middle of the year. That is a military intervention of a significant kind.

EXTENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION ASSESSMENT

Senator PELL. Could I interrupt for 1 second there? In connection with those figures, you mentioned the 11,000 Soviet-Cuban troops, and earlier you mentioned \$200 million. Would other intelligence services agree with your assessment as to the extent of that intervention?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would think so. I have no independent means of checking that, but I have never seen these figures contested. The sum we now have for total equipment is about \$179 million. It is not quite \$200 million. Therefore, whatever happens to the Soviet influence there eventually, it is the mere fact that they were prepared to go to these lengths to install a government that must affect the calculations of countries like Zaire, Zambia, all of the francophone states, as well as countries in Europe and in Asia, and we have considerable evidence to that.

Second, if you look at the evolution of Soviet influence in Africa, it is true they have lost in some countries where they had been powerful, but it is also true that if you compare their situation today to what it was 20 years ago, they have been able to sustain an airlift into Angola by using bases in Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, and elsewhere, and that, too, is a fact. If you look at the secular trend that, too, is a reality.

Finally, what we wanted to do in Angola is to make it as costly as possible for them, along the lines that you suggested, to discourage future adventures of a similar kind.

Senator PELL. What I am trying to understand more clearly is the order of priorities because last year in Portugal the Soviets were engaged pretty heavily financially, if not with manpower, and in the early 1970's, they certainly were engaged in Egypt where they had SAM [surface to air missile] missiles directed at our ally Israel and also where they had in excess of 20,000 soldiers and, yet, we did not feel compelled to bring this to the point of almost confrontation that the administration would like to do in this case. What would be the difference, and, incidentally, I can add, thank God we did not interfere in Portugal because the good sense of the Portuguese have handled the situation themselves, apparently, for the time being at least.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well one reason we did not want to make this an overt action is precisely to avoid a public confrontation and to permit a solution of it without bringing it to the point of open confrontation, and we would have far preferred to handle the situation in Angola similar to that of Portugal, in which a combination of the expressions of our concerns, plus whatever advice we were able to give, helped improve the climate.

I would say, however, as a general rule, that the attempt to expand the Soviet sphere has been more effectively centered when the United States made it clear where the lines were and found itself in a position to take an action relevant to the local situation.

Senator PELL. You think that philosophy or viewpoint which is absolutely correct, in the years that I was an employee of your Department and living in Eastern Europe and it was correct in the 1940's and 1950's, still applies in the 1970's and 1980's?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would hope that the policy of relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union reaches a point where the proposition

will not have to be tested, but if, in fact, the policy is disregarded to a point, as it has in Angola, I would think it applies, yes.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Senator CLARK [presiding]. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

POLICY OF HELPING WEAK NATIONS RESIST AGGRESSION

Mr. Secretary, one thing strikes me very sharply about your statement. The challenge, it seems to me, the fundamental policy of the United States is this: You used the words "only if Soviet lack of restraint carries the risk of counteraction."

If you then also follow this further on in your statement—and I only use the specifics because the thoughts are very clearly in your mind, you will see again a kind of summation of that view. "A demonstration of a lack of resolve could lead the Soviets to a great miscalculation, thereby plunging us into a major confrontation which neither of us wants."

Is it your belief and that of the administration policy that wherever the Soviet Union moves hastily, as it did in Angola, we must commit ourselves to counter it, that we must back up with whatever is necessary to let the Soviets know they cannot get away with it by using Cuban troops? So the question I ask you is, Is it the administration's view that we must counter, whatever it takes, a hostile move by the Soviets where it affects—and I will take your definition—a people who simply cannot resist them and will be overwhelmed and will thereby be governed by some form of Communist state?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it is certainly the administration's view that the Soviet Union must not be given any assurance that it can use its military forces in an aggressive way without running the risk of encountering the United States. Whether what we will precisely do in each circumstance, that I am not prepared to say, but we must certainly discourage the proposition that the Soviet Union has the right to deploy its military forces into other parts of the world or use the military forces of its client states in an aggressive manner without serious risks because, if we do not do this, we will sooner or later find a situation either of miscalculation or of such an erosion of restraint where we will then have to take much more drastic action under much more serious circumstances.

IS EQUAL CONSIDERATION NECESSARY?

Senator JAVITS. Does that action necessarily have to be action equal to what the Soviet Union takes? In other words, they are moving with material, military material, and troops who are their agents. Must we counteract in that place with military material and some form of military force if nothing else will do?

Secretary KISSINGER. That depends on the local situation. We have to react in some relevant form to the provocation. It is hard to predict from case to case, and I would not insist on one rule for all circumstances.

Senator JAVITS. For example, Cuba has just been readmitted to the OAS [Organization of American States] in a sense. She was

readmitted because she seemed to be having relatively peaceful intentions toward Latin America, no more Che Guevara activities. Now Cuba has materially endangered the peace of the world, and extraordinary action, not unequivocal to what brought on the 1962 crisis, at which Kennedy called the turn on the Soviet Union and Khrushchev turned his ships around.

Why should we not lean on the OAS and on the whole inter-American system to throw out Cuba?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, technically Cuba has not been readmitted to the OAS. Technically what the OAS has done was to vote to ratify its existing practice which was that any state in the hemisphere had the right to reestablish relations with Cuba at its own discretion. But it has not readmitted, Cuba has not been readmitted specifically to the OAS. The problem we have—it is our impression—and I would be interested also to get the Senator's impression from his trip to Latin America—that several Latin American States are profoundly concerned about—

Senator JAVITS. Excuse me, just 1 second, please.

I am sorry, please proceed. How much time do you have, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary KISSINGER. At most 10 more minutes.

They are profoundly concerned about Cuban actions and what it may foreshadow in the Western Hemisphere. At the same time there are also many countries that for their own domestic reasons, their own sense of security, may not be prepared to make great public declarations about this. I am planning to go to Latin America next month and I will get a better sense of the real point of view in Latin America at that time. But I already know of several Latin American countries that are profoundly concerned about what is going on with Cuban forces in Africa.

ALLY SUPPORT FOR U.S. POSITION

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, my own impression, and I have just been there—as you know—is that you would probably find the same division in Latin America that you found with the Organization of Africa Unity, about even. It is my considered judgment that the United States should nonetheless denounce what is being done, consider a motion that the OAS revoke its favorable action toward Cuba, and have it out. I think that is one of the things we are learning, that if we are going to be outvoted, then we might as well do it fighting for what we think is right.

Second, Mr. Secretary, is the same thing not true of NATO? NATO has assiduously avoided the proposition that anything outside the NATO geography is its business. Now I know Europe is very weakened and very worried about oil, but it, too, can stand up stronger than it has. And I will tell you this; as one Senator who voted against American involvement in Angola, if we had had any help, if we had had the least demonstration that others were with us, you might have gotten a very different result.

But the fact is that I think the Congress: this is just my own feeling as one Senator, has just about had it with the proposition that it is up to us; everybody will hold our coat, but we have to do it alone. Now, somehow or other that nut has to be cracked and it will never

be cracked unless we stand up to it because we are the leader. Whatever our decriers may say everywhere, and even the Secretary's testimony emphasizes that, we remain the leader. They all look to us.

Secretary KISSINGER. In defense of our NATO allies, I must say that I met with the NATO Council in the early part of December and there was a very large amount of support for the policies we were then pursuing, and some, I would say, not announced assistance, not announced for the same reason that we were trying to keep our support covert at that time. I must say again, last week when I briefed the NATO Council upon my return from Moscow, I found 13 of the 15 foreign ministers came to Brussels, which was an unusual demonstration of solidarity, and I would think that the basic analysis that I have presented here as to the nature of the Angola problem would be shared by the overwhelming majority of my colleagues in NATO.

We are the leaders and we have a special responsibility.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I think what is coming through the world is that we wish to be joined with others in our special responsibility, as you call it. It seems that the premise in their minds is that they can tell us sotto voce, or in the privacy of the chancery, that they are with us, as so many Asian nations did during the Vietnam war, but they had better find out that that does not work anymore.

Just as Senator Case made the strong point with you that for good or ill, Congress is asserting a constitutional authority which it has not asserted in years, it is my judgment that the public wants our people to take the lead of making it overt instead of covert. There are lots of advantages to making it covert. The Russians demonstrate that.

But that is not our ball game. Our allies are going to have to make their support overt also. They have to realize that they will have to declare themselves with us and that the quiet conversation will not do.

Secretary KISSINGER. But again, I really have to say in defense of our NATO allies, who for the first time in a long time have been supporting us, the British Foreign Minister, the German Foreign Minister, the French Prime Minister, all made public statements last week very much along the lines of what I am saying here.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

There appears to have been some doubt on the degree of support our Angolan position has received from our NATO allies. Enclosed are statements by President Giscard d'Estaing of France, British Foreign Secretary Callaghan and the report of a speech by German Foreign Minister Genscher which are representative of the public position taken by our allies. In addition, declarations made privately within NATO by our principal allies demonstrate a concern similar to our own with this attempt by the Soviet Union to establish themselves by force in this new area.

STATEMENT BY FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING ON JANUARY 7, 1976

The French Government condemns the massive shipment of war material, and, even more, of foreign troops which for several weeks has been openly observed in Angola. It requests that it end. The continuation of such an intervention would create a situation of permanent tension and division in Africa, destroying the climate of peace which until now had accompanied independence, and would divert this continent from its primary task of development.

STATEMENT BY BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN ON JANUARY 7, 1976

At the end of this week, the Organization of African Unity will begin a meeting of the Council of Ministers and then of the Heads of State which will have an important bearing on the future of Angola. Her Majesty's Government has,

on a number of occasions, welcomed the efforts which the OAU has devoted to the difficult problem of Angola and wishes the coming meetings every success.

For their part, Her Majesty's Government has been following with close attention and increasing concern the fighting in Angola which has caused heavy loss of life, much human misery and considerable damage to the economy of Angola. Her Majesty's Government has consistently opposed the intervention of all foreign armed forces in Angola and has made strong representations to governments involved. In order to prevent further bloodshed and destruction, and to give all the people of Angola an opportunity to determine their own future freely without outside intervention, Her Majesty's Government calls for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces and the ending of supplies of weapons and military material.

REPORT OF THE STATEMENT BY GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ON JANUARY 23, 1976 (PART OF AN UNCLASSIFIED CABLE FROM THE AMERICAN CONSULATE, BREMEN, GERMANY)

Genscher said firmly that the FRG cannot remain indifferent when attempts are being made in Africa to supplant classical colonialism with a form of "ideological colonialism." Detente, he said, was being threatened by direct and indirect interventions designed to carve out new spheres of influence in the Third World. He admonished that the countries of the Third World should beware that they did not win their freedoms from old dependence only to fall prey to new ones.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I am very glad to learn that. You have indicated that perhaps they gave us some actual help too.

But as I say, I think these are not black and white. It ought to be clear that one of the reasons why there is a sense of hesitation on the part of Congress is that we simply feel that it is high time that there be a partnership for the responsibility, whether in blood or money it has got to be a partnership which encompasses sacrifice as well as moral support.

I can only say, Mr. Secretary, that nobody is more dedicated to these alliances than you are, and I feel exactly the same way. It has been my whole life. But I must recognize the fact now—our chairman would like me—oh, there he is—I would just like to ask one other question. I think too that there needs to be a clear understanding of this matter of reporting to or advising a small group in each committee, like our own committee. The Secretary has certain limitations as to the number of people he advises and I would like to introduce into the record, if I may, ask unanimous consent, section 662 the Foreign Assistance Act which specifies exactly what we desire the Department to do respecting the reporting of intelligence activities and to urge the Secretary in his coming discussions with our committee to come to an agreement between the Executive and the Congress.

[The information referred to follows:]

SECTION 662 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

Sec. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Activities.—(a) No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply during military operations initiated by the United States under a declaration of war approved by the Congress or an exercise of powers by the President under the War Powers Resolution.

Senator JAVITS. The Congress is asserting power and we have to have perhaps better procedures than we have had. I can understand the Secretary's feeling, having briefed so many. But the law says that in that regard he is to give us a description of what is being done. We found in Vietnam, where there was the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, that that was not enough. And so I hope very much that you will work on that with us.

And I would like to say finally that I thoroughly agree with the Secretary, with my colleagues, of our rehashing of history. We have all suffered. Both Congress and the Executive have made serious mistakes. But it is a watershed year, and I hope the President will find a way to communicate the fact to us, although it is a Presidential year and though he is a candidate. We are prepared and he must be prepared to make those decisions now because they simply will not wait.

Thank you, Senator.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

GLOBAL MONROE DOCTRINE

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, you have stated and restated the position with regard to the effect of nonmatching by the United States and the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. It seems to me, if I may be so bold, that you have restated a global Monroe Doctrine. You, in effect, said, as I understand it, only a Soviet lack of restraint carries the risk of counteraction and I quote that from that portion of your statement that was read by Senator Javits and from other portions of your statement.

For example, "When one great power attempts to obtain special positions of influence based on military interventions, the other power is sooner or later bound to act to offset this advantage in some other place or manner."

I am not sure, obviously, whether we are capable of extending the Monroe Doctrine globally. I do not know how it differs from that basic document that we relied on in the 19th century.

Secretary KISSINGER. I said in reply to a question of Senator Javits, that the United States should not say in advance what it would not do in the case of specific Soviet military movements. But the dilemma is that if we say that anything else out of Europe and Japan is open to Soviet military action, then we will be inviting that very military action. That will sooner or later create an international situation in which the overall balance is so shifted against us that it will either require the most massive exertions and turn us into a military garrison, or lead us into some sort of confrontation. That is not a doctrine in my view. That is a reality.

Senator BIDEN. But does that not assume, Mr. Secretary, that if in fact the Soviets exert influence on any part of the world, other than Europe or Japan, that it is going to tip that balance you are talking about? What difference does it make whether or not the Soviets—

Secretary KISSINGER. We are talking about the use of military force to achieve their aims.

Senator BIDEN. Even the use of military force. Now you are assuming the use of military force backed by Soviet dollars and/or troops.

There is no place in the world where that can be done where it is not going to at least begin to tip the balance.

Secretary KISSINGER. I do not want to say that there is no place, but I do not want to say in advance what the place is.

U.S. INTERESTS AT VARIOUS STAGES OF ANGOLAN SITUATION

Senator BIDEN. You do say in advance, do you not, that we must discourage the Soviet Union? This was Senator Javits' point, must that discouragement that you referred to only be one that dictates an equal amount of movement on the part of the United States. You say it depends on the local situation as to how much discouragement we are going to supply. But there is no possibility under your theory here, is there, for us to take no action?

I mean some action must be taken and it seems to me that maybe it might be better—it is very presumptuous of me in light of my aged 33 and lack of experience to suggest an alternative route, but I am going to do that because I'm elected in the same manner all Senators are. It seems to me it might be better for us to determine where our interests really are; leave our allies to understand that we are not backing out of the world; setting out what we can do and what we cannot do and setting about doing it; rather than getting into the situation like Angola.

For example, my recollection was refreshed while I heard the testimony today. The first time I sat down with the CIA in a briefing, and then later the State Department, the justification for the involvement in Africa had nothing to do with the Soviet Union at that point. That was a low priority as stated to me. The high priority was that there will be destabilization of Africa because friendly African States will feel that maybe we do not have the resolve to help them; specifically Zambia and Zaire were cited to me.

Then 2 months later I was told that the justification was our strategic interest and we heard at least a feeble attempt to backup that statement of the sealanes and Brazil and now we hear that the justification which I assume was all along the global consequences of our failure to exercise that bit of discouragement, whatever level of discouragement it is, in Angola, and almost anywhere else in the world. And that just leaves unanswered questions when you talk to us about the need for the Executive to be the prime mover of foreign policy, which I agree it must be.

But it does not answer questions when it is left that open ended as to how much, how long, what are the chances, and will we succeed, even if in fact your Monroe Doctrine extension is correct.

Since I do not have any more time, you do not have to answer. I just gave my little speech and want it on the record though.

I think this is, although a rational not a wise course of conduct to pursue either in Angola or anywhere else in the world if that is the imperative by which we operate.

Secretary KISSINGER. I would like to touch briefly on this problem.

First, the various briefings you received, leaving aside the addiction to a word which has entered common usage that I am not particularly fond of, it was a serious consideration for us in July and August of what the impact on Zaire and Zambia would be and it is perfectly

natural. These are key countries in Africa and anybody conducting foreign policy has to be concerned with them. At that point the level of Soviet intervention was very considerable but not yet as massive as it is today. And so it is quite possible that the relative priorities can be stated in different ways at different times.

The basic objectives have been substantially as described here.

Senator BIDEN. Some might argue that the statement of the original objective caused the action on the part of the Soviets which in turn required us to state a new objective and escalate our nations. I do not want to debate that with you now but at least some would state that and it should be noted.

Secretary KISSINGER. But I would disagree with it.

Senator BIDEN. I am sure you would.

U.S. WORLD INTERESTS

Secretary KISSINGER. With respect to the other questions; what are our American interests in the world? Of course we have to define our interests and of course we have to decide where to act and in what manner. But it is also true that the United States, as the most cohesive country in this free world, as the strongest country in the free world, has an obligation that reality imposes on it that cannot be expressed in doctrine or avoided by stating a counterdoctrine. Anybody conducting foreign policy will have to be judged by his perception of reality and by the degree he attempts to shape it.

We then will have to see whose perception was right. It is the view that I have expressed here; it is that if you take action at an early phase in the changes of equilibrium, you face a more ambiguous decision but a lesser investment. You always have the choice of waiting while the threat becomes overwhelming. In that case you will have gained inward assurance and you will have to pay a much higher price. Any nation can make that choice anywhere along the line.

Senator BIDEN. We start from the same basic premise, you and I, which may disturb you. If we continue with the course of exercising that obligation, we will by definition have eliminated the ability to fulfill that obligation. That is, we need to stay the strongest, we need to stay involved in the world. And it seems to me that we must decide, to use that trite phrase that became so much in vogue in the 1960's, the "policeman of the world." We are going to be sure that we aren't the strongest nation in the world; in fact, that we have lost some of our impact around the world among our allies in the free world.

Secretary KISSINGER. It depends what it is we are trying to police. I am not saying we have to police every situation. But we cannot be indifferent to the use of Soviet—

Senator BIDEN. In private sometime I would like to find out whether there is any place in the whole wide world where it would not make any difference.

My time is up.

Secretary KISSINGER. My difficulty is that I should have left half an hour ago.

Senator CLARK [presiding]. How would it be if Senator Percy and I agree to ask only one question each?

Secretary KISSINGER. Probably each will ask a devastating question. Senator CLARK. Not at all.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, that is in addition to the two that I left hanging beforehand, which can be answered in one or two words.

OFFSETTING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN MID-DECEMBER

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, I would like you to explain as precisely as you can what part of the \$28 billion that you requested for the use of Angola would have been used in mid-December to overcome, I think what you described at that time as almost \$200 million on behalf of the Soviets. Some 11,000 Cuban troops were there; 400 Russian advisers. What reason is there that our contributing \$28 million more, without technicians, without troops, would have really forced the Soviets into a coalition or brought about the stalemate that would have been necessary to do that?

Wasn't the \$28 million really only the beginning? Would that have really turned the situation around? I mean in your judgment.

Secretary KISSINGER. In my judgment, which I held at the time, one I did not invent afterward, in my judgment we were then on a course which would have had a good chance of resolution at the OAU meeting; perhaps not the most brilliant outcome in the world, but which would have restored the issue to essentially African dimensions and removed the superpowers from it. Had this failed, we would then have to decide—we would certainly not have been able to continue it as a covert operation—and we would then have had to decide what degree of overt involvement we would undertake in Angola; or whether we should bring pressures in some other way; or what position to take.

It was my judgment at the time—or my sense at the time that the possibility—if it appeared that no decisive victory could be achieved as a result of the October escalation of the Soviet Union and Cubans, that the possibility for negotiation existed.

Senator CLARK. As you look at the future, do you feel that even with that \$200 million, with the 11,000 troops and so forth—

Secretary KISSINGER. I look at the future now, that another escalation has occurred and that formal positions have been taken by the Soviet Union that were not taken prior to the middle of December. We have a much more difficult problem and I do not believe the \$28 million will do it now. Therefore I have stated the request for overt assistance in a much more cautious way.

Senator CLARK. And in that statement of the possibility of coming to Congress for overt aid, certainly you do not feel that additional funds would be enough, that you certainly could not offset troops and advisers and so forth only with money; that we could not absorb hundreds of millions of dollars.

Secretary KISSINGER. We would like to sit down with a number of the interested parties in the Congress and give them our assessment of the situation without at first making a recommendation; just so we can achieve a common assessment.

Senator CLARK. Senator Percy?

CHINESE ROLE IN ANGOLA; SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ATTITUDE

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask one other somewhat related question, if we could give you time now to respond on the questions before: China and its role, discussions you might have had in China with Premier Teng about their role, what their intentions are; and if it is true they have in a sense withdrawn, why did they choose to withdraw? And then the question of the reaction of the Soviets, Mr. Brezhnev, when you very forcefully made known to them what our attitude and feeling was on their role that they are playing now in the civil war in Angola.

Secretary KISSINGER. With respect to the Chinese, all I am prepared to say in a public session is that their role there is more complicated than appears from the public press: and that I do not believe that events there in Angola have been extremely encouraging to them.

With respect to the discussions with Mr. Brezhnev, I believe if the Soviet Union ever thought of accommodation, it could have done so only within the context of some balance of risks that seemed plausible to those who had initiated the action to begin with. That as the risks disappeared by our unilateral action, they had almost no basis for stopping what they were doing, which has clearly succeeded and perhaps had almost no basis for dealing with some of their client states.

And this is why these local balances are more complex than some of the questioning has perhaps implied.

Senator PERCY. Is there anything further that you could say about the Soviets?

Secretary KISSINGER. We have certainly made our view very clear. I hope very much that the Soviet Union will keep in mind the special responsibility two superpowers have to exercise restraints; and that upon further reflection of the conversations that we have had and the great issues at stake, that they may yet bring themselves to exercise the restraint that we feel the situation calls for.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUES

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, I will just take 30 seconds to ask you to reconsider your decision, and I do it in this open hearing with some regret because it is a subject that you and I have discussed on the telephone. Senator Ribicoff, John Glenn, and myself have written you twice. We have had startling testimony this morning and every day at these nuclear oversight hearings.

Dr. Lillienthal says he is glad he is as old as he is. Eminent witnesses this morning have testified within the foreseeable future that they can foresee an exchange of nuclear weapons and the danger of that. All of us feel so. I have a great respect for Secretary Ingersoll. We only urge that you reconsider your personal decision. The committee will make itself available any time, any day that you see fit to testify. I say that not only in the light of Angola, a terribly important problem, but in the light of history. I think this will be a very small problem, relatively speaking, compared with the position the

U.S. Government takes on proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.

Secretary KISSINGER. I am testifying practically every day for the next 2 weeks.

Senator PERCY. No Secretary has ever testified as frequently or made himself more available. That is the only single request that I have made.

Secretary KISSINGER. If you are not pressed for a particular time frame, so that we can do it, say, over the next 4 weeks sometime, I will undertake, if you will give me the time, to prepare a thoughtful statement that the subject requires. I think that the subject your committee is addressing is among the two or three that will most affect our future; the question of proliferation. I am intensely interested in it.

Senator PERCY. We are committed to report legislation concerning how we handle this by March 1 on the floor.

Secretary KISSINGER. The reason I declined was because my impression was it had to take place before February 6, and my schedule simply does not permit it before February 6, since I am testifying every day I am in town. But if you can extend it by a month and let me do it sometime in February or early March.

Senator PERCY. Sometime in February would be very helpful.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, there are several other questions that we will submit in writing.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY SENATOR CLARK

Question 1. You have testified that you may come back to Congress and ask us for millions more to offset the Soviets. In your judgment, can we overcome 11,000 Cuban troops and 400 Russian advisors without our similar involvement?

Answer. What would have been achieved by a commitment in December of less than \$30 million as both a demonstration of our will and as effective support in the field, would, of course, be much more difficult now with the number of Cubans so elevated and the battle lines so drastically altered. We have never sought to "overcome" the Cubans and Russians with our modest support but instead to achieve a balance on the ground that would lead to a negotiated settlement and the departure of all foreign forces. Equally, there has never been any intention of committing U.S. forces there to counteract the Soviets and Cubans.

Question 2. You have said—in several ways—that we cannot allow the Soviets and Cubans to succeed here. Aren't you saying that we must match any escalation, or are we simply going to threaten and back out?

Answer. I'm sure you'll agree that it's not our policy to make idle threats, and no credible foreign policy can be based on bluffing and posturing. We believed our covert operation, by mid-December, had succeeded in causing a reanalysis on the part of the Kremlin and, despite the presence of 5,000-6,000 Cuban troops at that time, had succeeded in achieving a very favorable military alignment. That credibility was lost when the Soviets realized the Congress would not support the Administration in a covert military program.

Question 3. Historically, African states have strived for non-alignment and have resented major power efforts to dictate their policies. For example, the Soviet Union gave generous assistance to the liberation struggle in Mozambique. But recently the Mozambique government refused the Soviet Union base privileges and publicly accused the Soviet Union of pushing too hard.

Agostinho Neto and Savimbi and Roberto told me that they believe Angola should be non-aligned. Angola is wealthy enough to preserve its independence of outside donors.

Even if the Soviet-backed faction wins in Angola, do you believe it is likely that the Soviet Union will gain a permanent foothold there?

Answer. I am familiar with the hypothesis which contends that in the long run African nationalist tendencies will reassert themselves in Angola, and force the Soviet and Cuban presence out. Perhaps. But this is no more than a hypothesis, which it is imprudent to count on to base our policy.

In any case, whatever the long run fate of Communist influence in Angola, the Soviets will be seen throughout Africa and the world to have intervened to determine the destiny of a far away land, and to fix upon it a certain set of leaders, against the will of the majority of its people. This success in this instance cannot but increase their own willingness to engage in such adventures in the future, and cannot but discourage those who would seek to resist them.

While MPLA's African nationalist tendencies may cause it to refuse to grant the USSR formal base rights, its ideology, appreciation for Soviet assistance and continued security needs indicate it may provide the same type of facilities as Guinea, Congo and Somalia now provide.

Question 4. If the Soviet-backed faction wins, couldn't the United States encourage non-alignment by attempting to establish good relations with the new government—as you are doing in Mozambique?

Answer. The question of relations with a victorious MPLA is complicated by the nature of the victory—MPLA is not winning the war, Cuban troops with Soviet arms are—and to recognize such a fait accompli would signal that we really aren't as disturbed by that action as we have said. Our ultimate action will depend on the behavior of the MPLA internationally.

Question 5. Congress has provided money in the recent foreign assistance bill specifically for the former Portuguese colonies—including Angola when a government comes to power.

The United States has provided substantial economic and military assistance to Zaire since 1966 (\$205 million, not including this year's request for \$40 million). President Mobutu has, in return, been the principal backer of the FNLA.

On December 18, the New York Times reported that the 40 Committee decided on July 17 to provide arms directly to Roberto and Savimbi and to replace arms that had previously been supplied by Zaire.

Do you know whether President Mobutu was supplying arms to the FNLA between the time of the Portuguese coup and the time of the first Russian shipment of arms to the MPLA? What commitments and deliveries have we made to replace Zairian arms provided to the FNLA?

Answer. Zaire, to our knowledge, provided arms, training, bases, funds and political support to the FNLA since 1961 until the present. We reported to eight Congressional committees from July to December what we planned, through our covert program, to accomplish.

Question 6. Rationale for Keeping this Covert.

The first report of United States covert assistance to Angola appeared September 25 in the New York Times, giving some idea of the amounts of assistance the United States and the Soviet Union were providing and the rationale for U.S. assistance. From that time on, numerous reports openly discussed U.S. "covert" involvement in Angola.

Since this was no longer a secret operation, why didn't the Administration come openly to Congress to explain its Angola policy?

Answer. That we were assisting Angolans was not officially acknowledged until mid-December. One objective of our support was implementation of the Alvor Agreements to form an Angolan government supported by three contending factions, and this seemed more readily achieved by extending covert assistance. This policy seemed headed for success until large scale Soviet and Cuban intervention tipped the balance against the forces we had been helping.

The Administration in fact briefed eight Congressional committees a total of 24 times from July to December both about the covert program, and the overt aspects of our policies with respect to Angola.

Question 7. Reportedly, the Administration wanted to channel \$28 million in the Military Appropriations Bill into covert military assistance for Angola. Why was this request not made openly?

Answer. An open request would have involved military assistance funds for neighboring states to be spent across their borders. This would have been contrary to existing U.S. laws and would have created major international complications.

Question 8. Do you think it is wise to make a major commitment of American resources and prestige to a military conflict without first seeking approval of Congress and the American people?

Answer. The six appropriate committees of Congress were all briefed by the Administration after the decision was made but before implementation. At that stage, we were not clear about the extent of Soviet involvement and sought to avoid an open confrontation.

DÉTENTE

Question 9. The Administration has argued that Soviet involvement in Angola is inconsistent with the U.S.-Soviet agreement to "refrain from efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other."

Yet this agreement was signed on May 29, 1972, when the United States was conducting the largest bombing campaign of the Indochina war.

It did not prevent the United States from providing covert support to anti-Marxists in Chile, or more recently—allegedly—in Italy.

It has not prevented the Soviet Union and the United States from arming opposite sides in the Middle East.

It has not prevented assistance by both the United States and the Soviet Union to political parties in Portugal.

Why has the Angola involvement been singled out as a violation of this agreement?

Answer. In Angola for the first time, the Soviet Union has equipped and dispatched a military expeditionary force to intervene in a conflict far from its normal areas of security concern. A certain degree of competition is inevitable between the U.S. and the USSR. The Angolan intervention, however, is clearly a serious attempt by the Soviets to impose a regime by force and to gain a unilateral advantage for themselves. This is clearly inconsistent with the Statement of Principles governing our bilateral relations signed at the summit in 1972.

NEGOTIATIONS

Question 10. When did the United States first formally approach the Soviet Union to protest its involvement in the Angola Civil War?

Answer. One of the purposes of a covert operation is to permit maximum flexibility on both sides without the direct or public confrontation that would be required by a diplomatic exchange or an overt request for funds. When our support effort was fully underway in September 1975, I publicly mentioned our deep concern over the involvement of foreign forces in Angola. After other public warnings failed to bring an adequate response, I raised this issue with the Soviets in late October. It was then raised twice in November by me and by the President in December. There was some indication the public and private warnings had the effect of giving the Soviets pause, for between December 9 and 24, no Soviet planes delivered arms to the MPLA. It was only after the Senate vote on December 19 cutting off funds that the arms flow recommenced.

Question 11. Why wasn't the Soviet Union approached diplomatically when the Administration first discovered that it was providing substantial military assistance to the MPLA?

Answer. It appeared to us that the early shipments of Soviet arms to the MPLA were merely part of an effort to strengthen that group so it could compete militarily with the then much stronger FNLA. It wasn't until later that the Soviet arms deliveries to the MPLA seemed to do more than achieve parity with FNLA. Once the Soviets had committed resources on that scale, there would have been no point in our raising the issue with them until we had shown by our actions the seriousness with which we viewed the situation. Having shown our willingness to counter Soviet actions, and having demonstrated to them the consequences of these actions, we could then discuss the situation with some hope of a satisfactory resolution. This point was reached late last year.

Question 12. Reportedly former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Nathaniel Davis, urged that the United States mount a major diplomatic effort to achieve a settlement of the Angola war rather than provide substantial covert military assistance. Was this option considered? On what grounds was it rejected?

Answer. At the time (June and July of 1975) that our options regarding a future U.S. role in Angola were being studied, there was no "war" as such in Angola. Hostilities involving the three movements had until that time been largely limited to the city of Luanda and its environs. What we saw taking place in that period was a determined effort by the Soviet-armed MPLA to expel the FNLA and UNITA (which commanded the loyalty of a majority of the population) both from the capital of Angola and from participation in the transi-

tional government set up under the Alvor Accord(s) in January. MPLA then began its efforts to occupy as many of Angola's sixteen district capitals as possible.

The various courses of action and the degree and nature of possible American response to what appeared to us as an increasingly patent Soviet power-play were examined at great length by the concerned departments and agencies of the government.

We chose the option of covert support because, in its absence, the MPLA would have occupied all of Angola. The only method that could have set the stage for effective diplomacy was to restore a measure of balance on the ground.

It is not the policy of the Administration to reveal identities of the numerous officers of several governmental agencies who were concerned at various stages with our Angolan policy or to comment upon the opinions such officers may have held on policy matters. The Congress may be assured that all viewpoints were registered and considered. The final decision was made in the light of what was deemed to be in the best interest of the United States.

Question 13. South Africa: What precisely is our relationship with South Africa in this conflict? Does the United States share intelligence with South Africa on a regular basis?

Answer. The United States did not encourage, and before the fact, had no knowledge of the South African intervention in Angola. We have publicly condemned that intervention, and urged withdrawal of South African, Cuban and Soviet forces from Angola. South Africa is one of the many African countries with which we conduct exchanges of certain kinds of intelligence.

Question 14. What is the extent of our coordination with South Africa, either directly or through the factions that we are both supporting?

Answer. There has been no military or diplomatic policy coordination between South Africa and the United States, either directly or through UNITA or FNLA.

Question 15. Recently, there have been reports of the sale of six Hercules transport planes to South Africa. Are these or any similar planes sold by the United States to South Africa being used for transport in Angola? Wouldn't this be a violation of the arms embargo against South Africa?

Answer. The only Hercules transportation planes in the possession of the South African Air Force were sold to it prior to the implementation of our arms embargo in 1963. There are no restrictions on the use of these aircraft. To our knowledge no other U.S. origin aircraft have been used by the South Africans in Angola.

Question 16. Apparently, South African troops fighting on the side of the FNLA and UNITA have damaged the credibility of these factions in Africa. This was the main reason for Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA and may have been the reason for other states' recognition of the MPLA as well. Doesn't it damage the United States image in Africa to be associated with South Africa in this conflict?

Answer. Our position against apartheid and in support of majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia is well-known in Africa. While some African states perceived the distinction between our role in Angola and that of the South Africans, others charged us with collaboration. Whether they really saw no difference or simply considered the charges useful politically is hard to say.

Question 17. One reason that has been given for preventing a victory for the Soviet-backed faction in Angola is that this faction might encourage liberation movements fighting against racial domination in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Is one of the reasons for United States involvement in this conflict to prevent further violence in these southern African countries?

Answer. The United States supports peaceful change in Namibia and Rhodesia and we believe the climate for such a change would be enhanced by a peaceful resolution of the Angolan situation. However, this was not the major consideration in the adoption of our Angolan policy.

Question 18. Would an MPLA government in Angola be a greater threat to peace and stability in the region than a protracted, escalating Angola war fueled by outside assistance?

Answer. This question has been clearly overtaken by events. However, the states most clearly affected by the Angolan civil war, Zambia and Zaire, seemed to believe that their peace and stability would be harmed by an MPLA takeover achieved by foreign Communist intervention. In any case, whatever policies were followed by an MPLA regime in Angola, the demonstrated ability of the USSR to impose a regime of its choice, and determine the future of a country 6,000 miles from its borders can only have the most far-reaching consequences throughout Africa and the world.

Question 19. Some reports have indicated that the United States initially became involved in Angola primarily to support President Mobutu. Was this the initial reason for United States involvement in Angola?

Answer. A number of factors, including the support of neighboring states and regional stability, were, of course, also considered but the principal reason for this commitment of U.S. resources was to convince the Soviet Union that it could not intervene militarily so far from its frontier with impunity.

Question 20. President Kaunda, at the OAU summit, reportedly discussed "the danger of intervention by the superpowers and their allies." He stated: "Whilst these superpowers are trumpeting the end of the cold war era in their bilateral relations, they are at the same time sowing the seeds of discord in Africa."

This appears to be a criticism of both Soviet and United States intervention in Angola, yet Administration representatives have said that Zambia supports United States involvement in Angola.

Does Zambia support United States military assistance to factions in Angola?

Answer. I cannot speak directly for the Zambians, but I can say that Zambia, along with other states, told us it supported our efforts to achieve a compromise solution in Angola and that Zambia, along with Zaire, asked the U.S. to provide assistance to UNITA and FNLA.

Question 21. Administration representatives have argued that one reason for preventing an MPLA victory in Angola is the damage Angola can do to Zaire's and Zambia's economies with its control over the Benguela Railroad.

Won't the Benguela Railroad be closed as long as the war lasts; and won't a long war do more damage to Zambia's economy than an MPLA government?

Answer. It is our understanding that Zambia has a greater concern over the political nature of the power which exercises eventual permanent control over the railroad than it does over the short-term economic difficulties. A Soviet-backed MPLA controlling Zambia's principal access to the sea has great implications for Zambia's future.

Question 22. If the Administration is so concerned about economic stability in Zambia, why has it not offered Zambia balance of payments assistance at a time when copper prices and the closing of the Benguela Railroad have caused serious problems for Zambia's economy?

Answer. Although the Administration is genuinely concerned about Zambia's economic difficulties and has been prepared to give favorable consideration to any official Zambian request for assistance, we have not received any formal or official request from the Zambian Government for specific types of assistance. However, in light of the serious threats to its security now perceived by Zambia, we have advised them that we would like to be helpful and we are studying types of assistance that might be both feasible from the U.S. point of view and helpful from the Zambian point of view. We plan to work closely with the Congress in considering possible aid to Zambia.

In the meantime, Zambia is still drawing down the \$5 million AID program loan granted in 1973 to help deal with the transport emergency caused by the closure of the Rhodesian border. The loan is being utilized for General Electric locomotives, heavy duty cranes and a simulator to train truck drivers.

Question 23. Americans in Angola: There have been numerous reports of the CIA indirectly recruiting Americans to fight as mercenaries in Angola. Is the CIA involved in the recruitment or training of American mercenaries for Angola, either directly or indirectly?

Answer. No. The CIA has not directly or indirectly recruited any Americans to serve as mercenaries in Angola. The CIA has told both the FNLA and UNITA that no funds received from the U.S. can be used to hire American mercenaries.

Question 24. Has the State Department investigated reports of recruitment of mercenaries in the United States for Angola, such as the recruitment of Cubans in Florida or the advertisements that appeared in a Fresno newspaper?

Answer. The State Department has formally requested the Department of Justice to investigate these allegations of the recruitment of mercenaries for Angola, as well as for Rhodesia. The cases are now under investigation by the FBI.

Question 25. To your knowledge, are there Americans fighting in Angola or participating in the transport of military equipment?

Answer. To our knowledge there are no Americans fighting in Angola or transporting military equipment into that country. U.S. Air Force planes and crews have been used to fly equipment to Zaire but they have never entered Angola.

Question 26. On the Tunney Memorandum: Was this memorandum in fact delivered for the Department of State to the MPLA? There seems to be certain

paragraphs in this memorandum which would be unnecessarily offensive to the MPLA.

Answer. The memorandum which was prepared by the State Department was a series of talking points for a Boeing representative to discuss with an official of the MPLA government. Its purpose was to reiterate our position that we do not object to the MPLA per se, but to the Soviet and Cuban support it is using to dominate the other two factions. We indicated we would be prepared to cooperate with a government containing representatives of the MPLA, as well as the other two groups.

Question 27. In the sentence, "The United States is unwilling to condone an Angolan regime under Soviet control," did State mean to imply that an MPLA government would necessarily be under Soviet control?

Answer. We would hope any MPLA regime would avoid domination by the USSR. However, we are concerned regarding the absolute dependence of the MPLA on Cuban troops and Soviet arms for establishing control over the majority of the population in the country and the prospect for future dependence on the Soviets and Cubans to maintain this control.

Question 28. The memo also seems to imply that "post-war Angola" would not get any American or Western help unless it were a coalition government.

"The MPLA would do well to heed advice that no government can plan reconstruction in post-war Angola without American and Western help. No government can obtain the technological and financial resources to stimulate economic development without official American consent.

In fact, the United States would be quite responsive and helpful to a coalition government that was not dependent on the Soviet Union."

Was it the intent of the Administration to communicate that the post-war government in Angola would not have access to American technology unless it was a coalition government?

Answer. It was our intention to communicate to the MPLA that a regime dominated by the Soviet Union would not be favorably received by the United States and that its access to Western technology to develop its resources would be affected.

Senator CLARK. We thank you very much for coming up.

The next witness is Congressman Andrew Young.

The subcommittee will please come to order.

Congressman Young, I think we will wait until everyone has cleared out and calmed down. Everyone remaining in the room please be seated.

Congressman Young, we are particularly pleased to have you here. I know that you are one of the best informed persons in the Congress on Africa and that you have made a number of trips to that continent and have studied it in great detail. We are particularly pleased to have you with us as our first witness following the Secretary of State. You may proceed any way you deem appropriate.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW YOUNG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me commend you for taking on these hearings and for pressing on and trying to develop, I hope, a comprehensive policy for all of Africa; but for particularly now, southern Africa.

At the risk of being a little flippant, let me say that what I think we have heard is a view of Africa through the eyes of a European cold war man. And I do not think that that is what I see in Africa through my Afro-American eyes. I do agree that we do have serious considerations to be maintained in the whole situation in southern Africa. But I do not think we can take Angola as an isolated incident and I think

we make a mistake when we think that the problem that we are dealing with started in January of 1975.

It may be necessary to remember that we were on the wrong side of the Angolan colonial struggle for almost 15 years, during which time Senator Tunney on this side, and myself on the House side, introduced an amendment urging that none of the Portuguese weapons that we sent to Portugal for use in NATO be allowed to be transferred for use in Angola. Now that amendment was passed but it was never enforced. I think the first time I heard of napalm it was being used not in Vietnam but by the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola. In the light of that history and that wrong policy against all of our traditional values, and national interests, I think, we stopped—when the Portuguese Government fell—and did nothing and we created a vacuum and it was in that vacuum that Soviet influence began to expand and the situation became critical.

MILITARY ACTION IN AFRICA

I think it is a very mistaken notion that we can do anything militarily in Africa. But I also think that it is equally mistaken to think that it is possible for us to do nothing. We do have basic interests at stake because now especially, with the presence of masses of arms and with the presence of a number of Cuban troops, we have allowed a military situation to emerge in Angola that is not likely to stop with Angola and maybe even it should not.

The South African troops which came in from Namibia to wipe out the forces of Southwest African Peoples Organization are going to have to be reformed. And I am sure that once the situation stabilizes in southern Angola, there will be an effort on the part of those Namibians who had crossed over Angola to reactivate their guerrilla movement.

To the East Coast of Africa we have the situation with Rhodesia and the possible escalation of guerrilla warfare from the Mozambique or Zambian shores. We have only—in today's paper Zambia declaring a national emergency. And what we have in fact done is allowed a Soviet presence to emerge, not just in Angola, but we have opened the floodgates for turmoil and chaos in all of southern Africa because we did not do things when we could have. We did not do a simple thing like vote overwhelmingly to repeal the Byrd amendment which would have strengthened the hand of the very difficult negotiations Kenneth Kaunda and others were attempting in the Rhodesian situation.

And so without taking any more of your time on this, I hope that this committee will continue these hearings, not just in the view of dealing with whether or not there are arms to Angola, but forcing the State Department to come up with a positive policy to stabilize and liberate those states in Africa which are still suffering under a very unjust kind of oppression; the kind of oppression which leaves the door open for continued Soviet expansion and which we cannot counteract militarily.

UNITED STATES-SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY

We have got to have an aggressive, negotiated, nonmilitary policy for southern Africa. Otherwise we see that whole area in turmoil, and very definitely it is another Vietnam potentially.

Let me just say one thing about Angola; that we resisted any involvement in Nigeria when the northern troops of Nigeria were provided with a heavy supply of Soviet arms. It is probable that our sympathies in this country—because of a very good public relations campaign—were overwhelmingly with the Biafrans. Had we made the choice of military involvement with Biafra, the kinds of economic relationships we now have with Nigeria would not be possible.

I think that there will be tribal discord, there will be governments coming and going in many African states. We should, in our Bicentennial Year, be reminded that there was a great tension between three forces, Thomas Jefferson with large French influence; Alexander Hamilton with some suspected British influence; and John Adams, a confirmed Yankee. And only the strong hand of George Washington kept our own country together through several possibilities of partitioning. The world has never been, you know, a place where isolated events can occur unrelated. It is even less so now in Africa than it was for us 200 years ago.

And whenever there is a vacuum there will be forces moving that I do not think will be moving in the interest of African unity and in African freedom. But up to now, we have not, as a nation, moved in the interest of African unity and African freedom. And I would hope that from this subcommittee we might see such a movement come.

FUTURE HEARINGS ON CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Thank you, very much. I think it is excellent advice. I do want to say that these hearings on Angola are only the beginning of a series of hearings that we will be holding all this year, with particular emphasis on central and southern Africa. We are going to turn our attention specifically following the Angolan hearings to the situation in South Africa, in Zambia, in Rhodesia; and quite frankly it is our hope that we can convert some of the current interest in Angola into an African policy because much of the problem, as I think you have indicated, is that we have not taken a sincere interest in Angola. I am sorry, I should say in Africa. We have never been militarily in this case, in Angola, and we have not developed a policy toward Africa.

In fact, I think the Secretary of State has himself said that we have not as yet really developed an African policy, and that is much of the problem. Certainly as we go through these next several months with hearings on various parts of Africa, particularly central and southern Africa, we hope to develop some suggestions of a policy, both from governmental and nongovernmental witnesses. We would greatly appreciate any idea that you would have as we go along toward that objective.

Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Congressman Young, I would like to express appreciation to you for coming. I assure you that the greatest hope of the Senate is that, by taking a deep interest and by working with the administration, we can move toward a more enlightened and effective policy in Africa. This is clearly shown by the attitude of our chairman. The way in which he has pursued his responsibility has been in the finest tradition of the Senate. And I think the work of his subcommittee will prove to be of real value to the country and perhaps to the peace of the world.

INTEREST OF EUROPE, U.S.S.R., AND NATO ALLIES IN AFRICA

There are some related questions to which I would like you to respond for the record because we have a vote now and you have pressing duties. What do you perceive to be our interest in Africa—both from the standpoint of our role in the world, and our humanitarian interests in these people; and also in our own self interest? What do you perceive as the role and interests of Europe and our NATO allies today in Africa and particularly in Angola? What are the real interests, as you perceive them, of the Soviet Union? And finally, how strong is the spirit of nationalism in Angola? Is it likely to prevail?

Your judgment on those matters would be of real help to the Senate.

I just wish we had time now to pursue these subjects in conversation with you.

Mr. YOUNG. Let me just say I would be glad to submit that very shortly.

[See Appendix.]

Mr. YOUNG. If I could just have two words to say then—everywhere I went in Africa, and I am sure Senator Clark found the same sentiment, Africans were much more concerned about racism in South Africa, in Rhodesia, than they were about the possible threat of communism. They feel like they have dealt with that successfully in other places and that they can minimize that influence. I am not so sure with the presence of 11,000 Cubans, it is going to be as easy as it was. But that makes the situation even more critical.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

I want you to know also in a bipartisan sense that, while the African Subcommittee has generally had to draft people to work on it, it is something that Senator Clark sought and I asked to be assigned to it. I certainly wish to work very closely with my distinguished colleague. The Midwest is interested in what goes on in Africa. We think that it is terribly important. We appreciate your counseling and your guidance.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Congressman Young.

This subcommittee stands in recess now until Tuesday morning at 10 a.m.

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene Tuesday, February 3, 1976, at 10 a.m.]

ANGOLA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark, Biden, Case, Javits, and Percy.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The purpose of today's hearing is to hear the Department of Defense on the strategic questions regarding Angola and how that might fit into the broader pattern of southern Africa, generally.

Following the Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth's testimony this afternoon, we are going to hear three nongovernmental experts, Leon Gouré, professor at the Center for Advanced International Studies of the University of Miami, an expert on Soviet Studies; Marshall Shulman, a professor at Columbia University, also a Soviet expert; and then from Stephen Weissman of the University of Texas, who has particular knowledge of the Congo question and other related African subjects.

I think that, because of the time problems—I know that Secretary Ellsworth has other business later this afternoon, we are having a quorum call right now, and probably we will have to leave for a vote in about 10 or 15 minutes—I think we are going to go right ahead with your testimony and try to get that on record before we vote.

Senator Biden, do you have an opening statement?

Senator BIDEN. I have no opening statement, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Fine.

Secretary Ellsworth, if you would just proceed in any way that you think is appropriate.

[Secretary Ellsworth's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT ELLSWORTH, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Robert Ellsworth of Katonah, New York, was nominated by President Gerald Ford to be Deputy Secretary of Defense on December 11, 1975, confirmed by the United States Senate on December 19, 1975, and sworn into office on January 2, 1976.

When nominated, Mr. Ellsworth was serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), a position he held since June 5, 1974.

Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Ellsworth was a general partner in Lazard Freres and Company, of New York City. From 1969 to 1971, he served as United States Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with rank of Ambassador, after serving during 1969 as Assistant to the President. He was National Political Director of the Presidential Campaign in 1968. From 1961 to 1967, he served as a member of the House of Representatives from Kansas, and in Congress he was a member of the Joint Economic Committee, Veterans Affairs Committee, Post Office and Civil Service Committee and House Republican Task Force on NATO.

Mr. Ellsworth was born June 11, 1926, at Lawrence, Kansas, and received his B.S. degree from the University of Kansas in 1945 and his J.D. degree from the University of Michigan School of Law in 1949. From 1944 to 1946 and from 1950 to 1953, he served in the United States Navy, with the rank of Lieutenant Commander. From 1949 to 1950, he was an attorney with the firm of Chapin and Neal at Springfield, Massachusetts, and during 1954, he was an attorney with the Maritime Administration at the Department of Commerce. From 1955 to 1960, he was in private law practice at Lawrence, Kansas.

He was admitted to practice law in the Supreme Court of the United States and the highest courts of Kansas, Massachusetts and the District of Columbia.

Mr. Ellsworth is married to the former Vivian Sies. They have one son, Robert William, and one daughter, Ann Elizabeth.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. May I present my associate, John A. Reed, Jr., director of the African Region in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

I will proceed, if I may, to read my statement, which is fairly short. Then I will be available for questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ELLSWORTH, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN A. REED, JR., DIRECTOR, AFRICAN REGION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to participate in this series of hearings that will place on public record the facts and issues involved in the Angolan situation. At the outset—and without hesitation—I want to state unequivocally that the Department of Defense neither recommends nor favors deployment of U.S. military forces to Angola. This is not to say, however, that we view the action taken there by the Russians as anything but inconsistent—militarily and politically—with superpower détente. It is our belief that the Soviets clearly are seeking to exploit a tragic civil war for the purpose of enhancing their power and influence in a peripheral area thousands of miles from Soviet shores.

On January 29, the Secretary of State presented the foreign policy considerations and the sequence of events that have shaped the United States concern and actions with respect to Angola. Today, I will address strategic U.S. interests in Angola and the military significance of Soviet incursions there.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

Angola occupies a key position on the large South African peninsula astride the major South Atlantic shipping lanes, has good ports and airfields, and a relatively advanced inland transportation system. Angola ports and railroads are particularly important to Zaire and Zambia, for most of their foreign exchange has been generated by

exports of minerals—mostly copper—transshipped through Angola. Any prolonged disruption of the normal transportation system and economic patterns of the area would generate unstable security conditions in both countries.

Angola's own rich natural resource potential—oil, iron ore, diamonds, and manganese—adds to its strategic significance. Further, its proximity to areas torn by dissension over self-determination, majority rule, and legislated racial discrimination, makes Angola of special interest to those who seek military solutions to the complex of southern African problems.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Immediate U.S. strategic interests in Angola are relatively limited when compared with those in many other areas of the world. We hope, however, that the government that finally emerges in Angola will grant us overflight and landing rights, if requested, for our aircraft, and that port facilities will be made available for occasional naval ship visits. At the same time, we would not want potential enemies to obtain exclusive use of Angola and its facilities for military purposes. Such action would expand the possibilities of military operations in the area and set the stage for continuing tensions within and among countries throughout the region.

In the past, Department of Defense aircraft typically have flown four to six flights per month through southern Africa in support of NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], the Air Force Eastern Test Range station near Pretoria, and the American Embassy in South Africa. Prior to November 11, 1975 when Angola became independent, the Portuguese permitted DOD [Department of Defense] aircraft to overfly Angola. Since that time, alternate routing over international waters has been required, adding some 1,600 nautical miles to each C-141 flight and increasing operational time and costs accordingly.

The need for occasional port visits is also important. Although the reopening last summer of the Suez Canal removed the immediate need to use the Cape route, the Canal could be closed again at short notice, rapidly changing our requirements for Cape transits.

But the use of the Cape route requires either access to port facilities in southern Africa or expensive underway refueling and reprovisioning operations. Although the Republic of South Africa's ports have highly significant capabilities, we suspended normal U.S. Navy visits there in 1967. Our policy also precludes visits to Namibia. Because of current country attitudes, ports in Tanzania and the Malagasy Republic are not available, and prospects for resuming port calls in Mozambique are uncertain. U.S. naval units made eight visits to Lourenco Marques in 1973 and eight more before August 1974 when such visits were suspended. Luanda and Mocamedès in Angola are former ports of call, but they are, of course, at least temporarily unavailable. Rotation of destroyers between MIDEASTFOR and the 6th Fleet now occurs via the Suez Canal, but ports in southern Africa would regain their importance if the Canal route again is denied us.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

We suspect that the Soviets have objectives in Angola well beyond their announced support for the Popular Liberation Movement. One has only to look at Guinea and Somalia to see African facilities now being used by the Soviets to project their air and sea capabilities. The port of Conakry has been used by various Soviet vessels involved in the delivery of supplies and equipment to the MPLA in Angola as well as those patrolling the waters off the coast of West Africa. The Soviets deploy Bear or Badger reconnaissance aircraft on a regular basis from Guinea on surveillance missions over the Atlantic. Similarly, the facilities in Somalia are used for surveillance of the major shipping lanes through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, to monitor movement of commercial and military vessels there.

We have reports that the Soviets already are pressing for naval bases and refueling rights in Mozambique which acquired its independence last June. Apparently, Mozambique has not acceded to such requests. I believe the military significance of a permanent Soviet or Cuban presence in Angola is not to be taken lightly. If the Soviets are successful in either establishing military bases or obtaining operating rights in Angola, their strategic and tactical capabilities would be greatly enhanced. Soviet maritime aerial surveillance capacity in the South Atlantic would be improved through extensions of operations and on station times in target areas. Capabilities for surface surveillance of the South Atlantic, including the vital sea lanes around the Cape, would be enhanced, particularly if an operating base were available in Angola.

The vast majority of ocean traffic—including large tankers carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the United States—passes some 480 miles off the Angolan coast after rounding the cape, affording excellent opportunities for disruptive action from an Angolan base. In any event, Moscow's ability to project its naval power would be materially enhanced by gaining access to Angolan refueling and berthing facilities, lessening the requirements—and costs—for underway support and refueling. The Soviets presently find it necessary to keep several oilers operating off the west coast of Africa to sustain their sea movements in support of Angolan related activities.

SOVIET, CUBAN IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA SECURITY, STABILITY

We are also deeply concerned over the potential impact a sustained Soviet or Cuban presence could have on security and stability in southern Africa. We continue to work to promote peaceful solutions to the issues of majority rule in Rhodesia, self-determination in Namibia, and an ending of apartheid in South Africa. A Soviet presence in Angola could serve to support insurgencies in these three countries, following the Soviet policy of aiding "wars of liberation."


Zaire and Zambia, Angola's moderate neighbors, could also be exposed to the dangers of active Soviet-supported insurgency as a consequence of their assistance to FNLA/UNITA in its struggle against the MPLA. Moreover, Zaire perceives an increasing threat to its security from Soviet equipment deliveries and military influence in Congo—Brazzaville. The United States is supporting through the

foreign military sales program a phased modernization of Zaire's security forces that will permit it to continue to play a moderate, stabilizing role in south central Africa.

POLITICAL, MILITARY SITUATION EVALUATION

Mr. Chairman, you requested an up-to-the-minute evaluation of the political and military situation in Angola for the subcommittee. A map of Angola which reflects the general traces of those territories currently controlled by the warring factions has been provided the members. It should be used as a reference for my comments.

[The material referred to follows:]



The crosshatched areas are under control of the People's Republic of Angola government formed by the Soviet-supported MPLA with its capital in Luanda. The other areas—representing 60 percent

of Angola's total territory—are controlled by the UNITA/FNLA coalition government—the Democratic Republic of Angola. It is based in the south at Huambo [formerly Nova Lisboa] a town that has been evacuated, about a week ago.

Senator CLARK. You do not have the population figures to match the geographical, do you?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. They are not too different from the geographical. My collaborator tells me that UNITA has the support of about 2 million people, MPLA about 1 million, and FNLA about 700,000.

Senator CLARK. That would match this map's coloring?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct. They are generally in the geographical areas that are marked on the map.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Ideally, a political solution should be found for Angola in which all three of the liberation groups would participate in a government of national unity. Admittedly, there are long-standing differences among the three groups. But certain of these differences—particularly tribal, geographical, and urban-rural differences—underscore the essentiality of some sort of government of national unity if the newly independent Angola is to experience peace and the opportunity for full social and economic development. The MPLA appears uninterested at this time in anything short of a military victory. From time-to-time there has been speculation of an MPLA/UNITA government as a viable alternative, but the battlefield successes gained by the MPLA with massive Soviet and Cuban assistance appear to be overshadowing all efforts for a political solution. Nevertheless, the reported withdrawal of South African forces from the fighting could eliminate the principal rallying point used by the pro-MPLA supporters at the OAU summit meeting last month but at the same time reduce the effective military resistance to the advance of Cuban troops.

Turning to the current military situation, the FNLA is in the northernmost finger of Angola conducting defensive operations along a line which hinges on the coast north of the city of Ambrizete and runs about 60 miles south of Zaire's border. MPLA activity there appears limited to probing actions along the coast and small unit actions elsewhere. We suspect that major segments of the MPLA and Cuban forces have been shifted from the northern front to the major fronts in preparation for offensive operations there. In the south, MPLA and Cuban troops based in the port city of Novo Redondo are likely preparing for attacks on the important port-railhead complex at Lobito. MPLA/Cuban forces are advancing south along the main road which parallels the coastline some 90-150 miles inland. The road leads to the capital of the FNLA/UNITA coalition, Huambo, which has been evacuated, but is still being defended. In the eastern front the battle for Luso continues. There are good defensive positions which UNITA could choose to use in the south. The prospects for insurgency actions by FNLA/UNITA forces on all fronts are high.

CLARIFYING RECENT POINTS OF CONJECTURE CONCERNING DOD

Mr. Chairman, in concluding my remarks, I would like to clarify for the record several points that have been the subject of considerable

conjecture over recent months. For simplicity, I will call them our "have done" and our "have not done" lists.

First are the "have nots."

The Department of Defense has not hired or trained—at Fort Benning, Ga., or anywhere else—mercenaries to fight in Angola.

The Department of Defense has never sent or stationed U.S. military or DOD contract personnel in Angola to support UNITA or FNLA, and none are there now.

The Department of Defense has not provided weapons to the warring factions in Angola.

Finally, we have not altered our basic policies toward South Africa to cooperate in any way with the South African military as the result of that country's involvement in Angola.

This leads to my "have done" list.

We have continued to adhere strictly to the embargo on arms for South Africa which has been in effect in its present form since 1963.

We have consistently sought to promote a compromise solution in Angola that would permit all three Angolan factions a voice in Angola's future: an African solution to what is essentially an African problem. This effort has involved modest amounts of funds for indirect arms aid to anti-Communist elements in Angola.

As the result of the additional Soviet naval presence off the West Coast of Africa, our surveillance activities in the area have been increased.

Finally, the United States took the lead in the refugee evacuation operation mounted last summer in response to an urgent Portuguese request for assistance. Between September 7 and November 3, 1975, the Military Aircraft Command, employing commercial contract aircraft, flew 31,597 refugees from Angola to Portugal. This was 68 percent of all refugees transported on flights donated by foreign governments. A total of 117 missions were flown. France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, East Germany, and the U.S.S.R. also participated in the airlift but, as usual, the U.S. played the major role in this humanitarian undertaking.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I am ready to respond to any questions you or the subcommittee members may have.

INDIRECT ARMS AID FOR ANTI-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I think it is a very helpful statement, and that your list of have-nots are of particular value to us. I want to explore more of those.

Just a couple of very quick side points.

In your statement you say, "This effort has involved modest amounts of funds for indirect arms aid for anti-Communist"—that is the part that I want to ask you about—"elements in Angola."

I wonder if this is not a bit too broad of a generalization in view of the fact that the Chinese Communists were assisting, at least one, and I think both, of the factions that we are supporting. We could equally say we are funding Communist factions, it seems to me.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I do not understand that those factions are Communists, even though they may have been supported by some PRC

[People's Republic of China] support. I do not mind amending that to say "anti-Soviet" or "anti-MPLA," however you wish.

I would not agree that they were pro-Communists just because they accepted some support from the PRC.

Senator CLARK. That is probably fair, but you have no hesitancy labeling the MPLA as Communists.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not at all.

Senator CLARK. You would feel the other two factions are not Communist?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Correct.

AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE STATION NEAR PRETORIA

Senator CLARK. Just another quick point of clarification; you speak of the Air Force Eastern Test Range Station near Pretoria. Is that NASA's tracking station?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No; not the NASA tracking station. It is the far end of a series of stations that the Air Force uses to monitor and as we say, telemeter, some of our missile test shots.

Senator CLARK. That is not the facility that is planned to be closed?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That Air Force station is in standby status at the present time.

Senator CLARK. We are not using it?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. It was used in January, and can be reactivated for use when need be, but basically it is in a standby status.

Senator CLARK. Your argument here, as I recall, is that it would be helpful if you could overfly Angola, because you are making six flights a month through southern Africa in support of this range. You would not be making six flights a month now, or would you?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. May I ask my collaborator, Mr. Reed, to respond in some detail to your interest there in that situation?

Mr. Reed?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir.

We have had that eastern test range facility in Africa for some time. In 1970, we moved to phase down and eventually to mothball the facility. It is, however, brought up from time to time. We do have one U.S. Air Force enlisted man stationed at the site, as well as a number of local contractors.

Senator CLARK. When you say six flights a month, do they go down to see one person?

Mr. REED. They support that site. They do a lot of other things, too. They also support the Embassy at Pretoria. These flights bring in inspectors, bring in maintenance personnel, equipment and so forth.

Senator CLARK. You are still making approximately six?

Mr. REED. I think it is now two flights a month for that particular purpose.

U.S. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN RECRUITING MERCENARIES

Senator CLARK. I would like to explore with you, Mr. Secretary, in a little more detail the whole question of mercenaries.

I just came back from England last night, and the papers there are full of stories about mothers who say they do not want their 17-year-old son to be taken off, he lied about his age and is going down to fight for the FNLA and so forth.

I would like to explore in some detail these accounts and get your reaction, because you were very straightforward, I thought, in your testimony here and your list of have-nots, concerning the fact that the Department of Defense had not hired or trained at Fort Benning, Ga., or anywhere else, mercenaries to fly in Angola.

Are any U.S. Government employees involved directly or indirectly in the recruitment of American or foreign mercenaries for fighting in Angola?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, in response to that, I heard your words very precisely, I want to be very careful in my response.

Let me say that the Department of Defense has no knowledge of any such operations.

Senator CLARK. No American employees recruiting foreigners or Americans?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I am only Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense has no knowledge of any such operations.

Senator CLARK. The London Observer reported that a group called the Security Advisory Service is in England and is recruiting British mercenaries with American money. That organization was quoted as saying that the group's contact was a Maj. James Leonard, Assistant Army Attaché in the American Embassy in London.

Would you comment on that? You would know about something like that if it were happening, certainly.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I would presume I would. If that is true, then it would, of course, be inconsistent with my answer to your question, and would be a source of embarrassment to me to find out that that were true.

Senator CLARK. You are not aware of it?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. Would you mind providing for the record—you have not particularly investigated that?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I have.

Senator CLARK. You have investigated that?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I have not investigated that particular incident.

Senator CLARK. Yes; that is what I mean.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. After the Secretary of Defense was on TV the other day, and this question came up, I went to some pains to investigate it and my answer to your first question was a carefully considered answer on my part, and it stands.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, if for any reason you learn differently in the next few days, would you advise this committee that Maj. Leonard, or anybody else associated with the Department of Defense, is assisting, directly or indirectly, in the hiring of mercenaries here or abroad?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I will.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

BREAKDOWN OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO FACTIONS

How much of the assistance that the United States has given to the factions in Angola has been in the form of weapons, how much of it has been in cash that could be used for the recruitment or transportation and payment of mercenaries?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, as far as I am aware, it has been in the form of cash that could be used for the purchase of weapons.

Senator CLARK. I understand the Secretary of State in his testimony here—perhaps you have had a chance to review that—said that it is entirely possible that part of the money we provided, could, in fact, be used to hire mercenaries by one of the two factions.

Is that your understanding of the situation?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I would not want to contradict the Secretary. I would think as a matter of logic that that would be possible.

Senator CLARK. I am afraid I am going to have to go vote. I think Senator Biden will be back in a minute or two.

We will just stand in recess. As soon as he returns, he will continue the questioning.

I might just tell you a couple of the other questions that I want to ask that you can be thinking about.

The British Sunday Telegraph, the day before yesterday, reported that \$200,000 of U.S. money given to the FNLA has been sent to London for the recruitment of mercenaries. I want you to comment on that.

Secondly, reportedly American veterans are being recruited to fight as mercenaries in Angola. You have seen a number of these reports, I know.

My question is, is there any evidence that people are being approached on a military basis by these recruiters? Have you had any evidence of that?

Maybe you can answer the latter easily.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. My answer that I gave to your very first question would stand for both of those questions.

Senator CLARK. No information of any kind in terms of the DOD? You are speaking only for the DOD? No other source?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Correct.

Senator CLARK. We stand in recess for 2 or 3 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. The hearing will come to order, please.

Senator Clark, as you know, is voting. I passed him on the elevator and he suggested that I begin with my questions while he is on his way over and back.

Mr. Secretary, I have several questions.

I apologize if I am repeating anything that Senator Clark asked you. If he did, just tell me and I will read it in the record so you will not have to go back over it again.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE OF SEA LANES

I have been fascinated for some time now with the assertion of the possibility of a disruptive influence on our sealanes as a consequence of a Soviet domination of Angola, and I assume that your concern in that area is based on several assumptions: (1) that the MPLA would be victorious; (2) that the MPLA, once victorious, would be passive with regard to Soviet demands; (3) that the Soviets would make strong demands on the MPLA.

Is that correct?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Certainly, the MPLA being victorious—it seems that they already are victorious, as I see the situation on the ground, as far as—

Mr. BIDEN. Victorious, in that they control the entire of Angola?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Victorious in the sense that they have established really overwhelming conventional military superiority over everyone else in Angola. In a matter of weeks, if they choose to do so, it is obvious that they can control the entire territory militarily.

Moving on to what the Soviets would demand or request and what the government, the MPLA government of Angola, would accede to, one does not know. But, as I make clear in my statement, should the Soviets, through their relationship with the MPLA government of Angola, be able to establish substantial air and naval facilities there, then there would be the possibility for them to pose a threat to the shipping lanes that come around the Cape.

Senator BIDEN. Again, I assume in your job that it is your responsibility to plan for the worst case scenario. That is what you are doing for us here, is it not? You are not at all certain that it is going to happen, but you must assume for your projections that that is a possibility of happening?

In other words, since I have been a member of this committee, we, with regard to everything from Vietnam, the arms race, and everything in between in international relations, are presented with the worst case scenario all the time. We in this committee are told that we have to build based on that scenario, but seldom have we been confronted with specific information which would indicate that the probability that the worst case scenario will come to pass.

This may be a naive question, but what are the facts that lead you to believe that it is likely that the Soviets would in fact be in a position to demand and/or be granted the facilities which would be needed in order to accomplish this disruptive action that you are concerned about?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. We have used several words. We have used "likely"; we have used "probable"; we have used "worst case"; and then there are several different stages, looking into the future, trying to be futurists and historians at the same time.

Let me put it this way. The Soviets have utilized the facilities which they have acquired or been granted in Somalia and in Guinea for the purpose of enlarging, enhancing, and strengthening the naval operating and surveillance capability which they have exercised.

It is not unreasonable, it seems to me—

Senator BIDEN. You mean we have evidence that they have used the new found facilities in Africa for increased surveillance and—what else did you say?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Operations.

Senator BIDEN. Operations? By "operations" you mean just functioning in that area?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. For example: They have used those facilities in connection with their provision of a flow of military equipment and ordinance into Angola. So it seems to me not unreasonable to suppose that should they be fortunate enough to be able to acquire any of the air or naval facilities in Angola that they might reasonably be expected to

use those facilities also for further surveillance and operational requirements, should they decide that they want to.

Senator BIDEN. Fine.

One more question with regard to potential disruptive action on the part of the Soviets with regard to our shipping lanes, particularly transport of oil.

For the record, what possible disruptive action could they take? Obviously, confiscation or sinking one or more U.S. ships is a possibility. Is there any other kind of disruptive activity that would be available to them with port facilities that are not available to them without port facilities in Angola?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Angolan facilities in relation to surveillance of naval operations or harassment or anything else are simply facilities that permit you to do what you want to do at lower cost than otherwise you could.

Senator BIDEN. That is an important point to make. Some people who have spoken to us on the subject have at least implied that the Soviets would not be capable of doing the things that they might be able to do if they were in fact in command of the port facilities. It is a matter of degree.

You are telling us that the cost factor is something that is the only thing that is changed in the equation. Do they not have a significant naval force that is capable of disrupting those sea lanes just about any way they see fit now, regardless of the availability of those ports?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. They do have, theoretically, as an intellectual construct. That is correct. In the real world, it could make a considerable difference to a power whether or not we have facilities of the kind that would be available in Angola. It could, in the real world, make quite a considerable difference, a cost difference.

Theoretically, it is only a cost difference.

Mr. BIDEN. I am not sure I understand the degree to which the picture would change.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. The kinds of costs I am talking about, of course, are costs in terms of both money and vessel availabilities, because of the fact that they would have a home port or a port for replenishment instead of having to be on station on the high seas for months and months at a time.

In addition to that, it is more costly financially to transport replenishment and refueling from naval bases in the Soviet Union proper for replenishment on the high seas off West Africa than it is to have those kinds of replenishment and refueling supplies on hand in Angola.

Senator BIDEN. They are on hand in other African nations, though, are they not?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Right.

Senator BIDEN. Again, what I am trying to get to, and you have helped me a great deal, at least to qualify my thinking insofar as what the extent of the increased leverage and/or cost savings that would be available to the Soviet Union as a consequence of having these ports.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. If you are asking me for a number, I have not made a study to prepare a number. I think it would be measurable. I would think the cost savings would be non-trivial.

Senator BIDEN. Maybe you could—not now, but at some time for the record, or some time in the future, supply me and the committee

with some estimates of what, in terms of percentage increases or decreases it would be to maintain the naval presence that would be needed to disrupt the sea lanes, if they had Angolan ports and what the costs would be if they did not have Angolan ports.

It seems to me, if it were a matter of minimal difference in cost that maybe we should not be assuming that the Soviets would take risks beyond which they have already taken in order to assure they are available.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Sure. We can do such a study. That would not be the only reason for the Soviets to take certain risks with regard to Angola. Besides that, I am not so sure that they would have viewed several months ago the situation in Angola as holding very great risks for them.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting that is the only one. It is one that is often mentioned. There are others I would like to question you about, too.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I think we could provide that. I do not know how valid and legitimate it would be, but we will do what we can.

[The information referred to follows:]

SOVIET NAVAL COST ESTIMATES

(Provided by Department of Defense)

Actual data on investment and operating costs of Soviet logistics vessels are not currently available. A study of this nature, therefore, would be extremely speculative, given the uncertainty of the cost data and the many assumptions that could be made on the size and mix of any Soviet force that might operate from bases in Angola to disrupt the sea lanes. It is known that the Soviets have used two replenishment oilers and one naval oiler to support their operations off the West Coast of Africa during the Angola situation. A gross indication of one facet of possible naval activity, based on 1974 cost data for similar types of U.S. Navy vessels, would be savings of some \$10 million annually for personnel and operations/maintenance of each oiler, plus an initial investment cost of \$80-120 million for each vessel. If one assumes that the oilers are needed elsewhere, however, then the cost avoidance because of the Angolan bases would be the annual costs for personnel and operations and maintenance only.

DOD RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING U.S. AID TO FNLA/UNITA

Senator BIDEN. You indicated in your testimony that:

I want to state unequivocally that the Department of Defense neither recommends nor favors deployment of U.S. military forces to Angola.

Is there anything in regard to shoring up, aiding the FNLA or UNITA that the Defense Department would recommend?

You told us that you definitely do not recommend covert activities? Would you recommend an increase or substantial amount of money for supply of arms? Would you recommend anything? You told us what you do not recommend. What do you recommend?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I am not prepared to make recommendations today, Senator, in a public hearing.

Senator BIDEN. Fair enough.

I do not believe I have any further questions. Thank you very much.

SOVIET USE OF ANGOLAN FACILITIES TO BLOCK U.S. SHIPPING

Senator CLARK [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, as I was listening to your answers about the sea ports and costs, if in fact the Soviet Union were

to use facilities in Angola to block our shipping, that would be an act of war, would it not?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. It certainly would.

Senator CLARK. That would be something that they could as easily do off the Somalia bases, could they not?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not necessarily.

Senator CLARK. Not necessarily?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No.

Senator CLARK. Different ships pass in the two areas?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I am not sure that different ships do pass in the two areas. Here we are speaking, you understand, entirely hypothetically, in regard to this matter.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Should a political situation develop in which that would be contemplated, then I think you would have to say in a number of strategically important ways, the ocean areas off the west coast of Africa are substantially different from the geographical and strategic situation that exists at the mouth of the Gulf and of the Red Sea by Somalia.

Senator CLARK. Would this be equally true of petroleum carrying ships?

DOD TESTIMONY CONCERNING MERCENARIES CLARIFICATION

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is what I am speaking of mainly.

Senator CLARK. I would like to summarize what I understand your testimony to be with regard to mercenaries, so that we do not leave with any different impressions.

As I understand your testimony, you are saying no Department of Defense employee or money is being used directly or indirectly to recruit or train or pay mercenaries to fight in Angola.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Essentially, that is correct.

Senator CLARK. You do not rule out the possibility that American money given to anti-Soviet factions is being used to recruit, to train, and to pay mercenaries?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. Do you say that strictly as Deputy Secretary of Defense or a member of the 40 Committee or both,

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I say it as both.

Senator CLARK. Both? Good.

SAC BASE CARGO PLANE STEPPED-UP NIGHT FLIGHT REPORTS

I would like to ask more specifically with regard to supplying of the factions and so forth. Late last week, as you know, there were various reports of an unusual number of night flights of large cargo planes out of the key Strategic Air Command [SAC] base in New Hampshire.

One report said 24 flights out last Thursday night between nightfall and 11:00 p.m., just to give you an idea of the frequency we are talking about. Reportedly the base was operated under stepped-up security measures during the times of these flights.

I realize that this kind of activity could well be part of a mutual defense exercise that you are not at liberty to discuss, but there have been views expressed that it might be something else in this case, that

these flights are carrying military equipment or supplies destined either directly or indirectly for the factions that we have been supporting in Angola.

Can you tell us anything more about this?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No, I cannot.

Senator CLARK. You have never heard of the stepped-up flights?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

BALANCING SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. I would like to go into the question, if I may, of what it would take to balance the Soviet and Cuban involvement there in your judgment.

Could a military stalemate have been achieved in Angola if the \$28 million of additional aid that the administration was seeking had been made available.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No, I do not think so.

Senator CLARK. You do not think that would have caused a stalemate?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not militarily.

Senator CLARK. Therefore, you would doubt that the \$9 million contained in the military appropriations bill, which was blocked, would have been adequate to achieve a stalemate militarily?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. Do you have any personal estimate, or any ideas at all, of what might have been required to offset the Soviet and Cuban equipment there?

As I recall it, in mid-December, the figures were a little less than \$200 million estimated in military equipment that the Soviets had delivered. The Secretary of State was quoted saying something like 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban troops, something in the area of 400 Russian advisors.

What do you think would have been required, or would be required now, to achieve a stalemate—not a victory, just a stalemate?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I do not know the answer to that question as to the past. As to the present, as I said to Senator Biden in response to a somewhat different form of the same question, I am not prepared today to make recommendations.

Senator CLARK. In any case, it seems quite clear to you that another \$28 million would not have turned the situation around or created a stalemate that could have brought about the goals that we wanted to achieve?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. It could not today.

Senator CLARK. Do you think it could have in mid-December?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Before I answer that, I would like to go back and review the situation in mid-December. One must look at the situation in mid-December from that perspective.

I would be skeptical that that amount would have been sufficient given the level of Soviet-supplied military equipment—the kind of equipment, the numbers of Cuban forces there to handle it and deploy it and use it in battle—that that would have been sufficient to have established a conventional military balance at that time.

That is off the top of my head.

Senator CLARK. I am inclined to agree with you, Mr. Secretary. It seems to me that given the present situation, 11,000 Cuban troops, 400 Russian advisers, and some \$200 million, that it would take a good deal more than money to offset that kind of organization, that kind of experience?

Are not mercenaries absolutely essential?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. In very large numbers. I do not know whether "mercenaries" is the word.

Senator CLARK. Troops.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Substantial numbers of trained and experienced combat men would be necessary to counterbalance that kind of a military presence. Of course, the other alternative is for those Cubans to leave. That also would establish a balance.

Senator CLARK. As long as they stay and the Russians stay, it would require either our involving a good number of advisers or troops or someone recruiting mercenaries to offset that or the South Africans coming back in.

One of those things certainly would have to occur, would they not, to create a stalemate?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. There would have to be, in one way or another, either the withdrawal of the Cubans or the Russians, or the introduction of large numbers of trained, experienced combat soldiers—very large numbers.

Senator CLARK. You would assume that if the administration comes openly to this committee or to the Congress that that is going to have to be a part of the request?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I do not know.

U.S./SOVIET COMPETITIVE ESCALATION

Senator CLARK. Is it not likely that additional U.S. military assistance would encourage additional Soviet assistance and the competition would escalate seriously before any kind of final solution would occur? Would you not assume from your position that if we were to continue to escalate, the Soviets would certainly continue to escalate?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I was not aware that we were escalating.

Senator CLARK. I said "if we were to." In other words, if we were to go in with another \$28 million or \$50 million or \$100 million or whatever—

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I do not know. I would have to see the package. I have not seen any proposals anywhere in the administration that we escalate our military assistance in Angola. I have not seen any such proposal.

Senator CLARK. Certainly the \$28 million in December was for an escalation, or doubling of our effort. You mean beyond the \$28 million?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. You were speaking about continuing to escalate. Aside from the use of the word "continue"—I have not seen any proposals for any continuing military assistance in Angola on the part of the administration.

Senator CLARK. Over and above the \$28 million that was requested?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am a guest of the subcommittee. I appreciate your invitation.

I am just trying to soak up the information you have been giving the subcommittee. I do not have it all clearly in my head yet.

DOD TESTIMONY INFORMATIONAL ONLY

Your appearance here is for our information as to existing conditions and not in support of any proposal that is coming from the executive branch at this time, is that correct?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

WILL CHINESE RETURN TO OPPOSE RUSSIAN-SUPPORTED GROUP?

Senator CASE. This may be out of your own competence. If so, please tell me, or if for any other reason you do not want to go into it, tell me too.

One of the reasons that many of us felt that we should stop the Angola operation was the fact—there were three reasons, really, that nobody else but us was doing it as far as the West went: China had quit; and—I was not counting South Africa in the West—South Africa was getting in there big—and the whole combination looked to us as a very bad bet. At least that is my own feeling about it, apart from the question of whether or not we should be involved in another country's civil war and whether or not Russia should be involved on one side or the other.

Do you have any knowledge that the Chinese may be interested in attempting to come back and give a hand to the side that is opposing the Russian-supported group?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No; I have no information that they are, Senator.

Senator CASE. Or are not?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Or are not.

Senator CASE. Either way.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct. I do not have any information that they are or are not.

Senator CASE. Would it not seem strange that they are a little unhappy about the way things are going? They have upbraided us with not being tough enough with the Russians in other areas. Presumably they are not anxious to see the Russians gain an unusual advantage and influence here.

My speculation, frankly, was that they decided that this was a losing battle as it was going, and decided to pull out before they got caught in an East-West confrontation, a black-white confrontation on the one side of the show to their great disadvantage in world opinion and in Africa generally. That is my view.

Assuming that that was correct, I thought that it was a good idea for us to do the same thing. I would not rule out an opposition to the Russians if it could be done on some basis that had a chance to succeed in bringing about a stalemate and let the Angolans decide it for themselves. I would not rule that out.

I am not anxious to see the Russian side dominate or win, or to see any outside influence succeed, and that is why I am asking these questions.

EUROPEAN, WESTERN INTEREST IN SHARING RESPONSIBILITY

Could you tell me whether you have any information that any European or Western country is interested in taking a share in this responsibility?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No.

PRESENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA

Senator CASE. Then it is just as bad or worse than it was before, is it not, except that the South Africans have gotten out, which in one respect is not a bad idea, and on the other hand, it eliminates any kind of organized military opposition, does it not?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact—

Senator CASE. You made that point, I am sure.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I made that point in my written testimony, both ways.

Senator CASE. I guess I am just going over a straw that the chairman has already thrashed. I am sorry if that is so.

It does seem to me from a military standpoint that the situation has not changed for the better, as far as opportunities for success.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. As I indicated before you came in, the military balance within Angola at the present time is such that the MPLA has overwhelming conventional military superiority, and has the capability to control the country completely militarily in a matter of weeks, if they choose to do so.

Senator CASE. For the same general purposes, do you see any reason to expect that if we want to do something about this, we would be doing it on our own without the support of China, without the support of Western Europe or Japan?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I do not know the answer to that. It has not been approached yet on that kind of a basis.

Senator CASE. That is a little out of your line anyway, is it not?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not completely, but largely it would be. But that approach has never been made, as far as I am aware.

Senator CASE. There is no effort being made by any of them to get into the picture or asking us to get into the picture with them?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Senator Case.

ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL REQUESTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Mr. Secretary, as I understand your testimony, you are not aware of any proposal of the administration to come before the Congress requesting military assistance?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No; I am not.

Senator CLARK. The Secretary of State, in testimony before this committee last week, indicated there may be an administration request for funds. That is what I had particular reference to.

FUND SOURCES FOR CONTINUED COVERT ACTIVITY WITHOUT
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

Both the Senate and the House passed an amendment, as you know, to the Defense appropriations bill stating that none of the funds of the bill can be used for activities in Angola. Are there any sources of funds for covert activity other than those in that bill, and, if so, does the administration intend, to your knowledge, to use these funds without the express approval of Congress?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Senator, I have considerable difficulty, although I hope I succeed, in keeping track of the Defense budget, if I can answer your question in that way.

Senator CLARK. You are not going to seek any funding for the CIA outside of the Defense budget?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. What is your answer with regard to the Defense budget? As I understand the amendment, it would be impossible for you to spend any money that is in that bill for Angola.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. In accordance with the terms of the amendment, that is my understanding.

SHARING ANGOLA INFORMATION, ANALYSIS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY

Senator CLARK. A couple of questions about South Africa.

I know you were kind enough to come before this subcommittee, I believe it was you, 6 or 8 months ago, and talk with us during a series of hearings on Africa, Angola and a number of countries—

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That was Mr. Noyes.

Senator CLARK. I am sorry.

The Military Attaché's Office in South Africa includes 11 representatives of the U.S. military, as I understand it. Do these representatives share information and analysis about Angola with the South African military?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. The answer to that is no.

Senator CLARK. They do not share any information on Angola? There is not an exchange of information?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

FUNCTION OF MILITARY ATTACHÉ OFFICE REPRESENTATIVES IN
SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. What is the function of these representatives? Why do we have that many in South Africa, in view of the fact that we have an arms embargo and we do not land there? We have no activities there of any kind. What do these 11 people do?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I wonder if I could provide the answer to that on a classified basis.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE—SOUTH AFRICA

(Supplied By Department of Defense)

The size of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in South Africa is based on several factors:

a. Foremost is the importance and scope of the DAO's mission. The DAO is accredited to South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland. [Deleted].

b. The necessity to operate and maintain an aircraft to support Embassy requirements as well as those of the DAO. Two of the 11 spaces (the assistant air attache who serves as the copilot and the aircraft maintenance technician) are involved.

c. The physical location of the DAO at two sites—Pretoria and Cape Town. This increases the requirement for enlisted intelligence assistants but is essential to mission accomplishment.

[As of the date of publication, the classified portion of the above insert had not been received.]

UNITED STATES/SOUTH AFRICA POLICY COORDINATION

Senator CLARK. Since the United States and South Africa have been assisting the same factions in Angola, presumably, I had certainly thought sharing information and analysis with those factions would be necessary. Would it not be difficult for the United States and South Africa not to coordinate their Angola policies?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. There has been no coordination that I am aware of, certainly none on the military level.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator CLARK. I am going to have to ask for a recess again. I do not think it will be more than 2 or 3 minutes.

Thank you.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. The hearing will please come to order.

Mr. Secretary, I have a few short questions and Senator Clark tells me—I passed him on the way—he has three or four more.

LACK OF EFFECT OF UNITED STATES \$28 MILLION INPUT

As I was leaving to vote, Senator Clark, I believe, was asking questions—maybe it was Senator Case, I do not recall—whether or not it made much difference if we had put in \$28 million, or \$29 million or whatever, in the outcome, in light of the significant input on the part of the Soviets and the Cubans.

I understand your answer to be probably not.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Certainly not today. It might have, you know, at some earlier time along the line. Clearly not today; who knows about the past.

ADMINISTRATION REQUEST FOR AID TO UNITA, FNLA

Senator BIDEN. I understand you were asked about whether you knew that the administration was going to be coming forward to ask for any overt aid to either the MPLA—excuse me, the UNITA or the FNLA.

You said you were not aware, you did not know. Is that correct?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I am not aware of any proposals from the administration for any kind of military assistance to anyone in Angola.

Senator BIDEN. One of my concerns that I have had since the first CIA briefing I attended is what was the relative strength, politically and militarily, of the MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA, each standing on its own?

I think that may be an important consideration to explore if, in fact, we are going to be asked to take some sort of overt action with regard to trying to at least lessen the march of the MPLA somewhat.

I would like to ask you about that more particularly.

UNITA/FNLA CAPABILITY WITH ADDITIONAL U.S. MONETARY, ARMS SUPPORT

Is UNITA or the FNLA, absent the presence of U.S. military forces which you have ruled out, capable, as a consequence, with additional money and arms to do much about the situation in Angola?

Does each have the military expertise and leadership elements among its own to be able to make use of a mass infusion of sophisticated military weapons, in your judgment?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. If I may, I would answer that on the other side of the coin by saying, as I had said already, that if one could envision all of the Cubans out and all of the Soviet equipment cut off, then that would be one way of working toward the restoration of a reasonable, local, conventional military balance.

I think that answers your question.

Basically I would think that the UNITA/FNLA would have trained personnel and professional military leadership, spirit, morale, organizational capabilities that would permit them on that kind of a basis to constitute a reasonably equitable local military, conventional military balance with the MPLA.

Senator BIDEN. That is what I am asking, and you answered directly. The reason I asked that, we have had numerous reports from so-called experts and nonexperts that Dr. Neto was considerably more astute than Holden Roberto, that the morale, did in fact, vary among the three factions with the MPLA being more disciplined, more militarily disciplined, better trained, absent or prior to the large infusion of Soviet arms.

That is why I asked, because my concern from the beginning is, even assuming it was decided that it was in our interest to stop the MPLA, which I will not argue at this moment, assuming it is, can we win? Can we do anything about it?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not as long as the Cubans are there and the Soviet military equipment is there.

Senator BIDEN. I asked this question before of administration and nonadministration officials. There was a good deal of disagreement whether or not, in a totally indigenous war with the three Angolan factions backed only with military equipment from the outside in an equal weight and manner, that Savimbi or Roberto had the capability or military expertise to do with what they had what Neto had. There was a great deal of skepticism. That is why I am asking the question which you have answered.

STOPPING MPLA IN LIGHT OF SOVIET MILITARY, CUBAN AID

Another thing that concerns me—if the MPLA with Cuban help and with the infusion of military aid on the part of the Soviet Union, that level of help, continues, how can the MPLA be stopped?

Is there a way that they can be stopped?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not militarily under the present circumstances.

Senator BIDEN. What change in circumstances could stop them?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I do not know that there is any, but the Chairman, Senator Clark, was talking, and I was in a colloquy with him about it, so that we both were talking in terms of very substantial numbers of trained, experienced men well-equipped with modern combat weapons introduced from some source in order to counter the MPLA military, conventional military, capability.

That would be the only way.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator Clark [presiding]. Just three or four more questions, Mr. Secretary.

One other question on South Africa.

USE OF U.S. PLANES SOLD TO SOUTH AFRICA

Recently there have been reports on the sale of six Hercules transport planes to South Africa. It also has been reported that the MPLA shot down a South African aircraft.

Are these, or any of the other planes, sold by the United States to South Africa being used for transport or other military purposes in Angola, to your knowledge?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. May I ask my collaborator, Mr. Reed, to respond to that?

Mr. REED. The planes that you refer to, I believe, are the C-130 aircraft that we sold to the South African Government prior to our military embargo in 1963. We have sold no C-130's to them since that time.

Senator CLARK. So the Hercules transport planes were sold—six Hercules transport planes were sold prior to 1963?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. There are no reports of any sales since then, or there have been no sales?

Mr. REED. There have been no sales of C-130's to South Africa since that time.

PREVENTING SOVIET-SUPPORTED INSURGENCY IN RHODESIA,
NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. You testified, Mr. Secretary, that the Soviet presence in Angola could serve to support insurgents in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself. Is one of the main reasons for United States assistance to Angola to prevent this from happening, in your judgment?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes.

Senator CLARK. What do you think the impact would be on those countries of a long and escalating war in Angola as to that particular problem?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, I guess one could sum up that the impact would probably be destabilizing. It would probably be unhealthy.

ZAMBIA ASSISTANCE TO FNLA/UNITA

Senator CLARK. You testified that Zaire and Zambia could also be exposed to the dangers of active, Soviet-supported insurgency as a consequence of their assistance to the FNLA and UNITA and its struggle against the MPLA.

Has it really been established that Zambia gave assistance to the FNLA?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. To UNITA.

Senator CLARK. I thought your testimony said FNLA and UNITA?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I was speaking of them together.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ESCALATING ANGOLA WAR TO ZAIRE, ZAMBIA

Senator CLARK. Would not a long war preventing the opening of the railroad have serious consequences for those two countries? Would not a continuing, escalating war, if we were to keep going in and the Cubans, the South Africans, the Russians or any part of that, is that not going to be disastrous to a stable economy for Zaire and Zambia in view of the essential nature of the railroad?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Anything that makes that railroad unavailable to Zaire and Zambia is going to have a very severe impact on their economies, whether it is a war or whether it is a railroad in the hands of a hostile government, or whether it is some kind of a washout of the roadbed, anything that makes that railroad inaccessible to them will have a bad effect on their economies.

ESTABLISHING GOOD RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT THAT COMES TO POWER

Senator CLARK. The MPLA has repeatedly asserted its commitment to nonalignment for Angola and I notice in the paper again today, Neto was quoted as saying he was nonaligned. He has expressly stated that he does not intend to allow the Soviet Union to establish bases in Angola.

If the United States wants to prevent the establishment of Soviet bases in Angola—certainly we do—should we not encourage Angola on nonalignment and seek to establish good relations with whatever government comes to power there much as we did in Mozambique? Would that not be a wise way to avoid it?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. It would be one way.

SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Senator CLARK. Is it not true that the Soviet Union has failed much more often than they have succeeded to gain a permanent presence of that kind of African countries?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I do not know; I have not kept count. But I do notice that they have a couple of permanent presences or apparently permanent presences that substantially enhance their surveillance capabilities in that area.

Senator CLARK. Somalia and Guinea?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. Do you know of any others?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No.

OFFSETTING SOVIET-SPONSORED FACTION

Senator CLARK. From the Monday morning quarterback's position, do you think some other type of assistance to FNLA might have been more productive in light of this experience, that the DOD should forebear in the future to supplying arms to one faction in a civil war in an African country?

I guess what I am really saying—could you think of a better approach than we may have used in Angola that would have offset the Soviet sponsored faction there?

Should we have gone another round? Should we have gone another way?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. If I understood your question correctly, it was, might we not in retrospect have done something other than supply military aid to FNLA.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. We have not supplied any military aid to FNLA that I am aware of.

Senator CLARK. What?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. We in the Department of Defense have not supplied any military aid to FNLA that I am aware of.

Senator CLARK. In our Government we certainly have. Certainly a number of people, from the President and the Secretary of State, I think, are on record as saying, we have given money for military assistance to those two movements. In fact, I am under the impression that you said you thought most of the money had gone to military assistance rather than money that could have been used for mercenaries.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, you will have to forgive me, but I have had in the past and still do to some extent have responsibility for the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] and military assistance programs in the Department of Defense. Those simply have not been involved at all with any of the three factions in Angola.

Senator CLARK. Yes, I understand.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, I just wanted to make clear that the Department of Defense had not provided any military assistance whatsoever to any of the factions in Angola.

Now, then, as for what might have been done by the Government differently, I really have not had the opportunity, Senator, to reflect on that as a Monday morning quarterback. I suppose it is possible to go back in history a number of years and to say by way of criticism of past administrations, of the present administration, of the whole American Government, that there might have been more imaginative and luckier set of perspectives on Africa as far as our policy is concerned.

I really do not pretend to be an expert on that area of the world and I am not prepared at this time to offer those kinds of criticisms.

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you a more specific question, because that was rather vague.

You spoke of the Department of Defense providing military equipment to the factions and said, in fact, none had been provided.

What about Zaire? Could we have given, or did we give, military assistance from the Department of Defense, equipment that could have been passed on to the factions?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No.

Senator CLARK. That could not have happened?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not legally, and I do not think that it did in fact.

Senator CLARK. There would be nothing to prevent the Zairians from giving military equipment that they have obtained from another source to one or both of the factions and we, in turn, in effect replace that with military equipment that we gave. There is no way under the law to prevent that.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

CUBAN/SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT CHRONOLOGY

Senator CLARK. Do you know whether the Cuban soldiers came into Angola before or after the South Africans, since there is some question about who is responding to whom, if there was any response there?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I really do not have a precise chronology on that, Senator. If you will permit me, I will try to establish a chronology and provide an answer for the record.

Senator CLARK. That will be very helpful. If you could do it in terms of not only dates but numbers—

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. That would be useful.

[The information referred to follows:]

CHRONOLOGY—CUBAN/SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

[Supplied by the Dept. of Defense]

Cuban military personnel preceded the South Africans into Angola. Since the late 1960's a permanent advisory force of approximately [deleted] Cubans had supported the MPLA. First indications of the introduction of additional Cuban personnel were received on 25 July 1975. The introduction of South African forces began on 11 August 1975 when a small force was deployed into Southern Angola as a security guard for the Cunene hydroelectric project. Key dates are:

Date:

Event

[Deleted].

The South African expeditionary force totaled only some 1,000 men at its peak; it was pulled back by late January 1976 to a buffer zone of 30 miles beyond the South West Africa frontier and reinforced by another [deleted] South African troops. Cuba's military strength sent to Angola currently totals approximately 12,000.

[As of the date of publication, the classified portion of the above insert had not been received.]

DOD POLICY CONCERNING ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Last, Mr. Secretary, there have been numerous reports, as I am sure you read, that there were divisions within the administration over its Angolan policy. I suppose there are often divisions over most all of the policies that are evolved.

Could you tell us where the Department of Defense stands on this? Was it in support, in fact, of the covert activities? Did you favor this larger or smaller commitment?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Speaking for myself, I have never had any problem supporting the notion of doing what we could to help offset the effect of the Soviet and Cuban assistance to the MPLA, for the reasons that I have outlined in my own statement.

Senator CLARK. You supported the policy that we followed?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Certainly.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate your frankness.

Senator PERCY?

COMMENDING SECRETARY ELLSWORTH'S TESTIMONY

Senator PERCY. Secretary Ellsworth, I would just like to tell Senator Clark that the testimony you gave last week on intelligence and our responsibility was most helpful and incisive.

INTEREST OF NATO ALLIES IN ANGOLA

You have had long experience in NATO. Can you summarize and tell us what direct or indirect interest our NATO allies might have in Angola, both military and economic interests?

Does Portugal, for instance, retain any economic or military interest in Angola now?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Senator.

First of all, as far as I know, Portugal retains no special, specific or concrete economic or other interest in Angola. That is my understanding. Portuguese commercial interests retain some interest in Angola, but beyond that, there is no particular specific or concrete interest in Angola.

Now then, as far as NATO members generally, of course, first of all, the NATO treaty does not extend below the Tropic of Cancer, so therefore, NATO as an organization or as a treaty or as an alliance has no interest whatsoever, technically speaking, within the four corners of the NATO treaty.

Naturally, the states of Western Europe have a general interest in the maintenance of stability and the avoidance of friction, conflicts, controversies that might lead to an expanded or enlarged war.

Of course, there is no member of NATO, no state in Western Europe, in fact, there is no other nation in the world that has the superpower responsibilities that the United States has, save only the possibility of the Soviet Union being in that category. In recent years, the Soviet Union has achieved the status of a global superpower. Both of those powers, it seems to me, have a very considerable interest in avoiding unnecessary abrasions, conflicts, controversies, wars, large and small, particularly getting themselves involved in them.

I think that is what is so unfortunate, frankly, about the Soviet Union reaching out into Angola and into south central Africa, as it were, and involving itself so actively and so energetically in that situation, in that unfortunate country, and in that very intricate, complex part of Africa.

But in answer to your question, I do not think that there is any other country in the world that has the interest that the United States has in that situation.

Senator PERCY. You mean in just making sure that there is stability?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That there is stability.

Senator PERCY. There is no inclination on the part of any of our NATO allies to unilaterally intervene, for instance?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not that I am aware of. I think that I would be aware of it.

NATO ALLY ENCOURAGEMENT OF U.S. ACTIONS

Senator PERCY. Can you indicate whether or not any of them have directly asked us, or suggested to us, that it might be a good idea for the United States in the interest of overall stability and in the interest of our NATO alliance or allies, for us to carry the ball? Have they encouraged us? Have they in any way condemned the action of the Congress in tying the administration's hands in this regard?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No; I cannot indicate, except to say that we have received some comments from some of our friends, together with a number of other events that they have observed over recent years, that this setting our hand to the plow and then not following through has caused them some concern, has created in their minds some area of doubt about our readiness to act in the case of need, not that they would have necessarily defined Angola as we, the administration, did as a case of need, but it has raised the question of the relationships, the role of the Congress and its ability to abort this operation. It has raised some small measure of doubt, I think, in the minds of a number of our friends of our readiness to act in case of need. I am not trying to exaggerate. I am not trying to overstate or be an alarmist, because I do not think that the reactions I am speaking about would justify that.

Since you asked the question, there has been some reaction along that line.

UNITED STATES VITAL INTERESTS AT STAKE

Senator PERCY. I do not think that there is any question of what we need to demonstrate to the Soviet Union. Just let them try to interfere as the Japanese did in Hawaii or Guam or any place like that and they will see we have enough national resolve to do anything that was necessary to put a stop to it.

The question here is whether or not Angola is the right place for such a response. Just because the Soviets are in there, do we have to go in? That was our problem in Vietnam. Our vital interests were not at stake, really. It is a long way away logistically, extraordinarily hard to back it up and we were backing a side that did not have the moral strength, did not have the necessary resolve or sense of unity. They were filled with corruption, and we simply could not support them. We were embarrassed that we had backed the wrong horse, in a sense, although the alternative was also pretty bad.

Our best bet probably was to stay out of Angola, and not end up the way we did in Vietnam.

Some people say you cannot compare Vietnam and Angola. But both countries are geographically remote from us, and you have said yourself that you do not favor sending U.S. military forces to Angola.

Can we agree, then, that our vital interest is not enough at stake there to justify it—but when our vital interests are threatened we are

going to stand up and fight for what we think is right and fight to win?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Absolutely.

U.S./UNITA/FNLA UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING MERCENARIES

Senator PERCY. On the question of mercenaries, we have raised that issue, and it gets into an odd and difficult area.

Does the U.S. Government have any sort of understanding with UNITA or the FNLA about whether the funds we provided them can or cannot be used to hire mercenaries?

Have we covered that subject in specifics with them? There is a concern and question as to whether or not funds are being used—these ads you see in the paper, offers of \$1,500 a month and so forth.

The general assumption is nobody has that kind of money other than the CIA, so it must be the CIA. That is not a necessary conclusion at all, but do we have any kind of understanding that you can discuss with us?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Senator Clark and I have had a number of questions and answers about that, and to sum up my answers to him to all of those questions, we in the Department of Defense have no knowledge of any kind of mercenary operations, and that would also apply to the question that you have asked.

RECOMMENDATIONS SOLICITED FROM SECRETARY ELLSWORTH

Senator PERCY. As a skilled legislator yourself in the past and having been in two branches of government, do you have any solution to this problem?

In our form of government, we have got to be so open, and the tendency is to get more and more open about it. The very fact that the administration comes forward and requests something covertly or overtly, or orbits the thought that it may have to go overt in this particular area, then it says it is going to and then it looks powerless and impotent because it cannot get it. Is there not any way that before we orbit these ideas that the issues can be raised so we can get what the response would be from Congress? If we could, we would not present such a divided foreign policy to the world—which must be extraordinarily confusing and very frustrating.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Senator, no; I do not have the answer to that or solutions to offer. All I can say in response to your comments is that I am hopeful that in these months and weeks that we are going through that we are all attempting to work our way toward a mode of governing, a mode of handling our international relations, our foreign affairs, our national defense and our security interests, wherever they may be, that will be on a unified basis, that will be on a strong basis which will provide the rest of the world with confidence in what our position is and what our readiness is and what our capabilities are, and what our policies are with confidence, be it in the minds of our potential adversaries or our friends and allies.

Senator PERCY. I hope that we can work toward that. I think that it is extraordinarily important.

I think that the action the House took the other day in reversing the decision of the subcommittee was absolutely right.

From my discussions with people back in Illinois yesterday, I found almost universal support for that action. People of this country are not so stupid as to think we can conduct a government and just lay everything out on the table and do it all as openly as some would have us do. This is not a pure democracy.

It is a dangerous thought to try to move us in that direction.

We should not have to submit everything to referendum. The people of this country know that, and they do not want it.

This is why I took a strong position. I felt that the position the Senate was put in to try to vote on releasing a 259-page report on assassinations when we had a copy of the report at 9 o'clock and the vote was to come at 1 o'clock was about the most ludicrous position I have ever been put in as an individual, and I flatly stated that I would vote against it if the vote came; of course, we did not have a vote.

I think your testimony before us the other day was extraordinarily helpful. A great many of us, and, I think, the American people, want to work toward finding a way that we can, in a democratic/republican process carry on foreign policy and our national security and defense and intelligence work in such a way that we work together, not at odds.

I hope that as a result of all of this soul searching we are doing that we are going to find a way to do it and I think you have been very helpful.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

NATO SUPPORT CONCERNING ACTIONS IN ANGOLA

One last clarification, Mr. Secretary. I think you made it clear in your answer to Senator Percy and Senator Case about NATO support concerning actions in Angola—it was my understanding that your answer to Senator Case was that our NATO allies were not assisting the factions that we support in Angola.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

COMMENDATION OF SECRETARY ELLSWORTH

I think your testimony has been very helpful. I particularly appreciate your frankness and the brevity of your answers and your responsiveness.

Thank you very much for coming, both of you.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WITNESSES

Senator CLARK. We are going to hear next from Dr. Leon Gouré, a professor with the Center for Advanced Studies of the University of Miami.

We would like all three of the witnesses to come to the table.

We will hear the witnesses in the order they appear on the agenda—Professor Gouré, Professor Schulman, and Mr. Weissman and reserve the remainder of our time for discussion so you can comment back and forth on each other's testimony.

Dr. GOURÉ. I have a prepared statement for the committee. I thought to save the committee time that I might simply present a summary of that paper.

Senator CLARK. Excellent.

STATEMENT OF DR. LEON GOURÉ, PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Dr. GOURÉ. Mr. Chairman, I would like, at the outset, to emphasize to you and the members of this committee that the subject I feel most competent to discuss is how the Soviet Union perceives the international situation, its relations with the United States, and in this specific case, how it sees the developments in Angola and its involvement in that country in relation to the United States-Soviet détente and overall Soviet objectives.

SOVIET CONCEPT OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"

In order to understand Soviet actions in Angola, it is essential to appreciate the differences between the Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence" as a basis for its relations with the United States and the American views of the implications of "détente." Much of the misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries stems from American assumptions that the Soviet Union shares essentially our understanding of the basic rules and purposes of détente, even though the Soviet leadership has defined its views of the scope and limits of United States-Soviet cooperation with great candor.

According to the Soviet definition of "peaceful coexistence," its principles apply only to relations between states of the opposing systems—Communist and capitalist—and provide primarily for agreements aimed at reducing the danger of the occurrence of a nuclear war between them. Beyond this, however, as Soviet leaders persistently remind us, "peaceful coexistence" means neither the cessation of what Brezhnev has called the continuing and irreconcilable struggle between the two systems for dominance, nor cooperation for the preservation of international stability, nor the cessation of Soviet efforts to promote and support social-political changes in what they describe as the "remaining sphere of influence" of the West in general and of the United States in particular.

The Soviet leadership specifically excludes the so-called "anti-imperialist national liberation" movements struggling for "total" political and economic independence and for socialism in the Third World from the rules of "peaceful coexistence."

Indeed, Moscow perceives the national liberation struggle as a very important and highly effective element in the global revolutionary process and as a major ally of the Soviet Union and the Communist movement in what is described as their "joint offensive against imperialism and capitalism in the struggle for the victory of socialism."

In the Soviet view, the national liberation movement makes a critical contribution to shifting the "correlation of world forces" in favor of the Soviet Union by helping to erode U.S. global positions and influence, to diminish its power and to isolate it from the rest of the world.

Furthermore, "peaceful coexistence" is not an end in itself, but a

strategy and an instrument, one of whose purposes, according to Soviet pronouncements, is to create favorable conditions for the upsurge and successes of the revolutionary and national liberation movements, because it unilaterally restrains the United States from effectively opposing these movements, or Soviet attempts to exploit them.

Thus, according to the Soviet Government newspaper *Izvestia* of November 6, 1975, peaceful coexistence "is intended to create a world order under which the inevitable social changes within states [i.e., non-Communist states] would not result in international conflicts, clashes, and devastating wars. This is the only true meaning of détente."

It should also be noted that while "peaceful coexistence" prohibits wars between the states of the two opposing systems, it does not preclude the use of force by the revolutionary and national liberation movements and the so-called "progressive" states.

As Premier Kosygin asserted on July 3, 1972, and as Soviet leaders and spokesmen have repeated over the years, the right of peoples and "progressive" countries to resort to armed uprisings and to wars of national liberation against domestic reactionary forces and foreign imperialism is "sacred" and Soviet political and material support for such struggles is declared to be "one of the paramount principles of Soviet foreign policy."

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN PORTUGUESE AFRICAN COLONIES

Soviet intervention in Angola is a vivid example of the practical implementation of "peaceful coexistence." Soviet involvement in that country goes back some 20 years when, it alleges, the MPLA was organized "on the initiative of the Communist Party and the allied Party of Joint Struggle of the Africans of Angola."

The Soviet Union was similarly involved in the other Portuguese colonies, notably in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

The April 1974 military coup in Portugal and the decision of the Spínola government to end Portugal's colonial rule in Africa opened up a major opportunity for the Soviet Union to try to influence developments not only in Angola but in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Rather than detail the chronology of subsequent Soviet actions in Angola, I would like to make a number of observations about Soviet perceptions and risk-benefit calculations.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS, RISK-BENEFIT CALCULATIONS OF INTERVENTION

First of all, any opportunity Moscow saw for playing a significant role in Angola required that the MPLA achieve a dominant position. As it was the weakest of the three contending groups, the Soviet Union saw the need to strengthen it militarily, which it began doing in March 1975. By May, the first contingent of Cuban military personnel arrived.

The U.S. failure to publicly react to these Soviet moves reinforced Moscow's belief that the United States was unlikely to make a major issue of the Soviet-Cuban involvement. Indeed, the response was to provide some covert arms aid to the FNLA and UNITA from Zaire, Zambia and later, by China and South Africa, thus confirming Mos-

cow's judgment that the U.S. Government continued to give top priority to its détente policy.

The Soviet Union also perceived a strong interaction between the developments in Portugal and those in Angola. In its view, the shifts to the Left in the two countries reinforced each other and were believed to be largely interdependent.

Consequently, while the ruling military council in Portugal was under the leadership of General Goncalves and strong Communist influence, Moscow expected that the Portuguese military would act in concert with the MPLA; the fall of Goncalves, however, brought this Soviet expectation to naught.

With the MPLA's control of Luanda threatened by the forces of the FNLA and UNITA, the Soviet Union apparently decided to mount a rescue operation by covertly bringing in on October 1975 large numbers of Cuban combat troops who knew how to use the modern weapons the Soviet Union had sent to Angola. Once again, the United States failed to make a public issue of this escalating Communist intervention.

The military successes of the Cuban forces and the weak reactions of the countries supporting the FNLA and UNITA led Moscow to decide that there was little risk in supporting an MPLA-Cuban campaign to take over all of Angola. The South African intervention proved a blessing to the Soviet Union. On the one hand, it was too small to overcome the Cuban forces, and on the other, it not only discredited UNITA, but generated increased support for the MPLA on the part of African States and allowed Moscow to claim that it was helping the Angolan people to resist South African aggression and the possible takeover of the country.

Furthermore, this gave Moscow an opening to identify the United States with South Africa.

The establishment in November 1975 of the People's Republic of Angola with an MPLA Government and the recognition accorded it by nearly half the African States, provided Moscow with a legitimization of its intervention, which now is claimed to be carried out at the request of the legal Government of Angola.

It is in this context that Pravda, on Jan. 3, 1976, called for an end to "foreign armed intervention," meaning, of course, South Africa, Zaire, Zambia and, indirectly, the United States. Neither in that Pravda article nor in the widely cited article in the Jan. 29, 1976, issue of Izvestia were there any indications that Moscow was prepared to seek a real political settlement. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how these articles could have given rise to expectations in the U.S. press that the Soviet Union stood ready to seek a compromise, especially at a time when its confidence in the total success of its policy was becoming increasingly pronounced.

Secretary Kissinger's warnings beginning in December that Soviet action in Angola threatened the future of détente not only escalated the significance for U.S.-Soviet relations of development in Angola, but also raised the question of the credibility of these warnings, as well as the ability of the U.S. to affect the situation in Angola. That Moscow chose to disregard these warnings reflects a Soviet belief that the combination of external and domestic constraints on U.S. policies is too strong at this time to allow the United States any real options

and consequently, that the United States, in fact, is not in a position to impose serious penalties on the Soviet Union for its actions in Angola.

According to Soviet analyses, the present "correlation of forces" between the two systems, both in military and political terms, is such that the United States is itself anxious to avoid confrontations with the Soviet Union and that it views the continuation of its détente policy, to quote a Soviet spokesman, as a "categorical imperative."

The Soviet leadership believes this judgment to be confirmed by U.S. insistence on giving priority to SALT over the Angolan problem, by its reluctance to halt grain deliveries or to deny further grain sales to the Soviet Union, and by the opposition of Congress to any U.S. involvement in Angola.

Thus, by insisting that it will not be deterred from carrying out what it calls its "internationalist duty" in Angola, the Soviet Union, in fact, seeks to underscore the impotence of the United States and its inability to use détente as a means of deterring Soviet action, and to magnify the significance of Soviet successes and power.

The Soviet Union clearly hopes to reap substantial benefits from its actions in Angola. Aside from the economic and strategic gains which it might achieve as a result of its close ties to the MPLA Government, Moscow sees an opportunity to enhance its prestige and credibility as the leader of the global "anti-imperialist national liberation" movement and in particular, to foster what *Izvestia* described on Jan. 29, 1976, as "the growing anti-imperialist unity of the freedom-loving African countries."

The credibility of the Soviet Union's claim to leadership of the so-called progressive forces in the Third World depends on demonstrating that it will not subordinate its support of them to the exigencies of its détente relations with the United States.

Thus, as *Izvestia* stated on December 26, 1975:

The African and nonaligned countries have also had an opportunity to see for themselves the groundlessness of the Maoist allegations that, under the influence of the normalization of relations with the capitalist countries and the relaxation of international tensions, the Soviet Union "will not want" to defend the interests of the peoples of young states.

Similarly, Fidel Castro expects to refurbish his image as a revolutionary leader as a result of the presence and successes of the Cuban troops in Angola and thereby enhance his role and influence in the Third World in general and in Latin America in particular.

The Soviet leadership has no illusions about the Marxist character of either the MPLA or the other progressive African regimes, and it is not its objective at this time to establish true Communist systems in those countries.

The point at issue, as *Izvestia* stated on January 29, 1976, is whether Angola will have a pro-Western orientation which the Soviets claim will have a profoundly adverse effect on the unity and progress of anti-imperialist policies of the African States and on the "further widening of the struggle against the racist regimes in the south of Africa, that is, Rhodesia and South Africa, or whether it will have a progressive and pro-Soviet orientation, thus strengthening Moscow's influence in Africa and in the Third World as a whole.

The persistent Soviet assertions that the outcome in Angola will be critical for the further national liberation struggle in the south of Africa raises the strong possibility that Angola may become a spring-board for such a struggle not only against South Africa and Rhodesia, but also against the moderate regimes in Zaire and Zambia.

EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA ON DÉTENTE

Thus, as far as the effects of the developments of Angola on détente are concerned, the Soviet Union is attempting to demonstrate to its friends and potential clients that its détente relationship does not take precedence over its support of the so-called anti-imperialist forces and that Moscow is prepared to escalate its intervention in the Third World to an unprecedented level of overt use of force in support of them.

In so doing, the Soviet Union also seeks to give the impression that the United States has no real options at this time but to give precedence to its détente policy and that the constraints on U.S. policies are such as to make Americans increasingly hesitant to offer effective opposition to Moscow's attempts.

It is clearly evident that Moscow believes it can play by its own rules, leaving it essentially to the United States to determine whether or not it can tolerate them.

[Dr. Gouré's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. LEON GOURÉ

THE SOVIET UNION'S PERCEPTIONS OF ANGOLA AND THE ISSUE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Mr. Chairman: I would like to emphasize at the outset that the subject I feel most competent to discuss is what my colleague at the Center for Advanced International Studies of the University of Miami, Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, calls "the view from the Kremlin"; that is, how the Soviet leadership perceives the international situation, its relations with the United States, and in this case, the developments in Angola. I believe most thoughtful people will agree that the Soviet Union's views of the world, of its interests and priorities, as well as its appreciation of the risks and benefits of its policy choices, in most instances, do not mirror our own. The Soviet view of the world and of international relations is shaped and influenced by an ideology, history, values, experiences, and objectives which, in most major respects, differ fundamentally from those of the United States. Naturally, the Soviet leadership formulates its policies and determines its strategy and tactics on the basis of its own perceptions of the world and of the opportunities it sees for attaining its objectives. Consequently, Soviet policies and actions cannot be properly understood except in the light of Moscow's perceptions.

In reply to Secretary of State Kissinger's warning last December that Moscow's intervention in Angola endangered détente, the Soviet Government's newspaper, *Izvestia*, on December 25 and 26, 1975, expressed surprise and irritation over what it called American assertions that such Soviet behavior "contradicts" what Moscow claims to be its primary aim, namely, to bring about a relaxation in U.S.-Soviet relations. The newspaper denied that such a contradiction exists, and went on to reaffirm once more a long-standing Soviet position to the effect that Soviet "support of the people's national liberation struggle is one of the most important principles of Soviet foreign policy." In a sense, *Izvestia* is justified in being impatient with American complaints of this sort, because prior to, as well as since the 1972 Moscow Summit Meeting, Soviet leaders and spokesmen have defined and described their understanding of the rules of their "peaceful co-existence" policy, as against the U.S. understanding of "détente," with what they call "exhaustive clarity."

According to the Soviet definition of "peaceful coexistence," its principles apply only to state-to-state relations between states of the opposing systems—the communist and the capitalist—and specifically provide for agreements aimed at reducing the risks of an outbreak of a nuclear war or of dangerous confrontations between the superpowers which might lead to such a war. Beyond this, however, as Soviet leaders assert, "peaceful coexistence" does not and cannot mean any kind of status quo between the opposing systems or any cessation of their struggle for dominance. In particular, the revolutionary movements inside capitalist countries and the so-called "anti-imperialist national liberation" movements in the Third World are specifically excluded from the principles of "peaceful coexistence." In other words, as Soviet spokesmen emphasize, "peaceful coexistence" assures only the inviolability of frontiers and territories of countries against aggression, but it does not include, as they say the American concept of *detente* does, the principle of inviolability of social-political systems inside non-communist countries, or of what they describe as the "remaining sphere of influence" of the west in general, and of the U.S. in particular. Indeed, as General Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin proclaimed immediately after the 1972 Moscow Summit, and as they and other Soviet leaders have repeated ever since, "peaceful coexistence" does not and cannot deny the "sacred" right of the peoples and countries of the Third World to struggle for what they call total political and economic independence from Western domination and for socialism. More than that, according to Soviet assertions, the national liberation movement is seen as an important ally of the Soviet Union and the communist movements in what is described as their "joint offensive against imperialism and capitalism in the struggle for the victory of socialism." Thus, contrary to Secretary Kissinger's warning that *detente* must be "indivisible" if it is to be a viable relationship, the Soviets view "peaceful coexistence" as being highly divisible, and claim that any other approach, according to their pronouncement, is "illusory," "dead," "bankrupt," and "unrealistic," because it ignores the "real" world and the actual state of power relations therein.

"Peaceful coexistence" is not seen by the Soviet leaders as an end in itself, but rather as a strategy and an instrument in an ongoing process which Brezhnev has described as the continuing and irreconcilable struggle between the systems. Specifically, "peaceful coexistence" is defined as being a "special" and "highly effective" form of this struggle, aimed at creating favorable conditions for the upsurge of the revolutionary and "anti-imperialist national liberation" forces throughout the world and for active Soviet support of them. "Peaceful coexistence" is said to create these favorable conditions by placing increasing constraints on the ability and willingness of the United States to resort to force or other measures to oppose these movements. In their turn, the successes of these movements are seen as helping to bring about a further shift in the "correlation of world forces" in favor of the Soviet Union, thereby strengthening these constraints on the U.S. and reducing the risks that Soviet expansionist policies may provoke confrontations with the United States. Indeed, as an article in *Izvestia* of November 6, 1975 pointed out, peaceful coexistence "is intended to create a world order under which the inevitable social changes within states [i.e., non-communist states] would not result in international conflicts, clashes and devastating wars. This is the only true meaning of *detente*."

It is important to emphasize that in the Soviet view, these injunctions against foreign intervention in the revolutionary and national liberation struggle do not apply symmetrically to both sides. Rather, they apply only to the capitalist countries in general, and the U.S. in particular, because by definition their aims are reactionary and imperialist, and consequently their interventions are "aggressions" against the peoples struggling for progress and socialism. CPSU Central Committee and Politburo member M. A. Suslov invoked this persistent Soviet line when he declared in a speech on July 4, 1975, that "peaceful coexistence" serves to restrict the "possibilities for the so-called 'export of counter-revolution'" by the West. The Soviet Union and its allies, however, cannot be restricted in their right to exercise their "internationalist duty" to give whatever support is necessary to the national liberation movements and to shield them against Western interference.

In particular, while "peaceful coexistence" is intended to preclude war between the states of the opposing systems, it does not prohibit resort to violence in what the Soviets call "just" wars of liberation. As early as July 3, 1972, Premier Kosygin asserted that "peaceful coexistence" in U.S.-Soviet relations "in no case means the rejection of the rights of peoples, arms in hand," to strug-

gle for national liberation, and he proclaimed that the Soviet Union "unfailingly assists peoples which have risen in struggle against the colonialists." This also has become a persistent theme in Soviet pronouncements. For example, an article in *Izvestia* of September 11, 1973 stated that while wars as a means of resolving disputes between the great powers must be "banned," the Soviet Union "must not 'ban' civil or national liberation wars" or armed uprisings. Similarly, an article in the November 1975 issue of the party-military journal, *Communist of the Armed Forces*, asserted that "the communist parties and other progressive forces consider it their duty to support the peoples' sacred struggle against various forms of oppression and the just liberation wars against imperialism." And, as was noted, Soviet leaders have continuously emphasized, as for example Suslov did on April 22, 1975, and USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko repeated on May 13, 1975, that "political and material support of the national liberation movement" is "one of the paramount principles of Soviet foreign policy." Indeed, as *Izvestia* of November 6, 1975 claimed, "the Soviet Union has never concealed the fact that it supported and now supports" what it called the "patriots" and "rebels" in Vietnam, Mozambique and Angola, as well as the revolutionary forces in Portugal and Spain and in other countries.

Paralleling the public Soviet commitments to support the national liberation movements and wars, increasing mention is made of the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in support of them. According to the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, General Yepishev, "today, the defense of the Soviet fatherland is closely tied to giving comprehensive assistance to national liberation movements, progressive regimes and new states which are struggling against imperialist domination." He described this as "one of the most important manifestations" of the Soviet Armed Forces' "external function." Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko, the USSR Minister of Defense and Politburo member, made similar statements in his writings in 1974 and 1975, and predicted that this "external function" of the Soviet Armed Forces could continue to grow.

The Soviet intervention in Angola is a particularly good example of how the Soviet Union has been implementing its policy of support of national liberation movements and how it perceives the present state of the "correlation of forces" and their significance for Soviet and U.S. policies. According to Soviet claims, Moscow's support of the MPLA in Angola goes back to the mid-1950's, when it is said to have been founded under a different name, "on the initiative of the Communist Party and the Allied Party of Joint Struggle of the Africans of Angola." The political cleavage between the MPLA and the rival National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which is primarily based on the Bakongo Tribe in northern Angola, began in the early 1960's and became particularly pronounced in the course of the struggle in the Congo in 1960-1964 between the Leftist forces led by Patrice Lumumba, with which the MPLA identified, and which was supported by the Soviet Union, and the Western-supported nationalist coalition of such leaders as Kasabubu, Adoula and Mobutu, with whom the FNLA became politically linked. The eventual victory of Mobutu and the death of Lumumba resulted in the FNLA taking an increasing anti-communist line and gaining Zaire's support. The Soviet reaction was to denounce the FNLA's "Washington orientation" and its "sectarian policy," and by 1966 to view it as a hostile organization and a tool of "American imperialism." By contrast, Moscow recognized that the MPLA, lacking other sponsors, had to rely on Soviet assistance, thereby insuring that the Soviet Union would keep control over it. As a result, active Soviet support for the MPLA increased. Furthermore, the MPLA established ties with the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party, and in particular, the leader of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, became a personal friend of Cunhal, who in 1962 arranged for Neto's first visit to Moscow.

Subsequently, Soviet motivations for supporting the MPLA were reinforced by the growing rivalry between Moscow and Peking over leadership of and influence in the Third World national liberation movement. China's involvement in Angola's neighboring states: Tanzania and Zambia, and China's support of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which was organized in the mid-1960's by Doctor Jonas Savimbi, on the basis of the Ovimbundu tribe in southern Angola where perceived by the Soviet Union as a challenge to its influence in Africa. The Chinese also established relations with and gave support to the FNLA, especially after the visit of Zaire's President Mobutu to Peking in 1973.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union, contrary to its general practice of speaking only of "material" aid to national liberation movements, openly stated

that it was supplying arms to the MPLA guerrillas. Presumably, in this case Moscow sought to gain credit for its support of the anti-colonialist struggle in Angola and believed that such a public acknowledgement would not have any adverse effects on its relations with either the U.S. or Western Europe, and that in any event Portugal was in no position to retaliate.

The April 1974 military coup in Portugal and the decision of the Spínola Government to end Portugal's rule in Africa not only eliminated the Portuguese as a military factor in Angola but provided new opportunities for the Soviet Union to influence the political orientation of the former Portuguese colonies. Indeed, with the emergence of the new regimes in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, Moscow perceived a "general shift to the left" in Africa and a further opportunity to lead the "anti-imperialist" and "anti-racist" campaign on the continent against both U.S. and the remaining white ruled states of Rhodesia and South Africa. In Angola, however, the existence of three movements competing for power greatly complicated Portuguese efforts to form a transitional government which would take over from Portugal. Efforts at forming a coalition of the three movements bore no real fruit. Although the Soviet Union at first praised the so-called Alvor Agreement reached in January 1975, which led to the installation of a transitional regime composed of all factions in Luanda, the Soviet Union recognized that the MPLA was very weak at that time and, consequently, was likely to lose out in the contest for power. Moscow decided, therefore, to build up the MPLA's military strength with large shipments of modern arms, which apparently began to reach Luanda and the MPLA in March 1975. Meanwhile, the MPLA-FNLA-UNITA coalition collapsed, was re-formed, and collapsed again, leading to an expanding military conflict between the MPLA and the latter two groups.

In addition to providing military equipment to the MPLA, the Soviet Union dispatched military advisers to help train MPLA troops. In May 1975, the first contingent of Cuban military advisers arrived. By August, the MPLA had sufficient strength to drive the forces of the other two groups out of Luanda, thereby establishing its claim to be the sole government of Angola when the Portuguese withdrew on November 11, 1975.

It is apparent that as developments in Angola unfolded, there were several stages in Soviet perceptions and strategy toward that country, and Soviet risk/benefit calculations changed as time progressed. In terms of Soviet perceptions and calculations, Moscow took note of the fact that the United States Government took no public notice of the initial Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, and certainly gave no indication that it might view Soviet actions as endangering the U.S.-Soviet detente. Instead, some covert arms aid was provided to the FNLA and UNITA from Zaire and Zambia, as well as by China, and later, South Africa. As in other such instances in the past, the failure of the United States to react strongly to such Soviet probes and tests of American attitudes merely served to encourage Moscow to believe that the United States was unlikely to make a major issue of the Angola situation.

Another important factor in Soviet decisions on Angola was the developments in Portugal. Moscow, as well as the Portuguese Communist Party, saw, as Pravda of April 24, 1975 pointed out, an "obvious cause-effect relationship" between the developments in Portugal and Angola. In the Soviet view, "the armed struggle" of the "progressive" forces in the Portuguese colonies had resulted not only in the defeat of the Portuguese Army, but had also, to a considerable extent, helped to radicalize it. Consequently, not only the Portuguese Communists, but also the radical officers in the ruling military council (MPA), especially while it was led by General Gonçalves, perceived the MPLA as sharing the same ideology and, therefore, viewed it, according to a member of the council, as a "natural ally" of the "revolutionary" forces in Portugal. Indeed, on May 22, the Council announced that in carrying out the agreement to grant independence to Angola, it would adhere to a policy of "active neutrality" and "repulse the reactionary and alien forces attempting to boycott the process of decolonization, and thereby impede, if only indirectly, the development of the revolutionary process in Portugal." Pravda, on June 10, 1975, repeated Cunhal's warning that there was danger that Angola might be taken over by "reactionary" forces in order to frustrate Portugal's progressive policies.

For a time, therefore, it appeared to Moscow that the revolutionary military leadership in Portugal, under the strong influence of the communists, would play a major role in supporting the MPLA and that a lasting relationship could be established between revolutionary Portugal and a People's Republic of Angola

under MPLA leadership. The fall of Goncalves, however, and the subsequent shift of the MPA to a more moderate position brought these Soviet expectations to naught.

As a consequence, the Soviet Union was faced with the need to find some other way of supporting the MPLA, all the more so since the allied forces of the FNLA and UNITA were on the offensive and threatened Luanda. It was obvious that the MPLA soldiers were not able to quickly assimilate the use of modern weapons and heavy equipment which the Soviet Union had sent to Angola. In the light of this situation, the Soviet Union apparently decided to mount a major rescue operation by means of a large-scale intervention of Cuban combat troops, who began to arrive in early October 1975. Again, the United States Government did not react publicly to this intervention, although it was the first time that large communist...

The establishment of the People's Republic of Angola after the Portuguese withdrew, coupled with the recognition which 35 states initially accorded to it (including 18 African states) lent legitimacy to the Soviet-Cuban intervention inasmuch as Moscow could claim thereafter that the intervention was being carried out at the request of the legal government of Angola, in accordance with international law. By contrast, Soviet spokesmen argued that South Africa was committing a "direct aggression * * * against the sovereign People's Republic of Angola," and that this placed South Africa in violation of international law. It is on this basis that Pravda on January 3, 1976 called for an end to "foreign armed intervention," a call which obviously referred only to South Africa, Zaire and Zambia, and indirectly to the United States, but not to the Soviet-Cuban forces. There was nothing in the Pravda statement to justify any expectation that it might signal a Soviet willingness to seek a negotiated settlement, as was subsequently confirmed by Izvestia on January 6. Instead, the defeat of the FNLA, the congressional opposition to any U.S. involvement in Angola, the isolation of South Africa and its decision to pull out its forces, which ensured the defeat of UNITA, made a Soviet compromise unnecessary.

Soviet actions in Angola are a vivid demonstration of Moscow's principles of "peaceful coexistence" in action. The novel form which this action has taken, that is, the overt intervention of foreign Communist combat forces in a non-Communist country in support of an "anti-imperialist" and "progressive" national liberation movement endorsed by the Soviet Union, is not a departure from these principles, but merely indicates that, in Moscow's assessment, such a demonstration is politically advantageous and carries little risk or penalties.

Secretary Kissinger's warnings, beginning in December, that Soviet actions in Angola threatened the future of detente not only escalated the significance of developments in Angola for U.S.-Soviet relations, but also posed the question of the credibility of these warnings, as well as of the ability of the U.S. to affect the situation in Angola. The fact that Moscow chose to disregard the U.S. attempt to use detente as a deterrent shows that it does not take this threat seriously because it believes the combination of external and domestic constraints on United States policy to be strong at this time to allow the U.S. any real options. According to Soviet analyses, the present "correlation of forces," both in military and in political terms, is such that the United States itself is anxious to avoid confrontations with the Soviet Union and that it views the continuation of its detente policy, to quote a Soviet spokesman, as a "categorical imperative."

In Moscow's perception, therefore, the threat that the U.S. may impose serious penalties on the Soviet Union in retaliation for its actions in Angola or initiate effective counter-measures in that country is essentially hollow. No doubt the Soviet leadership believes its judgment to be confirmed by U.S. insistence on the continuation of the search for agreements on arms control, the clear indication that the U.S. would not withhold grain deliveries or curtail grain sales to the Soviet Union, and opposition on the part of Congress to a U.S. involvement in Angola. Thus, by insisting that it is not deterred by pressures from the U.S. in carrying out what it calls its "internationalist duty" in Angola, the Soviet Union, in fact, seeks to underscore the impotence of the United States and to magnify the significance of Soviet successes and power. It remains to be seen how the Angolan experience will influence Soviet willingness to intervene militarily in other national liberation struggles in countries which, in Moscow's judgment, are not of great interest to the United States. Such a policy, however, would increase the chances that the Soviet Union may miscalculate American attitudes and resolve, thus increasing the likelihood of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

Whatever the future Soviet actions may be, it is clear that Moscow expects to harvest important gains from its intervention in Angola. In particular, it sees

in it an opportunity to enhance its prestige and its credentials as a leader of the "anti-imperialist national liberation" struggles, not only in the eyes of the Africans, but of other Third World countries as well, and thereby offset some of its recent setbacks in Latin America, Portugal and the Middle East. As *Izvestia* wrote on December 26, 1975: the "African and other non-aligned countries have also had an opportunity to see for themselves the groundlessness of the Maoist allegations that, under the influence of the normalization of relations with the capitalist states and the relaxation of international tension, the Soviet Union 'will not want' to defend the interests of the peoples of young states." And *Izvestia* went on to make the point that the Soviet Union is carrying out its "international duty" in supporting the People's Republic of Angola, "no matter who insisted" that it abstain from such actions. Moscow also expects to gain a political and propaganda advantage by mounting a massive worldwide campaign of "solidarity" with the MPLA and against further U.S. interference through its various front organizations, such as the World Peace Council. Of course, despite its disclaimers of having any selfish interests in Angola, the Soviet Union is well aware of Angola's economic importance and may hope to cash in on it, after the Neto Government completes the nationalization of the country's oil and mineral resources. And the Soviet Navy probably hopes to gain the use of Angolan ports.

By sending Cuban troops to Angola, Fidel Castro also expects to refurbish his image as a revolutionary leader in the Third World in general and Latin America in particular. In this respect, Castro may gain even more than the Soviet Union, because it is Cuba and not its Soviet patron which shed blood in Angola and, incidentally, demonstrated the valor and efficiency of its soldiers. Whether this will tempt Castro to give more active support to radical guerrilla movements in Latin America remains to be seen, but his prestige and influence among the Latin American Left are likely to rise. His venture in Angola, however may alarm some of the Latin American governments, which may become concerned over the possibility of future Cuban armed "intervention" in the region.

Of course, Soviet and Cuban expectations may be damaged if the war in Angola becomes protracted and inconclusive and the Cuban forces continue to suffer casualties. However, Soviet and Cuban statements indicate that they are becoming increasingly confident of gaining a relatively swift and total victory. Furthermore, Moscow and Neto may have the option of trying to make a deal with UNITA, thereby giving the illusion of a political settlement. Such a move would help to pacify the Ovimbundu Tribe without significantly weakening the MPLA's dominant position. It could also add a touch of cosmetics to Soviet actions and disregard of the U.S. concept of the rules of detente in Angola.

What may be of particular near-term concern for the United States is that the developments in Angola may be but a prelude to a Soviet-backed African military campaign against South Africa. For example, Neto was quoted by a Soviet TASS correspondent on December 27, 1975 as having said that "the formation of the People's Republic of Angola will help Africa's progressive forces to strengthen their position in the struggle against imperialism, for complete liberation of the continent." Conversely, Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly warned that a victory of the anti-MPLA forces would delay the "liberation" of the people of South Africa and weaken the national liberation movement there. Indeed, with Soviet encouragement and support, Angola could become a base for a variety of so-called "progressive" national-liberation movements directed not only against South Africa and Namibia, but also against the present governments of Zaire and Zambia. Having altered the "correlation of forces" in southern Africa, and with its close ties to some of the other former Portuguese colonies and a number of other African countries, the Soviet Union no doubt will find it hard to resist the temptation to exploit what it perceives as a favorable position on the African continent.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet leaders are well aware that neither the MPLA nor any of the other "progressive" regimes in Africa are "Marxists" in the communist understanding of the term, and they neither expect nor believe that true communist regimes can be established in Africa at the present stage of its development. Indeed, this is not Moscow's objective. The main thrust of Soviet policy in the Third World is to unite the less-developed countries in a global "anti-imperialist" stance directed primarily against the United States which, Moscow believes, will increasingly erode U.S. global positions and influence, weaken its power, and eventually isolate it from the rest of the world. Thus, from the Soviet viewpoint, the two central issues in Angola are whether the former colony will have a pro-Soviet or a pro-Western orientation and whether Soviet

intervention will help intensify the "anti-imperialist" tendencies of other African and Third World countries. Obviously, Moscow believes such gains to be sufficiently important to warrant the expenditure of several hundred million dollars, the blood of Cuban soldiers, and the risk of making the U.S. more skeptical concerning the mutuality of the benefits of detente. And, what is even more significant, the Soviet Union believes the "correlation of forces" to be sufficiently in its favor to allow it to escalate its intervention in Third World affairs to an unprecedented level of overt use of force.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, professor.

We will go on now to Professor Shulman.

Senator JAVITS. May I say that Professor Shulman is a personal friend of mine, a constituent. I came especially, although we all have to meet the Ambassador in a few moments, simply to pay my respect to his judgment and his legendary service.

Dr. SHULMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

**STATEMENT OF DR. MARSHALL D. SHULMAN, ADLAI E. STEVENSON
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FORMER DI-
RECTOR, RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY**

Dr. SHULMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your invitation to testify before the subcommittee on the significance of the Angolan issue in the present state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

My testimony covers some of the same ground that Professor Gouré covered, but perhaps you will detect some difference of interpretation on some details of the analysis.

In my prepared statement, I address myself to two questions:

First: Why has the Soviet Union, in its recently increased intervention in Angola, shown less restraint than before, and than it has shown elsewhere?

Second: What is the relationship between the Angolan issue to broader aspects of present and future U.S.-Soviet relations?

LESS SOVIET RESTRAINT THAN EARLIER AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS

First, why less Soviet restraint now than before?

In its earlier interventions in Africa, during the Congo crisis of 1960, in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, the level of Soviet economic and military assistance was relatively modest, and was withdrawn when conditions turned unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Even in Somalia, where the Soviet presence remains, the Soviet Union has clearly sought to avoid so direct a provocation as to risk its own involvement in military conflict in Africa.

From the beginning of the Angolan independence struggle in 1961, Soviet and later Cuban involvement was kept at modest levels, increasing somewhat in the last quarter of 1974, but rising steeply in the spring and summer of 1975, when Cuban soldiers began to make their appearance in large numbers.

Even that minimum degree of restraint which had marked Soviet military support to Egypt and Syria before and after the Middle East war of October 1973, has been lacking in the large-scale flow of weapons, military advisers, and Cuban soldiers which has made possible the savage civil war among the three Angolan independence factions.

In seeking an explanation for this change in Soviet behavior, we are obliged to take account of the following factors:

One: Some have argued that the Soviet increased intervention was responsive to intervention by the United States and South Africa, but information available on the timing of the respective interventions is not sufficiently clear to sustain this argument.

It appears that the U.S. assistance to the FNLA/UNITA forces began in January 1975 and was increased in July 1975.

The introduction of South African troops through Namibia apparently began in September 1975. While some increase in the Soviet level of military assistance was noted toward the end of 1974, the steep rise of March 1975 may conceivably have been related to the American moves which began in January, but even if this were the case, the scale of Soviet-Cuban flow of weapons, advisers, and soldiers was clearly disproportionate to the U.S. assistance program.

Two: Somewhat more persuasive is the possibility of an anti-Chinese motivation for the Soviet increase. During the previous period, Chinese influence in Africa had been steadily increasing where Soviet influence had been diminishing.

During 1974, Chinese forces had been supplying and training FNLA soldiers in Zaire, at a modest level. Here was a clear opportunity to demonstrate to the African States the relative strength of Soviet versus Chinese support, to weaken Chinese influence by creating an identification with South Africa, and to refute Chinese charges of Soviet lack of militant support for revolutionary "wars of national liberation."

More importantly, in view of the intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry following the withdrawal of the United States from Indochina, here was an opportunity to show Peking that the Chinese reliance on the United States to offer effective opposition to the Soviet Union is a weak reed to lean upon.

Three: Internal pressures within the Soviet Union suggest another plausible explanation. Contrary to the claim sometimes advanced in this country that the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy has resulted in unequal advantages to the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership has been under pressure domestically from those who charge that the Soviet Union has suffered a diplomatic setback in the Middle East and a political defeat in Portugal.

Further, it is argued that opportunities to exploit the economic and political troubles of the West have been neglected, and that the détente policy has not produced economic benefits on the scale that had been promised and has not prevented the United States from lengthening its lead in military technology.

In Angola, the Soviet leadership has an opportunity to demonstrate its activism in answer to these charges during the critical months preceding the XXV Party Congress, and to do so with only moderate risks and costs.

Moreover, militant activism in Angola signals that serious shortcomings in the Soviet economy will not result in a more submissive foreign policy.

Four: One reason why the risks and costs of this scale of intervention in Angola may appear moderate stems from the Soviet perception of the present state of U.S. foreign policy. The combined effect of the internal conflict between the Congress and the executive branch in the United States and the political climate generated by the Vietnam and

Watergate experiences may be seen by the Soviet Union as preventing any effective U.S. response, either locally in Angola or generally.

Since it appears unlikely in any case that the Congress would have moved before the election to revise the restrictive provisions of the Trade Reform Act of 1974, no deprivation of economic benefits would be anticipated.

Five: A possible contributory factor was the rise and fall of Soviet hopes for Portugal. When the left wing was ascendant in Portugal, the Soviet Union may have felt that it had a free hand in supporting the MPLA, with which it had previously been linked through the Portuguese Communist Party. As hopes for a left-wing government in Portugal diminished, the need for a political victory elsewhere may have stimulated Soviet efforts.

Six: Weighed against this assessment of moderate risks and costs, the advantages of a decisive Soviet intervention in Angola would appear substantial. Whether or not the Soviet Union can anticipate future economic and military benefits from a continuing strong presence in Angola, the Soviet leadership can reasonably expect that its influences in Black Africa generally will be strengthened by this demonstration of its continuing support for "national liberation" and "anti-imperialist" forces, in anticipation of the coming struggles in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, while the United States can be identified with Portuguese imperialism and South Africa.

One can only speculate what weight the Soviet leadership has given to these various factors, but given the balance of moderate costs and substantial potential gains, it is apparent why the Soviet Union has not been dissuaded by U.S. diplomatic representations from increasing its military intervention in Angola.

ANGOLAN ISSUE EFFECT ON DÉTENTE

This brings us to the question: How does the Angolan issue affect broader aspects of present and future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union?

The Soviet intervention in Angola should not have occasioned as much surprise as it has in the United States. The Soviet leadership has made it abundantly clear that a relationship of "peaceful coexistence" does not preclude an active prosecution of politically competitive interests, particularly in situations defined by the Soviet Union as "wars of national liberation."

If the American political leadership had not so indiscriminately oversold the ambiguous word "détente," the American people would have been better prepared to sustain a relationship which involves a mixture of some competing and some overlapping interests. Perhaps with more realism and less rhetoric, we will be able to distinguish these interests more clearly.

There have also been misconceptions on the Soviet side. The political compromises that led the Soviet leadership to assert that a relationship of reduced tension and business-like cooperation could be consistent with a heightening of the ideological struggle, support for "wars of national liberation" and an indifference to humanitarian considerations have clearly involved unforeseen costs to the Soviet Union.

Although there has been a multiplication of contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States over the past 5 years, the two most important aspects of the relationship—the reduction in the military competition and the expansion of economic relations—have not fared well.

Although one hopes that the next round of SALT will be productive, to this point it must be acknowledged that despite 61½ years of negotiation, the strategic military competition continues to drift toward more unstable and less controllable weapons systems.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union have yet shown an adequate understanding of their real security interests in a stabilization of the military competition at moderate levels. This objective remains valid and urgent, despite Angola and all other differences between the two powers.

The hope for expanded economic relations between the two countries was, in my judgment, an important element in the Soviet turn toward a reduction of tensions with the United States in 1971. I believe that the Congress of the United States made an error of judgment in attaching to the Trade Reform Act of 1974 and the Export-Import Bank renewal restrictive provisions which could only be fulfilled at the price of public capitulation, and which therefore inevitably frustrated the purposes they were intended to serve.

If the trade agreement were in force, the Government of the United States would not be as devoid as it now is of instruments to encourage Soviet restraint in Angola and in other crisis situations.

With this instrument in hand, it would not be necessary to wield it so publicly and so explicitly as to negate its effect. It is not too late for us to learn this lesson.

It may be that it is not now in our power to rectify the situation in Angola, so that the Angolans with the help of their African neighbors but without outside military intervention can arrive at a peaceful political solution without further loss of lives. Our tangled and tortuous experience in Angola and our period of confusion of purpose make it difficult for us to know how to use our power helpfully in this situation.

But in the shadow of Angola, a more dread conflict threatens to engulf the continent, and the elements that might moderate it are being weakened, and will need our support.

The lesson which is underlined by the Angolan experience is that the central problem of our foreign policy is not the Soviet Union, but the threatening disintegration of international relations into widespread violence and anarchy.

Since no nation can be secure in such a world, we must learn to use our power—moral, economic, and military—to reverse these trends and to strengthen the international system.

To do this, we need to get our second wind in a realistic détente relationship with the Soviet Union, for the risks and instabilities of such problems as Africa presents will be infinitely greater if the United States and the Soviet Union are locked into a high-tension relationship instead of the imperfectly moderated competition called détente.

And finally in order to bring this about, we urgently need to dispel the mood of recrimination which now prevents the Congress and the executive branch from acting toward a common purpose.

Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I appreciate your statement.

Now we will hear from Professor Weissman, then we will have questions.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, DALLAS, TEX.

Dr. WEISSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My statement is not so much on the Soviet intent in Angola or Africa, but the likely results in Africa of Soviet policies, and particularly on United States policymakers' continuing misconceptions of these likely consequences.

U.S. POLICY IN ZAIRE AFFECT ON ANGOLA POLICY

A misconceived U.S. foreign policy in Zaire—formerly the Congo—has led to an even greater error in Angola. In each case, American military intervention has followed from the same false premises:

First, that the Soviet Union—or China—has the ability and intention to exert massive, long-term influence over politically effective militant or left-wing African nationalist movements, blocking good relations with the United States and thereby jeopardizing the world political balance, and second, that those African leaders who are willing to accept U.S. assistance in opposing these movements will be equally adept at political organizing and will select policies conducive to general economic advancement and some form of representative government.

Both countries have experienced a certain pattern of U.S.-backed military operations, particularly a reliance on white European, South African, and American military personnel, which has damaged such U.S. objectives as friendly relations with black Africa, racial moderation in southern Africa, and humanitarianism. But in the Angolan military theater, circumstances are such as to threaten a much larger white and American military presence along the lines of a Central African Indochina, with far-reaching consequences for African diplomacy and domestic stability.

It is not only by passing on of poor ideas and familiar military strategems that our Zairian intervention has conditioned our Angolan one. Our support for the Zairian regime, and for its current effort to achieve regional "hegemony," is a major reason for American involvement in neighboring Angola. As in Vietnam, an ill-founded "anti-Communist commitment" to a weakening government is leading American diplomacy toward disaster.

ILLUSIONS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST THREAT

Secretary of State Kissinger has suggested that Angolan independence occasions the same threat to U.S. security as Zairian—Congolese— independence did in 1960: "We cannot ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet build-up of weapons in Angola, which has introduced great power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years." But there is substantial evidence that American policymakers have, from 1960 on,

exaggerated Soviet possibilities in Zaire and underestimated the strength of indigenous nationalism with its quest for an independent foreign policy.

In 1960, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba headed the most effective mass political organization in Zaire, and the only one with a modern national orientation. Despite colonial Belgium's hasty and poorly conceived decolonization structure, Lumumba managed to form a governing coalition amidst great fragmentation. But then the army mutinied, Belgian troops reoccupied the country and organized the secession of its richest province and Lumumba called in U.N. Forces to restore order and remove the Belgians.

When the United Nations, with crucial U.S. backing, delayed in replacing Belgian troops and refused to move against the Belgian-led Katanga secession, Lumumba unsuccessfully appealed to U.S. and U.N. officials. He later threatened to dispense with the U.N. Force—with the exception of sympathetic African contingents—and to invade Katanga with Soviet and Afro-Asian help.

The Soviet Union eventually supplied trucks and 15 Ilyushin transport planes—with associated military technicians—which were used by Lumumba's troops in an unsuccessful invasion of Katanga.

In the view of U.S. policymakers, Lumumba's persistent, sometimes emotional, and shifting pleas for help against Belgium revealed "personal instability" which the Soviets came to exploit via "Communist," "Marxist" and "Pro-Communist" advisers in the Prime Minister's entourage.

As the Senate Intelligence Committee's Assassinations Report showed, the U.S. Embassy and CIA Station believed Lumumba was either a "Commie or just playing the Commie game" and that Zaire was "experiencing classic communist effort takeover government . . . another Cuba."

In fact, Lumumba was neither a Communist nor the leader of a political organization which would yield readily to foreign control. The personal and political development of the Lumumbists was conditioned by the discovery that equality and dignity could never be achieved within a framework of foreign political domination. Their political ideology was a militant, populist nationalism and their preference for a nonaligned international position was thus an integral part of their whole political approach. If they had a preferred external identification it was with other African leaders.

Lumumba's appeal for Soviet military aid to counter a much larger Western intervention in Katanga may have been unrealistic given the United State's violent reaction, but it was not the result of "personal instability" since it arose from his group's basic political formula, militant nationalism. Nor were his actions guided by "pro-Soviet" advisers. The two most distrusted counselors, a French Marxist press secretary who had worked for the Algerian rebels and President Nkrumah of Ghana opposed the final decision to accept Soviet aid.

Lumumba's most influential colleagues were other Zairian nationalists. Even after the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians, Lumumba manifested his independence by inviting Western technical assistance and recalling Belgian teachers and judges. He continued to meet with African diplomats who still hoped to achieve

a compromise between the impatient Prime Minister and the cautious U.N. Secretariat.

In succeeding years, Lumumba's heirs, now in opposition, continued to encounter American resistance. Although they received Soviet and Chinese diplomatic and material aid, they generally adhered to the Lumumba platform of 1960.

In 1961-62 they associated themselves with the Nehru-Nasser brand of neutralism and appealed to President Kennedy for support.

In the 1964-66 rebellions they sought Belgian support and established their closest relations with 10 African States. Even those few Lumumbists who came to profess some form of African Marxism or Communism—such as Mulele or the remaining small rebel group in the East—created national adaptations of Marxist doctrine and avowed to remain independent of the Soviets and Chinese.

In this connection, it will be recalled that the nearest thing to a pro-Soviet country in Africa was little Guinea in the early 1960's. Rebuffed by France and the United States, Guinea's Marxist President accepted a \$100 million aid package and 1,500 technicians from the Soviet Union.

However, when U.S. businessmen and the American Ambassador proved to be flexible, this Marxist rejected the counsel of his Soviet economic advisers and, during the Cuban Missile Crisis agreed to prohibit the Soviets from using an airfield they had built for him. Ambassador Attwood concluded, "The advisers weren't actually in charge, as we once suspected."

American policymakers also had inflated views of Soviet ambitions. In 1962 CIA Director Allen Dulles publicly admitted that "we over-rated the Soviet danger" in Zaire; for while "it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt at takeover in the Belgian Congo, well it did not work out that way at all."

The Soviets were actually aware that any attempt to take over African countries would be impeded by extended and vulnerable lines of communication crossing potentially hostile African nationalisms—that is, Egypt stopped the shipment of Soviet weapons to Zairian rebels when President Nasser concluded their position was weakening and his relations with the United States were endangered.

Most important, the Soviets were aware of a particularly unfriendly terrain in Africa. As President Johnson's former National Security Assistant, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has written:

Moscow recognized fairly early that African Communism suffered from a lack of native leadership and cadres; everyone of the handful of African revolutionaries trained in Moscow had left the movement. . . . No African fellow traveler has ever remained a stable and dependable ally of the U.S.S.R.: for Moscow the only safe Lumumba was a dead Lumumba.¹

Propagandist exploitation of conflicts and friendly association with the wave of the future seem to have been the main Soviet and Chinese goals in Zaire.

Today, in Angola, the Secretary of State defines the issue as: "whether the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expeditionary force,

¹ Africa and the Communist World, 1963, pp. 23, 33.

can impose on two-thirds of the country's population its own brand of government." But this formulation does not even mention MPLA, the most nationally-oriented and effective mass political organization in Angola's ill-prepared independence transition.

Born out of discussions between Africans, Portuguese Communists, and other leftists, compelled to organize guerrilla warfare against Portuguese colonialism MPLA developed its own brand of African Marxism and a stronger politico-military organization than the Lumumbists ever had. Spurned too by the West in their long war against colonialism, MPLA leaders turned to the Soviet Union and Cuba for arms and advisers. But they also received significant arms supplies from anti-Soviet Yugoslavia, food and medicines from Scandinavia, bases, sanctuaries and other assistance from African States—Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia—and liberation movements (FRELIMO, PAIGC [Guinea—Cape Verde African Independence Party].)

Cuban troops appeared in large numbers only as former Portuguese sergeants, Zairian regulars and South Africans began to assist MPLA's opponents. These MPLA veterans of a long political and military battle against foreign domination have declared publicly and in internal documents that they are not Communist puppets and that they will pursue an independent foreign policy including good relations with Western governments. The leading scholarly observers of the MPLA, John Marcum and Basil Davidson, are in agreement on this point. And they are joined, according to the *New York Times*, by the African experts of the State Department.

Again, Soviet ambitions appear to have been exaggerated by U.S. officials. Neither strategic military bases nor other long-range interests compatible with Soviet satellization were mentioned in press reports of administration briefings to Congress. As in Zaire, Soviet aid transshipments are partly dependent upon overflight and port privileges conferred by African nationalist regimes.

The Chilean episode suggests that the Soviets are themselves not anxious for another Cuba, in the sense of a massive financial and military investment in a nationalistic Marxism. In the likely event that Soviet objectives continue to be propagandistic, and are particularly directed to the liberation movements of Southern Africa, any effort to establish a satellite would be counterproductive.

Secretary Kissinger's version of the domino theory—that a success in Angola will encourage the Soviets to establish new patterns of dominance elsewhere, is merely an extension of the basic false premise about Angola. In reality, the most conspicuous Soviet successes in the Third World have been the product of extraordinary conditions—wartime occupation of North Korea or some combination of a strong indigenous Communist Party used to following the Soviet lead and continuous U.S. economic and military intervention in behalf of a discredited status quo, as in Cuba and Vietnam.

These conditions exist in no African country, and in few other places. And under circumstances of nuclear stalemate, quasi-détente and polycentrism, even the special cases do not exclude good relations with the United States.

POLITICAL CAPACITY, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES OF U.S. SUPPORTED
LEADERSHIP

Against the popular but pro-Communist Lumumbist nationalists, the U.S. sponsored alternative Zairian leadership hoping it would be politically effective and broadly disposed to objectives like orderly economic growth, social advancement, and representative institutions. But the principal figures, the Binza Group had failed the test of mass politics or had their power bases in the army and security apparatus. They installed an increasingly narrow ethno-political regime and were consequently led to govern without parliament and normal political life. Without an organized mass political counterweight, the army, politicians and higher civil service absorbed a greater proportion of the budget, even as recipients declined due to the continuing political crisis.

The resulting inflation and devaluations were paid for by the average man while the elite's income was adapted to price increases. The denouement was the Lumumbist-led Congo rebellions of 1964-66.

In the last decade, political power has been centralized under the Presidential dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko.

According to development economist J. Peemans in *African Affairs*, April 1975, there has been an accompanying reinforcement of economic power and concentration of income in favor of a limited class of people, who belong to the privileged circles of power. This elite, from the President on down, drains the rest of the country and forestalls balanced economic development by high salaries, corruption—"It has been estimated that an equivalent of 60 percent of ordinary state revenue was lost in 1971 or at least diverted to other purposes than the official ones"—transfers of money abroad and spending on luxury consumption goods—"which together represent 50 percent of the gross annual formation of capital in the country,"—and investment in trading activities which are highly profitable because the government holds down prices to agricultural producers.

While the regime lavishly spends mineral revenues on prestige goods like jumbo jets, agricultural investment represents less than a third of the budget proportion it did in 1958.

At the lower level, private wage employment declined from 11 to 8 percent of the active population between 1959 and 1973 and real wages dropped 35 percent between 1965 and 1973.

Americans got a glimpse of the real situation late last year when the regime spent about \$30 million to bring in a heavyweight championship fight in a largely vain effort to divert urban discontent.

The "President's Office" received a portion of the proceeds, but not in Zaire. A Mobutu owned Shell company, Risnelia, received the revenues in Switzerland.

With even further economic deterioration in the last 2 years due to rising oil prices and a bungled attempt to take over foreign commercial and agricultural enterprises, the United States has admitted a threat to the Zaire regime and requested about \$80 million in emergency economic and military aid.

The threat is from the discontented populace which is now openly critical of Mobutu, the potentiality of the rebel stronghold in the east, and the critical views of many educated military officers, some of whom may have attempted or discussed a coup last July.

Official sources quoted in the New York Times have said that from 1962 to 1969 and after January 1975, the United States covertly supplied money and arms to the Angolan FNLA led by Holden Roberto. Again, the weight of the evidence is that Roberto has been unable to extend his support beyond his ethnic group which is one of the smallest—11 percent—in the country.

Furthermore, he has been less inclined to guerrilla operations than MPLA and has disdained the task of modern political education. His embourgeoisement has been attested to by reliable sources, including a former Zairian minister who pointed out that he had invested funds in several apartment houses in the Zairian capital.

Jonas Savimbi's UNITA began to receive American help last July. Although he has based his support on a larger ethnic group than Roberto's—a third of the population—Angola experts consider UNITA less nationally oriented than MPLA. UNITA's guerrilla activities were less extensive than those of MPLA and FNLA.

Nor has political education been Savimbi's strong point as he has opportunistically shifted from Maoism to black power to recruitment of white votes to ethnic manipulation to an appeal for inclusion in an MPLA regime.

Recent news stories comparing his urban headquarters to that of the MPLA indicate that he has been unable to create an effective political and administrative organization. That MPLA has probably had an edge on its opponents since the late 1960's is an indication of the internal military and political weaknesses that have beset America's Angolan proteges.

REPRESSION BY WHITE MILITARY FORCES

Active intervention against the Lumumbist rebellions in 1964 began with CIA recruitment of Cuban exile pilots and European mechanics through front organizations in Miami and London. The Cubans flew T-6's and T-28's armed with rockets and machine guns and B-26 fighter-bombers.

A subsequent United States-Belgian military accord resulted in the dispatch of more than 500 Belgian staff and training officers and transport pilots, some of whom acted in close support of combat troops; provision of U.S. arms and offers of financing for a 700-man white mercenary force that would formally be hired by Zaire—mainly South Africans, Rhodesians and assorted Europeans—and the eventual involvement of more than 300 U.S. CIA and military personnel, mainly the aforementioned pilots and mechanics counterinsurgency advisers, troop transport and helicopter crews, instructors for equipment use, and headquarters planners.

At least 20 Americans including CIA Cubans, a colonel and a sergeant, fought in a white-spearheaded government column which attacked the rebel capital. Pacification operations continued over 2 years, but as the recent kidnapping of three American students in Tanzania by Zairian rebels indicated, they were never completely successful.

A CIA front, WIGMO, with an international personnel of more than 100 sustained air operations against rebels until 1967, while other U.S. supervised personnel pursued antirebel activity on Lake Tanganyika.

The United States-backed white mercenary repression produced a veritable carnage and made necessary the Stanleyville airdrop to rescue

U.S. and other white hostages. Synchronized with a mercenary ground attack on the rebel capital, the airdrop produced an unexpected political reaction against America in Africa and at the United Nations.

Not only "militant" African representatives, but even a "moderate" like President Kenyatta of Kenya declared he was "revolted" by the intervention. Only three African leaders publicly disassociated themselves from the protest. U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was stunned by the outburst of antiwhite emotion, and other scheduled air rescues were canceled.

Whether or not an overall plan exists, a similar pattern is emerging in Angola. Instead of regular Belgian officers there have been regular South African troops, estimated at anywhere from 1,200 to 6,000. Several hundred former Portuguese noncoms are acting as white mercenaries, and according to newspaper reports, hundreds of European, Cuban exile, and perhaps American mercenaries are on the scene, or soon will be.

It is acknowledged that CIA arms are going to the mercenaries' employers and the President has not denied that mercenaries are being financed by U.S. dollars. American pilots are reported to be flying in and out of battle areas. Extremist and anti-U.S. emotions are rising even in such important "moderate" African states as Nigeria and Ghana.

ANGOLAN CIRCUMSTANCES DIFFERENT THAN ZAIRE

Yet Angolan circumstances are very different from those which permitted a relatively modest and short-term repression in Zaire:

The MPLA is not ethnically fragmented, politically unorganized, militarily inexperienced, and dependent largely on traditional arms and magic, as were the post-Lumumba Zairian rebels.

Partly because of its efficacy, the MPLA has been able to count on advanced Soviet arms and Cuban advisors which probably exceed the external resources of U.S.-backed groups. In Zaire, the rebels received few modern arms until it was too late and there were few foreign advisors on the scene.

The former colonial power, Portugal, will not play the Belgian part in Angola; the possible substitute, South Africa, cannot overcommit itself lest it undermine its own negotiations with black states for détente and the installation of a moderate black regime in neighboring Rhodesia.

MPLA has been recognized by 40 states and receives diplomatic and material support from many more countries than the Zairian rebels—who were recognized by no one.

If it took more than 2 years of bloody, racially obnoxious operations by approximately 1,000 Belgian and U.S. military and CIA personnel and 700 to 800 white mercenaries to help defeat the rag-tag, poorly armed, hemp-smoking Zairian rebel army which lacked foreign officers and troops, how much and how long will it take to gain even a temporary advantage over a well-organized, foreign-assisted military force of perhaps 30,000 which has viable political and administrative support structures?

With the South Africans reluctant to assume a determinative role, and FNLA and UNITA probably less able to make a proportional

contribution than Zairian Government troops during the rebellion, who will provide the necessary forces?

The white mercenary and U.S. military role would seem destined to increase drastically and any escalation on the other side would deepen further the American involvement.

Also, since both sides are getting sophisticated armaments including airpower, and several African States or liberation movements are now involved in the Angolan war, there would seem to be considerable potential for a wider conflict along the lines of a Central African Indochina. And what will be the impact of such a large and long-term intervention on America's African diplomacy of friendly relations, racial moderation, and humanitarian assistance, not to mention the domestic fallout on black, youth, and liberal groups?

It was presumably considerations like these which prompted the State Department's African Bureau to oppose U.S. military intervention in Angola.

U.S. POLICIES IN ZAIRE, ANGOLA TIED TOGETHER

American policies in Zaire and Angola are tied together by more than a faulty intellectual framework and a recurring interventionist program. Secretary Kissinger's aides and other high officials have told Leslie Gelb of the New York Times that:

A major reason for American involvement in Angola was to maintain good relations with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, the man on whom Secretary of State Kissinger is banking to oppose Moscow's interests in Africa and to further Washington's interests in various international forums.

There is a more aggressive connotation to former CIA Director Colby's designation of Zaire as "a future regional big power" like Iran, Brazil, and Indonesia and to a high State Department official's expression that there is "a thrust" to bolster Mobutu's Zaire "in the hope that it could extend its hegemony throughout the continent."

The Zairian Government's concern with Angolan events blossomed in the early 1960's when it served as the instrument and willing adjunct of U.S.-Angolan policy. Thus in the initial period of CIA arming of Roberto, the arms were transferred and purchased by Zaire. [Whitaker, "African Report", May 1970.]

In the same epoch, U.S. military assistance and sales to Zaire were considerable. Zaire also expelled the MPLA and used its army to prevent MPLA guerrillas from penetrating Angola through its 1,300-mile border with Zaire. When CIA support for Roberto declined to \$10,000 per year after 1969, Mobutu took up the burden of assistance himself, supplying weapons, recruitment, and training. In April 1972, the Zairian Army put down a revolt against Roberto at the main FNLA military base in Kinkuzu. At Mobutu's apparent initiative, more than 1,000 Zairian regulars entered the war in northern Angola alongside FNLA.

Moreover, the Zairian President has become convinced that for economic and historical reasons the oil-rich northernmost district of Angola—Cabinda—should become a protectorate of Zaire. He has given both financial and diplomatic aid to a Cabinda faction which is seeking selfdetermination. At the same time, Zaire continues to be a funnel for the CIA operation in all of Angola.

In effect, Mobutu has been asking the United States to indulge once more its anti-Communist and developmental illusions by securing his weakening regime against potential Soviet-MPLA retaliatory subversion and furthering his regional expansionism in Cabinda and Angola.

The United States has become more deeply involved in the Angolan quagmire and Congress is considering the aforementioned special-aid package for Zaire, including \$19.5 million in foreign military sales credits—up from \$3.5 million last year. But the lesson of Vietnam is that dogged adherence to a mistaken commitment can lead straight to diplomatic disaster and internal dissension.

American intervention in Angola is based on false expectations of an inevitable Soviet-Cuban takeover of the MPLA and inaccurate estimates of the political potential of our Angolan clients. It also flows from our relationship with the Zaire regime which has been nourished by the same misconceptions.

There is a serious danger of large-scale United States and white intervention in the Angolan theater which could produce a wildly escalating Central African Vietnam. By its recent Angolan votes, Congress has taken a necessary step toward the reconstruction of U.S. policy in Africa. At the very least, we should cease disassociating ourselves from the more popular forces in black- and white-ruled countries, jettison an outmoded and reactive anticommunism, and recognize the political and moral urgency of moving ahead on such issues as hunger and commodity prices in this economically and politically important continent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

I would like to turn directly to some questions now. I hope others of you will feel free to comment if you have any strong feelings about the questions.

DOMINO THEORY

I would like to ask first Professors Gouré and Shulman particularly about what seems to me to be the principal thesis of our reason for being in Angola and our attitude toward the Soviet Union and their perception of us.

The Secretary of State has testified before this committee and I think very consistently has argued from the beginning in regard to the Angolan question that the issue is not a strategic one, the issue is not an ideological one, the issue is not an economic one, but rather the perception of the Soviet Union in terms of how we react to it—I am not saying this as articulately as I would like to. Let me put it another way.

He has argued that Soviet expansion 8,000 miles from its own border unchecked by our actions will lead the Soviet Union to believe that they may do this at will in other parts of the world, and therefore for that reason, not for strategic, ideological or other reasons, that we must act.

I think that fairly describes his position. I have heard him state it many times over.

First, Professor Gouré, do you subscribe to that idea or not?

Dr. GOURÉ. One, of course, cannot predict Soviet actions per se. We see an exceptional case of escalation, a form of Soviet intervention that we have not seen so far in Soviet involvements in the Third World. In each case, as I see, the way the Soviets have managed their involvement, Moscow goes through a series of probes in an attempt to determine what the U.S. response will be, the proper risk calculation, and so on.

Each time, of course, this leads to an assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two systems and their determination, because, in a sense, the Russians are assuming basically that the opponent never retreats simply because he is nice or disinterested, but that he will retreat only because although he is interested in the area, he is faced by superior force or a greater threat or cost, whatever it may be.

Therefore, there is a strong possibility that having carried out this exercise and in view of how it came out, or may come out, it will be repeated elsewhere.

Also, another issue is that now other national liberation movements—whatever you wish to call them—will essentially come to Moscow with demands, arguing that if you did it for the MPLA and we are in somewhat equal straits, whatever that may be, how about us, how about also massive aid, how about military aid?

It does not mean the Russians will do it. That depends upon their calculation at that particular time.

Basically Angola is a test of U.S. will and determination and ability to act. In that sense, therefore, it raises the danger of a repetition of such a situation.

Senator CLARK. Professor Shulman?

Dr. SHULMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that one can say as a general proposition that it is quite possible that, if the Soviet intervention here is successful and does not result in serious cost to the Soviet Union one could argue that this might strengthen the militants within the Soviet Union.

I think that probably is a reasonable assumption, but I am not sure it goes from this that one can argue that the Soviet experience here will be generalized elsewhere. It is terribly important to take account of particular local circumstances in each case.

First of all, my own impression, as I suggested in my prepared statement, is that the Soviet intervention here does not so much mark an increase in general Soviet aggressiveness or expansion as much as it does reflect some frustration with its difficulties elsewhere in an effort to show a bit of muscle here where it thinks it can do this without serious damage and serious cost.

Now, the general problem, I suppose, is one that goes back to the debate in 1947 between George Kennan and Walter Lippmann when the doctrine of containment was first enunciated. Lippmann, you know, challenged the Kennan statement of it on the grounds that it was an error in his judgment to suppose that we needed to oppose Soviet expansion and influence everywhere under all circumstances, particularly primarily by military means as he understood to be the argument.

I think our experience tends to bear out the wisdom of that qualification. We are having a series of geography lessons as a result of our

experiences. We learned about Indochina through Vietnam; now we are learning something about Africa.

Mr. Weissman's testimony has indicated how important it is for us to have the knowledge of the local culture, the local political forces and to make particular judgment in each instance on whether it is necessary, desirable, feasible and likely to be effective for us to intervene, either militarily, economically or politically.

I think that the weight of Mr. Weissman's testimony bears out the judgment that in this instance it would not be advisable for us to intervene.

Whether that appears to the Soviet Union as an invitation to interfere elsewhere, militarily, depends somewhat on how we do this.

If we proclaim that this is a symbolic case, if we build up the issue as a demonstrative example of United States will, we magnify the damage of it.

In that respect, I think the administration has made a serious error.

If, on the other hand—excuse me, sir.

Senator CLARK. A serious error in building up?

Dr. SHULMAN. Building up the case as an exemplary incident. There is going to be very little we can do to affect the outcome here.

On the other hand, the Congress, in making a judgment that it is not wise to intervene here, can do so in a way that does not justify our allies or the Soviet Union from concluding that this represents a paralysis of will, but instead represents a particular judgment about a particular case and that it says nothing about our determination to uphold our commitments where we feel it is important for us to do so. And moreover, in deciding not to take particular action in this case, we wish not to conceal our repugnance at the Soviet action and our feeling that this will certainly have an effect on our general relationship. Nevertheless, the Congress might say, our judgment of the particular circumstances is that it is not wise for us to act here. Then I think it would be less likely to be taken by the Soviet Union as an invitation for aggressive action in other instances.

Senator CLARK. You would come down I guess on the Lippmann side of arguing that we do not necessarily have to react to every Soviet action simply on the basis of that perception.

Dr. SHULMAN. I think that is right.

Subsequently, George Kennan, of course, clarified his own position to accord with that interpretation. He thought that the article was an unbalanced statement of his position.

As a general proposition, I would add one more consideration. We are in a period in which the Soviet Union has become a global power with global influence. Clearly, it is seeking to increase its political influence in the world relative to our own.

I do not think it necessarily follows that every expansion of Soviet influence is necessarily a disadvantage to us and needs to be resisted. Some do and some do not. We have to make a differentiated judgment.

Senator CLARK. Professor Gouré, do you have anything further to add?

Dr. GOURÉ. I generally agree with Professor Shulman. It does not follow that one has to hold the entire line or the Russians will necessarily always react.

They understand perfectly well that some areas are far more sensitive to the United States than others or generally for the West and consequently that intervention there will involve far more risk.

My own point was, and I think I have it in my prepared statement, that one of the failures, or, if you like, tactics of the United States is to always discount the initial Soviet probes and signals, unlike the Russians, who generally when they see something on the horizon, start screaming right away and getting very excited, and certainly make it clear that they object vehemently.

We regard doing this sort of thing as too disturbing for détente or other relations, so we choose not to make a play of it or simply tend to ignore such probes. The result is, that by the time the Russians have committed themselves to some course of action, have become really involved and are successful, we then begin to object.

By that time it is late, they are in there. Retreat involves a matter of prestige, all kinds of political costs for them and they feel essentially that we have misled them.

One can cite historically many such instances. I would contend that to a considerable degree we had a similar situation in Angola. There were various levels of stepped-up intervention, which essentially, as I can read in the public press, I am not privy to what Secretary Kissinger says or knows, but from the open press my impression is that we started seriously objecting and in effect talked about the danger to détente only when the Cubans started winning. Up to then, nothing happened.

The principle of involvement, the active involvement of the Soviets and Cubans had already occurred well before we started putting détente on the line.

U.S. REACTION TO SOVIET INTERVENTION

Senator CLARK. Let me ask about that, because it has been argued that Assistant Secretary for Africa, Mr. Davis, made the case, and many other people have made the case, whether he did or not, but what we should have done was react very quickly and both diplomatically and openly to bring very strong pressure to bear on the Soviets, let us say in April or May so that we might have prevented their deeper intervention.

Does that approach make sense to you?

Dr. GOURÉ. At least, sir, I think it would have had as good or better chance of succeeding than when we started the whole process in December, by which time you have a very successful opponent with no intention, of course, of giving up his gains.

At that time, of course, we could have indicated that we were taking the possibility of a Soviet involvement very seriously and we could have spelled out what the consequences would be. By the time Russians and Cubans are present in full force and winning, it is a very poor time to tell them to stop, to rap them over the knuckles and tell them to go home.

They will not do it.

Senator CLARK. In that respect, I know many of us on this committee and some others began to argue in August that we ought to make

a public issue of it. But the answer we got at that time was it was not the time to do it because we really did not have the bargaining chips to get them out. What we had to do was go in much heavier and get a stalemate and then negotiate, then bring pressure to bear on them.

How do you react to that?

Dr. GOURÉ. There is no chance for a stalemate. This is quite clear. One thing would have been, as was indicated, that we had simply Angolan factions fighting each other at just about an equal level of military capabilities. If you are dealing with what I will call European-type troops equipped and able to operate modern equipment, you have to oppose them with similar forces.

Once the Cubans came in force, the whole situation radically changed. From then on, the only alternative other than sending troops really opposing them in conventional engagement was to try to protract the war, to make it sufficiently inconclusive and costly so that the Russians somehow would go for a compromise.

I can see a compromise possible, but the compromise with UNITA, which right now is being denounced by Moscow as traitorous, would simply be cosmetic. The MPLA would be on top, of course. UNITA might have some ability to operate in its own tribal area, and we would have a unified situation without seriously altering the political character of the country. So a compromise would not make any difference.

The Russians have that option if the situation becomes too costly.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Mr. Weissman, it seemed to me that much of what you are saying in the latter part of your statement was that we were in Angola more for President Mobutu than reasons of the Angolan situation.

Dr. WEISSMAN. Yes; this is from reports of what Secretary Kissinger's aides and other high officials have said, guardedly, sometimes, was the major reason and one report, the major reason for our involvement in Angola.

Senator CLARK. I tend to subscribe to that view myself. I was just curious about your development of it. I think you have developed the argument very well and in some detail in your statement.

MPLA-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT IMPACT ON RHODESIA, NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA

What impact do you think an MPLA-dominated government would have on the future developments in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa?

You have studied Africa a good deal and you know something about that part of the world. Suppose the MPLA wins without any moderating influence, so to speak, of an FNLA or a UNITA coalition?

What is that going to do with Southwest Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa? Are they going to bring more pressure to bear, less, or the same?

Dr. WEISSMAN. I am not an expert on all of the movements in southern Africa, but I would say, obviously it would bring some more pressure and would provide another base of operation for the guerrillas operating there—for example, the SWAPO [South West African

People's Organization] group operating a Namibia. It is in part because South Africa sees this group as being strengthened by an MPLA victory that they have been in Angola.

Nevertheless, we have permitted Mozambique that borders also on some of the unstable areas of southern Africa to exist under a government which has vowed it will in the long run support independence movements.

The question we have to ask is, why do we have a stake in supporting the white-ruled regimes in these areas which are bound to eventually fall and why, therefore, should we be that worried that a movement such as MPLA will be taking over Angola and will marginally increase perhaps some of the resources available to a group in Namibia?

U.S. ASSOCIATIONS WITH LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Senator CLARK. Do you tend to argue that we ought to associate ourselves more with those liberation movements rather than, I guess, South Africa and South West Africa?

Dr. WEISSMAN. When the Nixon administration adopted a policy basically of repudiating the small attempts to get closer to liberation movements in the previous administration, the Nixon administration said the whites are here to stay.

They completely misread the future in Portuguese Africa. It seems to me if we persist in that delusion we will be misreading the probable future in Namibia, and South Africa ultimately.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator CLARK. I have several other questions. Unfortunately, I have a quorum call at 5:00 o'clock. I would like to stay with this, if I may.

We are going to recess just long enough for me to go to the floor and make a quorum and come right back.

Be comfortable, and I will be back in 5 or 6 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator CLARK. The subcommittee will come to order.

U.S.-SOVIET DÉTENTE AGREEMENT VIOLATIONS

The administration has argued that Soviet involvement in Angola is inconsistent with United States-Soviet agreements to refrain from efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other.

Professor Gouré talked about this a great deal. This agreement that has been sometimes referred to and signed on May 29, 1972, occurred at a time when the United States itself was conducting, I think, the largest bombing campaign in the Indochina war in late May of 1972. It did not prevent the United States from providing covert support to anti-Marxists in Chile. It did not prevent the Soviet Union or the United States from arming opposite sides in the Middle East. It has not prevented assistance by both the United States and the Soviet Union to political parties in Portugal and reportedly in Italy, so my question is, why single out Angola as a violation of this agreement. Is this simply a matter of the size of the commitment that they have made, and do you think the administration does not know,

as Professor Gouré has testified, that the Soviet Union never believed that agreement applied to its wars of liberation in Third World countries?

Go ahead, Professor Gouré.

Dr. GOURÉ. Mr. Chairman, I know that this formula certainly was in the agreement on basic principles. It was restated, as I recall, by Secretary Kissinger on the 8th of October after the beginning of the 1973 Middle East War as one of the no-nos or principles, thou shalt not. This did not quite explain what détente stood for, but we have had a series of statements of what détente is not.

In reality, of course, both sides have clearly understood that we are going to remain competitors. I think the significance of the Angolan situation is the overtness of Communist military intervention and the unusual level of violence which is occurring. After all, we have had Soviet combat troops and Communist combat troops only one or two times before in foreign situations. Mostly they are advisors, sometimes in very large numbers as we had in Egypt, nevertheless advisors, and the Soviet Union also provided a lot of equipment.

The use of foreign Communist troops to actually win the battles for the natives or the native movement is somewhat novel. It constitutes, I suppose, in the Secretary of State's view a new stage in Soviet behavior which requires some sort of public response.

Senator CLARK. The use of Cuban troops?

Dr. GOURÉ. Yes, sir. We were not reacting to mere aid. In fact, I would say both sides played the aid game. If it came from Zaire or Zambia on one side and South Africa, it came from the Russians on the other side. As far as Soviet equipment and advisors go, their presence was not seen by us as requiring an open U.S. response.

The Cuban presence changed everything. Unfortunately, we altered the situation by literally saying that this will damage détente, therefore trying to use this as a deterrent or the future of détente as a deterrent and this was said in repeated statements. This, of course, brought to the fore the whole question of the credibility of whether the U.S. is capable of changing its policy or in some form applying pressure within the détente context, or altering our understanding of détente.

There is no doubt that the United States' concept of détente and the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence are different indeed, because we are interested in stability and the Soviet Union is not. We expect to persuade the Russians that they should cooperate in the preservation of international stability, and the Russians essentially argue that given the dynamics of the international situation, given the social and political dynamics, this is an absurd expectation.

In fact, their line insists that the defense of the status quo means for the West to commit aggression, because given the social-political dynamics, the international status quo can only be maintained by force, therefore the West will have constant recourse to force in order to maintain the status quo, à la Vietnam and elsewhere to hold the line.

This is said by the Soviets to be bad, and is labelled as constituting aggression.

The Soviets, of course, take the position that they are not violating the rules. They have a movement in Angola which, as they claim, is supported by the people for the progressive development of Angola and they argue that the other people are trying to prevent this progress.

Of course, as the situation stands now, any intervention besides that of the Russians and Cubans will be said to constitute aggression against the established government in Angola.

Of course, not all of this is included in the Soviet public position. In current Soviet propaganda, no mention is made of the actual extent of Soviet or Cuban involvement. All the arguments say that the Soviet Union is saving Angola from South African aggression and take over. This is the main Soviet line, and that of their friends, allies, and supporters.

Thus, according to Moscow its intervention is not a violation. In fact, they refer to the U.N. Charter as assuring both the right of a state to selfdefense and the right of selfdetermination.

Nothing has been violated in the agreement, as far as they are concerned.

Dr. SHULMAN. My answer would be consistent with what Professor Gouré said. I would like to carry it a step further.

There is some doubt in my mind about the wisdom of our having signed the basic statement of principles in May of 1972. I think there was some selfdeception involved in the commitment that was entered into about restraint and avoiding unilateral advantage.

As Dr. Gouré has said, in practical terms, we know that the Soviet Union is likely to pursue its competitive advantages where it thinks it can do so, and indeed, we have done the same, where we have been able to do so successfully. This is a competitive relationship.

What our objective is here, I think, is to try to keep the competition within reasonable, safe boundaries, to assure that it does not involve us in nuclear war, if possible, and I think it is our objective to try to work towards some codification of the rules of engagement in local conflict situations.

We are somewhat imperfectly moving in that direction.

I think it would be quite proper for us to try to enunciate that as a goal. We are trying to work towards restraint and a certain codification of a degree of restraint. Moreover, over a longer period, it ought to be our objective to work towards a situation not in which the status quo is preserved, but in which the processes of change that are inevitable in the world can move forward without the intervention of force, either to prevent changes or to direct these changes.

That, I think, ought to be a part of our stated policy. It ought to be a part of our objective, and every action we take ought to be consistent with that objective.

What that means as a practical matter, I suppose, is that it is not only in the strategic field that we need a deterrent, but also in the conventional field and in other elements of power, political and economic as well.

It means the function of our forces ought to be not to enable us to intervene, but to insure that there will not be the intervention of other forces, in particular local situations as we can, as a practical matter, apply them.

I would like to see us try to articulate this as a reasonable objective rather than to pretend to ourselves that the rhetoric of the May 1972 statement of basic principles really represents an accomplished fact, and that the Soviet action is therefore violative of it.

There is a sense by which, I think, the scale of the Soviet interven-

tion and its use of Cuban forces on a large scale goes beyond what I suppose anyone would define as reasonable restraint here.

Nothing I have said would be inconsistent with that judgment.

SOVIET-CUBAN DIFFERENCES OVER LEVEL OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. Professor Shulman, would you see any possibility that the Soviet Union and Cuba could have any differences over the level of Cuban commitment there, or do you feel that, based on past precedents or your understanding of the Soviet Union, that the two are obviously working very closely together?

Dr. SHULMAN. It does appear that the Soviet Union and Cuba are working closely together, are collaborating, for example, in the airlift and in the matching of the Cuban forces with materials by the Soviet Union. But it seems to me not inconceivable that differences could arise between them in this operation as they have arisen between the two on similar issues in the past.

The Cubans generally are espousing a much more militant line in regards to the support of revolutionary activities, and quite often the Soviet Union has been clearly and explicitly at odds in its judgment about the effectiveness of that line under particular circumstances.

If the Soviet Union should reach a judgment that a coalition government is desirable here, it is possible that such a difference might arise with the Cubans. I would expect they would be somewhat more enthusiastic about carrying on the revolutionary struggle.

Senator CLARK. Do you agree with that?

Dr. GOURÉ. Yes; I would not take the view, based on all my studies of Cuba on which I have recently spent a great deal of time, that there was any real arm twisting involved or that the Cubans are merely paying off their great debt to the Soviet Union, or anything of this sort.

Castro really always had the ambition of being a major figure in the world revolutionary situation. He wanted to be a much greater spokesman in the Third World, and certainly in Latin America.

In fact, what might happen here, if one talks about this agreement, is precisely that Castro tends to gain in some sense, if the war goes well and quickly, of course, and is successful, more than Moscow, because Moscow provided the commissars and provided the equipment, but it is the Cubans who shed blood for the revolution and the advancement of the national liberation process.

This will make Castro a greater hero, I might say, than the bureaucrats in Moscow will be. How he will play this, both in the nonaligned nation area and in Latin America remains to be seen, and, we do not know what Latin American reaction will be. It could become fearful of future Cuban involvement.

I would remind you, sir, that in the recent deployment of British troops when there was a disturbance in British Honduras, the Cubans offered to send forces to counteract the British presence. Castro likes this sort of gesture. Therefore, he might resort to such gestures in the future in the case of other civil war situations in Latin America, or he might try to play along with the present regimes.

AFRICAN REACTION TO CUBAN PRESENCE

Senator CLARK. It might be a part of the reason that the African states have not reacted more strongly to what has happened there and that they perhaps do not feel the threat of, let us say, Cuban colonialism or imperialism or domination so much as they would Russian, whom they have been very suspicious of.

Dr. GOURÉ. Certainly one could argue the Russians did try to handle the whole thing with a certain amount of cosmetics. First of all, many of the arms shipments were delivered by Yugoslav ships, Russian equipment, but Yugoslav ships. They never admitted the presence of the Cubans publicly. Castro has, but not the Soviet Union.

This was covert: The Russians simply talked about material, political and moral support. It never went beyond this.

So we had a whole series of covert steps as again, for example, a massive Soviet troop presence which would have been more provocative both to the United States or, one could argue, more alarming to the Africans, because it would have represented white great power intervention.

You are right, certainly; I would agree. The Africans' image of the Cubans is that they will go home and that they certainly are not going to colonize Angola.

SOVIET HISTORIC INTEREST IN AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Professor Weissman, the Secretary of State has said on a number of occasions, including before this committee, in building the thesis that the Soviets are acting 8,000 miles from their own borders in a new way, that—I do not know if I have an exact quote—but they are acting in an area where the Soviet Union has never had an historic interest. Do you share that view that the Soviet Union has not had an historic interest in this part of the world?

Dr. WEISSMAN. They have had interests in the Angolan revolution since the beginning. At least by the 1960's MPLA was receiving Soviet assistance and one may say they had a traditional relationship with them that goes back to 1956 because the MPLA was formed in a dialog between Africans and leftists and Portuguese Communists who, at the time were associated with the Soviet Union. Out of this dialog came, not Africans joining the pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist party, but a new movement, the MPLA.

So there has been some relationship. The Soviet Union has given, as I noted, arms to Patrice Lumumba when he could not get them elsewhere. They had given material support a little late to the Congo rebels in 1964, which did not arrive, however, until the white mercenaries had repressed their rebellion.

So I think the Soviets have had an interest in the area. I think what they have done with MPLA now is not just to step up their interests a bit, but they have also made a judgment that MPLA is a politically effective movement and is likely to prevail. In the early 1970's, at a certain point when MPLA was having difficulty internally, the Soviet Union reserved its support and began not to give so many supplies to MPLA.

It is only with the judgment that they have made—which is supported, I think, by most scholars—that MPLA is likely to be the winner, that it has the best internal organization, that they have increased their involvement. I think in other areas of Africa if they see that other liberation movements are not competent, there is no reason to suppose that they will make any effort comparable to what they are making here.

Again, the effort has also been a countereffort to the involvement of Zairian regulars, Portuguese noncoms and South Africans on the side of our forces.

Senator CLARK. You say that is their reaction?

Dr. WEISSMAN. The arms were stepped up. There were better arms going to the Soviet supported groups in early 1975 than were going to the Western supported groups, but the Western supported groups were receiving arms through Zaïre.

Then, as the United States increased its aid, the Soviet Union—which had a headstart, one may say—also increased on the other side, its aid. For example, while there were always Cuban advisers, there were not large numbers of Cuban troops until the South Africans came in and the Zairians came in. Then as more South Africans came in, more Cubans came in.

So I think what looks now like a large Soviet intervention was not so large before the West began to mobilize, both in the United States through Zaïre and in South Africa.

Second, as I said earlier, the initial Soviet input was in part a political judgment on the efficacy of MPLA.

Senator CLARK. Professor Shulman?

Dr. SHULMAN. I would like to add a small, and perhaps pedantic, footnote to the question of historical interests; not on this part of Africa, but in Ethiopia, for example, there were some manifestations of Russian interests that go back to before the revolution. There was a maintenance of a hospital there, for example.

Dr. GOURÉ. If I may make one comment. I would not entirely agree with Mr. Weissman on this judgment.

Essentially, I think we have reasonable evidence that whatever the capacity of the organization of MPLA at the time when the Russians stepped up their aid and began the intervention, the MPLA was in the weakest position, controlled the least territory, certainly had the least in terms of total population, if one goes by tribal definition. No one has taken a public opinion poll in Angola.

Senator CLARK. Even less than the FNLA?

Dr. GOURÉ. Yes.

On top of that, the problem is that the MPLA is winning, not because of its superior organization, but it is winning because of the Cuban troops. It is not the heroism of the MPLA forces that is beating everybody, but the Cuban troops. The general picture is, essentially, that the Cubans go around bombarding everybody else, the opposition withdraws and the MPLA acts as a guard for the Cubans.

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT REACTION TO SOUTH AFRICA INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. You do not necessarily see the Cubans coming in in reaction to the South Africans?

Dr. GOURÉ. No, not really. The situation of the MPLA was already very poor before the South Africans made a significant bid. The Soviets did the usual thing in that situation. They shipped a lot of equipment, which eventually, if the situation had been stable, might have been used by the MPLA if they could have been trained. This took time. There was not that much time left.

They needed people who knew how to use it, use all of this rocket artillery, helicopters, tanks, et cetera.

If you recall some of the interviews we have seen over and over again published in the press by the FNLA and UNITA leaders, essentially saying, we get deliveries of armored cars, we get deliveries of tanks, what have you, but we do not know how to drive them. There are not enough Angolans who know how to drive a truck or run a tank in a combat situation.

The Cubans knew how.

Senator CLARK. Would you agree with the Assistant Secretary of Defense—were you here at the time he testified?

Dr. GOURÉ. Yes.

OFFSETTING SOVIET PRESENCE

Senator CLARK. It seemed to me—I hope I am not misquoting him—he indicated for us to offset the 11,000 Cubans, 400 Soviet advisors and some \$200 million in equipment—

Dr. GOURÉ. Also Algerians, North Koreans, and others.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. That it would take something more than money. It would take advisors or troops or mercenaries or something to offset that kind of presence.

Would you agree with that?

Dr. GOURÉ. If the intent were—in my opinion; I am not a strategist, but my judgment would be that if the intent were to establish—liberate would be the word—part of the area now controlled by the MPLA, establish a balance if you like where the other side controlled substantial territory, it would take troops, troops able to really fight the Cubans and the other volunteers, whoever they may be, and this would take European troops or American troops because the Cubans could not be handled just by the Africans themselves.

However, if the intent is to simply harass and have a prolonged guerrilla war—which these people presumably know how to do, they did it against the Portuguese before—and thereby simply up the cost to the Russians and Cubans, if that is the intention based on the assumption that the Russians and the Cubans will lose prestige in a protracted conflict and that they may then agree to some settlement, such level of action may be possible.

The only risk involved in that is if this policy fails, then the U.S. failure in Angola is further magnified.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

U.S. FUTURE ANGOLAN POLICY

Let me close by asking each of you to respond to a very difficult question, the one that all of us are going to have to face up to, and that is, what do you think the U.S. policy in Angola should be from this point on? What are our alternatives? What can we do, or what should we do?

I will start with you, Professor Gouré, and work across the table here. What do you see as our reasonable alternatives?

More specifically, what do you think we should do by way of policy?

Dr. GOURÉ. I do not believe that we can do much in Angola. The situation in Angola in the end is not going to be conducive to improving the U.S. image or our influence in Africa.

It will be important, however, to take a stance that will indicate that the United States will react if Angola becomes a springboard for further advances or for other methods of intervention in other countries and that this will have serious consequences.

The real question, unfortunately, is the détente issue. Unless we have the ability to impose credible penalties built into the détente indicating that we will not tolerate such Soviet action, when according to our judgment and actions violate the principles of détente, then the other side has a free hand yet, we cannot accept the Soviet view of peaceful coexistence as they define it.

I know that most action which we can take in this case will be politically unpleasant. One, for example, could be related to the wheat deal. It would be an indication of American seriousness and concern if we were to withhold the wheat, storing it here and, if necessary, paying the farmers for the wheat that is scheduled to go to Russia rather than deliver it.

This would be a major gesture of American displeasure.

It would show that the Americans are quite upset about the situation. Verbal protests are not going to get us anywhere.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Professor Shulman?

Dr. SHULMAN. I would like to preface my comment by saying I am by no means an Africa specialist.

First of all, I think it would be wise, as earlier testimony suggested, for us not to overdramatize the general significance of the Angolan issue in order not to magnify the consequences of our not acting here.

Second, I would argue that it would be important for the Congress, if it declares itself in opposition, as it has done, to further American involvement, that it do so in a differentiated way, that it makes clear that it does not regard intervention here to be useful, but this does not constitute a general withdrawal from the world.

Senator CLARK. Not a precedent?

Dr. SHULMAN. Exactly.

Our judgment in these matters have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. No one should conclude that the United States will not fulfill its commitments where its interests are involved.

With regard to the local situation, I suppose it depends somewhat on what happens, depending whether there is a coalition government that emerges or there is a partition, whether there is a long, protracted guerrilla war.

One thing that worries me about the possibility of protracted guerrilla war is its consequences for the future of Africa itself.

It appears to me, the longer the conflict is protracted here, the more it will weaken those forces within Africa that might have a moderating effect on the coming conflicts with regard to South Africa and Rhodesia. This is a consideration we ought to have in mind.

I would suppose it would be useful for us not to take such measures as would cut us off from contact with the Angolans in whatever future government which might emerge.

I would agree with regard to the relations with the Soviet Union that we ought to make clear that we regard this action of theirs as excessive, clearly going beyond any reasonable prosecution of their interest, and showing a degree of lack of restraint which we all, regardless of our position on what the United States can do locally, take quite seriously.

I think that might not be without its effect, largely, it seems to me, because of the Soviet concern about what consequences this might have for American political life generally. The longer this goes on, the more it serves to harden American attitudes on future relations with the Soviet Union. I think this should be a matter of concern.

I do think, just to conclude, that certainly nothing in this issue should impair our efforts to try to reach a SALT agreement on its merits.

I am not certain about the wisdom of using the grain issue that Dr. Gouré spoke of. Of course, apart from the practical question of whether it is feasible for us to do this in regard to the local pressures involved, there is perhaps some difference between the use of grain in this issue, particularly, and other forms of economic penalty.

For example, if we had the trade bill in force and the Eximbank were able to give credit, I would have no hesitation in saying that this is a consideration that ought to affect our judgment about the flow of credits to the Soviet Union.

The use of the grain deal troubles me a little bit, because it is a part of our objective here to stabilize grain trade.

I would think it would not be wise to establish a precedent that this deal can be turned on and off for political objectives. It can be done in similar ways in other direction.

To some extent, we have an interest in the stabilization of the grain markets, and also we have some hope of encouraging the Soviet Union to move to support world grain reserves forward which this step is intended to move them. On that one, I am less sure.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Dr. GOURÉ. May I make one comment, sir?

Senator CLARK. Certainly.

Dr. GOURÉ. It is only this, that from the Soviet point of view Angola is at this stage of the world situation, not unique. The reading of Soviet literature, particularly in the last 6 months, shows an increasing Soviet toughening on the European situation as well and an increasing debate on how to explore the vulnerabilities in Europe.

It also shows generally a much stronger Soviet appeal to national liberation struggles around the world, and if one takes the Middle East, a harder Soviet line again on the Middle East negotiations and so on.

The Soviets hard stand on Angola is not entirely unique in the overall context of current Soviet policies. Whatever motivates them—and I think I generally agree with some of the points, or rather, explanations, that Dr. Shulman made—but the point is that a decision seems to have been made in the Soviet Union that détente got it this so far, but that the pay-offs are not all that great anymore. We, Russians, have succeeded in dividing the West to a great degree. We have succeeded in isolating the United States to a considerable degree.

Even if that has happened all by itself, it does not matter. It oc-

curred, and it is better to exploit the existing opportunities now than to wait for an uncertain future when they may not reoccur.

As I see it right now, the general Soviet line is hardening. I have noticed, by the way, that the same commentary is coming out of Yugoslavia as regards its assessment of Soviet policy and one hears similar statements at this time from the Italian Communist Party and so on. Thus, this is not only my personal view.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Professor Weissman?

Dr. WEISSMAN. I think that one thing we could do would be to stop assisting the forces that are not going to win in Angola without a U.S. rescue operation and to begin to establish contacts with the MPLA which is trying to broaden its international support.

A second thing that I think we should do is reconsider the support we have given for President Mobutu in Zaire and some of his expansionist activities in Angola and we should reconsider the extent to which we are seemingly committed to the aspirations of a very unpopular regime in Zaire, a regime that is having serious internal problems.

We should perhaps begin to take our reserves from that regime.

A third thing, I think the Angolan policy, we talked about what it should not be a precedent for, but I think it should be a precedent for a reconsideration of American policy in southern Africa. It seems to me that we have an interest in not allowing African liberation movements to only have the Soviet Union to turn to in their hope for the future, that we have to begin to associate ourselves more closely with some of these liberation movements which stand for the type of regime that is also closer to our own moral and political views, and that perhaps in that association, in increasing that association, we will perhaps be disassociating ourselves from white-ruled Africa. We might thereby, in Africa, be creating more of a basis for détente, a deepening of détente with the Soviet Union.

If after all the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves roughly in support of the same forces, it seems to me that will be a factor working for a deepening of the détente relationship.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

I think your presentations have been excellent and most useful to this committee. This is the first opportunity we have had this year to really look at all of the questions that you have raised. I think it has been most useful.

CONTINUED HEARINGS

We are going to continue these hearings tomorrow afternoon. We will have Mr. John Marcum of the University of California and Larry Henderson, who spent some 20 years in Angola, as well as George Houser, American Committee on Africa.

We thank you very much for taking the time to come all the way down here to give us the benefit of your thinking.

Thank you.

The hearing stands in recess to reconvene tomorrow at 2 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m. the hearing recessed, to reconvene Wednesday, February 4, 1976, at 2 p.m.]

ANGOLA

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark and Biden.

Senator CLARK. The subcommittee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today is the third of a series of hearings on U.S. policy toward Angola, the African Affairs Subcommittee will hear the testimony of nongovernmental witnesses who are familiar with Angola.

We will first hear from Prof. John Marcum of the University of California at Santa Cruz, who is a leading academic authority on Angola. In fact, his testimony before this subcommittee last summer provided background and a good deal of insight into the Angola problem and certainly proved invaluable in congressional discussions of the administration policy toward Angola.

Second, we are going to hear from the Rev. Lawrence Henderson, a missionary for the United Church of Christ in Angola for 22 years, which speaks for a good deal of experience in that country. He will be able to tell us about Angola from the point of view of a man who has lived there, who has seen firsthand the development of the liberation struggle, and who knows the people most affected by this conflict.

Third, we will hear from Rev. George Houser, director of the American Committee on Africa since 1954. This church-supported organization has been providing monetary assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa, and it analyzed the U.S. African policy. We have heard a great deal of Reverend Houser on his efforts in the struggle for freedom and equality in southern Africa. We are delighted to have him here.

Today's witnesses have been following the situation in Angola for several years. They know the liberation movement leaders personally, I believe, in each case. I am confident that they will be able to provide information on what is going on in Angola that this committee undoubtedly needs in evaluating the administration's Angola policy.

We are going to hear from each of the three witnesses first. Following that, we will have time for questions. Professor Marcum?

STATEMENT OF PROF. JOHN A. MARCUM, PROVOST, MERRILL COLLEGE, AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ

Mr. MARCUM. Thank you very much, Senator Clark. I have a very brief statement I would like to read, and then a few comments on some of the testimony that has preceded.

Senator CLARK. Good.

Mr. MARCUM. The Angolan war represents a tragedy of missed opportunities. For 14 years American policymakers paid next to no attention to the wars for independence being waged by African nationalists in Portugal's African colonies. In fact, the architects of American policy—see the famous NSSM 39—dismissed African insurgent movements as ineffectual, as neither “realistic nor supportable” alternatives to continued colonial rule. American policymakers questioned “the depth and permanence of black resolve” and “ruled out a black victory at any stage.” They did not question the depth and permanence of Portuguese resolve. And when Portugal's war-worn armed forces overthrew the Caetano Government in April 1974 and moved to free the colonies, the American Government stood surprised and embarrassed—embarrassed by its close ties to the ancient regime, embarrassed by its miscalculations.

Absorbed in domestic difficulties and pressed by soldiers determined to go home, in late 1974—early 1975 Lisbon saw its authority slip away in Angola where competing nationalist movements jockeyed for power and neighboring Zaire increasingly intervened. Given the long history of bitter rivalry among and between Angola's three nationalist movements, it was clear that civil war and/or partition was likely unless someone picked up the umpire's whistle. It was at this point, early 1975, that the United States might have acted to head off a test of force.

U.S. POLICY QUESTIONED

Instead of providing covert aid to the Angolan movement with the largest army—the FNLA army was being trained by Chinese instructors in neighboring Zaire, the United States might have sought to shore-up efforts being made by Lisbon and the Organization of African Unity to create and sustain a coalition Angola government. Winter and spring of 1975 was a time for diplomacy. When in March and April the Zaire-based and equipped troops of Holden Roberto's FNLA, which expelled all rivals from the northern districts of Angola, launched military operations against the Luanda based MPLA, did the U.S. Government try to constrain its client? Or did the administration hope for the quick elimination of a movement that had been receiving Soviet support for some 15 years? Did the American Government think to advise the Soviets that it was prepared to guarantee that the MPLA led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, and not a Zaire-sponsored rival faction, would remain part of the tripartite transitional government? Did it convey to Moscow and other interested parties strong American backing for an inclusive coalition as over against the imposition of any movement by force? As Soviet arms began appearing in Luanda in April-May, did the Secretary of State sense the dangers of playing a “cover game of soldiers” and alert Moscow about his concerns?

Angola's Transitional Government collapsed in July 1975. The American response we now know was to match the Soviets not to reconcile the Angolans. What was really needed at that point was an urgent diplomatic quest for an African solution. Time was running out. Did the President or the Secretary of State call in OAU ambassadors or contact key African leaders and encourage and promise U.S. support for collective African initiatives? And when in August 1975, as we are now told, Soviet and Cuban personnel were observed coming into Angola, did anyone get on the hot line? David Binder of the New York Times, December 25, last, reports that Mr. Kissinger failed to make a formal protest to Moscow about growing Soviet intervention until late October, by which time Soviet prestige was publicly on the line.

As impossible-to-hide American intervention first caught the eye of the Soviets and then of the investigative press, the United States lost the neutral high ground from which it might have hoped to muster African diplomatic support against Soviet and Cuban involvement. Then, in late October, South Africa marched north out of Namibia. All hope of a unified African stance then disappeared as states such as Nigeria and Tanzania, previously critical of Soviet intervention, rallied to the cause of the MPLA, and Zaire and Zambia, fearful of Soviet intentions, and economically dependent on South Africa, continued their support for the FNLA and UNITA. Anxious and divided over how to respond to the active intrusion of white-ruled South Africa, African leaders collectively were able to do little more than to prevent the complete breakup of their regional association, the OAU.

ENCOURAGING UNITY AMONG AFRICAN, OTHER THIRD WORLD STATES

It is, I submit, in the U.S. best interest to encourage unity not division among African and other Third World states. Rather than exult in block-busting we should attempt to work with and strengthen functional associations of such states. It is precisely the excess of nationalism and decline of multilateral diplomacy in our world of 1976 that converts an Angola into a power vacuum and gives rise to the danger of an archaic super and minor power collision. Did the U.S. Government consider the importance of fostering intervention-resistance African unity when it failed to discourage or, according to some reports, secretly encourage South African intervention?

The Secretary of State has stated before this committee that: "The Soviet Union must not be given an opportunity to use military forces for aggressive purposes without running the risk of conflict with us." I would suggest a rephrasing: "The Soviet Union should not have been given the opportunity by us to intervene in Angola without risk of united African opposition."

Angola is a tragedy of missed opportunities.

But is there nothing to do now but argue fruitlessly with the Russians, look for scape goats on which to pin the blame for a self-inflicted humiliation, or turn to mercenaries and adventurers to stave off what we choose to define as a Soviet victory? Why do we insist on losing? Might discrete eleventh-hour contact with the Luanda government still offer some hope for a political solution? Might Luanda and Washington find an area of common agreement over the desir-

ability for a broad-based Angolan Government that could bring reconciliation, unity, and true independence to Angola? Is that possibility being explored? Or are we intent on throwing away another opportunity to restore peace to Angola and honor to ourselves?

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. You have some other comments, or reaction to people who appeared before the committee this week?

Mr. MARCUM. I do, sir, if I may.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

First I would like to talk briefly, if I might, about preventive diplomacy; and I think military power is not the only leverage in diplomacy as has been suggested. Allow me to point out the interview in today's Washington Star with Mario Soares, leaders of the Portuguese Socialist Party. This falls within the area of what I would call remedial diplomacy, since we seem to have failed in preventive diplomacy.

In response to questions in the paper he notes—he is talking about intervention—and he says:

But if political negotiations would be held among the great powers, who for a number of reasons seem to be interested in feeding the civil war in Angola, it might be possible to find a way out of this difficult situation. If such negotiations are not held, then we are inviting a great internationalization of this conflict, leading eventually to a new Vietnam.

I submit that is simply one more good argument for taking diplomatic initiative.

PROFESSOR MARCUM'S COMMENTS ON SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TESTIMONY

I would like to comment upon just a few points that the Secretary of State made in his testimony, particularly to get at some historical facts. He stated that the FNLA and UNITA played, as he put it, "Played a larger role than the MPLA in striving toward Angolan independence." I would suggest that is at best partisan, each movement had its day, each movement at various times in this struggle, achieved ascendancy and then declined. I believe historically that the MPLA did at least as well as the others, though none won a clear victory.

It is suggested, also, that the MPLA began military action against the Portuguese in the mid-1960's. In fact, fighting broke out in Angola in 1961, and both the MPLA and the UPA Union of Angola's Peoples, which is the predecessor of the FNLA, were involved in fighting at that time. I think it is important that the historical record be accurate.

At another point the Secretary of State suggested that although various uncoordinated insurgency efforts of these movements caused difficulties, they caused no serious military threat to the domination of Portuguese military forces in Angola. He goes on to say that, the overthrow of the Portuguese Government in April 1974, and subse-

quent growing strength of the Portuguese Communist Party apparently convinced Moscow of the revolutionary situation in Angola.

It is implicit in his statement that there is no connection between those two events. I think it is terribly important to note an incumbent can lose without an insurgent winning militarily. This happened in Vietnam. This happened in Algeria. This happened in Angola and Mozambique. The Portuguese coup was a direct result of the wars in Africa. One has only to read General Spínola's book written shortly before the coup on that, of the war that Portugal could not win, to understand the connecting links between those two events. It is not as though the Soviet Union had gotten interested in the affair only after the coup.

It is also suggested by the Secretary that Soviet aid began in the fall of 1974. The Soviet Union had been helping the MLPA for most of 15 years. Moreover, Chinese aid was coming in to the FNLA in late 1974. There are some press reports of 400 tons of Chinese arms arriving in Zaire in late 1974; they had Zaire equipment as well. And it was—and this is not mentioned in the testimony—it was in March and April that FNLA forces attacked.

If you read the press accounts of what happened at that time, you will find that most of them referred to attacks initially by FNLA forces, which were entrenched in the north, where they had previously evicted all other forces; and they felt at that time they had the military superiority.

Finally, it is suggested that only intervention by the Soviet Union prevented a situation of stalemate, that is, that no single movement would have been strong enough to take over. That is quite possible. But it is also possible that one of the movements might have been eliminated. At least one must consider the fact that the MPLA was the weakest movement at that time. It had internal difficulties. The FNLA had the largest number of troops. It did not look like a kind of winner-take-all contest and the initial attack came from the FNLA.

Senator CLARK. This would have been in January of last year?

Mr. MARCUM. This would have been in March and April, when the attacks were made; but the build-up, as I said, started in late 1974.

I am not suggesting there wasn't a build-up parallel to that on the other side. When one follows this chicken-and-egg sequence, it is important to get everything in, and to factor in Chinese and Zairian intervention, which in some ways preceded or paralleled that of the Soviets.

Finally, I think to blame the Senate, the Senate vote, for the resumption of Soviet aid in December, is to make a simplistic argument. Among other things, it leaves out the whole factor of South African intervention. Take for example, Nigerian reaction. Nigeria which is the largest and most important power in West Africa. Its reaction to South African intervention was to grant \$20 million of aid to the MPLA. And I believe one should note that the Soviet at that point saw that they could continue their intervention because they would

have African support for it. African support came as a result of South African intervention; it was not congressional action, but rather the realities of African politics that proved the dominant factor.

AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR MPLA PRIOR TO SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION

Senator BIDEN. Professor, on that point, from the historical perspective, is there any evidence of African support for the MPLA prior to South Africa intervening on behalf of UNITA?

Mr. MARCUM. Yes; there certainly was support. A state like Tanzania, for example, tended to be pro-MPLA, but it had been critical of Soviet intervention, and it is still concerned about it. There were other countries that were quite strongly pro-MPLA. But, the South African move certainly changed the policy on the part of Nigeria, Ghana, and certain other states.

Senator BIDEN. Is there any evidence that they were moving in that direction anyway? In other words, is it clearly the causative effect situation that had not South Africa gone in, would those nations, in your opinion have stayed neutral, or at least not openly supported the MPLA?

Mr. MARCUM. I think the evidence is strong that it was a causative effect. They have so stated publicly. I don't believe that there is any reason to question it; the stoning of the American Embassy in Laos had to do with that connection.

Senator BIDEN. I happen to agree, and I suspect the chairman agrees with you, but I would like to have as much substantiation for that as I can possibly get. That's what I'm groping for. It could be that we are being equally as simplistic as the Administration is in saying that is the causative effect with regard to the Senate action, or any other of their less well-founded arguments they have made with regard to this whole Angolan fiasco.

Mr. MARCUM. Well, I have talked to persons who were in Nigeria at the time. This is not the only country involved, but it is an important pace setter, if you will. They told me that they are convinced that South African intervention was indeed the factor that changed the policy there; and there was a followup, if you will, in other countries.

Senator BIDEN. I think it is fair to say there were some in the Senate who suggested that in private to administration officials very early on; and my recollection was that there was, if not assurance, statements made that there was little or no possibility of South Africa being involved, and it was nothing to worry about.

If there is anything for the record, at a later date, that you would supply with regard to that, I think that would be very helpful.

Mr. MARCUM. One of the points that I found curious was a public statement by the State Department that it did not consult with the South Africans, that it was not informed of the intervention. And I presume it did not suggest to the South Africans that intervention would not be a good thing; it saw no evil, heard no evil, stayed away from it, which is in itself a kind of complicity.

Senator CLARK. Are you finished?

Mr. MARCUM. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. We will go on, now, with Reverend Larry Henderson.

STATEMENT OF REV. LAWRENCE W. HENDERSON, BOARD OF WORLD
MINISTRIES, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, NEW YORK

Mr. HENDERSON. Senators, as I see the situation, self-determination is the issue in Angola. How can Angolans determine their own future? From this distance many other issues, interests and concerns get in the way and obscure the main issue. We can hardly see the Angolans. Our Secretary of State looks at Angola and sees a battlefield where we can test our wills and perhaps materiel with the U.S.S.R. The media, desiring to bring Angola into focus, wear ideological glasses, seeing now through the right lens, now through the left.

ISSUE IS ANGOLAN SELF-DETERMINATION

Advocates of intervention say, "We must send money and arms to defeat communism"; but other partisans contend that we must withdraw so the progressive forces may defeat imperialism. The advocates, not the Angolans, define "communism," "progressive," and "imperialism." Those representing both ends of the spectrum and most in between, cannot see the people of Angola as they look through their ideological spectacles. Advocates from both right and left miss the real issue which is Angolan self-determination.

You, who have the responsibility of designing U.S. foreign policy are forced to see problems rather than people. It is impossible for Americans to develop an understanding and empathy for peoples in every country in the world. On our infrequent furloughs during our 22 years in Angola, we were frustrated by the ignorance of Americans who confused "Angolia," as they called it, with "Mongolia." I suppose we should feel some satisfaction that we can now read about Angola on the front page of every newspaper and hear from Luanda, Huambo, and Benguela on every newscast. Yet, we are still not satisfied. Americans now know that Angola exists, and many know where it is, but they're still not aware of the Angolans.

Portuguese colonialism is historically responsible for the invisible status of the Angolans. Our friends and colleagues could be thrown in jail and tortured for saying, "I am an Angolan." He or she was supposed to say, "I am a Portuguese." Angolans fought for 13 years for the right to say, "I am an Angolan." They fought not only against Portugal, the poorest country in Western Europe, but against the United States, who supported its NATO ally diplomatically, politically, and economically.

Portuguese colonialism exploited the Angolans economically, but, more insidiously, it exploited the Angolans mentally and psychologically. The so-called natives came to believe that they were incapable of ruling themselves. The Angolans looked to their masters to control their destiny for good or ill. In the 1950's, when the wave of political independence spread across Africa, Angolans began to dream again of liberation. Yet, even as they dreamt of freedom, they looked outside for deliverance. I remember times when Angolans saw an occasional plane flying overhead and asked: "Are those black Americans coming to liberate us?" When their neighbors in the Belgian Congo became independent in 1960, Angolans took heart, but still expected someone from outside to free them.

Today marks the 15th anniversary of the attacks on the prison in Luanda, which was one of a series of events launching the war of

liberation. Angolans decided to take things into their own hands, rather than wait for someone else to rescue them from Portuguese colonialism. No Angolan political organization or activities were legally possible under the Portuguese. The liberation movements were clandestine political parties as well as military commands for guerrilla units. Most importantly, they were the only political instruments of Angolan self-determination. For 13 years the three liberation movements fought against Portugal, showing that Angolans were determined to be independent and rule their own nation. Angolans, together with Mozambicans and Guineans threw off the mental shackles of colonialism, and even inspired young officers in the Portuguese army, fighting in Africa, to free themselves from their fascist mentality. The formation of the Portuguese movement of the Armed Forces owed much to the African freedom fighters.

Opinions differ as to the relative merit, strength and capability of the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. I have my opinions and will be happy to share them, if they are of interest to you. However, the issue is self-determination. The Angolans must decide who should represent them, how they wish to be organized, what form of government and economy is most appropriate to their present situation.

ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE

The Alvor Agreement signed January 15, 1975, by Portugal and the three liberation movements stated: "Portugal recognizes the liberation movements—National Front for the Liberation of Angola; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, as the sole and legitimate representatives of the people of Angola." After defining the new political structure, the agreement proceeded: "The transitional government shall organize general elections for the Constituent Assembly within 9 months from January 31, 1975 * * *"

I wish I could communicate to you the exhilaration of the people as they slowly realized after April 25, 1974, that they themselves were going to rule their own country. Young people who had been in Portuguese-occupied Angola streamed to party headquarters in Kinshasa, Brazzaville, and Lunguè Bungo in the bush of eastern Angola to sign up for any service which the party might determine. Angolans could speak freely for the first time. The movements set up offices in the main cities and then spread them to towns and villages. Angolans in exile returned, as did refugees from neighboring countries. The youth and women's sections of the parties held meetings and made plans.

Remember, this was the first time in the lives of the Angolans that they could take open political action. Even when the civil administration broke down and the government was not paying salaries regularly, teachers continued in their classrooms, nurses cared for their patients and local party officials worked around the clock to respond to the needs of citizens. Wherever a political leader appeared, thousands of Angolans gathered, not only to show allegiance to their particular party, but also to recognize an Angolan who could lead Angolans. Even the breakdown in public services, which so impressed Western journalists, did not dampen the enthusiasm of the Angolans for their new-found independence. The inauguration of the Transi-

tional Government January 31, 1975, raised the Angolans' fervor to a new pitch and they set their sights on the election and November 11, Independence Day. Self-determination seemed within their grasp.

The three movements then began jockeying for power. Each movement defined self-determination for Angola in terms of its own power. FNLA and MPLA, the better-armed movements, perceived that UNITA, the weaker group militarily, might be the most popular. If the Alvor Agreement were to be implemented, general elections could give UNITA more power than the other two movements.

In the spring of 1975, the FNLA and MPLA clashed militarily in Luanda and then in other parts of the country. UNITA tried to stay neutral. Her military weakness and popular strength made it expedient to prepare for elections. By August of 1975, it became clear that Angolans were being frustrated again in their struggle for self-determination. Military power rather than the will of the people would determine the rules of Angola. Self-determination suffered even more severely, because it was not Angolan military power which would decide the issue. Foreign intervention escalated the fighting to the point where only foreigners had the equipment, technical knowledge and experience to carry on the war. Angolans were only lending their names to military units advised, led, and armed by foreigners. The covert nature of the U.S. involvement and our failure to condemn publicly South Africa's invasion made the Russian and Cuban intervention much more acceptable in Africa.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL SUPPORTED

I commend this committee and the Congress for insisting that the U.S. Government withdraw from Angola. It is ironical that after a dismal record of the U.S. interventions around the world: to rescue beleaguered dictators, to overthrow popular regimes and to install military juntas, the United States finally found itself backing the majority in Angola. However, it was for the wrong reasons. We saw Angola as a battlefield in the cold war, and so we would support anyone who seemed to be opposing the U.S.S.R. The Secretary of State even affirmed that he did not care what kind of government ruled Angola. Yet, even being on the side of the majority is not a valid reason for intervention. I support withdrawal, even though the present information from Angola indicates that this will facilitate the imposition of the MPLA minority regime on all of Angola.

ANGOLAN SELF-DETERMINATION

If the Alvor Agreement, which had established the machinery for self-determination failed, what chance of success is there after 6 months of bitter civil war? How can Angolans keep up their fight for self-determination? Some Angolans will not. They will return to the subservient position they had adopted under the Portuguese colonialism. Others will continue to organize politically to try to gain power, but prospects for an opposition party are not good. According to the announced plans of FNLA and UNITA, some Angolans will carry on the struggle for self-determination by guerrilla operations. We talk about "movements". This correctly implies that these organizations are

fluid. Angolans can operate within them to change the course of the movements to satisfy more nearly the people's aspirations. I am saddened by the physical suffering today in Angola, by the defeats by self-determination, and by the prospects of another minority regime imposed by foreign interests. At the same time, I am hopeful that the determination of Angolans which overthrew Portuguese colonialism will not be defeated even by the intervention of the great powers.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

I commend the chairman of the committee for his commitment to working for the development of a new U.S. policy toward Africa. With our present calamitous policy toward Africa, we cannot have a positive influence in Angola or in other areas of that continent. We supported Portugal while she fought to maintain control of her African colonies. We are breaking sanctions to import chrome and strengthen the rebel regime in Salisbury, Rhodesia. We have vetoed United Nations resolutions condemning South Africa's apartheid policy. In addition to rectifying these mistakes, we need to establish affirmative relations with the Organization of African Unity, and change our stance in the United Nations, so that we are not boasting about breaking up Third World blocs, but striving to understand the aspirations and problems of these less developed nations.

I recommend that you simultaneously undertake to develop a new policy toward Africa and encourage nonintervention in Angola. I was interested in reports that Senator Percy was exploring possibilities of using U.S. commercial and diplomatic pressure on the U.S.S.R., so it would withdraw from Angola. If the United States places itself in a more positive relationship to African nations, they will be the best source for suggestions as to what policies will promote self-determination in Angola. Our focusing on the cold war dimension of the Angolan conflict has largely disqualified us from playing a positive role in the present round of the struggle, but through the guidance and influence of this committee we may be in a stronger position in the next round.

ANGOLAN SELF-DETERMINATION

February 4, 1961, was a day of victory in Angola's long struggle for self-determination. Even though the prisoners were not freed in Angola that day, the Angolans themselves acted. Many of my friends in Angola have been celebrating this February 4 as a day of victory, since MPLA has used Russian advisers and materiel with Cuban officers and men to conquer most of the strategic points in that wealthy land. I cannot celebrate February 4, 1976, because I believe that most Angolans see this as a day of defeat in their struggle for self-determination.

Angola's struggle for self-determination has covered centuries and the end is not in sight. Angolans must fight the main battles, celebrate the victories and lament the defeats. As we relate to Angola, let us recognize that self-determination is the issue. Self-determination is the goal, and Angolan self-determination should be the principal measure of our policy toward Angola.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. Now, we are going to hear from George Houser, the Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa.

**STATEMENT OF GEORGE M. HOUSER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA, NEW YORK**

Mr. HOUSER. Thank you, Senator.

The rationale presented for U.S. involvement in Angola is not based on African or Angolan realities. I have purposely stated this proposition in the negative because U.S. policy in Angola is negative. Such a policy is not designed to win a contest or to inspire confidence.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET COLD WAR COMPETITION

The conflict in Angola has not been defined by U.S. Government spokesmen in Angolan terms. The chosen terminology has been that of the United States-Soviet Union cold war competition. According to Secretary Kissinger, the rationale for U.S. policy is to press the Soviet Union to show restraint in Angola or "our relationship is bound to become more tense, and there is no question that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind."

President Ford has likewise put the Angolan conflict in the context of Soviet policy. "I want you to know", he wrote to various African heads of state just prior to the recent OAU Conference, "how seriously we regard this Soviet intervention 8,000 miles away from its borders."

Most of the American press has echoed this same kind of definition of the struggle in Angola. It is portrayed as a struggle primarily between a "Soviet-backed," or "Marxist" group (the MPLA) and two "pro-West" factions (UNITA and FNLA). And there the matter seems to rest for most of the American people. So little importance is given to the programs and policies of any of the three political forces in Angola that nowhere in an official government statement has there been an attempt to describe what they stand for. There is nothing which has delineated the supposedly "pro-West" programs of UNITA and FNLA, for which the United States has spent millions of dollars and on behalf of which the United States has made gestures which can only be interpreted as intended to seriously challenge the Soviet Union.

Even more surprising is the astounding statement by both the President and the Secretary of State that they are not really opposed to the MPLA. "We seek neither the destruction nor the defeat of the MPLA," the President wrote to the African leaders. The Secretary of State said, "We are not opposed to the MPLA as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention."

If the United States is not strongly for UNITA, and it is not really against MPLA—what is all the fuss about? The answer seems to be that the issue is not Angola at all. Rather, from the U.S. perspective, the issue is defined only in U.S.-U.S.S.R. terms.

This base for U.S. policy is most unfortunate. Africa is not taken seriously. And when dramatic events force U.S. attention as in the

Angolan situation, it is too late. It is as if Dr. Kissinger is going back to the period prior to 1958, when there was no Bureau of African Affairs and when there was no Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Twice in the past year the Secretary of State has replaced Assistant Secretaries—once because an Assistant Secretary had advocated too strong a U.S. policy in southern Africa, and a second time because an Assistant Secretary differed on policy toward Angola. The Secretary of State has not taken a trip to Africa himself, not having considered internal developments on the continent important enough in his view of global politics. A non-Africa-centered policy is hardly designed to win strong support in Africa.

U.S. POLICY ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING SOVIET INTERVENTION

In my view, U.S. policy toward Angola stated in terms of Soviet expansionism, can be criticized on two counts. First, the policy makes the assumption that the Soviet Union will "take over" Angola. There is no disagreement on the fact that the Soviet Union has been a principal supporter of the MPLA. But this is not a new policy. It goes back 14 or 15 years—to 1961—when the armed struggle against Portuguese domination in Angola began. Although Soviet assistance to the MPLA was modest, it was nevertheless steady. It has escalated during the struggle for the control of Angola in 1975 as U.S. involvement has grown and as the South Africa invasion from Namibia in the south has posed a new kind of threat to the independence of the Angolan people.

Is the Soviet Union a serious threat to the independence of Angola? The MPLA does not think so. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Angola (the MPLA government) specifically states that "the Republic will not join any international military organization, or allow any foreign power to establish bases on its territory."

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania does not think so. He says, "If the Americans are intervening to prevent the Soviet Union from getting military bases on the South Atlantic, and to prevent an African country from becoming a colony or puppet of the U.S.S.R., then they are not thinking—just being arrogant. Suppose America were to say to Angola, 'If you want to be colonized by Russia, that is your own business.' Everyone knows how resounding would be the Angolan 'no' and Africa's 'no further.' The Angolans have shown that they are willing to fight for independence."

Unless one considers most African countries puppets or dupes of the Soviet Union, the majority of independent states do not consider the Soviet Union a threat—25 out of 46 countries have now recognized the MPLA government.

A comment should be made on the presence of Cubans in Angola. I would prefer that all foreign intervention in Angola could be eliminated. But it should be pointed out that no one alleges Cuba is trying to colonize Africa. U.S. spokesmen look upon the Cubans as pawns in the Soviet game. It is worth noting that Cuba has had an independent history of providing support and assistance not only to MPLA, but also to FRELIMO, PAIGC, and other southern African liberation movements. The major Cuban presence developed after the South African invasion of Angola, and may well reflect the seriousness with

which many countries reacted to what they saw as a very real threat to Angolan independence.

Whatever the motives may be for Soviet policy in Africa, or in Angola, the results are not such as to bolster the case for successful Soviet takeovers. Africa has not been a high-priority target for the U.S.S.R. Between 1966 and 1973 Soviet aid commitments to Africa were below 11 percent of aid to all less developed countries. Soviet policy in Africa did not stop the overthrow of Nkrumah, the expulsion of Soviet and East European diplomats from Guinea, the expulsion of Soviet technicians from Egypt, the break with Amin on Angola, and the policy did not procure bases in Algeria or Mozambique.

If anything, U.S. policy aimed at stopping Soviet assistance to MPLA has had exactly the opposite effect. As Nyerere pointed out, "If the MPLA government is forced to rely upon one of the super-powers for its very existence, it will be forced willy-nilly into the Soviet's embrace. If that is what the Russian move meant, they will be succeeding, thanks to the United States of America."

A U.S. policy based on the assumption that an African country, or a government in Angola, which has been receiving substantial assistance from the Soviet Union will automatically lose its independence of thought and action, does not take Africa seriously. My point is not intended to serve as an apology for any Soviet actions, but to expose the false assumptions on which U.S. policy is based. The difficulty with U.S. policy is precisely that it does not take Africans and their desire for independence seriously.

U.S. ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING MPLA INDEPENDENCE POSITION

Second, U.S. policy on Angola seems to make the assumption that the MPLA, as a socialist-oriented organization, will not follow an independent position. This assumption does not take into account the divisions in the socialist world and again ignores any ability of Africans to act independently. A few words should be said about the MPLA, Marxism, and socialism in the African context.

Very little distinction is made in American parlance between "communism" and "socialism." There are no African governments calling themselves "Communist," but there are many striving to build socialist societies. Americans must understand that Africa does not really have an option between "capitalism" and "socialism." The average African lives on a subsistence level. The few individuals in some countries who have accumulated private capital are the exception rather than the rule. For the most part, these "capitalists" have been able to accumulate their own private capital only through relationship with foreign companies. Most African states do not want their economies controlled by foreign concerns. They wish to have control in their own hands.

During the long years of the liberation struggle in Portugal's African colonies, the major liberation movements were very clear on their ideological and political independence. They did not wish to be labeled "Communist" or "Marxist," even if they rejected capitalism as impossible. Amilcar Cabral, the founder and great leader of the African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), tragically assassinated in 1973, spoke most clearly on this point in

1971. He said, "We believe that a struggle like ours is impossible without ideology. But what kind of ideology? Our desire to develop our country with social justice and power in the hands of the people is our ideological basis. I am a freedom fighter in my own country. You must judge from what I do in practice. If you decide that it's Marxism, tell everyone that it is Marxism. If you decide it's not Marxism, tell everyone it's not Marxism. But the labels are your affair; we don't like these kinds of labels."

This is the position of the MPLA, too. An interview with Dr. Agostinho Neto, president of the MPLA, appeared in the Methodist magazine *Motive* in February 1971. Neto said, "Our organization is not Communist and never has been. Our policies are not subordinated to socialist countries, to their practical policies, to their orientation or daily ideology. Our movement defines its external policies as those of an independent movement, a movement not tied to, or subordinated to, the policies of another country."

As Dr. Neto speaks of socialism he interprets it as ending exploitation. In an MPLA publication in 1972 he said, "We don't intend to allow either Angolans or foreigners to exploit others in the country." In a speech over Tanzania radio, Neto said, "Who exploits the iron ore of Angola? The Germans. Who exploits the petroleum? The Americans and the Belgians. And to whom does the Benguela Railway belong? To the English. Who owns the Diamond Co.? The Americans, the Belgians, the French, and the English." "The Angolan people must have the riches of our own country," Neto said on another occasion. One can get the best insight into the ideology of the MPLA through its practical policies in liberated areas under its control in Angola during the long struggle against Portuguese domination. Peoples' stores were organized where the peasants could trade their products through a system of barter for goods such as shoes, blankets, salt, soap, which were given to them by friendly countries and organizations overseas. On the village level, the people farmed land collectively in part, and for themselves in part. There was both communal and private land. MPLA reflected a nonracialism and a nontribalism. The leadership made clear that MPLA had some good friends in predominantly white countries and some enemies in black countries. The equality of women was emphasized.

PRACTICALITY OF MPLA LEADERSHIP

The MPLA leadership is practical. When I talked with MPLA leaders in Angola in March 1975 and raised the question about their relationship with the Gulf Oil Co., for example, they said they were getting along all right. It is worth pointing out that it was not the MPLA-led government which forced Gulf Oil to stop its operation in Angola, but rather the U.S. administration. This action, designed to deprive the MPLA government of revenue due from the oil operations, seems to have particularly dangerous implications for the future of Gulf or other U.S. corporate activities in Angola.

The main objective of newly independent governments is not to drive out foreign business, nor to end all individual ownership of business enterprises. Only a few days ago, Lopo do Nascimento, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Angola, said his government would prefer to maintain its commercial links to the U.S.

companies on "terms of mutual respect and benefit." Whatever may be finally constructed over a period of many years, precipitate action will not be taken.

In my statement I have dealt with the MPLA and not with UNITA or FNLA because the United States does not look upon the latter two political forces as a "problem." Presumably they would follow policies, from a U.S. perspective, which would not jeopardize U.S. interests. Nevertheless, it is instructive that the United States has not defined what a "pro-West" policy consists of. I would simply observe that there is nothing in the history of the two movements which would cause one to describe them as "democratic," for as clear about the direction in which they would lead Angola if they had the power of government.

U.S. HISTORICAL NONSUPPORT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA LIBERATION STRUGGLE

I should like to make two other brief comments on U.S. policy which are now clearly reflected in our position on the Angolan conflict. The first is that the United States is suffering from the fact that it has consistently refused to give its support to the southern Africa liberation struggle. None of the liberation movements, even if they may have received a modicum of American aid secretly, could look upon the United States as a partner in the struggle to end colonialism and white minority rule.

The United States was allied with Portugal during all the years of the armed struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The United States was more conscious of the need for a continued understanding with Salazar and Caetano in order to maintain the Azores airbase than to develop a working relationship with the liberation movements. The U.S. Government gave up its membership on the Decolonization Committee at the U.N. rather than face the constant criticism there. The United States did not welcome representatives of the liberation movements from the Portuguese territories at the State Department in Washington for fear of Portugal's reaction. The United States avoided acknowledging the strength of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau so that when this movement proclaimed its independent state a few months before the coup in Portugal established an anticolonial regime there, the United States did not feel called upon to recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. It is not surprising that no official from the administration in Washington was invited to Mozambique's independence.

The official attitude of the United States toward liberation movements was stated by David Newsom when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in 1972:

The question of U.S. official relations with leaders of opposition movements in colonial territories has always posed a dilemma for American policymakers. These movements are a political fact. On the one hand, the absence of contact or support from us leaves the leaders subject to certain other outside influences. On the other hand, the United States has traditionally been unwilling to recognize the opposition elements in colonial territories until an internationally recognized transfer of power has taken place.

How can the United States expect to be taken seriously as a friend to Africa with this record of alliance with the Portuguese colonial regime?

Those movements seeking assistance from the United States are viewed with some suspicion. Even aid from the United States becomes something of a liability.

AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN FUTURE

Finally, an important word about the future. The liberation struggle in Africa is by no means at an end. White minority control is still dominant in Rhodesia, in Namibia, and in South Africa. In Rhodesia a violent showdown seems in the offing. The white minority regime, although engaging in halfhearted discussion with one faction of African nationalists, seems not to be prepared to accept the immediate "inevitability" of majority rule. Yet nothing less than African control (Africans are 95 percent of the population) can bring peace to Rhodesia. The Zimbabwe nationalists are prepared for the continuation of armed struggle and thousands of guerrillas are perched for an extenuated conflict. Mozambique offers a base of operation.

In South Africa and Namibia, there is a facade but not the reality of change. The South African Government has given no sign of lessening its control over the economy and the reigns of government. The black people who are more than 80 percent of the population are still controlled by the pass laws and have no hope of participation in the political process. The white government plans for the creation of economically dependent Bantustans where a handful of traditional chiefs maintain a tentative control at the whim of the white minority government. The military strength of the government grows and is aimed at liquidating any possible challenge from the African people.

The United States has an increasingly large stake in the stability of the white dominated economy of South Africa. American investment is now over \$1.2 billion. American investment strengthens the status quo and does not challenge it. IBM [International Business Machines] supplies computers for South Africa's Department of Defense; ITT [International Telephone and Telegraph] supplies complex equipment for the South Africa communications system; Mobil and Caltex refine almost 50 percent of South Africa's oil. And now we read that the administration is being pressed by business interests and some Members of Congress to allow the Export-Import Bank to permit direct loans to South Africa. These loans were forbidden in 1964. Such a move would be precisely in the wrong direction.

Because South Africa is the strongest and wealthiest country in Africa, the struggle for nonracial majority rule is likely to be the most bitter. The white minority, fearful that they will lose special privilege, will resist change with military, political, and economic weapons.

LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM ANGOLAN EXPERIENCE

What lessons can be drawn from the Angolan experience for the struggle in southern Africa which lies ahead? One is that white South Africa will be prepared to wage a relentless battle to preserve its way of life. What else would have driven South Africa to send an invading force into Angola from Namibia in the face of almost unanimous condemnation from Africa and most of the rest of the world?

Second, the struggle will not be basically a white versus black issue. In South Africa there will be some blacks alined with the white minority attempting to maintain special privileges which have been granted them.

Third, the struggle will be one of international dimension. With which side will the United States be alined? If there is no change in the perception of the issue as seen by policymakers in Washington, the United States will remain on the side of the status quo, trying to protect what are regarded as strategic interests and corporate investments. The forces of liberation, the forces of change will be inaccurately branded as Communist. This must not happen. The United States should embark on a new policy before it is too late.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

I support three policy recommendations:

One: The United States should give no covert or overt assistance, financial or military, direct or through third parties, to Angola.

Two: The United States should stop the recruiting of mercenaries to fight in Angola. Under title 18 of the U.S. Code it is illegal for one who resides in the United States to enlist in the armed forces of any foreign entity. It is punishable by a fine of \$1,000 and no more than 3 years in prison. With foreign mercenaries playing an important role in the fighting in Angola, it is essential that the United States put an end to Americans participating in this way.

Three: The United States should end its pressure on the Gulf Oil Corp. to cease operation in Cabinda. Gulf Oil said it was operating on the principle of dealing with the de facto government during the long years of the liberation struggle. This same principle should be followed now.

Thank you.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I think these three papers which were presented are excellent. They are very insightful, very thoughtful, and certainly very useful to this subcommittee and to the Congress.

Mr. Marcum, your questions raised extremely important points. Mr. Henderson, your emphasis on Angolan self-determination is extremely important because it seems to me our Government is so concerned with superpowers that we have forgotten, or perhaps not even considered, the Angolans themselves. I think that is also a point raised in Mr. Houser's testimony, that our Government is not really looking at the Angola question from the African point of view and examined the ideological positions of the liberation movements from an African point of view, but from a global point of view.

The Secretary of State said in his testimony before this committee last Thursday that he does indeed see it from a global point of view, rather than the African point of view.

I have a number of questions, and I intend to ask them, if you have time to listen. I am going to ask Senator Biden if he has questions, but first, I have always wanted to answer questions, and we always sit up here and ask questions. I thought what I might do, before Senator

Biden asks his, is to take my time and try to answer some of the questions you raised, Mr. Marcum.

I thought your questions were very much to the point. If one can find the answers to these, one begins to see the direction of American foreign policy in the Angolan case, particularly in the beginning.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT

You say, "Instead of providing covert aid to the Angolan movement with the largest army—the FNLA army was being trained by Chinese instructors in neighboring Zaire—the United States might have sought to shore up effects being made by Lisbon and the Organization of African Unity to create and sustain a coalition Angolan Government. Winter and spring of 1975 was a time for diplomacy. When in March and April the Zaire-based and equipped troops of Holden Roberto's FNLA, which expelled all rivals from the northern districts of Angola launched military operations against the Luanda-based MPLA, did the United States Government try to constrain its client?"

I think the answer to that is clearly "No;" there was no evidence at all that any attempt was made at that point.

Let's go on. You asked, "Or did the administration hope for the quick elimination of a movement that had been receiving Soviet support for some 15 years?"

I think the answer there is a little less clear, but we do know that the "40 Committee" decided in January, in a matter of days after the Alvor Agreement, to put \$300,000 in cash to the FNLA government. So, one could certainly make the rather consistent argument that at that early stage, instead of working toward a coalition government, that we were indeed putting money in for one of these liberation movements, not two, only the FNLA, and certainly not three.

Let's go on with your questions. "Did the American Government think to advise the Soviets that it was prepared to guarantee that the MPLA led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, and not a Zaire-sponsored rival faction, would remain part of the tripartite transitional government?"

The answer is, no; we did not.

"Did it later convey to Moscow and other interested parties strong American backing for an inclusive coalition as over against the imposition of any movement by force?"

Again, the answer is, no, we did not.

You go on, "As Soviet arms began appearing in Luanda in April-May, did the Secretary of State sense the dangers of playing a 'covert game of soldiers' and alert Moscow about his concerns?"

The answer is "No." There is no indication. In fact, we have the Secretary's testimony and others' in the Department, as I will explain in a moment, that they did not go to the Soviet Union—privately or publicly—on any occasion at that stage, to talk to them about the Angola situation.

Further on you say.

Angola's "transitional government collapsed in July 1975. The American response we now know was to match the Soviets not to reconcile the Angolans. What was really needed at that point was an urgent diplomatic quest for an 'African solution.' Time was running out. Did the President or Secretary of State call in OAU ambassadors

or contact key African leaders and encourage and promise U.S. support for collective African initiatives?"

The answer clearly is "No."

U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS CONCERNING SOVIET STEPPED-UP INTERVENTION

"And when in August, 1975, as we are now told, Soviet and Cuban personnel were observed coming into Angola, did anyone get on the hot line?"

No. No protest of any kind was made to the Soviet Union.

"David Binder of the New York Times—December 25, 1975—reports that Mr. Kissinger failed to make a formal protest to Moscow about growing Soviet intervention until late October, by which time Soviet prestige was publicly on the line."

The answer there is, you are right. I say this because this subcommittee met with Secretary Ingersoll in very late July and suggested exactly that course; and the record will show that. We thought it was time, certainly, by now. We had only learned of the covert operations a matter of days before. We thought that before it got out of hand and the war started escalating beyond hope, that we ought to talk to the Soviets, that made good sense. That was not done.

On another occasion, in early October, the full Foreign Relations Committee—we had Mr. Colby and Mr. Sisco—made exactly the same point. Why have we not gone to the Soviets privately, early on, and said, now, the time has come to stop this and let the Angolans decide this issue. We had many possible alternatives of action at that point because the Cubans were not in yet. The Cubans troops began to come in in late September; and the South Africans had not come in yet. It was a good time to try to stop this thing.

We were advised of one thing, we couldn't do that because we didn't have any bargaining chips. That was the exact answer, we could not possibly go to the Soviets and talk about this because we didn't have any bargaining chips. The only way to get some bargaining chips was to go in there with a lot of money, military assistance, and turn this situation around; and then we'll start talking to the Soviets.

So, I think the answer is very clear, we made no meaningful diplomatic efforts until it was far too late to turn the situation around.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, you know, it was just 1 short year ago that you were not a chairman of a subcommittee, and in that 1 short year you see the same affliction as with all chairmen, you pick all the easy questions to answer. [Laughter.]

SUBCOMMITTEE VIEW OF ANGOLAN EVENTS

Senator BIDEN. I can't answer any more of the questions except concur with what Senator Clark has said. I will illuminate a few of the points so that you may understand, and then I'm going to ask questions.

What we saw from this side, first of all, was the difficulty in getting people to understand that there was an Angola. The chairman deserves the credit for getting our colleagues to distinguish at least between "Angola" and "Mongolia."

But beyond that, I can remember us being told initially in briefings that we were not looking for a stalemate. We had a stalemate. We asked them about the ideology. We kept pressing, "What confirmation do you have for what you are telling us," and we got some specious arguments. Then, lo and behold, a couple of months later—I can't recall when exactly, but we had another so-called secret briefing—and were told that all we needed was a stalemate, that's what we were looking for.

I asked, "Well, what happened to the stalemate we had before?"

"Objectives change as situations change" but our own objective is peace and security, and tranquility, and so on—I'm being a little facetious.

But my concern now is, rather than turn this into a mutual admiration society, that we were right, and you are now right, and the administration was wrong. I have a larger concern and I will play, if I may, the devil's advocate.

ANGOLAN SELF-DETERMINATION

Reverend, you talked throughout your paper about self-determination. Now, in light of where we are today—not what happened yesterday, or 2 months ago, or 15 years ago—in light of where we are today it seems to me, and correct me if you think I'm wrong, according to you, Reverend, a faction which does not represent the majority of the people in Angola, a minority faction has the majority influence and power, and in fact continues to move in the direction where resistance is lessened; and it is just a matter of time before the total domination of Angola by that minority faction.

Yet, you say that we must encourage self-determination. Is there any way that there can be self-determination for Angola now, in light of the tremendous amount of Soviet backing, Cuban forces, and the apparent minority position of the MPLA. Can there be self-determination, or is that something they will have to fight out later?

Mr. HENDERSON. I'm not at all saying that I don't think that there will be in the immediate, foreseeable future. And I think, as I expressed in the paper, that the United States is not in a position at this point to play a positive role.

I think each of us stated that new important element in a new United States-African policy is a different position in relation to OAU and African nations. I think that is a necessary step before we are in a position to make any positive contributions. I'm not at all hopeful.

Senator BIDEN. I didn't think you were. The reason I raised the question is that an administration spokesman, in the recent past, sitting at the same table you are, was offering the same argument you are, offering the same premise that Angola must have self-determination; and the only way they can have that now, in light of the Soviet presence and Cuban intervention is if we in fact are able in some way to counter that force.

So, I just wanted to make crystal clear for the record that there is no implication on your part that we are in a position to help accommodate that self-determination now.

An adjunct to that same question is, we should do it by different means now. It is going to be a longer range question. We should change our policy towards the OAU and other African nations. What do you think, are we going to suffer?

POSSIBLE U.S. LOSSES AS RESULT OF NONACTION

The reason I'm looking to you, you were there for 22 years. Are there any losses beyond the ones we already suffered diplomatically in Africa, which will occur as a consequence of our nonaction, that is, if from this moment on we in no way, overtly or covertly, are involved in the struggle that is going on in Angola, are we going to lose face in southern Africa? And I eliminate South Africa and Indonesia. Is Zaire going to feel they are abandoned?

Do you see any loss of prestige, of face in our nonaction in southern Africa, now?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, you ask are we, the United States, going to suffer, and are we going to lose face. I don't think we have any more to lose, as far as Africa is concerned. So, the answer to that would be, no.

Senator BIDEN. I'm not suggesting loss of face is at all relevant.

Mr. HENDERSON. I think we are going to suffer if we pursue our present policy in Africa.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that. What I want to find out right now, is there any downside. Obviously you all three have made the argument on the up side for a change in policy, that we can't go down any further, and to help not only Angola but ourselves with Africa is to drastically change our policy. That is the point you made, I think, very eloquently and very clearly.

I'm trying to be the devil's advocate and ask you the other side of the question, is there any immediate loss of prestige, loss of face, strategic positions, letting down our friends, a view on the African continent that we have neither the will nor the heart to aid legitimate independence movements.

I realize you made the arguments all the other way. I'm not sure I'm articulating very well what I'm trying to get. Any one of the three of you can respond. What happens in Zaire, for example, when in fact we just wash our hands of the whole situation?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, according to the news that I have seen for the last couple of days, Zaire appears to be a step or two ahead of the United States in adjusting to the new situation in Angola. So, perhaps we don't need to worry too much about Zaire and Zambia; they may take care of their interests more rapidly than we do of ours.

Senator BIDEN. Do you gentlemen share that point of view, specifically with regard to Zaire?

Mr. HOUSER. I wouldn't put Zaire and Zambia in the same boat. Zaire has a lot on the line in that the FNLA has been, I think you could say, their movement for these many years.

Senator BIDEN. That's why I asked the question.

Mr. HOUSER. Now, I have a lot of personal contacts, going back to 1954, when I was in the Belgian Congo in this respect, and I don't know how many times I may have visited Leopoldville, later Kinshasa,

when the UPA and the FNLA—whatever name was the current one—was operating there.

But the one thing that was very clear was that this movement depended on the support which it received from Zaire. Now, that was true in terms of not only the facilities which it had, but also the people it had because so many of the Bakongo people had fled northern Angola into the Congo, as the war started in 1961 and thereafter.

And the FNLA had the force of government because the Government of Zaire gave it the power of government, including the power of taxation; the power of recruiting its army, and military bases.

Senator BIDEN. I'm not in disagreement with that. I'm wondering, what happens now.

Mr. HOUSER. I'm saying in answer to that that Zaire has had a tremendous stake in the FNLA, and because of that fact there is no question about the fact that President Mobutu would be unhappy to see the United States pull out; if that is a direct answer to your question.

Senator BIDEN. That is half an answer.

Mr. HOUSER. I put Zambia in a different category because it has no stake in a thing of this sort at all.

MOBUTU UNHAPPINESS AT U.S. NONACTION

Senator BIDEN. I think we would agree with the administration at least to the degree to which that unhappiness would manifest itself, it might have some impact on the United States.

Now, when you say that Mobutu would be unhappy, what does that mean, what do you foresee? We all project. I have been free in my projections on little basis of contact with Angola. I tell everybody what I think is going to happen. And you, I think, are telling us here what is going to happen and what should be done. Now I'm asking you what is going to happen in Zaire, and you say Mobutu will be unhappy, obviously. Unhappy what way? What do you see coming as a consequence?

Mr. HOUSER. I think there is something like \$750 million that the United States, through various corporate investments, has in Zaire; I doubt that they are in jeopardy. So, I don't think that's an issue.

I feel that Zaire will adjust to a new situation existing in Angola, and as Larry Henderson points out, that process is already beginning.

EVIDENCE THAT MOBUTU WILL COME UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE

Senator BIDEN. The administration has indicated that one of the reasons why we should be very concerned about the MPLA faction totally dominating Angola with the help of the Soviets is that it would send other signals—and correct me if I'm wrong. I have difficulty understanding what they are saying—that Zaire will realize that there is no sense in resistance because their friend, the United States of America did not help them. Mobutu is going down the tube, so he decides to confiscate all American investment there. He would come under the aegis of a sphere of influence of the Soviet Union because he sees no real reason, or possibility of resistance. Zambia will follow suit, and the next thing we know it's the old domino theory that we

have all of South Africa come under the direct sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and bouncing on the end of a string like a puppet.

You know what happened in Angola, not only will the MPLA be dominant, which in fact seems to be the case, but it will be a puppet of Moscow. Moscow will pick up the phone and say, OK, now interfere with the shipping lanes, or do this or whatever.

The whole rationale is that the MPLA doesn't make any difference. The Soviet Union will control Angola, and that will have bad implications.

Is there any merit to the argument made by the administration that once Mobutu sees the cards on the table, which the Reverend and I would suggest he in fact does now, that his next play of hand would be. All right, Soviet Union, America has abandoned me. The FNLA is down the tube. I see no sense in resisting you any longer. You can be dominant in my country.

Is that the scenario? I prostituted it a bit, but I think that is essentially the argument. Do you see any merit to that argument?

Mr. HOUSER. Not much. For one thing, if one is looking at outside influence from the Communist world in Zaire, it is not the Soviet Union, it would be China.

Senator BIDEN. But China pulled out of Angola—

Mr. HOUSER. But not out of Zaire, if you are talking about Zaire.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that.

Mr. HOUSER. And you were talking about a domino theory that would have Zaire deciding to become a—

Senator BIDEN. Throw in with the Soviets.

Mr. HOUSER. Yes. And what I'm saying is, you would have to have a different kind of development entirely because it would not be the Soviet Union that would be the frontrunner in that situation if there was to be an alternative to the U.S. influence; it would be China, at the present time. And I don't think puppets are made that way, anyway.

Senator BIDEN. That's really the essence of it. Professor Marcum, I have a whole bunch of questions. I would like to submit some in writing. I'm taking too much time.

Mr. MARCUM. I would like to get into that question in just a little bit different way.

Senator BIDEN. You are a professor.

Mr. MARCUM. Accepting what Larry Henderson said about the lack of credibility, about the crippled nature of America's position in this—a mess has been created and unfortunately we did nothing to prevent it from being made.

Now, it is hard to get out, and a lot of people may get hurt, that is very true. It seems to me that maybe the last question I put, which is perhaps harder to answer than historical questions, could be posted again at this point, without any guarantee that acting on it would help without even trying to be optimistic about it.

It seems to me that there might be reason, nonetheless, to try to talk to the people of the MPLA who have indicated, in talking to visitors to Luanda that they are interested in contact. To talk with the MPLA, and see if there is any possibility that there would be an area of common agreement. To see if we might possibly mitigate the danger of retaliation against Zambia, for example, which has genuine fears about Soviet and Cuban power.

Perhaps we might be able to have a marginal influence at this point in encouraging a more generous attitude, if not toward the top leadership, at least toward junior members of other political groups. One might argue to the MPLA that it is not in their interest to remain a minority government; that they should reach out and bring in representatives, genuine representatives of other ethnic or regional communities, to see their role in the longer term, to value the importance of genuine independence. At least to offer them an alternative to being more and more dependent upon, and thus the creature of Soviet and Cuban involvement.

They might not respond positively. On the other hand, I find it interesting that they have said that they would still like to talk to Gulf Oil. I would have predicted earlier that the MPLA would already have brought in someone else to run these fields. They have not.

So, I want to raise the question, is there something that one could explore with the MPLA and perhaps save others from further damage and mitigate antagonisms while working with African states? As we have all said, the United States should think in African terms not just think about the Soviets.

Senator BIDEN. I think that's a very important point. I think those of us in the Congress who have been strongly opposed to the action, or nonaction that we have taken with regard to Angola have to recognize what I think, and you just said, Professor, that there is at least some legitimate reason for concern on the part of Zambia. It may not be the degree of concern of Soviet- and Cuban-forced domination that they may think it is, but yet, it is something that cannot be totally discounted.

Let me say parenthetically, I facetiously stated in one of the briefings—and I'm not revealing anything, that is all public now—I think Senator Clark may recall, they were telling us how many weapons and tanks were supplied to the MPLA by the Soviets. We said at that time, "isn't it about time that we back a winner in some of these conflicts." We were told we had to back the Soviet opposition. I said, "Wouldn't it be smarter if we found out how many guns the Soviets had given the MPLA, and then give the MPLA twice as many guns.

I didn't really mean that, but it startled the fellow who was giving us the briefing. To get to the point that you raised here, just because the Soviets had a considerable influence on the MPLA is no reason why we have to go through the Soviet Union, it seems to me, to at least initiate attempts to have dialogs with the MPLA directly. I would hope we can do that. I'm not at all confident that will occur, but it seems to me it would make sense if we did.

I am growing concerned what the immediate fallout of our actions, or nonactions will be in Zambia and Zaire, I don't think that can be taken lightly.

I asked too many questions, and I have to go to another meeting. But, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit about four questions.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF REVEREND HENDERSON'S MISSION

Reverend, one final question, what part of Angola did you spend most of your time in, geographically?

Mr. HENDERSON. If that's not a rhetorical question, I'm amazed I have hidden it so well. I was in Central Angola most of the time, and consequently have most of my contacts in UNITA country.

Senator BIDEN. That's what I thought, I just wanted to be sure. Thank you.

LIBERATION LEADERS EDUCATION IN MISSION SCHOOLS

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

I was interested in your last question because it is an interesting fact that all three of the liberation leaders in Angola went to school in mission schools. I remember very well as I visited Angola in August asking them, particularly Dr. Neto, whether he thought his education in school had something to do with his basic views. I didn't get a very specific answer to that, but it's an interesting point that all three were actually educated in mission schools. I think that Bishop Dodge in Missouri has actually taught, or at least was in direct contact with all three when they were students in mission schools. Am I right, or wrong?

Mr. HOUSER. I don't think so.

Senator CLARK. You want to comment on that?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, as a missionary, I would like to take credit, but I think it should be put into the record that during the period when these men were studying, it was the policy of the Portuguese Government to provide educational facilities for Portuguese or assimilated Africans; and the education for Africans was in the hands of the missions, predominantly Catholic. So, these three men studied in mission schools because that was the only way they could study.

Senator CLARK. If they wanted to go to school, that was the only possibility.

Mr. HENDERSON. Now, it is interesting, and we found it very significant, that they all three went to protestant mission schools; but that's another issue.

Senator CLARK. Well, gentlemen, let's not get into that.

Mr. HOUSER. Senator, it might also be interesting, and Larry Henderson can speak in more detail about this but they came from three different areas.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. HOUSER. Roberto from the Baptist, the British Baptist area in the north; Neto from the Methodist area in Luanda, and Savimbi, from the United Church of Christ and the United Church of Canada area a little further to the south. That's why I would doubt that Bishop Dodge—his main contact was with Neto.

Senator CLARK. Yes, he is Methodist.

I have several questions, and because I would like to cover several areas, I'm going to ask you to make your answers as brief as you can. I don't want to cut you off, but I'd like to cover as many areas as we can in the time that remains. I have about 45 minutes more, and I don't know if all three of you can stay that long, can you?

I think I'm going to ask these questions specifically of people, and then, if others want to comment very briefly because there is particular disagreement, I wish you would do so.

WILL MPLA ALLOW SOVIET AIR, NAVAL BASES?

Mr. Marcum, it was my impression from talking to Agostinho Neto that the MPLA wants Angola—he said that over and over again and Mr. Houser's testimony emphasized that in several respects—and they

want to have good relations with the United States. Now, if an MPLA government comes to power in Angola, do you think they will identify with the Soviet Union and allow the Soviet Union to dictate foreign policy; specifically, what do you think of the chances that the MPLA will allow the Soviet Union to establish air and naval bases in Angola?

Mr. MARCUM. Well, I'll try a prediction on that. I don't think it is very likely to allow such bases. On the other hand, this is going to be partly determined by what happens from here on. This is precisely why I think we ought to take some initiative, to establish some kind of discussions with them at this juncture, and not push them, as they themselves have suggested we might into a kind of Cuban reaction, push them out so far that they will argue they will have to have the Soviets to protect them from various kinds of threats along their borders, South African mercenaries, and the like.

I can't be sure, but I don't see why we shouldn't take their word, their constitution, if you will, at face value at the present. The Mozambicans who came to power with very much the same kind of support have not allowed the Soviets to establish bases. There would be certain costs incurred by the Soviets if they tried to do that; western military reaction is not the only kind of cost. So, I would be reasonably hopeful that they would not.

I suppose there is one problem here, and that is, what is a base? Is it allowing people to use facilities, or to create permanent facilities? The matter is a bit difficult, sometimes, to define. But I would think there is a good chance at least that the MPLA government would not allow permanent facilities, would not get itself linked up in any major way.

Senator CLARK. Particularly if we are able to move in some way in the present and in the future to prevent that from happening.

Mr. MARCUM. One of the worst things I think could happen would be a prolonged period of insurgency, guerrilla warfare, along with the phenomenon of continued activity by mercenaries of all descriptions. If such forces remain in action for a long period of time, I think that will really increase the danger that those who are backing the MPLA now will stay longer and in greater force, may need permanent facilities, and will be able to invoke—in their own interest, if you will—will invoke this kind of external threat.

Senator CLARK. Perhaps the same could be said for the South Africans, but I will come back to that question later.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH FUTURE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT

Mr. Henderson, if the United States wants good relations with the future government of Angola, whoever that may be, the MPLA, or a coalition, what do you think our policies should be from this point on; what should we do at this point, in your view?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, I suppose the answer depends on one's analysis of what is happening at the moment and will happen in the next weeks. I'm assuming that the MPLA, the Government at Luanda is at the moment able to take military control, substantially, of the whole country; and that the number of countries recognizing Angola will be increasing as the military situation develops. And so, I would agree with what John Marcum has been saying, that initiatives should be

taken in the direction of establishing some sort of relations—I'm not talking about diplomatic relations—with the government in Luanda.

I have to say, not because it is perhaps important to anybody else but myself, that I still have this ambivalent feeling within myself that by strengthening the government in Luanda many of the people in central Angola will be going through a particular crisis; and I might just back up a moment to say that one factor which I don't see mentioned too often in depth—and I don't think we have mentioned it too much here—is the question of fear as to why the movements have either invited or accepted intervention from outside. I think each one of the movements, the leaders of the movements, have at various times been very much afraid that his movement is going to be eliminated, and that is not a political process, that is a very personal process as far as these people are concerned.

I feel sure that it was a very important factor in UNITA accepting South African help to the degree that it accepted it, and is now accepting mercenaries because these people spread all along the Benguela Railway and now active in the government established by UNITA feel that as soon as their resistance ends, they are dead; and that's not a literary expression.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. HENDERSON. And consequently, I think that this—I personally am torn by this all the time. I agree with John on the political side that we should be opening new relationships with the government in Luanda; but I know people—and most of them are my closest friends—who are convinced, right or wrong, that as soon as that happens, the MPLA taking over physically in Angola, they will be immediately liquidated.

Senator CLARK. That there will be an enormous blood bath.

Mr. HENDERSON. I don't think that it will be an enormous blood bath, but at least the top leaders because the radio in Luanda, which is the main radio in all of Angola now, keeps naming these people all over central Angola, saying, "Traitor, Valentine Lobita—so-and-so and somebody else—will be the first ones eliminated."

Senator CLARK. I see.

Mr. HENDERSON. It doesn't take too much imagination to begin to draw a scenario.

Mr. MARCUM. I don't dispute that. It would, on the other hand reinforce my feeling that we ought to talk. It seems to me military reality that the MPLA is going to win. We don't help people by not talking, not trying to persuade and encourage a certain humanitarian attitude in the MPLA. We simply make them more furious. And perhaps we might somehow be able to mitigate that kind of retaliatory action. We ought to argue for it strongly, and we ought to make that our major public position. If there is a blood bath, that would have to affect how we respond. We could not in any sense condone it.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZAIRE, ZAMBIA; DANGER OF INSURGENCY

Senator CLARK. Mr. Houser, the administration representatives and some others have expressed concern that Angola, under the MPLA government would serve as a base for insurgency against Zambia and against Zaire and others. Do you accept that idea, and second, what

do you think the United States policy towards Zaire and Zambia should be? Should we provide them greater economic assistance, military assistance, or less? What should our policy be, and what are the chances Angola will be used as a base of insurgency against Kaunda and Mobutu?

Mr. HOUSER. I'm not sure I'm going to answer your question directly, first, but I'm going to say it seems to me the chances of greatest insurgency are not against Zaire and Zambia, but against Namibia.

Senator CLARK. That's my next question.

Mr. HOUSER. All right. Then I shouldn't deal with that. But I really think that is where the issue is. I would think that, on the assumption that we are dealing with an MPLA government, we have to remember that for many years the MPLA had its major base in Zambia. I was there many, many times from 1964, when Zambia became independent, until last November, November of 1975. After Zambian independence, and after the MPLA opened up what it called its "Second Front" in Cabinda in 1964, it moved to Western Zambia, and from 1966 on this became its "Third Front," although it maintained an office in Brazzaville as a base for its operations in Cabinda. Its main base, internationally, was in Lusaka, at the liberation headquarters, supported by the Government of Zambia; and its main medical and educational installations were on the western border of Zambia, right next to Angola, and in eastern Angola; that was MPLA's third front.

During that period of time UNITA was banned, it had been banned from Zambia from 1968 onward because UNITA had attacked the Benguela Railroad; and the FNLA never really had a headquarters in Zambia. So, the one movement that was supported by Zambia was the MPLA.

Now, I don't think that all of this is going to be forgotten by the MPLA. But, quite apart from that, I believe that the MPLA leadership are very practical in the way they approach these problems. It will be to their benefit to have good relations with Zambia, and to cooperate as far as the Benguela Railroad is concerned. If nothing else, it could fall in the same category—and this may not be a good analogy—as the fact that South Africa has a working relationship with the Mozambique Government in using the port of Lourenco-Marques and also the facilities of the Cabora-Bassa Dam; this relationship is not being jeopardized by the ideological differences between the South African Government and the Mozambique Government.

So, I would say that as far as Zambia and an MPLA government in Angola is concerned, I would think that they would develop a good working relationship once they get through a difficult period.

Senator CLARK. You certainly would not see it as a base of insurgency against the Zambian Government.

Mr. HOUSER. Not from Angola. But if there were some anti-Kaunda forces in Zambia that wanted to make incursions across the border, that might be something else again. All I would say at this point is that eastern Angola is not the best point from which to do that sort of thing.

Senator CLARK. And what about Zaire, in that respect, do you see a possible—

Mr. HOUSER. I would say it is more likely, the bitterness that the MPLA feels toward Zaire is going to be different, again because they

have taken a pretty bad beating, they were thrown out of Zaire way back in 1964. They tried and tried to develop some kind of united front with Roberto, and Roberto was against them; he was backed by the Zaire Government. So, there wouldn't be a great deal of love lost, I think—from past experience—between the MPLA and the present leadership of the Zaire Government.

The other factor is that you have anti-Mobutu elements who have been over a period of time, not just now, in Angola. This is not something new. It's a long border, too.

Senator CLARK. You are speaking of people of Katanga?

Mr. HOUSER. Yes; right. So, there would be more possibility, let's say, and also the nature of the area, it's much more populated along the Zaire-Angola border, it's a long border, than is true of Zambia.

Senator CLARK. Do you think there is a fairly good chance that the MPLA and the Soviets would turn the Katanga forces loose?

Mr. HOUSER. My feeling would be against it. I would say that the MPLA would not be looking for any foreign adventures; they will have enough difficulty, over a long period of time, trying to maintain a government with some of the built-in problems that exist, and are probably going to exist for some period of time. I would say that they would not be looking for border problems, or problems with their neighbors. I would think they would try to come to terms if Mobutu were prepared to come to terms with them. I think they would seek it, they would be happy for it; for one thing, it would perhaps lessen the fear that an MPLA government is likely to have about the security of the oil in Cabinda.

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you the latter part of the question, again. Very briefly, what should our policy be toward Zambia and Zaire? We now have before the Congress a request for some \$80 million in aid to Zaire, \$15 million of which is military, the rest economic. There is no proposal before us with regard to Zambia. What should our policy be, should we increase economic and military aid, or not?

Mr. HOUSER. I would hope we are assuming that built into any aid that might go to Zaire there would be the provision that this should not be used for Angola.

Senator CLARK. That would be illegal now, under the Foreign Assistance Act.

Mr. HOUSER. Well, I think that the United States should look at what the specific request is for, as far as Zaire is concerned.

Senator CLARK. Have you looked at the one that is pending now?

Mr. HOUSER. I haven't really studied it, no.

Senator CLARK. How about Zambia?

Mr. HOUSER. I would hope that the United States would do all it could to help Zambia out of a crushing situation which that country has been wrestling with for all the years of the struggle in Rhodesia, and all that Zambia has done over the years to support the liberation movements that have been based on Zambian soil; and all that Zambia has suffered, with the copper that it has not been able to get out either through Rhodesia or Mozambique, or Angola. I think we ought to look with greater sympathy to get the Tanzam Railway operating. Both Tanzania and Zambia originally hoped that they would get assistance to build that railroad from the United States and Western countries, and that was not done.

Senator CLARK. I'm not just saying this for the record, but this subcommittee has worked very hard to try to get assistance for Zambia. We felt, at the time the Zaire request came in, there ought to be some kind of assistance for Zambia for the same reasons. They have a real problem with copper prices, a real problem in terms of exports or imports because of their inability to use the Tanzam Railroad to any extent; there are difficulties with Rhodesia, and so forth.

We have been totally unsuccessful so far because the administration has opposed assistance to Zambia, which seems ironic in view of the fact that we have talked about our military assistance to assist Kaunda. It seems to me we could do very well to assist him by supporting assistance that he very badly needs at this point.

FUTURE U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Mr. Marcum, the administration and its representatives have expressed concern that Angola could be used as a base for those who seek military solutions to problems of Namibia and South Africa, and that the Soviet Union sometimes provided assistance to liberation movements where the United States has, as you said in your testimony, pursued a policy of pretty much noncommunication with these movements.

What do you think future U.S. policy should be toward the southern Africa liberation movements, and what can we do to avoid in fact another Angola; that is, a conflict where the Soviet Union supports one government and the United States another?

Mr. MARCUM. I think we can learn some lessons from what happened in Angola and apply them very well to subsequent cases; take Angola as an opening phase of a much broader set of problems, all of which are related to the same issue, fundamentally, and that is minority white rule. There is every reason to accept that. The official explanation for South African intervention in Angola was to get at SWAPO. The South African ambassador to the United States announced that. They tried to wipe out SWAPO. In fact, such action is unlikely to wipe out a nationalist movement. It may have set SWAPO back in terms of military action. But the only way to really get at the South-West African situation is to have the South African Government grant genuine political participation to Africans and come to terms with representative African movements. Pretoria must do what it is pressuring Ian Smith to do or face what I think are inevitable consequences; namely, protracted military conflict.

We can do certain things. We are not going to determine the course of history. But we can be quite clear about our stand. We can bring all our influence to bear for all-due-speed progress at the Windhoek constitutional discussions and for bringing SWAPO as well as other movements into those discussions. That does not exclude recognizing the fact that SWAPO probably has more support in the country than any other movement.

And in the case of Rhodesia, before it's too late and completely irrelevant, we might repeal the Byrd amendment. The fact is, the United States may see itself acting only after the event. Right now things seem calm, but, as Mr. Houser pointed out, guerrillas are training, they are gathering in neighboring areas. If the current Nkomo-

Smith talks break down, there is no question about what will happen; there is no question about what the ratios, populations, and forces will be; and there is no question about which side the Soviets are going to be on.

So, we might as well think about it now instead of afterward, when we are going to be in the same kind of mess as in Angola and able to do very little to help anybody.

Again, what we need is a little foresight, a little understanding of what the forces of history are, an appreciation of the consequences of those problems. It seems to me a difficult and threatening thing to all of us, when we find ourselves boxed into a kind of anti-Communist position and alined with the only other power that is going to be with us, South Africa. Given the sorts of racial implications that has for the United States, the kind of division, it threatens a calamity for us as a Nation. If for no other reason, we should deal with questions such as Rhodesia with the greatest care.

Senator CLARK. I think that is very well put.

UNITED STATES/SOUTH AFRICAN IDENTIFICATION IMPACT ON OTHER AFRICAN RELATIONS

Mr. Henderson, in your opinion, what has the impact of our Angola policy been in our relations with the other African states; specifically, what has the impact been of our identification with South Africa, a point John Marcum was just talking about? It is reported in the papers today from the Prime Minister of South Africa that there are 4,000 South African troops in southern Angola, blocking off an area, that is, I think, 50 miles wide across the whole country. What effect will finding ourselves on the same side as South Africa have on our relations with the rest of Africa?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, I guess I'll just have to repeat what I said one way in my paper and another way in my responses. I think that our African policy has been so negative up to this point, negative from the point of view of continental interests in Africa, and negative from the point of the well-being of the peoples in Africa, that what we have done in Angola has been seen by most of Africa simply as a confirmation of where we were already.

Senator CLARK. I see.

Mr. HENDERSON. I don't think that what we have done in Angola has really changed the image, it has confirmed the image which we have had.

One of the problems which we have, and our allies and friends have, is that in the kind of society where we can have a hearing like this, it's much more difficult to set policy, change policy, and so forth, even, if I may be so bold as to say, even in a country like South Africa—and I abhor the system in South Africa—but at least there would be a vote of no confidence in their parliament. And in the kind of society where there are possibilities of hearings, no confidence votes, and so forth, it is very difficult to turn policy around suddenly.

So, what has happened in Angola does not represent on our part a new policy, or any change. It's sort of like having a wound, a big festering wound, and you pick up part of the bandage and you see that's festering under there; that is part of the whole festering mess in which we are involved.

Consequently, I think that what we see in Angola is what our policy has been; and what we can learn, therefore, is how it appears to Africans because it appears much more vividly to them now. Therefore, we can go about the process, which hopefully this is part of, of changing our policy. But in a way that's kind of a hopeless point of a view because you can't say, "If I just do this, it's going to change things and be all right" because we know that change is going to be slow in coming; and we know that the thing we have to change is a whole perspective on African policy, it's not just our policy toward Angola, or Zambia, or Zaire. I think all of us have struck that note sufficiently.

SENATOR CLARK. Yes; it is not just a question of pronounced policy. I mean, our pronounced policy on South Africa and Rhodesia is positive. It's good on the whole. And yet, the question is, are we pushing that policy, or are we pursuing the policy that was outlined in private memoranda—that's the question.

IS COALITION GOVERNMENT REALISTIC AT THIS POINT?

MR. HOUSER. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ellsworth, testified here yesterday as follows: "Ideally, a political solution should be found for Angola in which all three of the liberation groups would participate in a government of national unity." It is certainly hard to quarrel with that.

My question is, from what you know about the liberation movements, is this a realistic policy on February 4?

MR. HOUSER. I was in Angola in March of last year. As I have looked at the year 1975 in retrospect, as to what was happening, I have felt that the period when I was there, which was the latter part of March, was the end of what I would call a period of equilibrium. There was a chance. It didn't look like a good chance, but it seemed as if there might be a chance that the transitional government pattern would work.

Now, I talked with a lot of different people while I was there, and in every conversation there was always the great big question mark of whether it was going to work; but each movement was still making attempts to put its quota of troops into the integrated military, which had been agreed upon. The council of defense was meeting regularly, and the transitional government was meeting regularly. They were dealing with the incidents which were taking place, and they were making motions toward getting ready for elections. No one was quite sure whether the elections would really take place in October, as they planned it; but there was a feeling, "OK, maybe it won't work, but we are still trying."

Now, that broke down at just about the time I left. There were a lot of different incidents that took place. As a matter of fact, I had a date to meet the same evening I was leaving with one of the ministers of the transitional government whom I saw very briefly at his office. He was leaving in a very big rush, and he said, "I was just shot at half an hour ago, I'll meet you in a couple of hours."

He showed up in a couple of hours, and he said, "There are so many things happening around town that I can't stay." I saw him for 15 minutes and he left. So, this was the beginning of the breakdown.

All I can say is that everything that has happened since that time would make it seemingly impossible to get these movements together.

There have been attempts made, Kenyatta of Kenya called a meeting at Nakuru in June, and they each agreed that they would stop the fighting, there would be a cease-fire and they would start operating together again. That agreement lasted a few hours, that's all; and the fighting continued with all the results we know.

All I can say is that new elements have not entered into the picture, to give one a feeling that you could have another meeting—if there was going to be a chance for it, you would think it might have occurred at the recent OAU meeting. I personally do not see a basis for any optimism at all.

MPLA RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Senator CLARK. What about the possibility, Mr. Houser, that the MPLA may feel that if they are going to have real peace and stability in Angola, in all of Angola, that there is going to have to be some accommodation with these other forces. It may not be with Roberto, but they are certainly going to have to recognize some kind of coalition if they want to have peace and stability. Do you buy that idea?

Mr. HOUSER. Well, the distinction has been made between the idea of a coalition government and a government of national unity.

Senator CLARK. No. I'm speaking of the latter.

Mr. HOUSER. The latter being a government which is not by political party, but by an individual, you might say. You run into problems as soon as you name the individual, however; and theoretically it's a good idea.

I would say that the timing of it would be terribly important, and I doubt the timing is right, now. I should say there would have to be a very clear stalemate that would have lasted over quite a period of time for the realization to take hold in any government that exists, that it had come to terms with other forces. I don't think that time has arrived yet. It will not come as long as there are South African troops that are occupying a significant portion of the southern part of Angola. I don't think there is any chance of it happening during that time because, for one thing, the rest of Africa, there are now 25 states, and I imagine there will be more soon that recognize the MPLA government, I don't think they will stand for it. I don't think the OAU will stand for it.

So, there have to be some new factors in the situation, one of which is that the South Africans have to get out. That would be the most important thing that would have to happen before any kind of an agreement could be reached. And then, I think, there will be a point reached where the government will recognize that it must deal with what exists in other parts of the country.

OAU CONFERENCE LESSONS

Senator CLARK. Thank you. One last question, Mr. Marcum. What do you make of the OAU meeting itself? As I recall, of the 46 states there were 22 that had already recognized the MPLA when they came to the meeting; and there were some 22, I think, who had not. They had certainly not taken a position in favor of the MPLA. Two, Ethiopia and Uganda, I believe, is chairman of the OAU and host of the conference in Ethiopia, who really maintained neutrality.

Many people were surprised that, given the fact that almost half supported the MPLA, they were not able to get a resolution through recognizing the MPLA, or condemning South Africa. What lessons are to be learned from the conference? I mean, what did it really tell us in terms of understanding that situation now?

Mr. MARCUM. I think that one of the most significant things about the meeting was its display of a kind of self-protection, if you will, a desire to save and preserve a certain degree of African unity. The cost for going one way or another might have been the breakup of the organization. So, people didn't press that point.

You will recall before the meeting that the President of Guinea-Conakry indicated that if it didn't go for recognition of the MPLA, he might pull out of the organization. That did not happen. Though the organization did not solve the situation, it wasn't destroyed.

Second, I suppose it was quite clear to those supporting the MPLA position—and there was a lot of Cuban lobbying going on, too—that they would probably win militarily anyway. So, they didn't need to get their victory via diplomatic action. They could get it the other way.

Thirdly, it seems to me that the meeting reflected exactly the kind of divisiveness, the kind of fracturing impact that South Africa's intervention had brought about. As I think I mentioned earlier, there very likely would have been an African consensus against Soviet and Cuban involvement, even by those who were friends of the MPLA but who felt that the magnitude, the dimensions of Soviet and Cuban involvement were not justifiable. But South African intervention changed this. Underlying matters is South Africa's denial of the humanity of black people, that is denial to them of any participation in the central organs of government. When it came in, South Africa immediately split the organization. There were those that felt, nonetheless, that they would have to support the FNLA and UNITA. They were embarrassed. They were in a very difficult situation. They were, as Larry Henderson suggested, desperately looking for ways to save themselves, to make any alliances. Though they may have wished to hide it from themselves, it was clear what an impact the South African alliance had upon self-respect, as well as diplomacy.

So, when South Africa intervened, African unity became almost impossible to achieve, or to make functional. There was a great deal of quarreling, African leaders weren't sure what to do and they retreated, if you will, hoping that at another date they might be able to once again have some kind of collective impact. It is really testimony to the durability of Africa's regional association, putting that as a priority. But it also reflects weak functional aspects of that association at the same time—its vulnerability to external manipulations.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I think your papers and your responses are certainly helpful to this committee.

It seems to me you have studied the subject very carefully, and this is very useful for us.

GOVERNMENT NATIONAL UNITY

Mr. HENDERSON. Senator, I would like to say one word on national unity.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. HENDERSON. I believe that even more important than the question of government national unity in Luanda is the way in which the Luanda government, the MPLA government, works in the various regions. If they are able to incorporate within the regional government organizations people who have some respect from the population of the region, there will be a more effective kind of government national unity than simply having these people sit in Luanda who before the press can appear to represent the people.

Senator CLARK. Some kind of a federation?

Mr. HENDERSON. No, not necessarily. But for instance, when they appoint the government people in Huambo, or Bié, or wherever, if they are able to incorporate people from that area who enjoy some respect on the part of the people of that area because, I think it is still true, as far as most of the people in Angola are concerned, they really don't care too much what goes on in Luanda. I wouldn't imply that it is the same in this country, but in Angola they don't care too much about what goes on in the capital, they care what goes on in their own city or county.

Senator CLARK. I understand that.

Again, thank you very much.

Let me say, these hearings will resume at 10 o'clock Friday morning in room 5110. We are going to be hearing from Bishop Ralph Dodge, who was a bishop in the South African region of the Methodist Church; and we will hear from Assistant Secretary Bill Schaufele and the former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. Mulcahy. We will put some of the questions we have talked about here today to these gentlemen.

Thank you very much for coming, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, February 6, 1976.]

RESPONSES TO SENATOR BIDEN'S ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Do you have specific recommendations as to how U.S. policies can shift, even at this late date, from their fixation on Angola as a U.S.-Soviet problem to Angola as an African problem?

Question 2. Even if U.S. policies do shift toward more of an "African policy," the "other" U.S. policies—i.e., Gulf Oil, other corporations—will not, and will in any event continue to be seen by Africans to be part of U.S. policy. Specifically, how can the Congress get a better handle on such corporate entities?

Question 3. Angola is not Vietnam, yet there are disturbing similarities: (a) the problem cast in U.S.-Communism terms; (b) U.S. official ignorance of the local situation, and of the degree to which that local situation will be determinative; (c) reservations down the line, within the U.S. Government, are overridden by top U.S. policymakers; (d) the particular U.S. clients are the less able. Question: Is this not a fair assessment? Are there other lessons to be learned from our Vietnam experience which may—even now, at this later date—help us in Africa?

Question 4. Do you subscribe to the view that the MPLA by-and-large contains much more of Angola's trained administrative and technical people than do the other two competing groups? Please spell out.

Question 5. What do we know about present factions within the MPLA?

Question 6. In the event the MPLA were to win a more-or-less "victory" over most of Angola in coming weeks, what would you anticipate would be the attitudes and actions of the various principal leading elements within the MPLA toward the USSR? Toward any Soviet major efforts to extract a price—in commitments, base rights, etc.—from the MPLA?

Question 7. In the event the MPLA were to win . . . (as in No. 6 above), what would be the likely reactions with MPLA leadership to expressed U.S. interest in recognizing the MPLA?

Question 8. There are some reports now of behind-the-scenes informal talks among the three factors, looking forward to a possible coalition of elements, headed by the MPLA. Can you confirm such reports? If such talks do take place, what do you feel will be their likely outcome? Is there a generally shared wish for national unity among the three leadership groups—even under MPLA leadership?

Question 9. Do you anticipate that the USSR will make any more lasting and significant inroads in the life of Angola than it has in Egypt or Somalia? Why?

RESPONSE OF LAWRENCE W. HENDERSON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR BIDEN

I will not respond to questions 1, 2, and 3 since I believe that either in my statement or in the oral questions and answers I gave as much information or as valid opinions as I have at this time. However I would like to make some comments on or answer some of the other questions.

Answer 4. Regarding trained administrative or technical people in the competing political groups, I would not agree that MPLA contains "much more" of Angola's trained administrative and technical people. I am not aware of any studies that have been made upon which one could base a reliable conclusion on this matter. From my experience in Angola I would say that we could usefully divide available trained personnel into three categories: First and largest would be the minor functionaries who have worked in government bureaus, banks or other offices in the private sector. Second, persons with a university or other higher technical training who have excellent academic training but may or may not have had practical experience within Angola. Third, men with leadership experience in the Portuguese Army. And fourth, other persons who have had some leadership experience or have demonstrated leadership capacity who do not fall within one of the other two categories.

Since most of the large government offices were in Luanda and MPLA has its main strength there it is probably safe to say that MPLA does have a larger number of persons with considerable experience in government offices at the lower functionary level. At least it would be true that there would be more people with ten or twenty years of experience since Africans entered the lower echelons of the government bureaucracies much earlier in Luanda than they did in the other parts of Angola. In the second category MPLA probably has some advantage since more people from the Luanda area in the secondary schools were able to go on to university than in other areas. However, in the last few years a considerable number of FNLA and UNITA people have completed university outside of Angola and an increasing number were attending the various university faculties spread around within Angola. In the third category I would think that UNITA might have an edge. Since the population was larger in central Angola and in the draft all young men were called up to army service during the last 10 years there were increasing numbers of young people who had secondary school education in central Angola and consequently were able to move into the noncommissioned officer rank in the Portuguese Army. Some of these men, after completing their military service went into Portuguese administrative service and are now working with UNITA. In the fourth category I would like to mention some of the people who have been assuming significant responsibility even though they do not have what would be considered adequate academic credentials for even training in government office or the private sector. For example, Africans have been directing missions or mission stations for the past 10 years and this has involved administering schools and hospitals, handling funds, directing personnel and being responsive and responsible to large community organizations. As one example I had mentioned the director of the Chilesso Evangelical Mission who took over that responsibility when Jonas Savimbi's father Lotmalheiro was arrested. Pastor Mario only had a primary school education but for the past 7 or 8 years he has been directing the Chilesso mission in its multi-form operations. He is only one of many Pastors, teachers, nurses, agriculturalists who have shown considerable leadership ability.

A reluctance to speak about my own work or the work of the missions and churches has perhaps led me to leave out a significant factor in the question of trained leadership for Angola tomorrow. One of the reasons that the Portuguese government was so hostile to the Protestant churches in Angola was that these churches were democratic institutions. For 50 years churches have been operating a very extensive education system with local village schools and regional boarding schools, clinics, agricultural and literacy programs. In the

medical field for example in central Angola, the United Church of Christ and the United Church of Canada related to 7 hospitals. During the past 10 years only two resident missionary doctors have been serving these 7 hospitals. However, locally trained African paramedical personnel have been keeping these hospitals open and efficiently functioning. If given an opportunity and more resources they could continue to provide very valuable health services for the people of Central Angola.

Answer 7. I believe that MPLA will be interested in having relations with as many countries as possible including the U.S. Through the African American Institute MPLA has accepted scholarship aid for students, however, has chosen to send them to Tanzania rather than to have them come to the U.S. to study. However, this was part of the AAI's program so they were not demanding any special consideration.

Answer 8. I do not believe that MPLA will be open to a coalition government but may form what it will call a government of national unity. Which will simply mean that they will bring in a few people who have not been active MPLA supporters but who also have not been active in either of the other movements. However, as I expressed at the end of the oral hearings last Wednesday, I believe that as important as a coalition, or rather as a government of national unity in Luanda, is the way in which a victorious MPLA will use responsible local leadership in the various areas of Angola.

Our testimony, written and oral, did not reflect accurately the significant leadership role of women in Angola. Each party has its Women's Organization. Many women have become teachers and nurses in Angola in the past 10 years.

In central Angola women in the churches have been directing "Domestic Schools" which provide educational opportunities for girls who were not able to enter the official schools. This network of schools has had several thousand students each year.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA.
New York, N.Y., February 10, 1976.

MR. ROBERT BAETON,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BAETON: This is just a brief note to say that I did not have an opportunity to deal with the questions which had been submitted in writing by Senator Biden. There just wasn't time to do it before February 9th. If necessary I hope you can extend my apologies to Senator Biden.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE M. HOUSER,
Executive Director.

ANGOLA

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 5110, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark and Percy.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will please come to order.

Although I have an opening statement, I am going to delay that until we have heard from Senator Tunney who, of course, has taken a very important leadership role on this issue in the U.S. Senate in his amendment to the Defense Appropriation Act. Senator Tunney, please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN V. TUNNEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; ACCOMPANIED BY MARK MORAN AND BILL COUGHLIN, STAFF ASSISTANTS

Senator TUNNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I might just say that there is no one in the Senate that has done more to bring this issue of Angola before the American people in the Senate than you. I think that so much of what was done by you made the groundwork for the Congress rejection of the request of the executive branch for money to go into Angola.

If it had not been done by you, and by your staff, I personally do not think that it would have been possible to be successful on the amendment that we both offered to the defense appropriation bill.

Senator CLARK. That is kind of you.

Senator TUNNEY. I would like to just discuss a few items of Angola with you.

SENATOR TUNNEY STAFF VISITS TO AFRICA

As you may know, two of my staff aides, Mr. Bill Coughlin, who is on my right, and Mr. Mark Moran, just returned from Angola. They both discussed the Angolan situation in Lisbon with Portuguese officials and others who have been associated with Angola. Mr. Moran then spent 8 days in Luanda talking both with officials of the MPLA and with Russians who were there. He also had the opportunity to observe personally what was taking place in Luanda, including a survey of captured military equipment.

Mr. Coughlin traveled to Kinshasa where he met with Holden Roberto, of the FNLA, and had extensive discussions with high officials of the Zaire Government. From there, he went to Lusaka for talks with officials of the Zambian Government and flew into southern Angola for meetings with Jonas Savimbi, of UNITA. He also had the opportunity to observe the military scene on the ground in Silva Porto and Lobito. Mr. Coughlin, I might add, is a qualified military observer, not only as an exfighter pilot, but from having worked many years as a war correspondent in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Cyprus, and elsewhere; working as a foreign correspondent for the Los Angeles Times.

Mr. Coughlin, after his visit to Angola, continued on to Capetown for talks with high South African officials on the involvement of that country in Angola.

I would like to make a brief statement on the conclusions I have drawn from the information they have brought back and then you will have an opportunity, if you care, to question Mr. Moran and Mr. Coughlin, with me.

CROSSROADS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA

Today we stand at what might be called a crossroads of American foreign policy in Africa. A little more than 1 year ago this Nation entered a process of escalation in Angola that was eventually to lead to the active support of one nationalist faction over another, the expenditure of millions of American dollars, the tacit, if not explicit, support of South African intervention in the black African nations and the greatest foreign policy debate in the American Congress since the end of the Vietnam war.

TUNNEY AMENDMENT TO PROHIBIT U.S. FUNDS IN ANGOLA

Six weeks ago I offered an amendment with you to prohibit the use of American funds in Angola because I was concerned that this country had not learned the lesson of Vietnam, that it was repeating the mistakes that inexorably led us down the path to disaster in Southeast Asia.

Wars as often begin by the subtle process of miscalculation as by the single stroke of sudden aggression.

Both nations and men become the unwitting victims of the traps they set themselves. Our actions today set the patterns of our behavior tomorrow and all too often we may find that, in the words of Emerson, "Events are in the saddle, and fate rides mankind."

Angola may seem to be a small problem today. But it was a smaller problem 6 months ago. Had Congress not acted to stem the tide, I am sure it would not have looked so small 6 months from now.

EXTENT OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

One of the first things that struck me in the information that my aides brought back from Angola was the extent of the American involvement there. It has been much larger and much more pervasive than I previously realized or than the administration has acknowledged.

Both the Soviet and the United States had been supplying small arms to factions in Angola for some time, the Russians to the MPLA and the Americans to the FNLA.

Last January, the administration decided to provide \$300,000 to Holden Roberto and the FNLA. It encouraged the Zaire Government to military involvement in Angola.

Last October, President Mobutu called UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to Kinshasa with word that the Americans wanted to give him some direct help. Savimbi met at President Mobutu's home with an "American friend," who discussed the military situation, and told him that while no American troops would be coming, direct military aid would be funneled through Zaire to him. Dr. Savimbi says that his "American friend" did not identify himself and that he never saw him again but quantities of American arms and ammunition did begin arriving. So did 11 armored Panhard cars and the Zaire troops to man them.

In the north, Zaire committed four to five understrength battalions, numbering 1,200 to 1,500 men to fight alongside the FNLA.

South African troops who had occupied a border strip inside southern Angola in August, were by October 23 sending an expeditionary force north, not long after Savimbi's meeting with his American friend.

In December, when South Africa was wavering in its support, Savimbi flew to Lusaka to tell President Kaunda of Zambia that he intended to go himself to South Africa to talk with its highest officials about additional aid. Again, an "American friend" sat in on that planning meeting. And I might say that that meeting took place the day after the vote in the Senate to cut off aid to Angola.

Savimbi did fly to Pretoria and he did meet with South African officials and military leaders. At one point, his pleas for help brought him 22 armored cars and perhaps 150 men to man them.

All of this carefully orchestrated assistance to the FNLA and UNITA had its effect. Whereas the two pro-Western factions had been forced out of Luanda and into retreat in midyear, they were back on the offensive and threatened Luanda as Independence Day and the Portuguese withdrawal neared on November 11.

I might add that my aides found ample evidence of American involvement with the airlift of arms to Angola, with Americans taking part in the air and on the ground. Mr. Moran has the names of some of those Americans. Mr. Coughlin has talked with the man Dr. Savimbi describes as his "American adviser."

With the FNLA and UNITA holding most of the country and threatening Luanda in late October, the Cubans began a massive airlift of troops into the country. Sophisticated Soviet weapons—122-millimeter rockets, multiple launchers, helicopters, spotter aircraft, light and medium tanks, and finally, Mig jets began to arrive in quantity about the same time. Estimates of the amount of money the Soviets have poured into Angola vary. One generally accepted by the Western intelligence community places the amount at \$200 million. But of that some \$120 million is given as the cost of logistic equipment being \$80 million.

That figure also seems to credit Soviet equipment at its original cost while the accounting of American weapons is at surplus value

or about 15 to 20 percent of actual value. This accounting trick is making American dollars available for Angola go much further.

In addition, substantial funds and weapons from many countries seem to be flowing into pro-Western Angola coffers. Among the many items of captured equipment, Mr. Moran saw boxes of mortars with Israeli markings. There also were U.S. military weapons from Anniston, Ala., with the shipping tags still on the boxes, together with the name of the officer in Alabama responsible for the shipment and the name of the American officer in Kinshasa, Zaire, receiving it. Mr. Moran has also the dates of those shipments via a South Carolina airbase.

Other boxes carried such designations as "manufactured in Italy for the U.S. Navy," and "manufactured in West Germany for the U.S. Army."

UNITA sources in Lisbon told my investigators they were receiving funds from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, indicating that the United States had served as go-between on the deals. The amount from Saudi Arabia was \$50 million, coming, curiously enough, after the Senate amendment cutting off American covert aid.

There is a pattern here of American orchestration and American involvement that goes far beyond what the administration has admitted.

For Dr. Kissinger to tell this committee, as he did last week, that the administration had no foreknowledge of South African involvement, seems a little bit less than frank. It seems to me that there is semantic juggling of the actual facts in his statement. Who were those Americans who knew in advance about Jonas Savimbi's secret meetings with South Africa's highest officials?

What was the result of all this clandestine American effort? When MPLA forces, spearheaded by Cuban troops, went on the offensive in November and December, they sent FNLA and UNITA into retreat. Faced with Soviet tanks, rockets, and aircraft, Zaire and South African forces have withdrawn from the conflict.

Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi both told Mr. Coughlin they would be unable to continue to fight more than another 2 to 3 weeks—and that was more than a week ago. After that, they will have to go back into the bush as guerrilla fighters once again. The equatorial rainy season, blown bridges and land mines may slow the MPLA advance to the south but Dr. Savimbi has no illusions about how swiftly the end is coming.

Holden Roberto's FNLA already is pinned into a very narrow strip along the northern border with Zaire.

The war in Angola, then, beyond guerrilla fighting, is nearly over. Even the presence of fresh CIA-funded mercenaries cannot turn the tide with small arms against sophisticated Soviet weapons.

The United States cannot save a losing cause with money alone. We would have to supply aircraft, tanks, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, helicopters and other weapons. Who is to fly and operate them? There is no time for training programs, there are no allies ready to intervene with such equipment. We would have to send instructors and advisers, and in all probability, American troops in a pattern all too reminiscent of Vietnam.

If the Administration is prepared to ask for covert funds for an American expeditionary force to the west coast of Africa, I am sure that the Congress is not about to approve.

Must we then write off Angola? Perhaps, but I believe such a conclusion to be premature. A West-African Cuba is not inevitable.

U.S. POLICY BASED ON MISCONCEPTION

I believe that our policy toward Angola in general and the MPLA in particular has been based on a serious misconception. Angola must be defended, we are told, because a Marxist government there would affect the stability of all Africa, would be the seat of subversion for Zambia and Zaire, and would provide the Soviet Union the air and naval springboard by which to alter the strategic balance in the South Atlantic.

More importantly, we are told a Soviet victory in Angola would rend the very fabric of American credibility around the world.

But credibility is an argument based on pride, not policy. It can be self-defeating. With each successive incantation by administration spokesmen of the argument that our interests are inextricably bound to those of FNLA and UNITA, more and more of our allies around the world and our friends in Africa actually begin to believe that the fate of the United States and the steadfastness of her global commitments hinges on the fortunes of Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto.

Actually, American interests are not tied indistinguishably to any of the parties. The civil war in Angola is as much tribal and regional as ideological. The fact that one side or the other may have chosen to accept aid from anyone who was willing to offer it should not be taken as stark and incontrovertible testimony of subservience to some super power or commitment to a particular ideology.

In the first place, MPLA is not the monolithic Marxist force that some Americans see it to be. It is a force composed of many different groups, of various origins with various philosophies. There are the black military commanders—radical, but without an ideological focus. There are the Western educated moderates who appear to be in day-to-day operation of the government, and certainly there are Marxists as well.

From the moment of the arrival of my staff assistant, Mr. Moran, in Luanda the MPLA sought to clarify what they term the “serious misconceptions of Americans” about the nature of the policies pursued by their movement. In almost 4 hours of discussions during his first full day in Luanda, MPLA leaders including Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento, and Secretary of State Bentu Rubiero emphasized to Mr. Moran their interest in better economic relations with our country.

Both underlined their own desire for American investments and credits and described the role they felt the United States could play in helping build an independent and nonaligned Angola and in developing Angola's rich natural resources. Prime Minister Nascimento went to great lengths to explain to Mr. Moran that the MPLA was not opposed to either multinational corporations or to foreign investment, adding that he firmly believed mutually profitable arrangements could be worked out between his government and the American corporations.

Mr. Rubiero, in turn, pointed out that Angola had not asked Gulf Oil to leave Cabinda and had—even after independence—gone so far as to pay cash in advance to Boeing in order to obtain American passenger airplanes when they could have gotten better financial terms from the Russians.

Both added that the official American position, which they termed “intransigent” on dealings between the MPLA and Gulf and Boeing were shortsighted in that they produced greater reliance on the Soviet Union for high technology goods and foreign capital and made better relations with the United States difficult. At the end of Mr. Moran’s stay, a direct appeal was made by Dr. Lara—General Secretary of the MPLA party—to Mr. Moran for senatorial intercession on behalf of the MPLA in an effort, both to get the planes released and to convince the Department of State to allow Gulf to engage in face-to-face discussions with the MPLA who, Dr. Lara claimed, had sent six telegrams requesting such a meeting, all to no avail.

UNITED STATES/MPLA POLITICAL, PRIVATE CONTACTS

In the political sphere, the MPLA responded to Dr. Kissinger’s signal that the United States was not opposed to MPLA itself—only to Soviet and Cuban intervention—with incredulity. Producing a draft of the State Department’s memorandum, Mr. Rubiero said it was the general feeling of the MPLA leadership that the document underscored a strong anti-MPLA position, at least as far as the administration was concerned.

Questioned, however, about the prospects for better relations with the United States, Mr. Nascimento, Mr. Rubiero, and the Party General Secretary Lara all agreed that they would welcome greater contacts with the United States, both private and governmental, and that they themselves were willing to take concrete steps in that direction.

Dr. Lara pointed out that prior to independence, MPLA had good relations with U.S. consular officials in Luanda and that the consulate had not been closed at the suggestion of the MPLA. In fact, he stressed MPLA continued to provide security for some U.S. Government owned facilities in Angola and even permitted local American employees to perform their consular duties.

COALITION GOVERNMENT

On the question of a coalition government between MPLA and UNITA, MPLA was less specific. Both Dr. Lara and Mr. Nascimento ruled out the possibility of a joint leadership between Jonas Savimbi and President Neto and minimized the prospects of direct talks so long as South African troops remained in Angola. They did hold open the door to discussions once the South Africans withdrew and indicated that they realized certain elements of the UNITA structure would have to be incorporated into MPLA if MPLA was to achieve effective control over southern Angola.

MPLA EVENTUAL FOREIGN POLICY COURSE

The third area of particular concern to me and, I am sure, one of great concern to other Senators, as well as to those of us who have been actively involved in the Angola question, which I asked Mr.

Moran to pursue in depth with the leaders of the MPLA, was the question of the foreign policy course they would chart if MPLA eventually became the dominant political force in Angola.

According to Mr. Moran, two dominant themes emerged in his discussions with the Prime Minister, Dr. Lara, the Secretary of State, and the Defense Minister, Mr. Iko Carriera. The first was their expressed desire to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy with an emphasis on the mutuality of their interests with other members of the Organization of African Unity. While admitting that a special relationship with the Soviet Union would inevitably result from the assistance provided during the war, Prime Minister Nascimento stressed that friendship did not mean dependence. Even Dr. Lara pointed out the MPLA felt that super power conflicts were relevant to Angola except insofar as Angola's own security was affected. He said that Angola would be no one's "satellite."

A second thing that emerged in these discussions appeared to be a genuine concern on the part of some members of the MPLA leadership, particularly the moderates, over the possibility that MPLA was being forced into a position of even greater reliance on the Soviet Union and Cuba by virtue of American support for the other side and especially by what they felt was a clear unwillingness on the part of the United States to deal with them in any meaningful way. The Prime Minister and Defense Minister, as well as Mr. Joachim Lemos of the MPLA Foreign Ministry, criticized the descriptions of MPLA as Marxist and Communist. All pointed to the dangers involved for the United States in leaving MPLA no alternative but to deal only with the Soviet bloc. Both the Prime Minister and the leftist Dr. Lara referred to "the mistake of Cuba" in which in their view the United States forced Cuba into an even greater cycle of reliance upon the Soviet Union.

MPLA FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ZAMBIA, ZAIRE

On specific items of concern to the United States, the MPLA has some specific answers. Asked about future relations with Zambia and Zaire and particularly about the fears of instability that might result from an MPLA takeover in Angola, Prime Minister Nascimento and Defense Minister Carriera stated categorically, and Dr. Lara agreed, that any MPLA government would not engage in the exportation of revolution in Africa. Carriera pointed out that it had been the MPLA which had, in the first place, held the rebel Katangese at bay when they wanted to carry the Angola civil war into Zaire. Katangese residents in Angola were used, but only after the incursion of Zairewa regulars and then only in Angola.

MPLA RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

On relations with South Africa MPLA was less forthcoming. They openly admitted their hostility toward apartheid and said only that their policies would be guided by the OAU. On the other hand, Prime Minister Nascimento and Dr. Lara indicated clearly that MPLA was willing to discuss the question of the Cunene hydroelectric dam in southern Angola and that they believed a mutually advantageous arrangement could be worked out similar to the understanding that exists between South Africa and Mozambique.

REMOVAL OF SOVIET, CUBAN TROOPS

On the extremely important question of the removal of Soviet and Cuban troops, there was a general consensus that once the other foreign forces went, so too would the Soviet and Cuban combat forces. As to the specifics of the assurances MPLA was willing to provide to the United States concerning the extent or the timing of such a withdrawal, I think that this is something that must first be discussed with members of this committee and representatives of the Department of State. The same is true with regard to the question of the establishment of Soviet and Cuban bases, although I will say that Mr. Moran was given certain assurances to convey to the Government of the United States with regard to these as well.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

I want to thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your attention. Mr. Moran and Mr. Coughlin are drawing up a chronology of Angolan events and are writing a report on their mission to Angola. Those will be submitted to the subcommittee when they are completed.

[At the time of publication, the information referred to had not been received.]

And if there are any questions that you would care to ask Mr. Coughlin and Mr. Moran, they are here. And I would just like to point out, finally, that from my point of view, the expressions that were made to Mr. Moran, which I have just repeated, by MPLA officials to be delivered to the Senate, which I am now doing, do not necessarily mean that I subscribe to the sincerity of the expressions by the MPLA leaders.

I think they are interesting and they should be evaluated. The statements were made and were asked to be transmitted. I think that, however, it would be wise for some members of our Government to begin to enter into the kind of diplomatic dialog which, I think, is necessary in any determination as to sincerity of statements that are made by not only MPLA officials, but any foreign diplomats.

Senator CLARK. I think that is good advice. In fact, we are going to be dealing with that with our next witnesses in terms of that kind of diplomatic contact.

COMMENDATION OF SENATOR TUNNEY

I thought your statement was a very comprehensive one and, above all, valuable, because it produces and presents to this committee a good deal of new information that we have not had before. As you indicated, we will be glad to have the other supplementary material, or anything else that you think would be appropriate for the purposes of this committee.

I think that will be extremely valuable. Is there anything else, by way of either detail or summary, that any of the three of you would want to add?

Senator TUNNEY. I have nothing further.

Senator CLARK. All right.

I hope, in view of your leadership and your interest, and the fact that these two staff members have traveled to Angola and through much of southern Africa, that we might call on them from time to time for further detail and further information.

Thank you very much.

Senator TUNNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. I have a brief statement; then we will hear from Mr. Mulcahy and Mr. Schaufele, if they would come up. Following their testimony, we are going to hear from Bishop Ralph Dodge.

As soon as we have order, I have a brief opening statement, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CLARK

During the course of these hearings, administration witnesses have testified on United States policy toward Angola as part of our global foreign policy. The Secretary of State discussed last week Angola as it affects the United States-Soviet relations. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, earlier this week, testified on American strategic interest in Angola.

Today, we will discuss the United States-Angola policy as it affects our future relations with Angola, our policy toward southern Africa, and our relations with Africa in general with those responsible for United States-African policy, Assistant Secretary William Schaufele and Deputy Assistant Secretary Edward Mulcahy.

What are the United States options in Angola at this time? It seems clear to us that the administration's goal of achieving a military stalemate is no longer a meaningful option. Unless the United States is prepared to send troops and advisers—and they have said they are not—or to strongly assist the South African troops to reenter Angola in large numbers—which also seems very unrealistic—it seems doubtful that achieving a stalemate is a very meaningful option.

One option that has been mentioned is to make the victory for the Soviet-backed faction as expensive as possible. Professor Gouré mentioned that as one of several possible options. That is not necessarily recommending them.

Now this can be done by continuing to send military assistance to the FNLA and UNITA and encouraging them to wage guerrilla warfare as the MPLA attempts to form a new government. But this would come as a tragic loss to our new found friends in Angola, I think. It would increase the serious economic pressure on Zambia and Zaire, both of whom are in very great difficulty already, and it would perpetuate the MPLA's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba for military assistance.

In my own judgment, the United States has only one real option in Angola, to begin serious dialog with the MPLA. Our communications with the strongest faction in Angola should be based not on threats and protest, but on our mutual interest and the interest of Africa. The United States and MPLA share a common interest in continued trade and investment and in many other areas. The MPLA has repeatedly stated that it wants Gulf Oil to return and operate its wells in Angola, that it wants the sale of Boeing aircraft negotiated originally with the Portuguese colonial government to go through to their government.

If Angola needs economic assistance to alleviate poverty or the lack of medical facilities, and absence of educational opportunities resulting from the Portuguese colonial rule, Congress has already provided for an assistance fund for that purpose.

The United States and the MPLA also have a common interest in future peace and stability in Angola and in southern Africa. And this could be the basis for discussions on how representatives of all Angola's population groups and regions could be brought into that government. The United States should, at the same time, make every effort to help ease tensions between Angola and her neighbors, Zaire and Zambia.

Finally, the United States and MPLA have a mutual interest in Angola's nonalignment. We can encourage this by demonstrating a desire to have good relations with the future government of Angola; by helping to resolve internal conflicts, and by helping to ease tensions between Angola and her neighbors. Or we can make nonalignment impossible by refusing to deal with the MPLA government, denying it the U.S. trade and investment and providing military assistance to internal factions and neighboring countries.

Just as the United States must now make a new beginning in its Angola policy, it must also make a new beginning in its southern Africa policy. In Angola and Mozambique, we made the mistake of assuming that Portuguese colonial rule could last for an indefinite future. While the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba were helping in the liberation struggle, we were not even communicating with most of the liberation movements; but instead were providing economic and military assistance to the dictatorship in Portugal.

We must not make the same mistakes in our policy toward Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. We must recognize that the course of history is on the side of those struggling against racial domination and minority rule. As the Communist powers continue their assistance to the liberation movements, we must take a hard look at our own relations with these movements and what we can do to further the cause of freedom in southern Africa.

We must prevent another Angola, if at all possible. We should not ignore liberation movements until independence is imminent and then back one faction simply because its opponent is backed by the Soviet Union. Angola poses an even more immediate problem for our southern Africa policy; 4,000 to 5,000 South African troops are now in southern Angola, according to the Defense Minister of South Africa. Up to this point the United States, to my knowledge, has never singled out the South African intervention in Angola for criticism, although we have often singled out the Cubans and the advisers from the Soviet Union. Yet, as one African Foreign Minister told me earlier this week, this intervention is for Africa a far greater problem than the presence of Cuban troops.

South Africa's military power surpasses that of any bordering African State. A spokesman pointed out, "Africa cannot tolerate South African military intervention into an African Continent. If this goes unchallenged, there will be more trouble in the future."

Now having lived with the domino theories for some time, we should be able to understand this concern. We cannot afford to be associated with South Africa's efforts to preserve the status quo in southern

Africa. We cannot afford not to protest the presence of South African troops in southern Angola.

Finally, the United States should, in the wake of Angola, make a new beginning in its Africa policy. Our preoccupation with the Soviets and what the Soviets are doing in Africa only hurt our relations with the African states. We need to recognize that all of the states strive for nonalignment. We need to respect their independence, their desire to do what they believe is right for their country in foreign and domestic policy, not what we believe is in their best interest. We need to work with them in the fields of economic development, trade and investment; and we need to support their efforts in the Organization of African Unity to reach negotiated settlements of conflicts on the continent, rather than fueling those conflicts with military assistance. If we seek to establish constructive relations with all the nations of Africa, if we encourage African unity rather than divisiveness and if we come to terms with what the Southern Africa problem means in the light of their own commitment to human rights and racial equality, our cold war interests in Africa may very well take care of themselves.

We would like to hear from the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Mr. William Schauffele, who is accompanied by the Deputy Assistant, Mr. Mulcahy. Do you have a statement?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Yes; I do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Proceed in any way you think appropriate.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. SCHAUFFELE, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD W. MULCAHY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Mr. Chairman, when Secretary Kissinger met with you and your distinguished colleagues on January 29th he asked you to look at what is happening in Angola in its larger global context. He discussed the implications of Moscow's effort to obtain a position of special influence in central Africa through military intervention by Cuban proxy. There is little that I can say either to add to or detract from this global analysis of what Angola means in the context of our future relations with the U.S.S.R.

What I would like therefore to do today is to examine the African dimension of this conflict in greater detail.

DEVELOPMENT FROM AFRICAN TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

At the risk of boring you with some history, I would like to convey our perception of how the Angolan conflict developed from being an African to being an international problem.

As you know, a part of our basic policy for many years in Africa has been to do what we could to insulate that continent from great power conflicts. We have sought to avoid confrontation except when it was forced upon us. In the case of the Soviet and Cuban thrust into Angola, we feel that the confrontation was forced upon us.

SOVIET, UNITED STATES ATTITUDES TOWARD MPLA

Within a purely African context, we are not opposed to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. In fact, before our consulate officers left Luanda last November, they had more contact with representatives of the MPLA than with the other two political movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA. What we oppose is the MPLA's effort, as a minority political movement, to impose itself as the Government of Angola, with the help of Soviet arms and a Cuban proxy army, on the majority in Angola.

A few words will perhaps help us understand why the U.S.S.R. and Cuba should be prepared to underwrite a minority political movement thousands of miles from home. According to a Soviet handbook, "Africa Today," published in 1962, the MPLA was founded in 1956 "on the initiative of the Communist Party and the allied Party of Joint Struggle of the Africans of Angola," a clandestine, anti-Portuguese organization. This was a period of growing Soviet interest in Africa where the process of decolonialization was unfolding and Moscow evidently saw opportunities to implant its influence in place of the departing metropole powers. There are obvious parallels between Soviet efforts to move in on the Congo after independence in 1960 and Moscow's behavior in Angola today.

In that case, the Soviets worked through the Belgian Communist Party and their own central committee apparatus concerned with relations with foreign Communists. This time Moscow worked through the Portuguese Communist Party, following the overthrow of the Caetano regime and the temporary ascendancy in Portugal of a radical military leadership with close ties to the Communists.

In 1964 the MPLA began to receive financial and military assistance through Portuguese Communist Party leaders. Moscow had previously financed another MPLA leader, Chipenda, who now is allied with the FNLA. Moscow slackened its aid in the early 1970's when the MPLA was in the middle of one of its periodic power struggles but at a time when the "national liberation" struggle against Portugal was still in full swing. When the Soviets decided to renew full-scale assistance to the MPLA in 1974, this was no contribution to "national liberation" with independence around the corner. It was a cynical move for political power after Portugal had already agreed to Angolan independence.

Based on my 17 years of work with Africa, I am convinced that the Africans could have worked out some consensus agreement bringing the factions together in Angola if they had been left to themselves. It was the Soviet decision, in my judgment, to step up arms aid to what it apparently regarded as an organization in which it had influence, which destroyed Portugal's effort through the Alvor agreement of January 1975 to establish a provisional coalition government embracing the three factions. With the prospect of being a minority partner in a postindependence government, and the promise of Soviet arms, the MPLA had no incentive to compromise.

It was precisely this sort of lack of restraint in pursuit of unilateral advantage in a situation of opportunity which the U.S.S.R. and this country solemnly agreed to avoid in the Declaration of Principles which they signed in May 1972 in Moscow.

To argue that the Soviet and Cuban intervention represented a response to action taken by this government, by Zaire or by South Africa ignores the facts and the chronology. I would suggest this line of argument begs the question of our unwillingness to face our responsibilities as they only power in the world able, if willing, to protect weaker nations from Soviet intervention in their domestic political quarrels.

CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS LEADING TO U.S. ASSISTANCE TO FNLA, UNITA

A succinct chronology of events in Angola that led up to our decision to provide assistance to the FNLA and UNITA forces and subsequent developments should make perfectly clear that our actions were reactive to those of the Soviet Union and Cuba, independent of those of South Africa, and designed to achieve a military situation which would promote a government of national unity composed of all three factions.

The Soviet Union began extensive rearming of the MPLA, then based in Congo-Brazzaville, in October 1974. Previous to this, we had rejected requests to provide military support to the FNLA. The Soviet arms shipments continued up through the January 1975 independence talks among the Portuguese and the three liberation movements which culminated in the Alvor Accord.

In January 1975 we provided funds to the FNLA for political purposes, reflecting our judgment that the FNLA was at a disadvantage operating in Luanda, an MPLA dominated city. This sum was to be doled out over many months and was insignificant compared to Moscow's military aid.

During the skirmishes between the FNLA and MPLA in February, and the major battles of March and April, we noticed an increasing tendency on the part of the MPLA forces to ignore the cease-fires called for by the leaders of all three movements and to act independently to achieve their maximum military goals. From March through May, not only did the quantity of the Soviet and Communist bloc arms flow increase, reflecting delivery decisions taken several months earlier, but the nature of the weaponry escalated as well, with quantities of large mortars and several armored vehicles showing up inside Angola by May.

MPLA intrasigence increased along with the Soviet aid in June and July, and on June 9, the MPLA drove the FNLA and UNITA completely out of Luanda, thereby destroying even the pretext of a coalition government. After separate pleas from Zambia and Zaire, each of which saw their security threatened by the specter of a Soviet supported MPLA, we reversed our earlier decision not to provide military support to any faction and on June 18 we authorized the use of covert funds for the FNLA and UNITA forces. Our goal was to strengthen the two movements sufficiently to preserve a military balance and thereby encourage the establishment of a compromise coalition government. We hoped at the same time to signal the seriousness of our concern by this decision to the Soviets and allow them to scale down their intervention without open confrontation.

After our decision was made, but before any U.S. assistance could become apparent, the first Cuban forces arrived in Angola in August as part of an arrangement among the Soviet Union, the MPLA, and

Cuba to enable the MPLA to extend its military control over all of the nation.

It was at about this same time that South African forces occupied several damsites inside Angola that are connected with a joint Portuguese-South African hydroelectric project in Angola and Namibia. Later, probably in late September, the South Africans apparently decided to intervene militarily in the conflict. We had nothing to do with their decision, were not consulted, and were not aware of their involvement in the fighting until after their entry. Large numbers of Cuban forces, including combat units, arrived in Angola almost simultaneously with the South Africans. This coincidence, plus reports from Cuban prisoners taken in Angola, indicates that the Cuban decision to intervene with combat forces was made, and forces dispatched, before the South Africans undertook their own intervention.

Commencing in late October, there was again a marked increase in the quantity and sophistication of the Soviet weapons, with tanks, rockets, and a large number of armored vehicles pouring in to be manned by the Cuban forces. This escalation has continued until now, except for a halt of some 2 weeks from December 9 to 25 when the Soviet Government may have been reevaluating its position in the light of ever firmer U.S. military and diplomatic signals which the Secretary has already outlined to you. However, the vote of this body on December 19 provided a general indication to everyone that U.S. ability and unwillingness to provide assistance was highly questionable.

At this point the FNLA had been driven back to the northern corner of its previously held territory and UNITA forces are still strongly resisting the MPLA advance in the south even with reduced resources and against over 11,000 well trained and equipped Cuban troops. Savimbi has said that he will carry on the battle against the MPLA again from the bush if he cannot get any outside assistance.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION

Our African friends—and even some which are not so friendly—are acutely aware of the implications for their security of Soviet and Cuban intervention including a massive expeditionary force in Africa. After all, there are few developing countries which do not have to deal with radical internal factions which would be quite capable of calling upon the U.S.S.R. to assist them in the name of “proletarian internationalism.”

Even some of our critics are visibly disturbed by the turn of events in Angola. The weekly magazine, *Jeune Afrique*, which is usually quite critical of the United States, sharply attacked the MPLA in its January 30 edition for allowing itself to become a pawn on the Soviet international chessboard stating that it did “not believe that the MPLA, very much a minority movement, politically and ethnically, was able to govern all of Angola alone or to preserve the independence of the country.”

In its issue a week earlier the *Jeune Afrique* editorial, which also criticized U.S. policy said: “The strategy of the MPLA that we cannot support is the monopolization of power on the very day of independence, at the predictable, therefore accepted, price of a civil war by a minority and Communist political party, with massive military

and human assistance from far-off foreign places, except ideologically, against all the neighboring countries. It is absolutely without precedent and one cannot see how it can succeed or, in addition, how it can be defended."

The Nigerian Herald complained on January 30 of the uncritical view then taken of Soviet activity in Africa. It argued that if Angola were to go Socialist, it should not be by force of arms. There are many other examples I could cite of public support for our position, not the least of which was the article in the New Republic, reprinted in the Washington Star last Sunday, by Colin Legum, a highly respected authority on Africa, often critical of our African policy.

I can tell you frankly from my meetings with five chiefs of state during my visit to Africa in December, and from numerous reports from our Ambassadors, that the 22 countries which followed existing OAU policy to recognize no faction during the summit of the Organization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa this past January, are watching closely to see whether the United States will be prepared to support its friends in Africa, or whether they should now adjust their policies to what they conceive of as new realities.

No one questions our power, but certainly many leaders around the world, friends, critics, and adversaries, question whether we still have the will to use our power in defense of what appears to them as obvious American—not merely African—interests. As one distinguished African leader expressed it to our Ambassador, it is ironic that when half of Africa is for once actively looking to the United States for support and leadership, the U.S. Government has its hands tied and cannot respond. Pleas to do something can be heard from all corners of Africa.

In the first place, of course, it is the countries neighboring the Communist military buildup in Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, namely, Zaire, Zambia, and Gabon, which are particularly concerned for their security. In supporting the FNLA and UNITA, and the idea of a coalition government, Zaire and Zambia wish to insure that Angola, which controls an important outlet for their economies, the Benguela Railroad, is run by a sovereign African government which is not dependent on foreign powers who pursue their own special interests in central and southern Africa.

We are told that we are overreacting, that the Africans will never be Communists and we should not worry about what the Soviets are doing. This argument misses the whole point of Moscow's strategy in less-developed areas like Africa. When the Soviets speak about changing the "correlation of forces" in the world, they are talking about extending their influence in countries where it has not been strong before, and conversely neutralizing Western influence in countries where it was previously dominant. It is true that Moscow claims to see this as a long, slow process growing out of internal social and other conflicts. It also believes, however, that Communist countries having a certain role to play as "midwives of progress" assisting leftist forces in each country.

We know well from other Soviet press articles this year, that the FNLA and UNITA forces are what the upside-down Soviet lexicon calls "reactionaries" and "splitters." The same sort of language was used to describe the vast majority of the Czech people when they also resisted Soviet efforts to impose a minority Soviet-style democracy.

Angola is an illustration of how the U.S.S.R. now feels it can behave in one of these conflict situations in Africa. The issue here is not merely one of principle: Real democracy versus totalitarianism—something which used to concern American liberals. But it is also a basic question of how social change is to come about in the developing world. We and the Soviets can both agree that many changes are needed, and we also thought we had agreed to use mutual restraint and avoid trying to take unilateral advantage of each other in future conflict situations, but certainly, the sending of a 12,000-man Cuban army to Angola to promote “progressive” social change is a curious form of restraint.

Now we are hearing from various MPLA leaders, reputedly the more moderate ones, that they have no intention of selling out to the Russians—that they will respect our economic interests—that they want to have close relations with us, et cetera. I would simply note that these statements come at a time of divisive internal debate in the United States and when the MPLA feels sure it will win the conflict, but is aware of other African concern about the foreign presence. No one knows exactly what will happen in Angola. But it is reasonable to assume that countries with an expeditionary force in place are in the best position to call the shots.

Some say that African nationalism will take care of the Russians and the Cubans and cite countries where excessive Soviet influence has been eliminated.

But there is no precedent in Africa for a government of a newly independent African state which owes its very existence to the Soviet Union. Certainly the fact that the Soviet Union was permitted to mount such a massive intervention from neighboring Congo-Brazzaville would not indicate that its influence has seriously diminished in the 10 years it has had a privileged position there.

Certainly the fact that there are some 3,300 Soviet military and civilian advisers in certain African States would not indicate that this influence is diminishing. Certainly the fact that Soviet military assistance deliveries have been three times their delivery of economic assistance is a clear indication of what they really seek in Africa.

I will not pretend to predict in what category an MPLA government might fall, except to note that with the obligations it will have incurred it may become one of the most dependent African governments on the continent.

This dependence and Soviet-Cuban ambitions in Africa lead me to question whether we will be seeing any early departure of this foreign army. I hope I am wrong.

Only now are many Americans and Africans beginning to see the implications of the presence of 12,000 Cubans in Angola. When the Cuban Deputy Prime Minister announced during the OAU summit meeting that Cuba would continue to send its troops to Angola as long as Neto wanted them, the Daily Mail of Lusaka exploded at this arrogant insistence that Cuba “would continue to send troops to Angola to kill Africans whether the OAU liked it or not.”

I tell you very frankly, as one who has spent many years in Africa and with Africans, and who has also spent the equivalent of many days talking to African leaders of different viewpoints about the Angolan problem, I am very concerned. I believe that we had a good chance

in the fall to persuade the Soviets that they would have to choose between the priorities of détente and their self-assumed role as champion of national liberation in central and southern Africa. But we never had the opportunity to find out.

On the ground in Angola the lack of sophisticated military equipment in quantities sufficient to handle Soviet rockets, tanks, and now planes has placed the FNLA and UNITA forces in an increasingly desperate situation. Further recognitions of the MPLA flow directly from this deteriorating military situation and the belief that the United States will not provide the response to balance Soviet-Cuban intervention.

The results are too easily predictable. Two groups representing a majority of Angolans are prevented from their rightful participation in the government of an independent nation because of outside intervention and the inability of the United States adequately to respond.

Moscow and Havana may see themselves shortly in a position to pursue their ambitions elsewhere under the dangerously mistaken notion that in succeeding once they can succeed again.

In the post-Angolan atmosphere of insecurity and disillusionment with the lack of U.S. support, the states neighboring Angola, Zaire, and Zambia, would be under great pressure to seek an accommodation disadvantageous to them or see their vital exit to the ocean threatened.

Other African States would adjust to the realities of power so vividly demonstrated in Angola by the Soviet airlift and the Cuban expeditionary force.

Those Soviet officials who pushed this "national liberation" struggle on the heels of Vietnam will have been proven right. Indeed the sweeping returns in Africa from involvement in a single internal power struggle can only encourage similar adventures elsewhere.

And in the last analysis, we risk bringing on other confrontations in the future under conditions less advantageous to us and more dangerous to us.

I share what I think is your wish, Mr. Chairman, that such problems could be resolved without the use of arms, that Africans be allowed to solve their own problems, that the United States not get involved in internal politics in Africa or elsewhere, that our attention be devoted to peaceful and successful evolution in Africa. But it takes two to tango, and while we are gyrating on the floor, the Soviet Union has taken somebody down the garden path. The African attitude based on its perception of Soviet power, will make it even more difficult for Africans to realize their own legitimate aspirations without outside interference.

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN REGARDING FUTURE SOVIET INTERVENTIONS

At this juncture, if the Congress is determined not to provide the wherewithal successfully to resist this Soviet-Cuban effort to establish their influence by force in this part of Africa, I believe it is imperative that Members of this Congress express their deep concern about the possibility that either of these two countries might engage in similar adventures elsewhere. To my knowledge, that concern which I know exists has not surfaced in any public hearings in which I have participated. In fact, the debate has largely been directed at U.S. in-

vovement. Second, I urge that you seriously consider what the United States can and should do to counter the effects of our unwillingness to meet our responsibilities in Angola, on our relationships in Africa, and on the security of our friends there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

I was interested in your comment: "To my knowledge that concern"—Soviet expansion—"which I know exists, has not surfaced in any public hearings in which I have participated."

I am under the impression that there is a good deal of discussion about that at these hearings. I know that you have participated at the opening with Secretary Kissinger when he expressed himself very strongly, and I think he was the only witness that day. On the second day of hearings, we heard from Deputy Assistant Secretary Ellsworth, who, I think, spoke in that direction very strongly; and the same day, Professors Shulman and Gouré, and today you. I am not sure there has not been more discussion on that side of the issue than there has on the other.

Or have you not participated in those?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. That is true in that sense, Mr. Chairman. What I was speaking of is the interest of the Members of Congress, as opposed to the statements by the administration.

Senator CLARK. Or nongovernmental witnesses?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. Right.

Senator CLARK. Let me say, in case there is any doubt about that, and I can only speak for myself in that regard of course, but I do not have any illusions at all about the nature of Soviet intentions, at least I do not think I do. I do not consider myself a Pollyanna on that issue for a moment. I think that the Soviet interest in Africa is real. I think their intentions are not good, from the point of view of either this country or southern Africa, or Africa generally. But their intentions, it seems to me, are not necessarily what they always achieve. I think that is where the issue really strikes one with the other.

I have no feeling at all that the Soviet Union has sent \$200 million into southern Africa or encouraged to work with the Cuban Government to send 12,000 troops, to use your figure, into Africa with great and good intentions. I do not believe that for a moment.

Let me go back over your testimony concerning four or five points, and then I have some questions, if I may. Mr. Mulcahy, I hope you will come in at any time you have something to add. I know you were very much in the policymaking part of our Government, at the earlier stages, before Mr. Schaufele was appointed Assistant Secretary.

I would like to just call your attention to various things that you have said and ask you further about them.

EVEN-HANDED POLICY TOWARD LIBERATION GROUPS

You said "within a purely African context, we are not opposed to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. In fact, before our consulate officers left Launda last November, they had more contact with representatives of the MPLA than with the other two political movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and... (UNITA)".

Now that would seem to imply that maybe we are taking a very even-handed policy here. We have more contacts with the MPLA than we do with the FNLA or UNITA. But in point of fact, we had already escalated our own commitment there, at least three times in support of the other two movements. According to all the press reports, and according to your statement, we put \$300,000 in early in the year on one side, the FNLA; we made greater commitments, according to press reports, which I believe are true, in July and then at least a couple of more times before November.

You do not mean to imply by that statement that we were following any kind of even-handed policy between the three movements, do you, in terms of our support?

MR. SCHAUFFELE. No. Beyond that statement is the support which the United States had already expressed for the Alvor Accord, and even the fact that we had hoped, during all this period, that the transitional government, comprising all three movements, would hold together or be put back together. And we had our consulate in Luanda until November and we had contacts with all three movements until two movements were expelled and we continued our contacts with the MPLA. It was all based on our hope for some kind of a coalition that would either be put back together or continue to exist.

Senator CLARK. I have several questions regarding that which we will go into later. What we did do in fact was to support the idea of the Alvor Agreement in the early stages. I do want to say that I met with your consulate in Launda in August, and I agree with you. I think you did an excellent job there. I think he represented this government with distinction, and I thought that he was most objective and most capable.

U.S. POLICY INCONSISTENCY

In the next sentence you say we are not really opposed to the MPLA as such, but "What we oppose is the MPLA's effort as a minority political movement," I do not want to sound facetious, but it seems to me that this government has had very little trouble supporting minority regimes in other parts of the world. I mean we supported the overthrow of the elected government of Chile and continue to support it.

What is this principle? I keep hearing this principle applying to Angola that we cannot support a minority political movement. Is Korea a majority political movement? Do our activities in Chile indicate that? Is this a new principle of American foreign policy?

MR. SCHAUFFELE. The principle in this particular case: we are looking at a situation in Angola and whatever might be our policy elsewhere, or whatever others may perceive as our policy elsewhere, I think the point is that the MPLA was a minority movement.

Senator CLARK. Sure.

MR. SCHAUFFELE. And is a minority movement.

And for instance, from my own experience, it is that in Africa, particularly perhaps as opposed to some other areas of the world, the consensus system has been the most successful system in establishing governments in independent Africa. The prospect that I see of a minority movement coming to power by force is one which is, in African terms, not one which has generally been the practice or one which is likely to establish the stability in that country which you spoke of earlier.

Senator CLARK. I could not agree with you more. I think the principle is well taken.

It just seems to me that it is rather inconsistent to argue that—I mean we did help a minority government in Chile come to power by force. If we are only going to apply that principle to Africa as a new State Department policy, then, that is fine. But it does seem to me that—I do not use the word hypocrisy in any terrible sense—but it seems to me that if it is good enough for Angola, it ought to be good enough for Chile.

I feel very strongly that when the Kennedy amendment is proposed a week from now on the floor, to cut off assistance to that minority regime in Chile, that the State Department is going to oppose the Kennedy amendment. They are going to say we have to support this government in Chile. I just think it is a little inconsistent that, on the one hand, we can give covert activity to overthrow governments that are freely elected on one continent, and say on the other hand, that one of our principal motives for going into Angola is to prevent a minority regime from coming to power by force.

And I happen to agree with that principle. I think that the Soviet Union and Cuba and their interference in helping the MPLA as a minority government to come to power is despicable. I think it is equally despicable in Chile.

ESTIMATED LEVELS OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE BEFORE JANUARY 1975

Let us keep going here. I think this is very important. I am glad you went through the chronology because I think so much depends upon the correct sequence of events there.

A succinct chronology of events in Angola that led up to our decision to provide assistance to the FNLA and UNITA forces and subsequent developments should make perfectly clear—and I want to emphasize these points—that our actions were reactive to those of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

You go on to talk about how equipment was brought in in October of 1974 by the Soviet Union in the Congo-Brazzaville, and then later talk about the fact that we, too, had put money in somewhat later, in January, some \$300,000.

My question is this: What were the estimated levels—obviously you do not know precisely—of Soviet armaments or assistance to the MPLA prior to the time we put money in, prior to January 1975?

Mr. MULCAHY. Mr. Chairman, I think our figures are not wholly accurate insofar as the early part of Soviet assistance to MPLA was delivered to them in the form of equipment and training in the Republic of the Congo, where, as you may recall, we closed our diplomatic establishment in 1966, and has not yet reopened.

But on the basis of our best estimates, we believe that MPLA had an armed force of approximately 3,500 at the time of the coup in Portugal, and the end of the fighting in Angola.

Senator CLARK. Now wait, that would have been April 25, 1974?

Mr. MULCAHY. Yes. And through that figure, I think that figure continued fairly stable through the summer of 1974.

After the Alvor Accords, the MPLA units who had been, up to that time, chiefly in the Congo, arrived on the mainland of Angola and numbered, in the January to February period, something like 5,000.

Obviously they had been built up in the meantime. They arrived, according to U.S. Government observation, with a very large supply of new Soviet-provided equipment.

Sometime in the months between January and late spring, May or June, they apparently recruited the 4,000 Katanganese gendarmes who had been previously used by the Portuguese.

Senator CLARK. You say by May or June?

Mr. MULCAHY. In the springtime. We are not exactly sure whether they came as a body or whether they were gradually recruited.

But certainly by the middle of the year, roughly June, they had added these 4,000 Katanganese gendarmes to their armed forces. By July, after the fairly liberal inflow of further Soviet weapons, these we learned about, I must say, chiefly through the Portuguese—these were weapons landed on beaches.

Senator CLARK. I wonder if we could go back to my original question? We are going to have a chance to go into the question of July and post-July and so forth, which I think is important to have on the record. But my question had to do with the magnitude of Soviet involvement prior to the Alvor Agreement. What is your best estimate as to what that was?

Your statement says the Soviet Union began extensive rearming of the MPLA, then based in Congo-Brazzaville in October 1974.

Now most of the testimony we have had—I do not question, I am just asking for evidence of it—most of the testimony we have had from every source have talked about a buildup in March and April of 1975. There have been vague references made before about something in late 1974. But let us try to get those a little bit more specific.

What are the best evidences of 1974, what are the estimates?

Mr. MULCAHY. I have just been reminded by one of my colleagues that our official estimate in January, in January 1975, was that MPLA's force had grown from the previously mentioned 3,600 to approximately 6,000.

Senator CLARK. That is not my question. I do want to come to the MPLA and its relationships to the other movements. What I am talking about is "The Soviet Union began extensive rearming of the MPLA," not how big was the MPLA force itself, which could be due to a lot of factors. Did you observe armaments being delivered in Brazzaville? Do you have estimates of how much the Soviet Union put in? You see it seems to me important if we are going to say clearly, as you did in your statement that we are reacting to Soviet action. What is the Soviet action?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. We do not have the exact statistics. We can try to get them.

I think what we saw, Mr. Chairman, was enough arms going in to, in effect, double the size of the MPLA armed forces.

Senator CLARK. So that the doubling is entirely due to Soviet intervention?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. I thought it had to do with bringing in the Katanganese.

Mr. SCHAUFLE. No, I am talking about—the Katanganese recruitment came later. But that was post-Alvor Agreement.

Senator CLARK. So you do not have any broad or wide estimates?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. We can probably get some figures. I do not have them with me.

[The information referred to follows:]

SOVIET ARMS AID TO MPLA BEFORE JANUARY 1975

(Supplied by Department of State)

From the mid-1960s to 1972, the MPLA was the recipient of a steady stream of Soviet-bloc supplied weapons. From 1972 to mid-1974, there was some drop-off in Soviet aid and as a result of the factional feuding within the MPLA. In August 1974, after the Portuguese had made clear their intent to grant independence to Angola, the Soviets began to step-up arms shipments to the MPLA. At that time, the Soviets began delivering the first consignment of a \$6 million shipment of military supplies to African liberation movements through Dar es Salaam. There is no evidence that a significant amount of military equipment later reached the Rhodesian or South African liberation movements, the only liberation movements other than the MPLA for which the equipment could have been intended. Moreover, Dar es Salaam had previously served—and continued to serve—as an important transit point for the shipment of Soviet and bloc equipment to the MPLA. By October or November 1974, the MPLA also was receiving military supplies via the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and the Congo (B). In December 1974, some 250 MPLA cadre were sent to the Soviet Union for military training. Further, from the arrival of the MPLA delegation in Luanda in November 1974, it was obvious they suffered no lack of funds to propagandize and organize their political backing.

We do not have the exact quantities of arms delivered to the MPLA in this period, but we know they were sufficient to equip a 5,000-7,000 man MPLA force by January 1975 (up from perhaps 1,500 in August 1974, exclusive of Chipenda's units), as well as provide thousands of AK-47s to the amorphous "People's Power" in the Luanda ghettos. These latter arms were first used in the fighting in Luanda in November 1974 between MPLA and FNLA.

Senator CLARK. I think it would be important to get them.

CHINESE, ZAIRIAN 1974 ASSISTANCE TO FNLA

Now let us look at this point because, as you say, it is very important that you look at the chronology carefully. I was curious concerning the fact that you do not put in the fact that the Chinese or the Zairians were in in 1974. What are your estimates as to how much the FNLA was receiving from China and from Zaire in this period? Is it conceivable that the Soviets could have been reacting to Zairian and Chinese supply to their enemy force, the FNLA?

Mr. MULCAHY. Sir, we are not aware that the Chinese provided very large quantities of weapons to the FNLA. They did have a military training mission, which they made available to them in training camps, chiefly in Zaire. And I am afraid we do not have any accurate figures on the actual extent of Chinese equipment provided.

Senator CLARK. You do not have any estimates of the volume of Chinese military assistance?

Mr. MULCAHY. I do not, sir. If we can find that out, I will be glad to submit it for the record.

Senator CLARK. Good.

[The information referred to follows:]

CHINESE INVOLVEMENT WITH FNLA AND UNITA

(Supplied by Department of State)

FNLA President Holden Roberto visited Peking in December 1973. Agreement was apparently reached for the People's Republic of China (PRC) to train and equip FNLA insurgents based in Zaire. Between May 1974 and October 1975, a

group of Chinese military instructors trained an estimated 5,000 FNLA troops and equipped them with small arms (AK-47 rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and light mortars). The Chinese military instructors were withdrawn in October 1975 after the PRC's Minister of Foreign Affairs had publicly signalled at the UN in September Peking's intention to disengage from the Angola conflict.

The Chinese also provided UNITA with limited financial assistance and limited quantities of small arms during the same period. Prior to 1972, the Chinese had made occasional financial contributions to UNITA and trained several of UNITA's cadre.

Senator CLARK. Certainly the Chinese were putting equipment into FNLA—we had testimony from Prof. John Marcum, the day before yesterday, on the volumes. I do not know what those were based upon. There is no question in anybody's mind that the Chinese were not only training, but also putting military equipment into the FNLA as early as the Soviets were—as early as October, which is the first cited Soviet involvement in your testimony.

Now what about Zaire? They were certainly putting in a pretty good amount of military equipment, at least as early as, or certainly earlier than the October 1974, were they not?

Mr. MULCAHY. Yes. I think Zaire's record of assistance to the FNLA goes back, of course, many, many years. And I daresay the bulk of the support, both financial and material, that FNLA received was from Zairian sources.

Senator CLARK. As I understand your testimony, neither of you would be prepared to argue that the Soviet shipment of armaments to the MPLA was greater than that which had been supplied by Zaire and China combined. You do not have the figures or the impression that one is any larger than the other, or do you?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. Well, I cannot speak from any statistical knowledge. I would say this, though, about—Zaire had been the normal supplier to the FNLA in the past, and I do know that the Chinese theory, if you want to call it that, in dealing with liberation movements is not to provide any significant amounts of military assistance: First, because they lack it; and second, because I think they honestly believe that what their role is in the liberation movements is training, is first to win their own battles.

Senator CLARK. Just so the chronology is complete then, what we really see is not Soviet involvement in October 1974, but rather a very long involvement on the part of Zaire and a rather long involvement, indeed, on the part of the Soviet Union to some extent in the MPLA; Chinese involvement in terms of training people in Zaire and FNLA troops; and then some \$300,000 for the FNLA beginning in January and spreading over a period of time. That would be the correct chronology, would it not?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. By and large, yes, sir.

FNLA, MPLA TROOP SIZES

Senator CLARK. I am interested, Mr. Mulcahy, in these troop sizes, how the Soviets built up the MPLA army from, I think you said your staff had indicated, from 3,600 at the time of the Portuguese revolution in early 1974, all the way to 6,000 by the time of the Alvor Agreement in January 1975.

What was the size of the FNLA at that point?

Mr. MULCAHY. My recollection is subject to check here, Mr. Chairman, about 8,000.

Senator CLARK. About 8,000, so the FNLA, even after the Soviet build-up, was one-third larger? My mathematics is 'bad'—2,000 larger than—one-fourth larger than the MPLA army.

Mr. MULCAHY. That is correct.

FNLA EXPULSION OF MPLA FROM AREAS NORTH OF LUANDA

Senator CLARK. Is it true, as Prof. John Marcum testified here the day before yesterday, that the FNLA drove the MPLA out of all but two northern provinces of Angola in February or at least March and April 1975?

Mr. MULCAHY. That was never an area, Mr. Chairman, that I was conscious of the MPLA ever occupying or being present in any strength.

Senator CLARK. The MPLA?

Mr. MULCAHY. In the two northern provinces, I do not believe that the MPLA ever was present there, in any large numbers. This is clarification, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. We are being joined, I see, by Mr. Ed Fugit, are you not?

Mr. MULCAHY. Mr. Fugit, as you know, Mr. Chairman, was stationed in Angola at our consulate in Luanda during most of this time, and is now Officer in Charge of Angolan affairs at the Department.

Might I ask Mr. Fugit to clarify this one, sir?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

My question, Mr. Fugit, is did the FNLA expel the MPLA from any of the areas north of Luanda?

Mr. FUGIT. Yes, sir. In June, after the MPLA succeeded in eliminating FNLA forces from the outskirts of Luanda, FNLA retaliated by kicking out the small MPLA detachments that are in the two northern provinces. At this time in Angola, every village and town in the country had two groups; 2 or 3, sometimes 10 troops from each liberation movement.

And the FNLA took this opportunity to liberate their two provinces.

Senator CLARK. My question really dealt with a little earlier period.

I am speaking of the period in Mr. Marcum's testimony. I believe. His testimony was that the FNLA had expelled the MPLA from the area north of Luanda in March and April; in other words, before they were expelled by the MPLA from the Luanda area.

What is your judgment of that?

Mr. FUGIT. I believe it was the first week in June. I do not have the records with me, but I believe it was then.

Senator CLARK. So you are saying, as a reaction to the MPLA actions against the FNLA in Luanda, rather than an earlier action?

Mr. FUGIT. Yes. I do not remember the dates, but I do remember the chronology of what happened sequentially; and it was reactive to being expelled from the suburbs of Luanda.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH SOUTH AFRICA
GOVERNMENT

Senator CLARK. In your statement Mr. Schaufele, speaking of the South Africans you say: "We had nothing to do with their decision, were not consulted and were not aware of their involvement in the fighting until after their entry."

My question deals with a slightly different period, after that entry. Is it not true that we had a regular exchange of intelligence information with the South African government as to their troop movements in Angola?

Mr. MULCAHY. Sir, the statement on the record, as it stands, is quite true. Once the military activities started, we were able to keep abreast of it, both by our own observations and by the routine exchange of intelligence, which we have had with the South African government as, of course, is the case with many other governments in Africa.

Senator CLARK. So we could not say we had no contact with South Africa. We had regular contact, a regular exchange of information with that government, at least as to their troop movements, where they were, what they were doing, that sort of thing.

Mr. MULCAHY. I might say, sir, having seen what came in through that channel, that it was really quite scanty, very general.

Senator CLARK. But it had to do with their troop movements?

Mr. MULCAHY. Yes. Generally; yes, where they had been in contact. I do not think that we were ever informed of the exact strength of the South African force, or the types of equipment it used, or any details of their actual military arrangements with UNITA or with the FNLA forces who were fighting in the south.

Senator CLARK. OK.

RUSSIAN, CUBAN PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AS RESULT OF ANGOLA

Turning to another point in your testimony, Mr. Schaufele, and this is a point I am sure we could both argue all day, so I will try to limit my comments on it. You make quite a case about the suspicion of Russian and Cuban presence in southern Africa as a result of Angola. And I could not agree with you more about that. You cite, for example, from the Nigerian Herald which complained on January 30 of the uncritical view then taken of Soviet activity in Africa. It argued that if Angola were to go Socialist, it should not be by force of arms and so forth. It seems to me that is the very point that those of us who voted against additional American aid were trying to make: that indeed, the suspicion by Africans of Soviet expansion in Africa would give its own reward. That is, the expansionism would be its own reward.

The Nigerians are the best example. They took all kinds of assistance at the time of their revolution from the Soviet Union. They did not become a Soviet satellite. It seems to me that, as you said, the OAU meeting itself is a good indication of that. At least half the people who

went to the OAU, I think one less than half, had already committed to the MPLA, and there was at least one other, Ethiopia, who was simply waiting until after the meeting. Yet they did not sanction the MPLA. They did not approve the MPLA. They did nothing to help the MPLA, and the Soviet sponsored faction.

It seems to me that this rather proves what we have been trying to say; namely, that there is enormous suspicion of the Russians. Their history of expansionism in Africa is most unsuccessful precisely because of that. If we become involved, particularly on the side of South Africa, it would only make it possible for them to succeed in this, where they otherwise are not going to succeed.

I would like your reaction.

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I would make two points there, Mr. Chairman. I do not accept the analogy with Nigeria. Nigeria was a strong, independent country that was confronted with a civil war in a small part of its country, relatively small, but agreed, a bloody war; but nevertheless, a relatively small part. There was no question in anybody's mind about Nigerian independence, about its ability to govern itself. And I do not think there was any danger perceived by anybody that Russian assistance to Nigeria would result in Russian domination.

Nor do I accept the argument, for instance, that people make about Ghana. The Peoples' Party established an independent government. They made a conscious decision to have close relations with the Soviet Union, but I do not think they ever lost their independence.

AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE LOSS BECAUSE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. Who has? Can you name a country in Africa that has lost their independence because of this kind of Soviet involvement?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. No; I will not name a country because I am not sure about relationships of a couple of countries with the Soviet Union, and I think I mentioned in my statement the concern I have about the influence of the Soviet Union in the Congo. But in this case, we are talking about a government which is not even established, and which essentially depends on the Soviet Union to establish itself, even against the other two movements, if they were not to receive any aid. If the MPLA were to establish itself as a government, it would do so with Soviet assistance.

Second, your argument, although I think it is an attractive one, and I think it has some validity, is the argument that history will take care of itself. And that is a valid argument in some cases. But I am not convinced of it in this particular case.

Senator CLARK. All right.

AFRICAN RECOGNITION OF MPLA

You also say:

As one distinguished African leader expressed it to our Ambassador, it is ironic that when half of Africa is for once actively looking to the United States for support and leadership—the U.S. Government has its hands tied and cannot respond. Pleas to “do something” can be heard from all corners of Africa.

I wonder about this. My impression is that slightly more than half of Africa has already recognized the MPLA. Am I accurate there?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Yes; that is correct.

AFRICAN PLEAS FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. Is it your position here that the other half want the United States to be actively involved in supplying military equipment to Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I would not necessarily phrase it in such explicit terms because the African leaders who talk to us phrase it differently, depending upon their own perceptions of the situation.

I would say that the countries, by and large, which have not recognized the MPLA, and some which have, are concerned about this and that they have expressed to us their concerns that we are not able to react to this Soviet intervention.

U.S. REACTION TO SOVIET INTERVENTION

Senator CLARK. Let us talk about reacting.

It is clear from your statement throughout that we ought to react. What should we do? We now have \$200 million—or more, I suppose, by now—in Soviet equipment. We have 400, I think it has been estimated, Russian advisors, we have 12,000 Cuban troops you told us this morning.

What should we do?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. We are in a much more difficult position.

Senator CLARK. I guess we are. I presume you are talking about the future and not just about the past.

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. If we had had the means in the past we might have been in a situation, which I tried to indicate in my statement, where the problem could have been solved. The situation now is one in which—as the Secretary indicated in his testimony—the United States is still considering its options, and is still considering whether to come back to this Congress for overt assistance. And that is a definite possibility.

So all I could say at this point is that I think it is incumbent on the U.S. Government to indicate, to show to its friends in Africa and people who are concerned about the situation in Angola, that our ability and willingness to help has not been destroyed. And also, I think it is incumbent upon us to try to help meet some of the security needs of the people most directly concerned—and I use the word security in a large sense, not just in a military sense.

Senator CLARK. So your testimony here today is really in condemnation of past congressional actions. You are not prepared to answer the pleas of these African governments with any—

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. We are formulating our positions now, and we obviously will be back in touch with the Congress on this particular matter.

POSSIBILITY OF U.S. TROOP, ADVISER, MONETARY INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. So you certainly have not ruled out the possibility. Obviously, if we are going to overcome the kind of description that I have just made of the Soviet and Cuban involvement—I assume you agree with Secretary Ellsworth who testified here earlier that it is going to take a good deal more than money to offset this present kind

of involvement, with \$100 million or something like that. It is going to take troops and advisers, is it not?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Let us put it this way: I agree with the Secretary of State who said it is going to take more money than we asked for in December.

Senator CLARK. So you say it might be done with money?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I do not exclude that.

Senator CLARK. You do not exclude that.

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Because I know there is no way we are going to send troops to Angola.

OFFSETTING SOVIET-CUBAN INVOLVEMENT WITH ADDITIONAL MONEY

Senator CLARK. Do you think it is entirely possible that the UNITA forces and the FNLA, as presently constructed, could offset the Soviet-Cuban involvement with some additional money?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I have been struck, over the last 10 days or 2 weeks, by the ability of UNITA to resist advances by better-armed, better-trained soldiers, even with the few resources at their command.

Senator CLARK. So you do not look upon the military situation in Angola at the moment as being desperate in any case?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I think that they find themselves in a desperate situation because they do not know how to replenish whatever arms or ammunition they need. I would still note, however, that 50 percent of the country is occupied primarily by UNITA and some FNLA forces.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SPEECH IN SAN FRANCISCO

Senator CLARK. I did want to call your attention to one statement of the Secretary of State's speech, day before yesterday, I think, in San Francisco. I will read it to you because the Secretary specifically asked, when he testified here, that this be deleted from his testimony because he no longer stood behind it. I will read it to you—and I see it got back into the San Francisco speech.

He refers to the fact that Congress had been regularly consulted on secret activities, and he says, "We sought, in these briefings, to determine the wishes of Congress, and there was little sign of active opposition to our carefully limited operations."

I remember specifically that that was on the first page of his testimony before this committee a week ago yesterday, and he asked that it be deleted. I hope you point that out to the speechwriters in the State Department.

Let us go on to the questions. I just wanted to talk first about some of your testimony.

STATISTICS CONCERNING FNLA, MPLA TROOP SIZE

I must say, Mr. Mulcahy, that the figures that you give for the MPLA army and the FNLA army are very different from those of Mr. Marcum. I advise you to look at his testimony and make any comments on that that you may.

He testified that the FNLA was about 20,000 and the MPLA, in January, was around 3,000. I would appreciate any statistical information that your records would show on that subject.

Mr. MULCAHY. We will obtain that.
[The information referred to follows:]

JANUARY 1975 STRENGTH OF LIBERATION ARMIES

(Supplied by Department of State)

Our estimates of the strength of the Angolan Liberation Armies were complicated by the lack of first-hand information and the natural tendency of movement leaders to exaggerate the size of their forces. Our best estimates put MPLA's actual armed troop strength between 5,000-7,000 (excluding any of Chipenda's forces). FNLA had, we believe, 5,000-6,000 trained and armed troops. UNITA had, at most, 2,000 at the same time. To these totals must be added "irregulars" or other troops in training; MPLA was reported to have armed several thousand untrained followers in Luanda's slums and had several thousand more in training in Angola and Congo (B), while FNLA had about 5,000 troops in training in Zaire and UNITA was beginning a campaign to mobilize their mass of popular support into a larger military force.

Senator CLARK. Professor Marcum, I thought, raised several rather good questions, and some of these are paraphrased from his testimony and added to from mine. But I would like to ask you two or three of these.

U.S. ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIPARTITE GOVERNMENT

Did the American government advise the Soviets in March and April that it was prepared to guarantee that the MPLA, led by Mr. Neto, and not simply the FNLA, would remain a part of the tripartite transitional government?

I think you need some background on this. The thrust of Mr. Marcum's testimony is that in fact, the MPLA may have been reacting to an effort on the part of Zaire, and to a lesser degree China, to establish the FNLA as the Government of Angola, and that in that fear they may have simply been reacting to them.

Now my question is, were we ever in contact with the Soviet Union that their sponsored faction was indeed, from our point of view, to be included in a tripartite government?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I am not sure that there was ever specific contact on this specific subject. I am not sure it was even necessary.

The United States supported the Alvor Accord; the United States supported the subsequent African efforts in Mombasa and Nacaroa to reestablish that accord. I think our position was always clear.

Senator CLARK. As you know, it is one thing to pronounce a position and it is another thing to actively pursue it.

Is there any evidence that we actively pursued establishment of a tripartite government? What evidence is there that we were really pushing hard for a full coalition government in the first 3 months prior to the Soviet build-up.

Were we really working with the OAU? Were we really working with the African governments to get a true coalition government as we have advocated so strongly in the last 2 or 3 months?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I understand your question, Mr. Chairman.

You pose the dilemma which people who are sincerely and deeply interested in Africa often pose to themselves. And that is, at what point does a great power get into an African process?

We could say that the African efforts were legitimate efforts and that they were being pursued, and we quietly told people that we sup-

ported it. But for us to get involved in some kind of an active and pressurizing way, I do not think would have been productive.

Senator CLARK. We certainly did very soon after.

Mr. SCHAUFLE. Yes, as soon as the conflict became clearly international, yes.

Senator CLARK. Would we have put \$300,000 in even prior to that?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. Well, I know that you and some others make a great deal of the \$300,000, but this type of assistance is the type of assistance that is generally known about in a clandestine way as a continuation of an existing situation, which I am sure our adversaries knew about. And I do not think that one can draw from this conclusion that we were actively engaged in trying to effect, directly, the African efforts that were going on.

Senator CLARK. When you say that it was a continuation of earlier efforts, in fact the earlier efforts were at a level of about \$10,000 a year, and this was \$300,000. Is that really just a continuation of the past?

Admittedly it is a small amount of money in absolute terms. Did you understand the question?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I do not know what the earlier figures were, but I would point out two things here.

In the first place, it is not money which, as you know, is handed out in a lump sum. Secondly, in view of our past help, we thought it was a logical sum to give as the FNLA organized its political base now in an independent Angola as opposed to what it had organized in Zaire.

Senator CLARK. I think my point was that you were saying we felt very strongly as a superpower that we ought to leave these African affairs in the Alvor Agreement to the Africans. I was still making the point that even \$300,000 is not leaving it to the Africans. It means that we are trying quietly to have some effect on the outcome of the African situation—I mean, to the degree that \$300,000 can affect it, we were trying to affect it.

Mr. SCHAUFLE. That is true, but we are talking two questions. Magnitude, which in this case was not very much, and secondly, a continuous situation of whatever assistance we were giving was also at least matched by assistance to the other groups. So in effect, there was a balancing.

UNITED STATES SILENCE REGARDING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. Now, a very important question in my judgment.

You have said that the Soviets went in and rearmed the MPLA in October of 1974. You and the Secretary have testified that the Soviets came in rather heavily in March and April of 1975, but there was a continuous flow of Soviet equipment all through the summer and the fall, right down to the present time almost, from what you have said.

Why did the Secretary of State, who feels so strongly on this issue, and why does the State Department, who has made an enormous issue of the Soviet involvement there in the period after—about November, I think late in November, whenever the Detroit speech was—why did the Secretary of State never, apparently, from all the testimony we

have had, once make this clear to the Soviet Union, either privately or publicly throughout that yearlong effort?

It was more than a year of silent Soviet involvement, and we made no issue of it at all with the Soviet Union. Why not at an early stage when we had some opportunity diplomatically, either through public or private pressure, to stop this escalation before the Cubans got in, before the South Africans got in?

Why in the world did we think that we dare not raise this question with the Soviets? To me this seems the greatest unanswered question.

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I think that when one looks and perceives things from this point in history, it looks somewhat different perhaps than it did at the time. We have the perspective of time now which we did not have then.

The Soviet Union reinitiated its arms assistance to the MPLA in November, which we observed and watched, and then the Alvor Accord was signed—as far as we knew, by everybody—with the intention of observing the Alvor Accords. We can probably understand the desire of all three movements to try to balance themselves militarily because they saw a protracted period of political jockeying and maneuvering as they set out to do what had been agreed to in the Alvor Accords.

Therefore, we were not unduly concerned at that time.

Senator CLARK. What time are you speaking of now?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. January.

We had seen the Soviet assistance, but there had been an agreement which had been some time in coming, and so we were willing to, in effect, then watch the working out of what was agreed to in the Alvor Accords. It was not until March or April, in effect, that it became quite clear that there was not going to be, if possible, an observance of the Alvor Accords, and that is when the massive Soviet assistance came in.

I cannot speak from personal knowledge of that time, but I can imagine very well—having dealt with the Soviet Union and with others under the circumstances—that the Soviets were already on the ground in force, not necessarily in numbers of people, but in influence, and that the Soviets do not respond to diplomatic pressure unless there is something behind it, and I can only assume—

Senator CLARK. You mean something militarily behind it?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. Militarily or economically or something of that nature. So, I can only assume that the U.S. attitudes at that point was finally decided in July to help get something on the ground in order to initiate some kind of a dialog with the Soviet Union on the subject.

Senator CLARK. I think that is consistent with what we have been told, but it really does not, it seems to me, answer the question very well. Can you give me the date of the Detroit speech?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. November 24.

Senator CLARK. November 24, for the first time the Secretary of State speaks out to the Soviet Union and puts it on the line. It talks about their aggression, their expansion, and all quite accurately, and yet he had known for a year of that involvement and a heavy buildup as you have testified as early as March and April, months ahead of that, and a steady buildup all through the summer and all through the fall of Soviet equipment, and, yet, we did not feel that we could even go to the Soviet Ambassador or the Soviet Union and say, quit it, stop,

you are putting détente on the line; you are all the things we have said since. It seems to me that by October or November and the Detroit speech, it was almost too late. The escalation had gotten so far out of line by this time. The Cubans were in; the South Africans were in. There was at least \$150 million in Soviet equipment. We, ourselves, are in and have escalated two or three times.

I just cannot accept the idea that there is no way you can talk to the Soviet Union except through countermilitary force.

It seems to me that there are other areas of discussion, and, indeed, we never did counter the Soviet Union in military force there before we started talking very loudly. It just leaves me cold to believe we could not have made any diplomatic overtures to the Soviet Union, private or public—and I am not going to ask you to comment on Nat Davis and his position. It has been publicly stated that he wanted to go public on this issue as early as the summer, but I can tell you that this subcommittee, I know. I know that Senator Biden and I, and I think others, met with the Secretary of State and suggested that action as early as July, and the record will certainly show this, and Mr. Mulcahy was there, and we met with Mr. Sisco later in the fall. He suggested the same action, and we were told we just simply did not have the bargaining chips—very much it seems to me the same thing that you are saying—to talk with the Soviet Union.

We have talked very loudly since, and we do not have the bargaining chips. I think if there has been one great mistake in the Angolan situation, it is the unwillingness to raise the question with the Soviet Union soon enough to have made a difference in the joint escalation. It seems to me that it is all well and good to say that because on December 19, the Senate voted to cut off \$9 million, that that was a signal to the Soviets that we did not have the will to stay. It seems to me that there was a much greater chance that, as they continued to pour equipment in in March and April and May and June and July and August and September and October, without any reaction from the United States, not any reaction, it was an open invitation to continue escalation.

You look like you want to comment.

Mr. SCHAUFEELE. I would only say two things, Mr. Chairman. The first public warning to the Soviet Union was apparently delivered by the Secretary in September at the dinner which he gave for the African representatives of the United States.

On the other hand, following one of your other thoughts, when we did have the chips on the ground and opened our discussions with the Soviet Union—that is a process which takes time, I know from my own experience—and we thought that there had been some progress.

Senator CLARK. I misunderstood your point.

Mr. SCHAUFEELE. We thought that there had been some possible progress.

Senator CLARK. In December?

Mr. SCHAUFEELE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Well, of course, I am talking about the period before the great escalation.

Mr. SCHAUFEELE. We realize that.

Senator CLARK. Senator Percy, any time you are ready.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

COMMENDATION OF SECRETARY SCHAUFLELE

Secretary Schaufele, I would first like to tell you I am extraordinarily sorry not to have been here earlier in the hearing. I enjoyed my work with you so much at the United Nations. I found it a great pleasure to work with you, and I am looking forward to working with you as a member of the African subcommittee in your new capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa.

I am delighted you are in this job, and I just want to put on the record the fact that a number of African delegates at the United Nations, as well as ambassadors right here in Washington, have told me how very pleased, indeed, they are that you are taking up this assignment.

I was up at the Lockheed hearings which Senator Church and I are conducting, so I could not get down earlier, but as I understand it Senator Clark has pursued, as carefully and thoughtfully as need be done, the history of the involvement by the Soviet Union, so I will try not to get into those areas. If I do duplicate any questions, just say so. I would rather read the record than have you go through it again.

It is generally believed that you had a very successful trip to Africa before the OAU summit, and that you represented America's concern about the MPLA very effectively.

AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR MPLA

Since the African nations are divided equally on the question of Angola at the summit, I wondered how strongly held the positions were on both sides. Could you comment—not mentioning the names of specific countries, if you feel that you cannot or should not—but could you comment as to whether the support for the MPLA was firm among all the 22 countries which took a pro-MPLA position?

MR. SCHAUFLELE. No, sir. I do not think it was firm.

SENATOR PERCY. I asked you this because, as you and I know as former U.N. delegates, many times a nation will cast a vote but not make any statement on the issue. If you ask the delegates if they feel strongly, they may say, no, we did not even like the resolution, but we voted for it in the name of African solidarity.

Were there countries that just sort of went along and did not have real conviction about what they were doing?

MR. SCHAUFLELE. If I could speak, perhaps, of several categories of countries that voted for the MPLA, that might, perhaps, clarify the issue.

There were those countries, as you know, that recognized the MPLA immediately in Africa, and they have strong traditional or ideological ties with the MPLA. There was another group of countries that came along somewhat later, in large part because of the South African intervention, but who, nevertheless, had a more open attitude toward eventual negotiated settlement among the three factions, and then there was the third group which had moved over to recognition of the MPLA very shortly before the summit, who, from all indications, responded to pressures from their African colleagues, and did not take a strong stand at the summit, so far as we know, and, although they could not obviously recant on their recognition, were much more open to compromise than some of the others.

So that I think that there was a group represented among those who recognized the MPLA who would have been happy to find some compromise.

Senator PERCY. Did you sense among the countries which did not favor a pro-MPLA position, that they were, in fact, opposed primarily to the Soviet and Cuban intervention?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Yes; although they equally condemned the South African intervention. They felt that by and large that it had been triggered by the increasing Soviet-Cuban intervention, and they were concerned about the long-range implications of Soviet intervention because they have seen the Soviets try it other times.

AFRICAN STATES' IMPACT ON PRESENT, FUTURE ANGOLAN SITUATION

Senator PERCY. Can the African states, themselves, in your judgment, have any real impact on the present or future situation in Angola? If so, what can they do?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I think they can. You mean, under the present circumstances?

Senator PERCY. Yes. We have the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of Zaire in Washington now. I am sure that is a question that he is pondering.

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I think if those countries who support the MPLA, or at least some of those countries, can use their influence with the MPLA to point out that the Soviet-Cuban presence is a serious detriment to the future relationships in that part of the world, that they can exert influence on the MPLA to reduce or eliminate its dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba.

The unfortunate thing is that one immediately delves into the problem of do you make your compromise after a military victory or before a military victory.

U.S. OBJECTIONS TO UNITA HIRING OF MERCENARIES

Senator PERCY. It is believed that American and other mercenaries are being hired by UNITA to fight against the MPLA. executive branch witnesses have said that U.S. money has reached UNITA, but UNITA decides how it will be spent. Can we assume that the United States has no objection to UNITA hiring American and other mercenaries?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. We certainly have objection to their hiring Americans because recruiting American mercenaries in the United States is illegal, and, as far as we know, there are not any.

Senator PERCY. And, yet, we have advertisements in the Washington Post for mercenaries. I pointed these stories out to Secretary Kissinger when he testified. I do not think he had seen them: Such offers as \$1,500 a month, and see the world.

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. The results of the investigation which I have seen so far do not indicate—there were earlier reports, as you recall, about the recruiting of mercenaries in California and Florida. As far as I know, these investigations have shown that, have not shown that there has been any such recruitment.

Now, the recruitment advertisements here in Washington I am not quite clear about, and we have not heard anything from the Department of Justice on this particular score.

It seems to be directed toward paramedical people, at least one advertisement which I saw, as opposed to mercenaries, to engage in combat, and I frankly do not know what that legal position is. I see no signs that anybody has ever gone, and I do not know whether there has been any report of the so-called paramedical personnel going to Angola.

STOPPING U.S. MERCENARIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF LAW

Senator PERCY. Does the United States in any way seek to stop Americans from going to Angola if they know that they are going there, or believe that they are going there as mercenaries in contravention of law?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. We would if we knew it.

Senator PERCY. Do we take any steps to try to insure it in view of the newspaper stories and the media accounts of this, and the questions in these hearings on that subject?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I can only assume that the Department of Justice and the FBI is taking whatever steps are necessary to insure that they do not.

STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNING MERCENARIES

Senator PERCY. Does the State Department have any responsibility in this matter?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. No, sir. The legal responsibility does not lie with the State Department, although when we hear about it, if only we hear about it, we inform the Department of Justice.

LAW CONCERNING U.S. CITIZENS FIGHTING UNDER FOREIGN FLAGS

Senator PERCY. Could you reiterate, again, for the record what the provisions of law are in the United States regarding U.S. citizens and resident aliens who go abroad to fight under foreign flags?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I am not sure that I can with any exactness. As I understand it, by and large the U.S. law prohibits the recruitment of U.S. residents and citizens for military action, for military service in a foreign government. I am not exactly clear on that, Senator, but I think that a priori, it is assumed that recruitment in this particular case, if it were to take place, would be illegal.

Now, when I was dealing with the Congo, it was clear that the hiring of mercenaries for a foreign government was illegal, and whether that should be broadened, or is broadened, under law to include any kind of service in a combatant status, I am not exactly clear.

CUBAN RESIDENTS OF UNITED STATES FIGHTING IN ANGOLA

Senator PERCY. Miami papers have actually carried reports of the recruiting of Cubans to be mercenaries in Angola. Are any Cuban residents of the United States fighting in Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Not to my knowledge.

Senator PERCY. If any Cubans from Florida are fighting for UNITA or the FNLA in Angola, if it is determined that they are—even in a private, unofficial capacity—they may be fighting Castro's Cubans. Thus, we may have kind of a Bay of Pigs shaping up in Angola. How

many Florida-based Cubans do you estimate are in Angola already, or en route, or are preparing to go? Has there ever been any attempt to estimate or surveil that?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I am not aware that there are any.

Mr. MULCAHY. Senator, on this one we referred this matter to the FBI, and, as you know, it rattled around in the press for a few days. Shortly after the story broke, I would say within a week, one journalist did a real delving operation in the Miami area, and found that there was absolutely no mercenary recruiting going on, that the initial story was more of a hoax.

STATE DEPARTMENT OBJECTIONS TO RECRUITMENT OF CUBANS

Senator PERCY. Does the State Department have objection then to the recruiting of Cubans in this country for combat in Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. Yes, sir.

CIA INVOLVEMENT IN RECRUITING, TRAINING, SENDING CUBANS TO ANGOLA

Senator PERCY. Does the CIA have any role in recruiting, training, or sending Cubans to Angola to your knowledge?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. None, sir, to my knowledge.

Senator PERCY. I want to thank you very much, indeed. Mr. Secretary, would it be possible for you to stay for a few more minutes? What is your time schedule?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I am giving a lunch at 12:30.

Senator PERCY. All right, I have a few questions that Senator Clark left with me and I would like to put them to you in the few minutes that remain until you have to leave.

CONTINUING WITHOUT SPECIFIC CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION

First of all, funds for covert involvement in Angola: the Tunney amendment blocked only the funds in the Defense appropriations bill from use for activities in Angola. Are there other funds available for this purpose? If so, does the administration intend to use them to continue operations on Angola without specific congressional authorization for that purpose?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I am not aware that there are any funds existing for that purpose. My own assumption would be that even if there were that, given the opinion of Congress, it would be very difficult for us to use them.

MAKING SOVIET-BACKED VICTORY EXPENSIVE AS POSSIBLE

Senator PERCY. Dr. Leon Gouré testified that one alternative the United States had in Angola was to provide military assistance for continued resistance in the south in order to make the victory for the Soviet-backed faction as expensive as possible. Is this alternative being seriously considered?

Mr. SCHAUFLE. I would put it this way, Senator, that the only alternative we are seriously considering now is coming back to ask for overt funds.

OVERT U.S. ASSISTANCE AFFECT ON ZAIRE, ZAMBIA

Senator PERCY. Would not such a policy hurt Zaire and Zambia by perpetuating the conflict that has kept the Banguela Railroad closed?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. The Banguela Railroad is going to be closed for a while anyway because so many bridges have been blown up. Certainly, Zaire and Zambia, if they were to support that kind of movement, would have to take into consideration that particular problem, and it all depends, I suppose, in a sense, on whether the guerrilla operations might take place.

The only authentic guerrilla operation which existed before the independence of Angola was largely the UNITA forces, which operated wholly within Angola, and I do not think ever operated that far north, to my knowledge, to the Banguelan Railroad. They did cross the Banguelan Railroad.

OVERT U.S. ASSISTANCE AFFECT ON MPLA SOVIET-CUBAN DEPENDENCE

Senator PERCY. Would it not perpetuate MPLA dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba for defense?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I did not get that.

Senator PERCY. Related to the last question on policy, hurting Zaire and Zambia by perpetuating the conflict involving the railroad, would it not perpetuate MPLA dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba for their defense?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I think that is a very real possibility and, perhaps, is indicative of the fact that the MPLA, if it were to establish a government alone, would be constantly confronted with the potentiality for insurgency from the other movements or any other movements which might subsequently be born.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN WAKE OF ANGOLA

Senator PERCY. The last question of Senator Clark relates to southern Africa. The independence of Mozambique and Angola brings to an end only two of the liberation struggles in southern Africa. The problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and in South Africa remain to be solved.

During the liberation struggle in Angola and Mozambique, the United States pursued a policy of noncommunication with the liberation movements, while providing economic and military assistance to Portugal.

The Soviet Union, Cuba, and China have often provided assistance to liberation movements, and will no doubt continue to do so.

What will United States policy be toward the liberation movements in southern Africa in the wake of Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I will say that it is not quite true that we have not had contact with liberation movements in the past. We have had contacts with them. We have had contacts with them concerning Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia, and also Namibia, so that those contacts have existed in the past, and I expect them to go on in the future.

Obviously, our hope is that the peaceful solution to the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia can be pursued vigorously, and we would be

willing to play our part if that would be feasible in helping those negotiations to proceed.

There are currently negotiations going on in Rhodesia. They are to be voted along with all the other members of the Security Council in favor of the resolution on Namibia last week, which we hope will also get us a little farther down the road toward self-determination there.

I do not anticipate that we will not have contact with liberation movements as we have in the past.

AVOIDING ANOTHER ANGOLA IN RHODESIA, NAMIBIA

Senator PERCY. The final part of that question from Senator Clark is how can we avoid another Angola in Rhodesia and Namibia?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Obviously, what we have always hoped for in the southern African issues, which has been a firm part of our policy, is a peaceful solution to southern African problems.

How we can prevent the idea of the United States backing one faction and the Soviets backing another faction may not even present itself. It has presented itself only in Angola. It did not present itself in Mozambique, where the Soviet, where cases where the Soviet Union gives aid to a unified liberation movement, and that liberation movement then comes to power by its own means, with some outside assistance. That has not caused us any difficulty.

The problem has been only in Angola where there are opposing liberation movements, and at the time, after independence was decided upon when, in effect, the Soviet Union provided assistance to one, to the detriment of others, is the only place it has arisen, and I would hope, although I cannot write the future or even foresee exactly how things will develop in the areas still under colonial rule, how they will develop, I think that, in the first place, if there is a unified liberation movement, that this problem will not arise. If they split up into different factions, then they could arise, but certainly our policy would be directed toward, to the extent that we can influence the situation, would be directed toward avoiding that, as we had hoped in this case, after the movements did sign an agreement with the Portuguese Government.

Senator PERCY. In 1 minute remaining I would like to ask, on my own behalf, two questions.

CUBAN POLICY RESPECTING EXPORT OF REVOLUTION, AFRICAN NATIONALISM STRENGTH

What do you conclude, Mr. Secretary, is the Cuban policy now with respect to the export of revolution to other parts of the world? Is this a unique experience in Angola, or do you feel that they are going to engage in this activity in other parts of the world as a policy guided and directed, possibly, by the Soviet Union and financed, possibly, by them? Second, is it your feeling that the spirit of nationalism is strong enough in Angola and in other parts of Africa that, having thrown off the yoke of colonialism, they are not about to have it imposed by anyone else, Soviet Union, or anyone else?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. In response to your first questions, I am not an expert on Cuba, but the presence of Cuba in several countries in the world outside the Western Hemisphere leads me to believe that the Cubans will continue to pursue a policy by which they will involve themselves in this kind of situation.

What the limitations and restraints are will largely depend on the degree of support which the Soviet Union provides because the Cubans are not able to mount these operations in any size unless they have financial support, so I think that we can expect to see a continuation of this kind of policy, if not in such large numbers, at least very often in significant numbers.

I certainly agree with you about the spirit of nationalism which animates African leaders. In the case of Egypt, it is often cited—and I would refer you to the article by Colin Latrum, who points out that the Soviet relations with Egypt lasted long enough that it significantly affected the course of events in the Middle East and was, in part, perhaps responsible for the war in 1973 and, so, it is one thing to say that an African government may throw off Soviet influence because of its own nationalism and nationalistic aspirations within 6 months or a year, and it is another one to say that it will last 10 years, and I think this is an important characteristic. And, as I pointed out in my statement, the fact that the Soviets could so easily mount an operation from Congo-Brazzaville, where they have had a relationship for 10 years, leads me to believe that nationalism does not always come to the fore so quickly as one would hope.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary and Mr. Deputy Assistant Secretary—

KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIAN ASSISTANCE TO UNITA

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Could I add one thing, Senator? I was here when Senator Tunney was testifying, and I would only like to address myself to one point that he made—and I do not remember his exact words—but I think that he said that there had been \$50 million in assistance from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to UNITA.

Now, I do not know where he gets that information. He did write a letter, to which I replied that to our knowledge there was no such assistance to any faction in Angola, that the Saudi Arabian Government—I had never heard about the Kuwaitian thing before—but the Saudi Arabian Government has specifically denied it, and I would like to reiterate here on the record that the U.S. Government has no knowledge of any such participation by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Senator PERCY. I think we might also give an opportunity to both those countries to reply to that and put it on the record. Would you like us to advise your office that we have detained you a little bit?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. No, they already have.

Senator PERCY. I want to thank both of you very much indeed for being here. We value your testimony today.

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator PERCY. The Chair calls Rev. Ralph Dodge of Washington, D.C.

Reverend Dodge, I wanted you to summarize your testimony, but it is quite brief, so proceed as you see fit.

STATEMENT OF BISHOP RALPH E. DODGE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Bishop DODGE. Thank you, Senator Percy.

I am not going to read my testimony. It is available for the record. I would like to, however, say a few words that I think are very important.

Before I do that, I want to express my very sincere appreciation to this subcommittee for allowing me to come and express some of my concern and thoughts, a privilege that I have often sought and have not had previously.

Senator PERCY. Bishop Dodge, for the record, could you identify your present and past affiliations, and the reason for your interest in this problem?

Bishop DODGE. I am Bishop Ralph Dodge. I have been a missionary in Angola. I went out first in 1936, and I have been related to the people and the church program in Angola for nearly 40 years now, and I think it is on that basis and long association with the people of Angola that I have been given this privilege of coming here and testifying before this committee.

Senator PERCY. And you are a Bishop of what church?

Bishop DODGE. United Methodist Church, now retired, but now engaged in the work of peace and self-development, a special assignment in the United Methodist Church.

Senator PERCY. And your last official relationship with the church as it related to Angola was what?

Bishop DODGE. I was a missionary in Angola from 1936 to 1950; then for 6 years I was on the Africa desk of the board of missions related to all the Methodist work in Africa, and then in 1956 I was elected a Bishop and had the assignment of Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia, and then after I retired from that, I was in Zambia as Chaplain at the Mindalo Ecumenical Foundation, so I have had considerable experience in this area with which we are dealing.

Going back again, I wanted to express my appreciation to the Senate and also to the House for having cut off funds because I think it is a very admirable job in trying to deescalate the conflict in Angola, and I do want to express my appreciation for that.

AGOSTINHO NETO BACKGROUND

It seems to me that we are facing a situation now in which there is a government in Angola, the People's Republic of Angola, and the President of that government is Agostinho Neto. I want to say just a word about Agostinho Neto because I think it might help in our future dealings with Angola and especially with the People's Republic of Angola.

I first met Agostinho Neto nearly 40 years ago now. He was a boy in grade school at the time. His father was a copastor with me in the Methodist Church in Luanda. A very serious lad, very studious and very intelligent, he was one of the few boys that passed his grade each year. He was about 14 years of age when we first met him, so he would

be approximately 54 years of age now. We were delighted when he completed his grade school and was one of the very few blacks of his generation to get into the Salvador Correio Liceu, the high school in Luanda, and increasingly he was very conspicuous because of the fact that there were so few blacks, in the Liceu, and we were highly honored when he completed the Liceu, one of the very, very few black men to complete the Liceu at that time.

He worked for a while, and then we got some scholarship money, and he studied medicine in Portugal, went first to the University of Coimbra, and then finished up in Lisbon, and came back to Angola.

What I want to say here is that his education was entirely in the West. He was practicing medicine in Angola at the time of the rush on the jail in Luanda, February 4, 1961, and later when there was the outbreak in the northern part of Angola. Because of his nationalistic tendency, he was imprisoned by the Portuguese, sent to Portugal, was imprisoned for some time, and then escaped, came back to Africa, and was made, at that time, president of the MPLA. Mario d'Andeade had relinquished that responsibility, and Neto had taken over.

MPLA PLEA FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

One of the first things that he did—and I want to emphasize this—after he assumed responsibility for the MPLA was to come to the United States. He was here in Washington in January of 1962. It so happened that I was in New York, and I accompanied him to Washington on the bus. It was a cold day, not only was it cold, as far as the winds blowing in Washington were concerned, but also he received a rather cold reception as far as his plea for assistance in the liberation of the people of Angola were concerned, and, so far as I know, he has not been back to the United States since then.

He went to the eastern countries later on and has had the support from the eastern countries.

I think that we need to know that he first came to the United States. Senator CLARK. Do you have any idea who he met with here?

Bishop DODGE. I do not, no. I accompanied him to Washington, and I left the next day to go back to Africa. I do not know with whom he met, no, I do not. I would say he was in the States for about 10 days altogether. He went to some of the other cities, Indianapolis and Detroit, supposedly at least, after he left Washington.

STRENGTH OF NETO'S FEELING OF NATIONALISM

Senator PERCY. Knowing him as well as you do, do you believe that the feeling of nationalism is going to be such that he would want to throw off the yoke of another colonialism from another country such as the Soviet Union and do everything he can to maintain his independence? How would you think he would handle that still taking into account that he is being backed by the support of the Soviet Union and opposed by us?

Bishop DODGE. We were in Angola very close to the people during the days of rising nationalism. Over and over again people said to us, "we are tired of being subjected to the Portuguese system. We have been colonized now for over 400 years. We will take our chances of

breaking any other group that may help us get our freedom. We will not be enslaved again," and I think that that is the spirit of, not only Neto, but I think that is the spirit of all the African nationalists. They want to be free, and they are not going to easily succumb to any other kind of control after they get their freedom, and I think that that is very definitely the case of Neto.

I think he is a nationalist. I think that Senator Tunney this morning has testified to the fact that he is not, and his government is not, anti-Western. They want to be free, and it is my impression that they will cooperate with all of those who are willing to cooperate with them once their government is recognized.

The morning news brought the information, I understand—I did not hear it—that two more countries have recognized the MPLA. I think that, without question, we are faced with the probability that we are going to have to deal with them as the Government of Angola in the future.

MPLA NATIONALISM VERSUS SENSE OF GRATITUDE, OBLIGATION

Senator PERCY. Could you position the MPLA, taking into account two different countries and situations—Egypt, which did finally throw the Soviets out, and Cuba, which is still collaborating with them on a massive scale? Where would you place Angola under the MPLA in relation to those two situations? Nationalism versus the sense of gratitude and obligation, possibly, to a country that has helped them?

Bishop DODGE. I think that, without question, it would be less than expected if they did not favor Russia in view of the fact that for the last 14 years Russia has helped them a great deal in achieving their independence, but also it is my impression that they are broadminded enough, interested in the development of their own people, that they are not going to give any special consideration to any one country.

In other words, I think that they are going to follow the policy that much of Africa has followed in not being alined either to one group or the other group, but will be independent and will exercise their freedom and independence.

REPERCUSSIONS OF U.S. AID CUTOFF

Senator PERCY. Would you care to comment on what you think the repercussions might be if we do follow your advice—cut off all funds, assistance and intervention, directly and indirectly? Will we be hurt in Angola in the future, and will we be hurt with other African countries who seek our assistance and help, particularly neighboring countries, such as Zaire?

Bishop DODGE. It is my impression—of course, it is only a matter of conjecture—that the MPLA will form as broadly a based government as possible. I think that the leaders are intelligent enough to know that they have to have a fairly broadly based government.

This does not, necessarily, mean that they are going to bring the present leaders, Savimbi and Holden Roberto, into the government, but I think that they will try to have a broadly based government in Angola.

My own feeling is that the prolongation of the conflict by giving support to the resistance movement, the pocket of UNITA in the

south-central and the corner of FNLA in the north, will only prolong the crisis. It will be more harmful as far as Zambia is concerned, as Zaire is concerned. I think that the best thing for the spirit in Africa, the adjacent countries, would be a return to normalcy as soon as possible.

Senator PERCY. You have made a very strong statement in your prepared statement, which, incidentally, without objection we will incorporate in the record in full at this point.

[Bishop Dodge's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BISHOP RALPH E. DODGE

First of all I want to express my sincere appreciation for the privilege of appearing before this very important Senate Committee.

Secondly, I also want to express my gratitude to Members of this Committee and to all Senators for your attempt to de-escalate the fighting in Angola by cutting off additional funds.

Thirdly, I need not tell you how difficult it is to be objective about the current struggle in Angola especially for one who has been deeply involved in the training of people in that country for nearly forty years. Two of my four children were born in Angola, all four spoke Portuguese before they did English, two of them attended school with some of the current leaders in Angola. Thus if I seem less than completely objective you will understand the reason.

Perhaps the one thing that I can add to the material already collected by this Committee during the past few weeks would be a word about the training and character of one of the leaders in the current struggle for the control of Angola, Dr. Agostinho Neto.

I first met Agostinho Neto in 1936 when he was a school boy still in the grades. His father was my associate as pastor of the Methodist Church in Luanda. The Neto family lived less than a hundred yards from our home. I saw Agostinho Neto almost daily and was proud when he finished the Liceu (High School) one of the very few blacks of his generation in Angola to do so. Later I had a part in recommending him for a church scholarship to study medicine in Portugal. Dr. Agostinho Neto received all of his training in the West.

At the time of the March 1961 outbreak in Angola, Dr. Neto was practicing medicine in Luanda. He was arrested by the Portuguese, imprisoned in Portugal, and escaped. Returning to Africa he was elected to head the MPLA. One of his first attempts to secure backing for his liberation movement was to come to the United States. He spent some time in Washington in January of 1962 and in other cities of this country. So far as I know he has not been to the United States since. It became quite evident that the United States was more interested in maintaining the status quo in Portuguese Africa than in aiding in the self-determination of the people of the various Portuguese colonies. To get the support he needed, Dr. Neto turned to the eastern socialistic countries. The point which I wish to emphasize is that Neto and many of his colleagues were educated in the west and first turned to the west for help.

A third factor which I think is significant is that, so far as I have been able to discover, Dr. Neto has not attacked the United States in any form although we have openly attacked him and his party. From my view point he and his party have shown great restraint in their dealings with us in the face of prolonged provocation.

It has become increasingly evident that the MPLA has the backing of a large segment of the people of Angola. Had the MPLA not had considerable internal grass root support the FNLA with the backing of Zaire across the border and supplied with United States equipment, money, and men and UNITA backed by a powerful South African commitment, those other groups would easily have crushed the movement aided only by socialistic nations thousands of miles away. Contrary to many reports MPLA does have considerable support from the masses.

Although I have the highest regard for Dr. Jonas Svimbi of UNITA and although I personally know Holden Roberto and many of his subordinates in the FNLA, it is my impression that for the good of the people of Angola and for the good of our own future relationships with Africa as a whole we should cease our overt or covert military involvement in the Angolan struggle and let the

majority of the people in that unfortunate country decide their own political future.

The U.S. missed the opportunity to help the people of Angola when help was sought and sorely needed. To pretend to be the Champion of democracy now when for years we supported a dictatorial colonial government is viewed by all who know recent African history as a farce. It would seem to me that the best thing we can do now is to admit we made a mistake—in fact two successive mistakes—and try to be helpful and constructive in the development of an independent Angola.

Making decisions is not easy. I wish for this Subcommittee on African Affairs and for the Senate as a whole the wisdom of a Solomon, the compassion of a Sister Teresa, and the vision of a John Wesley who considered the *whole world* as his parish.

U.S. SUPPORT OF PORTUGUESE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

Senator PERCY. You say that for us to pretend to be the champion of democracy when for years we have supported a dictatorial colonial government is viewed by all who know recent history as a farce. You add that it would be best now to admit that we made a mistake and try to be helpful and constructive in the development of an independent Angola.

Could you expand on that first phrase, that we supported a dictatorial colonial government? What timeframe are you referring to? What kind of support? Were we actually involved in Angola, itself, or was it just the relationship we had with Portugal? And did we actively intervene, or did we just shut our eyes and not champion the cause of independence down there, as you might have wished?

Bishop DODGE. I think it is generally thought that we gave moral support to the Portuguese. We wanted to have a stable situation in Africa, and we felt at the time that probably the liberation groups could not accomplish independence and, therefore, we gave our moral support to Portugal.

We were interested, of course, in the Azores as a naval base. This gave Portugal considerable economic help, you see, in maintaining their war in Angola. I think it was more of this than anything else. As far as I know, there was not any actual participation in trying to suppress the liberation groups, but it was, I think, generally accepted that, at least morally, and economically, there were some gifts during that time to strengthen the economy of Portugal.

Senator PERCY. Can you document these points? Do you know or believe that military and economic assistance that we gave Portugal was directly involved in Angola in helping Portugal to maintain the colonial status of Angola longer than would have been the case otherwise?

Bishop DODGE. I have seen military hardware, as many people had, that had the imprint, "Made in the U.S.A." It was generally assumed that this was what was termed "obsolete material" and was sold, acquired by Portugal.

Senator PERCY. Do you know whether it was sold to Portugal?

Bishop DODGE. I do not know.

There was thought in Africa—let me say what the Africans spoke and they spoke very forcefully about this—that it came through NATO supplies.

Again, there were others that said it was on the open market, and Portugal bought it.

As far as the war in Angola is concerned, it was not obsolete material. It was obsolete as far as the sophisticated war was concerned, but it was only recently that the war in Angola has become sophisticated, and, therefore, it was used.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Senator CLARK. I just have one further comment or question, Senator Percy. I am sure the record will show—and, unfortunately, I cannot provide the dollar amounts—that we were giving military assistance to Portugal at that time, as a member of NATO, as were most of the others.

Obviously, according to the law, that could not have been used legally in Angola by the Portuguese Government. It is an open question, apparently, as to whether it was.

Bishop DODGE. But it could have released other funds so, in effect, it was assistance.

TYPE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN ANGOLA

Senator PERCY. But could you name the type of equipment that you saw in Angola?

Bishop DODGE. It was a small gun material that some of the indigenous groups had. I am not familiar with arms, and so I do not know the type.

Senator PERCY. I gather that these seemed to be guns made in the United States and that you heard or presume had been purchased, say, through surplus sales. Some of them are sold at pretty low figures.

Senator CLARK. And, of course, we were training Portuguese Army officers throughout that period, again, as part of the NATO operations, some of whom ended up in Portugal.

BISHOP DODGE ACQUAINTANCE WITH NETO, ROBERTO

Bishop, you hold an unusual and unique position as a witness in the committee because you have, at least, known Mr. Neto directly, and, although I missed the first part of your statement, I gather that you have met one of the other liberation leaders, Mr. Roberto?

Bishop DODGE. Yes, I met Holden Roberto about 15 years ago here in the United States, and I have met him several times after that.

Senator CLARK. But you never met Mr. Savimbi?

Bishop DODGE. No, I have never met Jonas Savimbi, no. I have tried to see him at times when he was in Switzerland studying, but our paths just did not cross.

IMPRESSION CONCERNING NETO, ROBERTO SUPPORT, ABILITY TO RULE

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you a very subjective question. As you have known Mr. Neto and talked with Mr. Roberto a few times and with your knowledge of Angola, do you have the impression that one or the other of these two gentlemen would be most capable of ruling that country in terms of their public support, their popular support, and their own abilities? What judgments would you have?

Bishop DODGE. My judgment, again, it might be questioned because I have not met Jonas Savimbi.

Senator CLARK. I am just speaking about Roberto, the man we supported in the early stages.

Bishop DODGE. Let me just say this. My impression is that probably as far as charismatic personality is concerned, that Jonas Savimbi would have the edge on the other two. I do not think Neto is the least charismatic, nor do I think Holden Roberto is charismatic, although he has been referred to as the charismatic personality.

It is my impression that, as far as leadership is concerned, as far as organization is concerned, that the MPLA has by far the superior organization. I think it should be pointed out, too, and the statement has been made here a couple of times, that the MPLA is a minority government in Angola.

I am not so certain of that. I realize that they did not occupy nearly all of the country of Angola, but also I think it should be pointed out that many of the people who identified with FNLA were refugees in the Congo. I know many of these people personally. They had to identify with FNLA to remain in the Congo, otherwise they could not have remained there; therefore, they gave tacit support to the FNLA, and it is my impression that part of the disintegration of the FNLA forces in the north was the fact that these people were not emotionally ideologically supporters of Holden Roberto and the FNLA, and, therefore, my feeling is that a large group of them, at least, will welcome the takeover by MPLA in that northern part of Angola.

Senator CLARK. You have spoken about the popular support, and now this is a much more subjective question. What about the ability of these two men in terms of just their capability as leaders?

Bishop DODGE. You are referring to Holden Roberto and Agostinho Neto. In my opinion, there is no question whatsoever but that Agostinho Neto, as a person, is far more capable of holding a position of head of state than would be Holden Roberto. It is my impression that one of the problems Holden Roberto has had almost from the very beginning is the fact that he has been afraid of the highly educated people; the fact that Jonas Savimbi, at one time, was a part of his staff and left; the fact that Daniel Chipenda has vacillated.

It has been difficult for people of training, if you will, to identify with the FNLA. This does not mean that he does not have capable people in his party and on his staff, because he does have some, but as far as personalities are concerned, my impression would be that Agostinho Neto would be far more capable of leading a nation than would Holden Roberto.

PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM OF NETO

Senator CLARK. In your knowledge of Mr. Neto, do you view him as a Communist?

Bishop DODGE. I do not view him as a Communist. I have never discussed the question of philosophical idealism with him. I think that without question he is a Socialist, and I think that under the MPLA, there would be a socialistic form of government in Angola. I think this is logical. It has happened in other Angola countries.

Senator CLARK. African countries.

Bishop DODGE. In other African countries. Thank you, Senator. I do not think, personally, that he is a Marxist as far as an atheist Marxist, as far as his personal philosophy is concerned.

Senator CLARK. Let me say that I asked him that question in August. I did not ask him if he was a Communist. I asked him if he was a Marxist, and he said he was not.

Bishop DODGE. I say it is my impression that he is not, Senator.

BISHOP DODGE DISAGREEMENT WITH OTHER TESTIMONY

Senator CLARK. I wonder, you mentioned that it had been said here today that the MPLA was a minority government and that you had some question about that. You have indicated already that you do not have much question that the Portuguese Government, which we supported morally or otherwise, was a minority government. Have you heard anything else in the testimony given today as you sat here and listened with which you find strong disagreement that you would like to talk about?

Bishop DODGE. I agree largely with the testimonies that were given 2 days ago by George Houser and John Marcum and Larry Henderson, with that one exception, that Larry Henderson assumed that UNITA was the majority party and I would question that.

I think UNITA does have a strong following in the central southern part of Angola, a very virile, a very industrial people, and I think that there will be difficulty—if these people are not brought into a government, but I am hoping that MPLA would realize that, and it is my impression that they do have people from that section already identified with MPLA.

U.S. POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Senator CLARK. Lastly, I had recommended in my statement today that the best and proper action for the United States at this time in my subjective judgment is to make contact with the MPLA and to try to find some peaceful solution to this in which we could, hopefully, get some kind of unified government including Lumumba and the Congo and others, and that we should start with that assumption, rather than continuing to funnel money into the guerrilla groups which might require continued Soviet presence.

Do you tend to favor—I suppose one might call that—that kind of accommodation to the reality of the situation there, or do we have other alternatives open to us that would be better?

Bishop DODGE. No; it seems to me that under the circumstances, that would be the only realistic approach. Again, I have mentioned earlier that I am convinced that the MPLA leadership is sufficiently intelligent, that they are going to bring people from the Quimbundu and also from the Kishongo tribes into the government, as well as from the smaller tribes in Angola, and, although I do not know, I assume that they have tried to build a broadly based party, and that they do have people from these tribes already within the ranks of the MPLA.

FUTURE HEARINGS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. Your testimony has been very interesting and very helpful. This concludes the hearings on Angola, but it is only the beginning of the hearings on Africa. We are particularly looking forward to several more days of hearings throughout the year on other problems in southern Africa.

It is our firm conviction that one of the reasons that we have had so much difficulty in Angola is because we have not pursued an African policy in an African context, and we hope that, at least in a small way, this subcommittee can center some additional concern and interest on the problems of Africa, as a whole.

We thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

RESPONSES OF CONGRESSMAN YOUNG TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY

Question 1. What do you perceive to be our interests in Africa, both from the standpoint of our role in the world and our humanitarian interests in these people, and also in our own self-interest?

Answer. Well, the United States economic interests usually have tended to determine its political interests. But all of our policies up to the present have worked against any kind of involvement on a democratic basis with black Africa. This has not been a policy that the State Department has sought to push.

I think that we have to work hard at building a new and constructive policy towards Africa and in the case of southern Africa we have to wage aggressive, negotiated diplomacy to allow for peaceful passage to majority rule there. Maybe the Angolan crisis will force us into this posture.

We have got to stop using military responses (or the arming of our friends and clients in Africa) in a situation which really calls for political solutions. It is up to the U.S. to encourage and help shape an important economic linkage with African countries rather than get bogged down in long term conflicts. The Congress should be legislating measures which set up firm economic and commercial relations between Africa and the U.S. Africa has immense mineral and other wealth upon which we will increasingly depend.

The US, in its own self-interest, must realize where its economic future lies and note that Africa's growth, to some extent, is highly dependent on its access to our markets as well as the purchase of US technology.

We should look to the interest of peaceful resolution in the changeover of power in southern Africa. This could be done in several ways. We should press for negotiated settlements of the independent of Namibia, of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and ultimately the emergency of an independent majority-rule state in South Africa. Unless the US is willing to come down unequivocally on the side of black majority rule in southern Africa we will end up on the same wrong side as in the case of Angola.

All of our interests are so directly geared towards a peaceful solution that I would say even Africa's interests are geared the same way. Africa wants to deal primarily with the basic human needs of her many peoples for food, shelter, educational and health care. These are humanitarian goals which we currently assist through very limited economic assistance, a figure so low that it is shameful to mention it. But if we agree to upgrade our economic and trade relations with African nations then they can better move to deal with their development needs. Countries which deal from internal strength and progress make independent friends and allies.

Question 2. What do you perceive as the role and interests of Europe and our NATO allies today in Africa and particularly in Angola?

Answer. Except for England perhaps, the role of Europe is limited in Africa except for trading ties between former colonies and their past rulers. NATO may be a different matter because of the dominance of the U.S. in that organization. The NATO powers may have been called on to become involved in Angola as several newspapers have reported. I do know that because of the LOME agreement last year signed between many African states and the European Economic Community that probably Europe sees Africa as an important source of raw products and as an important market.

In the past 15 years it has not been Europe's perception regarding Africa that's been important but Africa's growing re-alignment of relations with Europe since independence. Britain and other countries in Europe have tremendous financial investment at stake throughout Africa and they want to protect it.

On the one hand they must worry about their traditional ties with the white minority regimes in southern Africa and what that stands for in the eyes of black Africa.

Europe during this time pretty much followed our lead and our policy usually defended what we thought to be our economic interests in South Africa and Rhodesia. Because Portugal also controlled the Azores, we sought to give a great deal of leeway to Portugal to do whatever she wanted to do because we thought that Portugal was part of the mechanism that made NATO a united front in Europe. Therefore our view of our strategic and economic interests allowed us for years to give arms to Portugal which we knew were being used to kill and torture her colonial people, all in the name of the NATO alliance.

I don't know whether or not NATO has any real interests in Angola or the rest of Africa except at the direction of U.S. interests and maybe that needs to be examined by the Congress. There has been some talk about NATO's alleged connection with South African defense forces on the question of protection of the Cape sea lanes and the Indian Ocean, but I really don't know that this is the case.

Question 3. What are the real interests as you perceive them of the Soviet Union?

Answer. I think that Russian interests in southern Africa are tremendous. I don't minimize the Soviet involvement as a concern at all. What is at stake is a potential belt in the most mineral rich part of Africa where Soviet influence might prevail.

I give credence to the possibilities of a Soviet enclave in the middle part of Africa for two reasons. The Soviet Union hopes to spread revolutionary ferment throughout the region. More moderate leaders such as President Kaunda of Zambia would become the target of leftist coups. Leadership that could live with the Russian influence like Neto of Angola would emerge, even though it would take the form of African socialism and strictly local power.

Of course once Africans have used Soviet assistance, usually arms, to accomplish their purpose, in the past they have always been asked to leave and I do not think that this pattern will change. Mozambique is probably as left a revolutionary operation in its fighting as we have seen and was highly dependent on the Soviet Union, but when the Russians asked to build a naval base there, Mozambique said no.

Another thing that may serve Soviet interests in southern Africa is that it could become a way of their not being dependent on the U.S. for grain. Russia is going to be dependent on the United States and detente is dependent on the Soviet reliance on us for food. They have kept reasonably peaceful because of that reliance. But if Russia could develop the agricultural potential of that region whereby they could grow three or four crops a year in that middle Angola-Zambian-Namibian-Rhodesian belt, then Russia could set up its own agricultural satellite. It could reduce its reliance on U.S. grains and cereals immensely and also acquire new political alliances.

Question 4. How strong is the spirit of nationalism in Angola? Is it likely to prevail?

Answer. I believe that there is a strong spirit of nationalism at work in Angola today. Although the three liberation movements have some tribal basis which prevented a realistic unitary nationalist movement such as Mozambique's FRELIMO from emerging, there can be little doubt of their total commitment to eliminate Portugal's rule from Angolan soil.

Even if MPLA emerges as the legitimate governing party of Angola, and this appears highly likely, I can see nothing which will change the fact that Angolans of whatever political persuasion are deeply committed to their country. We have to have confidence in Angola's perception of itself, along with the other member states of the Organization of African Unity, that African nationalism will prevail. In my experience, Africa's economic interests are so pervasive and overwhelming that ideology tends to decline once the military situation stabilizes. Angola should follow the same path.

